Full-bred Communism or Run-of-the-Mill Leftism: The Institute of Pacific Relations and Benjamin H. Kizer from 1947 to 1952

Master Thesis North American Studies
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Abstract

As McCarthyism truly took hold in the late 1940s, accusations of Communist allegations abounded. One institution affected by such accusations was the Institute of Pacific Relations, or IPR, an academic institute that published *Pacific Affairs* and *Far Eastern Survey*, both scholarly publications on the current situation in the Pacific. Although the IPR had been active in international affairs since 1925, the 1940s and 1950s, and the culture of McCarthyism proved to be its downfall, due to ever-increasing allegations of Communist subversion within the institute. An FBI investigation and HUAC hearings followed, and the IPR eventually lost funding. The IPR was one of many organizations that were affected by Senator McCarthy and his crusade against Communism, and many more individuals were affected. At the state level McCarthyism also proved pervasive, with Washington State being one of the most affected through the establishment of the Canwell Committee. Albert Canwell's anti-Communist crusade in Washington State provides a poignant reflection of Washington D.C.'s McCarthyism at a state level. A link between this federal and state level McCarthyism can be found in Benjamin Kizer, a Washington State lawyer and active member of the IPR, who was hounded by Canwell for his left-liberal beliefs throughout the forties and fifties. Kizer also presents a link between individual and institutional Communism, a distinction that was ignored during the prosecution of the IPR. The IPR, its members, and Kizer more specifically were all adversely affected by McCarthyism, and the level of persecution which they faced from the FBI, individuals like McCarthy or Canwell, and in some cases the American public was unjustified. This thesis finds the balance between individual and institutional Communism at the IPR, looks at subsequent investigations and prosecution of the IPR and Kizer, and lays out how McCarthyism related to this balance.

Keywords

McCarthyism, Communism, Institute of Pacific Relations, China, Canwell, HUAC, U.S. Politics

Introduction

In the 1950s, the United States was not only kept busy internationally by the start of the Cold War, but also on the home front. Allegations of Communism, both within government institutions, and on a more individual level, led to a tense atmosphere and conflict. There is a plethora of academic literature on McCarthyism and the Second Red Scare in the 1950s, and how this affected U.S. society and governmental institutions through witch-hunts and attacks on personal and professional reputations. Carleton characterized these witch-hunts at a local level as: "the red scare was basically a technique, a tool, a simplistic device for some members of the community to use against a whole set of unwelcome developments threatening those members' conception of the perfect and proper community" (Carleton 14). At a federal level, Senator Joseph McCarthy's crusade to weed out any and all Soviet influence in the American government was quickly picked up by other officials, and the American public, and was bolstered by the House Committee on Un-American Activities or HUAC. McCarthy's effective 'reign of terror' lasted half a decade, from the late 1940s to the mid 1950s, but the anti-Communist sentiment McCarthyism built on had already taken root much earlier, following American reactions to the Russian Revolution of 1917, in the form of the First Red Scare. Although McCarthyism can be used to describe unsubstantiated persecution more generally, I will focus on a more limited description; the wanton accusations of Communist sympathies and ties within the American government and other significant institutions during McCarthy's presence in Washington D.C, from 1947 until 1957. This description stems from an analysis of literature on McCarthyism by scholars such as Ellen Schrecker and Richard Fried.

The Institute of Pacific Relations was not originally a wholly American institution, but rather an international non-governmental organization, but during the 1930s America started playing a major role within the IPR, through the American Council of the IPR. The role of the IPR more broadly was education and promoting freedom internationally, through the lens of traditional Wilsonianism. It also published the *Pacific Affairs* journal, a publication that highlighted research relating to the Pacific, including book reviews. Because of its internationalist nature, many supporters of the IPR were left-leaning liberals, who agreed with promoting global liberalism. When combined with the IPR's close ties to *Amerasia,* Communist allegations quickly came knocking at its door. The question remains whether there is a distinct connection between the ideals of the IPR and true, anti-American

Communism. The IPR was prosecuted after accusations of Communism at an institutional level by McCarthy and others in the late 1940s, which did not distinguish properly between individual and institutional Communism. Benjamin Kizer, a member of the IPR and left Liberal from Washington State, also suffered from the amalgamation of individual and institutional Communism. This thesis will examine how the lack of distinction between these two distinct forms of Communism under McCarthy affected the IPR and Benjamin Kizer.

William T. Walker, author of *McCarthyism and the Red Scare: A Reference Guide* (2011) summarizes the prevalent academic viewpoints on McCarthy, and the way he handled politics as "McCarthy was fundamentally an anti-intellectual who sought position and fame, and a ruthless politician who spent his life trying to gain power by violating and ignoring the rules that make institutions and processes operate within an ethical context" (Walker XI). This does not mean that this is the only interpretation of McCarthy and his anti-Communist ideals, however, as is evident by Evans' portrayal of McCarthy in his work *Blacklisted by History: The Untold Story of Senator Joe McCarthy (2007).* Evans was a conservative American journalist, with a focus on uncovering what he considered the truth, and multiple other publications about both Communism and conservatism in the U.S. In *Blacklisted by History*, McCarthy is portrayed as a wronged and 'blacklisted' senator whose accusations of Communism were more often than not accurate. This portrayal is the polar opposite of McCarthy's portrayal in most other academic literature on the subject, such as by Fried (*Nightmare in Red: The McCarthy era in Perspective* (1990)), Klehr (*The Amerasia Spy Case: Prelude to McCarthyism* (1996)), or Walkowitz (*Secret Agents: The Rosenberg Case, McCarthyism and Fifties America* (2013)). The way these latter three approach McCarthy's legacy is by examining the nature of his accusations and prosecutions, and the individuals who were accused, instead of simply focusing on successful convictions or somewhat faint connections to Communism. This provides a more nuanced approach to any potential Communist involvement, and puts it into perspective against McCarthy's acerbic campaigns. Both Evans and the other authors give the reader some freedom to form an opinion on McCarthyism, but both camps also put forward a clear opinion on the matter. Schrecker, professor emerita of American history at Yeshiva University describes the "polemical furor" (Schrecker IX) created by the publication of her book *Many Are The Crimes: McCarthyism in America* (1998), a critical look at the political repression and intimidation perpetrated by McCarthy supporters during the fifties. Such a strong reaction shows that at the time, though

prevalent scholars condemned McCarthy, there were still contradicting, polarized views on the issue of McCarthyism.

Alongside different scholarly views on the success or validity of McCarthyism, multiple works offer an explanation for the rise and success of McCarthyism, and allow for a description of the socio-political landscape of 1950s America, to more accurately analyze McCarthyism as a phenomenon of its time. Nelson Polsby attempts a threefold explanation of McCarthyism, supported by hypotheses based on, among other aspects, ethnographic analysis, the political milieu of the fifties, and the support from McCarthy's political party. Polsby mentions an isolationist political atmosphere, McCarthy's authoritarian characteristics, and the demands of status groups, as three hypotheses for McCarthy's success. He concludes that all three of these hypotheses don't fully account for the rise of McCarthy, and that through more careful analysis, policy scientists and polling organizations could "help decision-makers to make rational choices" (Polsby 271), and in future more effectively react to politicians such as McCarthy.

There is also a separate historiography on the Institute of Pacific Relations, an organization that will be discussed extensively in this thesis. The Institute of Pacific Relations was an academic institute that published two journals, *Pacific Affairs* and *Far Eastern Survey*. The institute also held conferences and seminars, promoting Pacific studies and increased awareness of the Pacific as an important economic region. This historiography encompasses both its earlier history, and the effects of McCarthy's campaign against the institute. This historiography also focuses on the IPR's position within Pacific and Asian Studies, and how it helped or harmed the rise of this field. Prominent examples include Jonathan Marshall's *The Institute of Pacific Relations: Politics and polemics* (1976), Paul Hooper's *The Institute of Pacific Relations and the Origins of Asian and Pacific studies* (1988), and Tomoko Akami's *Internationalizing the Pacific* (2003). Authors often do not focus wholly on the IPR, but use the example of the IPR as one of McCarthy's victims, when discussing McCarthy's legacy. What has also not yet been done, is consolidate McCarthy's distaste of the broader unofficial U.S. Foreign Policy establishment, and the role the IPR played within this establishment. The State Department represented the official, federal dimension of the Foreign Policy establishment, but the IPR was part of the significant unofficial part of the Foreign Policy establishment, which consisted of academics, businessmen, and other non-governmental influences on U.S. foreign policy. As my thesis will show, its place as an academic, and often diplomatic institute as a part of the Foreign

Policy Establishment made it of extra interest to McCarthy, after his State Department inquisition fell short in 1950. Priscilla Roberts laid out the historiography on the American Foreign Policy Establishment in *"All the Right People": The Historiography of the American Foreign Policy Establishment* in 1992, and at no point is the IPR mentioned, although other foreign policy institutions such as the Council on Foreign Relations are. Furthermore, there is discussion about the Institute of Pacific Relations and its effectiveness at describing and furthering relations between the United States and countries on the Pacific Rim (most notably, China). Works on the role the IPR played diplomatically, such as Hooper's article on the origin of Pacific studies, don't examine any of the consequences McCarthy's witch-hunt had on the IPR. One article which does bridge the gap between the IPR and McCarthyism in a more general sense, is Woods' article on IPR funding by the Rockefeller Foundation, and the influence McCarthyism in Washington D.C. had on this funding.

Although McCarthyism and the motivations behind it have been thoroughly analyzed, an intriguing element that has received insufficient attention is the relation between individual and institutional accusations of Communism by anti-Communists. The IPR and Benjamin Kizer offer a very interesting case study to explore this overlooked element. I want to find out how this relation affected the prosecution of the IPR, and whether accusations of Communism at an institutional level were based upon individual Communism. Within the U.S. government, such accusations led to thousands of suspected Communists losing their jobs, and an NGO targeted by the same accusations might similarly suffer. I intend to use primary sources, such as the personal correspondence of Benjamin H. Kizer, who was a contributor to the IPR in the 1950s, and was the United National Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (or UNRRA) director in China from 1944 to 1946, to look at the relation between individual and institutional accusations. Kizer was personally persecuted by his neighbor in Washington State, the avid anti-Communist Albert F. Canwell. Canwell's oral autobiography will provide a perspective that is clearly influenced by McCarthyism, in order to properly contrast Kizer's left-liberal viewpoints. Kizer's position as a high-ranking member of the IPR and the UNRRA provide an interesting perspective on the U.S. and its view of the Pacific, and more specifically China. As China fell under the control of Mao Zedong's Communist regime in 1949, any interaction with its government warranted suspicion, according to supporters of McCarthy. Additionally, as Kizer was persecuted by anti-Communists as an individual, and was a member of the IPR, which was prosecuted on an

institutional level, his case study can be used to investigate the way in which the institutional and individual accusations were linked and used to legitimize this persecution.

I want to look at the following research question:

> How did the relation between individual and institutional Communism influence accusations of Communism during McCarthyism's peak in the 1940s and 1950s? How did this relation affect the prosecution of the IPR and its member Benjamin H. Kizer?

This research question will be aided and further defined by the following three sub-questions: How did anti-Communism become such a prominent ideology throughout the 1940s and 1950s, how was it affected by concerns about China's turn to Communism, and how did it pave the way for McCarthyism? What motivated the prosecution of the IPR at an institutional level by Alfred Kohlberg and Joseph McCarthy from 1944 to 1952, and what were the consequences of this prosecution for the IPR? Why did Albert Canwell's staunch anti-Communism campaign in Washington State in 1947 target IPR member Benjamin Kizer, and how did Kizer's position at the IPR affect this campaign? The prosecution of the IPR, and Canwell's prosecution Kizer will be used as case studies to answer these sub-questions, and to answer the overarching research question.

This MA thesis consists of a first chapter, which analyzes the rise of McCarthyism and its effect on the United States leading up to the 1950s, providing an explanation for its success. It will also clearly and separately define McCarthyism during the Second Red Scare, and portray it as the unique phenomenon it was. This will be followed by a chapter on the IPR, which will examine the investigations into the IPR and its individual members, and examine its prosecution on an individual and institutional level. The final chapter will turn away from Washington D.C. to zoom in on Washington State, looking at anti-Communism at a state and local level through the lens of Albert F. Canwell, a fervent anti-Communist, and Benjamin H. Kizer, his left-liberal 'nemesis', in order to examine the relationship between institutional and individual anti-Communism at an individual level. Research for the first chapter will be conducted mostly through secondary sources and reference works on McCarthyism, to more accurately place McCarthyism within its own time period and within a theoretical framework. Research for the second chapter will be comprised of a combination of secondary and primary literature. Publications by the IPR and on the IPR such as the Pacific Journal and Lawrence Woods' article on the IPR and Rockefeller philanthropy will be

supported by primary material from FBI investigations. The third chapter will feature additional FBI documents, alongside Canwell's autobiographical oral history, and Kizer's personal correspondence. These reports by the FBI on the IPR, *Amerasia,* and Kizer, will give insight on perceived levels of Communism for all the aforementioned. Finally, I intend to make use of Kizer's primary sources and Canwell's oral history on his personal crusade against Communists in America to provide detailed insight to McCarthyism at a state level, and how it affected individuals. Although Canwell's oral history is dangerously subjective, it provides the perspective of a rabid anti-Communist, showcasing a wholly new perspective. Kizer's sources will provide a first-hand view of the struggles the IPR faced, through correspondence that has not yet been used in academic literature on McCarthyism and the IPR. These struggles will be placed within the context of a divided America, with a political system that was still trying to recover from the Second World War, while at the same time preparing for what would later be dubbed the Cold War. During this era, many more workers, both governmental and non-, fell victim to the Second Red Scare and its anti-Communist accusations.

This project lies right at the intersection of two subjects pertinent to the 1950s: the U.S.' reaction to the developments in the Pacific, and the effect of McCarthyism on America. IPR was an internationalist reaction to a region, which was prematurely condemned by many anti-Communist hawks, while McCarthyism was an important phenomenon in American daily life, and also affected many American institutions such as the IPR. The presence of McCarthyism in Washington State also provides an interesting example of McCarthyism at the state level, and how it functioned. This MA thesis will combine these three phenomena and uses primary materials in the form of personal correspondence and diaries of Benjamin Kizer. Kizer's materials have not been used previously when examining the IPR, and provide a personal look into the life of a man deeply affected by anti-Communism, and by the relation between individual and institutional accusations of Communism. It is especially interesting, because literature on the IPR and McCarthyism rarely takes an individualist approach, focusing instead on institutional Communism or perceived evidence of individual Communism. Kizer's sources will be supplemented by FBI reports to offer a more personal and in-depth look at the inner workings of the IPR as it was being battered by Communist allegations, and the effect McCarthyism could have on individuals, and on a more localized level. The two key concepts that will feature in this thesis are McCarthyism and anti-Communism respectively. McCarthyism will be defined by political studies historiography,

in order to offer a nuanced and multi-perspective approach to a concept, which is easily oversimplified to 'a fight against Communism'. Although McCarthy's personal approach might be in line with this definition, subsequent effects of, reactions to, and analyses of the era of McCarthyism reveal a far broader and more intricate model, which shaped the United States throughout the 1950s, both domestically and internationally. For instance, James L. Gibson analyzes instances of political repression and intolerance in 1954, and its focus on the Left. A survey from this year shows that thirty percent of people think "Some people do not feel as free to say what they think as they used to" (Gibson 99), highlighting the effect McCarthy's fear-mongering tactics had on the American public. Anti-Communism will be analyzed through an American lens; American reactions to Communism and policies that stemmed from it offer a comprehensive perspective of Communist fears imbedded in the hearts and minds of Americans, and can be related back to both McCarthyism generally, and its effect on institutions such as the IPR more specifically. Through American eyes in the 1950s and subsequent decades, Communism was seen as the great evil America had to conquer. It was the antithesis to American freedom, religiosity, and patriotism. Its depiction by people such as McCarthy as an insidious form of brainwashing also meant that it was not limited to the Soviet Union or China, but could be present within America as well. This is the main justification behind McCarthy's witch-hunt, which revolved around the presence of Communist spies and other supporters of Communist thought within the U.S. government, and hidden throughout American society. Although anti-Communist sentiment was promoted in various aspects of American public life, through mediums such as Hollywood film or newspaper cartoons, McCarthyism and vicious anti-Communist allegations played an even more important role in the political sphere.

Both of these concepts will be used to examine the relation between the individual and the institutional within a framework of McCarthyism, through examining McCarthy's attacks on both individuals within the IPR, and the IPR as a whole. This thesis will look at the way anti-Communism focused on Communism in both individual and institutional form, and the way it linked these two forms in shaping anti-Communist accusations. These attacks were often intertwined, or extrapolated and expanded to the other kind. By zooming in on this specific element, this thesis attempts to add a new perspective to the existing historiography on how McCarthy shaped his anti-Communist campaigns. Additionally, this thesis will bridge the gap between McCarthy's condemnation of the Foreign Policy elite and his crusade against the IPR, by situating the IPR firmly within the academic branch of the Foreign Policy

elite. Analyzing McCarthy's approach to individual versus institutional, and his disdain of the IPR as an institution will provide a solid theoretical framework from which to answer my research question.

1: The Roots of McCarthyism

The era of McCarthyism remains a troubled time in American political history, one that warrants further examination. Equally enthralling are the historical circumstances that made anti-Communism and McCarthyism thrive. This chapter will comprise an overview of McCarthyism and Communist witch-hunts in the United States in the first half of the twentieth century. In doing so, it will provide historical context, and a thorough examination of its political basis, its effects, and its widespread popularity. It is important to do so, as this will later allow the IPR to be placed within this context, and the effects of McCarthyism on this institution to be examined. Examining the nature of the witch-hunts will provide a lens through which to view the inquiries into the IPR under McCarthy's reign. This chapter will examine historical cases of anti-Communism leading up to McCarthy's rise to political fame, and how McCarthy's appearance affected subsequent cases, in order to examine how anti-Communism became such a prominent ideology throughout the 1940s and 1950s, how it was affected by China's newly Communist government, and how it paved the way for McCarthyism. To answer this question, this chapter will start out with a short segment on the roots of American anti-Communism. Next will be an examination of the House Committee on Un-American Activities, a Committee in the House of Representatives, founded in 1938, and aimed at uncovering 'un-American' individuals. This will be followed by a look at the FBI under J. Edgar Hoover and how it dealt with Communism. This will segue into a section on the *Amerasia* investigation, a governmental probe into an academic publication that was suspected to have Communist affiliations. Subsequently this chapter will turn to the effect of China's conversion to Communism in 1949 on anti-Communist sentiment in America, and finally McCarthy's introduction to the D.C. political scene, after he won the Wisconsin senatorial race in 1947. Although McCarthy is a figurehead for America's witch-hunts, as this chapter will demonstrate, the seeds of McCarthyism were sowed long before he stepped on the scene, through strong anti-Communist sentiment. The IPR will function as a case study of 1950s McCarthyism, which will be discussed in chapter two. The IPR presents a highly interesting case: at a time when China was viewed with suspicion by many Americans, it focused on the Pacific, making itself an inevitable target for McCarthy and his followers. Additionally, its connection to a multitude of foreign policy lobbyists would glean McCarthy's interest. Not only the results and actions of McCarthyist thought merit further examination; the motivations that drove these actions must also be looked into.

Clearly then, McCarthyism came to be during a time of political and social turmoil and uncertainty, which must be taken into account when discussing its effects. However, it remains a nearly unprecedented instance of anti-Communism within the American political and private spheres. Though the First Red Scare, motivated by a fear of the 1917 Russian Revolution, was a time of great civic unrest and investigations into leftist entities, McCarthyism perpetuated the same mindset on an even larger scale. Under McCarthy, anti-Communism reached from the President, to Congress, to the FBI, and even to organizations such as the American Legion, a non-profit organization comprised of U.S. veterans. Such a high level of political involvement warrants attention, especially in relation to entities dealing with the subject of this involvement. The fight against Communism inherent within McCarthyism encompasses both Russia and China, which were both seen as threats, countries lost to Communist thought. Because of this, institutes such as the IPR were subject to increased scrutiny during McCarthyism. Once again, a differentiation must be made between an ideological motivation, which is based on an actual fear of Communism taking over America, and a political motivation, which simply feeds on this fear to achieve certain political goals. Such scrutiny will prove to be key in analyzing the interaction between McCarthyism and the IPR.

1.1: The HUAC as a precursor to McCarthyism

McCarthyism as a concept was, in part retrospectively, named after McCarthy's prolific anti-communism campaign, and its tendency to rely on brash accusations of Communism, as put forward in Ellen W. Schrecker's *Many are the crimes: McCarthyism in America* (1999), and Richard Fried's *Nightmare in Red : The Mccarthy Era in Perspective* (1990). However, brash accusations of Communism, already existed before McCarthy arrived in Washington, during earlier instances of anti-Communism (Goldstein XIII). McCarthy's etiquette in Washington revolved around boldly accusing people of being Communists or traitors, with little regard to whether this was entirely factual or not. The premise of premature and exaggerated accusations is what truly made McCarthyism such an alarming concept; people could be targeted by McCarthyists simply for holding a position which was tenuously linked to any notion of Communism. As aforementioned, this type of ungrounded accusation was already pervasive before McCarthy's rise to fame, however, which is laid out extensively in *Little 'Red Scares': Anti-Communism and Political Repression in the United States, 1921-1946*

(2016). The First Red Scare truly laid the groundwork for anti-Communist thought throughout the Twentieth Century. After the rise of Communism in Russia following the Russian Revolution of 1917, fears of this Bolshevism making its way to America grew. An increase in Leftism, Anarchism, and Unionism in the United States caused these fears to grow, and led to a legislative response by Wilson, reflected in the Espionage Act of 1917, and the Sedition Act of 1918. This response was effectively mirrored in the second half of the 1940s, following the Second World War, this time prompted by increased tensions with Soviet Russia, and the onset of the Cold War. The Cold War once again rejuvenated previous fears of Communist infiltration in America. The Soviets and their Communism were portrayed as a threat to the American way of life, and consequently perceived indicators of Communism such as Leftism and Unionism were investigated (O'Reilly 238). The American hunt against Communism, Communist propaganda, and subversion within the American government was already decidedly active in the mid-1930s, although it would be whipped up to frenzy under Senator McCarthy in the late 1940s and early 1950s. Fear of the Soviet Union's newfound power on the global stage made them a perfect target for demonization and denouncement, starting with their cultural and political beliefs. This led to a monumental increase in public and political distrust of Communism (O'Reilly 243).

Although there have been multiple committees dedicated to rooting out subversion and treason in the American political world, the most prominent ever is the House Committee on Un-American Activities, commonly referred to as HCUA or HUAC. The HUAC was a special investigative committee, active in the House of Representatives, and founded in 1938. Its key focus was uncovering Communism and Fascism within the public sphere, phenomena that were already receiving increased scrutiny in 1938, due to America's deteriorating relationship with the Soviets and their Communist ideals. The committee's congressional roots position it as a precursor to McCarthy's investigations, a decade later, though the Senate, rather than the House of Representatives carried out these investigations. The HUAC was the culmination of multiple committees originating since the close of the First World War. The main goal for all of these committees was uncovering subversion, and either Communist or Nazi sentiment and propaganda within the United States itself. The HUAC followed suit, focusing on "un-American activities" within the United States and bringing suspects in for questioning and trial. At the time, Dies was the leader of the Special Committee to investigate Un-American Activities, which quickly became known as the Dies Committee (O'Reilly 237). A Texas Democrat and fervent anti-Communist, Dies was the

perfect candidate to head a committee devoted to uncovering Communism and Un-American activities in America. Un-American activities could include associating with members of the Communist party, being published by a publication with alleged Communist ties, or even "taking sentences out of context from articles written a decade earlier" (Brinson 66). Dies levied this example by Brinson against Goodwin Watson in 1942, shortly after Watson was appointed head of the Foreign Broadcast Monitoring Service, by Martin Dies. Dies launched an unwarranted attack against Watson's person, due to his fear of a possible Communist heading up such an important American organization. Although the House Appropriations Committee cleared Watson and his colleague William E. Dodd Jr. relatively swiftly, Dies did not relent, and Watson and Dodd were called before the Dies Committee and the newly instated Special Subcommittee of the Appropriations Committee, or Kerr Committee. The investigation was intensive: "The Kerr Com-mittee questioned Watson for two full days on Friday, 9 April, and Monday, 12 April 1943, focusing its attention on Watson's organizational affiliations and scholarly writings" (Brinson 69).

Although Dies started a witch-hunt against Watson and Dodd, there was no substantial evidence suggesting either man was an actual Communist; Dies' accusations were based on their personal philosophies, and their critiques of the way America had handled the Great Depression. This critique struck Dies as Communism-adjacent, as did their association with organizations he deemed Communist fronts (Brinson 65). The ensuing trial started by Dies cost both men their federal appointment, and resulted in a long and arduous process before it got to that point. Susan Brinson, professor emeritus of media studies at Auburn University, describes the process as one motivated by more than just a desire to oust any American Communists: "Fear of Communism was motivated by a complex interrelationship of individual vendettas, political and economic adversaries, and a frequent distrust of intellectuals by the members of the House" (Brinson 70-71). Her article shows that a high profile case such as Watson and Dodd's can stem from baseless targeting of Americans who were not actual Communists, and is a poignant example of the witch-hunts carried out by the Dies Committee in the early 1940s, showcasing that it was more intent on interrogating its 'suspects', than actually basing its accusations on confirmed affiliations or recent publications. Brinson ascribes Dies' fervor to convict Watson and Dodd to a personal vendetta, however this seems insufficient to fully explain such a campaign. It is likely that even with his lack of proof, Dies truly believed both men to be Communists, and this further fueled his desire to expel them from an institution he found important.

In 1945 the Dies Committee evolved from a Special Investigative Committee to the standing committee known as the House Committee on Un-American Activities. Although no longer headed by Dies, its mission, to investigate subversion, treason, and possible Communism, remained the same. Just like McCarthyism, then, the HUAC was effectively already operating years before it formed into the committee we know today. The HUAC also handled high-profile subversion cases, such as its infamous Hollywood Blacklist case (1947), and its case against Alger Hiss (1948), both of which will be further examined to situate the HUAC within the era of McCarthyism. In the Hollywood Blacklist case, the HUAC focused on uncovering alleged members of the Communist Party of the United States of America (henceforth CPUSA) in Hollywood. The CPUSA had been founded in 1919, inspired by the Russian Revolution, and promoted a Communist future for America, one in which labor was unionized and fair, and which was pro-civil rights. It boasted a membership of over fifty thousand Americans by the end of the 1930s, which combined with its funding from the Soviet Union, made it a worthy target of anti-Communists. The HUAC's process of exposing Communists in Hollywood started after *The Hollywood Reporter* published a list of alleged Communists in Hollywood, which piqued the HUAC's attention. After all, Hollywood provided entertainment and American propaganda to the masses, and Communist infiltration of such an important organization would be disastrous. The committee subpoenaed various high-level Hollywood executives, and many of the names on the *Reporter*'s list, and conducted trials with conduct emblematic of the American crusade against Communism. Jack Meeks describes how the HUAC went about these Hollywood trials: "Yet, despite the negative publicity and public condemnation this practice engendered, the HUAC persisted in asking nearly every Hollywood communist or ex-communist to name names upon pain of a contempt of congress citation" (Meeks 64).

Meeks also mentions the variety of socio-political factors that influenced the behavior and decision-making process of the CPUSA and the HUAC alike, imbuing it with an importance akin to Brinson's earlier description, of the factors influencing America's 'fear of Communism'. He postulates, "The events of this era had a profound impact in shaping the institutional behavior of both the CPUSA and the HUAC. This in turn led directly to their collision over the Party's activities in Hollywood" (Meeks 67). The Hollywood trials further aligned the HUAC with the sort of anti-Communist action that would be taken under McCarthy: its disregard of fair, objective trials would be continued in McCarthy's wake over the following decade. Of course, the Second World War and its aftermath had shifted the

balance of power drastically, from having the United States and the Soviet Union on the same, powerful end of the spectrum, to pitting them against each other. Several of the aforementioned committees in the first half of the 20th century were partially dedicated to investigating Communism, but the aftermath of the Second World War renewed American fervor. Although Communism, and especially the Soviet penchant for a global expansion of Communism, had corroded America's opinion of the Soviet Union since the Russian Revolution, their cooperation during the Second World War had complicated this relationship. Hollywood, too, was influenced by this change, as it was now suddenly more advantageous to portray the Russians in a more positive light. This shift in Hollywood sentiment, and any potential Communist conversion which stemmed from it, was what the HUAC's 1947 investigation was most interested in.

Another controversial case investigated by the HUAC, and one of the most large-scale cases right before the rise of McCarthy, was the Alger Hiss case. In 1948 Whittaker Chambers, a former CPUSA member accused Hiss, president of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and former U.S. delegate to the United Nations, of Communist affiliations and intent to commit espionage. He claimed to know this information because of their close relationship as fellow Communists. This accusation came after two people, including a clerk at the Soviet Embassy named Igor Gouzenko, had previously leveled accusations against Hiss in 1945. As Gouzenko had previously uncovered Soviet spy operations, his accusations had already prompted two years of federal surveillance in order to determine whether Hiss was, in fact, in league with the Communists. Chambers' condemnation, however, apparently held more weight and caused Hiss to categorically deny any Communist involvement, and any familiarity with Chambers, in front of the HUAC. When appearing before this subcommittee, Chambers justified an inconsistency in his statement as follows: "Very easily, Alger. I was a Communist and you were a Communist" (HCUA hearing 1948). However, Weinstein casts doubt on Chambers' allegedly close relationship with Hiss and his wife, highlighting inconsistencies and flat-out lies, and concluding "Similar contradictions marked much of Chambers' testimony concerning his "close association" with the Hisses" (Weinstein 123). After a fraught trial, with various contradictions and no convictions, Chambers elevated his condemnation of Hiss by claiming he committed espionage, submitting leaked classified State Department cables as his evidence, known as the 'Baltimore documents'. Chambers also uncovered rolls of film from a pumpkin on his farm in Maryland. containing classified State Department materials, which he

claimed to have gotten from Hiss. These documents became known as the 'Pumpkin Papers'. Although the statute of limitations had run out for an espionage conviction for either man, the papers submitted by Chambers paved the way for dual Perjury convictions, as both men had lied on the stand when denying any history of espionage. Likely the weightiest aspects of the Hiss probe are the perjury trial and sentencing that followed in 1950, and the disparity between the two men here. Although both Chambers and Hiss had committed perjury by lying during earlier hearings, only Hiss went to trial, twice. Hiss was eventually found guilty of two counts of perjury and sentenced to jail time. Chambers, on the other hand, received no sentence or further repercussions for lying on the stand.

Chambers' motivations behind attacking Hiss remain relatively clouded. Although he did not accuse Hiss of Soviet espionage at first, he did do so after Hiss leveled claims of libel against him. This could have been an attempt to clear his own name, or it could have been a way to deny Hiss any credibility. Additionally, his initial testimony, stating Hiss was a member of CPUSA, might have been truthful, or might have been an attempt to 'get in the country's good books'. As a previous Communist spy, Chambers wanted to distance himself from CPUSA as much as possible. Because of this, and because of the aforementioned contradictions present at nearly every interval, doubt has been cast upon the legitimacy of the entire probe, for instance by scholars such as Earl Latham, Herbert Packer, and Allen Weinstein. Earl Latham, a specialist in political behavior and public administration mentioned the impact of the Alger Hiss case on the era of McCarthyism and the sentiment of the time: "Without the Alger Hiss case,--the six year controversy that followed might have been a much tamer affair, and the Communist issue somewhat more tractable" (Latham, qtd in Weinstein 121). Weinstein also brings up one of the most poignant moments of the trial in his article; a typewriter belonging to Hiss, with matching characteristics to the Baltimore Documents was submitted as key evidence. After he was convicted, however, Hiss' final statement was an indictment of its validity. Weinstein then expands on this by mentioning the opinion of his supporters: "Most Hiss supporters believe that the supposedly faked machine was constructed during the August-November, 1948, period, presumably with the assistance of the F.B.I." (Weinstein 127). Although this accusation is purely speculative, it seems unlikely that Chambers managed to duplicate the typewriter and come into possession of the State Department documents on his own, and his involvement with the Communist Party had ended at this point. FBI complicity would add another angle to this case, as it would mean the Federal government got involved directly, and falsified evidence. In a political climate

dominated by McCarthyism and relentless inquiries, this added dimension would be monumental, but no evidence of FBI involvement has been uncovered since.

The further political impact of the case is also far from negligible. Weinstein describes how Nixon's leadership during the probe into Alger Hiss effectively secured him a senate seat that year, and a republican nomination for vice-president two years later. Although the majority of the HUAC was inclined to accept Hiss' testimony, Nixon pressed on and was appointed head of a sub committee, intended to find out whether there was a relationship present between the two men, or Chambers had lied. Even during Nixon's campaign for the vice-presidency, his excellent conduct and his condemnation of Democratic 'misconduct' during the Alger Hiss case proved to be highly impactful talking points (Weinstein 121-122). Alongside its extended political relevance, another important facet of the Hiss case is its divisiveness along party lines. Republicans, who held the majority in the House of Representatives, seemed hell-bent on convicting Hiss of being a Communist, while many Democrats viewed the trial less favorably. This political dichotomy would remain a relevant characteristic throughout the McCarthy era.

1.2: The FBI and Institutional McCarthyism

The HUAC and earlier committee iterations, then, were clear propagators of McCarthyism and political intolerance in the two decades leading up to Senator McCarthy's actual campaign. However, they were not the only federal institutions that did so. The FBI's director also facilitated this political intolerance: J. Edgar Hoover had been appointed director in 1924, and would remain so until 1972, having served eight different U.S. presidents. Hoover had been active in the intelligence community during the first Red Scare, after the First World War and the Communist revolution, and would come to play an integral role in the FBI's approach to the Second Red Scare in the fifties. Under Hoover, the FBI was heavily involved in the investigation and persecution of Americans they suspected to be Communists, often dealing with cases that seemed more of a direct threat than the investigations carried out by the HUAC. One such case, the Rosenberg case of 1951, or Atom Spy case, became one of the most controversial cases handled by the FBI during the 1950s, with its legal legacy carrying on until today. The conduct and decision making of the FBI in this particular case has been thoroughly questioned, with mock Rosenberg trials being conducted forty years later, in an attempt to view the case as separate from its political climate. In this mock trial,

the Rosenbergs were found not guilty, though in reality this was not the case. Rebecca Walkowitz, chair of the English department at Rutgers University, in a collection of essays on the Rosenberg case, questions the integrity of the investigation, and speculates about the true nature behind the conviction of the Rosenbergs: "were they set up by a government eager for scapegoats in an era of military competition and nationalist anxiety? The trial in many minds came to stand for the paranoia of the Cold War" (Walkowitz 2).

The Rosenberg case revolved around Julius and Ethel Rosenberg (born Ethel Greenglass), a Jewish-American couple who met in the mid-1930s, when they were both members of the Young Communist League in New York City. Rosenberg proceeded to become a spy for the Soviet Union in the 1940s, passing on files from the army laboratory he worked at, and recruiting other engineers to his cause. This spying went on until June 1950, when Ethel's brother, David Greenglass, was apprehended by the FBI, on suspicion of espionage for the Soviet Union. During questioning, David gave up both Ethyl and Julius Rosenberg, stating that Julius had recruited him through his wife, Ruth Greenglass. Because of this confession, the Rosenbergs were also brought to testify before a grand jury in August of 1950, and were indicted on 11 overt acts. Both pleaded not guilty to these acts multiple times. Their trial began in March of 1951, with David Greenglass testifying about his work on the Manhattan Project in 1944, and Julius Rosenberg's interest in the matter. According to his testimony, he was convinced by Julius to write down information about his work on the project, and have his wife Ruth exchange this with a messenger by the name of Harry Gold. Gold had already been arrested and sentenced to thirty years for espionage the previous year, as he had been a courier for both Emil Fuchs, a scientist on the Manhattan Project who leaked American secrets to the Soviet Union, and Anatoli Yakovlev, former Soviet vice-consul in New York.

Gold's admission of guilt connected Greenglass, Fuchs, and Yakovlev in a chain of Soviet espionage, making all of them susceptible to prosecution. Greenglass's testimony implicated the Rosenbergs, and the FBI, in their piece on the trial, describes his recollection of a torn Jell-O box used at an exchange between his wife and Gold, combined with the mention of the name Julius:

> David answered, "Yes." Gold then said, "I come from Julius," and showed Greenglass the piece of cardboard which Yakovlev had given him. Greenglass requested Gold to come into his apartment, then took a piece of cardboard from a

> woman's handbag and compared it with the piece Gold had given him. The pieces matched. (Atom Spy Case)

The testimony of both Gold and Greenglass were considered enough evidence to convict the Rosenberg's for espionage, and both were sentenced to death in the week of 21 May 1951. Morton Sobell, an engineer who worked with Rosenberg and also leaked state secrets to the Soviet Union, was sentenced to thirty years in prison, while David Greenglass was sentenced to fifteen years in prison. The sentence was a deeply divisive one, as supporters of the Rosenbergs decried it, while more nationalist-minded Americans thought it just and fair punishment of Soviet spies. Walkowitz also touches on this divisiveness; "Even American Jewish groups and the American Left, communities in which the Rosenbergs worked and lived, were deeply divided by the case" (Walkowitz 2).

Although the Rosenbergs' sentence was delivered for May of 1951, legal appeals were kept up for the next two years. The Rosenbergs also received an outpouring of support from members of the public, who held rallies, signed clemency petitions, and on multiple occasions picketed the White House in the hopes of getting the president's attention. This picket line lasted continuously from December 27, 1952 until January 17, 1953, when it became clear that Truman had no intention of granting executive clemency. Additionally, articles supporting the Rosenbergs appeared in various publications, including the *National Guardian*, and the Communist Party's *Daily Worker*. Perhaps even more salient than the response at home, however, was Europe's response to the Rosenberg case. Embassies were bombarded with petitions, and demonstrations were held in support of the Rosenbergs, largely in cities in Western Europe, such as London and Paris (Atom Spy Case). This is exceptionally interesting, because these countries traditionally felt little of Communist influence, making their support of the Rosenbergs a humanitarian question, rather than a political one. The culture of anti-Communism and McCarthyism was largely confined to the United States, and the Rosenberg Case was especially impactful, because it presented the darker side of this culture to both the United States and the world.

The majority of these outcries of support are categorically dismissed by the FBI, however, which states, "It is evident that the clemency drive on behalf of the Rosenbergs was from the beginning a highly artificial affair and was carefully promoted rather than a spontaneous public reaction which the communist press sought to show" (Atom Spy Case). This reply clearly positions the FBI within the debate on the ethicality of the Rosenberg Case,

and anti-Communism more broadly. The FBI is intent on fighting Communism in America, regardless of how this fight might be viewed by the rest of the world. The author also goes on to decry any letters of support, and letters asking for clemency sent to the White House, claiming that

> At a number of rallies sponsored by the NCSJRC [National Committee to Secure Justice in the Rosenberg Case], individuals in attendance were handed telegrams, post cards, or letters which were completely filled out and addressed to the president and which lacked only a signature. (Atom Spy Case)

President Eisenhower, who did not pardon the Rosenbergs, apparently shared this opinion, appealing to the rule of law after having been petitioned fiercely. He also justified his decision by comparing the massive death toll associated with atomic warfare, and the mere two deaths of these spies. Julius and Ethyl Rosenberg were executed on June 19, 1953.

The Rosenberg case serves as an accurate representation of the role the FBI played in the anti-communist movement in the 1940s and 1950s. The FBI actively fostered a political environment, which relied on ungrounded accusations and political intolerance. The 'grey area' of American Communism and anti-Communism mainly made this possible. Although the Rosenberg's punishment was uncharacteristically harsh, it is nearly impossible to disassociate them from Communism completely. Within a public environment of fear, fueled by suspicions of Communist spies within American society, creating such a political environment was far more feasible. This environment of fear also legitimized the anti-communist movement, and brought it into the mainstream, whereas before it "was often dismissed as the peculiar prerogative of right-wing crackpots or conservative anti-New Deal politicos as diverse as Martin Dies and Thomas E. Dewey" (O'Reilly 374). The 1950s marked a clear shift in public culture, characterized by an elevated fear of Communist spies, increased distrust of the Soviet Union, and political divisiveness. This shift was bolstered by anti-Communist trials such as the Hollywood Blacklist, the Alger Hiss Case, and the Rosenberg Case, and allowed McCarthyism and anti-communism to peak in the 1950s, and truly became a part of everyday political life. This shift was conspicuously marked by the FBI's COINTELPRO, short for Counter Intelligence Program, which quickly became one of the FBI's most important programs in the fifties, and the following two decades.

1.3: COINTELPRO and *Amerasia*

COINTELPRO consisted of counter intelligence missions, focused on destroying American political organizations that did not align themselves with its government from within. One of these counter intelligence missions involved The CPUSA, but this was far from the most prolific or controversial mission carried out by COINTELPRO, which included Civil Rights movements in the sixties, the Black Panther Party, and many other activist groups. These counter intelligence missions were carried out covertly, and often resorted to intimidation, blackmail, or outright violence, displaying little care for legality. Undoubtedly, an operation such as this was reliant on having a clear enemy to protect the United States from, which UC Berkeley's Hatem Bazian succinctly summarizes as "The FBI program was heavily dependent on creating and managing a public fear of Communism, resulting in an induced panic" (Bazian 166). Although a public fear of Communism was prevalent throughout the Cold War, it originated not only from a preconceived public fear of the power of the Soviet Union, but was additionally stimulated by many of the institutions and interest groups mentioned in this chapter. In addition, as Americans started to realize there were actual Communist spies within their country, public fears of the expansionist Soviet empire started to grow. It is undeniable that anti-communist sentiment was not only managed by these institutions and their crusades against subversion and 'un-Americanness', but also heavily propagated and instigated. Even the simple act of portraying the presence of Communism and its influence as larger than it actually was, could have had a significant impact on public perception of the issue. The American public was far more likely to consider Soviet influence a tangible threat if it was present in their own front yard, or if they feared their neighbors might be Communists. This is the same approach Ronald Reagan later used to justify his interferences in South America, or 'America's backyard'. As with all matters of the public's perception of Communism, however, there is a significant amount of nuance involved. Although playing into the public's fears was an effective way to help justify any and all measures for hunting down Communists, the motivation behind this need not be malicious. Hoover, for instance, might have been personally convinced of the real, impending threat of Communism, and this motivated his excessive measures. In this way, the fear of Communism exacerbated the fear of Communism in a twisted vicious cycle (Goldstein XIV).

A poignant example of an FBI operation being used to shape public perception was the *Amerasia* Spy Case, or *Amerasia* Affair. The *Amerasia* Spy Case took place in the 1940s

and centered around *Amerasia*, an American journal on the Far East, and suspicions of Communist espionage within. Because the journal dealt with the Pacific and China, any true McCarthyist would harbor some feelings of suspicion towards the journal, which would have been strengthened by the amount of staff members who were current or former Communists, such as Joseph Milton Bernstein. In January of 1945, the Office of Strategic Services, or OSS, an intelligence branch of the U.S. government that preceded the CIA, deemed an investigation prudent. Although the Office of Strategic Services started the investigation into *Amerasia*, the FBI soon joined in, after classified State Department documents had been discovered at the *Amerasia* offices by the OSS. Clearly, there was some form of Communist subversive presence at *Amerasia*. Of key import to the FBI were intellectuals and diplomats known as 'China Hands', who had an intimate knowledge of the workings of both the Nationalist and Communist Chinese governments. These China Hands were seen as security risks, as they were more closely linked to the developing Communist nation in China than anyone. These (sometimes former) officers of the U.S. Foreign Service had often been in close contact with both the Nationalist and Communist Chinese governments. In his book on the *Amerasia* Spy Case, Harvey Klehr stresses the key role played in the *Amerasia* case by one of these China Hands, John Stewart Service, stating, "Because of his involvement, the *Amerasia* case would forever be linked to the triumph of Communism in China" (Klehr & Radosh 11). Klehr singles out Service because of his positive appraisal of a potential Communist government in China. His approval of Communism during his time as a Foreign Service officer, echoed by various other China Hands, would take part of the blame for Mao Zedong's rise to power.

Philip Jaffe, one of the founders of the journal, was also placed under investigation. His contact with figures such as John Service or Earl Browder, secretary of the Communist Party, was seen as suspicious. Jaffe had been heavily involved with the journal, and had been in contact with these men who were already being regarded with suspicion. Although the OSS has already illegally raided the *Amerasia* offices, the FBI continued to cross the border into illegality by breaking into the *Amerasia* offices and homes of multiple members, and planting bugs. The information gleaned from these bugs included a retelling of a 1945 conversation with a former member of *Amerasia*, Joe Bernstein, where Bernstein unveiled himself as a Soviet agent, and suggested they collaborate (Klehr & Radosh 65). This information prompted the FBI to officially raid the *Amerasia* offices once again, in June of 1946, seizing classified documents and arresting a swath of *Amerasia* employees, including

Philipp Jaffe and John Service. Because of the secretive nature with which evidence on *Amerasia*'s Communist involvement had been gathered, the public's view of the way the FBI had handled case was relatively negative; "[they] began to question if there was less to the case than met the eye. The government was accused of "red-baiting"" (Haynes & Klehr 34). Although the FBI had uncovered Communist activity in the form of plans to hand over classified documents to Soviet intelligence, and additional plans to publish from these classified documents, the public was completely unaware of these developments as the case progressed. The nature of the case also proved to be highly problematic for its prosecutors after the arrests made in June: "Between the arrests in June and the final disposition of the court case in October, however, nothing went right for the prosecutors" (Haynes & Klehr 34). The questionable way in which evidence had been obtained, combined with how politically controversial and divisive the case was, proved to be a significant obstacle for the prosecutors in fighting the case. The *Amerasia* affair is a poignant example of how the FBI's conduct in a time of Communist witch-hunts could backfire: their sloppy and over-eager approach to exposing Communist spies led to a relatively fruitless trial. This goes to show that even in the morally fraught world of hunting Communists in mid-century America, the rule of law could have an influence. Conversely and interestingly, some seemed convinced that this outcome was impossible without the interference of additional Soviet infiltration, postulating that the sloppy gathering of evidence and lack of convictions was due to Soviet interference in the case.

Although not affected by the inner workings of the State Department, the *Amerasia* trial proved to be an important milestone in anti-Communist prosecutions, and was an effective display of the troubles both sides faced during this period. Prosecutors were intent on convicting as many people as possible, for as many crimes as possible, while the defendants often had to deal with an inherent bias against anything, or anyone, regarded as remotely Communist. Kenneth O'Reilly describes the culture that propagated this as follows: "a political culture that casually accepts as a norm most any attempt—to equate advocacy of liberal reform with disloyalty" (Goldstein 238). As was also showcased in the Julius and Ethel Rosenberg case, legal cases dealing with the subject of Communism did not always seem fully objective, akin to persecution rather than legal prosecution. The *Amerasia* case, however, was one of the few cases in this period with very few convictions, in part because the FBI feared indicting on the basis of the evidence it had gathered illegally would not stick. Philipp Jaffe, for instance, who was a prominent member of both the organization and the

investigation, only paid a 2500-dollar fine. Even more noteworthy than its convoluted trial proceedings, was the political impact of the aftermath of the *Amerasia* case. Because of the overwhelming evidence of subversion, and the importance of quelling subversion in academic circles and publications, the lack of convictions in the *Amerasia* case were seen as a disconcerting failure.

As was to be expected, the head of the FBI J. Edgar Hoover was one of the figureheads of this notion and the subsequent investigation. In yet another trial to analyze an earlier trial, the House of Representatives instated Sam Hobbs as the leader of the new Hobbs Committee. This is of course reminiscent of the Alger Hiss case, and the variety of committees that were involved in that case, or even brought to life solely for the case, such as the Special Subcommittee of the Appropriations Committee. As the Hobbs Committee investigated the various government branches that were involved in the *Amerasia* case, they struggled to find any worthwhile information, or hard evidence of a cover up. As a matter of fact, "A slew of government witnesses from the OSS, Justice Department, and FBI pointed the finger at each other for mishandling the investigation" (Haynes & Klehr 39). Regardless, there was insufficient evidence to argue any malicious influence, and the Hobbs Committee limited its judgment of government offices involved in the trial to negligence. This could have been the end of the *Amerasia* case, but Joseph McCarthy latched onto it as proof of Soviet infiltration in the American government, and an example of the difficulties true Americans faced when trying to deal with Communism in America.

1.4: The role of China

Harvey and Klehr also mention how John Service's involvement in the case almost transformed it into a political statement, by exposing the dichotomous opinions on the future of China within the U.S. State Department. Because of Service's time in China and his support of Mao Zedong's Communist regime, and his criticism of the former Nationalist Kuomintang regime, he was seen by many as a Communist, and many high-ranking officials in the State Department disagreed with his position on the matter. General Stillwell, however, who used to be Service's superior at the State Department, shared his point of view and was willing to testify on both this matter, and Service's integrity. This could have created a trial that "would make public the disagreements within the American government about China policy" (Harvey & Klehr 35), which would highlight a strong disparity and sense of

uncertainty within the American government. Although Service ended up straying from the idea of having Stillwell testify, it would have provided insight into a government that was divided on a difficult issue. Creating policy towards China was effectively being stuck between a rock and a hard place. Most American policy makers did not view the incoming Communist government particularly favorably, but there were some, such as Service, who did. These also tended to have less favorable views of the outgoing Nationalist government, although that was not a prerequisite. Civil war had repeatedly reared its ugly head in China since 1927, culminating in increased hostilities directly following the Second World War, from 1945 to 1949. Chiang Kai-Shek's nationalist government was struggling against the offenses of the Chinese Communist Party, and its chairman Mao Zedong. American policy towards China was muddled; China Hands who were closely acquainted with both sides of the conflict, such as John Service or Owen Lattimore often favored Mao's rule. On the other hand, the State Department had been wary of Communism for the past thirty years, and was not likely to change its stance on the matter.

A poignant example of the difficulties facing American policy makers focusing on China is Secretary of State Dean Acheson. Acheson was appointed Secretary of State by president Truman in 1949, the same year that the Chinese Communist Party took over Mainland China. Although relations between America and China had been friendly up until this point, the rise of Communism prompted the U.S. to respond. Acheson's response to Mao Zedong's new government would become one of his most prolific and important decisions as Secretary of State. Acheson decided to adopt a policy of containment, in line with Truman's doctrine, which advocated containment of Soviet power and prevention of geopolitical expansion. At this point, although Acheson had only been Secretary of State for a short while, he was already being blamed for the 'loss of China'. The loss of China referred to the loss of China to Communism, and the loss of a valuable, powerful ally in the Pacific, as China was now aligned with 'the enemy'. Acheson maintained both the inevitability of a Communist threat in China, and his own fervent repudiation of Communism, yet he was still heavily criticized by Communist hawks for not cracking down enough on Communist China. Acheson would later fall under Joseph McCarthy's scrutiny, as McCarthy believed he had not fought the spread of Communism in China actively enough. Although containment would remain an important and valued part of American foreign policy towards Communist nations for decades, it was criticized during the McCarthy era as insufficient. McCarthy considered

trying to contain the spread of Communism rather than actively fighting to destroy it a form of compromise, and an insufficient response.

Truman and Acheson's half-hearted response to the conflict in China did not sit well with McCarthy and other anti-Communists. Many even believed a Communist infiltrator within the American government must have been responsible for America's lackadaisical approach to a threat as significant as China (Newman IX). Any subsequent good will towards the newly instated People's Republic of China was also viewed with suspicion, as Communist governments were not to be trusted. In an America that was starting to see the Soviet Union as a major threat and opponent, the developments in China from 1945 until 1949 were considered worrying by anti-Communists. Because Soviet Communism as described by Lenin was characterized by its requirement of a global spread, the Chinese turn to Communism could herald the beginning of this spread. The Communist turn in China presented a major upheaval of the global balance of power, as the United States now stood, as a sort of bastion of freedom and capitalism, opposite two major Communist powers in the Soviet Union and Communist China. Because of this power shift, Communism now presented itself as even more of a tangible threat to anti-Communists such as McCarthy, and often one that did not require further distinction. In many cases, Communism was consolidated as a singular threat, and distinctions such as Chinese or Soviet, and individual or institutional, were not actively made, in order to bolster an anti-Communist narrative that presented Communism as a large, looming threat.

1.5: McCarthy arrives in Washington D.C.

Joseph McCarthy was an inconspicuous Republican Senator from Wisconsin, who, after hearing of both the *Amerasia* and Alger Hiss spy cases, decided to campaign against the Communism he perceived as rampant in America, and more specifically within the State Department. He started this campaign in the spring of 1950, claiming that he had access to a list of Communist subversives currently active in the State Department, including John Stewart Service. Although this was largely baseless, and he did not, in fact, have access to such a list, McCarthy's fervor combined with widespread worries about the presence of Communist spies in the American government, gave him a significant platform. Haynes and Klehr additionally classify his motivation behind this first attack on Communism as largely politically motivated, mentioning his undistinguished career, and describing his motivation as

"Disenchanted by the department's slow response to President Truman's loyalty-security program and sensing a potentially useful issue for his reelection campaign" (Haynes & Klehr 40). McCarthy being politically motivated originally does not necessarily mean his later witch-hunts against Communism were too, but it does accurately portray him as someone willing, and able to use ideological intolerance for personal political gain.

Although McCarthy was not yet a powerful figure in Washington at the time, his accusations confirmed worries in the department, and a special subcommittee was set up once again, this time headed by Millard Tydings. Afraid of the possible implications if the committee uncovered there were far fewer Communists infiltrators than McCarthy had claimed, he swiftly decided he needed another line of attack for people to focus on. He had previously criticized both Philipp Jaffe, and John Service, as he believed the *Amerasia* case had been a fraudulent affair. He once again focused on these two alleged Communists, bringing them together as lackeys of Owen Lattimore. Owen Lattimore was an academic who was heavily involved with the Pacific, having edited the IPR's *Pacific Affairs* journal previously. In addition, Lattimore had advised both China's Nationalist government and the American government. McCarthy painted Lattimore as the ultimate Communist threat to the Senate and the Tydings committee, and claimed "it will be the biggest espionage case in the history of the country" (McCarthy, quoted in Haynes & Klehr 40). Lattimore, though an influential academic, had never taken a position at the State Department, and accusing him so harshly after claiming the State Department was the true hive of concealed Communism was controversial at best. McCarthy's approach here almost resembles that of a cornered animal, frantically trying to get an accusation to stick, in order to validate himself and any further anti-Communist rhetoric, be it political or ideological in nature. Although later accusations by McCarthy were often equally controversial or inaccurate, few had the same air of desperation as these early examples, when his role as the adjudicator of American Communism had not yet been solidified.

It would be an oversight to attribute McCarthy's focus on Lattimore solely to McCarthy's need for a win, however. Lattimore presented an interesting target for McCarthy politically, but also spoke directly to his convictions, as Lattimore was a member of the U.S. Foreign Policy Establishment. Priscilla Roberts, associate professor at the City University of Macau, described the Establishment as "a body of individuals committed to what are often loosely termed "internationalist" policies — who take a particular interest in and have had a substantial impact upon the direction of American foreign affairs" (Roberts 409). The

Foreign Policy Establishment was a collection of individuals, some directly associated with the State Department and some not, which had a direct impact on U.S. foreign policy in the twentieth century. The Establishment's policies revolved around promoting internationalism in American foreign policy, favoring foreign aid, and solidifying America's place on the global scene. This Establishment is described throughout Establishment historiography as a group with a significant influence on U.S. foreign policy through their connections, education, and wealth. Roberts contends that though there were critics of the Establishment on both sides of the political aisle, isolationist Republicans were its most vocal opponents, claiming that this Establishment promoted more left-leaning, liberal presidential candidates, in a bid to uphold support for their desired internationalist foreign policy (Roberts 413). Lattimore, who also promoted foreign aid to countries such as China, definitively shared this internationalist outlook on foreign policy. As Lattimore had significant pull within the State Department, and was involved with other unofficial institutions such as the IPR that also prioritized foreign policy, he was clearly active in the Foreign policy Establishment. His participation in this Establishment that was so despised by McCarthy made him an even more enticing target for McCarthy after his crusade against the State Department fell short.

As McCarthy's espionage case against Owen Lattimore began to slow down, he decided on a different approach, in an attempt to make an accusation stick. He opted for a less serious charge against Lattimore, telling his fellow Senators that Lattimore had used his influence at the State Department to promote a Communist policy towards China. According to McCarthy, Lattimore had "promoted and inspired among his contacts at the State Department an Asia policy that allowed the Communists to take control of China" (Haynes & Klehr 41). Although such an accusation was even harder to substantiate, that did not hold McCarthy back. At the same time, the *Amerasia* case was being put under public scrutiny, as newspapers released parts of the Hobbs committee hearings, allowing the American public to form an opinion about how the case was handled. This also renewed the conflict between Hoover's FBI and the Justice Department, with both departments blaming the other for the way the case was handled. The Justice Department focused on the illegal acquisition of evidence, and argued the case was dead on arrival because of it. Hoover retaliated fiercely, claiming that the Justice Department had approved the arrests, knowing that the burden of evidence was light to non-existent. This inter-departmental conflict meticulously showcases the uncertainties that accompanied the practice of McCarthyism. Because accusations were not always (or even rarely), indicators of absolute guilt, any legal process thereafter was

fraught with feelings of uncertainty. Whether these came from moral dilemmas, or an inability to pin someone as a Communist barely mattered.

In 1950, shortly after its investigation of the State Department, the Tydings committee proceeded to investigate the *Amerasia* trial, in order to bring the matter to a close once and for all. What they found proved to be far from satisfactory, however, as both Service and Jaffe contradicted their statements made during the case, and portrayed the *Amerasia* trial as even more legally unstable than before. As McCarthy felt his credibility slipping away because of this, he once again focused his efforts on Lattimore, who he believed to be an easier target. This time he shifted his line of attack from Lattimore's influence at the State Department, to Lattimore's influence in the academic world. This proved more fruitful, as Lattimore had on multiple occasions made questionable statements regarding Communism. His academic career had included a stint on the editorial board of *Amerasia*, which McCarthy clearly considered damning, and he had edited *Pacific Affairs*, a publication by the Institute of Pacific Relations. These two positions, combined with letters and statements in which Lattimore had shown support for the Soviet Union, and even Stalin, were enough for McCarthy to continue hounding him. They were not enough, however, for actual prosecution of Lattimore as a Communist, so his prosecutors opted for perjury charges instead. After a drawn-out trial, Lattimore was not convicted on any charges, but the damage done to his reputation had left a significant mark. An academic pariah in the U.S., he moved to the U.K. and continued his academics there.

1.6: Conclusion

The cases mentioned in this chapter were only a fraction of the cases that were tried in pursuit of McCarthyism, even a fraction of the high-profile cases. From the 1930s to the end of the 1950s, the ideology of what would later be known as 'McCarthyism' promoted thousands of charges of subversion, treason, espionage, and other charges related to the 'ultimate sin' of being a Communist. Although some of these charges were grounded, and involved the prosecution of actual Soviet spies or American collaborators, many were not. Additionally, the execution of many McCarthyist trials was problematic, with prosecutors attempting to find any sort of conviction, often because they were convinced of their suspect's Communist ties. Other investigations prompted by McCarthy, such as the investigation into the State Department, were flawed from the start, being based on political reasons rather than actual

evidence of Communism. The sentiment found in McCarthy trials is clearly visible in many cases during this period, such as the Rosenberg case, which felt almost like setting a precedent, or the *Amerasia* case, which prompted illegal gathering of evidence in an attempt to get a conviction. The *Amerasia* case provides an exceptional example, as there was solid evidence of Communist involvement at the journal, but the desire to gather this evidence had an opposite effect. This sentiment is also mirrored in institutional approaches to Communism in America, such as the FBI's COINTELPRO program, or the HUAC's Hollywood blacklist. All of these examples paint a picture of a time when both unsubstantiated, and excessive persecution were rampant, and the elimination of Communist influence in America was deemed more important than strictly adhering to the rule of law.

Nelson Polsby, former editor of the American Political Science Review, described McCarthyism in 1960 as "one of the most spectacular political phenomena of our time" (Polsby 250). It is important to note the political influence of McCarthyism, because even if McCarthyism originally stemmed from ideological motivations and a strongly anti-communist moral compass, it eventually transformed into a political matter, and in some cases a political tool. It is paramount to consider this political interpretation of McCarthyism when studying the IPR, its members, and its publications. Polsby also highlights a theory on the public's response to McCarthyism, theorizing that public uncertainty, and tensions between the United States and foreign powers such as Russia were major factors of McCarthy's popularity. Other factors include frustrations over the Korean War, and McCarthy's penchant to be straightforward. Additionally, McCarthyism tied into ideologies of isolationism and populism, by presenting a clearly defined "other" to rally against (Polsby 251). When viewed through a political, rather than an ideological lens, McCarthyism's tendency to target Left-leaning liberals as being closer to Communism has also given it a perceived right wing, Republican component. This component was supported by a 1954 Gallup survey in Wisconsin, McCarthy's home state, which showed that voters who were more favorable to McCarthy were also more likely to vote Republican, and consider themselves a Republican (Gallup 529, quoted in Polsby 262).

This environment reached its peak in the early 1950s, when Joseph McCarthy burst onto the political scene and proceeded to amplify the culture of anti-Communism that had been present there, as well as in the public scene. McCarthyism was dubbed as such for a reason, as McCarthy was at the helm of a reinvigorated crusade against Communist infiltration, accusing more people, and prosecuting them more zealously. His role as a

catalyst for political intolerance unified institutions and individuals, who had already been hunting possible Communists in America for nearly twenty years, and provided an environment where they could thrive. McCarthy's attitude towards reckless prosecution quickly became the norm, especially within the Republican Party, and accusations of Communism were rampant throughout the 1950s. Afterwards, an increased public discontent at the way the inquisition against Communism had been handled and a shift in the American political climate caused McCarthyism and the practice of extreme witch-hunts to be discarded. Subsequently, the sixties provided enough civil unrest and other societal change to shift the focus of the American political conversation away from its obsession with anti-Communism.

A final straw for McCarthy, and many other anti-Communist hawks, was the 'loss' of China to a Communist government. The Soviet Union already posed a threat to their America, and the conversion of another major global power to Communism was a horrific portend of Communism's spread. This distrust of the Communist Chinese government presented anti-Communist with yet another significant enemy, one which prompted suspicion of any American individual or institution associated with China. One of McCarthy's most zealous anti-Communist crusades proved to be his condemnation of the American branch of the Institute of Pacific Relations, or IPR. The IPR was an international journal with publications on nearly every aspect of the Pacific, including, of course, China. McCarthy's crusade against the IPR will showcase yet another example of the negative effect his tactics could have on an individual or institution. In the next chapter of this thesis, I will discuss his crusade against the IPR, and the aftermath thereof.

Chapter 2: The Institute of Pacific Relations

Although his vilification of Lattimore's persona truly solidified McCarthy as a front man of the crusade against Communism in America, it was only the first significant step on his path of destruction. Soon after attacking Lattimore, McCarthy set his sights on the Institute of Pacific Relations. The Institute of Pacific Relations, or IPR, was an academic institute, which published two journals on the Pacific region, *Pacific Affairs* and *Far Eastern Survey*. The institute was an NGO, chiefly stimulated by donations from the Rockefeller Foundation (Woods 1999 152-153). It received extensive support from this foundation that so far removed from Communism, yet anti-Communists still suspected the IPR of being a Communist organization. Its affiliations with a Chinese nation that was now being regarded with great suspicion by anti-Communists, and the membership of China Hands such as Lattimore painted a significant target on the IPR, in a way it would not have prior to the Chinese Communist Revolution. McCarthy's attacks were supplemented by his anti-Communist ally, Alfred Kohlberg, a former member of the IPR who believed its association with China to be troubling. This chapter will answer the question of what motivated the prosecution of the IPR at an institutional level by Alfred Kohlberg and Joseph McCarthy from 1944 to 1952, and what the consequences of this prosecution for the IPR were. It will do so by examining the structure of the IPR and its membership, highlighting any potential motivations for anti-Communist campaign against the institute. The next section will focus on the relation between individual and institutional Communism at the IPR, and how this relation was used by McCarthy, and during the prosecution of the IPR. The final part of the chapter will analyze the effect this prosecution had on the Institute following 1952.

An important distinction to be made when assessing Communist influence at the IPR is between the individual level and the institutional level. Individual members might well have links to the CPUSA, or have promoted Communist ideologies in correspondence, but this does not necessarily support the conclusion that the IPR as a whole was a Communist organization. Of course, it is still relevant to mention individual affiliations when assessing the institute as a whole, as long as the two remain carefully separated. A salient aspect of McCarthy's witch-hunt against the IPR was his consolidation of these two elements. McCarthy believed Communist leanings of IPR members individually could be used as an argument against the institution as a whole. Individual allegations of Communism were extrapolated to reflect on the institution they worked at, as had also been done in the

Amerasia case. This was also the case for Owen Lattimore, and other associates of the IPR, such as the aforementioned Frederick Vanderbilt Field. This approach by McCarthy and his followers provided them with a far more accessible way to discredit organizations or groups, through singling out important employees. This chapter will initially examine alleged Communist ties and influences at an institutional level, before focusing on individual allegations and persecution. Because of this approach, in analyzing Communist influence at the IPR, this chapter will continually distinguish between individual proof of Communist allegiance, and institutional proof, in an attempt to more accurately portray the situation at the IPR at the time. Additionally, it will examine the long-term effects of the McCarthyist crusade against the IPR, both with regards to its publications and its longevity as an organization

The institute had a significant number of characteristics that made it an interesting victim for McCarthy's accusations. Some of these characteristics were slightly more far-fetched than others. For example, McCarthy deemed the IPR worthy of condemnation based on the fact it had shared offices with *Amerasia.* McCarthy saw the geographical location of both publications as evidence of the strength of the bond between the two. Other characteristics were more realistic and relevant. For example, authors who published in *Amerasia* also published articles in IPR publications, and there was significant overlap between board members and other employees of both organizations. These affiliations with an organization that McCarthy believed to be definitively Communist in nature were enough to arouse his suspicions. The final straw for McCarthy was Owen Lattimore's stint as editor for *Pacific Affairs* in the 1930s and early 1940s. McCarthy had branded Lattimore as one of the most important Communist infiltrators of the time, and even the FBI had noted a "pro Russian viewpoint of Lattimore", and had described his correspondence with Frederick Vanderbilt Field, a known Communist and associate of the IPR, as "incriminating" (FBI Report 1951 6). Lattimore's association with the IPR provided McCarthy with yet another front he could attack the institute on.

A change in the institute's longevity due to McCarthy's attacks will be examined in this chapter, by studying the institute's funding and public support, and how long the institute continued to actively publish after the McCarthyist attacks. Withdrawal of funding or even the end of the institute as a whole might be linked to McCarthy's attacks, as his attacks were often paired with public vilification and condemnation. It is undeniable that the Communists witch-hunts instigated by McCarthy had a significant effect on those who fell victim to them,

clearly displayed by Owen Lattimore's fall from grace. The most intriguing characteristic of the McCarthy era is not simply any potential truth in his of accusations of Communism, or the effects these accusations had, however, but the relation between these two factors. To what extent were the effects McCarthy had disproportional, when compared against the truthfulness of his accusations. This relation can determine to what extent witch-hunts were based on truth, or conversely to what extent allegations were embellished, and used as a political tool. This manifests itself in the question whether the persecution of the IPR and its members stemmed from a fear of actual Communism, or if it was a way to cripple a political entity that was seen as too 'China-friendly'.

2.1: The structure of the IPR

The IPR was founded at a conference of like-minded internationalists in 1925, in Honolulu, Hawaii. It consisted of various international councils on Pacific Relations, which convened every year to discuss academic progress in the field of Pacific studies, overseen by the IPR's international secretariat. Although its headquarters were originally located in Honolulu, after the success of its first conference, they moved to New York in 1933, where they would come to occupy offices in the same building as *Amerasia*. The IPR's main objective was to bring Asian Studies, and the Pacific as an upcoming global powerhouse, into the forefront. It promoted education on the situation in the Pacific, and upheld relations with academic institutions in the Pacific. It achieved these goals through its two publications, *Pacific Affairs* and *Far Eastern Survey. Pacific Affairs* dealt with academic texts, book reviews, and more comprehensive review articles, all concerning various aspects of life in the Pacific. Additionally, the conferences held yearly by the international secretariat provided prestige for potential investors. During his time at the IPR, Owen Lattimore was also an editor for *Pacific Affairs*, which was the IPR's more prestigious publication. *Far Eastern Survey* was less far-reaching than *Pacific Affairs*, and was an academic review of Asian Studies. As it was a survey of a broader academia, it was harder to argue this journal would have been influenced by any political leanings at the IPR, and was thus of less import to both Kohlberg and McCarthy. Both publications are still active today, as *Pacific Affairs* at the University of British Columbia in Vancouver, and *Asian Studies* at University of California Press, respectively.

Although the IPR is generally viewed from this, primarily academic standpoint, Jonathan Marshall points to another significant characteristic of the IPR: its ability to promote and analyze financial and economic relations with the Pacific. He outlines how support for the IPR by the Rockefeller Foundation, American bankers, industrialists, and internationalists was mainly in pursuit of two goals: "promoting consensus on international issues between the national elites represented at its periodic conferences, and sponsoring studies of practical value on contemporary problems that contributed to international tensions in the Pacific region" (Marshall 36). The Rockefeller Foundation (or RF) was a philanthropic organization that mainly supported social, cultural, and international relations. From Marshall's point of view, the IPR played a major role as a diplomatic intermediary, almost acting as an ambassador for American business, while conversely also educating American business on the ins and outs of business with the Pacific. As global power dynamics shifted after the Second World War, the Pacific and countries such as Japan and China quickly became impressive potential trading partners, and having an institution such as the IPR to guide American business would prove an invaluable asset. Marshall goes on to expand on the role the IPR played in this new world. He mentions luncheons, briefings on the economic affairs of Pacific nations, "Junior Executive Seminars", and study groups consisting of businessmen and diplomats (Marshall 37). All of these perks provided by the IPR managed to keep the Institute founded throughout the 1930s and 1940s, relying not on endowments but on contributions from wealthy businessmen and the Rockefeller Foundation. An IPR report from 1950 lays out how its intimate knowledge of the Pacific provided an anticipatory view of economic change in the region after China's turn to Communism: "As early as 1947 the IPR decided to devote major emphasis in its international research programs to problems of nationalism and economic modernization in southern and southeastern Asia" (IPR report, qtd. in Marshall 38). This economic foresight afforded American business a sense of stability when it came to dealings in the Pacific. However, it would also open other avenues of investigation for McCarthy and the McCarran Committee. Any economic interaction with China, for instance, under its new Communist government, would most likely warrant far more interest from anti-Communist hawks, than purely academic or educational interactions. The IPR's relation with the Pacific then, had always been threefold: academic, political, and economic.

The IPR's political clout, its focus on foreign affairs, and its position as an academic institution on the East Coast sponsored by the Rockefeller Foundation, solidified its role

within the American Foreign Policy Establishment. Its influence on American foreign policy arose mostly through interactions with members of the State Department, and other official foreign policy makers. IPR members such as Lattimore, Carter, and Vanderbilt Field were all connected to the political scene to varying degrees. Vanderbilt Field was connected mostly through his family's wealth and social stature, while Lattimore and Carter cemented their connections to the political world through academia, and indeed their positions at the IPR. In addition, the vast majority of IPR members were notable contributors to their respective academic fields, providing a clear example of the "Ivy League Elite" that characterizes the Foreign Policy Establishment. The IPR's most important contribution to the legacy of the Foreign Policy Establishment was its focus on promoting internationalism within academic circles. It championed economic relations with the Pacific region, foreign aid to developing or struggling countries on the Pacific Rim, and upheld diplomatic connections with countries such as China. Lattimore, for instance, had been an advisor to Chiang Kai-Shek's regime. Through this unprecedented push for American relations with the Pacific, the IPR became a specialist representative of the un-official Foreign Policy Establishment. However, this involvement would not just lend prestige to the institute, but also attract the attention of the Establishment's opponents, McCarthy foremost among them.

2.2: A new target for McCarthy

The IPR had begun to make itself a target for anti-Communism in the 1930s and 1940s, through its connections to *Amerasia*, the supposed allegiances of select IPR members, and its extensive interaction with the Pacific. Although in this period China had not yet succumbed to Communism wholly, the seeds had been planted, and its fragile political state warranted attention from many. Although the institute's persecution would not happen until the 1950s, these connections aroused suspicions, and paved the way for the later investigation. This is also apparent from a 1951 FBI file, declassified in 1983, which contains brief histories on both the IPR and *Amerasia*, and examines the link between the two organizations. Although this file does not explicitly designate the institute as a whole as a Communist, it illustrates the FBI's concerns about Communist activity at the Institute. The investigation and subsequent report were intended to uncover any potential Communists, especially ones that linked *Amerasia* and the IPR. This may have been considered relevant, as it presents the FBI and McCarthy with an additional line of attack, but this is not explicitly mentioned in the

correspondence regarding the report. As an example of a link between the two institutes, the report mentions Edward C. Carter, Secretary General of the IPR during the period Lattimore was an editor there, and his aspirations to merge the two organizations: "Edward C. Carter, Secretary General of the IPR, favored a merger of "Amerasia" and IPR but a proposed consolidation – never materialized" (FBI Report 1951 9). Furthermore, the FBI report solidifies Owen Lattimore as a clear link between the organizations, as he was both an editor at the IPR, and on the editorial board of *Amerasia* at the same time, from 1937 to 1941. Lattimore was a key individual in the investigation, but was just one of many sites of overlap, however, as approximately 115 people published articles in both IPR publications, and *Amerasia*. Other important individuals singled out by the FBI's investigation include Frederick Vanderbilt Field, and Kate Louise Mitchell.

Vanderbilt Field could be considered a poster child for the threat of Communism seeping into American consciousness. A member of the extremely wealthy, and conservative Vanderbilt family, he was disowned after his party politics became too radical for his family's taste. His impressive, almost nationalist family background, combined with his ideological shift to the far Left, made him a very interesting individual to followers of McCarthy. His connections to both the IPR and *Amerasia*, therefore, created the same level of suspicion as Lattimore's involvement. Kate Louise Mitchell published articles for *Amerasia*, and both IPR publications, on the economic situation in the Pacific and Japan, and industrialization in these areas. One of these articles concerned talks at the 1939 IPR conference, held in Virginia Beach due to the onset of World War II. This meeting held more importance than previous years, as both the Soviet Union and Japan had declined to send delegates. Although William L. Holland, a member of the IPR secretariat, believed this was due to transportation issues, Robert Newman attributes these absences to a more serious reason:

> The truth was that the Soviet's seven-year flirtation with the IPR had simply come to an end. In the Soviet view, the bourgeois imperialists who dominated the IPR had finally shown their true colors, retreating and compromising when confronted with Fascist aggression. (Newman 43).

According to Newman, the Soviets disagreed with the way other members of the international council of the IPR were dealing with the war, and decided to cut ties with the organization. Another important aspect of the conference was a speech by a Nationalist Chinese delegation, which tried to dismiss any concerns about a Communist uprising in China, denying any Communist activity in China, and distancing itself from Soviet interpretations of Communism. This was an interesting speech to hold at a conference also attended by Owen Lattimore, a 'China Hand' who certainly realized this was not the case. Lattimore himself would later play a role in shaping the academic discussion about the Pacific and Pacific Studies, after China's Communist government took over. As a matter of fact, in 1945, after Mao and his Communists had begun their rule of China, Lattimore defended their reign, as Newman describes: "he gave them credit for having a more nearly democratic structure than the Kuomintang, despite their doctrinaire base" (Newman 124). All of these interactions between the IPR, *Amerasia*, the Soviet Union, and Communist China, provided a solid base for McCarthy and the FBI to suspect Communist involvement. At this point, however, there is still no irrefutable proof that the IPR was a fundamentally Communist institution, or was a tool directed by the Soviet Union. Its relation with Communism was largely ideological, and if not, directed towards the Far East, rather than Soviet Russia. The FBI even notes that "The Institute, as such, does not express opinions or advocate policies" (FBI Report 1951 15), an aspect of the IPR which was often overlooked by McCarthyists when they focused on individual party politics within the IPR.

As the Second World War drew to a close, public criticism against the IPR started to emerge. Although the IPR had always considered itself as impartial, with no political leanings, anything short of condemnation of America's enemies and rivals could be considered a criticism in such polemic times. In 1944, Alfred Kohlberg, a wealthy anti-Communist, who himself had owned a textile firm in pre-war China, launched an assault on the IPR. His background as a businessman who had dealings with the Kuomintang nationalist government can be postulated as a motivation behind his attack, combined with prompting from an ex-Socialist friend of Kohlberg's. In a fashion that was relatively unusual within a world of anti-Communism and hollow accusations, "Kohlberg spent six months in 1944 studying IPR publications for evidence of the Communist Party "line" on China" (Marshall 2). He published his findings on the matter in a nearly ninety-page study, which was disregarded by the IPR, but later provided Senator McCarthy with additional fuel for his raging anti-Communism fire, when he started his campaign in 1950. Throughout the second

half of the 1950s, Kohlberg and McCarthy continued their assault against the IPR, attempting to discredit the institution by repeatedly referring to it as a clearly Communist organization, or disparagingly reflecting on the ineffectiveness of the trail against the Institute. This assault was motivated by a belief that the IPR promoted Communist propaganda throughout the United States, and kept up relations between the Communist areas in the Pacific, and the United States.

Although the IPR had previously aroused suspicion through its connections to *Amerasia,* its alleged Communist members, and its close relation to the pacific, the final point McCarthy honed in on was the 'loss of China' to Communism after the Second World War, in 1949. Although McCarthy and his followers also attacked Secretary of State Dean Acheson over the loss of China, they used the same narrative against the IPR. McCarthy had blamed Acheson for not fulfilling his role as Secretary of State, and blamed the IPR for its sympathy to Communist policies in China, such as the more sympathetic views held by Owen Lattimore and Frederick Vanderbilt Field. Lattimore was a more nuanced Left Liberal who believed Communism had some plausible merits, while Vanderbilt Field was considered an actual Communist. Because the rise of China's Communist Party was widely viewed as a troubling development in the Pacific, Kohlberg and McCarthy's crusade against the IPR started to gain more traction, as their fear-mongering narrative became more effective. In August of 1950, Kohlberg also responded to the Tydings Committee's dismissal of McCarthy's claims of Communism within the State Department the previous month, by writing Senator Tydings an open letter in. In the letter, Kohlberg questions whether Tydings was influenced by Owen Lattimore in his decision to clear the suspects brought forth by McCarthy, showing that Kohlberg, and by extension McCarthy, truly believed that Communist infiltration in American political circles was a significant threat. His further condemnation of Tydings' 'clearance' of what Kohlberg viewed as Communist infiltrators is found on the second page of this letter:

> Professor Lattimore may claim "clearance" by you; the Administration that permits Communist meetings and the Communist press to cheer North Korea and blackguard Americans who are dying tonight for liberty in that far-off country, may claim "clearance" by you; the 1700 "Amerasia" documents may be "cleared"; but who will do the "clearing" when the bill is paid in "blood, sweat and tears"? (Kohlberg 1950).

2.3: The investigation begins

In the second half of 1950, soon after McCarthy's failure to convince the Tydings Committee that the State Department was a hive for American Communism, his combined efforts with Kohlberg to bring down the IPR started to bear fruit. The Senate acted on their consistent badgering of the legislature and repeated efforts to demonize the IPR, and an investigation into the IPR was started by the Special Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws, referred to as the McCarran Committee at the start of 1951. Senator Pat McCarran, a democrat senator for Nevada who was known to be a staunch communist, headed the committee and intended to investigate and enforce the Internal Security Act, put forward by McCarran himself, which passed in the Senate in September of 1950. The act was meant to investigate Communist subversion in the United States, after Congress had found that "There exists a world Communist movement which, in its origins, its development, and its present practice, is a world-wide revolutionary movement whose purpose it is – to establish a Communist totalitarian dictatorship" (U.S. Statute 81-831). Whereas the House Committee Un-American Activities had been prolific in investigating Communist allegations before, the founding of this committee shifted the majority of that responsibility to a Senate Committee.

The McCarran Committee would go on to play a large role in the prosecution and investigation of Communist activity, subversion, and propaganda in the United States throughout the following decade, allying with the FBI once again in the fight against Communism. Although it dealt with hundreds of cases of possible Communist threat, the committee's first major case was to investigate McCarthy and Kohlberg's allegations of widespread Communism within the IPR, an investigation that would stretch across all of 1951, and the first half of 1952. During the case itself, the individual who received the most attention and suspicion was once again Owen Lattimore. After having previously been targeted by McCarthy and Kohlberg, the Subcommittee adopted the same line of argumentation, and considered him pertinent to the investigation of the Institute. His extensive relations, and previous political experience with both Nationalist and Communist China garnered much attention within the McCarran Committee, as did his often Communist-esque personal views. Lattimore had previously preached the positive aspects of Communism such as a stable economic system, and an increased focus on civil rights. This increased interest can also be identified in the FBI's report on the IPR and *Amerasia*. The report

contains nearly seventy pages of information about individuals who were active in both *Amerasia* and the IPR, 115 people in total, Owen Lattimore being one of them. The page dedicated to Lattimore, however, includes a (mostly redacted) note stating, "Concerning OWEN LATTIMORE, it is to be noted that ~~(s)~~ u [red] advised that in 1935 he was informed by [red] – LOUIS F. BUDENZ advised in March, 1950, that although he had never met LATTIMORE he heard of him many times at political meetings of the Communist Party" (FBI Report 1951 69). These additional concerns reveal just how interested they were in Lattimore, as most other entries simply consist of members' positions at the IPR and *Amerasia,* and any articles published in their journals. Other members with additional notes include Frederick Vanderbilt Field, Philip Jaffe, and Benjamin H. Kizer.

More than half of the FBI report on IPR and *Amerasia,* then, concerns individuals who were active at the two organizations, displaying the level of individual interest there was from the FBI. Instead of a direct indictment of either the IPR or *Amerasia,* the report concerns an investigation into all of these individuals, framed by the two organizations they were a part of. It stands for an approach that does not truly seem to care about institutional Communism at either institute, but rather views them as a pool of Communist activity, in which they can then target individual swimmers. In this way Communism is battled on an individual level, taking Communists out of positions of power, rather than shutting down perceived Communist organizations. This is a similar approach to the one taken at the State Department a little over a year before, in 1950, after McCarthy's accusations of its 81 active Communists: an institutional presence of Communism was largely ignored in favor of investigations into the individuals named by McCarthy. A major difference between the State Department's case and the IPR, however, is the level of individual Communist involvement. The Tydings Committee largely cleared State Department employees of Communist involvement, but the FBI and the McCarran committee dug up considerably more Soviet-inclined 'dirt' on members of the IPR. 'Communist involvement' of course, is a broad term with varying degrees of culpability and legality, and it is important to qualify to what extent members of the IPR were actually involved with Communism when assessing its interactions with McCarthyism. A significant part of the individuals viewed with most interest by the FBI have already been mentioned, but deserve to be placed on a 'spectrum' of Communism, loosely ranging from absolutely no Communist involvement, to full-on Communist spy working for the Soviet Union. According to the findings of the FBI and the McCarran committee, however, no one at the IPR warranted a place on the latter end of the spectrum. Louis F. Budenz, a former Soviet spy who flipped in

1945 and became a fervent anti-Communist in the post-war years, is quoted in the FBI's report, describing the IPR as follows: "This is not a Communist front organization, but FIELD later succeeded in becoming secretary of its American Council" (FBI Report 1951 20). Frederick Vanderbilt Field, the Communist-leaning black sheep of the wealthy Vanderbilt family, was considered a dangerous presence at the IPR. This statement reinforces the FBI's approach, painting a picture of an Institute that was originally un-Communist, but was 'corrupted', as McCarthy would say, by its Communist members.

2.4: Categorizing Communism

Most of the names on the FBI's list of 'Communist magazine repeat offenders', however, were likely to find themselves around the middle of the Communist spectrum. Their academic articles and personal beliefs may have been in line with Communism to varying extents, and they were associated with institutions such as *Amerasia*. The list of names presented by the FBI consists mostly of lists of articles they wrote for either publication, along with any additional roles they might have held. For these individuals, such as Alvin Barber, the extent of their Communist involvement consisted of their involvement with the IPR and *Amerasia*, along with any personal political views they may have held regarding Communism. As becomes clear throughout the report, this was not deemed worthy of further investigation or worry. The next spot on the spectrum is held by individuals who had interacted with either publication, but had also interacted with other organizations, which investigations such as those carried out by Truman's loyalty program had prescribed a Communist nature. Examples include Kathleen Barnes, who had been affiliated with the American Russian Institute, and Thomas Arthur Bisson, who had been affiliated with the American League for Peace and Democracy, and a variety of other organizations accused of Communism. The American Russian Institute was considered the IPR's Russian counterpart, and the American League for Peace and Democracy was originally an anti-Fascist organization, with a significantly Socialist and Communist leadership. Benjamin Kizer also appears on this part of the spectrum, as he was on the board of Directors of the Russian War Relief, which the HUAC declared a "Communist controlled front organization" in 1942. (FBI Report 1951 76). As these three examples show, the scope of involvement with Communist organizations varies greatly, and prompts some movement along the spectrum, but both members fall within the

same category of ‘outside affiliations’. This part of the spectrum is characterized by a lack of active Communism, instead relying on affiliation and association.

The final and most salient category on the spectrum of Communist involvement at the IPR were the members that actively propagated Communist beliefs, were directly involved with the Communist Party or similar organizations such as the Daily Worker, or were seen as China- or Soviet-friendly. Within the IPR and *Amerasia*, these members can be characterized through extensively Communist publications, and more excessive flaunting of Communist allegiance within these communities. Of course, actual Communist spies and infiltrators would theoretically be even further on the Communist side of the spectrum, but are not taken into account here, as there is no proof of any such Communist presence at the IPR. Members of the chosen final category have often been mentioned before, and include big names such as Frederick Vanderbilt Field, Owen Lattimore, Edward C. Carter, Philip Jaffe, and Michael Greenberg. This final category was by far the most important to the FBI, as it contained individuals that were undeniably entangled with Communism, and therefore may have presented an actual threat. As far as the other categories go, there was a far lesser interest shown by the FBI, as it was unlikely these individuals posed a threat to National Security. The level of Communist involvement at the IPR, then, was significant, although it never emulated the likes of the Rosenberg case, and large parts of the involvement at the Institute appear to have been relatively innocent.

The FBI report, which relies largely on information considering publications, and positions held by Institute members, does not stoop to ungrounded accusations. The report does not just provide information on the situation at the IPR, however, but also gives insight into the situation at the FBI itself. For instance, a letter from the director of the FBI in Baltimore discusses their reports on Owen Lattimore. The main focus of this letter is labeling the Lattimore reports as “Administrativ[e]”, the justification being that “it is not believed that the info should be disseminated in view of the questionable admissibility of the documents which have been furnished by [redacted] and the possibility of embarrassment to the bureau” (FBI Report 1951 114). This is highly reminiscent of the *Amerasia* case, where prosecutors struggled to indict members of *Amerasia* due to illegal gathering of evidence by the FBI. Clearly, the FBI wanted to prevent this from happening to a second case concerning Communist involvement at a publication, as the director advises to only use documents viewed with consent of IPR members (such as Edward C. Carter) in its official review of the case. Perhaps even more interesting than the role the FBI played, however, is the report’s

sneak peek into McCarthy's interest in the case. The very last page of the report is a memorandum, dated January 17th, 1951, discussing Senator McCarthy's viewing of files related to the IPR. According to Mr. Belmont, the sender of the letter "the Senator had not cleared with the Director or Mr. Tolson before going into the check of these files" and "there was a definite opinion of the Resident Agent that the examination was being conducted without the knowledge of Carter or Lane" (FBI Report 1951 118). The files mentioned in this letter were files concerning the IPR, held at Edward C. Carter's farm in Massachusetts (a striking similarity to the Pumpkin Papers in the Alger Hiss case). This is another salient example of McCarthy's drive to weed out any suspected Communism, with little regard for the rules; in this situation he simply lied about his clearance in order to get access to files that were not available to the public, as is described in the FBI memorandum (FBI Report 1951 118).

2.5: The McCarran trial

Pat McCarran believed, as did many fervent anti-Communists, that the fall of Chiang Kai-Shek's nationalist government was akin to 'the loss of China', and although he did not blame Dean Acheson specifically, he heavily criticized the State Department's role in the matter. He shared McCarthy's views on this subject, and was critical of Owen Lattimore's influence in the State Department, just as McCarthy was. This critique of the State Department was extended to the Truman administration as a whole, as McCarran and McCarthy maintained it was not fighting Communism actively enough, neither at home or abroad. This sentiment was bolstered by the start of the Korean War, another example of Communist containment weighing heavily on the public's minds. After an offensive against the perceived lackadaisical attitude of the Truman administration towards Communism in 1950, the McCarran Committee started its investigation of the IPR in January 1951. As had been routine for many investigations of subversion and Communism, the committee's first move was to examine IPR records, in an attempt to suss out any overt Communism at the Institute. These were the same records McCarthy had visited in Massachusetts, and had examined without proper clearance. McCarran was authorized, however, and he moved the IPR records to Washington D.C., to examine them and start the investigation into the IPR. In *Nightmare in Red*, Richard M. Fried looks back at the McCarthy era, and discusses the reputation of the McCarran committee to respect due process and a proper trial: "evidence was formally introduced –

hearings were exhaustive – witnesses were heard in executive session before they named names in public" (Fried 145). All of these legal niceties were at odds with the true nature of the trials overseen by the committee, which harassed and hounded its witnesses to make them slip up, and reveal information they should not (Fried 145).

So too did McCarran treat the IPR trial. Former Communist-turned-whistleblower Louis Budenz spurred McCarran on. His testimonies are mentioned in the FBI report on the IPR, in the hearings by the Tydings Committee, and in the McCarran hearings. His anti-Communist portfolio, then, was extensive. His main spiel was accusing people of being involved with the Communist party, or the Soviet government, as he had been involved with both for many years, and would have heard their names, or been in contact with them. After accusing Lattimore in the Tydings hearings, Budenz did so once again during the McCarran hearings, prompting increased scrutiny and an extended investigation. From February 1951 to February 1952, the McCarran Committee interrogated "Lattimore, other IPR officials, and various China experts and diplomats as it tried to knit a fabric of conspiracy out of its evidence and presuppositions" (Fried 146). Throughout these interrogations, McCarran considered Lattimore public enemy number one, and he accused him of working with the Soviets in order to propagate Soviet ideals in America. McCarran was intent on proving an institutional Communism at the IPR, with direct links to the Soviets, a sort of institute of Soviet spies and propaganda on American soil. Testimonies by IPR members did not reveal this, however, but rather a more middle-of-the-road type of Communism among the members of the IPR, characterized by "something less than subversive conspiracy in the making of foreign policy, and something more than quiet routine" (Latham, quoted in Fried 147). Although various members of the IPR (such as Frederick Vanderbilt Field) had undeniable connections to Communism, it would be difficult for McCarran to prove a true Communist spy network was present at the IPR, as McCarthy and Kohlberg hoped he would.

Instead, McCarran used different routes to suffocate the IPR, alongside various China Hands: the anti-Communist Right had pressured Truman into his 1947 executive decree 9835, which provisioned strict loyalty checks of federal employees. Making use of this decree, McCarran dug up old State Department cases and re-interrogated China Hands with connections to the IPR, meanwhile continuing to publicly disparage the IPR and any connections to China. The climax of his battle against the IPR was his final interrogation of Owen Lattimore in 1952, which lasted twelve days, of which Joseph McCarthy attended nine, undoubtedly because of the vested interest he had in both the case and Lattimore specifically

(Fried 148). After twelve days of intense interrogation, during which Lattimore often misspoke, misremembered, or was proven wrong by his own correspondence, McCarran went on one final offensive against Lattimore and the IPR, accusing him of perjury during the trial, and demanding the Attorney General indict him. His offensive paid off, and Lattimore was indicted on seven counts of perjury in the winter of 1952. Lattimore would spend the following three years fighting these counts in various courts, culminating in a dismissal of the case in 1955.

2.6: The funding and future of the IPR

The acerbic nature of McCarthyism and the intensity of McCarthy's and Kohlberg's public verbal discrediting of the IPR in the late 1940s and 1950 dealt a heavy blow to the Institute's credibility. Although awarded the Navy "E" award, for excellence in wartime production, and having played a vital role in upholding and streamlining economic relations between the Pacific and American businesspeople, the public's opinion on the IPR was quick to shift following the accusations of Communism. Financial support for the IPR was not immediately affected, however, and Marshall mentions the surprising level of financial support afforded to the IPR by internationalist-minded businesspeople after the attacks by McCarthy and Kohlberg (Marshall 42). Because the IPR fit the philanthropic mission of the Rockefeller Foundation almost perfectly, the foundation had provided substantial support since the IPR's establishment in 1925, and would continue to do so until the end of the Second World War. At that time the foundation re-evaluated non-university agencies on its payroll, especially foreign ones, in a shift of policy aimed towards a more unilateral academic philanthropy. From 1946 onwards, support for institutions such as the IPR became more limited, but it was not until McCarthy's accusation of Communist conspiracy had gained too much traction to ignore, that the RF was truly forced to re-evaluate its support of the IPR. The RF did not immediately cease its funding, however, and throughout 1950 it debated whether it should cut funding or continue to support the IPR's mission, choosing to postpone grant extension approval until it could more accurately assess the Institute's position (Woods 155). It even chose to contact J. Edgar Hoover, director of the FBI, to ask him whether he thought the IPR deserved the foundation's support, and he replied he was not at liberty to comment, as the IPR was not a governmental agency (Woods 155). Because of positive responses from others, however, the RF decided to approve the IPR's grant extension until 1952.

After accusations of Communism against his person, and his release of IPR documents stored at his farm, Edward C. Carter left his position as head of the IPR in 1950, in an attempt to appease the RF, and clear any possible Communist accusations against the IPR related to his involvement. Of course, this would most likely prove insufficient, as accusations had been put forward against multitudes of IPR members, and the removal of one such (even high-ranking) member would not re-instate the Institute's credibility or reputation. Though a grant extension was approved in 1950, the then tenuous connection between the IPR and the RF was effectively severed by the McCarran committee's investigation. Even a substantial letter-writing campaign, started by William L. Holland, would not prove sufficient to safeguard Rockefeller funding for the IPR. In October of 1953, a year after the investigation had concluded, John D. Rockefeller III, the chair of the RF board, "expressed support for international organizations modeled after the IPR but agreed that the AIPR should be allowed to die before funding of any alterna-tive arrangement could be considered" (Willits interview, quoted in Woods 157), with AIPR referring to the American branch of the IPR, a specificity that was often omitted due to the American branch's prominence. Rockefeller's statement summarized the public's view of the IPR after the McCarran investigation: he was willing to fund an organization with the same purpose and model, but was no longer willing to do the same for the IPR due to its tarnished reputation. Woods also touches on support from the CIIA, the Canadian Institute of International Affairs, which had also provided the IPR with funding throughout its existence, although significantly less than the Rockefeller Foundation. The CIIA did not break under the pressure of McCarthyism as early as the Rockefellers, but eventually also had to cut funding. After an IPR conference in 1958 held a vote on dissolution, which did not pass, "the CIIA voted to reduce its contribution to the IPR from the regular $2500 – to a token $100" (Hooper 402, quoted in Woods 161).

McCarthy's condemnation of the IPR and its members had served its purpose, but had not struck the finishing blow. Though the campaign to discredit the IPR by McCarthy and Kohlberg proved to make the period directly after the Second World War more difficult for the Institute, it was the official hearings by the McCarran Committee in 1951 and 1952, and the results of these hearings, that put the final nail in the coffin for the IPR's public support and credibility. This stay of execution may, in part, have been due to the public's lack of a strong, consolidated opinion on the situation in the Pacific. Ironically, although the IPR had tried to promote awareness of this situation, this lack of awareness might have spared them from harsher judgement from the public in the years following the war, and following the

Communist takeover of China. Leffler shows just how divided public opinion was on the old, Nationalist government: “Far more Americans had an unfavorable view of Chiang than a favorable view; far more wanted the United States to disengage from Chiang than to grant him additional assistance” (Leffler 295). Leffler also covers the public’s attitude towards the new, Communist government: “Attitudes on China were malleable. Of those who were following developments, fewer than half opposed recognition of and trade with Communist China” (Leffler 295). Though the American public was quick to turn on the Soviet Union as the new, demonized enemy of the United States, and the face of evil Communism, its opinion on events in China ostensibly ranged from uneducated to unperturbed. Chiang Kai-Shek’s lack of popularity in the U.S. created an atmosphere, which was initially more conducive to the new Communist leadership than was to be expected. This atmosphere would change, as campaigns such as McCarthy’s portrayed both Soviet and Chinese Communists as inherently evil, but the initial sentiment following the Second World War allowed the IPR to remain a cultural and academic bridge between the United States and the Pacific for half a decade longer. Then, in 1951 and 1952, the pressure exerted by McCarran and other anti-Communists became too much, and the IPR became drastically less relevant, and less prominent. The following years, until its eventual disbandment in 1960, were fraught with difficulties, and mainly spent trying to keep a dying organization alive for as long as they could.

2.7: Conclusion

Kohlberg and McCarthy’s motivation for hounding the Institute, then, were based on various, relatively innocuous characteristics of the IPR: its association with China, shortly before and after it became a Communist nation; its members, including China Hands such as Owen Lattimore, and outspoken Communists such as Frederick Vanderbilt Field; and its place within the unofficial, academic branch of the American Foreign Policy Establishment. All of these characteristics evoked a campaign against the Institute, which purposefully blurred the lines between individual and institutional levels of Communism in a bid to persecute and prosecute the IPR. Although McCarran had failed to achieve his ultimate goal of uncovering a Soviet conspiracy at the IPR, his prolonged investigation had already done sufficient damage to the IPR, and many of its members. Funds were being withdrawn, public opinion had shifted, and academic virtue was being brought into question. Though the Institute remained in operation until 1960, it was a shadow of its former self and no longer held the same

authority on the Pacific it once had. McCarran's investigations, and McCarthy and Kohlberg's accusations, too, had affected individual members of the IPR and separate China Hands. Furthermore, the interaction between accusations at an individual and institutional level played a significant role in anti-Communist condemnation and prosecution of the IPR. McCarthy leveled charges of Communism at the IPR as an institution, but prosecuted the Institution through individual accusations of Communism. In addition to this skewed approach to the prosecution of institutional Communism, even the charges of Communism at an individual level did not stick. When reflecting on the prosecution of the IPR, then, it paints a picture of inadequate evidence and unapologetic, excessive anti-Communism. These foundations of McCarthyism and McCarthy's tactics express themselves in a disregard for the clear distinction between institutional and individual representations of Communism.

By creating the toxic, divisive atmosphere that perpetuated the Second Red Scare, and public worries about both China and the Soviet Union infiltrating America, these three men and their consorts held sway over much of the American political field. This was most prevalent and visible in Washington D.C., where the American political elite gathers, but not limited to it. Across the U.S. political races were being decided by who was the most anti-Communist, both local races and even the presidential race, as "The "Red Scare" – came to dominate much of the debate between Democrats and Republican in 1952" (History 1). Individuals could also be strongly affected by accusations of Communist allegiances, including Benjamin H. Kizer, a member of the IPR regarded with suspicion by anti-Communist Albert F. Canwell. Kizer's close associations with China, along with his connection to the IPR, are two institutional connections used to condemn him as a Communist on an individual level. Canwell's persecution of Kizer, and the role the relation between individual and institutional Communism played in this persecution, will be the main focus of the next chapter.

Chapter 3: Kizer and Canwell

The caustic nature of anti-Communism outside of Washington D.C. is encapsulated perfectly by Albert Canwell and his personal crusade against Communism in the Pacific Northwest, more specifically in the state of Washington. Although Canwell did not attack his political opponent directly, as some representatives did, his continual narrative of the Communist threat in the Pacific Northwest is a clear example of the Republican narrative that was used to win state elections. Canwell's fight against Communism was not just a political tool, however, as he fervently believed the Communist threat to be real. Neither was this fight limited to his political life: he devoted large parts of his personal life to stopping the spread of Communism, headed a committee that investigated allegations of Communism at various institutions such as Washington State University, and worked alongside the FBI as a liaison on the West Coast in the 1930s. Additionally, Canwell heavily criticized both institutions and individuals whom he believed to be affiliated with the Communist Party, one of these individuals being Benjamin Hamilton Kizer, who shared Canwell's miniscule hometown of Spokane. Kizer was a prominent lawyer within his community, as well as being actively involved in academic circles, and being a contributing member of the IPR. Kizer presents an exemplification of the majority of the IPR's members during the Institute's battle with McCarthyism. His close connections with individuals at the IPR and *Amerasia,* combined with connections to Russia and China through the Russian War Relief and UNRRA, place him in the category of Communist by association, on the previously laid out spectrum of Communism. Although the significant majority of suspected Communists at the IPR were Communists by association, this group was not seen as the most significant when approached from an institutional level: this was reserved for the individuals most closely linked to Communism, as their perceived level of Communist involvement would be easier to extrapolate to an institutional level. Contrary to many other 'Communist-associates' on this spectrum, however, Kizer was also a target for individual persecution, through Canwell's campaign in Washington State.

In this way, Kizer was a victim of both institutional and individual anti-Communism under McCarthy, and by extension Canwell. Although many individuals at the IPR would not be prosecuted, Kizer was a left-leaning liberal in Washington State, a political environment which in the 1950s was largely composed of wealthy Republicans who were afraid Communism might reach them, even in such remote areas of Washington State, it was easy to

both consider and paint him as a coldblooded Communist. His associations with Communist China further increased his susceptibility to accusations of Communism. Kizer vehemently refuted these charges, and would continue attempting to clear his name throughout Canwell's defamation. The question remains whether Canwell's allegations held any truth, or whether he simply wanted to discredit an opponent, though in this instance it was an intellectual one rather than a purely political one. The previous chapters of this thesis have discussed the impact of McCarthyism and anti-Communism in Washington D.C., the epicenter of American politics, prevalently at an institutional level. This final chapter will take a closer look at McCarthyism and anti-Communism at a state level, and the individual level, using Washington State as its main focus. It will do so by first examining what factors made Canwell believe Kizer to be a Communist, followed by Kizer's defense and his denial of Communist affiliation. These accusations against Kizer will be reviewed at an individual level, as that is how Kizer was most affected by Canwell's vitriol. After examining Kizer, it will go on to examine Canwell and his role in the Washington State legislature more closely, and how his anti-Communism affected Washington at a state level. Furthermore, this chapter will explore, through personal correspondence of Benjamin Kizer and extensive interviews with Albert Canwell, what prompted Canwell's allegations of Communism in the Pacific Northwest, and specifically of Benjamin Kizer, and to what extent they were based on the notion that Spokane 'was not big enough for the two of them'. Additionally, the chapter will examine how Kizer's alleged Communism was affected by his ties to the IPR and Communist China, to more clearly visualize the connection between institutional and individual allegations of Communism.

3.1: Kizer's alleged Communism

Though Canwell's approach to fighting Communism through the legislature was often more tempered than that of McCarthy, he often resorted to personal attacks and ungrounded accusations when fighting Communism in his personal life. One of the most notable victims of his anti-Communist furor was Benjamin Kizer. Kizer was a Spokane lawyer who was a Left Liberal and a keen supporter of civil rights and relations with the Pacific, in a time where this was often considered a Communist characteristic. His interest in the Pacific led to him being on *Amerasia'*s editorial board in 1942 and 1943, and publishing articles in *Amerasia,* and the IPR's *Far Eastern Survey*. This also means he corresponded with a variety of

prominent figures within these two organizations, including Owen Lattimore, former editor of the IPR's *Pacific Affairs* and McCarthy's main victim in his crusade against the IPR, and Edward C. Carter, former secretary general of the IPR. Canwell's prosecution of Kizer as an individual occurred at the same time as Kohlberg's prosecution of the IPR at an institutional level, and was imbued with the same fervor. Another salient affiliation that might have caused Canwell to accuse Kizer of Communism, was his time as director of the China department of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, or UNRRA, in 1945 and 1946. The UNRRA focused on providing relief aid to struggling nations across the world, an incentive proposed by president Roosevelt. This support included wartime support for both the Soviet Union and Nationalist China, nations that the United States still considered allies during the Second World War. Because American opinions on the Soviet Union started to become more negative during Kizer's time at UNRRA, because Canwell had been suspicious of the Soviets and their international Communist ideals since before the Second World War, and because Canwell considered Roosevelt far too Leftist, Kizer's tenure at UNRRA would likely have deepened Canwell's suspicions.

This was exacerbated after Kizer personally visited China from 1945 to 1946. Although China was still under its Nationalist government at the time, Communist dissenters were hosting the Chinese Communist Revolution, and Kizer did not definitively denounce the ideals put forth by this revolution. The purpose of Kizer's visit as a functionary of the UNRRA, was to assess the situation in China immediately following the Second World War, and to try to counteract the corruption and rampant bribery that was causing large portions of U.S. aid to go to the wrong persons. This misappropriation was mostly due to the UNRRA's cooperation with its Chinese counterpart, aptly named the Chinese National Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, or CNRRA, which promised to distribute American aid, but instead misappropriated large swaths of the aid sent by the Americans. His time in China disillusioned Kizer to both Chiang Kai-Shek's followers, and Mao Zedong's newly instated Communist leadership. There was significant infighting, corruption, inhumane treatment of Jewish people in ghettos, and Chinese babies dying in the streets (Lilly Library Kizer 1947). This prompted Kizer to fight even harder for humanitarian aid to China, in a naïve attempt to ameliorate a situation that was far beyond the scope of even UNRRA. After nearly half a year in China, and a visit from his wife and daughter, Kizer returned home in the summer of 1946, and not long after quit as director of the UNRRA's China department. Meanwhile, his daughter Carolyn Kizer had experienced a similar disillusionment, and both she and her

father spoke liberally of the problems in China and the aid it deserved, within their respective social circles. Kizer's condemnation of Chiang Kai-Shek did not sit well with Canwell, who commented that Kizer "was sort of the godfather of the intellectual group in the town, the pseudo-intellectuals. The people who wanted to be intellectuals and weren't" (Frederick 122), so as to discredit any opinions Kizer voiced on such matters.

Another organization that Kizer interacted with that may have aroused Canwell's suspicions was the Russian War Relief fund, a philanthropic relief fund, set up in 1941, dedicated to providing Russia with aid following Hitler's rise in 1939, similar to UNRRA. Kizer was on the Board of Directors for Russian War Relief, while Edward C. Carter, former secretary general of the IPR, was the head of the entire organization. To provide an example of the anti-Communism such organizations had to deal with, Carter describes having to instate a comprehensive public relations policy, in order to more effectively gather supplies and aid, due to "the necessity of counteracting the negative after-effects of years of American-Soviet diplomatic strain, particu-larly the shock and bitterness caused by popular misinterpretation of the German-Soviet pact of 1939" (Carter 63). During a period in which Americans did not view the Soviet Union favorably, garnering support from the public to provide relief to the Soviet Union was a hard sell, and required a convincing narrative of Soviet-American friendship. Although Russian War Relief had received full approval from the President's War Relief Control Board (Carter 66), its inherently pro-Soviet mission statement was raising suspicion in a political climate that was steadily turning its back on anything Communist. Though the Soviets had been a key ally to the U.S. during the Second World War, its conduct and policy after Hitler's defeat had left a sour taste in the mouth of most Americans. Additionally, although Carter made no mention of it in his overview from August 1944, the HUAC advised, as early as February 1942, that the Russian War Relief was a Communist controlled front organization (FBI Report 1951 65).

Understandably, Carter never makes any mention of Communism in his outline of the Russian War Relief, not even when discussing the Soviet Union. In addition, he allocates a debatable positive sentiment towards Russia to the American public: "If we understand correctly the sentiment of the people of the United States, they want and expect to help the people of these war-stricken areas make their fresh start" (Carter 74). In 1944, the American public's opinion of the Soviet Union was already shifting towards a more negative view, and anti-Communism had been on the scene for nearly three decades, making Carter's 'understanding' of the people's sentiment somewhat uncertain. A 1946 poll question about

the public's opinion on the Soviet Union portrays a divided America, with 38.6 percent of people believing the Soviet Union was a peace-loving country, and 37.8 percent believing it was an aggressive nation that would start a war to get what it wants. A modest 8.4 percent believed the Soviets could be both peace loving and warmongering, resulting in a very clear split in American public opinion (Public Opinion 1935-46). Carter's refusal to acknowledge Communism reflects the uncertain place of the Russian War Relief in post-Second World War America. As part of the Board of Directors for the organization, Kizer's position was also dubious in the eyes of anti-Communists such as Canwell. Similarly, Kizer's involvement with the IPR, *Amerasia,* proved sufficient for him to be scrutinized by the FBI more broadly, and Canwell specifically. The synergy between institutional and individual anti-Communism went both ways: connections with a perceived Communist organization such as the IPR could reflect poorly on an individual's reputation, but at the same time an individual accused of Communist leanings such as Owen Lattimore could reflect poorly on an organization. This two-way street allowed for a broader persecution at both an individual and organizational level, by using Communist affiliation at both levels separately as proof of Communism at the other level. Kizer's personal views on Communism, humanitarianism, and America's global position did not help him avoid suspicion either, as he was a proponent of aid to both China and Russia, and believed the United States was no longer the only major global power, and now had to share the world stage with the two aforementioned countries. To the ears of someone as anti-Communist as Canwell, such statements immediately hint at an affinity with Soviet thought, something he would have suspected of Kizer regardless, due to his previous positions.

Kizer's involvement with such a variety of academic and philanthropic organizations, all of them involving American foreign policy towards Russia and China, firmly situates him as a member of America's Foreign Policy Establishment. Kizer was not directly involved with US. Foreign Policy at the state department, as Owen Lattimore or John Service were, but his endeavors show that he could be considered an unofficial member of the Establishment McCarthy despised. Though his connection to the IPR had not lead to direct scrutiny from McCarthy, who had focused on the IPR at an institutional level and declined to prosecute individuals other than Lattimore, it provided additional fuel for Canwell's anti-Communist fire back in Kizer's home state. Through his institutional connections, Kizer thus became a target for Canwell's individual anti-Communism.

3.2: Kizer's defense

Although Kizer's 'suspect' connections to Communism were largely limited to interactions with the Pacific, rather than with actual Soviet entities, Canwell did not hesitate to portray Kizer as a Soviet puppet (Frederick 129). Reminiscent of the treatment Owen Lattimore was receiving in Washington D.C., Kizer was criticized as a full-bred Communist and suspected spy for the Soviets by Canwell, rather than someone who was affiliated with organizations accused of Communism. This highlights an interesting dichotomy between Soviet Communism, and a Pacific or Chinese brand of Communism, which display a variety of both ideological and practical, political differences, but are often almost equated by McCarthyists, when accusing someone of Communism. Canwell's accusations of Kizer as a Communist spy seem to disregard his affiliations with the Pacific, and potential Chinese Communism, in favor of Soviet Communism, though Kizer's only substantial link to Russia was through the Russian War Relief. Even if men like Kizer, Lattimore, Vanderbilt Field, or Carter truly accepted a Communist ideology as their own, or were involved with the Chinese government in a ploy to increase Chinese power in America, this requires a clear differentiation from Soviet Communism and its subversive actions. The Rosenbergs, for instance, were convicted of Soviet espionage, and executed for their actions, and accusations against Kizer and many of his peers at the IPR likely cannot be substantiated in a similar fashion, as their interactions with Communism through the IPR were almost wholly limited to Communist China. It makes sense for fervent anti-Communists such as Canwell and McCarthy not to differentiate between these two, however, as accusing someone of being a Soviet Communist pawn held more weight, due to its relevance at the time. The American public's fear of Communism within the United States largely revolved around the presence of Soviet spies, which had already been exposed, rather than potential Chinese agents.

Suspicions of Communist allegations were not limited to Benjamin Kizer either, as his daughter's clear political stances, and involvement with the National Endowment for the Arts, another program set up by Roosevelt, led to an additional investigation by the FBI. Carolyn Kizer's only connection to the IPR was an internship in the summer before its Mont Tremblant conference, accompanied by several book reviews published in Far Eastern Survey. Interestingly, the IPR was still mentioned in the FBI report as "a vehicle used by the Communists to orientate American far eastern policies toward Communist objectives" (FBI report CK appendix). Describing the IPR as a 'vehicle' suggests that the FBI envisioned

Communism at the IPR mainly on an individual level, with the institute functioning as a gathering place and publication, rather than a fundamentally communist organization at an institutional level.

This second FBI report concerning Benjamin Kizer's daughter Carolyn Kizer was provided in 1966, over a decade after the first report on the IPR and *Amerasia*. It still referred to the IPR, however, and to the investigation into the IPR of 1951. It mentions, for instance, Louis F. Budenz' accusations of Benjamin Kizer's membership of the Communist Party, and his unequivocal denial of such membership in 1951. Although Kizer's brushes with McCarthyism are seen as salient enough to touch on in this report, they hold little substantiating value, and do not affect the FBI's judgment of his daughter, who is cleared as being "loyal to United States although non-conformist" (FBI report CK 1966). This description could essentially be applied to her father as well, who was loyal to the United States as his country, even serving as the Chairman of the Pacific Northwest Regional Planning Commission (PNRPC) in 1941 (FBI report 1951 65), a committee which published articles on shipping, taxation, various industries and trades, and provided recommendations for all of these fields. Unlike the IPR and the UNRRA, the PNRPC was never accused of Communist subservience, and was thus generally seen as an organization that provided for the good of the region. Although it effectively provided much of the same service the IPR did, it did so regarding a region of America, rather than a region where Communism lived, and thus was considered acceptable.

At the time of Benjamin Kizer's Communist allegations in 1947, anti-Communism was still in full swing, and accusations of Communism did not require the same burden of proof they would at other times in history. This disparity is clearly noticeable in the 1966 FBI file on Kizer's daughter, which is far less willing to make statements of fact regarding Communist allegations, than, say, Canwell was regarding Kizer a mere fifteen years earlier. This also highlights another dichotomy within the fight against Communism, between the personal and institutional level of investigation. At any time, FBI reports provide a far more muted and nuanced look at the situation than personal accounts or witness statements. Witness statements from the likes of Kohlberg, Canwell, Chambers, or Budenz, for instance, were far less muted than the information found in the 1951 FBI report on the IPR. Any mention of Kizer in FBI reports simply refers to allegations of Communism against institutions he was a part of, rather than claiming direct Communist involvement. Kizer is quoted by the Seattle Post-Intelligencer as denying any Communist allegation, stating "I

never had any relationship with communism in any form or with any individual Communist" and "So far as I know it [the IPR] has no Communist tieups. I would not have anything to do with it if it did" (FBI report CK 1966). Interestingly, Kizer touches on both individual and institutional Communism here, stating he did not know any individual Communists, while also denying any knowledge of institutional Communism at the IPR. The rigidity of his statements seems somewhat farfetched, however, as it is highly unlikely an intelligent man like Kizer would not notice a single ounce of Communism in friends like Lattimore and Carter, or in the IPR's hallways. Additionally Canwell believed any possibility of Communist ties warranted a shift of the burden of proof to the accused, and did not deem Kizer's 1951 statements sufficient evidence of his innocence.

Conversely, however, Canwell continued to struggle to find sufficient evidence of Kizer's guilt throughout 1947 and 1948. This narrative is reinforced by Kizer's personal correspondence both during and after this period, which does not refer to, hint at, or explicitly state any Communist affiliation or support. Nowhere in his letters is there a mention of Communism beyond a desire for social reform, and a fascination with the worrisome situation in China, or mentions explicitly made in relation to Canwell's crusade, wherein Kizer categorically denies Canwell's charges. If Kizer was as closely allied with the Communist Party, and one of their leaders in Washington State, this would have been nearly impossible to hide thoroughly enough for there to be no hint of Communist sentiment within his letters to friends, employees, and organizations. In March of 1954, over three years after Spokane residents had vouched for Kizer's lack of Communist leanings, and after a period relatively devoid of strongly motivated accusations by Canwell, the FBI interviewed a former member of the CPUSA. Although her name was sadly redacted under exemption B7C, her statement still stands. She was a member of both the Washington State and Seattle Communist Parties, from 1933 to 1952, and 1942 to 1950 respectively. She unequivocally stated she "had no reason to believe he was ever a Communist Party member", and that although he sometimes agreed with social reforms advocated by the Communist Party, he also disagreed with them on other issues, causing her to describe him as a liberal (FBI Report CK 1966). This interview provides a substantiated narrative of Kizer's political affiliations, which are those of a man who might find some of his views akin to those of the Communist Party due to his strong stance on social reform and civil rights, but also those of a man with no true connection to the Communist Party and its dealings in the United States.

3.3: Canwell's personal fight against Communism

Washington State was primarily a Republican state during the two decades following the Second World War, and Canwell fit in far better than Kizer and his liberal ideologies. Canwell was a Republican through and through, running as Republican representative for the State House of Representatives in 1947, and voting Republican his whole life. His loyalty to the Republican party can be gathered from his statements on the Watergate scandal concerning his good friend, Richard W. Nixon: "I think that it was a skillfully planned frame-up; that the man who carried the equipment and was going to bug the thing was, oh, I call him a gung ho meathead – The whole Watergate thing was a phony" (Frederick 349). Before his tenure as a member of the Washington State legislature, from 1947 to 1949, Canwell was less involved with politics, and more directly involved with his struggle against Communism. He cooperated with the FBI and his regional sheriff's department in an attempt to uncover Communist infiltration in the region. He mentions, for instance, how at one point the Communists had a plan to weaken the Pacific Northwest with propaganda and other forms of Communist subversion, before actually bringing in an army through Alaska (Frederick 100). Suspicions such as these made Canwell believe that the Pacific Northwest was just as susceptible to, and just as significant a target for, the Communist spies that were trying to overthrow the American way of life. In his oral history, Canwell speaks extensively about this cooperation with the FBI, and how he was instrumental in the defense of the region against Communism. For instance, he describes his 'spy work' in 1931, when he was most actively working against Communism:

> In my undercover work I was able to volunteer my services to things like Russian War Relief and other groups, and totally disarm them. They, of course, first and foremost want publicity and here they had it. I would provide and make my prints and supply them to the FBI, and get them a story in the paper (Frederick 102).

These prints were only a small part of Canwell's actions against perceived Communism, which ranged from photographs and financial investigations to accusations of Communism against individuals, in an attempt to expose them and rob them of their credibility. In 1947,

Kizer fell victim to the latter action, and he is also mentioned frequently and disparagingly in Canwell's history. These accusations were part of a broader ideological motivation by Canwell, and his use of politics as a tool also fit within this ideology. Canwell used anti-Communist sentiment to his advantage in order to achieve political power, and proceeded to harness this political power in order to more effectively fight Communism. However, while Canwell's accusations against Kizer seem to be based in Canwell's belief that Kizer was an actual Communist, they are also such personal attacks that one senses a different, underlying motivation. Even forty-five years after the investigations into the IPR and Kizer took place, still described Kizer as "sort of the godfather of the group. As in Sherlock Holmes, there was a sinister character who always surfaced. Well, that was the way with Ben Kizer" (Frederick 122). This personal, and less factually based approach to the fight against Communism is emblematic for American anti-Communism, and especially for the political atmosphere of McCarthy's time. Kizer is not the only local vilified by Canwell, however, as he speaks adversely of Jim Haggin, Jerry O'Connell, Barbara Hartle, and many more whom he believed to be directly affiliated with the Communist Party in Washington State. Vice versa, Canwell sung the praises of anyone who helped him in his quest against Communism, even if they were previously Communists themselves, but turned on the Party and became informants or otherwise active in the fight against Communism. Louis F. Budenz comes to mind as their counterpart in Washington D.C., as he too was a former Communist who proceeded to liberally testify against members of the IPR and other suspected Communists. Canwell's praises were primarily reserved for local residents he approved of, such as Betty Webster, the wife of a local Communist labor leader who "was just beginning to realize that she was being had, as everybody is" (Frederick 124), and decided to assist Canwell in his anti-Communist evidence-gathering mission in the 1930s and 1940s. Aside from this local support, Canwell had also come into direct contact with Communist whistleblower Budenz during travels to Washington D.C., and had limited interactions with IPR-opponent Kohlberg, and FBI-director Hoover. Canwell praised Budenz, Kohlberg, and Hoover, considering them fellow patriots and approving of their ideologies regarding the eradication of Communism. In fact, similarly to McCarthy's interactions with Kohlberg, Canwell was brought into D.C.'s world of McCarthyism by Kohlberg, and introduced to people with similar notions. He describes Kohlberg and his relationship with the IPR as follows: "Very early he had become involved with the Institute of Pacific Relations (IPR). And being a very astute individual he very soon recognized that it was a Communist device and that their interests were not America's interest or Alfred Kohlberg's" (Frederick 166).

3.4: Anti-Communism in the Washington State legislature

Although McCarthyism was at its most prevalent in Washington D.C., and seeped through into all aspects of political life in there, this does not mean it was limited to this epicenter. McCarthy himself, for instance, was a representative from Wisconsin, which is where he first outlined his polemic vision of a Communist-free America. And although he was by far the most prolific politician nationally in the fight against Communism, he was far from the only one. At the state level, all over the United States, political campaigns were being decided by candidates' attitudes towards Communism, and the fervor with which they approached the issue. At this level, Communism and all of its consequences were treated as a far more politically divisive issue. In Washington, mostly Republicans stood to gain from Redbaiting and strong anti-Communist sentiment, as the political right was more at odds with Communist ideals than some liberal leftist politicians. At the state level, this dichotomy was magnified and then exacerbated. Communist threats portrayed as closer to home or limited to a specific state had significant persuasive potential. Adopting the fight against Communism as a significant part of a political campaign could provide extra votes from citizens who were afraid of the influence Communism might have on America. Because of its efficiency as a political tactic, anti-Communism was quickly picked up by various Republican representatives across the United States, such as Joseph McCarthy in Wisconsin, Pat McCarran in Nevada, and Albert Canwell in Washington State. These three examples come from completely different parts of America, yet all three were able to secure the Republican nomination, and be the victors of their respective campaigns, running on a political platform that revolved around anti-Communist rhetoric. The most salient campaign affected by an anti-Communist platform was the presidential election of 1952 between Eisenhower and Stevenson, during McCarthy's heyday. During this election, the Republicans criticized the Truman administration for not bearing down on Communism hard enough, and neither Eisenhower or his party condemned McCarthy for his anti-Communist tactics. This approach provided the Republicans with a solid campaigning platform, and eventually led to a significant victory over Stevenson.

These examples show the significant presence of anti-Communist thought within the American political sphere, and poignant examples of both a Republican senator and member of the House of Representatives using anti-Communist in their campaigns at the state level, in vastly different parts of the United States. At a state level, anti-Communism, and

consequently McCarthyism, provided for a more aggressive approach to politics; instead of simply promising to actively fight Communism, many political campaigns took the opportunistic route, and used Communism as a way to disparage their opponent. As a Republican nominee promising to fight the insidious spread of Communism in your state, what better way to solidify your position than to accuse your Democratic opponent of being a Socialist, or even a full-blown Communist. As with other instances of McCarthyism, these accusations required little substantial evidence to have a negative effect on the credibility of the opponent. In this way, redbaiting served as a political tool, undermining the credibility of the opponent and forcing them to respond to the allegations. This approach carried on through American politics and public thought in the Cold War, and many Americans to this day still have a hard time distinguishing Social Democrats from actual Socialists, or Socialists from Communists. This can be attributed in large part to anti-Communist narrative throughout the Cold War, but was already taking place in the period directly following the Second World War. In America, anti-Communist rhetoric was a characteristic of significant political campaigns in the late 1940s, and early 1950s. These campaigns include McCarthy's 1947 campaign for the Wisconsin senate, Canwell's 1947 campaign for the Washington House, Nixon's 1950 campaign for the California senate, and even Eisenhower's 1952 presidential campaign. Anti-Communism was evidently a national sentiment, rather than just a localized political phenomenon in Washington's political world, and not limited to McCarthy.

Canwell's 1947 foray into politics seemed to be merely a tool, a position from which he could exert more power, and more effectively fight the Communism he envisioned spreading across the state. As a member of the legislature, Canwell would rally strongly against any possible Communist infiltration in his state, just as he had already been actively working to uproot any hint of Communist subversion in the previous decade. His endorsement of Budenz shows that Canwell's brand of anti-Communism, then, was not simply limited to the State level. Although his personal actions and legislative actions were focused on Washington State, his ideologies and personality lined up extremely well with D.C. anti-Communists such as Kohlberg and McCarthy, and his views on matters in the capital was also the same. Canwell fit into a broader national network of anti-Communists and McCarthyists, choosing unlike McCarthy to focus his attention on the state level. In this way he proffered a local iteration of McCarthy's national goals and practices. As was the case for McCarthy and Kohlberg, Canwell believed the State Department at the time to be full of

subversives and secret Communists, and played a crucial role in the 'loss' of the Far East. Similarly, his views on both *Amerasia* and the IPR also mirror those of McCarthy and Kohlberg; Canwell believed "The hearings on the IPR are very exhaustive and, I think, very, very explanatory of how the Far East was lost" (Frederick 167). His disdain for both institutions can additionally be linked to his disdain for Kizer, who was involved with this liberal, academic world, which Canwell deemed wholly Communist. Any hint of support for a socialist or Communist ideology was already where Canwell drew his line, for he associated the principles of Communism not with Marxism, or strict economic principles, but with an ideology of world domination intent on conquering America: "As I observed the organization of the Communist Party, I quickly came to the determination that it was not so much a Marxist theory as a group of thugs who were out to take power" (Frederick 127). This view of Communism was widely accepted in America at that time, in an era of political unrest and anti-Soviet sentiment. This sentiment grew strongly among the populace after McCarthy stepped onto D.C.'s political scene, but before McCarthy, names like Canwell and Kohlberg were associated with the same brand of vitriol.

Because of Canwell's strong convictions, and willingness to get his hands dirty when it came to fighting against Communism, it quickly became one of his main platforms when he joined the Washington State legislature in 1947. This led to Canwell's most prominent legacy: the establishment of the Joint Legislative Fact-Finding Committee on Un-American Activities in 1948, which was quickly and accurately dubbed the 'Canwell Committee'. It was instated by House concurrent resolution No. 10, which provided for "investigation of subversive activities", because "These are times of public danger; subversive persons and groups are endangering our domestic unity", and to fight this trend "the committee shall investigate the activities of groups and organizations whose membership includes persons who are communists" (Washington State House 1). In effect, Canwell recreated the federal House Committee on Un-American Activities within the Washington State legislature, as this committee retained the same purpose and held the same powers as the HUAC. The HUAC had been active in Washington D.C. since 1938, and Canwell clearly took his inspiration from the committee, mentioning its achievements and convictions several times in his oral history (Frederick 211, 235, 281, 298). The Canwell Committee would prove to be Canwell's magnum opus when it came to hunting Communists, allowing him an agency and influence that he had not had when he was working alongside the FBI, and granting him the resources he so desperately wanted to commit extensive investigations into what he perceived as hubs

of Communism in his state. These investigations culminated in a January 1949 report by the committee, which outlined subversive activity within Washington State, and recommended a plan of action to quell it.

Interestingly, Kizer is never mentioned in this report, suggesting he was never directly or significantly associated with any of the organizations investigated by the committee. Although the committee "has accumulated an index file of approximately 40,000 subjects dealing with Communists, their Front Organizations and activities and related material" (Canwell Committee Report 4), and even subsequently mentions several 'notorious' Communists, Kizer's name is omitted, even though his involvement in the academic world meant he had close relations with University of Washington staff, one of Canwell's perceived Communist hubs. Other Communist hubs mentioned in the Canwell Committee's report include the Washington Old Age Pension Union, the Pacific Northwest Labor School, the Building Service Employees Union, and the Repertory Playhouse. These organizations were 'exposed' by the committee as Communist fronts, all of them inter-connected by the various Communist leaders that would frequent all of these organizations. Accusations against the various organizations range from substantiated and undeniable, to relatively far-fetched and harder to prove. For instance, the Building Service Employees Union misappropriated membership funds to the Communist Party, which implies serious connections to Communism and is readily evidenced by its financial records. On the other hand, the accusations levied against the Repertory Playhouse, a prestigious drama school located near the University of Washington, were far less ironclad: "[The Repertory Playhouse] heavily recruit its pupils from university students and many of them have been subtly indoctrinated with the poison of communism in an attempt to breed contempt for the American system of government" (Canwell Committee Report 7). Communist indoctrination of university students, though a significant worry for anti-Communists, was not as easily substantiated or punished as offenses such as misappropriation of funds.

More generally, the report calls attention to the pervasiveness of Communism throughout the state, and its infiltration of every level of society and government, whether it was municipal or federal. If the narrative laid out by the report were true, Communists were slowly surrounding true American patriots, and were lying in wait, ready to take over the nation when a sufficient amount of Americans had been indoctrinated. In fact, the report mentions this narrative explicitly, stating: "The State of Washington is acrawl with trained and iron-disciplined Communists. They have operated here with seeming immunity -- They

have successfully infiltrated their constant objectives: education, government, labor and municipal services" (Canwell Committee report 2). Every other mention of Communism in the report is disdainful, and reads as if the threat of Communism was major and unavoidable. Perhaps the most telling aspect of the entire report is its willingness to forego American values of freedom in the defense of the nation against Communism. After declaring the burden of responsibility can be shifted to the shoulders of the accused, rather than the accuser, the committee goes on to say "We believe that the security of this country is at all times paramount to a fancied right of privacy regarding affiliation in a known subversive organization such as the Communist Party" (Canwell Committee Report 9). It is very telling that a group of American Republicans, usually so invested in the protection of freedom and personal rights, are willing to discard others right to privacy when it comes to Communism. To this committee, safeguarding their America from Communism superseded their traditional American values, thereby inherently and ironically showing that America has undergone changes.

The Canwell Committee report flows along the same lines of McCarthyism as its predecessors and successors in Washington D.C.. It unequivocally denounces Communists, praises the FBI for its involvement in investigations, and suggests harsher measures for legislation pertaining to Communism. Examples of these harsher measures include, but are not limited to, a strengthening of the anti-subversive clause, expanding the definition of contempt of the Legislature, and placing the burden of proof of loyalty on any individual affiliated with Communist fronts (Canwell Committee Report 19-20). Because of the harsh position taken by the Canwell Committee on these matters, and because of Canwell's personal ideology aligning so strongly with Joseph McCarthy's, this period in Washington State's history is the quintessential example of McCarthyism at the state level, rather than the federal level McCarthy largely operated on. Conversely, at a legislative level, Canwell seemed less prone to McCarthyism than McCarthy himself, relying on actual affiliations with Communist organizations or fronts before putting forward accusations or starting investigations. This puts Canwell at odds with McCarthy, who was wont to accuse more liberally, as his condemnation of the State Department showed. At the same time, it also aligns Canwell's personal brand of McCarthyism more with that of Alfred Kohlberg, who conducted a thorough study of the IPR's publications and published an eighty-page paper on his findings, before accusing the IPR of Communism. Regardless of their tendency to investigate prior to accusing, however, both men can still be considered staunch McCarthyists

because of their venomous approach to both prosecution and persecution of who they considered to be Communists.

3.5: The Canwell Committee trials

The conduct of the Canwell Committee during its anti-Communist hearings in 1947 and 1948 was reminiscent of that of similar legislative committees in Washington D.C., and could be easily criticized for not yielding an objective trial to many of its accused. Among the many organizations accused and prosecuted by the Canwell Committee were the National Lawyers Guild (NLG), and the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU). Kizer had been a part of both, being a prominent lawyer who had considerable personal involvement in civil rights, and Canwell used this association to attack Kizer's character in 1948. Canwell's main indictment of these two organizations, however, was simply that he considered them 'left-wing', an accusation which realistically should hold no bearing when considering a member's character. In this instance, Canwell perceived the organizational Leftism of the NLG and ACLU as institutional Communism: their Leftist ways were akin to Communism in his eyes, and thus the organizations could be described as Communist organizations. He then extrapolates this institutional Communism to an individual level, by claiming Kizer's involvement in these organizations warranted suspicion, without any evidence of individual Communism on Kizer's part. This kind of misrepresentation of the facts was not limited to Canwell's personal statements, and his committee, although dubbed as 'fact-finding', operated on a comparable ethos of aggravated accusations. This conduct is clearly present in its first public hearing in 1947, during which the accused could not question the committee, or provide their own statements. In an exceptionally authoritarian move, Canwell had anyone who attempted to disrupt the hearing ejected by State Patrol (Reese 3). Even more damning was that the Committee paid ex-CPUSA members to provide statements on their former party, and its alleged plan to overthrow the entire U.S. government (Reese 3). Once again, this is a reflection of McCarthyism at the federal level; where the testimonies of witnesses like Louis F. Budenz were often draw into question because of their adaptability. People that had never been publicly mentioned before by the witnesses were suddenly 'certain Communists' or directly involved with the Communist Party.

Paying ex-Communists and ex-CPUSA members to indict others after their own 'reform' can be seen as the purest form of McCarthyism; it implies a willingness to do

whatever it takes to get an indictment, and a similar willingness to fudge the facts of a case, as long as the outcome benefits them. This outcome could be beneficial in two main ways: it could provide a conviction of someone they truly believed to be involved with Communism, or it could solidify the anti-Communist's political clout and potentially neutralize a political opponent. For Canwell, and at the same time also for McCarthy, the ultimate motivation for their anti-Communism seemed to be a combination of these two outcomes. These men were convinced they were making America a better place, by stopping the spread of their perceived Communism, while at the same time solidifying their own position within their respective political spheres. A highly important part of the specific ex-Communist testimonies was their alleged link between the CPUSA and Moscow (Reese 3). Even if the Canwell Committee could definitively prove organizations or individuals they were investigating were linked to the Communist party in the United States, this would not directly translate to a link with the Soviets, which would be needed to truly condemn someone as a Soviet spy. Because the paid witnesses provided such a link, any accusations of allegiance with the CPUSA suddenly became far more serious, as that allegiance would, in effect, place you within the evil Soviet's network. This connection was effectively one of the main missing links in the concurrent IPR investigation. Although there were significant accusations of both individual and institutional Communism, there was no substantial link to the Soviet Union, and subsequently no conviction for espionage (with Owen Lattimore eventually being convicted for perjury). This alleged link could also have bolstered Canwell's persecution of Kizer: if Canwell would have been able to definitely prove Kizer was a member of the CPUSA, he would then immediately have accused him of espionage for the Soviets. Though Canwell was never able to link Kizer to CPUSA, the Committee's almost immediate dismissal of objectiveness and factuality in this first trial clearly resembles McCarthyist practices, on par with McCarthy's *Amerasia* trials back in Washington, albeit with a rather more successful outcome for the anti-Communists.

Another great success for Canwell in his campaign against the Communist threat was booked during the second public hearings of the Canwell Committee in 1948, a large chunk of which was devoted to the aforementioned University of Washington. Six of its professors were accused of Communist allegiance, which, when exposed to college students, was considered particularly dangerous. Out of the six professors, three were active members of the CPUSA, which made them susceptible to even harsher treatment and sentencing. After a long trial by the University's Tenure Committee in 1948, the gubernatorial board was advised

to dismiss only one of the six professors. However, the board threw this suggestion in the wind, and fired three of the professors, putting the other three on a two-year probation. Far more important than the fate of the professors in this case, is the precedent it set (Reese 3). After witnessing such strict treatment of university professors regarding Communist affiliations, other universities across the nation began to bear down on its faculties, instating harsher rules in a bid to drive out Communism. Some professors were fired, and others forced to tone down their personal, liberal beliefs throughout the 1950s. This case by the Canwell Committee transported the attitude of McCarthyism and anti-Communism firmly into the academic world, where it would continue to suppress Leftist thought for years. This anti-Communist foray into the world of academia was effectively mirrored on the East Coast, as prosecution of the IPR presented a concrete challenge to the academic branch of the Foreign Policy Establishment. The results of both of these cases in this era presented a reinvigorated and branching anti-Communism, which would continue to hound Leftist academia over the coming decade. Because Kizer was not directly affiliated with the university, he was not directly affected, but his close association with members of an institution that Canwell perceived as infected by Communism was once more damning in Canwell's eyes

After these two hearings, Canwell was riding a high, having halted what he considered the pestilent spread of Communist organizations throughout his state, and protected his little slice of America. His exuberance soon came to an end, however, when Kizer was appointed as State Chairman of the Crusade for Freedom Committee in August of 1950. Effectively an American propaganda machine, the Crusade for Freedom Committee was the perfect appointment for Kizer to dispel any doubts about where his allegiances might lie, and to build a defense against Canwell's scathing offensive. This appointment infuriated Canwell, of course, who immediately re-visited his earlier criticisms of Kizer, and highlighted his affiliation to what Canwell described as "left-wing" organizations, which was reported on by the Seattle Daily Times on August 24, 1950 (FBI CK Report 1966 6). At first Kizer himself defended these affiliations as simply academic and unrelated to any Communism that he was aware of. A mere three days after that, "a group of 18 Spokane citizens had issued a statement defending KIZER against CANWELL's charges", arguing that rather than being a Communist, Kizer was "a champion for the finest of American democratic principles", one whose "services to his community are innumerable" (FBI Report CK 1966 8). There is no mention of the identity of these eighteen people, and whether or not they were connected to Kizer in any way. Although Canwell would perceive this public

defense as a Communist ploy to save Kizer, it provided Kizer with a sense of security, a reminder that not everyone held the same opinions as Canwell. In addition, Canwell later said Kizer was affiliated with a swath of people he claimed were Communist, including Barbara Hartle, an unnamed English professor, and Virg Warren. He also compared Kizer's person to Justice William O. Douglas and Melvin Rader, neither of who was a favorable comparison in Canwell's eyes. None of these claims were truly substantiated, however, and only appear within Canwell's personal oral history as memories and reminisces.

3.6: Conclusion

In 1954, a redacted witness described Kizer as "completely loyal to the ideals of the United States and its constitutional form of government" (FBI Report CK 1966). Further interviews with neighbors and other members of shared communities reveal similar opinions on Kizer, and the rest of his family. People describe him as a liberal democrat, with no noticeable inclination towards Communism, and a man of good standing. These statements bring the true nature of anti-Communism in the era of McCarthyism into perspective; although Kizer was widely considered an upstanding citizen, and member of various planning committees and civil rights organizations, Canwell's vitriolic campaign against Communism more broadly and Kizer specifically did not relent. Luckily, Kizer's reputation and job were not strongly affected, as he had built up an impressive reputation as a lawyer in Spokane, but in this he could be considered the exception more so than the rule. Professors at various colleges nation-wide, for instance, suffered under the McCarthyism that stemmed from Canwell's time in legislature, until the Supreme Court's Baggett v. Bullitt ruling in 1964, which ruled that the requirement to take an oath of non-subversiveness as a condition of employment was unconstitutional (377 U.S. 360).

Canwell's unwillingness to change his opinions about Kizer, or any of the other people he accused of Communism, almost forty years later, shows how deeply ingrained McCarthyism was in right wing American politics. Testimonies of strong moral character were discarded in favor of ones that told Canwell's truth, using an approach framed by personal attacks and shifting the burden of proof. Kizer's story as a victim of Canwell is representative of many American individuals affected by anti-Communism in the midst of the twentieth century. Canwell persecuted Kizer because of Kizer's affiliations with Communist China and Soviet Russia, through the UNRRA and Russian War Relief respectively, but also

because of his membership of the IPR. These institutional affiliations apparently warranted individual condemnation, as Canwell alludes to their importance in declaring Kizer a Communist ally. His links to China, which in the early 1950s was considered a by-product of Soviet Communist expansionism, condemned Kizer in Canwell's eyes, in the same way Owen Lattimore's connections to China had done so in McCarthy's eyes. Kizer's individual lack of ties to Communism did not seem to matter, as in Canwell's opinion, his institutional ties to organizations perceived as Communist reflected sufficiently on his individual character to warrant prosecution.

Conclusion

Ever since the Russian Revolution of 1917, the United States regarded Russia with increased scrutiny and suspicion. Communism presented a threat to many of America's capitalist, freedom-loving ideals. When accusations of Communism within America itself started to come in, this scrutiny made America turn on itself, heralding the First Red Scare in 1919, and strong anti-Communist sentiment. After more than two decades of this anti-Communism in America, McCarthy arrived in Washington D.C. and McCarthyism took hold of American politics. In 1949, two years after McCarthy became senator, Communism took over China, resulting in a heightened fear of Communism, which was now even more of a threat. This development was perfect for McCarthy, who used these growing fears to bolster his D.C. fear mongering campaign, persecuting individuals with connections to China in the same fashion as individuals with connections to Soviet Russia. McCarthyism is described as a political ideology, which rests on un-substantiated claims of Communist subversion, often characterized by so-called Communist witch-hunts. In the late 1940s and 1950s, accusations of Communism and the culture of what would later become known as McCarthyism culminated in the Second Red Scare, and many people losing their jobs over Communist accusations. This culture prompted an era of persecution and public vilification that was unprecedented, and cost many their jobs or their reputations. The most salient aspect of McCarthyism and this period is that these accusations, and the ensuing prosecution and persecution, did not have to be based in fact. McCarthy himself was a master at casting doubt on individuals within the American government, and based the majority of his political success on his campaigns to weed out Communism within the government. Many others mirrored his behavior and attitude across the U.S., mainly Republicans, such as Albert Canwell, John Edgar Hoover, and Alfred Kohlberg.

Motivations behind McCarthyism differed. Some saw it as the only effective way to stop Communism's spread in America, fearing that it was taking over parts of the Eastern hemisphere, and that it would soon become a global phenomenon. Others used it simply as a political tool, painting their political opponents as Communists or Communist apologists, in a bid to discredit them, and gain a political advantage. For many proponents of McCarthyism, it was a combination of the two, following an ideology that was inherently opposed to Communism, and willing to go further than had previously been accepted in order to fight Communism. Canwell, for instance, was a perfect example of an anti-Communist who used

McCarthyism as a political tool, but did so in order to fight his perceived active Communist threat. Regardless of the motivation behind their actions, followers of McCarthyism ushered in a new era of American politics, one that was quickly dismissed as a mistake after the fact, a 'heat of the moment' situation that somehow managed to span multiple decades. McCarthyism obstructed bi-partisan cooperation, academic expansion, and any form of decency and decorum within American politics, and was perhaps even more destructive outside of politics. A landmark example of this destructive effect is the fate of the IPR, targeted because of individual associations with perceived Communism, and its links to China, which as a newly Communist regime warranted additional suspicion from anti-Communists. The McCarthyist practice of equating individual associations of Communism with institutional Communism cost the IPR dearly, which without McCarthyism might have blossomed and furthered relations with countries and intellectuals in the Pacific, but was instead snuffed out due to this perceived Communist infiltration. Additionally, the Institute's field presented a problem to anti-Communists, as its focus on the Pacific incorporated China, viewed with nearly as much distaste as Soviet Russia after its switch to Communism. Although the fate of the IPR presents a notable illustration of the dangers of McCarthyism, the true danger lies in the fact that it is one of many examples. Institutions, governmental departments, political nominees, individuals of the American public and more, all fell under the great shroud of McCarthyism that laid over America in the 1950s.

The feature that most distinguished McCarthyism from other eras of American political culture, then, was its reliance on aspersions and doubt rather than factual evidence. Any politician could accuse another of Communist affiliation, and as Canwell stated explicitly, the burden of proof was shifted primarily to the accused, where before it lay with the accuser. This shift allowed for a wholly new way of accusing people, which required less proof while simultaneously carrying equal weight, through fear mongering and harassment of the accused. Another important feature of McCarthyism was that it was not limited to the political world, as is evident from the example of the IPR, a non-governmental institution that was investigated by governmental organizations. Cases of McCarthyism that involve both the government and the public sphere are less likely to be based on purely political motives, as politicians stand to gain less from accusing a non-governmental institution than, say, a political opponent. Even though the case against the IPR was not completely political, it is almost impossible to remove politics from the equation entirely. There were still connections to be found between the IPR and the State Department, such as Owen Lattimore and Philip

Jaffe. Proximity of suspected Communists to a governmental institution such as the State Department required a strong response in McCarthy's eyes, but this was once again a case of Communism by association, blurring the lines between individual and institutional Communism. McCarthy's claims of the State Department's infiltration by Communists resulted in individual persecution of Lattimore, which in turn resulted in institutional persecution of the IPR. The Institute's position within a country suddenly dominated by fears of China, and suspicions of China-friendly institutions, also establishes the influence of politics on the prosecution of the IPR. Although it had managed to avoid allegations of Communism in the decades prior to the Chinese Communist Revolution, the increased scrutiny in the late 1940s and early 1950s proved harmful to the IPR.

In the early 1950s, a time when McCarthy was not yet considered a champion of the anti-Communist cause, and when the culture of McCarthyism had not yet reached its peak, McCarthy needed an easy win. His condemnation of the State Department had bore little fruit, and he needed a new outlet for his anti-Communist furor, one that would substantiate him as a true hawk when it came to Communism, someone that could spot it and hunt it down from miles away. The IPR would be that much needed win, as McCarthy ran a successful campaign against the reputation of the Institute. Kohlberg's publication on perceived Communism within the IPR's academic publications also proved vital. Kohlberg criticized *Pacific Affairs* for being too Leftist, and for not denouncing the Communist rebellion in China. This gave McCarthy a solid base from which to start his crusade. Although technically the IPR was never convicted of Communism or spying by any branch of the American government, public opinion and opinions on the matter in Washington D.C. proved sufficient for McCarthy to solidify his reputation. Fears of connections to China, and the long-established fear of Communist expansionism created an atmosphere that chose to shun the IPR rather than risk defending it. This is also represented in the Rockefeller Foundation's hesitation to continue IPR funding, as the Institute's reputation deteriorated. The process of likening individual and institutional Communism, as well as a narrative of Communism by association bolstered McCarthy's campaign. When he failed to find evidence of Communism at an institutional level, he instead focused on persecuting individuals for their perceived Communism, portraying this individual Communism as an institutional fault. This individual Communism was often extrapolated from association with other institutions, such as Edward Carter and the Russian War Relief, or Frederick Vanderbilt Field and *The Daily Worker*. By amalgamating individual and institutional Communism in this way, and by playing into

public fear of Soviet Russia and Communist China, McCarthy managed to dominate the way American politics were carried out for nearly a decade. In that sense, the IPR became one of the many martyrs of the McCarthy era, the martyrs that would eventually convince the American government and public that McCarthyism must be stopped.

An important aspect of anti-Communism, and of the prosecutions set into motion by the likes of Canwell, Kohlberg, and McCarthy, is its amalgamation of the institutional and individual components of Communism. By letting individual cases of Communism among members reflect on perceived Communism at an institutional level, McCarthy and Kohlberg's campaign against the IPR gained traction. This is also reflected in the lack of significant Communist convictions after the trial against the IPR. Individual, relatively weak, connections to Communism were extrapolated to the institutional level in an attempt to discredit the IPR as an organization, but these connections did not manage to substantiate a connection between the IPR and Communism. Similarly, Canwell's besmirching of Kizer in Washington State relied chiefly on his connections to organizations that Canwell deemed either simply left-wing or Communist, including the IPR. In this scenario, the institutional, represented by the IPR, reflected on the individual, represented by Kizer, in a mirrored facsimile of the fate of the IPR. This is especially pertinent because in the examples outlined within this thesis, the equation of institutional and individual goes both ways, without substantial evidence of either the institution's or the individual's Communism. Although such associative reasoning does not hold ground upon closer inspection, during a political climate fueled by anti-Communism and dominated by McCarthyism it held far more weight and subsequently had clear consequences.

Although not all individuals active within the IPR managed to come out of the Senate trials unscathed, their actual convictions are also telling. Owen Lattimore, for instance, who had been described by McCarthy as "the top Soviet espionage agent in the United States" (New York Times 1989), was convicted solely on charges of Perjury during the trial, as they could not get any charges of actual Communist subversion or treason to stick. Although McCarthy later amended his statement to "one of" the top agents, his insistence that Lattimore was a Soviet spy is clearly at odds with his eventual conviction. This is emblematic of McCarthy's conduct; he was desperately looking for a big Communist fish to fry, and so he made Lattimore out to be one, without actual evidence. In an unsurprising equivalence to the IPR as a whole, however, the trial and consequent convictions were enough to destroy Lattimore's reputation, and affect the rest of his academic life, and life in the public eye. Both

the IPR and Lattimore are excellent examples of the consequences of McCarthyism: a clear lack of substantiated evidence is overlooked in a continued attempt to pin the accused as a Communist. Whereas a lack of evidence in other political climates would most likely lead to a dismissal of the case, McCarthyism instead pushed for increased persecution, and a search for other, less relevant missteps. All of this was justified through the portrayal of Communism as an imminent and realistic threat; a mentality of 'even if we cannot convict this individual or institution on actual charges of Communism, we must find or set up additional charges, to remove this perceived threat'. This mentality also demonstrated the reasoning behind the targeting of the IPR. The IPR came under scrutiny not due to actual evidence of Communist infiltration, but rather due to its perceived threat. Its connections to China and its Leftist ideals that did not immediately condemn Mao Zedong aroused suspicion, and McCarthy played into these suspicions.

Similar proceedings occurred at the state and local level all over America. Anyone, from a small town mayoral candidate, to a candidate for congress of a large state was able to use the fight against Communism as a talking point. Of course, not every individual embroiled in politics made use of the culture of McCarthyism, but a significant amount did. Albert Canwell was one of the most pertinent examples of an anti-Communist in a State Congress, and his conduct during Washington State's investigations into alleged Communist subversion was highly reminiscent of the trials McCarthy and McCarran were holding in Washington D.C.. Canwell can be considered a quintessential anti-Communist, having worked with the FBI, and on his own, to uncover Communism in his area of Washington State. His dedication to rooting out Communism shows that it was not simply a political tool for Canwell, but that he was heavily invested in fighting his imagined Communist presence in Washington State. This dedication is reinforced by the way he speaks about the Communist threat in his oral history, forty years later: even at that time he is still convinced America was under siege, and that he was instrumental in halting the Red tide in the Pacific Northwest. This sets him apart from McCarthyists who ascribed to the ideology purely for political gain morally, but his tactics remained the same, and his hounding of innocent Americans was as morally reprehensible as that of McCarthy, if not more so. Canwell's personal beliefs and fear of Communism made his crusade in the Pacific Northwest especially vicious, and prolific. His committee holds the legacy of being one of the most vilifying, and uncompromising anti-Communist legislative bodies, conducting strikingly polarized trials, and bringing Salem into the American twentieth century.

Canwell's dedication to fighting Communism, combined with his apparent dislike for Kizer and other Spokane intellectuals, led to harsh condemnations of many in his area. Institutions in Canwell's sights, such as the IPR, Russian War Relief, and the National Lawyers Guild were similarly condemned by his wide-ranging suspicions. Kizer himself was a member of these institutions and organizations, as they related either to his profession, or to his interests. Various Anti-Communists, such as Canwell and McCarthy himself, however, designated all of these institutions as having some level of Communist involvement. The Russian War Relief and the National Lawyers Guild were perceived as Communist fronts. The IPR stands out on this list, as it was condemned chiefly for its perceived individual connections to Communism, with no substantiated evidence of institutional Communism. When considering the argumentation and evidence provided by these anti-Communists, it quickly becomes apparent that it is unlikely that these institutions are inundated with Communism, as they claim. Rather, these examples, and other institutions that fell victim to McCarthyism, ascribe to a different, more leftist ideology than McCarthyists, and were persecuted for their ideology and their connection to China and Russia, regardless of the nature of these connections. Because this ideology may overlap with Communism on certain points, such as civil rights, it is then immediately considered a threat directly related to Communism. This threat is subsequently equated with Communism, and so too is the institution. Although modern political climates are likely to reject such condemnation, as it relies on an inherently flawed reasoning, McCarthy and his followers made considerable use of it. This culture of accusations and unsubstantiated attacks proliferated a mentality that made the witch hunts described in this thesis possible.

McCarthy's rise to power through Congress, and Canwell's nearly identical ascension to his State Congress, are two historical markers of McCarthyism, and provide a background of anti-Communism for the events that befell the Institute of Pacific Relations and Benjamin H. Kizer. The culture propagated by these two men, and by many other followers of McCarthy in Washington D.C. and across America, set into motion a veritable crusade. This crusade would end up costing thousands of innocent Americans their job, and spell the end for institutions such as the IPR. Although generally considered a dark, misguided period in American political history, proponents of McCarthyism still remain, regardless of the devastation caused by an ideology that revolved around hostility and suspicion. Ironically, the seeds of mistrust and suspicion sowed by McCarthy and his acolytes ended up being more effective at destabilizing the American political world than most Communist propaganda ever

was. The IPR and Kizer will continue to stand as martyrs of McCarthy's mid-century assault on America.

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