The Other Side of the Fence: Comparing Perceptions of Structures

Separating Warring Groups in Northern Ireland and Israel/Palestine

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Abstract

This thesis aimed to investigate the perceptions of Northern Irish Loyalists and Republicans towards the Peace Lines and of Israelis and Palestinians towards the West Bank Barrier. Potential similarities and differences across the two conflicts were assessed based on previous literature. $N = 95$ individuals (48 female, 47 male; average age $M = 37.58$) participated in an online survey containing mostly fixed-response questions with answer options arranged along a Likert scale. It was hypothesised that the perceptions of Loyalists and Israelis and those of Republicans and Palestinians are comparable (H_1); that the perceptions of these two pairs differ significantly from each other (H_2); and that Loyalists identify with Israelis, Republicans with Palestinians, and vice versa (H_3). Data for the entire sample showed partial support for H_1 and H_2. Data for a sample consisting of individuals who identified particularly strongly with their own group ($N = 66$) lent some support to all three hypotheses. Implications of the findings include the importance of considering people's subjective and divergent perceptions of separating structures both in research and in practical applications, the promise of cross-community reconciliation programmes, and the potential for using such projects in Israel/Palestine modelled on successful ones in Northern Ireland.

Keywords: Peace Lines, West Bank Barrier, Cross-Identification

Introduction

Despite claims that over recent decades, the number and intensity of armed conflicts waged among states or among different groups within states have declined (Cramer, 2006), there are multiple conflicts in the contemporary world that continue or have continued until rather recently. Such conflicts draw a significant amount of attention not only from affected parties but also from actors such as the international community, often due to the conflicts' intensity and apparent intractability. Two examples of such conflicts are those in Northern Ireland and in the Middle East between Israelis and Palestinians.

The conflict in Northern Ireland, often referred to as the Troubles, was waged between the two main groups within the Northern Irish population, which are divided along political and religious lines. Loyalists, who are mainly Protestant and who want Northern Ireland to remain part of the United Kingdom, fought for decades against Republicans, who tend to be Catholic and who strive for a reunification of the counties of Ulster with the Republic of Ireland (Gillespie, 2008). In the Middle East, Israelis, who established a Jewish state in the territory in 1948, continue to fight against Palestinians, who inhabited the area before and who perceive the Israelis to be illegitimate occupiers of their land (Mock, Obeidi, & Zeleznikow, 2014). A more detailed description of both conflicts as relevant to this thesis will be provided below.

At first sight, the two conflicts may seem to be substantially different from each other, except perhaps for their longevity and apparent intractability, which are or were evident in both cases. However, they can in fact be compared with regard to several aspects. A major important point of comparison relevant for this thesis is that in both conflicts physical structures have been established in order to keep the warring groups apart. In Northern Ireland, the so-called Peace Lines are supposed to separate Protestant or Loyalist communities from Catholic or Republican communities in order to prevent sectarian violence

between the two (Kumer & Krevs, 2015). In Israel/Palestine, the West Bank Barrier has been constructed by the Israelis to divide their own communities from those of Palestinians and more specifically to protect themselves from alleged Palestinian terrorists committing attacks in Israel (Cohen, 2006).

For this thesis, another aspect of interest bridging the two conflicts is that it appears that Loyalists and Republicans in Northern Ireland tend to identify themselves with Israelis and Palestinians, respectively ("A distant conflict resonates", 2017). A number of possible reasons has been suggested for this alleged cross-identification. It appears that on the one hand, Republicans feel that they share similarities with Palestinians as they perceive both groups to be dominated by foreign rulers, i.e., by Protestant English colonisers and by the Israelis, respectively. On the other hand, Loyalists seem to sympathise with Israelis based on their belief that both groups make righteous claims to certain territories, viewing the opposing native inhabitants as insurgents and terrorists (Dizard, 2014). However, it should be noted that this cross-identification has not yet been established empirically. Similarly, it is yet to be examined whether or not Israelis and Palestinians might equally sympathise with the Northern Irish Loyalists and Republicans, respectively. Hill and White (2008) suggest that practitioners working to resolve conflicts should pay close attention to signs of international solidarity as it may maintain and reignite conflicts.

Considering these two aspects in which there appears to be a connection between the conflicts in Northern Ireland and in Israel/Palestine, this thesis sets out to compare the perceptions of the separating structures that the four groups in the two regions hold. Furthermore, it attempts to empirically establish the alleged cross-identification on part of the Northern Irish groups and to explore whether or not such identification is mutual in that Israelis and Palestinians similarly affiliate themselves with the respective Northern Irish groups.

The main research question for this thesis is thus whether Northern Irish Loyalists and Israelis on the one hand and Northern Irish Republicans and Palestinians on the other hand exhibit comparable perceptions about the Peace Lines and the West Bank Barrier, respectively. Furthermore, two sub-questions are assessed: firstly, whether Northern Irish Loyalists and Israelis on the one hand show significantly different perceptions of the structures than do Northern Irish Republicans and Palestinians on the other hand; and secondly, whether Northern Irish Loyalists and Republicans indeed identify themselves with Israelis and Palestinians, respectively, and whether Israelis and Palestinians similarly identify themselves with Northern Irish Loyalists and Republicans, respectively. The latter, if found to apply, might serve as an explanation for potential similarities and differences in the perceptions that the four groups may exhibit.

Based on these questions, this thesis makes several hypotheses. It is hypothesised that Loyalists and Israelis on the one hand and Republicans and Palestinians on the other hand do in fact indicate comparable perceptions of the Peace Lines and the West Bank Barrier (H_1); that Loyalists and Israelis on the one hand show significantly different perceptions of the Peace Lines and the West Bank Barrier than Republicans and Palestinians on the other hand (H_2); and that Loyalists and Republicans identify with Israelis and Palestinians and the other way around (H_3). The rationale behind these hypotheses will be laid out after discussing relevant existing literature and the conceptual framework underlying this research.

In order to answer the research questions and to test the aforementioned hypotheses, this thesis is outlined as follows: Firstly, it briefly discusses the historical and more recent backgrounds of the two conflicts in order to provide a basis for the subsequent analysis. Secondly, it examines the construction and implications of the separating structures in the conflict regions, i.e., the Peace Lines in Northern Ireland and the West Bank Barrier in Israel/Palestine. Afterwards, it explores the alleged cross-identification on behalf of the

Northern Irish groups and discusses the potential for the mutuality of this phenomenon. After presenting the conceptual framework and research methodology in more detail, as well as the results of the statistical analysis, these results are thoroughly discussed before drawing conclusions.

Societal Relevance

The research conducted here can be seen to have societal as well as scientific or academic relevance. Concerning its societal relevance, this research project has the potential to yield useful implications for attempts of conflict resolution or peace consolidation for the conflicts in both Northern Ireland and in Israel/Palestine, thus directly impacting the affected populations. If the comparison of the two conflicts were to empirically verify the alleged cross-identification on behalf of the two Northern Irish groups, to establish such identification on behalf of Israelis and Palestinians with regard to the groups in Northern Ireland, and/or if it showed comparable results with respect to the perceptions about the separating structures, one could argue that the two conflicts could perhaps be compared along other dimensions as well. In addition to research on such similarities between Northern Ireland and Israel/Palestine, this study could form the basis for further projects generally investigating structures separating conflicting groups and their influence on the population. Moreover, further research on the perceptions of such structures of the affected groups or individuals is conceivable, as well as on perceptions of whether or not a certain structure serves as a suitable means to separate the groups in question. Finally, the current study may inspire research on possible alternatives and means of ultimately deconstructing separating structures.

Based on the results of this study and of possible similar research, one might be able to develop peacebuilding programmes which not only consider the objective impact but also

the subjectively perceived influence that separating structures have on people's lives, taking into account short-term and long-term consequences of their construction. The research could serve as a basis for attempts of conflict resolution or consolidation of peace in both conflicts investigated here, which include cross-community reconciliation programmes but also specifically consider the influence of separating structures. This could support attempts to normalise the situation in contexts where such structures play crucial roles and perhaps be a first step to ultimately be able to deconstruct the structures without risking recurrence or intensification of the conflict in question.

In general, the peace process and, more specifically, cross-community reconciliation in Northern Ireland are typically perceived to be rather successful (Hughes, 2009). Therefore, it is conceivable that similar approaches could be used in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict if the current project yields results that indicate that the two conflicts are comparable at least with regard to certain aspects. In fact, is has been suggested before that the Northern Irish peace process may serve as a model for the conflict between Israelis and Palestinians (Hill & White, 2008).

This research is also timely with respect to both conflict regions. The peace process in Northern Ireland may be significantly influenced by the United Kingdom (UK) leaving the European Union (EU), commonly referred to as Brexit, which at the time of writing is scheduled to occur before 31 October 2019. For instance, both the EU and the British government committed to further funding to the province after the last of the EU PEACE programmes terminates in 2020. However, concerns have been voiced since such plans appear to be based on an expected withdrawal agreement between the UK and the EU ("Peace funding", 2019; Madden, 2019), which as of June 2019 is not finally agreed upon. Moreover, in case no agreement is reached, the need to establish border controls of some sort between the UK and the Republic of Ireland may prove divisive. The Republic of Ireland,

and also Northern Irish Republicans, oppose a so-called hard border on the island of Ireland, i.e., between the Republic and Northern Ireland (Campbell, 2019). In contrast, Loyalists object to the potential alternative of checks in the Irish Sea, i.e., between Northern Ireland and the remainder of the UK, as they feel this would separate them from the rest of the state (Campbell, 2019).

Furthermore, elections held in Israel in 2019 may influence the state's policy towards Palestinians. For instance, prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu stated during his election campaign for the April 2019 elections that he is planning on annexing Israeli settlements in the West Bank ("Israel PM vows to annex West Bank settlements", 2019). Although Israel is scheduled to have fresh elections in September 2019 after negotiations for a coalition failed in May ("Israel to hold fresh election", 2019), the mere possibility of implementation of such policies is compelling. They would likely substantially impact the lives of Palestinians in the occupied territories and perhaps increase the significance of the West Bank Barrier as a structure dividing Israelis and Palestinians.

Scientific Relevance

In terms of the scientific relevance of the current research project, it is expected to offer significant contributions to the existing research and literature on both the Northern Irish and the Israeli-Palestinian conflicts. The cross-identification that the conflicting groups in Northern Ireland appear to show has been discussed previously (e.g., Louvet, 2016; Arar, 2017; "A distant conflict resonates", 2017), but it has not yet been empirically tested. This is attempted in the current study. Potential identification with the Northern Irish groups on behalf of the Israelis and Palestinians has not yet been examined either, which this study also aspires to do.

Furthermore, this study contributes data on the perceptions that people in the respective populations have of the Peace Lines and the West Bank Barrier. Although attitudes towards the Peace Lines have been investigated previously (e.g., Byrne, Gormley Heenan, & Robinson, 2012), it appears that there have been no similar projects on the West Bank Barrier. The comparison of such perceptions of the members of the different groups in the two different conflict regions conducted in this study are equally novel. This research thus not only expands existing research by adding data similar to those that already exist, but also contribute entirely new data and insights with regard to the conflicts in both Northern Ireland and in Israel/Palestine.

The hypothesised relationship between the populations in Northern Ireland and Israel/Palestine is practically applied to the specific issue of structures that physically separate conflicting groups. This represents the main point of interest and main objective of this research. It allows for the topic to be narrow enough as to not exceed the scope of a master's thesis, yet at the same time to provide meaningful insights into possible similarities among the two conflict regions. This way, this research can still serve to inspire future projects concerning other aspects regarding structures separating warring groups as well as more broadly concerning similarities of the conflicts in Northern Ireland and between Israelis and Palestinians.

Historical Background

To offer an extensive description of the historical background of the conflicts in both Northern Ireland and in Israel/Palestine would be beyond the scope of this thesis. As both have been discussed extensively elsewhere (e.g., Mulholland, 2002, 2003; Harms & Ferry, 2008; Tessler, 2009; Gelvin, 2014), only a brief summary of the outlines of the conflicts will be given here in order to provide the reader with a basis for the analysis that is to follow.

Northern Ireland

The origins of the conflict, the Troubles, in Northern Ireland can be traced back to the history of British colonialism on the island of Ireland. In the course of this colonisation, settlers from the UK arrived in Ireland. While some assimilated into the native population, many of those who arrived mainly from Scotland and settled in the north of the island maintained their predominantly Protestant religion as well as political views, which distinguished them from the mainly Catholic native Irish population (Kumer & Krevs, 2015). Throughout the period of British colonialism in Ireland, the Irish population frequently rebelled against the colonial rule and oppression, ultimately achieving independence for 'The Free State', later the Republic of Ireland, in 1921 (Cairns & Darby, 1998). This, at the same time, led to the creation of Northern Ireland, which comprised six counties on the island and remained under British control (Kumer & Krevs, 2015). The two communities in Northern Ireland continued to perceive their history in the light of a settler versus native division (McDowell & Shirlow, 2011).

The Troubles began in the late 1960s, when a civil rights campaign was established based on protests against discrimination against Catholics by the Protestant Loyalist government, which soon escalated into violence (Cairns & Darby, 1998). The conflict was waged between Loyalists, who are predominantly Protestant and who aim for Northern Ireland to remain part of the UK, and Republicans, who are mainly Catholic and strive for reunification of the island of Ireland and thus incorporation of the counties of Northern Ireland into the independent Republic of Ireland (e.g., Cairns & Darby, 1998). Despite the fact that Loyalists and Republicans predominantly belong to one religion each, it has been stated that the Troubles were of political nature rather than about religious affiliations (Robson, 2000) and that the groups merely "happen to be divided along religious lines" (Cairns & Darby, 1998, p. 754). Therefore, wherever possible, this thesis will also refer to the

groups as Loyalist and Republican, rather than using the religious denotations. The terms Unionist and Nationalist, which are typically used synonymously for Loyalist and Republican, respectively, are avoided simply to prevent confusion.

Three main parties were involved in the Troubles and were ultimately responsible for the deaths and injuries that occurred. Besides Republican paramilitary organisations such as the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) and Loyalist paramilitary organisations such as the Ulster Volunteer Force, security forces were also involved, e.g., the British Army and the Royal Ulster Constabulary (Hayes & McAllister, 2001). In general terms, there was a variety in the violence in Northern Ireland regarding its intensity, type, and location. Throughout the conflict, the number of deaths and injuries inflicted fluctuated significantly. The type of violence that was used ranged from demonstrations to planned killings and bomb detonations. Furthermore, violence during the Troubles was to a large extent centred in Belfast and Derry/Londonderry, with more rural areas typically less affected (Campbell, Cairns, & Mallett, 2004)

From the beginning of the Troubles in the late 1960s until the official end in 1998, more than 3,500 people were killed and approximately 40,000 were injured (Campbell et al., 2004). The nature of the Troubles, such as the duration and intensity of the conflict, particularly in proportion to population size, meant that a large number among the Northern Irish population experienced political violence directly (Hayes & McAllister, 2001). It has been claimed that the continuation of the conflict in Northern Ireland was due largely to the popular support for, or at least ambiguity towards, political violence. A substantial number of members of each community even openly supported the use of political violence (Hayes & McAllister, 2001, 2005).

The Troubles are said to have had several significant consequences. For many people in Northern Ireland, the conflict hugely influenced their everyday life, with the danger of

themselves or others close to them being killed or injured. It has also been suggested that the use of violence may have led to a vicious cycle of creating more of it, as experiencing violence may render individuals more likely to resort so similar measures themselves (Hayes & McAllister, 2001). In more general political terms, the conflict can be seen to have disrupted the functioning of democratic political institutions, despite their official existence throughout (Hayes & McAllister, 2001).

After decades of conflict, the main groups involved agreed to a ceasefire in 1994 (Jarman, 2004). Until then, violence had continued uninterruptedly for 25 years (Cairns & Darby, 1998). In 1998, the Troubles were officially terminated with the so-called Good Friday Agreement or Belfast Agreement. The agreement stipulated the decommissioning of weaponry held by paramilitary groups, the return to a devolved government in Northern Ireland, and a power-sharing agreement, although the latter was not in fact implemented until 2007 (McDowell & Shirlow, 2011; Kumer & Krevs, 2015). However, despite the peace agreement, segregation between the two conflicting groups is still highly prevalent, with higher segregation in areas of lower socio-economic standards (Kumer & Krevs, 2015). In many places, and particularly in urban working-class communities, segregation from the respective other is perceived to be normal (Gormley-Heenan & Byrne, 2012). The continuing separation of the two communities in Northern Ireland means that in many cases, there still is no or only little contact between members of the two groups (Campbell et al., 2004).

Israel/Palestine

The conflict in Israel/Palestine is waged between Israeli Jews, who founded a Jewish state in the territory in 1948, and Palestinian Arabs, who are mainly Muslim and perceive themselves as the indigenous and rightful inhabitants of the region, which is now occupied by the Jewish state of Israel (Mock et al., 2014). The conflict stems from competing Zionist and

Palestinian nationalisms. For both of these movements, the aspect of territory is a key issue (Yiftachel, 2002). Both groups believe themselves to be making righteous claims to the land in question as they both relate their origins to it (Mock et al., 2014). According to Wallach (2011), both Israelis and Palestinians utilise the issue of territory to advance their respective nationalisms and at the same time attempt to connect this issue to the more general aspects of identity and the legitimacy of their causes in order to support these. Peteet (2005) highlights how certain ways of framing and specific narratives are used by both groups to substantiate the legitimacy of their objectives and to justify the means they employ in order to achieve them. For instance, Israel can be seen to use narratives to describe the territory as formerly "uninhabited […] and unoccupied, regardless of the presence […] of the indigenous population" and to portray the Palestinian inhabitants as "savages […] or 'terrorists'" (Peteet, 2005, p. 155). On the other hand, Palestinians tend to depict the Israelis as illegitimate occupiers of the land that they inhabit (Mock et al., 2014).

　　　　After conflicting promises had been made to Jews and Arabs about the control of the territory in question, international actors set out to divide the territory among the two groups after the Second World War. However, after a United Nations (UN) Resolution was passed on a proposed partition plan dividing the territory along the so-called Green Line in 1947, fights broke out between Israelis and Palestinians as well as neighbouring Arab countries. When these fights ended in 1949, Israel occupied a large amount of territory that, according to the UN partition plan, in fact belonged to the Palestinians (Harms & Ferry, 2008; Mock et al., 2014). This war saw around 700,000 Palestinians fled or expelled from their homes (Harms & Ferry, 2008). To this day, Israel refuses to grant Palestinian refugees a right to return to their previous homes, posing a crucial obstacle in attempts to resolve the conflict since this represents a major demand by the Palestinian side (Mock et al., 2014).

Over the decades, tension between the Israelis and Palestinians and neighbouring Arab countries was typically high and occasionally escalated (Harms & Ferry, 2008). In 1967, tension between the different parties rose to such an extent that it resulted in the so-called Six-Day War in June, during which Israel occupied further Arab and Palestinian territories, including the West Bank and Gaza as well as the Sinai Peninsula and the Golan Heights. In the course of this, Israel came to control more than one million Palestinians in the occupied territories (Harms & Ferry, 2008). The Israeli state then commenced the settling of the occupied land, particularly in the West Bank (Mock et al., 2014). Some of the occupied territories were eventually returned to the neighbouring countries under certain conditions, but the Gaza Strip and the West Bank still remain under Israeli control (Mock et al., 2014).

Throughout the decades, the Palestinians have frequently revolted against Israeli occupation and oppression, most prominently and intensely during the two so-called Intifadas, Palestinian uprisings, respectively starting in 1987 and in 2000. The Intifadas were met with severe force by the Israeli army and over the course of the uprisings hundreds of Israelis and thousands of Palestinians were killed and tens of thousands injured (Harms & Ferry, 2008). However, the Palestinian territories of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip are still controlled by the Israelis. Although the extent and nature of Israeli control varies in the different areas, discrimination and oppression against Palestinians appear to be the norm (Harms & Ferry, 2008). The establishment of Israeli settlements in Palestinian territories has ceased in Gaza after the Israeli government implemented a disengagement plan for this region in 2005, but it continues to this day in the West Bank, significantly impairing Palestinian lives and adding to the existing tension between Israelis and Palestinians (Harms & Ferry, 2008; Mock et al., 2014) This is despite the fact that these settlements constitute a violation of International Humanitarian Law (Cohen, 2006). With respect to Israeli settlers, people relocating to the occupied territories can have both religious and political motivations,

with the settlements expanding the state's territory and acquiring resources (Cohen, 2006; Harms & Ferry, 2008).

Several attempts of solving the conflict between Israelis and Palestinians, including the Oslo Accords from 1993 and 1995, failed to lead to an end of the struggle (Harms & Ferry, 2008). Involvement of international actors such as in attempts of mediation or in the form of condemnation of Israeli action by international organisations and institutions did not seem to help to settle the conflict (Harms & Ferry, 2008). To date, the two parties to the conflict appear to be irreconcilable on numerous issues, most importantly the question of territory as well as the aforementioned right to return and statehood for Palestinians (Harms & Ferry, 2008).

Segregation and Structures Separating the Conflicting Groups

According to McAtackney (2011), walls separating warring groups in a conflict region from each other can have both positive and negative effects. On the one hand, they may be useful in controlling access to certain areas and in creating "a sense of security and belonging" among the population; on the other hand, they may also create feelings of insecurity and exclusion (McAtackney, 2011, p. 78). In the following, characteristics of the Peace Lines and the West Bank Barrier as instances of such structures are presented.

Northern Ireland: Peace Lines

The first Peace Line in Northern Ireland was constructed by the British Army in Belfast in 1969 in reaction to violence between the two communities, as it replaced an unofficial barricade with a more permanent structure (Gormley-Heenan & Byrne, 2012; McAtackney, 2011). The beginning of the construction of the Peace Lines thus dates back 50 years at the time of writing. The walls were supposed to manage complicated and frequently

violent relationships between conflicting neighbouring communities, to avert personal contact between members of the opposing groups, and to prevent expansion of the sectarian neighbourhoods (McAtackney, 2011; Kumer & Krevs, 2015). Furthermore, the walls were intended to increase safety and to provide the different groups with a sense of security and a way to identify "friendly territory" (Gormley-Heenan & Byrne, 2012, p. 4). However, it has also been claimed that the walls may facilitate violence by concentrating it to specific areas along their course (McAtackney, 2011). In most cases, Peace Lines were constructed because local communities requested them, which occurred with increased frequency during the Troubles as fear and intimidation rose (McAtackney, 2011).

Concerning the physical composition of the Peace Lines, it should be noted that there is a significant amount of variety concerning materials and designs. Some of the walls are solid and completely visually shield one community from the other; others consist of more temporary and at times transparent elements; and in some cases, there are merely fences (McAtackney, 2011). However, most Peace Lines have in common that they do allow people to move from one side to the other (McAtackney, 2011), although the gates that allow movement during the day may be closed, for instance, overnight or on Sundays (Sommers, 2014).

Although construction of the walls was supposed to be temporary, it soon became perceived as normal in the attempt to halt sectarian and communal violence. Interestingly, in Belfast one third of the walls has been built after the ceasefires in 1994 (Kumer & Krevs, 2015; Byrne & Gormley-Heenan, 2014) and just within the city there are still almost 100 Peace Lines (Arar, 2017). To this day, segregation and the structures supporting it are normal for a large share of the Northern Irish population, particularly in communities of lower socio-economic status in urban environments (Gormley-Heenan & Byrne, 2012; Kumer & Krevs,

2015). It appears that many people in the affected communities continue to regard the walls

as necessary for their protection and safety ("Will NI's peace walls come down", 2018).

The segregation of the two communities in Northern Ireland means that there still is

limited contact between them with regard to various aspects (Campbell et al., 2004).

Generally, although such segregation does not appear to cause conflict between groups itself,

it has been suggested that it does maintain conflict between them (Hewstone, Cairns, Voci,

Hamberger, & Niens, 2006). Hewstone et al. (2006) also stress that segregation provides

people with a sense of safety and that therefore a change of this situation is unlikely to occur

before people feel safer in their communities in general. Along similar lines, Kumer and

Krevs (2015) suggest that rather than the original reasons for the walls' construction, i.e.,

security and reduction of violence, now the consequences of their erection are crucial, e.g.,

fear of the other group due to lack of personal contact with its members.

It should also be noted that segregation of the two communities in Northern Ireland is

not merely based on physical separation by the Peace Lines. Rather, it is evident in a variety

of aspects of social life (Kumer & Krevs, 2015). For instance, the two different communities

show differential preferences regarding culture, sports, and schooling (Kumer & Krevs,

2015). In addition, housing of Protestant and Catholic inhabitants is largely segregated

(Knox, 2011). However, the Peace Lines do certainly contribute to the existing segregation as

they are a physical manifestation of it (Gormley-Heenan & Byrne, 2012). The fact that the

walls still exist has been claimed to have contributed to the affected communities'

marginalisation (McAtackney, 2011). Indeed, McKeown (2013) even suggests that the large

number of Peace Lines shows that "segregation is more dominant today than it was during

the height of the conflict" (p. 17). This may also be due to the fact that particularly young

people confine themselves to their own community due to fear of intimidation (Hayes &

McAllister, 2009). In general, it has been claimed that the segregation between communities,

while facilitating solidarity within them, has also contributed to community conflict and stereotyping as it "reduces the possibilities for positive inter-ethnic exchange" (Boal, 2002, p. 693). Similarly, the Peace Lines seem to provide security, yet at the same time disrupt movement (Boal, 2002). In addition to their effects on societal segregation, the Peace Lines have had negative economic impact and negative consequences for health and social well-being among the communities directly affected by them (Gormley-Heenan & Byrne, 2012; Byrne et al., 2012).

Previous research on attitudes towards Peace Lines.

Most prominently and relevant to the current study, Byrne et al. (2012) previously investigated people's attitudes towards the Peace Lines in Northern Ireland. Parts of their study are comparable to what this research is aiming to investigate and will thus be discussed here. In broad terms, they found that most participants felt that Peace Lines were established to make communities feel safer and to reduce intimidation and tensions among communities. Furthermore, the majority of people indicated that they would like to see the Peace Lines removed immediately or at some point in the future. Byrne et al. (2012) distinguished between respondents who live in close proximity of a Peace Line and the general population. One interesting distinction between the two was that, although still representing a clear majority, fewer Peace Line residents wanted the Peace Lines to be removed, and of those who did, a smaller proportion could in fact imagine their removal as compared to the general population. 69% of Peace Line residents believed that the walls are needed in order to prevent violence (Byrne et al., 2012).

Moreover, Byrne et al.'s (2012) research distinguished between Catholic and Protestant respondents. Results suggested, for instance, that more Protestants than Catholics believed that the Peace Lines protect their identity and that their community would be

threatened in its existence if the Peace Lines were removed. A large majority of respondents, regardless of their confession, indicated that they believed that segregation of the communities in Northern Ireland is commonplace regardless of whether or not Peace Lines are present.

Israel/Palestine: West Bank Barrier

Construction of the West Bank Barrier as a structure to separate Israeli and Palestinian populations started in 2002 at the peak of the Second Intifada, although the idea may originate in early Zionist ideologies (Cohen, 2006; El-Atrash, 2016; Jones, Leuenberger, & Regan Wills, 2016). The wall is constructed unilaterally by the Israeli government. The Palestinian Authority has neither been consulted on its construction in general nor on the route along which it is being built (Jones et al., 2016). Although it generally follows the course of the internationally recognised Green Line, it is mostly built on the Palestinian side of this line and frequently cuts into Palestinian West Bank territory in order to include Israeli settlements and exclude Palestinian communities, thereby claiming large proportions of land (Jones et al., 2016; Harms & Ferry, 2008). Only approximately 15% of the planned route of the wall in fact lie on the Green Line or on Israeli ground (El-Atrash, 2016).

Officially, the main purpose of the wall is protection of the Israeli population against Palestinian terrorists. It is claimed to be successful in doing so as the number of terrorist attacks in Israel appears to have decreased (Cohen, 2006; Perry, Apel, Newman, & Clarke, 2017). This argument is thus used by the Israeli government to justify the construction as well as the route of the West Bank Barrier. The government further claims that the Palestinians themselves are responsible for any potentially negative effects the wall might have on their lives as allegedly it would be deconstructed if there were no terrorist attacks on Israeli soil, thus stressing that the wall is supposedly a temporary structure (Cohen, 2006). Particularly

these claims of the temporary nature of the West Bank Barrier, however, are viewed with scepticism by Palestinians, especially due to the estimated costs of US$4 million per mile for its construction (Harms & Ferry, 2008).

Furthermore, it seems that the construction of the wall is not merely intended to protect Israelis from Palestinian terrorists. Cohen (2006) asserts that it is designed to unite Israeli settlements with Israel proper, to claim land and resources, and to generally expand Israel's territory, which might be used to define future state borders. Indeed, the Israeli government has claimed that the route of the West Bank Barrier should be taken as a starting point for potential future negotiations about borders between Israel and Palestine (Jones et al., 2016).

The West Bank Barrier has proved to have significant negative effects on the lives of the Palestinians. The wall is entirely controlled by the Israelis; whether or not Palestinians receive a permit to cross it is largely decided based on the individual's biography as well as characteristics of the community where he or she is from (Alatout, 2009). It appears that crossing the Green Line has become significantly more difficult for Palestinians since the beginning of the construction of the wall (Jones et al., 2016). The wall has disrupted the social, spatial, and physical development of Palestinian communities, it has annexed a vast amount of Palestinian grounds, negatively affected water supply in Palestinian villages, at times divided Palestinian villages in two, and cut Palestinians off their homes or land, which has not only immediate practical implications but also long-term negative consequences for Palestinian society and individual well-being (El-Atrash, 2016; Dana, 2017; Busbridge, 2013). The West Bank Barrier can be seen as a means by the Israeli state to control all spaces and inhabitants of the West Bank (Alatout, 2009).

In general, the Israeli population appears to largely support the existence of a wall along the West Bank border. Not only is it perceived to have reduced the number of terrorist

attacks in Israel, although it has been questioned whether this is in fact due to the presence of the wall, but it more broadly allows Israelis to avoid contact with Palestinians (Harms & Ferry, 2008; Cohen, 2006; Busbridge, 2013). Furthermore, it clearly establishes a border for their territory, which supposedly substantiates Israeli national legitimacy (Cohen, 2006). In contrast, the West Bank Barrier constitutes a considerable obstacle for Palestinians in their objective to obtain statehood for themselves. This is because the wall is built unilaterally by the Israelis and for the most part on territory that lies on the Palestinian side of the Green Line and is thus perceived by Palestinians as "an 'annexation' or 'apartheid' wall" rather than as a "security fence" as the Israelis call it (Busbridge, 2013, p. 656). This yields substantially different narratives among the two groups. Rather than enhancing security for Palestinians, the wall is considered to undermine it (Busbridge, 2013; El-Atrash, 2016). For Palestinians, the West Bank Barrier therefore has significant effects on their everyday lives as well as on their long-term political agenda (Harms & Ferry, 2008). Similarly to the Peace Lines in Northern Ireland, the West Bank Barrier can be seen to reduce contact between the two communities in the region (Busbridge, 2013).

Being one of the most contested structures of its kind, the West Bank Barrier has been condemned by the UN and it has been declared illegal both by the International Court of Justice and the Israeli High Court due to its unilateral construction and its location on Palestinian grounds (Busbridge, 2013; Harms & Ferry, 2008; Jones et al., 2016). However, this has not led to significant changes to its construction or location (Jones et al., 2016).

Parallels and Identification across the Conflicts

In general terms, some similarities can be observed across the conflicts in Northern Ireland and in Israel/Palestine. In Northern Ireland, the two opposing groups supposedly regard "their histories in terms of settler/native division" (McDowell & Shirlow, 2011, p.

701). This might be comparable to the perception of Palestinians that the land in which they are the native inhabitants is occupied by the Israelis, who in turn believe that it is their right to do so based on historic associations with the territory (Mock et al., 2012).

Another similarity is based on demographics. Catholics/Republicans in Northern Ireland show significantly larger population growth than Protestants/Loyalists, as do Palestinians compared to Israelis (Cairns & Darby, 1998; Usher, 2005). This has led to fear by Loyalists as well as Israelis that they will eventually be outnumbered by their enemies and lose their dominant status compared to the opposing groups and thus be threatened in their existence (Cairns & Darby, 1998; Usher, 2005). It should be noted, however, that at least the perceptions of these phenomena are highly subjective and may not equally apply to all groups and all their members.

Identification by Northern Irish Groups

At least some parts of the two conflicting groups in Northern Ireland have come to identify or sympathise with the warring groups in the Middle East. Republicans tend to identify with the Palestinians as they believe that both groups have been oppressed by foreign forces, while Loyalists sympathise with Israelis because they assert that these two groups both make righteous claims to the territories in question and fight against what they regard as violent insurgents and terrorists (Dizard, 2014).

According to Arar (2017), the international solidarity expressed by Republicans and Loyalists has been used to reinforce local divisions between the conflicting groups. Louvet (2016) has also extensively written about the solidarity with Israelis and Palestinians on behalf of the Northern Irish groups, outlining the background and reasoning behind these sympathies.

Republicans started showing interest in the Palestinian cause in the early 1970s (Louvet, 2016). They felt that both groups were fighting against occupiers or settlers to the land that they originally inhabited and that they shared experiences of colonisation and state-sponsored violence against them (Louvet, 2016; Arar, 2017). More specific examples for similarities between the cases of Ireland and Palestine could be the importance of the issue of territory as well as experiencing partition of the land (Louvet, 2016). Generally, the situation of Arabs in Israel was frequently depicted as similar to the discrimination that the Republicans experienced in Northern Ireland. Arar (2017) states that stressing similarities between the Palestinians' and their own situation allowed Republicans to legitimise their struggle by depicting it as anti-imperial. On a broader political level, it has been argued that the Republic of Ireland was hesitant in granting recognition of the state of Israel due to its own experience of British imperialism and that it opposed the partition of the territories in the Middle East due to its experience of the partition of the island of Ireland (Arar, 2017).

During the Troubles, the PIRA also portrayed its fight as one against imperialism and thus as a liberation struggle, drawing on similarities with Palestine (Arar, 2017). Furthermore, it actively collaborated with the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO): a faction of the PLO attempted to provide the PIRA with weapons; members of the PIRA were trained in camps in the Middle East; and in return, the PIRA supported the PLO when necessary (Louvet, 2016; Arar, 2017).

On a broader societal level, signs of solidarity with the Palestinians started to appear in Republican areas in Northern Ireland from the 1980s onwards. This was evident in murals depicting Palestinian suffering and showing solidarity and support for the Palestinian cause, as well as Palestinian flags being flown (Louvet, 2016; Arar, 2017).

In general, it appears that the support expressed by Loyalists for the Israelis was less prominent and may have largely occurred as a response to Republican support for the

Palestinians, most visibly after the Second Intifada in 2002 (Louvet, 2016; Arar, 2017). However, it seems that sympathy for the Israeli cause has increased over recent years. A crucial aspect here seems to be some sort of "siege mentality" (Louvet, 2016, p. 188), according to which both groups' existence is perceived to be constantly threatened by those around them, i.e., Republicans and Palestinians, respectively. The aspect of national security and corresponding legitimacy is therefore highly important to both Loyalists and Israelis. Hence, the issues of sovereignty, security, and the depiction of Republicans and Palestinians alike as terrorists were prominent among some Loyalists (Arar, 2017).

At least for some parts of the Loyalist community, affiliation with Israel is based on religious aspects, meaning that they would support Israeli people rather than the state of Israel as such. For some Loyalists, religious interpretations and perceived similarities with Israeli Jews are so strong that they in fact view Northern Ireland as "their own promised land" (Arar, 2017, p. 862). Thereby, they denounce portrayals of Protestant settling in Northern Ireland as imperial or colonial (Arar, 2017), thus contrasting Republican depictions and legitimising their own cause.

In their communities in Northern Ireland, Loyalists have also displayed Israeli flags and uttered pro-Israel slogans, although this could also be seen mainly as a response to the public support for Palestine shown by Republicans (Louvet, 2016). In the use of national symbols, some Loyalists have resorted to burning Palestinians flags alongside Irish Republican flags and symbols during parades (Arar, 2017). This could be regarded both as an instance of denouncing the 'other' in the international context in order to denounce one's direct enemy at home, as has been done by both Northern Irish groups (Arar, 2017), or as another example of Loyalist support for Israel being mainly a reaction to Republican support for Palestine. Interestingly, symbols for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, such as Israeli and

Palestinian flags flown in Northern Ireland, appear to have become more popular in times of relative peace (Hill & White, 2008).

For both groups and their signs of support for the respective groups in Israel/Palestine, one should bear in mind that the solidarity is mainly based on aspects of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict that can be used to reinforce the division between the communities in Northern Ireland. Religious or cultural differences are typically ignored, which suggests that expressions of solidarity are used strategically by both Republicans and Loyalists (Arar, 2017). Despite the utilisation by both groups of aspects of the Israeli/Palestinian conflict to further their own causes, one should bear in mind that Loyalists and Republicans alike do appear to show some understanding or respect for each other as well (Hayes & McAllister, 2001).

Potential Identification by Israelis and Palestinians

It appears that so far, no research has been conducted into whether Israelis and Palestinians similarly sympathise with the respective groups in Northern Ireland. Considering the fact that the PLO collaborated with the PIRA in the 1970s (Louvet, 2016), it could be expected that some level of sympathy exists for the Northern Irish group on behalf of the Palestinians. However, it should be noted that the PLO officially distanced itself from the PIRA as the demand for statehood for Palestinians may have been hindered by collaboration with an internationally condemned paramilitary group (Louvet, 2016). Nonetheless, sympathies may have existed or still exist among the broader Palestinian population. Another instance hinting at sympathy with the Republicans by Palestinians is described by Arar (2017): In 2011, the Moyle district council in Northern Ireland voted to twin with Gaza city. Although this decision was later revoked, it received a great deal of attention and, naturally, disapproval by Loyalists. Before the repeal of the decision, the Gaza mayor is quoted as

regarding the agreement as "an expression of existing solidarity and friendship between [the] two communities" (Arar, 2017, p. 871). This could be interpreted as a sign that Palestinians may at least to some extent also sympathise with the Republicans in Northern Ireland.

In more general terms, similarly to Republicans, Palestinians perceive their opposing group as illegitimate occupiers (Mock et al., 2012). This might function as an additional basis for possible solidarity with the Republicans. However, neither of these aspects have in fact been scrutinised before.

As for the Israelis, based on the existing literature it is difficult to gauge whether or not they might affiliate themselves with the Northern Irish Loyalists. It is conceivable that based on the aforementioned siege mentality experienced by the Loyalists (Louvet, 2016) as well as similar fears of being outnumbered by their enemies due to differential population growth rates (Cairns & Darby, 1998; Usher, 2005), Israelis could theoretically sympathise with the Loyalists. However, just as potential solidarity by Palestinians with the Republicans, possible solidarity by Israelis with the Loyalists has not yet been investigated.

Conceptual Framework

The two groups each in the Northern Irish and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, i.e., Northern Irish Loyalists, Northern Irish Republicans, Israelis, and Palestinians, serve as a starting point to this research and represent the independent variable. The different groups are defined based on people's place of residence and, most importantly, their identification with their respective own community. Thus, the decisive criterion here is not the nationality of the participants, but rather that they live either in Northern Ireland or in Israel/Palestine and that they at least to some extent identify as Loyalist, Republican, Israeli, or Palestinian. This is mostly due to the fact that nationalities in the two regions do not necessarily reflect people's

affiliation with a certain group, as will be further discussed when highlighting the limitations of this research.

This study applies the distinctions between the four groups to the concrete issue of perceptions of physical structures separating warring groups in conflict regions, i.e., the Peace Lines in Northern Ireland and the West Bank Barrier in Israel/Palestine. As its main objective, the study assesses these perceptions that members of the different groups have of the structures. Participants' perceptions thus represent the dependent variables in this study.

The average perceptions are then compared among the groups. Based on the historical background of the two conflicts as outlined above as well as on the alleged cross-identification, it is expected that the perceptions of Loyalists and Israelis on the one hand and those of Republicans and Palestinians on the other hand are comparable. In contrast, it is expected that these two pairs of groups exhibit significantly different perceptions, i.e., that Loyalists' and Israelis' perceptions differ from those of Republicans and Palestinians. In addition, this study attempts to establish empirically the potential cross-identification or solidarity among the four groups as has been discussed before. If replicable, such cross-identification may serve as an explanation for possible similarities and differences in the perceptions across the conflicts. This conceptualisation of the groups, their perceptions, and the cross-identification is depicted in Figure 1.

With regard to operationalisation, the concept of perceptions reported by participants is broken down into different components or dimensions, namely identification, security, effects of structures on security, removal of structures, and intergroup contact. These


Figure 1. Conceptualisation

components are further divided into more specific indicators or variables. The component of

identification contains the indicators identification and cross-identification; the component of

security contains the indicator of perceived safety; the component of effects of structures

contains the indicators intended effects and actual effects on one's own and the opposing

group; the component of removal contains the indicators of opinion on removal and expected

consequences; the component of intergroup contact contains the indicator of opinion on

contact. The indicators, in turn, are assessed by one or multiple survey questions that are

administered to the participants.

The described operationalisation should allow for the assessment of participants'

perceptions along the lines of the conceptualisation outlined above and portrayed in Figure 1.

This forms the basis of this research in that it permits the researcher to investigate whether

the independent variable, i.e., membership in one of the four different groups, significantly

influences the dependent variables, i.e., the perceptions of the separating structures. Based on

this, the elaborate research questions mentioned above can be investigated and answered.

Hypotheses

To summarise the information given thus far, based on implications from previous

research and on the conceptualisation described above, this thesis assesses three hypotheses.

Their precise content and the rationale behind them will be outlined in the following. All

hypotheses are expressed by means of the median *Mdn* as this is the measure of central

tendency used by the tests applied here, which will be described in detail in the section on

measurement and analysis.

As discussed above, the two Northern Irish groups perceive themselves to be similar

in some respects to the Israelis and Palestinians, respectively. Therefore, it is conceivable that

the two pairs of groups have similar perceptions of the separating structures that are present

in both conflict regions. Therefore, the first hypothesis (H_1) is that Northern Irish Loyalists and Israelis on the one hand and Northern Irish Republicans and Palestinians on the other hand exhibit comparable perceptions of the Peace Lines and the West Bank Barrier, i.e., that these groups' perceptions do not differ significantly from each other. The corresponding null hypothesis H_{01} is that the perceptions of Loyalists and Israelis and of Republicans and Palestinians are significantly different from each other.

H_{01}: $Mdn_{Loy} \neq Mdn_{Isr}$ and $Mdn_{Rep} \neq Mdn_{Pal}$

H_{A1}: $Mdn_{Loy} = Mdn_{Isr}$ and $Mdn_{Rep} = Mdn_{Pal}$

The literature on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict gives reason to believe that the two groups have substantially different opinions on the issue of the West Bank Barrier. This may be due to, for instance, the fact that the West Bank Barrier has been built unilaterally and without consent on behalf of the Palestinian population, which means that Palestinians likely have different and more negative opinions about the structure. Given the parallels between the two conflicts and the groups involved as outlined above, it seems possible that the two groups in each region would have fundamentally different views on the separating structures, while there may be similarities across the two conflicts. This would reflect findings from existing literature as well as the first hypothesis of this thesis. Thus, the second hypothesis (H_2) is that Northern Irish Loyalists and Israelis on the one hand show significantly different perceptions of the Peace Lines and the West Bank Barrier than Northern Irish Republicans and Palestinians on the other hand. The null hypothesis H_{02} is that there are no significant differences in perceptions among the two pairs.

H_{02}: $Mdn_{Loy/Isr} = Mdn_{Rep/Pal}$

H_{A2}: $Mdn_{Loy/Isr} \neq Mdn_{Rep/Pal}$

Finally, based on the existing literature, it is expected that the Northern Irish groups do indeed identify or sympathise with the groups in the Middle East. Although not tested

before, there are some indications that could imply mutuality of this phenomenon. Therefore, the third hypothesis (H_3), consisting of two parts, is that (a) Northern Irish Loyalists and Republicans identify themselves with Israelis and Palestinians, respectively, and that (b) Israelis and Palestinians affiliate themselves with Northern Irish Loyalists and Republicans, respectively. The respective null hypotheses H_{03} are that (a) there is no significant cross-identification on behalf of the Northern Irish groups and that (b) there is no significant cross-identification on behalf of Israelis and Palestinians. As answer options to the relevant questionnaire items were arranged on a Likert scale from 1 to 5, this hypothesis is assessed by determining deviations in responses from 3, which represents a *neutral* answer option.

H_{03a}: $Mdn_{\text{ID\_Isr by Loyalists}} \leq 3$; $Mdn_{\text{ID\_Pal by Republicans}} \leq 3$

H_{03b}: $Mdn_{\text{ID\_Loy by Israelis}} \leq 3$; $Mdn_{\text{ID\_Rep by Palestinians}} \leq 3$

H_{A3a}: $Mdn_{\text{ID\_Isr by Loyalists}} > 3$; $Mdn_{\text{ID\_Pal by Republicans}} > 3$

H_{A3b}: $Mdn_{\text{ID\_Loy by Israelis}} > 3$; $Mdn_{\text{ID\_Rep by Palestinians}} > 3$

Methods

Participants

Every person over the age of 18 who lives in either Northern Ireland or in Israel/Palestine and who affiliates him- or herself with either Northern Irish Loyalists, Northern Irish Republicans, Israelis, or Palestinians, was eligible to participate. There were no further restrictions regarding participants' age or other demographic characteristics.

Sampling and Sample Size

Potential participants were approached through personal contacts of the researcher as well as by reaching out to public figures and organisations which are active in either Northern Ireland or in Israel/Palestine, each accompanied by a request for further distribution of the

questionnaire. Furthermore, the study was promoted on social media and shared in social media groups whose members are likely to live in one of the two regions. Additionally, flyers advertising the study were distributed in community centres as well as to households in areas in Belfast which are known to have a majority of either Protestant/Loyalist or Catholic/Republican residents. A copy of these two flyers can be found in Figures A1 and A2 in Appendix A. Participation in the study was entirely voluntary and not rewarded with a monetary or any other reward. Responses to the questionnaire were collected for approximately two months from the end of March until the beginning of June 2019.

To the author's knowledge, the research conducted by Byrne et al. (2012) is the only study that assessed people's perceptions towards the Peace Lines in Northern Ireland in a way that is similar to the current research. However, even if one were to disregard the differences that exist between the two studies, Byrne et al. (2012) do not report any effect sizes for their tests. Therefore, it proves difficult to conduct *a priori* calculations of the required sample sizes for the current study. Nevertheless, such calculations were performed with *G*Power* to obtain rough estimates, using effect sizes corresponding to $r = 0.30$ and $r = 0.50$, which are commonly regarded as medium and large effects, respectively (Field, 2013), and a power value of 0.80, which Field (2013) describes as desirable. Aspiring to a power value of 0.80 at $\alpha = 0.05$, an effect size corresponding to $r = 0.30$ ($f = 0.315$) yields a required total sample size of $N = 116$, an effect size corresponding to $r = 0.50$ ($f = 0.577$) a total sample size of $N = 40$ for a Kruskal-Wallis Test comparing four groups. For a power value of 0.80 at $\alpha = 0.05$, an effect size corresponding to $r = 0.30$ ($d = 0.629$) yields a required sample size of $N = 18$, an effect size corresponding to $r = 0.50$ ($d = 1.155$) a sample size of $N = 7$ for a One-Sample Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test. The exact application of these two tests in this study will be explained in the section on measurement and analysis.

Ultimately, a total of $N = 95$ individuals participated in this study. No recorded responses were excluded from the analysis. 48 participants (50.50%) were female, 47 participants (49.50%) male. Participants' age ranged from 18 to 83 ($M = 37.58$, $SD = 13.713$). The number of participants was distributed among the four groups as follows: 16 participants (16.80% of the total number) were Northern Irish Loyalists, of which 5 were female and 11 male, with a mean age of $M = 41.75$ ($SD = 17.928$). 33 participants (34.70%) identified as Northern Irish Republicans, consisting of 14 females and 19 males, whose mean age was $M = 39.24$ ($SD = 12.916$). 21 participants (22.1%) indicated to be Israeli; 14 of these were female, 7 male, mean age $M = 37.33$ ($SD = 15.863$). Finally, 25 participants (26.30%) were Palestinian, consisting of 15 females and 10 males, with a mean age of $M = 32.92$ ($SD = 8.093$).

Research Design

Participants completed an online questionnaire in English with a total of 19 closed, fixed-response questions and one open-ended question. Four of these questions pertained to demographics and other basic information, i.e., age, gender, place of residence, and affiliation with one of the four groups in question. Apart from these questions on demographics and group identification, for all closed questions participants could choose from five answers each, arranged along a Likert scale. The survey was designed in such a way that participants would only be asked questions that pertain to their situation. For instance, participants from Northern Ireland were only asked about their perceptions of the Peace Lines while participants from Israel/Palestine only received questions on the West Bank Barrier. For the final open-ended question, participants could freely voice any further thoughts or comments they may have on the issue of the Peace Lines and the West Bank Barrier, respectively. Apart from the open-ended question, all questions, including those on demographics, were forced-

response items. Participants could thus not proceed or finalise the questionnaire without answering every one of those questions.

A copy of the questionnaire is added to Appendix B. It includes the so-called display logic for items for which it applies, i.e., the specification as to which participants see a certain item, which ensures that respondents are only asked questions that pertain to their region.

Measurement and Analysis

The different groups represent the independent variable in this research. The dependent variables are the participants' perceptions about the separating structures and their identification with their own and the three other groups, each measured on a five-point Likert scale. The statistical analysis of the collected data was performed using IBM SPSS. As described above, participants received questions pertaining only to the structure that affects them rather than more general questions mentioning both terms. In order to allow for a comparative analysis using the Kruskal-Wallis Test, answers to these questions were merged before conducting the analysis. As apart from the name of the structure the wording of the questions was identical, this should not pose a problem to the validity of the analysis.

To first gain an overview of the perceptions that the members of the four different groups hold, the most commonly chosen answer for each questionnaire item is reported for each group, i.e., the mode *Mo*. Additionally, the mean *M* and the standard deviation *SD* are reported to allow for a more general picture of the average values for each group for each questionnaire item. The median *Mdn* is not reported separately as it is the measure of central tendency used by both the Wilcoxon Test and the Kruskal-Wallis Test, whose functioning and application is described below.

Since the answer options for the survey questions are arranged on a five-point Likert scale, each question offers participants a *neutral* answer option. To assess whether, on

average, the opinions of the members of the different groups deviate from this neutral middle, a One-Sample Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test was performed for each item and for each group separately. The Wilcoxon Test assesses the null hypothesis that the median for the item in question equals the value 3 that represents the *neutral* answer option. This test was thus mainly used to test H_3 when applied to the questionnaire items relating to identification with the respective other groups. However, it was also used for the remaining questionnaire items to indicate deviations from the *neutral* answer as well as tendencies within participants' responses.

Following this, the data were analysed using the Kruskal-Wallis Test, which allows to determine whether or not the four groups differ significantly from each other in their perceptions and, if that is the case, which groups in fact do. The Kruskal-Wallis Test tests the null hypothesis that the distribution on a certain questionnaire item is the same across the different categories, i.e., across the four different groups assessed here. In case of a significant result, the individual groups were compared using a post-hoc step-down procedure to determine which groups differ from each other. The step-down procedure is preferred to pairwise comparisons as the latter require adjustment of the *p*-values, which in turn reduces the power of the test (Field, 2013). The Kruskal-Wallis Test was used to test H_1 and H_2. If the test was not significant or if it was significant but grouped Loyalists and Israelis and/or Republicans and Palestinians into one subset in the post-hoc analysis, this was interpreted as support for H_1, while categorisation of the two pairs into different subsets would suggest support for H_2.

The answers that participants gave to the open question were taken into account as follows: If possible, answers were categorised as positive or negative perceptions of the separating structures, including notions against or for the structures' removal, respectively. The four groups would then be compared on this dimension to see whether they differ

significantly with regard to these broad perceptions, again using the Kruskal-Wallis Test. The precise content of the comments is discussed later on. This also applies to comments which could not readily be classified as positive or negative opinions on or perceptions of the structures.

After conducting this general analysis, the tests as described above were repeated taking into account only responses by individuals who indicated that they identify *strongly* or *very strongly* with their own group. The methods used and the hypotheses tested were the same as for the analysis of the entire sample, it was merely restricted to these specific participants and no test was conducted for the item on strength of identification with one's own group as respondents were now selected based on their answer to this item. It is then discussed whether the results of analysing responses by individuals with particularly strong group affiliation differ from those of the entire sample.

Results

In the following, the results for each questionnaire item will be presented by reporting several statistics from the analyses: the most commonly chosen answer, i.e., the mode Mo, as well as the mean M and the standard deviation SD for each group; the test statistic T, the standardised test statistic Z to indicate tendencies, and the corresponding p-value for the Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test for each group; and the test statistic H and the corresponding p-value for the Kruskal-Wallis Test as well as the subsets that its post-hoc analysis yielded. For the latter it should be noted that it is possible for one group to be part of two subsets. This would indicate that this specific group does not differ significantly from either of the groups that it shares a subset with, while those groups that are in separate sets do differ significantly from each other.

All statistics reported here are based on a significance level of $\alpha = 0.05$. In the case of multiple modes existing, the most commonly chosen answers will be discussed in the text while reporting the smallest value as the statistical mode. Effect sizes and power values for all tests will be discussed collectively at the end of this section.

For the Kruskal-Wallis Test for both the entire sample and the sample containing only individuals with strong group affiliation, the homogeneity of variances across the groups was assessed before conducting the analysis. These tests showed significant results for the majority of variables in both cases. However, according to Lachenbruch and Clements (2007), unequal variances do not pose a problem to the validity of the Kruskal-Wallis Test, which is why it was carried out despite lack of homogeneity of variances for multiple items.

Identification

Participants' affiliation with their own group was assessed by asking them how strongly they identified with their own community, using a Likert scale with answers ranging from 1 (*very weakly*) to 5 (*very strongly*). Northern Irish Loyalists most commonly indicated that they identified *very strongly* with their own community ($Mo = 5$, $M = 3.31$, $SD = 1.448$). Most Republican participants also identified *very strongly* with their group ($Mo = 5$, $M = 4.06$, $SD = 0.864$). Israelis mostly indicated that they identified *strongly* with their group ($Mo = 4$, $M = 3.71$, $SD = 1.271$), while Palestinians again most frequently expressed *very strong* identification with their own community ($Mo = 5$, $M = 4.20$, $SD = 1.080$). The Wilcoxon Test was significant for Republicans ($T = 253.000$, $Z = 4.244$, $p = 0.000$), Israelis ($T = 147.000$, $Z = 2.160$, $p = 0.031$), and Palestinians ($T = 293.000$, $Z = 3.619$, $p = 0.000$), but not for Loyalists ($T = 51.000$, $Z = 0.970$, $p = 0.332$). As can be seen by the respective standardised test statistics, members of the former three groups tended to report group affiliation higher than 3 (*neutral*). However, the Kruskal-Wallis Test did not show any significant differences

between the four groups with regard to identification with their own group ($H(3) = 5.522$, $p = 0.137$).

Cross-Identification

Each participant was asked to indicate how strongly he or she identified with each of the three remaining groups, with answers again arranged on a Likert scale from 1 (*very weakly*) to 5 (*very strongly*).

Identification with Loyalists.

Northern Irish Republicans most commonly indicated that they identified *weakly* with Loyalists ($Mo = 2$, $M = 2.03$, $SD = 0.918$). Israelis most frequently indicated a *neutral* position for identification with Loyalists ($Mo = 3$, $M = 2.57$, $SD = 0.746$). The majority of Palestinian participants identified *very strongly* with Loyalists, although the respective mean was rather low ($Mo = 5$, $M = 2.40$, $SD = 0.816$). The results of the Wilcoxon Test suggest that Republicans ($T = 15.000$, $Z = -4.096$, $p = 0.000$), Israelis ($T = 0.000$, $Z = -2.251$, $p = 0.024$), and Palestinians ($T = 0.000$, $Z = -2.879$, $p = 0.004$) all tended to identify with Loyalists more weakly rather than indicating a neutral stance. The Kruskal-Wallis Test comparing the identification with Loyalists on behalf of Republicans, Israelis, and Palestinians showed that there were significant differences between the three, with Republicans and Palestinians forming one subset while Palestinians and Israelis similarly fitted in one subset ($H(2) = 6.635$, $p = 0.036$)

Identification with Republicans.

Northern Irish Loyalists most commonly indicated that they identified *very weakly* with Republicans ($Mo = 1$, $M = 2.25$, $SD = 1.291$). Israelis mostly indicated *neutral*

identification with Republicans ($Mo = 3$, $M = 2.81$, $SD = 0.814$). The same was true for most

Palestinians ($Mo = 3$, $M = 3.20$, $SD = 1.118$). The Wilcoxon Test was significant for Loyalists

($T = 8.000$, $Z = -2.107$ $p = 0.035$), with the negative standardised value indicating a tendency

to report rather weak identification with Republicans, but not for Israelis ($T = 4.000$, $Z = -$

$.966$, $p = 0.334$) and Palestinians ($T = 34.000$, $Z = 0.690$, $p = 0.490$). According to the

Kruskal-Wallis Test, there were significant differences between the three groups, with

Loyalists and Israelis in one and Israelis and Palestinians in another subset ($H(2) = 7.246$, $p = $

0.027).

Identification with Israelis.

Most Northern Irish Loyalists identified *very weakly* with Israelis ($Mo = 1$, $M = 2.56$,

$SD = 1.413$), as did Northern Irish Republicans ($Mo = 1$, $M = 1.76$, $SD = 0.902$) and

Palestinians ($Mo = 1$, $M = 1.56$, $SD = 0.917$). The Wilcoxon Test was not significant for

Loyalists ($T = 24.000$, $Z = -1.213$, $p = 0.225$). It was highly significant for both Republicans

($T = 5.000$, $Z = -4.504$, $p = 0.000$) and Palestinians ($T = 9.000$, $Z = -4.195$, $p = 0.000$), who

both reported identification with Israelis significantly lower than 3.

The results of the Kruskal-Wallis Test showed significant differences between the

groups where one subset contained Palestinians and Republicans and another one

Republicans and Loyalists ($H(2) = 6.811$, $p = 0.033$).

Identification with Palestinians.

With regard to identification with the Palestinians, there was substantial variety in

responses among Loyalists, with the same amount of people indicating *very weak*, *neutral*,

and *strong* identification with them, respectively ($Mo = 1$, $M = 2.63$, $SD = 1.258$). Most

Republicans identified *strongly* with Palestinians ($Mo = 4$, $M = 3.52$, $SD = 1.302$). Israelis

equally often indicated *weak* and *strong* identification with Palestinians ($Mo = 2, M = 3, SD = 1.378$). The Wilcoxon Test was not significant for Loyalists ($T = 17.500, Z = -1.417, p = 0.156$) or Israelis ($T = 105.000, Z = 0.000, p = 1.000$), but considerably close to significance for Republicans ($T = 268.000, Z = 1.959, p = 0.050$), who typically indicated stronger than *neutral* identification with Palestinians. However, the Kruskal-Wallis Test was not significant ($H(2) = 5.430, p = 0.066$).

Perceived Security and Impact of Structures

To assess the impact that participants perceived the separating structures to have, several questions related to the issue of security. Firstly, participants were asked how safe they generally feel in the community that they live in, with answer options ranging from 1 (*very unsafe*) to 5 (*very safe*). Loyalists ($Mo = 4, M = 4.19, SD = 0.750$), Republicans ($Mo = 4, M = 4.15, SD = 0.795$), and Israelis ($Mo = 4, M = 4, SD = 0.707$) commonly felt *safe* in their communities, whereas Palestinians tended to feel *unsafe* ($Mo = 2, M = 2.64, SD = 1.114$). The Wilcoxon Test showed highly significant results for Loyalists ($T = 91.000, Z = 3.272, p = 0.001$), Republicans ($T = 475.000, Z = 4.624, p = 0.000$), and Israelis ($T = 182.000, Z = 3.722, p = 0.000$), who accordingly usually indicated comparatively high feelings of safety. The Wilcoxon Test was not significant for Palestinians ($T = 73.500, Z = -1.560, p = 0.119$). Similarly, comparing the groups by means of the Kruskal-Wallis Test showed significant differences between the groups, with Palestinians in one subset and Israelis, Republicans, and Loyalists in another ($H(3) = 29.571, p = 0.000$).

Two questionnaire items pertained to the perceived intended purpose of the separating structure. In one question, participants were asked whether they felt that the walls were supposed to contribute to their own community's security, in another whether they thought that the structures were meant to increase the security of the respective other community in

their country or region. For both questions, answer options ranged from 1 (*strongly disagree*) to 5 (*strongly agree*).

Loyalists (*Mo* = 4, *M* = 3.56, *SD* = 1.031), Republicans (*Mo* = 4, *M* = 3.09, *SD* = 1.234), and Israelis (*Mo* = 4, *M* = 3.81, *SD* = 1.209) most commonly tended to *agree* that the walls were designed to contribute to their own community's security. In contrast, most Palestinian participants *strongly disagreed* with such a statement (*Mo* = 1, *M* = 1.44, *SD* = 1.003). The Wilcoxon Test was significant for Loyalists (*T* = 63.000, *Z* = 1.979, *p* = 0.048) and Israelis (*T* = 156.500, *Z* = 2.555, *p* = 0.011), who by trend indicated higher than *neutral* agreement with the statement. It was also highly significant for Palestinians (*T* = 18.500, *Z* = -4.135, *p* = 0.000) but as the negative standardised test statistic shows, Palestinians rather disagreed. The Wilcoxon Test was not significant for Republicans (*T* = 169.000, *Z* = 35.620, *p* = 0.855). According to the Kruskal-Wallis Test, Palestinians formed their own subset, while the other three groups fell together in a separate one (*H*(3) = 36.364, *p* = 0.000).

When asked whether the structures were designed to contribute to the respective other community's security, most Loyalists (*Mo* = 4, *M* = 3.63, *SD* = 1.025), Republicans (*Mo* = 4, *M* = 3.30, *SD* = 1.185), and Palestinians (*Mo* = 4, *M* = 3.04, *SD* = 1.485) *agreed*, while Israelis equally often *strongly disagreed* or *disagreed* (*Mo* = 1, *M* = 2.38, *SD* = 1.203). The Wilcoxon Test was significant for Loyalists (*T* = 74.500, *Z* = 2.140, *p* = 0.032), who tended to indicate higher than *neutral* agreement, and Israelis (*T* = 28.000, *Z* = -2.132, *p* = 0.033), who showed a tendency towards lower than *neutral* agreement. It was not significant for Republicans (*T* = 237.000, *Z* = 1.216, *p* = 0.224) or Palestinians (*T* = 137.000, *Z* = -.031, *p* = 0.975). The results of the Kruskal-Wallis Test were significant and categorised Israelis and Palestinians as belonging in one subset and Palestinians, Republicans, and Loyalists as belonging in another (*H*(3) = 9.901, *p* = 0.019).

Subsequently, participants were asked to indicate how much, in their opinion, the structures do in fact contribute to their own and the other community's security, respectively, with possible answers between 1 (*not at all*) and 5 (*a great deal*).

With regard to the first question, most Loyalists maintained that the Peace Lines contribute *a little* to their security ($Mo = 2$, $M = 2.69$, $SD = 1.250$), for most Republicans they do *not at all* ($Mo = 1$, $M = 2.24$, $SD = 1.173$); the majority of Israeli participants reported that they feel that the West Bank Barrier contributes either *a little* or *a lot* to their own security ($Mo = 2$, $M = 3.19$, $SD = 1.327$), while most Palestinians believed that it does *not at all* contribute to their security ($Mo = 1$, $M = 1.60$, $SD = 1.118$). The Wilcoxon Test was significant for Republicans ($T = 42.000$, $Z = -3.182$, $p = 0.001$) as well as Palestinians ($T = 6.000$, $Z = -4.245$, $p = 0.000$), who both showed a tendency to attribute less contribution to their own safety to the respective structure. It was not significant for Loyalists ($T = 33.000$, $Z = -.910$, $p = 0.363$) or Israelis ($T = 101.000$, $Z = 0.702$, $p = 0.483$). The Kruskal-Wallis Test was highly significant and yielded three different subsets containing Palestinians; Republicans and Loyalists; and Loyalists and Israelis, respectively ($H(3) = 19.769$, $p = 0.000$).

With regard to the second question, the majority of Loyalist participants indicated that they think that the separating structure contributes *a little* to the other community's security ($Mo = 2$, $M = 2.75$, $SD = 1.183$), while most Republicans ($Mo = 1$, $M = 2.33$, $SD = 1.190$), Israelis ($Mo = 1$, $M = 2.05$, $SD = 1.359$), and Palestinians ($Mo = 1$, $M = 2.60$, $SD = 1.443$) believed that the structures do not contribute to the respective other community' security *at all*. However, the Wilcoxon Test was significant for Republicans ($T = 68.000$, $Z = -3.006$, $p = 0.003$), who thus tended to perceive lower contribution to the other's security. It was also significant for Israelis ($T = 18.500$, $Z = -2.902$, $p = 0.004$), who similarly tended to attribute lower effects on the other community's security to the structures. It was not significant for

Loyalists ($T = 34.000$, $Z = -.849$, $p = 0.396$) or Palestinians ($T = 75.500$, $Z = -1.433$, $p = 0.152$). The Kruskal-Wallis Test was not significant for the perceived actual contribution of the walls to the respective other community's security ($H(3) = 4.004$, $p = 0.261$).

Opinions on Removal and Consequences

When asked whether the separating structure in their region should be removed immediately or in the near future (possible answers from 1, *strongly disagree*, to 5, *strongly agree*), the majority of Loyalist participants indicated that they *agreed* with this suggestion ($Mo = 4$, $M = 3.75$, $SD = 1.000$). Republicans ($Mo = 5$, $M = 4$, $SD = 1.031$) and Palestinians ($Mo = 5$, $M = 4.92$, $SD = 0.277$) most frequently *strongly agreed*. In contrast, Israelis most often either *strongly disagreed* or *disagreed* ($Mo = 1$, $M = 2.86$, $SD = 1.493$). The Wilcoxon Test was significant for Loyalists ($T = 69.000$, $Z = 2.443$, $p = 0.015$), Republicans ($T = 374.000$, $Z = 4.016$, $p = 0.000$), and Palestinians ($T = 325.000$, $Z = 4.838$, $p = 0.000$), who all showed a tendency to agree that the structures should be removed soon rather than taking a *neutral* position. The test was not significant for Israelis ($T = 76.000$, $Z = -.426$, $p = 0.670$). The Kruskal-Wallis Test was significant and yielded the following subsets: Israelis and Loyalists; Loyalists and Republicans; and Palestinians ($H(3) = 33.148$, $p = 0.000$).

Three questionnaire items related to expected consequences in the case that the Peace Lines or the West Bank Barrier were indeed removed. Rating how safe they would feel in their community (answer options from 1, *very unsafe*, to 5, *very safe*), Loyalists ($Mo = 4$, $M = 3.69$, $SD = 0.793$), Republicans ($Mo = 4$, $M = 4.00$, $SD = 0.866$), and Palestinians ($Mo = 4$, $M = 3.88$, $SD = 0.833$) mostly stated that they would feel *safe*, while Israelis ($Mo = 2$, $M = 2.71$, $SD = 1.189$) most often reported that they would feel *unsafe*. The Wilcoxon Test showed significant results for Loyalists ($T = 61.000$, $Z = 2.653$, $p = 0.008$), Republicans ($T = 360.000$, $Z = 4.262$, $p = 0.000$), and Palestinians ($T = 214.000$, $Z = 3.620$, $p = 0.000$), who all tended to

expect higher than *neutral* safety upon removal of the structures. It was not significant for Israelis ($T = 61.500$, $Z = -1.108$, $p = 0.268$). Accordingly, the Kruskal-Wallis test suggested significant differences between the four groups, with Israelis in one subset and the other three groups falling together into a separate one ($H(3) = 17.589$, $p = 0.001$).

When asked whether they thought that removal of the separating structures would lead to their community being threatened more than with the structures in place (possible answers from 1, *extremely unlikely*, to 5, *extremely likely*), most Loyalist participants expected this to be *somewhat unlikely* to be the case for their community ($Mo = 2$, $M = 2.56$, $SD = 0.964$); Republicans mostly considered this to be either *extremely unlikely* or *somewhat unlikely* ($Mo =1$, $M = 2.45$, $SD = 1.201$); most Israelis expected increased threat to their community to be *somewhat likely* ($Mo = 4$, $M = 3.86$, $SD = 1.108$); and Palestinians most often took a *neutral* position on this item ($Mo = 3$, $M = 2.84$, $SD = 1.313$). The Wilcoxon Test was significant for Republicans ($T = 81.000$, $Z = -2.486$, $p = 0.013$), who tended to expect lower threat to their community, and for Israelis ($T = 161.000$, $Z = 2.753$, $p = 0.006$), who typically expected higher threat. It was not significant for Loyalists ($T = 15.000$, $Z = -1.706$, $p = 0.088$) or Palestinians ($T = 71.000$, $Z = -.651$, $p = 0.515$). This seems to correspond to the significant results of the Kruskal-Wallis test according to which Republicans, Loyalists, and Palestinians fell into one subset that was significantly different from another one which contained Israelis ($H(3) = 16.958$, $p = 0.001$).

In contrast to this, participants were asked how likely they think it is that their community would thrive more without the separating structures in place, with answer options again ranging from 1 (*extremely unlikely*) to 5 (*extremely likely*). The majority of Loyalists thought that this is *somewhat likely* ($Mo = 4$, $M = 3.69$, $SD = 1.078$); Republicans ($Mo = 5$, $M = 3.82$, $SD = 1.158$) and Palestinians ($Mo = 5$, $M = 3.88$, $SD = 1.054$) indicated that they believe this is *extremely likely*; and most Israeli participants either thought this is *extremely*

unlikely or they took a *neutral* stance ($Mo = 1$, $M = 2.62$, $SD = 1.284$). The Wilcoxon Test

yielded significant results for Loyalists ($T = 74.500$, $Z = 2.112$, $p = 0.035$), Republicans ($T =$

303.000, $Z = 3.338$, $p = 0.001$), and Palestinians ($T = 173.500$, $Z = 3.254$, $p = 0.001$), each

with a tendency to expect their community to thrive more after removal of the separating

structures. It was not significant for Israelis ($T = 34.500$, $Z = -1.491$, $p = 0.136$). The Kruskal-

Wallis test was significant and again classified Israelis as belonging in a separate subset from

the one containing Loyalists, Republicans, and Palestinians ($H(3) = 13.482$, $p = 0.004$).

Two items pertained to the contact between the respective two communities within

one of the countries or regions. For one question, participants indicated how likely they think

it is that contact between the communities will increase if the separating structures are

removed; answer options ranged from 1 (*extremely unlikely*) to 5 (*extremely likely*). Loyalists

($Mo = 4$, $M = 3.69$, $SD = 1.352$), Republicans, ($Mo = 4$, $M = 3.82$, $SD = 1.044$), and Israelis

($Mo = 4$, $M = 3.29$, $SD = 1.347$) most commonly indicated that contact would be *somewhat*

likely to increase; most Palestinian participants believed that increased contact would be

extremely likely ($Mo = 5$, $M = 4.20$, $SD = 0.957$). The results of the Wilcoxon Test were

significant for Republicans ($T = 324.000$, $Z = 3.365$, $p = 0.001$) and Palestinians ($T =$

236.500, $Z = 3.682$, $p = 0.000$); members of both these groups tended to believe that

increased contact was more likely as compared to choosing the *neutral* option. The test was

not significant for Loyalists ($T = 79.000$, $Z = 1.711$, $p = 0.087$) or Israelis ($T = 94.500$, $Z =$

0.880, $p = 0.379$). The Kruskal-Wallis Test, however, did not indicate any significant

differences between the four groups ($H(3) = 6.734$, $p = 0.081$).

Finally, participants were asked how positively or negatively they view increased

contact between the communities (answer options from 1, *extremely negatively*, to 5,

extremely positively). Most Loyalists ($Mo = 4$, $M = 4.31$, $SD = 0.793$) and Palestinians ($Mo =$

4, $M = 3.80$, $SD = 1.225$) viewed increased contact *positively*; the majority of Republicans

($Mo = 5$, $M = 4.33$, $SD = 0.854$) and Israelis ($Mo = 5$, $M = 3.95$, $SD = 1.284$) viewed it

extremely positively. The Wilcoxon Test was rather highly significant for all four groups

(Loyalists: $T = 131.000$, $Z = 3.358$, $p = 0.001$; Republicans: $T = 473.000$, $Z = 4.550$, $p =$

0.000; Israelis: $T = 157.500$, $Z = 2.596$, $p = 0.009$; Palestinians: $T = 205.000$, $Z = 2.628$, $p =$

0.009); they all showed a tendency to view increased contact between communities more

positively as compared to a *neutral* position. Accordingly, the Kruskal-Wallis Test did not

yield any significant differences between the different groups ($H(3) = 3.456$, $p = 0.327$).

Individuals with Strong Group Affiliation

In the following, the results of the analysis will be discussed that included only those

individuals who indicated that they identified *strongly* or *very strongly* with their own group.

To avoid unnecessary repetition, only results from the Wilcoxon Test and Kruskal-Wallis

Test will be discussed that differ from the ones found for the entire sample.

Only including individuals in the analysis who showed strong affiliation with their

own group resulted in a sample of $N = 66$. Participants' age ranged from 20 to 83 ($M = 37.06$,

$SD = 13.198$). 33 of these participants (50%) were female and 33 (50%) were male. 7

identified as Loyalist (10.6%; 1 female, 6 male; age: $M = 42.57$, $SD = 14.831$); 22 as

Republican (33.3%; 11 female, 11 male; age: $M = 38.55$, $SD = 12.868$); 15 as Israeli (22.7%;

9 female, 6 male; age: $M = 38.73$, $SD = 17.806$); and 22 as Palestinian (33.3%; 12 female, 10

male; age: $M = 32.68$, $SD = 8.050$).

Cross-identification.

Identification with Loyalists.

For Israelis with strong group affiliation, the Wilcoxon Test on the item regarding

identification with Loyalists was no longer significant ($T = 0.000$, $Z = -1.000$, $p = 0.317$),

meaning that their responses tended to be closer to 3 (*neutral*) as compared to the entire sample. The Kruskal-Wallis Test was still significant ($H(2) = 16.466$, $p = 0.000$). However, now there appeared to be significant differences between all three groups as they were all classified as belonging into separate subsets each rather than Republicans and Palestinians being in one subset and Palestinians and Israelis in another.

Identification with Republicans.

The results of the Kruskal-Wallis Test for identification with Republicans ($H(2) = 11.439$, $p = 0.003$) differed compared to the entire sample in that, while Israelis and Palestinians were still classified into one subset, Loyalists were now in a subset of their own rather than sharing one with Israelis.

Identification with Israelis.

Compared to the entire sample, the Kruskal-Wallis Test for identification with Israelis ($H(2) = 10.300$, $p = 0.006$) yielded a change in reported subsets. Republicans and Loyalists now differed significantly as the latter now were in a separate subset while the former were still classified to belong to the same subset as Palestinians.

Identification with Palestinians.

In contrast to the entire sample, the Wilcoxon Test on the item regarding identification with Palestinians was now significant for Republicans ($T = 149.000$, $Z = 2.239$, $p = 0.025$). Republicans with strong group affiliation thus tended to identify more strongly with Palestinians than a *neutral* position. The Kruskal-Wallis test was now also significant ($H(2) = 9.244$, $p = 0.010$). Loyalists and Israelis formed one subset, as did Israelis and Republicans.

Perceived security and impact of structures.

The Wilcoxon Test for the question regarding intended security for one's own community was no longer significant for Loyalists with strong and very strong group affiliation ($T = 13.500$, $Z = 1.656$, $p = 0.098$). The results of the Kruskal-Wallis Test for this question ($H(3) = 32.561$, $p = 0.000$) changed insofar as it now identified three significantly different subsets containing Palestinians; Republicans and Loyalists; and Loyalists and Israelis, respectively. The fact that Republicans and Israelis were no longer part of the same subset shows that the results for these two groups now differed significantly.

Among Loyalists with strong group affiliation, the results of the Wilcoxon Test were not significant for the question pertaining to intended security for the other community ($T = 19.000$, $Z = 1.823$, $p = 0.068$). The same was true for Israelis with strong identification with their own group ($T = 23.500$, $Z = -.884$, $p = 0.377$). Similarly, the Kruskal-Wallis Test for this question was no longer significant ($H(3) = 5.895$, $p = 0.117$), meaning that there were no significant differences among the groups when only taking into account members with strong group affiliation.

The Wilcoxon Test for the item regarding actual security for the respective other community was no longer significant for Israelis ($T = 16.000$, $Z = -1.873$, $p = 0.061$).

Opinions on removal and consequences.

As compared to the entire sample, the Wilcoxon Test for Loyalists with strong or very strong group affiliation was not significant for the item on the removal of the structures ($T = 18.000$, $Z = 1.667$, $p = 0.096$).

The Wilcoxon Test for the questionnaire item on expected feelings of safety after removal of the structures showed that the responses given by Loyalists no longer significantly differed from 3 or *neutral* ($T = 12.000$, $Z = 1.342$, $p = 0.180$). The Kruskal Wallis Test ($H(3)$

= 14.832, p = 0.002) now classified Loyalists as not only belonging into one subset with Palestinians and Republicans, but also into one subset with Israelis, meaning that there were no significant differences between these two groups.

The item on expected increase in threat to one's own community now no longer showed a significant result of the Wilcoxon Test for Republicans (T = 50.500, Z = -1.277, p = 0.202). As compared to the entire sample, responses given for this item by Republicans with high group affiliation tended to be closer to the *neutral* 3.

Regarding expectations for their community to thrive more after removal of the walls, the result of the Wilcoxon Test was no longer significant for Loyalists (T = 13.000, Z = 0.541, p = 0.589). The Kruskal-Wallis Test ($H(3)$ = 12.526, p = 0.006) now identified Loyalists as not only sharing one subset with Palestinians and Republicans, but also one with Israelis, meaning that there no longer were significant differences between Loyalists and Israelis.

Finally, the Wilcoxon Test did not show significant results for the item regarding the opinion on contact between communities for Loyalists (T = 25.000, Z = 1.933, p = 0.053) or Israelis (T = 67.500, Z = 1.582, p = 0.114), meaning that their responses tended to be closer to 3 and thus less positive as compared to the entire sample. The results of the Kruskal-Wallis Test for this item may at first sight not have changed ($H(3)$ = 2.361, p = 0.501). However, it may be worth noting that it now yielded an even larger p-value and that the distributions of scores appeared to be even more similar among the different groups as compared to the results from the entire sample.

Participants' Comments

Participants were given the opportunity to voice additional thoughts they may have on the issue of the Peace Lines or the West Bank Barrier. As far as possible, these comments

were classified as either positive opinions about the structures or against their removal; or as negative opinions about the structures or supporting their removal.

23 participants used the opportunity to respond to the open question to express their opinion. According to the researcher's opinion, only ten of these comments could be readily classified according to the aforementioned scheme while the others were either ambiguous or not in fact relating to the topic of the Peace Lines or the West Bank Barrier. Since all ten of these comments were judged to represent negative opinions about the separating structures or opinions supporting the structures' removal, no statistical analyses were conducted on this variable as there would not have been any differences between the groups. Instead, the comments' content will be summarised in the following. Comments pertaining to the topic of separating structures will be elaborated on in the discussion. Comments regarding the design of this study will be discussed when deliberating the limitations of this research.

Regarding the Peace Lines, out of those comments classified as negative or supporting removal, only one was made by an individual who identified as Loyalist. This person claimed that while the Peace Lines may represent a tourist attraction in Northern Ireland, overall they have more negative than positive effects. Negative opinions voiced by Republicans included claims that the Peace Lines were exploited by Loyalists for gerrymandering and discrimination. Another comment suggested that, while being presented as a necessity for security, the Peace Lines served the purpose of social engineering in that they stress differences between the groups while obscuring commonalities.

Other comments about the Peace Lines that were less easy to classify as either positive or negative maintained that the Peace Lines are viewed differently or represent different concepts for different people; that their significance has changed compared to the height of the conflict; that they have increased security but now obstruct the progress of peace; that although desirable, the removal of the Peace Lines is still idealistic; and that their

removal may cause initial but not lasting increase in tensions between communities. With regard to the research design, one participant mentioned that Catholics or Republicans may not appreciate being labelled as 'Northern Irish' as was the case in the online questionnaire. Relating neither explicitly to the topic of the Peace Lines nor to the design of the study, one individual asserted that continued segregation between the communities in Northern Ireland was facilitated by older generations and that the peace process would likely be revised when younger citizens obtain political power.

As for the West Bank Barrier, several comments were made by Palestinian participants that either criticised the Barrier or supported its removal. These comments included demands for the wall to be removed and notions that it either does not contribute to security at all or that it had such effects only for Israelis. Several participants elaborated on the negative effects that the West Bank Barrier has on the lives of Palestinians and maintained that it is utilised by the Israelis to control the land as well as its inhabitants. One mentioned that due to its negative effects on their lives, Palestinians tend to refer to the Barrier as the 'apartheid wall'.

Several comments made by Israeli participants did not explicitly favour or object to the removal of the West Bank Barrier but stressed that such removal could only occur or at least be considered if it was part of a broader agreement or settlement between Israelis and Palestinians. One Israeli participant suggested that the main issue may not be the existence of the Barrier per se but rather the fact that it was constructed in the West Bank instead of on the internationally recognised Green Line.

Relating to the design of the study, one Palestinian participant recommended that Gaza should be included in the research as Gaza and the West Bank should not be viewed separately. Not explicitly commenting on the West Bank Barrier or the research design, two Palestinians implied that Israelis were to blame for the events in the region, which they

appeared to at least partially attribute to the unequal distribution of power among the two groups. In contrast, one Israeli participant claimed that Israelis were attacked or discriminated against due to them being Jewish.

In addition to these comments voiced by participants, some comments were received from people who likely did not participate in the survey themselves. When the study was advertised in some social media groups, advocates of the Palestinian cause criticised several aspects of it: Firstly, the use of the term 'West Bank Barrier' was condemned, maintaining that it did not reflect the devastating effect that the wall has on Palestinians. Secondly, commentators claimed that the fact that several questions in the survey pertained to the aspect of security meant that it reflected a dominant Israeli narrative and that it was therefore not relatable for Palestinians. Such criticism was voiced by three individuals.

Effect Sizes and Power

Effect size estimates for the Kruskal-Wallis Test (η^2) and for the Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test (*r*) were calculated and transformed using common formulas as outlined by Tomczak and Tomczak (2014) and Borenstein, Hedges, Higgins, and Rothstein (2009) to obtain the effect size estimates *f* and *d* that are required to calculate the corresponding power values as had been done for the *a priori* calculations. Effect size estimates and the total sample size or the appropriate sub-sample size were used to calculate the power of the Kruskal-Wallis Test for each item and of the Wilcoxon Test for each item and each group using *G*Power*.

The effect size estimates *f* and the corresponding power values for the Kruskal-Wallis Test for the entire sample are summarised in Table C1 in Appendix C. The effect sizes range from $f = 0.071$ to $f = 0.761$; the highest power value achieved for one item is 1.000, while the lowest is 0.078. For almost half of the items a power value of at least 0.80 was obtained.

Effect size estimates d and the corresponding power values for the Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test for the entire sample are displayed in Table C2 in Appendix C. These tests showed effect sizes between $d = -3.214$ and $d = 7.665$ or from $d = 0.000$ to $d = 7.665$ in absolute terms. The highest power value for one item for one group was 1.000, the lowest 0.050. For the vast majority of items, a power value of at least 0.80 was reached.

Table C3 in Appendix C shows the effect size estimates f and the corresponding power values for the Kruskal-Wallis Test for individuals with strong or very strong group affiliation. The effect sizes for the Kruskal-Wallis Test are between $f = 0.000$ and $f = 0.997$, with the highest power value for one item being 1 and the lowest 0.050. A power value of at least 0.80 was obtained for two thirds of the items. For this sample, for two variables negative values for the original effect size estimate η^2 were obtained. Given that η^2 is an estimate of the proportion of variance explained by a certain variable (Field, 2013), negative values are nonsensical and were thus treated as 0 for the following transformations and calculations.

The effect size estimates d and the corresponding power values for the Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test for individuals with strong or very strong group affiliation are summarised in Table C4 in Appendix C. Effect sizes ranged from $d = -3.859$ to $d = 7.284$ or from $d = 0.000$ to $d = 7.284$ in absolute terms, with the highest power value for one item for one group being 1.000 and the lowest 0.050. For more than two thirds of the items a power value of at least 0.80 was reached.

As is evident from these tables, some of the effect sizes and power values for the respective tests differ widely from one another. While the majority of power values appear to be sufficiently high, some are rather low, particularly for the Kruskal-Wallis Tests, indicating that a replication of the current study would benefit greatly from an increased sample size. Furthermore, it should be noted that the power values reported for the Kruskal-Wallis Tests

should be treated with caution as *G*Power* assumes equal group sizes for its calculations, which does not apply here.

Discussion

The results of the study conducted here partially support the hypothesis H_1 that the perceptions that Northern Irish Loyalists and Israelis on the one hand and Northern Irish Republicans and Palestinians on the other hand have of the separating structures in their regions, i.e., the Peace Lines and the West Bank Barrier, are comparable. Similarly, partial support was found for the hypothesis H_2 that the perceptions of these two pairs differ from each other. When analysing the entire sample, no substantial support could be found for the hypothesis H_3 that Loyalists and Israelis as well as Republicans and Palestinians identify with each other, respectively. However, some support was found for this hypothesis when analysing responses by individuals with strong group affiliation. In the following, the results outlined above will be discussed in more detail. As the hypotheses made in this thesis relate to the comparison of perceptions across the groups under investigation rather than the exact responses made by members of each group in themselves, the content of the items will be discussed only sporadically.

When taking into account the entire sample, some support could be found for H_1. Results were interpreted as supporting H_1 if no significant differences in perceptions were found between Loyalists and Israelis and/or between Republicans and Palestinians. For five out of 16 items, the Kruskal-Wallis Test was not significant, which means that there were no significant differences between the four groups for the perceptions sampled by these items. This in turn means that the opinions that Loyalists and Israelis hold did not differ significantly from each other, and neither did the perceptions that Republicans and Palestinians expressed. Furthermore, for items for which the Kruskal-Wallis Test was

significant, it frequently yielded results that classified Loyalists and Israelis and/or Republicans and Palestinians into one subset, meaning that they, respectively, did not differ significantly from each other. For Loyalists and Israelis, this was the case for an additional five out of 16 items. The responses given by Republicans and Palestinians did not differ significantly from each other on six items in addition to those for which the Kruskal-Wallis Test was not significant at all.

H2 was also partially supported by the results found for the entire sample. Results were seen to support H2 if significant differences in perceptions were found between Loyalists and Israelis on the one hand and Republicans and Palestinians on the other hand. For seven out of 16 items, the Kruskal-Wallis Test showed significant differences between Israelis and Palestinians in that the two were categorised to belong to different subsets. For none of the items the Kruskal-Wallis Test indicated significant differences between Loyalists and Republicans in the entire sample. For two items, significant differences were found between Loyalists and Palestinians, and for one question responses given by Israelis and Republicans differed significantly from each other. It should be noted that at times results in favour of H1 can be seen to subvert H2. For instance, if the Kruskal-Wallis Test is not significant, this supports H1 as no significant differences were found between the two respective groups. However, at the same time this would mean that H2 is not supported as a non-significant test result means that there are also no significant differences between the two pairs. Furthermore, one should take into account that for none of the items both H1 and H2 were fully supported as for no item there were similarities between Loyalists and Israelis and between Republicans and Palestinians and at the same time significant differences between the two pairs.

For all items regarding affiliation with one's own group as well as identification with the respective other groups, there are at least some similarities across groups corresponding to

those hypothesised. The Kruskal-Wallis Test was here either not significant or it yielded

subsets showing comparable perceptions by either Loyalists and Israelis or by Republicans

and Palestinians. Additionally, three of the four items on cross-identification exhibited

significant differences between groups from each region, i.e., between Republicans and

Israelis or between Loyalists and Palestinians. H_1 and H_2 thus seem to be supported for this

set of questions. The Wilcoxon Test for identification with Loyalists was significant for all

three other groups. However, the standardised test statistics showed that the effect was

negative, meaning that the null hypothesis of *neutral* or lower identification with Loyalists on

behalf of the Israelis could not be rejected. Nonetheless, the subsets produced by the Kruskal-

Wallis test showed that Israelis identified most with Loyalists and significantly more so than

did Republicans, meaning that the tendency of these test results corresponds to the

hypothesised relationships. The same holds true for identification with Republicans and with

Israelis, where the null hypothesis cannot be rejected either, but where it appears that

Palestinians identified most with Republicans and that this identification is significantly

stronger than that exhibited by Loyalists, and that Loyalists showed the highest levels of

identification with Israelis, which were significantly higher than those of Palestinians. The

Wilcoxon Test for the item on identification with Palestinians is remarkably close to reaching

statistical significance for Republican respondents ($T = 268.000$, $Z = 1.959$, $p = 0.050$).

Although technically this does not justify the rejection of the null hypothesis, it does suggest

that Republicans show a substantial amount of solidarity with the Palestinians.

        The results for the questionnaire items relating to perceived safety and intended and

actual effects of the structures on the security of the communities also seem to at least

partially support H_1 and H_2. For all these items, the Kruskal-Wallis Test showed either no

differences between any of the four groups or it grouped either Loyalists and Israelis or

Republicans and Palestinians together, which lends support to H_1. For three of these five

questions, significant differences were found between Israelis and Palestinians, which arguably speaks in favour of H_2. It is noticeable that Palestinians clearly indicated experiencing the lowest levels of own security both in general and with respect to intended and actual effects of the structures.

The questions on removal of the structures and expected consequences for one's own community show a similar pattern of results. The Kruskal-Wallis Test showed significant differences between Israelis and Palestinians for all four items, which seems to support H_2. At the same time, it classified Loyalists and Israelis into one subset for one question and Republicans and Palestinians into one subset for the remaining three questions, which lends support to H_1.

Finally, for the questions on expected increase in contact between communities upon removal of the separating structures and on the opinion about such contact, no significant differences between any of the groups were found. The Wilcoxon Test for the item on expectations about the occurrence of contact, while only significant for Republicans and Palestinians, indicated a positive trend for all four groups. Importantly, the Wilcoxon Test was significant and showed positive standardised test statistics for all groups for the item on the opinion about contact. This implies that members of all four groups viewed increased contact rather positively. The results for the entire sample are visualised in Figure 2, where compared to the conceptualisation of Figure 1, dashed lines represent support for a hypothesised relationship on at least some tests.

Figure 2. Results (entire sample)

For the tests conducted using the responses of only those individuals who affiliated themselves *strongly* or *very strongly* with their own group, again only results will be discussed that differ substantially compared to those of the entire sample in order to avoid unnecessary repetition. In this sub-sample, four out of 15 items did not yield a significant Kruskal-Wallis Test result, meaning that the perceptions expressed across the groups did not differ significantly from each other. For another eight questions, the Kruskal-Wallis Test was significant but it grouped Loyalists and Israelis into one subset for four questions, Republicans and Palestinians for two questions, and both pairs respectively for another two. Overall, however, a slightly lower number of pairs was classified as belonging into one subset when compared to the results for the entire sample. This means that H_1 is slightly less well supported among the sample of individuals who show *strong* or *very strong* affiliation with their own group.

The results for ten questions showed significant differences between either Loyalists and Republicans or between Israelis and Palestinians, thus lending at least partial support to H_2 on more occasions than did the data for the entire sample. Interestingly, while for the entire sample significant differences were found only between Israelis and Palestinians, the sub-sample of individuals with strong group affiliation resulted in significant differences between Loyalists and Republicans for the items on identification with Israelis and identification with Palestinians.

Furthermore, among individuals with strong group affiliation, some support was found for H_3. Firstly, the Wilcoxon Test for the item on identification with Loyalists was no longer significant for Israelis. As the significant effect found in the entire sample was negative, this means that Israelis who identified strongly with their own group had a tendency to also identify more strongly with Loyalists when compared to the entire sample. Furthermore, for the item on identification with Israelis, according to the Kruskal-Wallis Test

Loyalists formed their own subset, meaning that on average they reported significantly stronger identification with Israelis than did Republicans and Palestinians. However, it should be noted that the Wilcoxon Test for this item was not significant for Loyalists. Most importantly for the matter of cross-identification, Republicans in this sub-sample showed levels of identification with Palestinians that were significantly higher than *neutral* as the significant results of the Wilcoxon Test for this group for this item show. The results for the strong-affiliation sample are visualised in Figure 3, where dashed lines represent support for a hypothesised relationship on at least some tests and solid lines represent supported hypotheses.

The differences between the entire sample and individuals with strong group affiliation as discussed here lead to three tentative conclusions: Firstly, H_1 appears to be less well supported in the strong-affiliation sample as the hypothesised pairs were grouped together slightly less frequently. Secondly, there seems to be more support for H_2 since the hypothesised distinctions between the pairs were found more frequently or more clearly. Thirdly, there is now partial support for H_3 as, among other indications, most importantly the level of identification with Palestinians on behalf of Republicans reached significance. However, it should be noted that the conclusions from the differences between the two samples should be treated with caution considering the fact that they are drawn from two separate analyses and that the values are not directly compared between them. The contrasts found here should thus be regarded as tendencies rather than significant differences.

Figure 3. Results (strong-affiliation sample)

As mentioned above, it is noticeable that Palestinians typically reported low agreement when asked whether the separating structure in their region is intended to or does in fact contribute to their community's security. In contrast to this, Israelis, whose responses were significantly different, tended to report the highest agreement to these statements out of the four groups under investigation. Similarly, Palestinians tended to be more supportive of removal of the wall immediately or in the near future and to be more optimistic about the consequences than Israelis, i.e., they typically indicated that they expected their community to be threatened less and to thrive more after removal as compared to Israeli participants. This held true for both the entire sample and the strong-affiliation sample. Compared to the perceptions expressed by Israelis and Palestinians, the two Northern Irish groups both appeared to generally feel relatively safe in their respective communities, to support removal of the Peace Lines and to either be comparatively optimistic about the potential consequences of their removal or to have rather neutral opinions when compared to Israelis and Palestinians.

The broad tendencies in responses to the closed questions seem to be mirrored at least to some extent in the comments that some of the participants made when asked to voice additional thoughts they may have on the matter of the Peace Lines or the West Bank Barrier. Members of both Northern Irish groups tended to acknowledge that the Peace Lines have or had some positive effects, e.g., that they did in fact contribute to people's security, but maintained that at least nowadays they have more negative than positive effects. The majority of those who responded to the open question appeared to support the Peace Lines' removal either immediately or at some point in the future. Comments made by Palestinian participants were clearly objecting to the West Bank Barrier; they named numerous negative effects they experience from its existence and demanded its removal. One Palestinian participant remarked that in his or her community the West Bank Barrier is typically referred to as the

'apartheid wall'. This corresponds to previous literature discussed earlier that suggested that such terminology was used by Palestinians due to the negative effects of the wall that they experience. In contrast, Israeli respondents tended to be more cautious about the potential removal of the West Bank Barrier and typically asserted that this could only take place as part of a broader agreement between Israelis and Palestinians, which may reflect concern for their own community's safety as the quantitative data imply.

When reviewing the entire sample, the Kruskal-Wallis Test never showed any significant differences between Loyalists and Republicans. Analysing the strong-affiliation sample showed significant differences between the two Northern Irish groups only for the two items relating to identification with the two groups in the Middle East. Reponses by Loyalists and Republicans thus appear to differ less from each other than those given by Israelis and Palestinians. Different aspects may be able to serve as explanations for these differential responses. The conflict in Northern Ireland is, in contrast to the one in Israel/Palestine, at least officially terminated. It is thus conceivable that even if levels of conflict and tension had been comparable to those in the Middle East at the height of the Northern Irish conflict, they would have decreased substantially since then, likely resulting in more similar perceptions on behalf of the two groups. Considerable successes in cross-community reconciliation and ongoing efforts in this area are likely to contribute to attenuated attitudes of Loyalists and Republicans alike. Furthermore, and in contrast to the West Bank Barrier, the Peace Lines were not erected unilaterally by one party to the conflict. As explained above, they were in fact typically constructed on request of the affected communities themselves rather than being imposed on them. This may similarly result in members of the two groups having more comparable perceptions of them than is the case for the West Bank Barrier among Israelis and Palestinians.

As for cross-identification, only solidarity with Palestinians on behalf of Republicans seemed to exist, and only among Republicans who affiliate *strongly* or *very strongly* with their own group. Although the hypothesis made by this thesis on the issue of cross-identification expected it to also be evident on behalf of the other three groups, respectively, it may not be surprising that it was found only for Republicans. This seems to be in accordance with the existing literature discussed earlier, which suggests that solidarity across the conflicts may be a phenomenon mainly for the Republicans in Northern Ireland. Solidarity with Israelis on behalf of the Loyalists may indeed merely or to a large extent be a reaction to that expressed by the Republicans. Explicit identification with the Northern Irish groups on behalf of Israelis and Palestinians had not been found or even investigated previously, although there were some indications that it could exist.

The fact that there are differences in the tendencies of participants' responses depending on whether the entire sample or only the strong-affiliation sample is taken into account suggests that the strength of affiliation with one's own group may correlate firstly with one's perceptions of the separating structures in the region and secondly with one's impressions of and attitudes towards the respective other conflict and the groups involved in it. It seems that among those with strong group affiliation, there are slightly fewer commonalities among the groups across the two regions and slightly more differences among the groups within one region. Giving explanations for this phenomenon can only be tentative as more statistical analyses would be needed to confirm the findings. However, it is conceivable that people who identify more strongly with their own group have more extreme or more specific perceptions and attitudes towards the matter, which could be the reason that these differ more from both the opposing group in one's own region and from the theorised affiliated group in the respective other conflict region. This would thus explain why fewer similarities across the regions and more differences within them were found among the

strong-affiliation sample. On the other hand, this might also explain why identification with Palestinians on behalf of the Republican participants was significant for those with particularly strong group affiliation since these individuals may have a keener interest in other conflicts and specifically other groups involved in conflicts which they perceive to be in some way similar to their own.

This study's findings and their tentative explanations have several practical implications. The finding that there are in fact at least some similarities between Loyalists and Israelis and between Republicans and Palestinians with regard to their perceptions of the Peace Lines and of the West Bank Barrier implies that it is possible that broader parallels exist among the groups across the two conflicts. Such similarities suggest that similar projects for peacebuilding could be effective in both contexts. Considering that peacebuilding and particularly cross-community reconciliation in Northern Ireland are generally regarded as successful, adjusted but similar projects could initiate a promising reconciliation process between Israelis and Palestinians if implemented in that region. This is in line with previous claims that the peace process in Northern Ireland in general could possibly serve as a model for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

The fact that there appear to be fewer significant differences between Loyalists and Republicans than there are between Israelis and Palestinians seems to correspond to previous findings that Loyalists and Republicans at least to some extent show understanding for each other. It could also be interpreted as highlighting the success of cross-community projects in Northern Ireland, again recommending the use of similar schemes in Israel/Palestine. However, for individuals who identify strongly with their own group, two tests did show significant differences between the two Northern Irish groups. Therefore, one could also argue that for such individuals more or different cross-community projects might be needed in order to successfully reconcile the groups. Both the apparent success of existing cross-

community reconciliation programmes in Northern Ireland and the potential need for extended projects highlight the requirement for continued funding of such schemes. The uncertainty concerning such funding brought about by Brexit thus contributes to and stresses the timeliness of this research.

The finding of Republicans with strong group affiliation identifying with Palestinians hints at the need to consider cross-identification in research and practice. Even if this finding cannot be extended to the other groups, it links to the aforementioned claim that international solidarity needs to be taken into account in attempts to resolve conflicts as it may contribute to or reignite them. This could arguably be the case in Northern Ireland if international solidarity or expressions of it are used strategically by one or both groups to further its or their own cause as explained earlier.

The support for cross-community projects as discussed thus far is enhanced by the finding that all four groups appeared to consider increased contact between the two parties in their region to be positive. As most would also expect such contact to increase if the separating structures were removed, it seems that the structures likely represent an obstacle in establishing and maintaining peaceful and positive contact between the two respective groups. Therefore, the removal of the structures does appear advisable as they by nature hinder contact between the parties. However, naturally the needs of all groups involved should be taken into account when taking such measures in order to prevent recurrence or intensification of conflict.

In more general terms, many individuals in both regions appear to have relatively strong perceptions about the Peace Lines or the West Bank Barrier. Furthermore, one can at times observe substantial differences between those of Loyalists and Republicans and particularly between those of Israelis and Palestinians. This suggests that generally, in conducting research, in implementing reconciliation projects for civil society, in drafting

plans for the deconstruction of structures separating warring groups, etc., one has to take into account that people's perceptions may be significant but vary greatly and that they may differ substantially from what some people might consider to be the structures' objective effects as these effects are necessarily perceived and interpreted subjectively by each individual. The clear relevance of the matter of the Peace Lines and the West Bank Barrier highlights the fact that this issue has to be thoroughly contemplated when designing any kind of policy or scheme for conflict resolution, peacebuilding, or peace consolidation.

Limitations

Despite the careful design of the study, there are several limitations to this research. A notable limitation is that of the sample chosen to participate in the survey. Everyone above the age of 18 living in either Northern Ireland or in Israel/Palestine was invited to participate. This means that the study was not specific to those populations who live close to the Peace Lines or the West Bank Barrier and who would thus be directly affected by the presence of these structures in their everyday lives. The decision to include the entire populations was made in order to facilitate the conduction of the study. Considering that the aim was to gain insights into the different groups' perceptions on a broad basis, this decision appeared justifiable. In contrast to this, a comment was received from a participant who maintained that Gaza should be included in the research rather than viewing Gaza and the West Bank as two separate entities. In this context it should be noted that while this research did indeed only investigate the West Bank Barrier rather than include border structures in Gaza, Palestinians who live in Gaza were not in fact explicitly excluded from participation.

Other limitations pertain to the design of the questionnaire, and to the wording of some of the items in particular. For instance, the question regarding the potential removal of the Peace Lines or the West Bank Barrier asked participants about their opinion on the

removal of the structures 'immediately or in the near future'. As it is not specified more clearly, the interpretation of the latter part is naturally subjective. However, since this study aimed to investigate and compare general perceptions among the different groups rather than specific opinions about the removal of the structures, this potential issue of interpretation is not considered to be crucially influencing the study's results.

One participant's comment implied that the concept of 'contact' between the two respective communities, which was part of two questionnaire items, may have been ambiguous. Perhaps it should have been defined as peaceful contact rather than belligerence as for this participant the wording appears to have been equivocal.

Two more points were raised regarding the specificity of the study and its questions. One respondent suggested that to increase the relevance of participants' responses, the study should, for instance, include broader scenarios of possible solutions to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in order for participants to give meaningful answers. Otherwise, answers may differ depending on what situation participants deem to be likely. This corresponds with several comments that were made explicitly on the issue of the separating structures, in which some Israelis asserted that removal of the West Bank Barrier was only imaginable if it occurred within the framework of a broader settlement between the conflicting parties. Moreover, one participant mentioned the fact that the route of the West Bank Barrier deviates from the internationally recognised Green Line. The participant suggested that some people may object to this fact rather than the wall's existence itself, implying that this aspect should be included in the study. While these two points are rather specific, they may indeed represent limitations to this research as participants' interpretation of such issues may influence their responses which may thus vary more among them than would be expected.

As described earlier, some individuals criticised the study as not relatable to Palestinian participants. This is an indication that the wording may not have been sufficiently

sensitive with regard to the Palestinians' situation. However, it should be noted that although this criticism might lead to the expectation that Palestinians in general might have been less willing to participate in the study, overall slightly more Palestinians than Israelis ultimately participated; Palestinian participants made up 26.3% of the entire sample of this study. Furthermore, as this study targeted four different groups from two different contexts, it would have likely proved difficult to formulate all questions in a way that would have been entirely relatable to all members of all four groups.

In this context, regardless of the questions' reception by potential or actual participants, the emphasis on the aspect of security could have been reduced or attenuated. It could be argued that more general aspects such as the broad impact of the separating structures on participants' communities is at least partially covered by the questionnaire items on expected consequences of removal of the structures. However, participants' responses to these questions at best imply more general perceptions about the structures rather than expressing them explicitly. It would have been advisable to include more questions of a general nature, asking participants what effects they perceive the walls to have on their community in general, instead of focusing on the aspect of security.

In more general terms, one might criticise that the questionnaire did not include a demographic question on the participants' nationality or origin. Such a question was avoided mainly due to potential issues with participants' naming practices, particularly regarding the Northern Irish populations. As Cairns and Darby (1998) point out, people in Northern Ireland tend to describe their nationality or origin differently depending on whether they identify as Loyalists or Republicans. Loyalists tend to describe themselves as British, while Republicans would likely state that they are Irish (Cairns & Darby, 1998). Therefore, a question on nationality or origin may have produced confusion rather than clarification as participants stating that they are British or Irish rather than Northern Irish may have hindered their

identification as inhabitants of Northern Ireland rather than of other parts of the UK or of the Republic of Ireland. Similarly, in Israel/Palestine, nationality might not necessarily indicate a person's affiliation with a certain group. For instance, although they face significant obstacles in the process, Palestinians living in Jerusalem may in fact possess Israeli citizenship (Hasson, 2019) but would likely not affiliate themselves with the Israelis. Furthermore, since this study is specifically interested in people's affiliation with one of the four different groups, it appeared justifiable to omit a question on nationality or origin. Instead, in addition to the one on group affiliation, a question asking for participants' place of residence was included in order to verify that they do in fact live either in Northern Ireland or in Israel/Palestine.

Along these lines, one might criticise that the questionnaire items pertaining to participants' place of residence and group affiliation still referred to both groups from Northern Ireland as 'Northern Irish'. As discussed above, Catholics or Republicans are likely to describe themselves as Irish and may not appreciate being referred to as 'Northern Irish' as was also mentioned by one participant in the study. Yet again, as in the question about one's place of residence this specification was deemed necessary to ensure participants do in fact live in Northern Ireland rather than in the Republic. Perhaps, the term could have been avoided in the item on group membership. However, it seemed that having answer options that were labelled merely 'Catholic/Republican' or 'Protestant/Loyalist' may have been confusing to participants from Israel/Palestine who were asked the same question. A potential solution would be to initially categorise participants based on their answer to the question about their place of residence rather than to the question about their group affiliation and to then display separate questions about group affiliation to those indicating that they live in one region or the other.

Moreover, the labels 'Catholic/Republican' and 'Protestant/Loyalist' in themselves may be problematic: They do not allow for a distinction between religious and political affiliations despite the fact that, as stressed above, the Troubles were of political rather than religious nature. These labels may reinforce the impression that religious views among the Northern Irish population always correspond to certain political views. Although this may be true in many or even the majority of cases, it should be noted that there are of course exceptions. Individuals who are Protestant but identify as Republican or who are Catholic but identify as Loyalist would likely be deterred by this formulation and discontinue their participation in the study.

Another limitation might be that the survey did not include a question to assess participants' knowledge about the respective other conflict. It might have been advisable to include such a question before asking for participants' identification with the groups from the other region. This way, one could have included a distinction of participants' perceptions depending on whether the amount of knowledge they possess about the other conflict is high or low. However, since this study aimed to assess perceptions and identification on a broad societal level, participants' knowledge in this regard is not in fact relevant to the current research objective. Participants would not have been excluded from this study based on such a question, although it could have provided for an interesting additional variable.

This study also has some limitations based on the general methodology. It opted for quantitative rather than for qualitative methods based on the idea that this would facilitate the comparison across the different groups. To enhance response rates due to less time required to fill in the questionnaire, as well as to further aid the analysis, most questions were closed questions. It should be noted that this is likely to lead to lower amounts of detail than open questions would yield and that it may limit the ability to understand what participants specifically mean with their responses (McLafferty, 2010; Rahman, 2016). However, the

significant facilitation of administration and analysis are believed to outweigh these limitations. Furthermore, a final open question was included in the questionnaire in order to allow participants to voice further thoughts or comments they may have on the issue of the Peace Lines or the West Bank Barrier, which they may feel have not been covered by the previous fixed-response questions.

It should also be noted that, while the conflict between Israelis and Palestinians is still ongoing, the conflict in Northern Ireland officially ended more than 20 years ago and the region has enjoyed relative peace since then. This was also mentioned by one participant in his or her comment in the open question. This substantial difference could mean that the two situations and the perceptions of affected groups and individuals are not as readily comparable as has been presumed for this research.

Suggestions for Further Research

Partially based on the limitations to this study as well as participants' comments, several recommendations can be made for future research. Considering the potential limitation of inviting broad populations to participate in the study, one might consider either narrowing this down to include only people who live close to the structures that are being investigated or distinguishing between them and others in the survey, similarly to the study conducted by Byrne et al. (2012).

Furthermore, one should take into account whether or not each of the conflicts that are compared are currently ongoing or whether they have already ended as this can be expected to significantly influence people's perceptions and experiences of both the conflict in general and of specific issues such as separating structures in particular. Additionally, it should be considered whether or not the separating structure under investigation was built unilaterally.

These two aspects represent crucial differences between the conflicts in Northern Ireland and in Israel/Palestine.

The criticism voiced by individual Palestinians or their advocates could also be taken into account for future research projects. In order to avoid alienating any members of the target groups, it might for instance be advisable to allow for more differentiated answer options than using a Likert scale for most questions as has been done here. Moreover, including more than one open question may give participants from all target groups the opportunity to more freely voice their thoughts and concerns about the matter. Alternatively or perhaps additionally, more general questions on the perceived effects of the separating structures on the respective communities should be included.

This study found only partial evidence for the cross-identification that is suggested in previous literature in that only Republicans with strong group affiliation were found to identify with Palestinians, which was previously suggested to represent the main aspect of cross-identification across the conflicts. However, it should be considered that this study's sample size was relatively small and the power of some of the tests conducted accordingly low. Therefore, it would be advisable to conduct a study in one or both of the two regions investigated here with a larger sample size to assess potential solidarity across conflicts on behalf of the other groups. Considering the findings for some of the Republican participants in this study, it appears to be a viable research objective to replicate these findings and, if possible, extend them to the other groups.

The current research yielded some results that suggest that perceptions towards the Peace Lines and the West Bank Barrier may indeed be similar among Northern Irish Loyalists and Israelis on the one hand and among Northern Irish Republicans and Palestinians on the other hand. While the results did not explicitly show differences between these two pairs as entities, they did frequently show significant differences between the two

groups within one conflict region, particularly between Israelis and Palestinians. However, with respect to both of these aspects, not all tests yielded accordant results. Therefore, future research should continue to explore these conditions. In addition to larger sample sizes, future projects may profit from exploring more general aspects pertaining to the conflicts in Northern Ireland and in Israel/Palestine before narrowing down to specific similarities such as separating structures between the conflicting groups and to even more specific aspects of those, as has been done in this research.

Conclusion

This research set out to compare the perceptions that Loyalists and Republicans in Northern Ireland and Israelis and Palestinians have of the structures in their respective regions that were or are designed to keep the warring groups apart, i.e., the Peace Lines and the West Bank Barrier. It was hypothesised that the perceptions exhibited by Loyalists and Israelis on the one hand and by Republicans and Palestinians on the other hand are comparable; that the perceptions of these two pairs are significantly different from each other; and that Loyalists and Israelis and Republicans and Palestinians identify with each other, respectively.

Despite the aforementioned limitations and potential improvements to this research, it does provide important initial findings on the comparison of perceptions of separating structures across the four groups. Some support could be found for similarities in perceptions among Loyalists and Israelis and among Republicans and Palestinians. Significant differences between groups were mainly found within one region, i.e., between Israelis and Palestinians and, although less substantially, between Loyalists and Republicans. The third hypothesis was partially supported in that Republicans who identified strongly or very strongly with their own group showed cross-identification with Palestinians.

These findings may have important implications for both further academic research and practical attempts to initiate or consolidate reconciliation between the opposing groups in both regions. More extended research both into people's perceptions of separating structures and into similarities among groups across the different conflict regions seems advisable. This could also be broadened to include other regions in addition to Northern Ireland and Israel/Palestine. The findings of this study generally support the notion that peacebuilding and cross-community reconciliation in Northern Ireland seem to be rather successful. Considering the parallels between the two conflicts at least with regard to perceptions of separating structures, it is conceivable that similar projects could aid peacebuilding between Israelis and Palestinians as well. Although further research into this matter will be needed, cross-community projects appear to represent a viable approach for both situations. This claim is substantiated by the fact that members of all four groups by the majority view increased contact between the respective parties positively. Such contact between communities, which would likely be facilitated by the carefully designed removal of separating structures, could serve as the basis for the initiation or continuation of peaceful relations between the parties both in Northern Ireland and in Israel/Palestine.

Appendix A

Flyers Distributed in Belfast

Study participants wanted

Perceptions of Peace Lines
and the West Bank Barrier

Are you **over 18** years old and usually **live in Northern Ireland**? For my thesis I am conducting a study on the Peace Lines in Northern Ireland and on the West Bank Barrier in Israel/Palestine and I would be very grateful if you were willing to participate in my short survey.

You will be asked a few questions about your own and other communities and your opinions on the Peace Lines. Filling in the survey will only take around **5-10 minutes**.

Participate by scanning this QR code or by going to the following website:
http://fmru.az1.qualtrics.com/jfe/form/SV_egJjVm00Kfi0SS9

If you have any questions, don't hesitate to contact me:
henrike.neumann@student.ru.nl

Thanks for your help!

Henrike Neumann

Study: Perceptions of Peace Lines
http://fmru.az1.qualtrics.com
/jfe/form/SV_egJjVm00Kfi0SS9
Contact: henrike.neumann@student.ru.nl

Figure A1. Flyer distributed in community centres in Belfast

Study participants wanted

Perceptions of Peace Lines
and the West Bank Barrier

Are you **over 18** years old and usually **live in Northern Ireland**? For my thesis I am conducting a study on the Peace Lines in Northern Ireland and on the West Bank Barrier in Israel/Palestine and I would be very grateful if you were willing to participate in my short survey.

You will be asked a few questions about your own and other communities and your opinions on the Peace Lines. Filling in the survey will only take around **5-10 minutes**.

Participate by scanning the QR code or by going to the following website:
http://fmru.az1.qualtrics.com/jfe/form/SV_egJjVm00Kfi0SS9

If you have any questions, don't hesitate to contact me:
henrike.neumann@student.ru.nl

Thanks for your help!

Henrike Neumann

Figure A2. Flyer distributed to households in Belfast

Appendix B

Online Questionnaire

Survey Peace Lines/West Bank Barrier

Dear participant,

thank you very much for your willingness to participate in this survey.
This study aims to investigate Northern Irish people's perceptions of the Peace Lines and
Israelis' and Palestinians' perceptions of the West Bank Barrier.
If you are at least 18 years old and if you identify as either Northern Irish Protestant/Loyalist,
Northern Irish Catholic/Republican, Israeli, or Palestinian, you are invited to participate.
In the following, you will be asked several multiple-choice questions about your own and
other communities and about the Peace Lines if you live in Northern Ireland or the West
Bank Barrier if you live in Israel/Palestine. You will have the opportunity to voice additional
thoughts in an open question at the end of the survey. Please note that I am interested in your
personal opinions and perceptions and that there are no 'right' or 'wrong' answers.

Completion of the survey should not take longer than 8 minutes.

I conduct this study for my Master's thesis for the programme Human Geography at Radboud
University Nijmegen (NL). If you have any questions or concerns regarding this survey,
please do not hesitate to contact me via e-mail (henrike.neumann@student.ru.nl).

Participation in this survey is entirely voluntary. Participants can withdraw from the study at
any time without having to justify their decision. All responses will be anonymous and data
will be treated confidentially. Participation in the study does not involve any risks for
participants.

Thank you very much for your cooperation.

Kind regards,
Henrike Neumann

I) Where do you live?

○ Northern Ireland

○ Israel

○ Palestine

II) How old are you?
_____

III) What is your gender?

○ Female

○ Male

○ Other

IV) Which of the following groups/communities do you affiliate yourself with?

○ Northern Irish - Protestant/Loyalist

○ Northern Irish - Catholic/Republican

○ Israeli

○ Palestinian

----

1) How strongly do you identify with your own community?

○ Very strongly

○ Strongly

○ Neutral

○ Weakly

○ Very Weakly

2a) How strongly do you identify with Northern Irish Protestants/Loyalists who want Northern Ireland to remain part of the United Kingdom?

○ Very strongly

○ Strongly

○ Neutral

○ Weakly

○ Very weakly

2b) How strongly do you identify with Northern Irish Catholics/Republicans who want Northern Ireland to be part of the Republic of Ireland?

○ Very strongly

○ Strongly

○ Neutral

○ Weakly

○ Very weakly

2c) How strongly do you identify with Israelis?

○ Very strongly

○ Strongly

○ Neutral

○ Weakly

○ Very weakly

2d) How strongly do you identify with Palestinians?

○ Very strongly

○ Strongly

○ Neutral

○ Weakly

○ Very weakly

---

3) How safe do you feel in the community you live in?

○ Very safe

○ Safe

○ Neutral

○ Unsafe

○ Very unsafe

Display This Question:
If Where do you live? = Northern Ireland

4a) In your opinion, were the Peace Lines designed to contribute to your community's security?

○ Strongly agree

○ Agree

○ Neutral

○ Disagree

○ Strongly disagree

Display This Question:
If Where do you live? = Israel
Or Where do you live? = Palestine

4b) In your opinion, was the West Bank Barrier designed to contribute to your community's security?

○ Strongly agree

○ Agree

○ Neutral

○ Disagree

○ Strongly disagree

5a) In your opinion, were the Peace Lines designed to contribute to the security of the other community in your country/region?

○ Strongly agree

○ Agree

○ Neutral

○ Disagree

○ Strongly disagree

5b) In your opinion, was the West Bank Barrier designed to contribute to the security of the other community in your country/region?

○ Strongly agree

○ Agree

○ Neutral

○ Disagree

○ Strongly disagree

6a) In your opinion, how much do the Peace Lines in fact contribute to your community's security?

○ A great deal

○ A lot

○ Neutral

○ A little

○ Not at all

6b) In your opinion, how much does the West Bank Barrier in fact contribute to your community's security?

○ A great deal

○ A lot

○ Neutral

○ A little

○ Not at all

7a) In your opinion, how much do the Peace Lines in fact contribute to the security of the other community in your country/region?

○ A great deal

○ A lot

○ Neutral

○ A little

○ Not at all

7b) In your opinion, how much does the West Bank Barrier in fact contribute to the security of the other community in your country/region?

○ A great deal

○ A lot

○ Neutral

○ A little

○ Not at all

8a) In your opinion, should the Peace Lines be removed immediately or in the near future?

○ Strongly agree

○ Agree

○ Neutral

○ Disagree

○ Strongly disagree

8b) In your opinion, should the West Bank Barrier be removed immediately or in the near future?

○ Strongly agree

○ Agree

○ Neutral

○ Disagree

○ Strongly disagree

9a) If the Peace Lines were removed, how safe would you feel in the community you live in?

○ Very safe

○ Safe

○ Neutral

○ Unsafe

○ Very unsafe

9b) If the West Bank Barrier was removed, how safe would you feel in the community you live in?

○ Very safe

○ Safe

○ Neutral

○ Unsafe

○ Very unsafe

10a) If the Peace Lines were removed, how likely do you think it is that your community will be threatened more than with the Peace Lines in place?

○ Extremely likely

○ Somewhat likely

○ Neutral

○ Somewhat unlikely

○ Extremely unlikely

10b) If the West Bank Barrier was removed, how likely do you think it is that your community will be threatened more than with the West Bank Barrier in place?

○ Extremely likely

○ Somewhat likely

○ Neutral

○ Somewhat unlikely

○ Extremely unlikely

11a) If the Peace Lines were removed, how likely do you think it is that your community will thrive more than with the Peace Lines in place?

○ Extremely likely

○ Somewhat likely

○ Neutral

○ Somewhat unlikely

○ Extremely unlikely

11b) If the West Bank Barrier was removed, how likely do you think it is that your community will thrive more than with the West Bank Barrier in place?

○ Extremely likely

○ Somewhat likely

○ Neutral

○ Somewhat unlikely

○ Extremely unlikely

12a) If the Peace Lines were removed, how likely do you think it is that contact between communities will increase?

○ Extremely likely

○ Somewhat likely

○ Neutral

○ Somewhat unlikely

○ Extremely unlikely

12b) If the West Bank Barrier was removed, how likely do you think it is that contact between communities will increase?

○ Extremely likely

○ Somewhat likely

○ Neutral

○ Somewhat unlikely

○ Extremely unlikely

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13) How positively or negatively do you view increased contact between the communities in your country/region?

○ Extremely positively

○ Positively

○ Neutral

○ Negatively

○ Extremely negatively

Q14a) If you have any additional thoughts on the issue of the Peace Lines, please note them down here.

_____

Q14b) If you have any additional thoughts on the issue of the West Bank Barrier, please note them down here.

_____

Appendix C

Effect Sizes and Power

The following tables contain the effect size estimates and corresponding power values that

were achieved for each of the tests conducted in the analysis.

Table C1

Kruskal-Wallis Test: Effect Sizes and Power (Entire Sample)

	Identification own group	Identification with Loyalists	Identification with Republicans	Identification with Israelis	Identification with Palestinians	Safety	Purpose own security	Purpose security other	Actual own security	Actual security other	Removal	Removal – safety	Removal – threat	Removal – thrive	Removal – Contact	Contact – Opinion
f	0.169	0.255	0.312	0.270	0.232	0.642	0.761	0.286	0.475	0.106	0.704	0.437	0.426	0.361	0.207	0.071
Power	0.241	0.498	0.564	0.518	0.379	1.000	1.000	0.619	0.978	0.117	1.000	0.952	0.942	0.835	0.350	0.078

Table C2

Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test: Effect Sizes and Power (Entire Sample)

		Identification own group	Identification with Loyalists	Identification with Republicans	Identification with Israelis	Identification with Palestinians	Safety	Purpose own security	Purpose security other	Actual own security	Actual security other	Removal	Removal – safety	Removal – threat	Removal – thrive	Removal – Contact	Contact – Opinion
Loyalists	d	0.500	-	-1.239	-0.636	-0.758	2.844	1.139	1.266	0.467	-0.434	1.543	1.772	-0.943	1.243	0.946	3.090
	Power	0.585	-	0.999	0.764	0.880	1.000	0.995	0.999	0.537	0.488	1.000	1.000	0.968	0.999	0.969	1.000
Republicans	d	2.192	-2.034	-	-2.526	0.726	2.713	0.063	0.433	-1.331	-1.228	1.955	2.213	-0.960	1.428	1.445	2.595
	Power	1.000	1.000	-	1.000	0.990	1.000	0.097	0.768	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
Israelis	d	1.035	-1.128	-0.431	-	0.000	2.785	1.343	-1.051	0.310	-1.636	-0.187	-0.498	1.503	-0.688	0.391	1.375
	Power	0.998	0.999	0.586	-	0.050	1.000	1.000	0.998	0.380	1.000	0.201	0.693	1.000	0.907	0.517	1.000
Palestinians	d	2.098	-1.409	0.279	-3.084	-	-0.657	-2.942	-0.012	-3.214	-0.598	7.665	2.099	-0.263	1.714	2.177	1.236
	Power	1.000	1.000	0.374	1.000	-	0.929	1.000	0.056	1.000	0.883	1.000	1.000	0.345	1.000	1.000	1.000

Table C3

Kruskal-Wallis Test: Effect Sizes and Power (Strong-Affiliation Sample)

	Identification own group	Identification with Loyalists	Identification with Republicans	Identification with Israelis	Identification with Palestinians	Safety	Purpose own security	Purpose security other	Actual own security	Actual security other	Removal	Removal – safety	Removal – threat	Removal – thrive	Removal – Contact	Contact – Opinion
f	0.590	0.547	0.457	0.463	0.830	0.955	0.221	0.559	0.000	0.997	0.486	0.510	0.426	0.284	0.000	0.590
Power	0.983	0.889	0.815	0.759	1.000	1.000	0.277	0.971	0.050	1.000	0.910	0.936	0.813	0.440	0.050	0.983

Table C4

Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test: Effect Sizes and Power (Strong-Affiliation Sample)

		Identification with Loyalists	Identification with Republicans	Identification with Israelis	Identification with Palestinians	Safety	Purpose own security	Purpose security other	Actual own security	Actual security other	Removal	Removal – safety	Removal – threat	Removal – thrive	Removal – Contact	Contact – Opinion	Additional Thoughts
Loyalists	*d*	-	-3.859	0.784	-2.042	4.620	1.605	1.901	0.317	0.254	1.623	1.177	0.000	0.418	-0.082	2.140	-
	Power	-	1.000	0.554	0.998	1.000	0.975	0.995	0.179	0.144	0.977	0.844	0.050	0.245	0.073	0.999	-
Republicans	*d*	-2.562		-2.459	1.086	2.764	0.181	0.815	-1.112	-1.006	2.040	1.962	-0.566	1.606	1.715	2.338	-2.562
	Power	1.000		1.000	0.999	1.000	0.120	0.975	0.999	0.997	1.000	1.000	0.805	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
Israelis	*d*	-0.535	-0.535		-0.289	3.035	2.319	-0.469	0.094	-1.105	-0.945	-0.839	2.986	-1.094	0.151	0.895	-0.535
	Power	0.609	0.609		0.272	1.000	1.000	0.516	0.096	0.990	0.959	0.914	1.000	0.989	0.135	0.941	0.609
Palestinians	*d*	-1.439	0.297	-2.838		-0.807	-2.860	0.115	-2.895	-0.535	7.284	2.086	-0.252	1.574	2.025	1.586	-1.439
	Power	1.000	0.371	1.000		0.973	1.000	0.128	1.000	0.765	1.000	1.000	0.298	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000

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