The Anticompetitive Effects of Common Ownership in the U.S. Life Insurance Industry
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2020-08-25
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en
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Theoretical work in the past decades has argued that the increasing concentration of ownership by institutional investors may lead to decreased competition between commonly owned companies, resulting in inefficient market outcomes. Empirical evidence has been mixed, with some researchers finding severe anticompetitive effects, and others finding no evidence of any inefficient outcomes. This thesis aims to add to the existing body of evidence by investigating whether common ownership has anticompetitive effects in the U.S. life insurance industry, using a sample of 537 firms over six years. The model used is inspired by that of Gramlich and Grundl (2018), relying on ownership data and financial data that is publicly available. This thesis does not find any evidence to support the theory of common ownership.
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Faculteit der Managementwetenschappen