Enforcement behavior of the Dutch Police: a public goods game with police students
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2016-08-25
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en
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Police officers in the Netherlands have the freedom to sanction offenders at their own discretion. This means they do not have to issue a fine for every offense they encounter. In the absence of mandatory sanctioning by law, it is very important that police officers are intrinsically motivated to enforce the law to ensure a functional legal system. In order examine whether police officers are effective at enforcing the law, we conduct three linear public goods game experiments. We compare police students to regular students to examine how they differ in terms of contribution and sanctioning behavior and how this influences compliance with the law. We observe that police officers are indeed more effective at enforcing the law and have a larger preference to sanction. They are also more willing to bear costs associated with sanctioning than non-police individuals. We also find evidence that the police are initially not perceived by the public as being stricter than non-police individuals students, in terms of law enforcement.
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Faculteit der Managementwetenschappen