The politics of tax avoidance. Explaining the persistence of the Dutch preferential tax regime
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2015-01-20
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en
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Since the 1990s harmful practices of tax havens have come to dominate the politics of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). The salience of harmful and unfair aspects of tax havens has risen to greater and historically unprecedented heights ever since the economic crisis started in 2007/2008. The Netherlands has been repeatedly singled out and accused by multiple organizations as a tax haven, because it offers a regulatory infrastructure that made it possible for transnational corporations to avoid paying taxes since the 1970s. To date, the legislation allowing for these avoidance structures is still intact despite rising criticism. This thesis investigates to which extent the theories of neomercantilism and social constructivism can explain the persistence of the Dutch preferential tax regime. It finds that social constructivism offers the best explanations for why the Dutch tax regime seems to dodge international pressure. Norms on neoliberal economy and state sovereignty seem to have guided the international tax haven discourse to focus on information exchange and secrecy laws, rather than company substance or level of corporate taxation in general.
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Faculteit der Managementwetenschappen