Drifting tracks. A case study on the principal-agent relationship in the Dutch railway sector
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2025-12-02
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en
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Abstract
Principal-agent theory is widely used in public administration research to investigate delegated
relationships. However, the theory has been criticised for its dominant principal-centred focus and the
reliance on the rationalist paradigm that overlooks the agent’s perspective. This research addresses this
issue by adopting an agent-centred approach to examine the factors that lead to agency drift in the
relationship between the Dutch Ministry of Infrastructure and Water Management (principal) and
ProRail (agent), the state-owned railway infrastructure manager. Through an abductive, qualitative
single case study, combining document analysis and semi-structured interviews has been researched
how agency drift, defined as the agent’s deviation from the principal’s goals, emerges and manifests.
The findings reveal that agency drift occurs in a latent and subtle manner, through shifting, shirking and
potential neglect. The three factors that influence agency drift are goal misalignment, institutional
expertise and lobbying. Goal misalignment reflects divergent operational and strategic priorities,
institutional expertise enables ProRail to reframe the ministry’s objectives and lobbying is found to be
a complementary mechanism through which ProRail attempts to influence policy direction. Although
information asymmetry is structurally present, it does not significantly contribute to agency drift due to
interdependence and willingness to cooperate. These results show that agency drift does not solely
emerge from opportunism and hereby challenges the rationalist paradigm of the principal-agent theory.
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Faculteit der Managementwetenschappen