The Responsibility to Protect or the Responsibility to Select? A Critical Analysis of the Selectivity of Russia, the United States and France to Intervene in Libya but not in Syria
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2014-02-11
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en
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This Master thesis research aims to explain the selectivity of the international community on
humanitarian intervention in the cases of Libya and Syria. It attempts to explain how it can be that in
two seemingly comparable cases, the reaction of the international community can be so different.
This research aims to explain why a universal rule – the Responsibility to Protect – is not applied
universally, but selectively. It will do so by looking at three international actors namely Russia, the
United States and France. These actors were chosen because they are key players in international
politics, permanent members of the Security Council, their viewpoints range from realists to
interventionists and they all have different relations, interests and roles with regard to Libya and
Syria. The main research question is formulated as follows: The Responsibility to Protect or the
Responsibility to Select? A Critical Analysis of the Selectivity of Russia, the United States and France
to Intervene in Libya but not in Syria. The research consists of four Chapters. Chapter 1 gives a
background on the R2P principle, its adoption in the UN Charter, its evolution, criteria and the
perspective of Russia, the United States and France on R2P. Chapter 2 is a Critical Discourse Analysis
of the discourses that were used by Russia, the US and France on Libya and Syria in the United
Nations Security Council. The period that has been analyzed ranged for Libya from February 22, 2011,
up until March 17, 2011, and for Syria from April 21, 2011, up until July 19, 2012. It resulted that the
discourses that were used on Libya varied greatly from the discourses that were used in the
discussions on Syria. In the discussions on Libya, the responsibility of the international community,
human security and the protection of civilians stood central. Whereas in the meetings on Syria, the
complexity of the situation and the destabilizing risks for the already fragile region dominated the
discussion. Three main findings resulted from this chapter, namely 1) for Libya it was not the
question if the international community should intervene but how, 2) R2P resulted to be less
important than anticipated and 3) intervention in Libya was associated with positive consequences
such as the protection of civilians while intervention was assumed to contribute to further
destabilization of the region. Chapter 3 is a comparative analysis of the situation in Libya and Syria
based on seven factors that underline the uniqueness of Libya and Syria. Furthermore Chapter 3
applies the criteria of R2P to the cases of Libya and Syria. It resulted that in the case of Libya all
criteria seem to be fulfilled while only one criterion is applicable to Syria. It resulted that in the case
of Libya the clear level of threat, the poor international standing of the Gaddafi regime and the
support of regional and international organizations for the establishment of a no-fly zone facilitated
the intervention. Libya was contextualized in the inaction of the Rwandan genocide while Syria was
associated with the high risk of further destabilizing the (wider) region. The support of Russia and
Iran, the timing (after Libya), the fragmentation of the opposition, the risk for spill-over effects and
possibly even a sectarian war led to a great irony and one of the main reasons not to intervene in
Syria: it seemed as if the situation in Syria was too complex to prevent more harm than good.
Agreeing on the idea that people should be protected in the case of mass atrocities is easy, but
agreeing on a common response is a whole different story. Like R2P, the idea of collective security is
compelling in theory but highly selective in practice. This is a consequence of a state’s individualism
in a supposedly universal security system. R2P aims to protect civilians against atrocity crimes but it
is only a normative instrument that has no legal stance so in the end it is all dependent upon political
will. Intervention based on unique features in one case (Libya) does not imply intervention in another
case (Syria). This wrongly assumes that the situations are analogous, that interventions are purely
humanitarian or altruistic and that there is a duty or legal obligation to intervene.
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Faculteit der Managementwetenschappen