A Hylomorphic Account of the Concept of Function in the New Mechanist Philosophy of Science
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2024-08-31
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en
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New Mechanist Philosophy (NMP) sees mechanisms as ubiquitously functional. Nonetheless, there is a profound disagreement on whether functions are mind-independent facts. In this article, I use the Thomistic conception of causality to defend the realism of mechanistic functions. I show that contemporary realist accounts of mechanisn lack the kind of ontological strength that hylomorphism can provide, while perspectivalism fails to offer a convincing argument to defend functions as mere explanatory techniques. I show how hylomorphic ontology might help NMP realists build better arguments against perspectivalism and how NMP might be strengthened with further debate between both traditions.
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Faculteit der Filosofie, Theologie en Religiewetenschappen