Abstract:
Contemporary phenomenological accounts of depression have been increasingly focused on the temporal structure of the condition. In this article, I discuss the accounts proposed by Fuchs, Ratcliffe and Fernandez, and show how each of them faces significant drawbacks. I argue that this is primarily due to the fact that they employ a Husserlian model of temporal experience. Because on this account all temporal dimensions – past, present, and future – are conceived of as present in intentional experience, the meaning of a depressed person being ‘stuck in the present’ cannot become clear. Instead, I propose a conception of the temporal structure of depression based on Heidegger’s twofold account of temporality. On this account, depression essentially involves a disruption of the enactment of primordial time. I show how this account avoids the drawbacks of the others, while it is still able to accommodate persuasive features of their descriptions of the depressive experience.
