Is cognitive extension necessarily enhancement?

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The research on extended and integrated cognition is all about how resources outside of our brain can improve cognition tremendously. I argue that cognitive extension is not necessarily cognitive augmentation. Although extended cognition tends to be conceptualized as something that always enhances cognition that is not necessarily the case. Various cognitive processes do not necessarily augment. However, we barely hear anything about extended or integrated cognitive processes that are not augmentations. The problem might lie within the fact that these non-augmenting extended or integrated cognitive processes are not accounted for by the complementarity principle, which specifically is about augmenting or adding functions to the cognitive process. Thus, I propose a reformulation of the complementarity principle, namely the transformation principle. This new principle can account for any extended and integrated cognitive process regardless of its normative status while preventing cognitive bloat. To support my claim, I provide several examples and focus on social self-deception, anger issues and psychiatric disorders to show that these are examples of extended cognition that are not accounted for with the complementarity principle. My core point is this: if you find extended or integrated cognition plausible, then attenuated extended or integrated cognition should be part of it.
Faculteit der Filosofie, Theologie en Religiewetenschappen