The Hard Split: Replacing Cognitive Neuroscience's Implicit Ontology
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2018-08-27
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en
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Abstract
I introduce a new problem for cognitive neuroscience and its cognitive ontology
project: the hard split, which attacks the implicit folk psychological ontology of cognitive
neuroscience. First, I show the presence of this implicit ontology in cognitive neuroscience,
and that it identifies the realizers of function and experience without proof for or necessity
of this identity. I then argue that absent a replacement of this folk psychological ontology,
cognitive neuroscientists cannot reliably make claims about experience on the basis of
neuroscientific data. Lastly, I show that the ‘replacement ontology’ one chooses may have
effects extending beyond the validity of experiential claims, such as entailing new empirical
predictions, redefinition of concepts and changes in construct validity.
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Faculteit der Filosofie, Theologie en Religiewetenschappen