A Tale Untold – Implicit Narratives in the Narrative Self Constitution View
In narrative theories of personal identity there is a lack of clarity on how explicit an identity constituting narrative must be. In the Narrative Self Constitution View (Schechtman 1996), implicit self-narratives are taken to be unarticulated parts of one’s life which nevertheless determine one’s feelings and behaviors. Strawson (2004) takes an anti-narrativist stance because of the revision thesis, according to which explicit narratives are non-veridical reconstructions. Implicit narratives seem resistant to revision, and would hence undercut Strawson’s argument. I seek to clarify whether the concept of implicit narratives is intelligible and to what extent a narrative should be articulated. I argue that implicit narratives are intelligible indeed and that it is affection rather than articulation that is relevant.
Faculteit der Filosofie, Theologie en Religiewetenschappen