Strategic decision making between Mergers and Acquisitions: A Game Theoretic Perspective

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2024-07-08

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en

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This research contributes to literature on mergers and acquisitions and the differences between these two concepts, game theory, M&As and game theory, mergers and game theory and acquisitions and game theory. Moreover, it contributes to boards having to make a strategic decision between merging and acquiring, by describing an experimental task regarding the strategic decision of board members between mergers and acquisitions in a situation exhibiting high levels of both strategic uncertainty between boards and conflict of interest between boards. This experimental task is relevant, as prior literature on the strategic decision-making of boards using game theory has primarily focused on bargaining theory, neglecting other game theories. Adding to this, previous literature used mergers and acquisitions as one interchangeably concept. Performance of the experimental task with 21 students, that responded to both closed and open-ended questions regarding their strategic decision-making between mergers and acquisitions using a particular game theory, showed that almost all participants chose to acquire when there is a high level of strategic uncertainty. With the bargaining game, participants leaned towards merging. Conversely, applying the prisoner’s dilemma led to a preference for acquisition. Notably, applying the chicken game resulted in a preference for acquisition, contrasting with previous research that suggested a preference for merging. The outcomes are relevant for both literature and boards making strategic decisions between merging and acquiring, as they demonstrate how the application of not only bargaining theory, but also the prisoner’s dilemma and chicken game, influences boards' strategic choices between mergers and acquisitions.

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Faculteit der Managementwetenschappen

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