

Securitizing Uruzgan

Threat identification and formulation at the various levels during the Dutch military mission in Uruzgan (2006-2010)

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20-5-2015

MASTER THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE
REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF

MASTER OF SCIENCE
IN HUMAN GEOGRAPHY

RADBOUD UNIVERSITY NIJMEGEN
2015

Summary

This master thesis analyses to what extent the threats that are identified by the highest authority of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), correspond with the lower authority levels of the mission, the Dutch government and the Dutch military mission in Uruzgan respectively. The goal of the research is to understand the process of securitization of the ISAF mission in Uruzgan while at the same time the research tries to strengthen the theoretical foundations of the Securitization Theory. By securitizing issues the ‘*speaker*’ of the securitizing move gets (if successful) the power to implement measures that are only allowed in extreme situations. Securitization can be so powerful that it is necessary to understand the process which can grant a person this type of power. The Securitization Theory can explain the process of securitization and is therefore chosen as a basis for the theoretical framework of this thesis.

The Securitization Theory differs from other security theories in that it goes beyond the traditional military and political threats; in fact, it can include any threat. Securitization starts with the so-called *speech act*; the speaker, generally a state or the political elite, refers to an issue as a threat to the survival of something or someone (the so-called *referent object*). In order to protect the referent object *extraordinary measures* are claimed. These are measures that go beyond the ‘normal’ measures. The successfulness of the securitization depends on whether or not the speaker was able to convince its audience of the threat. The likelihood of acceptance is determined by the *facilitating conditions* of the securitization: the credibility of the threat, the formulation of the threat and the social capital of the speaker.

The literature review of this thesis shows that, although the Securitization Theory is in general received quite positively, it also received a lot of critique. For example, the concept of securitization is not clear because the theory attributes securitization to the moment in which an issue becomes a security issue. It is hard to determine when this moment exactly is and therefore hard to distinguish it from previous or future expressions and contexts. Another critique that is pointed out by the review is that the theory is flawed because of its Western bias, implying that securitization can only apply to Western liberal democracies in which only the state or the political elite can be the speaker of the securitizations. Furthermore the theory is criticized because it does not include other actors beside the state and the political elite as speakers. The theory benefits if it also includes people who are generally not able to express their threat, or if international organisations can become speakers. Another critique deals with insufficient inclusion of the context in the theory. The influence of the context (in which the threats are expressed and in which the audience receives these expressions) on the likelihood of acceptance is underestimated, according to the critics. A last point of critique is, the concept of the audience, while essential for the successfulness of a securitization, is underdeveloped.

The literature review functions as a tool in developing a research framework of the Securitization Theory; on the one hand this framework improves the original Securitization Theory by fixing its weaknesses, as pointed out by the critics in the literature review, while on the other hand this framework makes the Securitization Theory more applicable to the case study of Uruzgan. The research framework of the Securitization Theory as used in this thesis is more inclusive, by opening up to more actors and levels of securitization, and by developing more concrete and clear concepts of securitization, successful securitization and the audience. This research framework is applied to the case study of Uruzgan.

The case study of Uruzgan is in particular a case study of the Dutch military mission in Uruzgan during the period 2006-2010. The Dutch military mission in Uruzgan was part of the ISAF coalition in Afghanistan, under the command of NATO since 2003. The ISAF coalition expanded its range in four stages, eventually covering the entire area of Afghanistan. During the final stage, the expansion to

the South, the Netherlands was asked for support. The Netherlands agreed to become a lead nation for the province of Uruzgan, initially for a period of two years, 2006-2008. In 2007, the Dutch government decided that the mission was not complete yet and granted the request of NATO to stay for another two years. In 2010 the Dutch mission in Uruzgan ended.

This case study is chosen because it concerns a military mission, ISAF, which increases the likelihood that threats are actually formulated as the mission takes place in a conflict situation. Also the complex structure of the ISAF mission gives the opportunity to apply the Securitization Theory to different levels of decision-making (the macro, state and micro level, respectively) and gives the opportunity to test the successfulness of the securitization processes on different levels. This specific case study is also chosen because information on the Dutch mission in this province is relatively easy to access given to the language and personal restrictions of the researcher.

The research framework of the Securitization Theory is applied to all three levels of the case study; NATO, the Dutch government and the Dutch military in Uruzgan. Based on this framework the threats perceived at each level, the proposed extraordinary measures and the facilitating conditions are identified. For the NATO level, the research includes a desktop study. An analysis of NATO's official documents, videos and pictures results in the identification of four major threats: terrorism, narcotics, IEDs (improvised explosive devices, commonly referred to as 'road bombs') and the lack of public Afghan support. NATO formulated these various issues as threats to the international stability and security; NATO's global audience and more specifically its member states are addressed. A connection to terrorist attacks, insurgents and the number of Afghan civilian deaths is used to make the threats more specific for its broad audience. The extraordinary measures NATO formulated to tackle these threats are very general and leave room for interpretation, thereby remaining attractive for a large majority of this broader audience.

The second level consists of political and military actors that can be associated with the Dutch government. A review of the relevant letters to the Dutch House of Representatives, other official documents, videos and pictures concerning the ISAF mission published by the Dutch government and its ministries results in the identification of four threats: terrorism, narcotics, IEDs and corruption. The Dutch governmental level formulated these issues as specifically threatening to the Netherlands and its citizens, and also as threats to the Dutch military presence in Uruzgan, while referring less to the international dimensions of these threats. The threats are formulated as interrelated, following the logic of the Dutch 3D approach (integrating Defence, Diplomacy and Development).

Extraordinary measures are mostly formulated in specific (military) measures, leaving less room for interpretation.

The final level concerns the Dutch military deployed in Uruzgan. This part of the research is mainly based on interviews that are conducted during a research internship, and is complemented by books and documentaries capturing the personal experiences of military personnel deployed in Uruzgan. The interviews result in the identification of five perceived threats; OMF (Opposing Military Forces), IEDs, local structures, ISAF in relation to the Afghans and the organisation of the mission. The identified threats are solely about threats to the Dutch mission. At this level no extraordinary measures are formulated.

The final analysis shows that all securitizations of NATO are successful, at least to a certain extent. The threat of IEDs is perceived by all levels and therefore the securitization of IEDs by NATO can be seen as successful. Although the threat of terrorism is adopted by all levels, its formulation is adapted to the context of the speaker and its audience, adjusting it to the level of macro, state or micro actors. The threat of narcotics is only perceived by the two highest authority levels, while the threat of ISAF towards its own mission is perceived by both NATO and the Dutch military in Uruzgan.

The analysis also illustrates that the research framework was useful for this case study. The adjustments to the original Securitization Theory that are part of the research framework helped in

increasing the applicability of the theory. However, the Western bias of the theory as well as the inclusion of non-linguistic and extra-linguistic speech acts proved to be difficult in this case study.

The thesis concludes that the securitizations of NATO are successful, as they are taken over by the other levels, at least to a certain extent. Comparing these securitizations with the securitizations of the other levels, indicates that social capital has a significant influence on the successfulness of securitization. It also seems that, despite the successful securitizations, there is a difference in the interpretation of the threats between the different levels, in the sense that each level framed the threat within its own context, for instance by adjusting the referent object to its audiences.

The thesis furthermore concludes that the case study and the developed research framework make the Securitization Theory more specific and concrete, and therefore easier to apply. The thesis not only gives a better understanding of securitization processes within such a complex military structure, but might also contribute to a strengthening of the Securitization Theory.

Preface

Already in November 2013, the idea was born that my research should be about Afghanistan. At the start of my internship at the Netherlands Defence Academy (NLDA) in February 2014, research questions were formulated and the structure of my research was clear but it still took more than a year to handing in my master thesis.

First of all, I would like to thank Bert Bomert, who supervised me during the whole process and provided me with extensive and clear feedback every time I sent him a finished chapter. His feedback helped me to see new perspectives and improve the structure as well as the content of my research.

I would also like to thank Alexander Bon. As my supervisor during my internship at the NLDA he suggested useful reading material, helped with setting up interviews and was also always available for a brainstorm session. He gave me confidence to proceed with my research and confidence in my own skills. I would like to thank everyone at the NLDA for making me feel welcome and helping me through this difficult period of writing a master thesis.

Furthermore I would like to thank all the interviewees because without them this thesis would not be complete. They were very willing to help, explaining military topics (that I was not aware of or did not understand yet as a novice in this field) as well as sharing their personal experiences in Afghanistan.

Thank you for your interesting stories and input.

I would like to thank my parents as well. My parents always very supportive of all my choices also during my time at Radboud University as well as Leiden University. They supported my choice to do three internships instead of the required one and therefore accepted that I would extend my master program with almost a year. I appreciate that they give me the opportunity to explore different things and find out what I want to do after graduating. I would also like to thank my brothers Joep, Frans and Huub. They helped me with the final stage of this thesis, giving me some last remarks.

Lastly I would like to thank Rick Wolbertus who gave me moral support when I could not see the light at the end of the tunnel. He listened to every problem I faced during the writing process and he could always cheer me up.

Thanks to everyone for supporting me!

Anne Breuer

May, 2015

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Abbreviations

ADZ	Afghan Development Zones
ANA	Afghan National Army
ANP	Afghan National Police
ANSF	Afghan National Security Forces
BG	Battle Group
CONTCO	Contingent Commander
FAC	Forward Air Controller
FOB	Forward Operating Base
FST	Fire Support Team
GIROA	Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan
IEDs	Improvised Explosive Devices
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force
KAF	Kandahar Airfield
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
OEF	Operation Enduring Freedom
OMF	Opposing Military Forces
OMLT	Operational Mentoring and Liaison Team
PMT	Police Mentoring Team
PRT	Provincial Reconstruction Team
RC-C	Regional Command Central
RC-E	Regional Command East
RC-N	Regional Command North
RC-S	Regional Command South
RC-W	Regional Command West
S/RES	United Nations Security Council Resolution
THD	Task Force Daykundi
TFH	Task Force Helmand
TFK	Task Force Kandahar
TFN	Task Force Nimroz
TFU	Task Force Uruzgan
TFZ	Task Force Zabul
UN	United Nations

Chapter 1 Introduction

This thesis is about security. Security means ‘the state of being free from danger or threat’ (Security, 2015). Although the security of people is tested throughout history, it seems as if in recent years the security of the ‘normal’ citizen is at stake more than ever. Boko Haram, Charlie Hebdo, Ebola, flight MH17, flight 4U9525 and ISIS are just a few phrases that describe horrible events taking place last year. People’s lives have been and still are threatened by diseases, terrorist attacks, war and many other things. Out of fear for threats certain measures are taken. For example, after the attacks on 9/11 additional and stricter security measures have been taken in order to decrease the threat of terrorism. Security checks at airports are more strict, especially regarding liquids, but also inside airplanes measures have been taken to prevent terrorist attacks; the door of the cockpit can be locked from the inside, preventing unwanted individuals to take control of the plane. These various measures might not be implemented or accepted if there was no threat. It is exactly this process of calling an issue a threat and the effects this framing has, such as the implementation of extraordinary measures, that is of interest to this thesis.

1.1 Goal of thesis

According to the Securitization Theory, which functions as the foundation of this thesis, any issue can be securitized as long as there is sufficient support for the issue as a threat (Buzan, Waever, & De Wilde, 1998). Calling any issue a threat, regardless of the fact whether or not it is actually a threat or is only perceived as such, could be a powerful tool in justifying extraordinary measures; securitizing an issue could potentially allow for extraordinary measures. The consequences of securitization can be severe and therefore it is necessary to better understand this securitization process. Research into securitization processes could help in understanding why certain threats are accepted as threats and also in understanding why and when certain measures are allowed at times.

This thesis aims to further develop the Securitization Theory. Although the basic principles of the Securitization Theory is positively received by many scholars, it is criticized as well on that it cannot be considered as a theory. A literature review and a ‘real life’ case study are used in this thesis to uncover the strengths and weaknesses of the theory. Based on an identification of the weaknesses the foundations and argumentations of the Securitization Theory could be strengthened. The academic relevance is thus that this thesis aims to strengthen the foundations of the Securitization Theory and its position within the field of security studies.

This thesis also attempts at a better understanding of the concept and processes of securitization. The Dutch military mission in Uruzgan was part of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan. Within the hierarchical structures of ISAF the identification and formulation of threats can be analysed at three different levels (North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Dutch government, the Dutch military mission in Uruzgan), thereby giving the opportunity to analyse the entire process of securitization, starting from the identification of an issue as a threat until the acceptance – or rejection – of the threat and its accompanying extraordinary measures. This thesis provides more insight in securitization in a specific case, ultimately functioning as a tool for a better understanding processes of securitization. The lessons that can be learned from this case study can be beneficial for future missions with a similar complex structure. The social relevance of this thesis is that the lessons learned and the develop understanding of securitization, can help with a better, more effective and accurate approach, in terms of threat identification and communication regarding threats, between the different levels in future military missions.

1.2 Research questions

A better understanding of the process of securitization and a further development of the Securitization Theory are complex goals. In order to reach those goals several research questions are formulated. The main research question of this thesis is:

How are the security threats that have been identified and formulated by NATO corresponding with the identification and formulation of the security threats at the lower levels in the mission, the Dutch government and the Dutch mission in Uruzgan?

This research question mainly focuses on understanding the process of the securitization within the specific case study of the ISAF mission in Uruzgan. This question is rather complex; in order to be able to answer the main question, five sub-questions are formulated as well.

1. Which research framework can be based on the Securitization Theory?

Understanding the process of securitization requires an application of the Securitization Theory to a case study. The Securitization Theory as constructed by Buzan, Waever and De Wilde (1998) might not be directly applicable and therefore it is necessary to explore what a research framework based on the Securitization Theory could be.

2. What were the demographic and social circumstances in Uruzgan, Afghanistan?

As the case study of Uruzgan is chosen, it is necessary to sketch the context and the circumstances in which the three levels operated as well as what they had to take into account. Knowledge of the demographic and social context in Uruzgan is crucial to know because this context determines and influences the actors with whom the three levels engaged and who could influence the perception of the three levels.

3. What were the securitizations of the NATO for the mission in Uruzgan?

- a. Which security threats have been identified?*
- b. How were these security threats formulated and expressed?*
- c. How successful was the securitization?*

4. What were the securitizations of the Dutch government for the mission in Uruzgan?

- a. Which security threats have been identified?*
- b. How were these security threats formulated and expressed?*
- c. How successful was the securitization?*

5. What were the securitizations of the Dutch military in Uruzgan?

- a. Which security threats have been identified?*
- b. How were these security threats formulated and expressed?*
- c. How successful was the securitization?*

These questions are helpful in uncovering the securitization process at each level; NATO, the Dutch government and the Dutch military in Uruzgan, respectively. For each level the same set of questions is asked for the identification of the threats, the facilitating conditions of formulation and context, and the successfulness of the securitizations. The same questions are asked because this makes it easier to comprehend the complete process of securitization in such a complex structure.

1.3 Reading guide

The reading guide functions as a guide through the thesis. This guide explains the structure of the thesis by addressing the content of each chapter in brief.

The thesis starts with an introduction into the subject of securitization and the research questions.

Chapter 2 gives an overview of the methods that are used during this research. For each of the previously mentioned levels a different mix of methods is used in order to gather the necessary information. **Chapter 3** addresses the first method of this thesis, a literature review regarding the

Securitization Theory also including a review of its critics. This chapter concludes with a research framework of the Securitization Theory. This research framework makes the theory easier to apply to the case study as it includes slight changes to the theory, trying to include the various critiques the theory received, for instance regarding the concept of securitization, the speech act, the inclusion of context, the actors and the level of securitization.

The following chapter, **Chapter 4**, introduces the case study of Uruzgan. It starts by describing the context, the demographical and geographical features of the province of Uruzgan. This chapter continues with a brief introduction to the three levels that are central to the case study of Uruzgan; the NATO level, the Dutch government level and the Dutch military level in Uruzgan.

The next three chapters make up the empirical research of this thesis. **Chapter 5** identifies, on the basis of the sources included in the desktop study, those issues that are formulated as a threat at the NATO level. For each threat, the extraordinary measures that are called for by NATO, the formulation of the threat and the context in which the threat is expressed are discussed. The chapter ends with the potential evidence that could show whether or not the securitizations as expressed by NATO are successful. **Chapter 6** focuses on the securitizations of the Dutch government and all elements that are regarded as part of this level. This chapter, just as Chapter 7, follows the same structure as Chapter 5. **Chapter 7** deals with the Dutch military in Uruzgan and is primarily based on the information derived from the interviews.

Chapter 8 analyses the results of the empirical research. It gives a clear overview of which threats are found at each separate level but also if and which threats are found at more levels. This chapter also contains reflections on the research framework of the Securitization Theory. The final chapter, **Chapter 9**, provides the conclusions of this thesis as well as a critical reflection.

Chapter 2 Methodology

This chapter gives a broad overview of the methods that are used in this research. It is divided into two parts. The first part deals with the literature review, which is used as a tool to design the theoretical framework of the thesis. The second part addresses the methods that are used to identify the threats as formulated at the three levels.

2.1 Literature review

The purpose of the literature review is designing a research framework of the Securitization Theory, which can be applied to the case study. The literature review starts with an extensive analysis of the publication on which the Securitization Theory is primarily based, *Security: A new framework for analysis* (Buzan, Waever & De Wilde, 1998). The analysis explains the main principles of the Securitization Theory and results in a more comprehensive formulation of the original framework. The literature review continues with reviewing the critiques of the Securitization Theory because in order to strengthen the theory its weaknesses need to be known. Publications expressing these critiques are found through the use of RUQuest and the search terms 'securitization theory' and 'critiques on the securitization theory'. The most significant critiques on the Securitization Theory are taken into account for the designing of a research framework of the theory. It is this framework that is applied to the case study.

2.2 A case study

This thesis builds upon the Securitization Theory by applying the theory to a case study. A case study for this thesis has to fulfil two requirements. First, it has to be able to test the applicability of the Securitization Theory (in the form of the research framework) and, second, sufficient relevant information on the case study has to be available and accessible.

A case study testing the Securitization Theory needs a context in which issues are actually securitized; most likely a conflict situation or at least a situation in which the military is involved, as its primary task is to offer protection against threats. The research framework also, as will be explained in the next chapter, wants to see if other actors besides actors on a state level can securitize as well, therefore a case study for this thesis should ideally include macro, state and micro level actors. A hierarchical relationship between these levels is preferred as it provides the best opportunity to address successful securitizations on multiple levels. These requirements narrow the number of case studies down to those case studies where an international organisation has a mandate for a mission in a conflict zone, states contribute with military forces, equipment and support for the mission, and the military executes the orders of both the international and national level. In most cases these are UN-mandated missions.

The second requirement, being able to access enough relevant data, further narrows down the identification of the case study. There are and have been many UN-mandated missions, supported by lots of countries. Access to information on these missions at the international level is most likely the same for the various UN missions. However, access to information regarding the other levels depends on the national and sub-state actors that are chosen. Information is generally easier to access if one is more familiar with the context and language in which it is presented. Therefore the choice is made to focus on the Netherlands and the Dutch military. The Netherlands participated in numerous international military missions; the mission in Uruzgan (2006-2010) is the largest mission of the Netherlands since World War II. This Uruzgan mission includes the international (macro) level, being NATO. Although the mission is UN-mandated, NATO has command over the mission and in the context of the case study is therefore seen as the highest level of authority. The case study also includes the state level, represented by the Dutch government; the micro level actor is the Dutch military in Uruzgan. The mission is very well documented, not only given the turbulence it caused in

Dutch politics and society but also because the Ministry of Defence was relatively transparent regarding the mission. Military personnel was encouraged to share their experiences, either through publications or documentaries. The Ministry of Defence invited journalists to experience daily life in Uruzgan. In addition to this type of data, an internship at the Netherlands Defence Academy provided extra information and access to military personnel that were deployed in Uruzgan, giving more in-depth information.

The new research framework as developed in Chapter 3 helps analysing the process of securitization during the Dutch military mission in Uruzgan. For this identification of the expression of security threats a desktop study of textual and non-textual sources at all three levels is necessary; in addition, interviews are held in order to get more insight in the Dutch military mission level, as is explained in the coming paragraphs.

2.2.1 The desktop study

The desktop study consists of primary textual and non-textual sources and additional academic sources. Each type of sources is discussed separately.

2.2.1.1 Textual sources

The basis of the desktop study includes only primary sources, thus first-hand sources of the NATO, the Dutch government and the Dutch military mission level, respectively. First-hand sources are used because it has to be clear that NATO, the Dutch government and the Dutch military are the 'authors' of these documents and that they are expressing the threats. The desktop study includes all official documents relevant to the mission in Afghanistan, published by the various levels. Although this thesis focuses on the period 2006-2010, previous (and later) documents might be of interest as well, since the involvement of actors and their decision-making regarding the mission did take place prior to this period.

The goal of this desktop research is to find issues that are explicitly mentioned or framed as threats by the various levels. The threats are not predetermined in the sense that they are previously framed as such by the researcher. Only documented threats are considered, but not all formulations of threats are cited. Only the most clear formulations of issues as explicitly mentioned as threats or its synonyms – danger, risk and (serious) problem – are included in the various chapters as citations to serve as an example. For every level the desktop research is based on a slightly different approach, mainly due to the accessibility of the relevant documents of the actors.

For the NATO level, the research reviews documents accessible through the official NATO and ISAF sites¹. These documents cover a broad spectrum: from declarations and statements of conferences or summits, through NATO reports and articles in NATO's Review, to statements of NATO high officials such as the Secretary General or the ISAF Commander. These relevant documents are found through the search engine of NATO for speeches, opinions and statements, the page 'NATO and Afghanistan', NATO review and the search tool on the ISAF site². For this level the research terms 'Afghanistan' and 'ISAF' are used; although the main period for documents is 2006-2010, the desktop study also includes an extra search for the entire period between 2001, the year NATO's involvement in Afghanistan started, and 2010. On its site NATO has a special folder on Afghanistan and its involvement; therefore the review also includes documents of this folder. The same approach goes for ISAF, although its site mostly contains information dating after 2010.

In order to identify the securitizations and thus the threats as perceived by the Dutch government, the desktop study for this level includes, Letters to the House of Representatives on the topic of the Dutch mission, as well as other primary sources in which the government stated its views and

¹The official site of NATO is <http://www.nato.int/>; the official site of ISAF is <http://www.isaf.nato.int/>.

² The webpage for 'NATO and Afghanistan' is <http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/69772.htm>; the webpage for NATO review is http://www.nato.int/docu/review/index_EN.htm.

perceptions. The search terms 'Afghanistan', 'ISAF', 'Task Force Uruzgan' and 'Uruzgan' are used in the general search engine of the Dutch government³. Other documents include the final evaluation report regarding the Dutch mission, annual reports of the MIVD (Military Intelligence and Security Agency), as well as reports published by the ministries of Foreign Affairs, Defence and Development Cooperation. For this level, the search also covers the period from 2001 to 2012, since some expressions of threats might originate a couple of years prior to the mission, for example in reaction to the attacks of 9/11 or NATO's takeover of ISAF in 2003. Documents dating from the period after the mission ended in 2010 can give a better overview of the mission and its threats. Even though the search covers a larger period, documents of the years 2005-2006 and 2007-2008 are expected to be more useful, since during these years the Dutch government initially decided to deploy its military in Afghanistan and later on extended the duration of the mission. During these periods the government informed Parliament about its decisions, specifically about the tasks of the military, and also what the dangers of such a mission would be. Therefore it is more likely these documents include clearly formulated threats. The review of all these documents leads to the identification of threats as perceived by the Dutch government.

For the last level, the Dutch military mission to Uruzgan, the desktop study turns out to be somewhat different. This level does not bring forward many official and public documents, as documents might contain information that could be harmful to the mission. Nevertheless, there are some documents available, such as reports and the Task Force Uruzgan information booklet. The only official internet site concerning Task Force Uruzgan is the website of the Ministry of Defence. Therefore, the search engine of the Ministry of Defence is used, with the search terms 'Task Force Uruzgan' and 'Uruzgan' during the period of 2006-2010 to find relevant documents⁴. In addition, the desktop study includes various publications and books on the personal experiences of Dutch military personnel in Uruzgan; *Task force Uruzgan* by Noël van Bommel (2009) and *Op missie* by Jaus Müller (2009). These books give additional insights in the issues that are perceived as threats by the soldiers in the field, and are therefore useful in identifying the threats for this level. Since all documents available for this level are already subject to Afghanistan, ISAF and Task Force Uruzgan, and the period of 2006-2010, the approach only includes a search for the actual word 'threat' and its likely synonyms in the texts. Since it seems likely that this particular desktop study does not result in strong expressions of threats, additional interviews are held. These interviews rather than the documents form the basis of the threats as identified in Chapter 7. The method and outcome of the interviews is further discussed in Section 2.3.

2.2.1.2 Non-textual sources

This research also includes non-textual sources, such as videos, pictures and other images and thus other types of securitizations as well. Although non-textual sources might not be able to express a threat as clearly as textual sources can, they can however capture a theme or an image of the threat. The non-textual sources that are used in this thesis are all primary sources produced by the respective levels. While these sources can be used as a means to back up the textual securitizations, they can also be indicators of the successfulness of the securitizations. When available, the entire period between 2006-2010 is reviewed. In this case no search terms are used, since these sources give a good overview of how significant the security issues are in relation to the pictures and videos as published by the relevant speaker.

For the NATO level, NATO's YouTube channel and the photo albums as published by ISAF are useful as non-textual sources. ISAF uploaded most of its photo albums on flickr.com (ISAF, 2014). The ISAF account contains 2,380 albums, covering the period from August 2008 until December 2014. An extensive and detailed scan through these photos can identify particular themes. These themes could indicate whether or not the threats identified in the documents can be found here as well. The research also includes videos of NATO's YouTube channel between 2008 (when the account was

³ The webpage that is used for these searches is <http://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten-en-publicaties>

⁴ The webpage of the search engine of the Ministry of Defence is <http://defensie.nl/zoeken?trefwoord=>

created) and 2010 (NATO, 2014c). Some videos have not a specific topic related to the ISAF mission and therefore are excluded. For the other videos, the same method as the one regarding the ISAF photo albums applies. First, themes are identified and if these identified themes show a clear expression of a threat through the images, it is included as a threat in Chapter 5.

For the Dutch government level non-textual securitizations are more difficult to find. Only the Ministry of Defence published videos and pictures; it even produced a documentary '4 jaar Afghanistan,' consisting of 14 videos (Ministry of Defence, 2010a). The website of the Ministry of Defence states several subjects regarding its activities, one of which is on Afghanistan; thus for this case, the search has no search terms since they already deal specifically with Afghanistan (Ministry of Defence, 2015b). Although the Ministry of Defence has its own YouTube channel, these videos are not included because the channel only contains videos that are also available on the ministry's website. The Ministry of Defence also has photos concerning the mission in Uruzgan. These photos can be found under 'Current Topics', under the heading 'Photos', which has a folder of history albums. This folder contains an album of the mission to Uruzgan, consisting of 32 photos (Ministry of Defence, 2015a). If an analysis of both the videos and photos results in a clear expression of a threat, the threat is included in Chapter 6.

For the third level, the Dutch mission to Uruzgan, non-textual sources are more significant. Several documentaries on the mission are produced, such as 'Dagboek van onze helden' [Diary of our heroes] and 'Fokking hell' (Ministry of Defence, 2010b) (Feijten, Stakelbeek, & Ter Velde, 2010). While the 'Diary of our heroes' is commissioned by the Dutch Ministry of Defence, it is about military personnel telling their own story; they are in charge of the filming and what they want to show to the audience and therefore Chapter 7 includes these sources as well. Various drawings in the book by Noël van Bommel, based on personal experiences, are also included in the research.

2.2.1.3 Additional sources

Additional sources that are used for this research cover a broad spectrum: news articles, national polls, academic publications, papers, reports by national and international organisations, etcetera. In other words, these additional sources are documents and non-textual sources that are not produced, commissioned and/or published by the three levels central to this thesis. The sources are found using the search engines RUQuest and LexisNexis. The search terms are 'Securitization Theory', 'ISAF', 'NATO and Afghanistan', 'Uruzgan', 'Task Force Uruzgan', 'Nederlandse missie Uruzgan'. Different time periods are used for certain types of searches, since some terms are only relevant for this thesis for a specific period of time. For documents about the Securitization Theory no time period is used for the search; for documents about ISAF, NATO and Afghanistan the time period is 2001-2011, while for Uruzgan, Task Force Uruzgan and news articles the time period is 2005-2010.

The desktop study also includes Dutch news articles for the Dutch government level and the mission level, since they reflect the support and views of the Dutch citizens and Dutch military. Also only national newspapers are included because these are more likely to represent larger parts of the population; they include *NRC*, *de Volkskrant*, *ANP*, *Nederlands Dagblad* and *Trouw*.

These additional sources are used to clarify arguments. They give additional and more in-depth information regarding the findings in the official texts. They are also useful in determining whether or not the audience supports the threats and the use of extraordinary measures. In that sense they help to determine to which extent the securitization process is successful in relation to the other levels.

2.2.2 Interviews

The last method used for this research is the conducting of interviews with military personnel that served in Afghanistan. Interviews form the basis of Chapter 7, while the other (military) documents are used to fill the gaps and support the threats identified. In total, seven interviews (in Dutch) are held. The interviewees differ in rank and position, as well as the period of deployment in Uruzgan. Generally speaking, they give a good impression of the Dutch military mission in Uruzgan. Before starting the interview, participants are given a document describing the research and its purpose. This document underlines that participants can refuse to answer a question and that they can end

the interview at any time. The document also includes a form in which the participants can state whether or not they object to recording the interview and whether or not they would like to stay anonymous (see Annex 3 on page 76). Prior to the interview, it is made clear that classified information is not be useful, since the thesis has to be public. All information gathered is handled with confidentiality. Chapter 7, the chapter in which the interviews are integrated, are sent to the participants to make sure they have no objections to the contents. All measures help to create a 'safe' environment for the participants.

Table 1 gives an overview of the interviewees.

Table 1: Overview of the interviewees

Number	Function at time of deployment	Military branch
1.	Forward Air Controller/ Joint Fire Cell RC South	Royal Army
2.	Fire Support Team Commander/Team leader of Operational Mentor and Liaison Team (OMLT)	Royal Navy
3.	Executive Officer of the Deputy Chief of Staff of Operations at ISAF Headquarter	Royal Navy
4.	Commander of Fire Support Platoon	Royal Navy
5.	Commander of the first Task Force Uruzgan	Royal Army
6.	Legal Expert for the Contingent Commander	Royal Navy
7.	Legal Expert for the Contingent Commander	Royal Air Force

The interviews are semi-structured interviews, guided by a general set of questions (see Annex 2 on page 75). The approach of semi-structured interviews is chosen since the interviews are meant to find perceived threats and the expressions of these threats within the mission. A structured interview requires the interviewer to already have a clear idea about what the perceived threats are; the risk is that the interviewer is telling the participants what their perceived threats are, instead of the other way around. An unstructured interview, on the other hand, might not give the interviewer the answer she needs. Especially when dealing with a topic such as the perceived threats, which might not be something participants think of telling when they are asked about their deployment in Uruzgan. Semi-structured interviews gives the participants enough space to tell their own story, but also gives the interviewer the opportunity to steer the conversation to the issue of perceived threats. The interviews are used to identify the issues that were securitized within the military mission to Uruzgan and especially how they are formulated. All interviews are recorded (if permitted) and transcribed. The transcription helps with the identification of the perceived threats and also captures the formulations used by the participants.

Issues that are mentioned as threats during the interview are all regarded as threats. However due to the fact that these interviewees only represent themselves, these threats can be rather personal and not representative for threats perceived by the mission as it is only identified by one individual. For this reason Chapter 7 only includes threats if at least three out of the seven interviewees identify the same threat. While two individuals identifying the same threat could be a coincidence, three interviewees perceiving the same threat suggests the identification of a threat at this level. For the interviews the same rule applies as formulations of threats in documents, only the most clear and explicit formulations are cited.

The interviews are not only used for the identification of the threats but are also used to form an idea about the context in which the securitizations of all levels are expressed and to what extent the securitization of the higher levels are accepted.

Chapter 3: Theoretical framework

This chapter reviews the literature on the Securitization Theory and present the theoretical framework for this thesis. The Securitization Theory is a theory that explains ‘the process by which a securitizing actor induces an audience to agree with a given interpretation of an event or a set of events’ (Balzacq, 2005, p. 187). Thus the Securitization Theory can help in understanding the securitization process, as this theory addresses questions of who is securitizing which issues, for whom, why, with what results and under which conditions (Newman, 2010, p. 85)?

The Securitization Theory tries to understand the construction of threats rather than to determine what the ‘real threats’ are (Buzan, Waever & De Wilde, 1998, pp. 32, 35). For the case of the Dutch military mission in Uruzgan it does not really matter what the real threats were, but which threats were perceived and expressed; how were they constructed? These are the threats upon which action is taken and which have an effect on the Afghan population. Since the theory is not applied to many cases before, this case study might contribute to an improvement of the framework (Stritzel, 2007, p. 359).

In order to apply and possibly improve the theory, what the Securitization Theory actually entails and what its requirements are need to be clear. The first part of this chapter therefore elaborates on the basics of the Securitization Theory. Section 3.2 discusses the main critiques on the Securitization Theory, by focusing on the concepts of security, its actors, the context, and the act of expressing the threats called the speech act. The final section of this chapter proposes a research framework with some changes and adaptations to the original Securitization Theory. This research framework helps to answer the main research question.

3.1 Securitization Theory

For a long period time security was solely defined in terms of the security of states, their monopoly on violence and on wars between states. Security is traditionally about the sovereignty of states, where each political unit strives for its own benefit (Buzan & Waever, 2009, p. 253). This definition, however, was challenged after the Cold War, due to three major changes. First, after 1989 the world order shifted from a bipolar to a unipolar system. The main ideological competition between states ended when the Soviet Union collapsed. Furthermore, wars and conflicts occurred more often within states than between states. In addition, globalization and regionalization caused non-state actors to become more important in the international sphere. These changes resulted in a more complex security scene and in international security debates the military-political definition of security lost much of its relevance (Buzan, Waever & De Wilde, 1998, p. vii). In order to grasp these new dimensions of international security, scholars called for a widening of the concept of security beyond the political and military sectors. Critical security studies, such as focusing on human security, came to the fore, challenging the traditional notions regarding security as developed during the Cold War. Critical security studies reject the central, often-times exclusive role of the state, and want to broaden the security concept by including many new elements and dimensions within the security domain. Although the traditionalists and the critical security scholars are considered to be two opposites, most traditionalists acknowledged the fact that their approach needs to change. Most traditionalists, such as Gray (1994, in: Buzan, Waever & De Wilde, 1998, p. 3) are willing to be more flexible regarding the central role of the state; however, they still insist on the military sector as the defining dimension in security. Other traditionalists (Jahn, Lemaitre & Waever, 1987, in: Buzan, Waever & De Wilde, 1998, p. 3) are more keeping the focus on the state but are willing to define security in broader terms than just military sector. The main critique of the traditionalists on the critical security studies is still the same, however; by broadening the security concept, it can in the end include everything and that inevitably results in a concept with no meaning.

The Securitization Theory as developed by the so-called Copenhagen School offers a middle ground

between these two opposites. *Security: A new framework for analysis*, on which the Securitization Theory is mainly based, argues that its main purpose is 'to present a framework based on the wider agenda that will incorporate the traditionalist position' (Buzan, Waever & De Wilde, 1998, p. 4). The Securitization Theory extends the concept of security to five sectors, including the political and military dynamics, but also economic, societal and environmental sectors (Buzan, Waever & De Wilde, 1998, p. 7). While the theory does include non-state actors in the concept of international security, the state still seems to remain the central actor (Buzan, Waever & De Wilde, 1998, p. 18). It is argued that this theory offers a better understanding of the concept of security in the new and dynamic post-Cold War world and that it is influential in the realm of security studies (Albert & Buzan, 2011, p. 424; McDonald, 2008, p. 581; Roe, 2004, p. 279; Stetter et al., 2011, p. 445; Watson, 2011, p. 4; Watson, 2012, p. 281).

This chapter continues in 3.1.1 with the definition of the concept of security as used in the Securitization Theory. Next, the main actors within the Securitization Theory are discussed, such as securitizing actors, referent objects, and the audience. The third part deals more in depth with the notion of speech act and its facilitating conditions. Finally, attention is paid to the sectors in the theory.

3.1.1 The concept of securitization

According to the Securitization Theory, (international) security is mainly about survival. In existential circumstances, confronted with existential threats, survival requires extraordinary measures beyond normal politics. In this context securitization is 'the move that takes politics beyond the established rules of the game and frames the issue either as a special kind of politics or as above politics' (Buzan, Waever & De Wilde, 1998, p. 23). The linguistic (speech) act of calling something a threat to the security of someone or something is referred to as the securitizing move. This speech act is required to justify the extraordinary measures taken in order to survive. A successful securitization thus implies the acceptance of both the threat and the extraordinary measures.

Security in this theory is not about what the real threats are, but rather about those threats that are expressed or spoken, the perceived threats. An issue does not become a security issue because it exists, it becomes a security issue because something is presented as such (Balzacq, 2005, pp. 179, 181; Floyd, 2007, p. 329). In the Securitization Theory anything can thus become security. Security is socially constructed and thereby a subjective concept. The meaning of the notion of security is derived from the relationship between the audience and the securitizing actor regarding the interpretation of the speech act (Balzacq, 2005, p. 184). It also means, implicitly, that not everything which is presented as a security issue allows for extraordinary measures that go beyond normal politics (Buzan, Waever & De Wilde, 1998, pp. 24, 25, 31, 40).

It is argued that securitization is a powerful and political choice. While in some instances it might be necessary to protect the referent object, acts of securitization never are just innocent. When securitization is successful it allows for actions that are not allowed in a normal situation, for instance more secrecy or less accountability (Roe, 2004, p. 281). It implies more power to the securitizing actor and therefore securitization can be abused in order to gain more power. In particular securitizing actors with more social capital can abuse securitization easier, since they have more means to facilitate a successful act of securitization (Floyd, 2007, pp. 344-45). Therefore, according to Buzan, Waever and de Wilde (1998, p.4), one should strive for de-securitization rather than securitization (Pam Grad & Petersen, 2011, p. 321; Watson, 2012, pp. 295-296).

3.1.2 Actors within the Securitization Theory

In the traditionalist approach to security the main actor is the state. It is the state which has the power to express a threat, it is the state that is threatened, it is the state that can resort to extraordinary measures and it is the state that, in normal circumstances, can persuade the audience

to support its cause. As stated before and as this section illustrates, the most effective actor still remains the state; however, it is inherent to the Securitization Theory that other, non-state parties can be actors as well (Buzan, Waever & De Wilde, 1998, p. 18).

The Securitization Theory addresses three main actors. These are (1) the securitizing actor, the one who expresses a security threat; (2) the referent objects, those that are threatened; and (3) the functional actors, those that affect the dynamics of a sector in which the securitization is taking place. However, this thesis also refers to the audience as a separate actor. The audience might (partly) overlap with other actors; since it is crucial for the successfulness and legitimacy of the securitization move, however, it should be treated as a separate actor.

Securitizing actor

The securitizing actors are the agents that declare that an issue is threatening the survival of something (the referent object). In other words, the securitizing actor is the one who performs the security speech act, the expression of an issue as a security issue. The actor makes a deliberate political choice to label an issue as a security issue, thereby implying that this issue has priority over other issues and that it needs to be accompanied by extraordinary measures. The securitizing actor speaks on behalf of the referent objects to a certain audience which decides if the claim made is acceptable (Buzan, Waever & De Wilde, 1998, pp. 36, 39). More often than not the relevant actors are political parties, governments, pressure groups that have a large audience; in short, actors with some sort of authority (Buzan, Waever & De Wilde, 1998, pp. 40-41). However in the theory any actor who is able to express his concern.

Referent objects

In the traditionalist approach the referent object is the state, as international security is about the survival of the state. In the Securitization Theory, however, anything or anyone can be a referent object. The referent object is thus any object that has to survive and for whom survival is necessary, according to the securitizing actor (Buzan, Waever & De Wilde, 1998, p. 39).

Which securitizations are more successful than others partly depends on the scale of the referent object. If the referent object is only a very small unit, it might be very likely that it feels threatened, but if it is too small only a few will be concerned about its survival. On the other end of the scale is a situation where large parts of the (or even the entire) world or mankind are used as a referent object. The securitization is then based on shared values that extend beyond the national borders. While this was the case, for example, during the Cold War and the threat of nuclear warfare, it is hard to establish an security issue by which everyone feels threatened (Buzan & Waever, 2009, pp. 255, 260, 270). Therefore, Buzan, Waever & De Wilde (1998, p. 36) argue that the 'middle scale', referring to units on a state level, are the most fruitful referent objects. It is seen as a more identifiable object to which the audience can relate to. On this state level it is easier to identify who should be protected and who is the enemy.

The common securitizing actors, such as political parties and pressure groups, are less likely to be referent objects, as they can rarely speak of a need to protect their own survival. This means that in many cases the referent object and the securitizing actor are not one and the same. If they are the same, however, it most likely is the state. The state might be able to express this need successfully through state representatives, as the need to protect the survival of the state, the country or the nation, rather than the survival of the government or its individual representatives (Buzan, Waever & De Wilde, 1998, pp. 40, 42).

Functional actors

Since not everyone (nor everything) is directly involved in the process of securitization, there are also so-called functional actors. These actors can influence the decisions made in a sector, although being neither the referent object nor the securitizing actor. They might not want to or be able to securitize; they could in part function as the audience, or could even be part of the threat, nevertheless the influence the context of the securitization process (Buzan, Waever & De Wilde, 1998, p. 36).

Audience

The Securitization Theory mainly focuses on the securitizing side; however, as stated before, the audience is the decisive factor between the securitizing actor and the referent object (Balzacq, 2005, pp. 181, 184). The audience ultimately supports or rejects the claim that an issue is threatening the survival. The audience is thus the group of people or organisations to whom the securitizing actor expresses the claim and needs to convince the audience that a security issue needs to be accompanied by extraordinary measures (Buzan, Waever & De Wilde, 1998, p. 26). These extraordinary measures can cover a wide range; for example, the government is less open about its procedures or deems it necessary to tap phones of citizens in order to prevent an attack, or, in the most extreme situation, the government can use violence.

3.1.3 Speech act

The speech act is the main element of the Securitization Theory (Buzan, Waever & De Wilde, 1998, p. 26). The speech act is a deliberate political decision to make an issue a security issue, to create a new situation in existential politics (Huysmans, 2011, pp. 273, 275; Wilkinson, 2007, p. 8). Whether a speech act leads to a successful securitization or not, depends on the facilitating conditions in which the audience plays a large role.

The facilitating conditions for a speech act to result in a successful securitization can be distinguished into two categories. One is the internal aspect, dealing with the linguistics and grammar of the speech act, thus with the question of how the securitization is phrased. The second category is external and associated with the social environment and the context in which an issue is securitized. The social environment entails the social capital of the speaker. Although this does not mean that only people with an official authority can securitize, it does have a positive effect on one's social capital and, generally speaking, it is easier to convince an audience of the threat. The latter external factor is that a security threat is considered to be reasonable and credible. It is helpful if people can place a threat in the context in which they are living and/or is generally perceived as a threatening issue (Balzacq, 2005, pp. 190, 191). The three facilitating conditions for a successful speech act and thus a successful securitization are thus: (1) the grammar and linguistic of the speech act in which a security issue is expressed; (2) the social capital of the speaker which determines the likelihood of acceptance; and (3) the credibility of the features of the expressed threats (Buzan, Waever & De Wilde, 1998, pp. 32, 33).

3.1.4 Sectors

The aim of the Securitization Theory is to extend the concept of security beyond the traditionalist sectors of military and politics. This resulted in five categories or sectors: military, political, environmental, economic, and societal. Combined these sectors include all potential security issues, with each sector having its own domain and its own threats, actors and context. These various sectors are helpful in analysing and trying to understand the complex nature of security (Buzan, Waever & De Wilde, 1998, p. 195). It is acknowledged that in real life these five sectors do not exist independently from each other. Nevertheless, issues and threats are primarily associated with these five sectors (Buzan, Waever & De Wilde, 1998, pp. 52, 72, 105, 116, 141, 196).

3.2 Critiques on the Securitization Theory

The Securitization Theory received many positive reactions and acknowledgements in security studies, but it received just as much critique. One of the main points of critique is that the theory is not applied often and therefore it does not take into account some crucial factors (Pam Grad & Petersen, 2011, p. 316). Other critique involves criticism on its understanding of the concept of security; the focus on people that are in a position to speak, thereby neglecting the marginalized people; the exclusion of non-verbal securitizations; as well as the vagueness of the actors, more

specifically the audience (Buzan & Waever, 2009, p. 254; Huysmans, 2011, p. 372). Section 3.2 addresses the various shortcomings that are categorized in five themes.

3.2.1 Concept of securitization

Although the concept of securitization is defined as ‘the move that takes politics beyond the established rules of the game and frames the issue either as a special kind of politics or as above politics’, it is not explained, however, where is the distinction between ‘normal’ and ‘existential’ politics, nor how it can be defined (Buzan, Waever & De Wilde, 1998, p. 23). The Securitization Theory conveys the message that there is one specific moment that can be identified in which an issue becomes a security issue. The obvious critique is that an issue has to develop over time in order to become a security issue and that it is impossible to pinpoint an exact moment in time (McDonald, 2008, p. 576; Watson, 2011, pp. 5, 8). Little steps are involved, such as other actors identifying the same issue as a security issue, or evidence and developments that the issue becomes more pressing. Repetition of expressing the issue as a security issue is also needed, as it is less likely that the audience is convinced the first time around (Huysmans, 2011, p. 379; McDonald, 2008, p. 564). Through repetition people become more aware of an issue and start identifying it as a security issue. Solely focusing on the moment of first mentioning of an issue becoming a security issue, does not help in understanding how or why this was made possible under these particular circumstances. Roe (2008, pp. 621-622, 633) criticizes the very meaning of the notion of securitization. According to him, the concept of a successful securitization should not only focus on the speech act, but also include the actual implementation of the extraordinary measures; this is, however, not a necessary condition in the Securitization Theory (Barthwal-Datta, 2009, p. 284, 297). There are also suggestions for improving the Securitization Theory by combining and integrating it with (elements of) other theories. Watson (2012, p. 279), for example, claims that securitization should be considered as part of framing. The Securitization Theory would, in line with its claims, focus on the framing of security, while at the same time it could address, under the broader literature on framing, other so far neglected issues such as marginalization, non-linguistic communication, demonstrating audience acceptance, resistance and also de-securitization (Watson, 2012, p. 279). This has as an additional benefit that American scholars would be included since they rather think in framing processes (Watson, 2012, pp. 280, 283, 297). Floyd (2007, p. 327) argues that the Securitization Theory could benefit from a slightly different approach, the so-called Welsh School. The Welsh School focuses on a disintegration of the state as security actor, since the state is seen as a major cause for much insecurity; insecurity should not be a part of security. Proponents of the Welsh School focus on security as an emancipatory concept that can free people of their constraints, while the Securitization Theory has no ‘emancipatory ideal’ (Floyd, 2007, pp. 332, 333). However, applying the Welsh, emancipatory approach to the Copenhagen School would imply that the researcher speaks on behalf of those who cannot speak (in terms of security) and tell them what their security problems are. The analyst then hands in some of the objectivity, just in order to be ‘emancipatory’. The underlying critique of the lack of an emancipatory ideal is further examined in 3.2.5.

3.2.2 Level of securitization

The Securitization Theory focuses mainly on securitization on the state level. Although the claim was to open up all possibilities, the theory is too preoccupied with the state as the main actor and in the process the initial objective got lost. This is recognized by Buzan & Waever (2009), as they focus on extending the theory and its application to a macro level, where the micro level is occupied by the concept of human security. Some referent objects can be better understood at a global scale and in the context of global securitization (Buzan & Waever, 2009, p. 258).

3.2.3 Context of securitization

The Securitization Theory is originally developed by scholars from the West. It is therefore inevitable that the theory has a Western bias (McDonald, 2008, p. 577). Although in principle the theory can apply anywhere, there are some underlying assumptions that give away the Western perspective on the world and on the state. The Securitization Theory assumes that there is a democracy and that the audience consists of, at least in part, the citizens of a state. The theory assumes that the audience has the power to influence the securitizing actor, and that if the audience does not approve the actor does not proceed. If a state or an organisation is not democratically organised, however, the audience might not have such a significant role at all. It also assumes that the securitizing actor has the power to speak or to enforce extraordinary (military) measures, which might not be the case in every country or for every securitizing actor. It focuses on the importance of speech, which is indeed important in Western cultures where the freedom of speech is practiced and preached. However again, this is not the case all over the world. The Securitization Theory is thus based on Western politics, and Western concepts of legitimacy, power, norms and values (Pam Grad & Petersen, 2011, p. 320; Wilkinson, 2007, pp. 8, 10, 11, 13, 21; Vuori, 2008, p. 68). Although the theory claims it is applicable to other political frameworks and other cultures, it is much harder to apply it outside the West since some of its basic logics are based on Western assumptions (Barthwal-Datta, 2009, pp. 278, 299; Vuori, 2008, p. 93). It should be kept in mind that the Securitization Theory is not necessarily a universal rule or mechanism, even if it is presented as such (Guzzini, 2011, p. 335). Furthermore, Balzacq (2005, p. 173) also critiques to which extent the context is included in the Securitization Theory. The influence of the context in which the threat is expressed on the successfulness of the securitization is underestimated (Pam Grad & Petersen, 2011, p. 319; Watson, 2012, p. 287). It is not the mere utterance of the word 'security' that changes politics; the utterance of 'security' can only have the desired effect if it aligns with the external context (Balzacq, 2005, p. 173). The act of securitization refers to a certain context, in which the population can be mobilized. Here the notion of context refers to references to historical events, or to stereotypes and emotions. The context also refers to the situation in which the audience can see some evidence of the threat in its surroundings and can identify themselves that there is some truth in the security claim (Balzacq, 2005, pp. 179-180, 182, 183). McDonald (2008, pp. 571-573) also refers to the lack of context in the Securitization Theory. He does acknowledge that to a certain extent the theory addresses context, as it includes a diversity of sectors and therefore not every threat is treated in the same way. Besides, the theory does include the facilitating conditions in which securitization can be successful, and the audience and its support do play a role in the theory; issues which are all context-dependent. Still, the theory does not make clear in which context securitization or the securitizing moves are possible, nor how they are constructed (Barthwal-Datta, 2009, p. 283). It leaves, for instance, out what the support of the audience should entail and how it should be expressed. It is argued that the construction of security, which ultimately is the essence of the Securitization Theory, should pay more attention to the historical, social and political context in which this process takes place, since this influences how the securitizing moves are constructed and what their effect is (Guzzini, 2011, pp. 335, 336; McDonald, 2008, p. 573).

3.2.4 Speech act

As mentioned in 3.2.1 the Securitization Theory is critiqued because it is unclear when an issue exactly becomes a security issue. It is therefore argued that most of the security issues are progressing over time and do not become a security issue just as a consequence of a speech act (Huysmans, 2011, pp. 276, 277; McDonald, 2008, p. 569). The speech act should be seen as a partial step in a wider social process in which the securitization comes into existence (Stritzel, 2007, p. 277). Furthermore the theory, and especially the importance of speech act, implies that one can only express a security issue through speech and not otherwise, for instance through images, depictions or other representations of an issue as a security issue. Therefore, the Securitization Theory neglects

those threats that are not or cannot be verbally expressed, but that can still be perceived as life threatening (Balzacq, 2005, p. 181; Barthwal-Datta, 2009, p. 281; Hansen, 2000, p. 285; Roe, 2004, p. 282; Wilkinson, 2007, p. 12). While the Securitization Theory based on speech act was designed to widen the concept of security, it ultimately limits itself to just verbal securitization (McDonald, 2008, pp. 565, 570, 582). Nowadays security issues are not only verbally expressed (or written down); they could just as well be drawn, put into images or expressed through body language (Hansen, 2000, p. 302; Stritzel, 2007, p. 377). Images, for example, of the collapsing Twin Towers on 9/11 are used to express terrorism as a threat to the US, which in turn is used for justifying the War on Terror (McDonald, 2008, p. 569). Another example in this respect are the cartoons of the Prophet Muhammad, which were published in a Danish newspaper in 2005. They can be seen as securitizing moves that express the Islam as a threat to Western culture (McDonald, 2008, p. 569). While there are some securitization scholars who include non- and/or extra-linguistic methods, these are not included in the main framework of Securitization Theory yet (Watson, 2012, p. 297). Another consideration regarding the speech act is that the securitization mainly focuses on statesmen, on those in power that are rather distant from the ordinary people. It makes the Securitization Theory into a theory about the powerful and it thus expresses an elitist view of politics, while silencing the marginalized (Huysmans, 2011, p. 275; Hansen, 2000, p. 306). This is further explained in the next section.

3.2.5 Actors

The Securitization Theory focuses on the speech act as the only mechanism to securitize. This assumes that everyone is able to speak, since according to the theory anyone can securitize (McDonald, 2008, pp. 563, 564). In many countries there are, however, certain (groups of) people that are considered to be inferior and are not given the same rights as others. These people can be distinguished by ethnicity, culture, race, or more common, by the level of income. Those who are marginalized do not have the capacity, power nor time to express and claim their security threats and therefore are excluded from the Securitization Theory. Even as an audience it is difficult to assume that they would be able to reject a securitizing move by those actors in power (Hansen, 2000, pp. 287, 306). And even if they do have the capacity and the will to do so, it is less likely that the securitization is successful for they need a strong support group, which more often than not is lacking. Whereas in a democracy the people and other, non-state actors do have more chances to be heard, for instance through media and representatives, in non-democratic countries these opportunities are more limited (Barthwal-Datta, 2009, p. 277; Watson, 2011, p. 5; Wilkinson, 2007, pp. 13, 15). The critics thus argue for the inclusion of the marginalized, for an emancipatory element in the theory.

In addition, there are critiques concerning the lack of clarity regarding the audience. The Securitization Theory assumes that the audience is crucial for the acceptance of the securitization move, and thus of its success, but despite this crucial role the concept of audience is not properly developed (Balzacq, 2005, pp. 173, 178; Barthwal-Datta, 2009, p. 285). In Securitization Theory, the audience as such is not even referred to as an actor. It remains unclear who this audience is, what its status, its nature and its relationship with the securitizing actor are (Stritzel, 2007, pp. 362-363; Wilkinson, 2007, p. 11). Balzacq (2005, p. 192) addresses the concept of audience, by ascribing it three elements: (1) the audience's frame of reference; (2) the readiness of the audience to be convinced, which largely depends on the credibility of the securitizing actor; and (3) the ability of the audience to actually deny or grant the extraordinary measures. These three elements make the concept of the audience somewhat more clear, at least they give more insight in the role of the audience in securitization processes. A distinction in the type of support given by the audience can clarify the role of the audience as well. According to Roe (2008, pp. 615, 616) securitization can best be understood when divided into a stage of identification and a stage of mobilization. This distinction means that the audience can agree on the invocation of a threat, but may not agree with the implementation of the extraordinary measures. However, even with this distinction it is difficult to determine whether or not the securitization is accepted, and if so, to what extent (Barthwal-Datta,

2009, p. 284).

One last point of critique deals with the actors and their construction in general. Even though the Securitization Theory takes different actors into consideration, Stetter et al. (2011, pp. 445-46) claim that this underestimates the broader societal structures. The theory does not explain how these actors are constructed, nor how they came to be within the context of securitization. In particular regarding the audience these elements are not explained. Watson (2012, p. 286) agrees with Stetter et al., by arguing that the social capital of the securitizing actor should not be seen as a pre-existing factor, but more so as a process.

3.3 Research framework of securitization

This thesis uses an adapted research framework of Securitization Theory for two reasons. The first reason is that applications of the Securitization Theory are lacking, possibly due to the fact that it is a difficult theory to apply. The goal of the research framework is to make the theory more specific and therefore more applicable to case studies. The second reason for adapting the theory to a research framework is a consequence of the various points of critique on the Securitization Theory. This does not mean that every critique as previously discussed results in an adaptation, only those critiques are used that improve the theory and the theory's application. This sub-chapter follows the same order as Section 3.2. It addresses the critiques that are included in the research framework.

3.3.1 Concept of securitization

The definition of security is the same as in the original Securitization Theory. Security is about the survival of a referent object which, if threatened, needs extraordinary measures to be protected (Buzan, Waever & De Wilde, 1998, p. 23). However in this research framework a successful securitization implies that the perceived security issue is accepted by the audience, but also that the audience accepts the mobilization and implementation of the extraordinary measures. The intention of securitization therefore needs to be that these extraordinary measures are implemented when accepted by the public. If the measures are not implemented, this means that the securitization is not fully successful (Roe, 2008, pp. 621-622, 633; Barthwal-Datta, 2009, p. 284). The successfulness of the securitization is also reflected by the influence it has on other actors and whether they consider it also as a security issue. These factors help in analysing the success of the securitization in its application.

The concept of securitization in the research framework does not imply that an issue (suddenly) changes from a political issue to a security issue at one particular moment in time; it acknowledges that a securitization takes time (McDonald, 2008, p. 576). It looks at the prior developments and the securitizing moves leading up to the securitization which could involve other actors or sectors.

3.3.2 Level of analysis

The research framework focuses less on the state (unit) level as the level of analysis. It takes securitization processes at all levels, micro, state and macro, into account. There can also be overarching securitizations, such as the War on Terror, under which other securitizations on a state and micro-level take place. In principle, not much changes as the Securitization Theory already includes the possibilities on the macro and micro level.

3.3.3 Context of securitization

The central objective of the context in the research framework is that it acknowledges that every case is unique. The research framework is not a universal framework. While the essence of the theory is still present, it is interpreted differently in various cases. This goes for the Western bias as well, for which the Securitization Theory received much criticism (Hansen, 2000; Wilkinson, 2007). Liberal democracy and freedom of speech, generally perceived as Western, are not universal but they are shared by large parts of the world, especially since the end of the Cold War. Democracy and its values are currently not present in all countries, they are still considered to be goals for the (near)

future, also in Afghanistan. The research framework does not reject these assumptions completely as rejecting them would be rejecting the Securitization Theory, but it, however, loosens them, thereby making an application to non-democratic and non-Western countries easier. Of importance in the research framework is also the context for the speech act and ultimately securitization. Although the original theory already includes specific contexts through a differentiation of sectors and the facilitating conditions including the audience, it only does so to a limited extent. The research framework strongly emphasizes the context, by looking at how the speech act is framed in referring to history, stereotypes and its language, as well as by looking at the external conditions in which the speech act is preformed and is able to be constructed (Balzacq, 2005, pp. 179-183; Guzzini, 2011, pp. 335-336; McDonald, 2008, pp. 571-573).

3.3.4 Speech act

It is unlikely that a speech act is successful immediately the first time it is used. Therefore the research framework takes into account previous developments and sees the speech act as part of a process (Stritzel, 2007, p. 277). Another alteration is that the research framework extends the speech act to non-linguistic or extra-linguistic approaches, such as images, the use of metaphors and bodily expressions (Watson, 2012, pp. 297, 298; Hansen, 2000, p. 302). The speech act thus includes verbal, written and visual expressions of security issues, giving more people the opportunity to express threats.

3.3.5 Actors

It seems that those actors with power and enough social capital are the ones who are capable of securitizing. They are capable to convince its audience and capable of actually implementing the extraordinary measures. This limits the range of actors of securitization significantly, while according to the Securitization Theory it would actually open up the security spectrum to non-state actors (Barthwal-Datta, 2009, p. 277; Watson, 2011, p. 5; Wilkinson, 2007, pp. 13, 15). Although the importance if those securitizing actors cannot be denied, this research framework tries to fix this contradiction by allowing the researcher to apply the theory to any actor or unit. This means that the research framework loses some of its objectivity, as the researcher chooses the research object. The best way to proceed is to single out actors for the research and analyse their actions and thus (potential) securitizing moves. This gives the theory the opportunity to include an emancipatory element, by including non-state actors and their securitizations, that normally would not be heard. They might use images or other invocations for their security issues, without reaching a large enough audience, without reaching the national level.

Furthermore, this research framework tries to specify the audience and its role in the securitization. It clarifies and improves the concept of the audience into a more specific actor. In the research framework the role of the audience and its significance in the process of securitization depends on the frame of reference the audience has, the readiness of the audience to accept claims made by the securitizing actor, and its actual ability to reject or accept the securitization. In addition to this, the role of the audience is more clarified as the research framework identifies two types of support the audience can offer. It makes the distinction between the acceptance of the security issue (stage of identification) and the acceptance of the use of extraordinary measures (stage of mobilization) (Roe, 2008, pp. 615-616).

In general this research framework provides a clarification of the theory, being more specific about what is meant by the concepts. It is a framework that, given its emancipatory elements and the loosening of the state and Western assumptions, leans slightly more to a critical approach than the traditionalist. However, it is still the middle ground between the two approaches as it only loosens the assumptions while not rejecting them altogether, as critical security scholars do. The original theory is adapted by including contemporary developments and the critics of contemporary scholars, resulting in the research framework.

A clear overview of the principles of the Securitization Theory and the research framework is presented in table 2. This research framework functions as a guide through the case study of Uruzgan.

Table 2: The Securitization Theory and the research framework

	The Securitization Theory	The research framework
Concept of securitization	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The speech act, the move that takes an issue beyond the normal politics in order to protect the referent object in its survival • Successful securitization: acceptance of a security issue as well as the acceptance of (the need for) extraordinary measures 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The speech act, the move that takes an issue beyond the normal politics and claims also action that needs to be taken in order to protect the survival of the referent object • Successful securitization: acceptance of a security issue, as well as the acceptance and the implementation of extraordinary measures
Level of securitization	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Mainly state (unit) level 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Any level; micro, macro and state
Context	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Western orientation • Differentiation of sectors • Facilitating conditions 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Loosening while not rejecting Western orientation • Differentiation of sectors • Facilitating conditions, but with more emphasis on the conditions in which the securitization could take place, including prior developments, and the use of context in the speech act
Speech act	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Moment when a political issue becomes a security issue • Linguistic expressions 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Speech act is a process, rather than one specific moment in which the issue changes • Inclusion of non-linguistic and extra-linguistic expressions
Actors	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Securitizing actors are mainly made up of the political elite • Audience is important, but an underdeveloped actor 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Securitizing actors are mainly made up of the political elite, but opens up to non-state actors • Emancipation • Audience is more specified based on types of support • Clearer role of the audience in securitization

Chapter 4 The case study of Uruzgan

For testing a theory, one picks a case study that gives the right circumstances to proof a theory right or wrong. The Securitization Theory is not easy to apply; therefore, in order to make the theory more applicable, a research framework of the Securitization Theory is developed in Chapter 3. The case study of Uruzgan tests whether or not this research framework is an improvement to the applicability of the theory. At the same time the case study helps to identify how processes of securitization work in a complex military organisation and answer the main research question ‘how are the security threats that have been identified and formulated by NATO corresponding with the identification and formulation of the security threats at the lower levels in the mission, the Dutch government and the Dutch military in Uruzgan?’.

This chapter introduces the case study and also explains briefly the structure of the mission from which the hypothesis of this research can be derived.

4.1 The context of Uruzgan

Uruzgan is a province located in the south of Afghanistan and with an estimated population of 395,000. The capital is Tarin Kowt. Uruzgan’s size is about 28,522 km², almost three-quarters the size of the Netherlands. The local terrain is very mountainous, with its highest point reaching 2,778 meters (Koninklijke Landmacht, 2007, p. 25). Uruzgan is surrounded by the provinces of Helmand (west), Kandahar (south), Zabul (southeast), Ghanzi (east), and Daikundi (north). As a province Uruzgan did not exist before 1964 as it was part of the ‘greater Kandahar’ (Kandahar, Helmand, Uruzgan and Zabul) (Van Bijlert, 2009, p. 155). Only in March 2004, Uruzgan reached its current form, after being split in two separate provinces: Uruzgan and Daikundi. However, the exact borders of Uruzgan remain still unclear (Koninklijke Landmacht, 2007, p. 25).

Figure 1: Map of Uruzgan



Source: Ministry of Defence (2009)

As the majority of the population in Uruzgan lives in rural areas, its economic activities mainly evolve around traditional agriculture. The production of poppy remains an important source of income in Uruzgan. Other economic opportunities besides agriculture are very limited (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2006; in Grandia Mantas (2009), p. 33).

Uruzgan has a very complex ethnic structure (Kitzen, 2012, pp. 718-719). While the original population of Uruzgan were of Hazara ethnicity, they have been forcibly removed from most of Uruzgan and nowadays the Hazaras only make up eight per cent of the population in Uruzgan. The majority of the population (91%) are of Pashtun ethnicity, subdivided in many tribes and sub-tribes


(Van Bijlert, 2009, p. 155; The Liaison Office, 2010, p. iv). Since tribal identity is more important than the Afghan nationality, it is the affiliation with the sub-tribes that determine the loyalty (as well as conflicts and obligations of patronage) of the local population (Kitzen, 2012, p. 719). Local politics are shaped by these alignments, complicated by conflicts between pro-government strongmen and former Taliban, and other internal community divisions (The Liaison Office, 2010, p. 5). During the years between 2002 and 2006 the provincial government mainly consisted of members of the Popalzai tribe, representing just ten per cent of the population in Uruzgan; this government was responsible for deepening the (tribal) rifts in order to weaken their political opponents and strengthen their own rule (The Liaison Office, 2009, p. 5). Uruzgan also suffered from long-time negligence by the central government, in terms of education, health, transport and other basic services even though it played a major role in recent developments in Afghanistan (Grandia Mantas, 2009, p. 32). For example, the Taliban has its roots in Uruzgan (Philip, 2011; Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defence, 2012, p. 67). By 1996, the Taliban gained control over most parts of Afghanistan and ruled over Afghanistan with a strict regime based on religious laws. This Taliban regime came to an end in 2001, when the United States and its allies invaded Afghanistan after the Taliban's refusal to hand over al-Qaeda's Osama Bin Laden (Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defence, 2012, p. 15). Uruzgan continues to play a significant role contemporary Afghan politics, as the (former) president of Afghanistan, Karzai, has his roots in Uruzgan as well (Philip, 2011).

As a traditional stronghold of the Taliban, Uruzgan is seen as one of the most unsafe areas in Afghanistan, especially prior to the Dutch military mission; for example, the national office of statistics could not gather information regarding this province prior to 2006 because it was considered to be too dangerous (Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defence, 2012, p. 67). It is in this context that the Dutch military mission took place.

4.2 The mission in Uruzgan

The case study of Uruzgan includes actors at an international level, a national level, and a sub-national level. Figure 2 gives a clear (simplified) overview of the structure of the mission in Uruzgan. Each box – red, orange and yellow – represents a separate level of analysis.

Figure 2: Overview of mission structure



Source: Interviewee 3 (2014)

The red box depicts the highest level of authority of the ISAF mission. The units in this box (NATO, ISAF Headquarters, and the various regional commands) are responsible for decision making on an

international level regarding the mission and is further referred to as NATO. Decisions made at this level generally account for all elements of the mission.

The orange box represents the highest national level of authority for the Dutch military mission. It includes the Dutch government, responsible for the political decision-making. The CDS (Commander of the Armed Forces) is the highest in command of the military, while the Directorate of Operations (DOPS) has an advisory role for both the Dutch government and the CDS. In addition, all branches of the armed forces are included. The actors within this orange box make decisions regarding the mission in Uruzgan on behalf of the Netherlands; therefore all these actors are part of the label 'Dutch government'.

The yellow box represents all elements and units belonging to the level of the Dutch military mission in Uruzgan. The highest level of command for the mission is the local commander of Task Force Uruzgan (TFU). He is responsible for the operational decision-making, supported by an Operational Monitoring and Liaison Team (OMLT), a Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT), a Police Mentoring Team (PMT) as well as a Battle Group (BG). These various units are in direct contact with the local Afghan population, as well as with the insurgents. This research also refers to Dutch military stationed at Kandahar or Kabul as the Dutch military mission (in Uruzgan). Even though they are not located in Uruzgan, they are in the position to place Uruzgan within a larger picture; at the same time they are closer to the levels of NATO and the Dutch government and can therefore provide valuable insights.

Figure 2 shows that each actor acts at a different level and each level takes different actors into account. NATO is an international actor, acting in a global context. In its actions and decisions NATO has to take into account the views of its member states. The Dutch government, while it is also concerned with the international context, has to take into account the national context. National politicians have to agree with the decisions of the Dutch government. Although the Dutch military in Uruzgan follows the orders of both NATO and the Dutch government, in executing its policies it also has to take into account the local population of Uruzgan. Against this knowledge, a hypothesis is formulated.

The hypothesis is that there is a difference between the securitization processes at the three levels. Not all threats as perceived by the NATO level, nor their formulations, correspond with the other two levels, especially since not all securitization processes are successful.

This hypothesis is based on two assumptions. The first assumption is that the different contexts in which the speakers are operating results in different perceived threats. The second assumption is that all levels include other actors and contexts in their actions and thus in their securitizations as well. This means that, although they might perceive the same threat, the interpretation and formulation of a specific threat can still differ. The difference in the levels makes it less likely that all securitizations by NATO are successful.

The last three sections of this chapter describe each level in more detail.

4.2.1 NATO

ISAF is the most challenging mission of NATO so far, involving one of the largest military coalitions. Over fifty nations, member states as well as non-member states, contributed to ISAF (NATO, 2015b). At its peak more than 130,000 personnel participated in the mission.

The first steps towards the ISAF mission in Afghanistan was set in 2001. In a direct response to the 9/11 attacks in the United States, NATO, for the first time in its history, invoked Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty; stating that an attack on any NATO member (in this case the United States), is considered to be an attack against all of its members. Because the Taliban refused to hand over the

leaders of al-Qaeda, held responsible for the 9/11 attacks, the United States invaded Afghanistan. By December 22, 2001, the Taliban regime was defeated. An international conference in Bonn decided to have an interim government elected and also agreed on the establishment of an International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), which would support the reconstruction and stabilization in Afghanistan. UN Security Council Resolution (S/RES) 1386 (2001) approved of a UN-mandated ISAF mission in Afghanistan which was at that time limited to Kabul and its surroundings. In August 2003, NATO took over command of ISAF. ISAF was gradually extended to all of Afghanistan (Sperling & Webber, p. 345). The final stage in this process was the 2006 extension of ISAF to the south; at this stage the Netherlands became the lead nation in the province of Uruzgan, acting under the command of ISAF.

Although the ISAF mission ended December 31, 2014, NATO's commitment to Afghanistan has not ended yet. The Alliance initiated a new mission, Afghanistan Resolute Support, changing the nature of its involvement from a combat mission to a training, advice and support mission for the Afghan National Security Forces (NATO, 2015a).

4.2.2 The Dutch government

The involvement of the Netherlands in Afghanistan can also be traced back to the attacks of 9/11. As part of NATO, the Netherlands agreed with the invocation of Article 5 and as part of the international community it agreed with the establishment of ISAF. Based on this, the Dutch government decided, as of 2002, to contribute to ISAF, by deploying an infantry company in Kabul (Hazelbag, 2009, p. 8). By that time ISAF did not yet fall under the command of NATO. ISAF command rotated among individual participating states for a period of six months. When Germany and the Netherlands were jointly in charge of ISAF, they proposed a larger role for NATO. NATO supported this German/Dutch request and eventually took over complete command in August 2003 (NATO, 2008a, p. 12). The Netherlands continued its contribution to ISAF, as it deployed a Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in the Northern province of Baghlan (July 5, 2004- September 20, 2006) (Ministry of Defence, 2007a). Although the Netherlands had already contributed significantly to the stability and security of Afghanistan, NATO did request additional Dutch support as it planned to extend the ISAF mission to the South of Afghanistan. Since the Netherlands had previously proven its capability in Afghanistan, NATO Secretary General, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, and other leaders were putting pressure on the Dutch government to send troops to Uruzgan and become the lead nation in this province. (Kaarbo & Cantir, 2013, p. 474).


4.2.3 The Dutch military mission

As of 2006 the Dutch military had command over the province of Uruzgan as part of the ISAF mission, Task Force Uruzgan (TFU). The ISAF mission, and thus TFU, was primarily a Counter Insurgency (COIN) mission, focusing on winning the hearts and minds of the local population. For their income, strength and survival the insurgents depend on the support of the local population. Since the local population cannot support two opposing forces at the same time, gaining support for the ISAF mission would imply that support for the insurgents is decreasing. The COIN approach of the Dutch military is also known as the 3D approach, focusing on Development, Diplomacy and Defence (Dimitru & de Graaf, 2010, p. 435). It calls for an integrative approach, not only directed at short term solutions such as providing security but also including development and diplomacy policies so that the results will be sustainable. Therefore, TFU included both military and civilian personnel (Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defence, 2012, p. 34).

The Dutch military was not able to apply this approach to all of Uruzgan, however, since the province covers a too large area for the number of available forces. Therefore an 'inkblots approach' was used, focusing on creating 'safe havens', where the population can live in relative security and has freedom of movement; at the same time reconstruction projects can be initiated. The inkblot approach regarding safe areas consists of four stages: shape-clear-hold-build (Dimitru & de Graaf, 2010, p. 437). In Uruzgan these safety zones were called Afghan Development Zones (ADZ)

(Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defence, 2012, p. 17). The geographical starting points for this strategy were the towns of Tarin Kowt and Deh Rawod and parts of Chora, the location of the main Dutch military bases (The Liaison Office, 2010, p. 6). Below the gradual expansion of the inkblots during the mission is illustrated.


Figure 3: Afghan Development Zones and the inkblots in various years



Source: Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defence (2012), pp. 39-40

As Figure 4 shows, TFU is made up of several elements, consisting of a force of 950 people. The TFU had a staff of approximately one hundred members, while the PRT had maximum of 60 military personnel and the Battle Group (BG) consisted of 450 military personnel with additional supporting elements (Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defence, 2012, p. 34). The resulting two hundred military men and women were part of the other elements. Initially, the Operational Mentoring Liaison Team (OMLT) and the Police Mentoring Team (PMT) were not part of the structure, but were added on during a later stage when the security tasks were gradually handed over to the Afghan Security Forces.

Figure 4: Structure of TFU



Source: Interviewee 3 (2014)

Chapter 5 Securitization by NATO

NATO is an umbrella organisation of 28 nations, in which the member states have the final say (Grandia Mantas, 2010, pp. 482-483). For its military forces NATO depends on the capacities of its member states. Successful securitizations by NATO are therefore important as the organisation has to convince them to contribute, in this case, to ISAF (Grandia Mantas, 2010, p. 486).

The securitizing move

This chapter primarily identifies securitizing moves by NATO through an analysis of official documents; in addition, news articles, reports, videos and images are consulted. The official NATO documents state most clearly what NATO considers to be threatening. Other documentation is important for identifying and analysing securitizing moves as they back up the statements in the official documents. An analysis of the documents and non-textual sources of which NATO is the speaker results in the identification of four threats: terrorism, narcotics, Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs), and a lack of Afghan public support. These four threats are the only issues explicitly mentioned as threats by NATO and therefore they function as the basis of this chapter. First the actors involved in the securitizing move are briefly mentioned, followed by the speech acts for each identified threat. The citations included in the speech act are the clearest formulations found in the documents and non-textual sources stating the issues as threats.

Actors

The securitizing actor

The securitizing actor for the threats is NATO. NATO urges its member states to join its cause, which is resolving the situation in Afghanistan.

Functional actor

Functional actors in this context are other countries that contributed to ISAF while not being part of NATO itself. Another functional actor is the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIROA) which invited NATO troops to Afghanistan to contribute to security and stability in Afghanistan (The International Afghanistan Conference, 2004). The various media organisations can also be seen as functional actors, as they influence the environment in which NATO makes decisions.

Audience

The threats might have several audiences, but for NATO the most important audience are the NATO member states. The Afghan case was the first time action undertaken as a result of an invocation of Article 5 of the NATO Charter. The mission in Afghanistan was also the first time a NATO mission took place outside Europe. This new type of mission would therefore show to what extent member states were really committed to NATO, and its ideas about collective action. A rejection of this ISAF mission by member states could be fatal for the organisation; therefore it was necessary to get the support of all of member states also for the entire continuation of the mission.

Another important audience is the Afghan population. From the start of the military operation ISAF had the strategy of winning the hearts and minds of the local population. This strategy is directed at gaining support for the mission so that the Afghans are more willing to help ISAF instead of insurgents. It is therefore necessary to convince them of the necessity of ISAF, making them thus an audience of NATO. The issue of IEDs has a slightly different audience, as NATO's audience can be seen here in even broader terms: ranging from military personnel of the mission in Afghanistan, via technical engineers developing material capable of resisting IEDs, to the local Afghan population.

Threat 1: Terrorism

NATO is the leading force in the mission in Afghanistan, directed at building up stability and peace in the country and preventing it from becoming a safe haven for terrorists. The involvement of NATO in Afghanistan is a direct result of the terrorist attacks of 9/11 in New York and Washington (NATO, 2012, p. 3). In response to these attacks NATO clearly formulated terrorism as a direct threat; this started the process of securitization by NATO.

Speech act

On December 6, 2001, NATO issued a statement at the Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Brussels. According to this statement, 'the terrorist attacks of 11 September were an outrage against the entire world. We are responding to bring to justice those responsible for these crimes, and to prevent them from taking innocent lives in future. **Terrorism threatens the lives of our citizens, and their human rights and civil liberties**'⁵ (NATO, 2001).

Although this speech act was initiated quite early after the attacks, terrorism is perceived as a security issue during the entire period of NATO's involvement in Afghanistan. This paragraph lists the most clearly formulated speech acts of NATO regarding the threat of terrorists.

The 2006 joint declaration by NATO and the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan clearly stated that 'Afghanistan also **considers terrorism, extremism** and drug trafficking as **major challenges to security**, and is committed to taking full advantage of international support and assistance, and to cooperating with the international community to build capacity to eliminate **these threats**' (NATO, 2006a). At the Riga Summit in November 2006 NATO stated: 'we further recognise the need to disrupt the networks that finance, supply and equip **terrorists who threaten the government and people of Afghanistan**' (NATO, 2006b, p. 7). S/RES 1776 formulated how diverse the group of people associated with terrorism is, stating that it is 'reiterating its concern about the security situation in Afghanistan, in particular the increased violent and **terrorist activities by the Taliban, al-Qaeda, illegally armed groups and those involved in the narcotics trade, and the links between terrorism activities and illicit drugs, resulting in threats to the local population, national security forces and international military and civilian personnel**' (S/RES 1776, 2007, pp. 1-2). S/RES 1833 perceived this also in 2008, '**recognizing the increased threats posed by the Taliban, al-Qaeda and other extremist groups [...]**' (S/RES 1833, 2008, p. 2).

Terrorism also threatens the international security. This is clearly formulated by NATO Secretary General, Anders Fogh Rasmussen as he said '**what is happening in Afghanistan poses a clear and present danger to the citizens in all our countries. Terrorism that could strike our streets, our airports, our metros. Extremism that inspires violence across the world**' (Rasmussen, 2009b). Also in the Strategic Vision, NATO identified once again terrorism as a threat to the lives of Afghans, as well as to national and international stability: 'we gather in Bucharest to reaffirm our determination to help the people and the elected Government of Afghanistan build an enduring stable, secure, prosperous and democratic state, respectful of human rights **and free from the threat of terrorism**. [...] Neither we nor our Afghan partners will allow **extremists and terrorists such as the Taliban or al-Qaeda, to regain control of Afghanistan or use it as a base for terror that threatens all of our people and has been felt in many of our countries and beyond. [...]** Our vision of success is clear: **extremism and terrorism will no longer pose a threat to stability**' (NATO, 2008b). ISAF commander General McChrystal translated this view into a military goal. He said that the '**strategic goal is to defeat the insurgency threatening the stability of Afghanistan**' (McChrystal, 2009b).

There are of course examples of non-textual securitizing moves. For instance, in the documentary 'Road to Security' videos of the terrorists and other insurgents are shown, using their weapons and terrifying citizens (NATO, Road to Stability, 2009b, pp. part 1: 6.57-7.35). These images can be

⁵ All original citations are without any **bold** words. The author added this to emphasize the formulations of the threats.

perceived as non-textual securitization moves in which the capabilities of the insurgents are illustrated by their display of weaponry.

Extraordinary measures

One month after 9/11 NATO announced its additional measures taken as result of the invocation of Article 5. These measures included an agreement **‘to enhance intelligence-sharing on terrorism threats both bilaterally and within NATO’**, resulting in the creation of a Terrorism Threat Intelligence Unit (Reveron, 2006, p. 461; Robertson, 2001). Most of the intelligence is traditionally shared in bilateral agreements; however, as a consequence of terrorism there is a need to share it with all member states. All in all these steps are extra measures needed because of the perceived threat. This was further encouraged amongst other thing during the Riga Summit in 2006, as NATO commended **‘NATO’s Defence Against Terrorism initiatives, including development of cutting-edge technologies to counter terrorist threats, such as defending Allied forces in Afghanistan from Improvised Explosive Devices. We call upon Allies to continue to develop and fully implement their national capabilities in this important area, and to strengthen the Alliance’s ability to share information and intelligence on terrorism, especially in support of NATO operation’** (NATO, 2006b, p. 20). The Riga Summit also formulated the only speech act in which the extraordinary measures are directly claimed; it stated **‘the need to disrupt the networks that finance, supply and equip terrorists who threaten the government and people of Afghanistan’** (NATO, 2006b, p. 7).

The last two citations are formulations of extraordinary measures that can apply to any security issue of the mission. Both S/RES 1776 and S/RES 1833, in which the mandate for ISAF is formulated, stated that the resolution **‘authorizes the Member States participating in ISAF to take all necessary measures to fulfil its mandate’** (S/RES 1776, 2007, p. 3; S/RES 1833, 2008, p. 3). All member states can take any measure deemed necessary to create a stable and secure Afghanistan. Large parts of Afghanistan are unstable and insecure because of the presence of terrorists and insurgents. A safe haven for terrorists in Afghanistan leads to a growing number of attacks, to more criminality and instability, not only in the country, but in the region and the world as well (NATO, 2008a, p. 1; UNSC, 2001; UNSC, 2007, p. 3). In other words, fulfilling the mandate means defeating the terrorists in Afghanistan.

Facilitating conditions

The speech act includes in almost all cases a reference to the threat of terrorism with no boundaries. Terrorists might have a safe haven in Afghanistan, but the insecurity posed by them is not limited to Afghanistan only. Terrorism threatens also international security and stability and thus our own lives. Terrorism is used in combination with al-Qaeda, Taliban, extremism, insurgents, and illegally armed groups. These different names are used because the concept of ‘terrorists’ as a group is hard to define, as it overlaps with the other groups, such as drug barons and extremists. These combinations of names might help in creating more support for this securitization, since most people have no direct experiences with insurgents or armed groups, but they might have experiences with extremism. In particular in Western European countries the political debate on extremism could contribute to more support for fighting this threat. This is also part of the context of the securitization, leading to a second facilitating condition of securitization; the credibility of the features of the expressed threat, depending on the context. The initial context is the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks. NATO recognized that after 9/11 international security was highly dependent on the situation in Afghanistan. (NATO, 2008b). The attacks of September 11, 2001, followed by terrorist attacks in Madrid in 2004 and London in 2005 showed that terrorism affects people anywhere in the world and more specifically countries that are part of NATO. Another factor contributing to a context is the number of casualties for which the terrorists are held responsible, be it the victims of international attacks or the civilians killed in Afghanistan. The Taliban is held responsible for the majority of civilian casualties in Afghanistan (De Hoop Scheffer, 2007). The last facilitating condition for the securitization of terrorism is the social capital of the one speaker, in this case NATO. The social capital of NATO is considerable. NATO represents 26 European countries, as well as the United

States and Canada. It is a broad international Alliance for collective security and defence, trying to preserve international peace. Not only the cause, preservation of peace and stability, can be seen as a 'just and good' cause, also the fact that the organisation is made up of 28 countries that are generally perceived as good, just and credible countries makes NATO into a 'just and good' organisation. The social capital of NATO increases the chances for acceptance of the process of securitization. The social capital of the speaker (NATO) is the same for all the threats, therefore the chapter only mentions it once.

Threat 2: Narcotics

Narcotics, in the Afghan context specifically referred to as 'poppy's' or opium is an important part of the economy and trade flows in Afghanistan. Afghanistan has become the world's largest producer of opium (Costa & Pardew, 2007; NATO, 2008c, p. 3). Most of the opium is produced in the Southern parts of the country, the region where the insurgents are most active.

Speech act

The first time narcotics were specifically referred to as a threat in 2004. Participants of the International Afghanistan Conference agreed that **'opium poppy cultivation, drug production and trafficking pose a serious threat to the rule of law and development in Afghanistan as well as to international security'** (The International Afghanistan Conference, 2004). Two year later NATO with the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan declared **'terrorism, extremism and drug trafficking as major challenges to security, and is committed to taking full advantage of international support and assistance, and to cooperating with the international community to build capacity to eliminate these threats'** (NATO, 2006a). According to the Afghanistan Compact of 2006, **'meeting the threat that the narcotics industry poses to national, regional and international security as well as the development and governance of the country and the well-being of Afghans will be a priority for the Government and the international community'** (NATO, 2006c, p. 4). Two years later NATO still perceived that **'one of Afghanistan's toughest challenges remains narcotics. [...] The influence of the narcotics trade continues to hamper progress in key areas: security, governance, economic development and, increasingly, health'** (NATO, 2008c, p. 3). The same document stated that **'opium is not only a criminal problem; it funds the insurgency, drains the legal economy and promotes corruption. It constitutes a significant threat to Afghan governance, stability and regional security'** (NATO, 2008c, p. 20). The 2009 Afghanistan Report of NATO also explicitly referred to the narcotics as threatening to the Afghan population: **'the drugs trade also fuels corruption and undermines the rule of law. It jeopardises the prospects of long-term economic growth and impacts on the nation's health, as drug addiction is an ever-increasing problem in Afghanistan'** (NATO, 2009a, p. 28). Particularly the link between terrorism and narcotics makes narcotics a security issue. S/RES 1776 formulated this link quite directly: **'reiterating its concern about the security situation in Afghanistan, in particular the increased violent and terrorist activities by the Taliban, al-Qaeda, illegally armed groups and those involved in the narcotics trade, and the links between terrorism activities and illicit drugs, resulting in threats to the local population, national security forces and international military and civilian personnel'** (S/RES 1776, 2007, pp. 1-2). In an interview, James Pardew, Deputy Assistant Secretary General for Operations of NATO, stated: **'narcotics clearly [coming; AB] from Afghanistan is an alarming problem, but it points to the reasons why the international community including NATO are in Afghanistan. Dual threats; two threats. Afghanistan is a primary source of heroin and Afghanistan was a haven for al-Qaeda, the Taliban and other extremists who threaten international security and stability [...] We are very concerned about the linkage between narcotics and the Taliban and al-Qaeda'** (Costa & Pardew, 2007).

The last citation is from the 2008 Afghanistan Briefing which also mentioned the relation between narcotics and insurgency and highlighted its international consequences. According to the Afghanistan Briefing **'the drugs trade threatens Afghanistan's development and security, fostering endemic corruption in the country and financing the insurgency. Afghan drugs are also of direct concern to the international community: the drug-financed insurgency poses security risks for**

troops deployed in Afghanistan, and the drugs exported end up on the streets of cities across the world, causing serious health and social problems and violent crime' (NATO, 2008a, p. 9).

Extraordinary measures

In most cases NATO stated its support for the Afghan government in its efforts to fight the production and trade of narcotics (NATO, 2006b, p. 7; NATO, 2008a, p. 9; UNSC, 2008, p. 2). For example, the Riga Summit document stated **'we support the Government of Afghanistan's work to demonstrate decisive leadership**, including reaching out to the provinces, strengthening the rule of law, tackling corruption and taking **resolute measures against illegal narcotics'** (NATO, 2006b, p. 7). NATO also formulated that **'Afghanistan and the international community shall do everything – including the development of economic alternatives – to reduce and eventually eliminate this threat'** (The International Afghanistan Conference, 2004). More specific measures that NATO calls for in order to reduce the production and trafficking of narcotics include **'improved interdiction, law enforcement and judicial capacity building; enhanced cooperation among Afghanistan, neighbouring countries and the international community on disrupting the drugs trade; wider provision of economic alternatives for farmers and labourers in the context of comprehensive rural development; and building national and provincial counter-narcotics institutions. It will also be crucial to enforce a zero-tolerance policy towards official corruption; to pursue eradication as appropriate; to reinforce the message that producing or trading opiates is both immoral and a violation of Islamic law; and to reduce the demand for the illicit use of opiates'** (NATO, 2006c, p. 4). These measures show that NATO is convinced that **'dealing with illicit drug production cannot be confined to poppy eradication but requires the action of the Afghan Government and the whole international community in the fields of security, rule of law, governance, and alternative livelihood'** (NATO, 2008c, p. 20). In this respect James Pardew urged other international organisations and allies to step up their actions focused in counter narcotics, especially in more difficult areas of Afghanistan (Costa & Pardew, 2007).

Facilitating conditions

The formulations of this threat have three noticeable dimensions. The first one is that drug trafficking is often mentioned in relation to narcotics. Drug trafficking implies a mobile threat that can reach other parts of the world, and thus NATO member states. Narcotics as a security issue might be harder to visualize and therefore NATO specifically points at the relationship between narcotics and terrorism (NATO, 2006b, p. 7). This is another important dimension of NATO's formulations. The linkage between narcotics and terrorists helps people to understand that narcotics are threatening. Without narcotics terrorists are not able to finance their actions and attacks. The third relevant dimension is the reference to the effect of narcotics on the local population. It shows that, whereas at first sight narcotics might not seem to be so threatening, they can have a very significant effect on society by affecting and disrupting the legal economy, governance, security and public health in Afghanistan (NATO, 2008c, pp. 3, 20; NATO, 2009a, p. 28). Narcotics, both production and trade, are hard to control for any government and in particular so for the Afghan government which lacks the necessary capacities.

The context of NATO members states and their populations consists of extensive media coverage on the use of drugs and drug related casualties. In the United States drug overdoses have become the number one cause of death by injury (Centre for Disease Control and Prevention, 2014). Another important contributing contextual dimension is the war on drugs, which was initiated around the same time; a war in which the United States supports Colombia in its fight against insurgents that are also financed through narcotics. This war on drugs, strongly supported by the United States, shows that narcotics are perceived to be a significant threat and are treated likewise. Narcotics can also be placed in the context of the terrorists attacks. In its statements NATO explicitly mentioned narcotics and their connection with terrorism. Terrorist attacks like 9/11 and the attacks in Madrid and London are presented as indirect results of narcotics.

Threat 3: IEDs

Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) are used by the insurgents in Afghanistan. These insurgents include the Taliban, al-Qaeda and other terrorists. The purpose of IEDs is to cause casualties without direct contact with an opponent. The problem with IEDs is that they are not selective regarding its target, and therefore they not only pose a threat to national and international military and police, but also to civilians (NATO, 2009a, pp. 6, 9; The Asian Foundation, 2013, p. 16; UNSC, 2007, p. 2; UNSC, 2008, p. 2).

Speech act

Although IEDs are not mentioned as often as the other threats, IEDs are responsible for a large part of all casualties in Afghanistan. At the Bucharest Summit the IEDs were called a threat, representing **'a danger to the Afghan population, the ANSF and the multinational forces operating in Afghanistan'** (NATO, 2008c, p. 4). NATO stated that **'attacks against Afghan civilians and the International Community using IEDs caused the greatest loss of life'** (NATO, 2009a, p. 6). NATO's 2009 Afghanistan Report stated also that in 2008 insurgents accounted for the killing of 973 Afghan civilians, which is 80% of the total number of civilian casualties in 2008. This was primarily the result of **'insurgent IED attacks'**, which were up 27% in 2008 over 2007, [and therefore; AB] **continue to be the largest single cause of civilian casualties'** (NATO, 2009a, p. 9). IEDs are a threat because they are responsible for the majority of the civilian casualties.

Extraordinary measures

The call for extraordinary measures shows that IEDs are indeed perceived as a serious threat. In 2006, NATO stated that **'we commend NATO's Defence Against Terrorism initiatives, including development of cutting-edge technologies to counter terrorist threats, such as defending Allied forces in Afghanistan from Improvised Explosive Devices'** (NATO, 2006b, p. 20). In respect to IEDs, the United Nations Security Council resolutions called for extraordinary measures, authorizing participants in the ISAF mission to take all measures deemed necessary to fulfil the mandate but also call for a continuous contribution of personnel and other resources to the mission (UNSC, 2007, p. 3; UNSC, 2008, p. 3).

Facilitating conditions

IEDs are not as explicitly formulated as the other threats, but the numbers and facts referred to in the formulations underline the convincing fact that IEDs pose a significant threat. The numbers support the statement that IEDs are responsible for the majority of civilian casualties. When looking at military statistics, it becomes clear that IEDs account for the majority of military casualties as well (iCasualties, 2014; NATO, 2014a; Livingston & O'Hanlon, 2012, pp. 11, 12). Striking is that there are no clearly formulated extraordinary measures.

The context of this securitization is directly related to its casualties, as it shows Afghans and the military present in Afghanistan live with a constant threat of IEDs. These attacks are reported by the international media. Although most people will not experience IEDs directly (unlike, for instance, the fear for terrorist attacks in the home country), media reports do show that there are many IED attacks (Hamar de la Brethonière, 2007; Reformatorisch Dagblad, 2010). NATO member states have seen many military casualties as a result of IEDs. The number of people killed by IEDs is therefore not only a facilitating condition since it has been used in the formulation of the threat, but also because this is the context in which especially the people in Afghanistan are living.

Threat 4: Lack of Afghan public support

The threat of a lack of confidence and support of the people of Afghanistan is in some ways different than the other security issues. The previous three issues have an unlimited scope in the sense that there is no limit to whom or what they could threaten. The lack of public support in Afghanistan is limited to the threat for the ISAF mission itself. According to the mission statement, 'ISAF, in support of GIRoA [Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan], conducts operations in Afghanistan to

reduce the capability and the will of the insurgency, support the growth in capacity and capability of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), and facilitate improvements in governance and socio-economic development, in order to provide a secure environment for sustainable stability that is observable for the population' (McChrystal, 2009a, pp. 2-2). Without Afghan public support the goal of the mission cannot be reached and therefore is a serious concern for the mission.

Speech act

NATO's 2009 Afghanistan Report stated that **'the number of civilian casualties caused by international forces has always been, and remains, a serious concern for NATO's political and military leadership'** (NATO, 2009a, p. 9). The number of civilian casualties limits the support for the mission. It is this diminishing support that threatens the mission in achieving its goals. The lack of Afghan public support is especially of concern for the leadership of NATO and ISAF. ISAF Commander McChrystal in his Initial Assessment of the mission in 2009 underlined this threat. According to McChrystal one of the two main threats facing the ISAF mission was **'the crisis of popular confidence** that springs from the weakness of GIRoA institutions, the unpunished abuse of power by corrupt officials and power-brokers, a widespread sense of political disenfranchisement and a longstanding lack of economic opportunity' (McChrystal, 2009a, pp. 1-2, 2-5). The crisis caused by a lack of popular confidence might be more directed at the national government, but since ISAF is cooperating with the Afghan national government its reputation is also of influence as far as the confidence in ISAF and NATO is concerned.

The lack of confidence and support is also visible in the NATO documentary 'Voices above the noise' (NATO, 2011). The third part of this documentary shows civilian casualties, killed by pro-government forces including ISAF. The images of the dead bodies and of grieving Afghans, shows the significant impact casualties have on the local population. This results in more Afghans willing to join the insurgency (NATO, 2011, 0.05-2.00 min).

Extraordinary measures

In response to the threat of lack of Afghan public support NATO clearly stated what needs to be done. Former Secretary General of NATO, De Hoop Scheffer, made the claim that **'it is imperative that we reduce the loss of innocent civilian life and damage to civilian property. If we do not, then we risk losing the support that we continue to receive from the vast majority of people in Afghanistan'** (De Hoop Scheffer, 2007). In his Initial Assessment ISAF Commander McChrystal called for a change in tactics. The strategy of ISAF could no longer be focused on seizing terrain or destroying insurgents and their properties only, because eventually this was counterproductive as it caused much collateral damage for the local population. McChrystal underlined that **'our objective must be the population. In the struggle to gain the support of the people, every action we take must enable this effort. [...] Gaining their support will require a better understanding of the people's choices and needs.** However, progress is hindered by the dual threat of a resilient insurgency and a crisis of confidence in the government and the international coalition. **To win their support, we must protect the people from both of these threats'** (McChrystal, 2009a, pp. 1-1, 1-2). He called for new strategies focusing on the Afghan population in order to win their support and ultimately to achieve the goal of the mission. Therefore ISAF needed to **'improve effectiveness through greater partnering with ANSF; Prioritize responsive and accountable governance; Gain the initiative; Focus resources to those critical areas where vulnerable people are most threatened'** (McChrystal, 2009a, p 1-3). The extraordinary measures called for by S/RES 1776 can also apply for this security issue (UNSC, 2007, p. 3).

Facilitating conditions

NATO made in its formulations the connection between the lack of confidence of the Afghan people in ISAF and the number of casualties caused by the international forces. This connection makes the threat more visible and more understandable to others. ISAF is established to protect the Afghan population amongst other things, but if people only see the casualties caused by ISAF and other

international forces it becomes quite understandable that Afghans lose their confidence in ISAF. NATO made also the connection in its formulations between the lack of confidence in the Afghan government and the lack of confidence in ISAF. ISAF was present in Afghanistan at the request of the Afghan government and in that sense can be perceived as a 'guest' of the Afghan government. If the Afghan government is seen as corrupt and incapable, this also has a negative effect on the perception of the guest (Sperling & Webber, 2012, p. 360).

The context of this security issue is the growing discontentment with the operational approach of ISAF. The number of civilian casualties as a consequence of military operations is not only threatening for ISAF and the success of its mission, but also for the national government. In the recent past there were demonstrations against the government because of the many civilian casualties. President Hamid Karzai publically expressed his dissatisfaction with ISAF practices, especially concerning the number of civilian casualties (Gall, 2008, p. A6; Ghufraan, 2008, p. 155). Ordinary Afghans witness bombings, raids and shootings by both insurgents and ISAF, but they also see a government that is incapable of addressing these issues or providing security against them (Ghufraan, 2008, p. 156). So the diminishing public support is the result of combination of two things: the operational methods of ISAF and particularly the incapability of the Afghan government to protect the Afghans (Azerbaijani-Moghaddam & al., 2008, p. 9; McChrystal S., 2009a, pp. 2-4). In a survey, most Afghans responded that they do not trust ISAF, since they feel that ISAF is mainly been for strategic military reasons of NATO countries rather than for the protection of the Afghan people. They are afraid of ISAF, since they have the feeling that if they are misinterpreted they will be imprisoned or might even be killed (Azerbaijani-Moghaddam & al., 2008, pp. 9, 63) Some non-governmental organisations stated that the ISAF patrols do not contribute to feelings of protection and security, but quite contrary increase insecurity since those patrols attract suicide bombers and roadside bombs. (Azerbaijani-Moghaddam & al., 2008, p. 29).

Successful securitization?

A successful securitization implies not only the acceptance of a security issue as such, but also the use of extraordinary measures. This section deals with the successfulness of the securitization process for each specific threat. The successfulness of these securitizations of course also depends on the extent to which the perceptions of the security issues are taken over by member states of NATO. This topic will be dealt with in Chapter 6, where the securitizations of the Dutch government will be addressed.

Threat 1: Terrorism

The securitization of terrorism is connected to the initial call for a NATO mission to Afghanistan. The mission based on Article 5 is mandated to help Afghanistan in becoming a secure and stable country. This implies a necessity to fight terrorists. Since NATO as an organisation does not have its own military forces, it is dependent on the contribution of its members for carrying out this mission. The process of securitization can be called successful if the audience, in this case the member states, contributed to the mission.

The process of this securitization is successful as NATO has the support for the ISAF mission from its member states. It all started with the then Secretary General Lord Robertson, who, after 9/11, insisted on the invocation of Article 5 as the ultimate act of solidarity. If there was no unanimous agreement to the invocation, it would not only damage his authority but more importantly the reputation of NATO. On September 12, all 19 member states declared their unanimous support (Robertson, 2011). According to NATO the terrorist attacks of the previous day were an attack against all NATO allies and they therefore decided to contribute, both collectively and individually, to actions against the terrorists held responsible for the attacks (NATO, 2001). In the following weeks this resulted in the launching of Operation Eagle Assist and Operation Active Endeavour. These military operations included the deployment of an NATO Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) aircraft in the United States as well as deterring terrorist activities in the Mediterranean. It

also paved the way for various member states to support the US-led Operation Enduring Freedom, directed at removing the Taliban regime and the ousting of al-Qaeda from Afghanistan (Palmer, 2005). The invocation of Article 5 ultimately resulted in NATO taking over the lead over the International Security Assistance Force in Kabul, starting in August 2003 (NATO, 2003). Against this background the process of securitization can be considered successful as member states, as well as non-member states, did deploy their military forces on behalf of NATO. The call for counter-terrorist actions at the source (Afghanistan) was even supported by Germany, a NATO member that previously opposed similar military action in Iraq (Sperling & Webber, 2012, p. 365). The Netherlands, a NATO country where the mission was likewise heavily debated, became the lead nation in the province of Uruzgan and eventually extended the duration of this mission with another two years. Over period of a decade (at least until 2012), no NATO member state made a decision to withdraw all its forces; this indicates a sense of political commitment by NATO members, which can be considered as an example of a successful securitization process (Sperling & Webber, 2012, p. 349). Other possible evidence of the successfulness of the securitization and its extraordinary measures are the official photo albums of ISAF regarding the mission and the daily activities. The albums that can be related to terrorism. They often contain photos of ISAF forces defeating insurgents, indicating that terrorist and insurgents become less threatening (ISAF, 2014).

Threat 2: Narcotics

NATO called for its member states to support the Afghan government and its initiatives to counter drugs, specifically the production and trade. In 2003 the Afghan Government, supported by the international community, developed its National Drug Control Strategy (NDCS). This strategy included a multi-sector approach in order to eradicate the threat of drugs. ISAF supported the NDCS and the Afghan authorities by giving assistance through training, intelligence and logistics of counter-drugs operations. ISAF also helped in explaining the counter-narcotics policy to the Afghans (NATO, 2009a, pp. 28, 29). ISAF shared information with the Afghan authorities on topics related to narcotics. In response to Afghan authorities requests, ISAF provided logistics and, in extremis, supported the Afghan National Counter Narcotics Forces. ISAF was also coordinating and actively planning with other organisations involved in the eradication of drugs (NATO, 2008c, p. 20). Some member states went even further than supporting the Afghan authorities. The United Kingdom and the United States were at the forefront of the counter-narcotics action. For example, the Afghan Ministry of Counter-Narcotics was established under the guidance of the UK while the Ministry of Interior. This ministry implements narcotics policies which are strongly influenced by the US. Afghanistan heavily relies on the UK and the US in its counter-narcotics actions. In addition, the US formulated their own strategy to counter the narcotics problem, focusing on alternative livelihoods, elimination and eradication, interdiction, law enforcement and justice reform, and public information (Glaze, 2007, p. 9).

The successfulness of this securitization might not be as clear as compared to the securitization of terrorism. Although Afghanistan, the UK and the US are taking specific actions directed at disrupting the trade and production of narcotics, NATO itself did not take any specific action besides supporting the actions as undertaken by these three countries or other countries as well. The member states of NATO agree that narcotics are a threat and that something needs to be done, but there is no consensus about what kind of actions need to be taken (Dempsey & Burns, 2008). NATO therefore agrees to attack the drugs facilities and facilitators supporting the insurgency, but only if the troops involved have the authorization of their own government. Although the official albums of ISAF show the confiscation of drugs and the eradication of poppy fields, the relatively low number of albums could be a reflection of NATO not being clear on how ISAF should deal with narcotics and what its role in this respect should be (ISAF, 2014). Therefore the securitization might be seen as less successful.

Threat 3: IEDs

IEDs are threatening ISAF. As stated before, IEDs are responsible for a considerable amount of casualties, civilian and military, and they cause growing insecurity (NATO, 2009a, pp. 6, 9; The Asian Foundation, 2013, p. 16; UNSC, 2007, p. 2; UNSC, 2008, p. 2). The threat resulted in an enhanced counter-IED training for ISAF personnel as well as for the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) (NATO, 2008c, p. 4). This is also visible in the ISAF photo albums with IEDs as subject; most of these are about counter IED-training (ISAF, 2014). At the same time it resulted into new technical developments which contribute to the protection of personnel against IEDs and to a better tracking and disarmament of IEDs (NATO, 2008c, pp. 6, 4; Rietjens, Bollen, Khalil, & Wahidi, 2009). Member states themselves are also investing in equipment that offers better protection against IED attacks. For example, at the start of its participation in the ISAF mission, the Dutch government ordered 25 Bushmaster vehicles. These vehicles replaced the regular Mercedes terrain vehicles because the Bushmasters offer better protection, especially against IEDs (Ministry of Defence, 2006). There are good indication that the securitization of IEDs is successful, since NATO, as well as individual member states and other allies invested in counter-IED technology, training and equipment.

Threat 4: Lack of Afghan public support

The threat of losing Afghan public support for the mission is acknowledged by NATO. If NATO loses the support of the population there is a risk is that the Taliban and other insurgents gain support instead. In order to increase Afghan public support for the mission, NATO called for a change in tactics. At the start of the mission the first priority was to fight the insurgents. Unfortunately this strategy entailed collateral damage in the form of civilian casualties and damage to houses due to house raids. Afghans perceived ISAF more as a threat to their lives rather than a force that protected them. ISAF commander McChrystal, amongst others, realised that the strategy was counterproductive and a possible reason for an increase of the numbers of insurgents (McChrystal, 2009a; McChrystal, 2009c). The new strategy has the protection of civilians as first priority. S/RES 1776 specifically stated that avoiding civilian casualties where possible is a requirement for enhancing the security effort of ISAF (S/RES 1776, 2007, p. 2). Secretary General De Hoop Scheffer also called for less civilian casualties and announced that smaller bombs would be used for air strikes (Ghufran, 2008, p. 156). NATO shows this change through official videos of NATO and the ISAF media albums. The majority of these photos and videos concerning the mission are about the positive results ISAF achieved so far, such as building schools, bridges, hospitals, promoting women's and children's rights, giving medical care, training the ANP and ANA, education for the local population, etc. This is meant to underline that the Afghan population is at the centre of the mission and that the mission is mainly about rebuilding Afghanistan (ISAF, 2014; NATO, 2014c). This could be an indication of a successful securitization however it should be taken into account that these sources can be slightly biased.

Individual member states changed their tactics as well. Colonel Rob Querido, in 2007 commander of a Dutch Battle group in Uruzgan and from 2009 to 2012 commander of the Special Forces regiment, experienced first-hand how the tactics of the Dutch troops changed. Initially the mission was mainly an enemy driven mission, but it was soon realised they needed to win the heart and minds of the local population. The Dutch forces took on a comprehensive 3D approach, Defence, Development and Diplomacy, including a broader scope than just combat operations as Chapter 6 explains. In response to this change of tactics insurgents at first increased its large scale operations; when this did not work, they changed their tactics by using IEDs (NATO, 2014b). Statistical data collected by the Afghanistan NGO Safety Office in their ANSO Quarterly Data Report show that the new strategy of NATO did result in less civilian casualties by NATO forces (Crawford, 2011).

Chapter 6 Securitization by the Dutch government

This chapter shows the securitizations by the Dutch government level regarding the Dutch military mission.

The securitizing move

In order to identify the threats and extraordinary measures that are formulated at this level, official documents are analysed as well as media coverage, reports, videos and images. The analysis results in the identification of four interrelated threats: terrorism, narcotics, IEDs, and corruption. These four threats are the only issues explicitly mentioned as threats in this analysis. The actors involved in the securitizing moves of the Dutch government are discussed first, followed by the speech acts regarding the four threats.

Actors

The securitizing actor

The securitizing actor for the securitizations in this chapter is the Dutch government, but, as stated before, this can also include other national actors than just the official government.

Functional actor

The functional actors are the (national) media, other national actors such as civil society organisations, but also other countries contributing to ISAF. All these actors can influence the process of securitization as they can influence the context in which the decisions of both the securitizing actor and the audience are made.

Audience

The audience for these securitization moves is the population of the Netherlands. This is the audience that has to be convinced that the issues are really threats and that it is acceptable to implement extraordinary measures, such as spending more public money, and/or deploying the military in Uruzgan. It is important for the Dutch government that it has enough support for its decisions in order to get re-elected.

A more specific audience, although also part of the Dutch people, is the Dutch military. The military serves the Dutch government and therefore obeys the decisions made by the government. Still, it is important that military personnel, in executing their function as well as in their personal lives, support the goals of the mission or task. Larger support for the mission leads to more efficiency and a greater willingness to act and reach the formulated goals as it is something they think is necessary and something they are willing to fight for.

Threat 1: Terrorism

The threat of terrorism is significant for the Dutch government. Although the threat is mainly associated with terrorist attacks in the Western world, the Dutch government sees it also as a direct threat to its forces deployed in Uruzgan. The main actors responsible for expressing the threats on behalf of the Dutch government are the three relevant ministries, the Ministry of Defence, Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, respectively. These three ministries are also at the base of the so-called 'Dutch' approach in Afghanistan, the 3D approach; Diplomacy, Defence and Development, an integrated approach of the three ministries for rebuilding a country such as Afghanistan (Grandia Mantas, 2009, p. 5).

Speech act

Terrorism is initially perceived as a threat to national and international security. On March 1, 2004,

the Ministries of Justice and Foreigners' Affairs and Integration said, 'in the eyes of the Dutch government involvement in **an act of terrorism poses a threat to national security**' (Kamerstukken II 2003-2004, 27 925, nr. 118, 2004, p. 7)⁶. Ten days later terrorist attacks shocked Madrid and the rest of the world. In response to these attacks the government stated, it 'cannot guarantee that the Netherlands will be secure from attacks, but [...] it will be continuously alert **on terroristic threats and will make an effort to make the chance of an attack as limited as possible**' (Kamerstukken II 2003-2004, 27 925, nr. 123, 2004, p. 9). However as of 2005 a new dimension of Opposing Military Forces (OMF) was added to the threat of terrorism as the Dutch military were to be deployed in Uruzgan. In its annual report the Military Intelligence and Security Agency (MIVD) informed the Dutch government on the circumstances in Uruzgan prior to the deployment. It stated that **'the threat of terrorism remained high. The most important destabilizing factor remains the presence of the Opposing Militant Forces'** (MIVD, 2005, p. 40). On December 22, 2005, Parliament was informed (based on Article 100) of the decision⁷ of the government to deploy Dutch soldiers in Uruzgan, as the lead nation in the province. The letter to Parliament formulated that 'this is about a mission with real military risks [...] **The stabilization and the rebuilding of Afghanistan**, especially in the south where the Taliban originates from, **is of huge importance for the advancement of international rule of law and the fight against international terrorism that also threatens Europe**' (Kamerstukken II 2005-2006, 27 925, nr. 193, 2005, p. 3). The document further described that 'the **OMF** operate in and from some areas in the south and east and from Pakistan. They **form a potential threat to the entire country**' (Kamerstukken II 2005-2006, 27 925, nr. 193, 2005, p. 5). Further on in the same document it is stated that **'the risks of the mission** are largely determined but definitely not exclusively by the **OMF** actions' (Kamerstukken II 2005-2006, 27 925, nr. 193, 2005, p. 12). Terrorism is also perceived as a threat by the MIVD. In 2006, the first year of the mission, the MIVD reported that the Dutch military 'came repeatedly in contact with the **threat of terrorism and were target of attacks. The threat of terrorism consisted mostly of attacks by the Taliban**' (MIVD, 2006, pp. 36-37). Also the relevant ministries (Foreign Affairs, Defence and International Cooperation) confirmed that 'regarding **the hard core Taliban, attacks against ISAF continues to be part of the resistance against the international presence in Afghanistan and against the Afghan government. This core is able to pose a serious threat to the stabilization and reconstruction.** The possibilities for this core decreases if the support from the population for the ISAF presence grows' (Kamerstukken II 2005-2006, 27 925, nr. 201, 2006, p. 28). The threat of terrorism, was most prominent in 2007, resulting in heavy fighting in and around the town of Chora. It was reported that 'there are serious security incidents in Chora (June 2007) as well in Deh Rawod (from September until now), where the **OMF undertook offensive operations and committed cruelties against the locals. ISAF, supported by ANA and local security structures, succeeded in defeating the threat for Chora**' (Kamerstukken II 2007-2008, 27 925, nr. 279, 2007, p. 13). In 2009, the OMF are still considered to be a threat; **'there continues to be a threat due to indirect shootings at ISAF locations.** The Taliban is also continuing with its campaigns against Afghan civil servants, so as to hamper the development of the local government in the south of Afghanistan' (Kamerstukken II 2008-2009, 27 925, nr. 330, 2009, p. 9).

⁶ All quotes were translated from Dutch into English, and are therefore not the original wordings of the Dutch government.

Also all original quotes are without any **bold** words. The author added this to emphasize the formulations of the threats.

⁷ This resulted in a complex political debate in the Netherlands, since in its Article 100 letter to Parliament the government stated it had an 'intention' to deploy the military and not yet a 'decision', causing confusion among the members of Parliament (Hazelbag, 2009, p. 30; Lucardie, Bredewolde, Voerman, & Van de Walle, 2007, p. 16).

Extraordinary measures

One month after the attacks in New York and Washington, the Dutch government initiated an action plan. The action plan 'is a package of measures to prevent acts of terrorism' because **'on a national level extra efforts are needed to combat more effectively the threat of terrorism and to prevent terrorist crimes'** (Kamerstukken II 2001-2002, 27 925, nr. 10, 2001, p. 8). After the terrorist attacks in Madrid, the government called for a reassessment and revision of the broad and integrated approach (action plan) for the fight against terrorism. The Dutch governments stated that **'in light of these attacks [so as to decide; AB] which adjustments and additions are needed'** (Kamerstukken II 2003-2004, 27 925, nr. 123, 2004, p. 6). Initially these extraordinary measures focussed on domestic actions; a year later the government is requested by NATO to also act at an international level. At the end of 2005, the Article 100 letter informing Parliament about the decision to deploy Dutch military to Uruzgan could in essence be seen as a formulation for an extraordinary measure as the Dutch government only deploys its military in extreme situations where it is necessary to avert threats. Also the extension of the mission with an additional two years can be seen as an extraordinary measure. In order to create support for the extraordinary measure of extending the initial period of the mission with two years, the government formulated it as such: **'early withdrawal of the international community would not only be a destruction of capital, but could also easily lead to a revival of Afghan and exogenous extremism, with all its negative consequences for stability, security and human rights. Afghanistan as a failed state is a danger to itself and to the already volatile region. A stable and secure Afghanistan serves also the security of Europe and of the Netherlands. It has to be prevented that extremists use Afghanistan as a pool and training camp for terrorists who can mount attacks around the world'** (Kamerstukken II 2007-2008, 27 925, nr. 279, 2007, p. 17).

Extraordinary measures during the mission are mainly about using force only in extreme cases, since the Dutch military involvement was mainly about helping the Afghan authorities rather than acting as a counterterrorist mission. ISAF only took on robust action **'against groups or persons that pose a threat to the safety of the military personnel or pose a threat to the ISAF mandate [...], if necessary even through offensive operations'** (Kamerstukken II 2005-2006, 27 925, nr. 201, 2006, p. 22). The same goes for the Dutch military in Uruzgan. During the later years of the mission the government stated that **'security operations outside the ADZ are necessary to prevent the Taliban from being a direct threat to the extension of the ADZ's and the establishment'** (Kamerstukken II 2007-2008, 27 925, nr. 279, 2007, p. 18). In a parliamentary debate this was reaffirmed, **'safety operations outside the inkblots remain necessary to prevent the Taliban from posing a direct threat to the stability'** (Kamerstukken II 2007-2008, 27 925, nr. 321, 2008, p. 11).

Facilitating conditions

The first facilitating condition is the actual formulation of the securitizing moves. The first issue that stands out is the choice of words for this threat in relation to the period before and during the decision to go to Uruzgan. Prior to the mission the government used the term 'terrorism' as descriptions for the threat, while during the mission 'Taliban' and 'OMF' are used. OMF is an overarching term for the Taliban, al-Qaeda and other insurgents; the term is not used in the securitizations made by NATO. An explanation for this difference could be that most formulations of threats are made during the mission itself; referring to the OMF instead of terrorists makes it more an Afghan threat than an international one. Another difference with the way in which NATO made securitizations, is that for NATO the threat of terrorism has a clear international dimension, whereas for the Netherlands this is significantly less so. The Dutch government sees terrorism as a potential threat to its own national security and to its soldiers deployed in Afghanistan, but the threat is mainly expressed as a threat to the Afghan population, the development and government structures. By choosing this formulation, the Dutch government might want to show that the Dutch military is not in Afghanistan to fight the terrorists for the sake of the Netherlands, but they are there to help the Afghan people in establishing a stable and secure Afghanistan. This formulation could contribute in gaining more support for the mission by politicians, the population and the military; most of them

only approved of the mission if it was more about rebuilding than fighting (partly due to 'Srebrenica', see third facilitating condition of this threat) (Hazelbag, 2009, p. 34; ANP, 2006).

Another facilitating condition for a speech act is the social capital of the speaker. For all securitizations in this chapter the speaker is the Dutch government. The Dutch government is democratically elected and therefore enjoys considerable support among the population, including the military. Of course, also in Parliament there has to be enough support for the government (Kaarbo & Cantir, 2013, p. 476). Although the decision to deploy soldiers in Uruzgan and its extension caused some turbulence in the Dutch political debates as well as among the Dutch population, the government nevertheless represents a majority of the Dutch population. In general, the social capital of the government has a positive effect on the securitizations expressed.

The context in which the threat is expressed is another facilitating condition. The attacks in New York, Washington, Madrid and London illustrated that terrorists can strike everywhere and target innocent civilians to spread terror. Also the presence of the Taliban and other OMF in Afghanistan, and in particular Uruzgan, shows that this threat is a reality under which the people of Afghanistan live and the Dutch military operate (BN/De Stem, 2009; Algemeen Dagblad, 2008; Hamar de la Brethonière & Hijmans, 2008b; Hamar de la Brethonière, 2007; NRC Next, 2006; Van den Boogaard, 2007; Marlet, 2006). Another factor making up the context of the threat is more specific to the Netherlands, being the previous Dutch military involvement in Srebrenica. As part of the UN forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina the Dutch military had 'to protect' the town of Srebrenica that was declared by the UN as a safe area, a protected area. Despite the fact that an UN safe area means 'free of fighting', in July 1995 Srebrenica was attacked by the army of the Republika Srpska, resulting in a massacre in which thousands of Muslim men were executed. Because the Dutch troops were under UN mandate they could only provide limited resistance and were unable to stop the massacre in Srebrenica (En Toen - Nu, 2015). Since that traumatic incident Dutch politicians as well as ordinary people are reluctant to join a mission and take responsibility for such an extensive area (Interviewee 5, 2014; Mans, Meindersma, & Burema, 2008; Kranenburg, 2010).

Threat 2: Narcotics

For the Netherlands the production of and trade in narcotics are not only seen as a threat to the goal of achieving stability and security in Afghanistan since narcotics are a means of financing the terrorists, but also because narcotics undermine the official, legal economy and government structures.

Speech act

Prior to its decision to act as the lead nation for ISAF in Uruzgan, the government stated that 'one of the greatest challenges facing the Afghan government, is tackling the **drug economy**. Because of the **radical consequence of the size of the drug sector**, such as criminal networks, corrupt government officials, and the undermining of the legal economy, there is **a risk that the results that are achieved in establishing a democratic, safe and rule of law state will be diminished**. Action on this terrain has the highest priority' (Kamerstukken II 2005-2006, 27 925, nr. 185, 2005, p. 5).

The Article 100 letter also made the connection between criminality, corruption, drugs and achieving a democratic government in Afghanistan. The letter stated that the government structures are threatened by the OMF and in addition by '**warlords and drug barons who are often interconnected**.

The state also suffers from corruption, lack of capacity and criminality. The drug economy undermines the development of a legal economy and of a safe state of the rule of law'

(Kamerstukken II 2005-2006, 27 925, nr. 193, 2005, p. 5). One year later, the same conclusion was drawn 'the situation in the south of Afghanistan is instable and insecure, mainly due to actions from the Taliban and affiliated groups. In addition, in this region and especially in **Uruzgan, there are some interconnected problems** such as tensions between and within ethnic groups, lack of government control, **a high amount of corruption, drug production and criminality'** (Kamerstukken II 2005-2006, 27 925, nr. 199, 2006, p. 1). The government acknowledged once more that '**the poppy production and the trade in drugs are the cause as well as the result of the problems that have to be tackled**.

Drug production and trade has a negative influence on the development of security and governance' (Kamerstukken II 2007-2008, 27 925, nr. 279, 2007, p. 11). The relationship between poppy production in the south of Afghanistan and the lack of security and governmental legitimacy is thus recognized by the Dutch government.

An indirect illustration of the formulation of this threat is that 'narcotics' is an often used heading for paragraphs in these letters, indicating that narcotics is an important issue for the Dutch government concerning its involvement in Afghanistan (Kamerstukken II 2007-2008, 27 925, nr. 279, 2007) (Kamerstukken II 2008-2009, 27 925, nr. 330, 2009) (Kamerstukken II 2005-2006, 27 925, nr. 193, 2005) (Kamerstukken II 2005-2006, 27 925, nr. 185, 2005).

Extraordinary measures

Although the Netherlands did see narcotics as a threat to Afghanistan and the goal of the mission, the government did not express any extraordinary measures, measures that go beyond what is normally allowed by law. A parliamentarian for example said that 'the Taliban finance their war with drug money, amongst other things through collecting taxes from the farmers that produce opium.

This points to a military necessity to strictly, continuously and effectively tackle the production of opium' (Kamerstukken II 2007-2008, 27 925, nr. 321, 2008, pp. 6-7). But even this does not go beyond normal measures.

The first citation of this threat stated that action in the field of narcotics had the highest priority, however no specific measures are mentioned (Kamerstukken II 2005-2006, 27 925, nr. 185, 2005, p. 5). The Netherlands did participate in the Afghan drugs strategy, but focused on consistent information campaigns for farmers, the availability of alternative sources of income (also within the framework of a broader rural development strategy), and more attention for the rule of law. The Netherlands only supports eradication of the poppy fields if and when the Afghan authorities are in charge, alternatives are present, and it is primarily aimed at large interconnected areas of large poppy producers (Kamerstukken II 2007-2008, 27 925, nr. 279, 2007, p. 27). The Netherlands prefers short-term and midterm follow-ups including a broader approach to make sure small farmers are not negatively affected. However all these measures do not go beyond the normal state of affairs.

Facilitating conditions

The government formulated this specific threat as a problem that cannot be tackled alone; drugs are interconnected with corruption and criminality and therefore needs an integrated approach. In such a complex situation drugs are both a cause and the result of problems in Afghanistan. The formulation of the Dutch government shows that drugs threaten the goal of the mission, a safe and secure Afghanistan. The emphasis of this securitization is thus upon a development mission rather than a combat mission, which can help in gaining support for the mission and thus also for the securitization of this threat. Compared to NATO, this securitization differs in that it does not formulate drugs as an international problem; it is not depicted as a health issue in the Netherlands. The context in which this threat is expressed is quite hard to sketch. While most of its audience is within the Netherlands, the government formulated the threat as a threat to Afghanistan. Dutch people might not identify with this narrative since they have no comparable experiences. Although it is clear that narcotics can undermine the basic structures of a democratic state, this context does not necessarily trigger people in the Netherlands to support the securitization of this threat. A clear formulation of the connection between the narcotics and actual terrorist attacks is lacking. This brings us to another factor complicating the context, since, although it is known that the terrorists/OMF finance their actions through the opium trade, the farmers producing it cannot be seen as a homogeneous group. There are farmers who are forced to produce the opium, farmers that just want to belong to a group but also Taliban hard liners. For the Dutch military it is hard to make a distinction between these groups; if they protect the innocent farmers they protect the poppy production as well and in that sense might indirectly contribute to financing the Taliban (Kamerstukken II 2007-2008, 27 925, nr. 321, 2008, p. 6). Protecting innocent farmers and their income, however, outweighed for the Dutch government the negative consequence of saving OMF

farmers (Nederlands Dagblad, 2008; The Liaison Office, 2010, p. 12; Van den Boogaard, 2007). Another concern is that if they eradicate the poppy fields, they generate more resistance towards ISAF as they would take away the income from these poor farmers. Eradication of poppy fields therefore runs the risk of driving the local population into the arms of the Taliban (Trouw, 2007). This is the context that perfectly fits the government's perception of a combined development and reconstruction mission.

The facilitating condition of the social capital of the Dutch government is already discussed in the section regarding threat 1 and therefore is not repeated.

Threat 3: IEDs

The use of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) was a serious threat throughout the Dutch mission in Uruzgan. The significance of this threat is illustrated by the causes of deaths for the Dutch military deployed in Afghanistan. Out of a total of 24 military casualties, 13 are the result of IEDs (NOS, 2010; Van Bommel, 2010a). It is in particular the unpredictability of these attacks that are a challenge for the military, also for the local population, although they are more often aware of these devices.

Speech act

Before the government agreed to deploy a Dutch mission to Uruzgan, it was already clear that IEDs were a threat, although the term itself was not as commonly used as it is nowadays. As early as 2003 the Minister of Defence stated that 'undiminished remains **the threat of mines and unexploded devices**. Standard procedures of the deployed military forces provide for several precaution measures in the field, such as driving at forehand checked routes' (Kamerstukken II 2002-2003, 27 925, nr. 87, 2003, p. 5). In 2006 the Dutch soldiers experienced this threat first-hand as they had 'come repeatedly in contact with the threat of terrorism and were target of attacks. **The threat of terrorism consisted mostly of attacks by the Taliban through the use of explosives including the so-called Improved Explosive Devices**' (MIVD, 2006, pp. 36-37). During 2007 this threat became even larger. The government formulated that 'although the Taliban does not walk away from direct fire contact, **it is mainly the threat of IEDs and suicide attacks that increased this past year**' (Kamerstukken II 2007-2008, 27 925, nr. 279, 2007, p. 37). The threat even required an 'extra capacity to gather intelligence and information necessary for **the increasing threat of roadside bombs**' (Kamerstukken II 2007-2008, 27 925, nr. 321, 2008, p. 12). In 2009 a specific plan was drafted by the government in order 'to **address the threat of IEDS** [...] for this plan of approach, as of now, 78,6 million euro is allocated' (Kamerstukken II 2008-2009, 27 925, nr. 330, 2009, p. 18). Non-textual sources also illustrate that IEDs are considered a serious threat. In a documentary of the Ministry of Defence, consisting of 14 short videos about the mission and its daily routine, one deals solely with the threat of IEDs (Ministry of Defence, 2010a). Videos of the Ministry of Defence concerning Afghanistan are mostly about visits of high officials to Uruzgan or the activities of the Dutch PRT (Provincial Reconstruction Team), but another clear theme is IEDs, indicating that this is an important issue for the military (Ministry of Defence, 2015b). The ministry uploaded 32 pictures on its site about the mission in Uruzgan as well; three pictures exclusively deal with IEDs (other themes are, for example, the military equipment and personnel in general, the ANA and the Afghan population) (Ministry of Defence, 2015a). The only threat covered by non-textual sources on the government level is the threat of IEDs.

Extraordinary measures

The government clearly took some specific measures to counter the threat posed by IEDs. At an international level, in 2006 the MIVD initiated '**an intelligence system in which countries that participate in the ISAF mission in south Afghanistan can quickly share the information**' (MIVD, 2006, p. 54). Given that there was a significant increase in the use of IEDs against the Task Force, 'the Commander of all Dutch military forces **requested the MIVD to investigate how the contribution of the Task Force Counter Improvised Explosive Devices (TF CIED)** could be further intensified [...]' There is agreement that, given **the urgent operational needs, a special Counter IED team** [within;

AB] **the MIVD has to be established**' (MIVD, 2007, pp. 46-47). With the same goal in mind, the government '**purchased armoured sleeping containers for personnel in Tarin Kowt and Deh Rawod. In 2006 Bushmaster patrol vehicles were also purchased, in order to give adequate protection against IEDs**' (Kamerstukken II 2007-2008, 27 925, nr. 279, 2007, p. 37). In addition, the government stated that it 'is trying to supply **extra capacity to gather intelligence and information necessary for the increasing threat of roadside bombs**. A specific measure is the deployment of a **Sperwer with a detachment of 40 military men for a period of six months**' (Kamerstukken II 2007-2008, 27 925, nr. 321, 2008, p. 12). In 2009 again extra military capacity in the form of Dutch commandos and marines was deployed, focussing '**on patrolling, collecting intelligence and the capture and arrest of Taliban leaders and insurgents that are preoccupied with committing attacks and placing IEDs. [...] A second need concerns a supplement to the previously mentioned Counter IED measures. In order to be able to discover IEDs, Dutch F-16's will be geared up with special equipment for an operational testing**' (Kamerstukken II 2008-2009, 27 925, nr. 330, 2009, p. 17).

According to the government, all these measures are needed for a better protection against the threat of IEDs. The government allocated an additional 78.6 million Euros to specifically counter IEDs. The money was spent on additional research, detection equipment and also on a new generation of Bushmasters (Kamerstukken II 2008-2009, 27 925, nr. 330, 2009, p. 18). The government proposed additional funds for special equipment designed to counter IEDs and extra personnel specialized in countering and identifying IEDs (Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defence, 2012, pp. 87-89, 96). This additional capacity is needed to keep up with the threat of IEDs.

Facilitating conditions

The formulation of the Dutch government regarding this threat focuses on the increasing threat as posed by IEDs. Even though measures are taken, the threat of IEDs still increases. By formulating it in this way, the audience is made aware that it is a very pressing threat and therefore extra measures need to be taken just to keep up. The formulations of the extraordinary measures show that the need to combat this threat is urgent. Compared to the formulations as used by NATO, it becomes clear that the Dutch government does not use any specific figures regarding the increasing threat or the number of casualties by IEDs; it is only stated that IEDs still cause casualties among the Afghan security forces, the Afghan population, as well as ISAF forces.

The context in which the threat is expressed is marked by an increase in the use of different Improvised Explosive Devices and the number of casualties, both civilian and military (MIVD, 2006, p. 12). Each and every time a Dutch soldier was killed, it was covered extensively in the Dutch media, thereby directly connecting the Netherlands to the realities in Afghanistan (Van der Meer, Van den Berg, & Bakker, 2007, p. 354; Reformatorisch Dagblad, 2010; Van Bommel, 2010a).

Threat 4: Corruption

Corruption is present in all layers of the Afghan government. The Netherlands considers corruption to be a serious threat to the legitimacy of the government. If the government is corrupt, the population will not trust it and will find other ways around the government to get their basic services (The Liaison Office, 2009, pp. 2, 11). A legitimate government is also crucial for the improvements ISAF tries to achieve; ISAF is associated with the Afghan government since ISAF was invited by the government of Afghanistan. If the people do not trust the government and/or ISAF, they do not support the activities of ISAF. Without tackling corruption, the mission's goal of creating stability and security cannot be achieved.

Speech act

In the Article 100 letter that was sent to Parliament on December 22, 2005, the government stated that '**the state also suffers from corruption, lack of capacity and criminality**. The drug economy undermines the development of a legal economy and of a safe state of the rule of law' (Kamerstukken II 2005-2006, 27 925, nr. 193, 2005, p. 5). In its annual report the MIVD also claimed that insecurity is not only caused by the actions of the Opposing Militant Forces but finds its cause

also in the widespread corruption and criminality that is present in all layers of society and government institutions (MIVD, 2005, p. 40). This is also argued the Minister of Defence as he stated 'the situation in south Afghanistan is instable and insecure, mainly due to action from the Taliban and affiliated groups. **In addition, in this region and especially in Uruzgan there are some interconnected problems such as** tensions between and within ethnic groups, lack of government control, **a high amount of corruption**, drug production and criminality' (Kamerstukken II 2005-2006, 27 925, nr. 199, 2006, p. 1). While all securitizing moves so far indicate that corruption is a risk and has a negative effect on the governance in Afghanistan, only the MIVD calls it threatening; the MIVD formulated '**corruption poses a serious threat in Afghanistan to the legitimacy of the government**' (MIVD, 2008, p. 14)

Extraordinary measures

Prior to the decision of the Dutch government to deploy troops in Uruzgan, the government stated that the Afghan 'government also **needs to acquire the capacity to act on the provincial and local level. Improvement of the government and countering of corruption on all government levels, not solely by replacing the contaminated government officials but also through capacity building is a necessity**' (Kamerstukken II 2005-2006, 27 925, nr. 185, 2005, p. 5). The Dutch government also stated that the Afghan government has to deal, in cooperation with the international community, with the challenges it faces; this can, indirectly, be seen as an extraordinary measure for the Dutch government. The demand of the Dutch government, before agreeing to a mission in Uruzgan, that provincial governor Jan Mohammed Khan had to resign because he would be corrupt, can be seen as an expression of extraordinary measures (Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defence, 2012, p. 54). Apart from these two indirect indications of extraordinary measures, the government claimed none.

Facilitating conditions

The formulations of corruption as a threat are not as convincing as for the other threats. Corruption is mentioned explicitly as a threat only once; in other instances it is only mentioned in combination with other factors hampering the development of Afghanistan, or more specific being a threat to the legitimacy of the Afghan government. Extraordinary measures are not mentioned or proposed, perhaps because it is present everywhere in Afghanistan and therefore hard to tackle. It could of course also be that in the opinion of the Dutch government it is up to the Afghan government to tackle this specific problem.

The context of this threat is that everyone in Afghanistan comes in contact with corruption on a daily basis, it is present everywhere. Corruption not only takes place on a national level, but it is a fact of life on all levels of government. The Afghan people are not confident in their government as it is contaminated with corruption (Sperling & Webber, 2012, p. 360).

Successful securitization?

The success of the securitizations is determined by the audience's acceptance of the issues as security issues and also by the acceptance and implementation of the proposed extraordinary measures. The next chapter shows which threats are formulated by the Dutch military mission and thus indicate to which extent the securitizations by the Dutch government are successful. However, by looking at additional sources, such as news reports and academic publications, it is also possible to find indications of whether or not the securitizations are successful.

The successfulness of all securitizations largely depends on the support the Dutch government received for the initial deployment and subsequent extension of the mission.

The Dutch government started the process with gathering relevant information already at the beginning of 2005 (or perhaps even earlier), but the initial debate on the possibilities and risks of a military mission as part of ISAF lasted until February 3, 2006. Although the Prime Minister, the Minister of Defence and the Minister of Foreign Affairs were all in favour of a deployment of Dutch military to southern Afghanistan, the decision-making process was stalled by a coalition party, D66,

as well as an opposition party, the Labour Party. The coalition party even threatened to bring down the government if it would decide in favour of the deployment (Hazelbag, 2009, p. 1; Lucardie, Bredewolde, Voerman, & Van de Walle, 2007). It was important for the Dutch government to convince as many political parties as possible, members of the coalition as well as parties on the opposition benches, even though the cabinet can take this decision without the support of the parliament (Kaarbo & Cantir, 2013, pp. 466, 476).


A major point in the discussion was whether the mission was mainly about development and rebuilding, or more about combating the terrorists. Most politicians kept hammering on the idea that the mission should be about creating stability in Afghanistan and therefore the mission was about development. While MIVD reports and the relevant letters to Parliament acknowledged that there was a significant risk for the Dutch military which could even result in fatal casualties, the use of the term 'development mission', meant to create as much support as possible, resulted in wrong assumptions about the conditions in which the military would be operating. Once it became clear that the military would be involved in frequent fighting, the debate was fuelled (Hazelbag, 2009, p. 34; NRC, 2007a; ANP, 2006; Wendel, 2010). In the end the Dutch government and a majority of Parliament supported the deployment, just as two years later the extension of the mission with an additional two years, until 2010, was supported by a majority (Hazelbag, 2009, p. 1; Kamerstukken II 2005-2006, 27 925, nr. 201, 2006, p. 2; Kranenburg, 2010).

This majority support partly came about by external pressure by NATO, more specifically NATO's Secretary General De Hoop Scheffer (a Dutchman himself), the UN and Afghanistan. All these actors stressed that a Dutch refusal to participate in ISAF would have a significant impact on the stabilization process of Afghanistan, not only a risk to Afghanistan itself but to the rest of the world as well. The issue of solidarity with NATO member states was used to persuade the Dutch government in sending its troops (Kaarbo & Cantir, 2013, pp. 466, 474, 476, 478; Hazelbag, 2009, p. 19; NRC, 2006b; NRC, 2007b; NRC, 2006c; NRC, 2006a).

The parliamentary support for the mission was significantly stronger than the support of the people for the mission (in 2006, 127 of the 150 members of Parliament voted in favour of the mission; in 2008, 104 of the 150 members of Parliament voted in favour of the extension) (Müller, 2008; Klep, 2011, pp. 35, 52). In December 2005, when the first Article 100 letter to Parliament was presented, only 26% of the people polled in a public opinion survey were in favour of the mission. At the time of the parliamentary vote, the support for and against the mission was more or less equally divided (Kaarbo & Cantir, 2013, p. 477; NRC, 2005). From the start of the mission, every month the Ministry of Defence polled the public support for the mission. In October 2007, when the decision was discussed to whether or not extend the mission, 39% of the people were strongly in favour of extending the mission, while 37% were against and 24% were either indifferent or didn't answer the question (Ministry of Defence, 2010c, p. 7).

The two graphs shown below, based on the survey of July 2010, give a good overview of the public opinion during the mission. Figure 5 shows the public support throughout the mission, with red being the people against the mission, green representing the percentage in favour of the mission, and the grey line representing those who were neutral and/or did not answer the question (Ministry of Defence, 2010c, p. 7). The mission started in August 2006 with 36% in favour of the mission; in July 2010 33% was in favour. Those in favour never reached an absolute majority, although in August 2007 50% of the surveyed people supported the mission.


Figure 5: Public support for the mission



Source: Ministry of Defence (2010c), p. 7

Figure 6 shows the public's confidence in the military of being capable of fighting the Taliban (in red), support for the idea that the mission is contributing to the development of Uruzgan (in blue) and for the idea that the mission helps reducing the chances of terrorist attacks in the Netherlands (in green). The latter is based on a US and NATO narrative, arguing that the mission is crucial for the fight against terrorism and terrorist attacks (Dimitru & de Graaf, 2010, p. 434; Ministry of Defence, 2010c, p. 9). Polls conducted during the mission show that the majority of the Dutch public did not find this narrative convincing enough (Van der Meulen & Vos, 2011, p. 2; Ministry of Defence, 2010c, p. 9). The Dutch government failed to convince its public of the necessity of the mission, resulting in low public support; the government also failed to correctly explain and communicate about the mission to its audience, likewise many other NATO member states failed (Dimitru & de Graaf, 2010, p. 445; Hazelbag, 2009, p. 35; Thruelsen, 2010, p. 124; Rasmussen, 2009a; Trouw, 2006b; Van Bommel, 2010b).

Figure 6: Public confidence in the mission



Source: Ministry of Defence (2010c), p. 9

Even the military itself had its doubts regarding the mission. In 2006, 43% of the respondents in a survey amongst military personnel were against the government's decision to deploy the military in Uruzgan, largely because they did not believe they could achieve significant progress in a period of just two years (Van Wetten, 2006). A year later military unions spoke out against an extension of the mission, even though they shared the goal of the mission, as the unions felt it required too much from the military personnel (Gaster, 2007). However, when the mission ended, most of the military personnel and the military unions wanted to stay in Uruzgan beyond 2010, because they felt their job was not completed (BN/De Stem, 2010; Hustinx, 2010).


Despite the fact that the military had some doubts and that a majority of the population did not support the mission, the Dutch government still decided to deploy its military in Uruzgan. In the end it was the lack of support for a further extension of the mission, both within society and parliament, which resulted in the fall of the Dutch government and also in ending the mission (Hamar de la Brethonière, 2010b; Hamar de la Brethonière, 2009; Lagas, 2010). Although it seems that the Dutch government was still able to execute the extraordinary measures of the securitization without the support of its audience, the sustainability and legitimacy of those extraordinary measures did depend on the support of the audience.

The successfulness of each threat is discussed below, but it only includes indications of public opinion or lack of public support for the securitizations.

Threat 1: Terrorists

Although the main argument for the Dutch military mission was that it was needed to rebuild and stabilize Afghanistan, the argument derived from NATO was that it was necessary to prevent Afghanistan from becoming a safe haven for terrorists and thus to prevent future attacks in the Netherlands, was also by the Netherlands as well. A yearly survey by the National Coordinator on Terrorism Prevention and Security shows that in 2005 52% of the respondents were afraid of a terrorist attack in the Netherlands. At the start of the mission terrorism was perceived as a threat by a majority, while only a year later this number was cut in half, and gradually decreased to 9% in 2010 (Intomart GfK bv, 2010, p. 6).

Figure 7: How afraid are you of a terrorist attack in the Netherlands?



Source: Intomart GfK (2010), p. 6

This same trend can be seen regarding the question 'which issues that are currently relevant for the Netherlands, are you personally most worried about?' In 2005 the most pressing issue for the respondents was terrorism. In 2006 it was still a pressing issue, but considerably less so than a year before and in 2007 terrorist attacks hardly played a role for the respondents (Intomart GfK bv, 2010, p. 5).

Figure 8: Which of the following issues that are currently relevant for the Netherlands, are you personally most worried about?

n.b.= niet beschikbaar	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	
Totaal n=	835	845	951	830	800	801	
Regeringsbeleid / politiek	7%	18%	9%	10%	5%	22%	↑
Gezondheidszorg / zorg	19%	14%	7%	9%	11%	16%	↑
Economie / prijzen	25%	12%	12%	41%	11%	14%	
Veiligheid op straat	27%	18%	25%	13%	13%	11%	
Normen en waarden	4%	10%	10%	7%	18%	9%	↓
Werkloosheid / gelegenheid	5%	3%	1%	2%	13%	6%	↓
Radicalisering	n.b.	2%	3%	0%	6%	5%	
Immigratie / integratie	8%	4%	4%	2%	3%	4%	
Milieu	n.b.	6%	18%	9%	2%	2%	
Onderwijs	n.b.	n.b.	n.b.	n.b.	2%	2%	
Terrorisme / aanslagen	39%	20%	3%	1%	1%	1%	
Conflict Hezbollah	n.b.	2%	1%	0%	1%	1%	
Ziekten / virussen	n.b.	n.b.	n.b.	n.b.	6%	1%	↓
Conflict Irak / Afghanistan	n.b.	n.b.	n.b.	n.b.	0%	0%	
Anders, namelijk	n.b.	26%	31%	42%	3%	2%	
Nergens om / geen zorgen	6%	20%	19%	20%	5%	4%	
Weet niet	n.b.	8%	5%	9%	1%	1%	

Source: Intomart GfK (2010), p. 5

Although the decrease of terrorism as a pressing issue might be explained by the fact that the mission was progressing and thus therefore the population felt more secure, the own poll of the Ministry of Defence, as shown in Figure 6 on page 43, makes it clear that this is not the case here. An explanation might be that a clear narrative, such as expressed by NATO (see Chapter 5), was lacking, given that the Dutch narrative seemed to be a combination of the development narrative and the counterterrorism narrative, a combination that confused its audience, both civilian and military. No evidence is found that the Dutch public perceived the OMF as a direct threat. The military in Uruzgan, however, did come in direct contact with these alleged terrorists, OMF and other insurgents, and therefore it is likely that the military would regard this issue as a threat as well (Chapter 7 clarifies to which extent). All in all, there are some indications that the securitization of this threat was successful at the start of the mission, but only in relation to the international threat of terrorism. The extraordinary measure of military deployment in order to combat the threat of terrorism does not seem to be accepted by the audience, as the majority felt that the mission did not reduce the chances of terrorist attacks in the Netherlands.

Threat 2: Narcotics

Although narcotics is a threat to the goal of the Dutch mission, the Dutch government did not express any extraordinary measures and a clear narrative is lacking. Even for the threat of terrorists, which is a visible, understandable and direct and clear threat, it is difficult for the securitization to be successful; this might indicate how much more difficult it is for a threat that is not a direct life-threatening threat to the audience of the Dutch government. Still, the Dutch military in Uruzgan tried to counter the production of drugs through the use of promoting certified alternative crops, improvement of the infrastructure in rural areas, intelligence regarding drugs production, raising awareness through media and facilitating treatment centres for addicts (The Liaison Office, 2010, p. 12). This shows that the Dutch military did find drugs an important issue; Chapter 7 discusses whether or not the Dutch military consider it a threat as well. None of the polls about the public opinion regarding the mission in Uruzgan included questions regarding narcotics. This might indicate that this was not an issue of concern to Dutch society.

The securitization of narcotics does not seem successful, since the issue is not prevalent for the audience. An explanation could be that there was no clear narrative directed at the Dutch public concerning the question why narcotics are a threat; in addition, the lack of extraordinary measures makes the threat even more distant and less easy to identify.

Threat 3: IEDs

The process of securitization for the threat of IEDs seems successful. The government and the higher military levels claimed as extraordinary measures that new equipment, special intelligence and military forces were needed to counter the threat of IEDs (Reformatorisch Dagblad, 2010). This resulted in buying Bushmasters, armoured sleeping containers, setting up a special MIVD IED team and a Task Force Counter-IED (Hamar de la Brethonière & Hijmans, 2008a; Kamerstukken II 2007-2008, 27 925, nr. 279, 2007, p.37; Marlet, 2009; Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defence, 2012, p. 87-89; MIVD, 2007, pp. 46-47).

All these measures resulted in a more effective and efficient way to identify and dismantle IEDs, as illustrated by Table 3.

Table 3: The number of IEDs found by TFU (gevonden=found, waarvan ontploft=of which exploded, percentage ontploft/onschadelijk gemaakt= percentage exploded/dismantled)

IED's TFU	2007	2008	2009	2010 (tot 010710)
Gevonden	101	162	336	286
Waarvan ontploft	45	60	134	104
Percentage ontploft / onschadelijk gemaakt	45/55%	37/63%	32/68%	22/78%

Source: Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defence (2012), p. 42

The securitization of this threat can be considered successful, since the measures expressed are carried out by the military, by finding and dismantling an ever increasing number of IEDs (Hamar de la Brethonière & Hijmans, 2008a; Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defence, 2012, p. 42). Although the threat of IEDs could, if it would take too many lives, lead to a decreasing support for the overall mission, the loss of military lives (thirteen lives were taken by IEDs) during this mission resulted not automatically in a decrease in public support for the mission (Van der Meer, Van den Berg, & Bakker, 2007, p. 354; Voogd & Vos, 2010, p. 451). This does not mean that IEDs are not considered a threat by the audience, rather that the audience accepts a certain amount of casualties in order to achieve the mission's goal. The next chapter shows in more detail to which extent this specific threat is acknowledged within the military mission.

Threat 4: Corruption

Also for the threat of corruption the Dutch government did not seem to formulate extraordinary measures. It is therefore hard to determine if this securitization is successful or not. One accomplishment that could indicate that the Dutch government has successfully securitized corruption as a threat, is the replacement of the provincial governor of Uruzgan, Jan Mohammed Khan. Jan Mohammed Khan was accused by the Netherlands of having relations with the Taliban and being corrupt; therefore his presence was not in line with the goal of the Netherlands to achieve a democratic, secure and stable Afghanistan (Karskens, 2010; Marlet, 2010). His replacement was a prerequisite of the Dutch government to deploy its military, thus it was supported by the majority of the Parliament. The Afghan President met this condition of the Netherlands and replaced the governor; this might indicate that the President agreed with the threat of corruption and the extraordinary measure of replacement.

However, after his replacement Khan unofficially remained in control, since he still had major support in the province. His successors might have had good intentions, but they did not achieve much in the region; one successor was even accused of corruption as well (Derksen, 2007; Grandia Mantas, 2009, pp. 31-32; Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defence, 2012, p. 55; NRC Next, 2007; Parliament, 2009, p. 728; The Liaison Office, 2010, pp. 29-30).


For the military this issue of corruption was a difficult subject. As corruption is almost everywhere in Afghanistan, military personnel occasionally had, in order to make some progress, to work together with people that were known to be corrupt. However, other Afghans might then see the Dutch as 'friends' of corrupt persons, which would in turn negatively affect the Afghan support for the mission. The military continuously needed to be aware of the effect cooperation with a certain person has on the entire mission (Stolze & Rietjens, 2012, pp. 174-175). This is an indication that the securitization might be successful. On the other hand, polls surveying the public opinion of the Dutch population regarding the mission in Uruzgan did not include corruption, and therefore no assumptions can be made about how the Dutch population viewed corruption in Uruzgan.

Chapter 7 Securitization by the Dutch military mission

For the efficiency and effectiveness of the ISAF mission it is important that the threats expressed by NATO and the Dutch government largely overlap with those perceived at the field level. This chapter looks at the threats specifically perceived by the field, the Dutch military mission.

This chapter is primarily based on the interviews conducted by the researcher. The colored squares in the figure below show the interviewees within the structure of the mission. The two brown squares and the two blue squares indicate that two interviewees were deployed twice, but with a different task and function.

Figure 9: Overview of the interviewees within the organisation of the Dutch military mission



This chapter differs from the previous two chapters in that it does not securitize issues the same way NATO or the Dutch government did. While the interviewees and additional sources, like books and documentaries, do express threats, they do not represent official and clear statements, since they are expressed by one individual only, representing only himself, unlike the other levels where all NATO states or one particular nation are concerned (Koninklijke Landmacht, 2007, p. 13). Not every identified threat on this level is included in this chapter, only those that are identified by at least three out of the seven interviewees, making it less likely that it is only a coincidence. Another difference is that the securitizations of this chapter not necessarily aim at convincing the audience and/or gaining support, but rather aim at telling people their story so that they can better understand their situation. As a consequence, this chapter does not include any extraordinary measures, since obviously none were found in the research. The chapter nevertheless follows the main structure of the previous chapters, as this is the clearest way to present the securitizations.

The securitizing move

The various sources mention many threats, some of which are so interrelated that they can be combined. Nevertheless, an analysis of the sources resulted in a listing of five threats: the OMF, IEDs, local structures, ISAF in relation to the Afghans and the organisation of the mission.

Actors

The securitizing actor

For all securitizations in this chapter the securitizing actor is an individual of the Dutch military who was deployed in Uruzgan. This individual actor can have any rank or function, as long as he is part of the Dutch military deployed in Uruzgan.

Functional actor

The functional actors in this case are the (national and Afghan) media, the Afghan and Dutch governments and the countries contributing to ISAF. All these actors can influence the securitizations as they can influence the context of both the securitizing actor and the audience.

Audience

The audience for the securitizations of this chapter are primarily the Afghans and the Dutch military mission itself government. The Afghans need to be convinced that every action taken by the Dutch military is necessary in order to protect them as well as the military themselves against threats. If the mission does not convince the Afghans of these threats that are hindering the mission's goal and of the necessity of every action, the Afghans and the Afghan government might request the departure of the Dutch. The Dutch military mission is an audience because needs to raise awareness among its personnel that certain actions can threaten the mission.

The Dutch military however also only has to justify its actions to the Dutch politicians and the Dutch citizens by showing them that the mission is useful and that they do whatever it takes to achieve the goal. If it does not convince the Dutch audience, Dutch politicians might decide to stop the mission since there is not enough support for the mission in the Netherlands.

Threat 1: Opposing Military Forces (OMF)

While in the previous two chapters the OMF were included in the threat of terrorism, during the interviews and in the other sources this dimension of terrorism did not come up. Thus the threat of the OMF only refers to the direct local threat in Afghanistan itself.

The speech act

Before any military operation starts a threat analysis is made. For the Dutch mission it would be something along the lines of, according to an interviewee, **'the enemy is the Taliban** and [in; AB] that village we think there are twenty and in the whole area we think there are 500. They have the following weapons, and so on. I cannot come up with all these numbers but **the threat was a little bit from the old enemy perception of who the enemy is'** (Interviewee 5, 2014)^{8,9}. Another interviewee responded that he was most warned for the **threat of the OMF**, but he goes on by stating 'what is OMF? The funny thing is that we did not speak of an enemy, we did not have an enemy and of course it is not conventional. **We talked about those Opposing Military Forces, actually meaning the Taliban and their consortium'** (Interviewee 4, 2014). In other words, although there were opposing forces, it was not exactly clear who that might be. The weekly reports of the military mission, as published by the Ministry of Defence stating fire contact and accidents, did not clarify the perpetrator as well. If there was fire contact with the Dutch Task Force in Uruzgan the opponent would always be only referred to as the enemy (Ministry of Defence, 2015). Occasionally the enemy was called the Taliban, such as in a response to the question which danger they were most warned about by their superiors, 'well, mostly IEDs and what you say, IEDs, **the Taliban** but also the environment, the danger of the temperature, of specific vermin, snakes and scorpions' (Interviewee

⁸ All interviews are conducted and transcribed in Dutch. The quotes that are used here are translations of the transcripts.

⁹ The author added **bold** to the quotes to emphasize the formulations of the threats. Bold is added in order to emphasize the words that formulate the securitizing move.

1, 2014).

Others formulated the threat more in terms of actions. In Kabul, where the headquarters of ISAF were located, the OMF committed many suicide attacks. A respondent, stationed at ISAF headquarters, said **'the danger of attacks** was apparent. [...] **No, the largest threat were the suicide attacks'** (Interviewee 3, 2014). Suicide attacks and rocket attacks as well as direct fire contact is what makes the OMF threatening. In 'Task Force Uruzgan', Marc van Groenestein, attached to the Air force RC-South, also experienced the threat of the OMF: **'the enemy possessed heavy weaponry that poses a threat to the helicopters'** (Van Bommel, 2009, p. 25). The largest threat of the OMF the Dutch military experienced was in Chora, mid-2007. Larry Hamers tells his story in 'Task Force Uruzgan'; during an attack of the Taliban 'Elwyn fires a salvo nearby them and we hear immediate reaction on the Taliban radio. There is no other way than that they are fighters! There is a hard assault by the first platoon. **The Taliban take a big blow and for the moment the threat is countered'** (Van Bommel, 2009, p. 64). And he continues, 'Duck! From the mountains **shots are coming dreadfully close. Ivo's mates end the threat with a few hits'** (Van Bommel, 2009, p. 68). Rocket attacks highlight another action of the OMF. The OMF frequently fired rockets at the base in Kandahar where RC-South was located and Kamp Holland, the main base in Uruzgan. An interviewee told the story of his arrival at Kandahar in early 2006: 'I can still see the commander saying he was there for three months and nothing had happened; that night we needed to go to our bunker because it was the first **rocket attack**. [...] Sometimes they overshot with a big distance, sometimes the shots came close by, **but it is a threat indeed and that was the biggest threat for the people in Kandahar and certainly for the deployment task force and when we left.**' (Interviewee 7, 2014). The rocket attacks continued throughout the mission and became a weekly event (Ministry of Defence, 2015). Although it is perceived as threatening, after a while it is part of 'normal' life; it is as, in the words of Leonie Mentink, 'if a **rocket** would hit us, we would be dead. In the beginning this was frightening, but after a while it becomes a **vague threat**' (Müller, 2009, p. 105). The OMF are also depicted in the book by Noël van Bommel; four of the fourteen images show the threat of the OMF through the images of a rocket launch, firing airplanes, hostile Afghans, and the Dutch military being shot at (Van Bommel, Task Force Uruzgan, 2009). The documentaries about the Dutch military in Uruzgan, 'Fokking hell' and 'Dagboek van onze helden' [Diary of our heroes] also confirm the danger of the OMF. The documentaries show footage during actual encounters with the Taliban and offensive actions, but also show military personnel hiding in their bunkers because the OMF is shooting at the base with rockets (Feijten, Staklebeek, & Ter Velde, Fokking Hell, 2010; Ministry of Defence, 2010b). All these examples see the OMF as a direct threat to the Dutch military; however, the OMF also creates insecurity for the local population in Uruzgan. To which extent it is threatening for them 'depends of course what your position is as a local; if you agree with them, they do not **pose a real threat**. If you disagree with them, you are challenged. Especially in that period they were certainly present and actions were taken against civilians' (Interviewee 1, 2014).

Facilitating conditions

Although there are references to the OMF and the Taliban, the majority of the formulations do not state who is actually threatening the Dutch military. These formulations refer to 'the enemy' or to the actions without naming the perpetrator. An explanation for this could be that the Dutch military does not speak of an enemy in their daily routine or the fact that if you live in those extreme circumstances long enough they become 'normal' again, which might mean that something is no longer specifically defined as a threat.

The context of this securitization is the context of South Afghanistan, Uruzgan. The Taliban has its roots in Uruzgan and this is where the Taliban continues to fight. Even though the heaviest fighting did not take place in Uruzgan it remained a dangerous province for the ISAF forces because it was the Taliban's stronghold. To give an indication of how dangerous Uruzgan was, the soldiers that arrived the day after D-Day in 1944 had less TIC's (Troops In Contact; fire contact with the enemy) than the average Dutch soldier in 2007 in Uruzgan (Müller, Op missie, 2009, p. 88). The Dutch military operated in a context in which they had frequent direct and indirect fire contact with the OMF, which

could suggest that the context might facilitate the securitization of the OMF (Ministry of Defence, 2015). The final facilitating condition is the social capital of the speaker. For this level this is difficult to determine, since there is not one homogenous speaker. The speakers are all different individuals, different in rank and function. In essence one could presume that the higher in rank someone is the more social capital he/she has, as he/she has more responsibility and is therefore more credible. Given the wish for anonymity of the interviewees, this thesis does not state the ranks or other personal information. As a consequence, the social capital cannot be determined. The chapter does not discuss the social capital for other threats, since the same reasoning applies.

Threat 2: IEDs

The threat of IEDs is the only issue identified at all three levels. For this level, almost every interviewee perceived IEDs as threatening. This section only mentions the most clear speech acts regarding this issue.

The speech act

Not only for this mission, but for any military mission 'there is always a threat, this is also a fixed moment in the training, also part in my very limited training, **that is the threat of mines and currently the IEDs**' (Interviewee 7, 2014). More specific for the mission in Uruzgan, one of the respondents said that the threats he was warned about and experienced by himself were '**mostly IEDs** and what you say, **IEDs**, the Taliban but also the environment, the danger of the temperature, of specific vermin, snakes and scorpions' (Interviewee 1, 2014). The perceived threat of IEDs was reaffirmed time and again in other interviews; for example, a respondent said 'in general it were **mostly the IEDs** that affected us and for which we were warned the most [...] If you look at the enemy analysis of the OMF, which is normally quite extensive if you are in some sort of conventional setting. In this case this [the section on the OMF; AB] was often less [extensive; AB] than **the threat of Improvised Explosive Devices**' (Interviewee 4, 2014). IEDs were mentioned in his military orders and 'appeared to be **the largest enemy** in practice as well' (Interviewee 4, 2014). In general this respondent said, 'I think that the **threat was transparent and clear** [...] mainly those **IEDs** because large scale other types of attacks were not really known to us in that area, except for what happened in Chora' (Interviewee 4, 2014). IEDs slowed down many operations as 'Genie units searched the roads with their metal detectors, searching for the most deadly and **invisible enemy**, buried under the dusty sand: **the roadside bomb**' (Müller, Op missie, 2009, pp. 112-113). This situation, searching the road for IEDs with metal detectors, is also present in the documentaries. The threat of IEDs is even more prominent in the documentary 'Diary of our heroes' as it shows the impact IEDs can have on the military and the mission when two marines are killed by an IED (Feijten, Staklebeek, & Ter Velde, Fokking Hell, 2010; Ministry of Defence, 2010b).

This threat, strongly experienced in the field, resulted in a change on the national level in the area of counter-IED. Although it was known that IEDs would be an issue during the mission 'a taskforce was established in the Netherlands which was in direct contact with us [TFU; AB] to see how **the threat developed and how we could respond to it**' (Interviewee 5, 2014).

Facilitating conditions

Here again 'enemy' is used to describe a threat. Although for this issue it is more clear who or what poses the threat (the issue of IEDs was already known prior to the mission), the anonymity of the word 'enemy' could refer to the invisibility and unpredictability of the IEDs. The context of IEDs is the same as described in Chapter 6 on the potential successfulness of the securitization of IEDs. IEDs take lives and even though more IEDs are found and dismantled, the threat of IEDs remains high (NOS, 2010; Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defence, 2012, p. 42).

Threat 3: Local structures

Local structures include the ethnic and tribal relationships and thus also tensions between and within ethnic and tribal groups. These local structures heavily influence politics in Afghanistan, making the

political system in Afghanistan a mix of (premature) democracy and the traditional tribal/patrimonial system. These local structures define the complex social and political context in Uruzgan (Kitzen, Close Encounters of the Tribal Kind: the Implementation of Co-option as a tool for De-escalation of Conflict- The Case of the Netherlands in Afghanistan's Uruzgan Province, 2012, p. 718). For the military forces it is difficult to understand the local culture and customs but also to identify potential allies and potential enemies. This is of course not only threatening the goals of the mission but also the lives of the military forces involved.

The speech act

One interviewee answered the question for which security issue he was warned most about by his superior that **'one risk for the mission was the problem of the tribal structure and its sensitivities.** Afghans identify themselves with their tribe, their nationality is second to this. This can make the job [of the TFU; AB] very difficult and also resulting in a large risk [for sustainability of the mission's achievements; AB]' (Interviewee 2, 2014). He also experienced this threat during his own activities mentioning that **'this [the complexity of the tribal and political structure; AB] is unbreakable and has consequences on all activities that you develop'** (Interviewee 2, 2014). Another respondent identified the tribal structures as dangerous as well. He explained that when a local conflict occurs it is very difficult to determine the true cause of the conflict because as an outsider you are not familiar with the local structures. After a long process it 'becomes clear that water was the true cause and that they continue to fight until there is no more water. **Water does not pose a threat in itself, but anyone that has knowledge about the situation in Afghanistan could tell me that** [such a local conflict; AB] **is be dangerous for you** and you better not go there because it is a dangerous area' (Interviewee 5, 2014). Another aspect of the threat of local structures is politics. It is stated that **'the threats for the NATO mission are in the field of governance,** the trustworthiness of the Karzai government and the extent to which extent they were capable of forming a credible government to all Afghans' (Interviewee 3, 2014). For Afghanistan trustworthiness largely depends on the representation of tribal structures, a just appointment of local officials and the division of services between the tribes. The government prior to the Taliban was very decentralized and unbalanced in its representation of the tribal and local structures in the (local) government. It is reasoned that **'the threat from Afghanistan arose because Afghanistan was not governed properly.** Because Afghanistan was not governed properly, the Taliban was able to grow. The Taliban became a threat to the Western world' (Interviewee 3, 2014).

Facilitating conditions

The formulations of this threat highlight the importance of local structures in politics but also in daily life. It even can be seen as a cause for bad governance which in turn resulted in a Taliban governed Afghanistan. The context is that there are indeed multiple tribes, sub-tribes and ethnicities present in Uruzgan (Klep, 2011, p. 110; Kitzen, Close Encounters of the Tribal Kind: the Implementation of Co-option as a tool for De-escalation of Conflict- The Case of the Netherlands in Afghanistan's Uruzgan Province, 2012, p. 718). This results in many (historical) tensions between and within those tribes, but Uruzgan also witnesses a rivalry between pro-government strongmen and former Taliban as well as between internal community divisions, all of which are strengthened by the composition of the local government and political power (The Liaison Office, 2010, p. 5). Different groups ally with others because they have the same opponent rather than becoming allies because they agree with each other (The Liaison Office, 2010, p. 49). Each conflict has a different composition, making it difficult to distinguish opponents and advocates in a conflict. This also applies to ISAF as the different groups act rather pragmatic. But it is also a context in which the Afghan population does not trust its government, partly due to corruption (as discussed in Chapter 6 in the paragraph on the potential successfulness of the securitization of the threat corruption). The legitimacy of the provincial and local government remains poor throughout the mission because of the lack of capable and representative officials (Grandia Mantas, 2009, p. 41).

Threat 4: ISAF in relation to the Afghans

The mission is also threatened by its own actions towards the Afghan population; actions that might decrease their support for the mission.

The speech act

The first type of ISAF action contributing to the overall threat is the collateral damage caused by the actions of the Dutch military. According to a Forward Air Controller, 'for [his; AB] **field of expertise, the largest danger was dropping a bomb somewhere and destroying something, destroying property of people**', referring to the property of innocent civilians (Interviewee 1, 2014). The destruction of their property is used in Taliban propaganda, which is harmful for the ISAF mission (Interviewee 1, 2014). Another interviewee also perceived collateral damage as a threat to the mission. In answer to the question for which security issues he was mostly warned, he said there 'was an emphasis **on collateral damage**, on the consequences this could have' (Interviewee 2, 2014). A second type of action which contributed to the threat is the strategy of winning the hearts and minds of the Afghan population. This strategy implies meeting and talking to the locals, even establishing cooperation. The problem is that the OMF tend to punish everyone who cooperates with the ISAF forces and thus ISAF becomes a danger for the population (Interviewee 5, 2014). One interviewee realized the consequences of this strategy: 'You [TFU; AB] use of course many local people. These people could become a target [...] **We remain a threat for the people if they cooperate with you [...] We create also a threat for them if you decide to cooperate with us**' (Interviewee 6, 2014). The final type of ISAF action posing a potential threat to its mission is that the approach is too Western orientated. ISAF has certain Western goals that might not be suitable for the local population in Uruzgan and it generally includes not enough Afghans in decision making on development and its operations. According to one of the respondents, '**a threat for the mission was that we would do too much our own thing instead of supporting the Afghans** to do it themselves. In this way ISAF could be seen as a true separate Western power for many Afghans' (Interviewee 2, 2014). Another interviewee confirmed this, by saying '**the fact that we [ISAF; AB] initially did most operations with too little integration with Afghan National Security Forces was also a threat**' (Interviewee 3, 2014).

All these actions together can hinder the mission because these actions can decrease the number of Afghans that support the mission while their support is crucial for the success of the mission.

Facilitating conditions

The formulations are all about the necessity to focus on the Afghans, implying that they are the key to the successfulness of this mission. If ISAF is not aware that their actions could negatively affect the lives of the Afghans, it could decrease the support the Afghans have for the mission and increase their support for the Taliban. All formulations refer one way or another to the fact that actions taken by ISAF themselves could threaten their mission. The political context is formed by the repeated calls from NATO and ISAF commanders to focus on the Afghans as discussed in the paragraph on the successfulness of the securitization of the threat lack of Afghan public support in Chapter 5. Also part of the context are the official numbers of civilian victims as a result of Dutch military action in Uruzgan. Since 2006, the Dutch military is held responsible for the death of 110 civilians and the injuries of 90 other (Klep, 2011, p. 67). The local dimensions in Uruzgan are another aspect of the context of this threat, especially for the Western approach. A Western democracy might not be suitable for Afghanistan, especially not in such a short period of time, and at least requires some input for the Afghans themselves (Interviewee 3, 2014; Interviewee 4, 2014). The same goes for the integration of the military operations of ISAF. For them to be independent and functioning when ISAF leaves, they first need to be trained and that only works if they are engaged in the operations happening in their own country. Closer to the end of the mission, operations and development were more integrated and Afghans were taking the lead in several projects (Interviewee 3, 2014).

Threat 5: The organisation of the mission

The organisation of the Dutch mission also poses a threat to the mission. Especially at the beginning of the mission, when the deployment task force was already active in Uruzgan but the mandate of ISAF was not yet extended to the south of Afghanistan.

The speech act

One respondent elaborated on this problem, 'the organisational uncertainty never resulted into large problems, but we did start the mission very enthusiastically and apparently we did not realize how it would fit in the larger picture [...] Once again it did not cause any real problems, but it was indeed a **potential threat to the mission** as a whole' (Interviewee 7, 2014). When the TFU did fall under the ISAF mandate, other problems arose. ISAF was constructed in such a way that each country could have its own caveats which could influence the cooperation with the coalition. Two interviewees explained the consequences and the threat of working in a coalition such as ISAF. One of them said that '**you have [another] risk in relation to other countries of ISAF**. Regional Command South included Canada, Great Britain, the United States together, and Bulgaria, the Netherlands and Australia together. All were responsible for a province, but if something happened on the border of that province, cooperation is needed [...] **This implies the risk that if you refuse, the trust in the international coalition will be broken** and if you do it too often it will be at the expense of your own operation' (Interviewee 5, 2014). The other said that 'you get a **'coalition-threat'** if you say too often we are not doing it or you say we cannot do all of this [...] **If you do too many red card activities, you lose position on different levels and that is a threat**' (Interviewee 6, 2014). In other words, turning down ISAF coalition requests too often, could result in the refusal of Dutch requests as well and thus pose a threat to the overall mission and to the relations with other countries; on the other hand, granting requests too often could be a threat to the goal of the Dutch mission itself.

Facilitating conditions

These formulations also say the structure of ISAF is threat for its own mission but could also possibly threaten the relations between countries. This is also the context in which the Dutch military operated. ISAF is not only a military mission. It is a military mission of a political organisation, made up of many countries that all have to work together and compromise. Any decision made in the field during the Dutch mission can impact the (political) relations between the Netherlands and its allies. If the Netherlands says 'no' too often and does not contribute to important operations in the region, it could negatively impact the Netherlands. The Dutch mission represents the Netherlands in ISAF, and its actions also determine how other countries perceive the Netherlands.

Successful securitization?

The successfulness of the securitizations of this level is discussed briefly, since there is no other level included in this thesis that can determine to which extent these securitizations are taken over by another level and therefore determine the real success. This part gives only some indications, based on the sources, whether or not a securitization could be successful.

Threat 1: OMF

The OMF continues to be a security issue, even after the Dutch mission ended. The OMF continues to spread terror among the population. The Afghan population and the Dutch military experience the threat the OMF themselves (Interviewee 5, 2014; The Asia Foundation, 2010, p. 31; Van Bommel, Task Force Uruzgan, 2009, pp. 25, 64, 68, 141). It is therefore likely that the securitization of the OMF is successful.

Threat 2: IEDs

During the mission the Dutch government and the Dutch military put quite a lot of effort in Counter IEDs. Additional material was purchased and special teams were formed in the Netherlands as well as

in Uruzgan to keep up with the development of the IEDs and counter it at the same time. This resulted in a higher percentage of detected IEDs that could be dismantled (Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defence, 2012, p. 42). This could imply that the Dutch military were more aware of IEDs and thus that the securitization of IEDs was successful.

Threat 3: Local structures

The Dutch military used more and more input of the Afghans themselves as the mission proceeded, involving them in development projects and strengthening the relations between (tribal/ethnic/political) groups (Ministry of Defence, 2010b; The Liaison Office, 2010, pp. x, 50). When the Netherlands announced their departure at the end of 2010, many leaders in Uruzgan urged them to stay on because the Dutch military helped stabilizing the tribal and political relations in the region (Hamar de la Brethonière, 2010a; Scholten, 2009). This could imply that the securitization is successful and that extraordinary measures are implemented resulting in a decreased threat. Due to local structures, officials without the right qualifications get appointed. The government institutions therefore lack sufficient staff, are inadequate and do not have enough knowledge about national legislation. The institutions also suffer from corruption, limited budgets, conflicts between departments and a lack of coordination according to the Afghan population (The Liaison Office, 2012, p. 66). The fact that the Afghan population also view local structures as not beneficial to the development of Afghanistan, could imply that the securitization was successful.

Threat 4: ISAF in relation to the Afghans

The Dutch military in Afghanistan is known for their Dutch approach, also called the 3D approach. This approach was aimed at winning the hearts and minds of the Afghan population (NATO, 2014b). They were aware of the fact that collateral damage would be used as propaganda by the OMF and that it would discredit them. The Dutch military is seen by the majority of the population in Uruzgan as seriously committed to minimizing civilian casualties, but also as a military that honours local customs, culture and the local population (The Liaison Office, 2010, p. 51). In this regard the securitization might be successful as the measures are taken to minimize civilian casualties caused by ISAF action.

As the mission progressed, more operations included cooperation between the Afghan army or police and the ISAF forces, but also gave Afghans more opportunity to make decisions on development and construction projects (Interviewee 3, 2014; Ministry of Defence, 2010b). This could imply that the Dutch military, and more in general ISAF, tried to reduce the Western-biased approach in Afghanistan. These two developments might be an indication that the securitization of ISAF in relation to the Afghans was successful.

Threat 5: The organisation of the mission

The threat emanating from the unclear status of the Dutch mission was only temporary as it was resolved when the mission was officially operational in the south of Afghanistan. The other element of the threat was the result of the coalition construction of the mission. This part can be decreased if within the coalition a balance was found between granting support and executing your own mission. The information, to which extent this was done and which extraordinary measure were taken, is not accessible for the researcher therefore the successfulness of this threat remains unclear.

8 Analysis

The analysis is divided into two parts. The first part analyses to which degree the securitizations by NATO correlate with the other levels, the Dutch government and the Dutch military in Uruzgan, but also to which extent the securitizations by the Dutch government level are taken over by the Dutch military in Uruzgan.

The second part addresses the research framework of the Securitization Theory. The analysis shows which elements of the research framework prove to be suitable for applying the Securitization Theory to a case study and which elements prove to be less successful.

8.1 Analysis of the three levels of securitizations

In this part the formulations of threats as well as the extraordinary measures are compared. Although the facilitating conditions are also part of the comparison, they are less explicitly mentioned. They rather assist in explaining the differences in the securitization. The facilitating condition of social capital is excluded from the comparison as it is already a known difference. This difference functions as a basis for the research.

First, this chapter compares the securitized issues. Table 4 shows the threats perceived by each level. The colours in the table represent the threats are identified by more than one level. Only the IEDs are a threat for all levels. Terrorism is perceived as a threat by the NATO level and the Dutch government level; closely connected to this threat is the threat of the OMF, as perceived by the third level. Narcotics is also threatening for more levels. The last overlapping issue identified by more levels is the lack of Afghan public support, although as such not perceived at the level of the Dutch government.

The four issues/threats with an overlap in other levels are discussed in more detail below, comparing the formulations and the extraordinary measures. The last part discusses all other perceived threats.

Table 4: The issues securitized, by each level. The colours indicate that there is overlap between the different levels.

	Threat 1	Threat 2	Threat 3	Threat 4	Threat 5
NATO	Terrorism	Narcotics	IEDs	Lack of Afghan public support	
The Dutch government	Terrorism	Narcotics	IEDs	Corruption	
The Dutch military mission in Uruzgan	OMF	IEDs	Local structures	ISAF in relation to the Afghans	The organisation of the mission

8.1.1 Terrorism – OMF

The threat of terrorism is the largest threat and the initial reason for NATO to intervene in Afghanistan and to take charge of ISAF. For this threat it is clear that the securitization trickles down from an international level to a local level in Afghanistan. NATO perceives the threat of terrorism primarily as an international threat because terrorists can attack anywhere in the world. It is in particular formulated as a threat to the member states of NATO, associating terrorism with extremism which in many NATO member states is seen as a challenge. The Dutch government considers terrorism to be a threat to national security. It also makes the connection between the terrorist threat in Afghanistan and the stability and security in that country, but also to the ISAF forces present in Afghanistan. Regarding this latter dimension, the Dutch government no longer refers to terrorists but to OMF, the Opposing Military Forces. The Dutch military is only concerned about the OMF and does not express the international aspect of threat of terrorism.

Table 5: The threat of terrorism - OMF

	Formulation of the threat terrorism/OMF	Extraordinary measures
NATO	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Threat to citizens of NATO member states as well as to the stability of Afghanistan • Including extremism, al-Qaeda, Taliban, illegal armed groups 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Improve intelligence cooperation on terrorism • Disrupt terrorist networks • All necessary measures
The Dutch government	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Threat to national (Dutch) security, to the security and stability of Afghanistan, but also to ISAF • Including OMF, anti-Western elements, war lords, drugs barons 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • A national action plan • Mission to Uruzgan, including its extension • Offensive operations, also outside inkblots
The Dutch military mission in Uruzgan	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Speaking of 'enemy' • OMF mostly referred to as Taliban • Suicide and rocket attacks 	

All extraordinary measures taken by NATO in countering this threat concern the mission in Afghanistan, while the Dutch government included national measures as well. NATO expresses the need to improve intelligence regarding terrorism and the need for a disruption of the networks that finance and sustain the terrorist groups. The Dutch government partly answers to these calls, as one of its extraordinary measures is to send its military to Uruzgan to support the Afghan government and its forces. As NATO accepts all measures that are necessary to achieve the mission's goal, the Netherlands allows for offensive operations and operations outside the inkblots in order to avert the threat of terrorism and possibly disrupt the terrorist networks.

The Dutch government however also has a national interpretation of which measures need to be taken in order to combat the threat of terrorism; this action plan needs to be established and adjusted if necessary. Thus, while the Dutch government in most part takes over the securitization of NATO, it does have its own interests as well. As mentioned in Chapter 7, the level of the Dutch military in Uruzgan does not formulate any extraordinary measures, mainly because the individuals at this level felt they were not in a position to express extraordinary measures or because it simply did not concern them.

Each level defines this threat slightly different, with a focus on their own concerns. For NATO terrorism includes extremism, the Taliban, al-Qaeda and other illegal armed groups, while for the Dutch government it includes the OMF, anti-Western elements as well as war lords and drugs barons. The broad term 'OMF' is used by the Dutch military, but it also uses 'Taliban' and 'enemy'. The OMF can thus be seen as part of the complex structure of those belonging or associated with the threat of terrorism, but is more focused on the local level in Afghanistan than the international level. All levels define different parts of the same group that is perceived to be a threat to international security and the mission. However, to whom they pose a threat differs at each level. This can be the result of different perceptions, but also because the speakers express the threat in such a way that its audience could identify with. The Dutch government, as a direct audience of NATO, accepts the threat and the extraordinary measures claimed by NATO; in fact it calls for similar measures and implements them. While the Dutch military accepts the threat of the OMF as a local aspect of terrorism, it does not mention the international aspect. The Dutch citizens, including the Dutch military personnel, accepted the threat as expressed by the Dutch government at the start of the mission, as 52% of the respondents in a survey were afraid of a terrorist attack in the Netherlands. However, this fear decreased to only 9% at the end of the mission in 2010. During the mission also a large majority of the population did not think that the mission would help in reducing the chances of a terrorist attack (Intomart GfK bv, 2010, p. 6; Ministry of Defence, 2010c, pp. 13, 14). It was not a

major concern in the lives of people. As a result, a significant part of its audience did not fully accept the extraordinary measure of a military mission to Uruzgan; during the entire period of the mission there was never a majority of the Dutch population in favour of the mission (Ministry of Defence, 2010c).

The securitization of this threat and the extraordinary measures of NATO were accepted by the Dutch government and can thus be considered to be successful. Although the securitization of the Dutch government was accepted by the Dutch military, in particular the international dimension of this threat (prevention of terrorists attacks), the extraordinary measures were not accepted by a majority of the Dutch citizens. The securitization of this particular threat by the Dutch government therefore can only be seen as partly successful.

8.1.2 Narcotics

Narcotics is perceived at two levels as a threat, NATO and the Dutch government. The biggest difference in their formulation of the threat is that NATO focuses more on the mobility of the threat in terms of drugs trafficking and in terms of terrorist attacks that are financed by drugs. Narcotics is a threat not only to Afghanistan and its population, but also to ISAF and the citizens of its member states through the use of drugs and attacks that are financed by narcotics. The Dutch government refers to it as a threat to Afghanistan in several dimensions, such as rule of law, governance, the legal economy of Afghanistan, but also the mission's achievements. The Dutch government sees narcotics as a threat that is interconnected with many other issues facing Afghanistan, also making the connection to terrorism. The overview shows that while the issue that is securitized is the same, there are different focus points. NATO is more focused on the international scale and the Dutch government is more focusing on Afghanistan and the context in which its military operates. In this sense it can be said that the securitization of the threat was only partly accepted.

Table 6: Threat of narcotics

	Formulation of the threat narcotics	Extraordinary measures
NATO	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Threat to the rule of law and development in Afghanistan, Afghan population and ISAF as well as international security • Connection with terrorism • Mobile threat 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Development of economic alternatives • Support of the Afghan government • Disrupting drugs trade • Integrated anti-drugs approach
The Dutch government	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Threat to the mission's achievements, rule of law, legal economy, governance and security in Afghanistan • Interconnected threat 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Tackle opium production

The extraordinary measures are more in line with each other. NATO calls for an integrated anti-drugs approach supporting the Afghan government, including eradication, at least disruption of the drugs trade and finding economic alternatives. The Dutch government only expressed the need to tackle the opium trade which comes closest to a formulation of extraordinary measures. The Dutch military follows orders of the government. They promote alternative crops, raise awareness through media and invest in more intelligence on drugs production (The Liaison Office, 2010, p. 12). It shows that the Netherlands was in favour of an integrative approach. Both levels agree that integrative action needs to be taken to stop the production of opium.

The securitization of narcotics is partially successful, because although the threat is accepted, both levels have a different focus on why narcotics is threatening. Although the Netherlands did not really formulated extraordinary measures, there is evidence that they accepted and implemented the extraordinary measures of NATO.

8.1.3 IEDs

The threat of IEDs is the only threat that is identified as a threat by all three levels. However, there is a difference in formulation of the securitizing moves and the extraordinary measures that are claimed. Table 7 gives a clear overview of the differences in perception.

Table 7: Threat of IEDs

	Formulation of the threat IEDs	Extraordinary measures
NATO	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Cause greatest loss of life; danger • Giving statistics • Threat to Afghans, ANSF, ISAF and for development Afghanistan 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • All necessary measures • Develop capabilities to counter IEDs
The Dutch government	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Explicitly stating 'threat' • Focuses on the increase of the threat • Depicting IED searching (non-textual) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Establishment forces/ research teams specialized in counter-IEDs • Purchase equipment giving more protection against IEDs • Increase in intelligence
The Dutch military mission in Uruzgan	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Largest threat is IEDs • Already a known threat 	-

NATO's formulation is more directed at the casualties it causes, supported by the numbers given in the securitizing moves. While the formulation of the IEDs as a threat is specific in light of the numbers, the extraordinary measures leave room for interpretation. NATO does not state any specific measures that need to be taken. The Dutch government, however, claims three measures: the establishment of a specialized counter-IEDs team in research as well as in the field, the purchase of equipment that provides more protection against IEDs and improving the intelligence on information regarding IEDs. The reason the extraordinary measures of NATO are less specific than those of the Dutch government, could be because NATO takes into account the views of 28 member states; and even more within the ISAF coalition. All states might have different ideas, goals, limitations and different capabilities in terms of equipment and personnel, which could be the reason why NATO leaves the specific measures up to the decision of the participating states themselves. The Dutch government accepts the threat and implements its own interpretation of these measures in the field of counter-IEDs (Hamar de la Brethonière & Hijmans, 2008a; Kamerstukken II 2007-2008, 27925, nr. 279, 2007, p.37; Marlet, 2009; Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defence, 2012, pp. 87-89; MIVD, 2007, pp. 46-47). The Netherlands is more focusing on what it needs to do exactly to avert this specific threat and continuously keeps up with the threat. Rather than raising awareness, the securitization of the Dutch government is more directed at creating support in order to continue the development of its counter-IED strategy. The securitization of the Dutch military is reaffirming that although it is a well-known threat, it still remains the largest threat they are facing. For the Dutch government and the Dutch military the formulation of the threat did not directly involve casualties but was more about the significance of this threat. It is the largest threat and continuously evolving, in order to keep up the counter-IED strategy, equipment and research need to evolve as well. The threat of IEDs is perceived by all levels and it is regarded by all as a very pressing threat for the forces in and the population of Afghanistan. The securitization of this threat can therefore be seen as successful.

8.1.4 Afghan – ISAF relations

As mentioned before, this threat as such is not perceived by the Dutch government. The reason this securitization only covers two levels could be because the ISAF forces were the audience of this threat. NATO wanted ISAF to be aware of the fact that certain actions could negatively influence the ISAF-Afghan relations and therefore mission. It was the military, not the governments of the member states, that had to change their approach and therefore this threat was less likely to be of significance to the level of the Dutch government.

According to Chapter 5, NATO identified the lack of public Afghan support as a threat. NATO makes the connection between the collateral damage in the form of civilian casualties (and the destruction of property) and the decreasing support of the Afghan population as a result of this. This threat is adopted by the Dutch military level, as they also included this in the threat of ISAF in relation to Afghans. The Dutch military is aware of the negative consequences of collateral damage, as it is used by the OMF for their propaganda. However, the Dutch military added other elements to the security issue. It also realized that too little integration of the Afghan National Security Forces could lead to a decrease in support, but would also make the achievements of the mission less sustainable. The Dutch military was also aware that if Afghans support ISAF and cooperate with them, these Afghans become targets for the OMF, which does not motivate people to support ISAF. The threat of the lack of Afghan public support is thus accepted by its audience, namely the Dutch military in Uruzgan, but it added more dimensions to this threat.

The Dutch military accepts the extraordinary measures. They are known for the ‘Dutch’ approach, which involves meeting with the local population, talking and understanding; military force is only used when absolutely necessary. The Dutch military as well as other ISAF contributing countries incorporated more ANSF in their operations as the mission continued (NATO, 2014b). This securitization can be seen as successful although it was not perceived as a threat by the Dutch government.

Table 8: Threat of Afghan- ISAF relations

	Formulation of the threat of Afghan – ISAF relations	Extraordinary measures
NATO	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Innocent, civilian lives at stake • Popular confidence crisis 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Better understanding local people • More integration with ANSF • Less civilian casualties
The Dutch military mission in Uruzgan	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Collateral damage • Too Western • Threat to supporting Afghans 	-

8.1.4 Other

All securitizations by NATO are taken over by other levels and are at least in part successful. For the Dutch government, only the threat of corruption is not accepted as a threat by the Dutch military in Uruzgan. Although corruption can be seen as an element of the expressed threat of local structures, it is not corruption in itself that is identified by the Dutch military. For the Dutch military corruption is more a symptom, a result of the local structures rather than a threat in itself. Therefore the securitization of corruption cannot be seen as a successful securitization.

The Dutch military expressed five threats of which two are not perceived by the other levels, namely the local structures and the organisation of the mission. There can be several explanations why these threats are not picked up by the higher levels. Four plausible reasons are given here. One reason is, as mentioned before, that the level of Dutch military in Uruzgan consists of perceptions of individuals rather than from one organisation. As a result this level also expressed individual threats, which might not be representative of the threats facing the organisation as a whole. Another reason could be that NATO and the Dutch government level operate on a different scale than the Dutch military and therefore they might not be concerned with threats on that level. Also there was a lot at stake for NATO and its future with the ISAF mission and therefore identifying the mission’s flaws in its organisation might not be beneficial. Thus another reason might be that even though NATO saw them as threats, it did not want to identify them, at least not publicly. Since this research only includes public sources it cannot be identified. Furthermore since the Dutch government is a political institution more concerned with political dimensions of the mission, it could explain that it did not recognize these threats. So it could be that even though it knew there were challenges for the

military in Uruzgan, it did not experience it as a threat for its level as such. A final reason could be that the government and NATO simply did not know these threats existed. NATO and the Dutch government levels, those who are the speakers on those levels, are not necessarily the same people that are active in the field, the ones leading the operations. Those people that are the speakers are more likely to have higher positions, which usually also implies a larger distance from the field or at least less contact with the field. The assumption here is that 'if people are in constant touch with the system [which in this case would be the level of the Dutch military; AB], this makes it easier to detect and correct anomalies and also to implement more reliable environment' (Weick, 1988, p. 313). Less contact with the actual field that is executing the actual mission, could lead to threats that are not noticed at the higher authority levels, even though these threats might still be there. Those experiencing these threats might not be in the position to express the threats, as they are too far away from those who can securitize and can claim extraordinary measures.

8.2 Analysis of the research framework of securitization

The research framework is designed to make the Securitization Theory more applicable to real life case studies and ultimately it is an attempt to strengthen the theory. An analysis is necessary to see to which extent the research framework actually helped in its application and to which extent it could possibly strengthen the Securitization Theory.

The research framework differs in five dimensions from the original Securitization Theory. For each dimension it is analysed whether or not the changes were useful for the application of the theory to the case study of Uruzgan. This section of the chapter follows the order of Table 2 (The Securitization Theory and the research framework, p. 18); starting with addressing the concept of securitization, followed by the level, context, speech act and finally the actors.

8.2.1 The concept of securitization

In principle, securitization is the speech act, the move that makes an issue a security issue, acknowledging that an issue is threatening a referent object in its existence. The research framework adapts two elements from the original framework. The first is that the speech act not only includes the move that makes an issue a security issue, but also includes the need for implementing extraordinary measures. The second element is that a successful securitization not only includes the acceptance of the issue as a security issue and the acceptance of the need for extraordinary measures, but also the implementation of the extraordinary measures as the ultimate acceptance by the audience.

The first element would be very useful for the identification of securitizing moves. However, most speech acts deal solely with the issue as a security issue, while not mentioning the extraordinary measures within the same sentence or paragraph. Extraordinary measures are claimed, but given the separation of the claim and the expression of a security issue, they are harder to identify and link to a certain threat. The second element is rather useful. The acceptance of the extraordinary measures is connected to the implementation of these extraordinary measures. This makes the acceptance of both the threat and the extraordinary measures easier to identify, as the implementation is more specific and visible than the opinion of the audience. Thus, the inclusion of the implementation of extraordinary measures as a condition for a successful securitization makes the theory more applicable.

8.2.2 The level of securitization

The research framework broadens the level of securitization, by not limiting securitization to an act that can only be executed at the state level. This is indeed useful, as the case study of Uruzgan does include various actors, each with their own securitizations. Without the extension of the levels, the perceived threats of NATO and the Dutch military cannot be expressed, as many of their securitizations are misinterpreted or neglected if they are only seen through the lens of state level. The inclusion of other levels makes the research framework more applicable to the case study.

8.2.3 The context of securitization

The context is a diverse element in the research framework. The research framework tries to loosen the Western bias of the Securitization Theory, as well as to include threats of not just a military and political nature, and to focus more on context within the facilitating conditions.

The loosening of the Western bias is less relevant in this case, as all levels of this research included actors of Western origins. Although the methods do not necessarily have a Western bias, this adaptation in the research framework cannot be tested on its usefulness.

The context is included in the identification of the securitizations, in the sense that the research does not have any predetermined threats or sectors in which the threats must fit. The research is open to any securitization and therefore opens itself up to the context of this case study. This leads to the identification of threats beyond the sectors of political and military threats, identifying threats in all sectors. Although this approach is already present in the original framework, it is still a useful element for the theory's application as makes the theory more inclusive rather than exclusive.

The final aspect of the context in the research framework, focus on context within the facilitating conditions, is a successful adaptation. Although one of the facilitating conditions in the original framework is the credibility of the features of the expressed threat, the research framework names this the facilitating condition of context. This facilitating condition looks at the social context of the threat, the previous events that might facilitate the securitization of the threat. For example, for the threat of terrorism, the attacks of 9-11 and the ones in Madrid and in London, form a substantial context in which the threat is expressed. Another example is the lack of Dutch public support and the hesitations of Dutch politicians regarding the mission in Uruzgan which could be a result of the tragedy of Srebrenica. Current events are also included in the research as potential evidence for whether or not a securitization is successful.

8.2.4 The speech act

The speech act in the research framework differs from the original framework regarding three elements. The first element is that the speech act is seen as a process rather than a particular moment in time. If it is just a moment in time, the first mentioning of the issue as a threat would be the speech act and would make the other formulations insignificant as the securitization already started. By seeing the speech act as a process the other formulations gain meaning as well, altering the formulations slightly as the context of the threat changes in order to continue to convince the audience of the threat. The research framework benefits from the adjustment of the speech act as a process, as it does not necessarily have to identify the first securitizing move. It is more important to show multiple formulations, showing the entire process which is easier to apply to a real life case study.

The inclusion of non-linguistic and extra-linguistic expressions in the speech act is another element that is added. Although images, videos and headings in official documents are also used in this research, it turns out to be difficult to include this element. These expressions are not clear-cut expressions of threats and therefore it is difficult to make a distinction between a true securitization and an expression of an important issue for the speaker. This inclusion is more useful in illustrating the identified threats as threats rather than as sources for speech acts themselves.

The last element also helps in determining the successfulness of the securitization. The original framework only states that the goal of the speech act is acceptance of the threat by the audience. According to the research framework, however, the speech act's goal is to convince the audience of an issue as a threat and the need for the implementation of the extraordinary measures and ultimately that the extraordinary measures are implemented. In general it is easier to determine whether or not extraordinary measures are implemented rather than whether or not a threat is accepted by the audience. This alteration makes the theory more applicable, since the successfulness of the securitizations is less complicated to determine.

8.2.5 The actors

The important difference between the original framework and the research framework in the field of actors is that the latter emphasizes more on the inclusion of both state/political and non-state actors as securitizing actors. In this sense it has the potential to emancipate certain actors that previously were excluded as securitizing actors from the Securitization Theory. The inclusion of non-state actors enabled the theory to be applied to the entire scope of the case study. Although NATO and the Dutch government can be analysed as part of the original framework, since they both belong to the political elite, the research framework allows for the inclusion of the Dutch military in Uruzgan as non-state actors. The methods applied to the Dutch military level could potentially even be applied to the local population in Afghanistan. Interviews and other sources, such as publications based on personal experiences as well as public opinion polls, give a voice to people who are normally not in a position to express a threat or at least not in a position to securitize an issue. The lack of extraordinary measures for the level of the Dutch military indicates that there can still be some limits to the inclusion of non-state actors as securitizing actors, especially if it does not involve a unified actor. Nevertheless, due to the inclusion of non-state, non-political actors, the Securitization Theory is more applicable to this case study and potentially other case studies as well.

The last major difference with the original framework is that the audience is given a more significant role in the theory. The research framework makes the audience an important factor in the successfulness of a securitization. It is the audience that decides whether or not it accepts the issue as a threat and accepts the implementation of the extraordinary measures. The facilitating conditions only make the acceptance of the audience more or less likely, but the audience has the ultimate decision. Even though the speaker might refute the decision of the audience, the audience remains essential in the successfulness and sustainability of the securitization. For example, despite the fact that the threat was accepted, the extraordinary measure of the deployment of the Dutch military was not accepted by a majority of the Dutch population. Nevertheless, the Dutch government implemented this extraordinary measure and was able to do so for four years while the relative lack of support remained. The extraordinary measure did end as a consequence of disagreement within the government, as some political parties thought they could no longer neglect public opinion. This example also shows that there can be a distinction in the type of support the audience can give. The research is able to make a distinction between support for the threat as such and support for both the threat and its accompanying extraordinary measures. This distinction makes it possible to differentiate in successfulness of the securitizations. Although the audience might agree with claiming a specific threat, it can reject the extraordinary measures; for example, because they are considered to be too extreme or simply the wrong measures according to the audience. So, while in the original framework the acceptance of a threat is seen as a successful securitization, the ultimate goal of a securitization remains that extraordinary measures can be used by the speaker. If these extraordinary measures are not accepted, there is no use for a securitization. These alternations in favour of a more significant role of the audience are useful as they clarify the importance of the role of the audience but also clarify to which extent the securitization is successful and understanding the case study even better.

Chapter 9 Conclusion

This chapter concludes the thesis. First of all, the chapter formulates conclusions based on the analysis, regarding the process of securitization in Uruzgan as well as the research framework of the Securitization Theory. These conclusions result in implications they might have for potential speakers of securitization, as well as for the theory of securitization and security studies. The following section gives several suggestions on further research on this topic. The last two paragraphs state the limitations of the research and reflect on the entire research process.

9.1 Conclusion

The goal of this thesis is to investigate to which extent the identified threats at the highest authority in the ISAF mission, NATO, correspond with the lower authority levels of the mission, the Dutch government and the Dutch mission in Uruzgan, respectively. The motivation for this research is to understand the process of securitization which can give a person power. From this perspective the thesis develops a research framework of the Securitization Theory and applies it to the case study of Uruzgan, identifying the processes of securitization for each of the levels.

The main conclusion is that all securitizations of NATO are successful, at least to a certain extent. The most successful securitization is the threat of IEDs. This threat and its extraordinary measures are accepted by all the levels. This is also the most specific threat, which can easily be shown to the audience how pressing the threat was. This is done using the number of casualties caused by IEDs but also by giving through the number of IEDs that are planted and found. The evidence for IEDs and the increasing threat it poses cannot be denied. The second most successful securitization is the securitization of the threat terrorism-OMF; although it is accepted that groups such as al-Qaeda, Taliban and other insurgents are a threat, the levels do not agree on the referent object to which the threat is posed. Also the extraordinary measure linked to this threat by the Dutch government, deploying the Dutch military in Uruzgan, is not entirely accepted by its audience and therefore the securitization is not entirely successful. The securitizations of narcotics and the Afghan-ISAF relations and their extraordinary measures are only accepted by one other level and therefore they cannot be seen as completely successful.

Terrorism and IEDs are both specific threats. People can visualize the threat and people are more likely to experience fear or the actual results of these threats than all other expressed threats. This could be an explanation why their securitizations are successful.

Another conclusion is that, although the same threats are identified at different levels, there is still a difference of interpretation. The difference of interpretation for the terrorism-OMF, narcotics and Afghan-ISAF relations threats is most likely due to the scale of the audience that the speaker has to reach with its securitization. In the case of NATO, the audience is a broad international audience mainly consisting of its member states. Only for the threat 'lack of Afghan public support', the audience is more focused on ISAF. The audience of the Dutch government is the Dutch population, with as an essential part the Dutch military. The audience of the Dutch military in Uruzgan is the Dutch military, the Dutch population as well as the Afghans. NATO formulates its threats as threats to international security and stability. Whereas for the Dutch government it is important that its securitizations are supported by its population, it frames them as threat to the Netherlands or a threat to an important issue according to the Dutch public, namely the development of Afghanistan. For the Dutch military, it is more important to raise awareness of which threats they are faced with, not only for their own security but also to generate more understanding in the Netherlands and in Afghanistan.

It can also be concluded that not every threat that is perceived at the Dutch military level, operating in the field, are identified or perceived as threats by the higher authority levels. This could create problems, as the higher levels are not taking these threats into account in their distribution of forces and equipment or in their decision-making, potentially leaving them incapable to combat the threat.

The conclusion regarding the research framework of the securitization is that the adapted research framework is better suited for application to a case study than the original Securitization Theory. Most alterations in this research framework help to make actors and their role more specific and help to clarify definitions and processes of the theory. These alterations make it easier to identify the elements of securitization in the case study as well as to determine whether or not securitizations are successful and for which reasons some securitizations are more successful than others. Two important alterations prove to be difficult, the loosening of the Western bias of the Securitization Theory and the inclusion of non-linguistic and extra-linguistic expressions of speech acts. The former is less successful because the case study merely includes Western subjects. The inclusion of non-linguistic and extra-linguistic expressions of speech acts in this research can in most cases only be used as support for, or illustration of the identified threats. Nevertheless, this thesis concludes that the research framework can be seen as an improvement in the applicability of the Securitization Theory.

The hypothesis of this thesis is that there is a divergence between the securitizations of the three levels, because each level has its own context and its own actors to take into account. Thus, it is expected that not all securitizations of NATO would be successful. Although the research shows that there is a difference in interpretation of threats between the various levels and not all securitizations are taken over by all levels, every securitization of NATO is successful, at least to some extent. The differences of the levels in context and actors can thus be overcome and thus the findings of this research prove the hypothesis wrong.

As NATO has the most successful securitizations, in comparison to the other two levels, and since it is also the highest level of authority, it can be concluded that the authority and the social capital of the speaker do play a significant role in the successfulness of the securitizations.

9.2 Implications

The thesis can help speakers of securitization, in raising awareness about securitizations and the impact they can have. It shows that the social capital of the speaker is of significance for the acceptance of a threat by the audience. Also, the formulations of the threats seem crucial for the acceptance of a threat. The formulation needs to be adjusted to the context of the audience and their needs to complement with the concerns of the audience. The research shows that even though a speaker can refute the opinion of its audience, the acceptance of the securitization by the audience remains essential for its sustainability. This thesis also gives more clarity about the securitization process and therefore can have implications for future missions with a similar structure, especially concerning more effectiveness in their communication and threat identification between the relevant levels.

Other implications of the thesis deal with the Securitization Theory and security studies in general. This thesis shows that the Securitization Theory can be applied without too many alterations to the original framework. The critique on the theory is countered and thereby the research decreases the weaknesses of the theory. Through this research the foundations of the Securitization Theory are solidified, strengthening the position of the Securitization Theory within security studies. The Securitization Theory proves to be an adaptive and inclusive theory that is able to explain contemporary cases.

9.3 Further research

Research on the Securitization Theory and the process of securitization is still very scarce and therefore further research would be encouraged.

An important alteration of the research framework is that the theory is able to emancipate people. Although the thesis includes the level of the Dutch military in Uruzgan, it does not include another level to test the successfulness of its securitizations. One way of doing this can be to include the level of the local population in Uruzgan in further research. The inclusion of this level can show whether or not the threats as identified at 'higher levels' are the same threats as perceived by the local

population. Further research can show if international organisations such as NATO have their own interests or the interests of those they claim to help at heart. It will be very interesting to uncover these dimensions from the perspective of security.

Not only further research on this particular case study is encouraged, but the application of the theory to other case studies as well. Applying the theory to more case studies can help in developing the theory of securitization but also could test the suitability of the research framework to other cases. The theory and the research framework can especially benefit from case studies within a non-Western context or with non-Western actors, as this case study is unable to strengthen the theory in this regard. Further research in a non-Western context can truly test the proclaimed universality of the Securitization Theory.

The theory and the research framework can also benefit from case studies that include more sources of non-linguistic and extra-linguistic speech acts. For this research it proves to be difficult, especially since the research does not take place at the time when the speech acts were expressed. The non-linguistic and extra-linguistic speech acts are hard to determine if several years have gone by because they are less likely to be documented and archived than written speech acts. Case studies within a context or society in which a majority of the people are not able to read or write, and therefore non-linguistic or extra-linguistic speech acts gain an additional importance, can be very interesting for further research on the Securitization Theory.

9.4 Limitations

There are three important limitations to this research. This first limitation is already known prior to the start of the research. The research is limited because the case study is about a military mission, which is in general a sensitive issue. The sensitivity of the subject is expressed through the restriction of several documents that can be useful for the identification of the threats for the respective levels. The sensitivity of a military mission is also visible during the interviews; some questions cannot be answered because of the sensitivity and some specific examples cannot be given.

The interviews also illustrate another limitation. Chapter 7 is primarily based on seven interviews, which can be seen as rather limited. Since the interviewees only represent themselves and not the entire Dutch military that was deployed in Uruzgan, there is no risk of misrepresentation, but more interviews can give a more complete picture and strengthen the formulation of the threats. Also the fact that most of the interviewees are part of the Royal Marine can potentially hinder the thesis from presenting a more complete picture on securitizations of the Dutch military.

The last limitation is regarding the availability of the sources covering the entire period of 2006-2010. The pictures and videos used for the identification of threats perceived by NATO covers only the period of 2008 onwards as NATO started using YouTube and Flickr as of 2008. Also the ISAF website is no longer available in 2015, making it harder to access previous ISAF information. ISAF ended in December 2014 and therefore the website of ISAF transitioned into the website of the Resolute Support mission of NATO, the successor of ISAF.

9.5 Personal reflection

While the understanding of the Dutch mission in Uruzgan and the process of securitization are priorities, it is also important that this thesis potentially can strengthen the Securitization Theory. The theory of securitization is a theory that is not as clear as most theories. In order to be able to work with the theory and eventually apply it, several aspects of the theory needed to be redefined. This was rather difficult, as there was no guide book that could be followed in order to know what could be understood as a successful securitization. I had to redefine definitions and boundaries, following my interpretation of the theory and its critiques. It seemed like such a responsibility that it took a while for me to realize there was not one 'right' way to do this. Eventually I think that this thesis does contribute to the development of the Securitization Theory, even if it only functions as an example to make a theory better suitable for a case study.

The entire process altered my attitude towards theories; instead of seeing it as a burden that is a

mandatory element for a thesis, it actually functioned as a guide throughout the thesis. The framework structured my approach towards the case study, it structured this thesis as well as it helped to reach clear and presentable conclusions.

During my research it became clear that looking at a mission from the perspective of securitization was not commonly used. Military personnel did not necessarily view their mission or operation in terms of threats. Telling their stories and their experiences rarely included the mentioning of threats, unless it was specifically asked. Also the inclusiveness of the securitization, the fact that everything can become a security issue seems rather new to them. Once they understood this, they were very helpful in thinking of other threats they perceived besides the traditional military threats. The inclusion and comparison of the different levels within the mission was not a perspective that was often used; most of them were only concerned with their orders and their direct superiors, not necessarily thinking on how they would fit into the general picture.

This thesis contributes to the academic field of security studies as well as it raises more awareness on securitization and the difference in the identification of threats by several actors.

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Annexes

Annex 1 List of interviews

Interviewee 1. (2014, July 1).

Interviewee 2. (2014, June 17).

Interviewee 3. (2014, June 25).

Interviewee 4. (2014, May 26).

Interviewee 5. (2014, June 19).

Interviewee 6. (2014, June 18).

Interviewee 7. (2014, June 24).

Annex 2 Interview questions

1. Wat is/was uw rang?
2. Hoe lang ben u al in dienst?
3. Hoe vaak ben u al uitgezonden?
4. Wat is/was uw functie in het Defensie?

5. In welke periode bent u naar Afghanistan geweest?
6. Waar werd u gestationeerd?
7. Wat was de taak van uw eenheid binnen de missie (Task Force Uruzgan)?
8. Wat was uw taak binnen die eenheid?
9. Wat waren uw uit de hoofdtak afgeleide orders?
10. Heeft u uw taken goed kunnen uitvoeren?
11. Vond u dat de missietraining voldoende was om uw taak in Uruzgan uit te voeren?
12. Waar was u het minst op voorbereid?

13. Voor welk gevaar werd u het meest gewaarschuwd door uw meerderen?
14. Waren deze gevaren overeenkomstig met de gevaren vermeld in uw officiële orders?
15. Kwam dit overeen met wat u zag tijdens activiteiten?
16. Wat waren volgens u de dreiging voor de missie, de Afghanen en de provincie Uruzgan?

17. In hoeverre had de NAVO invloed op uw activiteiten en uw uitvoering?
18. Als u behalve onveiligheid andere problemen in Uruzgan moest noemen, wat zouden deze dan zijn?
19. Wat is u het meest bijgebleven van uw tijd in Uruzgan?
20. Zijn er nog dingen waarvan u denkt die interessant zijn die u graag kwijt wil?

Annex 3 Consent form

Toestemmingsverklaring voor het onderzoek 'Securitization in Uruzgan'

Dit volgende formulier is een toestemming om delen te nemen aan het onderzoek van Anne Breuer, student van Radboud Universiteit te Nijmegen voor haar masterscriptie.

Neem alstublieft de informatie op dit formulier zorgvuldig door voordat u beslist om wel of niet deel te nemen.

Het onderzoek

De scriptie gaat over hoe dreigingen gevormd en geformuleerd worden in de verschillende lagen van besluitvorming van missie Uruzgan. De analyse zal de besluitvorming van de NAVO, de Nederlandse regering en Defensie bevatten. Ook zal er worden gekeken de reactie op deze dreiging om zo een duidelijk en compleet beeld te krijgen van het hele proces rondom dreigingen in Uruzgan.

Methodes

De methodes die worden gebruikt bestaan uit het analyseren officiële (openbare) documenten van de NAVO, de Nederlandse regering en Defensie, academische artikelen en interviews. Het merendeel van het onderzoek zal plaatsvinden te Den Helder gedurende een stage aan het Koninklijk Instituut voor de Marine.

De interviews worden gehouden met individuele deelnemers en wordt opgenomen met een voice recorder tenzij er bezwaren zijn. Het interview bestaat voornamelijk uit vragen over de (uw) uitzending en ervaringen daar, gericht op de interactie tussen de politieke niveau en operationeel niveau.

Tijd

Dit onderzoek loopt van februari tot november 2014. De enige tijd die het van u vergt is het interview dat ongeveer 30 minuten zal duren tenzij meer tijd nodig is om het gesprek af te ronden.

Risico's

Er zijn geen geanticipeerde risico's verbonden aan dit onderzoek. De effecten van dit onderzoek kunnen worden vergeleken met een normaal gesprek en kan natuurlijk altijd op gevoelige onderwerpen stuiten. Mocht dit gebeuren kan u altijd onmiddellijk stoppen met het interview of verzoeken niet verder in te gaan op dit onderwerp en het interview vervolgen.

Voordelen

Het resultaat van dit onderzoek zal een beter beeld geven over de politieke vorming van dreigingen en de mogelijke verschillen op de verschillende niveaus. Het kan zijn dat dit onderzoek enorme verschillen blootlegt en dus als conclusie kan hebben dat er beter coördineert moet worden tussen de niveaus. Het zal in ieder geval weergeven waar de mogelijke knelpunten zitten in de beslissing om iets als een dreiging te beschouwen en daadwerkelijk maatregelen te nemen. Ook zullen de belangen van elk niveau een rol spelen in de identificatie van dreigingen. Al met al kan dit onderzoek bijdragen aan een beter beeld voor het proces omtrent de dreigingen want voordelig kan zijn voor komende missies.

Indien gewenst kan een kopie van het eindverslag, dat gemaakt wordt van dit onderzoek, aan u worden gemaild.

Vertrouwelijk

Bij dit onderzoek kunt u er voor kiezen om anoniem te blijven door dit aan te geven bij het overeenkomst gedeelte van dit formulier. Dit houdt in dat informatie verzameld gedurende de observaties en het interview wel wordt gebruikt voor het onderzoek, maar dat uw naam niet wordt vrijgegeven in dit proces of in het verslag. De informatie wordt alleen maar gebruikt voor dit onderzoek in dit vak en wordt bewaard bij privé bezittingen van de onderzoeker.

Participatie

Participatie is geheel vrijwillig en u kunt weigeren om deel te nemen of u terugtrekken op elk moment gedurende het onderzoek. Om u terug te trekken dient u de onderzoeker op hoogte te stellen van uw besluit maar er hoeven geen redenen gegeven te worden.

Contact met de onderzoeker

Als u vragen heeft of twijfels over dit onderzoek neem dan contact op met:

Naam: Anne Breuer
Adres: Het nieuwe diep 5, 1781 AC Den Helder
Email: annebreuer@hotmail.com
Mobiel: 0626749101

U kunt ook contact opnemen met de begeleiders van dit onderzoek:

Naam: Dr. H.W. Bomert
Functie: Universitair Hoofddocent Centrum Internationaal Conflict - Analyse & Management
Faculteit der Managementwetenschappen
Radboud Universiteit
Email: b.bomert@fm.ru.nl
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Of
Naam: Drs. A.A. Bon
Functie: Universitair Docent Internationale Betrekking
Faculteit der Militaire Wetenschappen (FMW)
Nederlandse Defensie Academie (NLDA)
Koninklijk Instituut voor de Marine
Email: AA.Bon@NLDA.nl
Telefoon: 0223-657128

Overeenkomst:

Kruis het juiste vakje aan

☐ Ik wil anoniem blijven

OF

☐ Ik vind het niet erg als mijn naam in het onderzoek gebruikt wordt

☐ Ik wil niet dat mijn interview opgenomen wordt met een voice recorder

OF

☐ Ik vind het niet erg als mijn interview opgenomen wordt met een voice recorder

De aard en het doel van dit onderzoek zijn duidelijk genoeg uitgelegd en ik stem vrijwillig toe om te participeren in dit onderzoek. Ik begrijp dat ik mij op elk moment uit het onderzoek kan terugtrekken zonder dat het gevolgen heeft.

Handtekening: _____ Datum: _____

Naam : _____