Real interest rates tend to be higher when the central bank chief and the head of government have a different political orientation

dc.contributor.advisor	Bohn, Frank
dc.contributor.author	O'Neil, Aise
dc.date.issued	2023-08-07
dc.description.abstract	Using panel data regression methods, this paper studies the effects of a difference in political affiliation between the chief central banker and head of government on real central bank policy rates and the economy. Such a difference in political affiliation appears to lead to an increase in real central bank policy rates, an increase in employment and tighter fiscal policy. This finding may have implications for future study of the effects of monetary policy tightening on the economy. It also implies that central bank chiefs may not be apolitical and consequently giving central banks more independence may not be sufficient to make monetary policy apolitical.
dc.identifier.uri	https://theses.ubn.ru.nl/handle/123456789/15058
dc.language.iso	en
dc.thesis.faculty	Faculteit der Managementwetenschappen
dc.thesis.specialisation	specialisations::Faculteit der Managementwetenschappen::Master Economics::Financial Economics
dc.thesis.studyprogramme	studyprogrammes::Faculteit der Managementwetenschappen::Master Economics
dc.thesis.type	Master
dc.title	Real interest rates tend to be higher when the central bank chief and the head of government have a different political orientation

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