Coercive Power and Wage Theft: A Simple Model

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dc.contributor.advisorAkkerman, A.
dc.contributor.authorEsteve Martín, Lucas
dc.date.issued2019-08-19
dc.description.abstractThis Master’s Thesis tries to explain and analyze a phenomenon that affects workers worldwide, the Wage Theft; which can be defined as the denial of wages or other worker’s rights rightfully owned by an employee. This Master’s Thesis tries to provide an explanation of what is Wage Theft and what is not Wage Theft for a correctly identification of the phenomenon. And, as Wage Theft happens inside the production process, therefore, inside the firm, this economic institution is analyzed, focusing in the existence of power relations or hierarchies within it, through a review of the related academic literature. As the central part of this work, a model of Wage Theft will be developed based on the conflict of interest between employers and employees about the level of effort at work and the time workers spend working. Therefore, the existence of Wage Theft will depend on the relative forces of each side of the conflict. In this model, for the Wage Theft to happen, it will imply that the workers would be working more time than they were hired for. Finally, and empirical analysis of the Spanish case will be provided as an illustration of the theoretical model.en_US
dc.identifier.urihttps://theses.ubn.ru.nl/handle/123456789/7974
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.thesis.facultyFaculteit der Managementwetenschappenen_US
dc.thesis.specialisationEconomics, Behaviour and Policyen_US
dc.thesis.studyprogrammeMaster Economicsen_US
dc.thesis.typeMasteren_US
dc.titleCoercive Power and Wage Theft: A Simple Modelen_US
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