

BACK TO THE ROOTS

THE VIRTUES OF THE FARMER IN THE 21ST CENTURY

A VIRTUE ETHICAL APPROACH OF THE ROLE OF THE CONTEMPORARY FARMER



Master Political Science 2014 – 2015 – Political Theory

Master Thesis – Final Version

Katharina Kampmann, s4394224

Supervisors:

Professor M.L.J. Wissenburg

Dr. G.C. van der Kamp-Alons

Words: 30.217

Date submitted: 17th of August 2015

Preface

Hoe ouder, hoe wijzer.

By delivering this master thesis my study era will come to an end. My journey has started all the way back in 2008. First, I have studied International Business in Enschede and then in 2013 I have 'dared a new step' by studying Political Science in Nijmegen. During my studies in Nijmegen, I have started to see 'the world out there' from a different perspective. It seems, as if my eyes are finally opened up.

Along my way, I have had the honour to meet many different inspiring people, who have accompanied and helped me to literally overcome barriers, on personal and professional level. Especially, during the process of writing this master thesis and completing the master programme in political science, I have realized that without the support of my family and dearest friends, I would have not come that far. This is why I would like to say from deep of heart 'vielen, vielen Dank'.

First, I would like to thank my family who has always unconditionally supported me. I feel really thankful, that you have trusted me all they way and always have believed in me. Haha Müddi, now is finally the day, you have yearned for so long 😊.

I would like to sincerely thank my supervisor Marcel Wissenburg. Thank you so much for your guidance through my farmer-jungle. Finally, you can enjoy your well-deserved sabitical. Thank you, Gerry van der Kamp-Alons, for giving me the opportunity to join you for Montreal. I also would like to thank my interviewees – Johannes Venne, Judith van Dijk, Wilhelm Gerwin, Chris Poelen for providing me with first-hand information on farming, as well as – Bart Hagens and Peter Jacobs from the HAS Summer School 'Varkens houden in 2025' and Ton Duffhues from ZLTO for their expert knowledge.

I would like to thank my Master matties, without you this year would have not been so 'Draaideur'-awesome. Thank you – Laura, Malu, Olinde, Ella, Esther, Bas, Resie, Sterre, Sander, Lisa, Dominique and Kelly. My special thanks go to Anja and Elco, who have spent their precious time correcting my thesis. Thank you so much for your help! Finally I would like to express my gratitude to Anne, for always being there for me, providing me with your emotional support along my way.

Katharina Kampmann, Nijmegen, August 2015

Abstract

In the political theoretical debates on animal and environmental ethics, in contrast to wider agricultural policy debates, it seems that the position of the traditional family farm is not considered. The overall tone in these debates is that altering nature for human purposes is not tenable anymore. This paper concentrates on the position of the traditional family farm in political theory. By applying the method of virtue ethics I will investigate whether the traditional family farm is morally legitimate. Derived from these debates, I develop a framework of three (representative) farm role models: the sustainable farmer, the steward farmer, the organic & ecological farmer. Additionally, these theoretical role models are collated with empirical reality through the method of interviewing. The development of this framework is highly relevant to study and to evaluate the role of the contemporary family farmer in order to properly justify the case of European farm support.

Key words

Family Farming, Virtue Ethics, Agricultural Ethics, Environmental Ethics, Animal Ethics

List of Abbreviations

Common Agricultural Policy (CAP)

Confined Animal Feeding Operations (CAFOs)

Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations (FAO)

German Farmer's Association / Deutscher Bauernverband (DBV)

European Union (EU)

Organic Farmer Chris Poelen (OFCP1 & OFCP2)

Organic Farmer Wilhelm Gerwin (OFWG)

Steward Farmer Judith van Dijk (StFJvD)

Sustainable Farmer Johannes Venne (SFJV1 & SFJV2)

Zuidelijke Land- en Tuinbouw Organisatie (ZLTO)

Glossary

Conventional Farming	Farming practice based on effective and efficient management
Factory Farm	Highly specialised farming practice in animal husbandry and/or plant cultivation on a large scale
Family Farm	Diverse farming practice in animal husbandry and/or plant cultivation on a small scale
Public Goods	Conservation of cultural (traditional) natural landscape
Self-sufficiency	Being not dependent on external supplies from 3 rd parties

List of Figures and Tables

Figure 3.1 Structure Virtues

Table 4.1 General Farmer's Virtues

Table 4.2 Theoretical Ranking Farmer's Virtues

Table 4.3 Reality Check Farmer's Virtues

Table 4.4 Overview Farmer Representatives

Table 4.5 Comparison Theoretical and Real Farmer's Virtues

Table of Contents

Preface	i
Abstract	ii
List of Abbreviations	iii
Glossary	iv
List of Figures and Tables	v
Introduction	1
Chapter 2 – Philosophical Debates touching Agriculture	5
2.1 Environmental Ethics	5
2.1.1 Consequentialism in Environmental Ethics.....	6
2.1.2 Deontology in Environmental Ethics	7
2.1.3 Virtue Ethics in Environmental Ethics.....	7
2.2 Animal Ethics	8
2.2.1 Consequentialism in Animal Ethics.....	10
2.2.1 Deontology in Animal Ethics	10
2.2.3 Virtue Ethics in Animal Ethics	12
2.3 Description Sustainable, Steward and Organic & Ecological Farmer	12
2.3.1 Sustainable Farmer	13
2.3.2 Steward Farmer.....	13
2.3.3 Organic & Ecological Farmer	14
2.4 Agricultural Ethics.....	15
2.4.1 Agrarian Romanticism.....	16
2.4.2 Agrarian Conservationism	18
2.4.3 Modern Forms of Agrarianism	19
Chapter 3 – Virtue Ethics.....	22
3.1 Description Debate Virtue Ethics	22

3.1.1 The Capability Approach	24
3.2 Three Concepts central to Virtue Ethics.....	26
3.2.1 Virtue.....	26
3.2.2 Phronesis	27
3.2.3 Eudaimonia.....	27
3.3 What are Virtues?	28
3.3.1 Finding the Balance.....	28
3.4 What are Role Models?.....	28
3.4.1 Role Models in Theory	29
Chapter 4 – The Farmer’s Virtues.....	32
4.1 General Farmer’s Virtues.....	34
4.1.1 Life Ethic.....	35
4.1.2 Work Ethic.....	38
4.1.3 Environmental Ethic	40
4.1.4 Animal Ethic.....	40
4.1.5 Societal Surroundings	42
4.2 Theoretical Ranking Famer’s Virtues.....	44
4.2.1 Life Ethic.....	45
4.2.2 Work Ethic.....	47
4.2.3 Environmental Ethic	49
4.2.4 Animal Ethic.....	50
4.2.5 Societal Surroundings	51
4.3 Reality Check Farmer’s Virtues.....	54
4.3.1 The Sustainable Farmer – Mr. Johannes Venne	58
4.3.2 The Steward Farmer – Ms Judith van Dijk.....	63
4.3.3 The Organic & Ecological Farmer – Mr. Wilhelm Gerwin.....	67
4.4 Comparison Theoretical and Real Farmer’s Virtues	72

Chapter 6 – Overall Conclusion 75

References 79

Endnotes 87

'We also know that family farming is much more than a mode of food production, it is also a way of life.' (Villarrea, Marcela – Director of FAO's Office of Partnerships, Advocacy and Capacity Development)

'[...] Agriculture is where theory becomes practice [...]' (Dobson, 2007, p. 94).

Introduction

The farmer and his practices of animal husbandry and plant cultivation are increasingly questioned and publicly criticized, at least with regard to conventional agriculture, and foremost with regard to the practices of so called factory farms.

Agriculture has changed dramatically, especially since the end of World War II. Agriculture of the 21st century is characterized by enormous technological progress, both with regard to the productivity of soil (biological-technical progress) as well as the productivity of work (mechanical-technical progress). This enormous progress was facilitated by the application of fertilizers and pesticides, the mechanization, the industrialization and the breeding of efficient and powerful animals and cultivated plants. Additionally, many government policies were (foremost) aimed at the intensification and maximization of production. These policies were especially justified in the 1970s, 80s, and 90s the European Union, which wanted to ensure its food-supplies (Candel et al., 2013). These changes allowed fewer farmers with reduced labour demands to still produce the majority of food and fibre, especially in Western society, the European Union context (Belwe, 2006).

Despite the positive effects of these changes, it made fresh meat, milk and eggs available to consumers on a global scale at favourable price, while at the same time reducing many risks related to farming activities, it became obvious that the associated costs with regard to the practices of so-called factory farming are disastrous. Foremost, the environmental resources that agricultural production depends on threaten the ability of future generations to produce food (Kolb, 2008).

Factory farming, also termed industrial farming, intensive chemical-based farming or company agriculture generally refers to confined animal feeding operations (CAFOs) (Dobson, 2007, pp. 94–95). Factory farming as defined by DeGrazia, 'tries to raise as many animals as possible in the smallest possible space in order to maximize profits'. It follows industrial processes for market-oriented mass production. This 'single-minded pursuit of profit is predominant in factory farming. Animals are regarded as nothing more than meat-producing objects' (DeGrazia, 1996, p. 281). The life of factory farm animals can be

described with the words of Thomas Hobbes 'nasty, (brutish) and short' (Hobbes, 2009). They (hens, pigs, cattle, cows etc.) live in small cages, with almost no access to daylight and fresh air. The only occupation they 'are allowed' to carry out is primarily and foremost eating, sitting and lying. Their life is predominantly characterized by boredom (DeGrazia, 1996).

Due to its devastating consequences, such as the suffering of millions of (invisible) animals producing meat, milk and eggsⁱ, topsoil depletion, salinization of land through irrigation, groundwater contamination, upset of ecological balances through insensitive pest control, the continued neglect of the living and working conditions of farm labourers, disintegration of economic and social conditions in rural communitiesⁱⁱ, and the creation of boring monocultural panoramas the institution of factory farming is outdated (Dobson, 2007). Nonetheless, the practices adopted by factory farms will continue because they are economically profitable (Kolk, 2008, p. 847). Even though the technology of the industrial farm causes the farmer to lose touch with nature and prevents him from hearing nature's feedback (Thompson, 2010, p. 57).

Fortunately, factory farming is not the only form of farming applied in Western Europe. The other, more traditional (and more decent) form of farming, is family farming. Family farming is, in many respects, more sustainable and sound, compared to the practices of factory farms (FAO, 2013). It is not only about producing healthy food, it is also about the attitude of people and their relation to land and animals. Family farming, in contrast to factory farming, binds people to the natural processes of the Earth and creates a sense of harmony with its environment (Dobson, 2007, p. 93). The family farm integrates a virtuous lifestyle, and thus provides the most favourable environment and surrounding for the moral development of individuals and their families.

Family, as well as small-scale farming are closely connected to the world food security (FAO, 2013). Family farming preserves traditional food products, while at the same time contributes to a balanced diet, safeguards the world's agro-biodiversity and promotes the sustainable use of natural resources (FAO, 2013). Family farming is an opportunity to boost local economies, especially when combined with specific policies aimed at social protection and well-being of communities not only in the European Union contexts, but also abroad (especially with focus on the developing countries) (FAO, 2013). In more concrete terms, family farming combines a variety of agricultural practices. Indeed, it is a combination of animal husbandry and plant cultivation. Different animals are kept, as well as different plants are cultivated. This leads to a higher degree of self-sufficiency from external supplies. As a consequence, it is one of the most basic entities in society, because it means to cultivate along with family members a piece of land in order to survive and develop (Strange, 1988).

Small-scale production is also one of the features of family farming. Animal husbandry and plant cultivation are only exercised to the extent that farmers and their family members are able to cope with and handle the workload in order to provide a flourishing life to their family and themselves. However the farming practices of family farmers differ, because they are derived from different historical backgrounds and different value and belief systems. Even though there are different types of family farm practices, it is all based on virtues. I state that there are three types of virtue ethical family farmers.

I classify three different types of family farmers, at least in the European context. These are the sustainable, the steward and the organic & ecological farmerⁱⁱⁱ. The sustainable farmer is the one who tries to manage all his farming activities as efficiently and effectively as possible in order to leave 'enough' for his offspring and future generations. His approach is a combination of technological advancement with traditional farming experience and insights. The steward farmer is the one who acts based upon Protestant values and beliefs. He sees himself as God's steward on earth, and tries to manage and preserve the divine creation including land and animals. In contrast to the two types of family farmers earlier mentioned, the organic & ecological farmer acts from the inner belief that nature in itself is valuable and therefore needs to be preserved; neither owing to the benefit of preserving it for future generations (the sustainable farmer), nor to the pleasure of God (the steward farmer).

Although the practices of family farmers seem to be more legitimate than the practices of factory farmers the farming practices of family farmers still remain in the centre of public attention and under constant public criticism (van Dinther, 2014; van der Ham, 2015; Schulte, 2015; Singeling, 2015). The public resentments have their ideational basis in two prominent political theoretical debates, namely the ones in environmental and animal ethics. Both have emerged over the past five decades (starting in the 1960s). The debates on environmental and animal ethics question the role of the agricultural establishment, in general, by debating the role of nature and animals (van Dinther, 2014; van der Ham, 2015; Schulte, 2015; Singeling, 2015).

Because of this, I will focus by answering the main question of this thesis:

How can an ethic of character help us to understand and respond appropriately to the challenges which today's family farmers face and contribute to foster a more harmonious relation between humanity/society and nature?

An answer to this question helps the European Union, national governments and local authorities to better grasp the societal relevance, function and situation of family farmers. The insights gained from my philosophical exercise offer a normative fundament for

favouring public policies addressing the (vital) institution of family farming, and additionally lead to reviewing public policies promoting factory farming.

In following parts, the word 'farmer' will be used interchangeably with 'family farmer', unless specifically stated otherwise. Further I will announce here for all feminists among us, that when I say farmer, I mean female as well as male farmers, equally. However, I will use the male form in the following parts, because it will simplify reading, and I do not want to cause extra strain to my readers while already delving into the world of farming.

The philosophical exercise I am conducting in the scope of this thesis is the following. I will begin this thesis by presenting the current state of affairs in the political theoretical debates on environmental-, animal- and agricultural ethics. In chapter 2, the reader has to familiarize with the philosophical background of the farmer in order to grasp the situation the farmer faces today. From these three debates, I will abstract three main ideal farmer role models. These will be the sustainable farmer, the steward farmer and the organic & ecological farmer. In the 3rd chapter, the topic of virtue ethics will be reviewed and subsequently connected as well as translated to the different farmer role models. The main exercise of my thesis will be conducted in the fourth chapter in three steps. First, I will set up a general virtue ethical framework of the virtues held by all farmer role models. However, these virtues are not held by all farmer role models equally, which is why second, I will conduct a theoretical analysis and will rank them according to the degree to which the different farmer role models accommodate these virtues (based on their philosophical roots in chapter 2). Third, I will research whether the general virtues found in the literature will match with family farmers in reality and whether my theoretical analysis of the virtues of family farmers will coincide with reality. This endeavour is highly relevant to show that the political relevance of family farming becomes especially visible in practice. Last, in chapter 5, I will provide an answer to the research question and all appertaining questions. I will affiliate back to virtues, and why of all things virtue ethics is the only moral guide helping me to answer these questions.

Chapter 2 – Philosophical Debates touching Agriculture

In this section, two philosophical debates are presented briefly. These are the debates on environmental and animal ethics. Both debates are relevant, because they mirror the background and public discourse that the contemporary farmer has to deal with and has to respond to. I chose to order the two debates according to the three different streams of normative ethics in moral philosophy, which are deontology, consequentialism and virtue ethics. This structure is chosen to emphasize the importance of virtue ethics for developing the 'good' farmer role model, in the end. From these two debates I will first extract and develop the characteristics of distinguished farmer role models. Subsequently, the role model of the sustainable, the steward and the organic and ecological farmer are presented. In the last part, the debate on agricultural ethics is introduced and the different farm role models are embedded in this debate in order to position the different farmer's types within the development of the agrarian thought.

2.1 Environmental Ethics

In the following part, I present a short overview of the different contributions to the political theoretical debate on environmental ethics. This is done to present the ethical dilemma the contemporary farmer is presented with from an environmental and animal ethical perspective, and has to respond to, in order to survive and develop.

There are two major perspectives in this debate. On the one hand, there is the perspective of anthropocentrism, under which the human being is the starting point. On the other hand, there is the perspective of ecologism, taking nature itself as point of departure. The difference lies in the distinction between *instrumental value* and *intrinsic value*, in the sense of non-instrumental value (Brennan & Lo, 2011). Instrumental value 'is the value of things as means to further ends, and intrinsic value should be understood as means to other ends' (Brennan & Lo, 2011). Anthropocentrism is derived from the Greek word *antropos*, which translates to human-being. It is solely about the reasons of humans for preserving the environment. Traditional Western ethical perspectives are human-centered or anthropocentric. This means they assign intrinsic value only to human beings, or they at least assign greater amount of intrinsic value to human beings than to other nonhumans (Brennan & Lo, 2011). First and foremost, the environment should be protected, in order to ensure human well-being and flourishing. Anthropocentrism puts the needs of human beings first. According to this rule, the role of nature and the environment has to be understood. For

instance, nature should be protected for the sake of future generations, but also simply because of its pleasant and inspiring effect on human-beings (Wissenburg, 2005, p. 4). Aristotle already stated, that 'nature has made all things specifically for the sake of man' and that the value of nonhuman things is merely instrumental, and therefore serves as a means to support and improve human life (Harvey, 1983).

2.1.1 Consequentialism in Environmental Ethics

Consequentialist ethical theories assign intrinsic value or disvalue to fundamental notions of the rightness or wrongness of an act. These theories consider an action as right or wrong on the basis of whether the consequences are good or bad. Utilitarianism is an example of consequentialist ethical thought. Utilitarianism regards pleasure and pain as an intrinsic value and disvalue. The right actions are those that produce the greatest balance of pleasure over pain (Brennan & Lo, 2011). However in utilitarianism it is irrelevant who enjoys pleasure, and who suffers pain. It is solely about 'the greatest happiness for the greatest number', and thereby does not take into consideration whether an act is right or wrong in itself. Famous utilitarianists as Jeremy Bentham and Peter Singer argued that all sentient beings that are capable of feeling pleasure or pain, also including nonhumans, should be incorporated into the overall balance of interest satisfaction. Singer argues that privileging human-beings is arbitrary. According to him, it is a kind of speciesism, in fact (Singer, 1975). In general, utilitarians attribute intrinsic value to the experience of pleasure, whereas environmental philosophers attribute intrinsic value to the natural environment. Environmental philosophers regard non-sentient objects in the environment, such as plants, rivers, mountains, and landscapes etc., as objects of moral concerns. For utilitarians, on the other hand, the natural environment fulfills merely an instrumental function for serving the maximization of pleasure for the greatest number of sentient beings. Consequently, the problem of utilitarianism becomes visible, because it only strives for maximization of utility, and therefore allows the 'sacrifice' of one person's over another. In general, the problem with consequentialism is that it reduces human beings to subjects who only see others as instruments to reach their own goals. In the end, utilitarianism strives for the highest goal however there is no norm for the highest goal itself. This is why it remains unclear in the debate whether an utilitarian approach can serve as an environmental ethic at all. However in the wider range of consequentialist theories intrinsic value is also attributed to various objects and processes in the natural environment, rather than pleasure or happiness.

2.1.2 Deontology in Environmental Ethics

In contrast to consequentialist ethical theories, deontological ethical theories uphold certain moral rules or duties in accordance to which an action is characterized as right or wrong, for instance 'not to kill', 'not to lie', 'to respect the rights of others', 'to keep promises'. It is mainly inspired by the German philosopher Immanuel Kant, and centered on his main concept, the categorical imperative – 'Handle so, dass die Maxime deines Willens jederzeit zugleich als Prinzip einer allgemeinen Gesetzgebung gelten könne' (Kant, 2002). Deontological ethical theories neither are about whether an action is right or wrong, nor about whether its consequences are good or bad. Instead deontologists justify a supposedly moral rule on the basis of the intrinsic value of those beings to which it applies. Some authors in the deontological tradition (even) argue that intrinsic value of organisms achieve their own good, irrespective of whether those organisms have conscious feelings or not. For example, Paul Taylor argues that each individual living thing in nature, an animal, a plant or a micro-organism is a 'teleological-center-of-life' (Taylor, 1981, 1986). All teleological-centers-of-life have equal intrinsic value, which entitles them to moral respect. Moreover, he states that we have to regard and also treat wild living things as ends in themselves and that a lack of respect is displayed when they are treated as mere means. More recently Agar argued, that living things have goals and therefore have moral worth (Agar, 2001). Further, Robin Attfield should also be named in this context. He argues for a hierarchical view with regard to intrinsic value. All beings possess intrinsic value, even though some of them – e. g. human beings – possess more intrinsic value than others. He tries to strike a balance between the conflicting interests of different living things, and can therefore be classified as a consequentialist (Attfield, 1987).

The problem with consequentialist and deontological ethical theories, however, is that both hold (rather) anthropocentric views of the environment. As a result, they can (merely) be categorized as individualistic approaches. In general, both approaches fail to accommodate concerns for ecological entities, as in the end only the well-being of human beings seems to matter.^{iv}

2.1.3 Virtue Ethics in Environmental Ethics

Last but not least, I will present an alternative to the consequentialist and deontological ethical thought, which is: *virtue ethics*. Virtue ethics is about 'das Verstehen' (in Weberian terms) of morality. It assesses the ethical quality of actions with regard to concepts such as honesty, sincerity and justice. The theoretical focus of virtue ethics does neither lie on what

makes an action right or wrong (consequentialism – over-all balance of good over evil in the world) nor on what kinds of things are good or bad (deontology – moral rules). Instead, it lies on moral character and tries to determine the (genuine) reasons for acting in a certain way. The motivation and justification of actions are dependent on the trait of character of the acting agent in virtue ethics. Central in virtue ethics is the question 'How to live a flourishing human life?'. 'Living virtuously' is Aristotle's tip to live a flourishing life. That means at the same time, that virtue ethics may seem to support an anthropocentric view of the environment. Yet, Aristotle also emphasized, that friendship belongs to a flourishing human life. Friendship also entails, valuing, respecting and caring for others as ends in themselves. Some authors extended this argument by stating that a flourishing human life also includes valuing, respecting and caring for the nonhuman world as an end in itself (O'Neill, 1992, 1993; Barry 1999).

What is striking in the environmental ethical debate is the fact, that it does not seem to 'discuss with' and respond to the debate on animal ethics. This seems odd, as both debates study and interpret the same thing, namely 'nature', under which ecology and animal advocacy fall (Wissenburg and Schlosberg, 2014, p. 7). These two debates evolved independently from each other, due to their different historical roots. Environmental ethics originates in concerns and questions of (physical) scarcity, and the general relationship between human beings and the non-human realm in which they are settled, whereas the debate on animal ethics derived from the concerns over the moral status of animals relative to humans (Wissenburg and Schlosberg, 2014, p. 7). In the following section, I will present the development of the ethical thought with respect to animal ethics.

2.2 Animal Ethics

Die religiöse Ehrfurcht vor dem, was unter uns ist, umfasst natürlich auch die Tierwelt und legt dem Menschen die Pflicht auf, die unter ihm stehenden Geschöpfe zu ehren und zu schonen. – Johann Wolfgang van Goethe (1749-1832)

In this section I provide a brief overview on the different strands in the philosophical debate of animal ethics. The focus in this paper lays on the development of Western political thought in animal ethics. Other strands of thought, for instance the influence of Eastern philosophers will not be considered due to the fact that they are irrelevant for the development of the three

different farm role models (mentioned in the introduction). Animal ethics are divided into three strands. They are animal welfare, which is the oldest tradition, evolved out of utilitarianism, animal rights derived from deontology, and animal capabilities stemming from virtue ethics (Wissenburg and Schlosberg, 2014, p. 2). In the first part the evolvement of animal welfare is presented, in the second part the evolvement of animal rights is introduced, and in the third part a brief overview of the animal capabilities approach is given.

The thought on the moral status of animals has its roots in religious as well as philosophical thought. Aristotle already argued that animals are able to sense, but are not capable of reasoning. Since they lack the capacity of reasoning, animals can (perfectly) serve as resources for human ends – ‘nature has made all things specifically for the sake of man’ and the value of nonhuman things in nature is merely instrumental (Harvey, 1983). However Pythagoras, on the other hand, believed that animals are reincarnated human beings. This statement is further supported by Theophrastus, who believed that animals have the capacity to reason, at least to some extent. Nevertheless, the majority of Western theologians and philosophers agreed with the Aristotelian view, that animals are actually inferior to human beings, due to their lack of reasoning capacity (DeGrazia, 2002, p. 3).

In the Bible it says that God created human beings in his own image, and thereby states that animals can be categorized as natural resources from which human beings can make use at their discretion (De Grazia, 2002, p. 4). It should be noted here, though, that the Bible can be interpreted in many different ways. Because it says that all humans are created in the image of God, animals can also be categorized as humans, which is a more egalitarian view, and, therefore, opposing the earlier stated Aristotelian one (De Grazia, 2002, p. 4). In the Middle Ages, Christian philosophers such as Augustine and Thomas Aquinas revived the Aristotelian thought that animals are subordinate to human beings because they miss the capacity to reason. This argument is widely accepted by Christianity in these days. The Jewish thought followed this argument as well, even though Judaism put more emphasis on animal welfare. They argue that all creatures made by God deserve compassion. In the Muslim tradition, the third Abrahamic religious tradition, it is believed that animals solely exist for human purposes. At the same time, the Prophet Muhammad said that ‘Whoever is kind to the creatures of Allah, is kind to himself.’ (De Grazia, 2002, p. 4) That means that cruelty to animals should be prohibited.

From the seventeenth to the late nineteenth century, a time starkly influenced by Descartes’s thought, advocating human dominance over animals, has been widely accepted. This thought has been influenced by Christianity, the dominant religion at that time. In modern science it seemed to be widely accepted that animals can feel no harm at all. However this

thought was going in against better general knowledge, because humans at that time were well aware of the fact that animals were capable of feeling pain.

2.2.1 Consequentialism in Animal Ethics

Jeremy Bentham argues in more radical terms for the equal treatment of animals. He argued that the right conduct was a matter of maximizing the balance of pleasure over pain for those affected by one's action. He considered the use of animals by humans as tyranny. John Stuart Mill extended and made the argument of Bentham more explicit by distinguishing human pleasures from animal pleasures (DeGrazia, 2002, p. 5).

Another view should be considered when describing the utilitarian perspective on the treatment of animals, namely the one of the German philosopher Arthur Schopenhauer. He rejected reason, autonomy, self-consciousness and power as primary determinants of moral status. He claimed that, in general, living morally requires compassion for all beings who can suffer. Furthermore the intellect of human beings as higher than the one of animals, and that is the reason why human being's capability to suffer is greater (DeGrazia, 2002, p. 6).

The theory of evolution from Charles Darwin greatly influenced our present perception of animal behavior. He argued that human beings evolved from animals, and, therefore the public attention turned to the actual treatment of animals. Furthermore, he stated that animals and human capacities differ not in kind, but only in degree (DeGrazia, 2002, p. 6).

David Hume's view on animals is considered to be more egalitarian. This is why he is, in the description of the debate on animal ethics, grouped under in the utilitarian strand of thought. He introduced the notion of sympathy of moral thought, whereby humans should consider and reflect on their handling of animals (DeGrazia, 2002, p. 5).

2.2.1 Deontology in Animal Ethics

Philosophers such as Thomas Hobbes, John Locke and Immanuel Kant argued that animals are very well capable of feeling harm, but were convinced that animals did not possess the capabilities to reason and grasp general concepts (DeGrazia, 2002, p. 4). However, it should be noted at this point that Hobbes and Locke cannot be classified as deontologists, but their argument concerning animals is in line with the deontological thought, at least to this regard. Most prominently was Kant's argument of personhood, which makes a being valuable and

morally considerable. This argument was used to justify the human use of animals (Gruen, 2014).

‘ [...] every rational being, exists as an end in himself and not merely as a means to be arbitrarily used by this or that will...Beings whose existence depends not on our will but on nature have, nevertheless, if they are not rational beings, only a relative value as means and are therefore called things. On the other hand, rational beings are called persons inasmuch as their nature already marks them out as ends in themselves’ (Kant, 2002).

Kant pointed out (in his Lectures on Ethics ‘Duties to Animals and Spirit’) that a person that is, for instance, cruel to a dog, might also be cruel towards his fellow humans. This implies that cruelty towards nonhuman animals would be wrong according to instrumental rather than intrinsic grounds.

Concluding, the overall tenor in the development of the Western political thought is that animals are largely regarded as existing merely to help meet human ends. In general, animals are seen as inferior, due to their limitations of moral status, autonomy, rationality, self-awareness and capability of understanding justice (DeGrazia, 2002, p. 6).

Recent developments in the discourse of animal ethics (mainly) go into the direction of granting animal rights, at least in the Western tradition. During the 19th century, in England the first advocates of animal rights protested against the use of animals for scientific research purposes (DeGrazia, 2002, p. 7). Then, during the time of the civil rights movements in the 1960s and 1970s protests centered on racial and sexual discrimination and were publicly discussed. That created the public discourse in environmental ethics while it also opened up the debate on the connected topic of the treatment of animals. Donald Griffin and Peter Singer were the most influential philosophers in the 70s with respect to moral thought in relation to animals. In 1983 Tom Regan published his book *The Case for Animal Rights* and here the present animal rights movement has its roots. His argument is that animals are an authentic and valuable ‘subject of life’ (Regan, 1983). According to this opinion, (certain) animals have intrinsic value, and therefore have the moral right to respectful treatment, which leads to a general moral duty to treat them not as mere means for our ends. He says that certain practices violate the moral right of intrinsically valuable animals – e.g. sport or commercial hunting, and experimentation on animals. For him, animals possessing sense-perceptions are ‘subject of life’ and therefore hold intrinsic value (Regan, 1983).

In general, animal rights advocates value animals merely because they are, and not because of their degree of autonomy, their sense of good and evil, or their 'capability' to feel pain (Wissenburg and Schlosberg, 2014, p. 4).

2.2.3 Virtue Ethics in Animal Ethics

Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum established the capabilities approach originally coming from virtue ethics. The capabilities approach is centered on the protection of human dignity by supporting and enabling the use of certain capabilities which are needed to perform essential functions that make a life worth living (Amartya & Nussbaum, 1993). The capabilities approach initially served as an amendment to John Rawls deontological *Theory of Justice*, however it is now regarded as a proper theory in itself. She also (quite recently) translated the (human) capabilities to capabilities for animals.

This brief introduction in animal ethics is providing a short overview of the development of the political theoretical thought with regard to animals. I chose to only briefly present this debate, in order to provide the reader with some background information concerning the development of the animal ethical thought, and for being able to translate this debate to the image the general public has of the contemporary farmer.

2.3 Description Sustainable, Steward and Organic & Ecological Farmer

After the brief outline of the political theoretical debates on environmental and animal ethics, this section is devoted to the description of the different farmer role-models, which are derived from the above-mentioned debates on animal and environmental ethics. These role models are the sustainable, the steward and the organic & ecological farmer. Furthermore, they give a first impression of what these different farmer role-models actually entail. This also means that at this stage there is no room for clarification for the description of their (distinct) characteristics. Nevertheless, the farmer role models will be further developed during the course of this thesis. In this section, it serves as a conclusion, in order to illustrate in which way the different farmer role-models are connected to the political theoretical thought on the environment and on animals.

2.3.1 Sustainable Farmer

I will start with the description of the role model of the sustainable farmer. First the farmer's relationship with animals will be elaborated on. In the following section his relationship with the environment will be explained. This structure applies to all farmer role-models listed below.

He, the sustainable farmer, cares for animals, and can therefore be categorized as an animal welfarist, in the broadest sense. However his sense for animal welfare should be considered in the context that his care for animals is limited to the production of qualitative meat. His premiss is to produce meat from animals which live under reasonable conditions. He is of the opinion that animals, which live under reasonable conditions, in order to ultimately get high-quality meat.

His relationship with the environment can be described in similar terms. The sustainable farmer is concerned about the environment in a rather anthropocentric way. He makes use of the environment in a mere instrumental way by managing his natural resources as effectively and efficiently as possible.

Sustainability, in both respects, should be regarded as effective and efficient management of the (natural and animal) resources available.

2.3.2 Steward Farmer

The concept for the steward farmer is derived from Protestant thought. He should be regarded as steward of God on earth, in order to ensure good management of the divine resources.

Animals are seen from the perspective of the steward farmer also in this regard, as part of God's creation. Humans 'benefit' from animals. However the steward farmer is also concerned about high standards of animal welfare and holds the belief that all creatures are made in the image of God and therefore deserve a proper treatment.

When it comes to the environment, the steward farmer just like the sustainable farmer is also concerned with the environment, but in an anthropocentric sense. Protestantism regards humans as the superior beings on earth, thus can make use of the environment (in the broadest sense) in order to survive and develop.

The difference between the sustainable and the steward farmer lies mainly in their world view. The sustainable farmer works in an economic manner in order to ensure the future existence of his descendants and himself, whereas the steward farmer is motivated by his inner belief in the preservation for the divine creation.

2.3.3 Organic & Ecological Farmer

In this part I would like to mention that the organic and ecological farmer are theoretically two types of farmers, but in this thesis is combined to one farmer role model. They are both very similar and differ from each other in a few details only.

I chose to call this role model ecological and organic farmer, because it is difficult to differentiate clearly between organic and ecological farming. In the literature, there is a clear distinction between the two concepts however in reality I claim there is no pure ecological farmer. Ecological farming does not exist, because basically farming implies to make use of animals and/or land, however in the ecological perception there is no room for making use of animals and/or land. One can only make use of it, if a harmonious cooperation between humans, animals and land is possible.

In the ecologist perception a harmonious relationship, and here I make use of Dobson's differentiation between 'environmentalism' and 'ecologism', is characterized by 'giving and taking'. 'Environmentalism' argues for a managerial approach to environmental problems, secure in the belief that they can be solved without fundamental changes in present values or patterns of production and consumption. 'Ecologism' holds that a sustainable and fulfilling existence presupposes radical changes in our relationship with the non-human natural world, and in our mode of social and political life (Dobson, 2007, pp. 2–3).

We, as human beings, have to adapt our (farming) practices to the natural life-cycle, which means effectively, to minimise resource use, to emphasize conservation and recycling, to avoid pollution and waste in order to become sustainable in the sense of self-sufficiency (Dobson, 2007, p. 91) Furthermore I claim that it is nearly impossible to support one's (farm) family with ecological farming, at least in the 21st century. This is why I introduce an integrated approach of organic & ecological farming. The ecological & organic farmer applies the method of organic farming with an ecological mindset. That means, that this farmer role model strives for an harmonious co-existence with animals and/or land. Yet, at the end of the day, he also has to ensure his family's and his personal well-being, which means that he has to earn money to make a living from it for his family and himself.

Now, I will give a short overview of the organic & ecological farmer role model, in order to give a first impression.

The organic & ecological farmer is mainly concerned with the natural conservation of the environment. He tries to adapt his farming practices to the natural environment and the rhythm of nature. This stands in stark contrast to the ideas of the sustainable farmer.

Animals are creatures which deserve a species-appropriate husbandry. This is why the organic & ecological farmer tries to establish a natural habitat for his animals. Furthermore, he is concerned with rearing 'enough' animals. 'Enough' should be understood in the sense that (agricultural) surplus is refused at any time by the organic & ecological farmer. 'Enough' signifies to produce enough natural resources in order to survive and develop, not more, not less.

The preservation and conservation of an intact ecosystem is the highest objective for the organic & ecological farmer. Accordingly, he regards the environment in a more ecological way. Even so, he has to ensure his existence after all and that is why he 'utilises' the environment, as well. Consequently his principles also ground on an anthropocentrism. He tries to adapt his farming practices to the natural life-cycle, and avoids any application of chemical means in order to increase natural growth.

The main difference with the sustainable and the steward farmer is that the organic & ecological farmer tries to adapt his farming practices to the natural life-cycle, and strives for (continuous) adaptation to the natural environment.

2.4 Agricultural Ethics

The ideas for the different farmer role models are closely connected to the debate on agricultural ethics. This is why I introduce the development of the agrarian thought and the different conceptions of the farmer, which are associated with the partly incompatible conceptions of 'good' farming practise. Furthermore, I will demonstrate that the ideas of the different farmer role-models are also connected to the debate on agricultural ethics. This theoretical background knowledge is indispensable, for the purpose of analysing the different farmer role-models at a later stage.

First, I will describe the general notions and assumption of the agrarian thought. Making it possible to differentiate between the various ways in which these approaches develop. Through this elaboration on the different philosophical theories it becomes clear where the

common ground stops and where we enter the separate theories that lead to the rather distinct proposals of the sustainable farmer, the steward farmer and the organic & ecological farmer.

The debate on agrarianism reaches back to the ancient Greek philosopher Socrates, as well as the ancient Chinese philosopher Confucius. I begin by quoting Socrates, who once wrote that ‘the best kind of work and the best kind of knowledge is farming, by which human beings supply themselves with necessary things’ (Xenophon in the *Oeconomicus*) (Kronenberg, 2009, pp. 37–38). The School of Agraricultural thought in China advocated a philosophy of peasant utopian communalism and egalitarianism. In societies influenced by Confucianism, the farmer was considered an esteemed productive member of society, whereas merchants, for example, were considered to be ‘greedy’.

Thomas Inge’s vision of agrarianism in the introduction of his book *Agrarianism in American Literature* gives a first impression of the topic:

‘Farming is the sole occupation which offers total independence and self-sufficiency. Urban life, capitalism and technology destroy independence and dignity while fostering vice and weakness. The agricultural community, with its fellowship of labor and cooperation is the model society. The farmer has a solid, stable position in the world order. He ‘has a sense of identity, sense of historical and religious tradition, a feeling of belonging to a concrete family, place, and region, which are psychologically and culturally beneficial’. The harmony of his life checks the encroachments of a fragmented, alienated modern society. Cultivation of the soil ‘has within it a positive spiritual good’ and from it the cultivator acquires the virtues of ‘honor, manliness, self-reliance, courage, moral integrity, and hospitality.’ These result from a direct contact with nature, and through nature a closer relationship to God. The agrarian is blessed in that he follows the example of God in creating order out of chaos’ (Inge, 1969).

2.4.1 Agrarian Romanticism

The ideas of contemporary agrarianism are derived from John Locke’s *Second Treatise on Civil Government*, as well as Thomas Jefferson’s *Notes from the State of Virginia*, who both can be located in the discourse of romantic (agrarian) poets. J. Hector St. John de Crevecoeur’s *Letters from an American Farmer* also contributed to the discourse of agrarianism in the 17th century. I briefly elaborate on each of these authors in the following section.

In his *Second Treatise Of Property* Locke develops a labor theory of value on the basis of Christian theology, natural law and the institution of private property. ‘*Whatsoever then he removes out of the state of nature hath provided, and left in it, he hath mixed his labour with, and joined to it something that is his own, and thereby makes it his property*’, he writes (De Crevecoeur, 1782). For Locke the improvement of land through agriculture is mankind’s God-given duty. Thus, the institution of private property inevitably arises (through the mixing of labour with soil) and should be understood as natural. Agrarian rights, however, go along with agrarian responsibility. Locke emphasizes that individuals are only entitled to what they can use; and that the rest must be left for others. That implies that Locke justifies private property as the natural reward for transforming *formerly rough soil* into a *pleasant farm*. Political relevance is added to the debate of agrarianism when property issues of land are involved. Locke’s contribution to agrarianism, then, is a Biblically derived agrarian exceptionalism. Since it involves mixing one’s labour with the soil, he holds, farming is a spiritually and materially superior form of work, the root of both personal wealth, as well as personal salvation.

Former American President, Thomas Jefferson^v, considered himself a farmer, as well. He expanded the agrarian exceptionalism of Locke. As the basis of the nation’s morality and democracy, he enforced the image of the American farmer. He said ‘those who labour in the earth are the chosen people of God, if ever he had a chosen people, whose breasts he has made his peculiar deposit for substantial and genuine virtue’ in his *Notes on the State of Virginia* (Jefferson, 1781). In other words, Jefferson as well as Locke regard smallholder farming as an individual moral necessity. They hold that working directly with nature fulfills man’s God-given purpose and at the same time sustains genuine Christian values (Carlisle, 2013).

J. Hector St. John de Crevecoeur is interesting to mention at this point of the debate, as well. The reason for considering his work is that he was one of the first to recognize an autonomous (American) agrarian movement, apart from the dependency-driven relationship between ‘lords and tenants’, which was typical for Europe at that time (Carlisle, 2013, p. 136). The United States should be mentioned in this regard as a deviant case (at least at that time) because the colonisation of American land had just started, and questions around property rights were highly debated (De Crevecoeur, 1782). In the United States early forms of citizenship in the democratic structure evolved, due to the fact that the acquisition of land gave immigrants the opportunity to live self-sufficiently and without dependency-structures of aristocracy, which were predominant in Europe during that time.

De Crevecoeur’s work *Letters from an American Farmer* gives an insight into the emergent American nation’s democratic agrarian society. He says ‘our laws are simple and just, we are

a race of cultivators, our cultivation is unrestrained, and therefore everything is prosperous and flourishing' (De Crevecoeur, 1782). His work is therefore closely connected to Locke's ideas of private property. Locke's ideas, as presented above, are about '*gaining land by mixing labour with it*'. For de Crevecoeur, *possession of the soil* is foundational to an American self-perception. It not only feeds and clothes us, but has also '*established all our rights; on it is founded our rank, our freedom, our power as citizen, our importance as inhabitants of such a district*.' Decentralization of land tenure, going together with material and spiritual benefits, is where his focus lies mainly. He distinguishes it quite drastically from the Europe by stating that 'Europe contains hardly any other distinction but lords and tenants' (Clarisle, 2013, p. 136). Indeed, there was no (political theoretical) debate on agricultural ethics. De Crevecoeur as well as Jefferson pointed out the fundamental idea of agrarian political thought, which is that the conviction that decentralized, distributed management benefits both nature and culture.

In the 17th and 18th century the debate of agrarianism mainly focused on the political justification for the legitimate acquisition of land.

It is important to examine agrarian romanticism, because it not only traces the historical roots and initial principles for the role-model of the sustainable farmer, but also, at least partly, the ones for the organic & ecological farmer, which were presented in section 2.3 (p. 12). Locke and De Crevecoeur can be considered as the main founding fathers of these role-models who emphasized the aspect of self-sufficiency through property rights.

Though the earth and all inferior creatures be common to all men, yet every man has a 'property' in his own 'person'. This, nobody has any right to but himself. The 'labour' of his body and the 'work' of his hands, we may say, are properly his. Whatsoever, then, he removes out of the state that Nature hath provided and left it in, he hath mixed his labour with it, and joined to it something that is his own, and thereby makes it his property.' (Locke, 1988)

Furthermore, the role-model of the organic & ecological farmer is also influenced by Lockean and De Crevecoeurian thought, because they both pointed out to leave enough natural resources for others.^{vi}

2.4.2 Agrarian Conservationism

In the United States, the 'Back to the Land' movement was prominent especially in the 60s and 70s (Taylor, 2005). In the 20th century, the debate on agrarianism shifted from legitimization of land-acquisition to the challenges of moral and environmental crises.

Aldo Leopold, Wendell Berry, Wes Jackson and Fred Kirschenmann can be categorized as agrarian conservationists. They propose, that early in the 20th century, the period of increased industrialization threatened the environmental base for democratic citizenship. The agrarian conservationist can be situated somewhere in-between the advocates for industrialization and the ones for conserving the wilderness. Their main argument holds that good human stewardship is necessary for the natural landscape. Small-scale farming practices need to be protected from the consequences of industrialization instead of concentrating land-use and large-scale mechanization. Leopold pointed out that small-scale farming is *the true guarantor of lasting environmental and social prosperity*. Berry, Jackson and Kirschenmann promoted agrarianism in the 60s and 70s in moral as well as in environmental terms as a simpler life, which was jointly responsible for the massive *Go Back to the Land Movement* in the United States (Taylor, 2005).

Agrarian conservationists highly criticized modern (industrial) farming practices of concentration and mechanization. Agrarian conservationists argue for 'good human stewardship'. 'Good human stewardship' implies that the traditional family farm cares for its (land) property in such a way that it will thrive for generations to come, and in doing so, it guarantees a long lasting environment and societal prosperity (Leopold, 1949).

The industrial progress of the 19th and 20th century threatened the natural basis of the ecosystem on the one hand, and formed the basis of democratic citizenship, on the other. Agrarian conservationists hold the values of self-sufficiency and (financial) independence. These values are the basis for an 'equal' society, according to them. By creating monocultures traditional (European) dependency structures would return, agrarian conservationist believed.

The agrarian conservationist and their ideal of preserving the environment deliver the ideological ground for the role-model of the organic & ecological farmer. The main aim of the organic & ecological farmer is to sustain and maintain the natural ecosystem, and therefore, he adapts his farming practices to it.

2.4.3 Modern Forms of Agrarianism

Above all, constraints on contemporary agrarianism are marked above all by property rights. In contemporary society, the value of land is especially based on market mechanisms, such as demand and supply (Carlisle, 2013). These constraints on contemporary agrarianism belong to a new strand of agrarianist thought, which is called *the critical school*. It is termed *critical*, because it calls for new forms of combining modern farming practices with old and

traditional ones, in order to ensure a more sustainable ecosystem as well as society, not dominated by existing power structures (Carlisle, 2013). That is why the modern approach is called critical agrarianism. Critical agrarians argue that an alternative land-tenure model which explicitly values public environment and social goods is necessary. They think, that a 'critical mass of private property owners with a strong land ethic can never be enough' (Carlisle, 2013).

The debate of agrarianism touches also upon the topics of race and feminism. In American history, the cultivation of land is strongly connected to colonization and slavery. The main authors in this sub-branch of modern agrarianst thought are Rachel Slocum, and Patricia Allen. Their argument is that the debate especially the American agrarian one, is solely centered on *white men*, and is thereby ignoring the cultural diversity of the United States which is rooted in slavery (Allen and Sachs, 1993). Another sub-branch presents the strand of agrarian feminism. Agrarian feminists, such as Carolyn Sachs, argue that agrarianism does not consider and recognize gender equality and still live with traditional role models, whereby women are more or less subordinate and subservient to *the (male) farmer*. In literature, the farmer is in the literature mostly associated with men (Allen and Sachs, 1993).

The modern agrarian school is called critical agrarianism. Contemporary critical agrarians are Liz Carlisle, Eric Freyfolge, Paul Thompson and Norman Wirzba. They argue for 'an effective way of transforming agrarian relationships among land, people and memory'. They emphasize the political theoretical method of story-telling with which critical agrarians work. Carlisle in particular states that 'critical agrarianism is [...] intended to generate and create' (Carlisle, 2013, p. 138). It is a call for new forms of *linking-up* past and present, people and land. Freyfolge's contribution to the modern debate is focused on property rights in the context of community and public goods, whereby Thompson's aim to unify the field of agrarianism with environmentalism and sustainability.

Among the school of critical agrarians falls the sub-branch of agrarian citizenship. Main advocates of this movement are Melanie Depuis, David Goodman and Hannah Wittman. They argue in favour of localism. Their argument is based upon the idea that agrarianism serves as an example to foster the virtues of citizenship. In addition, Wittman is further developing the Jeffersonian argument by stating that 'ties between people and land may prove central to the success of broader social struggles, because they reinforce affective ties between people and land' (Carlisle, 2013, p. 139). She proposes a dense socio-ecological network of community and human relations, which is tightly bound to the land. Supporter of agrarian citizenship argue that 'through every day practices of people on the land in their intertwined production and political activities' foster new forms of citizenship and rights.

In this section, it became visible where the different conceptions of the farmer role-models derived their ideological bases from. To sum it up, the ideological roots of the sustainable farmer lie in *Agrarian romanticism*, the steward farmer's derive partly from Agrarian conservationism, and the organic & ecological farmer's from *Agrarian romanticism*, *Agrarian conservationism*, as well as modern forms of *Critical Agrarianism*.

Chapter 3 – Virtue Ethics

This chapter serves as a general introduction to the third strand in moral philosophy, which is virtue ethics. The other two schools are deontology and consequentialism. My attempt is to provide a general virtue ethical framework of the three farmer role models, which reveals us which farmer role model possesses certain moral character traits (see chapter 4 for the specific virtues of the farmer), which can justify the institution of the farmer in the end.

I present the philosophical debate on virtue ethics here, because I want to familiarize the reader with the concept of virtue ethics. I want to guide the reader through the reasoning, why virtue ethics is the only philosophical approach which offers a possible solution for the farmer in his current situation. His situation can be described, as to handle the ever growing public criticism concerning his practices, (and the role model and institution of a farmer in general). A virtue ethical approach allows me to assign and to evaluate the virtues associated with contemporary farming practices.

The debate on virtue ethics will briefly be described and its most influential contributors, especially Martha Nussbaum's capability approach, are emphasized. As a result, I will be able to select the necessary *capabilities* of the farmer in order to lead a flourishing life with his surroundings. Then, three central themes of virtue ethics are highlighted and explained in more detail. Next, the Aristotelian notion of virtue is explained, in order to show the impact of virtues for our own life. By applying virtues on our own life, the function of role-models is looked at more closely. In this first part, I will mainly concentrate on moral virtues. Differing from Aristotle and his adherers, who believe that virtues can also be intellectual and physical (see also the section on *Phronesis* 3.2.2).

3.1 Description Debate Virtue Ethics

Virtue ethics initially emphasized the virtues or moral character, in contrast to the approach of deontology, which emphasizes duties or rules, or consequentialism, which emphasizes the consequences of an action (Hursthouse, 2013)^{vii}. A virtue ethicist would give moral advice similar to '... act as a virtuous person would act in your situation' (Hursthouse 2013, p. 168).

The founding fathers of virtue ethics are Plato and especially Aristotle.^{viii} Most virtue ethics take their inspiration from Aristotle (Athanasoulis, 2000).

A virtuous person in Aristotelian terms is someone who has an excellent character, or better to say, disposition. A virtuous person, in contrast to the ideal person of consequentialism or deontology, is excellent in many situations over a whole lifespan, not because we want to maximize utility or gain favours (consequentialism) or (simply) to do our duty (deontology), but because it is our genuine and inner disposition. Behaving excellently in the virtue ethical context means to use our own moral, intellectual and physical skills appropriately in (all) situations and circumstances (Hursthouse, 2013). Theories of virtue do not aim to identify universal principles, yet they deal with broader questions, which are rather context-dependent: 'How should I live?' and 'What is the good life?'. Living virtuously is the attempt to find a morally correct answer to these questions, as well as to find the balance for our own attempt to live virtuously. It is about the proper and appropriate behaviour in any kind of context and in any kind of situation (Hursthouse, 2013). It is about finding the 'right' benchmark, not only in any kind of context but also in any kind of situation (Hursthouse, 2013). The ultimate benchmark of a virtuous life is nature. Therefore living virtuously is living in harmony with nature in any kind of context but also in any kind of situation.

Virtue ethics has been regarded as the dominant approach in Western moral philosophy until the Enlightenment. During the nineteenth century it virtually disappeared from the scene^{ix}, because the deontological approach of Kant (Germany) and Hume (England) became very popular. During that time, the standard of nature was translated to 'sein & sollen' and respectively to 'is & ought to'. However, the problem with their approach was (and still is) that nothing can be construed and derived from nature. Nature cannot be the universal guideline, because it does not explicitly tell us how to appropriately act in certain situations. Nevertheless, with the philosophical approach of virtue ethics, the (individual) situation is examined and on that basis it is determined how to appropriately act and behave. In the 1950s it regained popularity, especially in Anglo-American philosophy (Hursthouse, 2013). In the famous article of Gertrude E.M. Anscombe 'Modern Moral Philosophy' (Anscombe, 1958) virtue ethics experienced its revival. In this article, Anscombe expressed her dissatisfaction with consequentialism and deontology, because neither of them was able, at least at that time, to address virtues themselves, such as having moral character, moral education, moral wisdom or discernment. Most importantly, they were not able to find an answer to the fundamental questions of 'What sort of a person should I be?' and 'How should we live?'.

3.1.1 The Capability Approach

More recently, Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum (at the end of the 1980s, beginning of the 1990s) introduced the capability approach, which has its roots in virtue ethics. I elaborate on their capability approach in more detail, because I consider it to be relevant for the (proper) development, and most important, the assessment of the farmer's virtues in chapter 4. The basic idea of Sen and Nussbaum's capability approach is that the conception of human beings is a life that contains 'truly human functioning' (Nussbaum, 2006, p. 74). The capability approach is about freedom to achieve well-being, which depends upon what people are able to do and to be. It is regarded as a flexible and multi-purpose framework, instead of a precise theory of wellbeing (Robeyns, 2011). The capability approach tries to be a comprehensive and holistic approach, because it asks which 'sets' of capabilities are open to human beings.

The capability approach serves to provide the philosophical basis for an account of the main human entitlements, which governments of all nations should respect and respectively implement as a minimum of human dignity (Nussbaum, 2006, p. 70). Nussbaum presents the capability approach as the source for political principles in a liberal pluralistic society. Her capability approach is a tool for a dignified human life, whereby people have the capability to pursue their conception of the good in cooperation with others. Her approach roots in a rather liberal conception of the good life. It should be seen in the light of Rawls' political liberalism. Nussbaum regards her capability approach as a further development to and improvement of John Rawls' Theory of Justice (Nussbaum, 2006, p. 70).

The capability approach consists of *functionings* and *capabilities*. *Functionings* and *capabilities* in themselves can be used as explanations of social phenomena (for instance assessing the quality of life) (Robeyns, 2011).^x 'Capabilities' are a person's real freedoms, or opportunities to achieve *functionings* (Robeyns, 2011). Sen and Nussbaum are in line with the Kantian tradition, that each and every person should pursue capabilities, and these should not be regarded as a mere tool of the ends of others but as an end in themselves (Nussbaum, 2006, p. 70). Even Karl Marx mentioned in his 'Economic & Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844', " 'That capabilities to which all citizens are entitled are many and not one, and are opportunities for activity, not simply quantities or resources.' " (Nussbaum, 2006, p. 74). The capability approach concentrates on the ends, rather than the means, because people differ in their ability to convert means into valuable opportunities (*capabilities*) or outcomes (*functionings*) (Sen 1992, pp. 26–28, pp. 36–38). People need to be empowered to achieve their ends by having all the same capacities or powers to convert

those means into equal capability sets. *Functionings*, in that respect, are various conditions of human beings and activities that a person can undertake (Robeyns, 2011). Additionally *functionings*, are a category, which is in itself morally neutral, because it is context-dependent, whether it is a good or a bad *functioning* (Robeyns, 2011). *Functionings* are constitutive of a person's being (Sen 1992, 39). Human *functionings* are those beings and doings that we take to constitute a human life, and which are central to our understanding of what is to be a human being. Interpersonal contact can be evaluated on basis of people's *capabilities* to function, which means 'their effective opportunities to undertake actions and activities that they have reason to value, and be the person that they have reason to want to be' (Robeyns, 2011). These *beings* and *doings* combined make a life valuable.

Summarizing, this is why capabilities are not understood as instrumental to a life with human dignity: they are understood, instead as ways of realizing a life with human dignity, in the different areas of life with which human beings typically engage. The guiding notion is not that of dignity itself, as if that could be separated from capabilities to live a life, but rather, that of a life with, or worthy of, human dignity, where that life is constituted, at least in part, by having the capabilities, on the list (see endnotes). In this way they right and the good seem thoroughly intertwined (Nussbaum, 2006, p. 162).

Now, I go on with Nussbaum's capability approach, instead of Sen's approach, because her approach coincides better with the Aristotelian roots. I do not deliver a thorough analysis between Sen's and Nussbaum's approach. This is not the purpose of this thesis. Mainly Nussbaum's capability approach builds on Aristotle's notion of virtue (Kleist, 2010). Nussbaum interprets capabilities as a modern and updated version of Aristotle's virtues (Kleist, 2010). Whereas Aristotle tries to define virtue, Nussbaum makes this vague Aristotelian notion of virtue more explicit. She explicitly defines what, and thereby I mean which *functionings* and *capabilities*, (at least) contribute to a dignified human life. For this reason, I am able to clearly define farmer's capabilities in chapter 3.

The combination of Nussbaum's human *functionings* and *capabilities*, as well as Aristotle's concept of *phronesis* helps me to transfer it to the current situation of the farmer. This combination allows me particularly to determine the *functionings* and *capabilities* of the farmer, as well as to classify them (in chapter 4, see section on 4.1 Farmer's General Virtues).

3.2 Three Concepts central to Virtue Ethics

In this section, I will briefly elaborate on the three concepts central to the Aristotelian tradition of virtue ethics, being *arête/virtue*, *phronesis* and *eudaimonia*. *Arête* means excellence or virtue, *phronesis* means practical or moral wisdom, and lastly *eudaimonia* means happiness or flourishing (Hursthouse, 2013). I do so, because especially the concept of *phronesis* is highly relevant in the later section on the farmer's virtues. *Phronesis*, practical wisdom, is a central notion of farming. Farming can only be mastered by practice and experience, and these elements are unified in the concept of *phronesis*. Furthermore these three notions of virtue ethics are dependent on each other, and their meaning can only be understood in their relational context.

3.2.1 Virtue

Arête^{xi} is literally translated as 'virtue of character', and means the excellence of character. The excellences of character are dispositions to act and feel in certain ways. Aristotle considered a moral disposition as virtuous when it was in balance, in proper proportion, between two extremes (Timpe):

‘ “Excellence [of character], then, is a disposition issuing in decisions, depending on intermediacy of the kind relative to us, this being determined by rational prescription and in the way in which the wise person would determine it. And it is intermediacy between two bad states, one involving excess, the other involving deficiency; and also because one set of bad states is deficient, the other excessive in relation to what is required both in affections and actions, whereas excellence both finds and chooses the intermediate.” ’ (Nicomachean Ethics II.7, Timpe)

Here, I would like to briefly present an example of a virtue, in order to become more familiar with this concept. For instance considering the virtue of 'being honest'. The honest person fully and truly recognizes what it means to be honest, and assigns, or at least tries to assign this to his daily life. However possessing a virtue is a matter of degree, some people are (naturally) gifted that they possess a certain virtue to a higher degree, than others (Hursthouse, 2013).

It is not easy to find the balance between our emotions and our rational recognition of certain reasons for actions.^{xii} For this reason, Aristotle and other virtue ethicists distinguish between full or perfect virtue and 'continence', or strength of will. Absolute virtuous people are able, in

this instance, to be honest, without any difficulty, and are able to resist certain desires or temptations. The continent people have to keep in check their desires or temptations to do otherwise (Hursthouse, 2013).

3.2.2 Phronesis

However, we cannot only ‘fall short’ in absolute virtue, but also in a lack of *phronesis*. (Once again, *phronesis* means moral or practical wisdom (Hursthouse, 2013). Two aspects should be considered about practical wisdom. One aspect is life experience, meaning to be wise about human beings and human life. And the other aspect concerns situational appreciation, which is the ability to rank and recognize one feature of a situation as more important than the other features.

For Aristotle, *phronesis* is learned and manifested when applying virtues in real life. The correct application of practical wisdom requires situational appreciation. Practical knowledge and understanding enables its holder to do right or to act justly in certain situations. For example, this is also why children are regarded to possess less *phronesis* than adults, because they possess less life experience.

For the virtues of the farmer, which I examine in chapter 4 chapter, *phronesis* is a central theme of farming. Farming can only be trained by practice and experience, by stating it bluntly, farming is (amongst other things) ‘learning by doing’.

3.2.3 Eudaimonia

Last but not least, there is *eudaimonia*, which means happiness, flourishing and well-being. *Eudaimonia* applies only to human beings, not to animals, due to the human ability of being rational.^{xiii} It is difficult to exactly define happiness, because happiness is subjective, people are happy about different things. Though, the notion of flourishing is different, as it refers to being in a good health. A condition for living ‘*eudaimonia*-ly’, is living in accordance with virtues. Genuine happiness is achieved when living a fulfilled life. To the question ‘What is a good life?’, virtue ethicists would answer a life in accordance with virtues.

Happiness is what we all strive for in life, and which brings into focus some idea of having an overall aim in life. However happiness is rather individual, because people have (radically) different views of what their personal happiness is, and how they achieve it. Aristotle, the

Stoics and later Protestant theories offer different and also competing views on happiness (Annas, 2011, p. 125).

3.3 What are Virtues?

3.3.1 Finding the Balance

Being virtuous is about the 'Golden Mean' according to Aristotle. There is a popular saying, which says 'virtue lies in the middle' between two extremes. The right choice for Aristotle is a choice for the middle. The 'Golden Mean' cannot be determined precisely with calculations and measurements. There is no exact minimum or maximum. The right middle way depends on the situation and on the circumstances. This is why, the questions 'What is right and what is wrong?', 'How should I act in this situation?' and 'How can I act virtuously in this situation?' have to be treated cautiously given the context and environment. We need to examine the two extremes of the given context, as well as that we need to specify the different aspects of the situation. Then it becomes clear, that virtue ethics is about admissibility of certain attitudes.

Here, I link to Geoffrey Cupit's notion on Aristotelean virtue ethics, as 'justice as fittingness', in order to clarify the notion of admissibility. Cupit namely views virtues as proportions, or 'fittingness' (Cupit, 1996). In short, he says, that what is required by justice is determined by what is required if we are to avoid people as less (or more) than they are (Cupit, 1996). In general, it is about how we should view the relationship between the individual and society.

Virtue ethics attempts to describe this relationship. The analysis of virtue ethics leads to an examination of humans, groups and even cultures, and their admissibility given the specific context and environment. These descriptions can be compared with a virtue ethical ideal, in order to learn about the appropriate behaviour (Van Tongeren, 2003, pp. 59–63).

3.4 What are Role Models?

Here, I will introduce the general notion of role models. I briefly present and explain what a role model is, and which function it serves. It is important to consider the function of role models in the context of Nussbaum's capability approach, as well as Aristotle's notion of *phronesis*, because it helps me to describe the general role model of the farmer. A role

model is (an) occupant/s of a social role, such as for example citizens, family members and of course the farmer, as well (Hardimon, 1994, p. 333).

The farmer fulfils an important social role in society. His role is to deliver qualitative and nutritious food for the population in general (Jefferson, 1781). He is the institution which secures food supplies (Jefferson, 1781). In governmental institutions, especially in the European Union, the topic of food security of food systems is given high priority in policy making. Food systems are oftentimes put at risk by food price crises (Barnier, 2008). Hence, governments are very keen on protecting their internal and external food supplies, by establishing agricultural structures which ensure and safeguard their country's food supply (Candel et al., 2014). They do not want to be dependent on external (meaning outside the European Union) food supplies, which are exposed to fluctuating prices, as well as quality (Candel et al., 2014).

3.4.1 Role Models in Theory

Role obligations are central to morality. It is interesting to do further research on them because they highlight the importance of the moral life dimension, which is structured by social institutions (Athanasoulis, 2010).

Especially in my thesis, the notion of role obligations is necessary to consider. I develop a virtue ethical framework based on three farmer role models (see chapter 4) – the sustainable, the steward, the organic & ecological farmer. These role models are based on the role obligations associated with them. The various obligations of the three farmer role models derive from the (political) philosophical debates in chapter 2, as well as from the societal discourse mentioned in the introduction. However before discussing the various farmer role models and its obligations, it is necessary to get acquainted with the general notion of role obligations central to my framework of the three farmer role models.

Morality has to be trained and developed by human beings (Athanasoulis, 2010). We do not possess morality right away from our birth, and we do not behave self-evidently morally in any kind of context and with any kind of situation. Morality and moral behaviour have to be developed and trained. This is why role models fulfil an important function. They namely demonstrate the appropriate moral behaviour in any kind of context and in any kind of situation (Athanasoulis, 2010). However, in order to assess the appropriate moral course of action, the concept of virtue ethics is central to the development of role models. The concept

of virtue ethics helps us to decide on the appropriate conduct in any kind of context and in any kind of situation.

Michael O. Hardimon defines role obligations as ‘a moral requirement’, which attaches to an institutional role, whose content is fixed by the function of the role, and whose normative force flows from the role. To say, that a role obligation ‘attaches to an institutional role’ is to say that it applies to an individual in her/his capacity as an occupant of that role (for instance, as a sister, as a citizen or as a farmer with regard to this thesis) (Hardimon 1994, 334).


The principle of fairness, developed by John Rawls, can help to explain how obligations emerge and develop. This principle holds that people have an obligation to carry out tasks associated with their role (i) that the institution of which the role is partly just and (ii) that they have either voluntarily accepted the benefits of the institution or made use of the opportunities the institution provides to advance their own interests (Rawls, 1999, pp. 293–300).

It often remains unclear what this role obligation actually entails (Hardimon, 1994, p. 340). This is why clear and obvious guidance with respect to our social roles is needed, because personal doubts and controversies about role obligations are a prominent feature of (contemporary) moral life and a source of (contemporary) moral complexity and perplexity (Hardimon, 1994, p. 341). This is the reason why disputes about the structure and significance of institutions within role obligations arise (Hardimon, 1994, p. 341).

A given social role is reflectively acceptable, as soon as it is reflected upon in suitable specified circumstances which are meaningful, rational and good (Hardimon, 1994, p. 348). However, that does not mean, if our roles fit our desires, preferences, and aims make them immediately reflectively acceptable (Hardimon, 1994, pp. 348–9).

First, I elaborated on the (historical) development of virtue ethics. Hereby, I focused on the rather modern approach of Martha Nussbaum – the capability approach. Second, I concentrated on the three notions central to virtue ethics, which are *arête* (virtue), *phronesis* (practical wisdom) and *eudaimonia* (happiness and flourishing). *Phronesis* is the main concept of farming, because it is about practical wisdom, which can only be learned by continuous practice and experience. Therefore the Aristotelian concept of *phronesis* is given special attention. Third, the theoretical basis of role models and its concomitant obligations are researched. Role models are especially important when it comes to the institution of the farmer, because they guide farmers’ moral conduct dependent on the context and situation.

I do so by scrutinizing the genuine motivations of the different farmer role models. Do the (theoretical) farmer role models, (as well as the actual representatives of the farmer role models) carry out certain farming practices because they follow certain virtues and associated values? This is why virtue ethics is so essential to my thesis, because I judge farming practices (on theoretical as well as practical level) on the basis of virtues. Are the motivations and reasons of the three farmer role models grounded in virtue ethics, and can they therefore be justified? The actual analysis of the virtues of the three farmer role models will be done in the next chapter. This chapter served as a first introduction to the concept of virtue ethics and its different components, in order to be able to assess the appropriate farmer role models in the following chapter.



In chapter 4, I will make use of my classification scheme (see figure 3.1). This classification scheme is necessary to arrange the virtues of the farmer, in general. The farmer possesses capabilities, in the Nussbaumian sense, which can be either 'beings' or 'doings'. 'Doings' are also termed *functionings*. *Functionings* are in itself morally neutral, this why farmers need to have *phronesis*, practical wisdom, for being able to appropriately use their experience and practical knowledge to judge certain situation.

'We have 'lots of love for our animals. We do certain things for a reason. I just want the best for my cows.' (SFJvD, p. 20)

Chapter 4 – The Farmer's Virtues

In the previous chapter I concentrated on virtue ethics, more concrete how this concept evolved and developed, and how it can offer a solution to societal problems. Martha Nussbaum and her capabilities approach, as well as Aristotle's concept of 'phronesis', practical wisdom, present an alternative, especially for farmers to deal with the increasing societal pressure concerning their farming practices, as well as concrete in dealing with the environment and animals. On the basis of chapter 3, I now define virtue in the context of this thesis as capabilities and phronesis. I do so, because these two notions of the overarching concept of virtue help me to explicitly investigate and nominate the necessary farmer's virtues.

Basically, the concept of virtue refers to the appropriate use of an ability in any kind of context or situation. Within the context of my thesis, I will not use the term ability, but rather the term Nussbaum introduced, 'capability'. Capabilities are a person's; in this case a farmer's, real freedoms or opportunities to achieve functionings (Robeyns, 2011). Functionings are 'beings' and 'doings', meaning various states of human beings and activities that a person can undertake (Robeyns, 2011). For example for the farmer (the 'beings') are being agriculturally educated, being not agriculturally educated, being a patient farmer, being a generous farmer etc. Examples of the second group of functionings (the 'doings') are harvesting, caring for animals, managing resources, eating animals. Noticeable is that the notion of 'functionings' is a moral, rather neutral, category. Functionings can be either good or bad (Robeyns, 2011). The goodness or badness is dependent on the context (Robeyns, 2011). Thus, 'the distinction between functionings and capabilities is between the realized and the effectively possible, in other words, between achievements, on the one hand, and freedoms or valuable opportunities from which one can choose, on the other' (Robeyns, 2011).

Additionally, the Aristotelean concept of *phronesis* has to be taken into account in my virtue ethical framework of the three farmer role models. Generally speaking the notion of phronesis means practical wisdom. *Phronesis* can only be gained by continuous (farming) practice and experience. This is why this notion is central to farming, because farming is not about, bluntly speaking, discussing on an abstract level how activities should be

accomplished, but rather about *de facto* acting based on practical reasoning as part of the development of a disposition to act (Annas, 2011, p. 28).

This is why the main exercise in this chapter, and generally in this thesis, is to investigate the virtues, the capabilities and phronesis, of the three farmer role models given their specific context. Then I am able to conclude which virtues of the three farmer role models can help us to foster a more harmonious relation with humanity/society, as well as, which farmer role model is virtue ethically legitimate, and which is not.

The chapter is divided in two parts. The first part is devoted to the evaluation of the farmer's virtues based on the three farmer role models. I do so in three steps. First, I give an overview of the farmer's general virtues. I divide this general introduction into a descriptive part (with sources) and a prescriptive part (with arguments) of each farmer's virtue. In the descriptive part, I broadly describe the particular virtue, and in the prescriptive part I justify as to why I consider it as a farmer's virtue. Second, I rank these general virtues as high – medium – low, according to the three farmer role models. Third, based on this ranking I theoretically evaluate whether an ethic of a character helps to understand and respond appropriately to the challenges today's farmers face.

In the second part, I use the framework of the ranking model for evaluating whether the theoretical farmer's virtues, I found in the literature coincide with the farmer's virtues in reality (see table 4.5). Finally, a comparison between the theoretical assumptions and the so-called, reality check is conducted, and similarities and differences are worked out.

In the end, this input should help me to answer the (main) research question, I formulated in the beginning, namely – *How can an ethic of character help us to understand and respond appropriately to the challenges today's farmers face and to contribute to foster a more harmonious relation between humanity/society and nature?*.

4.1 General Farmer’s Virtues

Theoretical Framework – General Farmer’s Virtues			
General Virtues	Specific Virtues	Virtue Classification	
1. Life Ethic			
	1.1 Simplicity	Capability	Being
	1.2 Living acc. to the rhythm of nature	Capability	Functioning + Phronesis
	1.3 Sense of Community	Capability	Being
2. Work Ethic			
	2.1 Entrepreneurial Spirit	Capability	Functioning + Phronesis
	2.2 Craftsmanship	Capability	Functioning + Phronesis
	2.3 Sense of Property	Capability	Being
3. Environmental Ethic			
	3.1 Depth of Concern for the Environment	Capability	Being
4. Animal Ethic			
	4.1 Depth of Concern for Individual Animals	Capability	Being
5. Societal Surroundings			
	5.1 Societal Impact (Perspective General Public)	Capability	Being
	5.2 Societal Status (Perspective Farmer)	Capability	Being
	5.3 Societal Impact	Capability	Functioning + Phronesis

Table 4.1: General Farmer’s Virtues

In this section, I will give a general introduction to the relationship between the different role models of farmers and their virtues, meaning *capabilities* and *phronesis*. All farmer role-models, the sustainable, the steward and the organic & ecological farmers, hold certain general virtues (see table 4.1), but to a different degree, either being high, medium and low (please also see Theoretical Ranking Farmer’s Virtues section 4.2).

I particularly concentrate on family farms, as already announced and discussed in the introduction. The general virtues of farming can be arranged in four broad categories. These overarching categories are: 1. Life-, 2. Work-, 3. Environmental-, 4. Animal Ethics and 5. Societal Surroundings. In the following section, I will elaborate briefly on them, as well as on

the belonging sub-categories. It should be noted, however, that this analysis of family farmers applies mainly within the geographical and cultural context of the European Union, and does not necessarily also hold for family farmers in other parts of the world.

4.1.1 Life Ethic

Being a farmer also means pursuing a certain way of life, or better: a certain lifestyle. Most farming activities take place in remote areas or small villages, because farmers need space for their farming activities. This means that farmers usually live relatively far away from densely populated areas (O’Sullivan, 2011)^{xiv}. This relative solitude requires a certain lifestyle, as well (Burton and Wilson, 2006, p. 105). It leads to different perception of space and time. Generally, society regards country life as not that fast-paced as life in large cities (Thompson, 2010, p. 105–110).

I developed three sub-categories, which illustrate the farmer’s lifestyle in more detail. These subcategories are: the degree of simplicity, living according to the rhythm of nature and sense of community.

1. Simplicity

As Cato the Elder, an ancient Roman philosopher, in his writings *De Agri Cultura*, already pointed out, the farmer’s lifestyle can be described as a rather simple life-style. Simplicity should be interpreted in the sense of being satisfied with the products nature can provide (Gambrel and Cafaro, 2009, p. 90). Many farmers can be described as down-to-earth and connected to their ‘own’ soil. Simplicity also entails the degree of self-sufficiency to which a farmer is able to establish closed-loop farming (Gambrel and Cafaro, 2009, p. 90). Meaning that he (only) keeps animals to that extent, he is able to produce fodder for them, for instance.

In this context, I also mention the latest encyclical letter of Pope Francis’ *Laudato si’* published in June 2015. I mention it here, because he strongly demands a change in our way of life (Pope Francis, 2015). People have to refrain from (pure) consumerism, but to orientate towards a simpler life-style, following the example set by Francis of Assisi, Pope Francis pointed out (Pope Francis, 2015). He explicitly states that farmers of (rich) industrialised countries have to develop a higher degree of self-sufficiency, for not distorting global competition with regard to agricultural products (Pope Francis, 2015).

I classify 'simplicity' as a capability. It is a 'being' a certain state, to put it in Nussbaum's terms (see also chapter 3, p. 23). The farmer's capability of 'simplicity' is necessary to establish a harmonious relationship with the farmer's environment. 'Simplicity' is essential for the careful use of resources and the avoidance of superfluous waste (see also chapter 2, section 2.4.2, p. 18). That means a modest life style is an achievement in itself, and leads to a dignified human life within the farmer's environment.

2. Living according to the rhythm of nature

Farmers need to adapt their lifestyle to the rhythm of nature (Sense about Science Organisation, 2015). According to Mr. Ambrose from the Organisation *Sense about Science*, 'the process of domestication is still very much working with natural variation and a natural process [...]'. There are certain tasks and activities a farmer can only perform during certain seasons, and more concretely, certain weather conditions (Sense about Science Organisation, 2015). That is why a farmer's working life is strongly influenced by nature. A farmer has to work hard to get everything done in time, meaning before certain conditions change, for instance the weather or the (food) prices etc^{xv} (Strange, 1988). This is why farmers need to adapt and organize their lives according to the rhythm of nature.

Furthermore, farmers need to handle a (certain) degree of uncertainty (Thompson, 2008, p. 199). Uncertainty should be put in the context of varying income and also varying prices for agricultural products (depending on their availability on the world market). Their availability, again, depends on, amongst other things, the harvest yields. Their purchase- as well as selling-prices depends on worldwide supply and demand. An individual farmer is not able to steer his surroundings, meaning he cannot influence the (average selling) prices for his products. He needs to deal with the largely unpredictable circumstances of the market mechanisms.

'Living according to the rhythm of nature' is classified as a functioning in the capability approach. It is a 'doing' (see also chapter 3, p. 23). Nevertheless, for 'living according to the rhythm of nature' a certain degree of phronesis is required (see also chapter 3, p. 26), because a farmer needs to have life experience and situational appreciation, in order to react appropriately to changing weather conditions, or fluctuating commodity prices.

3. Sense of Community

The family is a special institution for the farmer. The family farm should not only be understood in terms of the joy of living together in a community, but it is also a basic form of survival. The entity of the family farm is more fundamental than artificial entities such as the company, village or state (see also chapter 3, p. 16, quote Inge, 1969). Historically, the work on the farm was divided among the family members, in order to deal with the amount and variety of work. The family served (and still serves) as an instance of stability and income security, even though their significance has declined (slightly) in modern times. Family farmers are not exclusively dependent on other family members (any more), due to technological progress but still the family is an important institution of impartial solidarity, as Breuskin pointed out in (FAO, 2013)

Normally, on family farms, multiple generations (at least two) live under the same roof. What is particular about family farms is that usually every member of the family is (to various degrees) involved in supporting the family business, the actual farm activities. Working together and living together on the farm creates a strong bond of community (FAO, 2013). The intergenerational exchange of experiences of (agrarian) knowledge and practices makes this bond even stronger. As a consequence, the family farm is also a 'safe harbour' even in (economically) bad times. This shared commitment towards family members, as well as the willingness to pursue one target, which is the continued flourishing of the family farm, helps the family business to even handle (economically) tough times.

Furthermore, another positive aspect of the family farm is that it is possible to combine work and family matters. Due to the close distance to the farmer's work place, she/he can handle the balance between work and family better than people in a (normal/conventional) work relationship (SFJV2, p. 8).

I classify the virtue of 'sense of community' as a very important and necessary farmer's capability. It is a 'being' to describe it with Nussbaum's words, because it explains rather a condition, instead of a 'doing' (see also chapter 2, p. 16, quote Inge, 1969 & p. 18, Leopold, 1949). It is a necessary farmer's capability because it fosters ties between people and land (see chapter 3, p. 20, Carlisle et al., Wittman).

4.1.2 Work Ethic

The general farmer's work ethic can be divided into three sub-categories: entrepreneurial spirit, craftsmanship and sense of property. The farmer has a special relationship with nature and her/his land, which requires a certain work ethic. This is why, becoming and performing the occupation of a farmer is more a vocation, than (solely) an occupation, according to Jefferson (see also chapter 2, p. 16).

1. Entrepreneurial Spirit

Another aspect which all farmer role models have in common is their sense of entrepreneurship. Their farming activities and hard work have to pay off in the end in order to secure their, as well as that of their families' existence. The functioning of entrepreneurial spirit is oftentimes publicly criticized, which becomes apparent through the media, meaning public discussions on TV, as well as in the newspapers (van der Ham, 2015; Schulte, 2015). The degree of entrepreneurial spirit varies among the different farmer role models. It seems oftentimes to be disregarded by the general public that farmers manage an agricultural 'company' (Strange, 1988, pp. 245–247 ; Thompson, 2008, pp. 19–21). Of course, I am aware that the term 'company' sounds a bit harsh in the context of the rather romantic picture the general public has in mind when it comes to agriculture and farming practices. However, farmers (also) need to focus on effective and efficient management of their resources at hand, in order to make a living from it (Thompson, 2008, pp. 19–21). Of course, some farmers lie they focus more on maximisation of profit, than others. Though, in the end nobody will become a farmer because of the prosperous chances of earning a fortune and receiving a high-esteemed status in society (Thompson, 2008, pp. 19–21).

'Entrepreneurial spirit', I classify as a functioning in the capability approach. It describes the 'doing' of managing a farming business. If this virtue is very dominant in a certain farmer role model, it may lead to questionable farming practices, as it merely focuses on efficiency measurements. For being able to apply the functioning of 'entrepreneurial spirit' it is necessary to put it in an appropriate context (see also chapter 3, p. 23 – Functioning). Thus, the particular farmer role model needs to have *phronesis* in order to evaluate specific situations with 'common farmer's sense', which means to apply life experience and situational appreciation in order to assess a certain situation. A specific example is the decision of putting more or fewer animals in a stable, considering animal welfare measurements (see also SFJV2, p. 13).

2. Craftsmanship

Technical automation and progress have made farmer's life much easier, however most of the farming job still is craftsmanship (see also chapter 2, p. 20, Carlisle, 2013). In the end, certain activities cannot be performed by machines and/or automatically, because it requires human empathy, patience, sensitivity and above all experience, certainly in dealing with land and animals (see also chapter 2, p. 16). That means that *phronesis* is required when dealing with the environment and sentient-beings.

The farmer is an expert when it comes to cultivation of land and animal husbandry (SFJV2, p. 23–4). He acquires this knowledge through (continuous) education and training, but also through experience and every day practice. This implies that the skills of discipline and diligence are among the necessary capabilities in order to successfully lead a farm (see also chapter 2, p. 19–20, Carlisle, 2013). Nowadays, the occupation of the farmer learned by means of theoretical and practical education through accredited institutions (for instance the German Chamber for Agriculture).

'Craftsmanship' can be classified as a 'doing'. It is a functioning, because it describes the ability of mastering farming practices. Developing this functioning through *phronesis* requires much effort. That means that people usually become farmers out of inner conviction (see also chapter 2, p. 17, quote Locke). They need to develop a special (close) relationship with land and animals by *phronesis*, thus through life experience as well as situational appreciation, in order to successfully grow and cultivate land and animals, respectively.

3. Sense of Property:

The capability of 'sense of property' should be understood in the Lockean sense, meaning 'mixing one's labour with the earth' (please see section 2.4.1 Agrarian Romanticism, p. 28). Here I elaborate on the debate of agricultural ethics, and in this context I also refer to Locke and his 'Second Treatise of Government'.) This is why the capability of 'sense of property' should be understood in a rather emotional sense, meaning to feel allegiance with one's piece of land.

At this point, in order to interpret the emotion of allegiance with one's piece of farming land and buildings. Normally, and also for the majority, the profession of a farmer is passed on through generations from mother and father to daughter and son. Though becoming a farmer also includes a profound theoretical education (see section 4.2.2 Craftsmanship, p. 39). It is

about handing over responsibility for a piece of land, which one cultivates (Thompson, 2010, p. 93).

I classify the farmer's virtue of 'sense of property' as a 'being' in Nussbaum's capability approach. For this purpose, it is a condition. In this sense, farmers are connected to their piece of land; more concrete, they feel responsible for it, and thus it is a choice to achieve a dignified human life, or dignified human farmer's life. Without any piece of land, the farmer could not be a farmer (see chapter 2, p. 16, Inge, 1969). The 'sense of property' is rather a necessary condition for 'flourishing' farming. The activity of farming can only take place, if there is some amount of property.

4.1.3 Environmental Ethic

In the context of environmental ethic, I primarily focus on the different farmer role models and their applied methods in tillage, soil cultivation. Herewith, I mean whether chemicals and artificial fertilizers are applied in grain cultivation. My assumption is that for instance the sustainable farmer makes use of artificial fertilizers etc. to cultivate his land, while the organic & ecological absolutely tries to avoid the application of artificial fertilizers. The three farmer role models differ greatly with regard to this virtue. All farmer role models care for their land, but in different ways. I will explain that in more detail, when I describe the ranking of this virtue of the three role models.

The virtue of environmental ethics, namely the 'depth of concern for the environment' can be sorted as a 'being'. It is a choice, which is necessary for a dignified human life, in the Nussbaumian sense. The conservation and the careful handling of the environment is a necessary farmer's virtue with respect to a dignified treatment of the environment, in general (see chapter 2, environmental ethics, p. 5). Conservation and careful handling of the environment should be interpreted as the avoidance of chemicals and artificial fertilizers in tillage.

4.1.4 Animal Ethic

Animals are part of God's creation. 'Wir sehen Tiere als Teil der Schöpfung.'^{xvi} That is, at least, what (German) farmers have written down in their association's (The Association of German Farmer's) mission statement. Farmers feel obliged to protect their animals and to

take care of them, and to (a certain extent) offer them (also) a life worth living according to the mission statement of the Association of German Farmers (German Farmer's Association, 2011). However, the (divergent) views on offering animals 'a life worth living' varies greatly between the three different farmer role-models.

Animals, at least (bred) domestic animals, are sensitive creatures, and that is why they need to be protected. All farmers, at least family farmers, agree to this (German Farmer's Association, 2011).

Animals do not equal products. Though, farm animals are defined in the German law on farm animal protection, as:

'Nutztiere: landwirtschaftliche Nutztiere sowie andere warmblütige Wirbeltiere, die zur Erzeugung von Nahrungsmitteln, Wolle, Häuten oder Fellen oder zu anderen landwirtschaftlichen Zwecken gehalten werden oder deren Nachzucht zu diesen Zwecken gehalten werden soll' (German Federal Ministry of Justice and Consumer Protection, 2001).

This is why breeding animals and rearing animals demands dedication, patience and time. It is a general obligation (German Federal Ministry of Justice and Consumer Protection, 2001), everybody who keeps animals, especially (bred) domestic animals, should treat animals never solely as means to an end (Skipiol, 2009). However there is no clear-cut demarcation between instrumental and inherent value of farm animals, this is why I offer in section 4.2 (p. 45) clear definitions which varies between the three different farmer role models. Additionally, in this regard, the German Farmer Association states in their mission statement, the following:

'Wir wissen, dass die Haltung von Nutztieren stets ein verantwortungsvolles Abwägen zwischen vielfältigen Anforderungen (z. B. Tierwohl, Umwelt- und Klimaschutz, Lebensmittelsicherheit, Wirtschaftlichkeit) bedeutet. Wir stellen uns dieser Verantwortung und fühlen uns dem Schutz der Tiere verpflichtet' (German Federal Ministry of Justice and Consumer Protection, 2001).

The breeding and production of animals should never be seen from a purely instrumental point of view, however in the end, the (intentional) use of animals represents the basis and starting point for all farmer role models. Though, the capability of depth of concern for individual animals varies greatly among the three, at least to a certain extent.

In this context, I quote Paul Schwennesen, a farmer himself. He wrote the 'Ethics of Ranching', and commented on the (intentional) use of animals as the natural order of life:

[...] humans exist as an element of the natural order and as such we behave according to the same ecological rules [...]. Every species exploits its environment; it is precisely this unmanaged resource that leads to the blossoming of life. What one species excretes is another's welcome treat. The relatively oxygen-rich atmosphere we enjoy today is the poisonous result of cyanobacterial 'off-gassing from the Archean' (Schmidtz, 2012, pp. 340–1).

For this reason, I sort the farmer's virtue of 'depth of concern for individual animals', as a being in the capability approach. It is a condition, instead of a functioning, because it specifies the relation of farmers with their (farming) animals. It is a necessary farmer's capability because it contributes to a dignified human life. The dignified treatment of animals, in a Kantian sense, in contrast to the instrumental use of animals, also leads to a dignified human life, in the end (please see chapter 2, animal ethic, p. 8).

4.1.5 Societal Surroundings

For the farmer and his family mutual recognition is of (great) importance. That means, on the one hand, the recognition he earns from society through his farming activities, but also, on the other hand, the societal responsibility the farmer fulfils, such as the educational aspect, as well as the conservation and care for the diversity of the (public goods) landscape.

I developed three virtues which describe the relationship of the farmer with his surroundings. These are 'societal status', 'societal reputation' and 'societal impact'.

1. Societal Status

By 'societal status', I mean, how the role model of the farmer, wants to be seen by the general public. The farmer attaches importance to his reputation in society (see also chapter 2, p. 16–18). He wants to be seen as an integral and important part of society, as he provides the population with healthy, nutritious and fresh food (see also chapter 2, p. 16–18).

2. Societal Reputation

Societal status is described from the perspective of the farmer, whereby societal reputation is from the perspective of society. This capability outlines how basically the public regards the

farmer, or better to say the role model of the farmer. Society has an ambivalent picture of the farmer, because on the one hand they appreciate her/his high-qualitative products (mostly at a favourable price) (such as meat, milk and eggs), but on the other hand they do have questions about and do not fully comprehend her/his farming practices.

The virtues of ‘societal status’ and ‘societal reputations’ are ‘being’s’ in the Nussbaumian capabilities approach. They describe the capability of having a choice (see also chapter 3, p. 23). The farmer, in general, should be treated as a respectful member of the (human) community. He is the one providing care of healthy, nutritious and fresh food. For the fulfilment of this societal task, he should be recognized by the public. Of course, the public should question him with regard to his farming practices, however thereby never neglecting his (individual) respect towards him as an individual.

3. Societal Impact

However, farmers fulfil two important societal functions with regard to the virtue of ‘societal impact’.^{xviii} First, farmers are responsible for the formation of the landscape surrounding us, at least in Western Europe. Farmers are important ‘conservationists’ of the societal landscape. In European Union (EU) terminology, the societal landscape is called ‘public goods’. Most of the times, the population of the EU is not aware of the fact, that farmers are responsible to keep our countryside ‘in shape’, which we are able to enjoy (Alons and Zwaan, 2015, p. 13).

On the other hand, farmers fulfil an important educational aspect, especially for children and young adults (Strange, 1988, p. 39). They teach the future generation how food is produced, and additionally what should be considered when dealing with the environment and animals. Not all farmers regard and value this aspect as equally important, nevertheless farmers, especially farms, are the institution which conveys (practical) knowledge about the environment and animals.

The virtue of ‘societal impact’ can be classified as a ‘doing’ in Nussbaum’s capability approach. It is a rather morally neutral category, since it is context dependant. Concretely it differs in the context of the different farmer role models (see also chapter 2, p. 20). Additionally, for the farmer, *phronesis*, life experience and situational appreciation, is necessary to apply its societal impact effectively. For instance, the farmer needs to get used to teach children about farming practices.

4.2 Theoretical Ranking Famer’s Virtues

Theoretical Ranking Farmer’s Virtues					
		Sustainable Farmer	Steward Farmer	Ecological & Organic Farmer	
Virtues:					
<u>1. Life Ethic</u>					
1.1	Simplicity	LOW	MEDIUM	HIGH	
1.2	Living acc. to the rhythm of nature	LOW	MEDIUM	HIGH	
1.3	Sense of Community	MEDIUM	HIGH	HIGH	
<u>2. Work Ethic</u>					
2.1	Entrepreneurial Spirit	HIGH	MEDIUM	LOW	
2.2	Craftsmanship	LOW	HIGH	HIGH	
2.3	Sense of Property	MEDIUM	HIGH	HIGH	
<u>3. Environmental Ethic</u>					
3.1	Depth of Concern for the Environment	LOW	MEDIUM	HIGH	
<u>4. Animal Ethic</u>					
4.1	Depth of Concern for Individual Animals	LOW	MEDIUM	HIGH	
<u>5. Societal Surroundings</u>					
5.1	Societal Reputation	LOW	MEDIUM	HIGH	
5.2	Societal Status	HIGH	MEDIUM	LOW	
5.3	Societal Impact	MEDIUM	HIGH	HIGH	

Table 4.2: Theoretical Ranking Farmer’s Virtues

In contrast to the previous section, where I explained the general farmer's virtues, in this section, I elucidate on the theoretical ranking of the various virtues of the different farmer role models. All farmer role models possess the general virtues explained in the previous section, however the degree – high, medium or low – varies between the three farmer role models. Here, I state reasons, why the particular farmer role models scores respectively high, medium or low on the particular virtue.

4.2.1 Life Ethic

1. Simplicity

The sustainable farmer is the one focusing (the most, compared to the other two farmer role models) on a low cost-price ratio. He is specialized in producing one or two main products, being meat, vegetables, milk, eggs or the like. That means he is to the least degree self-sufficient in establishing a closed-loop economy, and thus he is dependent on external suppliers, for instance^{xviii} (see also chapter 2, Agrarian Romanticism, p. 17, De Crevecoeur's quote).

The steward and especially the organic & ecological farmer are focused on a closed-loop economy, meaning that they strive for maximum degree of self-sufficiency with their farming activities. That means they e.g. cultivate their own fodder. They exclusively feed their animals with their own-produced fodder. They do not keep more animals than they can feed with their 'home-made' fodder. This is why the steward, as well as the organic & ecological farmer, has a more diverse farm structure, which means keeping various animals. This leads in the end to a higher degree of self-sufficiency, as they are to a less extent dependent on external sources (see also chapter 2, Agrarian Conservationism, p. 18).

Especially for the organic & ecological farmer, 'sufficiency' is central to his life style. His (rather) simple life style results from it. He only produces as much as his family needs to live a happy and fruitful life, not more, not less^{xix} (see also chapter 2, Agrarian Conservationism, p. 18).

My theoretical evaluation of the capability of simplicity is that the sustainable farmer has the least simple life-style (low), in terms of closed-loop economy, whereas the organic & ecological farmer has the most (high), and the steward farmer is in between those two. However, I state here, that the sustainable farmer ranks material status as more important, than the steward and organic & ecological farmer.

2. Living according to the rhythm of nature

The sustainable farmer handles this degree of uncertainty by making use of technological means (such as bigger machines, various fertilizers for plants and animals, precise forecast instruments, genetically modified plants and animals etc.), in order to exert a greater extent of control over these factors causing uncertainty. This is why the sustainable farmer is ranked low on the functioning of living according to the rhythm of nature, as he tries to affect and manipulate the natural rhythm of nature in order to exert more control over it (Sense about Science Organisation, 2015).

On the contrary the steward farmer is (only) to a certain degree receptive to make use of these technological means. He would refuse for example the application of genetically modified plants and animals, because it conflicts with the natural origin of God's creation. Therefore the steward farmer is ranked medium on this functioning (see chapter 2, Agrarian Conservationism, p. 18).

The organic & ecological farmer is the one who tries to live in harmony with nature, and tries to apply as few technological means as possible. He tries to apply agricultural methods and techniques that do not harm the environment, or at least he tries to decrease their (negative) effects to a minimum. He tries to find a rather integrated approach; he applies agricultural means that respect the natural environment in itself. Instead of using heavy and high-tech machines, he uses more simple agricultural tools to cultivate his soil. For this reason, he is ranked high on the functioning of living according to the rhythm of nature. For instance, he absolutely refuses the application of fertilizers for plants and animals, as well as genetically modified plants and animals (see chapter 2, Modern Forms of Agrarianism, p. 19; Carlisle, 2013, p. 139).

3. Sense of Community

For all farmer role models, meaning the sustainable-, the steward- and the organic & ecological farmer, the family bond, and therefore the sense of community is very important (Strange, 1988, p. 245). In all role models the family is one of the most important institutions. In the context of this thesis, the focus lays especially on family farming, as a consequence the bonds of community of the family play a special role, here (see chapter 2, Agrarian Conservationism, p. 18, Leopold, Berry, Jackson, Kirschenman, Taylor).

The sustainable farmer regards the family as important. However, he always has to seek the balance between compatibility of family affairs with operating efficiently with regard to her/his farm activities. The sense of community of the sustainable farmer is ranked medium.

For the steward farmer the family and more generally the community is an indispensable Christian value, which is stick to at all times. The family offers security and protection also in (economically) bad times. This is the reason, why the capability of sense of community is ranked high for the steward farmer (see chapter 2, p. 16, quote, Inge)

The organic & ecological farmer views the family as a central part of his life, as it is essential to his lifestyle. It is a pure form of community, in his eyes, in the sense that in close companionship with family members a common purpose is aspired. This common purpose is to live in a symbiosis with nature. Additionally, the organic & ecological farmer is (only) able to accomplish his farming activities together with family members, because he practices a more basic form of farming (see section on 'living according to the rhythm of nature', section 4.1.1.2, p. 36). As a consequence thereof, the capability of sense of community is also ranked high for the organic & ecological farmer.

4.2.2 Work Ethic

1. Entrepreneurial Spirit

Theoretically it is assumed, that the sustainable farmer role-model incorporates entrepreneurial spirit the most. He can also be described as a (kind of) agrarian businessperson. He is concerned with efficient and effective management of his resources at hand, and this requires a more economic orientation of his farm activities, this is why the functioning of entrepreneurial spirit is ranked high with the sustainable farmer (see chapter 2, Agrarian Conservationism, p. 18).

The steward farmer ranks economies of scale less important than the sustainable farmer. However, as his name already suggests, he is a steward, a manager of the divine (re-)sources on earth. From his farmer role model a certain degree of economic rationality is (even) expected (at least by Protestants), which is a necessary condition for the management of God's creation (see also section 2.4 Agricultural Ethics, p. 16, quote Inge). He works in order to keep God's creation in a good (or even better) condition. For example, he tries to avoid waste, at all times. Every resource should be used and/or re-used. However,

not every decision related to his farm activities are based on economic motives, thus he is ranked medium on the capability of entrepreneurial spirit.

The organic & ecological farmer is (absolutely) not orientated towards profit-maximization. He is focused on finding a balance, a symbiosis between giving and taking, between his farming activities and his natural environment. For this reason, the role model of the organic & ecological farmer is ranked low on the capability of entrepreneurial spirit at least this is the ideal we have in mind of the organic & ecological farmer (see also 4.3 Modern Forms of Agrarianism, p.19).

It should be noted, however, that all farmer role models have in common, that they possess the capability of entrepreneurial spirit to a certain extent, because they need to earn a living for their families from their farming activities (Strange, 1988, p. 245).

2. Craftsmanship

Craftsmanship should be interpreted in two ways. On the one hand, craftsmanship with regard to technical know-how and its implementation in agricultural practices; and on the other hand, craftsmanship concerning traditional agricultural methods for the cultivation of land and in animal husbandry. I interpret and rank craftsmanship based on the degree of implementation of traditional agricultural methods and practices. A (more) traditional approach is required to 'not lose (genuine) touch with' nature and land (see also 2.4.2 Agrarian Conservationism, p. 18–19, Berry, Jackson & Kirschenmann).

The sustainable farmer is ranked low on the functioning craftsmanship. He is ranked low in contrast to the steward- and organic & ecological farmer, who are both ranked high. It is assumed that the sustainable farmer makes (heavy) use of technological tools and means, as he has to efficiently and effectively run his farm business (see chapter 2, Modern Forms of Agrarianism, p. 19).

In contrast to the sustainable farmer, the organic & ecological farmer tries to cultivate his land and to raise his animals as much as possible with his 'hands'. Via this (hands-on) method the least impact on the environment is exerted, even though less work (with regard to the cultivation of land and animal husbandry) can be accomplished.

The steward farmer is, when it comes to the functioning of craftsmanship, rather conservative. That means, that he also makes use of technological tools and means, but he trusts more standard and (traditionally) proven tools, instead of relying on the latest and newest technological trends.

However, an important remark at this point is that all farmer role models make use of technological progress to a certain extent. This is indispensable with regard to staying competitive in the (European) agrarian sector and also with regard to reduction of the work load (Thompson, 2008, p. 38).

3. Sense of Property

In theory, the capability of sense of property of farming land and buildings is ranked medium with the sustainable farmer and high for both the steward- and organic & ecological farmer. For all farmer role models, their property, meaning not only land but also buildings, animals and plants, is of great significance, because they need to work hard in order to uphold it (see also section 2.4 Agricultural Ethics, p. 16, quote Inge) (see SFJV2, p. 8). Nevertheless, there is a difference between the three farmer role models, at least in theory, namely, because the sustainable farmer possesses (generally significantly) more property than the steward and/or the organic & ecological farmer, he has another connection to it, which can be described as not that close.

The organic & ecological farmer has a special and rather close relation to his property, because he tends it with his hands, at least he tries to avoid as much as external influence of machines and the like (see section 4.1.2.2 Craftsmanship p. 39).

4.2.3 Environmental Ethic

I start with the sustainable farmer. He is ranked low on the capability of depth of concern for the environment. He sees his land as means to an end, which is to produce fodder for his animals, input for his biogas plant, or just to sell his harvest/crops at the highest price (see chapter 2, section 2.1 Environmental Ethics, p. 5). Of course, it costs him a lot of time, patience, effort and hard work to cultivate his land, but he makes use of additional tools, such as fertilizers, technological innovations, in order to get 'the best', meaning the highest yields, out of his land. He has a certain relation to his land and also cares for his land, however this relationship is limited to the maximum yield, he can generate with it.

The steward farmer is ranked medium, with regard to this capability. He cares about his land, but also more in an instrumental sense, comparable with the sustainable farmer (see chapter 2, section 2.2 Animal Ethics, p. 9). However, I claim that the steward farmer has a greater concern for the environment, especially God's land, than the sustainable farmer. He is aware

of God's creation, and the need and urgency to preserve and improve the status of God's land. That is at least, what he sees as his main task, namely the task of himself as manager of God on earth to ensure the quality of the divine environment and more specifically his land. He differs from the organic & ecological farmer, in the sense that he still sees himself as superior to the environment. He is allowed by God to make use of the environment to his advantage.

The organic & ecological farmer is ranked high on the capability of depth of concern for the environment. This farmer role model deeply cares for the environment and its state. He does not see himself, in contrast to the other two farmer role models of the sustainable and the steward farmer, as superior to the environment and his land. He rather sees himself as a component of that very environment and his land (see chapter 2, p. 5–6). He tries to live in harmony with nature, which means that he tries to live self-sufficiently from the (natural) resources, the environment has to offer. To put it more concrete, it means that the organic & ecological farmer “ ‘ minimises resource-use, emphasises conservation and recycling, and avoids pollution and waste’ ” to the highest possible level (Dobson, 2007, p. 92). Additionally, that means on practical level, that he absolutely rejects the use of any fertilizer or other chemical enhancement tools. Instead, he rather treats his land with natural and traditional (tried and trusted) methods to enhance its yield.

4.2.4 Animal Ethic

The sustainable farmer is ranked low with regard to the capability of 'depth of concern for individual animals'. He sticks to the EU laws and regulations concerning animal welfare, however the EU laws and regulations are (publicly) regarded as minimum requirements for animal welfare. His care for his farm animals is restricted to, and should be put in the light of, the delivery of delicious, qualitative and thoroughly produced meat (Skipiol, 2009, pp. 37–9). It is only possible to produce qualitative and thoroughly produced meat, if the (housing-) conditions for farm animals are tolerable, meaning that farm animals have enough space, light, food, and appropriate medical treatment, as well as activity or entertainment. (Nevertheless, at the end of the day, he is not (primarily) concerned about the individual animal, but rather about the good 'product', the qualitative meat (Skipiol, 2009, pp. 37– 9).

The steward farmer is ranked medium (see table p. 54) concerning his capability of the depth of concern for individual animals. He sees animals as creatures of God. This is why, they deserve a respectful treatment and should not solely be regarded as a means to an end,

such as a/n 'meat/egg/milk-tree'. Central to the role model of the steward farmer is his (deep) respect for God's creation. He believes that for respectful treatment of farm animals, dedication, patience and passion (for his agricultural craftsmanship) are essential qualities. The steward farmer cares a great deal about animal welfare. His effort to create appropriate surroundings for his animals counteracts (sometimes) his overall productivity and efficiency (see chapter 2, Animal Ethics, p. 8). This is why he stands in contrast to the sustainable farmer, who (mostly) takes measurements to increase animal welfare, when it increases at the same time his productivity and efficiency. Compared to the ecological & organic farmer, the steward farmer regards animals as lower classified species. Ultimately, the human, at least according to the opinion of the steward and sustainable farmer, stands at the top of the natural hierarchy.

The organic & ecological farmer is ranked highest with regard to depth of concern for individual animals. He strives for a closed-loop economy, which means that he feeds his animals with his own grown food and he uses the (animal) excrement in the end to fertilize his land. Furthermore, he can be classified as an egalitarian (to a large extent, at least), which means that he sees animals and human beings as rather equal creatures (Dobson, 2007, p. 92). He perceives his well-being as important as the well-being of his animals, that is why he 'sacrifices' his (rare) leisure time to provide his animals a life worth living. Even though he is (more or less) an egalitarian, at least when it comes to the treatment of animals and land, he occasionally 'celebrates' the consumption of meat. He, personally, regards meat as a luxury product. He applies species appropriate agriculture, which means that he treats his animals with utmost care, and only applies agricultural methods to enhance the well-being of his animals (Dobson, 2007, p. 92). The organic & ecological farmer is ranked high on the capability of depth of concern for individual animals. His effort and commitment for animal welfare exceeds the one of the sustainable and steward farmer.

4.2.5 Societal Surroundings

1. Societal Reputation

The general public has an increasingly ambivalent relation to the farming practices of the sustainable farmer (van Dinther, 2014; van der Ham, 2015; Schulte, 2015; Singeling, 2015). On the one hand, they appreciate his products, being meat, milk and eggs, at a reasonable price; but on the other hand they (increasingly) disapprove publicly his (rather) 'modern' farming practices (see also 4.1.2.2 Craftsmanship, p. 39). He is publicly regarded as (merely)

acting in his vested interest, which is generating profit. For this reason this capability is ranked low.

The steward farmer enjoys compared to the sustainable farmer a slightly better reputation, because he does not (constantly) weigh his farming practices against economies of scale (see also 4.1 Agrarian Romanticism, p. 17, quote Jefferson). For this reason, the capability of societal reputation is ranked medium.

The organic & ecological farmer enjoys the highest reputation (among the general public). His farming practices are publicly regarded as the most genuine and sincere ones. He tries to establish farming practices which make him independent from external supplies, which means that he is not highly-specialized in (rather) one sort of farming – e.g. only raising one sort of animals, only producing milk, only producing eggs or only cultivating crops. His farm consists of many different animals, and she/he cultivates different plants, as well (see also 2.4.2 Agrarian Conservationism, p. 18–19). He does so, in order to increase his degree of independency and self-sufficiency (see also 2.4.2 Agrarian Conservationism, p. 18). He tries to farm ‘in harmony with nature’.

2. Societal Status

The sustainable farmer wants to be seen as the expert on food production, with regard to plant cultivation and animal husbandry, by the general public. He is the one responsible for ‘providing the population’ with fresh, qualitative, nutritious, reasonably-priced food. He thinks that he fulfils an important societal role which deserves a high degree of recognition (see also 2.4.1 Agrarian Romanticism, p. 18, quote Locke).

The steward farmer also attaches importance to the capability of his societal status. However, compared to the sustainable farmer, he does not ascribe as much importance as the sustainable farmer to the capability of his societal status. He is rather concerned with his ‘divine’ task, which is to organise/manage/administer God’s creation (see also 2.4.1 Agrarian Romanticism, p. 16).

The organic & ecological farmer does not care as much as the sustainable and the steward farmer about the capability of his societal status/recognition. As a matter of course, she/he is proud on his farming successes and achievements, as well. However, this farmer role model does not value the capability of societal status/recognition simply as that important (see section 2.4.3 Modern Forms of Agrarianism, p. 19).

3. Societal Impact – Public Goods – School

The sustainable farmer intends to exert a positive societal impact with his farming practices. First, he sees himself as an ‘maintenance’/conservation-institution. His *functioning* is to conserve and cultivate the ‘natural’ landscape surrounding us (Alons and Zwaan, 2015) (see also section 2.4.1 Agrarian Romanticism, p. 16). Additionally, he attaches importance to the agricultural education of children and young adults. He wants to impart and pass knowledge to children and young adults. He is of the opinion that they should get a (realistic) picture of (modern) farming. He wants to promote the occupation of the (conventional) farmer, as well. The agricultural sector suffers from a lack of (highly-educated) personnel, already for years (Agrarheute.com, 2014). He exerts these *functionings*, ‘charity’ activities, by having a hidden agenda in mind. In the end, these ‘charity’ activities should contribute to his net profit in the end. He is ranked medium with regard to this *functioning*. Even though he wants to conserve the ‘natural’ landscape, and wants to actively promote the occupation of the farmer, he (still) is concerned about his (financial) performance, in the end.

The role model of the steward farmer sets both activities, conservation and cultivation of the ‘societal’/public landscape, as well as the educational aspect of her/his exemplary role for society high on his agenda (see also 2.4 Agricultural Ethics, p. 16, Inge’s quote). His inner protestant conviction views these charity *functionings* as highly important. He believes that society profits in a positive sense from his charity activities (see also 4.1 Agrarian Romanticism p. 28, De Crevecoeur and Jefferson). For this reason this farmer role model is classified as high on this functioning.

Like, the steward farmer, the organic & ecological farmer is also of the opinion that these two societal activities, *functionings*, are very important. The environment, ‘nature’ is the highest good for him. For this reason, he does everything in his power to ensure the conservation and cultivation of the ‘societal’/public landscape, as well as, educate future generations to respectfully treat the environment and its creatures (see also 2.4.3 Modern Forms of Agrarianism, p. 19–20). That is why the organic & ecological farmer is also ranked high with regard to this farmer’s functioning.

4.3 Reality Check Farmer's Virtues

Reality Check Farmer's Virtues					
		Sustainable Farmer	Steward Farmer	Ecological & Organic Farmer	
Representative:		Mr. Johannes Venne	Ms. Judith van Dijk	Mr. Wilhelm Gerwin	
Virtues:					
<u>1. Life Ethic</u>					
1.1	Simplicity	MEDIUM/LOW	MEDIUM	LOW/MEDIUM	
1.2	Living acc. to the rhythm of nature	LOW	LOW	MEDIUM	
1.3	Sense of Community	HIGH	MEDIUM	HIGH	
<u>2. Work Ethic</u>					
2.1	Entrepreneurial Spirit	HIGH	MEDIUM	HIGH/MEDIUM	
2.2	Craftsmanship	LOW	MEDIUM	LOW	
2.3	Sense of Property	HIGH	MEDIUM	HIGH	
<u>3. Environmental Ethic</u>					
3.1	Depth of Concern for the Environment	LOW/MEDIUM increase of awareness	MEDIUM	MEDIUM	
<u>4. Animal Ethic</u>					
4.1	Depth of Concern for Individual Animals	LOW/MEDIUM increase of awareness	HIGH	MEDIUM	
<u>5. Societal Surroundings</u>					
5.1	Societal Reputation	LOW	MEDIUM/LOW	HIGH	
5.2	Societal Status	HIGH	MEDIUM	MEDIUM	
5.3	Societal Impact	MEDIUM	HIGH	MEDIUM	

Table 4.3: Reality Check Farmer's Virtues

In this section I will conduct the so-called reality check. I will examine whether the theoretical virtues I have associated with each farmer role model also exist in reality, in order to prove a two-fold purpose. First, I will check whether the theoretical virtues I ascribed to each farmer role model also match with real-life virtues of the three farmer role models. Second, I will prove whether my virtue ethical framework is appropriate to research farmer role models, not only in theory, but also in practice. Hence, I am able to state that virtue ethical behaviour, at least of family farmers in Western Europe, can be analysed and evaluated in real life cases with the help of this virtue ethical framework.

I do so by conducting interviews with each farmer role model. That means, that (political philosophical) theory and reality of the various farming virtues do not necessarily have to comply with each other. In fact, this difference leads to interesting findings of and insights into the associated farming virtues. Herein I see the scientific relevance of my thesis: the combination of theories and real-life examples and the demonstration of their differences and similarities to society, governments, (European) institutions, policy makers, citizens and farmers themselves. It is absolutely relevant and necessary to explore the empirical reality of farming activities in order to assess whether society and its members have not lost connection with each other.

On this basis a new public debate can be opened up about appropriate farming virtues from an all-round perspective thus including farmers, citizens and policy-makers. It is highly relevant to perform this exercise, because my research has the potential to bridge the gap between society and agricultural practices in the 21st century.

I will start with the already known structure: the evaluation of the interview with the sustainable farmer, then the steward farmer and last the organic & ecological farmer.

Case Justification

I chose to interview the representatives of the different farmer role models for two reasons. First, they seem apparently to fit to the respective farmer role model, and second, from an organisational point of view. To find appropriate candidates, I made use of my (international) network, in the Netherlands and in Germany. However, the interviews are not intended to make a comparison between the Dutch farmer's virtues and the German ones, but to get a Western European picture on farmers' virtues in general.

I chose the method of open individual oral interviews, for the purpose of getting more in-depth information and differing views and opinions on farmers' virtues, in general. For this

purpose, the method of interviewing fitted the best with the purpose of my research, which is to prove whether a virtue ethical framework can be applied in theory as well as in practice.

At this point, it should be noted that my research – the virtue ethical framework, I have developed – is not suitable for every farmer worldwide. It is in fact a framework which is appropriate for an initial test with some representatives of the different farmer role models, in the Western European context. It links the different farmer role models with the corresponding virtues.

Overview Farmer Representatives

Overview Farmer Representatives						
Farmer Role Model		Personal Description Representative Farmer Role Model	Location	Animals	Land	Renewable Energy Production
1.	The Sustainable Farmer Interview Code: SFJV1 & SFJV2	Mr. Johannes Venne Age: 29 Marital Status: married Children: 0 Confessional Status: Roman Catholic Nationality: German	Germany, NRW, Sünninghausen	Pigs: 700 Poultry: 80.000 Diary Cows: 80 Cattle/Bull Fattening: xx	80 hectare (ha)	3 Wind Turbines xx Solar Installation
2.	The Steward Farmer Interview Code: StFJvD	Ms. Judith van Dijk Age: 25 Marital Status: unmarried Children: 0 Confessional Status: Orthodox Calvinist Nationality: Dutch	The Netherlands, Overijssel, Den Ham	Diary Cows: 100 Young (Diary) Cows/Calves: 60	55 ha Permanent Pasture	
3.	The Organic & Ecological Farmer Interview Code: OFWG	Mr. Wilhelm Gerwin Age: 27 Marital Status: unmarried Children: 0 Confessional Status: Roman Catholic Nationality: German	Germany, NRW, Oelde	Pigs: 250 Cattle/Bull Fattening: 120 Laying Hens: 200	180 ha - 35 ha Permanent Pasture - 145 ha Cereal Production	xx Solar Installation

Table 4.4: Overview Farmer Representatives

4.3.1 The Sustainable Farmer – Mr. Johannes Venne

Mr. Johannes Venne was chosen as the representative of the sustainable farmer. He, together with his father, and their family, manages their farm.

1. Life Ethic

Mr. Venne chose to become a farmer because he wants to adopt the lifestyle of his role model. He sees his parents and their life style as his personal role model.

'[...] Ich hab mich dafür entschieden. Ich habe da auch lange darüber nachgedacht, ne, was sind z. B. meine Vorbilder? Ja, und dann hab ich darüber nachgedacht und dann hab ich mir gedacht ... Alle haben ja früher Michael Schumacher, und den und den Star, aber eigentlich sind meine Eltern meine Vorbilder. So wie die mir das vorleben, und ich finde, dass sie es gut vorgelebt haben und so möchte ich das auch gerne weiter vorleben. Vielleicht ist das auch ein bisschen, weil man aufm Land konservativer ist, weil man nicht jeden Trend mitkriegt und nicht alles das mitmacht, was sich nicht bewährt hat.' (StFJV2, p. 8)

For Mr. Venne the family plays a central role in his farming activities. Everybody, meaning parents, children, partner and grand-children, have their tasks to fulfil in order to keep the (farming) business running. Furthermore, he is of the opinion that being a farmer is the perfect occupation to combine family life with work life. It is possible to combine both ends, as farming activities take normally place close to the farmer's own home, and one is able to decide on his own how to allot his time.

For instance, Mr. Venne states:

'Wir sind ein Familienbetrieb. Haben zwei Festarbeitskräfte mein Vater und ich und halt alle anderen müssen mithelfen – Geschwister, Partner, Mutter. Mutter macht Haushalt, auch sehr wichtig. Ja was haben wir noch, ungefähr 80ha Ackerbau, 700 Schweine, 80 Milchkühe mit Nachzucht und eigener Bullenmast, Fleckviehkühe ...' [...] auch in schlechten Zeiten nen Familienbetrieb, der arbeitet weiter, wenn so ein anderer Betrieb, son eh Aktien, oder son ne Genossenschaft, die sieht ja zu, dass sie die höchste Wertschöpfung immer runter kriegt.' (SFJV, p. 3)

2. Work Ethic

He sees himself as an expert in the area of animal husbandry and plant cultivation. He has a sound education in agriculture.

'Meister. Fachschule. [...] Agrarbetriebswirt. Staatlich geprüfter Agrarbetriebswirt.' (SFJV2, p. 28)

In more detail, he first completed an agricultural apprenticeship, and then finished his degree on agricultural business administration. Furthermore, he continuously attends (additional) training in order to keep pace with technological innovations with regard to animal husbandry and plant cultivation. Nevertheless, he emphasized that the most knowledge has been acquired on-the-job. Mr. Venne is a good example for the Aristotelian concept of *phronesis* (see also chapter 3, p. 26), because he stresses that life experience is very important to perform his job. This is why, he asks from the general public to trust him and his experience. The general public is (always) invited to take a look at his facilities/premises (animals and land) themselves to exchange thoughts/opinions and to form their own opinion.

Furthermore, he underlines the importance of sustainable and durable (stable) buildings. His personal motivation is to build stables or buildings in general, which last also for future generations and are easily adaptable to changing conditions with regard to technical progress and stricter environmental standards and regulations.

'[...] ich wollte das gerne weiter entwickeln. Klar, man ist auch Unternehmer, man will auch Geld verdienen. Aber wir investieren anders, wie andere Leute. Wir investieren in Nachhaltigkeit.' (SFJV2, p. 8)

'Wir bauen Gebäude, die halt längerwertig sind.' *'[...] Produktionsgebäude, und für uns ist das Eigentum eh, ja was wofür man lange gestanden hat, oder? [...].'* (SFJV2, p. 8)

'[...] unsere deutsche Mentalität zur Landwirtschaft anders ist, weil du einfach ... den Betrieb sehe ich als Leihgabe. Ich kriege den von meinem Vater [...].' (SFJV2, p. 12)

3. Environmental Ethic incl. in-text citation

On the level of environmental ethics, Mr. Venne is not aware of the difference in anthropocentrism and ecology. His definition of sustainability is a mere anthropocentric one, instead of an ecological one.

First, he understands the notion of sustainability as, for instance, constructing long-lasting well-constructed buildings that his children can also benefit from, if they decided to continue his farming business.

‘Wir investieren in Nachhaltigkeit. Wir bauen Gebäude, die halt längerwertig sind.’ (SFJV2, p. 8)

At the same time, he questions the standards of newly built stable buildings with regard to environmental protection, such as farmyard smell. He thinks, that too much energy is wasted by cleaning-techniques.

‘Ja, wir können nen Luftwäscher und allen Tröt machen, ist ja alles da (26:22min), bloss obs nachher dem ökologischen Fortschritt bringt. Das weiss ich mittlerweile nicht, weil einfach zu viel Energie wieder, in die ‘saubermach’ und ‘reinmach’ Techniken investiert wird, die am Ende, glaub ich, nicht zielführend sind.’ (SFJV2, p. 21)

Second, he tries with his farming activities to produce as much food for his animals as possible by himself, rather than purchasing it from external parties. His intention is to establish a closed-loop economy, thus not having to depend on food suppliers, but rather feeding his own self-grown crops. He emphasizes the logistics of food supplies have a (huge) negative impact on the environment, which he tries to reduce as much as possible.

‘Ja weil die Transportkosten. Ja, das Futter hat einfach zu wenig Energie, auf nen Kilo, auf ne Tonne, ne. Du fährst halt viel Masse durch die Gegend. [...]’ (SFJV2, p. 7)

Third, he produces energy with his solar installation, as well as with his wind turbines. For him, this activity of green energy production^{xx} is, in a sense, being sustainable, because he produces energy from renewable energy.

4. Animal Ethic

He cares for his animals. His professional and private interest is that, if animals feel well, they also perform better. Better performance in this case is measured by producing better milk and better meat. He realizes, that if he has, for instance, less poultry in one stable, the stress level of the animals is lower, which (in the end) contributes to their health. Through phronesis, life experience and situational appreciation, he developed a better ‘connection’ to his animals, and is more aware what contributes to their well-being.

'Denn wenn ich z. B. meinem Vater sage, z. B. bei den Hähnchen so ein Beispiel. Früher haben wir mehr Tiere reingepackt pro Quadratmeter, war auch erlaubt. Bloss ich sage jetzt, ich pack weniger rein, dann hab ich weniger Ärger. Einfach mehr Platz, weniger Stress. Und das sind solche Sachen, da lernt man einfach raus. Bloss, wenn jetzt, ich sag jetzt nochmal 10 Jahre, dann haben wir alle statt 0,75 m² pro Schwein, 9 m² pro Schwein, einfach diesen Platz und irgendwann sagen se, ist gar nicht so doof. Die haben jetzt mehr Platz, die haben weniger Stress. Das wird alles kommen. [...]' (SFJV2, p. 14)

Nonetheless, he is of the opinion that food, such as meat, should be sold at a favourable price. Therefore, the production of food should in either case contribute to animal welfare as well as to the efficient and effective management of resources.

'[...] Ich denke Mobilität ist, denk ich so wie Nahrungsmittel, es muss billig sein, und schnell und zuverlässig.' (SFJV2, p. 15)

Additionally, he is of the opinion, that it is about time, the government clearly communicated their vision and standards on animal husbandry.

„Klare Ziele geben, was eh von der Politik gefordert ist oder gewollt ist und von der Gesellschaft. Man kann ja nicht den Landwirten Massentierhaltung vorwerfen, und im Gegenzug sagen, wir wollen ja bessere Lebensmittel, aber man bezahlt die nicht und holt sich dann Billigimporte ausm Ausland rein.' (SFJV2, p. 21)

5. Societal Surroundings

Mr. Venne is aware of his 'bad' reputation. He feels personally affected by the public criticism concerning his farming practices. His opinion is that citizens are not well informed and do not know what it means to be a farmer. They do not comprehend, and are not interested in comprehending, his motives for taking certain decisions with regard to animal husbandry and plant cultivation.

„Ich denke einfach, weil wir uns auch mit unserem Tun und Handeln auch so identifizieren, fühlen wir uns auch jeder medialen Kritik sehr stark persönlich betroffen.' (Interview 2 Mr. J. Venne, p. 23)

„Ich glaub, das kann man den Leuten nicht beibringen. Das ist sehr schwer, die sagen z. B. ja ja. Ich seh's ja z. B., die Leute, die hier auf den Hof kommen. Die gucken sich dann und ja dann schön und schön, und dann hauen sie wieder ab. Aber die ganze Arbeit, die gemacht werden muss, das sehen die Leute gar nicht. [...]' (Interview 2 Mr. J Venne, p. 23)

„Ja, erst sagen sie ja, und dann sagen sie ... Menschen sind so, wenn die nen Gesicht zu dem Produkt haben, dann werden die so, dann auch einmal mit den Leuten gesprochen haben, dann glaub ich, dass sie dann erst die Meinung ändern und nicht diese scheiss Werbekacke, wo die mit Zeitung, die schönen grünen Wiesen, und da laufen dann die Kühe auf der Wiese. [...]“ (SFJV2, p. 24)

He cares about his environment, in the broadest sense. He does not want to impose a burden on his surroundings and (close) environment with his farming activities. This is why, he respects and takes into account the requests of his (direct) neighbourhood.

„Zum Beispiel, die Hähnchen, normal müsste ich sagen, müssten da noch zwei Ställe dabei, aber sozial wüsste ich, dass mich dein meine Nachbarn aufhängen würden. Ja, und das ist dann immer, man geht da solche Kompromisse ein.“ (SFJV2, p. 10)

He strives for an open dialogue with his surroundings about his agricultural endeavour. Here, the concept of *phronesis* (see also chapter 3, p. 27) comes back in again, consisting of life experience and situational appreciation. In this case, Mr. Venne wants to open up the dialogue with society, politics and citizens, in order to eventually find a mutual solution contributing to the welfare of animals, a more sustainable environment, comprehension of citizens as well as himself, in the end. He wants the government and policy makers to develop an applicable solution for him and society, instead of only blaming him for wrong farming practices.

„[...] die erste Akzeptanz verlange ich von der Politik, weil das sind die Leute, die vorweg gehen und sagen wo das Land hin soll.“ (SFJV2, p. 25)

„Die müssen einfach ne Bindung zu ihrem Bauern, hört sich doof an, aber die müssen ne Bindung zu ihrem Bauern, Vertrauen zu uns haben, das wir die Sache gut machen. So wie wir zu den Lehrern, da müssen wir ja auch Vertrauen zu haben. Es gibt ja immer Meinungsverschiedenheiten, ohhh ja das find ich nicht gut, ja aber dann muss man ja auch fragen, wie soll ich es denn sonst machen, oder wie kann man das besser machen.“ (SFJV2, p. 24)

„Ja, ich kann ja auch nicht sagen, du bist scheisse, was soll ich dagegen tun. Ja, mach das und das anders, dann biste gut. Ja, und dann ist das so, aber man kann immer Leute, oder generell, oder egal welche Branche. Man muss sagen, was man von der will, und auch ehrlich, und ich weiss, dass man damit keine Wahlen gewinnen kann. Wenn alle Leute wüssten, das ist jetzt die Marschrichtung, da wollen wir hin, und das wollen wir erreichen in unserm Land ist das, glaub ich für viele Leute einfacher, als eh, ohhh, was kommt jetzt, die Grünen, wieder tausend Vorschriften und noch mehr Bürokratie. [...]“ (SFJV2, p. 21)

4.3.2 The Steward Farmer – Ms Judith van Dijk

Ms. Judith van Dijk was chosen as the representative for the steward farmer. She, together with her father, manages their farm. She is raised in a very Protestant-Calvinistic way. For this reason, I chose her to serve as a representative of the role model of the steward farmer.

1. Life Ethic

Ms. van Dijk chose to become a farmer, because, for her personally, that is the work, which fulfills her the most. She holds a Master's degree in Animal Science from Wageningen university (the Netherlands). The occupation of a farmer, she chose very carefully. She enjoys caring for her animals, and being outside. Furthermore, she is of the opinion that she, together with her father, performs a very important societal task, which is to provide the Dutch population with fresh, high-qualitative and nutritious food, more concrete, being milk.

[...] Dat ik mee verantwoordelijk ben voor de voedselproductie in Nederland, zeg maar, he, en dat ik dat met heel veel zorg kan doen, dat vind ik wel, na daar kan ik denk ik meer uithalen, dan een bedrijfsbaan, zeg maar. (StFJvD, p. 4)

[...] omdat ik er trots op ben, ook wel. Ik vind dat we het goed doen, zeg maar. (StFJvD, p. 13)

She is raised by her parents in a (very) Protestant-Calvinistic way. Especially the fairly calvinistic values of hard work, not complaining, being satisfied and content with the own status, being modest are internalized by Ms. van Dijk, since her early childhood. She emphasizes that these religious beliefs are necessary skills to coop with her farming activities. On this basis, I also chose her to serve as a representative of the role model of the steward farmer.

[...] vanuit je geloof, moet je zeg maar, vanuit je calvinistische instelling moet je, hard werken, niet klagen, ehhe, tevreden zijn met wat je hebt, ehhe nou dat een beetje. (StFJvD, p. 13)

For her, similar to Mr. Venne's views, farming is a social (family) activity. Nonetheless, she interprets it in a different manner. For her not every family member has to be (actively and directly) involved in farming affairs, but parents, partners, children have to support her in her farming business, and show understanding for her choice to become a farmer, (and associated therewith her limited leisure-time).

[...] hij moet veel huishouden doen op zaterdag, omdat ik dan gewoon op de boerderij ben. Op die manier, zeg maar, helpt hij meer mee, dan ehhh op de boerderij zelf. (StFJvD, p. 4)

2. Work Ethic

Ms. van Dijk's aim is to further optimize business processes at her farm. She does not want the farm to grow in (large) numbers of dairy cows, but she wants to organise as well as modernize some farming activities for facilitation of farming processes.

We hebben nu 100 koeien, we willen graag 120 koeien. Dus een klein beetje groeien. En dan zou ik graag, ehhh, een melkroboter willen aanschaffen [...]. (StFJvD, p. 5)

[...] Ja maar ik denk, als je het met 100 koeien niet kan, of zeg maar niet kan verdienen, dan kan je dat met 400 ook niet, snap je. (StFJvD, p. 8)

[...] ik ken nu al die koeien. Dus, als ik in de wei loop, zeg maar, dan kan ik dus allemaal zo aanwijzen. Dan kan ik je iets over vertellen, maar als ik er 400 heb, dan kan dat niet meer. (StFJvD, p. 9)

She is proud of her work and sees it as her duty (in a positive sense) to carry on the farming activities of her father. She wants her father to be proud of her and her work on the farm.

Even so, her farm approach differs from the one of her father, because she pays first more attention to the individual well-being of 'her' cows. She is more prone to administer medicine (painkillers) to 'her' cows, for instance.

[...] ik geef koeien veel eerder een pijnstiller, als ik denk dat ze niet heel lekker in hun vel zitten, en pijnstiller is best wel duur, maar als ik denk, dat zon koei daarmee gebaat is, zeg maar, dan geef ik dat bijvoorbeeld eerder. (StFJvD, p. 20)

Second, she wants to reorganize their farm to a more environmental-friendly one. Her plan for the future is to become a organic-certified farm. Nonetheless, she thinks it is difficult to earn the organic-certified status for her farm, with regard to the strict rules and regulations, as well as bureaucratic 'burdens'.

3. Environmental Ethic

Ms. van Dijk's intention is to make the switch from conventional agricultural practices to organic ones with regard to the implementation of fertilizers (mentioned already in the section on Life Ethic). Her father sticks to the conventional agricultural practice, however she wants to reorganise it to organic ones. However she points out, that she does not have profound knowledge to implement it. She, first, needs to get more acquainted with the practices of organic farming in general. Nevertheless, she realizes that it is not easy to comply with all the Dutch laws and regulations concerning organic farming, this is why she doubts to accomplish it (rather) short-term.

In de biologische sector pakken ze dat beter aan, de gebruik van kunstmest. (StFJvD, p. 20)

Het principe van biologisch vind ik in de melkveehouderij heel mooi, omdat ze echt denken, in cirkels denken, zeg maar. Koei, grond, milieu; koei, grond, milieu, dat staat allemaal heel erg in verbinding. (StFJvD, p. 20)

[..] mijn vader absoluut niet zonder kunstmest wil. We zitten zo ingebakken, zeg maar, ik kan het gewoon nog niet. Je moet je land op een heel andere manier gaan managen, zeg maar. Dat heb ik gewoon nog niet in de fingers. (StFJvD, p. 21)

4. Animal Ethic

She cares for her animals, 'her cows', to a great extent. She wants to offer them 'a life worth living'. She even emphasizes that especially dairy cows, do not have such a long life expectancy. Their life expectancy is circa five to seven years, because of their 'topsport' presentation of maximum milk production every day.^{xxi} The van Dijks (Ms. van Dijk junior and Mr. van Dijk senior) both agreed upon to not solely focus on the milk production of a specific dairy cow, but to see the animal in its holistic entity. That means, that they focus on the well-being of the individual cow in general, and not solely focus on its maximum milk output, in order to increase their life expectancy. Ms. van Dijk emphasizes that she is responsible for the well-being of every individual cow on her farm. For her this is a great task, which she wants to carry out with an utmost sense of responsibility.

[...] En eh, dat we ook met heel veel liefde voor ons dieren op gaan, zeg maar. Dat we dingen niet zonder reden doen. En dat ik ook gewoon het beste voor mijn koeien wil, zeg maar. (StFJvD, p. 19)

Additionally, she, similar to Mr. Venne, follows the same 'philosophy', which is, that she is convinced that animals only 'produce' high-qualitative meat, milk or either eggs, if they feel at ease and are raised in a comfortable setting.

5. Societal Surroundings

She is frustrated of the picture the general public has about farming, and especially dairy farming. In the media (for instance broadcasting: Zembla uitzending – ‘De topsporters van de melkindustrie’ – 27th of May 2015) dairy farmers are presented as being an economically driven exploiter. This broadcasting especially showed a very biased covering of the facts, and did not include the perspective of farmers themselves.

[...] Die (Zembla uitzending – ‘De topsporters van de melkindustrie’ – 27th of May 2015) heeft een reputatie over de melkveehouderij, nou en daar waren we echt economische uitbouter, zeg maar. Deze aflevering die kan ik niet uitkijken, daar wordt ik zo gefrustreerd van, zeg maar. (StFJvD, p. 13)

Then again, she partly understands the increasing criticism of the general public, because the agricultural system has been established with the agenda of maximum output in every area, meaning meat-, milk- and egg production. She is also of the opinion that it is about time to re-think traditional and existing agricultural system.

[...] Aan de ene kant, eh, het klinkt misschien raar, maar de burgers, hebben ergens misschien een klein beetje gelijk. Zeg maar, zo onze melkkoeien, zeg maar, de worden over het algemeen niet heel oud, hehehe. Zoals in de natuur, zeg maar, kunnen ze makkelijk 10 of 15 jaar worden, en in de Nederlandse melkveehouderij gebeurt dat gewoon niet. (StFJvD, p. 10)

Her vision is, that her ‘stable-doors’ are always open for interested citizens. She thinks, that citizens do have the right to know where their ‘milk’ comes from. For this reasons, she likes the aspect of informing interested citizens, and especially children about the life and the work on a farm. She views it as very important that citizens make their own picture from farming activities, but also pose questions regarding her work method, for example. She wants to tell an honest ‘story’ to interested citizens, as she believes that this is the only way to gain (back) citizens’ trust in agriculture.

[...] En ik denk, dat je, eh, het imago kan verbeteren door aan beide kanten een eerlijk verhaal te vertellen, want is zie mijn koeien ook het liefste blij in de wei, maar door het systeem, zeg maar, lukt dat gewoon niet. En als je dat goed kan uitleggen, zonder in extremen te gaan, denk ik dat je heel veel wint. (StFJvD, p. 12)

[..] Dat we inderdaad geld moeten verdienen met onze koeien en dat we soms echt economische keuzes maken en dat we soms ook dingen doen, die misschien wel op

welzijnsgebied niet ideaal zijn, maar dat we dat ook niet leuk vinden om te doen. En eh, dat we ook met heel veel liefde voor ons dieren op gaan, zeg maar. Dat we dingen niet zonder reden doen. En dat ik ook gewoon het beste voor mijn koeien wil, zeg maar. (StFJvD, p. 19)

4.3.3 The Organic & Ecological Farmer – Mr. Wilhelm Gerwin

I chose Mr. Wilhelm Gerwin, as a representative of the organic and ecological farmer, because he, together with his father, runs an organic farm.

1. Life Ethic

In the 1990s Mr. Gerwin's parents decided to turn to organic agriculture. He characterizes them as 'open-minded thinkers', who wanted to deploy less 'chemistry', such as artificial fertilizers, in their farming practices. They received funding and subsidies from the European Union.

Ca. 1990 wurde ein Förderprogramm aufgelegt und da ist mein Vater eingestiegen. Aufgrund der Größe des Betriebs, stand mein Vater vor der Entscheidung komplett aufzuhören oder auf biologischen Anbau umzusatteln. Wenn wir damals z.B. 500 oder 1000 Mastschweine gehabt hätten, wären wir in einen Bereich gewesen, in dem man nicht alles auf Bio umgestellt hätte. Aber eben gerade wegen unserer Größe und vor allem der Starthilfe durch die Subventionen sowie der Einstellung meiner Eltern, die sozusagen Querdenker waren, Wert auf biologischen Anbau gelegt haben und nicht immer Chemie einsetzen wollten, haben wir auf biologischen Anbau umgestellt. (OFWG, p. 3)

Mr. Gerwin is now junior-chief, and manages their farm together with his father. Their farm consists of pigs, cattle, laying hens, as well as different forms of plant cultivation. He attended no special education in organic agriculture. He rather completed an apprenticeship in conventional agriculture and studied agricultural business administration. The reason for doing so is that he thinks to learn from both perspectives of agriculture. He is able to use insights from either method in order to improve his agricultural practices. Nevertheless, he, himself claims, that he only continues with organic agriculture as long as he is able to sustain his and his family's life with this farming practice. If he is not able to sustain himself and his family by his organic farm activities, then he is going to make the switch to conventional agriculture.

Ich finde den ökologischen Landbau gut, verschließe mich dem konventionellen Anbau aber nicht. Ich bin nicht ‚verheiratet‘ mit Öko, sondern schaue auch auf die Zahlen. Wenn ich mit Öko rote Zahlen schreiben würde und kein Geld verdienen würde, würde ich wahrscheinlich in den konventionellen Anbau wechseln oder eine Betriebsteilung einleiten. (OFWG, p. 3)

Organic farmers have to stick to strict EU laws and regulations, as well as national laws and regulations. They are supervised and controlled on a regular basis, and have to proof that they stick to these rules and regulations, at any time. These regular controls are conducted because organic farming is subsidised by the German state. The government has to ensure whether taxpayer's money is spent carefully. There are two forms of subsidies for organic farming, one is for animals husbandry, and one is for plant cultivation. Organic farmers are subsidised per hectare soil, they possess.

Die Förderung macht alleine schon ca. 50% des Gewinns [...] aus. [...] Genau, es gibt eine Förderung pro Hektar. Zusätzlich gibt es noch Förderungen, falls du deine Tiere z.B. auf Stroh hältst. [...] Nein, nachdem die Bullenprämie u.ä. abgeschafft wurden, wurden diese zusätzlichen Forderungen auferlegt, z.B. Festmist oder vielfältige Fruchtfolge. Vielfältige Fruchtfolge heißt, dass du mindestens 5 verschiedene Getreidearten in der Fruchtfolge haben. Ich glaube auch Leguminosen, also Hülsenfrüchte, Stickstoffsammler. [...] Der Großteil der Förderung wird allerdings pro Hektar geleistet. [...] Der Verbraucher muss bereit sein, für das Kilo Fleisch das doppelte zu bezahlen. Unterstützer argumentieren, dass sie für das artgerechte Halten der Tiere und dafür, dass z.B. keine Spritzmittel eingesetzt werden, bereit sind, das doppelte zu bezahlen. Oder z.B. auch dafür, dass die Flächen nicht überdüngt werden, also das der chemische Dünger nicht auf den Acker verteilt wird. (OFWG, p. 6)

Du hast 1x pro Jahr die Ökokontrolle. Und Kontrollen von der Landwirtschaftskammer: Vielfältige Fruchtfolge, Prüfungen, ob wirklich entsprechende Früchte angebaut werden. Z.B. wird der Anbau von Leguminosen, Ackerbohnen, jedes Jahr geprüft. Die letzten 2 oder 3 Jahre wurde wir jedes Jahr kontrolliert, ist aber abhängig vom Betrieb. Dann hast du Festmist-Prüfungen. Dazu werden die Ställe ausgemessen und die Anzahl der Tiere geprüft, da jedes Tier einen bestimmten Raum haben muss. (OFWG, p. 5)

2. Work Ethic

Mr. Gerwin's working days start 5am in the morning, and do not end before 9pm in the evening, especially, during summer time. On top of the 'normal' farm business, the harvest

season falls is during summer period (during July and August), as well, which entails additional workload.

He says, if you would like to become a farmer, you need to be passionate about it, because the occupation of a farmer is rather labour-intensive, and you are not rewarded (at least financially) sufficiently for the hard work.

Weil ich finde, heutzutage, in dem Beruf, musst du schon die Leidenschaft dafür haben. Weil der Beruf so arbeitsintensiv ist. Weil wenn du dir manchmal denkst: "Bin ich eigentlich bekloppt, 35 Stunden Woche im Industriebetrieb, habe die gleiche Kohle oder mehr, privat jetzt sozusagen gesehen, und" Deswegen, du musst die Leidenschaft haben. (OFWG, p. 9)

Further, he mentioned, the hard work should pay off in the end, to some extent. For him, that means he wants to be able to financially support his family. He occasionally wants to enjoy some leisure-time and undertake some (leisure) activities. Plus, he wants to be able to purchase a new tractor, from time to time.

Ich lege z.B. keinen Wert darauf, mir jedes Jahr ein neues Auto zu kaufen. Für mich ist es wichtig, dass ich z.B. genug Geld habe, um das örtliche Schützenfest mitzufeiern, nach 5 Jahren einen neuen Schlepper kaufen kann oder meine Familie ernähren kann. Also ohne mich jeden Tag zu fragen, wie ich über die Runden komme. (OFWG, p. 8)

3. Environmental Ethic

Even though Mr. Gerwin has a (theoretical) background in conventional farming, he is convinced of the methods of organic farming. He is convinced, that it is necessary to reduce harvest yields, and to not use chemical fertilizers, for the proper treatment of the soil, in the end.

[...] Ich bin damit großgeworden und finde es gut. Klar macht es Sinn, nicht immer sofort mit der Chemiekeule zu kommen. Manchmal kann man lieber Erträge runterschrauben, also weniger ernten, und dafür den Acker nicht so ausbeuten. Konventionelle beuten mit Monokulturen zum Teil den Acker aus. Und diese Wertschätzung für den Boden finde ich gut. Ich nutze weniger Stickstoff für den Boden und fahre die Erträge etwas runter. (OFWG, p. 4)

He is proud when he is able to harvest

Ja, genau. Ich kann sagen, das habe ich gesät, und du siehst es heranwachsen und wenn du es später erntest, denkst du dir: "Boah, das habe ich jetzt von der Fläche runtergeholt, geerntet.". Das ist auch schon cool. [...] (OFWG, p. 9)

4. Animal Ethic

The difference in animal husbandry in organic compared to conventional farming is that for instance pigs, have more space (1,3m² – 0,85m²) (Marquart, M. and Teevs, C., 2013). Another difference is that pigs of organic farms are kept outside, whereas pigs of conventional farms are solely kept inside. Apart from these two differences, pigs from organic as well as from conventional farms are being slaughtered after they have reached a weight around circa 115 kg, and are circa 180 days old. Nonetheless, Mr. Gerwin points out, that standards for animal welfare are higher in organic farming. He, personally, feels happy, if he experiences that his animals are also 'happy', at least 'live a life worth living' to his mind.

Man selber erfreut sich daran, wenn es dem eigenen Tier gut geht. Unglückliche Tiere werden ja auch krank, obwohl man das wahrscheinlich auch nicht so sagen kann. Jedenfalls, wir legen Wert darauf, dass es z.B. unseren Kälbern gut geht. (OFWG, p. 7)

5. Societal Surroundings

His farm is located directly next to a city. Due to this close distance to the city, Mr Gerwin and his family run a (small) farm store. At their farm store, they sell their own eggs, as well as their own potatoes, directly to the consumer. That means they get a lot of 'traffic' (from consumers) on their farm. These consumers are very interested in and do oftentimes pose (critical) questions concerning his organic farming activities. The consumers, who buy their products at his farm store, shop out of conviction that organic farming is more environmental-friendly, and is the farming practice of the future. Notwithstanding, he mentions, that they (sometimes) even monitor (and check on) him if certain activities are allowed in organic farming, such as the use of a slurry-tanker (liquid manure), for instance.

[...] Also wir haben ja die Laufkundschaft, also wir verkaufen ja etwas die Kartoffeln, Eier und so. Und, weil wir den Weg direkt hinterm Hof haben. Du hast viele Eltern mit kleinen Kindern, und so. Wenn sich das ergibt, hast du schon manchmal welche, die dich dann fragen: "Wie sieht es aus, und warum macht ihr das so und so? Warum habt ihr hier hinten einen Spritzer auf dem Hof stehen? Ihr seid doch eigentlich Biobauern." [...] wenn du

manchmal eine Gülletonne da stehen hast: "Wie, ihr seid doch Biobauern, ihr fahrt doch gar keine Gülle." (OFWG, p. 10)

Mr. Gerwin mentions, that consumers demand for organic agricultural products from organic farms. If they would not be prepared to pay for the extra effort of organic farmers, organic farming would not exist. So the consumer, at least some of them, are very well aware of the additional value of organic farming, and are prepared to spend extra money for it. Even so Mr. Gerwin adds, that organic farming practices are highly subsidized by the German government.

Der Verbraucher muss bereit sein, für das Kilo Fleisch das doppelte zu bezahlen. [...] Würden sich alle Verbraucher nur nach dem Preis richten, würde es keinen ökologischen Landbau geben. Dann würde sich ökologischer Landbau nicht lohnen. (OFWG, p. 6)

4.4 Comparison Theoretical and Real Farmer's Virtues

Comparison Theory vs Practice Farmer's Virtues						
	Sustainable Farmer	Theoretical Assumptions	Steward Farmer	Theoretical Assumptions	Organic & Ecological Farmer	Theoretical Assumptions
Representative:	Mr. Johannes Venne		Ms. Judith van Dijk		Mr. Wilhelm Gerwin	
Virtues:						
1. Life Ethic						
1.1 Simplicity	MEDIUM/LOW	LOW	MEDIUM	MEDIUM	LOW/MEDIUM	HIGH
1.2 Living acc. to the rhythm of nature	LOW	LOW	LOW	MEDIUM	MEDIUM	HIGH
1.3 Sense of Community	HIGH	MEDIUM	MEDIUM	HIGH	HIGH	HIGH
2. Work Ethic						
2.1 Entrepreneurial Spirit	HIGH	HIGH	MEDIUM	MEDIUM	HIGH/MEDIUM	LOW
2.2 Craftsmanship	LOW	LOW (technical focus)	MEDIUM	HIGH	LOW (technical focus)	HIGH
2.3 Sense of Property	HIGH	MEDIUM	MEDIUM	HIGH	HIGH	HIGH
3. Environmental Ethic						
3.1 Depth of Concern for the Environment	MEDIUM increase of awareness	LOW	MEDIUM	MEDIUM	MEDIUM	HIGH more egalitarian
4. Animal Ethic						
4.1 Depth of Concern for Individual Animals	MEDIUM increase of awareness	LOW	HIGH	MEDIUM	MEDIUM	HIGH more egalitarian
5. Societal Surroundings						
5.1 Societal Reputation	LOW	LOW	MEDIUM/LOW	MEDIUM	HIGH	HIGH
5.2 Societal Status	MEDIUM	HIGH	MEDIUM	MEDIUM	MEDIUM	LOW
5.3 Societal Impact	MEDIUM	MEDIUM	HIGH	HIGH	MEDIUM	HIGH

Table 4.5: Comparison Theoretical and Real Farmer's Virtues

General Conclusion – Comparison Theoretical and Real Farmer's Virtues

In this chapter I conducted the main exercise of this thesis. In three steps, I conducted a virtue ethical analysis of the three farmer role models, in theory as well as in practice. First I explained the general virtues of farming, all family farmers to various degrees, hold. In the second step I analysed, on a theoretical basis, to which degrees, high, medium or low, the three farmer role models, the sustainable, the steward and the organic & ecological farmer hold these virtues. Third, the final step was to proof whether the theoretical ranking of the three farmer role models coincide with reality.

Now I am able to conclude two aspects from this main exercise. First there are similarities and differences between theory and reality concerning farming virtues. These similarities and differences in virtue ethical behaviour of the three farmer role models are necessary to examine, because it helps us to better understand the position of farmers in general (at least in the Western European context). This insight helps us to (re-)foster a harmonious relationship between society and farmers. Second, I am able to conclude that I developed a virtue ethical framework. This framework allows researchers (from philosophy as well as social science) to analyse farmer's virtues, in various context. It is highly relevant to conduct a virtue ethical analysis with my framework, for being able to investigate which virtue/s specifically contribute to foster a more harmonious relationship between society and farmers.

In section 4.2 (Theoretical Ranking Farmers' Virtues, p. 43) I concluded that there are distinct differences between the three farmer role models, mainly with regard to the rather anthropocentric world view of the sustainable and steward farmer, in contrast to the rather ecological world view of the organic & ecological farmer. However in reality this strict demarcation between anthropocentrism and ecology is rather vague, and (even) varies per individual farmer. It is more, that the three farmer role models overlap with regard to their practices. I conclude based on my reality check that the organic & ecological farmer can also be classified in more anthropocentric terms.

I conclude, that the vagueness between the anthropocentric and the ecological world view is due to insufficient knowledge of the three farmer representatives, I have interviewed. They do not know the difference between, what Dobson calls called 'environmentalism' and 'ecologism'. As already explained in chapter 2, 'Environmentalism' argues for a managerial approach to environmental problems, secure in the belief that they can be solved without fundamental changes in present values or patterns of production and consumption. 'Ecologism' holds that a sustainable and fulfilling existence presupposes radical changes in

our relationship with the non-human natural world, and in our mode of social and political life (Dobson, 2007, pp. 2–3).

Indeed, this conclusion should be put in the light, that the representative of the organic & ecological farmer, I chose, is rather biased. Nevertheless, generally speaking, especially with regard to the capability of simplicity and the functionings of entrepreneurial spirit and craftsmanship, the theoretical assumptions do not match with reality. The organic & ecological farmer also applies rather (economic) farming practices, with regard to his vested interest. His vested interest is to generate sufficient financial means in order to survive and develop. I conclude here, that the reason for this difference can be explained by the fact that all farmer role models have to support their families, as well as their farm with financial means. However, at the same time, some farmers change to organic and ecological farming because of economic reasons. Especially farmers specialized in the cultivation of vegetables see economic advantages and opportunities in organic and ecological farming.^{xxii} Consequently rational (economic) measurements in connection with farming practices have to be more closely investigated, because these seem to be unfavourable (at least to various degrees) for the environment and animals. At this point, I would like to quote Ms. van Dijk, who says:

‘Dat we inderdaad geld moeten verdienen met onze koeien en dat we soms echt economische keuzes maken en dat we soms ook dingen doen, die misschien wel op welzijnsgebied niet ideaal zijn, maar dat we dat ook niet leuk vinden om te doen. En ,[...] dat we ook met heel veel liefde voor ons dieren op gaan, zeg maar. Dat we dingen niet zonder reden doen. En dat ik ook gewoon het beste voor mijn koeien wil [...].’ (StFJvD, p. 19)

Despite the fact, that all farmer role models act in some instances unfavourably with regard to the environment and animals, generally speaking, the (family) farmer acts generally based on virtues. Especially, the virtues of life ethic and societal surroundings show that the farmer cares about its societal environment.

Chapter 6 – Overall Conclusion

In this chapter I combine all aspects from the previous chapters, and give a final answer to the research question posed in the introduction. I start this little journey by recapitulating briefly the insights gained in chapter 1, 2, 3 and 4. Then, I will answer the main research question. *How can an ethic of character help us to understand and respond appropriately to the challenges today's farmers face and contribute to foster a more harmonious relation between humanity/society and nature?* The answer of my research question will be evaluated based on Rawls' Public Reasoning. Finally, I will conclude with the limitations and restrictions concerning my research, as well as my prospects for future research.

I began my journey with the description of the current situation of family farmers. Family farming describes a certain relationship of people who cultivate their land and animals (Dobson, 2007, p. 93). In more concrete terms, family farming combines a variety of agricultural practices of animal husbandry and plant cultivation. The family farmer is exposed to increasing public criticism with regard to his farming practices. The family farmer deserves special consideration in the political (theoretical) discussion, because he serves as the basic entity and institution in society (see chapter 2, section 2.4.1 Agrarian romanticism, p. 17). He should not be equated with the factory farmer. The factory farmer is no legitimate institution at all, because he merely sees the environment and animals in purely instrumental terms. My basic assumption is that the motives of the family farmer are not based solely on instrumental terms, but rather on virtues. Virtues are necessary moral codes to appropriately act in certain societal surroundings. For this reason, I developed a virtue ethical framework, in order to investigate the (underlying) virtues of the family farmer, for the final purpose of fostering a harmonious relation with humanity/society, in the end.

In chapter 2, I combined the three philosophical debates about the circumstances of the farmer, namely environmental, animal and agricultural ethics. I organized them with respect to three dominant schools in moral philosophy, which are consequentialism, deontology and virtue ethics. I did so because I wanted to stress the importance of virtue ethics, in contrast to the mere maximisation of utility (consequentialism) or simply doing one's duty (deontology). Virtue ethics is the only approach, which considers the environment and specific circumstances individuals have to deal with, regarding their own moral, intellectual and physical skills (Hursthouse, 2013). Based on the philosophical debates of environmental and animal ethics, I have developed three different types of family farmer role models, which are the sustainable, the steward and the organic & ecological farmer. I linked these three role

models of family farmers to the various stages of the development of agricultural ethics. I showed that the roots of the three farmer role models originate from agricultural ethics. The ideational base for the sustainable farmer has been derived from Agrarian romanticism (see chapter 2, p. 16), for the steward (partly) from Agrarian conservationism (see chapter 2, p. 18), and for the organic & ecological farmer from Agrarian romanticism, Agrarian conservationism, as well as modern forms of Critical Agrarianism (see chapter 2, p. 20).

Then, in chapter 3, the topic of virtue ethics has been explored. The reason for this is that I wanted to familiarize the reader with the development of the concept of virtue ethics. Virtue ethics is central to this thesis, because it allows considering and including the societal context that the farmer has to deal with and respond to. The farmer's virtues can only be appropriately assessed in relation with his respective societal surroundings. I started by describing the development of the concept of virtue ethics. I devoted special attention to the recent developments in virtue ethics, especially Nussbaum's capability approach. I considered Nussbaum's capability approach essential to this thesis, because it helped me to figure out the particular *capabilities* and *functionings* of the farmer role models. Additionally, I explained the Aristoteleian concept of *phronesis*. *Phronesis* means life experience and situational appreciation. The farmer's practices, or better to say, *functionings*, have to be grounded in *phronesis*. Consequently, the practice of farming is 'learning by doing'. The final stage of this chapter was the involvement with the concept of role models. Acting virtuously means to follow a certain ideal. This virtuous ideal has been incorporated in role models, and thus conferred to the three farmer role models.

The main exercise of this thesis has been conducted in chapter 4. I created a virtue ethical framework in three steps. First, I set up a general framework of the virtues of the farmer. These general virtues were divided into the categories of life, work, environmental, animal ethic and societal surroundings and originate from the philosophical debates of environmental, animal and agricultural ethics discussed in chapter 2. Second, the three different farmer role models, the sustainable, the steward and the organic & ecological were ranked high, medium or low on these general virtues. The theoretical basis for the ranking of the particular farmer role model was grounded in the debate on agricultural ethics (see chapter 2). This theoretical ranking helped me to evaluate which ethic of character contributed to foster a harmonious relation with humanity/society, at least in theory. Third, I investigated whether the theoretical ranking of the virtues of the three farmer role models matched with reality. I have conducted interviews with representatives of the three farmer models in order to find out whether the theoretical virtues as well as the ranking of the theoretical virtues occurred in reality.

After recapitulating the main aspects of my thesis, it is time to give an answer to the main research question. The main research question is – *How can an ethic of character help us to understand and respond appropriately to the challenges today's farmers face and contribute to foster a more harmonious relation between humanity/society and nature?*

My answer to this question is two-fold. First, an ethic of character, which means a virtuous character, helps to understand the (particular) situation of farmers, at least the situation of farmers in Western Europe. The virtues of the three different role models (of the family farmer) give insights into the farmer's motives, as well as into the various degrees of these motives. The situation of farmers is based on the virtues of life, work, environmental, animal ethic as well as societal surroundings. Consequently, it can be concluded that the family farmer's practices are based and influenced by virtues, or more concrete, by *capabilities* and *phronesis*. This is in itself an important finding because it shows that the family farmer is concerned with fostering a more harmonious relation between humanity/society and nature, in general, because his motives are based on virtues.

Second, the economic aspect of farming needs to be revised and openly debated upon, because it needs to be (democratically) investigated what the (actual) added value of farming (at least in Western Europe) is; is it either a huge range of agricultural products at the most favourable price, or is it sufficient sustainable agricultural products at a reasonable price? *De facto*, the farmer role model of the future should be a farmer who possesses the 'best' virtues of all farmer role models. This future farmer role model combines 'high tech with high touch'^{xxiii}. Thus, again, the concept of *phronesis* should remain central to farming. The 'symbioses' of life experience and situational appreciation will not lose its importance.

However, an important remark at this point is that for fostering a harmonious relationship, at least two parties are necessary. At this point, I would like to refer back to chapter 3, section 3.4 (p. 30) to the notion of role models, Hardimon says explicitly that role models have to be 'reflectively acceptable'. For the farmer, that means in particular that on the one hand the farmer has to be open for discussing and reviewing his farming practices, and on the other hand, society has to be open, as well, for discussing and reviewing their (consumption) practices. Thus an open dialogue needs to be established, in order to create mutual understanding for each other's position and motives. Here politics come into the game, because political structures can help to facilitate this dialogue. Political and governmental institutions have to be available in order for the farmer to inform himself and reflect upon his current farming practices. In case of necessity, the farmer is able to revise and correct these practices. Such institutions are necessary in order to overcome the public discrepancy between agriculture and society.

At this point I refer to Rawls and his concept of 'Burdens of Judgement – Public Reasoning'. Rawls states that there are 'Burdens of Judgements', which lead to disagreement between reasonable persons (Rawls, 1993, p. 55). *'Different conceptions of the world can reasonably be elaborated from different standpoints and diversity arises in part from our distinct perspectives. It is unrealistic – or worse, it arouses mutual suspicion and hostility – to suppose that all our differences are rooted solely in ignorance and perversity, or else in the rivalries for power, status or economic gain.'* (Rawls, 1993, p. 58). He concludes that there are limits to what we can justify to others. However, these limits and differences have to be accepted due to liberty of conscience and freedom of thought (Rawls, 1993, p. 51).

Relating Rawls' concept back to the topic of my thesis, it can be said that moral pluralism is an aspect of contemporary society. We have to accept conflicting farmer's practices based on different virtue ethical ideals, at least at this point. This also points to the several weaknesses this thesis has. First, as is the case in many theses, not all topics that are in some way relevant to the research question could be discussed and analysed in detail. Scarcity of time, as well as the lack of room for more words, negatively affects the extensiveness of the topics that are discussed here. This is the reason why it was not possible to (extensively) research other virtues, such as wisdom and temperance, as well as the interface between intellectual and moral virtues. Second, I only had the chance to conduct a small empirical test, rather than interviewing a randomly selected sample of farmers, in order to test my virtue ethical framework. I only had the chance to include one representative of each farmer role models, which depicts a rather biased empirical evidence. Third, the representatives chosen might mirror reality in a distorted way, and therefore I might have drawn the wrong conclusions. Despite all these weaknesses, I was able to give an answer to the research question formulated in the introduction. My virtue ethical framework enables social scientists to evaluate an ethic of character with regard to appropriate farming practices, in the context of family farming. By developing this virtue ethical framework for farmer role models I am able to place and categorize myself among agricultural ethicists, more concrete critical agrarianists (see chapter 2, p. 18).

References

Agar, N. (2001) *Life's Intrinsic Value. Science, Ethics and Nature*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Agrarheute.com. (2014) *Projekt zur Integration ausländischer Fachkräfte gestartet*. Agrarheute.com, 21 February. Retrieved from URL: <http://www.agrarheute.com/iamo-projekt-integration-auslaend-an>, accessed 15 August 2015.

Allen, P. and Sachs, C. (1993) Sustainable agriculture in the United States: engagements, silences, and possibilities for transformation. In: P. Allen (ed.) *Food for the Future*. New York: John Wiley & Sons, pp. 134–67.

Alons, G. and Zwaan, P. (2015) New Wine in Different Bottles: Negotiating and Selling the CAP post-2013 Reform. *Sociologia Ruralis*, advance online publication 8 April, doi: 10.1111/soru.12088.

Amartya, S. and Nussbaum, M. (1993) *The Quality of Life*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Anscombe, G. M. E. (1958) Modern moral philosophy. *Philosophy* 33 (124): 1–19.

Attfield, R. (1987) *A Theory of Value and Obligation*. London: Croom Helm.

Attfield, R. (1998) Saving Nature, Feeding People, and Ethics. *Environmental Values* 7 (3): pp. 291–304.

Attfield, R. (2001) Christianity. In: D. Jamieson (ed.) *A Companion to Environmental Philosophy*. Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 96–110.

Athanassoulis, N. Virtue Ethics. *The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. Retrieved from URL: <http://www.iep.utm.edu/virtue/>, accessed 16 May 2015.

Barnier, M. (2008) How Europe should tackle the global food crisis. *Europe's World*, 1 October. Retrieved from URL: http://europesworld.org/2008/10/01/how-europe-should-tackle-the-global-food-crisis/#.Vc-aq_mqqko, accessed 15 August 2015.

Baron, M.W., Petit, P. and Slote, M. (1997) *Three methods of ethics*. Malden: Blackwell Publishing.

Barry, J. (1999) *Rethinking Green Politics*. London: Sage.

Beckhoff, M. (ed.) (1997) *Encyclopaedia of Animal Rights and Animal Welfare*. Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press.

Belwe, K. (ed.) (2006) Ländlicher Raum. Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte. Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 11 September. Retrieved from URL: <http://www.bpb.de/shop/zeitschriften/apuz/29540/laendlicher-raum>, accessed 12 June 2015.

Bentham, J. [1789] (1948) *Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

Berry, W. (1972) *A Continuous Harmony: Essays Cultural and Agricultural*. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich.

Boucher, D and Kelly, P. (2009) *Political Thinkers. From Socrates to the Present*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Brennan, A. and Lo, Y.S. (2011) Environmental Ethics. In: E.N. Zalta (ed.) *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. Retrieved from URL: <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2011/entries/ethics-environmental/>, accessed 25 April 2015.

Burton, R.J.F. and Wilson, G.A. (2006) Injecting social psychology theory into conceptualizations of agricultural agency: towards a “post-productivist” farmer self-identity. *Journal of Rural Studies* 22: pp. 95–115.

Candel, J., Breeman, G.E., Stiller, S.J., Termeer, C.J.A.M. (2013) Disentangling the consensus frame of food security: The case of the EU Common Agricultural Policy reform debate. In: *Food Policy* 44: pp. 47–58.

Carlisle, L. (2013) *Critical Agrarianism*. Berkeley: Cambridge University Press.

Cato, [160 BC] (2009) De agri cultura. In: Froesch, H. (trans.) *Über die Landwirtschaft*. Ditzingen: Reclam.

Cupit, G. (1996) *Justice as Fittingness*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Darwall, S. (ed.) (2003) *Virtue ethics*. Malden, Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishing.

De Crèvecoeur, H.St.J. [1782] (1962) *Letters from an American Farmer*. New York: The New York American Library.

DeGrazia, D. (1996) *Taking animals seriously. Mental life and moral status*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

DeGrazia, D. (2002) *Animal rights: a very short introduction*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

van Dinther, M. (2014) De 10 geboden van goed eten: Gij zult biologisch eten. *Volkskrant*. 2 April.

Dobson, A. (1990) *Green Political Thought*. London: Harper Collins.

Dobson, A. (2007) *Green Political Thought*. London: Routledge.

Dobson, A. (ed.) (1999) *Fairness and Futurity: Essays on Environmental Sustainability and Social Justice*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Driessen, C.P.G (2014) *Animal deliberation: the co-evolution of technology and ethics on the farm*. Phd thesis, University Wageningen, Wageningen, the Netherlands.

Dupuis, E.M. and Goodman, D. (2005) Should we go 'home' to eat? Towards a reflexive political localism. *Journal of Rural Studies* 21 (3): pp. 359–371.

European Parliamentary Research Service. (2014) Definition of Public Goods. 7 January, <http://epthinktank.eu/2014/01/07/public-goods/>, accessed 8 June 2015.

Feenstra, G. What is Sustainable Agriculture? Retrieved from URL: <http://www.sarep.ucdavis.edu/about-sarep/def>, accessed 8 June 2015.

Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations. (2013) *International Year of Family Farming*. FAO report, 30 May. Retrieved from URL: http://www.fao.org/fileadmin/user_upload/iyff/docs/Final_Master_Plan_IYFF_2014_30-05.pdf, accessed 20 June 2015.

Foot, P. (2001) *Natural Goodness*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Freidel, F. and Sidey, H. (2006) The Presidents of the United States of America. Retrieved from URL: <https://www.whitehouse.gov/1600/presidents/thomasjefferson>, accessed 29 January 2015.

Freyfolge, E.T. (2003) Private property rights in land: An agrarian view. In: N. Wirzba (ed.) *The Essential Agrarian Reader*. Washington: Shoemaker and Hoard, pp. 237–258.

Gambrel, J.C. and Cafaro, P. (2010) The Virtue of Simplicity. *Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics* 23 (1-2): pp. 85–105.

German Farmer's Association. (2011) Leitbild des Deutschen Bauernverbandes. Deutscher Bauernverband, 1 July. Retrieved from URL: <http://media.repro-mayr.de/79/542779.pdf>, accessed 13 July 2015.

German Federal Ministry of Food and Agriculture. (2015) *Wege zu einer gesellschaftlichen akzeptierten Nutztierhaltung*. Scientific Advisory Board for Agricultural Policy. Retrieved from URL:

http://www.bmel.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/Ministerium/Beiraete/Agrarpolitik/GutachtenNutztierehaltung-Kurzfassung.pdf?__blob=publicationFile, accessed 8 June 2015.

German Federal Ministry of Justice and Consumer Protection. (2001) Tierschutz-Nutztierhaltungsverordnung. German Federal Ministry of Justice and Consumer Protection, 25 October. Retrieved from URL: <http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/bundesrecht/tierschnutztv/gesamt.pdf>, accessed 23 July 2015.

Griffin, D.R. (1981) *The Question of Animal Awareness*. New York: Rockefeller University Press.

Gruen, L. (2014) The Moral Status of Animals. In: E.N. Zalta (ed.) *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. Retrieved from URL: <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2014/entries/moral-animal/>, accessed 24 April 2015.

van der Ham, T. (2015) *De topsporters van de melkindustrie*. (Nederlandse Publieke Omroep, Zembla) 35 mm film. Retrieved from URL: <http://zembla.vara.nl/seizoenen/2015/afleveringen/27-05-2015>, accessed 7 August 2015.

Hanson, V.C. (1995) *The Other Greeks: The Family Farm and the Agrarian Roots of Western Civilization*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Hardimon, M.O. (1994) Role Obligations. *The Journal of Philosophy* 91 (7): pp. 333–363.

Harvey, F.D. (1983) The Penguin Politics Trevor J. Saunders (tr.): Aristotle: The Politics. *The Classical Review* 33 (2): pp. 238–241.

Hobbes, T. [1651] (2009) *Leviathan*. Retrieved from URL: <https://www.gutenberg.org/files/3207/3207-h/3207-h.htm>, accessed 16 August 2015.

Hursthouse, R. (2013) Virtue Ethics. In: E.N. Zalta (ed.) *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. Retrieved from URL: <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2013/entries/ethics-virtue/>, accessed 16 May 2015.

Inge, T. (ed.) (1969). *Agrarianism in American Literature*. Retrieved from URL: <http://self.gutenberg.org/articles/agrarianism>, accessed 16 August 2015.

Jefferson, T. (1781) *Notes on the State of Virginia*. Richmond: J.W. Randolph.

Kant, I. [1783] (2002) *Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals*. Yale: Yale University Press.

Kleist, C. (2010) Global Ethics: Capabilities Approach. In: *The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. Retrieved from URL: <http://www.iep.utm.edu/ge-capab/>, accessed 16 May 2015.

Kirschenmann, F. (2010) *Cultivating an Ecological Conscience: Essays of a Farmer Philosopher*. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky.

Kloppenburg, J. (1991) Social theory and the de/reconstruction of agricultural science: Local knowledge for an alternative agriculture. *Rural Sociology* 56 (4): pp. 519–548.

Kolb, R.W (ed.) (2008) *Encyclopedia of Business Ethics and Society*. Thousand Oaks, California: SAGE Publications.

Kronenberg, L. (2009) *Allegories of Farming from Greece to Rome: Philosophical Satire in Xenophon, Varro and Virgil*, online publication May, <http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511729973.002>.

Leopold, A. (1949) The land ethic. In: A. Leopold (ed.) *A Sand County Almanac*. New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 201–226.

Locke, J. [1689] (1988) *Two Treatise of Government*. In: P. Laslett (ed.) *Cambridge Texts in the History of Political Thought*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Marquart, M. and Teevs, C. (2013) Mäster im Vergleich: Das Schweinesystem. *Spiegel Online*, 18 February 2013: Retrieved from URL: <http://www.spiegel.de/wirtschaft/unternehmen/schweinemast-vergleich-der-konventionellen-mit-bio-haltung-a-882816.html>, accessed 7 August 2015.

Nussbaum, M. (2009) *Frontiers of Justice: Disabilities, nationality, species membership*. Harvard University Press.

Nussbaum, M. (2011) *Creating Capabilities. The Human Development Approach*. Harvard University Press.

O'Neill, J. (1992) The Varieties of Intrinsic Value. *Monist* 75 (2): pp. 119–137.

O'Neill, J. (1993) *Ecology, Policy and Politics*. London: Routledge.

O'Sullivan, S. (2011) *Animals, equality and democracy*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Pope Francis (2015) *Laudato si'*. Encyclical Letter, 24 May. Retrieved from URL: http://w2.vatican.va/content/francesco/en/encyclicals/documents/papa-francesco_20150524_enciclica-laudato-si.html, accessed 20 June 2015.

Pulido, L. (1996) *Environmentalism and Economic Justice: Two Chicano Struggles in the Southwest*. Tucson: University of Arizona Press.

Rawls, J. (1993) *Political Liberalism*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Rawls, J. (1999) *A Theory of Justice*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Regan, T. (1983) *The case for animal rights*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Regan, T. and Singer, P. (eds.) (1989) *Animal Rights and Human Obligations*. Englewood Cliffs, Prentice Hall.

Robeyns, I. (2011) The Capability Approach. In: E.N. Zalta (ed.) *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. Retrieved from URL: <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2011/entries/capability-approach/>, accessed 21 May 2015.

Sachs, C. (1983) *The Invisible Farmers: Women in Agricultural Production*. Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Littlefield.

Schmidtz, D. and Willott, E. (eds.) (2012) *Environmental Ethics: What Really Matters, What Really Works*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Schulte, J. (2015) *Fleischesser am Pranger – kommt jetzt das Ende der Wurst?* (Westdeutscher Rundfunk, Hart aber fair) 76 mm film. Retrieved from URL: <http://www.ardmediathek.de/tv/Hart-aber-fair/Fleischesser-am-Pranger-kommt-jetzt-da/Das-Erste/Video?documentId=29005228&bcastId=561146>, accessed 20 June 2015.

Sen, A. (1992) *Inequality Re-examined*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Sen, A. (1999) *Development as Freedom*. New York: Knopf.

Sense about Science Organisation. (2015) *What does natural actually mean?* Expert Panel on Plant Science, 27 February. Retrieved from URL: <http://www.senseaboutscience.org/pages/natural-qa.html>, 20 June 2015.

Singeling, L. (2015) Wie is bereid het Varken van Morgen te betalen? *Volkskrant*, 30 June.

Singer, P. (1975) *Animal Liberation*. New York: Random House.

Singer, P. (1993) *Practical Ethics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Skipiol, A. (2009) *Die Mensch-Nutztier-Beziehung. Dimension, Einflussfaktoren und Auswirkungen am Beispiel der Schweinehaltung in Hohenlohe*. Phd thesis, University Hohenheim, Hohenheim, Germany.

Slocum, R. (2007) Whiteness, space and alternative food practice. *Geoforum* 38 (3): pp. 520–533.

Smith, K.K. (2003) *Wendell Berry and the Agrarian Tradition*. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas.

Strange, M. (1988) *Family Farming. A New Economic Vision*. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press.

Swanton, C. (2005) *Virtue Ethics: A Pluralistic View*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Taylor, A. (1999) *Magpies, Monkeys and Morals: What Philosophers Say about Animal Liberation*. Peterborough: Canada.

Taylor, B. (ed.) (2005) *Encyclopedia of Religion and Nature*. London & New York: Continuum.

Taylor, P. (1981) The Ethics of Respect for Nature. *Environmental Ethics* 3 (3): pp. 197–218.

Taylor, P. (1986) *Respect for Nature*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Timpe, K. Moral Character. *The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. Retrieved from URL: <http://www.iep.utm.edu/virtue/>, accessed 16 May 2015.

Thompson, P.B. (ed.) (2008) *The Ethics of Intensification. Agricultural Development and Cultural Change*. Houten: Springer Media B.V.

Thompson, P.B. (2010) *The Agrarian Vision: Sustainability and Environmental Ethics*. Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky.

Van Tongeren, P. (2003) *Deugdelijk Leven. Een inleiding in de deugdethiek*. Amsterdam: SUN.

Walker, R.L. and Ivanhoe, P.J. (eds.) (2007) *Working Virtue: Virtue Ethics and Contemporary Moral Problems*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Wissenburg, M.L.J. (2005) *Mens, natuur en onderwerping. Een humanistisch perspectief op de intrinsieke waarde van de natuur*. Inaugural lecture Socrates Professor of Humanist Philosophy at Wageningen University. Wageningen, 24 March.

Wissenburg, M.L.J. and Schlosberg, D. (2014) *Introducing animal politics and political animals*. London: Palgrave Macmillan.

Wirzba, N. (2003) Why agrarianism matters – even to urbanities. In: N. Wirzba (ed.) *The Essential Agrarian Reader*. Washington: Shoemaker and Hoard, pp. 1–22.

Endnotes

i For more elaboration on this point, I would advice to read Siobhan O’Sullivan’s book *Animals, Equality and Democracy*. Her main argument is, that farm animals are not visible, because they are locked up in large factory farms. If it would be visible under which conditions these farm animals live, more awareness would be drawn to their situation, which would lead to an improvement of their living conditions, in the end.

ii I do not expand and elaborate on medical care and the use of antibiotics in livestock production, because most statements concerning this matter are not thoroughly researched. (Factory) farmers are represented in public as if they would harm their animals on purpose, at least with regard to proper medical treatment. In the European Union high standards and strict rules and regulations exist with regard to the medical treatment of farm animals. The outbreak of the swine fever in the Netherlands in 1997 and in Germany in 2006, resulted in the tightening of European rules and regulations concerning animal husbandry. Many institutions, such as the veterinary inspection office supervise the proper and strict adherence to these rules and regulations. This does not take away the fact, that in this branch, as in every branch ‘rotten apples’ exist, unfortunately.

iii The idea for the division and classification of the sustainable, the steward and the organic & ecological farmer originate from my thesis supervisor Prof. Mr. Wissenburg. All the glory goes to him.

iv I consider further elaboration on this point as not necessary, because for explaining the different farmer role-models it is not relevant. However, farming practices, in the end, always serve the interest of humans, and are therefore always anthropocentric in nature. The primary reason why I consider this debate here is to shortly elaborate on the development of the environmental thought, because I would like to relate it to the different farmer role-models at a later stage.

v Thomas Jefferson (1743-1826) was one of the Founding Fathers of America, as well as the main author of the Declaration of Independence. He was the 3rd President of the United States of America, and was in office as American President from 1801 to 1809. He belonged to the Democratic-Republican Party (Freidel and Sidey, 2006).

vi ‘Enough’ should be understood in the Lockean sense of leaving enough land for others. By ‘others’ co-citizens and also future generations are meant.

vii Probably you as an attentive reader will remind the presentation in chapter 2 of the differences in the three schools of moral philosophy. For a more detailed account on these three streams of moral philosophy, being consequentialism, deontology and virtue ethics, please see chapter 2.

viii However, the roots in Chinese literature are even more ancient. However, given the scope and focus of this Master Thesis, I will stick to the roots of the ancient Greeks.

ix However in confessional circles virtue ethics remained the dominant form of ethics.

x Nussbaum develops ten capabilities however I neither mention them here nor amplify them, because I would like to give a general introduction to the capability approach, not a detailed analysis. The ten human capabilities are– 1. Life, 2. Bodily Health, 3. Bodily Integrity, 4. Senses, Imagination and Thought, 5. Emotions, 6. Practical Reason, 7. Affiliation – 7a. Empathy, 7b. Self-respect, 8. Other Species, 9. Play, 10. Control over One’s Environment – 10a. Political, 10b. Material. Imagining a life without the capability in question, that such a life is not a life worthy of human dignity. It is intuitive and discursive, whether a life is worthy of human dignity (Nussbaum, 2006, pp. 76–77).

xi *Arête* means virtue. In the following section I will use the word virtue instead of *arête*.

xii In section 3.1.3 I will elaborate in more detail on Aristotle's concept of virtue, especially on the aspect of applying virtues to everyday situations.

xiii For a more in-depth discussion on animals and animal rights, please see chapter 2, especially section 2.2.1.

xiv Nowadays, policymakers encourage farmers to install their farms in remote areas, due to the risks of diseases in connection with (intensified) animal husbandry methods, such as the avian influenza (in the vernacular it is bird flu), swine fever and/or mad cow disease (also called 'BSE – Bovine Spongiforme Enzephalopathie').

^{xv} At this point, I would like to cite my father, a farmer to the core, who said: 'Ein Landwirt zu sein bedeutet selbst und ständig zu arbeiten.' 'Being a farmer implies to work by yourself and to work all the time.'

xvi Retrieved from website <http://www.slb-dresden.de/dokumente/Leitbild-Nutztierhaltung.pdf>, 4th of August 2015.

xvii Of course, one can think of more aspects with regard to the societal impact of farmers, however I stick to these two aspects in order to examine only the aspects relevant to this thesis, as well as, to limit the scope of this thesis.

xviii Especially in animal husbandry it is difficult to integrate closed-loop farming activities, because animals need food which is very high in protein, which is impossible for European farmers to solely cultivate, due to soil conditions, soil impact as well as (European) legislation.

xix However the definition of happy and fruitful life also varies among the different farmer's role models. What contributes to a happy and fruitful life? This question is a very philosophical one, as already other philosophers racked their brains over this matter. I am not able to sufficiently answer this question, and this is not my main objective, here. I think it depends greatly from person to person. However, I state here, that the sustainable farmer values material status as more important, than the steward and organic & ecological farmer.

^{xx} Green energy production means in this context to produce energy from solar, wind or water power.

^{xxi} De topsporters van de melkindustrie - Part 1, 12th of June 2015, retrieved from website 7th of August 2015 – Zembla broadcasting; De topsporters van de melkindustrie - Part 2, 17th of June 2015, retrieved from website 7th of August – Zembla broadcasting. In this Zembla broadcasting the cow is compared to a (consummate) athlete, because they need to produce as much milk as possible, as a consequence of scaling-up processes and fierce (global) competition with regard to food prices.

^{xxii} Please see interview with Mr. Chris Poelen. He says that organic farming is financially more attractive, in the end, at least in the vegetable-branch.

^{xxiii} The expression 'high tech with high touch', I came across in one of my expert-talks over my thesis. All the glory goes to Mr. Ton Duffhues with respect to this expression. He is a consultant for farmers in the domain of agriculture & society at ZLTO (*Zuidelijke Landbouw en Tuinorganisatie*).