Is cognitive extension necessarily enhancement?
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2020-08-27
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en
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Abstract
The research on extended and integrated cognition is all about how resources outside of our
brain can improve cognition tremendously. I argue that cognitive extension is not
necessarily cognitive augmentation. Although extended cognition tends to be
conceptualized as something that always enhances cognition that is not necessarily the case.
Various cognitive processes do not necessarily augment. However, we barely hear anything
about extended or integrated cognitive processes that are not augmentations. The problem
might lie within the fact that these non-augmenting extended or integrated cognitive
processes are not accounted for by the complementarity principle, which specifically is
about augmenting or adding functions to the cognitive process. Thus, I propose a
reformulation of the complementarity principle, namely the transformation principle. This
new principle can account for any extended and integrated cognitive process regardless of
its normative status while preventing cognitive bloat. To support my claim, I provide
several examples and focus on social self-deception, anger issues and psychiatric disorders
to show that these are examples of extended cognition that are not accounted for with the
complementarity principle. My core point is this: if you find extended or integrated
cognition plausible, then attenuated extended or integrated cognition should be part of it.
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Faculteit der Filosofie, Theologie en Religiewetenschappen