# Regional Integrative Governance: Climate change, environmental justice and mobility in the Pacific Islands

Lou (D.M.) Remeter | January 31th, 2021 | Radboud University

# Colophon

This document is a thesis to complete the Master's in Environment and Society Studies at School of Management, Radboud University, Nijmegen, Netherlands.

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# Preface

**In front of you lies the master's thesis "Regional Integrative Governance: Climate change, environmental justice and mobility in the Pacific Islands" within the framework of my Mater's in Environment and Sustainability completed at Radboud University.**

**My interests in mobility and justice in the context of climate change have been strengthened by the education I received at Radboud University. Carrying out this thesis was made possible by the academic skills acquired in the course of the programme.**

**I want to thank my supervisor Pof. Dr. Ingrid Visseren-Hamakers for the guidance, advice and expertise I could enjoy. With extraordinary conditions of the COVID-19 pandemic, together we made the research possible.**

**Finally, I thank my loved ones and closest friends for believing in me.**

**May the reading be pleasant.**

**Lou (D.M.) REMETER**
**Nijmegen, January 31th, 2021.**

## Summary

Over the past century, global migration trends have remained stable. However, political salience on migration has intensified. Since the 1980s, human movement within the context of climate change has been problematised and the different discourses have an impact on the governance of climate mobility.

Although among the smaller emitters of greenhouse gas, the low-elevated developing Pacific Islands are at the forefront of climate change impacts. While displacement due to sea-level rise has already occured, only a few Pacifc Islands have implemented climate mobility policies yet. By applying the Integrative Governance framework, conducting interviews and attend webinars, this thesis answers the following:

"**How is the nexus of climate change - environmental justice - mobility issues being governed by governments at the regional level in the Pacific islands and how can this be explained?"**

As part of the sustainable development governance system, this thesis finds that there is a lack of regional governance of the nexus of climate change-EJ-mobility issues. First, this non-regime is explained by the fact that climate mobility is not considered a political priority. Pacific governments fear that it would push donors to solely invest in migration programmes and that industrialised countries would reduce their climate mitigation objectives. Second, Islanders often reject climate change as a mobility crisis and voluntary immobility is often perceived as a indidegenous strategy to climate change.

Therefore, it is recommended to further research the perceptions of the Islanders at the regional level in order to enhance regional cooperation and policy coherence. It would enable regional discussions to be extricated from the hegemonic discourse of labour migration as a climate strategy brought in by foreign actors. Pacific Islanders have to be considered in the political debate and future agreements must take into account the colonial history; the strong attachment of the Islanders to their land; and the central role of religion.



**Key words: climate change, mobility, environmental justice, Pacific Islands, regional integrative governance.**

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Image on the cover page: Sébastien Goldberg, Tongariro National Park, New-Zealand (Unsplash.com)

# Chapter 1. Introduction

## 1.1. Problem statement

Over the past fifty years, migration and questions of ethnicity have increasingly been politicised in what Castles, de Haas and Miller (2014:5) call "the age of migration". Although migration has historically been a normal reaction to natural hazards (Cattaneo et al., 2019), human movements in the context of climate change are being problematised (Wiegel, Boas & Warner, 2019). Since the 1980's, the main discourses on climate migration have represented migrants as victims or as adaptative actors. Furthermore, international agencies such as the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change have established a link between immigration and threats on states' sovereignty and military security. There is a widespread idea that climate change will trigger a mass climate migration with 200 million of climate refugees by 2050 (IOM, 2008).

Nevertheless, migration which occurs within the borders of a state is "far higher than international migration" (Castles, de Haas & Miller, 2014:8). In addition, scholars such as Boas et al. (2019) find that the concept of a mass climate migration is flawed because it is empirically not evident that climate change is the sole driver of migration. In order to encompass all spatial and temporal dimensions of human movements and to extricate migration studies from the victims or adaptative narratives, research should shift to climate mobilities rather than climate migration (Boas et al., 2019). The mobility paradigm, which captures the movements of people, objects, capital, knowledge, information and image (Urry & Sheller, 2006), allows to raise questions of justice that are mostly ignored in the hegemonic discourses on climate migration.

The Pacific islands have represented a site to research the impacts of climate change such as on migration (McMichael, Farbotko, & McNamara, 2018). However, these islands are usually represented as small, remote and vulnerable. In 1992, the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development recognised the Small Island Developing States (SIDS) as a group of developing countries which face unique economical, social and environmental challenges. In 1994, the Barbados Programme of Action was established by the UN General Assembly to address those challenges and was endorsed by all SIDS. However, the term SIDS may reproduce narratives from the Global North that make these islands remote and inherently fragile (Lee, 2009).

Although among the smaller global emitters of greenhouse gas, it is expected that the Pacific islands will suffer the most dire impacts of climate

change. Conventionally, the Pacific islands is the region of the Pacific Ocean which encompasses "three ethnogeographic groupings" of Melanesia, Micronesia and Polynesia but do not include Australia and the Asian-related islands and territories (West, 2020; Figure 1; Table 1). They are part of the Oceanian continent and are also called the small Pacific islands or the Pacific Island Countries. Because many of them are on low-elevated land and are surrounded by millions of square kilometers of ocean (Boncour & Burson, 2010), they are very sensitive to sea-level rise. Additionally, global warming intensifies extreme weather (Bell et. al, 2016), coral bleaching, land erosion which altogether exacerbate impacts of sea-level rise (Burns, 2000).

Displacement and relocation have already occured because of sea-level rise in Kiribati or Tuvalu (Boncour & Burson, 2010). Whereas Fiji, Tuvalu and Kiribati have implemented mobility policies in the context of climate change (McMichael, Farbotko & McNamara, 2018), many Pacific islanders reject the climate refugee discourse and many Indigenous communities remain voluntarily immobile (Farbotko & McMichael, 2019). By applying the Integrative Governance framework (Visseren-Hamakers, 2018a, 2018b), this thesis aims to better understand how the nexus of climate change - environmental justice - mobility is governed by governments at the regional level in the Pacific islands (Figure 1, Table 1). After mapping the governance instruments at stake, explaining their relationship will contribute to "understanding the impacts of climate change on [mobility] in the Pacific" (UN ESCAP, 2014, 3).




**Figure 1.** ***Map of the Pacific Islands in Micronesia, Melanesia and Polynesia.***
From "Global Climate Change Impacts on Pacific Islands Terrestrial Biodiversity: a review", by Taylor, S. & Kumar, L., 2016, *Tropical Conservation Science*, Vol. 9, Issue 1, 204, Copyright: © S. Taylor and L. Kumar.

| Ethnogeographic grouping | Islands |
|---|---|

| | |
|---|---|
| **Micronesia** | - Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands (unincorporated US territory)<br>- Federated States of Micronesia<br>- Guam (unincorporated US territory),<br><br>- Kiribati (considered Least Developed Country),<br>- Nauru,<br>- Palau,<br>- Republic of Marshall Islands |
| **Polynesia** | - Samoa,<br>- Tonga,<br>- Tuvalu (considered Least Developed Country)<br><br>- Cook Islands (self-governed territory of New Zealand),<br>- French Polynesia (French collectivity),<br>- Niue (Free association with New Zealand) |
| **Melanesia** | - Fiji,<br>- Papua New Guinea,<br>- Solomon Islands (considered Least Developed Country),<br>- Vanuatu (considered Least Developed Country) |

**Table 1.** ***Table of the Pacific islands included in this research***
*Reference*: My own elaboration with information from Taylor, S. & Kumar, L (2016) and Foster, S. (1998).

### 1.2. Research questions

The main research question is:

**How is the nexus of climate change - environmental justice - mobility issues being governed by governments at the regional level in the Pacific islands and how can this be explained?**

In order to answer this question, three sub-questions are articulated:

**Sub question 1:** The nexus is composed of which governance instruments at the regional level?

**Sub Question 2:** What are the relationships between the governance instruments in terms of synergies, trade-offs or neutral effects?

**Sub Question 3:** How the actors, discourses, institutions and systemic factors explain the relationship between the governance systems?

### 1.3. Societal and scientific relevance

Reming (2020) argues that there is a critical need to study climate mobility discourses at the regional level in the Pacific islands. Academic research often studies only a few islands from the Pacific region such as Kiribati, Tuvalu or Fiji (UN ESCAP, 2014) and often dismiss the Islanders' point of view. Therefore, this research links the debates of climate change, environmental justice and mobility at the regional level in the Pacific islands. It seeks to avoid reproducing the traditional discourses on climate migration. This echoes the call of Future Earth and Belmont Forum for input through their Collaborative Research Actions on "Human Migration and Global Change" in 2019. As a response to the current academic gaps, they recommend a human-centered approach to better understand how migration in the context of global climate change is a matter of injustice. Furthermore, this inquiry contributes to debates on integrative governance (Visseren-Hamakers, 2018a, 2018b). It attempts to provide a more complete operationalisation at the last step of the IG framework (see Chapter 2).

In addition to scientific contributions, this research is addressed to policy-makers and development actors involved in governing issues of climate change, mobility and environmental justice at the regional level in the Pacific Islands. There are:

> "significant information gaps in understanding the impacts of climate change on migration in the Pacific. Particular research needs include: the integration of climate change and migration policy" (UN ESCAP, 2014:3).

This research must provide sound policy recommendations and academic leverage points in line with understanding the reasons for the current state of the governance on climate mobility (justice). Finally, relationships of power in nationhood are rather reinforced by hegemonic discourses on immigration (Quinsaat, 2014). As contesting discourses enable to question those relationships (Quinsaat, 2014), this inquiry also provides alternatives to hegemonic discourses on climate mobility which may thus represent a source of knowledge for empowerment.

# Chapter 2. Theoretical framework

## 2.1. The climate change and justice nexus

Questions of justice and equity have emerged politically and academically as climate change has become a political matter (Bulkeley et al., 2013). Literature shows many accounts of **distributive justice** (e.g. Clough & Bell, 2016; Foster, 1998; Pope, Wu & Boone, 2016); **recognition justice** (e.g. Whyte, 2011; Martin et al., 2016); **participative justice** (e.g. Hofmann, 2018; Few, Brown & Tompkins, 2011); **racial justice** (e.g. Jampel, 2018; Sister, Wolch & Wilson, 2009); **critical justice** (e.g. Pellow, 2016; Pellow & Brulle, 2005); **feminist theory and ecofeminism** (e.g. Verchick, 2004; Verchick, 1996; Mann, 2011); **gender perspective** (e.g. Bell, 2016; Unger, 2004); **queer ecofeminism** (e.g. Gaard, 2004); **human-rights approach** (e.g. Hawkins, 2019; Sachs, 1996); and **climate justice** (Schlosberg & Collins, 2014; Schlosberg, 2012). While substantial academic work can be found, **environmental justice** (hereinafter written as EJ) remains the key one.

EJ is a praxis which means that social movement practices, policies and academic theories inform each other's language and definitions. EJ has a strong grassroot history that started in the US in the 1950's. The movement was carried by the black community, in majority from low-income households, who had been suffering unfair environmental bads. Two events mark the beginning of the movement although they have not originally been framed as such: the Cross Bronx Expressway project of 1948-1972 and the Memphis Sanitation Workers' Strike of 1968 (Berkley, 2011). Both events call attention to the issue of unfair distribution of environmental burdens, mainly on people of colour. Other academics trace the origins back in the late 1970's (Kelbessa, 2012) followed by important studies such as the landfill research of the US General Accounting Office in 1982 (Massey, 2004); the pioneer work of Bullard (e.g. Bullard, 1983) and the national-level study of the United Church of Christ Commission on Racial Justice (Mohai & Bryant, 1992). The history of the movement explains that the first accounts of EJ theory were framed by questions of inequity and race. As environmental racism became more apparent in studies (e.g. Mohai and Bryant, 1992), racism injustice was pushed "to the federal agenda by the early 1990s" (Holifield, Chakraborty & Walker, 2017:3). Later, the first generation of scholars merely documenting environmental injustice was followed by the "second generation" who "incorporate a deeper consideration of theory and the ways that gender, sexuality, and other categories of difference" are at stake in EJ (Pellow, 2016:223). More precisely, the demands from the EJ movement have

helped point out the theoretical inexactitudes (Schlosberg, 2004). Liberal theories such as the Rawlsian school of thoughts seek perfect justice (Schlosberg, 2004) rather than focus on what produces the inequities (Hunold & Young, 1998). Therefore, according to Schlosberg (2013), an accurate framework of EJ includes the plurality of justice, i.e. recognition, distribution and participation paradigms that I elaborate below.

Martin and Boersema (2011:148) explain "that recognition refers to the political struggle for the acceptance and respect for ''difference": different ethnicity, different knowledge system, different gender [...]". A misrecognized group or individual is a member of a society deprived from its right to participate in social life (Fraser, 1998) and it is a direct threat to indigenous survival and cultures (Schlosberg, 2004). For instance, the recognition paradigm in EJ can refer to information displayed in the proper languages so that all communities are aware of landfill and incinerators projects (see Whyte, 2017). It refers to the recognition of experiences and realities of people as well. Therefore, recognition is the starting-point of the EJ praxis and a prerequisite for distribution because "a lack of recognition of group difference" leads to inequities of distribution (Schlosberg, 2004:519).

The distribution paradigm entails the fair distribution of environmental risk (Schlosberg, 2004); the outcome of social structures and relations through practices, power or language within "institutional contexts" (Young, 2010). Regarding the distribution of hazardous landfills, Hunold and Young (1998) affirm that recognition *and* participation are crucial. They explain that maintaining the discussion around issues of distribution ignores who has the right to participate and according to which rules (Hunold & Young, 1998).

According to Schlosberg (2004:517), the participation paradigm concerns the "participation in the political processes which create and manage environmental policy". Contrary to some scholars who used the paradigms against one another, Schlosberg (2013) has argued that the paradigm of recognition actually reconnects with issues of distribution and participation in EJ.

The praxis of EJ has expanded in its application and is increasingly used as an analytical frame to analyse climate change (Schlosberg, 2013; Schlosberg & Collins, 2014). Schlosberg & Collins (2014) point to the Environmental Justice and Climate Change initiative in 2001, listing 10 principles of climate justice, and the aftermath of Hurricane Kartina in 2005 as the intersection of climate change and EJ. Echoing the early application of EJ on environmental burdens, the "African Americans and Climate Change: An Unequal Burden" highlighted that African

American would suffer disproportionately from climate change impacts (Schlosberg & Collins, 2014:362). As point of fact, outcomes of climate change are a result of a social construction: the impacts of climate change interact with the existing social institutions and structures and the inequalities resulting from these social objects enhance the vulnerability to climate change (Thiede & Brown, 2013). In addition to being "less responsible" (Schlosberg & Collins, 2014:362), the African Americans who suffer inequalities as a result of urban planning, governance, social interactions might be deprived from access to resilience and might be more vulnerable to climate change. Hurricane Katrina in 2005 reinforced this illustration since a lot of people, mostly from low-income and African-American households, were already more vulnerable than the rest of the population before the event. In turn, this higher vulnerability limited their capacity to stay and to protect themselves or their capacity to evacuate before the event. Therefore, the recognition, distribution and participation paradigms began to be applied on climate change as another issue of EJ.

Sometimes, when EJ is applied to climate change, scholars, activists and policy-makers forget that, historically, EJ is a praxis and that they should inform each other's language. However, it remains important to mention the main contributions to climate justice theory. First, Caney (2017) developed the human-rights approach to climate change impacts i.e. that climate change violates the most basic rights upon which we have already agreed (Schlosberg & Collins, 2014). The author argues that there is historical proof to applying a human-right approach to climate change with the "Principle 1 of the 1972 Stockholm Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment", "the Malé Declaration on the Human Dimension of Global Climate Change" as well as "the Human Rights Council of the United Nations" which "as passed a resolution" (7/23, 2008) on climate change impeding the enjoyment of human rights (Caney, 2017:70,71) (Table 2). The 2002 Bali principles of Climate Justice also apply an human rights and environmental justice perspective (Table 2). Furthermore, climate change mitigation is a demand for applying human rights (Moellendorf, 2015) since, if climate change isn't mitigated, the latter has impact on human health, access to food, water and security of livelihoods. Moellendorf (2015) refers to Article 25, Paragraph 1 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as well as the Article 11 of International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights who are designed to protect populations from the harms caused by climate change (Table 2).

| Date | (piece of) Document | Organisation |
|---|---|---|
| | **Article 25, Paragraph 1 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights** | |

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| **1948** | *"Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social services, and the right to security in the event of unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, old age or other lack of livelihood in circumstances beyond his control."* | UN General Assembly |
| **1966** | **Article 11 of International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights**<br><br>*"The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to an adequate standard of living for himself and his family, including adequate food, clothing and housing, and to the continuous improvement of living conditions."* | UN General Assembly |
| **1972** | **Principle 1 of the 1972 Stockholm Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment**<br><br>*"Man has the fundamental right to freedom, equality and adequate conditions of life, in an environment of a quality that permits a life of dignity and well-being, and he bears a solemn responsibility to protect and improve the environment for present and future generations. [...]".* | UN Conference on the Human Environment |
| **2002** | **Bali principles of Climate Justice** | An international coalition (e.g. *CorpWatch*, *Third World Network*, *Oil Watch*, *the Indigenous Environmental Network*) |
| **2007** | **Male' Declaration on the Human Dimension of Global Climate Change**<br><br>*"Noting that the fundamental right to an environment capable of supporting human society and the full enjoyment of human rights is recognized [...]" (1)* | SIDS |
| **2008** | **Resolution 7/23 on Human rights and climate change**<br><br>"Concerned that climate change poses an immediate and far-reaching threat to people and communities around the world and has implications for the full enjoyment of human rights" (1) | Human Rights Council of the UN |

**Table 2.** ***Historical overview of documents applying human-rights to climate change***

*Reference*: My own elaboration.

Applying human rights in the context of climate change directly refers to inequalities and vulnerabilities from which poor and marginalised people suffer (McInerney-Lankford, 2009). Additionally, looking at climate change through a human-centered lense helps to localise the global discussions on the every-day life experiences of people suffering the effects of climate change (Limon, 2009). Limon (2009) defends that a human-rights approach to climate change gives or amplifies voices of the poor, marginalized or vulnerable people - which echoes with the paradigms of recognition and participation of EJ. The author further suggests a framework of the climate impacts and their impacts on humans and the related implicated human rights (Figure 2).




**Figure 2.** ***Framework of impacts of climate change on humans and the human rights implicated***

*Reference*: "HUMAN RIGHTS AND CLIMATE CHANGE: CONSTRUCTING A CASE FOR POLITICAL ACTION", Limon, M., 2009, *Harvard Environmental Law Review*, Vol. 33, 476.

The discussion on human-rights raises questions on who is responsible and who should be providing justice for whom. In that respect, a historical responsibility approach and compensatory justice entail concepts of compensation and reparations for climate damage (Moelledendorf, 2015). In 1992, the UN Conference on Environmental and Development in Rio de Janeiro agreed upon the Common But Differentiated Responsibility (CBDR) (Epstein, 2007). The CBDR refers to the responsibility a nation holds to mitigate climate change depending on its contributions to climate change and its national mitigation capabilities. Therefore, the shared responsibility to climate change is acknowledged but is

contextualised notably in the dichotomy of developed and developing countries because "contribution to the degradation of global environmental resources" correlates with "high level of development" (Epstein, 2007). Similarly, wealthy countries owe a climate debt to poor countries (Pickering & Barry, 2012). Furtheremore, in the Carribean islands, a case for slavery and climate reparations is proposed because, often, Global North countries owe these compensations simulatenously (Sheller, 2020). In the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the Kyoto Protocol, the CBDR is associated with respective capabilities (CBDR-RC). The CBDR-RC is based on the distinction between developed countries that have an obligation to reduce their emissions whereas other countries do not have this obligation (Pauw, Mbeva & Asselt, 2019). However, this does not always reflect reality since, for instance, China has for long been considered a developing country yet ranks 2nd in global Gross Domestic Product per capita and was the largest emitter of greenhouse gas in 2019. The Paris Agreement has slightly improved the CBDR-RC distinction and the latter's interpretation can be found in the Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) (Pauw, Mbeva & Asselt, 2019). Notwithstanding an improved operationalisation, climate finance remains a major matter of justice. Finance is crucial to climate change policy in order to allow developed and developing countries to invest in low-carbon practices yet public finance is scarce and problems of fair and efficient funds distribution remain (Frankhauser et al., 2015). There is a lack of a clear definition on climate finance, however developed countries have agreed to reach US$ 30 billion of climate finance in 2012 and the commitment was raised to US$ 100 billion each year until 2025 after the Paris Agreement (Nakhooda, Watson & Schalatek, 2013). Finally, acknowledging that mitigation is a human right and climate finance remains a matter of justice needs to appear in adaptation and compensation policies (Moelledendorf, 2015).

## 2.2. The climate mobility and environmental justice nexus

### 2.2.1. An history of discourses

In the 19th Century, the Industrial Revolution modified the patterns of migration as it gave more possibilities for rural-urban and cross-border migration (Castles, de Haas & Miller, 2014). In the past decades, immigration has proved central to globalisation which in turn "has gained increasing political salience" (Castles, de Haas & Miller, 2014:5). On the continuum of discussions on migration, politicians, scientists, and international humanitarian agencies have given particular attention to the impacts of climate change on migration. Conceptualising migration and giving it legal frameworks depend on how the human movement is being framed hence the importance of understanding the different discourses.

In the 1980's, environment and migration was a "highly problematised" nexus (Wiegel, Boas & Warner, 2019). The earliest discourse, called alarmist, maximalist or pessimist, represents environmental migrants as "victims" in the need for foreign funding and assistance (Ransan-Cooper et al., 2015; Table 2). In 1985, the term 'environmental refugee' first appeared (Biermann and Boas, 2012) and its usage grew in the maximalist phase (Bettini & Gioli, 2015) associated with the idea that large groups of environmental migrants would threaten global security. The link between migration and security is called "securitization" (Castles, de Haas & Miller, 2014) also found in the climate security literature. Therefore, the securisation demarcates the discussion of environmental change and migration within the questions of the military and the sovereignty of a nation-state (Barnett, 2003). As Boas et al. (2019:901) mention, the securisation is even being reproduced by international institutions such as the "UN Security Council [who] warns of mass climate migration and the subsequent risk of aggravating conflicts". Myers (2002) argues that environmental refugees, "in their desperation", were 25 million in 1995, a "total number (...) [that] could well double by the year 2010". However, critics to the alarmist discourse disprove a mass climate migration because it is not proven that climate change is the sole driver of migration (Boas et al., 2019). Some methods used to forecast numbers of climate migrants and refugees often present gaps (McAdam, 2012). Scientific models are not capable to predict where, when and for how long a natural disaster may occur therefore it is difficult to determine the number of people who would be affected (Piguet, Pécoud & de Guchteneire, 2011). While the alarmist discourse draws a linear cause-effect relationship between climate change and migration, this relationship is rather multi-causal and complex (Wiegel, Boas & Warner, 2019). Furthermore, framing migrants as victims or refugees tend to deprive them from agency to adapt and reinforce a colonial perspective that the Global North can save the rest of the world. In general, the alarmist discourse undermines the protection of migrants and displaced people (Sajjad, 2018) because it dismisses the potential from states to plan migration, displacement and relocation in a fair way.

Overall, the alarmist discussion ignores the context in which migration might occur. Migration in the context of climate change most likely happens within the border of a state (Boas et al., 2019). The spality of human movement is as much important as the temporality. Rapid-onset events such as cyclones, rains and floods tend to provoke short-term and internal displacement rather than a long-term migration because affected individuals and groups are usually poor (Piguet, Pécoud & de Guchteneire, 2011). Furthermore, people often return to their home and as Piguet, Pécoud and de Guchteneire (2011) explain, in the aftermath of the Indian ocean tsunami in 2004, outsiders moved to help their

family or to work in reconstructing the damaged areas. The authors add that migration only occurs when the communities depend on their environment and that "social factors exacerbate the impacts of the disaster" as for the case of Hurricane Katrina (Piguet, Pécoud & de Guchteneire, 2011:8).

Despite the critiques, the climate refugee discourse remains very present in the academic and political spheres (Wiegel, Boas & Warner, 2019). For example, Harmann wrote for *The Guardian* in 2014 that climate refugees are the people seeking asylum because of sea-level rise and that a lot of climate refugees are expected. In July 2020, the New York Times published "The Great Climate Migration" which argued that an aggressive response to climate change would slow international migration. However, Biermann and Boas (2012) explain that the Global North might be in the better position to provide resources for adaptation and migration to the poorest and most affected regions of the world. It applies for the protection of refugees as well. The authors believe that multi-level governance is needed in the case of climate refugees and proposed a protocol for "the recognition, protection, and resettlement of climate refugees" (Biermann & Boas, 2012:294).

In opposition to the alarmist discourse, the idea that migration is an adaptation to climate change has emerged in the early 2000's. Migrants as "adaptive agents" through "labour migration" or "remittances sending" have gained academic and political salience (Table 3). Babagaliyeva et al. (2017) found that labour migration in Tajikistan is important and families are dependent on the money their relatives send from abroad. They explain that this money, the remittances, is often spent in fixing climate damages and is increasingly invested in small business, creating a possibility for "sustainable investments of [...] for a climate resilient future" with the proper policies (Babagaliyeva et al., 2017:28).

This discursive shift acknowledges that migration is not solely a negative consequence yet a way to climate change resilience (Barnett and O'Neill, 2012; Castles, de Haas & Miller, 2014). Black et al. (2011) introduce a framework "identif[ying] five families of drivers which affect migration decisions: economic, political, social, demographic and environmental drivers" in order to enhance the migrants' agency. Similarly, in the Foresight's report (2011), "drivers" at the macro level are likely to be influenced by environmental change which could result in migration or immobility at the meso and micro level of "decision" (Foresight, 2011; Figure 3). Notwithstanding the optimism, the adaptive discourse has also received critiques. It implies an obligation to move (McMichael, Farbotko & McNamara, 2018), pushes the responsibility of adapting on the affected people and questions of justice and equalities remain ignored (Wiegel, Boas & Warner, 2019).




**Figure 3.** ***Conceptual framework of drivers of environmental migration***
*Reference*; "The conceptual framework that has been used in this project, showing the 'drivers' of migration and the influence of environmental change" from "Migration and Global Environmental Change, Future Challenges and Opportunities", Foresight, 2011, 12.

More recent research has highlighted unequal structures of power (e.g. Baldwin, 2017) and has attempted to provide more grounded empirical evidence (e.g. Boas, Dahm & Wrathall, 2019). After framing migrants as victims, security threats and adaptive agents, Ransan-Cooper et al. (2015:111) identify a fourth frame, namely the migrants as "political subjects". The authors argue that this framing has received less attention as for the "lack of concerted and high-level institutional focus" (Ransan-Cooper et al., 2015). The narratives of migrants as political subjects are interwoven with conceptualisations of critical theory and justice:

> "While authors working within this frame may still see environmental migration as a possible welcome adaptation strategy (e.g. Bronen, 2011; Morrissey, 2012), they are interested, more broadly, in how socioeconomic, political and institutional structures constrain the way in which 'migration as adaptation,' as well as possible in situ adaptation, may become available and experienced (Wrathall et al., 2014)." (Ransan-Cooper et al., 2015:112).

Nevertheless, attention should be given on avoiding to romanticize bottom-up approach to political initiatives because it sees communities as homogeneous and unified and overlooks inequities (Ransan-Cooper et al., 2015). Applying this frame means that the emphasis on governance should also focus on local understandings "with emerging understandings of what empowerment means to different groups in relation to their mobility decisions" (Ransan-Cooper et al., 2015:112).

| Frames (signature policy recommendation) / Type of Actor | Victims (international protection & compensation for those affected) | Security threats (border protection & military preparedness) | Adaptive agents (labour migration, upskilling & remittances) | Political subjects (multi-scalar & constant bottom up participation in policy design & initiatives) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Academia/ Research** | Myers; Bogardi | Reuveny; Myers | Black; Warner | Morrissey; Marino |
| **Think-tanks** | New Economics Foundation (UK) | Council on Foreign Relations (USA) | Institute for Environment and Human Security (UNU) | -- |
| **Political leaders** | AOSIS; Nansen Initiative | John Kerry (USA, Secretary of State) | Anote Tong (Kiribati, President) | -- |
| **Government agencies** | -- | Department of State (USA) | Foresight (UK Government Office for Science) | -- |
| **International environmental organisations** | Friends of the Earth; Earth Policy Institute | IPCC | -- | -- |
| **International humanitarian or development organisations** | Christian Aid; GermanWatch | -- | IOM | Displacement Solutions |
| **Media** | Time Magazine (USA) | CBSNews (USA) | -- | -- |
| **National/Sub-national NGOs** | -- | -- | -- | Tulele Peisa (PNG); Shishmaref Erosion and Relocation Coalition (USA); |

Key:

| 1980s to Present | 1990ss to Present | 2000s to Present | 2010s to Present | Academia | Policy | Other |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|

**Table 3**. ***The different discourses on migration and climate change since the 1980's***

*Reference*; From "Being(s) framed: The means and ends of framing environmental migrants", Ransan-Cooper et al., 2015, *Global Environmental Change*, 108.

### 2.2.2. Mobility justice

About 15 years ago, the mobility paradigm was introduced as a result of social justice contributions being static in theorising and researching movement (Sheller & Urry, 2006). Mobility paradigm entails the physical movement by means of human movements or technology; movements of image and information through media; telecommunication and communication networks; immobilie structures that govern the movement of humans, information and image; state borders; spatial and relational mobility and immobility (Sheller & Urry, 2006:212). In other words, "machines, images, information, power, money, ideas, and dangers are on the move" (Sheller & Urry, 2006:221).

Automobility and transition to low-carbon societies were originally the main discussions in mobilities studies. It has evolved in understanding the role that mobility has in social institutions and practices and the role of power structures in governing mobility and immobility (Sheller, 2020). Mobility can represent an advantage in providing people with access to economic opportunities, networks or hobbies yet can be "differential" notably in the context of climate change where marginalised people become immobile (Cook & Butz, 2014). Therefore, there is a need for a transition towards environmentally sustainable mobility and justice mobility (Sheller, 2011).

It is important to understand that mobility research is "motivated by concerns of social justice, social change and social futures" (Sheller, 2020:11). The justice dimension is fundamental to the mobility paradigm which is thus a better approach to investigate human movements and inequalities in the context of climate change. The mobility paradigm takes distance from the static lens through which mobility is governed (Boas et al., 2018; Schapendonk & Steel, 2014) and it helps reconnect migration studies with the idea of 'immobility' that requires more policy attention (Foresight, 2011).

Sheller (2018:19) sums up the different concepts in the literature "**differential mobility**" (Frith, 2012), "**uneven mobilities**" (Sheller, 2015), "**motility**" or potential mobility (Flamm and Kaufmann, 2006; Kellerman, 2012), "**mobility capabilities**" (Kronlid, 2008), and **questions of power, justice and mobility rights** (Bærenholdt, 2013; Faulconbridge and Hui, 2016)". The author's work focuses on justice and liberal and neoliberal power, inequalities and colonial perspectives and draws on concepts of social justice which some are also used in EJ. Cook and Butz (2018) presents the typology of the different justice concepts at the intersection of mobility paradigm and social justice: "distributive justice, procedural justice, deliberative justice, restorative justice, environmental justice, epistemic justice, retributive justice, recognition".

Uneven mobilities as "histories and spatial formations divided by race, class, gender, sexuality, ability and nationality" (Sheller, 2020:12) were extremely real during Hurricane Katrina. As a matter of fact, race, socio-economic status and income played a major role in determining the evacuation strategies where many were forced to stay and fought for their lives or died (Thiede & Brown, 2013). As already mentioned earlier, the vulnerability and the resilience to natural disasters are socially constructed in interactions with pre-existing social structures and inequalities (Thiede & Brown, 2013). Thiede & Brown (2013) point out the lack of linking race and socio-economic status to evacuation behaviour in earlier studies in the USA. In other words, Sheller (2011) explains that uneven mobilities can be unravelled in embedded everyday life. Mobility justice is

multi-scalar. With a human right approach, injustice can be considered when movement to a country is constrained or impossible because of borders (Sheller, 2020). Additionally, seeking to reduce immigration by means of strict border-controls only increases irregular immigration as well as threats to migrants' security and lives.

### 2.2.3. Climate mobilities

Table 4 summarises the main categories of human mobility found in the literature. In this thesis, I will use the term climate mobilities which occur in the context of rapid or slow-onset events of global warming of temperatures, ice melt, sea level rise and extreme weather. There are several key aspects of climate mobility.

First, as aforementioned, climate mobilities happen rather internally or in short distance than internationally and long distance. In 2017, almost 71 million people were displaced in the world to flee violence, conflict or disaster, out of which 50.8 million are internally displaced people (IDMC, 2017). The spatiality of climate migration depends on money and knowledge people possess; on national and international frameworks; and on available options for migration. According to "the new economics of labour migration", the decision to migrate often takes place at the household level (Castles, de Haas & Miller, 2014:38). Furthermore, mobility of household members also depends on if another member has already migrated and thus on networks established.

Second, the temporality is another key dimension. In research as well as politics, there is a need for a more systematic use of temporal distinctions (Piguet, Pécoud & de Guchteneire, 2011). Climate mobilities can be on the long or short term, temporary or permanent. Long-term migration usually refers to a person who has moved for more than 12 months (UN Data, 1998); a short-term migrant is a person on the move for at least 3 months but less than 12 months (UN Data, 1998). A temporary displacement refers to a period inferior to three months (Piguet, Pécoud & de Guchteneire, 2011).

Voluntary or forced mobility is the third key aspect. For instance, Foresight (2011) makes a distinction between choosing to stay (immobility), being forced to stay (trapped populations), choosing to leave (migration) and being forced to leave (displacement). In the context of Hurricane Katrina, the poorest communities, often people of colour, didn't have the means to either protect their houses and themselves nor to escape. They are called trapped populations. Furthermore, it is common in the literature that displacement is used to describe a form of forced migration. In their knowledge synthesis, Foresight (2011:15) explains that "operational challenges" or "geopolitical challenges" may emerge from the displacement of millions of people in the context of natural

disasters, notably in the context of islands that may disappear and lose their sovereignty. Climate change seems to be a limit to mobility itself (Black & Collyer, 2014). However, the line between forced and voluntary is sometimes blurred and this notion in normative theory is sometimes problematic (Ottonelli & Torresi, 2013). In the context of climate mobilities, it cannot always be clear to what extent climate change has forced individuals to move or to stay.

The last key aspect is that of legal frameworks and policies. Knowledge, money as well as political context and legal options are determinant of mobility. Simultaneously, the way migration in the context of climate change is contextualised has impacts on how it is governed (McAdam, 2012). There is no consensual definition of climate mobility and there is no global legal framework on climate mobilities. Climate refugee is not a recognised category under the 1951 Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees to the climate status of refugees (Biermann and Boas, 2011; European Parliamentary, 2018). Actually, the UN Human High Commissioner for Refugees (2011:1) argues that the term climate refugee should not be used because it is "misleading". Although the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, the UNFCCC or the International Organisation of Migration either deal with refugees, climate change and/or migration, there is no official bureaucracy in charge of counting individuals involved in climate mobilities (McAdam, 2012). An issue remains: climate change and migration needs to be better investigated at the global level in terms of justice and human rights rather than in crisis terms (Bettini, 2017).

| **Category of human mobility** | **Definition** |
|---|---|
| **Disaster displacement** | "The movement of persons who have been forced or obliged to leave their homes or places of habitual residence as a result of a disaster or in order to avoid the impact of an immediate and foreseeable natural hazard" (p. 51). |
| **Evacuation** | "Facilitation or organization of transfer of individuals or groups from one area/locality to another in order to ensure their security, safety and well-being" (p. 63). |
| **Migration** | "The movement of persons away from their place of usual residence, either across an international border or within a State" (p.137).<br><br>*Environmental migration:* "A person or group(s) of persons who, predominantly for reasons of sudden or progressive changes in the environment that adversely affect their lives or living conditions, are forced to leave their places of habitual residence, or choose to do so, either temporarily or permanently, and who |

| | |
|---|---|
| | move within or outside their country of origin or habitual residence" (p. 31). |
| **Relocation** | "In the context of humanitarian emergencies, relocations are to be considered as internal humanitarian evacuations and are understood as large-scale movements of civilians, who face an immediate threat to life in a conflict setting, to locations within the same country where they can be more effectively protected" (p. 178). |
| **Resettlement** | "The transfer of refugees from the country in which they have sought protection to another State that has agreed to admit them – as refugees – with permanent residence status" (p.184). |
| **Return** | "In a general sense, the act or process of going back or being taken back to the point of departure. This could be within the territorial boundaries of a country, as in the case of returning internally displaced persons (IDPs) and demobilized combatants; or between a country of destination or transit and a country of origin, as in the case of migrant workers, refugees or asylum seekers" (p. 186). |

**Table 4.** ***Definitions of the different categories of human mobility***
*Reference*: My own elaboration with information from "Glossary on Migration", IOM, 2019.

## 2.3. Integrative Governance

Because many policies and rules at different levels of governance, these instruments influence one another whether they tackle the same issues or not (Visseren-Hamakers, 2018a, 2018b). The "debate on fragmentation has itself been rather fragmented" and recently, the Sustainable Development Goals have acknowledged the need for policy coherence to reach sustainable development (Visseren-Hamakers, 2018a, 2018b, 2015). In that respect, integrative governance (IG) enables to focus on relationships between governance instruments as the starting point for governance (Visseren-Hamakers, 2018a, 2018b). A very important advantage is that IG is suitable for interdisciplinary studies (Visseren-Hamakers, 2018a, 2018b). The integrated approach of IG actually draws on different theoretical perspectives such as pragmatism and "rational choice theory, institutionalism, constructivism, and critical theory" (Visseren-Hamakers, 2018a:5). Combining these different perspectives is rather very in line with pragmatic research (Moona and Blakc, 2014). Furthermore, IG bridges the gap between the many conceptualisations developed and used by scholars to study the instruments' relationships (Visseren-Hamakers, 2018b). Additionally, it seeks to find explanations to these relationships.

IG allows us to see climate change, mobility and environmental justice as a nexus of issues. Because connecting these issues makes research interdisciplinary by nature, the IG is suitable to unravel and understand how the

issues are being governed. In that respect, this thesis adopts the IG framework which analyses and practices IG (Figure 4). IG is defined as "the theories and practices that focus on the relationships between governance instruments and/or systems" (Visseren-Hamakers, 2018a:2). The original framework (Figure 4) is composed of three steps: 1) mapping the governance instruments and their relationships 2) the performance of the governance systems and 3) the explanations for the relationship and performance (Visseren-Hamakers, 2018a:5). It is said that the main contribution takes place at the last step in which one attempts to explain the relationships between and within the governance systems. Therefore, analysing and practicing IG enables us to pay the necessary attention to those relationships as well as to explain them (Visseren-Hamakers, 2018a).




**Figure 4.** ***IG framework***

*Reference:* "A 3-step analysis of the relationships and performance of governance systems" from "A framework for analysing and practicing Integrative Governance: The case of global animal and conservation governance", Visseren-Hamakers, I.J., 2018a, 5.

In this thesis, the IG framework is modified. The second step which focuses on the performance of the governance systems will be set aside. Because the research question reflects a gap in current knowledge, it is not known or evident at this stage of the inquiry what instruments or governance systems are involved. Therefore, focuses on step 1 and step 3 reinforces findings for the research question. Furthermore, there is a complexity in operationalising the IG framework that requires efforts for each step. Within the limits of the thesis, it is more relevant to simplify the framework in order to seek a complete answer to the research question. Eventually, the literature review has shown that justice is a central dimension to the mobility paradigm, however it is far less evident that

justice is central to climate mobilities. In that matter, the thesis may provide an answer in the case of the governance of the nexus of climate change, mobility and EJ by governments at the regional level of the Pacific islands. Nevertheless, applying the full framework and contributing to its operationalization are excellent opportunities for further research (Chapter 5).

The modification brought to the IG framework is motivated by inputs from Bliss (2019) to the application of the IG. Indeed, for their PhD research, the author has removed step 2 as there is a possibility it could hinder the answer to the research question. Figure 5 shows the framework adapted to the discussion above and presents the nexus of climate change, mobility and EJ issues as three distinct governance systems.




**Figure 5.** ***The IG Framework adapted to the research***
*Reference*: My own elaboration based on original framework by Visseren-Hamakers, I., 2018a and Bliss, C., 2019.

## 2.4. Operationalisation

Operationalising a theoretical model means that theoretical constructs are translated into measurable entities (van Thiel, 2014). There are three steps to the operationalisation: 1) defining the theoretical concepts; 2) determining variables which are the way the concepts are identified in reality; and 3) observing the values which are measuring the variable (van thiel, 2014:43,44).

| Concept | Definition | Variables | Value |
|---|---|---|---|
| **Relationship** | Institutional interaction (Oberthür & Ghering, 2006) in a pair of instruments sums up from instances of interaction (Visseren-Hamakers, 2018a:6). | - type of interaction<br>- main direction<br>- effect of interaction<br>- evolution of interactions | Nominal scale (qualitative score):<br><br>Trade-offs, synergies or neutral effects (within and among governance systems) |
| **Cluster of explanatory factors** | Constructs that draw on and reflect the different literature on governance and that, brought together, explain the relationship. | - a: actors<br>- b: institutions<br>- c: discourses, norms and practices<br>- d: systemic factors (contexts) | Nominal scale:<br><br>*Macro-level (large-scale social processes)*:<br>-political, economical, social, historical context<br><br>*Micro-level (small-scale interactions between individuals)*:<br>- resources, knowledge and power<br>- interests and perception of interests<br>- the role of rules and norms in defining social practices of participation and interactions among actors<br>- the role of hegemonic and non-hegemonic discursive narratives |

**Table 5.** ***Operationalisation of IG framework***
*Reference*: My own elaboration.

Table 4 gives an overview of the operationalisation of the IG framework used in this thesis. In step 1, I will map which instruments govern the issues of climate change, mobility and justice at the intergovernmental regional level in the PSIDS. A governance instrument is "public, private and hybrid policies and rules" and a governance system is "the total of instruments on a certain issue at a specific level of governance" (Visseren-Hamakers, 2018a:6). The author explains that a high level of abstraction is expected in analysing at different levels of governance which is allowed by grouping the instruments into governance systems. Following the mapping exercise is capturing the relationships between and within governance systems as first conceptualised by Oberthür and Gehring

(Visseren-Hamakers, 2018). The interaction is a cause-effect relationship between a source instrument and the target instrument (Oberthür & Gehring, 2006). The relationship can fall under one of the four following ideals: cognitive interaction (flow of information and knowledge), interaction through commitment (rules and norms committed to in the course instrument influence the target instrument), behavioral interaction (the behaviour change induced by the source instrument affects the target one) and interaction at the impact level (influence of one another's goal) (Oberthür & Gehring, 2006). The analysis should capture the main instrument relationships which will help to provide evidence for the summarization of relationships in and among governance systems (Vissenren-Hamakers, 2018). Finally, the idea is to put forward the main directions of the interaction; the effect the latter has in terms of trade-offs, synergies or neutral effects; and the historical evolution of the interaction.

In step 2, the framework allows us to explain the relationships between and within the governance systems. Visseren-Hamakers (2018a) proposes four clusters of explanatory factors which actually overlap: a) the actors; b) the institutions; c) discourses, norms and practices and d) the structures. The actor clusters refers to the main actors involved in the systems and to how their tangible, intangible resources, interests and perception of their interests influence the relationships of the governance systems (Visseren-Hamakers, 2018a:8). The institutions cluster refers to "sets of rules, decision-making procedures and programs that define social practices, assign roles to the participants in these practices, and guide interactions among the occupants of individual roles" (Young, 2002: 5 in Visseren-Hamakers, 2018a) and how they influence the relationships. Then, it is important to ask how the hegemonic discourses, norms and practices influence the relationships and finally how the societal structures of "discourses, power relations among actors, and institutions" together influence the relationships (Visseren-Hamakers, 2018a:10). Nevertheless, Bliss (2019) highlighted the operationalisation challenge regarding the lack of clear empirical application. Therefore, it is resolved by understanding that the actors, discourses and institutions in their context overlap and are embedded in the social, economical and political context in which relationships are being reproduced.

Finally, to answer the research question, step 1 will provide answers to sub-question 1 and 2 (Chapter 1). Instruments that govern climate change, mobility and/or EJ by governments at the regional level of the Pacific islands will be selected. It includes any instruments from intergovernmental organisations at the Pacific islands. Then, relationships will be determined by focusing on the content of the instruments and their date of implementation in order to determine if they support one another's political orientation. Step 2 will answer

the sub-question 3 and will focus on the cluster of explanatory factors. It means focusing on the actors involved at the regional governance of the nexus; on the role of norms and rules that have an effect on the governance such as history of institution power; on the role of discourses and practices such as the role of religion in shaping institutional interactions; and finally these three factors are contextualised in the large-scale historical, economical, social, political contexts.

# Chapter 3. Methodology

## 3.1. Considerations with regard to research philosophy

In the literature, the research philosophy entails the set of beliefs that underlies the research process (Creswell & Poth, 2018; van Thiel, 2014). These beliefs are categorised under four philosophical assumptions: ontology, epistemology, axiology and methodology (Creswell & Poth, 2018; Guba & Lincoln, 1994). In other words, a research paradigm respectively addresses "the nature of reality"; "how reality is known"; "the role of values" and "the approach to inquiry" (Creswell & Poth, 2018:35).

This thesis is conducted from a pragmatic approach which is often considered out of the classic paradigm systems (positivism, post-positivism, critical theory and constructivism). Contrary to the classic paradigms driven by philosophical assumptions, understanding a specific issue for practical outcomes drives the pragmatic inquiry (Visseren-Hamakers, 2018a). Moon and Blackman (2014) explain that all necessary approaches should be used to understand a research problem under pragmatism. Furthermore, a pragmatic inquiry enables to render "social sciences more relevant for policy practitioners" (Vissern-Hamakers, 2018a). The IG framework is by essence rather pragmatic because it aims to analyse and practice IG which will be used as the theoretical practical base to understand and explain the relationships in the governance and provide recommendations for its improvement (Visseren-Hamakers, 2018a; Bliss, 2019; Korthals, 2016; Creswell & Poth, 2018). Wright and Head (2009) argue that pragmatism is not a whole new alternative to understand governance yet it enables to challenge old regulatory mechanisms that might be poor in addressing current challenges.

The pragmatic ontology, or the nature of reality, implies that reality is "useful and practical" (Creswell & Poth, 2018:35). Visseren-Hamakers (2018a) argues that a pragmatic inquiry embraces a realist ontology. Structural realism (which accepts that structures existing around reality can change and thus change the nature of reality) and critical realism (which entails that it is impossible to perfectly understand reality because of human and mechanisms flaw) (Moon & Black, 2014) are both relevant to pragmatic ontology. Pragmatism in research philosophy considers dealing with facts, from which results take their importance yet acknowledges that there is not one truth because the latter is in constant evolution outside of the mind (Žukauskas, Vveinhardt and Andriukaitienė, 2018).

In the pragmatic epistemology, "reality is known through using many tools of research" (Creswell & Poth, 2018:35). Pragmatism draws on empiricism and rationalism (Moon & Black, 2014) and its epistemology embraces inter-subjectivity beyond objectivity (Visseren-Hamakers, 2018a). The pragmatic philosophy actually rejects the classical dichotomy of objectivism and subjectivism rather redirects the research to focus on both approaches (Kaushik & Walsh, 2019).

Then, the axiology in pragmatism refers to the values in knowledge that reflect on researchers and participants (Creswell & Poth, 2018). My positionality within the context of the research is therefore important to address such as gender, age or race as well as personal and professional beliefs (Creswell & Poth, 2018). Because this thesis addresses the governance of mobility issues, it is important to note that I am a French migrant who lives, studies and works in the Netherlands for more than two years. Furthermore, I am a white woman and I am very sensitive to challenges within sustainable development. In other words, I have been very sensitive to debates around gender, racism and animal well-being. Eventually, following a Pre-Master's and a Master's in Environment and Society Studies have been motivated by my personal convictions and in turn have shaped and framed my opinions about different public debates.

Finally, although pragmatism is a great perspective to justify mixed methods (qualitative and quantitative approaches to inquiry) (see Morgan, 2007; Onwuegbuzie & Leech, 2007; Feilzer, 2009), this thesis takes a qualitative research approach to data collection and analysis. Pragmatists argue that the inquiry should be contextualised to the social, historical, political, economical situations and focus on the practical implications of their inquiry (Creswell & Poth, 2018). A qualitative inquiry embraces "interpretive and material practices" to understand and transform the world and the final product is a "complex interpretation" that contributes to the literature (Creswell & Poth, 2018:8). The qualitative approach is suitable for this inquiry because it takes into account the perceptions of the participants and it both describes and explains the research problem. Often, a qualitative approach is inductive which means that data are collected and analysed to produce a theory. In this inquiry, the qualitative approach is further relevant because the existing IG framework can be modified to investigate the phenomena (Ang, 2014) and because the thesis findings contribute to the IG framework.

## 3.2. Research strategy

There are four research strategies: experiment, survey, case study and desk research (van Thiel, 2014). Because of the context of COVID-19, which has restrained many possibilities during the summer 2020, this thesis is a desk

research in most parts. Contrary to other strategies in which the researcher produces the data, a desk research implies that most of the data I have used have been collected or produced by other people such as previous research (van Thiel, 2014). Therefore, the main method used in this inquiry is the content analysis which means that I interpreted the content of pre-existing documents (van Thiel, 2014). However, I have combined interviews, which are a method often used in case study or survey (van Thiel, 2014), and webinars with methods of desk research.

Desk research is efficient, cheap and enables the researcher to collect the data without interfering with the situation: this has great implications for the validity and reliability of the research (van Thiel, 2014). It also means that the amount and the quality of the existing data are crucial to the practical implications of this pragmatic inquiry. Because a desk research implies that the available data is not always produced for the research, its content might not match the needs of the researcher. It is an operationalisation problem that requires the researcher to be "creative" (van Thiel, 2014:106). It justifies webinars as a source of data to be collected as well as a method for validity and reliability because it is a (indirect) call of expertise (van Thiel, 2014).

### 3.3. Methods of data collection and analysis

Here, the methods to collect data are presented. They correspond to how the research is actually conducted at the empirical phase. Collecting data occurred within the limits of the COVID-19 pandemic. Opting for desk research is a good alternative because it allows the use of pre-existing data. Nevertheless, it is itself a limit to a complete application of the IG framework because the latter requires gathering important data on governance actors, their interests and perceptions of their interests as well as the role of discourses and norms. As highlighted above, the pre-existing data might not always meet the researcher's needs. Therefore, I combined semi-structured interviews with content analysis. Internet browsers and tools of telecommunication such as Skype or Zoom were the main tools used.

Figure 6 gives an overview of the methods that were used at each stage of the inquiry. The methods are elaborated below. In practice, a deductive qualitative data often comprises the data collection, ordering and analysis yet an inductive inquiry is rather iterative (van Thiel, 2014). An iterative process indicates that while the data collection is carried out new ideas arise, which in turn feed the process of data collection and analysis. In some cases, the iterative process may change the initial methodology of an inquiry. The iterative process is particularly visible at the semi-structured interviews stage because the first interviews often shed light on new ideas or concepts that require to collect new

data which in turn may change the operationalisation of the following interviews. Furthermore, as literature review and content analysis are carried out, new findings may serve as inputs for more semi-structured interviews.




**Figure 6.** ***Overview of data collection and analysis involved at the four stages of the inquiry***

*Reference*: My own elaboration.

### 3.3.1.Literature review

In the literature review chapter, the researcher conducts an analysis of secondary data and presents an interpretation and gaps in existing knowledge (van Thiel, 2014). A traditional literature review is "a *re-view* of something that has already been written" (Jesson, Matheson & Lacey, 2011:9). A systematic literature review is a review that follows a method (Jesson, Matheson & Lacey, 2011:12):

1) Define a research question
2) Design a plan
3) Search for literature
4) Apply exclusion and inclusion criteria
5) Apply quality assessment
6) Synthesis

The authors further argue that a traditional literature review can be conducted with a systematic approach but a systematic review needs to address each of the

six points. In this thesis, a conceptual review (review of conceptual knowledge which contributes to the understanding of the issues) with a systematic approach was conducted (Jesson, Matheson & Lacey, 2011:12). Because the data gathered in the literature review allows for a model to be constructed (van Thiel, 2014), I suggest that the synthesis of the systematic approach includes the theoretical framework that is chosen by the inquirer (Lichtman, 2013).

Defining the research question was originally motivated by my personal interests in researching the links between climate change, migration and environmental justice. These interests are supported by my field of studies. After scanning the literature on aforementioned topics, I started focusing on the Pacific Islands. Precisely, I focused on the Nationally Determined Contributions of the different Pacific Islands (Annex). The NDCs tackle contributions to climate change mitigation, individually determined by countries. I thus conducted keyword research in the NDCs ("migration", "relocation", "displacement" and "resettlement"). These primary efforts enabled me to identify the different governments' position and to later detect the knowledge gap which exists at the regional level. The information in the Annex was collected during the literature review and provides background information (van Thiel, 2014).

Designing the research question led to defining a plan and to search for literature to be included in the final product (Jesson, Matheson & Lacey, 2011):

1) Nexus 1: climate change and environmental justice;
2) Nexus 2: climate change and mobility justice;
3) Nexus 3: mobility and environmental justice;
4) integrative governance.

The data was ordered manually. Furthermore, coding is central to the inquiry because it means that the researcher makes sense of the content they found (Creswell & Poth, 2018). A thematic coding was applied: parts of data were categorised into common ideas or themes. When no more new information was retrieved, it means that the collection of data was saturated. In the end, the final product is a synthesis of the literature review and introduced the IG framework which is the theoretical framework used for this inquiry.

### 3.3.2. Semi-structured interviews and webinars

Since answers to questions can be detailed, semi-structured interviews are conducted in order to specify and complement the desk research data. Holding semi-structured interviews aimed to cover the concepts found in the theoretical framework; to check the validity of my early findings; and to highlight new ideas or concepts. Therefore, the interviews were operationalised in line with the

theoretical framework: the guide was divided into two parts to respect step 1 and step 2 (Figure 5).

Sampling is a very important aspect to qualitative and interview-based research. Following the four-point approach proposed by Robinson (2014), the qualitative sampling method used in this research is summed-up in Table 5. Addressing the four points is a central element to the validity of an interview study (Robinson, 2014).

| Point | Name | Definition | Key Decisions |
|---|---|---|---|
| **Point 1** | Define a sample universe | "Establish a sample universe on inclusion and/or exclusion criteria" | Inclusion criteria:<br>- being an inhabitant of the PSIDS was taken into account<br>- actors involved at the regional level in the issues of climate change, justice and mobility<br>- academics and juniors involved in researching one or several of the issues of climate change, justice and mobility<br><br>Exclusion criterion:<br>- no knowledge or experience with any of the issues tackled in the thesis<br><br>The sample universe is therefore rather heterogeneous. |
| **Point 2** | Decide on a sample size | "Choose a size or range by taking into account what is ideal and practical" | Approximate size: 10 to 30 people. (NB: initial estimation at the beginning of research process within the time and resources limit which evolved along with the global pandemic circumstances) |
| **Point 3** | Devise a sample strategy | "Select a purposive sampling strategy to specify who will be included in the sample" | Stratified sampling:<br>- Categories of people to be included in the sample: 1) academics 2) regional policy-makers 3) international institution actors<br>- To reflect the interdisciplinary nature of the research<br>- Number: at least 5 people in each category as I sought equality in the number of voices heard. |
| **Point 4** | Source the | | - Online recruiting |

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| | sample | | - snowball sampling |

**Table 6.** ***The 4-point approach to the sampling decision process of the thesis***
*Reference*: My own elaboration with information from "Sampling in Interview-Based Qualitative Research: A Theoretical and Practical Guide", Robinson, O.C., 2014, *Qualitative Research in Psychology*, 26.

Given the COVID-19 context, the semi-structured interviews were held on Skype. They were recorded and manually transcripted. In order to analyse the transcripts, they were manually coded and a thematic coding was executed (van Thiel, 2014). Nevertheless, the size of the interview sample was not reached (Table 6).

| **Field** | **Organisation** | **Date of interview** |
|---|---|---|
| Academic | Wageningen University (Netherlands) | 20th November 2020 |
| Academic | Drexel University (USA) | 14th December 2020 |

**Table 7.** ***Interviewes***
*Reference*: My own elaboration

Several reasons can explain the lack of respondents. The pressures from the COVID-19 pandemic have totally re-shaped the original research I envisaged. First, in the course of year 2020, I did not have the opportunity to conduct an internship and therefore be able to widen my professional network and possibilities to contact people. In the end of 2019 and beginning of 2020, I had the chance to exchange emails with a contact from the United Nations' mission in Mali. However, the social and political contexts did not allow me to complete an internship there. Further intensive research did not turn out successful either. Second, I suggest that online interview recruitment might not be the most efficient method to reach out to people. Third, the two reasons evoked are interwoven with the pressures from the COVID-19 pandemic.

Notwithstanding the difficulties to conduct an internship and interviews, I sought to find alternatives allowing me to collect data. In March 2020, I contacted the Collaborative Research Actions on "Human Migration and Global Change" of Future Earth and Belmont. After a few-email exchange, it was settled that my thesis findings could serve their research and I would be informed of any research progress. However, after contacting the same person again in November, I didn't get any answer regarding the research progress and an interview invitation. Later, in August 2020, I had the chance to discuss the relevance and the theoretical framework of my research with Lothar Smith, Assistant Professor at Radboud University. It has enabled me to point out gaps in

my research proposal. Although dozens of emails, Facebook and LinkedIn messages were sent, in the majority of time I did not get any answer. Some people, in majority academics, informed me that it was not a good time for them; others engaged in a conversation to arrange an interview and suddenly stopped answering. I would say it was easier to reach out to academics than policy-makers, advisors, governmental actors. Point 3 (Table 6) highlights the willingness to reflect the interdisciplinary nature of this research. However, I argue that my interview sample does not meet this requirement.

Current global pressures require creativity. Simultaneously with actively seeking for participants, I attended webinars. These online conferences are more and more a part of our everyday lives and it was a great opportunity to receive information from multiple participants at once. During most of the webinars, it was possible to ask questions directly to a prefered recipient. However, it does not allow for an extended discussion contrary to interviews which enable the researcher to dive into details. Furthermore the researcher may operationalise the semi-structured interviews against the theoretical framework whereas it was not possible to shape the agenda of discussions taking in webinars whereas. Table 7 summarises the different online conferences which I attended. In some cases however, the webinars were not a solution. For instance, I was in contact with a UN staff member of the Pacific Climate Change and Migration - Human Security Programme (PCCM-HS) in order to schedule an interview. In the meantime, I sought a way to attend the regional discussion that governments started within the framework of the PCCM-HS. The interview could not be scheduled and the regional discussion turned out to be closed for external parties.

| **Date** | **Webinars and organisers** |
|---|---|
| 19th of November | "Virtual Regional Consultation on Disaster Displacement<br>"Managing risk and addressing disaster displacement:<br>Challenges, effective Practices and solutions in the Asia"<br><br>*By*: IOM, Platform on Disaster Displacement, UNDP Asia-Pacific, UNDER AP and UN Secretary General's High Level Panel on Internal Displacement |
| 24th of November | "Data and research on human mobility in the context of disasters, climate change and environmental degradation: Where are we and what comes next?"<br><br>*By*: the Data Knowledge Working Group of the Platform on Disaster Displacement. |
| from August to December 2020 | A series of five events: |

| | |
|---|---|
| | 1) “Laws and the Pandemic”;<br>2) “Local Humanitarian Action for a Resilient Pacific”;<br>3) “Expect the unexpected: the rainy-day-saving approach”;<br>4) “Serving a Public Good – The Pacific Regional Federation for Resilience Professional” and<br>5) “Stories of Resilience, Recovery and Solutions in Contexts of Internal Displacement”.<br><br>*By*: the Data Knowledge Working Group of the Platform on Disaster Displacement |

**Table 8.** ***Overview of the webinars***
*Reference*: My own elaboration.

### 3.3.3. Content analysis

Within an explanatory research, conducting a content analysis implies that the researcher analyzes contents of pre-existing data such as legal documents, previous academic research or articles (van Thiel, 2014). The thrust of this analysis is what the researcher seeks to convey (van Thiel, 2014). First, the researcher collects the documents. The literature review made at the first stage of the thesis was thus also useful for the content analysis. Then, it also means that another literature review was conducted in order to answer the research questions. While different ordering methods exist, both a narrative analysis which “focuses on identifying and analysing the stories that people tell” and a discourses analysis were conducted to produce the findings chapter (van Thiel, 2014:109).

## 3.4. Reliability and validity

As a pragmatic inquiry makes sense in the economical, political, social or historical contexts, internal validity is more relevant than external validity. The plausibility of the inquiry is made possible by the use of different sources because it prevents from working with incorrect sources. Furthermore, the thesis supervising process further ensures the internal validity and the reliability of the inquiry because it calls for peer evaluation and expertise (van Thiel, 2014). As mentioned earlier, the webinars also act as a tool for validity and reliability because it is a kind of call of expertise (van Thiel, 2014). However, it is also quite limited for the same reasons evoked earlier: there is less time available and no possibility to shape the discussion.

Reliability encompasses the “replicability or repeatability of results or observations” which is rather in line with quantitative research (Golafshani, 2003:598). It is far less evident for qualitative research because the findings reflect on the researcher’s interpretation and the participants' thoughts.

Repeatability implies that executing the research under the same conditions should give the same results. Interviews are a gap in reliability because other (and more) participants may have given different answers (van Thiel, 2014). However, participants were given similar constructed questions which ensures reliability. Thus, it makes sense to talk about comprehensibility which makes the qualitative inquiry repeatable (Van Thiel, 2014).

### 3.5. Ethical considerations

Four considerations are taken into account. First, no harm was done to the participants (van Thiel, 2014). The participants did not mention that the research could cause them problems. Second, I recorded and transcripted the interviews however, these information remain private. The anonymity of the participants is ensured in this thesis. Furthermore, the participants may withdraw at any moment. Third, the participants are aware of the purpose of the research as well as the fact that findings from interviews would be used in the final product. Interviewees are informed and have given their approval to participate. Finally, the fact that as much clear information as possible was given to the participants seeks to ensure that the interviews were not misleading.

# Chapter 4. Findings

## 4.1. Step 1 - Sub question 1

### 4.1.1. Climate change and EJ

As mentioned in Chapter 2, step 1 of IG framework (Figure 5) aims to answer sub-questions 1 and 2. First, the sub-question 1 "The nexus is composed of which governance instruments at the regional level?" is answered by mapping the instruments that governments use to govern the nexus of climate change-EJ-mobility issues at the regional Pacific islands.

In the Pacific islands, regional governance of the climate change-EJ nexus belongs to the larger sustainable development governance system. In that matter, the **Pacific Roadmap for Sustainable Development** (hereinafter as PRSD) is the key process which guides the achievement of the Agenda 2030 and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). It is composed of two parts. First, the draft implementation strategy entails planning and implementation of regional actions for sustainable development. The second part entails accountability. The first part is translated into five interlinked elements:

1) Leadership and coordination
2) Advocacy and communications
3) Regional priorities monitoring and set of indicators (**see the 132 Pacific Sustainable Indicators**)
4) Integrated reporting
5) Supporting the means of implementation.

The **PRSD** was prepared by the Pacific SDGs Taskforce and the Leaders of the Pacific Island Forum (PIF) endorsed it in 2017. The PIF is the regional premier political and economic policy organisation of the Pacific founded in 1971 and composed of 18 members: Australia, Cook Islands, Federated States of Micronesia, Fiji, French Polynesia, Kiribati, Nauru, New Caledonia, New Zealand, Niue, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Republic of Marshall Islands, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, and Vanuatu.

In the 132 Pacific Sustainable Indicators, the SDG 13 tackles climate change and makes reference to the Sendai Framework; the need for integrated policy to adapt to climate change and achieve climate resilience; climate finance; and external support for technology, finance and management with a focus on vulnerable people (Figure 7).


**Figure 7. SDG 13: *Climate Change and its targets***
*Note*: From "132 Pacific Sustainable Indicators", Pacific SDG Task Force, 2017.

The **PRSD** addresses issues of justice. In the 132 Pacific Sustainable Indicators, the SDG 16 tackles Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions with 7 targets. The target 16.7.2. is the closest to the participation paradigm as developed in EJ although without making a reference to the environment and climate change i.e. "Proportion of population who believe decision-making is inclusive and responsive, by sex, age, disability and population group". It would be therefore interesting to ask the proportion of the population who believe decision-making is inclusive and responsive in the context of climate change and climate policies. Moreover, the SDG 11, target 11.6.1.: "Proportion of urban solid waste regularly collected and with adequate final discharge out of total urban solid waste generated- by cities" echos with waste collection being documented as an EJ matter by the grassroot movement and academics.

The elaboration of the **PRSD** is itself framed by a justice discourse. It is shown by key narratives of recognition and participation in the introduction: "[the PRSD] is premised on the underlying principle of leaving no one behind" and "social inclusion" that are crucial to vulnerable and marginalised people for which climate change impacts might be increased by the interaction with social structures.

In addition to addressing climate change and EJ, the **PRSD** slightly addresses the mobility-EJ nexus. In the SDG 10, which concerns reduction of inequalities, the target 10.7.2 is: "Number of countries that have implemented well-managed migration policies". It can be seen as an application of the justice dimension which is central to the mobility paradigm. However, the extent to

which mobility and EJ are tackled is debatable because the 132 Pacific Sustainable Indicators do not specify the conditions under which migration policies are considered well-managed and thus reduce inequalities. Issues of inequalities in migration policies can be multiple: researching the role of gender in migration and addressing possible gaps; reducing human trafficking, irregular migration and providing safe migration options; providing equal access to mobility; land implications; etc.

The **PRSD** is the key process at the regional level because it is the outcome of a reflection on the complex development landscape in the Pacific islands. A multitude of regional actors are in charge of implementing sustainable development. Actually, they simultaneously have to respond to climate change and natural disasters, implement sustainable development and report actions (Figure 9) yet the administrations often have limited resources and capacities (Saili, 2019). For instance, there are more than 30 regional agreements and plans to mitigate climate change however the planning, implementation and monitoring are very uneffective (SREP, 2012). Overall, sustainable development regional governance is effective.

Furthermore, the PIF Secretariat acknowledged in 2015 that the implementation of the UN Millennium Development Goals (8 goals to be achieved worldwide between 2000 and 2016 to eradicate poverty, discrimination, environmental degradation) was unfinished. Therefore, the leaders of the PIF Secretariat fully agreed on the SDGs and, as they wanted to localise the priorities to achieve the Agenda 2030 and the SDGs, the Pacific SDGs Task Force was established, a "consultative and country-driven process" (Pacific SDGs Task Force, 2019:1; Figure 8) to prepare the **PRSD**.




**Figure 8.** ***The members of the Pacific SDGs Taskforce***
*Reference:* From "Leaving no one behind", Saili, C., 2019, 5.

*Note*: The CROP, Council of Regional Organisations of the Pacific, an agency of the PIF for coordination in the Pacific.

With the **PRSD**, lessons have been learnt in order to provide policy coherence on sustainable development - and thus climate change and EJ - at the regional level. The need to integrate the national, regional and global levels of reporting was necessary to lighten the burden of implementing, planning and reporting for the PSIDS (Nilon, 2017). The **PRSD** falls within a wide range of regional and national frameworks and aims to streamline reports of national and regional actions (Figure 9). What Figure 9 shows is that the starting point for policy coherence in sustainable development governance is at the national level. The different frameworks endorsed at the national level have to be implemented in the national policies. National policies themselves have to meet the goals of the **PRSD**, the Framework for Pacific Regionalism (FRP) and the Pacific Leaders Gender Equality Declaration (PLGED). Finally, the **PRSD** guidelines are in line with the FRP and the PLGED and inverse is all true.




**Figure 9**. ***Global, regional and national sustainable development frameworks in the Pacific islands.***
*Reference*: My own elaboration with information from Nilon, 2019.

### 4.1.2. EJ and mobility in the context of climate change

As aforementioned, the EJ-mobility is part of the larger sustainable development governance at the regional level in the Pacific islands. In the **PRSD**, a limited reference to mobility in the context of inequalities reduction is made. Regional

development actors “[express] doubt in the state of governance of [human mobilities in the context of climate change]” (Vinke et al., 2020: 74). No legal framework is implemented by governments at the regional level to govern climate mobility and EJ. However, cooperation is visible in disaster risk management within the **Framework for Resilient Development** (hereinafter FRD). The **FRD** is the only framework which addresses climate mobilities (justice) (Vinke et al., 2020; Corenda, Bello & Bryar, 2015) and was endorsed by the PIF Secretariat in 2016 for the period 2017-2030.

In 2016, the Pacific Communities (SPC) proposed the **FRD** which provides guidelines as “an integrated approach to address climate change and disaster risk management” (SPC, 2016:vii). The SPC is one agency of the Council of Regional Organisations of the Pacific (CROP), established by the PIF in 1988 to improve the regional intergovernmental cooperation, coordination, and collaboration and is the key regional scientific and technical organisation since 1947 and owned by 26 pacific islands. Therefore, the **FRD** was presented as a non-political document which means it was not motivated by nor concerned with politics rather a scientific product aiming to inform the different stakeholders involved in achieving a resilient development in the Pacific Islands. It was welcomed as the first of the kind to promote integrated approaches to address climate change and disaster risk management (Thomas & Benjamin, 2017) into sustainable and resilient development.

The **FRD** acknowledges that impacts of climate change exacerbate existing development issues and addresses the role of the public and private sectors in resilience-building. It evokes three goals:

1) resilience built on integrated adaptation in social and economic practices and risk reduction,
2) low-carbon development which is consistent with global, regional and national plans and frameworks and
3) strengthened disaster preparedness, response and recovery.

As the **FRD** highlights that grounded responses to climate change are interwoven with internal and external migration, it refers to the issue of disaster displacement and migration to be addressed by “national and subnational governments and administrations'' (SPC, 2016 : 15), by the civil society and by the private sector under the goals 1 and 3 mentioned above. Governments especially have to focus on protecting their communities including relocation and migration policies. Furthermore, the **FRD** is also framed by narratives of justice:

> “The FRD advocates for the systematic adoption of inclusive and participatory processes, which gather contributions across different stakeholder groups, women and men, and in particular the most vulnerable

members of society, which are all recognised as unique and powerful agents of change, to ensure that measures are not only effective but also equitable in meeting the needs of all members of the community." (Pacific Community, 2016 : 2).

We can also identify clear applications of EJ as presented in Chapter 2. "The systemic adoption of inclusive and participatory processes" concern recognising people, notably "the vulnerable members of society", and allowing them to participate so that the policies or rules are localised and represent the needs of the community.

An issue emerges from mapping instruments (Figure 10) that governments use to govern the climate change-EJ-mobility nexus because efforts are considerable in climate change mitigation yet the EJ-mobility nexus is hardly governed. The **FRD**, the only regional framework tackling mobility (justice) in the context of climate change, was endorsed by the PIF however it is not implemented yet. In that matter, a special task force of the Pacific Resilient Partnership was established in order to drive the implementation of the **FRD** (CROP, 2019). Different initiatives such as evaluating the framework were expected to be completed by the beginning of the year 2020 (CROP, 2019). Actually, the series of webinars hosted by the Pacific Resilient Partnership that I have attended were part of the ongoing implementation process of the **FRD**.




**Figure 10.** ***Map of governance instruments***
*Reference*: My own elaboration

### 4.2. Step 1 - Sub-question 2

To answer the sub-question 2: "What are the relationships between the governance instruments in terms of synergies, trade-offs or neutral effects?"", the IG framework focuses on the interactions between a pair of government instruments. The pair in this thesis is the **PRSD** and the **FRD** however the **PRSD** is a process, guidelines and the **FRD** is not fully implemented yet therefore also remains a guiding document.

The **PRSD** and the **FRD** are both part of the sustainable development regional governance and address issues of climate change-EJ-mobility. To do so, they focus on guidinding for coordination and policy coherence. They also have a common objective in streamlining the reports again the different sustainable development frameworks that are implemented in the Pacific islands. The **PRSD** and the **FRD** can be approached as pair. A key element of the pair interaction is the fact that the **PRSD** "remains a living document" which the Pacific SDGs Task Force reviews upon "lessons learned and [...] shifting priorities over the period to 2030" (Pacific SGDs TF, 2017). In other words, the source instrument **FRD** enables a flow of information or learning knowledge, idea or information (Oberthür & Gehring, 2006) feeding the ongoing process of revising the target instrument **PRSD**. Oberthür and Gehring (2006 : 35) provides an example of an adopted procedure under the Montreal Protocol which influenced the negotiations within climate change governance can serve as an analogy to our pair interaction. In fact, the SPC worked on an integrated approach in sustainable development and was first a non-political document (SPC, 2016). The **FRD** can thus be seen as a policy-model and can represent one of the processes upon which the Pacific SDGs TF will revise the PRSD (CROP, 2018). For instance, the information the **FRD** provides could have a direct benefit on precising the SDG 10, target 10.7.2. As I mentioned above, the reduction of inequalities through well-managed migration policies does not specify the requirements to be met to reach a situation of good management. Under their first goal, the priority action i)p) might help precise:

> "Integrate human mobility aspects, where appropriate, including strengthening the capacity of governments and administrations to protect individuals and communities that are vulnerable to climate change and disaster displacement and migration, through targeted national policies and actions, including relocation and labour migration policies." (SPC, 2016:15).

The priority action ii)i) tackles inclusiveness as well framed by a gender approach:

> "Build capacity of women and men to effectively participate in development of national and regional policies and agreements to such new and emerging issues as geo-engineering and forced migration." (SPC, 2016:16).

The cognitive interaction is further reinforced by the fact that bringing together the experiences and lessons from all stakeholders in climate change and disaster risk in order to reach the three goals of the **FRD** will heavily depend on "the establishment of good governance arrangements, and effective dialogue, communication and partnerships" (FRD, 2017: 3). Implementing the **FRD** at the regional level and enabling policy coherence from the national level already lie in in the reevaluation of the **PRSD** in collaboration with the Pacific Resilience Partnership. Indeed, the participants of the Pacific Resilience Partnership (PRP) at the inaugural Pacific Resilience Meeting in 2019:

> "[...] encourage the engagement of finance and planning officials in the efforts of the PRP to ensure that resilient development is embedded in national planning and budgetary processes" (2019, 6)

This point alone is directly connected to the SDGs 7, 13 and 17 and indicators 7.b.1 ; 13.2.1 ; 13.b.1 ; 17.7.1 ; 17.3.1. ; 17.14.1. ; 17.15.1 of the 132 Pacific Sustainable Indicators. Furthermore, actions need to be taken such as strengthening cooperation on climate change and disasters to build a resilient development especially through the FRD (CROP, 2018: xvii). As both the **PRSD** and the **FRD** are planned until 2030, the immediate effects of their cognitive interaction are beneficial because the guidance objectives of both instruments are going in the same policy direction. They share common objectives; they are framed with perspectives of EJ and they participate in the achievement of the same global agreements. This results in a "synergy" between the two instruments (Oberthür & Gehring, 2006 : 46).

The state of the synergy between the **PRSD** and the **FRD** logically depends on future implementation of frameworks and policies at the regional level. Furthermore, the nexus climate change-EJ-mobility might actually take the form of "a regional risk governance arrangement" (CROP, 2019:8). In August 2020, during the PRP webinars, intervenants such as Mr. Sumeo Silu, the Director of Tuvalu National Disaster Management Office, argued for the "multiple hazard approach" in the context of climate and disaster resilience (PRP, 2020:2). Promoting such an approach might drive the expansion of regional risk governance especially in the context of "COVID-19 and

Tropical Cyclones Tino and Harold and ongoing drought" (PRP, 2020:1). Table 9 sums-up the main characteristics of the **PRSD-FRD** relationships to answer sub-question 2.

| **Institutional interactions** | Pair: **PRSD** & **FRD** |
|---|---|
| **Type** | **Cognitive** |
| **Main direction** | **FRD** source instrument → **PRSD** target instrument |
| **Effect** | **Synergy** into sustainable development regional governance system |
| **Evolution** | In the future (after **PRSD** review and implementation of **FRD**): immediat synergy might result in a **risk governance system with multi-hazard approach** covering climate change-EJ-mobility nexus and other issues such as virus and diseases. |

**Table 9:** ***Interaction between the PRSD and the FRD***
*Note*: My own elaboration based on information from Visseren-Hamakers, I., 2018a & Oberthür, S. & Gehring, T., 2006).

### 4.3. Step 1 - sub-questions 1 and 2

The findings above help give a concluding step 1 framework. Currently, the climate change-EJ-mobility nexus is governed in the sustainable development regional governance system. The **PRSD**, the key process, mainly addresses climate change and the **FRD**, the only regional framework which addresses climate mobility (justice) is not implemented yet. Figure 10 shows the step 1 of the IG framework applied to the problem.




**Figure 11.** ***Findings of applying step 1 of the IG framework***
*Reference*: My own elaboration.

## 4.4. Step 2 - sub-question 3

### 4.4.1. Mobility is not a priority in the agenda

It is clear that the nexus of climate change-EJ-mobility is hardly governed by governments at the regional level in the Pacific islands. Although the **PRSD** does mention these issues in its 132 Pacific Sustainable Indicators, the emphasis in general is much more enhanced on climate change actions. The step 2 of the IG framework enables us to explain the relationship between governance instruments and systems however here, one governance system is at stake and one of the two found instruments, the **FRD**, is not implemented yet. Therefore, we are dealing with a "nonregime" because no regional framework dealing with the nexus is implemented (Visseren-Hamakers, 2018a:12). It implies that step 2 cannot be applied to explain the relationships within and among governance systems. Here, I apply step 2 in order to explain that the climate change-EJ-mobility is a non-regime. Overall, the main reason which explains the non-regime is that mobility is not perceived as a prior interest by regional actors in the Pacific islands.

***Actors (a)***

The most important regional actors in the sustainable development regional governance are the Pacific governments. At the regional, they have an interest in not placing climate mobilities at the top of the political agenda. Indeed, if they adopt mobility policies as a strategy to climate change, the Pacific governments fear that it would dismiss the obligation of industrialised countries to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions (Thomas & Benjamin, 2017). In other words, there is unequal power between the Pacific islands and large, industrialised countries notably in global climate change governance. The Pacific islands have been very active in asking immediat climate actions to protect their lands yet global governance has clearly been quite ineffective in drastically cutting emissions (Campbell, 2010). In order to have more power, state and nonstate actors in the Pacific have formed climate networks to work for the interests of the islands as a whole (Denton, 2017). Nevertheless, these networks are struggling between the global narratives on climate change that are rather technical and the local narratives of power and knowledge (Denton, 2018).

Because foreign donors support the funding of migration programmes as a response to climate change, these actors aim to reduce the compensations under the Warsaw International Loss and Damage Mechanism (Remling, 2020). In 2015, this mechanism, considered as a part of the institutions (b) in this thesis, was reaffirmed under the Paris Agreement and is the main institution dealing with losses due to climate change impacts such as loss on human mobility, culture diversity and indegenous knowledge (UNFCCC). In 2018, Vanuatu submitted a strong proposal to the Executive Committee of the Loss and

Damage as part of the call for submissions and provided a specification of "type and nature of actions to address loss and damage for which finance may be required" (Republic of Vanuatu, 2018:1). The Alliance of Small Island States have actively advocated the need for compensation to which Vanuatu participates (Republic of Vanuatu, 2018). The proposal includes strong recommendations for a finance mechanism of the Loss and Damage as well as a framework which clearly defines the losses and related costs and minimal financial flow (Republic of Vanuatu, 2018). Nevertheless, financial compensations are a very sensitive subject in the UNFCCC and when an island seeks to make a political case for climate compensation under the international law, it may even be wiser to not mention the Loss and Damage (Interviewee 1). Interviewee 2 agrees with this idea and explains that it was a total failure at the last round of international negotiations which is a direct result of the main discourses present in the Global North. Currently, the lack of data and the absence of a clear definition in the Warsaw Mechanism reinforces the fact that developed countries are very reluctant to the idea of compensatory mechanisms (Nand & Bardsley, 2020).

Eventually, while migration programmes are already being funded, the Pacific governments do not develop climate mobility policies because it rules out other strategies to be funded. For both state and nonstate actors such as the former Prime Minister and some citizens of Tuvalu, mobility is associated with the fear of losing sovereignty (Oakes, 2019). Sovereignty is the supreme power or authority of a state to govern itself or others. In the context of climate change, it is necessary to redefine the concept of sovereignty for it to become "a political act" that helps solve the current challenges of relocating communities for instance (Arcanjo, 2019). Barnett & Adger (2003) go further by incorporating sovereignty as a form of loss due to climate change and raise a question of justice because uneven climate burdens such as the loss of sovereignty and cultures for the Pacific Island cannot be calculated as other monetary costs of climate change.

***Institutions (b)***

While the absence of definition and agreement on Warsaw International Loss and Damage Mechanism might be very problematic in the future (Nand & Bardsley, 2020), the discussion in overall questions the efficiency of the state-centered approach of the UNFCCC and the management of climate funds. It is now acknowledged that developed countries have a bigger responsibility in climate change, notably through the CBDR, but providing justice through climate funds remains a critical issue to the UNFCCC. Additionally, the Pacific region appears to be a competitive market for fundings on human mobility, development and climate change because the islands are portrayed as a space

for experiences and studies through which organisations and agencies such as the ILO or the European Union can claim their leadership (Remling, 2020).

***Discourses, norms and practices (c)***

The role of discourses, norms and practices explaining the non regime of climate change-EJ-mobility is the biggest within the four clusters of explanatory factors. Historically, the discourses on climate mobility have emerged in the 1980's in the Global North (Chapter 2). However the discussion started much later in the Pacific region with, first, on the occasion of Oikoumene Pasifika 2009. The leaders from the Pacific Conference of Churches tackled the protection of resettled and forcely relocated communities in the context of climate change and signed the Moana Declaration. When regional development actors entered the debate, the interest in mobility and EJ in the context of climate change was thereupon framed by three main connected discourses. These discourses tend to reinforce that regional actors such as the PIF Secretariat and the SCP do not place climate mobility at the top of the regional agenda.

First, there is a dominance of seeing managed labour migration as an adaptation to climate change, a discourse supported by representatives of the International Labour Migration (ILO) and the PIF Secretariat (Remling, 2020:3). It echoes with the hegemonic global discourse which frames migration as an adaptation to climate change (Chapter 2). For example, the **FRD** suggests that regional actors provide protection to displaced people and migrations through national policies such as labour migration policy (SPC, 2016). The fact that the PIF Secretariat and the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) have participated in "the process for the development of the framework" (SPC, 2016:1) explain that the labour migration discourse is present in the **FRD**. Actually, regional actors defending this discourse are:

> "to some degree connected to an EU-funded project called the Pacific Climate Change and Migration Project 'Enhancing the Capacity of Pacific Island Countries to Manage the Impacts of Climate Change on Migration (...) implemented jointly by the UNESCAP, the ILO and the UNDP" (Remling, 2020:3).

The PCCM did not result in policies at the regional level but was present in 2015 when Kiribati and Tuvalu developed their national displacement policies (Remling, 2015). Recently, the governments of the Pacific islands have started regional dialogue in the context of the Pacific Climate Change Migration - Human Security (PCCM-HS) (IOM, 2020). Effective from 2019-2021, this programme witnesses a new inclusion of human security which is in line with the project donors UN Trust Fund for Human Security. The PCCM-HS aims to

provide a human-security response, to increase access to labour migration, to improve data collection and to provide a displacement, migration and relocation framework (IOM). It targets Cook Islands, Fiji, Federated States of Micronesia, Kiribati, Nauru, Papua New Guinea, Republic of the Marshall Islands, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu and Vanuatu. A draft response to the PCCM-HS process is expected by 2021-2022. In other words, the managed labour migration and human security discourses have emerged in the Pacific region because they have been brought by foreign actors such as the ILO and the UNDP (Remling, 2020). These actors have spread the idea that managed labour migration is the preemptive solution to the inexorable fate of the Pacific islands.

Currently, the PIF Secretariat and the PacificSIDS are building a human security case in order to enhance regional cooperation on making climate change and human mobility a political claim (Vinke et al., 2015). As it takes place in the framework of the PacificSIDS, it might legitimize the seruciation discourse in the Pacific drawing on the idea that SIDS are small, remote and vulnerable. Interestingly, the question of sovereignty loss is tackled by the Permanent Mission of the Republic of Nauru to the United Nations:

> "The nexus between security and climate change refers to the implications or obstacles posed by the adverse impacts that substantially interfere with the ability to maintain territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence." (2).

In the meantime, Pacific ambassadors representing the PacificSIDS reject the climate refugee discourse and aim for a "collective 'global vision for the future', centred on retaining territory, nationality and cultural identity" rather than the refugee narratives (McNamara & Gibson, 2009:483). Historically, the pacific islands have been represented as inherently fragile. In the 18$^{th}$ Century, flows of voluntary European migrants moved to what they considered empty and remote lands (Opeskin & MacDermott, 2009). In opposition to the Western perspective, Hau'ofa argues that the Pacific is a transnationalist region from which migrants are connected by the ocean because, for instance, human movements between Tonga, Samoa and Fiji already existed before the arrival of the Europeans (in Lee, 2009).

However, the labour migration is coherent with the fact that migration is in general considered based on socio-economic factors in the Pacific. Urban migration motivated by poverty or lack of employment is a crucial experience. In the meantime, policy-makers in the Pacific islands do not really make a difference between climate-related mobility and non-climate related mobility because both interact which in turn places socio-economic mobility at the top of the agenda instead of climate mobility (Vinke et al., 2020). In other words, an

infrastructure damage caused by erosion, itself driven and enhanced by climate change, which causes an issue of crop production would be tackled as an agriculture policy problem. Therefore, the solutions provided by these narratives prescribe that Australia and New Zealand should be the receiving areas of the temporary and/or circular (repetitive movement between home and working place) labour migration and that flows of low-skilled migrants can take existing channels (Remling, 2020). New Zealand is often presented as a country of immigration in the literature (Bedford & Poot, 2010). The socio-economic narratives draw on history and current patterns of migration. For thousands of years, human mobility has been central to the Pacific islands and their formation because people have fled overcrowded places or conflicts yet they remain very attached to their land (Vinke et al., 2020). In the late 18th Century, patterns of labour immigration in the Pacific emerged (Lee, 2009). Nowadays, urban economic migration is a very common experience in Polynesia whose outflow of population is the largest in the past decades (Voigt-Graf, 2015). The immigration is generally towards the Pacific Rim - a term which designs the lands situated around the Pacific islands - as "a response to real and perceived inequalities in incomes, education, training, socioeconomic opportunities, and health care" (Voigt-Graf, 2015:2). It is believed that circular migration schemes such as New Zealand's Recognised Seasonal Employer (RSE) scheme and Australia's Seasonal Worker Program (SWP) represent the best practices of temporary labour migration however the poor governance seems to hinder the benefits for development in the sending areas (Hugo, 2009). While ILO argues that with the right information Islanders can move (ILO, 2016), the temporary labour migration needs permanent investments and governance and its effectiveness depends on the context (Bedford et. al, 2017). ILO has argued that its project has "helped" the Pacific islands adapt to climate change through "voluntary and regular migration" and remittances of money but also knowledge and network which allow to achieve community resilience (ILO, 2016:1). Remittances are often presented as a solution to low development and opportunities for employment in the original countries (Browne & Mineshima, 2007). However, the current poor governance has created a dependence: remittances have become vital to the gross domestic product in a majority of the Pacifc islands (WHO, 2013) since it is sometimes the only source of income especially in Polynesia (Connell & Brown, 2005). Furthermore, migrants from the Pacific islands such as Samoa, Tonga, Cook Islands and Niue remain in their receiving areas despite a desire to return home might explain the strong resort to remittance (Connell & Brown, 2005). Additionally, there is unequal access to opportunities because, for instance, young unemployed inhabitants of Melanesian islands have not been able to benefit from labour migration (Voigt-Graf, 2015).

The second main discourse sees migration as a possible option but not the most important one for which representatives of the SPC argue (Remling, 2020). Here, the regional development actors do not agree with the "standard development theory" that describes the Pacific islands as small, very sensitive, vulnerable and not capable of responding (Barnett & Waters, 2016). Unlike a sense of vulnerability narrowed to their geographic characteristics, it is believed that the Pacific islands suffer a mix of socio-economic and political factors, globalisation and colonialism which tend to enhance vulnerability in some aspects. It is coherent with the idea that climate change might enhance the already existing social structures and institutions that create inequalities and unequal outcomes, which may be considered more important than climate change (Barnett & Chamberlain, 2010). Therefore, the solution provided in this second important discourse on climate mobility is to tackle the factors responsible for creating the Pacific islands' vulnerability enhanced by climate change without providing a labour migration option as a top priority (Remling, 2020). The third important discourse, largely defended by the grassroot movement, argues that climate change will have critical impacts on Pacific Islands and that although migration should be a last resort option, mobility opportunities should be planned ahead (Remling, 2020). With respect to planning climate mobility, Thomas & Benjamin (2017) explains it is necessary to adopt a preemptive approach to mobility rather than the current ad-hoc approach in a majority of the islands. Regional development actors who support this discourse may therefore provide solutions for matters of justice in climate mobility because planning options mobility enable concerned individuals to be included in relocation or migratory processes as well as to be protected when the movement happens.

***Context (d)***

The lack of regional governance on the climate change-EJ-mobility nexus is actually rather coherent with the key policy challenges that remain regarding climate mobilities. I would like to put aside the statement that "the South Pacific, therefore, provides a suitable lens through which to examine wider policy issues raised by migration in the context of climate change" (Burson, 2010:12) because the Pacific islands have long been considered as a place for academic experiments. However, Burson (2010:12) raises important questions which are relevant for climate mobilities policy:

"

- understanding the potential scale and patterns of climate change– related migration

- understanding the complexity and multi-causality of climate change–related migration
- managing climate change–related migration
- finding workable definitions and solutions under international law [and/or that could redefine international law]."

At the regional level, the political challenges are interwoven with knowledge gaps (UN ESCAP, 2014). The UN ESCAP (2014) highlights the necessity for information notably in having a clear understanding of the impacts of climate change, how they are perceived and experienced by the communities as well as in collecting data. The Pacific Catastrophe Risk Assessment and Financing Initiative aims to provide the Pacific Islands with disaster risk modelling and assessment tools and especially to integrate financial aspects into climate change and natural disaster with a collection of geo-data. Nevertheless, it is still a necessity to provide integrated models of disaster risk, climate change and mobilities. These gaps are explained by another research gap: studies usually focus on a few islands instead of enlarging scope to the regional level (UN ESCAP, 2014).

Nevertheless, the lack of governance is not a reflection of the national efforts. There is a gap between few islands who address climate mobility (justice) and the non-regime at the regional level. Some Pacific governments have implemented climate mobility policies and many have referred to disaster risk management policies in their NDCs (Annex). Fiji, Kiribati and Vanuatu are among the first countries to plan and implement migration and relocation policies in the context of climate change. In 2018, Fiji published the Planned Relocation Guidelines - "A framework to undertake climate change related relocation" for the government and other stakeholders. It guides in acknowledging planned relocation in the context of climate change and disasters and is framed by narratives of inclusiveness and gender-based participation of affected communities. Kiribati's government had considered migration towards Australia or New Zealand as a response to climate change (Interviewee 1). In its first NDCs, Kiribati mentions resettlement and migration in the context of climate change under the 2013 National Framework for Climate Change and Climate Change Adaptation. Furthermore, in 2018 Vanuatu presented its National Policy on Climate Change and Disaster-induced Displacement. Finally, the Republic of Marshall Islands has raised the question of resettlement in its second NDCs. In other words, a little number of the Pacific islands have acknowledged the reality of climate mobility. In general however, most of the Pacific islands have a legal framework regarding migration, mainly tackling labour migration (Corenda, Bello & Bryar, 2015; see also the PIDC Portfolio of Immigration Legislation). The Pacific

Immigration Development Community (PIDC) is a regional consultative process established in 1996 aims to improve the management of internal mobility and borders as well as to enhance coordination in immigration in the region. They mainly focus on migration legislation, data, irregular migration, governance in the region. The PIDC provides a disaster and immigration policy brief "Disaster response and the role of immigration No. 1/2010" that aims to answer three questions "Why is the role of immigration officers important in responding to a disaster? How do immigration processes hinder an effective response? And, what action should be taken now?". No mention to mobility justice or similar issues is made in the policy brief. Moreover, they consider that further information can be found with the "International Disaster Response Laws, Rules and Principles Guidelines".

Finally, the non-regime can be anchored in the broader context of the Pacific environmental management. Especially, there is a failure from governments to offer long-term solutions to climate change because effects of climate change cannot always be isolated from globalisation and practices in the last century. Although justice issues of climate mobility are not a very predominant matter in the discourses, justice is tackled by the Pacific region which is reflected through the Framework for Pacific Regionalism. Endorsed in 2014 by the PIF Secretariat Leaders, it is

> "Our Pacific Vision is for a region of peace, harmony, security, social inclusion, and prosperity, so that all Pacific people can lead free, healthy, and productive lives." (Framework for Pacific Regionalism, 2014:3).

#### 4.4.2. Pacific Islanders remain voluntary immobile

***Actors (a)***

As mentioned earlier, to gain authority the Pacific region forms climate networks of governance with state and nonstate actors (Denton, 2017; Denton, 2018). The non-regime of climate change-EJ-mobility is further explained by the fact that non-state actors, communities of the Pacific islands, strongly reject the climate refugee discourse and the mobility as a response to climate change (Perumal, 2018). The Pacific Climate Warriors, a young-led NGO who aims to inform and empower inhabitants in the context of climate change, claim "We are not drowning. We are fighting". Their message is very powerful: they travel across the islands in hand-made canoes to combat the fossil fuel industry and stop their project (world.350.org). In general, Pacific islanders do not agree with the victimisation generated in the climate refugee discourse as it does not align with their perception of dignity (Perumal, 2018). Additionally, the Pacific islanders in

general do not agree with the representation that they are vulnerable and incapable to participate in migration responses (UN ESCAP, 2014). As Foresight (2011) prescribes to focus on immobility and scholars call for studies which approach the islanders' perspective, there is a need to understand and incorporate the local perceptions of climate change and mobility into policy-making. In Tuvalu, inhabitants denied that climate change is a mobility crisis (McMichael, Farbotko & McNamara, 2018). McMichael, Farbotko and McNamara (2018) explain that Tuvaluans perceive climate change as a threat to their culture and do not see migration as the main response as they'd rather opt for in-situ adaptation or even be prepared to die on their land. In addition to immobility, Tuvaluans express a "neg[ation to] the need for migration policies or protection as a refugee" because, similarly to the Pacific governments, it does not meet their main requests for greenhouse gas emissions or for climate fundings (Perumal, 2018:51). The authors argue that the "voluntary immobility can be interpreted as an important indigenous adaptation strategy" (McMichael, Farbotko & McNamara, 2018:8). As mentioned earlier, the climate networks in the Pacific struggle with a global technical narrative and local power narratives on climate change. The high "scientization" of knowledge around climate change hinders the local capacity to intervene: mobility studies and policies should draw on local and indegenous knowledge (McAdam, 2012:33).

***Discourses, norms and practices* (c)**

Actually, it is very important to understand that the islanders' cultural identity is tied to their land and environment. Losing their land is often perceived as the worst thing that could happen to them (UN ESCAP, 2014). Therefore, rejecting the migration discourse all together is interwoven with issues of land in the process of being mobile (Tabe, 2019). According to Interviewee 2, access to land and food is a mobility justice matter. Indeed, as the relationship between the Islanders and nature is "mutually constitutive" and the land is "mutually held" (Campbell, 2019:5), there is an issue of legally providing land for communities who migrate or relocate so as to maintain their identity and practices during the mobility process (Tabe, 2019). The case of Vanuatu is very relevant. "Vanuatu" means "our land forever" in the majority of Melanesian languages used (Foster, 1999). For Kiribati, the former President Anote Tong from 2003-2015 implemented adaptive strategies to climate change and adopted a migration approach (Hermann & Kempf, 2017). Furthermore, he acquired a land of 20km$^2$ in Fiji (Interviewee 1; Ellsmoor & Rosen, 2016) in order to prepare for future economic developments and provide food security (Hermann & Kempf, 2017). Nevertheless, the i-Kiribati "associated the purchase with the possibility of

future migration to Fiji" which might have triggered a switch in local acceptance for collective migration to immobility (Hermann & Kempf, 2017:232).

Labelling Pacific islands as climate refugees totally ignores mobility history and patterns (McAdam, 2012). Evidence shows that colonisation of the Pacific has started as long as 40,000 years ago (Smith, 2007). From the 18th Century, "movements of Pacific Islanders have often been associated with economic and political interests of Colonial Empires" (Tabe, 2019:1). Many forced displacement due to natural hazards occured in the Pacific but most of the time, islanders returned to their original home (Tabe, 2019). Interviewee 2 suggests that temporal relocation should be addressed with presenting Islanders the idea that they can return. For instance, McAdam (2012) explains that the climate discourse on the case of Tuvalu ignores the socio-economic underlying pressures such as resources on constraints. As mentioned earlier, socio-economic migration has been identified as early as the 18th Century in the Pacific islands. Nevertheless, it seems that the framing migration as socio-economic is a result from perceived inequalities in income and that they do not always have knowledge and understanding of the impacts and adaptations to climate change therefore the latter is not always considered a major issue (UN ESCAP, 2014).

Finally, religion is a common force of the Pacific region and is an important element to its history (Robbins, 2006). Religious narratives are central to how islanders perceive climate change (UN ESCAP, 2014). There is a failure from global organisations and institutions to acknowledge the role of religion and spirituality. This point is therefore directly linked to the scientification of climate change because the Global North approach to scientific rationality is not capable of providing the Pacific islands with effective sustainable strategies as it dismisses the role that spirituality and relationship with nature has in the decision-making (Luetz & Nunn, 2020). Furthermore, the religious involved in decision-making tend to be more influenced by traditional and local knowledge which is in majority informed by christianism (Luetz & Nunn, 2020). According to Nunn (2017), the failure of foreign interventions lies in "the sidelining of God" because those interventions are framed by secular narratives which question the legitimization of spirituality in the debate. People engaged in spirituality account for almost the totality of the islanders (Nunn,2017) and they seem to have avoided the disenchantment of nature that some social scientists suggest has been brought by capitalism. This explains that the Moana Declaration from the Pacific Churches Conference in 2009 is not entirely part of the climate change and climate mobility governance. There is unequal power between foregin regional actors and local perspectives in the debate. Eventually, there is a strong

belief, religiously-ladden, that other places after migrating might be worse (Nunn et al., 2016).

***Context (d)***

Tabe (2019) argues that if climate mobility is to be planned, differences among islands have to be taken into account especially with the receiving communities before relocation or displacement occurs. As a matter of fact, the Pacific island region covers more than 800,000 square kilometers ($km^2$) of land “of which New Zealand and Papua New Guinea make up approximately nine-tenthes'' (West, 2020). There is a marked divergence between the populations of the islands: Papua New Guinea has 9,000,000 inhabitants and Niue counts a population of 1,600 inhabitants. In general, the region has a relatively young population (WHO, 2013) and the youngster might actually be the one to tend to migration (UN ESCAP, 2014). Papua New Guinea is also the largest island with a superficy of more than 400,000 $km^2$. Nauru is the smallest and is 21 $km^2$ wide. Furthermore, the climate in the region is strongly influenced by the ocean as well as the fact that islands are scattered across a large area (Sturman & McGowan, 1999). It means that some islands experience droughts while others might simultaneously experience floods yet the common climate-related challenges are to provide access to water and to protect the populations from climate and natural hazards (Sturman & McGowan, 1999). In addition, geographical challenges are embedded in a context of cultural diversity. For instance, in the majority of the islands English and French are official languages yet Marshallese, Maori, Palauan, Sonsoral, Tobi, Angaur, Hiri Motu, Tok Pisin, Samoan, Tongan and Bislama are further national nationales. Many more languages are spoken in the region e.g. in Papua New Guinea there are more than 800 indigenous languages. It is paramount that non-Indigenous scholars reconnect their work with the understanding of the Indigenous communities of the Pacific especially in the interests for environmental justice (Suliman et al., 2019).

# Chapitre 5. Conclusion

## 5.1. Conclusion

By applying the IG framework (Figure 5), this thesis finds that sustainable development regional governance (SDRG) addresses issues of climate change, EJ and mobility in the Pacific islands. In the Pacific islands, the SDRG has for long been ineffective and complicated because of a large number of global, regional and national frameworks to implement and monitor (Figure 9). Therefore, the key process in the SDRG is the **PRSD** which guides the achievement for the Agenda 2030 and the SDGs as well as lightens the burden of implementing and monitoring. In 2016, the PIF Secretariat Leaders endorsed the **FRD.** Because the cognitive relationship between the **PRSD** and **FRD** supports each other's guidelines, it results in a synergy within the SDRG (Figure 11). However, while the **FRD** is the only regional framework addressing issues of mobility (justice) in the context of climate change, its implementation process is ongoing.

In other words, this thesis finds that there is a non-regime of climate change-EJ-mobility nexus by governments at the regional level in the Pacific Islands. Therefore, the last step of the IG frameworks explains the lack of governance (Figure 11). There are two main reasons for a lack of governance: climate mobility is not a priority of the regional political agenda and Pacific islanders tend to want to remain immobile.




*Figure 12. Concluding findings*

*Reference*: My own elaboration

***Actors (a)***

The different regional actors have different interests. The Pacific governments do not have an interest in producing mobility policies because it could imply a reduced obligation on industrialised countries to cut emissions of greenhouse gas. It may redirect donors to fund migration programmes and rule out funding other resilient strategies. In the meantime, foreign actors are already investing in migration policies which can assert their leadership in the Pacific and reduce the compensations under the Warsaw International Loss and Damages Mechanism. Finally, both state and nonstate actors perceive climate mobility as a possible loss of sovereignty.

***Institutions (b)***

The Pacific islands are among the smaller emitters of greenhouse gas yet they suffer the most dire climate change impacts. In that matter, they have been actively demanding climate actions notably through the UNFCCC Cop in Paris. They also demand external fundings. However, the UNFCCC has for now not been able to secure a drastic cut in emissions. Furthermore, although Vanuatu made a strong proposal in 2018, the compensatory mechanism under the Warsaw International Loss and Damages Mechanism is still not effective. Climate finance remains a sensitive issue in the UNFCCC and there is a constant reluctance from industrialized countries to finance compensatory mechanisms for loss and damages.

***Discourses, practices and norms (c)***

There are many narratives at stake in the Pacific region with regard to the climate change-EJ-mobility nexus. Foreign actors such as the EU, ILO and UNDP have brought in the region the discourse of managed labour migration as an adaptation strategy. This discourse can be found in the **FRD**. Other discourses see mobility as the last resort in the context of climate change or as a necessity to be planned by governments. Furthermore, Pacific Islanders don't perceive climate change as a mobility crisis, reject the climate refugee discourses and often perceive migration as socio-economically driven. Voluntary immobility is an indigenous strategy to climate change. Overall, the Pacific Islanders' cultural identity is tied to their lands and often refuse to leave and might even be ready to die on their lands. Finally, religion and spirituality play a crucial role in the everyday life of Pacific Islanders. The failure of global frameworks in the Pacific islands is partly explained because of secular and technical narratives on climate change in opposition to local religious beliefs.

***Context (d)***

In the Pacific, mobility is perceived as a socio-economic issue which is anchored in history. Since the 18th Century, patterns of labour migration have emerged. The colonialist history is further crucial which nowadays cristallise the unequal power relationships in the SDRG. The non-regime is also in line with the key policy challenges on climate mobility as well as a lack of data and knowledge.

## 5.2. Discussion

This thesis has applied an adapted version of the IG framework as proposed by Vissseren-Hamakers (2018a, 2018b). This thesis contributes to the discussion on how to apply the framework but its operationalisation remains in need for elaboration. It might be relevant to envisage the last step in mobility studies with another theoretical layer such as with the mobility framework proposed by van der Velde and van Naerssen (2011). Within the struggle of global technical narratives on climate change and local Pacific knowledge narratives, I suggest that another dimension to the Oberthür and Gehring (2006) framework can be added. If we include non-state actor instruments into the regional governance, the Moana Declaration from the Pacific Church Conference which tackles climate mobility and justice, it may question the institutional interactions framework. Drawing on the finds, I suggest that the application of the framework might take distance from the secular point of view. May the interaction between the Moana Declaration and other instruments be categorised under one of the four interactions type? Or could a spiritual type of interaction be added? As religion and spirituality are central to the Pacific Islanders' life, reflecting on the framework by means of interviews might contribute to the discussion in a fair way. This point highlights that interviews were central to this research. My findings have highlighted the necessity to include local perspectives on climate change and mobility. However, I am aware this thesis failed to address the interdisciplinary nature of the study because I was not able to interview more people from different fields such as policy-makers or regional development actors such as NGOs implemented in the Pacific or representatives of the PIF or SPC. This lack of representation is valuable in understanding that practicing and analysing IG implies that as many voices as possible have to be listened to. Additionally, I point out the lack of connection to indegenous knowledge (Suliman, 2019) in my application and research as I myself recommended should be done.

This thesis rather frames actors of climate mobility as political subjects (Ransan-Cooper et al., 2015; Table 3). It has highlighted that Pacific Islanders are not a homogenous community but rich in diversity. Inequalities exist, especially

among women, youth and disabled people. Their vulnerability is enhanced by climate change. In the meantime, voluntary immobility and indegenous knowledge are often perceived as climate strategies. Therefore, the current non-regime in the Pacific Islands gives room to activate the political subject frame to govern climate mobility (justice). It enables to include understandings of Islanders on climate change, mobility and to tackle inequalities with a bottom-up approach.

Dahinden (2016) suggests that migration studies should be de-migranticised. The author questions the nation-state and ethnicity-centered epistemology in migration studies because the nation-state often acts as a natural lense through which migration is studied. Migrants are often represented as in opposition to citizens of a state. One of the ways out of the nation-state discourse normalization is to conduct research with concepts built outside of migration studies (Dahinden, 2016). Using social frameworks helps because usually, migration and ethnicity are not automatically in the research question (Dahinden, 2016). According to the author, applying a mobility framework is valid because it takes distance from the cross-border conceptualisation of migration; focuses on (unqueal) distribution of resources in mobility and accepts that human movement is not an abnormality.

This research has therefore contributed to de-migranticise studies. By adopting a mobility approach in the context of climate change, it adopts an interdisciplinary point of view. It also makes a difference between the way politics use categories and how I conducted the research using analytical categories such as climate mobilities rather than climate migration only (Dahinden, 2016). Furthermore, the thesis finds that the **FRD** is an integrated approach to climate change and natural disasters into sustainable development and that governing climate mobility might take part in a risk regional governance. This integration is another way to avoid the normalisation of nation-state discourse. However, the rising institutionalisation of migration research (Dahinde, 2016) might also be a result of the Global North's discourse and thus not necessarily a problem in the Pacific islands for instance.

### 5.3. Limits to the research

The COVID-19 pandemic is the limit to this research. Originally, the thesis was imagined as an ethnographic research. However, the pandemic pressures and the absence of an internship had pushed me to opt for desk research. Furthermore, conducting only two interviews is undeniably a limit. Because the research process had to change and was slowed down a lot, time became a limit as well. Eventually, money can be considered as a limit as well because a desk

research implies to use pre-existing data. However, there is a considerable amount of data that might need to be purchased which is, in my student position, acceptable to a certain extent.

## 5.4. Recommendations

### 5.4.1. For further research

Desk research in public administration and management can be conducted as a preparatory research stage (van Thiel, 2014). Therefore, further research points need to be considered:

1) **Research should focus more at the regional level**

Research covering climate change-EJ-mobility must focus at the regional level such as UN ESCAP (2014) prescribes. A knowledge gap persists especially in providing policy coherence because the same islands are constantly being studied such as Tuvalu, Kiribati, Vanuatu and Fiji.

2) **Theorising climate mobility justice**

There is a gap in theorising and applying climate mobility justice because it is sometimes not evident to apply. It might be explained by the fact that dominant discourses frame migrants as victims, threats or as adaptive agents and many studies are funded by agencies or organisations that reproduce those frames. Bettini, Nash and Gioli (2016) point to the lack of studied political responses in de-securised migration studies yet the narratives of the climate refugee at least highlighted some aspects of justice. Within the Pacific islands, there is a need to apply a climate mobility justice framework to unravel implications for land use as well as to acknowledge the fear of the Pacific Islanders regarding their losing culture, sovereignty and their land.

3) **Discourses at the regional level**

As Remling (2020) explains, there is a need for more intensively researching the discourses in the Pacific islands at the regional level. Especially, it is important to understand how climate change and mobility is perceived within the Pacific Islanders. However, it is also important to not romanticize the local because there are structures of inequalities that need to be tackled (Interviewee 2).

4) **Climate mobility data**

Because migration is often framed as socio-economic, it hinders the possibility for the Pacific Immigration Development Community or the Pacific Catastrophe Risk Assessment and Financing Initiative to act as an official bureaucracy in collecting and ordering climate mobility data. Therefore, further research needs

to assess climate change and mobility in the Pacific islands in order to integrate mobility, loss and damages, climate change, differentiation of the data, etc. These studies must avoid making a direct link between climate change and mobility so as to not reproduce the mistaken scientific models that already exist. Interviewee 1 argues however that technology alone is not the solution to localise climate change impacts and to understand the communities responses.

5) **Colonialism and Environmental reparations**

In the literature, there is an island studies field and research on Pacific islands are often made in comparison with Caribbean islands. In the latter, there is a political case made for slavery and environmental reparation simultaneously (Sheller, 2020). In other words, it can be possible to put forward a case for colonialism and environmental reparations in the Pacific islands.

This thesis has found that the FRD is a unique framework to integrate climate change and disaster risk in sustainable development. Further island studies may research the possibility to implement such a framework in the Carribean Islands for instance.

### 5.4.2. For policy-makers

I argue that it is a necessity for the Pacific governments to address climate change-EJ-mobility at the regional level because it enables preemptive approaches in which understanding local perceptions and including everyone's voices are possible.

1) **Full implementation of the FRD**

Regional cooperation is crucial in order to achieve sustainable development (Vinke et al., 2020). Therefore, one logical solution is to fully implement the FRD in order to make possible the governance of the climate change-EJ-mobility nexus. Furthermore, many Pacific islands still have to "integrate voluntary migration, forced displacement and planned relocation into national laws and policies, such as national adaptation plans for action" (UN ESCAP, 2014). However, if the main labour migration is being reproduced - because the knowledge gap at the regional level is not filled - there is a risk that governing the nexus takes the path of existing labour migration schemes. This would hinder the possibility to protect mobile and immobile people. Furthermore, the reviewing process of the **PRSD** *needs* to take into account the flow information provided by **FRD**.

2) **Policy coherence**

Governing the climate change-EJ-mobility nexus implies an interdisciplinary nature of the contributions. It requires policy coherence in the Pacific islands but also globally because no one policy field can hold control. Furthermore, policy coherence might be an alternative to the commotion of opening the 1951 Refugee Convention to climate refugees under international law. It also means that the Global North needs to change the narratives on climate mobility. Eventually, as the global discussion on climate mobility has not decided on an official definition nor framework, it makes it very complicated for the Warsam International Loss and Damage Mechanism to fulfil its compensatory objectives. Policy coherence therefore starts with an approval on definitions, implications for international laws and integration into global frameworks.

3) **Localise climate change interventions**

Interventions for climate change have to be localised. It is paramount to reconnect with local perspectives and indigenous knowledge and practices and the latter might be the best adaptive strategies. Foreign regional actors need to engage discussion with religious actors (Nunn, 2017) otherwise their interventions will remain useless. Discussions with the different sending and receiving areas need to be engaged to minimize conflict and discrimination as well as loss of identity when a community is relocated. Localised preemptive approaches include implications for land and nature. Finally, it implies to understand that climate mobility is *one* of the options that should be made available for the Pacific islands. Obviously, there is an urgent need to cut greenhouse gas emissions to maintain global warming well below 2°C.

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Annex: Overview of the Nationally Determined Contributions of the PSIDS (first round except Marshall Islands which have published their second NDCs)

| COUNTRIES | | NDC Targets | Mentioned Policies | URL to Online Document |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | American Samoa | N/A | | |
| 2 | Common wealth of Northern Marianas | N/A | | |
| 3 | Cook Islands | Submitted on: 01/09/2016<br><br>- 100% renewable coverage by 2020 after having reached if 50%-target of 2015<br>- unconditional 38%-reduction of emission from energy by 2020 (based on 2006 level)<br>- conditional reduction of 43% of emission from energy (based on 2006 level) upon receiving external support | - Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Action under the UNFCCC<br>- *'Te Kaveinga Nui'*<br>- First, Second and Third National Sustainable Development Plan 2015-2020<br>- Joint National Disaster Risk Management and Climate Change Adaptation Plan 2011-2015 updated to 2020<br>- Climate and Disaster Compatible Development Policy 2013-2016<br>- The Renewable Energy Chart<br><br>Note: Loss and Damage not factored in the policy planning | INTENDED NATIONALLY DETERMINED CONTRIBUTIONS COOK ISLANDS Introduction The Cook Islands is a small island developing state compr |
| 4 | Federated States of Micronesia | Submitted on: 15/09/2016<br><br>- unconditional reduction of GHG emissions by 28% by 2025 (based on 2000 level)<br>- conditional reduction of GHG emission by 35% by 2015 (based on 2000 level) upon receiving international community support for capacity-building | - Nationwide Integrated Disaster Risk Management and Climate Change Policy 2013<br>- The FSM Climate Change Act 2014 | 'Electricity Sector Analysis for Federated States of Micronesia' s Intended Nationally Determined Contribution' prepared by |
| 5 | Fiji | Submitted on: 22/04/2016<br><br>- 99% of renewable | - Pacific Island Framework for Action on Climate Change 2006-2015 | Fiji's Intended Nationally |

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|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | energy share in electricity by 2030 from the 61% of 2013<br>For a total of $CO_2$ by 30% by 2030 (from 2020 to 2030):<br>- unconditional reduction by 10% through the Green Growth Framework and use of national resources<br>- conditional achievement of remaining percentages upon external funding of US$500 million | - Green Growth Framework 2014<br>- Draft Energy Policy 2013<br>- Draft Energy Strategic Action Plan 2013<br>- Sustainable Energy for All global report<br>- Fiji Electricity Authority draft Power Development Plan<br>- Electricity Act<br>- Clean Development Mechanism Policy Guideline<br>- National Climate Change Policy | Determined Contribution |
| 6 | French Polynesia | N/A | | |
| 7 | Guam | N/A | | |
| 8 | Kiribati | Submitted on: 21/09/2016<br><br>- unconditional reduction of emissions by 13.7% by 2025 and 12.8% by 2030<br>- conditional GHG reduction by 48.8% by 2025; 49% by 2030. With appropriate external assistance, possible reduction of emissions by 61.8% by 2030 | - Kiribati National Energy Policy<br>- Majuro Declaration<br>- National Adaptation Plans of Action 2007<br>- Kiribati Adaptation Project<br>- Kiribati Integrated Environment Policy<br>- Kiribati Development Plan<br>- National Framework for Climate Change and Climate Change Adaptation 2013<br>- The Kiribati Joint Implementation Plan on Climate Change and Disaster Risk Management<br>- Environment Act 1999 | STRUCTURE OF THE INDC |
| 9 | Nauru | Submitted on: 07/04/2016<br><br>- achievement of targets under the National Energy Road Map: replace a substantial part of the existing diesel generation with large scale grid connected solar PV system<br>- 80kt of $CO_2$ emissions by | - National Sustainable Development Strategy 2005-2025<br>- Nauru Energy Roadmap 2014-2020<br>- Second National Communication 2015<br>- The Republic of Nauru Climate Change Adaptation and Disaster Risk Management Framework | REPUBLIC REPUBLIC OF NAURU |

| | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | 2030 conditional upon external financial help<br>- unconditional contribution of US$5 million for 0.6 MW solar PV system implementation | - Nauru's Utility Secor-A Strategy for Reform<br>- National Energy Policy Framework<br>- Nauru Utilities Cooperation Act | |
| 10 | New Caledonia | N/A | | |
| 11 | Niue | Submitted on: 28/10/2016<br><br>- 38% share of renewable energy of total electricity generation by 2020<br>- partly delivered by a 10% reduction in residential, commercial and government electricity demand by 2020<br>- conditional 80% share of renewable energy of total electricity general or even more by 2025 upon additional international assistance | - Niue's National Strategic Plan for *Niue ke Monuina*<br>- Niue Strategic Energy Road Map 2015-2025<br>- National Climate Change Policy 2009 (Forest Policy, National Energy Policy, Ecosystems Approach to Fisheries Management)<br>- Niue's Joint National Action Plan for Disaster Risk Management and Climate Change Adaptation<br>- Climate Change Adaptation & Health Plan 2013 | Intended Nationally Determined Contributions |
| 12 | Palau | Submitted on: 22/04/2016<br><br>Indicative targets (base on 2005 level)<br>- 22% energy sector emissions reductions by 2025<br>- 45% renewable energy target by 2025<br>- 35% energy efficiency target by 2025 | - Palau Climate Change Policy<br>- Palau's National Appropriate Mitigation Actions<br>- National Adaptation Plan<br>- Palau's National Master Development Plan - Palau 2020<br>- Home Energy Efficiency Program<br>- Energy Audit programme<br>- National Solid Waste Framework | Republic of Palau Intended Nationally Determined Contribution |
| 13 | Papua New Guinea | Submitted on: 24/03/2016<br><br>- conditional 100% renewable energy in electricity generation by 2030 upon external assistance | - PNG Vision 2050 (seven areas including Environmental Sustainability and Climate Change)<br>- Climate Change Bill 2015<br>- Climate Change Act<br>- National Climate Change Development Management Policy the Adaptation | Intended Nationally Determined Contribution (INDC) Under the United Nations Framework Convention |

| | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | Strategies, Risk Management | on Climate Change |
| 14 | Republic of the Marshall Islands | Submitted on: 22/11/2018 (Second NDCs)<br><br>- reduction of GHG emission to at least 32% by 2025 and to at least 45% by 2030 (below 2010 levels) (binding target)<br>- indicative target of reduction of GHG emission by at least 58% by 2035 (below 2010 levels)<br>- net zero GHG emissions by 2050 at the latest | In the Second NDCs:<br><br>- *Tile Til Eo* 2050 Climate Strategy | The Republic of the Marshall Islands Nationally Determined Contribution |
| 15 | Samoa | Submitted on: 22/04/2016<br><br>- conditional 100% renewable electricity generation in 2025 upon external international assistance | - Strategy for Development of Samoa 2012-2016<br>- Samoa Energy Sector Plan 2012-2016<br>- Electricity Act 2010<br>- Greenhouse Gas Abatement Strategy<br>- Climate Change Policy 2007<br>- Energy Efficient Act | Samoa's Intended Nationally Determined Contribution |
| 16 | Solomon Islands | Submitted on: 21/09/2016<br><br>- unconditional 12% emission reduction by 2025 and 30% by 2030 (based on 2015 levels)<br>- conditional 27% GHG emission reduction by 2025 and 45% by 2030 upon appropriate international assistance | - Climate Change Policy 2012-2017<br>- National Development Strategy 2011-2020<br>- National Adaptation Programme of Action | INTENDED NATIONALLY DETERMINED CONTRIBUTION |
| 17 | Timor-Leste | Submitted on: 16/08/2017<br><br>- conditional “conscious decision not to have a target for emission reduction, but outline the commitment to reducing emissions through various activities in sectors like transport, agriculture, forestry and energy” upon | - National Adaptation Plan<br>- Operational Law of Clean Development Mechanism 2010<br>- National Focal Point for Green Climate Fund<br>- Environmental Basic Law 2012<br>- Environmental License Decree Law 2011<br>- Decree Law on Export, | Untitled |

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| | | international climate finance and assistance | Import and Use of Ozone Depleting Substances<br>- Decree Law on Protected Areas<br>- Proposed Decree Law on Establishing a National Renewable Energy Systems<br>- Proposed Biodiversity Decree Law<br>- Draft Climate Change Policy 2016 | |
| 18 | Tonga | Submitted on: 21/09/2016<br><br>- 50% of electricity generation from renewable sources by 2020<br>- 70% of electricity generation from renewable energy by 2030<br>- improve energy efficiency through reduction of electricity line losses to 9% by 2020<br>- to double the 2015 number of Marine Protected Areas by 2030 | - Joint National Adaptation Plan for Climate Change Adaptation and Disaster Risk Reduction (including Tonga Agriculture Sector Plan)<br>- National Climate Climate Change Policy<br>- Tongan Strategic Development Framework 2015-2025<br>- Climate CHange policy 2015-2020<br>- Tonga Energy Roadmap 2010-2020<br>- National Forest Policy 2010<br>- National Infrastructure and Investment Plan<br>- National Biodiversity Strategy and Action Plan | INTENDED NATIONALLY DETERMINED CONTRIBUTIONS |
| 19 | Tuvalu | Submitted on: 22/04/2016<br><br>- 100% GHG emission reduction from the electricity generation by 2025 i.e. 0 emission<br>- quantified economy-wide target for a reduction in total GHG emission from the energy sector to 60% below 2010 levels by 2025<br>- conditional emissions further reduced upon necessary technology and finance | - Tuvalu National Energy Policy 2009<br>- Majuro Declaration on Climate Leadership 2013<br>- National Adaptation Plan of Action<br>- National Strategic Action Plan for Climate Change and Disaster Risk Management<br>- National Climate Change Policy<br>- National Action Plan 2016<br>- National Strategic Plan<br>- National Strategic Development Plan<br>- Master Plan for Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency in Tuvalu | Government of Tuvalu Intended Nationally Determined Contributions |

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| | | | 2012-2020<br>- Energy Strategic Action Plan<br>- Energy Efficiency Act | |
| 20 | Vanuatu | Submitted on: 21/09/2016<br><br>- conditional 100% renewable energy in electricity upon external financial and technical support by 2030<br>- 100% below BaU emissions for electricity sub-sector and 30% for energy sector as a whole | - National Energy Roadmap 2013-2020-2030<br>- National Adaptation Programme of Action<br>- National Climate Change and Disaster Risk Reduction Policy<br>- Government's Priority and Action Agenda 2006-2015<br>- Rural Electrification Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Action | REPUBLIC OF VANUATU INTENDED NATIONALLY DETERMINED CONTRIBUTION (INDC) |