Self or No-Self? Towards a better concept of self for enactivism
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2024-01-27
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en
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Enactivism was originally conceived by Varela et all. as a research paradigm for theorizing about the mind, explicitly combining modern (western) cognitive science, phenomenology and Buddhism. They combined these fields in order to integrate these different perspectives on the mind: third-person (stemming from science) and first-person (phenomenology and Buddhism); theoretical insights (phenomenology and science) and practical insights (Buddhism). The one factor binding the theoretical and practical perspectives together, is that they all pointed toward a view wherein the self as ordinarily understood is an illusion: a no-self doctrine. Phenomenologists like Dan Zahavi, however, do hold on to the reality of self, albeit in a minimalist form.
In this thesis I want to argue that a phenomenological, minimal notion of self is a better fit for enactivism then a strict no-self doctrine. The minimal self maintains all of the theoretical benefits of a Buddhist no-self doctrine for enactivism, like being able to deny the existence of a full-blown Cartesian ego-self. Furthermore: a phenomenological notion of self is better able to stave off Cartesian mind-body dualism, if supplemented with a Merleau-Pontian analysis of embodiment, so that the lived body becomes part of the minimal self.
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Faculteit der Filosofie, Theologie en Religiewetenschappen