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The search for a division between the United Nations and the European Union with regard to the deployment of military operations:
the role of humanitarianism and realism

Maarten Foekens

Human Geography, Master Specialisation: Conflicts, Territories, and Identities

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Contents

Abbreviations

ABAKO	Alliance des Bakongo
AFDL	Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo-Zaire
AU	The African Union
CEMAC	The Central African Economic and Monetary Community (French abbreviation)
CFSP	The Common Foreign and Security Policy
CIS	The Commonwealth of Independent States
DDR	Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration
DPA	The Department of Political Affairs
DRC	The Democratic Republic of the Congo
EC	The European Community
ECOWAS	The Economic Community of West African States
ESC	The Economic and Social Council
ESDP	The European Security and Defence Policy
ESS	The European Security Strategy
GAERC	The General Affairs and Foreign Relations Council
ICJ	The International Court of Justice
ICRC	The International Committee of the Red Cross
IR	International Relations
MLC	Mouvement pour la Libération du Congo
MNC	Mouvement National Congolais
NATO	The North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
OAS	The Organization of American States
OCHA	The Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OHCHR	The Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights
OSCE	The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
PSC	The Political and Security Committee
RCD	Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie
SADC	The Southern African Development Community
SSR	Security Sector Reform
UN	The United Nations
UNDP	The United Nations Development Programme
(UN)DPKO	The Department of Peacekeeping Operations
(UN)DPA	The Department of Political Affairs
(UN)GA	The United Nations General Assembly
UNICEF	The United Nations Children's Fund
(UN)SC	The United Nations Security Council
(UN)SG	The United Nations Secretary General
WEU	The Western European Union
WFP	The World Food Programme

Introduction

In front of you there is a research on military operations, this research tries to find an answer to the question whether there is a division visible between the United Nations and the European Union with regard to the deployment of military operations. The existence of this division will be examined in the light of two theories of International Relations; humanitarianism and realism. Hereinafter this introduction will point out the adopted course of this research, the objectives, the social and scientific relevance, the content and the formulated central hypothesis and sub hypotheses.

The idea was to design a research on peace operations. The content was from the beginning onwards under construction. Was my first desire to examine the quality of peace operations deployed by different organizations, my second solely focused on the existence of a distribution between several organizations that deploy peace operations. Because of limitations in time and number of pages the content of this research needed some severe reviews and who sees the title of this research know which direction it turned. Not all organizations that deploy peace operations will be examined but only the United Nations and European Union, and not all peace operations will be examined but only the peace operations in which a large number of military personnel are deployed. Later on this introduction will explain the choice for these organizations, first something about the subject and central goal of this thesis.

In short the subject of this research is the existence or absence of a division between the UN and the EU with regard to the deployment of military personnel.
The main reason to deal with this subject is curiosity. Curiosity about what are the real motives behind the deployment of military personnel, curiosity about the decision making procedure within both organizations, curiosity about the relation between the UN and the EU, with other words: curiosity with regard to all subjects related to peace operations.
Because the existence of a division is a very broad subject this thesis used two theories of International Relations; humanitarianism and realism to find out whether a division is present and inserted these theories in the central hypothesis: 'UN military operations are mainly deployed for humanitarian purposes whereas realism is the basis for EU military operations'.

The two theories will first of all demarcate the research and with regard to the theories themselves the main reason to deal with these two theories lies in the fact that whoever examines subjects related to peace operations is often confronted with the term realism. With this theory there is an interesting starting point to deal with peace operations and the organizations involved. To formulate a hypothesis this research searched for a counterpart. Idealism was an option yet with in mind the growing attention for humanitarian interventions this thesis preferred humanitarianism.

This thesis presumes first of all that there is a division between the UN and the EU with regard to the deployment of military personnel, Furthermore this thesis also presumes that the UN is guided by humanitarianism and the EU guided by realism and will examine whether this is really the case. Also the sub hypothesis formulated in this thesis clearly indicates the presumed different theories that are guiding for the UN and the EU. By applying these theories to the UN and the EU this thesis wants to find out whether there are some clear indications of a division between the organizations. So there we have two organizations, two theories and one subject, time to explain the relevance and construct a research.

The number of conflicts and fatalities in human history are massively. As we speak today there are still several conflicts ongoing, conflicts that started decades ago (Israel/Arab) but also conflicts that broke out (again) more recently (Iraq, Chad and so on). The first words of the United Nations Charter

are: "*We the peoples of the United Nations determined to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war*". This is a noble goal and one cannot deny that the UN has been kept busy since the end of World War II. The UN is deploying military personnel throughout the world and it is fair to state that the United Nations is the most important organization with regard to peace operations. The organization has a long history of deployment of military personnel and is entrusted with the maintenance of international peace and security. The European Union on the other hand is a regional organization. Where the UN has a long history of military deployment the Union in this respect is still in its infancy with regard to the deployment of military personnel under its own flag. This however does not take away that the Union seeks it role as a global player, and the foreign and security policy should contribute to the fulfillment of this role. The role of the European Union with regard to maintaining international peace and security is growing. This has not only to do with more coherence, willingness and national influence within the EU but also with the lack of capacity of the UN. The ministers of foreign affairs and defence of the Dutch government are for example clearly stating in their letters to the Dutch parliament that they prefer the situation in which the execution of peace operations is putted in the hands of the EU and NATO. These differences, the evolvement of the Union and the role both organizations play in the world makes these two organizations worth examining.

What is clear is that there are a lot of documents dealing with peace operations. Both the United Nations and the European Union are giving for every operation the background, facts, figures, mandates and all the documents that the organization itself adopted. Documents referred to are for example the resolutions of the Security Council, resolutions of the General Assembly, reports of the Secretary-General, the European Security Strategy, and the Joint Actions of the Council. Although the documentation of both organizations is quite comprehensive, specific information on the decision-making process and explicit reference to decisive factors to deploy militaries is lacking. The UN is most of the time referring to situations as being a threat to international peace and security and sees a need for humanitarian assistance. The question is what does definitions like 'international peace and security' and 'humanitarian assistance' mean and when is this endangered or necessary? Are there clear blue prints for these situations or are these decision made on a case-by-case approach? It might be clear that the documentation on the subject of the thesis is far from perfect. Next to the questions on the definition there are other questions that are more important for this research. These questions are related to the process of decision making and the outcomes. Central is the question when does the United Nations deploy military personnel and when does the European Union deploy military personnel? Other questions that are related to this central question are why the UN and the EU deploy military personnel in certain areas while in the meantime are not involved in other situations that occur? With in mind the pressing need to deploy military personnel in the Middle-East and in Africa this thesis is wondering whether there are some crucial factors behind the decision to deploy military personnel. The reason to deal with these questions is because this thesis tries to see through the whole process related to peace operations. It will be though to see through this whole process but by labelling the UN and the EU as organizations guided by respectively humanitarianism and realism this thesis has a starting point.

This introduction already brought forward the evolvement of the European Union in the last decade with regard to the deployment of military personnel it is however uncertain what the future will have in store for this organization and more important how will this organization evolve. One might think for example about the relation between the military and civilian component of peace operations. With regard to the future of peace operations it is also questionable what the influence of the notion 'responsibility to protect' will be on the decision making process within the UN and the EU. Next to the evolvements within the two organizations it is uncertain what will happen on the ground in Africa, in the Middle East and in countries like Iraq and Afghanistan. Providing an unambiguous answer to all these question and predict the future will be problematic therefore this thesis wants to examine military operations deployed by the UN and the EU with in mind the theories of

humanitarianism and realism and deliver a contribution to this area of scientific research, by examining what rely matters with regard to the deployment of military personnel.

This research will first of all point out the meaning of both theories and the ongoing debate with regard to peace operations and introduce the formulated sub hypotheses (chapter 1). To provide a comprehensive framework this research will describe the background of both organizations, the internal structure of both organizations and several relevant issues with regard to peace operations and more specific military operations (chapter 2). When this framework is constructed this research will deal with the four sub hypotheses that presume that the UN is an organization guided by humanitarianism while the EU is guided by realism and will link these theories with four important aspects of the deployment of military personnel by the two organizations (chapter 3). These will be the purposes and priorities of the organizations (paragraph 3.2), the geographical preferences of the organizations (paragraph 3.3), the decisive factors for the organizations (paragraph 3.4), and the characteristics of the military operations of both organizations (paragraph 3.5). Dealing with all these aspects and the formulated sub hypothesis will make it possible to formulate an answer to the central hypothesis. Furthermore this thesis will examine whether in the above mentioned paragraphs indications can be found for the existence of a division between the UN and the EU. Before this thesis comes to a final conclusion on the central hypothesis and the division it will deal with three cases in which the UN and / or the EU deployed military personnel, and find out whether practice confirms the answers of this research. The cases dealt with will be Sierra Leone, Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (chapter 4).

Before this thesis continues I want to thank everybody who contributed to this piece of work, by answering my questions, criticize my work or by simply supporting me.

Enjoy

Maarten Foekens

Chapter 1
Humanitarianism, Realism, The Debate, And The Four Sub Hypothesis

1.1 Introduction
1.2 Humanitarianism
1.3 Realism
1.4 The debate
1.5 The four sub hypothesis

1.1 Introduction

 Like stated in the introduction this thesis wants to examine whether there is a distinction between the United Nations and the European Union with regard to the deployment of military personnel. The central hypothesis is formulated as follows: 'UN military operations are mainly deployed for humanitarian purposes whereas realism is the basis for EU military operations'. This chapter will first of all bring forward the content of the two theories brought forward in the hypothesis; humanitarianism and realism and explain that these theories can describe the actual intentions behind military intervention. When the content of these theories are given this chapter will point out that the theories are subject to a debate. This debate deals with the role of theories with regard to the deployment of peace operations. Finally this chapter will point out how this thesis will examine the hypothesis, by bringing forward the four sub hypothesis that will be dealt with in this thesis.

1.2 Humanitarianism

What is humanitarianism anyway?[1] On the question what is humanitarianism Wolfram Alpha (computational knowledge engine) answers "the doctrine that people's duty is to promote human welfare". The online dictionary refers to "the doctrine that humanity's obligations are concerned wholly with the welfare of the human race".[2] Or as defined by the encyclopedia Britannica "Humanitarianism, strictly defined, is the institutionalization of compassion".[3] A more extensive definition is formulated in an article published by Oxfam International that state that: "Humanitarianism is the belief that all human beings deserve respect and dignity, and to enjoy their rights to assistance and protection. Humanitarians accordingly dedicate themselves to help provide that assistance and protection for everyone who needs them, irrespective of race, creed, religion, nationality or any other distinction. The obligation to save lives, alleviate suffering and promote human dignity in the middle of human-made or natural disasters is more important than any other principle or ideology". Furthermore this article brings forward the opinion of Albert Schweitzer who states that "Humanitarianism consists in never sacrificing a human being to a purpose". The basis of modern humanitarianism lies according to some in the Red Cross Movement in the late 19th century.[4]

What becomes clear immediately are two things, first of all the definition of humanitarianism, if there is one, is very broad, constantly developing and applicable to many aspects of international relations. Second of all is the intermixture of the term humanitarianism with humanitarians, humanitarian law, human rights, human welfare and so on. A discussion on the content of the term

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[1] http://www.ncciraq.org/IMG/pdf/What_is_Humanitarianism_anyway.pdf.
[2] http://dictionary.reference.com/search?q=Humanitarianism.
[3] http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/551385/social-science/38921/New-intellectual-and-philosophical-tendencies#ref=ref423659.
[4] Oxfam International's Policy Compendium Note on Humanitarianism, to be found on: http://humanitarian-space.dk/fileadmin/templates/billeder/dokumenter/oi_hum_policy_humanitarianism.txt.

humanitarianism would be a research on itself therefore this thesis will hold with the general and broad description of humanitarianism that includes human welfare and the key cornerstone of humanitarianism – independence, neutrality, impartiality and 'doing no harm' (seeking not to buy into nor exacerbate the conflict in any way) and the broader aspects of humanitarianism revolving around promotion of human rights and justice issues.[5]

What becomes clear is that humanitarianism is closely related to humanitarian intervention and also humanitarian action. About the definition of humanitarian intervention there is an ongoing debate. The NATO for example defined humanitarian intervention as an armed intervention in another state, without the agreement of that state, to address (the threat of) a humanitarian disaster, in particular caused by grave and large-scale violations of fundamental human rights.[6]

In the old days, humanitarian intervention was a lawyer's doctrine, a way of justifying a very limited set of exceptions to the principles of national sovereignty and territorial integrity.[7]
Holzgrefe defines humanitarian intervention as the threat or use of force across state borders by a state (or a group of states) aimed at preventing or ending widespread and grave violations of fundamental human rights of individuals other than its own citizens, without the permission of the state within whose territory force is applied.[8] This definition leaves unattended two types of behaviour, the non-forcible intervention (threat or use of economic, diplomatic or other sanctions) and forcible interventions aimed at protecting or rescuing the intervening state's own nationals. Adam Roberts defines humanitarian intervention as a "military intervention in a state, without the approval of its authorities, and with the purpose of preventing widespread suffering or death among the inhabitants".[9] For Tonny Brems Knudsen, humanitarian intervention is "dictatorial or coercive interference in the sphere of jurisdiction of a sovereign state motivated or legitimated by humanitarian concerns".[10] According to Martha Finnemore, humanitarian intervention is a "military intervention with the goal of protecting the lives and welfare of foreign civilians".[11] In the words of Bhikhu Parekh, humanitarian intervention is "an act of intervention in the internal affairs of another country with a view to ending the physical suffering caused by the disintegrations or gross misuse of authority of the state, and helping create conditions in which a viable structure of civil authority can emerge".[12] In a proper legal sense, according to Wil D. Verwey, it is understood "as referring only to coercive action taken by states, at their initiative, and involving the use of armed force, for the purpose of preventing or putting a halt to serious and wide-scale violations of fundamental human rights, in particular the right to life, inside the territory of another state".[13] For an extensive description of the definition of the concept, the common points within the definitions, the evolution of the concept until the Cold War, the changing context in the post-Cold War era, and the UN

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[5]Global Future, A World Vision Journal on Human Development, Number 2, 2006, Humanitarianism revisited: issues for the 21st century. To be found on:
http://www.globalfutureonline.org/PolicyAdvocacy/GlblFutr.nsf/issues/E99341D03FDD284588257203001FF794/$File/GF062web.pdf?OpenElement.
[6] This definition was adopted by a NATO seminar in Scheveningen on the topic in November 1999.
[7] Michael Walzer: "The Argument about Humanitarian Intervention". To be found on: http://them.polylog.org/5/awm-en.htm.
[8] J.L. Holzgrefe and Robert O. Keohane: 'Humanitarian Intervention; Ethical, Legal, and Political Dilemmas. P. 18 To be found on: http://assets.cambridge.org/97805218/21988/sample/9780521821988ws.pdf.
[9] Adam Roberts, 'Humanitarian War: Military Intervention and Human Rights', International Affairs, Vol. 69, No. 3, July 1993, p. 426.
[10] Tonny Brems Knudsen, 'Humanitarian Intervention Revisited: Post-Cold War Responses to Classical Problems', in Michael Pugh, The UN, Peace and Force, London, Frank Cass, 1997, p. 146.
[11] Martha Finnemore, 'Constructing Norms of Humanitarian Intervention', in Peter Z. Katzenstein (ed.), The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identities in World Politics, New York, Colombia University Press, 1996, p. 154.
[12] Bhikhu Parekh, 'Rethinking Humanitarian Intervention', in Jan Nederveen Pieterse (ed.), World Orders in the Making, London, Macmillan Press Ltd, 1998, p. 147.
[13] 5 Wil D. Verwey, 'Humanitarian Intervention in the 1990s and Beyond: An International Law Perspective', in Jan Nederveen Pieterse (ed.), World Orders in the Making, London, Macmillan Press Ltd, 1998, p. 180.

justification by using 'threat to international peace and security' this thesis refers to an article written by Saban Kardas[14] and an article written by Bhikhu Parekh which analyzes the nature of humanitarian intervention, its historical specificity and presuppositions.[15]

In this thesis the term humanitarianism will be used to indicate the theory that can be used to explain the reasons behind military intervention. Humanitarianism in this sense means that there is special attention for humanitarian concerns to relief human suffering, to prevent or address a humanitarian disaster or for the protection of human beings.

1.3 Realism

To come to a general description of the term realism is quite problematic. Therefore this thesis joins several books and articles written in the last decades. Is his book 'Realism and International Relations'[16], Jack Donnely clearly describes the nature and contribution of realism. Donnely starts his description of 'a definition' with the sentences: "Realism emphasizes the constraints on politics imposed by human nature and the absence of international government. Together, they make international relations largely a realm of power and interest".[17]

To define realism Donnely refers to Waltz, Morgenthau, Maersheimer, Gilpin, Smith, Carr etc. When reading more about the theory one will find out that these writers are representatives of different branches of the theory, Carr (modern realism), Waltz (defensive realism), Maersheimer (offensive realism), Gilpin (hegemonic theory) and Morgenthau (neoclassical realism). What becomes clear is that there is an long history of the theory, the definition of realism is subject to debate, and also important to mention is that realism is a term that is not only used to describe peace operations but also areas such as arts, law and philosophy.

In short we can introduce some representative definitions of realism. Keohane brings forward the state-centric assumption: states are the most important actors in world politics. Furthermore Keohane deals with the power assumption: states seek power and they calculate their interests in terms of power.[18] A second definition is the one brought forward by Wayman and Diehl. They state first of all that the international system is anarchic, furthermore nation-states pursue their own national interests defined primarily in terms of power. Secondly they argue the primacy of balance of power politics.[19] Also Gilpin brings forward a definition of realism. Two central parts of his definition are that states are motivated primarily by their national interests and that power relations are a fundamental feature of international affairs.[20] A fourth definition, of Frankel, highlights the centrality of states, the anarchy in the world, the notion that states seek to maximize their security or their power and the utility of force.[21] A last definition this chapter wants to bring forward is the one drafted by Schweller: International affairs takes place in a state of anarchy, power is the fundamental

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[14] Saban Kardas: "Humanitarian Intervention: The Evolution Of The Idea and Practice" in Perceptions, journal of international affairs, June-July 2001 Volume VI - Number 2 to be found on:

[15] The article of Bhikhu Parekh can also be found in *International Political Science Review / Revue internationale de science politique*, Vol. 18, No. 1, January 1997, pp. 49-69.

[16] Jack Donnely: 'Realism and International Relations'. Cambridge University Press. 2000. To be found on: http://assets.cambridge.org/97805215/97524/frontmatter/9780521597524_frontmatter.pdf.

[17] Jack Donnely: 'Realism and International Relations'. Cambridge University Press. 2000. p.7. to be found on: http://assets.cambridge.org/97805215/92291/sample/9780521592291wsc00.pdf.

[18] Book Review: Robert O. Keohane (ed.): 'Neorealism and its Critics' (1986).

[19] Frank Whelon Wayman, Paul Francis Diehl Reconstructing Realpolitik (1994).

[20] Robert Gilpin in: Realism: restatements and renewal (1996).

[21] Benjamin Frankel: roots of realism (1996).

feature of international politics and politics are not a function of ethics.[22]

Having this all said it becomes clear that terms as anarchy, power, security, state-centric and own interest are essential in defining realism. For this thesis realism, in the context of international relations, is a receptacle of theories and approaches that have in common that they believe that behavior of states is primarily driven by power and security.[23]

1.4 The debate

This chapter brought forward two theories that can be used to explain the choices made by the UN and the EU with regard to the deployment of military personnel. Before we move on to the subsequent chapters it is necessary to say something about International Relation (IR) and the debate with regard to peace operations.

There are several ongoing debates with regard to peace operations, intervention and international relations.[24] This thesis wants to focus on the debate that deals with theories behind the deployment of military personnel. Two theories and two organizations will be central in this thesis: humanitarianism and realism and the United Nations and the European Union. The question to be answered is what the guiding theory for the UN and the EU with regard to the deployment of military personnel is.

International Relations

International Relations can be described as the study/science that deals with foreign affairs and global issues among states, international organizations and non-governmental organizations. Within IR several theories are developed like realism, liberalism, idealism, positivism, postmodernism, (social) constructivism, the international society theory and so on. This thesis will deal with realism and humanitarianism. It is fair to say that realism (and neo-realism) is one of the first and most familiar theories of IR. The previous paragraph introduced a description of realism and outlined several characteristics. With regard to humanitarianism this is less clear. Humanitarianism as theory is less familiar and for scientist in IR, humanitarian intervention on the other hand is well known. Other theories that are related to humanitarianism are idealism, neoliberalism, solidarism and humanitarian idealism.[25] Perhaps it is necessary to indicate why this thesis will not deal with the above mentioned theories but with the theory of humanitarianism. With regard to idealism one can ask himself what is the ideal situation and in which cases should organizations act / intervene on the basis of idealism? The presence of humanitarianism, one the contrary, can more easily be detect when we look at the number of casualties, the humanitarian situation in a country and so on. Neoliberalism as a theory that contains terms like economy and free market is not the right theory to oppose the theory of realism brought forward in this thesis. Also solidarism, which mainly deals with cohesion, is not the theory that can contribute to the main purpose of this thesis namely to examine the theories that are in central in the decision-making process within the UN and the EU.

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[22] Randall L. Schweller: "New Realist Research on Alliances: Refining, Not Refuting, Waltz's Balancing Proposition," American Political Science Review, Vol. 91, No. 4 (December 1997). "A Tale of Two Realisms: Expanding the Institutions Debate", Mershon International Studies Review, Vol. 41, Supplement 2 (April 1997), with David Priess.

[23] For a more extensive description of realism see: http://www.iep.utm.edu/p/polreal.htm.

[24] To mention only some: there is a debate on the current role of realism, there are debates on the content/ concept of humanitarian intervention, there is a so-called realism-idealism debate. There is a debate on the relation between peace operations and IR, and there is a debate on the legitimatisation of humanitarian interventions.

[25] For example: W.D. Eberwein who states that: "Humanitarian actors, as they argue, operate on the basis of idealism". To be found on: http://bibliothek.wzb.eu/pdf/2001/p01-307.pdf and Mona Fixdal and Dan Smith: 'Humanitarian Intervention and Just War', who state that: "Idealism is inherent in the premises for humanitarian intervention" to be found on: http://www.jstor.org.proxy.ubn.ru.nl:8080/stable/pdfplus/254418.pdf.

Ongoing debate

The reason to deal with realism and humanitarianism is because of the ongoing debate with regard to peace operations on the reasons to, and justification of, deployment of military personnel. Is the UN more guided by realist purposes than by humanitarian purposes? And are realist purposes the main basis for EU behaviour? The question remains what role of both theories play with regard to the decision to deploy military operations. The question in this thesis is not what should be the theory that guides the decision making process in the UN and the EU, this would lead to a morale debate. The question to be answered is what the guiding theory for the UN and the EU with regard to the deployment of military personnel is.

The debate becomes really interesting when we consider why in several cases, where human beings where at risk, the UN and the EU did not intervene. That the role of the EU as youthful and regional organizations is different and that the EU will not intervene in all situations is understandable, yet why certain countries are preferred above others can be part of the debate. When we consider the cases in which the UN did not intervene directly Rwanda, Congo and Chechnya are the first countries that comes to mind. Neil MacFarlane states that "*In contrasting cases where liberal interventions did occur with those where, in equally or more compelling circumstances it did not, one is driven to the conclusion that commitments of substantial military resources depended on the level of perceived interest of major states. Where this interest was not evident (as in Rwanda) and/or where the human rights agenda conflicted with the power-political interests of major states (as in Chechnya), forceful peace operations did not occur, or, as in Kosovo, they did occur but outside the UN mandating machinery*".[26]

With regard to the absence and existence of humanitarian and realist purposes for the UN decision making process an interesting research is done by Gilligan and Stedman.[27] In their research they refer to prior research. The first one mentioned is Bennis[28]: "*In the real world any UN decision to intervene or any UN decision to legitimize or endorse any country's unilateral intervention against another country will reflect the dominant power of the intervening side and the relative importance of the subject nation . . . anyone who believes that the real motivation for outside governmental military intervention (UN endorsed or otherwise) is the alleviation of civilian hardship is suffering from a serious delusion of benevolence*".
David Gibbs (1997)[29] hints at classic imperialistic motives behind decisions of the United Nations to deploy operations, even in seemingly unselfish interventions (Somalia) one can find 'grubby' motivations. Not all academics go as far as Bennis or Gibbs, most are more nuanced with regard to the motivation. Emphasize is on the extent to which any decision to deploy operations must partially serve the national interests of the permanent members of the SC.
An example is Chantal De Jonge Oudraat (1996)[30] who argues that the choice of where the United Nations goes is determined by "*The extent to which the interests of one or more of the members of the P-5 are engaged in the case in question; and the extent to which the conflict is believed by the P-5 to constitute a threat to international peace and security*". A threat to international peace is defined

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[26] S. Neil MacFarlane: "The Theory and Practice of Peacekeeping in the 1990s". To be found on: http://www.global-g.jp/paper/3-10.pdf.
[27] Michael Gilligan and Stephen John Stedman: 'Where do Peacekeepers go', p.49. International Studies Review, Vol. 5, No. 4, Dissolving Boundaries, December 2003, pp. 37- 54. To be found on: http://www.jstor.org.proxy.ubn.ru.nl:8080/stable/3186392?seq=1&cookieSet=1.
[28] Bennis, Phylis, PHYLIS. (1996) Calling the Shots: How Washington Dominates Today's U.N. New York: Olive Branch Press.
[29] Gibbs, David. (1997) Is Peacekeeping a New Form of Imperialism? International Peacekeeping 4: pps. 122-128.
[30] Chantal de Jonge Oudraat (1996): "The United Nations and Internal Conflict. In: International Dimensions of Internal Conflicts, edited by Michael E. Brown, MA: MIT Press.

on the basis of whether the war spills over its borders to pose a larger regional threat.[31] Other research is done by Neack[32], she concludes that the findings support a realist interpretation; that is "*States whose interests were better served by the continuation of the status quo-that is, states of the advanced industrialized West and non-Western states that have enjoyed some prestige in the international status quo-have dominated United Nations peacekeeping*". Peter Jacobsen (1996)[33] argues that national interest is not the sine qua non for intervention that many believe, but that the power of what is known as the CNN effect is also less than many believe. Andreas Andersson (2000)[34] also disputes the argument that the national interests of the permanent members are decisive for where the United Nations chooses to go. Noting the broad geographical distribution of interventions and the many deployments that appear to be independent of any permanent member's direct interest, he argues that the Security Council has been guided primarily by a desire to promote democracy in the world. He interprets this motive as an idealistic interest of the permanent members related to the democratic peace hypothesis. In their research Gilligan and Stedman furthermore explain some of the problems in literature and in the variables used in different theories and models and explain which variables they used.[35] Gilligan and Stedman on the basis of their research conclude that the more severe a conflict, measured by the number of deaths, the more likely the United Nations is to intervene. Another finding is that there is no evidence that the UN intervenes more likely in countries with high primary commodity exports. And finding number 9 of the research is that there is no evidence that the UN intervenes in former colonies of the permanent members of the SC at a higher rate than it does in other countries. In their conclusion Gilligan and Stedman state that the UN is more sensitive to humanitarian missions than it is given credit for.[36]

When we look at the EU it is possible to ask our self the same questions and find out whether the decisions to deploy military personnel are taken on the basis of realistic purposes, humanitarian purposes or a combination of both. Finding the answers to these questions can be problematic when we keep in mind the possible difference between what is on paper and what is the content of the discussion between the decision makers. Furthermore it is sometime hard to separate humanitarian and realist purposes and sometimes both purposes are part of the considerations. What is also possible is that in different situation different purposes are important and some cases are the exception and whether these exceptions prove the rule is not certain.

Other reasons

This thesis introduced the debate with regard to the deployment of military personnel, other reasons to deal with these operations and the theories are first of all the role realism, interests and power, did play and do play with regard to peace operations. The second reason is the growing attention for humanitarian considerations. Currently issues like human rights, poverty, humanitarian suffering and human catastrophes are explicitly referred to when organizations indicate its reasons to intervene in states. Are these references to humanitarian considerations only used to hush up real intentions and justify the intervention or are these considerations really decisive? That humanitarian intervention is so controversial is because of the difficulty in judging an organization's true motivation to

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[31] Michael Gilligan and Stephen John Stedman: "Where do Peacekeepers go". To be found on: http://www.jstor.org.proxy.ubn.ru.nl:8080/stable/3186392?seq=1&cookieSet=1.

[32] Laura Neack (1995): UN Peace-keeping: In the Interest of Community or Self? Journal of Peace Research 32:181-196.

[33] Peter Viggo Jacobsen (1996) National Interest, Humanitarianism or CNN: What Triggers UN Peace Enforcement after the Cold War? Journal of Peace Research 33:205-215.

[34] Andreas Andersson: Democracies and UN Peacekeeping Operations, 1990-1996. International Peacekeeping, 2000, 7:1-22.

[35] For these problems and variables see page 39 and following of Michael Gilligan and Stephen John Stedman: "Where do Peacekeepers go". To be found on: http://www.jstor.org.proxy.ubn.ru.nl:8080/stable/3186392?seq=1&cookieSet=1.

[36] Michael Gilligan and Stephen John Stedman: 'Where do Peacekeepers go', p.53. International Studies Review, Vol. 5, No. 4, Dissolving Boundaries, December 2003, pp. 37- 54. To be found on: http://www.jstor.org.proxy.ubn.ru.nl:8080/stable/3186392?seq=1&cookieSet=1.

intervene.[37] A third reason is the differences between the two theories. Realists believe that intervention should only occur if it is in a state's (organizations') national interest because if not, the host state's rights are violated and in a sense, realists are entirely against humanitarian intervention because when they legitimize intervention, it is certainly not for a humanitarian agenda, but to protect and enhance the national interest.[38]

More and more operations are referred to as being humanitarian operations / humanitarian interventions / humanitarian actions and at the same time humanitarian intervention is one of the most debated topics in the international relations community. Adam Roberts states that: "*Since the end of the Cold War there has been a strong trend towards identifying humanitarian considerations as a basis for certain military mandates and actions. This trend has been observed not only in armed conflicts, whether civil or international (for example, Bosnia and Sierra Leone), but also in situations of tyrannical or brutal government (Rwanda and Haiti), uncontrolled violence (Somalia and Albania), and the establishment of international forces to help implement a peace agreement (Kosovo and East Timor). Some of the cases mentioned have had characteristics of several of these types of situation*".[39]

This thesis will bring forward several documents that support or oppose the central hypothesis. It will become clear that there is a debate on the existence or absence of realist and humanitarian purposes with regard to the deployment of military personnel by the UN and the EU. To examine the central hypothesis the subsequent paragraph will bring forward five sub hypotheses.

1.4 The four sub hypothesis

The central hypothesis of this thesis is that UN military operations are mainly deployed for humanitarian purposes whereas realism is the basis for EU military operations. To examine this hypothesis chapter 3 will deal with four different aspects of the organizations with regard to the military operations. These aspects will be the purposes and priorities of the UN and the EU with regard to the deployment of military personnel; the geographical preferences of both organizations; the decisive factors to deploy military personnel by both organizations; and the characteristics of the operations deployed by both organizations. Every aspect will be examined on the basis of a sub hypothesis. These sub hypotheses are formulated with in mind certain presumption, which will be explained in the respectively paragraphs. The following sub hypotheses will be introduced:

In paragraph 3.2 which deal with the purposes and priorities of the United Nations and the European Union with regard to military operations the sub hypothesis will be:

- *The purposes and priorities of organizations guided by humanitarianism seek to achieve humanitarian objectives while an organization guided by realist considerations will be an expression of own interests. So the UN seeks to achieve humanitarian objectives while the EU is mostly interested in own interests.*

In paragraph 3.3 which deal with the geographical preferences of the United Nations and the European Union with regard to military operations the sub hypothesis will be:

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[37] April Putney: 'Humanitarian Intervention', to be found on:
http://wrt-intertext.syr.edu/XI/HumanitarianIntervention.html.
[38] April Putney: 'Humanitarian Intervention', to be found on:
http://wrt-intertext.syr.edu/XI/HumanitarianIntervention.html.
[39] Roberts, Adam. 'Humanitarian Issues and Agencies as Triggers for International Military Action.' *International Review of the Red Cross* Vol. 82 No. 839 (2000), pp. 673-698. To be found on:
http://www.icrc.org/Web/Eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/57JQQA.

- *For an organization guided by humanitarianism there are no geographical preferences, the UN will deploy military personnel where required and when preferences exist than this is related to the intensity of human suffering. The geographical preferences of the EU, as a realist organization, will indicate areas in which it has political, economic and security interests.*

In paragraph 3.4 which deal with the decisive factors for the United Nations and the European Union to deploy military operations with regard to military operations the sub hypothesis will be:

- *Decisive for the UN, an organization guided by humanitarianism, will be the situation that occurs, while for the EU, an organization guided by realism, decisive will be the willingness and the interests at stake.*

In paragraph 3.5 which deal with the characteristics and preferences of the United Nations and European Union with regard to military operations the sub hypothesis will be:

- *The characteristics of operations deployed by the UN, an organizations guided by humanitarianism, will point out the importance of broad operations that will remain in place as long as necessary, while an organization guided by realist purposes, the EU, deploys military personnel no longer than necessary and the size will depend on the willingness of the organization.*

Before this thesis will deal with the different sub hypotheses it will introduce several aspects of peace operations and the two organizations. The reason to include this chapter in the thesis is that it will provide a comprehensive framework that makes it possible to oversee several aspects that will be touched on in the subsequent chapters. When we want to say something about the hypothesis it is necessary to know what kind of organizations the UN and the EU are, what the backgrounds are and when did the organizations became active. Also the competence and decision making process within both organizations can produce some useful information to find an answer to the central hypothesis. In this paragraph the organs that can influence the decision making process are introduced and the most important aspects of the whole process are elaborated on. Hereinafter the focus will be on peace operations. The history and developments of peace operations are useful because they indicate the kind of operations that can be deployed and more important is that it will indicate which operations are currently more 'popular'. Indirectly it will bring forward other interesting information, namely the geographical spreading of peace operations. The legal basis of peace operations is an introduction into international law and the rules as laid down by the organizations themselves. Because this thesis is focussed on the military component of peace operations and not on the broad concept of peace operations this chapter will also deal with the content and developments of the military component. It will become clear that the role military personnel play in peace operations changed and where military personnel were deployed in the last decades. With other words this chapter will point out the background of several issues that will be dealt with in this thesis and will serve as a stepping stone to the subsequent chapters.

Chapter 2
The United Nations, the European Union, peace operations and military operations

2.1 Introduction
2.2 The United Nations (history, competence and legal basis of peace operations)
2.3 The European Union (history, competence and legal basis of peace operations)
2.4 The history and developments of peace operations
2.5 The content and developments of military operations
2.6 The military component and the integrated approach

2.1 Introduction

Like stated at the end of the previous chapter this chapter will deal with subjects that are not directly linked to the hypotheses yet according to me necessary to deal with. In broad lines this chapter will be divided four parts. The first will deal with the organizations that are involved in the deployment of peace operations. Most important for this thesis are the United Nations and the European Union. This short introduction will point out the background of the organizations, like how they are established and how they function. Hereinafter this chapter will bring forward the history and developments of peace operations as well as the legal basis of peace operations. Hereinafter this chapter will focus on the military component of peace operations and introduce how the military component or military operations look like and introduce the developments that took place in the last few decades. Finally this chapter will say something about the role the military component plays within the broader concept of peace operations.

2.2 The United Nations

The United Nations (UN) was established on 24 October 1945, just after the Second World War, as a successor to the League of Nations. Currently 192 States have become member of this organization. The five most important bodies of the UN are the General Assembly (GA), the Security Council (SC), the Economic and Social Council (ESC), the Secretariat, and the International Court of Justice (ICJ). Other entities are for example the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR); the World Food Programme (WFP); the UN Children's Fund (UNICEF); the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA); the UN Development Programme (UNDP); the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) and the Secretary General.

Clearly visible in the preamble is the purpose of the UN, namely to save succeeding generations form the scourge of war. In Article 1 paragraph 1 the Charter continues by stating that the purposes of the UN are to "*To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace*".[40] One might question what the content of international peace is and what is meant by 'a threat'.[41] A description of the content of international peace would be a research on its own, therefore this thesis will only deal with the

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[40] The Charter of the United Nations can be found on the website of the United Nations: http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/.
[41] Interview 9.

What is clear is that since its establishment the UN has taking a leading role in the prevention of wars and pushed for peaceful, instead of violent, means to determine conflicts. Also in case of ongoing conflicts the UN helped to restore peace, in many cases through the deployment of peace operations. Because the UN does not have its own military force it is necessary that member states voluntarily contribute military personnel. With the outbreak of the Cold War the UN was less active in the field of peace and security. In the early nineties the Cold War ended and the UN got involved in several conflicts throughout the world.

In 1992 the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO)[42] was established, this department is dedicated to assisting the Member States of the UN and the SG in their efforts to maintain international peace and security. The DPKO is responsible for the planning, preparing, managing, and directing of UN peacekeeping operations. Furthermore the DPKO provides political and executive direction to UN peace operations and keep up contact with the SC, the Member States that contribute troops, the financial contributors and the parties to the conflict.[43]
The DPKO cooperates with another body namely the Department of Political Affairs (DPA). The DPA plays a central role in preventing and resolving deadly conflicts and promotes lasting peace in societies emerging from wars, with other words conflict prevention, peacemaking and peace building. Important tasks are for example to monitor and assess global political developments, provide support and guidance to the operation in the field and support the Member States directly through electoral assistance.[44]

In the subsequent paragraphs this thesis will bring forward certain peace operations. Since 1948 the UN deployed 63 peacekeeping operations, form which sixteen are active today. Next to these peacekeeping operations the UN in also active in other peace operations, the so-called political and peace building missions, examples are the operations in Burundi and Afghanistan. In the current active peacekeeping operations 89,909 uniformed personnel is deployed, including 75,285 troops, 12,112 police and 2,512 military observers.[45]

In August 2000 a report was published by a panel on enhancing the effectiveness of UN peace operations. This reports, often referred to as the Brahimi Report, contained more than fifty recommendations to the SG, the SC, the GA and the Member States. Examples of the recommendations are the need to make sure that all key parties to the conflict agree on the UN's involvement and role in resolving the conflict, the need to make the peace operation part of a more comprehensive strategy, and the need to for an achievable mandate. These are only some of the recommendations; this thesis will elaborate more fully on these recommendations whenever necessary throughout the subsequent chapters.[46]

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[42] Website of the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, to be found on: http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/dpko.shtml.
[43] Website of the United Nations Coordination of Outer Space Activities, to be found on: http://www.uncosa.unvienna.org/uncosa/en/directory/dpko/index.html.
[44] Website of the United Nations Department of Political Affairs, to be found on: http://www.un.org/Depts/dpa/.
[45] Website of the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, to be found on: http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/bnote.htm.
[46] United Nations General Assembly Security Council, Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, 21 August 2000 (A/55/305–S/2000/809), also known as the Brahimi-report. To be found on: http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/.

The United Nations: competence and decision making with regard to the deployment of military operations

Peace operations are established by the organ that has the primary responsibility with regard to maintenance of international peace and security, the Security Council (SC). The SC responds to crises on a case-by-case basis and has a wide range options at its disposal.[47] Before the SC decides that a peace operations is established it may take into account several considerations. First of all whether the situation is or will endanger or constitute a threat to international peace and security. A second consideration might be whether a regional or sub-regional organization is ready and able to assist in resolving the problems. Whether there is a cease-fire might be a third consideration. The SC is more willing to deploy peace operation is situations where the parties to the conflict signed a cease-fire agreement and have the intention to peacefully resolve the conflict. Important is furthermore, especially with in mind the history of peace operations, whether it is possible to formulate a precise mandate for the mission. A last consideration worth mentioning here is whether the SC can ensure the safety and security of their personnel, for example by an agreement of the important parties to the conflict.[48]

The SC authorizes peace operations, yet other actors play an important role. Before the SC decides to establish a peace operations consultations take place between the SC, the UN Secretariat, the member states, regional organizations, parties to the conflict, and potential contributing troops.[49] At the same time it is possible that the SG decides to convene a Strategic Assessment of the situation. This Strategic Assessment consists out of information regarding the post-conflict environment and other factors that may have influence on the UN peace operation. Examples are the root causes of the conflict, the political and security developments and conditions, the human rights situation and possible other UN activities in the region. On the basis of this information possible strategic objectives of the peace operation will be brought forward. Another aspect of the assessment is the alternative strategies, options and scenarios for the role and scope of the operations as well as the risks of UN involvement.[50] With other words the situation is analysed and the priorities are defined in which an UN peace operations can be established.

When the outcome of the previous steps is that a peace operation is desirable the UN usually deploys a (Technical) Assessment Mission. This means that persons, working for UN departments and funds, travel to the country and will examine the humanitarian, human rights, political and military situation on the ground. Hereinafter the SG writes a report to the SC on the basis of the findings and recommendations of the Assessment Mission. In this report the SG advices the SC on the actions that are necessary, including the size, mandate and necessary resources for the peace operation.

Hereinafter the SC will authorize the establishment of a peace operation and decides its size and mandate. Under the authority of the SC the SG has the command in these operations. The overall responsibility for the conduct and support of these operations is delegated to the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations. With consent of the SC, the SG appoints a Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG). The SRSG is the 'Head of Mission' and is responsible for the implementation of the operations' mandate, and is developing strategies. Furthermore planning is needed for political, military, operational and support aspects. The SRSG reports through

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[47] See the Capstone Doctrine p.47, the Capstone Doctrine can be found on: http://pbpu.unlb.org/pbps/Library/Capstone_Doctrine_ENG.pdf.
[48] See the Capstone Doctrine p.48, the Capstone Doctrine can be found on: http://pbpu.unlb.org/pbps/Library/Capstone_Doctrine_ENG.pdf.
[49] See the Capstone Doctrine p.47, the Capstone Doctrine can be found on: http://pbpu.unlb.org/pbps/Library/Capstone_Doctrine_ENG.pdf.
[50] United Nations, Integrated Missions Planning Process (IMPP), Guidelines Endorsed by the Secretary-General on XX 2006. To be found on: http://www.undg.org/docs/9146/IMPP_report.doc.

the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations to the SG. After the establishment of a peace operation the SG informs the SC by sending reports, in which the SC is informed about the operation. A last notion is that the SC sometimes reviews its decision, by adjusting or renewing its mandate.[51]

Because of the mentioned absence of a UN force a resolution of the SC will not automatically lead to the deployment of troops. There is a need to get member states willing to support the operation and eventually participate by contributing military troops including supplies, equipment and transportation.[52]

The legal basis of peace operations

For an examination of the military component of peace operations and later on with the division of this military component it is necessary to get a clear picture on the legal basis of such operations. The first thing that comes to mind is the UN. The purpose of the UN can be found in the earlier mentioned Article 1 paragraph 1 of the UN Charter. That states that the purpose is: "*To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace*". The UN Charter demands that member states resolve their international disputes by peaceful means and refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state.[53]

While states have tried to justify the use of force in many ways two types of actions fall within the ambit of international law. The first one is the use of force as part of a Security Council action sanctioned under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. The second action is individual or collective self-defence pursuant to Article 51 of the UN Charter and customary international law. Chapter VII of the UN Charter is of particular relevance. In this chapter the actions with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression can be found. The Security Council has the primary responsibility for the maintenance of peace and security.[54] As confirmed by the International Court of Justice this primary responsibility does not mean an exclusive one.[55] This means that also the UN General Assembly is responsible for the maintenance of peace and security and Chapter VIII with regard to regional organizations can be used. The other option, the right to self-defence, was already customary law before it was codified in the UN Charter. This right to self-defence can be interpreted restrictive and expensive; this last interpretation means for example that also anticipatory action is lawful.

Self-defence might be necessary when a State need to protect nationals and their property located abroad, nation's political independence or nation's territorial integrity.[56]

Dealing with the invasion of Iraq, where it is unclear whether the invasion's legal basis is the Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002 of the United States Congress or several resolutions by the Security Council (especially Resolution 678), will go beyond the scope of

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[51] See for example the operations in Congo, Cyprus, and Sierra Leone.

[52] Because of the subject this thesis will not deal extensively with the need to recruit civilian and police personnel

[53] Art 2, paragraph 3 and 4 of the UN Charter.

[54] Article 24 UN Charter.

[55] Certain Expenses of the UN (Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter), Advisory Opinion of 20 July 1962, I.C.J. Reports 1962, p. 163.

[56] Other sources mentioned in the literature are: Article 2 paragraph 7 of the UN Charter, General Assembly resolution 2625 (XXV) 1970, the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation, and the Helsinki Final Act of 1975.

this thesis, what is clear that using force solely on the basis of domestic legislation is a breach of international law.[57]

2.3 The European Union

Dealing with the history and developments with regard the EU would go beyond the scope of this thesis therefore this thesis will only touch upon certain important developments with regard to EU military operations. Most important is the second-pillar of the EU, the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) as major element of this pillar. The CFSP includes all areas of foreign policy, including defence.

As is well known the EU was established in 1993 by the Maastricht Treaty. Of special importance with regard to the CFSP was the Amsterdam Treaty of 1999 in which the CFSP institutions and the decision-making procedure were strengthened. The Treaty of Amsterdam included some new or improved tasks for the EU, namely the humanitarian and rescue operations, peacekeeping operations and the use of combat force in crisis management which includes the peacemaking operations ("Petersburg tasks"). Most of these tasks are part of the ESDP, which is dealing with the development of the civilian and military capacity for crisis management and conflict prevention at international level. By doing so the EU want to support the process of maintaining peace and international security, as described in the UN Charter.[58] During the years it became clear that the range of missions, introduced in the Petersburg Declaration, should be broadened. The creation of other/new missions and the possibility to have recourse to military means became necessary in certain cases. Examples are: conflict prevention, joint actions for disarmament, military advice and assistance, post-conflict stabilisation and support at the request of the authorities of a third country in the fight against terrorism.

Until 2002 the EU was actively involved in conflict prevention and crisis management efforts yet never conducted peace operations on its own or contribute EU troops to existing missions. The EU involvement was most of the time related to development aid, like economic and reconstruction assistance for post-conflict societies. This however did not prevent individual States to contribute military and civilian personnel to peace operations conducted by the UN, NATO, WEU and the OSCE.[59]

From 2003 onwards the EU became more active with regard to the prevention of conflicts and the role of the CFSP changed rapidly. Several European Council meetings, in Cologne[60], Helsinki[61] and Feira[62], made this possible. The meeting in Cologne made sure that the EU made efforts to act autonomously backed up by credible military forces to live up to the Petersburg tasks. Mentioned are the need to enhance military capacities, cooperation in the defence industry and the transfer of certain functions from the WEU to the EU.

In Helsinki decisions were taken with regard to the military capabilities, the so-called 'global objective' which means that the EU must be able to deploy up to 60.000 persons within 60 days and for at least one year. Also decisions were made with regard to the civilian crisis management capabilities and the creation of certain military and political bodies was achieved, this thesis will deal

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[57] For a more extensive elaboration on the subject see Sharon Wiharta: 'The legitimacy of peace operations', to be found on http://www.sipri.org/yearbook/2009/files/SIPRIYB0903.pdf.

[58] Glossary on the European Security and Defence Policy on the website of the European Union, to be found on: http://europa.eu/scadplus/glossary/european_security_defence_policy_en.htm.

[59]Website of the The Henry L. Stimson Center, to be found on: http://www.stimson.org/fopo/?SN=FO20020425356.

[60] Conclusions of the Presidency, Cologne European Council, 3 and 4 June 1999, to be found on: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/kol1_en.htm.

[61] Conclusions of the Presidency, Helsinki European Council, 10 and 11 December 1999, to be found on: http://www.unizar.es/euroconstitucion/documents/helsinki%20summit.pdf.

[62] Santa Maria Da Feira European Council, 19 and 20 June 2000.

with these bodies in chapter 4. A last point of deliberation was the relationship with the WEU, NATO and the involvement of non-EU Member States.[63] In Feira more detailed provisions were adopted with regard to the issues dealt with in the two other Council meetings, like the military capabilities, participation of Third States, and co-operation with the NATO etcetera.[64] In the new treaty of Lisbon the pillar structure will disappear and issues with regard to foreign policy can be found in title V 'General provisions on the Union's external action and specific provisions on the common foreign and security policy'.

Another important development has to do with Battle groups, dealing extensively with this concept would go beyond the scope of this thesis therefore a general description will be given here. The Battle Group is a 'specific form' of the Union's rapid response elements. Which means that whenever required the Battle Group can be on the ground within 5-10 days and is sustainable for at least 30 days. The Battle Group can be used as a stand-alone mission and also as an intervention force after which a large operation can be deployed. The Battle Group will have a lead nation or a framework nation and should be capable to deal with several tasks mentioned in the Petersburg declaration and the ESS.[65]

With the EU Police Mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Operation Concordia in Macedonia and Operation Artemis in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, all deployed in 2003, the EU showed that it willing to become an active organization with regard to peace operations. With the failure to act in Yugoslavia and the difficult relations within the Union with regard to the invasion in Iraq the deployment of operation Artemis can be seen as a healing process for the EU and a possibility to show its capability and presence throughout the world.[66]

The European Union: competence and decision making with regard to the deployment of military operations

The foreign policy of the European Union is contained in the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), the second of the three pillars of the EU. This structure pillar will disappear when the Treaty of Lisbon will be ratified by all Member States of the EU. The Amsterdam Treaty created the office of the High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy who coordinates and represents the EU's foreign policy. A major element of the CFSP is the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). Decisions with regard to the ESDP are made in the Council of the European Union, an intergovernmental body. The primary decision-making body with regard to EU military operations is the General Affairs and Foreign Relations Council (GAERC). The GAERC is composed of the foreign ministers of the member states, sometimes accompanied by the ministers of defence. Decisions on the establishment of an EU military operation are taken in the GAERC by unanimity without exception. So every member of the GAERC/ every member state may veto the establishment of such an operation. The decision to establish an operation takes place in the form a Joint Action. In this Joint Action also issues can be found with regard to the command, time frame and financing of the operation.[67]

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[63] See the Declaration [of the members of the WEU and of the EU] on The Role of the [WEU] and its Relations with the [EU] and with [NATO] (Maastricht, 10 December 1991); Declaration of the WEU on the Role of [WEU] and its Relations with the [EU] and with [NATO] (Brussels, 22 July 1997) and Protocol (No 1) on Article 17 [TEU] (Amsterdam, 2 October 1997).
[64] Jan Wouters and Frederik Naert: 'How Effective is the European Security Architecture? Lessons from Bosnia and Kosovo'. International and Comparative Law Quarterly, pp.540 - 576, Vol. 50, No. 3, July 2001.
[65] EU Council Secretariat Factsheet: 'EU Battegroups, November 2006, to be found on: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/esdp/91624.pdf.
[66] Interview 6, 14 and 15.
[67] Article 14 Treaty of the European Union.

Three important structures that are created within the EU with regard to the ESDP are the Political and Security Committee (PSC)[68], the EU Military Committee (EUMC)[69] and the EU Military Staff (EUMS).[70] The PSC meets at the ambassadorial level as a preparatory body for the Council of the EU. It has as main functions to follow the international situation, and help to define policies within the CFSP including the ESDP. It prepares a coherent EU response to a crisis and exercises its political control and strategic direction.[71] The European Union Military Committee (EUMC) is the highest military body set up within the Council. It is composed of the Chiefs of Defense of the Member States, who are regularly represented by their permanent military representatives. The EUMC provides the PSC with advice and recommendations on all military matters within the EU.[72] The main operational functions of EUMS are early warning, situation assessment, and strategic planning.[73]
An important notion is that most of the time the earlier mentioned PSC is used as a preparatory body to negotiate the establishment of EU operations. With regard to EU crisis management the GAERC can transfer the political and strategic control of operations to the PSC. Interesting for this thesis is that the PSC is also charged with co-ordinating activities with other international organisations, of which the most important once are the UN and the NATO.[74]

The decision-making procedure in the ESDP with regard to the employment of EU military operations can be divided in several phases. Obviously the first phase is the detection of a crisis. The PSC monitors the international situation with regard to peace and security and receives information from different actors, like the European Commission and states. When it is decided that the situation concerned needs involvement of the EU it is time to move on to the subsequent phases. The second phase is the decision to employ an operation and the determination of the command structure. The third phase deals with the planning of the operation. In these two phases several decisions have to be taken. Three important decisions are first of all the general decision to employ an operation. This general decision can be found in a Joint Action of the Council.[75] This thesis already point out that the employment of an operation on the territory of another state needs the consent of the government of that state and/ or a mandate from the UNSC.
In the mean time the member states of the EU decide themselves whether they participate in the operation and make sure their national requirements are fulfilled. Secondly Article 14 of the Treaty of the European Union (TEU) requires that the Joint Action contains details on for example the scope, objectives, means and financing of the operation. The content of all these issues are part of the deliberation between and within member states. A third decision (actually decisions) that has to be taken is concerning the co-operation with other international partners, like the NATO or third states. This said clearly shows the sequential decision-making process with regard to EU military operations, the decisions take place at the international, European and national level. After these decisions it is time to begin with the implementation of the military operation and finally the revision and termination of the operation.[76]

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[68] Council decision of 22 January 2001, setting up the Political and Security Committee (2001/78/CFSP).

[69] Council decision of 22 January 2001, setting up the Military Committee of the European Union (2001/79/CFSP).

[70] Council decision of 10 May 2005, amending decision 2001/80/CFSP on the establishment of the Military Staff of the European Union (2005/395/CFSP).

[71] Website of the Council of the European Union, to be found on:
 http://www.consilium.europa.eu/cms3_fo/showPage.asp?id=279&lang=EN&mode=g.

[72] Website of the Council of the European Union: 'The EU Military Committee'. To be found on:
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/showPage.aspx?id=1065&lang=en.

[73] Website of the Council of the European Union: 'The EU Military Staff'. To be found on:
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/showPage.aspx?id=1039&lang=en.

[74] See for example on the website of 'summaries of EU's legislation', the article on the Political and Security Committee. To be found on:
http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/foreign_and_security_policy/cfsp_and_esdp_implementation/r00005_en.htm.

[75] Article 14 Treaty of the European Union.

[76] For another description of the decision making procedure see Sharon Wiharta: 'Planning and deploying peace operations, to be found on: http://www.sipri.org/contents/conflict/YB08_chap3.pdf/download/.

Important for the decision-making procedure in the European Union is political willingness of the member states, which also mean that the decision-shaping is very important.[77] Especially the willingness of the three important states in the Union (France, Great Britain and Germany) is important because these three states often decide what will happen.[78] Hereinafter the procedure for deploying military personnel can be started and most of the time the procedure is strictly followed.[79] For a more complete description of the actors in the decision-making procedure the planning and implementation of ESDP operations this thesis refers to the article of Petar Petrov[80]

The legal basis of peace operations

The legal basis of peace operations conducted by the European Union is a somewhat more complex subject. First of all it is important to mention that the European Union has, with the entry into force of the Treaty of Nice, granted the ESDP an institutional dimension. From Article 11 onwards the TEU is dealing with foreign and security issues. Article 17 of the TEU is the main legal basis for the European Union's involvement in military operations.[81] The first part of Article 17 (1) TEU states that: "The common foreign and security policy shall include all questions relating to the security of the Union, including the progressive framing of a common defence policy, which might lead to a common defence, should the European Council so decide".[82] In paragraph 2 of Article 17 it specified that: "*Questions referred to in this Article shall include humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking*".[83] In this second paragraph a clear reflection is given of the so-called Petersburg Tasks. Somewhat less applicable for this paragraph, yet still important for ESDP operations are the agreements concluded under Article 24 TEU.

What is clear is that the Council's Joint Action (CJA) is of special importance for the establishment of EU peace operations. In chapter 4 this thesis will bring forward the procedure to come to such a CJA and what might be the content of such a CJA.

To conclude this paragraph it is necessary to say something about the relation between the European Union and the UN. First of all it is important to mention that the EU does not consider itself to be a Chapter VIII regional arrangement and has never invoked this chapter to justify an action under ESDP[84], while in some documents this view is challenged.
The question is whether an UN mandate is necessary. In official EU documents it is point out that there is need to act in accordance with the principles of the UN Charter[85], and the UN and the OSCE are often mentioned as 'leading organizations'. Whether there is a need for a UN mandate can be determined by two issues namely, the nature of the operation and the area op deployment. With the nature of the operation there is a distinction between coercive or non coercive operations and the area of deployment is the distinction between operations in Europe and outside Europe. Although it

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[77] Interview 11.

[78] Björn McClintock: 'NATO and ESDP – Roommates or Rivals?' P.6: 'The state has remained the primary security actor in the EU'. To be found on: http://theses.lub.lu.se/archive/2006/08/14/1155537054-13457-987/Roommates_or_Rivals.pdf.

[79] Interview 2.

[80] Petar Petrov: 'The ESDP in motion: opportunities and constraints for the application of an integrated civil-military operational scenario' in Studia Diplomatica, the Brussels Journal of International Relations. Vol. LX, 2007, Number 3: Peace and Security in Central Africa; International Intervention in Africa; NATO and ESDP. pps.157-182.

[81] *Valentina Falco: '*Old Continent, New Wars: The European Union and International Humanitarian Law', p.4 to be found on: http://www.ies.be/files/repo/conference2008/EUinIA_I_2_Falco.pdf

[82] Article 17 paragraph 1 Treaty on the European Union

[83] Article 17 paragraph 2 Treaty on the European Union

[84] Thierry Tardy: 'Limits and Opportunities of UN-EU Relations in Peace Operations: Implications for DPKO'. The Geneva Center for Security Policy (GCSP), September 2003, to be found on: https://pksoi.army.mil/Docs/Doctrine/UN%20Policy%20Documents/UN%20EU.pdf

[85] See for example: Presidency Report on ESDP, Nice European Council, December 2000.

is not explicitly formulated by the EU, it seems that in case the operation is coercive and/or outside Europe the EU seeks a UN mandate. On the contrary, a non coercive operation inside Europe, for example EUPM in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Concordia in Macedonia, does not legally require a UN mandate.
In other cases, like non coercive and consent-based operation outside Europe or a consent-based coercive operation, it is not clear when such an UN mandate is necessary.

This however does not take away that a UN mandate, for example in the form of a Security Council resolution means more than a legal basis, it is also providing operations broader legitimacy and impartiality. Also the growing attention for the NATO makes the current situation less more clear.

2.4 The history and developments of peace operations

History of peace operations[86]

Peace operation is a term that covers a wide range of activities. In 1992, the former Secretary-General of the UN, in his Agenda for Peace brought forward what these activities can be.[87] First of all there are operations that support diplomacy. The clearest example is preventive diplomacy, an action that aims to prevent disputes between parties to develop or escalate and limit the expansion of conflicts when they occur, like preventive deployment of forces. A second form is peacemaking, a diplomatic action under Chapter VI of the UN Charter to bring hostile parties to a negotiated agreement. This can be done by diplomacy, mediation, negotiation or other forms of peaceful settlement that end disputes and resolve the issues that led to the conflict
Thirdly peace operations can be construed as peacekeeping operations. Peacekeeping is a non-coercive instrument of diplomacy, where a legitimate, international civil and/or military coalition is employed with the consent of the belligerent parties, in an impartial, non-combatant manner, to implement conflict prevention and/or resolution arrangements or assist humanitarian aid operations. Well-known tasks are the observation and monitoring of truces and ceasefires.

A fourth important part of peace operations are called peace enforcement operations. In contradiction to peacekeeping, peace enforcement is the coercive use of civil and military sanctions and collective security actions, by legitimate, international intervention forces, to assist diplomatic efforts to prevent armed conflict from starting, escalating or spreading or to restore peace between belligerents, who may not consent to that intervention. Peace enforcement operations differ from war. In war, the ultimate military aim is to defeat a designated enemy force. In peace enforcement operations, the military aim will normally be to coerce the belligerents or potential belligerents into avoiding or ceasing armed conflict and participating in peaceful settlement of disputes.[88] Another description of peace enforcement is "*the use of force against one of the parties to enforce an end to hostilities*".[89]

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[86]For an extensive overview on peace operations see 'Commanding United Nations Peacekeeping Operations. To be found on: http://www.defence.gov.au/adfwc/Peacekeeping/documents/Commanding%20Peacekeeping%20Operations%20-%2020%20Jun%2008.pdf.

[87] Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to the statement adopted by the Summit Meeting of the Security Council on 31 January 1992: 'An Agenda for Peace: preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peace-keeping'. 17 June 1992 (A/47/277 - S/24111).

[88] In the Report of the Panel on UN Peace Operations it is stated that UN peace operations entail three principal activities: conflict prevention and peacemaking, peacekeeping, and peace-building.

[89] A definition from the UN Department of Political Affairs ('UNDPA'), http://www.un.org/Depts/dpa/docs/peacemak.htm. See also Supplement to An Agenda for Peace (UN Doc. A/50/60-S/1995/1, 3 January 1995), par. 77-80.

A last activity this thesis wants to refer to is peace building. Peace building is the activities that support peace efforts in countries emerging from conflicts. Or to say it in accordance with the UN document 'An Agenda for Peace': "*Peace building consists of a wide range of activities associated with capacity building, reconciliation, and societal transformation. Peace building is a long-term process that occurs after violent conflict has slowed down or come to a halt. Thus, it is the phase of the peace process that takes place after peacemaking and peacekeeping*".[90] Peace building is necessary to strengthen and rebuild civil infrastructures and institutions to avoid a return to conflict. It might have several purposes, like inspiring confidence, support economics, restore civil authority, rebuilding physical infrastructures, reestablishing commerce, schools, and medical facilities.

What is clear is that current peace operations are more than only military operations. Part of peace operations are also political, diplomatic, electoral, human rights, civil police and humanitarian issues. Because of the subject of this thesis will mostly deal with peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations, because the military component of peace operations is the most present in these operations. This however does not take away that the military component can be present in peace operations with peacemaking and preventive diplomacy activities.

The developments with regard to peace operations

In this paragraph this thesis will examine the most important developments with regard to peace operations. Describing all the developments would lead to an extensive paragraph about the different peacekeeping and peace-enforcement operations carried out in the last decades. The developments with regard the military component in the peace operations can be seen in the different operations like traditional peacekeeping operations, managing transition operations, wider peacekeeping, peace-enforcement and peace-support operations[91] that are deployed by the different international and regional organizations. What is clear is that the current operations are not comparable with the operations in the past. The department of peacekeeping operations of the UN states that peacekeeping goals were primarily limited to maintaining ceasefires and stabilizing situations on the ground so that efforts could be made at the political level to resolve the conflict by peaceful means. Those missions consisted of military observers and lightly armed troops with monitoring, reporting and confidence-building roles in support of ceasefires and limited peace agreements. Nowadays the UN is faced with the rising demand for increasingly complex peace operations.

These first operations by the UN were traditional peacekeeping operations, also described as first generation operations. In these operations like UNTSO[92], UNEF I[93] and UNFICYP[94] military personnel was involved. Although these operations where bound by three characteristics (consent, impartiality and minimum use of force) it were mainly military operations. The personnel of the UN Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) merely consist out of military observers. The maximum strength of the First UN Emergency Force (UNEF I) was 6,073 military personnel. On 31 August 2009 the total number of troops in Cyprus, in respect of the UN Peacekeeping Force was 861. Ratner describes these operations as follows: "First generation peacekeeping represent those were a political organ of the UN deploys a military force between two or more armies, with their consent, pending, and in the absence of, a political settlement".[95] Traditional peacekeeping or first generation operations can be described in many ways but all have in common that they are non-coercive, consists out of consent-

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[90] Boutros-Ghali, Boutros: 'An Agenda for Peace'. New York, UN 1995,to be found on: http://www.un.org/Docs/SG/agpeace.html.

[91] Bellamy, Alex, Paul D. Williams and Stuart Griffin: 'Understanding Peacekeeping'. Cambridge, Polity Press, 2004.

[92] Established by Security Council Resolution 50 (1948) of 29 May 1948.

[93] Established by General Assembly Resolution 1001 (1956) of 7 November 1956.

[94] Established by Security Council Resolution 186 (1964) of 4 March 1964.

[95] Ratner, Steven R.: 'The New UN Peacekeeping'. New York, St. Martin's Press, 1995, p.17.

based activities, to support a peace process or interim ceasefire, to help prevent the resumption or escalation of violence and establish a stable peace.[96] A last aspect is that traditional peacekeeping operations are authorised under Chapter VI of the UN Charter.[97]

Because of certain problems like the inability to accomplish own goals and wider tasks or actively promote conflict resolution and the dependence on consent (also important with the regard to the new wars as described by Kaldor[98]) the UN deployed their operations differently in the nineties. Deployed are the so-called managing transition operations. These operations aim to manage and oversee a process of transition from violence to stable peace within states. These operations differ from traditional peacekeeping operations in certain aspects. Examples are the stage of the conflict and the civilian component (multidimensional). Important for this thesis is that managing transition operations are concerned with the implementation of peace-accords and the possible need for demilitarization, because of this these operations have, next to the civilian, a military component.[99] Examples of managing transition operations are UNTAG[100], ONUSAL[101] and UNTAC[102].
Positive aspects of the managing transition operations are that in most cases there was a "*Widespread legitimacy and broad support given to the peace process by former parties to the conflict*".[103] Yet according to Bellamy, Williams and Griffin there are some problems with regard to managing transition operations. Mentioned problems are that the military component was not strong enough to fulfil their mandate, there was too much focus on free and fair elections and there were problems with logistics and procurement. The last problem has to do with the dependence on the consent of host governments and made it possible that powerful domestic actors prevented the UN to achieve their goals. Because situations occur in which there was no consent and the conflict was ongoing other operations became necessary.[104]

These other operations are called wider peacekeeping. Sometimes also referred to as 'second generation peacekeeping'[105] or 'Chapter 6½' peacekeeping'.[106] This thesis will point out some characteristics of these operations. A first important one is that they occur within a context of ongoing violence. A second one is the intra-state character, and third characteristic is that more tasks are attributed to soldiers compared to earlier operations. A fourth characteristic is that the operations have to deal with more and more national and international governmental and non-governmental organizations. A fifth characteristic is that wider peacekeeping operations have frequently changing mandates. It is also possible that there is a so-called gap between the means and the ends in wider peacekeeping operations. Examples of these wider peacekeeping operations are UNPROFOR[107], UNAMIR[108], UNOMSIL[109] and UNAMSIL.[110] Problems with regard to these operations are the inadequate mandates, the impossibility to implement mandates, confusion about the rules of

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[96] Bellamy, Alex, Paul D. Williams and Stuart Griffin: 'Understanding Peacekeeping'. Cambridge, Polity Press, 2004, p.96.

[97] Janet E. Heininger: 'Peacekeeping in transition, the UN in Cambodia'. New York, Twentieth Century Fund Press, 1994.

[98] Mary Kaldor: 'New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era'. Stanford, California Stanford University Press, 1999.

[99] Bellamy, Alex, Paul D. Williams and Stuart Griffin: 'Understanding Peacekeeping'. Cambridge, Polity Press, 2004, p.112.

[100] Established by Security Council Resolution 632 (1989) of 16 February 1989.

[101] Established by Security Council Resolution 693 (1991) of 20 May 1991.

[102] Established by Security Council Resolution 745 (1992) 28 February 1992.

[103] Bellamy, Alex, Paul D. Williams and Stuart Griffin: 'Understanding Peacekeeping'. Cambridge, Polity Press, 2004, p.126.

[104] Bellamy, Alex, Paul D. Williams and Stuart Griffin: 'Understanding Peacekeeping'. Cambridge, Polity Press, 2004, p.126 and 127.

[105] Mackinlay and Chopra: 'Second Generation Mulitinational Operations'. The Washington Quarterly 15, summer 1992.

[106] Bailey, Sydney D. and Sam Daws: 'The UN: A Concise Political Guide'. Lanham, Barnes & Noble Books, 1995.

[107] Established by Security Council Resolution 743 (1994) of 21 February 1994.

[108] Established by Security Council Resolution 872 (1993) of 5 October 1993 adjusted by Security Council Resolution 912 (1994) of 21 April 1994 expanded by Security Council Resolution 918 (1994) of 17 May 1994 further adjusted by Security Council Resolution 997 (1995) of 9 June 1995 (see also Resolution 965 (1994) and 1029 (1995)).

[109] Established by Security Council Resolution 1181 (1998) of 13 July 1998.

[110] Established by Security Council Resolution 1270 (1999) of 22 October 1999.

engagement, inadequate logistics and resources, the failure of political will, and organizational problems.[111]

Another form of operations is the already mentioned peace enforcement operations. These operations are concerned with activities that fall under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Under this Chapter it is possible to impose economic, and more important for this thesis, military sanctions (Article 42). Article 43 of the UN Charter opened up the possibility to establish a permanent force. That the UN still has no permanent force might be clear. This is an important issue because of the need for the UN to delegate Chapter VII powers to UN organs, UN member states and regional organizations. The most important examples of peace enforcement operations are UNOSOM II[112] and ONUC.[113]

The last form of peace operations is the peace support operations. These operations are established under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, have a strong military component, are not dependent on consent (yet still important), have a civil component, sees the need to close the gap between means and ends and are pressing for good coordination between the UN and the states that 'deliver' troops.[114] These characteristics are comparable with the recommendations of the Panel on UN Peace Operations, also referred to as the Brahimi-report. Most common peace support operations are IFOR[115] (commanded by the NATO), KFOR[116] (NATO-led force), INTERFET[117] (Australian-led) and ISAF[118] (US-led 'war on terrorism').[119]

There are some reasons why this thesis gave an outline on the different forms of operations. First of all it is a starting point to take a look at the role of military personnel within these operations and whether this role has changed. Another aspect is that it already indicates that since the early nineties next to the UN and their Member States also other organizations got involved in operations, including the military component of these operations.

When we oversee the list of operations of the UN from the first peacekeeping operation in 1948 and the first peacekeeping operation force in 1956, which has as its mandate to secure and supervise the cessation of hostilities, to the establishment of an operation in Chad (MINURCAT) which is established under Chapter VII of the UN Charter it becomes clear that the concept and content of the military component of peace operations has changed.

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[111] For a more comprehensive explanation see: Bellamy, Alex, Paul D. Williams and Stuart Griffin: 'Understanding Peacekeeping'. Cambridge, Polity Press, 2004, pp. 143-145.

[112] Established by Security Council Resolution 814 (1993) of 26 March 1993.

[113] Established by Security Council Resolution 143 (1960) of 14 July 1960 and Security Council Resolution 161 (1961) of 21 February 1961.

[114] Bellamy, Alex, Paul D. Williams and Stuart Griffin: 'Understanding Peacekeeping'. Cambridge, Polity Press, 2004, pp.165-185.

[115] Established by Security Council Resolution 1091 (1995) of 15 December 1995.

[116] Established by Security Council Resolution 1244 (1999) of 10 June 1999.

[117] Established by Security Council Resolution 1264 (1999) of 15 September 1999.

[118] Established by Security Council Resolution 1386 (2001) of 20 December 2001.

[119] Bellamy, Alex, Paul D. Williams and Stuart Griffin: 'Understanding Peacekeeping'. Cambridge, Polity Press, 2004, pp. 173-185.

2.5 The content and developments of the military component of peace operations

"The military component of every peace operations is designed to put into effect the mandate given and the goals listed"

The content of the military component

In every peacekeeping or peace operation unarmed military observers or armed troops are deployed, often referred to as the peacekeeping force. The primary function of the military component is to observe and report on security-related issues and provide security.[120] Because the situation in every country, in which there is a need for a peace operation, differs there is not one concept for the military component. The content of the military component may vary for example because of the stage of the conflict, the policy of the contributors or the humanitarian situation in the country.

In broad lines three groups can be distinguished within the military component, the formed units or contingents, the military observers and the staff officers.[121] The first group, the formed units or contingents, can include infantry, aviation, armour, engineers. These are supported by several units, for example the logistic support, the specialists in explosives etcetera. The second group are the military observers (MILOBs), MILOBs are the unarmed officers. Soon after the Second World War the UN deployed MILOBs in the conflicting region between India and Pakistan. The primary tasks, clearly visible in UNMOGIB, UNOGIL, and UNYOM, were 'supervision, monitoring, verification and reporting of cease-fire agreements, separations and withdrawals of forces, as well as the cessation of foreign assistance to former belligerents'.[122] With the UN Observer Group in Central America (ONUCA) the tasks of MILOBs were expanded. These tasks include additional tasks of monitoring the ceasefire and separation of forces, and the demobilization, resettlement and repatriation process.[123] Other tasks that have become part of MILOBs activities are assistance in and confiscation of weapons caches, maintaining liaison with and between belligerent factions, other (civilian) UN agencies, non-government organisations (NGOs), and neighbouring countries; and providing assistance to humanitarian agencies in the supervision and conduct of prisoners of war exchanges, food distribution and the provision of medical care.[124] The third group, staff officers, serve in staff posts, both in the forces headquarter or in specialised positions where they cooperate with civilian staff.

What is clear already is that the military component of peace operations involves all forms of the employment of military forcible means across the whole scale of conflicts, from operations with a peacekeeping or peace-enforcement character up to full-scale operations.[125]

To give an inside this thesis will hereinafter point out the different activities which can be carried out by the military component of peace operations:

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[120] 'UN Military Roles and Responsibilities' to be found in the Operational Guide to the IDDRS of the United Nations Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Resource Centre, to be found on: http://www.unddr.org/iddrs/og/OG_4_40.pdf.

[121] See also Eric Suy: 'Het Brahimi Report, Welke Toekomst voor Vredesoperaties?' to be found on: http://www.law.kuleuven.be/iir/nl/activiteiten/documentatie/suysempk.pdf.

[122] Larry M Forster: 'Training Standards for United Nations Military Observers: The Foundation of Excellence', to be found on: http://www.iss.co.za/Pubs/ASR/6No4/Forster.html.

[123] UN Security Council resolution 653 (1990), of 20 April 1990. See also UN Security Council resolution 644 (1989), of 7 November 1989 and the UN Security Council resolution 650 (1990), of 27 March 1990.

[124] Larry M Forster: 'Training Standards for United Nations Military Observers: The Foundation of Excellence', to be found on: http://www.iss.co.za/Pubs/ASR/6No4/Forster.html.

[125] Swedish National Defense College, to be found on: www.fhs.se.

- participation in fact-finding missions;
- liaison, negotiation and provision of good offices;
- inspection, investigation, verification and monitoring;
- preventive deployment;
- observation, including observation of non-UN missions;
- interposition;
- assistance in the implementation of comprehensive settlements where a military component can be tasked to:
- canton, disarm and demobilise factions/ Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR);
- provide logistics assistance to humanitarian relief operations;
- provide support to the repatriation of refugees and internally displaced persons;
- assist in the conduct of electoral activity;
- assist in human rights monitoring;
- assist in peace-building tasks to:
- train national defence forces;
- rebuild infrastructure;
- disposal of explosive ordnance, including mines (demining);
- restoration and maintenance of law, order and stability;
- protection for the delivery of humanitarian relief;
- protection of human rights;
- actions taken to guarantee and deny freedom of movement;
- enforcement of diplomatic, economic and military sanctions;
- Support to peacemaking and political negotiations.
- Providing a secure environment
- Observation and monitoring.
- Security sector reform and training
- Support to humanitarian activities
- Protection of civilians
- Defence of protected zones; and
- Forcible separation of belligerents[126]

The developments with regard to military component of peace operations

This paragraph will bring forward important developments with regard to the military component in the different peace operations. This paragraph will deal more extensively with several operations, and indicate the most important aspects of the mandate. By doing so the differences between operations deployed before 1990, the operations deployed in the nineties and the operations deployed more recently will become clearer. Dealing with all the operations will go beyond the scope of this thesis therefore this thesis chose to deal with operations that reflects the 'spirit of the times'.

The first operation of the UN in which a large number of military personnel was deployed is UNEF I. The mandate of the Force was to secure and supervise the cessation of hostilities, including the withdrawal of the armed forces of France, Israel and the United Kingdom from Egyptian territory and, after the withdrawal, to serve as a buffer between the Egyptian and Israeli forces and to provide

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[126] 'Peace Operations, An Australian Perspective'. To be found on:
http://www.defence.gov.au/adfwc/peacekeeping/terminology.htm Other terms used can be found on:
http://www.combatindex.com/store/MCWP/Sample/TYPE_OPERATIONS/MCWP_3-33_8.pdf.
And http://doc.operationspaix.net/serv1/Handbook_on_UN_Multidimesional_PKO.pdf.

impartial supervision of the ceasefire.[127] In 1960 ONUC was deployed to take the necessary steps, in consultation with the government of the Republic of the Congo, to provide the government with such military assistance as might be necessary until, through that government's efforts with UN technical assistance, the national security forces might be able, in the opinion of the government, to meet fully their tasks.[128] In 1961 the Security Council adopted two resolutions that authorized the use of force.[129] In 1978 UNIFIL was deployed to confirm Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon, restore international peace and security and assist the Lebanese Government in restoring its effective authority in the area. Following the July/August 2006 crisis, the SC enhanced the Force and decided that in addition to the original mandate, it would, among other things, monitor the cessation of hostilities; accompany and support the Lebanese armed forces as they deploy throughout the south of Lebanon; and extend its assistance to help ensure humanitarian access to civilian populations and the voluntary and safe return of displaced persons.

By its resolution, the SC also authorized UNIFIL to take all necessary action in areas of deployment of its forces and as it deems within its capabilities, to ensure that its area of operations is not utilized for hostile activities of any kind; to resist attempts by forceful means to prevent it from discharging its duties under the mandate of the SC; and to protect UN personnel, facilities, installations and equipment, ensure the security and freedom of movement of UN personnel, humanitarian workers and, without prejudice to the responsibility of the government of Lebanon, to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence.

Two other important operations took place in Somalia between 1992 and 1995, UNSOM I and UNOSOM II. UNOSOM I was established to monitor the ceasefire in Mogadishu and escort deliveries of humanitarian supplies to division centres in the city. The mission's mandate and strength were later enlarged to enable it to protect humanitarian convoys and division centres throughout Somalia. It later worked with the Unified Task Force in the effort to establish a safe environment for the delivery of humanitarian assistance. UNOSOM II was established in March 1993 to take appropriate action, including enforcement measures, to establish throughout Somalia a secure environment for humanitarian assistance. To that end, UNOSOM II was to complete, through disarmament and reconciliation, the task begun by the Unified Task Force for the restoration of peace, stability, law and order. Examples of the different tasks of the military component of this operation are monitoring respect for the cessation of hostilities, preventing any resumption of violence, maintaining control of the heavy weapons, securing all ports, airports and lines of communications required for the delivery of humanitarian assistance; protecting the personnel, installations and equipment of the UN and its agencies, ICRC as well as NGOs, continuing mine-clearing and assisting in repatriation of refugees and displaced persons in Somalia.

In the end of the 20th century and beginning of the 21st century several operations with a large military component are established on the African continent. UNAMSIL in Sierra Leone, MONUC in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, UNMIL in Liberia, UNOCI in Côte d'Ivoire and UNMIS in Sudan. Without pretending that all these operations are more or less the same, certain issues are common in these operations. First of all observing and monitoring the implementation of a peace or ceasefire agreement, Secondly the protection and assistance of UN personnel, installations and equipment. Thirdly the collection of arms and redeployment of forces which are both related to disarmament, demobilization, reintegration, repatriation and resettlement. Fourthly is the facilitation by military personnel of different initiative, for example the Security Sector Reform, humanitarian assistance, election process, human rights, return of refugees and internally displaced persons.

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[127] United Nations General Assembly Resolutions 997, 998, 999, 1000, 1001 and 1002 (all adopted in November 1956).
[128] United Nations Security Council Resolution 143, 14 July 1960 (S/4387).
[129] United Nations Security Council Resolution 161, 21 February 1961 (S/4741) and United Nations Security Council Resolution, 169 24 November 1961 (S/5002) to be found on: http://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/onucRS.htm.

Because peace operations differ, also the military components of these operations differ. This can be the result of the mandate, the activities deployed, and the situation in the country etcetera. In broad lines military personnel can be deployed in five different types of military reaction: peace enforcement, preventive peacekeeping, pre-settlement peacekeeping (traditional peacekeeping), post-settlement peacekeeping and an international military force to protect humanitarian assistance.[130]

2.8 Military component and the integrated approach of peace operations

This thesis brought forward that the first peace operations, deployed by the UN, were mainly military operations. For example the thirteen peace operations established during the Cold War, most of these operations had a military mandate and deployed military personnel. Nowadays peace operations are often more than solely military operations. This is clearly described in the Brahimi-report in which it is stated that: "*Peacekeeping is a 50-year-old enterprise that has evolved rapidly in the past decade from a traditional, primarily military model of observing ceasefires and force separations after inter-State wars, to incorporate a complex model of many elements, military and civilian, working together to build peace in the dangerous aftermath of civil wars*".[131] Although the military component remains and important aspect of peace operations other components have gained more and more attention. Because of the number and complexity of peace operations the concept of integrated approach was introduced.[132] Prevention, management and resolving conflicts have to be done by several actors from different sectors. As Jean-Marie Guéhenno, the current UN Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, says: "*Not only has UN peacekeeping grown in size but it has become increasingly complex. Beyond simply monitoring cease-fires, today's multi-dimensional peacekeeping operations are called upon to facilitate the political process through the promotion of national dialogue and reconciliation, protect civilians, assist in the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of combatants, support the organization of elections, protect and promote human rights, and assist in restoring the rule of law*".[133] The handbook on UN Multidimensional Peacekeeping Operations starts by stating that: "*As peacekeeping has evolved, particularly since the late 1980s, a growing number of UN peacekeeping operations have become multidimensional in nature, composed of a range of components, including military, civilian police, political affairs, rule of law, human rights, humanitarian, reconstruction, public information and gender. There are also a number of areas, such as mission support and security and safety of personnel that remain essential to peacekeeping regardless of a particular mission's mandate*".[134]

The previous chapter has already pointed out some developments with regard to peace operations. Here this thesis wants to bring forward reasons that led to more comprehensive operations. One of the first reasons to introduce (actually continue) the trend to transform peace operations into multidimensional operations are the failures in Bosnia, Rwanda and Somalia. It became clear that the current structures and content of peace operations were not capable to restore peace and security. Related is the notion that the sole focus on security aspects was not sufficient to stop conflicts. It became more and more clear that there was to less attention for the root causes of conflicts. Two

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[130] For an extensive explanation of the five types of international military reaction to conflicts see Marrack Goulding: 'The Case for an Integrated Approach to Peace and Security'. Published in Monograph No 21, Resolute Partners, February 1998. To be found on: http://www.iss.co.za/Pubs/Monographs/No21/Goulding.html.

[131] UN General Assembly and Security Council: 'Comprehensive review of the whole question of peacekeeping operations in all their aspects', paragraph 12. 21 August 2000 (A/55/305–S/2000/809).

[132] See for an UN approach on this issue Capstone Doctrine p.53, the Capstone doctrine can be found on: http://pbpu.unlb.org/pbps/Library/Capstone_Doctrine_ENG.pdf.

[133] UN Peacekeeping Operations, guidelines and principles. To be found on: http://pbpu.unlb.org/pbps/Library/Capstone_Doctrine_ENG.pdf.

[134] Website of the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, to be found on: http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/lessons/.

important documents plead in favour of the integrated approach. The first document was written in August 2000 by a panel led by Lakhdar Brahimi, a former Algerian foreign minister, presented to the UNSG a report with recommendations for improving the UN's peace and security operations.[135] The second document was written by the former Secretary-General of the UN, Kofi Annan. In this report the SG interlinked several pillars for example: security, development, governance and human rights.[136]

The role of the military component in peacekeeping operations continues to evolve in response to new challenges and political realities. To stay relevant, troop contributors and DPKO, with the assistance of donor governments, must work together to improve the readiness and capability of troops for the complex challenges of multidimensional peacekeeping. To some extent these challenges have been met through the creation of new mechanisms promoting coordination and joint planning and improved training, preparedness, rapid deployment and logistical support. Work remains to be done to improve equipment interoperability and compatibility among different national contingents and the standardization of operating procedures. Troop preparedness and self-sustainment also require continued attention.
The military component must work in close cooperation with all components of the mission, because the success of a multidimensional peacekeeping operation is measured by much more than simply the absence of conflict. The re-establishment and further development of strong democratic institutions and respect for the rule of law and human rights of all citizens are also important measures of success. The military component must work with all other partners in this wider context to help consolidate peace.[137]

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[135] UN General Assembly and Security Council. 'Comprehensive review of the whole question of peacekeeping operations in all their aspects'. 21 August 2000 (A/55/305–S/2000/809).
[136] Report of the Secretary-General: 'In larger freedom: towards development, security and human rights for all'. 21 of March 2005 (A/59/2005) to be found on:
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N05/270/78/PDF/N0527078.pdf?OpenElement.
[137] IMPETUS, Bulletin of the EU Military Staff, Spring/Summer 2007, Issue 3, Planning for Kosovo, Taking Charge ESDP under Review. To be found on: *http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/IMPETUS3.pdf*.

Chapter 3
Four Sub Hypotheses On
Purposes And Priorities; Geographical Preferences; Decisive Factors; And Characteristics

3.1 Introduction
3.2 Purposes and priorities of the United Nations and the European Union with regard to the deployment of military personnel
3.3 Geographical preferences and of the United Nations and the European Union with regard to the deployment of military personnel
3.4 Decisive factors for United Nations and the European Union with regard to the deployment of military personnel
3.5 Characteristics of operations deployed by the United Nations and the European Union

3.1 Introduction

Until now this thesis brought forward the content of the theories and the related debate with regard to humanitarianism and realism, furthermore both organizations central to this thesis are dealt with as well as the developments and content of peace operations and the military component. With all this is mind this chapter will look at four important aspects that are important for answering the central question of this thesis whether there is a division visible. The aspects dealt with are the purposes and priorities, the geographical preferences, the decisive factors of both organizations, and the characteristics of the military operations deployed by both organizations. To find an answer to the question of division there are four sub hypotheses formulated. The construction of paragraph 3.2, 3.3, 3.4 and 3.5 is quite similar. Every paragraph will explain the formulation of the sub hypothesis and introduce the subject at hand. Hereinafter the paragraph will indicate the most important elements of the subject for the UN and indicates whether the UN is really guided by humanitarianism. The same will be done with regard to the EU, with the exception that the paragraph searches for an indication of realism. As a conclusion every paragraph will point out whether there are indications for the existence of a division between the UN and the EU with regard to the deployment of military personnel. The first aspect dealt with is the purposes and priorities of both organizations:

3.2 The purposes and priorities of the United Nations and the European Union with regard to military operations

Sub hypothesis:
The purposes and priorities of organizations guided by humanitarianism seek to achieve humanitarian objectives while an organization guided by realist considerations will be an expression of own interests. So the UN seeks to achieve humanitarian objectives while the EU is mostly interested in own interests.

To answers questions related to the existence of a division and the central hypotheses of this thesis the first step is to found out whether in the purposes and priorities of both organizations indications can be found for such a division and the applicability of both theories. This paragraph will bring forward the main purposes and priorities of both organizations with regard to the deployment of military personnel. With in mind the central hypothesis that the UN is guided by humanitarianism and the EU is guided by realism this sub hypothesis comes as no surprise. This thesis introduced the

content of both theories and this sub hypothesis derived one central issue from each theory that can be linked to central subject of this paragraph; the purposes and priorities of both organizations. With in mind the presumption that the UN is an organizations that is guided by humanitarianism, this organization should have humanitarian purposes and priorities or with other words seeks to achieve humanitarian objectives. With regard to the EU the purposes and priorities should indicate the existence or absence of realist considerations. In realism, as brought forward, central terms are power, interests and security. For this paragraph, dealing with purposes and priorities, these terms can be referred to as own power, own interests and own security. When the EU is an organizations guided by realism these terms should be at the background of the purposes and priorities.

This paragraph will introduce the main important purposes and priorities with regard to the deployment of military personnel. These purposes and priorities will be derived from several sources (formal documents, statements of the respective organization's personnel, literature, interviews and so on). For both organizations this thesis will consider whether the purposes and priorities brought forward confirm or invalidate the sub hypothesis brought forward in this thesis.

The United Nations

This paragraph will continue where chapter 2 ended and focus specifically on the issues related to the purposes and priorities of the UN with regard to the deployment of military personnel. The part of this paragraph on the UN will be divided in two parts. The first part will deal with some persons working for the UN and some documents published by the UN. These will be the UN Charter, the under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, the 2005 World Summit Outcome, the SG's priorities, the SC agenda, and the capstone doctrine. The second part will be a receptacle of different articles, opinions, and documents related to the purposes and priorities of the UN with regard to peace operations.

In general it can be said that the purposes of the United Nations are, to maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace. The Charter of the United Nations clearly states what the purposes of the United Nations are. The first one is to maintain international peace and security. Secondly the United Nations wants to develop friendly relations among nations. Thirdly the United Nations wants to achieve international co-operation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion; and fourthly the organization wants to be a centre for harmonizing the actions of nations in the attainment of these common ends.[138] Already in the Preamble to its Charter, the UN placed the maintenance of peace among nations as its primary reason for existence.[139] It is clear is that the UN is an organization that is dedicated to maintain international peace and stimulate international relations. Yet at the same time the formulation of the abovementioned purposes is broad and it is questionable what the actual consequences of these purposes are. Other sources are needed to clarify the purposes and priorities of the UN.

Such a source is the under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations who identified six areas that require priority attention: "… *enhancement of African peacekeeping capacity, development and implementation of comprehensive strategies for complex peace operations, disciplinary issues,*

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[138] Article 1 Un Charter and Bjørn Møller: 'UN Military Demands and Non-Offensive Defense Collective Security Humanitarian Intervention and Peace Support Operations', to be found on:
 http://www.gmu.edu/academic/pcs/moller.htm.
[139] Joseph P. Bialke: 'United Nations peace operations: applicable norms and the application of the law of armed conflict. P.1, to be found on: http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m6007/is_2001_Wntr/ai_75622163/.

training, and effective capturing and application of best practices. Those priorities should remain in 2004 with a focus, however, on addressing them within the context of new and expanding operations".[140] So here we have some more specific formulated priorities, like Africa, that are of special importance for the UN.

An important document in which the purposes of the United Nations are outlined is the 2005 World Summit Outcome[141] in which the United Nations Millennium Declaration was reaffirmed and extended. This document states in paragraph 9 that: *"We acknowledge that peace and security, development and human rights are the pillars of the United Nations system and the foundations for collective security and well-being".* With other words, four issues are of special importance for the UN: peace, security, development and human rights. In short this 2005 World Summit Outcome is adopted to provide multilateral solutions to problems in respect of development, peace and collective security, human rights and the rule of law, and strengthening of the United Nations. Especially this second issue; peace and collective security is of relevance for this thesis. From paragraph 69 onwards the document deals with international peace and security. In paragraph 73 it is stated that: "*We emphasize the obligation of States to settle their disputes by peaceful means in accordance with Chapter VI of the Charter, including, when appropriate, by the use of the International Court of Justice*". Paragraph 74 and 75 continue by bringing forward the need for a coherent and integrated approach to the prevention of armed conflicts and the settlement of disputes. Paragraph 77 and following deal with the use of force under the Charter of the United Nations. After stressing the importance of friendly relations the General Assembly reaffirms the authority of the Security Council to mandate coercive action to maintain and restore international peace and security. Furthermore it stresses the need and importance to act in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter. In the subsequent paragraph the primary responsibility of the Security Council is once again reaffirmed. Hereinafter the resolution deals with some issues related to terrorism. More important for this thesis are paragraph 92 and following that deal with peacekeeping. It is pointed out that there is a need for integrated missions and it is recognized that regional organizations, as provided for under Chapter VIII of the Charter, are important for the contribution to peace and security. The efforts of the European Union (and other regional entities) to develop capacities such as for rapid deployment, standby and bridging arrangements are supported. Paragraph 97 and following deal with peace building and hereinafter the document continues with issues like children in armed conflicts, human rights, rule of law, democracy, refugees, and finally with some remarks on how to strengthening the United Nations.

There we have several indications of the purposes and priorities of the UN. The question is whether the purposes brought forward in the UN Charter and the 2005 World Summit Outcome can be characterised as being an outcome of humanitarianism. Peace, collective security, international cooperation, settlement of disputes, and primary responsibility of the SC are not necessarily humanitarian purposes, these purposes can also be an expression of realistic considerations. Yet next to these purposes the UN Charter and the 2005 World Summit Outcome also bring forward international problems with a humanitarian character, respect for human rights and fundamental freedom, (collective security and) well-being, peace building, children in war and refugees. The purposes brought forward so far cannot be described as being purely humanitarian considerations yet what becomes clear is that there is wide attention for humanitarian issues.

The following source this thesis wants to bring forward is the opinion of the current Secretary-General (since 2007) of the United Nations, Ban Ki-moon. Ban Ki-moon identified some priorities for the United Nations in the coming years. The priorities for action of the Secretary-General of the

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[140] United Nations Information Service: 'Reform of UN Peacekeeping Operations a Real Process With Benefits, Under–Secretary-General Tells Fourth Committee', 16 October 2003 (GA/SPD/265). To be found on: http://www.unis.unvienna.org/unis/pressrels/2003/gaspd265.html
[141] United Nations General Assembly resolution 60/1 of 24 October 2005 (A/RES/60/1).

United Nations are formulated as follows: "*We must strengthen the UN's ability to play its role to the fullest extent in conflict prevention, peacemaking, peacekeeping and peace building – these are all part of a continuum, and our approach must be integrated, coordinated and comprehensive. By enhancing our capacity for preventive diplomacy and supporting sustainable peace processes, we will build long-term solutions and respond more effectively to conflict*".[142] On his website the Secretary-General stresses the importance for the UN to strengthen its ability to play its role to the fullest extent in conflict prevention, peacemaking and peace building. These four aspects are, according to Ban Ki-moon, all part of a continuum and the approach of the United Nations must be integrated, coordinated and comprehensive. Long-term solutions are possible by enhancing the capacity for preventive diplomacy and supporting sustainable peace processes and this may contribute to a more effective response to conflicts. Furthermore the Secretary-General explicitly mentions two regions that are of special importance to the United Nations; Africa and the Middle East. For Africa it is necessary to tackle the root causes accompanied by political processes and developments. Furthermore the Secretary-General sees the need to pay special attention by the United Nations for the situation in Sudan and especially Darfur. The second region mentioned is the Middle East. First of all the Secretary-General acknowledged that the region is as complex, fragile and dangerous as it has ever been. Yet at the same time he sees opportunities for reconciliation. There should be special attention for the relation between the Palestinians and the Israelis. Also the situation in Iraq needs the attention of the United Nations in the coming years. Other priorities of the Secretary-General, like the climate change, development and UN reform, are of less importance for this thesis.[143] The priorities as brought forward by the SG of the UN has indicated two other important issues for the UN that are not yet mentioned namely that the Security Council has taken some significant steps to pursue the goal of non-proliferation in North Korea and Iran and other actions to counter the risk of proliferation of nuclear and other weapons and that there is a focus on central Africa.[144] All these purposes and priorities formulated by Ban Ki-moon are clear and indicate the role that the UN wants to play with regard to peace operations.

With regard to the priorities of the United Nations it is also interesting to take a close look at the questions dealt with by the Security Council, in 2007/2008, under its responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. The Security Council dealt with the situation in the Middle East, Cyprus, Western Sahara, Timor-Leste, Liberia, Somalia, former Yugoslavia, Rwanda, Georgia, Haiti, Burundi, Afghanistan, Sierra Leone, Great Lakes region, DRC, Eritrea and Ethiopia, Guinea-Bissau, Côte d'Ivoire, Sudan, Myanmar and Iraq. Other issues dealt with are children and armed conflicts, protection of civilians in armed conflict, small arms, women and peace and security, terrorist acts, non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, post-conflict peace building, and the role of regional and sub regional organizations in the maintenance of international peace and security.[145]

The purposes as brought forward by the SG are mainly gathered around strengthening the role of the UN. This in itself is not an expression of humanitarian objectives, on the contrary it can more easily been seen as a form of realism. The attention for Africa and the Middle East, especially for Darfur, the Israel/Palestine conflict and Iraq can be considered as being an outcome of humanitarian objectives. Can be, because similar to the purposes brought forward in the UN Charter and the 2005 World Summit Outcome these purposes can also be an expression of objectives of, for example, major powers like China and the USA. The question that is not directly answered is whether peace in the Middle East for example is necessary because of the humanitarian suffering or because of the other interests, for example economic (oil), safety (missiles) and so on. The issues dealt with by the

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[142] Website of the Secretary General of the United Nations, to be found on: http://www.un.org/sg/priority.shtml.
[143] Website of the Secretary General of the United Nations, to be found on: http://www.un.org/sg/priority.shtml.
[144] Website of the Secretary General of the United Nations, to be found on: http://www.un.org/sg/priority.shtml.
[145] Website of the UN Security Council, to be found on: http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/annual08_pt2.

SC are more reflecting humanitarian objectives. In several countries dealt with by the SC the population is suffering (Sudan Afghanistan, Haiti, the DRC, Myanmar) yet at the same time it is also necessary to keep in mind that other, more realistic, considerations might be the reason that these countries are dealt with by the SC. The subsequent paragraph will deal more fully with the areas and countries mentioned above, more important for this paragraph are the so-called 'other issues'. Where terrorists acts and non pro-proliferation can be seen as subjects in the category of own interests we cannot deny that subjects dealt with by the SC are related to humanitarian objectives. Prevent as much as possible the involvement of children in conflicts, protection of civilians in armed conflicts, stop arms trade, attention for women in conflicts, prevent terrorist attacks and so on, all these issues dealt with by the SC indicate the role that humanitarian considerations with regard to the UN's purposes and priorities.

Another important document in respect of United Nations peace operations is the Capstone Doctrine.[146] In this document that is officially titled: "United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, principles and guidelines" (2008) the UN acknowledged the evolving role of United Nations peacekeeping operations. In paragraph 2.3 the documents explicitly deals with the core business of those operations. First the tasks the so-called traditional peace operations are given hereinafter the document deals with the tasks and functions of a new generation of multi-dimensional peace operations.[147] The document states that: "*Multi-dimensional United Nations peacekeeping operations are deployed as one part of a much broader international effort to help countries emerging from conflict make the transition to a sustainable peace*".[148] Within this broader context the multi-dimensional operations deployed by the United Nations have three core functions. Those are first of all the creation of a secure and stable environment. This includes the strengthening of the State's ability to provide security, with full respect for the rule of law and human rights. Secondly it is necessary to facilitate the political process by promoting dialogue and reconciliation and supporting the establishment of a legitimate and effective institution of governance. Thirdly United Nations multi-dimensional peace operations should provide a framework for ensuring that all United Nations and other international actors can pursue their activities at the country-level in a coherent and coordinated manner.[149]

As amplification the document continues by stating that multi-dimensional operations can provide operational support to national law enforcement agencies, security at key government installations, ports and other vital infrastructure and humanitarian mine action assistance. Furthermore these operations should establish the necessary security conditions for the free flow of people, goods and humanitarian assistance. The multi-dimensional United Nations peacekeeping operations can also play a critical role in securing the peace process, and ensuring that humanitarian and development partners are able to work in a safe environment. Because most of the conflicts nowadays are of an internal character, a large number of the casualties are civilians. Therefore it is necessary that peace operations protect civilians that are under imminent threat of physical violence.

In the Capstone Doctrine there are some clear indications of the presence of humanitarian objectives, terms like (multi-dimensional) peace operations, peace and security are explicit connected to issues like human rights, rule of law, humanitarian mine action, humanitarian and development partners, civilian causalities, and physical violence.

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[146] United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, principles and guidelines, 2008. To be found on: http://www.peacekeepingbestpractices.unlb.org/Pbps/Library/Capstone_Doctrine_ENG.pdf

[147] For a description of characteristics of such operations and the conditions under which such operations are established see Chapter 2.

[148] United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, principles and guidelines, 2008. P.22-23. To be found on: http://www.peacekeepingbestpractices.unlb.org/Pbps/Library/Capstone_Doctrine_ENG.pdf.

[149] United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, principles and guidelines, 2008. P.23. To be found on: http://www.peacekeepingbestpractices.unlb.org/Pbps/Library/Capstone_Doctrine_ENG.pdf.

Hereinafter this thesis will shortly quote some objectives of the United Nations with regard to international peace and security, these objectives are derived from several different sources. First of all Koffi Annan, the former SG of the UN, who brings forward in his article: 'We the peoples, the role of the UN in the 21st century' (2000) that important purposes are to prevent conflicts, protect vulnerable, addressing dilemmas of intervention, and strengthening peace operations.[150] Also in 2000 the Deputy Secretary-General at OSCE Ministerial Meeting brings forward the importance of early warning and strengthening restored democracy, in conflict prevention.[151] Adam Roberts states that the main objectives behind UN operations are to demonstrate power, protecting nationals and United Nations personnel and humanitarian considerations.[152] In the Handbook developed by the DPKO (2003) emphasize is on alleviating the suffering of people affected by war and assisting them in the reconstruction of their post-conflict societies.[153] All the above mentioned persons and documents clearly indicate the importance of prevent/ address human suffering and/or preventive action.

Two articles published in December 2004 bring forward other aspects of the objectives behind UN operations. The first article is published on the Global Policy Forum and states that: "*Deploying military capacities - for peacekeeping as well as peace enforcement -has proved to be a valuable tool in ending wars and helping to secure States in their aftermath*".[154] And the second of Johnstone states that it is important to rebuild states among liberal-democratic lines.[155] The United Nations states in 2005 that the organization has continued to provide support to stabilize fragile peace agreements and assist political transition processes.[156] The Annual Review of Global Peace Operations 2008 brings forward the priorities of the UN to support states recover from conflicts[157], and in line with the previous mentioned prevention is the objective as formulated by the DPKO namely, preventing the conflict from returning or escalating.[158] These four sources clearly indicate the importance of helping countries in the aftermath of a conflict to rebuild itself.

Other indications of the purposes and priorities can be found in an article published on the UN Chronicle were it is said that to guarantee collective security the United Nations should be an effective instrument for preventing conflict that it was always meant to be, by acting on several key policy and institutional priorities, such as: preventing catastrophic terrorism, disarmament and non-proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, reducing the prevalence and risk of war, and set out principles with regard to the use of force. Other priorities for global action include more effective cooperation to combat organized crime, to prevent illicit trade in small arms and light

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[150] Koffi A. Annan: 'We the peoples, the role of the UN in the 21st century', Published by the United Nations Department of Public Information, March 2000 (DPI/2083/Rev.1). To be found on: http://www.un.org/millennium/sg/report/summ.htm.

[151] United Nations Information Service: 'Deputy Secretary-General Highlights United Nations' Crisis Management And Rapid Reaction Capacity at OSCE Ministerial Meeting', 27 November 2000 (UNIS/DSG/54). To be found on: http://www.unis.unvienna.org/unis/pressrels/2000/dsg54.html.

[152] Roberts, Adam. 'Humanitarian Issues and Agencies as Triggers for International Military Action.' International Review of the Red Cross Vol. 82 No. 839 (2000), pp. 673-698. To be found on: http://www.icrc.org/Wb/Eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/57JQQA.

[153]Department of Peacekeeping Operations United Nations, Peacekeeping Best Practices Unit: 'Handbook on United Nations Multidimensional Peacekeeping Operations', December 2003. To be found on: http://www.peacekeepingbestpractices.unlb.org/Pbps/library/Handbook%20on%20UN%20PKOs.pdf.

[154] Global Policy Forum: 'Threats, Challenges and Change', December 13, 2004. To be found on: http://www.globalpolicy.org/reform/initiatives/panels/high/1213afnewsresponse.htm.

[155]Ian Johnstone: 'Recent Thinking on Peacekeeping: Literature Review No. 1', Center on International Cooperation, Project on Transformations in Multilateral Security Institutions Implications for the UN, December 16, 2004, p2. To be found on: http://www.cic.nyu.edu/internationalsecurity/docs/Recent%20Thinking%20on%20Peacekeeping%20Literature%20Review1.pdf.

[156] United Nations Peacekeeping, meeting new challenges, 21 March 2005. To be found on: http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/faq/q&a.pdf.

[157] See also: Annual Review of Global Peace Operations 2008; a project of the Center on International Cooperation, p. 7.

[158] Website of the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, June 2009. To be found on: http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/factsheet.pdf.

weapons, and to remove the scourge of landmines, which still kill and maim innocent people, and hold back development in nearly half the world's countries.[159] The priorities brought forward here are not directly priorities to prevent human suffering, while preventing terrorist attacks and nuclear attacks and combat crime and illicit arms trade, might in fact prevent human suffering. Dan Sarooshi (2007)is more explicitly referring to humanitarian considerations when he states on the Global Policy Forum that "*The Council has delegated its Chapter VII powers to member States for the attainment of various objectives including to counter a use of force, to carry out a naval interdiction against a state, to achieve humanitarian objectives, to protect UN declared 'safe areas,' and to ensure implementation of a peace agreement*".[160]

Finally this thesis wants to bring forward the mandates given to the different UN peace operations. From this mandates it is possible to derive objectives of the United Nations. Often mentioned objectives in the mandates are to observe ceasefire, DDR, and the refugee/IDP return. Especially the objectives like refugee/IDP return, human rights monitoring, and the protection of humanitarian relief indicate the importance of humanitarian considerations for the UN. The mandates from 1948-2000 of UN peace operations can be found in Annex I and II.

The United Nations and humanitarianism

This paragraph brought forward several purposes and priorities of the United Nations with regard to the deployment of military personnel. As became clear during this paragraph it is sometime problematic to define purposes and priorities as being an outcome of humanitarianism. For example terms like peace and security. Is peace and security so important for the UN because of the interests of several countries within the UN or because the UN wants to prevent human suffering? Conflicts may disturb trade, cause massive flow of refugees and so on. On the other hand conflicts are also a source of human suffering. Defining 'maintenance of international peace and security' as being an outcome of humanitarianism would be too much yet the purposes and priorities of the UN that were brought forward seem to confirm the existence of humanitarian purposes / objectives. This paragraph brought forward the importance of issues like international peace and security; collective security; development; sustainable peace, prevention; support states; solving humanitarian problems; protect the vulnerable; deal with humanitarian objectives; protecting human rights and fundamental freedoms; children and armed conflicts; refugees and more in general make the world a safer place. Like stated before there are some issues that can be labeled as being not necessarily an outcome of humanitarian considerations. Examples are peace (who benefits from peace?) and security (whose security?). Also the remarks made by Roberts indicate that the purposes and priorities of the UN are in some way guided by realism. Although it is not always clear what is at the background of the purposes and priorities it is fair to say that the documents and opinions brought forward in this paragraph confirm the idea formulated in the (sub) hypothesis that humanitarian considerations are of special importance for the United Nations.

The European Union

In chapter 2 this thesis brought forward the developments of relevance within the European Union. Mentioned are the drafting of the Treaty of the European Union and the amendments. Furthermore the relevance of several meetings was pointed out. This paragraph will bring forward several mentioned documents (like the ESS and the Helsinki Headline Goals) and meetings to give a clear overview of the Union's purposes and priorities with regard to military operations.

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[159] UN Chronicle: 'In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights For All', 2005. To be found on: http://www.un.org/Pubs/chronicle/2005/issue1/0105p4.html.
[160] Dan Sarooshi: 'Security Council', Global Policy Forum. To be found on: http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/gensc.htm.

An important document that gives insight in the general view of the European Union's foreign and security policy is the European Security Strategy (ESS). In this document, drawn up by Javier Solana and adopted by the Brussels European Council in December 2003, the Union's defence and security strategies can be found. Clearly stated in the introduction is that: "*No single country is able to tackle today's complex problems on its own… Europe still faces security threats and challenges. The outbreak of conflict in the Balkans was a reminder that war has not disappeared from our continent. Over the last decade, no region of the world has been untouched by armed conflict. Most of these conflicts have been within rather than between states, and most of the victims have been civilians…and with a wide range of instruments at its disposal, the European Union is inevitably a global player. In the last decade European forces have been deployed abroad to places as distant as Afghanistan, East Timor and the DRC. The increasing convergence of European interests and the strengthening of mutual solidarity of the EU makes us a more credible and effective actor. Europe should be ready to share in the responsibility for global security and in building a better world*".[161] With other words the European Union is strongly aware of its international position and willing to take responsibility for international security. Hereinafter the ESS points out that many civilians died during war in the past decades, many refugees fled from home and several regions suffer from poverty. The European Union is of the opinion that security is a precondition of development. Conflicts have destroyed next to material also social achievements. Most of the time conflicts have ruined economy, deterred investments and encouraged criminality. Therefore it is necessary to guarantee security; security is a precondition of development. Also the competition for natural resources (water) will not contribute to a stable environment in several regions. This paragraph will continue with three important issues brought forward in the ESS and consider the role of realism is with regard to these choices in the ESS.

The first important issue for the EU is to address key threats. Key threats mentioned in the ESS (which are more diverse, less visible and less predictable) are terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, failed states and organised crime. In addressing these threats the European Union has responded after 11 September with measures like a European Arrest Warrant, rules that make it possible to intervene in terrorist financing and an agreement on mutual legal assistance with the USA. Furthermore the EU has pursued policies against the proliferation over many years. The European Union has also intervened to help deal with regional conflicts and support failed States, like in the Balkans, Afghanistan and in the DRC. Bringing democracy and good governance to the Balkans is for example an effective way to tackle organised crime within the EU. Like the Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy brings forward in the future some (other) threats might become more important like terrorism and energy security.[162] Although there is attention for failed states this first issue clearly indicates the importance of realism for the EU. All the threats referred to are threats that the EU faces and like becomes clear with the example of tackling organized crime the ESS directly refers to the importance for the Union.

That realism is important for the EU also becomes clear when the ESS refers to globalization and brings forward that because of globalization not only nearby threats are of importance to the EU but also nuclear activities in North Korea, proliferation in the Middle East and terrorist activities in central and southeast Asia are threats that have to be dealt with. The ESS refers to the spread of state failure and organised crime in West Africa to point out the danger of neglecting international threats. The EU should be ready to act before a crisis occurs, which means conflict prevention and threat prevention as early as possible. With other words it is possible to say that the Union's attention for problems way beyond its own territory is also driven by own security interests.

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[161] 'A Secure Europe in a Better World' European Security Strategy, Brussels, 12 December 2003, p. 1. To be found on: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf.
[162] Interview 12 and 'The Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy: Providing Security in a Changing World'. Brussels, 11 December 2008 (S407/08). To be found on: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/reports/104630.pdf.

Important with regard to EU peace operations and at the same time related to the above mentioned threats are the remarks on page 6 and following of the ESS that indicate the issues that the European Union should deal with: "*State failure and organised crime spread if they are neglected – as we have seen in West Africa. This implies that we should be ready to act before a crisis occurs. Conflict prevention and threat prevention cannot start too early*" and "*In failed states, military instruments may be needed to restore order, humanitarian means to tackle the immediate crisis. Regional conflicts need political solutions but military assets and effective policing may be needed in the post conflict phase. Economic instruments serve reconstruction, and civilian crisis management helps restore civil government. The European Union is particularly well equipped to respond to such multi-faceted situations*".[163] With these remarks it is doubtable whether the threats mentioned in the ESS are an outcome of realism. The Union is willing to tackle immediate crisis and also willing to reconstruct, so perhaps with regard to peace operations the EU is more than a realistic organization.

The second important issue mentioned in the ESS is building security in the neighbourhood. Of special importance are the countries and regions on the borders of Europe, like East Europe, the Mediterranean, the Balkan, Southern Caucasus and Israel. Building security is necessary to create stability in Europe itself and also to promote security outside Europe in the Middle East for example. Efforts are necessary to prevent outbreak of conflicts, to strengthen international relations and to press for reform. It is fair to state that security is an important purposes/ priority for the Union, especially security in the neighbourhood is of importance because this might prevent destabilization of the region and prevent the flow of refugees.[164] With in mind the importance for the EU to create stability and security in the region and stop the flow of refugees it is clear that the importance of the neighbourhood is an outcome of realistic considerations.

The third important issue mentioned in the ESS is described as supporting an international order based on effective multilateralism within the United Nations. The ESS states that: "*In a world of global threats, global markets and global media, our security and prosperity increasingly depend on an effective multilateral system. The development of a stronger international society, well functioning international institutions and a rule-based international order is our objective*".[165] Important are international law, good relations with the United Nations, and acknowledgement of the central role of the Security Council with regard to international peace and security. Furthermore the Union states that international and regional organisations, especially the NATO can make an important contribution to achieve this objective. Well-governed democratic states are according to the ESS the best protection for international security. To strengthen the international order it is therefore necessary to spread good governance, support social and political reform, deal with corruption and abuse of power, establish the rule of law and protect human rights. To label this third issue as being an outcome of realism or perhaps even humanitarianism would be too much. The question remains whether the ESS is a noble document or that it is a document aimed at improving the EU global position. The notion that well-governed democratic states are the best protection for international security can give an indication that security, especially own security, is more important for the Union than other objectives and that realistic considerations are at the background of the formulated objectives in the ESS.

The three issues referred to can be described as the strategic objectives of the Union's CFSP. However there is also critique on the ESS, especially with regard to the documents as being a strategy. An often heard critique is that the ESS is not defining a real strategy and neither indicates

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[163] 'A Secure Europe in a Better World' European Security Strategy, Brussels, 12 December 2003, p. 7. To be found on: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf.
[164] Interview 5.
[165] 'A Secure Europe in a Better World' European Security Strategy, Brussels, 12 December 2003, p. 9. To be found on: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf.

clear priorities.[166] Who reads the ESS might wonder whether the EU knows what it wants with regard to the deployment of operations. What are the tasks that the EU should be capable of? What are the specific priorities? What is the scale of involvement? An often heard remark is that the ESS is broad and vague.[167] The adoption of the Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy in December 2008 introduced a more detailed strategy yet this cannot be seen as a grand strategy for the EU.[168] With these remarks it becomes clear that a description of the purposes and priorities of the EU might not be easy.

Hereinafter several important meetings and related statements will be brought forward that are of relevance for this paragraph. These meetings and statements will indicate the most important purposes and priorities developed in the light of the ESDP and CFSP. The first meeting this thesis wants to bring forward is the meeting in St. Malo. This meeting took place before the CFSP became active. Here the French and British Heads of States declared that the "*Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises*".[169] Another important meeting took place in June 1992 and lead to the Petersburg Declaration; in this declaration the tasks of Western European Union were clearly described. Important is that this document envisaged three types of mission: humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking. These missions should guarantee an effective response to the threats identified in the early nineties. With regard to the subject of this thesis the crisis management are of special importance. Both meetings clearly indicate that the EU should be able and capable to respond to international crisis.

An important meeting for the EU took place in 1999, at the Cologne European Council Meeting (3 and 4 June). Here the EU leaders stated that they were determined that "*the European Union shall play its full role on the international stage. To that end, we intend to give the European Union the necessary means and capabilities to assume its responsibilities regarding common European policy on security and defence. (…) the Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and the readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises without prejudice to actions by NATO*".[170] In continuation of this statement several other meetings took place in which the EU pointed out its military targets (see Helsinki Headline Goal), including the number of troops and the command and control over these troops.

It seems that every meeting the EU wanted to do more, be more capable and wanted to improve its role on the global level. In 2001, another important meeting took place in Laeken. Here the European Council stated that the "*Union is now capable of conducting some crisis management operations*" and "*the EU is now able to conduct some crisis-management operations. The Union will be in a position to take on progressively more demanding operations, as the assets and capabilities at its disposal continue to develop*" .[171]

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[166] Interview 2 and 6.

[167] Interview 11 and 16.

[168] 'The Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy: Providing Security in a Changing World'. Brussels, 11 December 2008 (S407/08). To be found on:
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/reports/104630.pdf.

[169] Alexander R. Vershbow: 'European Security and Defense Identity: Berlin, St.Malo, and Beyond'. Published in Joint Force Quarterly, Spring 1999, pp. 52-55. To be found on: http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/jfq_pubs/1121.pdf.

[170] Presidency Conclusions, European Council Declaration on Strengthening the Common European Policy on Security and Defense, Cologne European Council 3 and 4 June 1999. To be found on:
http://www.esdp-course.ethz.ch/content/ref/199906Cologne_Excerpt.htm.

[171] Presidency Conclusions, European Council, 14 and 15 December 2001 Laeken. To be found on:
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/enlargement/ec/pdf/laeken_en.pdf.

That the intentions of the Union are not only words on paper becomes clear in 2003, when the General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC) declared that "*the EU now has operational capability across the full range of Petersburg tasks, limited and constrained by recognised shortfalls*".[172] In 2008, after several meetings and the drafting of the European Security Strategy it was time to clarify the current position of the EU by drafting the Headline Goal 2010.[173] Not only was it necessary to identify the strategic objectives, but also it was necessary to deal with issues like the operational requirements and capabilities of the Union. Of special importance is the identification of the strategic planning assumptions. Five illustrative scenarios were prepared, with a wide spectrum of military operations. These were: separation of parties by force; stabilisation, reconstruction and military advice to third countries; conflict prevention; evacuation operation; assistance to humanitarian operations. As stated in the Headline Goal 2010 the EU wants: "*To be able by 2010 to respond with rapid and decisive action applying a fully coherent approach to the whole spectrum of crisis management operations covered by the Treaty on European Union".[174]* These intentions are in line with the meetings described above and the Headline Goal 2010 confirms that the Union wants to become a global player that is capable to respond to international crisis.

In 2008 the role of the EU is described as "*The EU today continues to strive for peace, security, and prosperity across the European continent—and often beyond. Since the mid-1990s, the EU has been developing a credible foreign and security policy designed to contribute meaningfully to peacekeeping through international crisis management operations around the globe*".[175] Furthermore the ESDP, as part of the Union's Common Foreign and Security Policy, enables the EU to develop the international crisis management capacities required to achieve five key objectives, namely: to safeguard the EU's common values and fundamental interests; to strengthen the security of the EU; to preserve peace and international security in accordance with the UN Charter; to promote international cooperation; and advance democracy and the rule of law, including human rights.[176]

Before we round off this paragraph will shortly say something about the policy implications for Europe as brought forward in the European Security Strategy. The Strategy states that the European Union need to be more active, more coherent, more capable and work with others. So the European Union should more actively pursue their strategic objectives in crisis management as well as in conflict prevention (which includes robust intervention). Furthermore the European Union should sustain several operations simultaneously and support the United Nations as it responds to international threats.[177]

With regard to 'more capable' the ESS strives for more flexible, more mobile military personnel that have more resources at their disposal. Furthermore it means sharing of intelligence and the increase of EU's capabilities in different missions (joint disarmament operations, support for third countries in combating terrorism and security sector reform). With more coherent the Strategy means that all instruments within the EU and its member states should be brought together.

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[172] EU Council Secretariat, Development of European Military Capabilities: The Force Catalogue 2006. To be found on: http://consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/MilitaryCapabilitiesFC06backgroundNov06_en.pdf.
[173] Headline Goal 2010, approved by General Affairs and External Relations Council on 17 May 2004, endorsed by the European Council of 17 and 18 June 2004. To be found on:
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/2010%20Headline%20Goal.pdf.
[174] Headline Goal 2010, approved by General Affairs and External Relations Council on 17 May 2004, endorsed by the European Council of 17 and 18 June 2004, p.1. To be found on:
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/2010%20Headline%20Goal.pdf.
[175] EU Focus, "The EU and Peacekeeping: Promoting Security, Stability and Democratic Values", November 2008. To be found on: http://www.eurunion.org/News/eunewsletters/EUFocus/2008/EUFocus-Peacekeeping-Nov08.pdf.
[176] Article 11 Treaty on the European Union.
[177] For a more extensive elaboration on 'more active, more capable' see:
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/NewsletterEUMS_060424.pdf.

The strategy concludes by stating that the EU is not capable of dealing with all the problems on its own and therefore need to work with partners through multilateral cooperation in international organisations and through partnerships with key actors.

This paragraph dealt quite extensively with several documents in which indications of European purposes and priorities can be found. The literature brings forward several other purposes and priorities of the European Union like: the mentioned global role that the European Union wants to play[178], which means that the EU is convinced that it has the capabilities and wants to use them to become an international actor. Another priority is to build a partnership with Africa[179]; the EU wants support Africa (and the African Union). A third purpose/priority for the Union is formulated as the responsibility to protect[180] which mean that the EU as part of the international community will not stand by and allow other States to inflict harm on their own populations. Related to this priority is the protection of the vulnerable.[181] Furthermore a purpose of the EU that can be referred to is to bolster international prestige.[182] By delivering experts for different civil and military crisis management activities the Union wants to bring added-value to this area of policy.[183] With regard to crisis management the Union wants to maintenance a secure environment for the implementation of peace agreements.[184] Other priorities for the Union are to address root causes of conflicts[185]; respond rapidly to conflicts[186]; deal with failed states; support states recovering from conflicts[187] and strategic support to the United Nations.[188]

Terms that are further used in the European Security Strategy to describe the goals of the European Union are 'Spreading good governance', 'supporting social and political reform', 'dealing with corruption and abuse of power', 'establishing the rule of law and protecting human rights' and 'justice and opportunity for everyone'.[189]

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[178] Martin Ortega: 'region building' in Europe and across the world (pp. 117-130). In Chaillot Paper 72, November 2004, pp. 118-130.

[179] Richard Gowan: 'Good Intentions Bad Outcomes', in E!Sharp, January-February 2009, pp.57-59. To be found on: http://www.cic.nyu.edu/internationalsecurity/docs/Good%20Intentions.pdf and Daniel Keohane: 'EU defence policy: Beyond the Balkans, beyond peacekeeping?' Centre for European Reform, 1 July 2003, par 23. To be found on: http://www.cer.org.uk/articles/keohane_weltpolitik_jul03.html.

[180] Council of the European Union, Javier Solana, EU High Representative for the CFSP, welcomes today's launch of the Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, Brussels, 14 February 2008 (S058/08). To be found on: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/declarations/98733.pdf.

[181] Richard Gowan: 'Good Intentions Bad Outcomes', in E!Sharp, January-February 2009, pp.57-59. To be found on: http://www.cic.nyu.edu/internationalsecurity/docs/Good%20Intentions.pdf.

[182] Petar Petrov: 'The ESDP in motion: opportunities and constraints for the application of an integrated civil-military operational scenario' in Studia Diplomatica, the Brussels Journal of International Relations. Vol. LX, 2007, Number 3: Peace and Security in Central Africa; International Intervention in Africa; NATO and ESDP. pp.157-182.

[183] Petar Petrov: 'The ESDP in motion: opportunities and constraints for the application of an integrated civil-military operational scenario' in Studia Diplomatica, the Brussels Journal of International Relations. Vol. LX, 2007, Number 3: Peace and Security in Central Africa; International Intervention in Africa; NATO and ESDP. pp.157-182.

[184] Heiner Hanggi and Fred Tanner: 'Promoting security sector governance in the EU's neighbourhood'. In Chaillot Paper 80. July 2005, p36. To be found on: http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/cp080.pdf.

[185] Fernanda Faria: 'Crisis management in sub-Saharan Africa; The role of the European Union' in: Occasional Paper 51, April 2004, European Union Institute for Security Studies, p.53.

[186] Richard Gowan: 'Good Intentions Bad Outcomes', in E!Sharp, January-February 2009, pp.57-59. To be found on: http://www.cic.nyu.edu/internationalsecurity/docs/Good%20Intentions.pdf.

[187] Annual Review of Global Peace Operations 2008; a project of the Center on International Cooperation, p. 7.

[188] Richard Gowan: 'Good Intentions Bad Outcomes', in E!Sharp, January-February 2009, pp.57-59. To be found on: http://www.cic.nyu.edu/internationalsecurity/docs/Good%20Intentions.pdf.

[189] A Secure Europe in a Better World' European Security Strategy, Brussels, 12 December 2003, p. 10. To be found on: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf.

The European Union and realism

With regard the EU some humanitarian considerations can be detected like solidarity, international security, humanitarian operations, and effective multilateralism. Yet when we critically look at the given documents we might see another organization. The ESS for example starts with the assumption that the EU faces threats and challenges, so the importance of the Union's own security. Other aspect that can indicate the existence of realist purposes are the attendance for economic issues in several security related documents, the great attention for threats and the neighborhood within the ESS, the notion that bringing democracy and good governance to the Balkans is an effective way to tackle organised crime within the EU, the search for stability in the EU. So behind the documents it is possible to detect own interests, realist purposes. That a regional organization is more concerned in its own region seems not so wrong or strange yet the question is whether the deployment of military personnel by the Union will only happen is case of interests of the Union or one or more of its member states. References to European interests, security, threats, neighbourhood, and our security clearly indicate the applicability of realism to the EU purposes and priorities.

The existence of a division

This paragraph dealt with several purposes and priorities of the UN and the EU with regard to the deployment of military personnel. The question is whether the answers found in this paragraph can indicate some kind of a division between the UN and the EU. The first division found in this paragraph is clearly the difference between the UN, as an international organization, and the EU, as a regional organization. The UN is concerned with international peace and security, while the EU is more concerned with regional stability. Furthermore in the formulation of the purposes and priorities of the UN there is much more attention for humanitarian related subjects, while the EU is more concerned with economical and security issues. When we look at the purposes and priorities brought forward in this paragraph two aspect of division are clearly present first of all the EU is more focussed on Europe and its region while the focus of the UN is worldwide. Secondly, the UN's purposes and priorities seem to be a reflection of the question: 'what can we do for the world?' while the EU's purposes and priorities are more a reflection of the question: 'where can we safeguard our interests'.

3.3 The geographical preferences of the United Nations and the European Union

Sub hypothesis:
For an organization guided by humanitarianism there are no geographical preferences, the UN will deploy military personnel where required and when preferences exist than this is related to the intensity of human suffering. The geographical preferences of the EU, as a realist organization, will indicate areas in which it has political, economic and security interests.

An organization guided by humanitarianism should not have preferences with regard to regions or countries. Not the region or the country is in front but the humanitarian situation within the region or country. Not only the humanitarian situation in Africa and Europe is important, but also the humanitarian situation in Asia, the Middle East, or South America can lead to the deployment of military personnel. On the other hand an organization guided by realist considerations is more reasoning from its own point of view. So the interest of the Union is the most important consideration and not the humanitarian situation within a region or a country. A realist organization is more concerned with own security, own power and other interests. This paragraph will take a closer look at the geographical dispersal of military operations deployed by the UN and the EU and try to find indications that humanitarianism and realism have influence on the geographical preferences of both organizations.

The United Nations

Although the United Nations is the international organization that should represent every country and every country should be part of the United Nations geographical preferences this paragraph wants to find out whether certain geographical preferences or priorities can be detected. In broad lines this paragraph will look at the documents published by the United Nations, articles written about the operations of the United Nations, numbers of troops and military observers that are deployed in the last years and deal with largest operations deployed by the United Nations. Before concluding whether the UN is an organization guided by humanitarianism three issues will be brought forward. These will be the failed state index, the number of death tolls and finally the problem of internal displacements. Because all three issues can give an indication of human suffering it might be useful to link these issues to the deployment of military operations by the UN and find out whether the UN really deploys such operations in case of serious human suffering.

The United Nations have mentioned, in statements and documents, several countries and regions that are at the centre of its attention. When we for example look at the statement of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Ban Ki-moon, in his first address to the UN Security Council, the Secretary-General said that ensuring peace in Darfur and the Democratic Republic of the Congo is at the top of his agenda.[190] In an interview with Jean-Marie Guéhenno, Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations by Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, this choice of the Secretary-General is confirmed and some other countries are mentioned that are of core importance to the United Nations. Guéhenno states that the United Nations have the priorities of specific missions, where a lot is at stake. After the achievements in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) in 2006 it is now necessary to continue the efforts in this country. Achievements in the DRC are, according to Guéhenno, not only important for the people of the country itself but also for the whole of Africa. Guéhenno also confirms that the tragedy in Darfur is a challenge that the United Nations faces. Progress is made in ending the 'largest conflict in Africa'; the north-south conflict in Sudan, and now

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[190] Jonas Hagen: 'Security Council Hears Ban Ki-moon's Top Priorities', UN Chronicle, 2007. To be found on: http://www.un.org/Pubs/chronicle/2007/webArticles/011007_bsc.htm.

it is also time to face the problems in Darfur. Other priorities that Guéhenno mentions are Kosovo (massive engagement of the United Nations has regained stability but clearly the situation needs to evolve)[191], Lebanon and the two countries in which operations are closed down (Burundi and Sierra Leone).[192]

As we will see later on the choice of Ban Ki-moon and Jean-Marie Guéhenno to focus on the DRC and Sudan is justifiable with in mind the number of causalities and internally displaced persons (IDP's). Since 1975 more than two million people died in both countries[193] and in Sudan there were in December 2008 almost five million IDP's while in the DRC one point four million persons were internally displaced.[194]

Ban Ki-moon has also put forward his priorities on his website[195], the Secretary-General specially refers to Africa and the Middle East. With regard to the Middle East the SG is aware of the complex, fragile and dangerous environment of the region. Movement toward a just, lasting and comprehensive peace have to be encouraged to set aside the deep mistrust between the Israeli's and the Palestinians. Another problematic region is Iraq. It is necessary to promote national reconciliation, provide humanitarian assistance to innocent civilians and create a more stable regional environment. Another way to find out where the United Nations is focusing on is to look at the country focus of the Department of Political Affairs (UNDPA). The Department of Political Affairs 'manages special political missions and peace-building support offices engaged in conflict prevention, peacemaking and post-conflict peace building in Africa, South and Central Asia and the Middle East'.[196] That not all missions have a military component goes without saying. One can see that the focus in Africa is on the Central African Republic, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan, West-Africa, Western-Sahara and the Great Lakes region. Other regional focus is on Americas (Central America and Guyana), Europe (Cyprus), Asia and Pacific (Central Asia, Myanmar, Nepal) and the Middle East (Iraq, Lebanon and the Middle East Peace process).[197]

The United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO) states in 'Meeting New Challenges' that: "*The United Nations has responded to evolving, complex situations in Côte d'Ivoire, Burundi, Georgia, the Middle East, Kosovo and the Sudan; and provided robust, responsive peacekeeping in areas such as in the eastern DRC and in city districts of Port-au- Prince, Haiti. In 2005, the Organization completed its peacekeeping mandates in Sierra Leone and Timor-Leste and established UN peace building support missions there and the Council mandated the establishment of three new operations in Africa: in Sierra Leone, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Ethiopia and Eritrea*".[198]

The SG, the UNDPA and the UNDPKO all bring forward countries and regions that suffer from conflicts and tensions in and outside their borders. As this thesis will bring forward latter on most of the countries mentioned above are listed on the failed states index, and have to cope with IDP's. The

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[191] Kaveh L. Afrasiabi, Director of the Global Interfaith Peace, interviewed Mr. Guéhenno on 19 January 2007. The Chronicle Interview 'We are more advanced in Peacekeeping than in Peacebuilding efforts'. To be found on: http://www.un.org/Pubs/chronicle/2007/issue1/0107p16.htm.

[192] Kaveh L. Afrasiabi, Director of the Global Interfaith Peace, interviewed Mr. Guéhenno on 19 January 2007. The Chronicle Interview 'We are more advanced in Peacekeeping than in Peacebuilding efforts'. To be found on: http://www.un.org/Pubs/chronicle/2007/issue1/0107p16.htm.

[193] Source: http://users.erols.com/mwhite28/war-2000.htm.

[194] IDMC: 'Activity Report 2008'. To be found on: http://www2.reliefweb.int/rw/lib.nsf/db900sid/SNAA-7UF93Z/$file/IDMC%20Activity_Report_2008.pdf?openelement.

[195] Website of the Secretary General of the United Nations, to be found on: http://www.un.org/sg/priority.shtml.

[196] Website of the United Nations Department of Political Affairs, to be found on: http://www.un.org/Depts/dpa/fieldmissions.html.

[197] Website of the United Nations Department of Political Affairs, to be found on: http://www.un.org/Depts/dpa/index.html.

[198] United Nations Peacekeeping, meeting new challenges, 21 March 2005. To be found on: http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/faq/q&a.pdf.

attention for all these countries confirms the international view of the UN and the attention for human suffering.

In the Annual Review of Global Peace Operations 2008 some preferences of the United Nations can be detected. It is stated that: "*The planned deployment of nearly 40,000 peacekeepers in Darfur, Chad, the Central African Republic, and Somalia, combined with the existing mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea, represented the emergence of a major peacekeeping concentration in the Broader Horn of Africa*".[199] So the Broader Horn of Africa is of special importance to the United Nations. In the strategic summary this is said as following: "*The broader Horn of Africa region will become one of the most concentrated peacekeeping theatres in the world*".[200]
The Annual Review furthermore dealt with three operational clusters of peace operations (defined by the combination of source of troops, location of their deployment and the authorizing institution or institutions). Mentioned are first of all an Asian-African Nexus of operations in Africa, where 67,715 UN and non-UN military and police personnel were deployed, drawing primarily on troops from Africa itself and three major South Asian contributors: India, Pakistan and Bangladesh. The three South Asian and African contributors account for over 80 percent of all UN troops deployed in Africa. Second of all a Euro-Middle Eastern nexus of operations in the broader Middle East and South Central Asia, where 58,895 troops were deployed, relying largely on European forces under UN and NATO command.[201] European troops made up 60 percent of the UN force in Lebanon and over 50 percent of the 41,000 NATO troops in Afghanistan. And the third cluster; the regional specializations, including the Australian-led force in Timor-Leste and Solomon Islands; the Russian peacekeeping forces in the Commonwealth of Independent States; the European presence in the Western Balkans and the African presence in Somalia, Darfur and the Central African Republic. Most of these deployments, though led by regional actors, operated under a UN political framework.[202]

So for the UN the Asian-African nexus is of special importance. In the Middle East other organizations operate next to or in cooperation with the UN (NATO and EU) and the third cluster, although often operating under UN framework, are not UN operations. In Annex IV the number of military personnel deployed by the UN from 2005 onwards is given and these numbers indicate the importance of the African continent and the growing attention for the Middle East.

What becomes clear is that most military personnel are deployed in Africa and that there is also attention for the Middle East (UNIFIL) and Central and South America (MINUSTAH). The question is whether this is the outcome of geographical preferences of the UN or that UN involvement is necessary to prevent human suffering in these countries. Before we answer this question we will take a look at the largest military operations deployed by the UN, the operations currently deployed by the UN, the failed states index, the death tolls and the number of refugees.

The geographical preferences of the United Nations, or needs throughout the world can also be detected from the peace operations that has been deployed until now. When we take a closer look at the largest operations, in which the most military personnel and military observers are deployed

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[199] Annual Review of Global Peace Operations 2008, a project of the Center on International Cooperation, briefing paper, p. 4. To be found on: http://www.cic.nyu.edu/internationalsecurity/docs/Final2008briefingreport.pdf.
[200] Annual Review of Global Peace Operations 2008, a project of the Center on International Cooperation. The editorially independent *Review* is a project of the Center on International Cooperation at New York University, with the support of the Peacekeeping Best Practices Section of the UN's Department of Peacekeeping Operations and in cooperation with the International Peace Academy. Pp. 3-4.
[201] Annual Review of Global Peace Operations 2008, a project of the Center on International Cooperation, briefing paper, p. 4. To be found on: http://www.cic.nyu.edu/internationalsecurity/docs/Final2008briefingreport.pdf.
[202] Annual Review of Global Peace Operations 2008, a project of the Center on International Cooperation, briefing paper, p. 4. To be found on: http://www.cic.nyu.edu/internationalsecurity/docs/Final2008briefingreport.pdf.

we might see some kind of preferences appear. The nine largest military operations deployed by the UN are the following:

- MINUSTAH (7062 troops/0 military observers)
- MONUC (16646 troops/715 military observers)
- UNDOF (1043 troops/0 military observers)
- UNFICYP (853 troops/0 military observers)
- UNIFIL (13264 troops/0 military observers)
- UNMEE (1464 troops/222 military observers)(
- UNMIL (13924 troops/201 military observers)
- UNMIS (8807 troops/1607 military observers)
- UNOCI (7871troops/188 military observers)

In broad lines one can say that the United Nations has deployed their largest military operations in four areas. Which are, first of all, the broader Horn of Africa region (DRC, Sudan, Eritrea and Ethiopia). The second area is Western Africa (Western Sahara, Liberia and Côte d'Ivoire). The Third area is the Middle East (between Israel and Syria on the Golan, Lebanon and the European country Cyprus). And finally, the last region is Central America (in which only Haiti is important for the United Nations).

Below the current operations deployed by the United Nations are given, with the year of deployment, the number of military observers, number of troops and the costs of the mission.[203] What is clearly visible is that most of the current operations are deployed on the African continent. Five of the seven, current operational, operations that are deployed this century are deployed in Africa. One operation is deployed in Haiti and the United Nations decided to send some military observers to Timor-Leste. That the African continent is of special importance for the United Nations is also clearly visible with in mind the number of troops that are deployed throughout the world. Currently the United Nations has deployed troops in ten operations from which six are situated on the African continent. Of the seven operations with a large military component (more than 7,000 troops deployed) five are situated on the African continent.
Something comparable is visible when the number of military observers and the budget of the different operations are considered. The five operations with the largest number of military observers are established in Africa and from the eight operations with a budget exceeding 300 million dollars, six are located in Africa.

Outside Africa troops are deployed in four operations, strikingly three of these operations are established for the first time more than 30 years ago. Only the operation in Haiti was decided on this century.

Box 1

Mission and place on failed state index:	Since:	Number of MO	Number of troops	Budget in million dollars:
Africa				
MINURCAT (Chad: 4 / RCA: 8)	2007	44	-	315
UNAMID (3)	2007	157	9,753	1,569
UNMIS (3)	2005	629	8,721	859
UNOCI (11)	2004	191	7,829	497
UNMIL (2006: 12)	2003	200	10,782	632
MONUC (5)	1999	718	16,587	1,243
MINURSO	1991	190	20	48

[203] Information from the website of the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, to be found on: http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/bnote.htm and the budget include other aspects of the peace operation and are rounded off.

Americas				
MINUSTAH (12)	2004	-	7,031	602
Asia and the Pacific				
UNMIT (20)	2006	32	-	181
UNMOGIP (Pakistan 10)	1949	43	-	17
Europe				
UNIFICYP	1946	-	858	57
UNOMIG (33)	1993	137	-	36
UNAMIK	1999	24	-	207
Middle East				
UNDOF	1974	-	1,043	48
UNIFIL (2009: 29, 2008: 18)	1978	-	12,733	681
UNTSO	1948	151	-	66
Total		**2,516**	**75,357**	

To give an indication of the problems within the countries in which the UN deployed military personnel Box 1 indicated the position of these countries on the 'failed state index 2009' which is published by the Fund for Peace.[204] Countries, listed in the top ten of the index, in which the UN is currently not military involved are Somalia (1); Zimbabwe (2); Iraq (6); Afghanistan (7); and Guinea (9). The UN did deploy operations in Somalia (UNOSOM I and II), and currently the EU is deploying a military operation in Somalia (coast). So there is attention for this country. The EU also deployed an SSR operation in Guinea. That the UN is currently not military involved in Iraq and Afghanistan can be explained when we keep in mind the procedure that lead to the invasion of both countries. Perhaps it is good to mention that the UN deployed a (non-military) operation in Afghanistan namely UNAMA. The last country mentioned here is Zimbabwe, although the UN is involved in this country with development programs etcetera there is no military involvement.

Above this thesis introduced the failed state index and compared the countries in the top of this list with the operations deployed by the UN. It appeared that in several countries on this list the UN was and is involved military. Hereinafter this paragraph will bring forward the largest number of death tolls between 1975 and 2000 and see whether the UN was involved in these situations of massive human suffering.

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[204] The Fund For Peace, promoting sustainable peace: the failed state index. To be found on:
http://www.fundforpeace.org/web/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=99&Itemid=323.

Box 2: death tolls between 1975 and 2000[205]

The map given above indicates the countries with the highest death tolls (1975-2000). As we will see the UN did deploy operations in almost every country indicated on this map:
Bosnia (UNMIBH); Gulf War (UNIKOM); Iran-Iraq (UNIIMOG); Afghanistan (UNAMA); Cambodia (UNTAC, UNAMC); East-Timor (UNTAET, UNMISET); Mozambique (ONUMOZ); Uganda/Rwanda (UNOMUR); Rwanda (UNAMIR); Ethiopia (UNMEE); Sudan (UNMIS, UNAMID); Burundi (ONUB), Liberia (ONOMIL); Congo (ONUC, MONUC); Angola (MONUA, ANAVEM I, II, III); Lebanon (UNOGIL); El Salvador (ONUSAL); Nicaragua (ONUCA). In three of the mentioned countries (regions) in which substantial persons got killed the UN did not deploy an operation namely in North-Korea, Argentina and with regard to the Kurds.

Other indications can be found in the number of refugees in the different countries and especially the number of internally displaced persons (IDP's) and see whether involvement of the UN could have something to do with the humanitarian situation within the country. Some examples:

Countries in Central and East Africa with more than 100,000 IDP's are: Sudan (4.9 million); DRC (1.4 million); Somalia (1.3 million); Uganda (628,000); Kenya (351,000); Ethiopia (250,000); Chad (167,000); RCA (123,000); and Burundi (100,000).[206] Countries in Central and East Africa with more than 100,000 refugees are: Kenya; Chad; Tanzania; Sudan; DRC; and Uganda. In the Activity Report 2008 of the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre the numbers of IDP's throughout the world can be found. Crystal clear is that especially in the Middle East, Asia, the Balkans and Central and East Africa there are enormous numbers of IDP's.[207] Perhaps it is even better to find the number of IDP's within a country at the time the UN deployed a military operations. It will become clear that in countries like Chad, RCA, Sudan, Cote d'Ivoire, Liberia, Lebanon, and Kosovo there were and are some serious problems with IDP's.[208] Dealing with all countries and the numbers of IDP's separately

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[205] The shape of a cross means 10,000; a small skull means 100,000; a large skull means 1,000,000; a skull in a box means unknown but high. Source: http://users.erols.com/mwhite28/war-2000.htm.
[206] IDP's and Refugees in Central and East Africa. To be found on:
http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/fullMaps_Af.nsf/luFullMap/BC04DF756A3AFCDFC12575BB0052FAFA/$File/map.pdf?OpenElement.
[207] IDMC: 'Activity Report 2008'. To be found on:
http://www2.reliefweb.int/rw/lib.nsf/db900sid/SNAA-7UF93Z/$file/IDMC%20Activity_Report_2008.pdf?openelement.
[208] See the website of the CIA: The World Fact book.

will go beyond the scope of this thesis, yet what becomes clear is that in almost every country in which the UN has currently deployed a military operation there are serious problems with IDP's.[209]

The United Nations and humanitarianism

What becomes clear is that the United Nations has a global view and deploys military personnel all around the globe, from Central America, to Africa, to the Middle East, to Asia. What we do see is that the United Nations has priorities with regard to the regions in which peace operations are deployed. This is not only a political decision of the permanent members of the SC but also a question of need. This thesis shortly dealt with three issues that might indicate the existence of this need. First of all the failed state index, the UN is keeping an eye on the countries listed on this index and in several countries the UN has deployed an operation. That the UN did not deploy operations in all the countries on this list does not directly contradict the presumption that the UN is an organization guided by humanitarianism. Other reasons can prevent the UN from intervening, like we have seen with regard to Iraq (role of the USA). Secondly, this paragraph brought forward the number of causalities between 1975 and 2000. The outcome seems to confirm the importance of humanitarian considerations for the UN with regard to the deployment of military personnel. The UN did deploy military personnel in most countries that suffered from violent conflicts and whenever this was not the case the UN got involved in other forms (by supporting development etcetera). Thirdly this paragraph brought forward the number of IDP's and refugees. These numbers might indicate the existence of conflicts within countries and humanitarian problems. This argument is not watertight because there might be other reasons that people are displaced but still it is an indication of human suffering. When we take a look at the number of IDP's in the countries in which the UN deployed military personnel it is fair to state that in general these countries have serious problems with IDP's.

Most military personnel are deployed in Africa, yet at the same time we can conclude that the most civil wars take place in Africa. With in mind the mentioned purposes and priorities it is fair to say that the geographical preferences and geographical deployment of military personnel express humanitarian purposes. Yet, when we are a bit more critical it is possible to doubt about the purposes behind the deployment of several thousands of troops on Haiti, yet at the same time Haiti is the least developed country in Americas, there is corruption, natural disasters took place, there was a humanitarian crises and so on. The involvement in Haiti fit into the theory of humanitarianism.[210] Furthermore it is possible to look at the number of troops deployed in Asia, according to Gilligan and Stedman there is evidence of regional bias in the UN's selection of missions, in which the worst bias is against Asia.[211] Gilligan and Stedman examined the intervention of the UN throughout the world with in mind the number of deaths and concluded that involvement of UN military personnel in Asia indicate some form of hesitation of the UN to get involved there. Andreas Andersson (2000)[212] is of the opinion that humanitarian considerations are guiding for the UN with regard to peace operations when he disputes the argument that the national interests of the permanent members are decisive for where the United Nations chooses to go. Noting the broad geographical division of interventions and the many deployments that appear to be independent of any permanent member's direct interest, he argues that the Security Council has been guided

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[209] For the complete numbers of IDP's worldwide this thesis refers to the Activity Report 2008 of IDMC, p2.

[210] Information can be obtained from press release of the SC of 18 February 2004 (SC/8004), to be found on: http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2004/sc8004.doc.htm and from The World Fact Book of the CIA, to be found on https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/HA.html.

[211] Michael Gilligan and Stephen John Stedman: 'Where do Peacekeepers go', p.49. International Studies Review, Vol. 5, No. 4, Dissolving Boundaries, December 2003, pp. 37- 54. To be found on: http://www.jstor.org.proxy.ubn.ru.nl:8080/stable/3186392?seq=1&cookieSet=1.

[212] Andreas Andersson (2000): Democracies and UN Peacekeeping Operations, 1990-1996. International Peacekeeping 7:1- 22.

primarily by a desire to promote democracy in the world. He interprets this motive as an idealistic interest of the permanent members related to the democratic peace hypotheses.

With in mind the ongoing civil wars, the failed states index, the death tolls, and number of IDP's it is fair to state that the geographical choices of the SG, the SC, the UNDPKO, and the UNDPA can be regarded as outcome of humanitarianism. The UN as an organization is concerned with all situations in which human beings suffer, and in general it is fair to state that the UN deployed military personnel in most of these situations. There are several reasons that the UN did not deploy military personnel in all countries that face humanitarian problems and the subsequent paragraph on the decisive factors will deal more extensively with these reasons.

With in mind the operations deployed in countries that are in the top of the failed state index and/or that suffer or have suffered from massive death tolls and/or have to cope with large numbers of IDP's it is fair to state that humanitarian considerations do play an important role in the deployment of military operations by the UN. Next to the SC and GA, who are in the front seat with regard to the deployment of military personnel, other organs of the UN constantly monitor the humanitarian situation worldwide and indicate where intervention might be necessary or desirable. The UN has a global view and the operations currently deployed are a clear indication that humanitarianism is guiding for UN operations.

The European Union

Now it is time to take a closer look at the geographical choices, considerations and priorities of the Union's foreign and security policy. Of all ESDP operations nine were deployed on the African continent, from which five are still active.[213] Six operations were deployed in the Western Balkans[214], three in the Middle East[215], two in Asia[216] and two in South Caucasus.[217] Furthermore the EU deployed two border missions.[218] A clear description of the Union's geographical preferences is that: "*the EU hopes to enhance security both in regions bordering the Union—including the Balkans, the southern Mediterranean, Central Asia, and the Middle East—and beyond, and to foster multilateral solutions to security challenges. In the last decade, both under the aegis of ESDP and otherwise, European forces have been deployed close to home in the former Yugoslavia and to places as distant as Afghanistan, Indonesia, and Africa. A strong and agile European Union, able to marshal a collective European response to security challenges, is a vital part of an effective multilateral system that advances peace and security*".[219]

More information about the Union's CFSP and ESDP can be found in the Annual report from the Council to the European Parliament on the main aspects and basic choices of the CFSP (2007).[220] Especially with regard to the CFSP and ESDP priorities in geographical areas the documents is dealing extensively. Furthermore the document deals with so-called horizontal priorities like counter-terrorism, non proliferation, disarmament, arms trade, early warning, conflict prevention, promoting human rights, energy security and climate change. The Annual report starts with the notion that: "*In*

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[213] EU NAVFOR Somalia; EU SSR Guinea-Bissau; EUFOR Chad/RCA; EUPOL RD Congo; EUSEC RD Congo; EU Support to Amis (Darfur); EUPOL Kinshasa; EUFOR RD Congo; Artemis.
[214] EUFOR-Althea; EUPM EULEX Kosovo; EUPAT; Concordia; Proxima.
[215] EUPOL COPPS; EU BAM Rafah; Eujust Lex.
[216] EUPOL Afghanistan; AMM.
[217] EUMM; Eujust Themis.
[218] Moldavia/Ukraine and Georgia/ South Caucasus.
[219] EU Focus, European Security and Defense Policy, Working for a Safer World, January 2006. To be found on: http://www.eurunion.org/News/eunewsletters/EUFocus/2006/EUFocus-ESDP.pdf.
[220] Council of the European Union, General Secretariat: 'Annual report from the Council to the European Parliament on the main aspects and basic choices of the CFSP', 2007. To be found on: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/EN_PESC.pdf.

2007, nine different ESDP missions were operational across three continents, providing 'key enablers' for peace, stability and security, from the Democratic Republic of the Congo to the Palestinian Territories and Bosnia and Herzegovina. EU engagement in the Western Balkans, the Southern Caucasus, the Middle East, Sudan and Afghanistan demonstrated the EU's willingness to assist in resolving and preventing conflicts worldwide". Furthermore in its introduction the report refers to cooperation with different multilateral organisations; the EU-US cooperation covering the full spectrum of international issues, from the Middle East, Africa and the Western Balkans, including Kosovo; the relation with countries of the Eastern and Southern neighbourhood; the Joint EU/Africa Strategy and the EU strategy on Central Asia; the EU contribution to the creation of a continental African Peace and Security Architecture; and the bridging military operation in Eastern Chad and north-eastern Central African Republic (EUFOR Chad/RCA) in the framework of the ESDP. All of these issues point out the geographical priorities/ preferences of the Union's foreign and security policy. In the report eight geographical areas are identified: Western Balkans; Eastern Europe and Central Asia; Mediterranean Region and Turkey; Middle East/ Gulf; Africa; Transatlantic relations; Asia-Oceania; Latin America and Caribbean.

With in mind the above mentioned information it seems that the EU has no geographical preferences. Hereinafter this paragraph will focus on the number and geographical dispersal of military operations. In total the EU deployed six military operations. Out of these six four are deployed in Africa and two in the Western Balkans. The first military operation was operation Concordia in the Former Republic of Yugoslavia in March 2003. In June 2003 the EU deployed its second military operation in Congo called Artemis. In December 2004 the second operation in the Western Balkan was established namely EUFOR-Althea in Bosnia-Herzegovina. In July 2005 the EU did sent troops to support AMIS (Darfur) which consists only of two military observers. One year later another mission was send to Congo (EUFOR RD Congo). More recently, in January 2008, the European Union decided to launch a military operation in Chad en RCA. The last military operation was send to the coast of Somalia in December 2008.

Hereinafter this thesis will point out some other indications of the geographical preferences of the European Union. The first important document is the already mentioned ESS. With regard to geographical preferences the ESS is quite clear: the Neighbourhood (which includes Balkans), Afghanistan and the DRC. Furthermore the ESS mentions certain countries or regions that face serious threats like Sub-Saharan Africa (poor), Kashmir, the Middle East and the Great Lake region (regional conflicts), Somalia and Liberia (failed states) and North Korea (nuclear weapons).

Interesting to see is also the press releases of the meetings of the General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC). In these documents a clear indication is given of the countries and regions that are according to the GAERC of special interests. When we take a closer look at the 2870th meeting[221] three regions are dealt with: the neighbourhood (Western Balkans and Georgia); Africa (Africa in general, Somalia and Zimbabwe) and the Middle East (Middle East Peace Process, Lebanon, Iraq and Afghanistan).

Hereinafter several opinions of several persons/organizations will be brought forward. The first opinion can be found in an article written by van Staden. Here it is said that it is to be expected that the Union is more likely to engage, and engage more heavily, in the close-up regions than it would be when moving further out from the geographical core.[222] With other words it is likely that the EU, when this is necessary, will deploy operations in the neighborhood. In an article published by United States Institute for Peace (USIP) more or less the same assertion is made with regard to regional

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[221] Press release of the 2870th meeting of the General Affairs and External Relations Council, Brussels 26-27 May 2008. To be found on http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/08/st09/st09868.en08.pdf.
[222] Van Staden, A. et al. (2000) Towards a European Strategic Concept, the Hague: the Clingendael Institute, p.28.

organizations in general: "*Regional organizations (and coalitions of state actors) are usually the choice (for the most challenging peace enforcement missions and) for local missions (in which regional partners want a speedier or more robust response to a crisis)".[223]*

According to Stephanie Fletcher the Balkans remain the most important area of interest for ESDP missions and continue to take up a large part of its resources (7,000 soldiers and approximately 500 civilians).[224] Also Daniel Keohane is of this opinion when he states that: "*However, in practice – at least until the recent decision to send EU troops to Congo – most of the attention paid to ESDP by defense planners focused on conducting peacekeeping operations in the Balkans*".[225]

Yet next geographical preferences for the neighborhood (limited to the Balkans) the Union also has preferences with regard to the broader neighborhood.[226] This includes Georgia[227], the Caucasus[228], (Central) Asia (especially Afghanistan)[229], the Gulf[230], and the Israel/Palestine conflict.[231] According to Jan Wouters and Tom Ruys[232] it seems that the EU has followed a 'gradualist' approach on crisis management.[233] The EU first engaged in a nearby police mission (EUPM), followed by a nearby military operation in FYROM (Concordia). This last operation, in opposite to operation Artemis, took place in a relatively stable environment. The mentioned operation Artemis was the first military operation outside the Union's proximity. Operation Artemis was furthermore limited in time and scope. With the operation Althea (Bosnia-Herzegovina) the EU launched a larger operation.

The importance of the (broader) neighbourhood is given, now it is time to see whether there are also other geographical preferences. Fernanda Faria points this out very clear when she states that "*European policy towards Africa has existed ever since the European integration process started*" and "*Since the early 1990s, the issue of conflicts in Africa has gained particular importance in the overall EU policy towards Africa and has been the subject of intense discussions within the European Union and with other international partners*".[234] This opinion is also confirmed when we consider the importance of countries and regions like Somalia[235], Chad[236], the DRC[237], and Sub-Saharan Africa.[238]

With regard to the broader neighbourhood this thesis already brought forward the importance of Afghanistan. The Executive Summary of the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) Report states that: "*Dealing with the situation in Afghanistan, where there is a real risk of NATO failure, was perceived as security priority, as well as tackling conflicts in the Neighbourhood*".[239] Also Alexander Mattelaer has this opinion when he states that: "*The centre of gravity of European military engagement lies in the*

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[223] Donald C F Daniel: 'Whither Peace Operations?' USIP Special Reports, United States Institute of Peace (USIP), November 2008. To be found on: http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?id=93488&lng=en.

[224] Stephanie Fletcher*:* 'European Security and Defense Policy: Between 'Offensive Defense' and 'Human Security''. International Policy Analysis Unit, November 2006, pp. 3-4. To be found on*:* http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/id/04139.pdf.

[225] Daniel Keohane: 'EU defence policy: Beyond the Balkans, beyond peacekeeping?' Centre for European Reform, 1 July 2003, par 23. To be found on: http://www.cer.org.uk/articles/keohane_weltpolitik_jul03.html.

[226] Interview 6, 7 and 11.

[227] Interview 7.

[228] Interview 5.

[229] Interview 5 and 7.

[230] Interview 2.

[231] Interview 5 and 11.

[232] Jan Wouters and Tom Ruys: 'The European Union, the United Nations and crisis management: the road to partnership': http://www.law.kuleuven.be/iir/nl/wp/WP/WP80e.pdf.

[233] G. Lindstrom, 'On the ground: EDSP Operations' in N. Gnesotto, op. cit., supra n. 59, 111-129, at 111.

[234] Fernanda Faria: 'Crisis management in sub-Saharan Africa; The role of the European Union' in: Occasional Paper 51, April 2004, European Union Institute for Security Studies, p.53.

[235] Interview 7 and 15.

[236] Interview 5, 7 and 15.

[237] Interview 2 and 7.

[238] Interview 1, 2 and 5.

[239] ISS Report Number 05. p.12.

Balkans and Afghanistan. The number of European troops in Africa is minimal. However from a qualitative point of view it can be argued that the region constitutes one of the main theatres in the development of the ESDP". Mattelaer explains this by considering the geographical divisions of operations; there are many more European soldiers (which does not mean EU soldiers, but soldiers deployed by European member states) in Afghanistan than all those in Africa, but it is highly significant that five out of fifteen (at that time) European operations are deployed in Africa from which four in the DRC. Another interesting thing mentioned by Mattelaer is that "*Military crisis management is regarded as the necessary complement of the broader Africa policy of the EU*".[240] Mattelaer is confirming the importance of the Balkan and Afghanistan for European countries (which not necessarily means the EU) and Africa (where he mentions the ESDP development).

This paragraph already brought forward the outcome of the interviews in Brussels hereinafter the main preferences pointed out will be reproduced. The most important geographical preferences of the European Union were the Neighbourhood[241] and Africa.[242] Although the scope of the Neighbourhood is extended the Balkans are still of special importance.[243] Furthermore the Israel/Palestine conflict will be an important issue for the European Union.[244] The importance of the Balkans has to do with the security of the Union, the broader neighbourhood is also important with regard to security and also the stability of the border region of the Union. The involvement in the Middle East has to do with security interests (terrorism etc.) But also with a more political objective of showing commitment and demonstrate the willingness to be a global actor.[245] In Africa the geographical preference is especially on former colonies[246] with the exception of Somalia (trade, shipping lines, and oil).[247]

In Annex V the number of troops and military observers deployed by the European Union (between 2006 and 2008) in the different regions is given.

The European Union and realism

With regard to the geographical preferences and choices of the Union we see a smaller scope than the UN. This is not remarkable when we consider that the EU is a regional organization, the EU has less member states and the EU is less experienced in the deployment of military personnel. Is it justified to describe the geographical preferences and choices as a consequence of realism? Detection of realist purposes in the Neighbourhood policy is not that problematic. The Union wants to create a region of stability, peace and security within the Union and its borders. So the Balkan, the Mediterranean and Eastern Europe are of special importance for the European Union. Also the attention for the broader neighbourhood and the concerns of the Union with regard to the destabilization of the broader region is obvious.[248] Furthermore we have seen the attention for Africa, where the Union has deployed four military operations. In the subsequent paragraphs of this chapter some more will be dealt with the importance of the colonial heritage and historical ties, the flow of refugees and the possible interests in natural resources. When we overview the six military operations deployed by the Union it will not be very problematic to see certain interests: Concordia and Artemis (EU's security, refugees, and instability), Artemis and EUFOR RD Congo (show

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[240] A. Mattelaer: 'EUFOR RDC and the development of the ESDP' in Studia Diplomatica, the Brussels Journal of International Relations. Vol. LX, 2007, Number 3: Peace and Security in Central Africa; International Intervention in Africa; NATO and ESDP. pp. 73-89.
[241] Interview 1, 5, 7, 10, 11 and 16.
[242] Interview 1,2,7, 9, 10,14, 15 and 16.
[243] Interview 2 and 6.
[244] Interview 5, 7 and 11.
[245] Interview 7.
[246] Interview 10, 11 (even only French speaking countries) and 16.
[247] Interview 5 and 7.
[248] Interview 7.

capabilities, Belgium history, diplomatic interests, guilt, and history with Rwanda), EUFOR Chad/RCA (French interests, and the importance of Chad for the regional security), EU NAVFOR Somalia (economic: sea lines, fishery, and trade). To describe the military operations as being deployed for humanitarian considerations, to stop humanitarian suffering, is more problematic. Operation Althea was not deployed during the heat of the fight, the operation in Somalia is not deployed to stop the humanitarian suffering of the population of Somalia but to prevent and stop the high jacking of ships, and perhaps even more important is to show the Union's capacity. When the operations in Congo were deployed for humanitarian considerations it is doubtable what operations, that are limited in time and scope, can do with regard to human suffering.

In short the security interests of the Union in the neighbourhood (Balkan, Eastern Europe) and the broader neighbourhood (for example Israel) are clear. The interests in the Middle East can be a result of the objectives defined in the ESS, to deal with threats like terrorism. With regard to Africa the security threats are more indirect yet there the historical ties and political and economical considerations do play a role.[249]

The existence of a division

It is time to conclude whether this paragraph brought forward indications of the existence of a division. This paragraph once again confirmed the idea that the UN has a global view. Furthermore this paragraph brought forward the operations deployed by both organizations. When we compare the geographical area in which military personnel is deployed we might see a division. The operations deployed by the EU are located in the neighbourhood and in certain parts of Africa, especially in French-speaking parts (except for Somalia). In 2006 and 2007 the most military personnel was deployed in the neighbourhood and in 2008 there were for the first time more EU troops deployed in Africa than in the neighbourhood. So geographically the EU is mostly concerned with the neighbourhood and Africa. When we look at the number of troops deployed by the UN we see that between 2005 and 2008 at least 68 percent of its military personnel were deployed in Africa. At the same time the UN has only deployed troops on the European continent with regard to operation UNIFICYP, and MILOB's in Georgia and Kosovo. Between 2005 and 2008 the number of military personnel active on the European continent did not exceeded two percent of the total military deployment. So here is an indication of a division between the UN and the EU. This is perhaps not unexpected but it is important to notice because it means that to a large extent the UN gives its fiat to other organizations (like the EU and the NATO) to deploy militaries in this region. The situation in Cyprus is an exception, yet the reason that not the EU but the UN deployed militaries there is understandable when we consider that Greece is a member of the EU and Turkey is an Eurasian country.

Another indication for a division between the UN and the EU can be found in the deployment of military personnel to other parts of the world. In the last three years the UN (see Anex IV and Box 1) deployed a substantial part of its military personnel in the Middle East. One can argue that the ESDP is not full-grown, that other organizations like the NATO do play a role in the Middle East, that EU member states contribute to operations in the Middle East, and that the USA is involved in the Middle East (for example with regard to Israel). This however does not mean that there is currently no division with regard to the deployment of military personnel between the UN and the EU. The EU, as organization, did not deploy military personnel in the Middle East and neither did so in Central America and Asia. So for the time being one can argue that the EU is more concerned with regional problems and certain parts of Africa while the UN has a global view. Perhaps in the future the EU will deploy military personnel in the Middle East or in Asia yet for the time being there seem to be a geographical distinction between the UN and the EU with regard to the deployment of military personnel.

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[249] Interview 6.

3.4 The decisive factors for the United Nations and the European Union to deploy military personnel

Sub Hypothesis:
Decisive for the UN, an organization guided by humanitarianism, will be the situation that occurs, while for the EU, an organization guided by realism, decisive will be the willingness and the interests at stake.

The formulation of the sub hypothesis is the answer on one simple question: what will be decisive for an organization guided by humanitarianism/realism with regard to the deployment of military personnel? For an organization guided by humanitarianism, the UN, the answer should reflect the importance to prevent or address human suffering and humanitarian problems and also the absence of a preconceived opinion. The (humanitarian) situation within a country or region decides whether the UN will get involved. For an organization guided by realism, the EU, it will be more important that there are interests at stake and that there is willingness to plead a cause for these interests.

Perhaps this paragraph seems similar to paragraph 2.2 that dealt with the purposes and priorities. This is however not the case. Paragraph 2.2 concentrated on the what the UN and EU wants to do with regard to military operations and also what the organizations did put on paper. This paragraph will deal more fully with the decision to deploy militaries and find out what and when both organizations are willing to accomplish.

In short this paragraph will bring forward the decisive factors to deploy military personnel by the United Nations and the European Union. With regard to the United Nations this paragraph will bring forward some important articles of the UN Charter and distillate some important factors for the United Nations to act. Another way to find out what are the decisive factors for the United Nations is by looking at some documents from or about the organization itself. This paragraph will continue by dealing with the ongoing debate on humanitarian considerations and conclude with some research work on the most important factors for the United Nations to interfere and deploy military personnel.
The part of this paragraph that deals with the EU will be somewhat different, because this thesis already extensively dealt with the purposes and priorities of the European Union and the European Security Strategy. Therefore the part of the paragraph on the European Union will only shortly deal with some general remarks on the establishment of operations by the European Union and continue with the decisive factors mentioned in the conversations with stakeholders and experts in Brussels.

The United Nations

United Nations Charter:

Article 2 paragraph 4:
All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.

Article 24 paragraph 1:
In order to ensure prompt and effective action by the United Nations, its Members confer on the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, and agree that in carrying out its duties under this responsibility the Security Council acts on their behalf.

Article 39:
The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security.

Article 42:
Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations.

Above this thesis brought forward some important Articles in the UN Charter with regard to the question on the decisive factors to establish peace operations. What becomes clear is the need to maintain or restore international peace and security. Whenever international peace and security is at stake the United Nations may take action. Hereinafter this paragraph will bring forward possible threats (Article 39) that might lead to action of the UN.

In the Report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change: A more secure world: our shared responsibility several threats are explicitly mentioned. The report states that: *"The United Nations was created in 1945 above all else 'to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war' — to ensure that the horrors of the World Wars were never repeated. Sixty years later, we know all too well that the biggest security threats we face now, and in the decades ahead, go far beyond States waging aggressive war. They extend to poverty, infectious disease and environmental degradation; war and violence within States; the spread and possible use of nuclear, radiological, chemical and biological weapons; terrorism; and transnational organized crime. The threats are from non-State actors as well as States and to human security as well as State security"*.[250] The Report continues by defining the six clusters of threats with which the world must be concerned now and in the decades ahead. The first cluster is economic and social threats (including poverty, infectious diseases and environmental degradation). Second cluster is inter-state conflict. Third cluster deals with internal conflicts, including civil wars, genocide and other large-scale atrocities. Fourth cluster is the nuclear, radiological, chemical and biological weapons. The fifth and sixth clusters refer to terrorism and transnational organized crime.[251]

The United Nations should make sure that threats that are distant do not become imminent and those that are imminent do not actually become destructive. This first of all requires a framework for preventive actions. Yet when peaceful prevention fails it might become necessary for the United Nations to intervene by the use of military force. According to the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change the United Nations and especially the Security Council is empowered to deal with every threat that states may confront. Situations that are distinguished are situations in which a state claims to act in self-defence; situations in which a State is posing a threat to others outside its borders; and situations in which the threat is primarily internal and the issue is the responsibility to protect a State's own people. In all these cases the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change believes that the UN Charter is equal to the task: secure collective security.[252]

Another important remark of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change is that "*In the case of a State posing a threat to other States, people outside its borders or to international order more generally, the language of Chapter VII is inherently broad enough, and has been interpreted broadly enough, to allow the Security Council to approve any coercive act ion at all, including military*

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[250] United Nations General Assembly, Follow-up to the outcome of the Millennium Summit. Fifty-ninth session, Agenda item 55 (A/59/565). P 11 and 15, to be found on: http://www.un.org/secureworld/report.pdf.

[251] United Nations General Assembly, Follow-up to the outcome of the Millennium Summit. Fifty-ninth session, Agenda item 55 (A/59/565). P 53, to be found on: http://www.un.org/secureworld/report.pdf.

[252] United Nations General Assembly, Follow-up to the outcome of the Millennium Summit. Fifty-ninth session, Agenda item 55 (A/59/565). Pp. 14 and 53, to be found on: http://www.un.org/secureworld/report.pdf.

action, against a State when it deems this 'necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security'. That is the case whether the threat is occurring now, in the imminent future or more distant future; whether it involves the State's own actions or those of non-State actors it harbours or supports; or whether it takes the form of an act or omission, an actual or potential act of violence or simply a challenge to the Council's authority".[253]

During the Security Council meeting in on 8 January 2007 (New York) two Permanent Representatives to the United Nations identified several threats. First of all, Ricardo Alberto Arias, the Permanent Representative of Panama to the United Nations, who states that **"***These threats*** [threats to international peace and security] *derive principally from destabilization caused by poverty, injustice and marginalization. They come from the spread of infectious diseases, from the scarcity and abuse of natural resources, and from destruction of the environment. They stem from ethnic, cultural and religious conflicts, and from the systematic violations of human rights. They stem from transnational organized crime, from the stockpiling and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and from the illicit trafficking in small arms. Finally, they derive from fundamentalism, especially those forms that proclaim themselves the guardians of the truth and that seek to impose this truth through force, including through terrorist acts*".[254] The second Permanent Representative mentioned here is Johan Verbeke (Belgium). Verbeke brings forward threats like: terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, major human rights violations, organised crime, failing states or environmental deterioration.[255]

The reason to bring forward all these possible threats is that each threat might trigger the UN to deploy military personnel in regions or countries that are confronted with these threats or cause these threats. Furthermore the formulation of these threats indicates whether the UN is concerned with humanitarian considerations. Whether this is the case will be dealt with later on now it is time to bring forward other factors that might be decisive for the United Nations with regard to the deployment of military personnel.

The first reason is to secure the return of refugees. This might seem a humanitarian cause, yet is also reflects the concerns of States that are faced with an extreme number of refugees (or threat thereof). In many cases since 1990, massive refugee flows have been seen as constituting a threat to international peace and security, and by that justifying involvement and action by the Security Council. Other reasons might be the protection of fellow nationals, the protection of UN personnel from attack, the security of present or future investments, and the spreading of democracy.[256]

Hereinafter this paragraph will deal with humanitarian considerations and see whether these considerations might lead to military action by the United Nations. Since 1990, [in one episode after another, in which international bodies have sought to stop terrible excesses in crisis-torn regions,] three main types of humanitarian issue have been cited, for example in UN Security Council resolutions, as grounds for international concern:
- Murder and deliberate infliction of suffering on civilians, prisoners and others;
- Refusal of parties to a conflict to allow or assist humanitarian relief activities;
- Violence and threats of violence against humanitarian workers.[257]

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[253] United Nations General Assembly, Follow-up to the outcome of the Millennium Summit. Fifty-ninth session, Agenda item 55 (A/59/565). Par 193, p. 55, to be found on: http://www.un.org/secureworld/report.pdf.

[254] Ricardo Alberto Arias: '*Threats to international peace and security',* United Nations Security Council, Sixty-second year, 5615th meeting, 8 January 2007, New York (S/PV.5615). To be found on: http://www.mire.gob.pa/onu/Data/threats_internationaln_peace_security.pdf.

[255] Johan Verbeke: 'Threats to international peace and security', Statements in the Security Council, 8 January 2007. To be found on: http://www.diplomatie.be/en/nu/PartBel/declarations/details.asp?TEXTID=64593.

[256] Adam Roberts: Humanitarian issues and agencies as triggers for international military action International Review of the Red Cross No. 839 (2000), pp. 673-698. To be found on: http://www.icrc.org/Web/Eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/57JQQA.

[257] Adam Roberts: Humanitarian issues and agencies as triggers for international military action International Review of the Red Cross No. 839 (2000), pp. 673-698. To be found on: http://www.icrc.org/Web/Eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/57JQQA.

Concerns does not necessarily means military actions, but the Security Council in its resolutions have in fact repeatedly condemned such actions (murder, refuse humanitarian relief actions, violence against humanitarian workers) by parties to conflicts as violations of international humanitarian law. Then in many cases the Security Council, or certain of its leading members, have gone on to authorize or initiate the use of force in order to end a pattern of violations. In short, the law of war is acquiring a role as a trigger for military action.[258]

With regard to humanitarian considerations as decisive factors for UN military deployment Roberts states that: "*Since the end of the Cold War there has been a strong trend towards identifying humanitarian considerations as a basis for certain military mandates and actions. This trend has been observed not only in armed conflicts, whether civil or international (for example, Bosnia and Sierra Leone), but also in situations of tyrannical or brutal government (Rwanda and Haiti), uncontrolled violence (Somalia and Albania), and the establishment of international forces to help implement a peace agreement (Kosovo and East Timor). Some of the cases mentioned have had characteristics of several of these types of situation*".[259] With other words the role of humanitarian considerations in the decision making process of the UN should not be underestimated.

That the United Nations is willing to interfere on the basis of humanitarian considerations is clearly visible in the earlier mentioned report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change. In paragraph 203 the report states that: "*We endorse the emerging norm that there is a collective international responsibility to protect, exercisable by the Security Council authorizing military intervention as a last resort, in the event of genocide and other large-scale killing, ethnic cleansing or serious violations of international humanitarian law which sovereign Governments have proved powerless or unwilling to prevent*".[260]

This paragraph brought forward threats (like terrorism, poverty), interests (flow of refugee, protection of personnel) and humanitarian considerations (human suffering) that can be decisive factors. Though it is doubtable whether the United Nations will always interfere when one of the above mentioned threats or situations occurs. A question one can ask is why certain civil wars are considered to be a threat to international peace and security and others are peripheral to security?[261] To get more insight into the decisive factors this paragraph will bring forward the earlier mentioned research of Gilligan and Stedman about the deployment of military personnel through the United Nations. Gilligan and Stedman (2001) used empirical techniques to answer a simple but normatively important question: what determines where and when the United Nations sends peacekeepers? According to Gilligan and Stedman the procedure and standards of the United Nations provide little guidance as to the actual decision of the SC on when and where operations are deployed. They look at all civil wars after 1988 (60 in total), the number to which UN peacekeepers were sent (19 in total), and how much time passed after the start of each war before a mission was deployed. The most significant of their ten findings is that the more severe a civil conflict, measured by the death toll, the more likely the UN is to intervene. They also find that the UN is significantly less likely to intervene in civil wars in militarily strong states, measured by the size of the government army. And they identify a regional bias in favour of Europe over Africa and, surprisingly, Africa over Asia (in the sense that the

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[258] Adam Roberts: Humanitarian issues and agencies as triggers for international military action International Review of the Red Cross No. 839 (2000), pp. 673-698. To be found on: http://www.icrc.org/Web/Eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/57JQQA.
[259] Adam Roberts: Humanitarian issues and agencies as triggers for international military action International Review of the Red Cross No. 839 (2000), pp. 673-698. To be found on: http://www.icrc.org/Web/Eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/57JQQA.
[260] United Nations General Assembly, Follow-up to the outcome of the Millennium Summit. Fifty-ninth session, Agenda item 55 (A/59/565). Par. 203, p 57, to be found on: http://www.un.org/secureworld/report.pdf, paragraph 203, page 57.
[261] Michael Gilligan and Stephen John Stedman: 'Where do Peacekeepers go', p.37. International Studies Review, Vol. 5, No. 4, Dissolving Boundaries, December 2003, pp. 37- 54. To be found on: http://www.jstor.org.proxy.ubn.ru.nl:8080/stable/3186392?seq=1&cookieSet=1.

UN tends to react more swiftly to crises in the former). Taken as whole, their results "*Suggest an image of the UN that attempts to balance between the dictates of power and concerns of principle*"; it seems to respond to civil wars that involve the greatest humanitarian catastrophes, but is also guided by considerations of power, cost and risk. Furthermore one should not forget the importance of consent from the host country.[262] Consent can for example be an additional legitimatization for the intervention, and can make it more attractive for the UN to intervene.

In chapter 1 this thesis brought forward the opinion of Bennis who thinks that humanitarian considerations are not the real motives behind interventions. Also David Gibbs is convinced that there are imperialistic motives behind decisions of the United Nations to deploy operations, even in seemingly unselfish interventions like Somalia. Other academics are more nuanced with regard to the motivation and are of the opinion that national interest of the P-5 do play a role in the decision making process. Chantal De Jonge Oudraat (1996) for example who argues that next to national interests of the P-5 there it is considered whether the situation constitute a threat to international peace and security

Before this paragraph concludes on the role of humanitarianism, with regard to the deployment of military personnel by the UN, it will reproduce some opinions on the decisive factors that were brought forward in the interviews. The first one is that the SC needs the willingness to deal with a problematic situation[263] and also that the SC needs the will to deploy military personnel.[264] The unwillingness of the United States to deploy troops on the ground in Somalia in an example in which there was UN action.[265] Finally the support from the permanent members of the SC is an absolute necessity.[266]

The United Nations and humanitarianism

This paragraph brought forward several threats that may trigger UN intervention and the possibility of intervention on the basis of humanitarian considerations. With regard to the content of the documents it seems justified to acknowledge the important role of humanitarian purposes for the deployment of military personnel and the deployment of peace operations in general. All kinds of concerns can trigger UN action from poverty to terrorism, from diseases to violence, and from environmental degradation to nuclear weapons. Also research work brought forward underlines the importance of humanitarian considerations. On the contrary there are also arguments that the deployment of military personnel by the UN is less concerned with humanitarian purposes and more with the willingness of the SC and especially its permanent members, also with in mind the considerations of power, risks and costs.

The European Union

Because this thesis dealt with the purposes and priorities of the European Union quite extensively in the previous paragraphs this paragraph will strictly focus on the decisive factors, without touching on documents like the ESS etcetera. Some articles will be dealt with that give an indication of the decisive factors for the European Union to deploy military personnel and more important this paragraph will point out opinions of the experts and stakeholders in Brussels.

Before this paragraph will deal with the decisive factors it is wise to make some general remarks about the European Union with regard to the deployment of military personnel. Some of these

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[262] Interview 11.
[263] Interview 15.
[264] Interview 3.
[265] Interview 3.
[266] Interview 3 and 9.

remarks are already mentioned earlier, but repeated because of the importance of these remarks for the identification of decisive factors for the EU with regard to the deployment of military personnel. First of all the European Union is intergovernmental[267], which mean primarily comprised by sovereign states. So states are important with regard to the functioning of the EU. With regard to deployment of military personnel this means that not the Union but the member states of the Union decide on deployment. Secondly, it is often brought forward that the European Union has no (real) strategy[268], there are some documents published, yet they are broad and do not indicate the direction the Union is heading. Thirdly, the decision to deploy military personnel is a political decision[269]; the political leaders of the Union's member states decide whether the Union will deploy military personnel. The decision made by the European Union with regard to the deployment of military personnel are often an additional sum of political considerations and budgetary considerations[270], so the states within the Union consider the possibilities, the willingness, and the costs of the deployment and the outcome depends on the all these considerations. Fourthly, the decision to deploy military personnel by the European Union is made on a case by case approach[271]; the Union has no list that for example states that when there is a humanitarian catastrophe in the neighborhood it will intervene. Furthermore the decisions made by the European Union with regard to the deployment of military personnel are *ad hoc*[272], so the decision to deploy military personnel when an humanitarian catastrophe occur does not mean that when another humanitarian catastrophe occur the Union is also willing to act. The decision is taken for this specific situation only. With regard to the relation with the United Nations one can say that the Union searches for a United Nations mandate[273] and the European Union wants to act in spirit of the UN.[274]

About the relations within the Union itself it is important to know that the three important member states of the Union (France, Great Britain and Germany) often decide what will happen.[275] But it is also possible that one country in the European Union asks other countries to join the EU operation.[276] Two final remarks here are that the European Union is very keen on the developments in the region/ neighborhood[277] and that the crisis decides if and where the European Union will get involved.[278] With in mind the decision making process brought forward in chapter 2 and the above mentioned remarks on the important actors in the EU and different features of EU decision with regard to the deployment of military personnel it is time to deal with the most important factors that might be decisive. Might, because in different situations different factors can be decisive. In short the following factors are important for the deployment of military personnel: willingness, guidance by one of the larger countries, capacity, request from the United Nations, interests, humanitarian purposes, historical ties, the term of implications, the command and control and the Union's role as global player.

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[267]Interview 5 and Björn McClintock: 'NATO and ESDP – Roommates or Rivals?' P.6: 'The state has remained the primary security actor in the EU'. To be found on: http://theses.lub.lu.se/archive/2006/08/14/1155537054-13457-987/Roommates_or_Rivals.pdf

[268] *Stephanie Fletcher:* 'European Security and Defense Policy: Between 'Offensive Defense' and 'Human Security''. International Policy Analysis Unit, November 2006, p. 4. To be found on: http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/id/04139.pdf. Furthermore interview 6 and 15.

[269] Interview 8 and 10.

[270] Interview 11.

[271] Interview 8 and 10.

[272] Interview 9 and 11.

[273] Interview 14 and 15.

[274] Interview 15.

[275] Interview 6 and 15.

[276] Interview 9.

[277] Interview 6.

[278] Interview 15.

The first decisive factor mentioned is willingness[279]; this is also the most important factor. Political willingness within the European Union is an indispensable factor for the deployment of military personnel. Member states need the will to contribute troops and provide the operations with sufficient budget.[280] When we take a look at the case of the DRC it becomes clear that in 2003 and 2006 there was willingness, while in 2008 this willingness was absent.[281] Important for this political willingness is the second decisive factors; the willingness of one or more of the leading member states in the European Union (France, Great Britain and Germany).[282] One of these countries often pushes for an operation or takes the lead and supplies large part of the troops. Without the willingness of France, Great Britain or Germany it is very problematic to deploy an EU operation. It is also very important that one of these countries takes the lead. Great Britain for example wanted to go to Bosnia-Herzegovina, to take over from the NATO.[283] France wanted to show itself and the EU and show that it was capable to deploy military personnel in Africa.[284] France wanted to go to Chad instead of Sudan[285] and also in the operations deployed in the DRC France took the lead.[286] This however does not mean that whenever one of these three countries wants to deploy a peace operation it will happen. An operation under EU-flag cannot be a one-country operation, so France, Germany and Great Britain need other member states to deliver troops.[287] This however does not mean that it is impossible for smaller countries within the European Union to form a coalition that is willing to deploy military personnel.[288] Another option is that a member states that runs presidency in the European Union place a situation on the agenda.[289] An example in which this happened was the (SSR) operation in Guinea-Bissau, where Portugal pushed for an operation.[290]

Another important factor for the European Union is whether there is sufficient capacity/ capabilities to deploy an operation and whether it is possible to mobilize these capacities.[291] In line with the previous mentioned factors one can say that without political willingness and the support of one of the leading member states of the Union it is hard, if not impossible, to find the capacity.

A fourth important factor can be a request from the United Nations[292], such a request might trigger the Union to deploy military personnel. The fifth important factor, interests, should be dealt with more extensively. The term 'interests' is very vague and broad and can refer to several domains like political interests, strategic interests, security interests, economic interests, and societal interests.[293] This can be interests of the European Union as a whole but also interests of a particular member state. Some examples are the protection of the sea lines in Somalia, the integration of the Balkans in the Union[294], the interest of France in the energy of the DRC[295], the interest of security in the Neighborhood of the Union[296], presence in Africa[297], and interests in reducing the flow of refugees.[298]

[279] Interview 2, 5, 6, 7, 11 and 15 and see Göteborg European Council Presidency Report on the European Security and Defense Policy, Brussels 11 June 2001, p.50. To be found on: http://register.consilium.eu.int/pdf/en/01/st09/09526-r1en1.pdf.
[280] Interview 11.
[281] Interview 15.
[282] Interview 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 14, 15 and 16.
[283] Interview 14.
[284] Interview 6.
[285] Interview 7, 10, 11 and 14.
[286] Interview 7.
[287] Interview 7.
[288] Interview 2.
[289] Interview 10 and 11.
[290] Interview 8 and10.
[291] Interview 5, 7, 11, 14 and 16.
[292] Interview 10 and 14.
[293] A. Mattelaer: 'EUFOR RDC and the development of the ESDP' in Studia Diplomatica, the Brussels Journal of International Relations. Vol. LX, 2007, Number 3: Peace and Security in Central Africa; International Intervention in Africa; NATO and ESDP. p. 79 and interview 1, 4, 5, 9, 10, 11, 14 and 15.
[294] Interview 11.
[295] Interview 9.
[296] Interview 7.
[297] Interview 6.

The sixth decisive factor can be the humanitarian need to deploy military personnel.[299] Perhaps it is sometime difficult to separate this factor from the above mentioned interests. Are the two operations in the DRC deployed because of humanitarian needs or because of interests of the Union? This question will be dealt with later on, yet it is good to mention here that humanitarian needs and the gravity of the situation might play a role in the deployment of EU operations. Who is more critical will say that EU uses humanitarian goals as an excuse to get involved in certain countries.[300]
A seventh decisive factor can be the historical ties with certain countries, mentioned is already the operation in Guinea-Bissau, but also the military operations in the DRC and Chad cannot be seen without looking at the colonial past.[301]

Another important factor is that long term (military) operations are not very popular within the Union.[302] It seems that this argument should be dealt with in the subsequent paragraph on characteristics of military operations, yet for the EU the prospect of a long term operation might be a decisive factor to refuse the deployment of an operation. In an ongoing conflict the possibility to leave, on a short term, will decrease, so these considerations need to be taken into account. A ninth important factor for the Union is that it can command and control its own operations. Instead of deploying military personnel under the UN-flag, certain member states are keener on deploying military personnel under the EU-flag.[303]
A tenth important factor is the global role the Union wants to play. EU operations give clout to the European Foreign and Security Policy and are a platform to show itself to the world.[304] The EU deployed operations in the DRC to show itself in a large conflict and prove that it was capable to act.[305] With other words the EU wants to make headlines in the newspaper.[306]

The eleventh factor deals with the neighborhood. This thesis already brought forward the importance of the neighborhood (geographical) and the interests of the Union in this region. When a problematic situation occurs in the neighborhood the geographical distance might be decisive for the deployment of military personnel because of the security of the Union, the flow of refugees, and the integration of parts of the neighborhood in the European Union.[307]

Other factors that might play a role in the decision to deploy military personnel can be whether the investments and causalities are defendable[308], whether it is possible to prevent conflicts[309], the attention of the media and related the public opinion[310], the symbolic importance of the operation[311], support the African Union[312], and whether the operation is cost efficient.[313]

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[298] Interview 6.
[299] Interview 1, 4, 5, 6 and 10.
[300] Interview 6.
[301] Interview 2, 7, 10 and 14.
[302] Interview 6 and 15.
[303] Interview 7, 11 and 14.
[304] Interview 6 and 11.
[305] Interview 6.
[306] Interview 7.
[307] Interview 2, 6, 7, 10, 11 and 15.
[308] Interview 11.
[309] Interview10.
[310] Interview 6 and 10.
[311] Interview 7.
[312] Interview 14.
[313] Interview 14.

The European Union and realism

With regard to the factors that can be decisive for the Union to deploy military personnel the humanitarian purposes are more at the background. Contrary to humanitarian purposes, realist purposes are much easier to detect. With regard to the UN this thesis brought forward several documents that indicate the presence of humanitarian purposes, while the presence of such purposes are less easier found in EU documents. The role of the Union as a regional organization/ global player is quite different from the role of the UN as being the primary responsible organization with regard to international peace and security. The Union has a different position which also means that the role the Union plays with regard to military interventions is different. The Union's starting point is its own accord: the Union's security, the willingness of the member states, the capabilities of the member states, and different other interests. So with regard to the sub hypothesis there are some strong indications that the EU is guided by realist considerations.

The existence of a division

When we compare the decisive factors of the UN and the EU with regard to the deployment of military personnel some kind of a division becomes clear. This paragraph clearly indicated the role of humanitarian considerations for the UN. The references to refugees, humanitarian intervention, international humanitarian law, and the responsibility to protect clearly indicates that humanitarian considerations influence the decisions of the UN with regard to the deployment of military personnel. The decisive factors for the EU that were brought forward have another starting point, namely willingness, capacity, interests and so on. When we agree with the previous stated than the division would imply that the EU only intervenes when there are interests at stake and there is willingness to deploy military personnel and that the humanitarian considerations are guiding for the actual decision, made by the UN, to deploy military personnel. This paragraph brought forward some indications that it is problematic for this division to stand firm. First of all within the EU there is attention for humanitarian needs. Secondly, the arguments brought forward that the decisions made by the UN with regard to the deployment of military personnel are less concerned with humanitarianism. So there is no sharp division between the UN and the EU that would imply that the UN will act in case of human suffering and the Union will only act whenever there is willingness and there are interests at stake.

3.5 Characteristics and preferences of the United Nations and European Union with regard to military operations

Sub Hypothesis:
The characteristics of operations deployed by the UN, an organizations guided by humanitarianism, will point out the importance of broad operations that will remain in place as long as necessary, while an organization guided by realist purposes, the EU, deploys military personnel no longer than necessary and the size will depend on the willingness of the organization.

Why should the UN deploy broad and long-term operations while the EU deploys military personnel only short-term? Basically, the formulation of the sub hypothesis is a prediction of what could be the influence of humanitarianism and realism on the characteristics of military operations. When humanitarianism lays at the basis of military intervention it makes sense that the operation will remain in place as long as necessary to end human suffering. This means that an intervention can last months but also years. It would run contrary to the content of humanitarianism when the UN (presumed guided by humanitarianism) would intervene in a country and decide that whatever may happen the troops will not stay longer than six months. When the situation does not change or gets worse it would mean that the UN is not primarily driven by the idea to prevent human suffering. Another characteristic of a military operation deployed by the UN that was introduced in the sub hypothesis was the broadness of the operation. Broad in this sense means that the operation has several tasks and objectives.

The idea is that an operation with only a few objectives, for example to create a buffer zone and maintain a ceasefire, will often not prevent human suffering in the future. To address and prevent human suffering there are many problems that have to solved. Often a country in which intervention is necessary suffers from poverty, is involved in an armed conflict, suffers from rebel groups, or suffers from arms trade. To make sure that human suffering will not continue immediately after the withdrawal of UN troops it is often necessary to disarm, to reintegrate and reconcile the population.

With regard to the EU the sub hypothesis states that EU military personnel will not be deployed longer than necessary and the size depends on the willingness of the organization. With other words the term and size depends on the interests of the Union in deploying military personnel. Because realistic considerations are decisive and not humanitarian considerations it is not necessary to stay longer than necessary to safeguard the Union's interests.

The United Nations

This paragraph will bring forward several characteristics of United Nations peace operations. To begin it is necessary to state that most conflicts in which the United Nations is involved are intra-state conflicts. That the United Nations is more and more involved in intra-state conflicts is in itself not distinguishing the organisation from others. In 2001 Kaldor already stated that after the Cold War there appeared to be a distinction between 'old' en 'new' wars.[314] Without going into detail about the specific characteristics of this distinction it is clear that this development from international conflicts between states to intra-state or civil wars made it necessary to adjust the framework and strategy of United Nations peace operations. Another general remark about peace operations is that the countries involved in such peace operations often prefer a degree of consent form the parties to

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[314] Kaldor, M. (2001) Chapter 1 Introduction, from New and Old wars, organized violence in a global era; Polity Press Cambridge.

the conflict.[315] This however does not mean that the United Nations is not willing to intervene without such consent. In certain cases the Security Council deems it necessary to mandate an operation without the full support of all the parties involved. Examples are the operations in Somalia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, where neither ceasefires nor the consent of all the parties in conflict had been secured.[316]

Another aspect of United Nations peace operations is the integrated approach. The United Nations is more and more deploying integrated missions and multidimensional operations. In chapter 2 this thesis already dealt with the content of these operations. The earlier mentioned Brahimi report for example recommended a more integrated mission planning and support. Richard Gowan in his article on peacekeeping in crisis states that there: "*Are long term trends in favour of effective and coherent integrated peace operations*".[317] Also the report on integrated missions' states that the more and more integrated peace operations are deployed:"*An increasing number of operations are multifunctional in nature. Mandates range from immediate stabilisation and protection of civilians to supporting humanitarian assistance, organising elections, assisting the development of new political structures, engaging in security sector reform, disarming, demobilising and reintegrating former combatants and laying the foundations of a lasting peace*" and "*An 'Integrated Mission' is an instrument with which the UN seeks to help countries in the transition from war to lasting peace, or to address a similarly complex situation that requires a system-wide UN response, through subsuming actors and approaches within an overall political-strategic crisis management framework*".[318] Examples are the operations in Chad and Sierra Leone that clearly indicate the integrated approach of UN operations.[319]

The integrated approach of the United Nations peace operations makes it for example possible to deal, next to the establishment of a secure and peaceful environment, with human rights, the rule of law, humanitarian assistance.[320] An example is the operation in Congo in which issues like DDR, human rights and maintain a secure environment in which the elections can take place are part of the operation's mandate.[321] The United Nations has the possibility to deploy peace operations with wide spectrum of instruments (economic, political, developmental and humanitarian) in an integrated and coordinated manner.

In many articles about United Nations peace operations, it appears that the United Nations is for the greater part deploying complex and large peace operations.[322] One example is a report of the United States Institute of Peace (USIP) called 'Whither Peace Operations?'. This report states that "*The United Nations is generally the instrument of choice for missions in Africa and for complex missions—such as those that involve helping failed or failing states restore public order and services*".[323] With regard to the complexity of peace operations the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO) states that: "*The end of the Cold War precipitated a dramatic shift in UN peacekeeping. Freed from bipolarization, the Security Council established larger and more complex*

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[315] Donald C F Daniel: 'Whither Peace Operations?' USIP Special Reports, United States Institute of Peace (USIP), November 2008. To be found on: http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?id=93488&lng=en.
[316] United Nations Peacekeeping, meeting new challenges, 21 March 2005. To be found on: http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/faq/q&a.pdf.
[317] Richard Gowan: 'The Strategic Context: Peacekeeping in Crisis, 2006–08' http://www.cic.nyu.edu/internationalsecurity/docs/strategiccontext.pdf.
[318] Report on Integrated Missions: Practical Perspectives and Recommendations. Independent Study for the Expanded UN ECHA Core Group, May 2005, p.14. To be found on: http://www.undg.org/docs/8484/6031-Integrated_Missions_Report.pdf.
[319] Interview 14, with the remark that MINURCAT was intentionally not an integrated operation.
[320] The three examples referred to can be found in the Brahimi report in paragraph 99 and 126. To be found on: http://www.un.org/peace/reports/peace_operations/.
[321] Interview 9.
[322] Interview 7, 9 and 10.
[323] Donald C F Daniel: 'Whither Peace Operations?' USIP Special Reports, United States Institute of Peace (USIP), November 2008. To be found on: http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?id=93488&lng=en.

UN peacekeeping missions, often to help implement comprehensive peace agreements between protagonists in intra-State conflicts". Furthermore the UNDPKO states that: "*The United Nations has responded to evolving, complex situations in Côte d'Ivoire, Burundi, Georgia, the Middle East, Kosovo and the Sudan*".[324] A last example this thesis wants to give is a report published by the Dutch institute Clingendael about the possibility to deploy military personnel in Africa that states that (translated from Dutch) the trend that will go on in United Nations peace operations of the last two to three years is the deployment of new, complex and very large operations.[325] The institutes (USIP and Clingendael) as well as the UNDPKO clearly indicate that UN operations can be characterised as complex and large operations. With these characteristics and the attention for the integrated approach it seems that the presumption in the sub hypothesis that UN operations are broad operations is confirmed.

With regard to the second presumption in the sub hypothesis with regard to the time of deployment the answer might not be so clear. When we examine the history of peace operations deployed by the UN it is questionable whether UN operations can be characterised as long-term involvement. Clear examples of long term involvement are UNIFICYP (1946), UNTSO (1948), UNMIGIP (1949), UNDOF (1974), UNIFIL (1978), MINURSO (1991), UNOMIG (1993), UNAMIK (1999) and MONUC (1999). This is not only long term involvement of civilian personnel but also military involvement. 858 troops are deployed on Cyprus; 1,043 troops are deployed on the Golan; 12,733 troops are deployed in Lebanon; and 16,587 troops are deployed in the DRC. With all this in mind it is fair to state that, although not always the case, the term of UN deployment or commitment is quite long.[326] The two characteristics mentioned in sub hypothesis are to a large extend confirmed, yet before this paragraph concludes on the role of humanitarianism with regard to the characteristics of UN operations other characteristics will be touched upon.

An often mentioned characteristic is that most UN peace operations are conducted under a robust Chapter VII mandate. Countries in which the United Nations deployed more robust peace operations are for example (eastern) DRC, Sudan (Darfur) and Haiti.[327] Schabio states that the Brahimi Report: "*Identified areas of improvement and made recommendations, which to a large extent were followed… UNAMIR and UNPROFOR were the last operations of its kind (traditional UN peacekeeping). They proved not to be suitable for the challenges of modern conflict resolution. The UN adapted their strategy to the new environment. Following missions were conducted under a robust Chapter VII mandate, enabling UN forces to carry out their mandate in more belligerent situations. A mixture of the tools given in charter was used*".[328] Also the Center for Security Studies (CSS) in its Analyses of February 2007 state that: "*The security and observer missions of 'classic' peacekeeping are increasingly being replaced by complex, multidimensional missions furnished with robust mandates. Most UN missions today are equipped with a so-called 'robust mandate' under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, allowing troops to carry out their mission by force, if necessary*".[329]

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[324] United Nations Peacekeeping, meeting new challenges, 21 March 2005. To be found on: http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/faq/q&a.pdf.

[325] Report: 'Militaire inzetmogelijkheden in Afrika', p.110. To be found on: http://www.clingendael.nl/publications/2009/20090126_cscp_rapport_afrika.pdf

[326] Interview 2 and 3.

[327] Interview 3 and United Nations Peacekeeping, meeting new challenges, 21 March 2005. To be found on: http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/faq/q&a.pdf.

[328] Holger Schabio: The UN Role in Future Military Conflicts, p157. To be found on: http://www.bdcol.ee/fileadmin/docs/bsdr/7-UN%20in%20Future%20Conflicts-Holger%20Schabio.pdf see also Fifty-eighth General Assembly, Fourth Committee, 10th Meeting: 'Traditional Peacekeeping's Transformation Into More Robust, Complex Operations Focus of Discussion in Fourth Committee. Press Release, 17 October 2003 (GA/SPD/267). To be found on: http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2003/gaspd267.doc.htm.

[329] CSS Analyses in Security Policy: 'UN Peace Operations in Transition', Vol. 2, No. 7, February 2007. To be found on: http://se2.isn.ch/serviceengine/FileContent?serviceID=10&fileid=229C8C8A-F73A-8A92-4155-B02CE85B7048&lng=en see also the Report on Integrated Missions, Independent Study for the Expanded UN ECHA Core Group led by Espen Barth Eide, May 2005. To be found on: http://www.globalpolicy.org/security///peacekpg/general/2005/05integrated.pdf.

The UN is deploying more robust peace operations in the last years. Since the end of the Cold War international peacekeeping operations have undergone further development, and today they often cover a more extensive range of duties and a more robust mandate than they used to.[330] Where traditionally peace operations were launched under Chapter VI of the UN Charter the recently launched operations have a Chapter VII mandate. The difference between operations launched under Chapter VI or VII should not be overestimated because the differences in these mandates lies only in specific parts, like the protection of civilians.[331]

William J. Durch and Madeline L. England in their article 'The Purposes of Peace Operations' are dealing with some characteristics of peace operations by reproducing the Brahimi report that insisted that troop contributors send well-equipped forces to UN operations; that mandates allow military initiative in dangerous environments; and that 'impartiality' be redefined to mean 'adherence to the principles of the Charter and to the objectives of a mandate that is rooted in those Charter principles' rather than arms-length neutrality. In dangerous situations with 'obvious aggressors and victims', peacekeepers, it argued, 'may not only be operationally justified in using force but morally compelled to do so', and should therefore be equipped with 'robust rules of engagement'.[332] About characteristics of peace operations Durch and England are furthermore stating that: "*Peace operations are most often born and built in crisis, and function in a realm of partial control and competing priorities that is intrinsic to multi-national or multi-lateral organization. Their lack of innate organizational coherence reflects their practice-based, case-driven history and the locus of primary political-military power in states rather than in the organizations that most frequently sponsor these operations. Every actor involved in post-conflict reconstruction efforts, large and small, official or not, is both independent and protective of its own turf*".[333]

To conclude this paragraph will introduce some remarks that can be found in literature. The first remark is that in general the UN has no problems with raising enough peacekeepers for operations like in Eritrea. Yet the UN can have some more problems with finding member states that are willing to deploy an intervention force, see for example the need to deploy an intervention force to stop the bloodshed in East Timor.[334] This is one of the reasons that the UN is not very willing deploy operations in which it is very likely that its military personnel has to fight.[335] The UN has demonstrated an increased flexibility in the structures and types of its field deployments.[336] The Annual Review of Peace Operations bring forward another possible characteristic of UN operations namely the rapid intervention: "*The failures to mount large-scale responses to African conflicts in 2007 were in contrast to more decisive UN deployments elsewhere, most obviously its rapid intervention in Lebanon in late 2006*".[337] Perhaps this operation in Lebanon is not the best example, because it intentionally was not meant to be an operation under UN-flag and this operation can be seen as an UN operation with EU rules.[338] A last characteristic this paragraph wants to bring forward

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[330] Federal Department of Foreign Affairs (Switzerland): 'International peace-keeping operations'. To be found on: http://www.eda.admin.ch/eda/en/home/topics/peasec/peac/intpo.html.

[331] Interview 3.

[332] William J. Durch, with Madeline L. England: 'The Purposes of Peace Operations' p.2, to be found on: http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/peacekpg/general/2009/0309purpose.pdf and the report referred to is United Nations, Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, A/55/305-S/2000/809, 21 August 2000, para. 48–50, 55 and 64.

[333] William J. Durch, with Madeline L. England: 'The Purposes of Peace Operations' p.4 to be found on: http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/peacekpg/general/2009/0309purpose.pdf.

[334] Daniel Keohane: 'EU defence policy: Beyond the Balkans, beyond peacekeeping?' Centre for European Reform, 1 July 2003, par 23. To be found on: http://www.cer.org.uk/articles/keohane_weltpolitik_jul03.html.

[335] Interview 14.

[336] Website of the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, to be found on: http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/factsheet.pdf.

[337] Annual Review of Global Peace Operations 2008, a project of the Center on International Cooperation. P.4.

[338] Interview 3.

is the increase of hybrid operations of the UN.[339] Examples are the operations in Darfur and Somalia.[340]

The United Nations and humanitarianism

This paragraph clearly confirms the sub hypothesis with regard to the characteristics of operations deployed by the UN. We have seen that UN operations can be described as complex and large. Furthermore there is special attention for the integrated approach and long term involvement. The question is whether this confirmation of the sub hypothesis means that the UN is also really guided by humanitarianism. One might be critical and bring forward that these characteristics are related to the position of the UN as being the primary organization with regard to international peace and security. The scale of involvement can be an outcome of realist purposes because with many soldiers an organization is better able to defend their interests. More logical is that large scale of involvement is necessary to stop human suffering and establish a secure environment in which a state can be rebuild and the root causes are tackled. Labeling large, complex and integrated missions as being examples of humanitarianism is possible yet we have to keep in mind that this thesis only deals with the military component of peace operations. Therefore deliberation on the role of humanitarianism and realism with regard to the characteristics of UN operations will dealt with in chapter 5 where it is concluded on the importance of these theories.

The European Union

Describing the characteristics of EU operations might be problematic when we look at the different documents and scenarios. The EU has published several documents that indicate the capacity the Union wants to have with regard to the deployment of military personnel and operations in general. Examples of such documents are the European Security Strategy, the Helsinki Headline Goals, the Berlin Plus Agreement, the Civilian Headline Goals 2010, the European Capability Action Plan, the so-called Petersburg Tasks, the extended Petersburg missions and so on. The last document referred to, Petersburg, is an interesting one for this part of the thesis because it identifies tasks for the EU. Ortega suggests that a clearer wording of the Petersburg tasks would identify four types: "evacuation, humanitarian, peacekeeping and crisis management, the latter including the use of combat forces".[341]

Before this paragraph continues with the characteristics of EU operations it is good to mention that the EU can deploy military personnel under different frameworks. The first possibility is deployment under the Berlin Plus Agreement. (Berlin Plus scenario[342]), in which the EU resorts to NATO planning and command resources. A second possibility is the "Framework Nation scenario"[343], in which one particular member state of the EU expresses willingness to offer national capabilities and lead the command and control process. In these two scenarios there are also different possibilities for example to deploy military personnel in a coalition with states outside the Union, or in support of a

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[339] Shepard Forman: 'Multidimensional and Integrated Peace Operations: Trends and Challenges' March 2007. To be found on: http://www.cic.nyu.edu/internationalsecurity/timor-leste_shep_article.html.
[340] Interview 3.
[341] Ortega, M. (2001) *Military Intervention and the European Union*. Chaillot Paper 45, Paris: ISS, p. 111.
[342] Petar Petrov: 'The ESDP in motion: opportunities and constraints for the application of an integrated civil-military operational scenario' in Studia Diplomatica, the Brussels Journal of International Relations. Vol. LX, 2007, Number 3: Peace and Security in Central Africa; International Intervention in Africa; NATO and ESDP. pps.157-182. See also Tomáš KARÁSEK: 'EU Military Intervention in the Middle East? The Limits of ´Low Security Policy'. To be found on: http://www.defenceandstrategy.eu/cs/aktualni-cislo-2-2007/clanky/eu-military-intervention-in-the-middle-east-the-limits-of-low-security-policy.html.
[343] Petar Petrov: 'The ESDP in motion: opportunities and constraints for the application of an integrated civil-military operational scenario' in Studia Diplomatica, the Brussels Journal of International Relations. Vol. LX, 2007, Number 3: Peace and Security in Central Africa; International Intervention in Africa; NATO and ESDP. pps.157-182.

UN operation.[344] This can be a standby operation or a bridging operation.[345] Standby operation means that the EU holds ready military personnel for an agreed period of time to support the UN whenever necessary. The bridging model aims at providing the UN with time to mount a new operation or to reorganize an existing one (see Artemis). Such a model calls for rapid deployment of appropriate military capabilities and agreed duration and end-state.[346] The EU can also serve as an intervention force[347], currently the French president, Sarkozy is pushing for such an intervention force.[348] Another option is the so-called follow up model.[349] In which the EU takes over from another organization. Other terms that are used to describe EU operations are the Battle Group Concept (already dealt with in chapter 2), crisis management operations (which are often civilian operations), and the European Rapid Reaction Force, (intervene in crises before they become full-scale wars).

As brought forward there are a lot of possibilities for the EU to deploy military personnel, the question is whether the operations deployed by the EU have some general characteristics. When we look at the literature related to this question several characteristics appear to be of special importance for the EU. The first characteristic is that military operations deployed by the EU are often deployed for a short-term.[350] Long-term involvement of the EU is often civilian instead of military.[351] Furthermore the EU is more willing to send troops to situations with low risks[352], this is perhaps not a characteristic of the operation itself yet it indicates the kind of operations the Union is willing to deploy. A third characteristic is the scale of the operations deployed by the Union, which is often small. Small with regard to the number of troops, small with regard to the tasks of these military personnel, and small with regard to the geographical scope.[353] The operations in the DRC and Chad (border safety) are clearly examples of small scale operations[354] while operation EUFOR-Althea

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[344] Jan Wouters and Tom Ruys: 'The European Union, the United Nations and crisis management: the road to partnership' http://www.law.kuleuven.be/iir/nl/wp/WP/WP80e.pdf and IMPETUS, Bulletin of the EU Military Staff, Spring/Summer 2007, Issue 3, Planning for Kosovo, Taking Charge ESDP under Review. To be found on: *http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/IMPETUS3.pdf.* Furthermore interview 9 and 14.

[345] Jan Wouters and Tom Ruys: 'The European Union, the United Nations and crisis management: the road to partnership': http://www.law.kuleuven.be/iir/nl/wp/WP/WP80e.pdf.

[346] EU-UN co-operation in Military Crisis Management Operations Elements of Implementation of the EU-UN Joint Declaration, Adopted by the European Council (17-18 June 2004), p. 4 paragraph 9. To be found on: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/EU-UN%20co-operation%20in%20Military%20Crisis%20Management%20Operations.pdf

[347] Stephanie Fletcher: 'European Security and Defense Policy: Between 'Offensive Defense' and 'Human Security''. International Policy Analysis Unit, November 2006, p. 4. To be found on: http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/id/04139.pdf.

[348] See for example the article of Lucia Kubosova: 'France to push for intervention force created by the EU big six'. To be found on: http://euobserver.com/9/25667.

[349] Tomáš KARÁSEK: 'EU Military Intervention in the Middle East? The Limits of ´Low Security Policy'. To be found on: http://www.defenseandstrategy.eu/cs/aktualni-cislo-2-2007/clanky/eu-military-intervention-in-the-middle-east-the-limits-of-low-security-policy.html. And interview 9 and 14.

[350] Tomáš KARÁSEK: 'EU Military Intervention in the Middle East? The Limits of ´Low Security Policy'. To be found on: http://www.defenseandstrategy.eu/cs/aktualni-cislo-2-2007/clanky/eu-military-intervention-in-the-middle-east-the-limits-of-low-security-policy.html and See also: Annual Review of Global Peace Operations 2008; a project of the Center on International Cooperation, p. 23 and 27. And Heiner Hanggi and Fred Tanner: 'Promoting security sector governance in the EU's neighbourhood'. In Chaillot Paper 80. July 2005, p35. To be found on: http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/cp080.pdf. And interview 5, 6, 7, 9 and 16 (while long-term involvement is mostly civilian).

[351] Interview 5

[352] A. Mattelaer: 'EUFOR RDC and the development of the ESDP' in Studia Diplomatica, the Brussels Journal of International Relations. Vol. LX, 2007, Number 3: Peace and Security in Central Africa; International Intervention in Africa; NATO and ESDP. pp. 73-89. And interview 2 and 10.

[353] IMPETUS, Bulletin of the EU Military Staff, Spring/Summer 2007, Issue 3, Planning for Kosovo, Taking Charge ESDP under Review. To be found on: *http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/IMPETUS3.pdf. And interview 6,* 7, 9, 11, 14, 15 and 16.

[354] Interview 6.

in Bosnia-Herzegovina is in this respect an exception.[355] Smaller operations often mean that the operations deployed by the EU are limited in scope[356] and have clear objectives.[357] Fernanda Faria is of the opinion that the EU have continued to be involved [in Africa], but more on their own and in very specific and limited types of operations.[358]

When we examine the peace operations of the EU there is much to say for defining the EU operations as being speedier.[359] On the one hand this means that the EU can rapidly deploy operations[360] and on the other hand there is the possibility of rapid decision-making within the Union[361], which could even be improved in the coming years.[362] Related to the rapid decision-making process and deployment is that the EU is capable of mobilizing resources in very brief delays (see Artemis, AMM and EUBAM Rafah).[363] Another characteristic of EU military operations is that they are robust.[364] Javier Solana, in his document "A secure Europe in a better world", already stated that "*We (the EU) need to develop a strategic culture that fosters early, rapid, and when necessary robust intervention*".[365] Before the first military operation of the EU, operation Artemis in the DRC, was launched the EU clearly stated that it should be given robust rules of engagement.[366] Another operation of the EU in the DRC was launched after the request by the UN to provide a robust rapid reaction force to back up MONUC during the elections in July 2006.[367] With in mind the problem with regard to the deployment of an UN intervention force in East Timor the EU could give the UN the rapid and robust reaction capability it needs.[368] Another example in which the EU deployed a robust operation is operation EUFOR-Althea.[369]

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[355] Tomáš KARÁSEK: 'EU Military Intervention in the Middle East? The Limits of ´Low Security Policy'. To be found on: http://www.defenceandstrategy.eu/cs/aktualni-cislo-2-2007/clanky/eu-military-intervention-in-the-middle-east-the-limits-of-low-security-policy.html.

[356] See for example operation Artemis: Kees Homan: 'Operation Artemis in the Democratic Republic of Congo'. To be found on: http://www.clingendael.nl/publications/2007/20070531_cscp_chapter_homan.pdf.

[357] Interview 6.

[358] Fernanda Faria: 'Crisis management in sub-Saharan Africa; The role of the European Union' in: Occasional Paper 51, April 2004, European Union Institute for Security Studies, p.54. And interview 2, 4, 6, 9 and 11.

[359] Interview 5, 9 and 14.

[360] See the European Security Strategy; Per M. Martinsen: 'The European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) – a Strategic Culture in the Making?' To be found on: http://www.essex.ac.uk/ECPR/events/generalconference/marburg/papers/17/1/Martinsen.pdf; Pedro Serrano, 'A Strategic Approach to the European Security and Defence Policy', in Agnieszka Nowak (ed.), 'Civilian Crisis Management: The EU Way', *Chaillot Paper*, no. 90, June 2006; Donald C F Daniel: 'Whither Peace Operations?' USIP Special Reports, United States Institute of Peace (USIP), November 2008. To be found on: http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?id=93488&lng=en; see also the Rapid Reaction Force; Annual Review of Global Peace Operations 2008, a project of the Center on International Cooperation. P.27; and Agenda for Peace (Unit Nations, 2005 World Summit Outcome, UN Doc. A/RESP/60/1, 24 October 2—5, p.23.

[361] See the headline goals 2010. To be found on: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/2010%20Headline%20Goal.pdf.

[362] European Security and Defence Assembly, Assembly of WEU: 'ESDP developments and the Headline Goal 2010 – reply to the annual report of the Council'. Par 112, 15 June 2005 (DOCUMENT A/1898). To be found on: http://assembly-weu.itnetwork.fr/en/documents/sessions_ordinaires/rpt/2005/1898.html#P81_1809.

[363] Pedro Serrano, 'A Strategic Approach to the European Security and Defence Policy', in Agnieszka Nowak (ed.), 'Civilian Crisis Management: The EU Way', *Chaillot Paper*, no. 90, June 2006.

[364] Interview 2 and 14.

[365] Javier Solana, 'A secure Europe in a better world', European Council, Thessaloniki, June 20 2003. To be found on: http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/solanae.pdf p.17.

[366] Stephen Castle: 'Military mission to Africa is first for the EU'. The Independent, 5 June 2003. To be found on: http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/military-mission-to-africa-is-first-for-the-eu-539787.html.

[367] Richard Gowan: 'The European Security Strategy's Global Objectives: Effective Multilateralism', pp. 52-53. In: Sven Biscop and Jan Joel Andersson: 'The EU and the European security strategy'. Pp. 42-61.

[368] Interview 9 and 14.

[369] Website of EUFOR Althea, to be found on: http://www.euforbih.org/eufor/index.php?Itemid=28&id=12&option=com_content&task=view

The European parliament confirms the importance of robust intervention in its resolution on the ESDP operation in Chad and the Central African Republic (RCA) and states that "*EUFOR must have a robust mandate pursuant to Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter and clear rules of engagement allowing the use of force when necessary, especially in case of attacks against civilians, humanitarian workers, camps, villages or UN police officers and for self-defence*".[370]

This paragraph brought forward the possible operations the EU can deploy and the main characteristics of EU operations, like short-term, rapid, small scale, and robust. Hereinafter this paragraph will bring forward several other characteristics that can be derived from the operations deployed by the Union. The first on is that the Union is in favor of preventive deployment of military personnel or deployment in an early stage of the conflict.[371] The ESS clearly indicates the importance of preventive or early stage intervention and the operation deployed in the Former Yugoslavian Republic of the Macedonia (Concordia) is an example of early stage intervention.
Other characteristics this paragraph shortly want to introduce are that crisis management experts and capabilities (military and civilian) from European Union member states are among the most high qualified.[372] The European Union has a plurality on instruments at its disposal which 'brings added value'.[373] Another characteristic of EU operations (and also operations of other organizations) is that their operations are getting more and more hybrid.[374] Hybrid operations are operations in which international organizations, regional organizations, or countries deploy operations on a complementary basis in country or region. Flexibility is another characteristic of EU operations.[375] Furthermore a characteristic of EU operations is that emphasize is on force protection.[376]
This paragraph already stated that in the Petersburg Tasks an indication can be found for four types of action (evacuation, humanitarian, peacekeeping and crisis management). Because in literature it appeared that the most often used action is crisis management[377], we might see this as a characteristic of EU operations. Another characteristic is that the EU is looking for an end stage or exit strategy whenever it deploys military personnel.[378]

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[370] European Parliament: ,'Motion for a resolution', Spetember 2007 (B6-0364/2007). To be found on: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//NONSGML+MOTION+B6-2007-0364+0+DOC+PDF+V0//EN.

[371] Stephanie Fletcher: 'European Security and Defense Policy: Between 'Offensive Defense' and 'Human Security''. International Policy Analysis Unit, November 2006, p. 3. To be found on: http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/id/04139.pdf ; A. Mattelaer: 'EUFOR RDC and the development of the ESDP' in Studia Diplomatica, the Brussels Journal of International Relations. Vol. LX, 2007, Number 3: Peace and Security in Central Africa; International Intervention in Africa; NATO and ESDP. P. 74 and 83.

[372] Annual Review of Global Peace Operations 2008, a project of the Center on International Cooperation, p.11. And interview 9 and 14.

[373] Pedro Serrano, 'A Strategic Approach to the European Security and Defence Policy', in Agnieszka Nowak (ed.), 'Civilian Crisis Management: The EU Way', *Chaillot Paper*, no. 90, June 2006.

[374] Richard Gowan: 'The EU's Multiple Strategic Identities: European Security after Lebanon and the Congo'. Studia Diplomatica, the Brussels Journal of International Relations: 'Global Europe', VOL. LX, 2007, No. 1, pp. 59-80. To be found on: http://www.cic.nyu.edu/internationalsecurity/docs/EUsmultiplestrategicidentities.pdf and Shepard Forman: 'Multidimensional and Integrated Peace Operations: Trends and Challenges'. Center on International Cooperation, March 2007. To be found on: http://www.cic.nyu.edu/internationalsecurity/timor-leste_shep_article.html.

[375] Stephanie Fletcher: 'European Security and Defense Policy: Between 'Offensive Defense' and 'Human Security''. International Policy Analysis Unit, November 2006, p. 4. To be found on: http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/id/04139.pdf.

[376] A. Mattelaer: 'EUFOR RDC and the development of the ESDP' in Studia Diplomatica, the Brussels Journal of International Relations. Vol. LX, 2007, Number 3: Peace and Security in Central Africa; International Intervention in Africa; NATO and ESDP, p. 86.

[377] See the European Security Strategy and the website of the Department for Security Policy of the Norwegian Ministry of Defence: 'Multidimensional and Integrated Peace Operations: Trends and Challenges', 19 November 2007. To be found on: http://www.regjeringen.no/nb/dep/fd/aktuelt/nyheter/2007/Multidimensional-and-Integrated-Peace-Op-2.html?id=491112 .

[378] See the European Security Strategy and the website of the Department for Security Policy of the Norwegian Ministry of Defence: 'Multidimensional and Integrated Peace Operations: Trends and Challenges', 19 November 2007. To be found on: http://www.regjeringen.no/nb/dep/fd/aktuelt/nyheter/2007/Multidimensional-and-Integrated-Peace-Op-2.html?id=491112. See also European Parliament resolution on the ESDP operation in Chad and the Central African Republic

In her article on European Security and Defence Policy Stefanie Flechtner includes many of the above mentioned characteristics by stating that "*The realignment of European security policy concerns ESDP capabilities, as well as operations on the ground. Its focus is on expanding ESDP to become more robust, flexible, and, most of all, more globally engaged. A battle group, a fighting force of approximately 1,500 soldiers, is a unit that is able to deploy rapidly for small-scale and robust fighting missions in distant regions. Artemis, the EU military intervention in the Democratic Republic of Congo from June until September 2003, mirrored precisely this mission profile. This was the first time that the EU had intervened in an acute crisis situation. The intervention force was equipped with a robust UN mandate (Security Council Resolution 1484) that allowed the approximately 1,800 ESDP soldiers to use military force. Additionally, Artemis was the first EU mission outside Europe and the first EU military operation without the support of NATO structures. Within the EU the mission was generally seen as a success and may provide a good model for future EU interventions*".[379]

The European Union and realism

This thesis brought forward that the sub hypothesis with regard to the characteristics of UN seems to be confirmed. The same can be said with regard to the second part of the sub hypothesis. Nevertheless the same problem as with regard to the UN occurs and that is whether the assumptions brought forward in the introduction are undoubtedly true. The conclusion on the influence of realism on the characteristics will be taken in combination with other issues brought forward in this thesis (chapter 5)

The existence of a division

While labeling large, complex and integrated missions as being examples of humanitarianism and short, small operations as examples of realism is problematic, this paragraph contributes to the search for a division between the UN and the EU with regard to the deployment of military personnel. In the box 3 a general overview of the differences is given, which will be explained below.

Box 3

United Nations	European Union
Large operations (objectives)	Small operations (objectives)
Large operations (number of troops)	Small operations (number of troops)
Often long term involvement	Often short term involvement (exit strategy)
Quantity	Quality
Searches for support	Support other organizations
'Flexibility'	Flexibility
Risks: less choice	Low risks
'Speedy'	Speedy deployment and decision making
Robust	Robust
Robust rules of engagement	Robust rules of engagement

Box 3 makes clear that there are several differences between the UN and the EU with regard to the deployment of military personnel detectable. In general it is fair to state that the UN deploys large (complex), long term, robust operations while the EU deploys small (specific), short term, robust operations. Furthermore the Union is the organization with quality (sophisticated weapons, aircrafts, tanks, and well trained personnel), can rapidly deploy flexible operations, preferably in situations of

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(B6-0362/2007) to be found on: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=MOTION&reference=B6-2007-0362&language=EN and interview 9.
[379] Stephanie Fletcher: 'European Security and Defense Policy: Between 'Offensive Defense' and 'Human Security''. International Policy Analysis Unit, November 2006, p. 4. To be found on: http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/id/04139.pdf

low risks. The characteristics of UN operations are somewhat different. The quality of personnel and equipment is not (always) at the same level as operations deployed by the EU. Furthermore it is fair to state that compared to the EU the decision making process within the UN, with regard to the deployment and the transformation of existing operations, is less flexible and speedy. With regard to the deployment of military personnel in situations of ongoing conflicts (high risks) it is necessary to keep in mind the different role both organizations play on the international scene. The EU, as a regional organization, can simply refuse to deploy military personnel, while for the UN this can be more problematic. Related to this 'role' of the EU is the possibility to deploy military personnel in support of operations launched by other organizations, or as an intervention force.

This paragraph brought forward several differences characteristics of UN and EU operations, the question is whether this also means that there is a division. Before we answer this question it is important to keep in mind two things. First of all the characteristics brought forward in this paragraph are sweeping statements. Not all UN operations can be described as long-term operations, see for example operation MINUGUA in Guatemala (January-May 1997), and operation UNSF in West New Guinea (October 1992 – April 1993). With regard to military operations deployed by the EU it is good to notice that the operation deployed in Bosnia-Herzegovina is present for almost five years. Secondly, the European Union, the CFSP, and the ESDP are still in progress. Which mean that the Union is working to improve coordination between the civilian and military component of operations. Furthermore the Union also wants to be capable to deploy any operation necessary. The previous paragraph pointed out that the willingness of the Union is of major influence on the deployment of military operations, this paragraph wants to underline the influence of the Union's youthfulness on several characteristics of its operations (short-term, small).

This thesis clearly brought forward that there are differences between the organizations, with regard to decision making, with regard to the organizations role, with regard to the history. This paragraph focused on the differences between the (military) operations deployed by both organizations. It appeared that with regard to aspects like term of involvement and scale of involvement there are some clear differences between the UN and the EU. However we have to be cautious to collate differences with division. Division means that it is an explicit choice to deploy operations with characteristics A, B and C and that the operations are distributed between the organizations. In the final conclusion of this thesis the findings of this paragraph with regard to the characteristics will be integrated with the findings of previous paragraphs to find a deliberate answer to the central question of this thesis.

Before this thesis will conclude on the central question of this thesis and the formulated hypothesis and sub hypotheses it will continue by dealing with three countries in which the UN and/or the EU deployed military personnel and examine the accuracy of the hypothesis about humanitarianism and realism and whether the paragraphs brought forward in this chapter are confirmed in practice.

Chapter 4
The Cases

4.1 Introduction
4.2 Sierra Leone
4.3 Bosnia-Herzegovina
4.4 The Democratic Republic of the Congo

4.1 Introduction

The previous chapter dealt with the sub hypotheses on humanitarianism and realism and tried to find indications for a division between the United Nations and the European Union with regard to peace operations and especially military operations. This chapter will examine whether the different issues dealt with in the previous chapter are also detectable in the practice. Therefore this chapter will bring forward three countries in which military operations are deployed. The three countries are Sierra Leone, Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC).

There are several reasons to deal with these specific countries. The reasons to deal with Sierra Leone are the following: first of all there were some serious humanitarian problems within the country. Second of all the operation deployed in Sierra Leone was a comprehensive operation. Thirdly the geographical location makes Sierra Leone an interesting example. Fourthly it is a country in which the EU did not get involved. And fifthly the history of Sierra Leone, the role of Great Britain (a permanent member of the SC), and the possible presence of realism makes Sierra Leone and the operation deployed in this country worth examining.

The reasons to deal with the operation in Bosnia-Herzegovina are first of all that Bosnia-Herzegovina lies on the European continent, or to say it differently is part of the Union's Neighbourhood. So geographical this country is important for the Union, Furthermore Bosnia-Herzegovina is also important for the security of the Union itself: spill-over effects, spread of organised crime, weapon smuggling and so on. Also the possibility that the EU is faced with a flow of refugees makes this country of special interests for this thesis. Also the low-grade involvement of the UN in Bosnia-Herzegovina makes this country worth examining. A last reason is that the operation of the EU was a follow up operation; the Union replaced an operation deployed by the NATO.

The last country this thesis will deal with is the DRC. When there is one country in the world that is faced with interventions from international and regional organizations it is the DRC. Several thousands of UN military personnel are deployed there and also several EU operations were deployed in several parts of the country. Furthermore because of the size of the country the DRC is an important country with regard to international peace and security. Also with in mind the history of the DRC with neighbouring countries the importance of international involvement becomes clear. Another reason to deal with Congo is the history, especially the colonial history of the country. Two final reasons are the presence of natural resources and the humanitarian situation within the country.

Because an extensive description of the countries, the conflicts and the organization's involvement in these countries will go beyond the scope of this research, only the most important aspects of the cases will be dealt with. Every paragraph will conclude with an assessment of the presence of humanitarian or realistic considerations with regard to the operation(s) deployed in these three countries. Furthermore all paragraphs will consider whether a division, as brought forward in chapter 3, is visible in these specific countries.

4.2 Sierra Leone[380]

Introduction

From 1991 to 2001 Sierra Leone suffered from a civil war. Since 1978 Sierra Leone was a one-party State, with the All People's Congress (APC) as the only legal party. In October 1990 Momoh, the current leader of the APC and president of the country, established a multi-party system. In 1991 the situation became restless and in March 1991 the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), supported by Charles Taylor from Liberia, launched a war from the east of the country to overthrow the government. In cooperation and with support of the Military Observer Group (ECOMOG) of the ECOWAS, especially Guinea and Nigeria, the army of Sierra Leone defended the government. However on April 29, 1992 six members of the Sierra Leonean army overthrow the government themselves.[381] The soldiers established the National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC) with Valentine Strasser as leader. Strasser suspended the 1991 constitution and declared a state of emergency.

The attacks continued and in 1995 the UN explicitly meddle with the conflict. A Special Envoy worked together with the OAU and ECOWAS to try to negotiate a settlement to the conflict. In January 1996 Maada Bio, deputy chairman of the NPRC, staged a coup with some other members of the NPRC because they were unhappy with the progress made by Strasser in the peace process (the civil war continued).
Efforts of the UN, OAU, ECOWAS and Maada Bio led to the parliamentary and presidential elections in the beginning of 1996. Alhaji Dr. Ahmed Tejan Kabbah, from the Sierra Leone People's Party (SLPP) won the elections and the army accepted their new leader. So far so good, yet the RUF did not participate in the elections and also did not accept the outcome of the elections.

In November 1996 the RUF and the Government signed a peace agreement (Abidjan Accord). This however did not prevent a military coup by the Armed Force Revolutionary Council (AFRC) in May 1997. The AFRC consisted out of members of the army as well as the RUF and they did not agree with the decision of the government to sent Major General Koroma to prison. The military coup succeeded and Koroma was released from prison and installed as president. In the meantime president Kabbah was expelled to Guinea.

Al steps taken to persuade the junta to step down failed and in October 1997 the Security Council imposed an oil and arms embargo and used ECOMOG troops to ensure implementation.[382] Hereinafter the ECOWAS Committee of Five on Sierra Leone tried to set up another peace agreement, which was accepted by the junta. Yet because of severe critics on key provisions by the junta the agreement was never implemented.

In response to an attack, ECOMOG launched a military attack in February 1998 which defeated the junta. In March President Kabbah returned to Freetown, and the oil and arms embargos were terminated.[383] On June 1998 the Security Council established UNOMSIL (United Nations Observer

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[380] The information provided in this paragraph is a collection of different articles, resolutions and websites on the history of Sierra Leone. Websites used are the CIA World Factbook on Sierra Leone, to be found on: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/sl.html; BBC News Country Profile, to be found on: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/country_profiles/1061561.stm; the Sierra Leone Web, to be found on: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/country_profiles/1061561.stm; and the website of the UNDPKO on UNAMSIL, to be found on: http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/unamsil/index.html.
[381] Website of the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, to be found on: http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/index.asp.
[382] United Nations Security Council Resolution 1132 (1997) of 8 October 1997.
[383] United Nations Security Council Resolution 1156 (1998) of 16 March 1998.

Mission in Sierra Leone) to monitor the military and security situation in Sierra Leone, as well as the disarmament and demobilization of former combatants.[384] It was also asked to assist in monitoring respect for international humanitarian law. UNOMSIL was terminated on 22 October 1999, when the Security Council authorized deployment of a new and significantly larger peacekeeping operation UNAMSIL (the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone).

The reason that the Security Council decided to establish UNAMSIL was that the situation in Sierra Leone was far from stable. Rebels gained control of half of the country and in December 1998 attacked Freetown. The city was under control of the rebels for several days, and the personnel of UNOMSIL were evacuated. This same month ECOMOG troops retook Freetown and installed the civilian government again. From May to July 1999 the Government negotiated with the rebels, which lead to the Lomé agreement, key issues were the need to end hostilities and form a government of national unity and an expended role for UNOMSIL.[385] After expending UNOMSIL the Security Council decided that a new and much larger mission was needed to carry out provisions of the Lomé peace agreement.

The mandate

The Security Council established UNAMSIL by its resolution 1270/1999 of 22 October 1999. Key tasks were to cooperate with the government and other parties to implement the Lomé Peace Agreement and assist implementation of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration plan. UNAMSIL's mandate was revised in February 2000 and its size was expanded, this last happened once again in March and in May 2000. The mandate of UNAMSIL was successfully completed in December 2005 and succeeded by a new mission UNIOSIL (United Nations Integrated Office for Sierra Leone).

UNAMSIL had, according to paragraph 8, the following mandate:

- To cooperate with the Government of Sierra Leone and the other parties to the Peace Agreement in the implementation of the Agreement
- To assist the Government of Sierra Leone in the implementation of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration plan
- To that end, to establish a presence at key locations throughout the territory of Sierra Leone, including at disarmament/reception centres and demobilization centres
- To ensure the security and freedom of movement of United Nations personnel
- To monitor adherence to the ceasefire in accordance with the ceasefire agreement of 18 May 1999 (S/1999/585, annex) through the structures provided for therein
- To encourage the parties to create confidence-building mechanisms and support their functioning
- To facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance
- To support the operations of United Nations civilian officials, including the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and his staff, human rights officers and civil affairs officers
- To provide support, as requested, to the elections, which are to be held in accordance with the present constitution of Sierra Leone

According to Security Council resolution 1289 (2000) of 7 February 2000, the mandate was revised to include the following tasks (acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations):

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[384] United Nations Security Council Resolution 1181 (1998) of 13 July 1998.
[385] United Nations Security Council Resolution 1260 (1999) of 20 August 1998.

- To provide security at key locations and Government buildings, in particular in Freetown, important intersections and major airports, including Lungi airport
- To facilitate the free flow of people, goods and humanitarian assistance along specified thoroughfares
- To provide security in and at all sites of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme
- To coordinate with and assist, the Sierra Leone law enforcement authorities in the discharge of their responsibilities
- To guard weapons, ammunition and other military equipment collected from ex-combatants and to assists in their subsequent disposal or destruction

The Council authorized UNAMSIL to take the necessary action to fulfil those additional tasks, and affirmed that, in the discharge of its mandate, UNAMSIL may take the necessary action to ensure the security and freedom of movement of its personnel and, within its capabilities and areas of deployment, to afford protection to civilians under imminent threat of physical violence, taking into account the responsibilities of the Government of Sierra Leone.

Why the United Nations intervened

This paragraph will deal with the reasons that the United Nations brought forward to establish a peacekeeping operation in Sierra Leone. These reasons have to be found in different sources, for example the Security Council decisions, the reports of the Secretary General, statements of the President of the Security Council and articles in newspapers or on the internet. In his first report on the situation in Sierra Leone, the Secretary General (SG) of the UN addressed the current problems of the country involved. Highlighted was the history of the conflict, the political situation, the peace negotiations, the democratization process, the situation with regard to security, economy and the humanitarian problems. What becomes clear in the concluding observations and recommendations is that the SG urges the international community to demonstrate its solidarity with the people of Sierra Leone and that there is a need to support and assist the democratization process. Furthermore the SG points out the importance of demobilization of the combatants and financial support for humanitarian agencies. And conclude by referring to the humanitarian convoys that are targeted and the unwillingness of the RUF to join the electoral process.[386] In June 1998 the SG, in his fifth report on the situation in Sierra Leone, proposes the establishment of a United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL). This mission has to promote security and stability and support the disarmament, demobilizations, reintegration of (former) combatants and help the reconstruction and rehabilitation of Sierra Leone.[387] In the resolution establishing the mission, the SC state that it is gravely concerned at the loss of life and immense suffering undergone by the people of Sierra Leone, including refugees and displaced persons, as a result of the continuing rebel attacks, and in particular at the plight of children affected by the conflict.[388] In the eighth report on the situation in Sierra Leone the SG point forward some problems, like the rift between the RUF and the AFRC, the detention of UN, ECOWAS and other international personnel by the AFRC, Koroma's grievances with regard the peace agreement, the unwillingness to support the DDR-process. Also mentioned is the situation with regard to children, the detention of thousand civilians, the robbing of UNOMSIL personnel, the human rights mechanisms that have not been established etcetera. According to the SG it was time to send a robust UN force that is able to assist the government with regard to the DDR-process, ensure security of UN-personnel, maintain ceasefire, facilitate humanitarian assistance

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[386] Report of the Secretary General of the United Nations on the situation in Sierra Leone, 21 November 1995 (S1995/975).
[387] Fifth report of the Secretary General of the United Nations on the situation in Sierra Leone, 9 June 1998 (S1998/486).
[388] United Nations Security Council resolution 1998/1181, 13 July 1998.

and support the electoral process.[389] Hereinafter the SC decided that the situation in Sierra Leone continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security in the region (see also the flow of refugees to Guinea and Liberia) and established the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone.[390]

Humanitarianism and realism

Like indicated above many humanitarian considerations can be found in the documents published by the UN with regard to the situation in Sierra Leone. Stating that humanitarian consideration were the only considerations will be too much also with in mind that many documents are not written by the SC but work of humanitarian organs of the UN. Furthermore we have to keep in mind the number of troops deployed by Great Britain and the colonial history of Sierra Leone. Who is more critical can state that countries like the USA, Great Britain and France wanted to gain greater influence on the African continent.[391] To conclude it is clear that humanitarian considerations were present during the decision to deploy military personnel in Sierra Leone, furthermore the documents and mandate of the operation indicate the importance of humanitarian considerations. Yet at the same time it is impossible to underestimate the influence of the British (and American) government on the decision making procedure in the SC. UNAMSIL confirms the conclusions drafted in chapter 3, with regard to the characteristics of the operations, the role of humanitarian considerations but also with regard to the role of the permanent members of the SC.

Division

When we look at the facts and figures of operation UNAMSIL as reproduced by the UN, confirmation can be found for the characteristics outlined in the previous chapter and supports the assumption that there is a division. First of all term of involvement, from 22 October 1999 till 31 December 2005, confirms the assumption that UN operations include long term involvement. The second issue is the scale of the involvement of the UN. Authorized is a maximum strength of 17,500 military personnel including 260 military observers and up to 170 police personnel. Authorized does not mean actually deployed yet on the 31st of March 2002 the UN had deployed 17,368 military personnel, 87 UN police, 322 international civilians, and 552 national civilians. So the assumption that UN operations implicate large scale involvement can also be confirmed. The second issue also indicates another assumption, namely the integrated approach of UN operations. With the involvement of military personnel, police, military observers and national and international civilians the integrated approach is more or less given. The SC in resolution 1562 (2004) confirms that all these officers 'will function as integrated units'.[392] The interference in Sierra Leone confirms the role of the UN as being an organization that is concerned with all situations throughout the world and fits into the four regions brought forward in chapter 3. Like mentioned in paragraph 2.4 UNAMSIL was an operation referred to as wider peacekeeping operations. One characteristic of such operations is already mentioned: the integrated approach and related the cooperation with NGO's. Other characteristics are that such operations are deployed in a context of ongoing violence. With other words the assumption that the UN is, contrary to the EU, willing to deploy military personnel when there is a high scale of intensity. In 1999 UNAMSIL was deployed and in 2002 the civil war was ended, so the operation was deployed during the conflict. Another characteristic of wider peacekeeping operations is the broad scale of tasks attributed to the operation. The mandate of UNAMSIL clearly indicates the broad range of tasks and also confirms the difference between the EU, with specific objectives and tasks, and the UN, with broad mandates, and tasks. It might be clear that during the civil war in Sierra Leone the EU as an

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[389] Eight report of the Secretary General of the United Nations on the situation in Sierra Leone, 28 September 1999 (S1999/1003).
[390] United Nations Security Council resolution 1270/1999, 22 October 1999.
[391] Chris Marsden and Chris Talbot: 'Britain's military intervention in Sierra Leone part of a new "Scramble for Africa", 20 May 2000. To be found on: http://www.wsws.org/articles/2000/may2000/sier-m20.shtml.
[392] United Nations Security Council resolution 1562/2004, 17 September 2004, paragraph 5.

organization was not ready to act. As we know now the first military EU operation took place in 2003. Because the EU was not actively deploying military personnel during the civil war in Sierra Leone it problematic to answer the question on the existence of a division. Yet what it confirms is that the UN deployed a broad, large operation in Sierra Leone in a period of ongoing violence. Hereinafter this thesis will deal with the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina, where both organizations got involved, and examine whether a division is detectable in the deployment of military personnel in this country.

4.3 Bosnia-Herzegovina

Introduction

This paragraph will start with the explanation of the name of the EU operation Althea. On the website of EUFOR-Althea it was said that Althea is regarded by many as the Greek goddess of healing. In myth, Althea, mother of Meleager, was told by the Gods that her son would die as soon as a piece of wood on her fire was consumed. Althea took the wood from the fire, extinguished it and placed the wood in a chest to preserve her son's life. With the fire in Bosnia and Herzegovina extinguished, Operation ALTHEA will now assist the healing of the country and all its peoples. Unlike the myth, the wood will never again be taken from the chest but will remain preserved, safely, forever.[393]

Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH) became independent form the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia on March 1, 1992 and was recognized on April 6, 1992. BiH was one of the six republics that made up the former Yugoslavia. It is fair to state that the situation in BiH was from the beginning onwards far from ideal. BiH was a country with different ethnic groups (Serbs, Croats and Bosniaks), with different languages, there was a proclaimed Republika Srpska, and there was involvement of Croatia and Serbia. None of the three ethnic groups constituted a majority of the population. Bosniaks made up 44 percent of the population (4.4 million) Serbs, made up 31 percent (3.1 million), Croats 17 percent (1.7 million) and 5.5 percent declared themselves Yugoslavs. The other 2.5 percent consists out of small minority groups (like Roma and Jews).

Important to mention is that before the war broke out a multiparty election was held in BiH. The outcome was that three nationalist parties got 76 percent of the votes and formed a coalition government, but it fell apart as Yugoslavia disintegrated in 1991

The secession of Croatia and Slovenia in June 1991, the war in Croatia in July 1991 and the secret meeting between Miloševic and Tudjman, were they discussed the option to partitioning BiH, had negative influence on the relation between the three ethnic groups. Especially problematic became the dispute between the Serbs at the one side and the Croats and the Bosniaks (with the support of the European Community) at the other side about the secession from Yugoslavia. The Serbs were not in favour of an independent status of BiH and boycotted the referendum.

Preventive diplomacy was unsuccessful, the European Community (EC) for example sent the European Community Monitoring Mission (ECMM) which had only some deterrent effect and perhaps prevented the spill over to neighbouring countries. The same can be said with regard to OSCE initiatives.[394] The first action by the UNSC was the adoption of resolution 713[395] in which the arms embargo, initiated by the EC, was supported. In the end of November 1991 Croatia and

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[393] Website of EUFOR Althea, to be found on: http://www.euforbih.org and http://www.behindthename.com/name/althea
[394] Jan Wouters and Frederik Naert: 'How Effective is the European Security Architecture? Lessons from Bosnia and Kosovo'. International and Comparative Law Quarterly, pp.540 - 576, Vol. 50, No. 3, July 2001.
[395] United Nations Security Council resolution 713 (1991) of 25 September 1991.

Yugoslavia signed an agreement in Geneva and requested a UN peacekeeping force.[396] The SG decided that this peacekeeping force will not be deployed at this stage and in January 1992, after the assignment of an Implementing Accord a small UN operation was sent to supervise the ceasefire in BiH.[397]

In the meantime, in 1992 the war broke out between the Bosniaks (Bosnian Muslims), Croats and Serbs.[398] To be brief the conflict can be described as following. The Bosnian Croats were supported by the Croatian government and army and in the beginning fought alongside the Bosnian government forces, which consist mainly out of Muslims (Bosniaks/ Bosnian Muslims), against the Bosnian Serbs which got external support from the Yugoslavian army. An extensive description of the conflict would deal with the declaration of Serbia and Montenegro that it would be named the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the involvement of irregular armed groups from Croatia and Serbia, the involvement of ultranationalist parties and former guerrillas from Islamic countries.
What followed is known to many and can be described as massacres and ethnic cleansing by all three ethnic groups. The Serbs wanted to expend and link up their territories and eliminate the non-Serb population and in the summer of 1992 the Serbs controlled 70 percent of the country. In May the Croats started a war against the Bosniaks (their former allies) to gain control over central BiH and the part of Mostar that was under control of the Bosniaks.

Until 1995, when the war finally ended, the efforts made by the international community were not very successful. The involvement of the European Community and the United Nations did not stop the conflict. Examples are several conferences organised by the United Nations and the European Community, the resolution in September 1991 of the Security Council in which they already called on the warring parties to implement an embargo on weapons and other military equipment.[399] Neither the establishment of UNPROFOR (United Nations Protection Force) on the 21st of February 1992 by the Security Council and several conferences organized by the United Nations and the European Community had the intended effect.[400]

UNPROFOR

Midway February 1992 the SG recommended the SC to establish UNPROFOR. The SC approved the report and on 21 February it adopted resolution 743 which established the UN Force for an initial period of 12 months. The SC stated that the UN Force should be an interim arrangement to create the conditions of peace and security required for the negotiation of an overall settlement of the Yugoslav crisis.[401] On April the 7th the SC decided, with in mind the situation on the ground and the report of the SG, to authorize the full deployment of the UN Force.[402] The operational mandate of UNPROFOR extends to five Republics of the former Yugoslavia - Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia - and it has a liaison presence in the sixth, Slovenia. Although UNPROFOR was not a traditional peacekeeping operation, it was authorised under Chapter VII of the UN Charter[403] and authorised to use air power[404], it lacked both the mandate and the means to end

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[396] Bethlehem and Weller (eds.): '*The 'Yugoslav' Crisis in International Law: General Issues'.* Cambridge University Press, 1997, pp. 472-473.

[397] United Nations Security Council Resolution 727 (1991), par. 2-3.

[398] 'Bosnia and Herzegovina', to be found on: http://encarta.msn.com/encnet/refpages/RefArticle.aspx?refid=761563626 and 'Wars of Yugoslav Succession', to be found on: http://encarta.msn.com/encyclopedia_761584605_2/Wars_of_Yugoslav_Succession.html.

[399] United Nations Security Council Resolution 713 (1991) of 25 September 1991.

[400] United Nations Security Council Resolution 743 (1992) of 21 February 1992. See for a more extensive documentation of UNPROFOR: http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co_mission/unprof_b.htm.

[401] United Nations Security Council resolution 743 (1992) of 21 February 1992, par. 5.

[402] United Nations Security Council resolution 749 (1992) of 7 April 1992, par. 2.

[403] United Nations Security Council resolution 807 (1992), preamble.

[404] United Nations Security Council resolution 836 (1992), par. 9-10.

the ongoing conflict. Examples are the kidnapping of 350 UNPROFOR personnel in May 1995 and the impotence to defend the safe areas, including Sebrenica, in July 1995.

Important to mention is that the UN took measures to prevent the conflict from spreading to Macedonia within UNPROFOR, this part of the operation became later on independent and known as the United Nations Preventive Deployment Force (UNPREDEP). Furthermore the OSCE was involved in the conflict and made sure that the sanctions of the UN were implemented and by the deployment of certain missions, especially with regard to preventive diplomacy. Another organization involved was the NATO, this organization made sure that the UN embargo was observed, enforced a flight ban over Bosnia and supported UNPROFOR in the form of air strikes. Also the WEU as well as the EU were involved in BiH, by supporting the OSCE and administering Mostar.

As far as military aspects are concerned, the EU was at the time dependent on the WEU, which was still fully immersed in developing its operational capabilities. The OSCE did not have the necessary means to be militarily involved either. UNPROFOR and with it the UN had lost all credibility.[405] The impossibility of other organizations to act and the early involvement of NATO did put the North Atlantic organization in the rear seat with regard to the future of BiH.

IFOR and SFOR

On 20 December 1995 UNPROFOR was replaced by multinational Implementation Force (IFOR) of 60,000 troops. IFOR was given a one-year mandate to implement the military aspects of the Peace Agreement, the operation was quiet successful and the NATO foreign and defence ministers concluded that "a reduced military presence was needed to provide the stability necessary for consolidating the peace".[406] So after one year IFOR was replaced by SFOR (Stabilization Force). Both Forces were responsible for the military aspects of the Dayton Agreement. Both Forces were established under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, under one central command (except for the Russian troops), where heavily armed and are separated from civilian aspects. The main difference between the two operations is already in the name was IFOR deployed to implement peace, SFOR had to stabilise the peace.

In the end of 2004 the NATO decided to hand over its own operation. On 2 December 2004 the European Union launched a military operation in BiH. In 2003, with the Thessaloniki Declaration, it was already stated that the future of the Western Balkans, with BiH as an important country, was in the hands of the European Union. Next to the political engagement, the assistance programmes, the police support, and the monitoring mission the EU was willing to support BiH by sending military personnel. Especially Great Britain was very keen on deploying military personnel in BiH and take over from the NATO.[407]

EUFOR-Althea

The robust operation was called European Union military force (EUFOR-Althea) and had the same manpower level as SFOR, namely almost 7000 troops. The key objectives of Althea were to 'conduct a military operation in BiH in order to provide deterrence, continued compliance with the responsibility to fulfil the role specified in the General Framework Agreement for Peace (GFAP)/ Dayton Agreement in BiH and to contribute to a safe and secure environment in BiH, in line with its mandate, required to achieve core tasks in the OHR's Mission Implementation Plan and the

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[405] Jan Wouters and Frederik Naert: 'How Effective is the European Security Architecture? Lessons from Bosnia and Kosovo'. International and Comparative Law Quarterly, pp.540 - 576, Vol. 50, No. 3, July 2001. And interview 2, 7 and 10.
[406] For more information see the SFOR website of the NATO, to be found on: http://www.nato.int/SFOR/docu/d981116a.htm.
[407] Interview 2 and 5.

Stabilization and Association Process (SAP)'.[408] Althea is established in accordance with Chapter VII of the UN Charter[409] to ensure continued compliance with the GFAP/Dayton Agreement.

The EU military operation has, next to its key objectives, some supporting tasks. These are to provide support to the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and relevant authorities, and provide the security environment in which the police can act against the organised criminal network.[410]

EUFOR troops were located in three main areas; in North (Tuzla), North West (Banja Luka) and South East (Mostar). The Headquarter was based in Camp Butmir, Sarajevo. In February 2007 the European Council decided that because of the level of threat in BiH the level of troops could be decreased and nowadays around 2200 troops are deployed in BiH. These troops can be, whenever necessary, reinforced by KFOR troops and Over the Horizon Forces (OTHF).[411]

The legal basis

An important document with regard to the legal basis of EUFOR-Althea is first of all resolution 1551 (2004) of the UNSC. In this resolution the SC stated that it is committed to the situation in the former Yugoslavia and takes note of and welcomes the intention of the EU to launch a military operation. A second important document is Council Joint Action 2004/570/CFSP of 12 July 2004 on the European Union military operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In this document the Council brings forward the purpose and content of the operation. On 22 November 1994 the SC adopted resolution 1575. This resolution confirmed many issues dealt with in resolution 1551 and authorised the EU military operation. On 25 November the Council adopted a Joint Action that authorised the launching of the European Union military operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In 2007 EUFOR was successfully reconfigured and EUFOR continues to act in accordance with its peace enforcement mandate under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, as specified in UN Security Council resolutions 1575 (2004), 1639 (2005), 1722 (2006), and 1785 (2007), renewed by the Security Council on 20 November 2008 (Security Council resolution 1845 (2008)).

Objectives

The two most important objectives are to maintain a safe and secure environment in BiH and to ensure continued compliance with the Dayton/Paris agreement (General Framework Agreement for Peace/GFAP); and to support the international community's High Representative/EU Special Representative for BiH, Miroslav Lajčák, and the local authorities.

Furthermore EUFOR supports the implementation of a number of tasks like countermine, control over lower airspace, military movement control as well as weapons storage sites management. Furthermore the earlier mentioned support to the ICTY in pursuit of persons indicted for war crimes (the responsibility for full cooperation with ICTY rests with the BiH authorities) was an important objective. EUFOR also contributes to defence reform in BiH.

The Operation Commander is General Sir John McColl (UK). The EU's Political and Security Committee exercises the political control and strategic direction of the operation, under the responsibility of the Council of the EU.

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[408] Article 1 of the Council Joint Action 2004/570/CFSP, of 12 July 2004 on the European Union military operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
[409] United Nations Security Council resolution 1551 (2004) of 9 July 2004.
[410] Website of EUFOR Althea, to be found on:
http://www.euforbih.org/eufor/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=12&Itemid=28.
[411] OTHF can be up to four battalions from France, Germany, United Kingdom and Italy.

Humanitarianism and realism

In operation Althea a clear confirmation can be found for the assumption that the EU deploys military personnel because of realist purposes. This thesis already brought forward several arguments like the security within the Union, the security within the region (backyard), the flow of refugees, and the integration of the Balkans. Of course there are some references to human suffering yet the Union interfered not in the heat of the conflict, had many interests in the region and wanted to show that it was capable to deploy a military operation. It is clear that security in BiH is a very important factor for stability in the Balkans and the EU wanted to show that it was capable to stabilize such problems that occur in the neighborhood.

Division

Overseeing the whole operation in Bosnia-Herzegovina it becomes clear that the assumptions brought forward in chapter 3 will not all find confirmation in this paragraph. Two points are of special importance, first of all the number of troops deployed, second of all the period of involvement. To start with the number of troops; this thesis suggested that the EU was not very willing to deploy military personnel on a large scale. At the time the EU followed up SFOR the number of troops were equal to the number of troops deployed by SFOR (almost 7,000 troops). The fact is that in February 2007 the Council, after 26 months, decided to reduce the number of troops deployed in BiH. So there was a large scale involvement yet after two years the EU already reduced the number of troops to approximately 2200. The second point is the period of involvement. Where the EU 'normally' deploys military operations for several months the operation in BiH is already deployed for more than four and a half years. What does this leave for the assumption that the EU is not very willing to deploy military personnel for longer period? In my view both characteristics of the operation in BiH, long term and scale of involvement, are not remarkable when we look at the interests of the Union. Furthermore the costs and risks related to the operation in BiH are defendable. The situation in the Balkans is one of the major concerns for European leaders and security of the region is of important for every civilian of the Union.

Other assumptions are confirmed. First of all the EU operation can be described as a 'follow up operation'; in the case of BiH it is clear that the Union take over an operation from the NATO. A second assumption is the geographical preference; which is dealt with earlier on. Furthermore the scale of intensity during the deployment; what becomes clear is that the conflict was not that severe anymore and that the NATO guaranteed an acceptable transition. Before we conclude on the division between the UN and EU with regard to the deployment of military personnel this paragraph wants to compare the operation UNPROFOR and operation EUFOR-Althea. The first thing that strikes are the number of UN military personnel deployed in Bosnia-Herzegovina; more than 39,000. Above it was stated that the deployment of 7,000 (and later reduced to 2,200) troops by the EU was large scale involvement. However with in mind the number of troops deployed by the UN it seems that EU deployment was not that large scale. A division with regard to the scale of involvement, as introduced in the previous chapter, is still plausible. A second issue is the mandate of both operations. These mandates are difficult to compare, because the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina changed during the years, but Avril McDonald for example states that the mandate of UNPROFOR was unclear and restricted. McDonald brings forward that the mandate left unclear to what extend the local population had to be protected. [412] A third issue is that UNPROFOR troops were poorly equipped and highly vulnerable to retaliation in certain areas.[413]

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[412] Avril McDonald: 'The year in review', in Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law 2003. T.M.C. Asser Press, pp. 239-291, p.248.
[413] Jane Boulden: 'NATO and the United Nations During UNPROFOR'. To be found on: http://www.nato.int/acad/fellow/99-01/boulden.pdf.

To conclude on the operations deployed by the UN and the EU several indications that were brought forward in the previous chapter are confirmed. Perhaps the division between the UN and the EU with regard to the deployment of military personnel for a longer period of time is not that sharp as declared. Furthermore it was stated that the EU is willing to deploy operations on a larger scale, yet compared to the number of troops deployed by the UN it not convincing to argue that the EU deploys militaries on a large scale. The willingness demonstrated indicates that in certain situations (where security issues and other interests are at stake), the Union deploys larger operations, with more tasks and for a longer period.

4.4 The Democratic Republic of the Congo

Introduction

In June 1960 Congo became independent and no longer a Belgian colony. To ensure the withdrawal of Belgian forces, to assist the Government in maintaining law and order and to provide technical assistance the UN deployed ONUC (1960-1964).[414] Patrice Lumumba, the leader of the MNC party[415], becomes the prime minister and Joseph Kasavubu, the leader of ABAKO[416], becomes the president of the country. In July the first tensions become clear in the region of Katanga which leaded to the declaration of independence of this region by Moise Tshombe. In the meantime Lumumba is dismissed from his office, by the president, and later on arrested and with complicity of US and Belgium, murdered. In 1963 Katanga's secession ended and in 1964 Tshombe is appointed as prime minister and the country formally named the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). With the coup lead by Joseph Mobutu, who was appointed as chief staff of the Congo army by prime minister Lumumba in 1960, the period know as the first republic came to an end. Mobutu was supported by the United States, mainly because Mobutu was opposing communists. Mobutu established a one-party system and declared himself head of state. Although human rights were violated and the country had severe problems with corruption the situation was relatively stable. Mobutu started to change the names of the cities throughout the country, Léopoldville for example became Kinshasa, and in 1971 Mobutu even changed the name of the country. The DRC was renamed the Republic of Zaire and the River Congo was renamed Zaire. In 1973 and 1974 Mobutu did nationalise several foreign firms which has as a result that European investors left the country. In the following years Mobutu invited foreign companies to invest in Zaire, yet without great success. And after problems with Belgium loans certain development programs were cancelled and the economic situation worsened. In 1990 the Soviet Union collapsed and the support and interest of the US for Mobutu decreased. Because of the situation in the country the opposition demanded reforms and Mobutu formally changed the one-party system into a multiparty system. However the situation in Zaire did not change much and Mobutu stayed in power for another 7 years.

In 1996 the situation in Zaire became more and more problematic. Reasons are the genocide in that took place in Rwanda and the establishment of a Tutsi-government Rwandan Hutu militia forces fled into Eastern Zaire. These forces joined hands with the Zairian army and started to fight against the ethnic Tutsi's in Eastern Zaire. The Tutsi's in Eastern Zaire soon formed militias and they joined a coalition with opposition parties and were supported by the Rwandan and Ugandan government. This coalition was led by Laurent-Desire Kabila and become known as the Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo-Zaire (AFDL). When Mobutu left the country in 1997 for

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[414] More about ONUC can be found on the website of ONUC, to be found on:
http://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/onuc.htm.
[415] Mouvement National Congolais.
[416] Alliance des Bakongo.

a medical treatment in Switzerland, Laurent-Desire Kabila (who was supported by the governments of Rwanda, Burundi and Uganda) took over Kinshasa and declared himself president of the reverted Democratic Republic of the Congo. In June 1997 Kabila dismissed his Rwandan chief of staff Kabarebe, thanked the Rwandan government for their help and asked them to withdraw their troops from the territory of the DRC, which lead to tensions between Kabila and the Rwandan-government. In 1998 two rebel groups, the MLC[417] (supported by the Ugandan-government) and the RCD[418] (supported by the Rwandan-government) tried to overthrow president Kabila. Because of the support of Kabila's new allies: Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe this attack was without success. An important event was the ratification of the Lusaka peace agreement in 1999 by six countries involved. The agreement was later on singed by both the RCD and MLC.

In February 2000 the UNSC authorised the deployment of MONUC. In 2001 Kabila was killed by one of his own bodyguards and succeeded by his son, Joseph Kabila. Joseph immediately called for peace talks to end the conflict. In February parties (Kabila's Congo, Rwanda and Uganda) agreed that the foreign troops would withdraw. And in February 2001 the UN deployed peacekeepers on the territory of the DRC. Within one year, ethnic clashes took place in the northeast of the DRC. The Rwandan and Ugandan government decided to send more troops across the border. Throughout the rest of the year several peace talks took place in which it was decided that foreign troops (except for Rwandan) would withdraw and furthermore the opposing parties would get a share in power. Joseph Kabila formed a transition government and a constitution was approved by the citizens of the DRC. On 30 July 2006 elections took place and Joseph gained 45 percent of the votes while the leader of the MLC, Jean- Pierre Bemba, got 20 percent. The outcome of the elections resulted in fights in Kinshasa and made it necessary for MONUC to intervene. In the second round of the elections Joseph won 70 percent of the votes. Bemba accepted his defeat although he had serious doubts on the fairness of the elections. Joseph Kabila was sworn in as the new president on 6 December 2006. Later this month the army, with support of the UN, clashed with General Laurent Nkunda in the province North-Kivu and in 2007 the governmental army clashed with groups loyal to the defeated Bemba in Kinshasa. Throughout the year the conflict, especially in the East of the country continued and there was a major outbreak of the Ebola-virus. In January 2008 the government signed a peace agreement with several leaders of rebel groups, including Laurent Nkunda. Despite this peace agreement the months following the fights in the east of Congo continued between the governmental army and Rwandan Hutu militias and also with rebels loyal to Laurent Nkunda.

MONUC / Mandate

The UNSC adopted more than 50 resolutions with regard to the DRC. Most of these resolutions were necessary to extend the mandate of MONUC. Other issues dealt with in these resolutions are the need to sign the ceasefire agreement and cease hostilities, the decision to expand MONUC, the decision to establish a committee to monitor compliance with the arms embargo, the decision to increase the military strength of MONUC, the deployment of more personnel, the authorisation of the reserve force (EUFOR RD Congo), the decision to renew the sanctions regime, and the demand that armed groups and militias lay down their weapons.

Important is first of all the Security Council resolution 1291 (2000) of 24 February 2000. This resolution set forward the mandate of MONUC. Important aspects of this mandate are related to the implementation of the ceasefire agreement. An action plan was needed to gather military information on the parties' forces and make sure that the hostilities ceased. Furthermore this plan had to deal with the disarmament, demobilization, resettlement and reintegration of all members of the forces and the withdrawal of foreign forces.

Other important aspects of the mandate were the liaison with all the parties' military forces, the efforts with regard to prisoners of war, the development of a mine action plan, the cooperation with

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[417] Mouvement pour la Libération du Congo.
[418] Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie.

humanitarian agencies and the facilitation of humanitarian assistance and efforts with regard to human rights. Paragraph 8 of the resolution is stating that MONUC is acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter and may take necessary action to protect personnel, installations, equipment and civilians under threat of physical violence.

In 2004 the UNSC adopted another important resolution, namely resolution 1565 (2004). This resolution contained an increase of MONUC's strength, civilian personnel and air mobility. Other important aspects of the mandate were first of all the authorisation to deploy more military personnel, maintain present in key areas, build confidence and discourage violence. Other important aspects were the need to ensure protection of civilians, humanitarian personnel, UN personnel, facilities, installations and equipment. Furthermore MONUC should establish links with the United Nations Operation in Burundi (ONUB), and the governments of both the DRC and Burundi, to monitor and discourage the cross-border movements of combatants. Furthermore it remains necessary to seize and collect arms and related material. The SC furthermore brings forward the need to observe and report on the armed movements and groups and the presence of foreign military forces, the need to secure freedom of movement for deployed personnel and special attention for Eastern Congo.

In paragraph 5 the UNSC decides that MONUC also has the mandate to support the Government of National Unity and Transition. Part of MONUC's mandate is to contribute to the security of the institutions and protection of national officials. Furthermore there is a need to improve the security conditions with regard to humanitarian assistance. MONUC for instance has to assist the Government with the voluntary return of refugees and internally displaced persons. Assistance is also needed with regard to disarmament, repatriation and demobilization of foreign combatants. Furthermore MONUC need to provide a secure environment in which free elections can take place and assist in the promotion of and protection of human rights. MONUC needs to cooperate with the Government and other UN agencies to bring to justice those responsible for serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law. In paragraph 7 the SC furthermore decides that MONUC should contribute to efforts with regard to legislation, the security sector reform and the election process.

In the end of January 2008 the SC authorised MONUC to assist the Congolese authorities in organizing, preparing and conducting local elections.[419]

EUFOR RD Congo

On 25 April 2006, the UNSC adopted resolution 1671 (2006), this resolution authorized the temporary deployment of an European Force to support MONUC during the period encompassing the elections in the DRC. Important to mention is that the military operations was conducted in full agreement and close coordination with the Congolese authorities and also in close coordination with MONUC.

EUFOR RD Congo is the second military intervention of the EU in the DRC. The first military operation in the DRC was operation Artemis (2003). This operation was a test of the EU's capacity to execute an autonomous military crisis-management intervention. This operation was 'autonomous' because it did not relay on NATO assets and capabilities (including the chain of command) that are available for the Union's military missions since adoption of the "Berlin plus" agreements between the EU and NATO (2002-2003)[420].

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[419] See United Nations Security Council resolution 1797 (2008) of 30 January 2008. This thesis furthermore refers for a more extensive documentation of the UN's presence in the DRC to: Xavier Zeebroek: 'The United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo: Searching for the missing peace, July 2008. FRIDE Working Paper 66.

[420] European Security and Defence Assembly, Assembly of WEU: 'European Union operations in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) - reply to the annual report of the Council'. Par 97 and following, 20 December 2006 (DOCUMENT A/1954). To be found on:http://www.assembly-weu.org/en/documents/sessions_ordinaires/rpt/2006/1954.php#P269_70469.

Before dealing with the content of the operation it is useful to good to bring forward the main aspects at the background of the Union's intervention that are of relevance for this paragraph. First of all certain member states of the Union have (direct/indirect) ties with the DRC.[421] The DRC was for example a former colony of Belgium and suffered from the spill-over effects of the conflict in Rwanda (a former colony of France). So because of these (historical) ties there is special attention for this region/country. Secondly the EU was willing to deploy military personnel in the DRC. In the previous chapter the importance of willingness was already underlined and it became clear that the EU was willing to deploy military personnel in the DRC. Especially the France government wanted to deploy an EU operation in the DRC, and combined wanted to show that the EU was capable to deploy an operation in such a problematic environment.[422] Furthermore the EU had the tools to deploy such an operation: well-trained and equipped military personnel were available.

Operation EUFOR RD Congo can be described as the first practical application of the concept 'Battle Group'. Because of the different approaches of the Union's member states it was not an EU Battle Group and more an ad hoc Battle group.
The European Union's engagement in Congo did not come as a surprise after the deployment of operation Artemis, EUPOL Kinshasa and EUSEC RD Congo. It was a matter not only of political coherence, but also of demonstrating the Union's ability to deploy its full range of civil and military crisis-management tools, whether political (the Special Representative) or economic and social (the Commission), pertaining to security (EUPOL Kinshasa) or to armed forces reform (EUSEC RD Congo), or of a military nature (EUFOR RD Congo).[423]

The operation EUFOR RD Congo was an autonomous EU-led operation and conducted in the framework of the ESDP. Operation EUFOR RD Congo was 'successfully' concluded on 30 November 2006.[424] In short we can say that the operations had as its main objectives to support MONUC, contribute to protection of civilians, and contribute to the protection the airport of Kinshasa. The commitment of the European Union was the deployment of an element in Kinshasa of more than 1,000 military personnel; the availability of a battalion-size "on-call" force over the horizon outside the country in Gabon, but quickly deployable if necessary.[425]

The Resolution of the SC states in paragraph 8 that EUFOR RD Congo is authorized to take al necessary measures, within its means and capabilities, to carry out the following tasks:
- To support MONUC to stabilize a situation, in case MONUC faces serious difficulties in fulfilling its mandate within its existing capabilities.
- To contribute to the protection of civilians under imminent threat of physical violence in the areas of its deployment, and without prejudice to the responsibility of the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
- To contribute to airport protection in Kinshasa.
- To ensure the security and freedom of movement of the personnel as well as the protection of the installations of EUFOR RD Congo.

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[421] Interview 7, 10 and 11.

[422] Interview 6.

[423] European Security and Defence Assembly, Assembly of WEU: 'European Union operations in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) - reply to the annual report of the Council'. Par 101 and following, 20 December 2006 (DOCUMENT A/1954). To be found on:http://www.assembly-weu.org/en/documents/sessions_ordinaires/rpt/2006/1954.php#P269_70469.

[424] Website of the Council of the European Union on the operation EUFOR RD Congo. To be found on: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/showPage.aspx?id=1091&lang=nl.

[425] IMPETUS, Bulletin of the EU Military Staff, Autumn/ Winter 2006, Issue 2, Progress and Achievements, Supporting African Capabilities. To be found on: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/IMPETUS2Final.pdf.

- To execute operations of limited character in order to extract individuals in danger.[426]

Other important documents in which the content and purposes of the military operations can be found are Council Joint Action 2006/319/CFSP of 27 April 2006[427], Council Decision 2006/412/CFSP of 12 June 2006[428] and Council Joint Action 2007/147/CFSP of 27 February 2007.[429]

Humanitarianism and realism

The UN involvement in the DRC is not easy to capture under international relation theories. Did the France government push for an UN operation or did UN organs and members of the SC are enormously concerned with regard to the gravity of the situation in the DRC. What is clear first of all is the seriousness of the situation in Congo. Because the DRC is a large country and has borders with many countries the importance of the country is irrefutable. Problems in the DRC were enormous from the committers of genocide in Rwanda that fled to Congo, to the armed groups controlled large parts of the countries, to the genocide and massive rape that took place. It would not be problematic to bring forward humanitarian considerations as the basis for military intervention. The UN, in several documents, clearly indicates the humanitarian problems. Furthermore the broad mandate point out several tasks and objectives to improve the humanitarian situation. The humanitarian purposes are given, yet what about the realist purposes? First of all it is important to look at the role of the France government; as this thesis brought forward the France government wanted to show the capabilities of the EU and wanted to be political present in Africa. The France government did not had direct historical ties with the region but the earlier mentioned fled from committers of genocide from Rwanda made the DRC also part of its concerns. Furthermore stability, instead of instability, in the DRC and the surrounding countries is of importance for every country.
The deployment of MONUC by the UN has as its background several humanitarian considerations at the same time the role of France and the interests of the SC in stability in the region can be brought forward

This thesis several times referred to the operation in the DRC and brought forward the presence of several interests for the EU member states. Historical ties of Belgium and France in the region and the country, interests in the forest of Katanga by Belgium, interest in energy of the France, the diplomatic interests of Belgium. Furthermore also the flow of refugees and illegal immigration can be mentioned as interests for the EU. Furthermore also the humanitarian considerations as mentioned, like genocide and insecurity, are part of EU's considerations. Yet when we take into account the mentioned interests and the presence of the EU in the DRC, which was short, limited and specific we can seriously doubt the importance of humanitarian considerations.

Division

When we take into account the information brought forward in this paragraph the division between the UN and the EU is in broad lines confirmed. In short we can say that that MONUC is deployed for a

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[426] United Nations - Security Council Resolution 1671 (2006) - Adopted by the Security Council at its 5421st meeting, on 25 April 2006 to be found on: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/Res1671_En.pdf.
[427] Council Joint Action 2006/319/CFSP of 27 April 2006 on the European Union military operation in support of the United Nations Organisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) during the election process.
[428] Council Decision 2006/412/CFSP of 12 June 2006 on the launching of the European Union military operation in support of the United Nations Organisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) during the election process (Operation EUFOR RD Congo).
[429] Council Joint Action 2007/147/CFSP of 27 February 2007 repealing Joint Action 2006/319/CFSP on the European Union military operation in support of the United Nations Organisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) during the election process.

long term, has a broad mandate, has many tasks, is a large scale involvement, and is maintained in the DRC irrespective of the intensity of the conflict. As explained also the geographical choice is a confirmation of the outcomes of chapter 3. Also in the operation EUFOR RD Congo confirmations of the assumptions of the previous chapters can be found. These are the short term involvement of the EU, the specific tasks of the EU, the limited scale of involvement and the limitation of tasks and objectives. Furthermore scale of the intensities during the election was not enormous high and the Union decided and deployed the troops rapidly. The geographical preferences of the Union are mentioned several times before in this thesis and finally the EU operations is an example of EU support to UN operations. With all this in mind it is fair to say that the operations deployed in the DRC confirm the outcomes of the previous chapters.

Chapter 5
Conclusion

5.1 Introduction
5.2 The four sub hypothesis
5.3 The United Nations guided by humanitarianism with regard to the deployment of military personnel?
5.4 The European Union guided by realism with regard to the deployment of military personnel?
5.5 Conclusion on the absence or existence of a division between the United Nations and the European Union with regard to the deployment of military personnel

5.1 Introduction

This chapter will give an overview the different aspects brought forward in this thesis and formulate and answer to the central question and hypothesis. Chapter 1 introduced the subject of this thesis, explained the theories humanitarianism and realism, introduced the merit of the debate and introduced the sub hypotheses. Chapter 2 provided the necessary background of the UN and the EU as well as the history and developments of peace and military operations. Chapter 3 dealt with four important aspects with regard to the two organizations involved in the deployment of military personnel. All four aspects are examined on the basis of a formulated sub hypothesis. Chapter 4 did put to the test the theories of humanitarianism and realism as well as the possible existence of a division by dealing with three cases in which military personnel were deployed. Before this thesis formulates a final conclusion it will continue by concluding on the sub hypotheses, and the role that the two theories play with regard to the deployment of military personnel by both organizations.

5.2 The four sub hypothesis

The first sub hypothesis dealt with the purposes and priorities of both organizations. The documents indicate that the UN pushed for a humanitarian role with their reference to collective security, the promotion of a safer world and the attention for humanitarian suffering in the DRC and Sudan. So a confirmation of the sub hypothesis that argues the importance of humanitarian objectives. At the same time it is important to keep in mind the broad scope of most UN documents and the undesirable situation in which an international organization like UN expresses realist purposes in their documents. The documents that indicate the purposes and priorities of the EU point out that the Union is more concerned with possible threats and the neighbourhood and effective multilateralism. Especially the threats and neighbourhood indicates the central role of the Union's own security. Furthermore the attention for economic issues indicates some form of egoistic worldview. This however let unimpeded the attention for humanitarian suffering throughout the globe. Already in paragraph 2.4 an important notion was brought forward that both organizations monitor the international situation with regard to peace and security. The UN clearly indicates that it looks at the root causes, the human rights situation, and the political developments while the EU is more concerned whether the situations needs EU involvement. This is not directly a case of realism versus humanitarianism but also a case of a more comprehensive organization. The UN is a large organization with many humanitarian organs that are communicating about problematic situations. The EU as smaller, regional organization has less experience, capabilities, and status with regard to these issues.

With regard to the geographical preferences it is important to mention that both organizations are concerned with the regions that currently need the most intention like Africa and the Middle East. This thesis brought forward the possible critics with regard to Haiti and the regional bias against Asia. If we state that the UN has geographical preferences it is necessary to keep in mind several other aspects that are part of the decision making process, like how much troops are available, where are internal conflicts located, are governments willing to cooperate and are troops qualified to do the job. That the UN, in their documents, explicitly refers to the Middle East and Africa is a confirmation of the sub hypothesis, because in a general sense the Middle East is an important region with regard to international peace and security and on the African continent human beings are suffering severely. The geographical preferences of the European Union are of course first of all the neighbourhood. In paragraph 4.3 this thesis explained the realist purposes behind this preference. That the neighbourhood policy is an outcome of the Union's own interests is clear yet it is also important to keep in mind that it is the most logical consequence of being a regional organization. Involvement of regional organizations in their neighbourhood often means fast deployment, confidence, and knowledge of the region. It would be strange when the African Union interfere in situations that take place in the Balkans while the European Union is also capable of deploying such operations. When we take a more specific look at the military operations of the EU it is not easy to deny the presence of EU or EU member states' interests. The security in the neighbourhood, the integration of countries into the European Union, the number of France soldiers present in the DRC and Chad, the historical ties, the problems with the sea lines in Somalia and so on. Like this thesis brought forward every decision to deploy military personnel is a case of willingness. When we imagine that the EU can get involved in many situations that need military personnel, a choice have to be made, and it is highly doubtable whether the Union will get involved in a higher degree in countries in which political and economical interests are absent. Throughout this thesis the existence and importance of the colonial heritage and historical ties, the flow of refugees and the possible interests in natural resources became clear. This however does not take away that humanitarian considerations are present and can trigger EU operations or contribute to the willingness to deploy military personnel. What is clear is the accuracy of the sub hypothesis that presumed the presence of economic, political and other interests within the geographical preferences of the EU.

In paragraph 3.4 this thesis dealt with the decisive factors to deploy military personnel. It was stated that all kind of concerns can trigger UN action and that humanitarian consideration are important for the deployment of military operations. But this paragraph also brought forward arguments that oppose the importance of humanitarian considerations with regard to the actual decision to deploy military personnel. The most important argument deals with the role that realism plays in the UN with regard to the decision making process and related; the necessary willingness of the SC to approve military deployment.
Not very different from the UN is the situation in the EU. The EU is dependent on the willingness of its member states. And quite similar, although not formal, is the willingness of the 'big three' (comparable to the P-5) to deploy an EU operation. With regard to the decisive factors of the Union to deploy military personnel it is easier to detect realist purposes than humanitarian once. The Union's starting point is its own accord: the Union's security, the willingness of the member states, the capabilities of the member states, and different other interests. So with regard to the sub hypothesis there are some strong indications that the UN is not above all guided by humanitarianism and realism is an important theory within the EU when we speak about the decisive factors.

After dealing with the decisive factors this thesis dealt with the characteristics of the military operations. Like stated before these characteristics when isolated cannot be used to confirm or deny the central hypothesis yet in combination with other issues they can. When we for example imagine large and complex operations that include human rights supervision, SSR, DDR, establishing rule of law, and police training it is easier to detect the humanitarian considerations; which are creating a stable and secure country/region that is able to protect humans and make development possible.

Small and specific operations can be used as contributing to these large operations or function as a short term additional strength. In itself small operation with small mandates and a limited number of tasks can be successfully concluded yet the question is whether civilians are best served with such operations. Protecting the city of Bunia in the DRC for a couple of months, supervise the sea lines in Somalia, does this solve the problems and the root causes of conflicts and problems? The Union clearly indicates that it is willing to deploy integrated operations yet at the moment the cooperation between military personnel and civilians and between the different components of operations is not sufficient. With regard to the civilian involvement the Union it is possible to state that there is more willingness for long term and broad involvement yet this thesis deals with the military component and here this long term and broad involvement is less visible.

5.3 The United Nations guided by humanitarianism with regard to the deployment of military personnel?

This part of the paragraph will first of all bring forward arguments against the assumption that the United Nations deploys military personnel for humanitarian purposes. Hereinafter the arguments in favor of the assumption will be brought forward. Also the answers of the persons I did interview will be brought forward.

The first argument that can be used against the assumption that military operations are deploy for humanitarian purposes is the internal structure of the United Nations. With regard to the deployment of military personnel the most important body of the UN is the Security Council. During the interviews it became clear that there was some hesitation to label the United Nations as an organization that deploys military personnel for humanitarian purposes. Often said is that although the United Nations has many tools at its disposal for humanitarian actions the military component of peace operations is less concerned with humanitarian considerations. Important to keep in mind is that the decision about the deployment of the military component is solely taken by the SC. Some participants state that the decisions of the SC are being guided by realist purposes, are a form of power politics, or are not really humanitarianism.[430] More concrete the permanent members of the SC are according to some not guided by humanitarian considerations and are more guided by realist purposes.[431] Examples of the absence of humanitarian considerations are the refusal to intervene in Zimbabwe and operation UNIFIL which cannot be described as a humanitarian operation.[432] Furthermore it is questionable whether the UN operation in Somalia which did not tackle the root causes can be labeled as an example of the guidance of humanitarianism.[433] What becomes clear is that there are always interests that play a role in the decision making process with regard to the deployment of military personnel. These interests will never be found on paper yet they are (sometimes) at the background of the decision.[434]

Within the SC the five permanent members (United States, Russia, China, Great Britain and France) have the possibility to veto. This means that in case one of the permanent members of the SC opposes the establishment of an operation than such an operation will not be deployed. Two examples to make this clear are the situation in Zimbabwe (2008) and Myanmar (2007). In both cases Russia and China vetoed the drafted resolutions. Adoption of a resolution does not automatically mean that there will be an operation deployed, yet vote against such resolutions means that the chance that there will be an operation is diminished. The consequences of such vetoes can be that in situations of massively human suffering the UN cannot deploy military personnel through a decision

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[430] Interview 5, 11, 12, 15 and 16.
[431] Interview 5 and 16.
[432] Interview 2 and 15.
[433] Interview 15.
[434] Interview 12 and 16.

of the SC.[435] This means that the United Nations with regard to the deployment of military personnel is dependent on the willingness of the permanent members of the SC and even of the non-permanent members, which also means that humanitarian considerations are not the only considerations that will lead to a deployment of military personnel.[436] Another argument against the assumption can be the existence of other purposes. Adam Roberts states that "*In some crises they adopted a response in the name of humanitarianism because they were unable to formulate, or to agree, substantive policies dealing with the fundamental issues involved. Nor does the emphasis on humanitarian aspects mean that there were no other purposes, interests or motives at stake. In each case there were*". Roberts point out three important once namely: Securing return of refugees, international peace and security, and credibility of commitments and/or demonstration of power. Hereinafter Roberts continues by stating that "*In many cases there may have been other interests at stake, encompassing the protection of fellow nationals, the protection of UN personnel from attack, the security of present or future investments, and the spreading of democracy*".[437] Another argument can be the regional bias of the deployment of UN operations. According to Gilligan and Stedman there is evidence of regional bias in the UN's selection of missions, in which the worst bias is against Asia.[438] This in itself does not prove the existence of realist purposes or absence of humanitarian purposes, explanations can be found in the development of regions, the occurrence of civil wars etc. Related to this regional bias is the question why the UN did interfere in certain countries like Sierra Leone, Mozambique, Somalia and Guatemala and did not deploy military personnel in Kashmir and Algeria?

There are also arguments in favor of the assumption that the United Nations deploys military personnel for humanitarian purposes. For the first argument references can be made to the research of Gilligan and Stedman. The research brings forward findings that support, or are not opposing, the assumption. First finding is that the more severe a conflict, measured by the number of deaths, the more likely the United Nations is to intervene. In line with this finding is paragraph 3.3 in which this thesis indicated that the UN is generally (military) involved in countries that have a high ranking on the failed states index or suffer from a high number of deaths and IDP's. Another finding in the research of Gilligan and Stedman is that there is no evidence that the UN intervenes more likely in countries with high primary commodity exports. And finding number 9 of the research is that there is no evidence that the UN intervenes in former colonies of the permanent members of the SC at a higher rate than it does in other countries. In their conclusion Gilligan and Stedman state that the UN is more sensitive to humanitarian missions than it is given credit for.[439] This paragraph already brought forward the article written by Adam Roberts and in this document also some arguments in favor of the assumption can be found. Roberts states that: "*Since the end of the Cold War there has been a strong trend towards identifying humanitarian considerations as a basis for certain military mandates and actions. This trend has been observed not only in armed conflicts, whether civil or international (for example, Bosnia and Sierra Leone), but also in situations of tyrannical or brutal government (Rwanda and Haiti), uncontrolled violence (Somalia and Albania), and the establishment of international forces to help implement a peace agreement (Kosovo and East Timor). Some of the*

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[435] Note: because the SC has the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security and not the sole responsibility peace operations can be deployed by the General Assembly.

[436] See for a more extensive elaboration on this subject: Bennis, Phylis: 'Calling the Shots: How Washington Dominates Today's UN'. New York: Olive Branch Press, 1996.

[437] Roberts, Adam. 'Humanitarian Issues and Agencies as Triggers for International Military Action.' *International Review of the Red Cross* Vol. 82 No. 839 (2000), pp. 673-698. To be found on: http://www.icrc.org/Web/Eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/57JQQA.

[438] Michael Gilligan and Stephen John Stedman: 'Where do Peacekeepers go', p.49. International Studies Review, Vol. 5, No. 4, Dissolving Boundaries, December 2003, pp. 37- 54. To be found on: http://www.jstor.org.proxy.ubn.ru.nl:8080/stable/3186392?seq=1&cookieSet=1.

[439] Michael Gilligan and Stephen John Stedman: 'Where do Peacekeepers go', p.53. International Studies Review, Vol. 5, No. 4, Dissolving Boundaries, December 2003, pp. 37- 54. To be found on: http://www.jstor.org.proxy.ubn.ru.nl:8080/stable/3186392?seq=1&cookieSet=1.

cases mentioned have had characteristics of several of these types of situation".[440] Furthermore Roberts bring forward nine crises in which humanitarian issues were referred to prominently in UN Security Council resolutions (Northern Iraq, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Somalia, Rwanda, Haiti, Albania, Kosovo, East-Timor and Sierra Leone).[441] So, humanitarian purposes and considerations are important for the UN with regard to military actions. Another argument can be found in the operation in the DRC; we might wonder what the interests of Pakistan, India and Bangladesh are in sending troops.[442] Is the decision to deploy troops in the DRC guided by realist or humanitarian purposes? We cannot say that the permanent members of the SC have mayor interests, not being humanitarian, in the DRC.[443] An interesting statements brought forward during the interviews was that the UN, because of its position, sometimes has no choice.

A final argument is the involvement of the UN in the development of the concept of the Responsibility to Protect. Dealing with this subject will go beyond the scope of this thesis yet what becomes clear is that the UN plays an important role on the international stage that is related to this subject.

That there is some hesitation is clear, yet what also became clear of the interviews is that the United Nations has a special role in the international stage.[444] When conflicts erupt, civil wars break out or states fail it is the UN that has its role to play. In contradiction to regional organizations like the EU the UN cannot chose a region, and cannot reject to get involved.[445] The UN has the primary responsibility with regard to the maintenance of international peace and security so every threat to the international peace and security should be dealt with by the UN. To find out whether the UN is guided by humanitarian purposes, realist purposes or a combination of the two it is important to notice this central role of the UN. In case the UN is solely guided by realist purposes it would mean that in case of a conflict in which the members (both permanent and non-permanent) have no interests at all, there will be no deployment of military personnel. An example in which military personnel were deployed while there was an absence of interests is the operation in East-Timor (UNTAET).[446]

Conclusion

The role of the UN on the international stage, the purposes and priorities of the UN, the geographical preferences of the UN, and the characteristics of the military operations deployed by the UN, seems to point in the direction that the UN deploys military personnel for humanitarian purposes. With regard to all these issues it is justified to state that humanitarianism is an important theory to describe the functioning of the UN. The hesitation to label the UN as an organization that deploys military personnel mainly for humanitarian purposes has above all to do with the decision making procedure in the SC. The role and power of the permanent members and the possibility to veto certain decision shows the friction between humanitarianism and realism. Although many documents, operations deployed, priorities, and preferences indicate the importance of humanitarianism we cannot conclude that the UN mainly or only deploys military personnel for humanitarian purposes. The role of humanitarian considerations in the decisions and resolution is not always as present as humanitarianism would suggest.

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[440] Roberts, Adam. 'Humanitarian Issues and Agencies as Triggers for International Military Action.' *International Review of the Red Cross* Vol. 82 No. 839 (2000), pp. 673-698. To be found on: http://www.icrc.org/Web/Eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/57JQQA.

[441] See for an extensive description of humanitarian interventions; Jennifer M. Welsh: 'Humanitarian intervention and international relations', Oxford University Press, 2004, p.81.

[442] Interview 9.

[443] Interview 9.

[444] Interview 2, 6 and 14.

[445] Interview 2 and 14.

[446] Interview 9.

5.4 The European Union guided by realism with regard to the deployment of military personnel?

This part of the paragraph will bring forward opinions in literature that deal with the existence or absence of realist purposes for the deployment of EU operations, furthermore also the outcomes of the interviews will be touch on.

As this thesis will bring forward there are many indication that realist purposes play an important role in the decision making process of the EU with regard to the deployment of military personnel. This however does not take away that there are some indications that also humanitarian purposes are important for the EU. An example of a document in which humanitarian considerations can be found is Article 11 of the TEU which state that objectives of the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy are: "*To preserve peace and strengthen international security in accordance with the UN Charter, to promote international cooperation, to develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms*". Furthermore the Petersburg Tasks, integrated in the Amsterdam Treaty and the ESS refer explicitly to emergency response of the EU in case of humanitarian crisis. Another indication that the European Union is concerned with humanitarian can be found in Bulletin of the EU military staff that states: "*EU has made further progress towards developing its military capability. As a basis for the Capability Development Process the following five illustrative scenarios have been used: Conflict Prevention (CP), Separation Of Parties by Force (SOPF), Stabilisation, Reconstruction and Military Advice to Third Countries (SR), Evacuation Operations (EO) and Assistance to Humanitarian Operations (HA)*".[447] The newsletter 'EU focus' states that: "*Whether close to home through such efforts as the Stabilization and Association Process in the Balkans or the EU Neighbourhood Policy, or through active leadership in Middle East peace negotiations or response to crisis in Africa, the EU is regularly at the forefront of efforts to make the world a safer and more secure place*".[448] Adam Roberts describes the attention for humanitarian considerations in general when he states that: "*Since the end of the Cold War there has been a strong trend towards identifying humanitarian considerations as a basis for certain military mandates and actions*".[449] Richard Gowan brings forward the following: "*The Congo crisis tested three widely proclaimed EU priorities: its partnership with Africa, its strategic support to the UN, and its belief in the need to protect the vulnerable*".[450] This last proclaimed priority indicates the existence of humanitarian considerations. A last indication this thesis will mention here is operation Artemis, according to Alexander Mattelaer: "*Artemis was mandated by the Security Council (UNSCR 1484) and executed in close collaboration with the blue helmets already on the ground. Moreover, it had clear humanitarian objectives; the official aim was to quell ethnic bloodshed in and around the town of Bunia*".[451]

Like stated before there are some strong indication that the EU mainly deploys military personnel for realist purposes. Hereinafter some important indications and remarks will be brought forward. In general we can say that every decision to deploy military personnel by the European Union is a

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[447] IMPETUS, Bulletin of the EU Military Staff: 'The Way Ahead', Spring/Summer 2006. To be found on: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/NewsletterEUMS_060424.pdf.

[448] EU Focus, European Security and Defense Policy, Working for a Safer World, January 2006. To be found on: http://www.eurunion.org/News/eunewsletters/EUFocus/2006/EUFocus-ESDP.pdf.

[449] Roberts, Adam. 'Humanitarian Issues and Agencies as Triggers for International Military Action.' *International Review of the Red Cross* Vol. 82 No. 839 (2000), pp. 673-698. To be found on: http://www.icrc.org/Web/Eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/57JQQA.

[450] Richard Gowan: 'Good Intentions Bad Outcomes', in E!Sharp, January-February 2009, pp.57-59. To be found on: http://www.cic.nyu.edu/internationalsecurity/docs/Good%20Intentions.pdf.

[451] A. Mattelaer: 'EUFOR RDC and the development of the ESDP' in Studia Diplomatica, the Brussels Journal of International Relations. Vol. LX, 2007, Number 3: Peace and Security in Central Africa; International Intervention in Africa; NATO and ESDP. pp. 73-89.

political one, which means that they are taken on the basis of political considerations.[452] With other words the military tool is in fact a political tool.[453] Furthermore the EU wants to play its role on the international stage. The described meetings in St. Malo and especially the one in Cologne (1999) point out that the EU leaders were determined that "*The European Union shall play its full role on the international stage. To that end, we intend to give the European Union the necessary means and capabilities to assume its responsibilities regarding common European policy on security and defence. (…) the Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and the readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises without prejudice to actions by NATO*".[454] The question remains what are the reasons that the Union want to play this 'full role' are they for strengthening the Unions position world wide (realism) or for the 'sake of humanity' (humanitarianism). As we will see it seems that at the moment these meetings took place the Union was more concerned with the former reason.

Article 11 of the TEU clearly indicates the importance of security for the European Union. "*The objectives of the common foreign and security policy shall be: to strengthen the security of the Union and its Member States in all ways*". Furthermore it is important to mention that Article 11 indicates that the CFSP has as its objective to safeguard the common values, fundamental interests and independence of the Union.

Gheorghe Stamate, in his article 'The Rise of the European Security and Defence Policy, or Back to Political Realism?' deals quite extensively with the ESDP and its relation with realism. In his article Stamate brings forward that realism remains to be the most influential theory to explain security and defence and that international organizations are subordinated to national purposes. Furthermore Stamate foresees a certain temptation for western European states to revert to power politics. Stamate continues by stating that the rise of the ESDP is viewed by many scholar of IR as a re-emerging power politics game in Europe, and in international relations. Two final remarks made by Stamate this thesis wants to bring forward are first of all that although the military security environment in Europe is improved (with some exception), the classic concern of strategy – the use of military force for political purposes – is the major concern for the foreign and security policy elites in much of Europe. Secondly the ESDP will remain a mixture between realism and constructivism, between national and European policies, between international security system consequences and EU security policy interests and actions.[455]

Before this paragraph continues, two authors that write something about the relation between the EU and realism will be brought forward. First of all, Francesco Ortoleva, who describes the shift of the foreign policy from a normative power to an identity constructed on traditional great power ideas.[456] Second of all Catherine Gegout who argues that realism is the best way to explain the policies with regard to Sudan, because no Member State is willing to take an EU position which goes against its

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[452] Catherine Gegout: 'Explaining European Intervention in Africa: Realism versus Constructivism' Paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, Town & Country Resort and Convention Center, San Diego, California, USA, March 2006. To be found on: http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p99065_index.html.

[453] Interview 7.

[454] EU Council Secretariat 'background': Development of European Military Capabilities: The Force Catalogue 2006, November 2006. To be found on:
http://consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/MilitaryCapabilitiesFC06backgroundNov06_en.pdf.

[455] Gheorghe Stamate: 'The Rise of the European Security and Defense Policy, or Back to Political Realism?'. To be found on: http://liu.diva-portal.org/smash/record.jsf?pid=diva2:19849.

[456] Francesco Ortoleva: 'From Normative Power to Great Power Politics: Change in the European Union's Foreign Policy Identity' *Paper presented at the annual meeting of the ISA's 49th Annual Convention, Bridging Multiple Divides, Hilton San Francisco,* March 2008. To be found on: http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p252497_index.html.

national interests. Furthermore Gegout shows the relevance of power politics for explaining the absence of military intervention in Sudan.[457]

The general view of most participants in the interviews is that realist purposes are more important for the deployment of EU operations than humanitarian purposes. This however does not mean that there are no humanitarian purposes detectable within the Union's foreign policy. According to some humanitarian considerations are part of the decision making process, or the decisions are a combination of interests and humanitarian considerations.[458] One participant formulated it differently by describing the combination between own interests and moral interests.[459] Furthermore several participants referred to the operations in the DRC and Chad to describe the influence of humanitarian considerations. With regard to the involvement of the EU in the DRC the answers differ, possible answers are: there are no real interests, there are no economic or security interests, and the involvement in the DRC is a combination of realism and humanitarianism.[460] Furthermore it is stated that both operations of the EU in the DRC and Chad have a glance of humanitarianism and the operation in Chad has a humanitarian framework.[461]
Interesting to mention are furthermore the humanitarian considerations within Germany with regard to the approval of an operation to the DRC, the preference of Nordic countries for humanitarian operations and the need of humanitarian considerations to trigger the deployment of military personnel.[462]

Can we describe the deployment of EU military personnel as being an outcome of realism, interests, and power politics? Every decision is a combination of several considerations, which can be political, economical, budgetary etcetera.[463] Interesting during the interviews were the notions that the documents of the European Union are hiding the interests behind operations, that decisions to deploy military personnel will never contain realist purposes and when there was more on paper with regard to the deployment of military operations the realist purposes will become clearer.[464] Furthermore it was several times stated that interests can be found everywhere, examples are economic interests (trade, natural resources), political interests (political presence, historical ties), or interests to stop the flow of refugees and illegal immigration.[465] When we for example look at the importance of the Neighbourhood for the Union's foreign policy it is quite simple to discover realist purposes like the stability in the region, safeguarding the security of the Union and the population, prevent the flow of refugees and so on.[466] The operations in BiH and Georgia clearly indicate the importance of realism with regard to the deployment of military personnel. Formally the operation in Georgia was a civilian operation and falls outside the scope of this thesis, but it is referred because a large sum of the civilian personnel deployed here had a military ranking.[467] This paragraph dealt with the operations in Chad and the DRC with regard to humanitarian considerations yet it is also important to look at these operations from a realist perspective. When we do so we can easily detect some realist purposes of the intervention in the DRC for example the interest of Belgium in the forest of Katanga and the interests of France in energy resources that will be found in the future (uranium

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[457] Catherine Gegout: 'Explaining European Intervention in Africa: Realism versus Constructivism' Paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, Town & Country Resort and Convention Center, San Diego, California, USA, March 2006. To be found on: http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p99065_index.html.
[458] Interview 1, 2, 4, 5, 12 and 14.
[459] Interview 2.
[460] Interview 5, 6 and 11.
[461] Interview 2 and 14.
[462] Interview 10, 11 and 14.
[463] Interview 10 and 11.
[464] Interview 5, 8 and 10.
[465] Interview 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 9, 11, 12 and 14.
[466] Interview 16.
[467] Interview 5.

and plutonium).[468] Furthermore the DRC is of interest because of the historical ties and the feeling of guilt (also with in mind the genocide in Rwanda). When we look at other countries in which the EU deployed military personnel we can say that Chad has oil, Somalia is important for the sea lines and Althea is because of before mentioned arguments of security of special importance.[469] This thesis brought also forward that the France government wanted to go to the DRC and also wanted to get involved in a large conflict to show the Unions (France) capacity.[470] According to one of the participants the humanitarian goals are even used as an excuse for the deployment of military personnel.[471] Another indication of the importance of realist purposes is the shift, in the early 1990s, of the Union from an organization that is providing a normative framework to an organization in which realism became important.[472] Finally this thesis wants to bring forward the opinion that the Union's development policy is actually the Union's foreign policy and a form of power politics.[473] Although the development policy goes outside the scope of this thesis it is interesting to note that the Union is granting development aid to countries in the Balkan, Egypt and Morocco and less to countries that need it more (LDC-countries).

Conclusion

The documents of the EU and especially the CFSP indicate more clearly the realist purposes of the Union and its deployment of military personnel. The importance of coping with threats and the Neighborhood clearly indicates the realist considerations behind the Union's foreign policy. This chapter clearly indicates several issues that indicate the existence of realist purposes like the importance of the Union's security, the role as global player, the references to economical issues, the role of France, and several other interests that play a role with regard to the deployment of military personnel. Also with regard to the decision making process it became clear that willingness was the most important aspect of military deployment. Without the willingness of the 'big three' or a coalition of member states it is impossible to deploy military personnel, even in case of enormous human suffering. Of course as brought forward there are references to humanitarian issues and considerations. This thesis will not say that these humanitarian considerations are only a camouflage of realist purposes, humanitarian considerations can be an additional reason to deploy military personnel and the Union is willing to interfere when human suffering takes place. The Union is a regional organization it can chose which operations they will deploy and willingness of the member states remains a necessary condition.

With regard to the EU it is fair to state the major importance of realist purposes for the deployment of military personnel. The presence of humanitarian considerations is less important in the decision making process of the Union's foreign policy.

5.5 Conclusion on the absence or existence of a division between the United Nations and the European Union with regard to the deployment of military personnel

This paragraph will conclude on the existence or absence of a division between the deployments of military personnel by both organizations and when this is the case whether it come up to the expectations of a humanitarian and realist organization. The expectations meant here are the involvement in humanitarian crisis, the deployment of large operations, the long term involvement and so on for a humanitarian organization and the deployment of military personnel only when there

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[468] Interview 9.
[469] Interview 2, 10, 11, 12, 14 and 16.
[470] Interview 6.
[471] Interview 6.
[472] Interview 11 and 16.
[473] Interview 1, 2 and 5.

are interests at stake for a realist organization. This paragraph will build on previous chapters and paragraphs because there already several indications are given.

Before this thesis will deal with the existence or absence of a division between the two organizations with regard to the deployment of military operations two general remarks will be brought forward. First of all it might occur that that one of the organizations is not very popular in a country or region or on the contrary is the only legitimate organization to act. An example is the initial refusal of the government of Chad to deploy UN military personnel. When one organizations is excluded this might indicate the existence of a division.
Secondly, both organizations are dependent on its member states, the decisions on the deployment of military personnel are taken by member states. In the UN this means that five permanent member states and ten non-permanent member states, in the EU this means that 27 states have to approve the deployment. Because member states have such an important voice within the decision making process it is more problematic to conclude which organization will deploy which operation. Therefore this thesis will conclude on the division on the basis of the characteristics of the operations, the behavior of the organizations, and the answers given during the interviews.

Now this thesis will bring forward several points that indicate the existence of a division between the UN and the EU with regard to the deployment of military personnel. The first indication is the importance of willingness for both organizations to deploy military personnel and the actual deployment of military personnel for long time.[474] The UN is as we have seen the organization that deploys long term operation while within the EU there is more caution to deploy military for longer periods. Second of all the position of both organizations is different. The EU can choose which military operations are being deployed while the UN, as the key actor with regard to international peace and security, is often forced to act (or at least under enormous pressure). Like we have seen in the previous chapter there is also a division visible with regard to the geographical preferences of both organizations. Although the EU states several times that it is dedicated to international peace and security the scope of 'international' is often limited to the neighborhood and Africa. The neighborhood is of special interest for the Union and Africa because of the mentioned interests, history and so on. The role of France with regard to the deployment of EU military personnel in Africa should not be underestimated. France wants to act under EU-flag and is also very influential in the Union's foreign policy. In the SC the role of France is more restricted by the presence of other large countries like the United States, China and Russia. Furthermore France has interests in Africa (energy) and there is a colonial heritage in Central Africa (France and Belgium). The operations in which EU military personnel was involved are limited to Europe (EUFOR Althea and Concordia) and Africa (Support AMIS II, Artemis RD Congo, EUFOR RD Congo, EUFOR Chad/RCA, EU SSR Guinea Bissau, and EU NAVFOR Atalanta).[475] The UN like we have seen cannot prefer one or two regions because of its position. The military operations in the Middle East (UNTSO, UNDOF, and UNIFIL), Europe (UNFICYP, UNMIK), Central Africa (MONUC, UNMIS, UNAMID, and MINURCAT), Western Africa (MINURSO, UNMIL, and UNOCI), Americas (MINUSTAH), Asia (UNMOGIP, UNMIT) are clear examples of the global view of the United Nations.[476] Furthermore it is crystal clear that the member states of the EU have, partly, other preferences and interests than the P-5 and the SC in general. The fourth point this thesis will bring forward is related to the third one (on geographical preferences) and deals with the Neighborhood/ Balkan.[477] The UN, and especially the USA, have more or less give prove that the Neighborhood is the EU's concern. This is especially important with regard to the involvement in the Balkans, with regard to Eastern Europe the EU has to take into account Russia.

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[474] Interview 2, 9 and 16.
[475] Council of the European Union: 'Overview of the missions and operations of the European Union August 2009'. To be found on: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/mapENaugust09.pdf.
[476] United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations: 'United Nations Peacekeeping Operations; background note of 31 July 2009'. To be found on: http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/bnote.htm.
[477] Interview 11 and 14.

The fifth indication of the existence of a division is the situation in which there is a large conflict or where there is involvement of states like the USA and China.[478] When there are broad interests at stake or one of the major powers is involved the probability that the EU will deploy military personnel (under EU-flag) is negligible.[479] Furthermore in certain situations like Kosovo, Bosnia-Herzegovina and the DRC, it is desirable that the UN, an international organization, takes the lead. The role of Russia in the case of Kosovo clearly indicates why the UN, instead of a regional organization, is preferred.

The following indications of the existence of a division will deal with the characteristics of the military operations deployed by the UN and the EU as described in paragraph 3.5. In short this paragraph brought forward that the most important characteristics of the military operations of the UN were the integrated approach, complex, large, more robust, and long term involvement. With regard to the regional organization this thesis brought forward the description of EU operations as being small, in number of troops, in objectives, and geographical area. Furthermore characteristics are short term, low risks, speedier, quality, flexibility and end stage. The previous subsection ended with the fifth indication, it is time to continue with number six and following.

The sixth indication is the possibility of rapid decision making and rapid deployment.[480] When situations occur that need direct involvement the EU has the possibilities to decide rapidly and deploy rapidly military personnel on the ground, for example by the deployment of an EU Battle group. A seventh point is the scale of intensity of the conflict / situation in which intervention is demanded.[481] The EU is more cautious to deploy military personnel in situations of high intensity. Again this can be linked to the notion that the EU can choose whether they deploy military personnel while the UN, because of its position, should also act in case of extreme violence.[482] Point number eight concerns the scale of the military involvement.[483] As we have seen the UN deployed several operations in which more than 7000 military personnel were active. When we compare these numbers of troops with the number of EU troops in the Balkans and Africa as given in Annex V we might conclude that there is something to say in favor of the assumption that there is some kind of division. Another point that can be brought forward is the differences between the tasks that are carried out by the military personnel. When we once again look at Annex I and II it becomes clear that the tasks of UN military personnel are mainly to observe ceasefire and separate forces, with other words observing and interposition also known as peacekeeping.[484] The EU is more carrying out tasks like stabilization, protection, and 'deterrence'.[485] The tenth possible indication that there is some kind of a division has to do with the quality of the military personnel.[486] The troops of the EU are better trained and better equipped than most military personnel that serve under the UN-flag. So the EU troops have the possibility to carry out specific tasks of which the UN troops are incapable of. The quality of EU operations can also be an outcome of the personnel's expertise in Africa. In combination with the tenth indication this thesis wants to bring forward two other points which are the deployment of specific operations by the EU and the deployment of military operations as an intervention force/ quick response (bridging) and as follow up operation.[487] With regard to both indications it is the UN that deploys the operation (large and long term)[488] and the EU role is to support this operation. This support can take place in an early phase, before the deployment of UN

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[478] Interview 5.
[479] Interview 15.
[480] Interview 5 and 16.
[481] Interview 2 and 10.
[482] Interview 10.
[483] Interview 2, 5, 9, 10, 11 and 16.
[484] Interview 12.
[485] Interview 2.
[486] Interview 14.
[487] Interview 9, 10, 14 and 16.
[488] Interview 10.

military personnel, in a problematic period, during the deployment of UN troops, or after the deployment of UN military personnel. So the EU supports the UN (or another organization) by carrying out specific tasks in specific periods. With other words the EU can be a temporary substitute for the UN.[489] There is a difference between the organizations with regard to structures, operations and personnel. These differences can be the period of decision making, the period for deployment, the quality of personnel, the quantity of troops available and so on. Because of these differences it might be useful to deploy intervention forces, have bridging operations, and additional strength for a limited period of time.

A last indication is one often brought forward in the interviews and that is the notion that there is a division 'by default'. Which means that there should not be a division, because the EU should be capable and willing to deploy military operations in all its aspects and in all situations yet this is not the case until now.[490]

This paragraph already brought forward that member states decide, so a clear division between the two organizations might be problematic to formulate. Another argument against the existence of a division is that every situation is unique. The situation decides whether an organization has to act and which organization will act. With other words it is unpredictable which organization will act, it is uncertain which activities have to be deployed, and it is unpredictable which interest will play a role in the decision making process. Another argument against the existence of a division is in my view the case of Lebanon. There is a need for an operation and initially the EU had the intention to deploy an operation. In the end, because of several issues (like the involvement of the Middle East) the military operation is deployed under the UN flag. Although 80-90% of the military personnel are EU troops, the operation in Lebanon is an UN operation.

This chapter clearly indicates that there are some clear indications that there is a division between the UN and the EU. Already in the chapter 3 on the geographical preferences and the characteristics the existence of some kind of division became clear. Brought forward are the position of the UN which has some consequences for their role in conflicts, the geographical preferences, the term of involvement, scale of intensity, the tasks and in general the deployment of military personnel. The role of the EU is different, not because of the initial intentions behind the EU yet more because of the developments, the public opinion, the willingness, the capacity, the own interests, the youthfulness and so on. There is something to say for the division 'by default'. Yet the question is whether it is really a matter of default when look the position of the EU as a regional position, the choice for short term operation, the geographical choices, the importance of the scale of intensity, the scale of involvement, the tasks and the role as supporter of operation. The EU in their documents and with their behavior until now clearly indicates which kind of military operations they want to deploy and which kind of operations they are capable of. This however does not exclude long term involvement of the EU, or broader mandates in the future. Because decisions are made ad hoc and the Union has a case-by-case approach there can be a shift of division.

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[489] Interview 9.
[490] Interview 2 and 11.

Annex I:

UN Peace Operations Mandates, 1948-1988[491]

Location/Country	UN Mission Acronym	Year Begun	Preventive Border Presence	Observe Cease-fire/Force Separation	Voluntary Weapon Control/DD&R	Refugee/IDP Relief/Return	Post-conflict Reconstruction	Other Civil Society Support	Peacebuilding - Good Offices	Observe/Certify Elections	Human Rights Monitoring/Reporting	Supervise/Conduct Elections	Police/Judicial Monitoring/Training	Police/Judicial Responsibility	Supervision of Civil Administration	Protect Humanitarian Relief	Protect Civilian Victims of Conflict	Maintain Safe/Secure Environment	Conduct of Civil Administration	Establish Safe/Secure Environment	Mandatory Weapon Control
Congo (Kinshasa)	ONUC	1960		X	X				X							X	X	X		X	X
W. New Guinea	UNTEA/UNSF	1962		X	X																
Cyprus	UNFICYP	1964		X																	
Lebanon	UNIFIL	1978		X																	
Israel/Egypt Lebanon/Syria	UNTSO	1948		X																	
India/Pakistan	UNMOGIP	1949		X																	
Israel/Egypt	UNEF I	1956		X																	
Lebanon	UNOGIL	1958		X																	
Yemen	UNYOM	1963		X																	
India/Pakistan	UNIPOM	1965		X																	
Israel/Egypt	UNEF II	1973		X																	
Israel/Syria	UNDOF	1974		X																	
Afghanistan	UNGOMAP	1988		X																	
Angola	UNAVEM I	1988		X																	
Iran/Iraq	UNIIMOG	1988		X																	

[491] http://www.stimson.org/fopo/pdf/peaceopsbr1001.pdf

Annex II:

UN Peace Operations Mandates, 1989-2000

Location/Country	UN Mission Acronym	Year Begin	Preventive Border Presence	Observe Cease-fire, Force Separation	Voluntary Weapon Control/DD&R	Refugee/IDP Relief Return	Post-conflict Reconstruction	Other Civil Society Support	Peacebuilding - Good Offices	Observe/Certify Elections	Human Rights Monitoring/Reporting	Supervise/Conduct Elections	Police/Judicial Monitoring/Training	Supervision of Civil Administration	Police/Judicial Responsibility	Protect Humanitarian Relief	Protect Civilian Victims of Conflict	Maintain Safe/Secure Environment	Conduct of Civil Administration	Establish Safe/Secure Environment	Mandatory Weapon Control
Somalia	UNOSOM II	1993	X																		
East Timor	UNTAET	1999		X																	
Kosovo	UNMIK	1999		X																	
Cambodia	UNTAC	1992		X																	
Haiti	UNMIH et al	1995		X																	
Slavonia(e)	UNTAES	1996		X																	
Sierra Leone	UNAMSIL	1999		X																	
Dem Rep. Congo	MONUC	1999		X																	
Bosnia, Croatia	UNPROFOR	1992		X																	
Somalia	UNOSOM I	1992		X																	
Angola	UNAVEM II	1991		X																	
El Salvador	ONUSAL	1991		X																	
Mozambique	ONUMOZ	1992		X																	
Guatemala	MINUGUA	1994		X																	
Angola	UNAVEM III	1995		X																	
Angola	MONUA	1997		X																	
Bosnia	UNMIBH	1995		X																	
Western Sahara	MINURSO	1991		X																	
Namibia	UNTAG	1989		X																	
Rwanda	UNAMIR	1993		X																	
South Africa	UNOMSA	1993		X																	
Central African Rep.	MINURCA	1998	X	X																	
Tajikistan	UNMOT	1994		X																	
Ethiopia/Eritrea	UNMEE	2000		X																	
Central America	ONUCA	1989		X																	
Kuwait/Iraq	UNIKOM	1991		X																	
Georgia, Liberia	UNOMIG, UNOMIL	1993		X																	
Chad/Libya	UNASOG	1994		X																	
Croatia	UNMOP	1996		X																	
Sierra Leone	UNOMSIL	1998		X																	
FYR Macedonia	UNPREDEP	1993		X																	

Annex III: decision making process in the European Union

The EU decision-making procedure

Annex IV number of military personnel deployed by the UN

2005 (30 September)[492]:

Region:	Troops/ Military Observers:	Percentage of total:
Africa	51,402	82.4 %
East Asia and the Pacific	15	0.0 %
Central and South Asia	57	0.1 %
Middle East	3,174	5.1 %
Europe	1,103	1.8 %
Central and South America	6,595	10.6 %
Total	**62,346**	**100%**

2006 (31 October)[493] :

Region:	Troops/ Military Observers:	Percentage of total:
Africa	54,587	75.3 %
East Asia and the Pacific	31	0.0 %
Central and South Asia	54	0.1 %
Middle East	10,147	14.0 %
Europe	1,017	1.4 %
Central and South America	6,652	9.2 %
Total	**72,488**	**100 %**

2007 (31 October)[494]:

Region:	Troops/ Military Observers:	Percentage of total:
Africa	50,263	68.6 %
East Asia and the Pacific	32	0.0 %
Central and South Asia	212	0.3 %
Middle East	14,687	20.0 %
Europe	1,033	1.4 %
Central and South America	7,060	9.6 %
Total	**73,287**	**100 %**

2008 (31 October)[495]:

Region:	Troops/ Military Observers:	Percentage of total:
Africa	55,786	71.4 %
East Asia and the Pacific	-	-
Central and South Asia	150	0.2 %
Middle East	14,154	18.1 %
Europe	1,019	1.3 %
Central and South America	7,009	9.0 %
Total	**78,118[496]**	**100 %**

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[492] Annual Review of Global Peace Operations 2006, a project of the Center on International Cooperation, briefing paper, p. 4. To be found on: http://www.cic.nyu.edu/internationalsecurity/docs/peacekeepingpdf_2006.pdf.

[493] Annual Review of Global Peace Operations 2007, a project of the Center on International Cooperation, briefing paper, p. 5. To be found on: http://www.cic.nyu.edu/internationalsecurity/docs/peacekeeping_BRIEFINGPAPER.pdf.

[494] Annual Review of Global Peace Operations 2008, a project of the Center on International Cooperation, briefing paper, p.6. To be found on: http://www.cic.nyu.edu/internationalsecurity/docs/Final2008briefingreport.pdf and http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/lib.nsf/db900sid/ASAZ-7RRCKK/$file/CIC_Feb2009.pdf?openelement.

[495] Annual Review of Global Peace Operations 2009, a project of the Center on International Cooperation, briefing paper, p.5. To be found on: http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/lib.nsf/db900sid/ASAZ-7RRCKK/$file/CIC_Feb2009.pdf?openelement and UN Missions Summary of Military and Police. Month of Report : 31 October 2008, to be found on: http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/contributors/2008/oct08_4.pdf.

[496] E-mail from Victoria DiDomenico, Project Officer, Center on International Cooperation and the previous mentioned UN Missions Summary of Military and Police.

Annex V: number of military personnel deployed by the EU

Military operations until 2006

Region	Started in:	Current end date:	Number of troops
Europe			
CONCORDIA FYROM	March 2003	Completed December 2003	350[497]
EUFOR-Althea	December 2004	Extended to November 2007	7000[498]
Africa			
ARTEMIS (Congo)	June 2003	Completed December 2003	1800[499]
AMIS II (support mission)	July 2005	Completed December 2007	2 MILOB's[500]
EUFOR RD Congo	July 2006	Completed November 2006	2300[501]

Military operations 2007:

Region:	Started:	Current end date:	Number of troops/MO:
Europe			
EUFOR-Althea	December 2004	Extended to November 2008	7000/ 2500*[502]
Africa			
AMIS II (assisting mission)	July 2005	Completed December 2007	2 MILOB's[503]

* Number of troops is reduced in February 2007

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[497] IMPETUS, Bulletin of the EU Military Staff: 'The Way Ahead', Spring/Summer 2006. To be found on: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/NewsletterEUMS_060424.pdf and EU Focus, The EU and Peacekeeping: Promoting Security, Stability and Democratic Values, November 2008. To be found on: http://www.eurunion.org/News/eunewsletters/EUFocus/2008/EUFocus-Peacekeeping-Nov08.pdf.

[498] Giji Gya: ESDP and EU Mission Update, ISIS Europe, European Security Review, Number 36, November 2007. To be found on: http://www.isis-europe.org/pdf/2007_artrel_77_esr36esdpmission-update.pdf.

[499] IMPETUS, Bulletin of the EU Military Staff: 'The Way Ahead', Spring/Summer 2006. To be found on: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/NewsletterEUMS_060424.pdf EU Focus, The EU and Peacekeeping: Promoting Security, Stability and Democratic Values, November 2008. To be found on: http://www.eurunion.org/News/eunewsletters/EUFocus/2008/EUFocus-Peacekeeping-Nov08.pdf and fact sheets which can be found on: http://home.aubg.bg/faculty/mtzankova/EUR%20405_Slides/ESDP%20military%20crisis%20management%20operations.ppt#2 .

[500] European Union, Council Secretariat, Factsheet, January 2008 (AMIS II/08). To be found on: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/080109-Factsheet8-AMISII.pdf.

[501] Fact sheets which can be found on: http://home.aubg.bg/faculty/mtzankova/EUR%20405_Slides/ESDP%20military%20crisis%20management%20operations.ppt#2 and EU Focus, The EU and Peacekeeping: Promoting Security, Stability and Democratic Values, November 2008. To be found on: http://www.eurunion.org/News/eunewsletters/EUFocus/2008/EUFocus-Peacekeeping-Nov08.pdf.

[502] Giji Gya: ESDP and EU Mission Update, ISIS Europe, European Security Review, Number 36, November 2007. To be found on: http://www.isis-europe.org/pdf/2007_artrel_77_esr36esdpmission-update.pdf.

[503] European Union, Council Secretariat, Factsheet, January 2008 (AMIS II/08). To be found on: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/080109-Factsheet8-AMISII.pdf.

Military operations 2008

Region	Started:	Current end date:	Number of troops:
Europe			
EUFOR-Althea	December 2004	Extended to November 2009	2500[504]
Africa			
EUFOR Chad/RCA	January 2008	Extended to January 2009	3700[505]
EU NAVFOR Somalia	December 2008	December 2009	1200[506]

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[504] Giji Gya: ESDP and EU Mission Update, ISIS Europe, European Security Review, Number 36, November 2007. To be found on: http://www.isis-europe.org/pdf/2007_artrel_77_esr36esdpmission-update.pdf.

[505] The initial deployment was 2800 troops see Giji Gya and Olivier Jacquemet: 'ESDP and EU Mission Update', ISIS Europe, European Security Review, Number 39, July 2008. To be found on:
http://www.isis-europe.org/pdf/2008_artrel_182_esr39-esdp-update.pdf and the full deployment means 3,500 troops: EU Focus, The EU and Peacekeeping: Promoting Security, Stability and Democratic Values, November 2008. To be found on: http://www.eurunion.org/News/eunewsletters/EUFocus/2008/EUFocus-Peacekeeping-Nov08.pdf.

[506] European Union, European Security and Defence Policy, Military operation of the EU: EU NAVFOR Somalia, December 2008, (EU NAVFOR/02). To be found on:
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/081208FactsheetEU_NAVFOR-v_2_EN.pdf.

Annex VI: Persons interviewed

Louise van Schaik (Institute Clingendael); Sven Biscop (Egmont Insititute); Gerrard Quille (Directorate General External Policies European Parliament); Michel Liegeois (University of Louvain de la Neuve); Xavier Zeebroek (Groupe de Recherche et d'Information sur la Paix et la Securité); Arthur Stam (Permanent military representative EU for the Netherlands); Antonio Missiroli (European Policy Centre); Giji Gya (International Security Information Service, Europe); Fernanda Faria (European Centre for Development Policy Management); Jo Coelmont (Senior Associate Fellow Egmont Institute); Antoine Rayroux (University of Brussels); Maria Derks (Institute Clingendael); Phillipe Barthlomé (did work for EPLO and now EU Relations Officer at Interpeace), Joaquim Salgueiro (European Commission).