Majority Groups and Power-Sharing: A complicated combination
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2019-08-12
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en
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For settling ethnic conflict in deeply divided societies, power-sharing arrangements often seem an appropriate solution. The idea of power-sharing is that former adversaries work together and jointly take decisions. This model can only work if the political elites show a basic willingness to cooperate. For minority elites, it seems rational to agree to a power-sharing agreement. However, for majority elites that enjoy political dominance it seems quite irrational. Why would they agree to shared rule and commit to the power-sharing agreement? Based on a process tracing analysis of Rwanda and Burundi, this thesis investigates the circumstances under which majority groups agree to power-sharing arrangements. The thesis is subdivided into four sections. First, I map out the concept of consociationalism (a particular form of power-sharing) and discuss alternative explanations for the consent of majority groups to consociationalism. Second, I provide the relevant context of the Rwandan and the Burundian case. Third, I present an analytical narrative of the Rwandan and Burundian peace negotiation processes. In concluding, I show that the power-dynamics between the majority group and the minority groups involved in the negotiation processes play a vital role in explaining majority group’s commitment to consociationalism. While majority groups agree to power-sharing arrangements in a period of weakness, the findings suggest that it depends on the amount of influence majority groups have on the final agreement whether they will stick to the agreement or not.
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Faculteit der Managementwetenschappen