Conspiracy Theories: Unwarranted Absurdities, Propaganda, or a Specific Way of Holding a Belief?

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dc.contributor.advisorBransen, J.
dc.contributor.advisorJongepier, F.
dc.contributor.authorRitterfeld, L.
dc.date.issued2021-07-29
dc.description.abstractIt is not self-evident what renders conspiracy theories less warranted than justified suspicions of real conspiracies. This thesis is an examination of proposed criteria for distinguishing between the two kinds of conspiratorial allegations. It consists of a critical response to Quassim Cassam’s approach of characterizing conspiracy theories as improbable political propaganda. Issues with his criteria are highlighted and an alternative perspective is introduced. Instead of finding a special feature in the theories, the suggested alternative focuses on epistemological flaws in the theorizing of such theories. Conspiracy theorizing is introduced as a specific way of holding a belief that is self-insulating and thereby immunized to counterevidence. Self-insulating beliefs are compared to Hannah Arendt’s concept of ideology and Karl Popper’s principle of non-falsifiability.en_US
dc.identifier.urihttps://theses.ubn.ru.nl/handle/123456789/11092
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.thesis.facultyFaculteit der Filosofie, Theologie en Religiewetenschappenen_US
dc.thesis.specialisationFilosofie van de Gedragswetenschappenen_US
dc.thesis.studyprogrammeMaster Filosofie (Wijsbegeerte van een bepaald wetenschapsgebied)en_US
dc.thesis.typeMasteren_US
dc.titleConspiracy Theories: Unwarranted Absurdities, Propaganda, or a Specific Way of Holding a Belief?en_US
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