Power to the ... unelected bureaucrats
| dc.contributor.advisor | Ham van, Carolien | |
| dc.contributor.author | Woudstra, Nick | |
| dc.date.issued | 2021-06-24 | |
| dc.description.abstract | In this thesis, the constraints and opportunities for clientelism on the local level are researched using a regression analysis (OLS) based on local and national data from 88 democratic countries using data from The Duke University Democratic Accountability and Linkages Project (DALP), the World Bank and The Global State of Democracy indices. This master’s thesis takes a deeper look into clientelism on the local level, as opposed to most research on clientelism focused on the national level. Clientelism is a form of distribution of resources and with local politics becoming more important in this governmental task, it is worthwhile to focus more on local politics. A broad collection of research on clientelism on local and national level are used to support the claims made in this thesis. The thesis finds that a strong independent bureaucracy and an effective parliament act as constraints for clientelist distribution of resources and can therefore help in preventing clientelism. Social presence in local communities create an opportunity for clientelist distribution of resources. | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri | https://theses.ubn.ru.nl/handle/123456789/12920 | |
| dc.language.iso | en | en_US |
| dc.thesis.faculty | Faculteit der Managementwetenschappen | en_US |
| dc.thesis.specialisation | Comparative Politics | en_US |
| dc.thesis.studyprogramme | Master Political Science | en_US |
| dc.thesis.type | Master | en_US |
| dc.title | Power to the ... unelected bureaucrats | en_US |
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