Joint Attention and Common Knowledge: Assessing the Relational Approach

dc.contributor.advisorGeurts, B.
dc.contributor.advisorLuthy, C.
dc.contributor.authorBattich, L.
dc.description.abstractTwo parents are looking together at their daughter as she takes her first steps in learning to walk unaided. They are both attending to their daughter and are both aware of each other’s attention. Everything about their mutual attention is out in the open between them. This mutual awareness puts the "jointness" in joint attention, and distinguishes it from scenarios in which different subjects merely happen to attend to the same object. In order to provide a satisfactory account of joint attention, some current prominent theories conceive of this mutual awareness as a primitive phenomenon, irreducible to the individual mental states of each participant. In this article, I examine John Campbell’s position, as exemplary of this view.en_US
dc.embargo.typePermanent embargoen_US
dc.thesis.facultyFaculteit der Filosofie, Theologie en Religiewetenschappenen_US
dc.thesis.specialisationPhilosophy of Language and Logicen_US
dc.thesis.studyprogrammePhilosophy: Research Masteren_US
dc.titleJoint Attention and Common Knowledge: Assessing the Relational Approachen_US
Original bundle
Now showing 1 - 1 of 1
No Thumbnail Available
Battich - scriptie.pdf
623.36 KB
Adobe Portable Document Format