Cognitive Institutions and Non-Referring Content

dc.contributor.advisor	Slors, M.
dc.contributor.advisor	Bakker, P.
dc.contributor.author	Wright, W.C.
dc.date.issued	2017-12-02
dc.description.abstract	There are a problematic set of beliefs for the Extended Mind Hypothesis which operate on non-referring content. Mental states operating on ostensive informational sources are intuitively more available for extended mind theories. the difficulty arises in accounting for kinds which are non-referring. Despite the explicit lack of extension, these types of content are not internalist argumentative tools but are rather good cases for Socially Extended Mind. Therefore, I will demonstrate the role which enculturation,social practice, and tradition play in individuating mental content. Here-in, the role that culture-as-institution plays in cognition is brought to force. It is the principled social distribution of cognition which allow for these forms and any appeal to non-derived content will not adequately address the fundamental components of non-referring, content-full cognitive states.	en_US
dc.identifier.uri	http://theses.ubn.ru.nl/handle/123456789/5264
dc.language.iso	en	en_US
dc.thesis.faculty	Faculteit der Filosofie, Theologie en Religiewetenschappen	en_US
dc.thesis.specialisation	Philosophy of Mind	en_US
dc.thesis.studyprogramme	Philosophy: Research Master	en_US
dc.thesis.type	Researchmaster	en_US
dc.title	Cognitive Institutions and Non-Referring Content	en_US

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