Criminal Law and Cognitive Science: the role of folk psychology as moral certainty

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dc.contributor.advisorSlors, M.
dc.contributor.advisorMertens, Th.
dc.contributor.authorLoon, M.S. van
dc.date.issued2016-11-23
dc.description.abstractContemporary cognitive scientists have tendency to claim that our common-sense cognitive concepts (or folk psychology) is wrong. Since criminal law employs several of these concepts in order to formulate the so-called 'Mens Rea' criterion, many cognitive scientists also claim that we should revise criminal law. In this article I argue, from a Wittgensteinian perspective, that this claim is both is unfeasible (i.e. cognitive science does not provide an alternative or homogenous vocabulary in return) and unjustified (i.e. an empirical overstretch and the intrusion of an autonomous discipline).en_US
dc.embargo.lift2099-01-01
dc.identifier.urihttp://theses.ubn.ru.nl/handle/123456789/4355
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.thesis.facultyFaculteit der Filosofie, Theologie en Religiewetenschappenen_US
dc.thesis.specialisationPhilosophy of Minden_US
dc.thesis.studyprogrammePhilosophy: Research Masteren_US
dc.thesis.typeMasteren_US
dc.titleCriminal Law and Cognitive Science: the role of folk psychology as moral certaintyen_US
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