Reagan’s Iran-Contra Affair of 1985-1987: Its Place in U.S. Foreign Policy History According to Sylvan and Majeski

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2019-06-17
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en
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The general narrative of the Iran-Contra scandal is that the efforts of Reagan and a few other high-level policy- and decisionmakers led to a situation which is virtually unique in its clear condemnation of presidential actions and its excessive use of presidential power to achieve presidential goals. David Sylvan and Stephen Majeski however, would be inclined to disagree. Their model of international U.S. Policy since the late 19th century is one of continuity; they believe all decisions on U.S. foreign policy follow a previously laid-out set of goals. According to Sylvan and Majeski, these policies are put in place by governmental institutions such as the department of state and they are able to account for nearly all foreign policy decision-making. In the rare case that a certain international situation does not fit any of the current policies put in place, a new policy is created which can be applied to any similar future cases. The level of applicability of Sylvan and Majeski’s theory to the Iran-Contra affair showcases to what extent it was a unique event in foreign policy history. Specific elements of the affair are unique, such as its entwinedness with the Reagan doctrine, and the modest prosecution of those involved. As a whole, however, the scandal relied heavily on institutional precedent and can clearly be aligned with the foreign policy history and continuity postulated by Sylvan and Majeski.
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