Aid in a state of exception : A sociological analysis to international aid agencies active in Somalia
Keywords
Loading...
Authors
Issue Date
2014-07-09
Language
en
Journal Title
Journal ISSN
Volume Title
Publisher
Abstract
This master thesis commences with the general observation that the safety of humanitarian and
development aid workers is not something given in Somalia. Aid workers have been attacked,
kidnapped and killed, sometimes with the consent of local authorities. This points to a certain
incompatibility of interests between international aid agencies and Somali local authorities, be
they warlords, district commissioners, or insurgents as al-Shabaab militants. It also suggests that
there is no such thing as a separate non-political ‘humanitarian space’ within Somalia, but
instead, that international aid agencies are part of the context in which they work – with all of its
dynamics. With these notions in mind, this thesis questions how international aid agencies
interact with Somalia’s dynamics of conflict. To what extend does the presence and practices of
international aid agencies affect conflict dynamics? Using a sociological framework introduced
by Pierre Bourdieu, the underlying mechanisms of this interaction will be traced back to three
guises of capital: 1) economic capital, 2) social capital, and 3) cultural capital. Through building
on the experiences of aid professionals that have worked in or on Somalia, it concludes that
international aid agencies excel in having economic capital, while relatively lacking social and
cultural capital. International aid agencies have the economic capital to pursue their projects:
they can rent cars, housing and finance other operational necessities. They can hire Somali staff,
consultants, and armed guards. However, aid workers suffer from a lack of social capital. They
face resistance when mingling in Somalia’s social structures. And due to the cultural
transformative character of their interventions, the mission of international aid agencies is
lacking local acceptance. Although bringing relief and emergency assistance to alleviate human
suffering, aid is often perceived as foreign meddling. This endangers the safety of aid workers
and their operations. Simultaneously, international aid agencies are regarded as a resource to
compete for: aid has been confiscated, aid workers kidnapped for ransoms and aid agencies
bribed for access to project sites and blackmailed for nepotistic means. To overcome these
challenges, international aid agencies hire security companies, pay local insurgents and involve
local authorities in economic operational processes such as hiring cars. However, through these
emergency measures – taken in a state of exception – international aid agencies become
involved in conflict itself. Operating without having to deal – quite literally – with actors that
thrive on instability and conflict, without endangering humanitarian principles as staying neutral,
impartial and independent, and without ‘doing harm,’ is impossible in Somalia. International aid
agencies are part of the violent conflicts that afflict the country. By so, international aid agencies
face a Samaritan’s dilemma: their very existence can prompt insurgents and local authorities to
generate the condition that attract aid, while suspending emergency food assistance can place
thousands of famine-affected people in a truly dire situation.
Description
Citation
Supervisor
Faculty
Faculteit der Managementwetenschappen