State-militia relationships in Iraq from 2003-2016

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2021-08-15
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en
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State-militia relationships are often explained with the Delegation Argument, in which governments delegate actions to pro-government militias (PGMs) that they must perform. However, state-militia relationships are far more complex, ranging from repression to incorporation. Often state-militia relationships shift over time. I test these shifts using Staniland’s categorization on state-militia relationships in Iraq between 2003 and 2016. In using explaining-outcome process-tracing I looked at how the Popular Mobilization Forces, an umbrella-organisation containing more than fifty PGMs, got incorporated into Iraq’s official security structure, linking the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003 to the incorporation of the PMF in 2016. This in-depth case study is based on news media reports, NGO reports, academic articles and secondary historical writings on Iraq. I found that Staniland’s categorization of state-militia relationships is applicable to the case of Iraq between 2003-2016, better explaining these relationships that using the Delegation Argument. However, the Iraqi state itself is not a unitary actor, but composed of a plethora of political parties and militias vying for state power at the cost of Iraq’s official security institutions. The clientelist Iraqi state, based on patronage networks that opt for the state’s resources, was severely weakened as the Islamic State rose to prominence.
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Faculteit der Managementwetenschappen