



How high stakes affect the likelihood of reaching a successful agreement during international negotiations

The case of Germany during the EU-Turkey refugee agreement negotiations

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Abstract

This thesis wants to know how the high stakes for German domestic actors during the EU-Turkey refugee agreement negotiations affected the likelihood of reaching a successful agreement. The three-level game theory offers two rivalling explanations of the effects that these high stakes could have. On the one hand, the theory argues that domestic actors strive for a maximum representation of their viewpoints in international negotiations. Therefore, one would expect that the more these actors value the outcome of the negotiations, the more important it is that their opinion is represented. This causes them to be less willing to make concessions towards the negotiation subjects, which makes it more difficult to reach an agreement. On the other hand, the three-level game states that actors are more likely to support an agreement if the status quo is unfavourable. Since the status quo was a crisis situation, one would expect domestic actors to be very willing to make concessions, which makes it easier to reach an agreement.

A qualitative content analysis is used to analyse data from the websites and Twitter feeds of German political party to assess which of these rivalling explanations has the strongest explanatory power. The results show that the high stakes of the EU-Turkey refugee agreement negotiations caused domestic actors to be considerably less willing to make concessions towards the agreement, making the successful conclusion of the negotiations significantly less likely. These results are academically relevant, because they provide valuable knowledge on the explanatory power of different aspects of the three-level game, which helps build a more accurate theory. The results are also of great societal value, because they enable negotiators to assess the chances of successful ratification more accurately. This makes it possible to reach an agreement more quickly and with a greater chance of success.

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II. Abbreviations

CDU	Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands
CSDP	Common Security and Defence Policy
CSU	Christlich-Soziale Union
EU	European Union
FDP	Freie Demokratische Partei
SPD	Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands

1. Introduction

Due to various conflicts around the world, in particular the Syrian civil war, the number of migrants arriving in Europe drastically increased in 2015 (UNHCR, 2019). Over 1 million people made their way to the European Union looking for refuge or better economic prospects (European Commission, 2016a). The European refugee crisis, as this massive displacement of people is known today, started in April 2015, when the number of migrants arriving in the European Union sharply increased from 11.274 to 31.066 (UNHCR, 2019). The crisis reached its peak in October of the same year, when over 220.000 migrants arrived in the EU (Ibid.). European leaders reacted to this in different ways. Hungary chose to close its borders to refugees (NPR, 2018), while Germany decided to keep its borders open. Because of this, more than a third of all asylum seekers that arrived in the EU in 2015 applied for asylum in Germany (Eurostat, 2016). The large number of refugees entering Germany caused various societal problems, like clashes in refugee centres, a shortage of teachers, a backlog of the registration of refugees and dissent within the ranks of political parties (The Guardian, 2015). This put a heavy strain on the population and the political establishment. Thus, the stakes of finding a solution to the European refugee crisis were high for domestic actors in Germany.

The EU, with Germany in a leading role, looked to Turkey, hoping it could help reduce the number of irregular migrants coming to the European Union (European Commission, 2015). On the 17th of May, 2015, the High Representative for Foreign Affairs of the European Union and the Foreign Minister of Turkey had a meeting, in which migration was extensively discussed (Oltean & Iov, 2017). This was the start of negotiations that resulted in the EU-Turkey Joint Action Plan on 15 October 2015 (European Commission, 2015) and the EU-Turkey Statement on 18 March 2016 (Council of the European Union, 2016), better known as the EU-Turkey refugee agreement. In these negotiations, the European Union and Turkey decided to take several measures to reduce irregular migration to the EU. The most important of which was to return all irregular migrants coming to the European Union from Turkey (Ibid.). In exchange, the EU covered the costs of sheltering these migrants. In addition, the Turkish accession process to the European Union was accelerated (Ibid.). The goal to decrease irregular migration was successfully reached. A year after the agreement was signed, the number of irregular arrivals from Turkey was reduced by 97% (European Commission, 2017).

Germany's leading role during the negotiations made it a key player in the decision-making process. This resulted in German authorities shaping crucial parts of the EU-Turkey refugee agreement (Krumm, 2016). Therefore, Germany plays a central role in this research, which wants to know how the chances of reaching a successful agreement were affected by the high stakes of the negotiations. It does so by

using one of the major theories on international negotiations, the three-level game theory, to answer the research question 'How did the high stakes for German domestic actors during the EU-Turkey refugee agreement negotiations affect the likelihood of reaching a successful agreement?'. The three-level game, by Evans, Jacobsen & Putnam (Evans, et al., 1993), is a theory that explains the interactions between domestic, international and supranational politics during international negotiations (Putnam, 1988). It offers two different explanations on how the high stakes during the EU-Turkey refugee agreement negotiations affected the likelihood of reaching a successful agreement. This research will assess the relative explanatory power of both of these explanations.

On the one hand, the three-level game theory states that various domestic actors pressure their national government to adopt policy that is in their favour (Ibid.). These governments try to satisfy the domestic pressures as much as possible during negotiations within the European Union (Larsén, 2004). Then, the EU represents the collective domestic opinion of its Member States during the negotiations with a third party (Ibid.). This indicates that domestic actors seek to maximize the representation of their viewpoints in international negotiations. Based on this, one would expect that the more these actors value the outcome of the negotiations, the more important it is that their opinion is represented, making them less willing to make concessions towards the agreement. Furthermore, the concept of win-sets will be used to determine how this affected the difficulty of reaching a successful outcome during the EU-Turkey refugee agreement negotiations. A win-set is a set of agreements that would gain domestic political majority if voted on (Putnam, 1988). Because a domestic political majority is necessary to sign and ratify an agreement, the negotiations between the EU and Turkey can only come to a successful conclusion if the agreement falls within the win-set of all negotiating parties (Ibid.). When actors are less willing to make concessions, the win-set becomes smaller. This makes it less likely that an agreement is successfully reached.

The second explanation of the three-level game on how the high stakes during the EU-Turkey refugee agreement negotiations affected the likelihood of reaching a successful agreement originates from an important concept within the theory: the costs of no-agreement. These are the adverse effects an actor would face if no agreement is reached (Putnam, 1988). This means that actors are more likely to support an agreement if the situation without an it is unfavourable. This increases the win-set, which makes it more likely that an agreement is successfully reached. Since no-agreement would mean that the European Union remains in a crisis situation, one would expect that the high stakes of the EU-Turkey refugee agreement negotiations caused domestic actors to be more willing to make concession, because they wanted to reach a successful agreement as quickly as possible.

To answer the research question, a congruence analysis is combined with a qualitative content analysis. The congruence analysis provides the structure, while the qualitative content analysis is used to analyse the data. The research focusses on Germany, because it was a key player in the negotiation process. More specifically, the research subjects of this thesis are German political parties, because their importance in domestic politics (Lindberg et al., 2008; Aurescu et al., 2013; Köln, 2014) and their function as a 'transmission belt' between legislators and citizens (Lindberg et al., 2008) make them an accurate indicator for the collective opinion of German domestic actors. The main sources of data are the parties' websites and their Twitter feed during the European refugee crisis. Of course, the EU-Turkey refugee agreement is looked at as well.

1.1. Scientific contribution & societal relevance

The findings of this thesis help explain how the EU-Turkey refugee agreement could be signed and ratified by Germany. It shows whether it was thanks to the high stakes of the negotiations that an agreement was possible or that the agreement was successfully ratified in spite of them. Academically, this is extremely relevant, because it provides valuable knowledge on the explanatory power of different aspects of the three-level game theory, like the theory's core assumption that domestic actors want to maximise the representation of their viewpoints in international negotiations and the concept of the costs of no-agreement. This helps build a more accurate theory. Knowing more about the effects of high stakes on the likelihood of reaching a successful agreement is also of great societal value, because it enables negotiators to assess the chances of successful ratification more accurately. This makes it possible to reach an agreement more quickly and with a greater chance at success. Especially during negotiations with high stakes, a successful agreement can solve serious problems, like an economic or humanitarian crisis (The Economist, 2018; European Commission, 2017). By reaching this agreement more quickly, the crisis is shortened.

1.2. Roadmap

This thesis starts with the presentation of the three-level game theory. Specific attention is paid to the rival explanations that the theory offers about how the high stakes during the EU-Turkey refugee agreement negotiations affected the likelihood of reaching a successful agreement. These explanations will serve as a basis for the hypotheses. The subsequent chapter gives an overview of the process and outcome of the EU-Turkey refugee agreement negotiations and the role that German political parties played in it. In the next chapter, the case study research design and the qualitative content analysis are outlined. The different coding phases and the predictions and final coding scheme that these result in are also discussed. The chapter ends with a detailed presentation of the data that

is used and a discussion of the limitations of the research design. Then, the results of the analysis are presented and an assessment is made about the extent to which the predictions are supported by the data. In the last chapter, these assessments are combined to determine the explanatory power of the hypotheses and to draw a conclusion on how the high stakes for German domestic actors during the EU-Turkey refugee agreement negotiations affected the likelihood of reaching a successful agreement.

2. Theoretical framework

Originally, the three-level game theory started out with just two levels: international relations and domestic politics. This two-level game is the foundation of three-level game theory and is therefore presented first. Subsequently, the emergence of the third level, the European Union, is explained. Particular attention is paid to the concepts of win-sets and costs of no-agreement, because they play an important role in the construction of the hypotheses. At the end of the chapter, it is explained what these hypotheses are and how they originate from the three-level game theory.

2.1. Three-level game theory

In the article 'Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games', Putnam (1988) explains the workings of the entanglement of international relations and domestic politics. There has been endless debate amongst international relations scholars about the importance of international and domestic actors on global politics (Chaudoin et al., 2012). Even though the discussion about their relative influence is still going on, there is a general consensus that the two levels influence each other to some extent (Ibid.). However, there is still much unknown about the workings of this entanglement. At the time of Putnam's writing (1988), a lot of literature about international negotiations consisted of catalogues of domestic factors that influence foreign policy, but a theory that could accurately capture the complexity of international negotiations remained absent (Ibid.). The two-level game approach fills this gap. Of course, the field of international negotiations has developed since then, but the two-level game theory is still frequently used by international relations scholars (Conceição-Heldt & Mello, 2017; Lütz & Hilgers, 2018; Bjola & Manor, 2018).

The main argument of the two-level game approach is that international negotiations consist of two levels. At the domestic level, various actors pressure the government to adopt policy that is in their favour. At the international level, the national governments try to minimise the negative consequences of foreign developments. At the same time, they try to satisfy domestic pressures as much as possible (Putnam, 1988). Failing to satisfy domestic actors could result in non-ratification when an agreement is reached. On the other hand, failing to satisfy the international actors could lead to their abandonment of the negotiations (Ibid.). For analytical convenience, the person that appears at both the domestic and the international negotiation table is called the 'negotiator' (see figure 2.1). This is the head of the negotiations and can be a head of government, a minister or another actor (Ibid.). During the EU-Turkey refugee agreement negotiations, this was the High Representative for Foreign Affairs of the European Union (European Council, 2017). The negotiation process is divided into two stages: bargaining between the negotiators to reach an agreement, called level I, and discussions

within domestic groups about whether to ratify the agreement, called level II. This process is visualised in figure 2.1. These stages are not independent, nor separated in time. Changes in the level I negotiations directly affect the level II negotiations and vice versa (Ibid.).




Figure 2.1: The two-level game.

Several authors argue that in the context of EU negotiations with third parties, a two-level game does not accurately capture the entire negotiation process (Moyer, 1993; Zartman, 1993; Patterson, 1997; Collinson, 1999; Pollack, 2003; Larsén, 2004; Bonvicini, 2008; Dimitrova & Steunenberg, 2017). One of the main critiques on the two-level game is that it oversimplifies the intricate web of relations within the international system, in which supranational organisations often play a large role (Mitchell, 2001). The solution was to incorporate these organisations into the two-level game as an intermediate level. As Larsén describes, the European Union “serves both as the international arena in the negotiations between the EU Member States, and as the domestic arena in the negotiations between the EU and [a third party]” (Larsén, 2004: 4). When using the three-level game approach, level III is the domestic arena of individual Member States, which is called level II in the two-level game model. The new level II is the level of negotiations within the Council of the European Union, where an understanding must be reached about a mandate for the negotiations with the third party. Level I is the international negotiation table with the European Union and the third party (Ibid.). An illustration of the three-level game approach can be found in figure 2.2.




Figure 2.2: The three-level game.

Win-sets

The most important concept of the three-level game approach is the win-set. According to Putnam, the win-set of a given constituency can be defined as “the set of all possible ... agreements that would ‘win’ -that is, gain the necessary majority among the constituents- when simply voted up or down” (Putnam, 1988: 437). Thus, if an agreement falls within the win-sets of all negotiating parties, it will, by definition, be possible to ratify it. This also means that an agreement that does not fall within the win-set cannot be ratified. Therefore, for any agreement to be successful, it must fall within the win-set of all negotiating parties. One can imagine, then, that large win-sets make an agreement more likely, just as small win-sets make it less likely (Putnam, 1988). During the EU-Turkey refugee agreement negotiations, the negotiator had to take the win-set of Turkey and of all EU Member States into account, since all of them had veto power (European Union, 2012). This gave domestic actors, like German political parties, considerable power.

Costs of no-agreement

If international negotiations are successfully concluded, the agreement can still be rejected at the European or domestic level (Putnam, 1988). This failure to ratify an agreement is called non-ratification. Ratification can often be seen as a successful parliamentary voting procedure. However, these ratification procedures do not need to be formalised (Ibid.). An actor might have a tradition of seeking broad consensus for its decisions, for example. Non-ratification can also occur when an actor, whose support is required to implement the agreed upon policy, refuses to cooperate. The abovementioned types of non-ratification are involuntary; the negotiator is unable to deliver on his promise because the ratification process failed. The contrasting type of non-ratification is voluntary defection. This refers to the negotiator breaking his promise out of rational egoism (Putnam, 1988). Not only are both voluntary and involuntary defection detrimental for negotiations, even the expectation of non-ratification can be a reason for negotiators to abort the negotiations (Ibid.). Because the chance of non-ratification is a huge hindrance for all parties at the negotiation table, having a history of being unable or unwilling to ratify agreements carries political and diplomatic costs. Therefore, it is likely that the negotiator did everything in its power to make sure the agreement would fall within the win-set of all parties involved in the EU-Turkey refugee agreement, before signing it.

The decision of domestic actors about whether to ratify an agreement is affected by the costs of no-agreement (Putnam, 1988). Since ratification is a process that takes place after an agreement is signed, the decision to ratify an agreement is made based on the alternative being no-agreement (Ibid.). After all, if the ratification process fails, there might never be a new, more favourable agreement. The costs of no-agreement are the adverse effects an actors would face if the agreement is not ratified or if no agreement is signed (Ibid.). Generally, this means that no-agreement represents the status quo (Ibid.). Putnam (1988) argues that actors will more easily support an agreement if the costs of no-agreement are high. Therefore, the win-set increases when the costs of no-agreement increase and vice versa. Since the status quo during the EU-Turkey refugee agreement negotiations was a state of crisis, Putnam would argue that the win-sets of EU Member States were very large.

2.2. Hypotheses

This thesis strives to find out how the high stakes for German domestic actors during the EU-Turkey refugee agreement negotiations affected the likelihood of reaching a successful agreement. Based on the three-level game theory, the high stakes of the negotiations could have two different effects. Firstly, the core of the three-level game is that domestic actors pressure the government to adopt policy that is in their favour. Thus, the theory assumes that domestic actors are self-seeking and try to

maximize the representation of their viewpoints in international negotiations. The more important a topic is, the more value these actors will attach to having their standpoints represented. This means that domestic actors are less willing to make concessions during the EU-Turkey refugee agreement negotiations than they would be during negotiations with lower stakes. This results in a decrease of their win-set, which makes the successful conclusion of the negotiations less likely. Based on these fundamentals of the three-level game theory, the first hypothesis is:

The high stakes of the EU-Turkey refugee negotiations caused German domestic actors to be less willing to make concessions towards the negotiation subjects, making it more difficult to successfully conclude the negotiations by decreasing the German win-set.

When looking at the costs of no-agreement, another part of the three-level game theory, one would expect the high stakes of the EU-Turkey refugee agreement negotiations to have the opposite effect. Because of the European refugee crisis, the status quo was a situation in which tens of thousands of refugees entered the European Union every month (UNHCR, 2019), causing societal and political chaos (Oltean & Iov, 2017). Therefore, the costs of no-agreement were extremely high. This makes domestic actors more willing to make concessions, resulting in a larger win-set. The second hypothesis is based on the principles of the costs of no-agreement:

The high stakes of the EU-Turkey refugee negotiations caused German domestic actors to be more willing to make concessions towards the negotiation subjects, making it easier to successfully conclude the negotiations by increasing the German win-set

3. EU-Turkey refugee agreement

This chapter describes the negotiation process of the EU-Turkey refugee agreement and the most important actors that took part in it. Particular attention is paid to the role of domestic actors, because they are the centre of this research. At the end of the chapter, the main topics of the final agreement are presented to give a clear view of what the negotiations were about.

3.1. European Union negotiation process

As the name suggests, the EU-Turkey refugee agreement negotiations took place between the European Union and Turkey. Because the EU is a supranational organisation that represents the interests of several states, the negotiations process is considered to be a three-level game. This makes it considerably less straightforward than when two states negotiate with each other. Before a description is given of the negotiation process between the European Union and Turkey, it is important to note that negotiation process between the EU and non-EU actors varies based on its topics. EU Negotiations can either be about topics of exclusive competency or shared competency. Areas of exclusive competency are those for which members of the European Union cannot sign individual agreements with non-EU actors (European Council, 2017). Examples of this are customs, monetary policy and commercial policy (EUR-Lex, 2016). The European Union shares its competency with representatives from all Member States on topics like freedom, security and justice (Ibid.). It also shares competency on matters relating to Foreign & Security Policy, but decision-making on these topics has some modified rules (European Council, 2017). The EU-Turkey refugee agreement negotiations fall under this category.

In figure 3.1, an illustration of European Union negotiations on Foreign & Security Policy is presented. The negotiations start at level II, when the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, which is the negotiator (European Council, 2017a), submits recommendations to the Council of the European Union (1). In the Council, a minister or state secretary of each Member State is seated (European Union, 2012). The Council meets in different configurations, depending on the subject (European Council, 2018). All configurations can adopt acts for the entire council, even if it does not fall within their priorities (Ibid.). Most likely, the EU-Turkey refugee agreement was handled by the Foreign Affairs Council configuration or the Justice and Home Affairs Council configuration, since they are responsible for respectively security & humanitarian aid (European Council, 2019a) and migration & border protection (European Council, 2019b). In the second step of the negotiations, the Council of the European Union decides whether to adopt a decision to authorise the opening of negotiations (2). Council decisions on Foreign & Security Policy are taken by unanimity (Europese Raad,

2017). Because every Member State is represented in the Council, all states have veto power. This means that the decision to open negotiations must fall within the win-set of all EU Member States. To ensure this is the case, each state must gather sufficient domestic support. If a Member State supports a Council decision that falls outside of its win-set, it will face domestic political consequences (Putnam, 1988). This is where the domestic level (level III) comes into play. The task of domestic actors during this part of the negotiations is to make their standpoints clear, so that their representative in the Council knows whether the decision to start negotiations would fall within the win-set. The third step of the negotiation process takes place at level I. In this phase, the European Union and Turkey try to negotiate an agreement (3). The domestic level is still in play, because the Council of the European Union can give directives to the negotiator during the negotiation process (3A). Thus, the Member States will continuously assess which of the possible agreements would fall within their win-set and direct the negotiator accordingly. At the end of the negotiations, the negotiator draws up an agreement (4). The Council of the European Union decides to sign the agreement if the councilmembers are unanimously in favour (5B), but not before gaining consent from the European Parliament (5A) (European Union, 2012). These last steps require unanimity in the Council of the European Union again, which means that the Member States have to pay attention to their win-set, giving domestic actors considerable power throughout the negotiation process.




Figure 3.1: European Union negotiations on foreign and security policy.

Just as the signing of an agreement is of vital importance to the successful conclusion of negotiations, so is its ratification. In order for the EU-Turkey refugee agreement to be ratified, new policy needed to be adopted by the Foreign Affairs Council configuration and the Justice and Home Affairs Council configuration (European Parliament, 2018a). This is done through the ordinary legislative procedure, which is initiated by the European Commission and needs a simple majority in the European Parliament

and the relevant Council configuration to pass (European Parliament, 2016). To completely implement the agreement, a Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) mission also had to be launched (Carrera, et al., 2015). The CSDP is a framework in which the European Union launches civilian and military crisis management operations (European Commission, 2012). All decisions about the CSDP are taken unanimously by the Council of the European Union and the European Council (European Parliament, 2018b). Thus, for the complete ratification of the agreement, unanimity in the Council is required once more. The fact that a single state can veto the ratification of the agreement makes it even more important that the agreement falls within the win-set of all Member States. Not only would non-ratification be detrimental to the EU-Turkey negotiations, it would even affect future negotiation chances (Putnam, 1988).

3.2. Relevant actors

In the previous section, it was made clear that domestic actors of all Member States were important during the EU-Turkey refugee agreement negotiations, because their support was needed for almost all stages of the negotiation process. Domestic actors can exercise their power by showing their standpoint to the European Parliament, the Council of the European Union or the European Council. The Council of the European Union is the most important link between domestic actors and the EU, because it is involved in most of the decision-making process and because it requires unanimity for the majority of decisions about the EU-Turkey refugee agreement. If the agreement falls outside of the win-set at any point in the negotiation process, parts of the agreement will have to be altered in order to prevent non-ratification. Therefore, the representatives in the Council must closely watch take the standpoints of domestic actors.

This thesis is interested in the effect of high stakes for German domestic actors on the likelihood of reaching a successful agreement. Therefore, German domestic actors are at the centre of this research. More specifically, German political parties are looked at, because they are an accurate indicator for domestic actors in Germany. This decision is explained at length in the methodological framework. For now, it is important to determine which German parties were active during the EU-Turkey refugee agreement negotiations.

The main legislative body in Germany is the Bundestag (Deutscher Bundestag, 2017b). An absolute majority in the Bundestag is required to pass bills and therefore for the decision whether to cast a veto on the signing or ratification of the EU-turkey refugee agreement in the Council of the European Union (Deutscher Bundestag, 2013). In the 18th Bundestag, which was in office from September 22nd 2013 (Reiter, 2013) until September 24th 2017 (Henley, 2017), 630 members were seated. These seats were

filled by members of the CDU, CSU, SPD, the Left Party¹ and Alliance 90/The Greens (Deutscher Bundestag, 2013). The CDU and CSU form an alliance in the Bundestag (Trinkwalder, 2018). However, both parties have separate members, leadership and standpoints (CDU, 2019a; CSU, 2019a). Furthermore, they run as separate parties in state elections. Therefore, this research looks at them as two independent parties.

The Bundesrat is the second legislative body in Germany and it is formed of members of the state governments (Encyclopaedia Britannica, 2019a). Its approval is necessary for the decision whether to cast a German veto in the Council of the European Union (Deutscher Bundestag, 2017a). It has 69 seats that are chosen indirectly through year-round state elections (Bundesrat, 2017). Therefore, the composition of the Bundesrat changes frequently. When looking at the time period of the negotiations, the parties in the Bundesrat are also present in the Bundestag (Schröder, 2017). Additionally, the FDP joined the Bundesrat in 2017 (Ibid.). This is only partly within the analysed time frame, but the party is still fully taken into account. The reason for this is that it was present in the Bundesrat in 2014 (Ibid.) and it was likely to be re-elected in the following years (Polls of Polls, 2019). Therefore, the negotiator had to keep the FDP's opinion in mind, in case it was re-elected before the EU-Turkey refugee agreement was ratified.

3.3. Topics of the agreement

The EU-Turkey Joint Action Plan (European Commission, 2015) and the EU-Turkey Statement (Council of the European Union, 2016) were the result of negotiations between the EU and Turkey. Together, they are better known as the EU-Turkey refugee agreement. The main topics of the agreement are international cooperation, EU-Turkey cooperation, Turkish accession, helping migrants, irregular migration and resettling migrants. These will be further explained in this section to provide a general understanding of what the agreement is about.

International cooperation

The EU-Turkey refugee agreement strongly supports international cooperation. This was to be expected, since international cooperation was necessary to sign the agreement. Still, the agreement elaborates on it by emphasizing the need for cooperation and coordination in tackling the European refugee crisis (European Commission, 2015). It also repeatedly mentions that the international community, which is inherently cooperative, is necessary to solve the European Union's problems (Ibid.). Statements about cooperation that are specifically aimed at Turkey do not fall under this topic.

¹ See appendix 8.1 for the party names in German

EU-Turkey cooperation is a very politically charged subject (SPD, 2017a), that could not only cloud the subject of general international cooperation, but it also deserves to be a subject of its own, since it is extensively discussed in the EU-Turkey refugee agreement (Ibid.).

EU-Turkey cooperation

The agreement relies heavily on increased cooperation between the EU and Turkey. It is not the goal of the agreement, but can be better viewed as a means to achieve another goal: the end of the European refugee crisis (Council of the European Union, 2016). Even though it is not the agreement's goal to increase EU-Turkey cooperation, it is clear that it would be significantly increased if the agreement would take effect. Overall, the agreement sees Turkey as a suitable partner to cooperate with and it strongly supports increased cooperation between the EU and Turkey (European Commission, 2015).

Turkish accession

The EU-Turkey refugee agreement takes a big step towards the accession of Turkey to the European Union. To become a member of the EU, a state must comply with all accession criteria and adopt and implement the *acquis* (European Commission, 2016b). The *acquis* is the body of obligations and rights of all Member States (European Commission, 2016c). It consists of 35 chapters that must be completed before a country can become a member of the European Union (European Commission, 2016d). In the EU-Turkey refugee agreement, the EU and Turkey agree to open negotiations on chapter 17 and 33 (Council of the European Union, 2016). The agreement also reconfirms the goal to accelerate visa-free travel between the EU and Turkey, which is an important step towards the integration of Turkey in the European Union (European Commission, 2019). The agreement does not ease the conditions of Turkish accession, but it does reconfirm the commitment of both the EU and Turkey to continue and speed up the process.

Helping migrants

The agreement strives to help migrants in several ways. First of all, it wants to protect migrants according to international standards (Council of the European Union, 2016). Secondly, it aims to provide humanitarian support to migrants in order to address their primary needs (European Commission, 2015). Furthermore, the EU-Turkey refugee agreement wants to provide legal and administrative support, education and health service (Ibid.). It also wants to take measures to allow

migrants to participate in the economy and in social activities. This clearly shows a commitment to provide secondary aid along with primary aid.

Irregular migration

The EU-Turkey refugee agreement is very negative about irregular migration. Stopping irregular migration from Turkey to the European Union is one of its primary goals (European Commission, 2015), which it tries to achieve in three different ways. First of all, by addressing the causes of flight that lead to the influx of migrants to the European Union. The second way the EU and Turkey want to reduce irregular migration is by closing the land and sea routes into the European Union (Ibid.). They want to do this by increasing the protection of the European Union's external borders, strengthening the Turkish coast guard and preventing migration across Turkish land borders (Ibid.). The last way the agreement tries to reduce irregular migration is by sending back all irregular migrants arriving in the European Union from Turkey (Ibid.).

Resettling migrants

It was mentioned in the previous topic that the EU and Turkey agreed that all irregular migrant arriving in the European Union from Turkey are returned. In exchange for this measure, regular migrants are resettled from Turkey to the EU. This is done on the basis of earlier commitments by Member States to take in refugees (Council of the European Union, 2016). Once these places of resettlement are filled, a new voluntary arrangement will be made among EU Member States (Ibid.). Lastly, a Voluntary Humanitarian Admission Scheme is activated once irregular arrivals are substantially reduced (Ibid.). Since all additional admissions are voluntary, one could argue that the impact of these additional measures is quite small. However, the potential impact for domestic actors is substantial, because it opens the door for countries to decide to take in additional migrants. Therefore, actors that oppose regular migration are likely to protest this part of the agreement strongly. On the other hand, parties that see opportunities in migration are likely to support this part of the agreement. Additionally, because the resettlement of migrants happens in a structured manner with countries being able to set limits on the number of refugees they want to take in, the chaotic situation before the agreement, in which there were great differences in the number of refugees each country took in, is likely to improve.

4. Methodological framework

This chapter describes the methodological choices of this research. It starts broadly, by explaining the advantages of using a single case study of Germany to analyse the effects of the high stakes for German domestic actors on the likelihood of reaching a successful agreement. Then, the use of a congruence analysis, which compares the explanatory power of two hypotheses by constructing predictions, is explained. The reasons for using qualitative content analysis to test these predictions are explained next. After discussing these major methodological choices, the chapter becomes more specific. It presents a detailed overview of the exploratory and specification phase of the analysis and the predictions and final coding scheme these respectively result in. Then, the reasons for analysing the websites and Twitter feeds of German political parties are presented. At the end of this chapter, the research design is reflected upon and its limitations are discussed.

4.1. Research design

Case study

This research takes the form of a single case study of Germany, focussing on the EU-Turkey refugee agreement negotiations. A single case study has multiple advantages that make it best suited for answering the research question. First of all, case studies are useful for uncovering connections or new ideas that the researcher did not expect to find (Reis, 2009). These discoveries could be extremely valuable for the construction of hypotheses for future research (Ibid.). This could help improve our understanding of the three-level game even further. Secondly, a great advantage of a case study is its depth. Its ability to investigate complex social phenomena that consist of several potentially important factors is unrivalled by other research designs (Ibid.). Case studies can give a comprehensive account of a phenomenon and consider many perspectives. Its depth allows for the use of different sources of evidence, which increases the reliability of the findings (Rose et al., 2015). Another research design, the qualitative comparative analysis, was considered as well, because of its superior ability to discover cross-case patterns, while respecting the heterogeneity of each case (Ragin, 2008). However, the case of Germany during the EU-Turkey refugee agreement negotiations was of such great importance, that more interesting results can be obtained by studying this one case in great detail, than several, less influential cases more superficially.

According to Baxter & Jack (2008), it is not only important to determine what your case will be, but also what it will not be. This helps to avoid setting too many objectives, which would not only risk the finishing of the research, but also make the subject too broad, losing the depth that makes a case study so valuable. This thesis follows the suggestion of Baxter & Jack (2008) by limiting the scope of the

research in several ways. First of all, only the EU side of the EU-Turkey refugee agreement negotiations is looked at. The reason for this is that data about the actors within the European Union is much more consistently available than data of Turkish actors. Secondly, looking at all countries in the European Union individually would be a tremendous task, far beyond the scope of this research. Therefore, this thesis will focus specifically on Germany. Because the EU-Turkey refugee agreement needs a unanimous vote in the Council of the European Union to be signed and ratified, every country in the European Union is a key player (European Union, 2012). However, Germany is looked at because it stands out even more. Not only did it take in the most refugees during the crisis (Kirk, 2017), but Krumm (2016) says that German authorities also (pre)shaped crucial parts of the agreement. Thirdly, only political parties are looked at, because their standpoints are a good indicator for the collective standpoints of German domestic actors for three reasons. First of all, political parties are generally considered to be extremely important actors in domestic politics (Lindberg et al., 2008; Aurescu et al., 2013; Köln, 2014). Secondly, political parties act as a 'transmission belt' between legislators and citizens (Lindberg et al., 2008). Because parties want to be re-elected, they will gather information about the opinion of their followers and adjust their policy decisions accordingly. Therefore, the standpoints of political parties reflect, to a large extent, the opinion of other domestic actors. Lastly, a majority in the Bundesrat and Bundestag is necessary for the EU-Turkey refugee agreement to take effect (Deutscher Bundestag 2013, Deutscher Bundestag, 2017a). Thus, the parties pass the final and decisive vote in the decision-making process. Because of this key role, they play a major part in determining the German win-set and will therefore be the research subjects of this thesis.

Congruence analysis

The structure of this thesis is based on a congruence analysis. The congruence analysis is a way of comparing two hypotheses, to test which of them has more explanatory power (Blatter & Haverland, 2012: 144). It does this by constructing empirical predictions for each of the hypotheses. In this research, the exploratory coding phase of the qualitative content analysis is used to provide extensive knowledge of the case, to be able to construct trustworthy predictions. These predictions are then compared to empirical data to assess their relative strength. The more the empirical data corresponds with a prediction, the stronger its empirical congruence (Ibid.). If the empirical congruence of a prediction is high, the explanatory power of the corresponding hypothesis is strong (Ibid.). For the assessment of the degree of congruence between the data and the predictions, a qualitative data analysis is used, which will be explained in the next section. A congruence analysis is the best suited method to use for this research, because it adds a level of control that strengthens the research findings (Ibid). Other types of research only assess the extent to which the data that is found matches

the data that is predicted to be found (Ibid.). In a congruence analysis, the predictions must not only be empirically supported, they must also find more empirical support than the predictions of the rivaling hypothesis. Blatter & Haverland (2012: 146) argue that this extra level of control make the analysis much more compelling.

4.2. Data analysis

The data in this research is analysed by using qualitative content analysis. This has been around since the 18th century (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005). It cannot only be conducted qualitatively, but also quantitatively, the latter being the most prominent form until the 1990's. Lately, the popularity and application of the qualitative content analysis has increased (Ibid.). Hsieh & Shannon define this type of analysis as "a research method for the subjective interpretation of the content of text data through the systemic classification process of coding and identifying themes and patterns" (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005: 1278). The 'subjective interpretation of the content of text data' is what transforms raw data into research findings. To help the researcher do this as effectively as possible, the 'systemic classification process of coding and identifying themes and patterns' is used. In this thesis, this coding process is done with the support of the qualitative data analysis software QDA Miner Lite (Provalis Research, n.d.). This software is free to use and contains all features that are relevant for this research. A major advantage over other free software packages for qualitative data analysis is the extensive availability of tutorials (Ibid.). These tutorials help guarantee the correct use of the software, which increases the reliability of the coding process.

This analysis is suitable for answering the research question for several reasons. First of all, it is able to almost completely grasp the full complexity of a topic and reduce it to understandable information (Kohlbacher, 2016), while still being able to process large quantities of data (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005). Secondly, one of the biggest advantages of qualitative content analysis is its ability to take the context of written texts into account (Kohlbacher, 2016). It can go beyond the words that are written and subtract their meaning. Both of these aspects are extremely important when looking at such a complex and broad topic as the EU-Turkey refugee agreement. Lastly, during the qualitative content analysis, it is possible to constantly compare data with the selected theory (Ibid.). This allows the researcher to gain new insights about the theory, which makes it well-suited for contributing to theoretical development, which is one of the goals of this thesis (Ibid.).

There are different ways to conduct a content analysis, based on the research goal and structure. Hsieh & Shannon (2005) distinguish between three types of qualitative content analysis: conventional, directed and summative. The major differences between the three types are their coding schemes and

the origin of their codes (Ibid.). The conventional analysis is an inductive way of doing research. The researcher looks at the data in a very open-minded way, trying to make connections and form categories for an initial coding scheme, on which the rest of the analysis is built. This type is best suited when little is known about a research subject (Ibid.). In the directed approach, existing information or an established theory is used to construct the initial coding scheme. Other researchers have called this “a deductive use of theory” (Potter & Levine-Donnerstein, 1999) or “deductive category application” (Mayring, 2000). Often, the goal of this approach is to increase our understanding of a theory (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005). The last type of qualitative content analysis, the summative approach, identifies and counts certain words and analyses the context in which they are used. This approach is most used when a single concept is studied (Ibid.). This thesis uses the directed content analysis, because the research is guided by the three-level game theory and the EU-Turkey refugee agreement.

The first step of the directed approach is to use existing information to identify important concepts to use as coding categories in the initial coding scheme (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005). In this case, the existing information is the EU-Turkey refugee agreement. The initial coding scheme serves as a framework for the exploratory coding phase. In that phase, the codes are assigned to the text, extra codes are added and subcategories are created for the primary codes (Ibid.). It is also used to gain an extensive knowledge of the case, which is important to help construct reliable predictions for the hypotheses. Lastly, the codes are structured and refined into a final coding scheme in the specification phase (Boeije, 2009). The application of the different phases of the qualitative content analysis and the predictions and final coding scheme these result in are discussed more extensively in the rest of this chapter.

Initial coding scheme

The initial coding scheme is based on the main topics of the EU-Turkey refugee agreement. It is kept broad, to make sure that there is enough room for new or alternative codes to emerge from the text during the exploratory coding phase. Therefore, the initial codes correspond directly to the main topics of the agreement. These are international cooperation, EU-Turkey cooperation, Turkish accession, helping migrants, irregular migration and resettling migrants.

Exploratory phase & predictions

The exploratory coding phase uses the initial coding scheme as a starting point to assign codes to the data. One of the goals of this phase is to expand the coding scheme to include everything that might be relevant to answering the research question, resulting in an extensive and unrefined coding scheme (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005). Another goal of the exploratory phase is to provide the researcher with a

deep knowledge of the case. This makes it extremely important in helping determine the empirical predictions of the congruence analysis. These predictions reflect what is expected to be found in the empirical data if a hypothesis is completely correct. Thus, each hypothesis has a different set of predictions. In the following paragraphs, these predictions are presented and attention is paid to the way their empirical congruence is established.

Hypothesis 1: The high stakes of the EU-Turkey refugee negotiations caused German domestic actors to be less willing to make concessions towards the negotiation subjects, making it more difficult to successfully conclude the negotiations by decreasing the German win-set.

This hypothesis is based on the core of the three-level game theory, which states that actors try to maximize the representation of their opinion in international negotiations. Therefore, it is expected that German political parties are unwilling to make concessions towards the EU-Turkey refugee agreement during the negotiations. After all, making concessions would result in a less accurate representation of their standpoints in the final agreement. Thus, one would expect the standpoints of German political parties during the EU-Turkey refugee agreement negotiations to closely resemble their standpoints in a non-crisis situation. It is also possible that parties move their standpoints away from the agreement, to clearly show the negotiator that the agreement does not fall within the win-set. Therefore, the first prediction is:

- 1. The standpoints of German political parties during the EU-Turkey refugee agreement negotiations were equally far or further removed from those of the agreement than in a non-crisis situation.*

To assess the extent to which this prediction is supported by the data, the text of the codes from websites of German political parties is analysed to determine the parties' standpoints on the topics of the EU-Turkey refugee agreement in a non-crisis situation. At the same time, the text of the codes from the Twitter feeds of German parties is analysed to determine what their standpoints were during the negotiations. Then, a comparison is made between the parties' standpoints in a non-crisis situation and during the negotiations. The parties' standpoints are looked at in terms of content. For example, the FDP mentioned in a non-crisis situation that those who flee from war should receive unbureaucratic humanitarian protection (FDP, 2019a). During the negotiations, the party said that it considers the human right to asylum to be non-negotiable (FDP, 2017a). The content of these statements is similar and therefore supports the prediction. While analysing the textual content, the use of language is taken into account. For example, when exclamation marks or capital letters are used,

the sentence is considered to be a stronger statement than if that is not the case. The same counts for certain words, like in the previous example of the FDP. During the negotiations, the party used 'non-negotiable' to describe the right to asylum. This makes the statement stronger than the other sentence, which stated that persons fleeing from war 'should receive protection'. In this case, the use of language indicates a solidification of the FDP's standpoint. This supports the prediction, because it shows that the FDP is unwilling to substantively deviate from this standpoint. In some cases, there is not enough data available to make a thorough assessment of a party's standpoints in a non-crisis situation. In those cases, instead of comparing the non-crisis standpoints with the standpoints during the negotiations, changes in the party's standpoints during the course of the negotiations are analysed. This still shows if a party's standpoints remained the same or moved away from the agreement. Only the Twitter data can be used for this analysis, which makes it well suited when no other data is available. This also means that the data from the party's website is lost. Therefore, it is only used when insufficient data is available to make an accurate assessment of a party's standpoint in a non-crisis situation.

If a party's main goal is to have its opinion represented as accurately as possible in the EU-Turkey refugee agreement, it is reasonable to expect that little attention is paid to the negotiation subjects on which the party already agrees. After all, those topics do not need adjustment. At the same time, the topics on which the party does not agree receive extra attention, in order to convince the negotiator that the topic would not fall within the German win-set, thereby persuading him to change the agreement. Thus, the second prediction is:

2. *During the EU-Turkey refugee agreement negotiations, German political parties paid less attention to the agreement's topics on which they agree and more attention to the topics on which they do not agree than they did in a non-crisis situation.*

To assess the empirical congruence of this prediction, it must first be determined on which subjects the German parties agree and disagree with the EU-Turkey refugee agreement. This is done by comparing the standpoints of every individual party with the standpoints of the agreement. The parties' standpoints are established by looking at the coded text of their Twitter feeds. The standpoints of the agreement are already described in chapter 3.3, but will be substantiated with data from the EU-Turkey Joint Action Plan and the EU-Turkey Statement. After determining on what topics the German parties agree or disagree, the frequency of the codes from the websites of German political parties are analysed to assess how much attention the parties paid to the topics of the agreement in a non-crisis situation. At the same time, the frequency of the codes from the German parties' Twitter feeds is

analysed to determine how much attention they paid to the topics of the agreement during the negotiations. These results are compared in order to assess the empirical congruence of the prediction. For this part of the analysis, the number of times the topics are coded and the amount of text that is devoted to them are both taken into account. It is important to note that the analysis looks at the relative length and number of codes of one topic in relation to the other topics. When analysing absolute numbers, changes that are measured might be caused by external factors. For example, a party might have hired a new public relations manager that wants to focus on Twitter, increasing the party's Twitter activity on all topics. This problem does not occur when analysing the relative numbers, because an overall change in Twitter activity does not affect the relative attention that is paid to each topic.

In the exploratory coding phase, it was discovered that German political parties sometimes refer back to their core values when defending one of their standpoints. Alliance 90/The Greens, for example, said that a humane asylum and refugee policy is at the core of green politics and green identity (Bündnis90/Die Grünen, 2015a). The commitment of parties to their core values indicates an unwillingness to deviate from their standpoints, which corresponds to the hypothesis. Therefore, the third prediction is:

3. *German political parties put more emphasis on their core values during the EU-Turkey refugee agreement negotiations than they did in a non-crisis situation.*

To test this prediction, a comparison is made between the relative length and number of times 'core values' are coded in a non-crisis situation and during the EU-Turkey refugee agreement negotiations. For the former, the codes from the websites of German parties are used. The latter uses the codes from their Twitter feeds. Like the previous prediction, the number of times the topics are coded and the amount of text that is devoted to them are both taken into account. Also, the relative code frequencies are used to draw conclusions, since they are less affected by external factors.

Hypothesis 2: The high stakes of the EU-Turkey refugee negotiations caused German domestic actors to be more willing to make concessions towards the negotiation subjects, making it easier to successfully conclude the negotiations by increasing the German win-set

The first and second hypotheses are mutually exclusive. After all, a political party cannot be less and more willing to make concessions at the same time. This means that all evidence that is found to support the first hypothesis weakens the explanatory power of the second hypothesis and vice versa.

This also means that the predictions of both hypotheses are each other's opposites. Thus, the predictions of the second hypothesis are:

1. *The standpoints of German political parties during the EU-Turkey refugee agreement negotiations were closer to those of the agreement than in a non-crisis situation.*
2. *During the EU-Turkey refugee agreement negotiations, German political parties paid more attention to the agreement's topics on which they agree and less attention to the topics on which they do not agree than they did in a non-crisis situation.*
3. *German political parties put less emphasis on their core values during the EU-Turkey refugee agreement negotiations than they did in a non-crisis situation.*

The advantage of having mutually exclusive predictions is that they can be tested in the same way. Therefore, the first prediction of both hypotheses is analysed simultaneously. The same counts for the second and third predictions of both hypotheses.

Specification phase & final coding scheme

The final coding scheme is the result of the specification phase. The goal of this phase is to bring order to the chaotic coding scheme that arose from the exploratory phase (Bengtsson, 2016). Codes that do not offer empirical support for one of the predictions are removed, overlapping codes are merged and the names of codes are refined. This produces the final coding scheme, which contains all the information that is necessary to assess the empirical congruence of the predictions. To provide a clear view of all coding categories, all (sub)codes that were added since the initial coding schemes are briefly explained. All coded data is added to this thesis as appendices in chapter 8.2 and 8.3.

International cooperation

- *Isolationism / internationalism*

Isolationism is the "policy of avoiding political or economic entanglements with other countries" (Encyclopaedia Britannica, 2019b). Internationalism is the belief that it is beneficial for countries to cooperate internationally, which is the opposite of isolationism (Cambridge Dictionary, 2019). Anything that indicates that a party supports either of these policies is coded in this subcategory.

EU-Turkey cooperation

- *Cooperation*

This subcategory is devoted to any statements that specifically refer to cooperation with Turkey.

- *Turkey*

General remarks that indicate a positive or negative attitude towards Turkey, but that do not directly mention cooperation, are coded in this subcategory.

Turkish accession

- *Accession*

This subcategory consists of statements that support or oppose the accession of Turkey to the EU.

- *Visa liberalisation*

Statements that indicate that a party supports or opposes the liberalisation of visa requirements for Turkish citizens traveling to the European Union belong in this subcategory.

Helping migrants

- *Primary aid*

All statements regarding life-saving support for migrants are coded in this subcategory.

- *Secondary aid*

All statements about anything more than life-saving support, like integration or education, are coded in this subcategory.

Irregular migration

- *Irregular migrants*

This subcategory consists of all remarks that specifically mention the differences between regular and irregular migrants and any position a party takes on this subject.

- *Causes of flight*

Statements related to migrants' causes of flight are coded in this subcategory

- *Border protection*

This subcategory contains statements about the protection of the external and internal border of the European Union.

Resettling migrants

- *Number of migrants*

This subcategory contains statements about the number of refugees that enters the EU.

- *Distribution*

In this subcategory, all remarks about the distribution of migrants in the European Union or Germany are coded.

- *(Dis)advantages migration*

This subcategory contains all statements that emphasise the advantages or disadvantages of regular migration.

Core values

In this category, statements about the core values of German political parties are coded. They are only coded when the party defends those values and when it is made clear that they are used as a basis for policy decisions. Alliance 90/The Greens saying that a humane asylum and refugee policy is at the core of green politics and green identity (Bündnis90/Die Grünen, 2015a) is a perfect example of this. Another example would be the FDP saying that pocket money for refugees means independence and dignity (FDP, 2015a).

This shows that human dignity is one of the FDP's values, on which they base the decision to give refugees pocket money. The CDU mentioning that Merkel thanks everyone who works for refugees (CDU, 2015a) is not coded. Even though the CDU might base policy decisions on their core value of solidarity, it is not made clear enough in this statement. This category contains several core values as subcategories. Since their meaning is well-known, they are not discussed individually.

- *Human rights*
- *Humanity*
- *Solidarity*
- *Equality*
- *Peace*
- *Freedom*
- *Security*

Because the standpoints of German political parties on the topics of the agreement need to be analysed for the first predictions, all codes except 'core values' are used in that analysis. For the second prediction of both hypotheses, it must be determined whether German parties agree or disagree with the topics of the agreement. For this analysis, all codes except 'core values' are used again. Lastly, to determine whether German parties put more emphasis on their core values during the negotiations, only the code 'core values' is used.

4.3. Data

To assess the empirical congruence of the predictions, the standpoints of German political parties, their degree of attention paid to the EU-Turkey refugee agreement's topics and the degree of emphasis that is put on the parties' core values during the EU-Turkey refugee agreement negotiations is compared with the same aspects in a non-crisis situation. The websites of German political parties are analysed to gain information about the parties' standpoints in a non-crisis situation. Their Twitter feed is used to determine their standpoints during the EU-Turkey refugee agreement negotiations. This section explains why these data sources are the best ones to use for this research.

Website

To provide insight into the behaviour of German political parties in a non-crisis situation, the parties' websites are analysed. Every German political party has its main standpoints listed on its website (Bündnis 90/Die Grünen, 2019a; CDU, 2019b; CSU, 2019b; Die Linke, 2019a; FDP, 2019b; SPD, 2019a). Even though some themes appear to be less relevant for research about the EU-Turkey refugee agreement than others, no selection is made. It is for the qualitative content analysis to determine the

relevance of each text. An exception to this is made for the themes of Alliance 90/The Greens. They are much more elaborate than the those of other parties and would therefore create a data imbalance. Thus, for Alliance 90/The Greens only the title and the summary of each topic are analysed. The parties' websites are the best data source to use, because they show the parties' standpoints very accurately. Also, in contrast to press statements and party programmes, there is a large degree of consistency between the writing styles of parties on their website. This makes the results more consistent.

Twitter

To determine the behaviour of German political parties during the EU-Turkey refugee agreement negotiations, their Twitter feed is looked at. In order for parties to gain electoral success, they need to promote their standpoints. Falasca's (2017) research shows that political parties use Twitter as a channel to do this. Therefore, the Twitter feed of political parties is a good reflection of their standpoints. To limit the search for Tweets to those that are relevant to this research, three selection criteria are used. First of all, a time limitation is set. After all, the goal is to find out what the parties' standpoints were during a specific time period, namely the EU-Turkey refugee agreement negotiations. The official negotiations started on 17 May 2015, but both the EU and Turkey were already individually preparing before that time (Oltean & Iov, 2017). It is unknown how long this preparation phase lasted (Ibid.). This thesis estimates the starting date of the negotiations to be on 01-01-2015. The negotiations ended with the EU-Turkey Statement on 18 March 2016. However, there are several reasons that it is important to look at the 18 months after the signing of the agreement as well. Firstly, because ratification is an important part of the negotiations process, which takes place after the agreement is signed (Putnam, 1988). In this phase, domestic actors can still exercise their influence by blocking the ratification of the agreement (Ibid.). Secondly, a year after the EU-Turkey Statement, many reviews of the first year are posted (Comisión Española de Ayuda al Refugiado, 2017; Toygür & Benvenuti, 2017; Dodwell, 2017; Koenig & Walter-Franke, 2017). Looking at the 18 months after the agreement was signed will allow for analysis of the response to these reviews.

In addition to the time limitation, a selection is made based on the Tweet's relevance to the subjects of the EU-Turkey refugee agreement. This is done by searching for Tweets using the search terms 'Flüchtlinge', 'Migration' and 'Asyl' (see appendix 8.1 for the translations) to find all relevant results related to migration and 'EU', 'Europäische' and 'Türkei' to find all relevant results related to the European Union and Turkey. To determine the most relevant search terms, a broad set of search terms was constructed based on the main themes of the EU-Turkey refugee agreement. The final selection was made by using 'trial and error'. Different combinations of search terms were tried until no relevant Tweets were left out.

The third selection that is made is within the Tweets themselves. In this research, only the text of Tweets and the text within pictures are looked at. Even though it is sometimes useful to analyse pictures in a qualitative content analysis (Rodrigues, 2017), this is not the case for the data in this research. Most pictures that are posted have little connection to the Tweet's subject. Most of the pictures the FDP posts, for example, only show the face of one of the party members (FDP, 2017b). Therefore, the pictures are left out of the analysis. One exception is when pictures mainly contain text. To gather as much data as possible, the text of these pictures is included in the analysis.

Alternatives

Besides the parties' websites and Twitter feeds, there are other sources of data that were considered for the analysis. First of all, different social media platforms were looked at. However, one of the advantages of Twitter is that Tweets have a high information density. This makes the coding process less time-consuming. Another advantage of Twitter over other social media platforms is its superior search engine (Twitter, 2019). Secondly, German parliamentary questions were considered as a data source. German political parties can submit a *small request*. This is a request for information to the government on current issues. The government replies to these request in writing and the answer is not discussed in the Bundestag (Deutscher Bundestag, 2017c). It is also possible to submit a *large request*. The answer to these questions is often discussed publicly in the Bundestag, which makes it one of the strongest tools of government control (Deutscher Bundestag, 2017d). These requests contain a lot of information about the standpoint of the party that submits it (Deutscher Bundestag, 2017e). However, only two parties submitted any requests relating to the EU-Turkey refugee agreement during the analysed time period (Deutscher Bundestag, 2019). The Left Party submitted 25 small requests and Alliance 90/The Greens submitted 5 of them (Ibid.). This means that they do not provide sufficient information to answer the research question. Combining the requests with data from Twitter is not a suitable alternative, because it would create a large data imbalance among the parties.

One could argue that the lack of parliamentary questions provides some information as well. However, there is a vast amount of literature about parliamentary questions, with different explanation for variations in the number of questions that is asked (Dandoy, 2011). Therefore, drawing useful conclusions from the lack of questions that German political parties asked would require building a substantial theoretical framework, which is beyond the scope of this research. Thus, the websites and Twitter feeds of German political parties are the best available source of data to answer the research question.

4.4. Reflection & limitations of the research design

The case study and the directed qualitative content analysis have been chosen for their strengths, but they also have certain potential weaknesses that need to be addressed. The main weaknesses of the chosen research design are problems of reliability and generalisation (Kohlbacher, 2016). Usually, one of the main problems when doing a content analysis is the inter-coder reliability (Ibid.). Often, the amount of data is too large for one researcher to code. When coding with multiple people, it is important to determine whether different people assign codes in a similar way (Ibid.). This problem does not occur in this thesis, because all coding was done by the researcher. To ensure the stability of the researcher's coding, all codes are checked and adjusted after each coding round. Another limitation of the chosen research design is the limited possibility for generalisation. Because a single case study takes the complex context of a subject into account, it is difficult to generalise the findings to a larger number of cases (Tsang, 2014). Still, Reis (2009) argues that the importance of a detailed example should not be overlooked. Galileo only needed a single observation of a feather and a rock falling at equal speed in a vacuum to completely change the way researchers thought about gravity (Flyvbjerg, 2006). Of course, the single observation was later substantiated by other experiments, but this shows the effect a single case study can have. It reveals the workings of a concept in detail, which can later be substantiated by large-N research to generalise the findings.

5. Analysis

In this chapter, the empirical congruence of the predictions is assessed. Because the predictions of both hypotheses are opposites of each other, they are analysed in pairs. Thus, chapter 5.1 starts with the analysis of the first prediction of the first and second hypothesis. Chapter 5.2 analyses the second prediction of both hypotheses and in chapter 5.3 the last predictions of the hypotheses are analysed. At the end of every subchapter, a conclusion is drawn on which of the predictions is more strongly supported by the results and how this affects the explanatory power of the hypotheses. As explained before, the stronger the support for a prediction, the stronger the explanatory power of the corresponding hypothesis.

5.1. Difference in standpoints

In this section, the coded text from the websites of German parties is analysed to determine their standpoints on the topics of the EU-Turkey refugee agreement in a non-crisis situation. At the same time, the coded text from the Twitter feeds of German parties is analysed to determine their standpoints during the negotiations. Then, a comparison is made between the parties' standpoints in a non-crisis situation and during the negotiations, in order to assess to what extent the predictions are empirically supported. As explained in the methodological chapter, if insufficient information is available on the non-crisis standpoint of a party, changes in its standpoint during the course of the EU-Turkey refugee agreement negotiations are analysed instead.

The results are presented for each party individually, because their different standpoints must be taken into account. For each party, a summary of the results is set out first. Then, the individual topics are analysed. At the end, a conclusion is drawn on how the results of that party affect the predictions. After the analysis of the individual parties, the results are combined and a conclusion is drawn on how they affect the hypotheses. The overall results of the analysis show the strongest support for the prediction that the standpoints of German political parties during the EU-Turkey refugee agreement negotiations were equally far or further removed from those of the agreement than in a non-crisis situation. Since the standpoints of German parties are used as an indicator for the collective standpoints of all German domestic actors, these results indicate an unwillingness of German domestic actors to make concession towards the agreement. This strengthens the explanatory power of the first hypothesis.

CDU

The standpoint of the CDU is the same during the negotiations as in a non-crisis situation on three topics. On one topic, the party moves away from the agreement during the negotiations. On two other topics, the standpoint of the CDU moves closer to the agreement. Overall, the results from the CDU show a slightly stronger support for the prediction that the standpoints of German political parties during the EU-Turkey refugee agreement negotiations were equally far or further removed from those of the agreement than in a non-crisis situation. The analysis of the individual topics is presented below.

The CDU is strongly internationalist in a non-crisis situation. On its website, the party emphasises that Germany is part of the international community by saying that German citizens can only be protected if Germany contributes to peace and security worldwide² (CDU, 2019c). The CDU also strongly stands for a united Europe, for which it thinks the European Union is essential (CDU, 2019d). Therefore, the party argues the EU should be strengthened (ibid.). During the EU-Turkey refugee agreement negotiations, the CDU's standpoint is very similar. The party remains very committed to the international community and the European Union. For many problems, a cooperative solution is proposed (CDU, 2017a; CDU, 2017b). For example, the CDU fights for a European solution to border protection (CDU, 2016a), a common asylum policy (CDU, 2015b) and the abolishment of roaming charges (CDU, 2017c). It even mentions that you cannot be a good patriot if you do not support European unification (CDU, 2016b).

In a non-crisis situation, all parties remain silent on EU-Turkey cooperation. Therefore, it is examined whether the parties changed their opinion during the course of the EU-Turkey refugee agreement negotiations. At first, the CDU strongly supports cooperation with Turkey. In February 2016, the party mentions that it wants to work together to reduce illegal migration (CDU, 2016c) and that it is a great success that all EU Member States want to speak to Turkey at the next summit (CDU, 2016d). However, in August 2017, the CDU appears to change its opinion on EU-Turkey cooperation. It says that the party has decided to reorient its policy towards Turkey (CDU, 2017d). On the same day, the CDU mentions that it is not realistic to have better relations with Turkey (CDU, 2017e). Although the party says that it changed its policy, this does not last long. Five days after its 'policy change', the CDU proudly mentions its cooperation with Turkey to combat irregular migration (CDU, 2017f). Shortly after that, it even says that the EU-Turkey refugee agreement should be used as an example for agreements with

² The majority of texts that are analysed in this thesis are written in German. These texts were translated by the researcher. The sources that are referred to can be consulted for the original texts.

other countries (CDU, 2017g). This indicates that the CDU's policy towards cooperation with Turkey did not actually change.

Like the previous subject, all parties remain silent on Turkish accession on their websites. Thus, it is examined whether the CDU changed its opinion during the course of the EU-Turkey refugee agreement negotiations. There is no change in opinion when analysing the Twitter feed. From the start, the CDU is strongly against the accession of Turkey. The party mentions in July 2016 that Turkey cannot be a member of the European Union (CDU, 2016e). In August 2016, it also rules out visa liberalisation between the EU and Turkey (CDU, 2016f). In 2017, the CDU mentions several times that it opposes Turkish accession (CDU, 2017b) and it criticises the SPD for supporting accession talks with Turkey (CDU, 2017h).

In a non-crisis situation, the CDU is in favour of life-saving measures for refugees, but does not emphasise them (CDU, 2019e). The party pays more attention to secondary aid, specifically the integration of migrants into the German society (CDU, 2019f). It says that integration is a key political task and that it leads to mutual understanding and participation (Ibid.). During the EU-Turkey refugee agreement, the party maintains this stance towards integration, mentioning that a good integration policy is equal to a good security policy (CDU, 2016g). It goes even further by saying that language training, psychological help (Ibid.) and job opportunities (CDU, 2017i) should be available for migrants. Compared to the non-crisis situation, the CDU also puts more emphasis on the need to provide primary aid to people in need (CDU, 2015c; CDU, 2017j). This means the standpoints of the CDU are closer to the standpoints of the EU-Turkey refugee agreement during the negotiations than they are in a non-crisis situation. After all, the agreement strongly supports the provision of primary aid, psychological support and participation in the economy (European Commission, 2015).

The CDU does not say anything about irregular migration in a non-crisis situation. However, the party was very active on Twitter during the EU-Turkey refugee agreement negotiations. Therefore, potential changes in the party's opinion during the negotiation process are looked at. At the start of the negotiations, tackling the causes of flight is an important topic for the CDU, that mentions it both in November 2015 (CDU, 2015d) and January 2016 (CDU, 2016g). Another topic that receives considerable attention is the difference between asylum and immigration (CDU, 2015e; CDU, 2015f). The party underscores these differences in defence of all migrants. Therefore, at the start of the negotiations, the CDU's opinion is quite far removed from the standpoints of the EU-Turkey refugee agreement, which wants to tackle the causes of flight, but is much more focussed on increasing border protection and the return of irregular migrants (European Commission, 2015). In the second half of

2016 and in 2017, the CDU's standpoints resemble the agreement much more closely. The party starts to stress the importance of protecting of the European Union's external borders (CDU, 2016h) and it is clear that the return of irregular migrants is the party's new main topic. In March 2017, the CDU even says "Ausreisepflicht durchsetzen, Abschiebungen erleichtern!" (CDU, 2017k), which means that the party wants to make it easier to deport migrants that came to Germany illegally.

In a non-crisis situation, the CDU is strongly in favour of resettling migrants in Germany. It mentions that population change offers great opportunities (CDU, 2019g). It also says that diversity is an asset to Germany (CDU, 2019e) and that it is the task of the government to clearly show the opportunities the changing demographic brings (CDU, 2019g). During the EU-Turkey refugee agreement negotiations, the CDU is much more negative about migrants coming to Germany. The party does not pay attention to the advantages of migration, but instead accentuates the dangers, by arguing that dangerous migrants should get an ankle bracelet (CDU, 2017k) and that strong action is required against migrants that commit a sexual offense (CDU, 2017l). The party mitigates these statements somewhat by also saying that general suspicion against foreigners should be avoided (Ibid.), but there is still a clear difference between the party's standpoints in a non-crisis situation and during the negotiations.

In conclusion, the CDU's standpoint on international cooperation is the same during the EU-Turkey refugee agreement negotiations as in a non-crisis situation. The party's opinion on Turkish accession is also stable. The CDU appeared to change its opinion on EU-Turkey cooperation during the negotiations, but since this only lasted for a very short time, it is unlikely to have actually changed. Therefore, the results from these three topics all support the prediction of the first hypothesis. The same counts for resettling migrants, on which the CDU's standpoint was much further removed during the negotiations than in a non-crisis situation. The results on helping refugees and irregular migration show the opposite. On these topics, the CDU's standpoint resembles the agreement more closely during the negotiations, which supports the prediction of the second hypothesis. The overall results for the CDU are mixed, but show slightly stronger empirical congruence for the prediction that says that the standpoints of German political parties during the EU-Turkey refugee agreement negotiations were equally far or further removed from those of the agreement than in a non-crisis situation. This offers support to the first hypothesis.

CSU

The standpoint of the CSU is the same during the negotiations as in a non-crisis situation on two topics. On all other topics, the CSU moves away from the agreement. Overall, the results from the CSU show

a strong support for the prediction that the standpoints of German political parties during the EU-Turkey refugee agreement negotiations were equally far or further removed from those of the agreement than in a non-crisis situation. The analysis of each of the topics is presented below.

There is very limited data available about the CSU in a non-crisis situation (CSU, 2019b). The party pays attention to some of the subjects of the EU-Turkey refugee agreement, but not extensive enough to get a clear view of its non-crisis standpoints. Therefore, it is examined whether the party changed its opinion during the course of the EU-Turkey refugee agreement negotiations on any of the topics. On the first topic, international cooperation, the CSU has a very internationalist and pro-European opinion at the start of the negotiations. The party promotes EU-wide measures to tackle a variety of problems, like the abolishment of roaming charges (CSU, 2015a), a ban on cloned food products (CSU, 2015b) and the support of refugees in war zones (CSU, 2015c). It also wants the European Union to cooperate with the rest of the world (CSU, 2015d). At the end of 2015, this standpoint changes drastically. The CSU starts focussing on the need to protect Germany's borders and interests (CSU, 2015e, CSU, 2016a) and even though the party stays committed to the European Union, it becomes much more critical of its functioning, arguing that a policy debate is needed on how to proceed with the European Union (CSU, 2016b). These new standpoints are far removed from those of the EU-Turkey refugee agreement.

In the beginning of 2016, the CSU repeatedly says that no concessions should be made towards Turkey (CSU, 2016c; CSU, 2016d) and it criticises the Turkish human rights situation (CSU, 2016e). However, it still supports the negotiations between the EU and Turkey (CSU, 2016d). In May 2016, after the EU-Turkey refugee agreement was reached, the party becomes less supportive EU-Turkey cooperation. It urges the EU to rethink its relationship with Turkey (CSU, 2016f) and it strongly opposes Turkish election campaigns in Germany (CSU, 2016g). It even says that the EU-Turkey refugee agreement is highly problematic (CSU, 2016h), even though it supported the negotiations earlier (CSU, 2016d).

The CSU is very consistent on the topic of Turkish accession. From the beginning, the party opposes visa liberalisation (CSU, 2016i) and the accession of Turkey to the European Union (CSU, 2015f). In July 2016, the party even says that anyone who wants Turkey to join the European Union will destroy Europe (CSU, 2016j). This strong and clear language is used throughout the negotiation process. In July 2017, the CSU demands a stop to the accession negotiations 'NOW!' (CSU, 2017a). Thus, the CSU does not change its standpoints on Turkish accession during the EU-Turkey refugee agreement negotiations.

The standpoint of the CSU about helping migrants is also consistent throughout the negotiation process. The party mentions several times that help should be provided to people in need (CSU,

2017b). However, in September 2015, it says that refugees should not be given the electronic health card (CSU, 2015g), which is needed to receive health insurance (Bundesministerium für Gesundheit, 2019). This could indicate an unwillingness to provide primary aid to refugees, but it could also mean that the party thinks the electronic health card is not the best way to supply the aid that refugees need. Because the CSU reconfirms its commitment to the provision of primary aid to refugees throughout the negotiations process (CSU, 2017b), the latter is most likely the case. The CSU does not say much on the topic of secondary aid. It only stresses the importance of migrants integrating into the German society (CSU, 2015h), which is a standpoint that does not change in the course of the negotiations.

At the start of the negotiations, the CSU voices its concern about the misuse of the right of asylum by economic migrants (CSU, 2015i). Another important topic for the CSU in this phase of the negotiations is the reduction of the number of irregular migrants by protecting the external borders of the European Union (CSU, 2015j) and by classifying more countries as a safe country of origin (CSU, 2015k). Quite early in the negotiations, at the end of 2015, the CSU's standpoint on border protection changes. Instead of supporting EU border protection, the party moves away from the EU-Turkey refugee agreement by lobbying for an increased protection of the German borders (CSU, 2015l). The CSU maintains this standpoint throughout the rest of the negotiation process. In August 2017 it even criticises the European Union for prohibiting the protection of national borders (CSU, 2017c). Unlike its standpoint on border protection, the CSU's stance on safe countries of origin and the misuse of the asylum system by economic migrants does not change in the course of the negotiations (CSU, 2017b; CSU, 2017d).

For the CSU, the topic of resettling migrants is dominated by the need to reduce the migratory pressure on Germany. At the start of the negotiation process, the party's focus is predominantly on a fairer distribution of refugees within Germany and the European Union (CSU, 2015m; CSU, 2015n). In April 2015, the party also says that the national government should pay more attention to the number of refugees (CSU, 2015o). However, it does not say that the number of refugees should be decreased. This changed in September 2015, when the CSU argues that it wants to help refugees, but that they cannot realistically be accommodated (CSU, 2015p). From then on, limiting the number of migrants being settled in Germany is the main goal of the CSU (CSU, 2017b). The CSU's stance towards migrants also changes. The party puts more emphasis on the disadvantages of migration, like criminality (CSU, 2016k) and the risk of terrorist attacks (CSU, 2016l). By becoming more negative towards migrants, the CSU moves away from the standpoints of the agreement, that wants to resettle migrants in the European Union.

On the topics of Turkish accession and helping migrants, the standpoints of the CSU are consistent. On all other topics, the opinion of the CSU moves away from the agreement, especially on border protection and international cooperation. Thus, the results from the CSU show a clear support for the prediction that the standpoints of German political parties during the EU-Turkey refugee agreement negotiations were equally far or further removed from those of the agreement than in a non-crisis situation. This supports the first hypothesis.

SPD

The standpoint of the SPD is the same during the negotiations as in a non-crisis situation on one topic. On two topics, the party moves away from the agreement during the negotiations. On three other topics, the standpoint of the SPD moves closer to the agreement. Overall, the results from the SPD equally support both predictions. The analysis of each individual topic is presented below.

In a non-crisis situation, the SPD is very internationally oriented. One of the themes on its website is even called “Miteinander statt gegeneinander” (SPD, 2019b), which translates to ‘with each other instead of against each other’. The party stresses the importance of reaching European solutions and it condemns national unilateral measures (Ibid.). During the EU-Turkey refugee agreement negotiations, the SPD maintains this standpoint. It still wants European solutions (SPD, 2016a) and it even says that its opinion on European cooperation is unchanged (SPD, 2016b).

Like the CDU and CSU, the SPD does not say anything about EU-Turkey cooperation or Turkish accession in a non-crisis situation. Therefore, possible changes in opinion during the EU-Turkey refugee agreement negotiations are looked at. On the topic of EU-Turkey cooperation, the SPD is very consistent. Throughout the negotiation process, the party criticises events in Turkey that do not meet the party’s norms. In 2016, it condemns the status of Turkish democracy (SPD, 2016c) and in 2017 it denounces the imprisonment of the German journalist Yücel and demands his release (SPD, 2017b).

Unfortunately, the SPD only mentions the topic of Turkish accession twice during the EU-Turkey refugee agreement negotiations (SPD, 2017c; SPD, 2017d). This is not enough to make an accurate assessment on the changes in its standpoint during the negotiations, especially since the Tweets are both from the second half of 2017. The lack of Tweets could mean three things. Firstly, it could mean that the SPD does not use Twitter as a means to express its opinion. As can be seen from the numerous Tweets on the other topics of the agreement, this is not the case. Secondly, it could mean that the party does not have a strong enough opinion on the topic for it to be worth expressing. This could be true, but the SPD’s strong criticism on Turkish domestic policy makes it unlikely that it would not have

an opinion on Turkish accession. Lastly, the SPD could avoid talking about Turkish accession, because it does not want to draw attention to the topic. A Tweet from the CDU suggests this might be the case. The CDU says that the SPD campaigned for Turkish accession for years, but that it now opposes it (CDU, 2017m). The SPD could be afraid of losing votes if the public finds out about its sudden change of opinion. If the CDU's statement is correct, this would mean that the SPD drastically moved away from the standpoints of the EU-Turkey refugee agreement. However, it must be taken into account that the CDU might have exaggerated the change in the SPD's opinion to make the party look inconsistent.

In a non-crisis situation, the SPD is focussed on the provision of primary aid to people in need. It says that it takes responsibility for people fleeing from war, terror and persecution (SPD, 2019b). The party does not mention that it wants to offer any secondary aid. During the EU-Turkey refugee agreement negotiations, the party still supports the protection of those who flee (SPD, 2015a). However, the focus of the SPD lies predominantly on the provision of secondary aid. The party wants to provide good integration (SPD, 2015b), job opportunities (SPD, 2015c), language courses (Ibid.), better healthcare (SPD, 2017e) and the possibility for civic engagement (Ibid.). By supporting the provision of a wide range of secondary aid, the standpoint of the SPD is closer to the EU-Turkey refugee agreement during the negotiations than in a non-crisis situation. After all, secondary aid is strongly featured in the agreement (European Commission, 2015).

When in a non-crisis situation, the SPD says that it is important to protect the external borders of the European Union and that the border protection agency Frontex should become a powerful border police force (SPD, 2019b). At the same time, the party wants to combat the causes of flight for refugees and it emphasises that people without the right to stay in the EU should leave (Ibid.). These standpoints are very similar to the standpoints of the EU-Turkey refugee agreement. During the negotiations, these standpoints remain largely the same. The SPD still wants to protect the external borders of the European Union (SPD, 2016b), combat the causes of flight (SPD, 2017f) and send back illegal migrants (Ibid). Additionally, it wants to offer refugees legal ways to enter the European Union (Ibid.), which is exactly what the EU-Turkey refugee agreement does. Thus, the SPD's standpoint on this topic is slightly closer to the agreement during the negotiations than it is in a non-crisis situation.

In a non-crisis situation, the SPD is very supportive of migration, arguing that we need male and female workers from abroad to be able to live in prosperity in the future (SPD, 2019b). Almost identical statements about the need for migrant workers are made during the EU-Turkey refugee agreement negotiations. The party Tweets that migration is a part of Germany's history (SPD, 2017g) and that migrants are necessary (SPD, 2015b). While emphasising the need for migrants in Germany, the party

also repeatedly mentions that a fairer distribution of migrants within the EU is required (SPD, 2017c; SPD, 2017d). Since the agreement improves the fairness of the distribution of migrants across the European Union, the SPD's shift in attention towards this topic indicates that its opinion moved towards the agreement during the negotiations.

In conclusion, the standpoint of the SPD on international cooperation is the same during the EU-Turkey refugee agreement negotiations as in a non-crisis situation. The party is also consistent on its stance towards cooperation between the EU and Turkey. These results support the prediction of the first hypothesis. Furthermore, there is a reasonable chance that the party's standpoint on Turkish accession drastically moved away from the agreement, which strengthens the support for the prediction that the standpoints of German political parties during the EU-Turkey refugee agreement negotiations were equally far or further removed from those of the agreement than in a non-crisis situation. However, the results from the other topics indicate a strong empirical congruence of the prediction of the other hypothesis, which states that the standpoints of German political parties during the EU-Turkey refugee agreement negotiations were closer to those of the agreement than in a non-crisis situation. This is the case for helping migrants, irregular migration and resettling migrants. Thus, the overall results support both hypotheses equally.

The Left Party

The standpoint of the Left Party is the same during the negotiations as in a non-crisis situation on almost all topics. The only exception is Turkish accession, on which the party moves away from the agreement. Overall, these results strongly support the prediction that the standpoints of German political parties during the EU-Turkey refugee agreement negotiations were equally far or further removed from those of the agreement than in a non-crisis situation than for the other prediction. The individual analysis of the topics is presented below.

In a non-crisis situation, the Left Party is critical of the current status of the European Union (Die Linke, 2019b), which could indicate an unwillingness to cooperate internationally. However, the party mainly criticises the EU's lack of democracy, its social policy and its dependence on the financial markets (Ibid.). This does not suggest that the Left Party opposes the international cooperation that the European Union brings. Furthermore, it mentions that industrialized countries should work together to combat inequality around the world (Die Linke, 2019c). Therefore, the Left Party is most likely an internationalist party that is critical of the issues that the current international cooperation is focussed on. During the EU-Turkey refugee agreement, this standpoint remains the same. The party still criticises the current focus of international cooperation (Die Linke, 2015a; Die Linke, 2015b), but it

wants to use this cooperation to try to change this. This is very clear when the party is trying to stop TTIP (Die Linke, 2015b), a trade agreement between the United States and the EU (Rijksoverheid, 2019). On the one hand, the party tries to change policy that would increase international cooperation, but on the other hand, it does this through cooperation with other EU countries (Die Linke, 2015b).

Because there is no data available about the Left Party's standpoint on EU-Turkey cooperation in a non-crisis situation, changes in its standpoints during the EU-Turkey refugee agreement negotiations are looked at. At the start of the negotiations, the Left Party pays attention to the worsening situation in Turkey (Die Linke, 2016a) and shows its support for groups that are being oppressed by Erdogan (Die Linke, 2016b; Die Linke, 2016c). Later in the negotiation process, the party's standpoint against Turkey becomes stronger. In May 2017, it wants to withdraw Germany's armed forces from Turkey and end arms deliveries to the country (Die Linke, 2017a). In September 2017, the Left Party even directly addresses the government to ask for policy changes (Die Linke, 2017b). Thus, during the negotiations, the Left Party's standpoint on EU-Turkey cooperation moves further away from the EU-Turkey refugee agreement.

There is little information available about the opinion of the Left Party about Turkish accession (Die Linke, 2017c; Die Linke, 2017d). In 2016, the party says that the accession talks with Turkey should be aborted (Die Linke, 2016d). In 2017, the party reconfirms this by criticising the government for continuing the talks about Turkish accession (Die Linke, 2017e). This suggests that the standpoint of the Left Party is stable throughout the negotiation process. This assumption is strengthened by the party's strong criticism towards the situation in Turkey. However, there is not enough data available to establish this with a large degree of certainty.

On their website, the Left Party pays particular attention to the provision of secondary aid to refugees. It criticises the government on the lack of good integration policy (Die Linke, 2019c) and it argues that refugees should have the right to social, cultural and democratic participation in Germany (Ibid.). The party does not mention that it wants to provide primary aid to refugees, but it is reasonable to expect that a party that wants to provide secondary aid to refugees also wants to save their lives. During the EU-Turkey refugee agreement negotiations, the standpoint of the Left Party towards helping refugees remains the same. It wants to protect refugees (Die Linke, 2015c), but it also goes beyond just saving their lives by arguing for economic protection (Die Linke, 2015d) and social inclusion (Die Linke, 2016e). Thus, the party's standpoint on helping migrants is the same during the EU-Turkey refugee agreement negotiations as in a non-crisis situation.

In a non-crisis situation, the Left Party speaks strongly against the closing of national or European borders, arguing that we should help refugees instead of blocking their escape routes (Die Linke, 2019b). The party also argues that Germany should focus on making sure that people do not need to migrate, by removing the causes of flight (Ibid.). During the negotiations, the party solidifies its stance towards irregular migration. Like in a non-crisis situation, it is still against closing borders (Die Linke, 2016f; Die Linke, 2017f) and in favour of fighting the causes of flight (Die Linke, 2017g), but its standpoint got even stronger. This can be seen by the frequent use of exclamation marks in its Tweets.

There is no information on the opinion of the Left Party in a non-crisis situation for the last topic. Therefore, the potential change of the party's standpoint during the EU-Turkey refugee agreement negotiations is looked at. During the first year of the negotiation process, the standpoint of the Left Party remains the same. It strongly accentuates the advantages of migration for Germany (Die Linke, 2015e). The party pays particular attention to the economic advantages that migrants have (Die Linke, 2015f) and it disproves their rumoured economic disadvantages (Die Linke, 2015g). After the first year, the Left Party completely shifts its attention to the number of migrants arriving in Germany. Other parties propose an upper limit of refugees to take in, but the Left Party attacks these propositions (Die Linke, 2016g; Die Linke, 2017h). Even though its attention shifted to different topics, it is unlikely that the party's opinion changed in a substantive way, because both at the start and the end of the negotiations, it supports the arrival of migrants in Germany.

The standpoint of the Left Party on international cooperation is the same during the negotiations as in a non-crisis situation. Its standpoint on EU-Turkey cooperation and helping migrants is consistent as well. These results support the prediction of the first hypothesis. The results from irregular migration, a topic on which the party solidified its standpoint, provide further support for the prediction that the standpoints of German political parties during the EU-Turkey refugee agreement negotiations were equally far or further removed from those of the agreement than in a non-crisis situation. This prediction is also supported by the topic of Turkish accession, on which the Left Party moved its standpoint away from the agreement. Lastly, the attention of the party on resettling migrants changed to different subtopics, but it is unlikely that this means that the party changed its substantive standpoint. Overall, the results of the Left Party strongly support the prediction that the standpoints of German political parties during the EU-Turkey refugee agreement negotiations were equally far or further removed from those of the agreement than in a non-crisis situation. This strengthens the explanatory power of the first hypothesis.

Alliance 90/The Greens

The standpoint of Alliance 90/The Greens is the same during the negotiations as in a non-crisis situation on three topics. On one topic, the party moves away from the agreement during the negotiations. On one other topic, the standpoint of the Alliance 90/The Greens moves closer to the agreement. Lastly, the results from the topic of resettling migrants are inconclusive. Overall, the results from Alliance 90/The Greens strongly support the prediction that the standpoints of German political parties during the EU-Turkey refugee agreement negotiations were equally far or further removed from those of the agreement than in a non-crisis situation than for the other prediction. The analysis of each of the topics is presented below.

In a non-crisis situation, Alliance 90/The Greens is extremely internationalist. It argues that Germany has a responsibility to work with countries across the world to ensure human rights, peace and global justice (Bündnis 90/Die Grünen, 2019b). According to the party, international cooperation is the only way that the world can become sustainable and peaceful (Bündnis 90/Die Grünen, 2019c). One of the ways it thinks this international cooperation can be accomplished is through the European Union (Ibid.). During the EU-Turkey refugee agreement negotiations, the standpoint of Alliance 90/The Greens remains the same. It still thinks that international cooperation is the way to ensure a peaceful world (Bündnis 90/Die Grünen, 2017a). Also, the party is still strongly in favour of the European Union, as witnessed by its criticism of parties that attack the EU (Bündnis 90/Die Grünen, 2017b) and its focus on the ways that the European Union improves the world (Bündnis 90/Die Grünen, 2016a; Bündnis 90/Die Grünen, 2017c).

Throughout the negotiation process of the EU-Turkey refugee agreement, the standpoint of Alliance 90/The Greens on the topic of EU-Turkey cooperation remains the same. On the one hand, it criticises the events in Turkey that do not correlate with Germany's values (Bündnis 90/Die Grünen, 2016b; Bündnis 90/Die Grünen, 2017d). On the other hand, it wants to keep the dialogue between the EU and Turkey going (Bündnis 90/Die Grünen, 2017e). It even supports German politicians traveling to Turkey to facilitate this dialogue (Bündnis 90/Die Grünen, 2015b; Bündnis 90/Die Grünen, 2017d).

Alliance 90/The Greens' standpoint is less consistent throughout the negotiation process when it comes to Turkish accession. At first, the party strongly opposes Turkish accession to the European Union, saying that a country that wants to introduce the death penalty cannot be a Member State (Bündnis 90/Die Grünen, 2016c). Later, it reconfirms this standpoint by stating that Turkey could become a member of the EU, but not with the current state of its democracy (Bündnis 90/Die Grünen, 2017f). However, at the end of the negotiations, Alliance 90/The Greens says that it would benefit

Erdogan if the EU accession talks are terminated (Bündnis 90/Die Grünen, 2017g), implying that the European Union should continue the talks. The party thereby moves its standpoint closer to the EU-Turkey refugee agreement, in which Turkish accession is one of the main subjects.

In a non-crisis situation, Alliance 90/The Greens promotes itself as 'the integration party' (Bündnis 90/Die Grünen, 2019d). It believes in helping refugees by protecting their rights, providing language courses and making refugees a real part of society (Ibid.). Like the Left Party, Alliance 90/The Greens does not speak about providing primary aid, but again it is reasonable to assume that a party that wants to provide secondary aid to refugees also wants to save their lives. During the EU-Turkey refugee agreement negotiations, the party sticks with its non-crisis standpoints. It wants to save refugees from drowning at sea (Bündnis 90/Die Grünen, 2015c) and attacks the government for not providing language courses (Bündnis 90/Die Grünen, 2017h). Furthermore, it is the only party that clearly states that family reunification is a vital part of integration (Bündnis 90/Die Grünen, 2016d) that increases the chances of success (Bündnis 90/Die Grünen, 2017h). Therefore, it stays true to its statement about being 'the integration party'.

Even though Alliance 90/The Greens does not say much about irregular migration in a non-crisis situation, it is clear that the party firmly opposes border protection (Bündnis 90/Die Grünen, 2019b). It also speaks in favour of reducing the causes of flight for refugees (Bündnis 90/Die Grünen, 2019e). These standpoints remain largely the same during the EU-Turkey refugee agreement negotiations (Bündnis 90/Die Grünen, 2015c; Bündnis 90/Die Grünen, 2016e), but they are slightly strengthened, as witnessed by the frequent use of exclamation marks. Therefore, Alliance 90/The Greens' standpoints during the negotiations corresponds less with the agreement, in which border protection plays an important role, than in a non-crisis situation.

On the last topic, the resettling of migrants, Alliance 90/The Greens takes a clear position in defence of migrants coming to Germany. It emphasises the advantages of migration for the German society (Bündnis 90/Die Grünen, 2019f) and economy (Bündnis 90/Die Grünen, 2019g). It even says that Germany is dependent on them (Ibid.). Strangely, the party barely mentions the same topics during the EU-Turkey refugee agreement negotiations. It completely shifts its attention to the number of migrants coming to Germany, arguing against an upper limit of refugees in Germany (Bündnis 90/Die Grünen, 2016e). It also strongly supports family reunification, which would bring more migrants to Germany (Bündnis 90/Die Grünen, 2016f). Just like the Left Party, Alliance 90/The Greens shifts its attention to different topics, but it still defends the resettling of migrants in Germany in a non-crisis

situation as well as during the EU-Turkey refugee agreement negotiations. Therefore, it is unlikely that its opinion changed substantively.

Alliance 90/The Greens' opinion on EU-Turkey cooperation remained the same throughout the negotiation process. The party's opinion was also stable on international cooperation and helping migrants. These results support the prediction of the first hypothesis. Additionally, Alliance 90/The Greens' standpoint on irregular migration moved away from the agreement, which supports that prediction even more. The only result that supports the rivalling prediction is that of Turkish accession, on which the party moves towards the agreement. Lastly, a shift in attention on resettling migrants was found, but it is unlikely that this means that the party's standpoint changed substantively. Overall, the results indicate a high empirical congruence of the prediction that says that the standpoints of German political parties during the EU-Turkey refugee agreement negotiations were equally far or further removed from those of the agreement than in a non-crisis situation. This offers strong support for the first hypothesis.

FDP

The standpoint of the FDP is the same during the negotiations as in a non-crisis situation on three topics. On all other topics, the party moves away from the agreement during the negotiations. Overall, the results from the FDP show a much stronger support for the prediction that the standpoints of German political parties during the EU-Turkey refugee agreement negotiations were equally far or further removed from those of the agreement than in a non-crisis situation than for the other prediction. The analysis of the individual topics is presented below.

The FDP is extremely internationalist in a non-crisis situation. It emphasises the opportunities of globalisation and argues that the challenges of globalisation can only be overcome by working together on global solutions (FDP, 2019c). The party also strongly supports the European Union and the euro, calling it a prerequisite for growth and prosperity in Europe (FDP, 2019d). Furthermore, it wants to work together internationally on a wide variety of subjects, like data protection, energy policy, refugee and migration policy, counter-terrorism and climate change (FDP, 2019e; FDP, 2019f). It is therefore unsurprising that the FDP condemns protectionist tendencies because they jeopardise economic freedom and peace around the world (FDP, 2019g). During the EU-Turkey refugee agreement negotiations, the party's standpoint on international cooperation is different. It still says it opposes national egoism (FDP, 2015b) and supports international cooperation (FDP, 2016a), but it also says that Germany should return to adhering to the Dublin-III agreement (FDP, 2016b), which is a very individual way of dealing with the refugee problem (Europa Nu, 2017). Also, the party strictly rejects paying extra

money to the EU for deeper European integration (FDP, 2017c; WELT, 2017). Therefore, the opinion of the FDP during the negotiations is less internationalist than in a non-crisis situation, which moves its standpoint away from the EU-Turkey refugee agreement.

During the course of the EU-Turkey refugee agreement negotiations, the FDP became more critical of EU-Turkey cooperation, thereby moving away from the agreement. At the start of the negotiations, the party is critical of Turkey, but it supports cooperation between the EU and Turkey to save the lives of refugees (FDP, 2015c). However, at the end of the negotiations, it does not deem any cooperation with Turkey realistic. (FDP, 2017d). Additionally, the more the negotiations progress, the more the FDP wants to take concrete steps to stop EU-Turkey cooperation. It wants to withdraw German soldiers from the country (FDP, 2017e) and it even argues that Turkey should be removed from NATO (FDP, 2017d).

The standpoint of the FDP about Turkish accession remains the same throughout the EU-Turkey refugee agreement negotiations. From the start, the party is strongly against the accession of Turkey to the European Union. In 2015 and 2016, the reason for its opposition of Turkish accession is the status of democracy in Turkey (FDP, 2015d; FDP, 2016c). In 2017, the party argues that the values of Turkey are too far apart from those of the European Union for Turkey to become a Member State (FDP, 2017f).

In a non-crisis situation, the FDP speaks strongly in favour of providing humanitarian aid to people in need (FDP, 2019a). It also mentions that all refugees should be given access to the German labour market (Ibid.) and that language courses should be provided (FDP, 2019h). This standpoints remains the same during the EU-Turkey refugee agreement negotiations. The FDP still wants to provide primary aid to refugees (FDP, 2017g) and it criticises the government for providing too little medical care (FDP, 2015e). The party also maintains its position on secondary aid, focussing on granting refugees access to the German labour market (FDP, 2015f; FDP, 2017h) and teaching them the German language (FDP, 2015g).

In a non-crisis situation, the reduction of irregular migration is important for the FDP. The party says that the unregulated influx of people must be limited (FDP, 2019h) and that refugees should return to their homeland as soon as the reasons for their flight have passed (FDP, 2019g). It also mentions that the tackling of the causes of flight for refugees is an important foreign policy objective (FDP, 2019i). The FDP does not mention its stance towards the closing of the German or European borders, but since the party is very internationally oriented, it is reasonable to assume that it wants to keep Germany's

borders open. Additionally, since the reduction of the influx of refugees is an important point on the party's agenda, it is likely that it is in favour of strengthening the external border of the European Union. If these assumptions are correct, the FDP's opinion in a non-crisis situation highly correlates with its opinion during the EU-Turkey refugee agreement negotiations. During the negotiations, the party says that closing the German borders would be a disaster for the German economy (FDP, 2016d) and that the external borders of the European Union should be protected (FDP, 2017i). The party's standpoints on sending refugees (FDP, 2016e) and combatting the causes of flight (FDP, 2015h) also remain unchanged.

In a non-crisis situation, the FDP emphasises the advantages of migration for Germany (FDP, 2019j). It says that Germany has been a country of immigration for years and that migrants contribute to society in many ways (FDP, 2019h). However, the party also mentions that migration should be controlled and that the arrival of too many migrants poses challenges for Germany (Ibid.). The FDP's standpoint on resettling migrants is different during the EU-Turkey refugee agreement negotiations. It does not pay attention to the advantages of migration anymore (FDP, 2017b; FDP, 2017j), but instead emphasises the need for a fairer distribution of refugees among Member States (FDP, 2015i; FDP, 2016f). This results in a much more negative tone towards refugees. Therefore, the FDP's standpoint is further away from the agreement during the negotiations than it is in a non-crisis situation.

In conclusion, the standpoint of the FDP is stable on Turkish accession and helping migrants. This is also the case for irregular migration, if the assumption that the party wants to protect the external border of the European Union is correct. The party's standpoint moves away from the agreement on all other topics. Therefore, the results of the FDP clearly show a strong empirical congruence of the prediction that the standpoints of German political parties during the EU-Turkey refugee agreement negotiations were equally far or further removed from those of the agreement than in a non-crisis situation. This supports the first hypothesis.

Conclusion

The CDU and the Left Party show mixed results on the empirical congruence of the predictions. Both parties move towards the standpoints of the EU-Turkey refugee agreement on several topics, all of which are about migration. The CDU still shows slightly more support for the prediction of the first hypothesis, but the SPD's results support both predictions equally. Unlike the results of the CDU and SPD, the outcome of all other parties indicates a strong support for the prediction that the standpoints of German political parties during the EU-Turkey refugee agreement negotiations were equally far or further removed from those of the agreement than in a non-crisis situation. This suggests that parties

were unwilling to make concessions towards the EU-Turkey refugee agreement, which strongly supports the hypothesis that states that the high stakes of the EU-Turkey refugee negotiations caused German domestic actors to be less willing to make concessions towards the negotiation subjects, making it more difficult to successfully conclude the negotiations by decreasing the German win-set.

5.2. Attention to the agreement's topics

The second prediction of the first hypothesis says that during the EU-Turkey refugee agreement negotiations, German political parties paid less attention to the agreement's topics on which they agree and more attention to the topics on which they do not agree than they did in a non-crisis situation. The prediction of the second hypothesis states the exact opposite. In order to assess which of these predictions is most strongly supported by the data, two things need to be analysed. First, it must be determined on what topics each party agrees or disagrees with the agreement. This is done by comparing the coded text from the parties' Twitter feeds with the EU-Turkey refugee agreement. Because the topics of the agreement have been extensively discussed in chapter 3.3 and because the standpoints of the agreement received considerable attention in the previous section, the topics on which the parties agree or disagree are only briefly touched upon. The second part of the analysis uses the frequency of the codes from the websites of German political parties to determine how much attention the parties paid to the topics of the EU-Turkey refugee agreement in a non-crisis situation. At the same time, the code frequency from the parties' Twitter feeds is analysed to determine how much attention they paid to the topics of the agreement during the negotiations. A comparison is then made between the attention that is paid in a non-crisis situation and during the negotiations. This is done for the topics on which the parties agree and on which they disagree. As mentioned in the methodological chapter, the relative code frequencies are used to draw conclusions, since they are less affected by external factors.

The results most strongly support the prediction of the first hypothesis, which states that German political parties paid less attention to the agreement's topics on which they agree and more attention to the topics on which they do not agree than they did in a non-crisis situation. The results of the analysis are first presented for each party individually, because every party agrees or disagrees with the agreement on different topics. Then, the data of all German parties is combined to strengthen the individual conclusions. At the end of this section, a conclusion is drawn on the extent to which the predictions are supported by the findings and how this affects the explanatory power of the hypotheses.

CDU

Like the agreement, the CDU supports international cooperation, EU-Turkey cooperation, the provision of primary and secondary aid to migrants and a fairer distribution of migrants across Europe. It also agrees with the agreement's standpoints on irregular migration, combatting the causes of flight and border protection. However, unlike the agreement, the CDU is critical of the situation in Turkey and it opposes Turkish accession to the EU. The party also frequently emphasises the disadvantages of migration, which does not correspond with the agreement. Furthermore, unlike the agreement, it wants to reduce the number of legal migrants coming to Germany.

The second column of table 5.1 summarises the standpoints of the CDU in relation to the agreement. Furthermore, the third column shows the absolute number of codes devoted to each topic in a non-crisis situation. The number of words that is used for these codes is presented in the fourth column. The next two columns show how these absolute numbers relate to the total number of codes and words of the CDU in a non-crisis situation. These relative numbers indicate how much attention a topic received in relation to the other topics of the agreement. Column seven to ten are similar to column three to six, but instead show what the party paid attention to during the EU-Turkey refugee agreement negotiations. The tables of other parties are presented in the same way.

CDU	(Dis)agree	Non-crisis situation				EU-Turkey refugee agreement negotiations			
		# Codes	# Words	% Codes	% Words	# Codes	# Words	% Codes	% Words
International cooperation									
Isolationism / internationalism	Agree	3	134	33	49	17	231	24	27
EU-Turkey cooperation									
Cooperation	Agree	0	0	0	0	7	114	10	13
Turkey	Disagree	0	0	0	0	5	65	7	8
Turkish accession									
Accession	Disagree	0	0	0	0	7	108	10	13
Visa liberalisation	Disagree	0	0	0	0	1	10	1	1
Helping migrants									
Primary aid	Agree	1	16	11	6	3	19	4	2
Secondary aid	Agree	2	50	22	18	3	30	4	4
Irregular migration									
Irregular migrants	Agree	0	0	0	0	11	115	15	14
Causes of flight	Agree	0	0	0	0	2	9	3	1
Border protection	Agree	0	0	0	0	4	30	6	4
Resettling migrants									
Number of migrants	Disagree	0	0	0	0	8	85	11	10
Distribution	Agree	0	0	0	0	1	13	1	2
(Dis)advantages migration	Disagree	3	73	33	27	3	22	4	3

Table 5.1: Overview of the absolute and relative length and number of codes by the CDU.

Several notable results are found in table 5.1. First of all, it is surprising that the CDU is much more active on Twitter during the negotiations on both subtopics of EU-Turkey cooperation, even though it agrees with one of them and disagrees with the other. Just as striking are the results on Turkish

accession; the CDU disagrees with the agreement on both topics, but only one of them shows a substantial change in attention that is paid to them. The results on the other topics are also quite varied, even though there seems to be a consistent rise in attention to the topics that the party disagrees with, except for the (dis)advantages of migration. An extreme drop in attention to this topic can be seen during the EU-Turkey refugee agreement negotiations. No consistency is detected for the topics on which the party agrees. Three of them are given considerably more attention during the negotiations, but five of them receive less attention. For two of those, primary and secondary aid, the drop in attention is substantial. Overall, both predictions find some support in the data. The results were similar to such an extent that there is no reason to believe that they support one prediction more than the other.

CSU

The CSU agrees with the EU-Turkey refugee agreement on providing primary aid to refugees, reducing the number of irregular migrants, fighting the causes of flight and a fairer distribution of refugees across the EU. However, it disagrees on all other topics. Even though it initially supports international cooperation, the overall stance of the party during the negotiations is much more isolationist than the agreement is. An overview of the CSU's standpoints in relation to the agreement can be found in table 5.2.

CSU	(Dis)agree	Non-crisis situation				EU-Turkey refugee agreement negotiations			
		# Codes	# Words	% Codes	% Words	# Codes	# Words	% Codes	% Words
International cooperation									
Isolationism / internationalism	Disagree	1	44	50	83	12	179	9	10
EU-Turkey cooperation									
Cooperation	Disagree	0	0	0	0	10	130	7	7
Turkey	Disagree	0	0	0	0	5	75	4	4
Turkish accession									
Accession	Disagree	0	0	0	0	38	495	28	27
Visa liberalisation	Disagree	0	0	0	0	7	82	5	4
Helping migrants									
Primary aid	Agree	0	0	0	0	6	59	4	3
Secondary aid	Disagree	0	0	0	0	7	106	5	6
Irregular migration									
Irregular migrants	Agree	0	0	0	0	9	102	7	5
Causes of flight	Agree	0	0	0	0	2	18	1	1
Border protection	Disagree	0	0	0	0	8	132	6	7
Resettling migrants									
Number of migrants	Disagree	0	0	0	0	17	257	12	14
Distribution	Agree	1	9	50	17	12	176	9	9
(Dis)advantages migration	Disagree	0	0	0	0	5	55	4	3

Table 5.2: Overview of the absolute and relative length and number of codes by the CSU.

Table 5.2 also presents an overview of the length and number of codes for the CSU on each topic. The results in this table show that the CSU does not pay much attention to the topics of the EU-Turkey

refugee agreement in a non-crisis situation. Only international cooperation and the distribution of migrants receive any attention. Because there are so few codes in a non-crisis situation, the relative attention that is paid to these two topics is very high. Since both of them receive a lot of attention, it is striking that the CSU agrees on one of them, but disagrees on the other. Therefore, these results do not support either of the predictions so far.

Since the CSU did not pay attention to any of the other topics in a non-crisis situation, all of them receive more attention during the negotiations. This counts for topics that the CSU agrees with and disagrees with, but the latter increase substantially more than the former. 71% of the number of codes and 72% of the coded words are on topics that the party disagrees with. Since there are eight of these topics, this equates to an increase of almost nine percentage points per topic. The topics that the party agrees with cover 12% of the codes and 9% of the coded words, divided amongst three topics. Thus, attention to each topic increased by less than four percentage points. In conclusion, the overall results are affected by the fact that the CSU did not provide much information about its standpoints in a non-crisis situation. Still, it is clear that during the EU-Turkey refugee agreement negotiations, the party paid considerably more attention to topics it disagrees with than to topics it agrees with. Therefore, the results from the CSU support the prediction that German political parties paid less attention to the agreement's topics on which they agree and more attention to the topics on which they do not agree than they did in a non-crisis situation. This supports the first hypothesis.

SPD

Like the agreement, the CDU supports international cooperation and cooperation between the EU and Turkey. It also agrees with the EU-Turkey refugee agreement on all subtopics of helping migrants, irregular migration and resettling migrants. The party only disagrees on the accession of Turkey to the European Union and on its stance towards Turkey, because the SPD is much more negative about Turkey than the agreement is. An overview of the SPD's standpoints in relation to the agreement can be found in table 5.3.

SPD	(Dis)agree	Non-crisis situation				EU-Turkey refugee agreement negotiations			
		# Codes	# Words	% Codes	% Words	# Codes	# Words	% Codes	% Words
International cooperation									
Isolationism / internationalism	Agree	7	106	54	48	18	233	29	24
EU-Turkey cooperation									
Cooperation	Agree	0	0	0	0	1	14	2	1
Turkey	Disagree	0	0	0	0	17	221	27	23
Turkish accession									
Accession	Disagree	0	0	0	0	2	33	3	3
Visa liberalisation	Unknown	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Helping migrants									
Primary aid	Agree	2	34	15	15	3	56	5	6
Secondary aid	Agree	0	0	0	0	9	112	15	12
Irregular migration									
Irregular migrants	Agree	1	11	8	5	3	18	5	2
Causes of flight	Agree	1	16	8	7	2	23	3	2
Border protection	Agree	1	24	8	11	2	29	3	3
Resettling migrants									
Number of migrants	Agree	0	0	0	0	2	20	3	2
Distribution	Agree	0	0	0	0	2	116	3	12
(Dis)advantages migration	Agree	1	32	8	14	1	85	2	9

Table 5.3: Overview of the absolute and relative length and number of codes by the SPD.

When looking at the relative frequency of the SPD's codes, that can be found in table 5.3, the results of the topics on which the party disagrees are consistent. No attention was paid to any of those subjects in a non-crisis situation, but during the negotiations they both received some attention. The accession of Turkey even became one of the most talked-about topics of the SPD during the negotiations. Therefore, the data suggests that the topics on which the party did not agree received more attention during the negotiations than in a non-crisis situation, providing support to the prediction of the first hypothesis. The results on the topics on which the party agrees are more varied. The SPD's attention increased on four of them and decreased on six others. Because the decrease in attention is slightly stronger than the increase, these results moderately support the prediction of the first hypothesis. Overall, the first hypothesis is most strongly supported by the results from the SPD.

The Left Party

The Left Party disagrees with the EU-Turkey agreement on all subtopics of EU-Turkey cooperation and on Turkish accession. It also disagrees on border protection and irregular migration. However, like the agreement, the Left Party supports international cooperation, the provision of aid to refugees and removing the causes of flight. Furthermore, the party does not mind taking in regular migrants and it accentuates the advantages of migration, which corresponds with the agreement. Unfortunately, the party does not mention anything about visa liberalisation or the distribution of migrants across Europe. Therefore, they are not taken into account in this analysis. Table 5.4 summarises the standpoints of the Left Party in relation to the agreement. It also shows the absolute and relative length and number

of codes of the Left Party in a non-crisis situation and during the EU-Turkey refugee agreement negotiations.

The Left Party	(Dis)agree	Non-crisis situation				EU-Turkey refugee agreement negotiations			
		# Codes	# Words	% Codes	% Words	# Codes	# Words	% Codes	% Words
International cooperation									
Isolationism / internationalism	Agree	7	258	58	68	14	195	22	21
EU-Turkey cooperation									
Cooperation	Disagree	0	0	0	0	9	128	14	14
Turkey	Disagree	0	0	0	0	11	192	17	20
Turkish accession									
Accession	Disagree	0	0	0	0	2	31	3	3
Visa liberalisation	Unknown	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Helping migrants									
Primary aid	Agree	0	0	0	0	11	131	17	14
Secondary aid	Agree	2	41	17	11	2	22	3	2
Irregular migration									
Irregular migrants	Disagree	0	0	0	0	2	30	3	3
Causes of flight	Agree	1	28	8	7	4	47	6	5
Border protection	Disagree	2	55	17	14	3	39	5	4
Resettling migrants									
Number of migrants	Agree	0	0	0	0	3	50	5	5
Distribution	Unknown	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
(Dis)advantages migration	Agree	0	0	0	0	3	77	5	8

Table 5.4: Overview of the absolute and relative length and number of codes by the Left Party.

Some interesting results are found in table 5.4. First of all, the party pays considerably more attention to the topics of EU-Turkey cooperation, Turkish accession and irregular migration during the negotiations than in a non-crisis situation. At the same time, the protection of the EU borders receives less attention. Taken together, these results moderately support the prediction of the first hypothesis, since the party disagrees on all of them. The results of the topics on which the party agrees are very mixed. An increase in attention can be seen on four of them, while a decrease in attention is found for three topics. This seems to favour the prediction of the second hypothesis. However, the decrease in attention is much stronger than the increase, especially when it comes to international cooperation. Therefore, the overall results slightly favour the prediction that during the EU-Turkey refugee agreement negotiations, German political parties paid less attention to the agreement's topics on which they agree and more attention to the topics on which they do not agree than they did in a non-crisis situation. This supports the first hypothesis.

Alliance 90/The Greens

Like the EU-Turkey refugee agreement, Alliance 90/The Greens supports international cooperation, EU-Turkey cooperation and combatting the causes of flight for refugees. It also agrees with the standpoints of the agreement on all subtopics of helping and resettling migrants. The party partially supports accession talks with Turkey, but because it rejects Turkey's actual accession, its opinion does

not correspond with that of the agreement. It also differs in opinion on its stance towards Turkey, on irregular migration and on border protection. An overview of the standpoints of Alliance 90/The Greens in relation to the agreement can be found in table 5.5. It also shows the absolute and relative length and number of codes of Alliance 90/The Greens.

Alliance 90/The Greens	(Dis)agree	Non-crisis situation				EU-Turkey refugee agreement negotiations			
		# Codes	# Words	% Codes	% Words	# Codes	# Words	% Codes	% Words
International cooperation									
Isolationism / internationalism	Agree	11	217	50	55	14	169	20	20
EU-Turkey cooperation									
Cooperation	Agree	0	0	0	0	4	59	6	7
Turkey	Disagree	0	0	0	0	8	115	11	13
Turkish accession									
Accession	Disagree	0	0	0	0	3	50	4	6
Visa liberalisation	Unknown	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Helping migrants									
Primary aid	Agree	0	0	0	0	11	148	16	17
Secondary aid	Agree	4	88	18	22	14	160	20	19
Irregular migration									
Irregular migrants	Disagree	0	0	0	0	1	9	1	1
Causes of flight	Agree	1	14	5	4	1	17	1	2
Border protection	Disagree	1	6	5	2	2	14	3	2
Resettling migrants									
Number of migrants	Agree	0	0	0	0	11	109	16	13
Distribution	Agree	0	0	0	0	1	12	1	1
(Dis)advantages migration	Agree	5	72	23	18	0	0	0	0

Table 5.5: Overview of the absolute and relative length and number of codes by Alliance 90/The Greens.

When looking at table 5.5, it is clear that during the negotiations, Alliance 90/The Greens paid more attention to the topics on which it does not agree than in a non-crisis situation. The party pays considerably more attention to its stance towards Turkey and irregular migration and Turkish accession both receive slightly more attention. The only topic that receives less attention is border protection. However, even though the topic is coded fewer times, the relative number of words devoted to it is the same. Therefore, the results from the topics on which the party disagrees are strongly in favour of the prediction of the first hypothesis. On the other topics, a big drop in attention can be seen in international cooperation and the (dis)advantages of migration. In a non-crisis situation, 73% of the number of codes and the amount of coded text are about these topics. During the negotiations, however, the (dis)advantages of migration are not talked about anymore and the attention that is paid to international cooperation drops to 20%. The causes of flight also receive slightly less attention. At the same time, there are various subjects that the party discusses more frequently, like EU-Turkey cooperation, primary aid and the number and distribution of migrants. However, the increase of attention paid to those topics is much less significant. Therefore, these results slightly support the prediction of the first hypothesis. Thus, the predication that German political parties paid less attention to the agreement's topics on which they agree and more attention to the topics on which they do not

agree than they did in a non-crisis situation is more strongly supported by the data than the rivalling prediction. This supports the first hypothesis.

FDP

The FDP agrees with the EU-Turkey refugee agreement on all subtopics of international cooperation, helping migrants and irregular migration. It also sympathises with the agreement on a fairer distribution of migrants. It disagrees on the number of migrants, the (dis)advantages of migration and on all topics about Turkey. A summary of the FDP's standpoints in relation to the agreement are presented in table 5.6. This table also shows the absolute and relative length and number of codes of the FDP in a non-crisis situation and during the EU-Turkey refugee agreement negotiations.

FDP	(Dis)agree	Non-crisis situation				EU-Turkey refugee agreement negotiations			
		# Codes	# Words	% Codes	% Words	# Codes	# Words	% Codes	% Words
International cooperation									
Isolationism / internationalism	Agree	23	552	53	53	20	263	22	24
EU-Turkey cooperation									
Cooperation	Disagree	0	0	0	0	16	195	18	18
Turkey	Disagree	0	0	0	0	7	91	8	8
Turkish accession									
Accession	Disagree	0	0	0	0	15	212	16	19
Visa liberalisation	Disagree	0	0	0	0	1	17	1	2
Helping migrants									
Primary aid	Agree	4	64	9	6	4	42	4	4
Secondary aid	Agree	4	99	9	10	10	91	11	8
Irregular migration									
Irregular migrants	Agree	2	41	5	4	4	37	4	3
Causes of flight	Agree	1	33	2	3	2	16	2	1
Border protection	Agree	0	0	0	0	5	57	5	5
Resettling migrants									
Number of migrants	Disagree	1	13	2	1	0	0	0	0
Distribution	Agree	1	22	2	2	5	58	5	5
(Dis)advantages migration	Disagree	6	168	14	16	2	24	2	2

Table 5.6: Overview of the absolute and relative length and number of codes by the FDP.

From the topics that the party agrees with, the attention that is paid to international cooperation changes the most. The relative attention that this topic receives drops approximately 30 percentage points during the negotiations. Other subjects, like primary aid, irregular migrants and the causes of flight decrease as well, but much less significantly. On the other hand, border protection and the distribution of migrants receive slightly more attention. These results speak in favour of the prediction of the first hypothesis. All topics regarding Turkey, on which the party disagrees, receive considerably more attention during the negotiations than in a non-crisis situation. In total, the relative number of codes increased by 44 percentage points and the relative number of coded words increased by 47 percentage points. This speaks strongly in favour of the prediction of the first hypothesis. However, these results are somewhat mitigated by the fact that two topics that the party

disagreed with received less attention, with a total decrease of almost 15 percentage points. Overall, the results support the prediction that says that during the EU-Turkey refugee agreement negotiations, German political parties paid less attention to the agreement's topics on which they agree and more attention to the topics on which they do not agree than they did in a non-crisis situation. This strengthens the first hypothesis.

All parties

In total, there are 43 topics on which German political parties agree with the EU-Turkey refugee agreement. The relative number of times these topics are coded is considerably lower during the negotiations than in a non-crisis situation. A total drop of 127 percentage points³ is found, which comes down to 2.95 percentage points per topic. On average, this means that if 10 percent of all codes from a party were about a certain topic in a non-crisis situation, this decreased to 7.05 percent during the negotiations. Similar results are found for the number of words that are devoted to the topics on which the parties agree. During the negotiations, the relative number of words devoted to these topics decreased by 113 percentage points. This equals to a drop of 2.63 percentage points per topic.

The numbers above show a decrease in attention that is paid to topics on which the party agrees in relation to the total attention that is paid to all topics of the agreement. This means that the results for the other topics are, by definition, their direct opposites. Thus, the relative number of times parties talked about topics on which they disagree with the EU-Turkey refugee agreement increased by 127 percentage points during the negotiations. At the same time, the relative number of words devoted to these topics is 113 percentage points higher during the negotiations than in a non-crisis situation. Since there are 31 topics on which the parties disagree, this comes down to respectively 4.10 and 3.65 percentage points per topic.

These results clearly indicate a strong empirical congruence for the prediction that German political parties paid less attention to the agreement's topics on which they agree and more attention to the topics on which they do not agree than they did in a non-crisis situation. The rivaling prediction is not backed up by the data. Thus, these results strongly support the first hypothesis, which states that the high stakes of the EU-Turkey refugee negotiations caused German domestic actors to be less willing to make concessions towards the negotiation subjects, making it more difficult to successfully conclude the negotiations by decreasing the German win-set.

³ The cumulative percentages in this chapter may slightly vary from the results shown in tables 5.1 to 5.6, due to rounding differences.

Conclusion

Each of the parties showed some empirical congruence for both predictions. The outcome of the analysis for the CDU even showed equal support for the prediction of the first and second hypothesis. However, when combining the individual conclusions from all parties, a clear trend is visible. The overall results of the Left Party and Alliance 90/The Greens show that the prediction of the first hypothesis has slightly more empirical congruence than the prediction of the second hypothesis. The outcome of the analysis for the CSU, SPD and FDP show even stronger support in favour of the prediction of the first hypothesis. Furthermore, when looking at the combined results from all parties, the results strongly show that during the EU-Turkey refugee agreement negotiations, German political parties paid less attention to the agreement's topics on which they agree and more attention to the topics on which they do not agree than they did in a non-crisis situation. This suggests that parties focussed on the topics of the agreement that they wanted to change, which indicates that they were not willing to make concession towards the agreement. This supports the first hypothesis, which states that the high stakes of the EU-Turkey refugee negotiations caused German domestic actors to be less willing to make concessions towards the negotiation subjects, making it more difficult to successfully conclude the negotiations by decreasing the German win-set.

5.3. Emphasis on core values

The third prediction belonging to the first hypothesis states that German political parties put more emphasis on their core values during the EU-Turkey refugee agreement negotiations than they did in a non-crisis situation. The rivalling prediction of the second hypothesis says the exact opposite. In order to assess which of the predictions finds the strongest support in the data, a comparison is made between the relative length and number of times 'core values' are coded in a non-crisis situation and during the EU-Turkey refugee agreement negotiations. For the former, the codes from the websites of German parties are used. The latter uses the codes from their Twitter feeds. Like in the previous section, the relative code frequencies are used to draw conclusions, since they are less affected by external factors. Unlike the last two sections, however, there is no need to analyse the parties individually. Previously, individual characteristics of parties had to be taken into account, like their standpoints or whether they agree with the topics of the agreement. This is not the case in this section. Therefore, the results of all parties are combined. As a consequence, this section is much shorter than the previous ones.

Table 5.7 shows the absolute frequency of all codes related to the core values of the political parties and the number of words devoted to them. It also shows how these numbers relate to the total

number of codes and the total number of coded words in the data. The table clearly shows that German political parties paid less attention to their core values during the EU-Turkey refugee agreement negotiations than they did in a non-crisis situation. Every single one of the relative values of the non-crisis situation is higher than during the negotiations. The most striking difference is found in the relative number of codes. In a non-crisis situation, almost a third of the codes contain references to one of the party's values, while this was less than 10% during the negotiations. These results strongly support the prediction of the second hypothesis, which says that German political parties put less emphasis on their core values during the EU-Turkey refugee agreement negotiations than in a non-crisis situation. This suggests that German parties were willing to deviate from their core values during the EU-Turkey refugee agreement negotiations, which indicates that they might be willing to make concessions towards the agreement. This supports the second hypothesis, which states that the high stakes of the EU-Turkey refugee negotiations caused German domestic actors to be more willing to make concessions towards the negotiation subjects, making it easier to successfully conclude the negotiations by increasing the German win-set.

All parties	Non-crisis situation				EU-Turkey refugee agreement negotiations			
	# Codes	# Words	% Codes	% Words	# Codes	# Words	% Codes	% Words
Human rights	14	327	9.5	9.4	17	236	3.0	3.2
Humanity	6	121	4.1	3.5	13	159	2.3	2.2
Solidarity	5	113	3.4	3.3	9	118	1.6	1.6
Equality	4	123	2.7	3.6	5	65	0.9	0.9
Peace	12	308	8.1	8.9	6	80	1.1	1.1
Freedom	4	99	2.7	2.9	3	48	0.5	0.7
Security	2	53	1.4	1.5	3	43	0.5	0.6
Total	47	1144	31.9	33.0	56	749	9.9	10.2

Table 5.7: Overview of the absolute and relative length and number of codes on the core values of all parties combined.

6. Conclusion

This thesis set out to answer the question how the high stakes for German domestic actors during the EU-Turkey refugee agreement negotiations affected the likelihood of reaching a successful agreement. It did this by looking at two rivaling explanations of the effects high stakes could have according to the three-level game theory. On the one hand, the theory says that domestic actors strive for a maximum representation of their viewpoints in international negotiations. Therefore, one would expect that the more these actors value the outcome of the negotiations, the more important it is that their opinion is represented. The first hypothesis is based on this part of the three-level game theory: 'The high stakes of the EU-Turkey refugee negotiations caused German domestic actors to be less willing to make concessions towards the negotiation subjects, making it more difficult to successfully conclude the negotiations by decreasing the German win-set'. On the other hand, the three-level game states that actors are more likely to support an agreement if the status quo is unfavourable. Since the status quo before the EU-turkey refugee agreement was a crisis situation that caused great political and societal chaos in Europe, one would expect that domestic actors were very willing to make concession in order to make it easier for an agreement to be signed. The second hypothesis is based on this part of the theory: 'The high stakes of the EU-Turkey refugee negotiations caused German domestic actors to be more willing to make concessions towards the negotiation subjects, making it easier to successfully conclude the negotiations by increasing the German win-set'.

To determine which of the hypotheses has the strongest explanatory power, three predictions were tested for each of the hypotheses. These predictions illustrate what is expected to be found in the empirical data if the corresponding hypothesis is correct. The more the research findings support these predictions, the stronger the explanatory power of the hypothesis. The first prediction of the first hypothesis is that the standpoints of German political parties during the EU-Turkey refugee agreement negotiations were equally far or further removed from those of the agreement than in a non-crisis situation. The second one is that during the EU-Turkey refugee agreement negotiations, German political parties paid less attention to the agreement's topics on which they agree and more attention to the topics on which they do not agree than they did in a non-crisis situation. The third prediction of the first hypothesis is that German political parties put more emphasis on their core values during the EU-Turkey refugee agreement negotiations than they did in a non-crisis situation. Since the hypotheses are direct opposites of each other, the predictions are as well. Thus, for the second hypothesis, it is predicted that the standpoints of German political parties moved closer to the agreement, that parties paid more attention to topics on which they agree and less to topics on which they do not agree and

that they put less emphasis on their core values during the EU-Turkey refugee agreement than in a non-crisis situation.

The analysis showed that the standpoints of most political parties stayed the same or moved away from the agreement during the negotiations, which strongly supports the prediction of the first hypothesis. Secondly, some support was found for the second prediction of both hypotheses, but overall, the empirical congruence of the prediction of the first hypothesis was the strongest. Thus, the results of the first two predictions strongly suggest that the high stakes of the EU-Turkey refugee negotiations caused German domestic actors to be less willing to make concessions. The results from the last predictions are surprising, since they point in the opposite direction. They clearly show that German political parties put considerably less emphasis on their core values during the EU-Turkey refugee agreement than in a non-crisis situation, which indicates that German parties were willing to change their standpoints. According to the prediction, this supports the second hypothesis. However, because these results are in conflict with the findings of the previous predictions, it is important to reflect on the causality that resulted in the third prediction. So far, this thesis assumed that an increased willingness of parties to change their standpoints would result in them making more concessions towards the agreement. However, it could also be the case that parties that are more willing to change their standpoints move their opinion away from the agreement instead. This would explain why there were no German political parties whose non-crisis standpoints fully correspond with their standpoints during the negotiations. After all, the willingness of parties to change their opinion was very high.

Overall, the high stakes of the EU-Turkey refugee agreement caused German domestic actors, for which political parties were used as an indicator, to be considerably less willing to make concessions towards the topics of the agreement, decreasing the German win-set. Since the agreement has to fall within the win-set of all negotiating parties to be successfully signed and ratified, this made the successful conclusion of the negotiations significantly less likely. Thus, it is not because of the high stakes of the agreement that it was successful, but despite them.

6.1. Discussion

This research contributes to the academic debate by showing that the fundamentals of the three-level game theory and the costs of no-agreement both played a role in determining the outcome of the EU-Turkey refugee agreement negotiations. At the same time, it was made clear that the effects of these different aspects of the theory were not equal. The evidence strongly suggests that the costs of no-agreement played an inferior role during the EU-Turkey refugee agreement negotiations. Even though

the exact findings of a single case study are difficult to generalise to a larger population, there is no reason to believe that these rivalling forces could not be playing a role in other negotiations with high stakes, albeit with varying strength. This is also of great societal value, because it is something that negotiators can, and should, take into account right away. This helps assess the win-set more accurately, which decreases the risk of non-ratification.

The results of this research can also be used to increase our understanding on the outcome of other crisis negotiations or to help explain the lack of progress in negotiations that are still ongoing. For example, it is possible that the effects found in this thesis are also applicable to the negotiations between the United Kingdom and the rest of the European Union about the Brexit. The high stakes of these negotiations could explain why no agreement has been reached yet. Furthermore, the heavy emphasis that the British prime minister put on the negative effects of a no-deal Brexit increased the stakes of the negotiations, possibly decreasing the likelihood of reaching an agreement even more.

Something that cannot be explained by this research is why the standpoints of several German political parties moved towards the agreement on some topics and away from it on other topics. This could mean two things. Firstly, the high stakes could have a varying effect on different topics. Perhaps humanitarian stakes have a different effect than economic stakes, for example. More research into these differences could yield very interesting results. A second explanation could be that external influences, like international lobby groups, played a decisive role in determining the parties' standpoints. Even though no indication of this was found in the data, it cannot be ruled out either. Therefore, it would be interesting to look into this more deeply in future research. There are several other things that were uncovered in this research that would benefit from further analysis. Firstly, it would be very interesting to know whether the results that were found in this case study could be replicated in large-N research. This would provide insight in whether the results were case-specific or part of a larger phenomenon. Secondly, In the case of the EU-Turkey refugee agreement negotiations, the coalition parties CDU and SPD were the ones that were relatively the most inclined to move towards the standpoints of the agreement. This suggests that there might be a varying effect of high stakes on coalition parties and opposition parties. Additional research on this topic is required to determine whether this effect is indeed present.

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8. Appendices

8.1. Translations

Asyl	Asylum
Bündnis 90/Die Grünen	Alliance 90/The Greens
Die Linke	The Left Party
Europäische	European
Flüchtlinge	Refugees
Türkei	Turkey

8.2. Codes of the websites of German political parties

This section is devoted to the codes of the standpoints of German political parties on their website. These codes are used to determine what the standpoints of German parties are in a non-crisis situation. Each of the coding tables contains one of the main coding categories, for which the following sources were used:

Bündnis 90/Die Grünen (2019a). *Wofür wir kämpfen*. URL: <https://www.gruene.de/themen/gruene-themen-von-a-bis-z.html?L=12> (18-03-2019).

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Text from the websites of German political parties coded as 'international cooperation'

Category	Code	Case	Text	Words	% Words
International cooperation	Isolationism / internationalism	1. CDU	Die CDU-geführte Bundesregierung trägt eine erhebliche Verantwortung in den großen Krisen unserer Zeit. Wir können als Partner nur gestaltend zum Schutz unserer Bürger Einfluss nehmen, wenn wir einen Beitrag zum Frieden und zur Sicherheit in der Welt leisten	39	2.5%
International cooperation	Isolationism / internationalism	1. CDU	Deutschland steht auch in einer Zeit internationaler Krisen zu seinen entwicklungspolitischen Verpflichtungen.	12	0.8%
International cooperation	Isolationism / internationalism	1. CDU	Die Einheit Europas ist eine Erfolgsgeschichte, die fest mit der CDU verbunden ist. Auch Deutschland geht es auf Dauer nur gut, wenn es Europa gut geht. Die Europäische Union ist mehr als eine Werte- und Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft: Vor allem sichert uns die Einheit Europas seit mehr als sechs Jahrzehnten Freiheit und Sicherheit, Frieden und Wohlstand. Wir wollen diese Einheit stärken und die EU handlungsfähiger machen. Die CDU war, ist und bleibt die Partei der Europäischen Idee. Deutschland ist der Stabilitätsanker in der Europäischen Union.	83	5.3%
International cooperation	Isolationism / internationalism	2. CSU	Bayern ist Vorbild in Sachen stabile Finanzen. Nicht nur in Deutschland, sondern auch für Europa. Europa braucht einen stabilen Euro. Deshalb darf es keine Eurobonds oder die Vergemeinschaftung von Schulden in Europa geben. Europa darf keine Schuldenunion werden, sondern Europa muss eine Stabilitätsunion sein.	44	5.0%
International cooperation	Isolationism / internationalism	3. SPD	Miteinander statt gegeneinander	3	0.2%
International cooperation	Isolationism / internationalism	3. SPD	Menschlichkeit, Vernunft und eine gesamteuropäische Lösung. Das sind die Grundsätze der SPD für eine europäische Migrations- und Flüchtlingspolitik. Nur mit und nicht gegen Europa werden wir der Herausforderung gerecht auf der Grundlage unserer gemeinsamen Werte.	35	2.2%
International cooperation	Isolationism / internationalism	3. SPD	Dabei ist Europa als Ganzes gefordert.	6	0.4%
International cooperation	Isolationism / internationalism	3. SPD	Europäische Lösungen. Keine nationalen Alleingänge.	5	0.3%
International cooperation	Isolationism / internationalism	3. SPD	Wir müssen die Herausforderungen der Flüchtlingsaufnahme europäisch bewältigen und den Staaten in Südeuropa, in die die meisten Schutzsuchenden einreisen, helfen. Diese Staaten haben Anspruch auf besondere Unterstützung zum Beispiel finanzielle und administrative Hilfen.	33	2.1%
International cooperation	Isolationism / internationalism	3. SPD	Nationale Alleingänge, wie von der CSU gefordert, sind gefährlich für unser Land und für Europa.	15	0.9%
International cooperation	Isolationism / internationalism	3. SPD	Abkommen mit sicheren Herkunftsländern sind hierbei ein wichtiger Schlüssel.	9	0.6%
International cooperation	Isolationism / internationalism	4. Linke	DIE LINKE streitet für ein soziales, demokratisches und friedliches Europa. Die Europäische Union ist das in vielen Bereichen nicht. Sie basiert auf Verträgen, die vor allem die Interessen der Unternehmen im Blick haben.	33	0.9%
International cooperation	Isolationism / internationalism	4. Linke	Wir streiten für eine Europäische Union, die aus dem Klammergriff der Finanzmärkte und der Kürzungspolitik befreit wird.	17	0.5%
International cooperation	Isolationism / internationalism	4. Linke	Wir kämpfen zusammen mit Allen, die einen Neustart der Europäischen Union wollen - demokratisch, sozial, ökologisch, friedlich.	16	0.5%
International cooperation	Isolationism / internationalism	4. Linke	Fluchtursachen sind vielfältig. Fast immer hängen sie mit der weltweiten Ungleichheit zwischen Arm und Reich zusammen. Diese Ungleichheit wächst durch Ausbeutung in unfairen Handelsbeziehungen, das Erstarken der großen Agrarkonzerne, rücksichtslos agierende transnationale Konzerne und den durch die Industrieländer in erster Linie zu verantwortenden Klimawandel.	45	1.3%
International cooperation	Isolationism / internationalism	4. Linke	DIE LINKE kämpft für eine solidarische gerechte Weltwirtschaftsordnung, gegen Krieg und Rüstungsexporte, gegen Landraub, für faire Produktionsverhältnisse, für Demokratie und Menschenrechte, weltweit	22	0.6%
International cooperation	Isolationism / internationalism	4. Linke	In den Ländern, in denen der Krieg gegen den Terror geführt wird, wie Afghanistan, Pakistan und Irak, hat er die Gesellschaften zerstört. Er hat die bekämpften Gruppen wie Taliban und Al Kaida kaum geschwächt, andere Gruppen wie den Islamischen Staat überhaupt erst stark gemacht. Deutschland ist eines der reichsten Länder der Welt und hat Macht und Einfluss auf diese Entwicklungen.	60	1.7%
International cooperation	Isolationism / internationalism	4. Linke	Wenn die Regierung von »deutscher Verantwortung in der Welt« spricht, sagen wir: Das muss eine Verantwortung für Abrüstung und friedliche Konfliktlösungen sein. Um Krieg und Gewalt zu beenden und allen Menschen ein gutes Leben zu ermöglichen, müssen globale friedliche und kooperative Lösungen gefunden werden. Das geht nur, wenn Konflikte friedlich gelöst werden, wenn konsequent abgerüstet und die Weltwirtschaftsordnung gerecht organisiert wird und mit internationaler Solidarität.	65	1.8%
International cooperation	Isolationism / internationalism	5. Gruenen	Wir wollen eine grüne Landwirtschaft, die sich an der Gesundheit der Menschen und dem Schutz unserer Umwelt ausrichtet. Sie muss Milliarden Menschen ernähren und die Lebensgrundlagen von morgen erhalten.	29	1.0%
International cooperation	Isolationism / internationalism	5. Gruenen	Globale Probleme gemeinschaftlich lösen - zivil, nachhaltig und gerecht. Das ist grüne Außenpolitik. Denn Kriege, Konflikte, Hungersnöte und Klimakrise wirken über Grenzen hinweg. Ihre Auswirkungen sind global und lassen sich nur kooperativ auf internationaler Ebene lösen, etwa im Rahmen der Europäischen Union und der Vereinten Nationen.	45	1.6%
International cooperation	Isolationism / internationalism	5. Gruenen	Deutschland muss mehr internationale Verantwortung für Frieden, Menschenrechte und globale Gerechtigkeit übernehmen	12	0.4%
International cooperation	Isolationism / internationalism	5. Gruenen	Klimakrise, Kriege, Hunger und Finanzkrisen zeigen: Unsere globale Wirtschaftsweise muss sich grundlegend ändern, damit alle Menschen faire Chancen erhalten.	19	0.7%
International cooperation	Isolationism / internationalism	5. Gruenen	Mit dem Pariser Klimaabkommen und den globalen Nachhaltigkeitszielen ist dafür der Rahmen gesetzt. Wir wollen diese Ziele engagiert umsetzen.	19	0.7%
International cooperation	Isolationism / internationalism	5. Gruenen	Für eine gute Zukunft brauchen wir die Europäische Union.	9	0.3%
International cooperation	Isolationism / internationalism	5. Gruenen	Wir wollen ein vereintes Europas, das zusammenhält und auch in schwierigen Zeiten den Weg der europäischen Integration weitergeht.	18	0.6%
International cooperation	Isolationism / internationalism	5. Gruenen	Nur zusammen können wir grenzüberschreitende Probleme lösen, allen voran die Klimakrise und den Terrorismus, aber auch Steuervermeidung und Arbeitslosigkeit.	19	0.7%
International cooperation	Isolationism / internationalism	5. Gruenen	Nur zusammen können wir Globalisierung gerecht machen, eine ökologisch moderne Wirtschaft schaffen und Frieden sichern	15	0.5%
International cooperation	Isolationism / internationalism	5. Gruenen	Deshalb wollen wir die Europäische Union sozialer, umweltbewusster und demokratischer machen.	11	0.4%
International cooperation	Isolationism / internationalism	5. Gruenen	Klimaschutz sichert Wohlstand und Beschäftigung und macht die Welt gerechter, denn die Ärmsten leiden am meisten unter den Folgen der Klimakrise	21	0.7%
International cooperation	Isolationism / internationalism	6. FDP	Durch Globalisierung und Digitalisierung sind Staaten heute vernetzter denn je. Dies eröffnet große Chancen für Frieden und Wohlstand.	18	0.4%
International cooperation	Isolationism / internationalism	6. FDP	Gleichzeitig gibt es mehr und mehr Herausforderungen, die nur durch globale Lösungen bewältigt werden können. Internationaler Terrorismus, Hunger und Armut, Bürgerkriege, Flüchtlings- und Migrationsbewegungen, die Ordnung der internationalen Finanzmärkte oder die Bekämpfung des Klimawandels sind nur einige Beispiele.	38	0.9%
International cooperation	Isolationism / internationalism	6. FDP	Für uns Freie Demokraten ist Deutschland Teil der westlichen Wertegemeinschaft. Daher treten wir ein für die Stärkung der Beziehungen zu unseren europäischen Partnern, den USA sowie allen Staaten, die sich zu Menschenrechten, Rechtsstaatlichkeit, Demokratie und Marktwirtschaft bekennen	37	0.9%
International cooperation	Isolationism / internationalism	6. FDP	Wir setzen auf eine gemeinsame Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik mit unseren Partnern im Rahmen internationaler Systeme und Gemeinschaften, wie die NATO, die Vereinten Nationen und die Europäische Union	27	0.6%
International cooperation	Isolationism / internationalism	6. FDP	Gleichzeitig werden aber über nationale Grenzen hinweg explosionsartig Daten produziert, gespeichert und verarbeitet. Unternehmen wollen dadurch zum Beispiel Informationen über das Verhalten ihrer Kunden gewinnen. Geheimdienste spähren massenhaft Bürger und Unternehmen aus. Der Staat stellt durch die anlasslose Vorratsdatenspeicherung jeden Einzelnen unter Generalverdacht. Die Folge: Die Bürger haben längst die Kontrolle darüber verloren, wer welche Daten von ihnen gespeichert hat.	60	1.4%
International cooperation	Isolationism / internationalism	6. FDP	Daher setzen wir auf zeitgemäße und internationale Datenschutzabkommen sowie die Sensibilisierung der Bürger für mehr Bewusstsein im Umgang mit ihren persönlichen Daten.	22	0.5%
International cooperation	Isolationism / internationalism	6. FDP	Der Euro bringt uns viele Erleichterungen. Für die Wirtschaft entfallen zum Beispiel Kosten des Währungsaustausches sowie Wechselkursrisiken. Urlauber können in vielen Ländern bequem damit bezahlen.	25	0.6%
International cooperation	Isolationism / internationalism	6. FDP	Für uns ist klar: Ein stabiler Euro ist Voraussetzung für Wachstum und Wohlstand in Europa.	15	0.4%
International cooperation	Isolationism / internationalism	6. FDP	Eine widerrechtliche Nutzung des Europäischen Stabilitätsmechanismus (ESM) sowie eine dauerhafte Transferunion zu Lasten der europäischen Steuerzahler lehnen wir ab.	19	0.4%

International cooperation	Isolationism / internationalism	6. FDP	Europa ist ein großartiges Projekt, das uns Frieden, Freiheit und Wohlstand bringt.	12	0.3%
International cooperation	Isolationism / internationalism	6. FDP	Ständige Krisengipfel, wie zum Beispiel zur Flüchtlingsfrage oder zur Eurostabilisierung, das Hin- und Herschieben von Verantwortung und unsinnige Verbote schmälern die Erfolge der europäischen Einigung in der Wahrnehmung vieler Menschen. Neue Ressentiments von rechts und links, Abschottung und nationale Alleingänge sind die Folge.	43	1.0%
International cooperation	Isolationism / internationalism	6. FDP	Wir Freie Demokraten wollen Europa wieder zu einem Kontinent der Chancen machen. Wir treten für mehr Europa und europäische Lösungen ein, wo es sinnvoll ist.	25	0.6%
International cooperation	Isolationism / internationalism	6. FDP	Daher wollen wir einen gemeinsamen Datenschutz, einen Energiebinnenmarkt, eine konsequente Haushaltsdisziplin und einen stabilen Euro, eine gemeinsame Flüchtlings- und Einwanderungspolitik sowie eine abgestimmte	24	0.6%
International cooperation	Isolationism / internationalism	6. FDP	Denn nur so kann Europa künftig ein Freiheitsprojekt sein.	9	0.2%
International cooperation	Isolationism / internationalism	6. FDP	Protektionistische Tendenzen dies- und jenseits des Atlantik setzen bereits ausgehandelte Verträge und Abkommen aufs Spiel	15	0.4%
International cooperation	Isolationism / internationalism	6. FDP	Dabei hat freier Handel die Welt zusammenrücken lassen. Mehr Chancen und Annehmlichkeiten für mehr Menschen sind die Folge	18	0.4%
International cooperation	Isolationism / internationalism	6. FDP	Abschottung und wirtschaftlicher Nationalismus gefährden jedoch nicht nur die internationalen Strukturen der wirtschaftlichen Freiheit. Denn: Enge wirtschaftliche Verbindungen zwischen Staaten fördern Frieden und Stabilität	25	0.6%
International cooperation	Isolationism / internationalism	6. FDP	Wir Freie Demokraten wollen die Chancen des Freihandels nutzen, ohne die hohen Standards hierzulande aufzugeben. Das geht, denn freier Handel sichert Fortschritt und Frieden weltweit	25	0.6%
International cooperation	Isolationism / internationalism	6. FDP	Handelshemmnisse sollen abgebaut, hohe Standards bei Menschenrechten, Arbeits-, Lebensmittel- und Umweltsicherheit beibehalten werden	13	0.3%
International cooperation	Isolationism / internationalism	6. FDP	Gleichzeitig ist Umwelt- und Klimaschutz eine Aufgabe, die nicht an Ländergrenzen endet	12	0.3%
International cooperation	Isolationism / internationalism	6. FDP	Wir Freie Demokraten wollen daher durch international abgestimmtes Handeln die Lebensgrundlagen der wachsenden Weltbevölkerung sichern	15	0.4%
International cooperation	Isolationism / internationalism	6. FDP	Daher ist für uns die weltweite Durchsetzung der Menschenrechte ein wichtiges außenpolitisches Ziel. Dazu zählt auch, die Ursachen von menschenunwürdigen Lebensumständen in weniger entwickelten Ländern zu bekämpfen, statt nur die Symptome zu behandeln	33	0.8%
International cooperation	Isolationism / internationalism	6. FDP	Kriegsflüchtlingen und Verfolgten humanitären Schutz zu gewähren, ist für uns eine zivilisatorische Verpflichtung, die jedoch von der internationalen Staatengemeinschaft gemeinsam wahrzunehmen ist.	22	0.5%

Text from the websites of German political parties coded as 'helping migrants'

Category	Code	Case	Text	Words	% Words
Helping migrants	Secondary aid	1. CDU	Für die CDU ist die Integration von Menschen mit ausländischen Wurzeln in unsere Gesellschaft eine politische Schlüsselaufgabe. Wir verstehen Integration als einen positiven, fortschreitenden Prozess, der von Einwanderern, Politik und der gesamten Gesellschaft gestaltet wird.	35	2.2%
Helping migrants	Secondary aid	1. CDU	Integration führt zu gleichberechtigter Teilhabe, zu wechselseitigem Verständnis und zugleich zur Identifikation mit unserem Land.	15	1.0%
Helping migrants	Primary aid	1. CDU	Nach christlichem Verständnis sind Mensch, Natur und Umwelt Schöpfung Gottes. Sie zu bewahren, ist unser Auftrag.	16	1.0%
Helping migrants	Primary aid	3. SPD	Für humanitäre Verantwortung, Respekt und Anstand Wir übernehmen Verantwortung für Menschen, die vor Krieg, Terror und Verfolgung fliehen.	18	1.1%
Helping migrants	Primary aid	3. SPD	Das gilt für die Aufnahme und Versorgung von Schutzsuchenden genauso wie für die Bekämpfung der Fluchtursachen.	16	1.0%
Helping migrants	Secondary aid	4. Linke	Die Bundesregierung hat keine Voraussetzungen für eine gute Integration geschaffen und betreibt stattdessen weiter eine Politik der Abschottung, des Generalverdachts und der Entrechtung gegenüber Einwanderern und Geflüchteten.	27	0.8%
Helping migrants	Secondary aid	4. Linke	Geflüchtete sollen das Recht auf soziale, kulturelle und demokratische Teilhabe in unserem Land haben.	14	0.4%
Helping migrants	Secondary aid	5. Gruenen	Eine grüne Integrationspolitik schafft Rechte und Chancen in der Gesellschaft	10	0.4%
Helping migrants	Secondary aid	5. Gruenen	Integration beginnt am Tag des Ankommens. Wer Teil dieser Gesellschaft werden soll, braucht Rechte und Zugänge. Wer Teil dieser Gesellschaft sein will, braucht Sprache und Motivation. Grüne Politik fördert Teilhabe, unterstützt die Ankommenden und die hier Lebenden	37	1.3%
Helping migrants	Secondary aid	5. Gruenen	Wir Grünen sind die Integrationspartei. Wir sorgen für ein gutes und friedliches Zusammenleben in einer vielfältigen Gesellschaft.	17	0.6%
Helping migrants	Secondary aid	5. Gruenen	Integration geht nur mit Grundgesetz das sind unsere Rechte und unsere Regeln. Wer hier glücklich werden will, muss unser Grundgesetz und seine Grundwerte anerkennen.	24	0.9%
Helping migrants	Primary aid	6. FDP	Wer vor Krieg flüchtet, soll unbürokratisch humanitären Schutz erhalten, nach Wegfall der Fluchtgründe aber wieder in die alte Heimat zurückkehren.	20	0.5%
Helping migrants	Primary aid	6. FDP	Verfolgte sollen Asyl bzw. Schutz gemäß der Genfer Flüchtlingskonvention beantragen können.	11	0.3%
Helping migrants	Secondary aid	6. FDP	Unabhängig davon soll jedem der dauerhafte Zugang zu unserem Arbeitsmarkt nach den Kriterien eines modernen Einwanderungsgesetzes offen stehen.	18	0.4%
Helping migrants	Primary aid	6. FDP	Wer als Kriegsflüchtling zu uns kommt, soll vorübergehend humanitären Schutz erhalten.	11	0.3%
Helping migrants	Secondary aid	6. FDP	Deutschland ist seit Jahren ein Einwanderungsland. Dies zeigt sich an den Millionen Menschen mit Migrationshintergrund, die hierzulande leben. Viele von ihnen sind hier geboren, sprechen die deutsche Sprache und bringen sich vielfältig in die Gesellschaft ein	36	0.9%
Helping migrants	Secondary aid	6. FDP	Daher wollen wir qualifizierten Fachkräften den Zugang zum deutschen Arbeitsmarkt erleichtern. Ob Arbeitsmigranten, Kriegsflüchtlinge oder Asylsuchende sie alle müssen das Grundgesetz als objektive Wertordnung unserer Gesellschaft anerkennen	27	0.6%
Helping migrants	Secondary aid	6. FDP	Weitere zentrale Voraussetzungen für eine erfolgreiche Integration sind für uns das Erlernen der deutschen Sprache und bessere Partizipationsmöglichkeiten.	18	0.4%
Helping migrants	Primary aid	6. FDP	Kriegsflüchtlingen und Verfolgten humanitären Schutz zu gewähren, ist für uns eine zivilisatorische Verpflichtung, die jedoch von der internationalen Staatengemeinschaft gemeinsam wahrzunehmen ist.	22	0.5%

Text from the websites of German political parties coded as 'irregular migration'

Category	Code	Case	Text	Words	% Words
Irregular migration	Causes of flight	3. SPD	Das gilt für die Aufnahme und Versorgung von Schutzsuchenden genauso wie für die Bekämpfung der Fluchtursachen.	16	1.0%
Irregular migration	Border protection	3. SPD	Der Schutz der gemeinsamen Außengrenzen ist wichtig, um Freizügigkeit und Freiheit in Europa zu erhalten. Die europäische Grenzschutzagentur Frontex muss eine leistungsfähige Grenzschutzpolizei werden	24	1.5%
Irregular migration	Irregular migrants	3. SPD	Zum Asylrecht gehört auch, dass Menschen ohne Bleiberecht wieder ausreisen müssen.	11	0.7%
Irregular migration	Border protection	4. Linke	Die Bundesregierung hat keine Voraussetzungen für eine gute Integration geschaffen und betreibt stattdessen weiter eine Politik der Abschottung, des Generalverdachts und der Entrechtung gegenüber Einwanderern und Geflüchteten.	27	0.8%
Irregular migration	Causes of flight	4. Linke	DIE LINKE will die Ursachen von Flucht und Vertreibung bekämpfen, anstatt Flüchtende zu bekämpfen und deren Fluchtwege zu blockieren. Im Zentrum steht: das Recht, »nicht migrieren zu müssen«	28	0.8%
Irregular migration	Border protection	4. Linke	DIE LINKE will die Ursachen von Flucht und Vertreibung bekämpfen, anstatt Flüchtende zu bekämpfen und deren Fluchtwege zu blockieren. Im Zentrum steht: das Recht, »nicht migrieren zu müssen«	28	0.8%
Irregular migration	Border protection	5. Gruenen	Allen Abschottungstendenzen treten wir entschieden entgegen.	6	0.2%
Irregular migration	Causes of flight	5. Gruenen	Dazu wollen wir Armut und soziale Ungleichheit abbauen, faire Handelsabkommen schließen und Fluchtursachen mindern.	14	0.5%
Irregular migration	Irregular migrants	6. FDP	Wer vor Krieg flüchtet, soll unbürokratisch humanitären Schutz erhalten, nach Wegfall der Fluchtgründe aber wieder in die alte Heimat zurückkehren.	20	0.5%
Irregular migration	Irregular migrants	6. FDP	Wir Freie Demokraten sehen in geregelter Einwanderung eine große Chance für Deutschland. Der unregelmäßige Zustrom von Menschen muss jedoch begrenzt werden	21	0.5%
Irregular migration	Causes of flight	6. FDP	Daher ist für uns die weltweite Durchsetzung der Menschenrechte ein wichtiges außenpolitisches Ziel. Dazu zählt auch, die Ursachen von menschenunwürdigen Lebensumständen in weniger entwickelten Ländern zu bekämpfen, statt nur die Symptome zu behandeln	33	0.8%

Text from the websites of German political parties coded as 'resettling migrants'

Category	Code	Case	Text	Words	% Words
Resettling migrants	(Dis)advantages migration	1. CDU	unsere Gesellschaft wird vielfältiger. Es ist Aufgabe der Politik, vor allem die Chancen aufzuzeigen, die dieser Wandel mit	20	1.3%
Resettling migrants	(Dis)advantages migration	1. CDU	Der Bevölkerungswandel bietet eine große Chance für unser Land, Vorreiter bei neuen gesellschaftlichen und	25	1.6%
Resettling migrants	(Dis)advantages migration	1. CDU	Wir verstehen Integration als einen positiven, fortschreitenden Prozess, der von Einwanderern, Politik und der gesamten	28	1.8%
Resettling migrants	Distribution	2. CSU	Unsere Maxime heißt: Fairness durch Befähigung, nicht durch Umverteilung!	9	1.0%
Resettling migrants	(Dis)advantages migration	3. SPD	Wenn wir morgen noch in Wohlstand leben und über gute Renten verfügen wollen, brauchen wir auch gut ausgebildete	32	2.0%
Resettling migrants	(Dis)advantages migration	5. Gruenen	Eine grüne Integrationspolitik schafft Rechte und Chancen in der Gesellschaft	10	0.4%
Resettling migrants	(Dis)advantages migration	5. Gruenen	Deutschland ist ein Einwanderungsland. Und ein Einwanderungsland braucht ein Einwanderungsgesetz. Es soll die	24	0.9%
Resettling migrants	(Dis)advantages migration	5. Gruenen	Die alternde Gesellschaft und der Fachkräftemangel zeigen: Deutschland ist langfristig auf Einwanderung angewiesen	13	0.5%
Resettling migrants	(Dis)advantages migration	5. Gruenen	Menschen ergänzen und bereichern sich in ihrer Verschiedenheit.	8	0.3%
Resettling migrants	(Dis)advantages migration	5. Gruenen	Es geht nicht um bloße Vielfalt und reines Nebeneinander. Es geht um Einheit und Gemeinsamkeit in Vielfalt.	17	0.6%
Resettling migrants	(Dis)advantages migration	6. FDP	Deutschland ist ein Einwanderungsland schon seit Jahren.	7	0.2%
Resettling migrants	(Dis)advantages migration	6. FDP	Flüchtlinge suchen Schutz vor Krieg und Verfolgung. Ungeachtet der Gründe muss es für alle, die nach Deutschland	36	0.9%
Resettling migrants	(Dis)advantages migration	6. FDP	Wir sind überzeugt, dass in einer gesteuerten Einwanderung große Chancen für unser Land liegen. Denn angesichts des	42	1.0%
Resettling migrants	(Dis)advantages migration	6. FDP	Deutschland ist seit Jahren ein Einwanderungsland. Dies zeigt sich an den Millionen Menschen mit Migrationshintergrund,	36	0.9%
Resettling migrants	Number of migrants	6. FDP	Die ungeordnete Aufnahme hunderttausender Flüchtlinge stellt Politik und Gesellschaft jedoch vor neue Herausforderungen	13	0.3%
Resettling migrants	(Dis)advantages migration	6. FDP	Wir Freie Demokraten sehen in geregelter Einwanderung eine große Chance für Deutschland. Der unregelmäßige Zustrom von	21	0.5%
Resettling migrants	(Dis)advantages migration	6. FDP	Für uns kommt es nicht darauf an, woher jemand kommt, sondern was er erreichen will. Daher wollen wir qualifizierten	26	0.6%
Resettling migrants	Distribution	6. FDP	Kriegsflüchtlingen und Verfolgten humanitären Schutz zu gewähren, ist für uns eine zivilisatorische Verpflichtung, die	22	0.5%

Text from the websites of German political parties coded as 'values'

Category	Code	Case	Text	Words	% Words
Values	Peace	1. CDU	Wir können als Partner nur gestaltend zum Schutz unserer Bürger Einfluss nehmen, wenn wir einen Beitrag zum Frieden und zur Sicherheit in der Welt leisten.	25	1.6%
Values	Security	1. CDU	Wir können als Partner nur gestaltend zum Schutz unserer Bürger Einfluss nehmen, wenn wir einen Beitrag zum Frieden und zur Sicherheit in der Welt leisten.	25	1.6%
Values	Freedom	1. CDU	Hierbei lassen wir uns leiten von universellen Werten wie Freiheit und Menschenwürde und der Herrschaft des Rechts.	17	1.1%
Values	Humanity	1. CDU	Hierbei lassen wir uns leiten von universellen Werten wie Freiheit und Menschenwürde und der Herrschaft des Rechts.	17	1.1%
Values	Human rights	1. CDU	Menschenrechte sind Ausdruck der unantastbaren Würde des Menschen – universell, unteilbar und unveräußerlich. Auf dieser Grundüberzeugung basiert unser politisches Handeln in Deutschland und in der Welt. Menschenrechte durchdringen alle Bereiche der Politik. Ihre Einhaltung ist ethisches Fundament für die demokratische, wirtschaftliche und kulturelle Entwicklung eines jeden Landes.	46	2.9%
Values	Peace	1. CDU	Vor allem sichert uns die Einheit Europas seit mehr als sechs Jahrzehnten Freiheit und Sicherheit, Frieden und Wohlstand. Wir wollen diese Einheit stärken und die EU handlungsfähiger machen.	28	1.8%
Values	Freedom	1. CDU	Vor allem sichert uns die Einheit Europas seit mehr als sechs Jahrzehnten Freiheit und Sicherheit, Frieden und Wohlstand. Wir wollen diese Einheit stärken und die EU handlungsfähiger machen.	28	1.8%
Values	Security	1. CDU	Vor allem sichert uns die Einheit Europas seit mehr als sechs Jahrzehnten Freiheit und Sicherheit, Frieden und Wohlstand. Wir wollen diese Einheit stärken und die EU handlungsfähiger machen.	28	1.8%
Values	Humanity	1. CDU	Hier werden Werte gelebt, die sich aus dem christlichen Verständnis vom Menschen ergeben – seiner unveräußerlichen Würde und seiner Mitmenschlichkeit. Wir setzen auf familienfreundliche Rahmenbedingungen und starke Familien in Deutschland. Eltern mit Kindern wollen wir weiter entlasten.	36	2.3%
Values	Solidarity	1. CDU	Wir stehen ebenso für ein solidarisches Gesundheitswesen, in dem Hilfe für Kranke und Ältere sowie Eigenverantwortung zwei Seiten ein und derselben Medaille sind.	23	1.5%
Values	Freedom	1. CDU	Wir wollen, dass sie frei und sicher leben können – ob zu Hause, in Straßen und auf Plätzen, in Bussen und Bahnen, bei Tag und Nacht. Sicherheit ist eine Voraussetzung für Freiheit, für ein friedliches Zusammenleben und das Vertrauen in unseren Staat.	41	2.6%
Values	Security	1. CDU	Wir wollen, dass sie frei und sicher leben können – ob zu Hause, in Straßen und auf Plätzen, in Bussen und Bahnen, bei Tag und Nacht. Sicherheit ist eine Voraussetzung für Freiheit, für ein friedliches Zusammenleben und das Vertrauen in unseren Staat.	41	2.6%
Values	Freedom	1. CDU	Wer unsere Grundwerte wie Freiheit, Demokratie und die Achtung der Menschenwürde bekämpft, dem treten wir mit aller Härte und Entschiedenheit entgegen.	21	1.3%
Values	Humanity	1. CDU	Wer unsere Grundwerte wie Freiheit, Demokratie und die Achtung der Menschenwürde bekämpft, dem treten wir mit aller Härte und Entschiedenheit entgegen.	21	1.3%
Values	Humanity	1. CDU	Dafür wollen wir die Rahmenbedingungen schaffen. Wir achten jeden Menschen als einmalige und unverfügbare Person in allen Lebensphasen.	18	1.2%
Values	Solidarity	2. CSU	Der Einzelne kann sich darauf verlassen, dass ihm geholfen wird, wenn er sich selbst nicht helfen kann.	17	1.9%
Values	Security	2. CSU	Mit innerer Sicherheit: durch konsequenten Schutz vor Gewalt und Kriminalität. Damit die Menschen in Bayern gut und sicher leben können.	20	2.3%
Values	Solidarity	2. CSU	Dass bei uns keiner am Wegesrand zurückbleibt. Dass wir zusammenstehen und zusammenhalten, gerade wenn es darauf ankommt.	17	1.9%
Values	Solidarity	2. CSU	Die gelebte Solidarität in Bayern ist der Kitt unserer Gesellschaft. Das zu pflegen und zu fördern ist für uns als christlich-soziale Partei eine besondere Verpflichtung.	26	3.0%
Values	Freedom	2. CSU	Bayern heißt nicht umsonst „der Freistaat“. Freiheit hat für uns in Bayern schon immer einen besonderen Stellenwert. Und so machen wir auch heute Politik.	24	2.7%
Values	Solidarity	3. SPD	Starke Familien gehören für uns zu einem solidarischen Land.	9	0.6%
Values	Solidarity	3. SPD	Gutes Wohnen gehört zu einem solidarischen Land.	7	0.4%
Values	Solidarity	3. SPD	Eine gute medizinische Versorgung mit allem, was nötig ist, muss es für alle gleichermaßen geben. Das gehört zu einem solidarischen Land.	21	1.3%
Values	Humanity	3. SPD	wir entlasten die Angehörigen. Mehr Menschlichkeit, weniger Druck.	8	0.5%
Values	Solidarity	3. SPD	Wir lassen die nicht allein, die sich um andere kümmern. Das gehört zu einem solidarischen Land.	16	1.0%
Values	Humanity	3. SPD	Menschlichkeit, Vernunft und eine gesamteuropäische Lösung. Das sind die Grundsätze der SPD für eine europäische Migrations- und Flüchtlingspolitik.	18	1.1%
Values	Humanity	3. SPD	Für humanitäre Verantwortung, Respekt und Anstand. Wir übernehmen Verantwortung für Menschen, die vor Krieg, Terror und Verfolgung fliehen.	18	1.1%
Values	Human rights	3. SPD	Dabei muss es klare Verabredungen über die Aufnahme von Geflüchteten geben – in Übereinstimmung mit den Menschenrechten.	16	1.0%
Values	Solidarity	3. SPD	Die SPD steht für klare und menschliche Regeln bei der Migration. Wir handeln entschlossen gegen rechte Stimmungsmache und Hetze gegen Menschen. Das gehört zu einem solidarischen Land.	27	1.7%
Values	Peace	4. Linke	DIE LINKE streitet für ein soziales, demokratisches und friedliches Europa. Die Europäische Union ist das in vielen Bereichen nicht. Sie basiert auf Verträgen, die vor allem die Interessen der Unternehmen im Blick haben.	33	0.9%
Values	Solidarity	4. Linke	Für ein Europa, in dem die Menschen und die Bevölkerungen nicht gegeneinander gestellt und die natürlichen Lebensgrundlagen nicht zerstört werden – für ein Europa der solidarischen Nachbarn.	26	0.7%
Values	Peace	4. Linke	Wir kämpfen zusammen mit Allen, die einen Neustart der Europäischen Union wollen – demokratisch, sozial, ökologisch, friedlich.	16	0.5%
Values	Human rights	4. Linke	Die Bundesregierung hat keine Voraussetzungen für eine gute Integration geschaffen und betreibt stattdessen weiter eine Politik der Abschottung, des Generalverdachts und der Entrechtung gegenüber Einwanderern und Geflüchteten.	27	0.8%
Values	Peace	4. Linke	DIE LINKE kämpft für eine solidarische gerechte Weltwirtschaftsordnung, gegen Krieg und Rüstungsexporte, gegen Landraub, für faire Produktionsverhältnisse, für Demokratie und Menschenrechte, weltweit.	22	0.6%
Values	Solidarity	4. Linke	DIE LINKE kämpft für eine solidarische gerechte Weltwirtschaftsordnung, gegen Krieg und Rüstungsexporte, gegen Landraub, für faire Produktionsverhältnisse, für Demokratie und Menschenrechte, weltweit.	22	0.6%
Values	Human rights	4. Linke	DIE LINKE kämpft für eine solidarische gerechte Weltwirtschaftsordnung, gegen Krieg und Rüstungsexporte, gegen Landraub, für faire Produktionsverhältnisse, für Demokratie und Menschenrechte, weltweit. Geflüchtete sollen das Recht auf soziale, kulturelle und demokratische Teilhabe in unserem Land haben.	36	1.0%
Values	Peace	4. Linke	DIE LINKE ist die Partei des Friedens. Wir kämpfen für konsequente Abrüstung und wollen den Export von Waffen und Rüstungsgütern verbieten.	21	0.6%

Values	Peace	4. Linke	Wenn die Regierung von »deutscher Verantwortung in der Welt« spricht, sagen wir: Das muss eine Verantwortung für Abrüstung und friedliche Konfliktlösungen sein. Um Krieg und Gewalt zu beenden und allen Menschen ein gutes Leben zu ermöglichen, müssen globale friedliche und kooperative Lösungen gefunden werden. Das geht nur, wenn Konflikte friedlich gelöst werden, wenn konsequent abgerüstet und die Weltwirtschaftsordnung gerecht organisiert wird und mit internationaler Solidarität.	65	1.8%
Values	Solidarity	4. Linke	Das geht nur, wenn Konflikte friedlich gelöst werden, wenn konsequent abgerüstet und die Weltwirtschaftsordnung gerecht organisiert wird und mit internationaler Solidarität.	21	0.6%
Values	Solidarity	4. Linke	Wir wollen ein solidarisches, gerechtes und barrierefreies Gesundheitssystem, in dem die Versorgung der Patientinnen und Patienten im Mittelpunkt steht	19	0.5%
Values	Equality	4. Linke	Gleichberechtigung für alle Lebensweisen!	4	0.1%
Values	Equality	4. Linke	DIE LINKE setzt sich für die Gleichberechtigung aller Lebensweisen ein	10	0.3%
Values	Human rights	5. Gruenen	Flüchtlinge brauchen Schutz. Wir Grüne bekennen uns zum Grundrecht auf Asyl und zu einer Flüchtlingspolitik, die auf Menschenrechten gründet	19	0.7%
Values	Humanity	5. Gruenen	Eine grüne Integrationspolitik schafft Rechte und Chancen in der Gesellschaft. Für uns gilt: Jeder Einzelfall zählt. Der einzelne Mensch ist und bleibt für uns das Maß aller Dinge.	28	1.0%
Values	Equality	5. Gruenen	Eine grüne Integrationspolitik schafft Rechte und Chancen in der Gesellschaft. Für uns gilt: Jeder Einzelfall zählt. Der einzelne Mensch ist und bleibt für uns das Maß aller Dinge.	28	1.0%
Values	Human rights	5. Gruenen	Deutschland muss mehr internationale Verantwortung für Frieden, Menschenrechte und globale Gerechtigkeit übernehmen	12	0.4%
Values	Peace	5. Gruenen	Deutschland muss mehr internationale Verantwortung für Frieden, Menschenrechte und globale Gerechtigkeit übernehmen	12	0.4%
Values	Equality	5. Gruenen	Eine inklusive Gesellschaft ist für uns deshalb ein wichtiges Ziel	10	0.4%
Values	Equality	5. Gruenen	Klimakrise, Kriege, Hunger und Finanzkrisen zeigen: Unsere globale Wirtschaftsweise muss sich grundlegend ändern, damit alle Menschen faire Chancen erhalten.	19	0.7%
Values	Human rights	5. Gruenen	Wir treten für eine menschenrechtliche Sorgfaltspflicht von Unternehmen ein.	9	0.3%
Values	Peace	5. Gruenen	Nur zusammen können wir Globalisierung gerecht machen, eine ökologisch moderne Wirtschaft schaffen und Frieden sichern. Deshalb wollen wir die Europäische Union sozialer, umweltbewusster und demokratischer machen.	26	0.9%
Values	Security	5. Gruenen	Deutschland soll für alle Menschen, die hier leben, ein sicheres Land bleiben. Dazu brauchen wir eine wirksame Sicherheitspolitik, die real vor Kriminalität und Terror schützt und den Bürgerrechten verpflichtet ist	30	1.1%
Values	Human rights	5. Gruenen	Deutschland soll für alle Menschen, die hier leben, ein sicheres Land bleiben. Dazu brauchen wir eine wirksame Sicherheitspolitik, die real vor Kriminalität und Terror schützt und den Bürgerrechten verpflichtet ist	30	1.1%
Values	Peace	5. Gruenen	Wir Grünen sind die Integrationspartei. Wir sorgen für ein gutes und friedliches Zusammenleben in einer vielfältigen Gesellschaft	17	0.6%
Values	Equality	5. Gruenen	Klimaschutz sichert Wohlstand und Beschäftigung und macht die Welt gerechter, denn die Ärmsten leiden am meisten unter den Folgen der Klimakrise. Wir wollen die Wirtschaft ökologisch modernisieren, denn Nichthandeln wird teurer als mutiges Vorgehen	34	1.2%
Values	Equality	5. Gruenen	Denn die Frage, wie ein Lebensweg verläuft, darf nicht der geografische Zufall entscheiden.	13	0.5%
Values	Security	5. Gruenen	Jede Form von Gewalt muss mit allen rechtsstaatlichen Mitteln bekämpft werden	11	0.4%
Values	Solidarity	5. Gruenen	Wir Grüne wollen eine Alterssicherung, die für alle Menschen funktioniert und in der alle solidarisch füreinander eintreten	17	0.6%
Values	Human rights	5. Gruenen	Grüne Rechtspolitik steht für den konsequenten Schutz von Grund- und Menschenrechten, für das Grundgesetz.	14	0.5%
Values	Equality	5. Gruenen	Und wir arbeiten dafür, dass alle den gleichen Zugang zum Recht haben.	12	0.4%
Values	Human rights	6. FDP	Verfolgte sollen Asyl bzw. Schutz gemäß der Genfer Flüchtlingskonvention beantragen können.	11	0.3%
Values	Peace	6. FDP	Durch Globalisierung und Digitalisierung sind Staaten heute vernetzter denn je. Dies eröffnet große Chancen für Frieden und Wohlstand.	18	0.4%
Values	Human rights	6. FDP	Für uns Freie Demokraten ist Deutschland Teil der westlichen Wertegemeinschaft. Daher treten wir ein für die Stärkung der Beziehungen zu unseren europäischen Partnern, den USA sowie allen Staaten, die sich zu Menschenrechten, Rechtsstaatlichkeit, Demokratie und Marktwirtschaft bekennen	37	0.9%
Values	Freedom	6. FDP	Bürgerliche Freiheitsrechte sind eine wichtige Errungenschaft. Denn sie schützen den Einzelnen und seine Entscheidungen gegenüber dem Staat und schaffen so Raum für Freiheit und Selbstbestimmung	25	0.6%
Values	Human rights	6. FDP	Bürgerliche Freiheitsrechte sind eine wichtige Errungenschaft. Denn sie schützen den Einzelnen und seine Entscheidungen gegenüber dem Staat und schaffen so Raum für Freiheit und Selbstbestimmung	25	0.6%
Values	Security	6. FDP	Bürgerliche Freiheitsrechte sind eine wichtige Errungenschaft. Denn sie schützen den Einzelnen und seine Entscheidungen gegenüber dem Staat und schaffen so Raum für Freiheit und Selbstbestimmung	25	0.6%
Values	Security	6. FDP	Wir Freie Demokraten treten für die Achtung unserer Verfassung und der darin festgelegten Bürgerrechte ein. Dabei ist stets eine vernünftige Balance zwischen Freiheit und Sicherheit zu wahren	27	0.6%
Values	Freedom	6. FDP	Wir Freie Demokraten treten für die Achtung unserer Verfassung und der darin festgelegten Bürgerrechte ein. Dabei ist stets eine vernünftige Balance zwischen Freiheit und Sicherheit zu wahren	27	0.6%
Values	Human rights	6. FDP	Wir Freie Demokraten treten für die Achtung unserer Verfassung und der darin festgelegten Bürgerrechte ein. Dabei ist stets eine vernünftige Balance zwischen Freiheit und Sicherheit zu wahren	27	0.6%
Values	Equality	6. FDP	Glasfasertechnologie und ein diskriminierungsfreier Internetzugang durch Netzneutralität	7	0.2%
Values	Equality	6. FDP	Jeder soll die Chance haben voranzukommen, egal woher er kommt	10	0.2%
Values	Peace	6. FDP	Wir Freie Demokraten wollen die Chancen des Freihandels nutzen, ohne die hohen Standards hierzulande aufzugeben. Das geht, denn freier Handel sichert Fortschritt und Frieden weltweit	25	0.6%
Values	Human rights	6. FDP	Handelshemmnisse sollen abgebaut, hohe Standards bei Menschenrechten, Arbeits-, Lebensmittel- und Umweltsicherheit beibehalten werden	13	0.3%
Values	Equality	6. FDP	Wenn wir also Chancengerechtigkeit für jedes Kind wollen, sollten wir bei der frühkindlichen Bildung anfangen.	15	0.4%
Values	Equality	6. FDP	jeder Mensch soll seinen Lebensentwurf verwirklichen können. Auch sind für uns alle Lebensgemeinschaften gleich wertvoll.	15	0.4%
Values	Security	6. FDP	Polizei und Justiz müssen Haushaltspriorität erhalten und von nebensächlichen Aufgaben entlastet werden.	12	0.3%
Values	Equality	6. FDP	Für uns kommt es nicht darauf an, woher jemand kommt, sondern was er erreichen will. Daher wollen wir qualifizierten Fachkräften den Zugang zum deutschen Arbeitsmarkt erleichtern. Ob Arbeitsmigranten, Kriegsflüchtlinge oder Asylsuchende – sie alle müssen das Grundgesetz als objektive Wertordnung unserer Gesellschaft anerkennen	42	1.0%
Values	Humanity	6. FDP	Menschenwürde, Leben, Privatsphäre, Meinungsfreiheit – zu diesen und weiteren Rechten haben sich Staaten durch die Allgemeine Erklärung der Menschenrechte der Vereinten Nationen bekannt	22	0.5%
Values	Human rights	6. FDP	Menschenwürde, Leben, Privatsphäre, Meinungsfreiheit – zu diesen und weiteren Rechten haben sich Staaten durch die Allgemeine Erklärung der Menschenrechte der Vereinten Nationen bekannt	22	0.5%
Values	Freedom	6. FDP	Menschenwürde, Leben, Privatsphäre, Meinungsfreiheit – zu diesen und weiteren Rechten haben sich Staaten durch die Allgemeine Erklärung der Menschenrechte der Vereinten Nationen bekannt	22	0.5%

Values	Human rights	6. FDP	Kriege, Terrorismus, Folter, Menschenhandel, Diskriminierung aufgrund von Religionszugehörigkeit oder sexueller Orientierung, Zensur der Medien oder geheimdienstliche Überwachung machen den Schutz der Menschenrechte heute so aktuell wie damals.	27	0.6%
Values	Freedom	6. FDP	Für uns Freie Demokraten sichern die universellen Menschenrechte die individuelle Freiheit und damit ein Leben in Selbstbestimmung und Würde. Daher ist für uns die weltweite Durchsetzung der Menschenrechte ein wichtiges	32	0.8%
Values	Human rights	6. FDP	Für uns Freie Demokraten sichern die universellen Menschenrechte die individuelle Freiheit und damit ein Leben in Selbstbestimmung und Würde. Daher ist für uns die weltweite Durchsetzung der Menschenrechte ein wichtiges	32	0.8%
Values	Human rights	6. FDP	Daher ist für uns die weltweite Durchsetzung der Menschenrechte ein wichtiges außenpolitisches Ziel. Dazu zählt auch, die Ursachen von menschenunwürdigen Lebensumständen in weniger entwickelten Ländern zu bekämpfen, statt nur die Symptome zu behandeln	33	0.8%

8.3. Codes of the Twitter feeds of German political parties

This section is devoted to the codes of the standpoints of German political parties on their Twitter page. These codes are used to determine what the standpoints of German parties were during the EU-Turkey refugee agreement negotiations. Each of the coding tables contains one of the main coding categories, for which the following sources were used:

Bündnis 90/Die Grünen (2017j). *Flüchtlinge OR Migration OR Asyl from: Die_Gruenen*. URL:

https://twitter.com/search?l=&q=Fl%C3%BChtlinge%20OR%20Migration%20OR%20Asyl%20from%3ADie_gruenen%20since%3A2015-01-01%20until%3A2017-09-18&src=typd (18-03-2019).

Bündnis 90/Die Grünen (2017k). *EU OR Europäische OR Türkei from: Die_Gruenen*. URL:

https://twitter.com/search?l=&q=EU%20OR%20Europ%C3%A4ische%20OR%20T%C3%BCrkei%20from%3ADie_Gruenen%20since%3A2015-01-01%20until%3A2017-09-18&src=typd&lang=nl (18-03-2019).

CDU (2017a). *Flüchtlinge OR Migration OR Asyl from: CDU*. URL:

<https://twitter.com/search?l=&q=Fl%C3%BChtlinge%20OR%20Migration%20OR%20Asyl%20from%3ACDU%20since%3A2015-01-01%20until%3A2017-09-18&src=typd&lang=nl> (14-03-2019).

CDU (2017b). *EU OR Europäische OR Türkei from: CDU*. URL:

<https://twitter.com/search?l=&q=EU%20OR%20Europ%C3%A4ische%20OR%20T%C3%BCrkei%20from%3ACDU%20since%3A2015-01-01%20until%3A2017-09-18&src=typd&lang=nl> (14-03-2019).

CSU (2017b). *Flüchtlinge OR Migration OR Asyl from: CSU*. URL:

<https://twitter.com/search?l=&q=Fl%C3%BChtlinge%20OR%20Migration%20OR%20Asyl%20from%3ACSU%20since%3A2015-01-01%20until%3A2017-09-18&src=typd&lang=nl> (14-03-2019).

CSU (2017d). *EU OR Europäische OR Türkei from: CSU*. URL:

<https://twitter.com/search?l=&q=EU%20OR%20Europ%C3%A4ische%20OR%20T%C3%BCrkei%20from%3ACSU%20since%3A2015-01-01%20until%3A2017-09-18&src=typd&lang=nl> (14-03-2019).

Die Linke (2017c). *Flüchtlinge OR Migration OR Asyl from: DieLinke*. URL:

<https://twitter.com/search?l=&q=Fl%C3%BChtlinge%20OR%20Migration%20OR%20Asyl%20from%3ADieLinke%20since%3A2015-01-01%20until%3A2017-09-18&src=typd&lang=nl> (18-03-2019).

Die Linke (2017d). *EU OR Europäische OR Türkei from: DieLinke*. URL:

<https://twitter.com/search?l=&q=EU%20OR%20Europ%C3%A4ische%20OR%20T%C3%BCrkei%20from%3ADieLinke%20since%3A2015-01-01%20until%3A2017-09-18&src=typd&lang=nl> (18-03-2019).

FDP (2017b). *Flüchtlinge OR Migration OR Asyl from: FDP*. URL:

<https://twitter.com/search?l=&q=Fl%C3%BCchtlinge%20OR%20Migration%20OR%20Asyl%20from%3AFDP%09%20since%3A2015-01-01%20until%3A2017-09-18&src=typd&lang=nl> (18-03-2019).

FDP (2017j). *EU OR Europäische OR Türkei from: FDP*. URL:

<https://twitter.com/search?l=&q=EU%20OR%20Europ%C3%A4ische%20OR%20T%C3%BCrkei%20from%3AFDP%20since%3A2015-01-01%20until%3A2017-09-18&src=typd&lang=nl> (18-03-2019).

SPD (2017c). *Flüchtlinge OR Migration OR Asyl from: SPDDE*. URL:

<https://twitter.com/search?l=&q=Fl%C3%BCchtlinge%20OR%20Migration%20OR%20Asyl%20from%3ASPDDE%20since%3A2015-01-01%20until%3A2017-09-18&src=typd&lang=nl> (18-03-2019).

SPD (2017d). *EU OR Europäische OR Türkei from: SPDDE*. URL:

<https://twitter.com/search?l=&q=EU%20OR%20Europ%C3%A4ische%20OR%20T%C3%BCrkei%20from%3ASPDDE%20since%3A2015-01-01%20until%3A2017-09-18&src=typd&lang=nl> (18-03-2019).

Text from the Twitter feeds of German political parties coded as 'international cooperation'

Category	Code	Case	Text	Words	% Words
International cooperation	Isolationism / internationalism	01. CDU Refugees	Es ging um Zusammenhalt, Umwelt, Digitalisierung, Europa, Migration, Sicherheit.	9	1.0%
International cooperation	Isolationism / internationalism	01. CDU Refugees	Gemeinsame Lösung für Europa	4	0.5%
International cooperation	Isolationism / internationalism	01. CDU Refugees	Mit #dkongresse als Union gemeinsam großen Veränderungen - Globalisierung, Digitalisierung & Migration - gute Richtung geben	13	1.5%
International cooperation	Isolationism / internationalism	02. CDU EU	#70JahreCDU = 70 Jahre erfolgreiche Leistungen für unser Land. Z.B. die Gründung der #EU am 1. November 1993	18	1.9%
International cooperation	Isolationism / internationalism	02. CDU EU	Schlüssel zur Lösung der Flüchtlingsfrage: europäische Außengrenzen sichern.	8	0.8%
International cooperation	Isolationism / internationalism	02. CDU EU	#Merkel: Ich bin sehr optimistisch, dass uns eine europäische Lösung gelingt	11	1.2%
International cooperation	Isolationism / internationalism	02. CDU EU	Ergebnisse des EU-Gipfels: Europäische Lösung steht!	7	0.7%
International cooperation	Isolationism / internationalism	02. CDU EU	Die EU ist stark genug, um die richtigen Antworten auf den heutigen Tag zu geben	15	1.6%
International cooperation	Isolationism / internationalism	02. CDU EU	"Der heutige Tag ist ein Einschnitt für Europa, er ist ein Einschnitt für den europäischen Einigungsprozess. Die Europäische Union ist stark genug, um die richtigen Antworten auf den heutigen Tag zu geben.	32	3.4%
International cooperation	Isolationism / internationalism	02. CDU EU	Si eist eine einzigartige Solidar- und Wertegemeinschaft. Gemeinsam werden wir unsere Werte wie Freiheit, Demokratie und Rechtsstaatlichkeit im globalen Wettbewerb weiter behaupten können."	23	2.4%
International cooperation	Isolationism / internationalism	02. CDU EU	Man kann kein guter Patriot sein, wenn man nicht für die Europäische Einigung ist!	14	1.5%
International cooperation	Isolationism / internationalism	02. CDU EU	Wir wollen #CETA auf den Weg bringen.	7	0.7%
International cooperation	Isolationism / internationalism	02. CDU EU	Danke, Europäische Union! Das #Smartphone wie zu Hause nutzen. #EU #Roaming abgeschafft!	12	1.3%
International cooperation	Isolationism / internationalism	02. CDU EU	Die größte Sicherheit und das größte Friedensprojekt für uns ist die Europäische Union.	13	1.4%
International cooperation	Isolationism / internationalism	02. CDU EU	Wir stehen hinter der #Bundeswehr, und wir stehen zu unserer Verantwortung im Rahmen von UN, #Nato und EU.	18	1.9%
International cooperation	Isolationism / internationalism	02. CDU EU	Schulz kritisiert europäische Flüchtlingspolitik. Fakt ist: Merkel arbeitet aktiv an gemeinsamen Lösungen	12	1.3%
International cooperation	Isolationism / internationalism	02. CDU EU	Europa muss Abkommen nach dem Vorbild des EU-Türkei-Abkommens auch mit anderen Ländern schließen.	15	1.6%
International cooperation	Isolationism / internationalism	03. CSU Refugees	Joachim Herrmann will an Grenzkontrollen festhalten, solange die EU-Außengrenzen nicht anständig geschützt werden.	14	0.8%
International cooperation	Isolationism / internationalism	03. CSU Refugees	"Es muss auch das Interesse der SPD sein, die eigene Grenze und das eigene Staatsgebiet zu schützen."	17	1.0%
International cooperation	Isolationism / internationalism	03. CSU Refugees	Bundesverkehrsminister Alexander Dobrindt: Dt. Binnengrenzen kontrollieren, falls illegale Migration an EU-Außengrenzen nicht gestoppt wird.	15	0.9%
International cooperation	Isolationism / internationalism	03. CSU Refugees	Das Jahr 2015 darf sich nicht wiederholen und das muss sich in der Programmatik der Union niederschlagen.	17	1.0%
International cooperation	Isolationism / internationalism	04. CSU EU	für Abschaffung der Auslandsgebühren für Handys.	6	0.4%
International cooperation	Isolationism / internationalism	04. CSU EU	"Ich plädiere dafür die Roaminggebühren langfristig auslaufen zu lassen."	9	0.6%
International cooperation	Isolationism / internationalism	04. CSU EU	#Bayern für ein #EU-weites Verbot von Klonprodukten in Lebensmitteln: Kein Copy und Paste in der Tierzucht!	17	1.1%
International cooperation	Isolationism / internationalism	04. CSU EU	Andi Scheuer fordert einen EU-Afrika-Gipfel, um gemeinsam mit den Machthabern in Nordafrika Lösungen zu finden.	16	1.1%
International cooperation	Isolationism / internationalism	04. CSU EU	Wenn wir in der Welt von morgen eine Stimme haben wollen, brauchen wir eine europäische Stimme.	16	1.1%
International cooperation	Isolationism / internationalism	04. CSU EU	"Allein diese internationalen Maßnahmen werden voraussichtlich nicht reichen & deshalb müssen wir in Deutschland handeln."	14	0.9%
International cooperation	Isolationism / internationalism	04. CSU EU	Egal wie das Referendum ausgeht: "Wir in Europa" brauchen eine Grundsatzdebatte, wie es mit der EU weitergehen soll.	18	1.2%
International cooperation	Isolationism / internationalism	04. CSU EU	"Wir brauchen eine EU, die sich um die großen Fragen unserer Zeit kümmert und sich nicht in kleinteiligen Fragen	20	1.3%
International cooperation	Isolationism / internationalism	05. SPD Refugees	"Es muss eine gemeinsame europ. Asylpolitik, mit einer sinnvollen Verteilung der Flüchtlinge auf ganz Europa, geben."	16	1.6%
International cooperation	Isolationism / internationalism	05. SPD Refugees	"Wir stehen zu einer europäischen Lösung"	6	0.6%
International cooperation	Isolationism / internationalism	05. SPD Refugees	"Geflüchtete und Migration" heute auf @XING_de: "Es kommt mehr denn je auf Europa an"	15	1.5%
International cooperation	Isolationism / internationalism	06. SPD EU	Europa und die Europäische Union sind ein Glücksfall für Frieden und Wohlstand.	12	1.2%
International cooperation	Isolationism / internationalism	06. SPD EU	"#Europa braucht einen neuen Aufbruch"	5	0.5%
International cooperation	Isolationism / internationalism	06. SPD EU	"Wir brauchen nicht weniger, sondern mehr europäische Lösungen"	8	0.8%
International cooperation	Isolationism / internationalism	06. SPD EU	"Das Hochziehen nationaler Grenzen innerhalb Europas führt uns in eine Sackgasse." Brauchen europäische Lösung.	14	1.4%
International cooperation	Isolationism / internationalism	06. SPD EU	"Wir bleiben bei unserer Überzeugung: nationale Grenzen lösen Probleme nicht, wir brauchen eine europäische Lösung."	15	1.5%
International cooperation	Isolationism / internationalism	06. SPD EU	60 % unserer Exporte gehen in EU. Sind nicht der Lastesel, sondern der Gewinner der EU.	15	1.5%
International cooperation	Isolationism / internationalism	06. SPD EU	Vor 60 Jahren wurde in Rom das Fundament gelegt, auf dem die EU gebaut ist. Aus Feinden wurden Freunde und Partner. Happy Birthday!	23	2.3%
International cooperation	Isolationism / internationalism	06. SPD EU	Europa ist ein Wunder. Lasst es uns nicht aufgeben. Lasst uns dafür kämpfen! Happy Birthday, European Union!	17	1.7%
International cooperation	Isolationism / internationalism	06. SPD EU	Dürfen uns auf der Erfolgsgeschichte der EU nicht ausruhen	9	0.9%
International cooperation	Isolationism / internationalism	06. SPD EU	Die EU muss zu einer Globalen Friedensmacht werden.	8	0.8%
International cooperation	Isolationism / internationalism	06. SPD EU	"Ich wünsche mir einen Bundeskanzler, der die europäische Idee verinnerlicht hat."	11	1.1%
International cooperation	Isolationism / internationalism	06. SPD EU	Europa wächst enger zusammen. Endlich Schluss mit #Roaming-Gebühren in der EU.	12	1.2%
International cooperation	Isolationism / internationalism	06. SPD EU	Brauchen keine Aufrüstungs-Spirale à la Trump. Brauchen gemeinsame europäische Linie in der Außenpolitik.	14	1.4%
International cooperation	Isolationism / internationalism	06. SPD EU	Wir müssen die EU zusammenhalten! Wir dürfen sie nicht Leuten überlassen, die sie von innen zerstören wollen!	17	1.7%
International cooperation	Isolationism / internationalism	06. SPD EU	Für das Selfie mit @MartinSchulz muss sie sich nicht schämen. Für ihre anti-europäische Gesinnung schon!	16	1.6%
International cooperation	Isolationism / internationalism	08. Linke EU	Die Botschaft der Mehrheit in #Griechenland ist ein Ja für eine alternative europäische Politik	14	0.9%
International cooperation	Isolationism / internationalism	08. Linke EU	Austeritätspolitik hat EU-Skepsis und Nationalismus befördert. Die EU muss sozial + demokratisch werden.	13	0.9%
International cooperation	Isolationism / internationalism	08. Linke EU	Das Handelsabkommen #CETA zw EU & Kanada ist ein Trojanisches Pferd, um #TTIP durchzusetzen.	13	0.9%
International cooperation	Isolationism / internationalism	08. Linke EU	Die Proteste gegen TTIP und CETA gehen weiter!	8	0.5%
International cooperation	Isolationism / internationalism	08. Linke EU	Wir müssen die EU scharf kritisieren und neu denken - für einen sozialen + demokratischen Neustart in Europa.	16	1.1%
International cooperation	Isolationism / internationalism	08. Linke EU	"Die fehlende Solidarität und der Rückzug in den Gedanken des Nationalstaates führt zu Euroskepsismus"	14	0.9%
International cooperation	Isolationism / internationalism	08. Linke EU	Als glühende Europäerin finde ich 2 Dinge unerträglich: aufkeimenden Nationalismus und den aktuellen Kurs der EU.	16	1.1%
International cooperation	Isolationism / internationalism	08. Linke EU	Die Europäische Idee verliert Unterstützung großer Teile der Bevölkerungen, obwohl sie diese gerade dringend benötigt.	15	1.0%
International cooperation	Isolationism / internationalism	08. Linke EU	Die EU ist kein Friedensprojekt, das ist ein Wunsch aber leider nicht Realität.	13	0.9%
International cooperation	Isolationism / internationalism	08. Linke EU	Wir verteidigen die offenen Grenzen - von Mauern haben wir genug! Die EU nicht den Nationalisten überlassen!	16	1.1%
International cooperation	Isolationism / internationalism	08. Linke EU	Wir müssen weg von der nationalen Abschottung und Europäische Lösungen für die Menschen durchsetzen.	14	0.9%
International cooperation	Isolationism / internationalism	08. Linke EU	Wir stehen nicht als Partner für eine anti-europäische Politik zur Verfügung!	12	0.8%
International cooperation	Isolationism / internationalism	08. Linke EU	Es hätte der Bundesregierung gut getan, die Menschenrechtsverletzungen in der #Türkei beim #G20-Gipfel zum Thema zu machen.	18	1.2%
International cooperation	Isolationism / internationalism	08. Linke EU	EU kann nur gerettet werden, wenn soziale Sicherheit und ökologische Nachhaltigkeit Hauptziele sind.	13	0.9%
International cooperation	Isolationism / internationalism	10. Greens EU	"Der Schaden eines Griechenland-Austritts aus der EU wäre irreparabel"	10	1.1%
International cooperation	Isolationism / internationalism	10. Greens EU	"Die Zukunft liegt in Europa, nicht im Nationalismus. Müssen jetzt vor allem die sozialen Probleme in der EU angehen"	19	2.0%
International cooperation	Isolationism / internationalism	10. Greens EU	It's Your Europe! Für ein Europa der Bürgerinnen und Bürger.	10	1.1%

International cooperation	Isolationism / internationalism	10. Greens EU	eine gemeinsame europäische Partei schaffen	5	0.5%
International cooperation	Isolationism / internationalism	10. Greens EU	Neue #Allensbach-Umfrage: 78 Prozent der Befragten in Deutschland möchten in der #EU bleiben. #Yourope	15	1.6%
International cooperation	Isolationism / internationalism	10. Greens EU	"Die EU ist der beste Kriegsvermeidungsmechanismus, der jemals erfunden wurde."	10	1.1%
International cooperation	Isolationism / internationalism	10. Greens EU	Unfassbar: Frauke #Petry fordert das Ende der EU und vergleicht sie mit der Herrschaft von Nazideutschland über Europa.	18	1.9%
International cooperation	Isolationism / internationalism	10. Greens EU	„Nationalismus heisst Krieg“	3	0.3%
International cooperation	Isolationism / internationalism	10. Greens EU	60 Jahre Europäische Verträge. Das heißt: 60 Jahre Frieden, Zusammenhalt und Demokratie. Wir sagen: Happy Birthday	16	1.7%
International cooperation	Isolationism / internationalism	10. Greens EU	JA zu Europa Mut zu Veränderung	6	0.6%
International cooperation	Isolationism / internationalism	10. Greens EU	Die #EU hat das Aus für #Roaming-Gebühren beschlossen. Ab Juni auch auf #Reisen ohne Zusatzkosten mobil telefonieren & surfen! Danke Europa!	21	2.2%
International cooperation	Isolationism / internationalism	10. Greens EU	#Frankreich wählt den Europäer #Macron statt der rechten Nationalistin LePen. Ein guter Abend für Frankreich. Und die EU.	18	1.9%
International cooperation	Isolationism / internationalism	10. Greens EU	Europa gewinnt! Glückwunsch dem neuen Präsidenten Frankreichs	7	0.7%
International cooperation	Isolationism / internationalism	10. Greens EU	Danke, Europa! Ab heute keine #Roaming-Gebühren mehr in der EU.	11	1.2%
International cooperation	Isolationism / internationalism	11. FDP Refugees	Sollte #Merkel beim EU-Gipfel keine europäische #Asyl-Lösung erreichen, muss DE dringend zu #Dublin-III zurückkehren	17	2.1%
International cooperation	Isolationism / internationalism	12. FDP EU	Eine europäische Armee ist nicht nur sinnvoll, sondern auch notwendig	10	0.7%
International cooperation	Isolationism / internationalism	12. FDP EU	Basis für Zusammenleben sind europäische Werte, dürfen nicht gebrochen werden	10	0.7%
International cooperation	Isolationism / internationalism	12. FDP EU	In der #Flüchtlingskrise müssen europäische Werte statt nationaler Egoismen im Vordergrund stehen	12	0.8%
International cooperation	Isolationism / internationalism	12. FDP EU	Ergebnisloses #EU Innenminister-Treffen ist ein klarer Misserfolg	8	0.6%
International cooperation	Isolationism / internationalism	12. FDP EU	Die EU muss für die Flüchtlinge an einem Strang ziehen	10	0.7%
International cooperation	Isolationism / internationalism	12. FDP EU	EU-Regierungschefs beraten über die #Flüchtlingskrise. @Lambsdorff ruft sie auf, die EU handlungsfähig zu machen	15	1.1%
International cooperation	Isolationism / internationalism	12. FDP EU	"Wir wollen die europäische Einbindung, die humanitäre Verantwortung und rationales Handeln."	11	0.8%
International cooperation	Isolationism / internationalism	12. FDP EU	Nach #Brexit ist die Debatte über die Zukunft Europas eröffnet. Die EU braucht einen #Neustart. Wir wollen #NEUropa.	18	1.3%
International cooperation	Isolationism / internationalism	12. FDP EU	Die #ALDE fordert mehr Wertschätzung für das europäische Projekt. Teilen und mitmachen!	12	0.8%
International cooperation	Isolationism / internationalism	12. FDP EU	The EU flag was adopted #OnThisDay in 1955. We dare to say we're Europeans: standing for our values against rising nationalism	22	1.5%
International cooperation	Isolationism / internationalism	12. FDP EU	Mit #CETA senden Kanada und die EU ein wichtiges Signal für fairen Handel und offene Märkte	16	1.1%
International cooperation	Isolationism / internationalism	12. FDP EU	Klare Entscheidung für #CETA im EU-Parlament. Wir freuen uns auf Wachstum und Wohlstand in Europa. Abschottung ist der falsche Weg.	21	1.5%
International cooperation	Isolationism / internationalism	12. FDP EU	Apropos CETA... Wir waren schon dafür, als es noch uncool war.	11	0.8%
International cooperation	Isolationism / internationalism	12. FDP EU	Wir müssen mutige Schritte wagen, damit die EU gestärkt aus den Krisen hervorgeht	13	0.9%
International cooperation	Isolationism / internationalism	12. FDP EU	Große Herausforderung: Bewahrung der #EU-Erregenschaften der liberalen Demokratie westlicher Prägung	11	0.8%
International cooperation	Isolationism / internationalism	12. FDP EU	Wir wollen eine Politik, die weltoffen, proeuropäisch, marktwirtschaftlich und rechtsstaatlich ist.	11	0.8%
International cooperation	Isolationism / internationalism	12. FDP EU	pierremoscovici will mehr Geld von D für die EU = eine #Vergemeinschaftung von Schulden. Wir lehnen das strikt ab!	18	1.3%
International cooperation	Isolationism / internationalism	12. FDP EU	Keine gemeinsamen Schulden.	3	0.2%
International cooperation	Isolationism / internationalism	12. FDP EU	Der schon in DE nicht funktionierende Länderfinanzausgleich darf nicht auf die EU übertragen werden.	14	1.0%

Text from the Twitter feeds of German political parties coded as 'EU-Turkey cooperation'

Category	Code	Case	Text	Words	% Words
EU-Turkey cooperation	Cooperation	01. CDU Refugees	Merkel in Stuttgarter Ztg: Gemeinsam mit der Türkei wollen wir die illegale Migration möglichst stark verringern.	16	1.9%
EU-Turkey cooperation	Cooperation	02. CDU EU	"Wir sind uns einig: Es ist ein Erfolg, dass beim nächsten Gipfel alle 28 EU-Mitgliedstaaten mit der Türkei reden werden.	21	2.2%
EU-Turkey cooperation	Cooperation	02. CDU EU	Sind mit der Türkei in wichtigen Punkten einen Schritt weitergekommen	10	1.1%
EU-Turkey cooperation	Cooperation	02. CDU EU	Unsere Werte sind die Grundlage für Beziehungen zur Türkei	9	1.0%
EU-Turkey cooperation	Turkey	02. CDU EU	Vorwürfe gegen Deutsche in der Türkei "rechtsstaatlich hoch problematisch"	9	1.0%
EU-Turkey cooperation	Turkey	02. CDU EU	#Merkel fordert in #BPK Freilassung der zu Unrecht inhaftierten Deutschen in der #Türkei, rechtsstaatliche Prinzipien	16	1.7%
EU-Turkey cooperation	Cooperation	02. CDU EU	Ich würde sehr gerne bessere Beziehungen zu der #Türkei haben, aber wir müssen natürlich die Realität beachten.	17	1.8%
EU-Turkey cooperation	Turkey	02. CDU EU	Ich möchte vor allem den 14 Menschen helfen, die in der Türkei im Gefängnis sitzen.	15	1.6%
EU-Turkey cooperation	Turkey	02. CDU EU	Die Türkei entfernt sich in atemberaubendem Tempo von allen demokratischen Gepflogenheiten.	11	1.2%
EU-Turkey cooperation	Cooperation	02. CDU EU	Statt über die mangelnde Solidarität anderer Staaten zu lamentieren, hat Merkel ein bis heute wirksames Abkommen mit der Türkei geschlossen und den Zustrom von dort gestoppt.	26	2.7%
EU-Turkey cooperation	Turkey	02. CDU EU	Die unberechtigt inhaftierten Deutschen wie @Besser_Deniz müssen frei kommen, fordert #Merkel im #Bundestag.	14	1.5%
EU-Turkey cooperation	Cooperation	02. CDU EU	Europa muss Abkommen nach dem Vorbild des EU-Türkei-Abkommens auch mit anderen Ländern schließen.	15	1.6%
EU-Turkey cooperation	Cooperation	04. CSU EU	Eine #Obergrenze ist auch bei einer Einigung mit der #Türkei notwendig.	11	0.7%
EU-Turkey cooperation	Turkey	04. CSU EU	Position gegenüber #Türkei ist klar: Schluss mit Menschenrechtsverletzungen und Eingriffen in Presse- und	14	0.9%
EU-Turkey cooperation	Cooperation	04. CSU EU	Vorstand einstimmig für harten Kurs bei Türkei-Verhandlungen!	8	0.5%
EU-Turkey cooperation	Cooperation	04. CSU EU	Harter Kurs: #CSU hat für Verhandlungen zwischen #EU und #Türkei in dieser Woche klare Forderungen formuliert.	16	1.1%
EU-Turkey cooperation	Cooperation	04. CSU EU	Keine leichtfertigen Zugeständnisse bei #Türkei-Verhandlungen. Wir bleiben auf Kurs!	10	0.7%
EU-Turkey cooperation	Turkey	04. CSU EU	#Erdogan lässt den deutschen Botschafter in der #Türkei wegen eines Satirevideos einbestellen.	12	0.8%
EU-Turkey cooperation	Turkey	04. CSU EU	Erdogans Angriff auf die Pressefreiheit ist ein Anschlag auf unser Grundgesetz!	11	0.7%
EU-Turkey cooperation	Cooperation	04. CSU EU	Der Deal mit der Türkei ist hochproblematisch. Wir importieren damit die Probleme der Türkei nach Deutschland.	16	1.1%
EU-Turkey cooperation	Turkey	04. CSU EU	„Was gerade in der Türkei passiert, ist nicht gerade vertrauensbildend und mit dem europäischen Demokratieverständnis nicht vereinbar.“	17	1.1%
EU-Turkey cooperation	Cooperation	04. CSU EU	fordert die #EU auf, ihr Verhältnis zur #Türkei grundlegend zu überdenken.	11	0.7%
EU-Turkey cooperation	Cooperation	04. CSU EU	„Türkische Innenpolitik hat auf deutschem Boden nichts verloren. Wer sich da einmischen möchte, soll das in der Türkei	19	1.3%
EU-Turkey cooperation	Cooperation	04. CSU EU	#Seehofer? spricht #Klartext zur #Türkei. Man kann sich nicht erpressen lassen als Bundesrepublik Deutschland und als EU auch nicht.	19	1.3%
EU-Turkey cooperation	Turkey	04. CSU EU	Hier bei den Vorgängen in der Türkei einfach wegzuschauen oder die Vorgänge sogar noch zu beschönigen, das halte ich für unverantwortlich!	21	1.4%
EU-Turkey cooperation	Cooperation	04. CSU EU	Türkische Wahlkampfveranstaltungen in #Deutschland? Nicht mit uns: #Erdogan soll zuhause Wahlkampf machen!	12	0.8%
EU-Turkey cooperation	Cooperation	04. CSU EU	Wir wollen keine türkische Innenpolitik auf deutschem Boden!	8	0.5%
EU-Turkey cooperation	Turkey	06. SPD EU	Wir verurteilen die Aufhebung der Immunität von mehr als 1/4 der türkischen Abgeordneten in aller Schärfe!	17	1.7%
EU-Turkey cooperation	Turkey	06. SPD EU	„Dieses Gesetz dient nur Erdogans Machterhalt.“ Katarina Barley	8	0.8%
EU-Turkey cooperation	Turkey	06. SPD EU	Gesetz dient nicht Strafverfolgung od Terrorbekämpfung, sondern Machterhalt.	8	0.8%
EU-Turkey cooperation	Turkey	06. SPD EU	„Es ist nur zu hoffen, dass Präsident Erdogan mit seinem Vorhaben, die Immunität Zahlreicher türkischer Abgeordneter aufzuheben, im türkischen Parlament scheitert.“	21	2.1%
EU-Turkey cooperation	Turkey	06. SPD EU	Menschenrechtslage in der #Türkei ist nicht erst seit gestern Thema. Muss im Einklang mit den Werten der EU sein.	19	1.9%
EU-Turkey cooperation	Turkey	06. SPD EU	es reicht! Schluss mit der Aushöhlung der Demokratie in der Türkei.	11	1.1%
EU-Turkey cooperation	Turkey	06. SPD EU	Wir verurteilen die jüngsten Verhaftungen in d. #Türkei auf das Schärfste. Unsere Solidarität gehört denen, die sich f. Demokratie einsetzen	20	2.0%
EU-Turkey cooperation	Turkey	06. SPD EU	So nicht, Herr Erdogan!	4	0.4%
EU-Turkey cooperation	Turkey	06. SPD EU	Wir verurteilen die Untersuchungshaft für den Journalisten Deniz #Yücel in der #Türkei und fordern seine sofortige Freilassung!	17	1.7%
EU-Turkey cooperation	Turkey	06. SPD EU	Deniz Yücel muss freigelassen werden!	5	0.5%
EU-Turkey cooperation	Turkey	06. SPD EU	Erdogan ist nicht die Türkei!	5	0.5%
EU-Turkey cooperation	Turkey	06. SPD EU	möge Preis auch stellv. für Cumhuriyet & inhaftierte Journalisten in der Türkei & der Welt entgegennehmen.	14	1.4%
EU-Turkey cooperation	Turkey	06. SPD EU	„Unzählige Journalisten sitzen in der Türkei im Gefängnis. Herr Erdogan: Lassen sie diese Menschen frei!“	15	1.5%
EU-Turkey cooperation	Turkey	06. SPD EU	Die Türkei eskaliert und provoziert in einer Art und Weise, die nicht mehr akzeptabel ist!	15	1.5%
EU-Turkey cooperation	Turkey	06. SPD EU	„Die türkische Regierung hat rote Linien überschritten. Das konnte nicht ohne Antwort bleiben.“	13	1.3%
EU-Turkey cooperation	Cooperation	06. SPD EU	„Von Schulz geforderter Abbruch der Beitrittsverhandlungen, heißt nicht Abbruch des Dialogs mit der Türkei.“	14	1.4%
EU-Turkey cooperation	Turkey	06. SPD EU	Wir wünschen Deniz #Yücel zum Geburtstag: seine sofortige Freilassung und die aller unschuldig in der Türkei inhaftierten.	17	1.7%
EU-Turkey cooperation	Turkey	06. SPD EU	„Es ist ein Skandal, dass Deniz Yücel immer noch in Haft ist.“	12	1.2%
EU-Turkey cooperation	Turkey	08. Linke EU	Solidarität mit Kurden, denen die Türkei im eigenen Land den Krieg erklärt hat.	13	0.9%
EU-Turkey cooperation	Turkey	08. Linke EU	Die #Türkei führt einen schmutzigen Krieg gegen die #Kurden und zündelt gefährlich in #Syrien!	14	0.9%
EU-Turkey cooperation	Turkey	08. Linke EU	Unser #Demokratie-Verständnis ist irgendwie anders....	6	0.4%
EU-Turkey cooperation	Turkey	08. Linke EU	„Wir machen niemals Kompromisse in Sachen Demokratie“ (Erdogan, 20.7.2016) Seit dem 16. Juli 2016: Über 6.000 Militärangehörige, Richter und Staatsanwälte festgenommen Etwa 59.000 Lehrer, Ministeriumsmitarbeiter, Richter und Staatsanwälte entlassen bzw. suspendiert 25 Radio- und Fernsehstationen die Sendelizenzen entzogen 21 gesperrte Websites Ausreiseverbot für Wissenschaftler Ausrufung des Ausnahmezustandes	51	3.4%
EU-Turkey cooperation	Turkey	08. Linke EU	Wenn man die europäischen Werte ernst nimmt, darf man Entwicklung in der #Türkei nicht durchgehen lassen.	16	1.1%
EU-Turkey cooperation	Turkey	08. Linke EU	Wir schweigen nicht. Wir sind solidarisch mit den festgenommenen Abgeordneten der #HDP.	12	0.8%
EU-Turkey cooperation	Turkey	08. Linke EU	Solidarität mit den Abgeordneten der HDP! Wir schweigen nicht!	9	0.6%
EU-Turkey cooperation	Cooperation	08. Linke EU	„Es ist wichtig, dass der Druck der Europäischen Union auf #Erdogan zunimmt. Er ist für die #Türkei u. #Europa eine Gefahr.“	21	1.4%
EU-Turkey cooperation	Turkey	08. Linke EU	#Erdogan macht #Türkei zur Diktatur. Bundesregierung muss Haltung zeigen und sich auf Seite der Demokratie stellen	16	1.1%
EU-Turkey cooperation	Cooperation	08. Linke EU	#Bundeswehr aus #Incirlik abziehen, Waffenlieferungen in die Türkei beenden.	9	0.6%
EU-Turkey cooperation	Turkey	08. Linke EU	Es hätte der Bundesregierung gut getan, die Menschenrechtsverletzungen in der #Türkei beim #G20-Gipfel zum Thema zu machen.	18	1.2%

EU-Turkey cooperation	Turkey	08. Linke EU	Der #csdberlin ist auch politisch: @schatzbln und @klausleederer zeigen Solidarität mit #LGBTIQ in der Türkei	15	1.0%
EU-Turkey cooperation	Cooperation	08. Linke EU	Wir wäre es, die militärische Zusammenarbeit mit der Türkei zu beenden?	11	0.7%
EU-Turkey cooperation	Cooperation	08. Linke EU	Wie wäre es damit Frau #Merkel, jede militärische Zusammenarbeit mit der #Türkei zu beenden?	14	0.9%
EU-Turkey cooperation	Turkey	08. Linke EU	Merkel+Schulz: Mit der Türkei geht es so nicht weiter. Die Linke: Wenn Ihr Euch so einig seid warum tut Ihr nichts?	22	1.4%
EU-Turkey cooperation	Cooperation	08. Linke EU	Statt Abkommen mit #Türkei rechtfertigen: Es ist an der Zeit, militärische Zusammenarbeit mit #Erdogan zu beenden, Frau #Merkel.	18	1.2%
EU-Turkey cooperation	Cooperation	08. Linke EU	Es ist absurd, dass Deutschland an Saudi-Arabien oder die #Türkei Waffen liefert.	13	0.9%
EU-Turkey cooperation	Cooperation	08. Linke EU	"Es gibt weiter Waffenlieferungen, Hermes und Geheimdienst-Zusammenarbeit. #Merkel macht nichts."	11	0.7%
EU-Turkey cooperation	Cooperation	08. Linke EU	Wie wäre es, die Rüstungsexporte in die #Türkei zu stoppen? Das wäre ein klares Zeichen an #Erdogan	17	1.1%
EU-Turkey cooperation	Cooperation	08. Linke EU	"Schluss mit den #Waffenexporten an #Saudi-Arabien, an die #Türkei. Das muss endlich aufhören!"	14	0.9%
EU-Turkey cooperation	Turkey	09. Greens Refugees	Georg Restle: "Die #Türkei ist kein sicherer Herkunftsstaat. Es darf keinen BIP-Vorbehalt beim Grundrecht auf Asyl	18	2.0%
EU-Turkey cooperation	Turkey	10. Greens EU	Morgen reisen @cem_ozdemir & @RebHarms in die #Türkei, um sich für ein Ende d Gewalt & die Wiederaufnahme d. Friedensprozesses einzusetzen.	20	2.1%
EU-Turkey cooperation	Turkey	10. Greens EU	Die Lehre aus dem #Putschversuch muss sein: Mehr Demokratie, nicht: Mehr autoritäre Herrschaft!	13	1.4%
EU-Turkey cooperation	Turkey	10. Greens EU	Militärputsch gescheitert. Demokratie weiter in Gefahr.	6	0.6%
EU-Turkey cooperation	Turkey	10. Greens EU	Die #Türkei muss wieder auf den Weg zu #Demokratie & Menschenrechten zurückfinden!	11	1.2%
EU-Turkey cooperation	Turkey	10. Greens EU	Wir dürfen die demokratische Zivilgesellschaft in der #Türkei nicht alleine lassen!	11	1.2%
EU-Turkey cooperation	Turkey	10. Greens EU	Erst den Staatsapparat gesäubert. Dann die Presse und sozialen Medien ausgeschaltet. Jetzt verhaftet er die Opposition. Präsident Erdogan führt die Türkei in die Diktatur.	24	2.5%
EU-Turkey cooperation	Cooperation	10. Greens EU	Dialog ist wichtig, aber das darf nicht kritiklose Kooperation bedeuten, die unsere Werte ignoriert.	14	1.5%
EU-Turkey cooperation	Cooperation	10. Greens EU	"Ich erwarte, dass die Bundeskanzlerin unsere Werte verteidigt und nicht an der Palastpforte in Ankara abgibt."	16	1.7%
EU-Turkey cooperation	Cooperation	10. Greens EU	"Alle deutschen Rüstungsexporte in die Türkei müssen jetzt umgehend gestoppt werden"	11	1.2%
EU-Turkey cooperation	Turkey	10. Greens EU	mit leidenschaftlichem Statement: Wir lassen Opposition in der #Türkei nicht im Stich!	12	1.3%
EU-Turkey cooperation	Cooperation	10. Greens EU	"Finde es wichtig, dass die Werte dieses Landes mitreisen, wenn ein Außenminister z.B. in die Türkei reist."	18	1.9%
EU-Turkey cooperation	Cooperation	11. FDP Refugees	EU und Türkei müssen für #Flüchtlinge pragmatisch zusammenarbeiten	8	1.0%
EU-Turkey cooperation	Turkey	12. FDP EU	Kritische Journalisten in der #Türkei werden immer wieder bedroht. @Lambsdorff übt scharfe Kritik am #Erdogan-Regime	16	1.1%
EU-Turkey cooperation	Cooperation	12. FDP EU	#Merkel hat die #Türkei besucht - und Erdogan einige Zusagen gemacht. @Lambsdorff warnte vor falschen Versprechungen	15	1.1%
EU-Turkey cooperation	Turkey	12. FDP EU	Kurz vor EU-Gipfel mit #Türkei: Zwei türkische Journalisten inhaftiert. Festnahme wirkt wie ein Hohn	15	1.1%
EU-Turkey cooperation	Cooperation	12. FDP EU	Ergebnisse des EU-Türkei-Gipfels sehen @c_lindner & @Lambsdorff kritisch. EU darf ihre Werte nicht über Bord werfen	18	1.3%
EU-Turkey cooperation	Cooperation	12. FDP EU	Merkel hätte anders entscheiden müssen, um gegenüber der Türkei unser Verständnis von #Meinungsfreiheit + #Rechtsstaatlichkeit zu vertreten!	16	1.1%
EU-Turkey cooperation	Turkey	12. FDP EU	#Erdogan will Europäische #Menschenrechtskonvention teilweise aussetzen. @Lambsdorff sagt: Notbremse ziehen	10	0.7%
EU-Turkey cooperation	Turkey	12. FDP EU	#Erdogan beerdigt die Demokratie.	4	0.3%
EU-Turkey cooperation	Turkey	12. FDP EU	Mit dem Referendum steht die #Türkei vor dem Schritt in ein autokratisches Regierungssystem	13	0.9%
EU-Turkey cooperation	Cooperation	12. FDP EU	Es sei eine Frage der Selbstachtung, Amtsträgern aus der #Türkei bis auf Weiteres keine Einreiseerlaubnis zu erteilen	17	1.2%
EU-Turkey cooperation	Cooperation	12. FDP EU	Keine Einreiseerlaubnis für Amtsträger aus der Türkei.	7	0.5%
EU-Turkey cooperation	Turkey	12. FDP EU	Die Türkei hat sich von westlichen Werten verabschiedet. Wir fordern endlich klare Kante von der Bundesregierung!	16	1.1%
EU-Turkey cooperation	Cooperation	12. FDP EU	Das Verhalten der #Türkei ist eine schwere Störung der Zusammenarbeit in der #NATO	13	0.9%
EU-Turkey cooperation	Cooperation	12. FDP EU	Sofortiger Abzug unserer Truppen aus Incirlik!	6	0.4%
EU-Turkey cooperation	Cooperation	12. FDP EU	Die Bundesregierung muss die unhaltbare Situation in #Incirlik beenden, unsere Soldaten & Tornados abziehen.	13	0.9%
EU-Turkey cooperation	Cooperation	12. FDP EU	Truppen aus Incirlik abziehen.	4	0.3%
EU-Turkey cooperation	Cooperation	12. FDP EU	Niemand wünscht sich das Ausscheiden der #Türkei aus der #NATO. Verhalten der türki. Führung sei nicht hinnehmbar	17	1.2%
EU-Turkey cooperation	Cooperation	12. FDP EU	Wer nicht an die Werte und die Regeln hält, kann der NATO nicht weiter angehören.	15	1.1%
EU-Turkey cooperation	Cooperation	12. FDP EU	Die #Bundesregierung ist in der Pflicht, einen Auftritt von @RT_Erdogan zu verhindern	13	0.9%
EU-Turkey cooperation	Cooperation	12. FDP EU	Kein öffentlicher Auftritt von Erdogan in Deutschland.	7	0.5%
EU-Turkey cooperation	Cooperation	12. FDP EU	#EU muss die Beitrittsverhandlungen mit der #Tuerkei einfrieren, aber nicht den Dialog, so @Lambsdorff.	14	1.0%
EU-Turkey cooperation	Cooperation	12. FDP EU	Menschenrechte, Meinungs- und Presse-Freiheit sowie Rechtsstaatlichkeit sind für uns nicht verhandelbar.	12	0.8%
EU-Turkey cooperation	Turkey	12. FDP EU	#Erdogan will die #Türkei per Dekret regieren. @Lambsdorff verurteilt diese Pläne als Angriff auf die Demokratie	16	1.1%

Text from the Twitter feeds of German political parties coded as 'Turkish accession'

Category	Code	Case	Text	Words	% Words
Turkish accession	Accession	02. CDU EU	Türkei kann nicht Mitglied der Europäischen Union sein	8	0.8%
Turkish accession	Accession	02. CDU EU	Aleine Debatte um Todesstrafe zeigt, wie weit sich die Türkei von Europa entfernt hat.	14	1.5%
Turkish accession	Visa liberalisation	02. CDU EU	sieht unter den gegenwärtigen Bedingungen keine Visafreiheit für die Türkei	10	1.1%
Turkish accession	Accession	02. CDU EU	Kandidat Schulz ist der Mann, der die Türkei in die EU holen will: Wir nicht.	15	1.6%
Turkish accession	Accession	02. CDU EU	Die Beitrittsverhandlungen sind zur Zeit nicht existent	7	0.7%
Turkish accession	Accession	02. CDU EU	Sehe den Beitritt der Türkei nicht, habe ihn zur EU noch nie gesehen, als die Sozialdemokraten da noch eine andere Haltung hatten	22	2.3%
Turkish accession	Accession	02. CDU EU	redet über die Türkei. Gerade die SPD hat aber seit Jahren für einen EU-Beitritt des Erdogan-Landes geworben.	19	2.0%
Turkish accession	Accession	02. CDU EU	Über Jahre hinweg hat sie für einen EU-Beitritt Ankara geworben. (...) Schröder, Steinmeier, Gabriel und Schulz sahen die Türkei als Mitglied der EU.	23	2.4%
Turkish accession	Accession	04. CSU EU	„Wir wollen nicht wegen der Flüchtlingskrise eine Vollmitgliedschaft der Türkei in der EU.“	13	0.9%
Turkish accession	Accession	04. CSU EU	#CSU fordert: Keine Vollmitgliedschaft der Türkei in der EU! Keine volle Visafreiheit!	12	0.8%
Turkish accession	Visa liberalisation	04. CSU EU	„Eine volle Visafreiheit für die Türkei haben wir aus Sicherheitsgründen von Anfang an abgelehnt.“	14	0.9%
Turkish accession	Visa liberalisation	04. CSU EU	Bayerns Innenminister Joachim Herrmann warnt vor Visa-Lockerungen für die #Türkei.	11	0.7%
Turkish accession	Visa liberalisation	04. CSU EU	„Alle Türken inklusive Kurden nach Deutschland frei einreisen zu lassen, ist keinesfalls vertretbar.“	13	0.9%
Turkish accession	Accession	04. CSU EU	CSU-Position ist klar: Es kann keine EU-Vollmitgliedschaft der Türkei geben!	12	0.8%
Turkish accession	Accession	04. CSU EU	CSU-Chef #Seehofer kritisiert, dass Aufnahme der #Türkei in EU nach wie vor nicht zu den Akten gelegt ist.	19	1.3%
Turkish accession	Accession	04. CSU EU	"Den Beitritt der Türkei zur EU wollen wir von der CSU ganz klar nicht."	14	0.9%
Turkish accession	Accession	04. CSU EU	Weber gegen #EU-Beitritt der #Türkei, „Beitrittsverhandlungen jetzt beenden“	9	0.6%
Turkish accession	Accession	04. CSU EU	Die Position der #CSU ist klar: Ein Beitritt der #Türkei zu EU kommt nicht in Frage!	16	1.1%
Turkish accession	Accession	04. CSU EU	„Was gerade in der Türkei passiert, ist nicht gerade vertrauensbildend und mit dem europäischen Demokratieverständnis nicht vereinbar.“	17	1.1%
Turkish accession	Accession	04. CSU EU	Die #Türkei darf nicht Mitglied der #EU werden und eine vollständige Visafreiheit ist mit dieser Türkei nicht möglich.	18	1.2%
Turkish accession	Visa liberalisation	04. CSU EU	Die #Türkei darf nicht Mitglied der #EU werden und eine vollständige Visafreiheit ist mit dieser Türkei nicht möglich.	18	1.2%
Turkish accession	Accession	04. CSU EU	EVP-Fraktionschef @ManfredWeber gegen EU-Mitgliedschaft der Türkei.	8	0.5%
Turkish accession	Accession	04. CSU EU	„Wer die Türkei in Europa aufnehmen will, wird am Ende der Tage Europa zerstören.“	14	0.9%
Turkish accession	Accession	04. CSU EU	Eine Mitgliedschaft der #Türkei in der EU kommt nicht in Frage!	11	0.7%
Turkish accession	Accession	04. CSU EU	Visafreiheit für #Türkei ist derzeit völlig ausgeschlossen und die Beitrittsverhandlungen müssen gestoppt werden.	13	0.9%
Turkish accession	Visa liberalisation	04. CSU EU	Visafreiheit für #Türkei ist derzeit völlig ausgeschlossen und die Beitrittsverhandlungen müssen gestoppt werden.	13	0.9%
Turkish accession	Accession	04. CSU EU	„Eine EU-Mitgliedschaft der Türkei kommt für die CSU nicht in Frage.“	12	0.8%
Turkish accession	Visa liberalisation	04. CSU EU	Visafreiheit für die #Türkei ist in der aktuellen Lage völlig ausgeschlossen.	11	0.7%
Turkish accession	Accession	04. CSU EU	Bayerns Innenminister Joachim Herrmann lehnt weitere Verhandlungen mit der Türkei über einen EU-Beitritt ab.	15	1.0%
Turkish accession	Accession	04. CSU EU	„Eine türkische EU-Mitgliedschaft kann überhaupt keine Option sein.“	9	0.6%
Turkish accession	Accession	04. CSU EU	Ein Land, das demokratische Werte so mit Füßen tritt, kann nicht Mitglied der EU sein	15	1.0%
Turkish accession	Accession	04. CSU EU	80% der Deutschen sind gegen einen Beitritt der #Türkei in die EU. RT, wenn auch du gegen einen Beitritt bist!	20	1.3%
Turkish accession	Accession	04. CSU EU	Der türkische Staatspräsident Erdogan führt die Türkei immer weiter von Europa weg.	12	0.8%
Turkish accession	Accession	04. CSU EU	„Ein Beitritt der Türkei in die EU ist völlig illusorisch.“	10	0.7%
Turkish accession	Accession	04. CSU EU	CSU war schon immer gegen Vollmitgliedschaft der #Türkei. Die Realität zeigt: Wir liegen richtig, andere schließen sich unserer Meinung an!	20	1.3%
Turkish accession	Accession	04. CSU EU	Wer Todesstrafe neu beschließen will, Journalisten einsperrt und Grundrechte mit Füßen tritt, gehört nicht in die EU.	17	1.1%
Turkish accession	Accession	04. CSU EU	Die Türkei hat definitiv keinen Platz in der Europäischen Union!	10	0.7%
Turkish accession	Accession	04. CSU EU	zur Türkei: Wer Demokratie und Rechtsstaatlichkeit mit Füßen tritt, hat in der EU nichts zu suchen.	16	1.1%
Turkish accession	Accession	04. CSU EU	Wir wollen nicht, dass die Türkei Mitglied in der Europäischen Union wird.	12	0.8%
Turkish accession	Accession	04. CSU EU	Kein EU-Beitritt der Türkei!	5	0.3%
Turkish accession	Accession	04. CSU EU	Wer @MartinSchulz wählt, der holt die Türkei in die Europäische Union.	11	0.7%
Turkish accession	Accession	04. CSU EU	Aktuelle Umfrage: rund zwei Drittel der Deutschen wollen den Abbruch der #EU-Beitrittsverhandlungen mit der #Türkei.	16	1.1%
Turkish accession	Accession	04. CSU EU	Für die CSU gilt: Kein EU-Beitritt der #Türkei!	9	0.6%
Turkish accession	Accession	04. CSU EU	64.2% sind für einen Abbruch der EU-Beitrittsverhandlungen mit der Türkei	12	0.8%
Turkish accession	Accession	04. CSU EU	Die Türkei hat für den Türkei gestimmt. Die Türkei bricht mit diesem Referendum die EU-Beitrittsgespräche selbst ab.	18	1.2%
Turkish accession	Accession	04. CSU EU	Für die CSU gilt: Kein EU-Beitritt der Türkei! Laut aktueller Umfrage sind 86% der Deutschen gegen einen EU-Beitritt der Türkei.	22	1.4%
Turkish accession	Accession	04. CSU EU	Sofortiger Stop der Beitrittsverhandlungen JETZT!	5	0.3%
Turkish accession	Accession	04. CSU EU	Wir sagen: Klare Kante gegen Erdogan! Kein EU-Beitritt der Türkei!	11	0.7%
Turkish accession	Visa liberalisation	04. CSU EU	Keine Visaliberalisierung!	2	0.1%
Turkish accession	Accession	04. CSU EU	Die Position der Union ist klar: Kein EU-Beitritt der Türkei!	11	0.7%
Turkish accession	Accession	04. CSU EU	Die Position der Union ist klar: Kein EU-Beitritt der Türkei!	11	0.7%
Turkish accession	Accession	04. CSU EU	Dinge beim Namen nennen: Kein EU-Beitritt der Türkei!	9	0.6%
Turkish accession	Accession	04. CSU EU	Die Position der Union ist klar: Kein EU-Beitritt der Türkei!	11	0.7%
Turkish accession	Accession	06. SPD EU	„Wenn Herr Erdogan die deutschen Gefangenen nicht freilässt, muss EU Verhandlungen mit Türkei über die Ausweitung der Zollunion abbrechen.“	19	1.9%
Turkish accession	Accession	06. SPD EU	„Von Schulz geforderter Abbruch der Beitrittsverhandlungen, heißt nicht Abbruch des Dialogs mit der Türkei.“	14	1.4%
Turkish accession	Accession	08. Linke EU	#Merkel ist gefordert: Die #EU-Beitrittsverhandlungen müssen gestoppt, Flüchtlingsdeal mit #Erdogan aufgelöst werden.	13	0.9%
Turkish accession	Accession	08. Linke EU	warum die Bundesregierung nicht mehr Druck gemacht hat. Dabei wird mit der Türkei über den EU-Beitritt verhandelt!	18	1.2%
Turkish accession	Accession	10. Greens EU	Ein Land, das die Todesstrafe wieder einführen möchte, kann, nicht Mitglied in der Europäische Union werden.	16	1.7%
Turkish accession	Accession	10. Greens EU	„Eine europäische Türkei hat ihren Platz in Europa. Doch das ist nicht Erdogans Türkei, sondern die der Demokratie.“	18	1.9%
Turkish accession	Accession	10. Greens EU	„Wenn EU-Beitrittsverhandlungen gestoppt werden, freut sich Erdogan, die EU beschäftigt sich mit sich selbst.“	15	1.6%
Turkish accession	Accession	12. FDP EU	Nach Türkei-Wahlen wird erneut über die Beziehungen zur EU gesprochen. @Lambsdorff meint: Beitrittsprozess beenden	15	1.1%
Turkish accession	Visa liberalisation	12. FDP EU	So wird es auch 2017 nichts mit der #Visafreiheit für die #Türkei. Allein die Schuld von #Erdogan	17	1.2%

Turkish accession	Accession	12. FDP EU	Die Beitrittsgespräche mit der Türkei müssen beendet werden	8	0.6%
Turkish accession	Accession	12. FDP EU	Die Türkei ist auf dem Weg in die Diktatur, konstatiert @Lambsdorff. EU-Beitritt sollte vom Tisch.	16	1.1%
Turkish accession	Accession	12. FDP EU	Beitrittsverhandlungen mit der #Türkei sind ein Zombie, so @Lambsdorff "Bewegt sich noch, ist aber eigentlich tot"	16	1.1%
Turkish accession	Accession	12. FDP EU	Mit der Einführung der Todesstrafe werden Gespräche über eine EU-Mitgliedschaft der Türkei gegenstandslos.	14	1.0%
Turkish accession	Accession	12. FDP EU	Stoppt die EU-Beitrittsverhandlungen mit der Türkei: Weil Erdogan die Todesstrafe wieder einführen will.	14	1.0%
Turkish accession	Accession	12. FDP EU	Eine geänderte türkische Verfassung steht im Widerspruch zu unseren Werten. Mit ihr kann die Türkei kein Mitglied der EU werden.	20	1.4%
Turkish accession	Accession	12. FDP EU	Ein schwarzer Tag für die Türkei. Hat das Referendum Bestand, kann das Land kein EU-Mitglied werden.	17	1.2%
Turkish accession	Accession	12. FDP EU	Bisher bekommt die #Türkei als EU-Beitrittskandidat Milliarden-Hilfen. Seit dem Referendum ist klar, dass sie nicht mehr beitreten will.	20	1.4%
Turkish accession	Accession	12. FDP EU	Auszahlung der EU-Vorbeitritts-hilfen an die Türkei stoppen!	8	0.6%
Turkish accession	Accession	12. FDP EU	#EU muss die Beitrittsverhandlungen mit der #Tuerkei einfrieren, aber nicht den Dialog, so @Lambsdorff.	14	1.0%
Turkish accession	Accession	12. FDP EU	Notbremse ziehen, kein EU-Beitritt.	5	0.4%
Turkish accession	Accession	12. FDP EU	Wir wollen die #Beitrittsverhandlungen der EU mit der #Türkei beenden + die damit verbundene finanzielle Unterstützung einstellen.	16	1.1%
Turkish accession	Accession	12. FDP EU	Mehrheit der Deutschen ist wie wir gegen den EU-Beitritt der Türkei 84% dagegen 3% dafür 13% weiss nicht	19	1.3%
Turkish accession	Accession	12. FDP EU	EU-Beitrittsverhandlungen mit der Türkei beenden. Autokraten müssen draussen bleiben.	10	0.7%

Text from the Twitter feeds of German political parties coded as 'helping migrants'

Category	Code	Case	Text	Words	% Words
Helping migrants	Primary aid	01. CDU Refugees	Menschen in Not helfen	4	0.5%
Helping migrants	Secondary aid	01. CDU Refugees	„Gute Integrationspolitik ist gute Sicherheitspolitik.“ #DeMaiziere kündigt mehr Sprachtraining & psychol.	10	1.2%
Helping migrants	Primary aid	01. CDU Refugees	Für die CDU ist klar: Wir helfen denjenigen, die Schutz benötigen.	11	1.3%
Helping migrants	Secondary aid	01. CDU Refugees	Arbeitsmöglichkeiten für Flüchtlinge? #Merkel in der #Townhall von @RTLde: Wo Arbeit ist, soll man Menschen auch arbeiten lassen.	18	2.1%
Helping migrants	Primary aid	01. CDU Refugees	Menschen in Not helfen	4	0.5%
Helping migrants	Secondary aid	01. CDU Refugees	Residenzpflicht verschärfen	2	0.2%
Helping migrants	Primary aid	03. CSU Refugees	Es geht um Platz für Menschen, die vor Krieg und Vertreibung fliehen.	12	0.7%
Helping migrants	Primary aid	03. CSU Refugees	Wer wirklich in Not ist, dem helfen wir.	8	0.5%
Helping migrants	Primary aid	03. CSU Refugees	#Flüchtlinge aus Bürgerkriegsgebieten brauchen unsere Solidarität. Das ist aber Aufgabe von ganz #Europa!	13	0.8%
Helping migrants	Primary aid	03. CSU Refugees	„Das Asylrecht ist für Kriegsflüchtlinge gemacht und nicht für Wirtschaftsflüchtlinge.“	10	0.6%
Helping migrants	Secondary aid	03. CSU Refugees	„Bayern ist das Land der gelingenden Integration und die CSU die moderne Volkspartei für alle Menschen in Bayern.“	18	1.1%
Helping migrants	Primary aid	03. CSU Refugees	Hilfe & Solidarität Schutzbedürftige	3	0.2%
Helping migrants	Secondary aid	03. CSU Refugees	Edmund Stoiber spricht #Klartext: „Flüchtlinge müssen deutsche Leitkultur anerkennen“	9	0.5%
Helping migrants	Secondary aid	03. CSU Refugees	Ilse Aigner: Die elektronische Gesundheitskarte an Flüchtlinge zu vergeben, ist der falsche Weg.	13	0.8%
Helping migrants	Secondary aid	03. CSU Refugees	Für die bayerische #Asyl-Politik gelten die Grundsäulen: Die Begrenzung des Zustroms und die Integration Schutzbedürftiger.	16	1.0%
Helping migrants	Secondary aid	03. CSU Refugees	Allerdings sei es dazu notwendig, die Zahl der #Flüchtlinge wegen der damit verbundenen hohen Integrationskosten erheblich zu reduzieren.	18	1.1%
Helping migrants	Secondary aid	03. CSU Refugees	Bayerns Innenminister #Herrmann hat sich für Sanktionen für integrationsunwillige #Flüchtlinge ausgesprochen.	11	0.7%
Helping migrants	Secondary aid	03. CSU Refugees	„Wer sich nicht integrieren will und der Gesellschaft und dem Land sogar feindlich gegenübersteht, der kann auf Dauer nicht hier bleiben.“	21	1.3%
Helping migrants	Primary aid	03. CSU Refugees	Asylrecht ist nicht für Wirtschaftsmigranten gemacht, sondern für Menschen, die wirklich Schutzbedarf haben.	13	0.8%
Helping migrants	Secondary aid	05. SPD Refugees	Bleiberecht für junge Flüchtlinge verbessern	5	0.5%
Helping migrants	Primary aid	05. SPD Refugees	Fahimi: Anstieg fremdenfeindlicher Übergriffe ist abscheulich. Müssen uns an die Seite d. Flüchtlinge + Migranten stellen und sie schützen!	18	1.8%
Helping migrants	Primary aid	05. SPD Refugees	Auf Druck der SPD stellt der Bund in diesem Jahr 1 Mrd. Euro zusätzlich zur Verfügung, um Flüchtlinge unterzubringen.	19	1.9%
Helping migrants	Secondary aid	05. SPD Refugees	Vorurteil: Die nehmen uns die Jobs weg! Fakt: Deutschland braucht Zuwanderung! Besonders Fachkräfte werden gesucht. Viele Flüchtlinge, die bei uns Asyl beantragen, sind gut ausgebildet um zum teil hoch qualifiziert. Wir brauchen nun eine doppelte Integration: erstens die Integration der Flüchtlinge, zweitens die Integration von Arbeitslosen Bürgerinnen und	49	4.9%
Helping migrants	Secondary aid	05. SPD Refugees	SPD startet Kampagne gegen Fremdenhass und für eine Willkommenskultur für Flüchtlinge.	11	1.1%
Helping migrants	Primary aid	05. SPD Refugees	„Die Flüchtlinge, die zu uns kommen, flohen vor dem gleichen Terror wie in Paris. Sie sind Opfer, keine Täter“	19	1.9%
Helping migrants	Secondary aid	05. SPD Refugees	„Aufgabe d #UNHCR heute wichtiger denn je. Flüchtlinge brauchen nicht nur humanitäre, sondern auch politische Unterstützung.“	16	1.6%
Helping migrants	Secondary aid	05. SPD Refugees	Gute Migration: Fluchtursachen bekämpfen, Flüchtlinge in EU solidar. verteilen, anerk. Flüchtlinge besser integrieren	13	1.3%
Helping migrants	Secondary aid	05. SPD Refugees	Thema Flüchtlinge: Brauchen schnellere Asylverfahren, Sprachunterricht und Arbeit.	8	0.8%
Helping migrants	Secondary aid	06. SPD EU	Bessere Gesundheitsversorgung	2	0.2%
Helping migrants	Secondary aid	06. SPD EU	Sprachkurse sofort nach Einreise	4	0.4%
Helping migrants	Secondary aid	06. SPD EU	Bund fördert bürgerschaftliches Engagement	4	0.4%
Helping migrants	Primary aid	07. Linke Refugees	Internationale Woche gegen #Rassismus. Wir sagen: „#Flüchtlinge willkommen!“	8	0.9%
Helping migrants	Primary aid	07. Linke Refugees	Eine Frage der Humanität und des Mitgefühls diese Menschen aufzunehmen!	10	1.2%
Helping migrants	Primary aid	07. Linke Refugees	#Flüchtlinge willkommen!	2	0.2%
Helping migrants	Secondary aid	07. Linke Refugees	Wir akzeptieren nicht, dass #Flüchtlinge zum #Lohndumping benutzt werden!	9	1.0%
Helping migrants	Primary aid	07. Linke Refugees	Keine braunen, schwarzen oder grüne Mauern gegen Flüchtende. Hilfe und Solidarität für Menschen in Not!	15	1.7%
Helping migrants	Primary aid	07. Linke Refugees	Am #TagGegenRassismus und an jedem anderen Tag: #Flüchtlinge Willkommen!	9	1.0%
Helping migrants	Primary aid	07. Linke Refugees	Die #Flüchtlinge sind die Botschafter der Kriege und des Elends dieser Welt!	12	1.4%
Helping migrants	Secondary aid	07. Linke Refugees	#Fluechtlinge integrieren und den Menschen hier die Angst vor dem sozialen Abstieg nehmen.	13	1.5%
Helping migrants	Primary aid	07. Linke Refugees	„@dieLinke verteidigt das Grundrecht auf #Asyl und will eine soziale Offensive für alle.“	13	1.5%
Helping migrants	Primary aid	07. Linke Refugees	Werden uns an keiner Regierung beteiligen, die das Grundrecht auf Asyl schleift.	12	1.4%
Helping migrants	Primary aid	07. Linke Refugees	„Das Grundrecht auf Asyl ist für uns nicht verhandelbar. Wir wollen es wieder herstellen.“	14	1.6%
Helping migrants	Primary aid	07. Linke Refugees	„Wir verteidigen das Recht auf Asyl. Ohne Obergrenzen. Aber unser Fokus ist es, die Fluchtursachen zu bekämpfen.“	17	2.0%
Helping migrants	Primary aid	07. Linke Refugees	Wir zeigen klare Kante gegen Rechts. Mit uns gibt es keine Obergrenzen. Das Recht auf Asyl ist nicht verhandelbar.	19	2.2%
Helping migrants	Primary aid	09. Greens Refugees	Wir dürfen #Flüchtlinge nicht alleine lassen!	6	0.7%
Helping migrants	Primary aid	09. Greens Refugees	„Liebe CSU, wer CHRISTLICH & SOZIAL sein will, der grenzt Flüchtlinge nicht aus. Der HILFT ihnen!“	16	1.8%
Helping migrants	Primary aid	09. Greens Refugees	Wir brauchen endlich eine EU-Seenotrettung und legale Fluchtwege!	9	1.0%
Helping migrants	Primary aid	09. Greens Refugees	Flüchtlinge brauchen unsere Hilfe	4	0.4%
Helping migrants	Primary aid	09. Greens Refugees	Georg Restle: „Die #Türkei ist kein sicherer Herkunftsstaat. Es darf keinen BIP-Vorbehalt beim Grundrecht auf #Asyl	18	2.0%
Helping migrants	Secondary aid	09. Greens Refugees	Nein zu Haftlagern für #Flüchtlinge, die die Union beschönigend „#Transitzonen“ nennt!	11	1.2%
Helping migrants	Secondary aid	09. Greens Refugees	Nein zu Haftlagern im Niemandsland!	5	0.6%
Helping migrants	Secondary aid	09. Greens Refugees	Nur wenn #Flüchtlinge bei uns auch glücklich werden können, kann deren #Integration gelingen.	13	1.4%
Helping migrants	Secondary aid	09. Greens Refugees	Wie soll Integration gelingen, wenn ihr Flüchtlinge von ihren Familien trennt?	11	1.2%
Helping migrants	Secondary aid	09. Greens Refugees	#Familiennachzug für #Flüchtlinge muss weiter möglich bleiben. Familien gehören zusammen!	10	1.1%
Helping migrants	Secondary aid	09. Greens Refugees	Familien gehören zusammen! Familiennachzug für Flüchtlinge muss weiter möglich bleiben.	10	1.1%
Helping migrants	Secondary aid	09. Greens Refugees	„Für die Integration ist es enorm wichtig, Ehepartner und Kinder bei sich zu haben.“	14	1.5%
Helping migrants	Primary aid	09. Greens Refugees	Wir fordern Schutz für Frauen und Kinder! Bundesregierung lässt sie im Stich.	12	1.3%
Helping migrants	Secondary aid	09. Greens Refugees	Wir kämpfen, dass die #Flüchtlinge, die zu uns kommen, keine Angst haben müssen!	13	1.4%
Helping migrants	Primary aid	09. Greens Refugees	Wir dürfen #Flüchtlinge nicht im Stich lassen!	7	0.8%
Helping migrants	Primary aid	09. Greens Refugees	Keine Deals wie den mit Erdogan mehr! Bei Merkels #Nordafrika-Reise muss gelten: Flüchtlinge müssen human behandelt werden - egal wo.	20	2.2%

Helping migrants	Secondary aid	09. Greens Refugees	Die wenigen #Flüchtlinge, die #Orbán überhaupt nach #Ungarn lässt, werden jetzt in Lagern eingesperrt. Und mit ihnen die Menschlichkeit.	19	2.1%
Helping migrants	Secondary aid	09. Greens Refugees	„Wer Menschen in Lager sperrt, schließt die Menschlichkeit gleich mit weg.“	11	1.2%
Helping migrants	Secondary aid	09. Greens Refugees	Schnelleren #Familiennachzug für Flüchtlinge ermöglichen - denn Familien gehören zusammen!	9	1.0%
Helping migrants	Primary aid	09. Greens Refugees	"Wir sind der Meinung, dass Afghanistan nicht sicher ist. Flüchtlinge dürfen dorthin nicht abgeschoben werden."	15	1.7%
Helping migrants	Primary aid	09. Greens Refugees	"Wer vor Krieg und Verfolgung flieht, muss Asyl bekommen. Das ist unser Grundgesetz -daran halten wir uns."	17	1.9%
Helping migrants	Secondary aid	09. Greens Refugees	#Integration geht schneller, wenn man sie anpackt statt aussitzt.	9	1.0%
Helping migrants	Secondary aid	09. Greens Refugees	Wenn Sprache der Schlüssel zur Integration ist warum schafft es diese Regierung dann nicht, endlich allen Geflüchteten Deutschkurse anzubieten?!	19	2.1%
Helping migrants	Primary aid	09. Greens Refugees	"Anstatt die seenotrettenden NGOs und die zahllosen Reeder, Kapitäne und Seeleute der privaten Handelsschifffahrt zu beschimpfen, sollte der Bundesinnenminister ihnen Dank und Respekt zollen."	24	2.7%
Helping migrants	Secondary aid	09. Greens Refugees	"#Familiennachzug macht #Integration leichter und erfolgreicher."	6	0.7%
Helping migrants	Secondary aid	11. FDP Refugees	@christianduerr fordert: Zugang für Flüchtlinge zum #Ausbildung smarkt und Abbau von rechtl. Hürden.	13	1.6%
Helping migrants	Secondary aid	11. FDP Refugees	Unbegleitete #fluechtlinge ausbilden statt abschieben	5	0.6%
Helping migrants	Secondary aid	11. FDP Refugees	#FDP ist gegen Arbeitsverbote für #Flüchtlinge. Jeder soll seines eigenen Glückes Schmied sein.	13	1.6%
Helping migrants	Primary aid	11. FDP Refugees	Der Bund sollte die Kosten für die Asylverfahren komplett übernehmen	10	1.3%
Helping migrants	Secondary aid	11. FDP Refugees	Beer schlägt vor, dass pensionierte Lehrer Deutsch für #Flüchtlinge unterrichten.	10	1.3%
Helping migrants	Secondary aid	11. FDP Refugees	junge #Flüchtlinge vom Schulbesuch auszuschließen, findet @Wissing lächerlich + ausländerfeindlich	9	1.1%
Helping migrants	Primary aid	11. FDP Refugees	Der Winter naht, medizinische Versorgung vieler Flüchtlinge ist mangelhaft.	9	1.1%
Helping migrants	Secondary aid	11. FDP Refugees	Finanzämter mahnen Vereine ab, die #Flüchtlinge umsonst mittrainieren lassen.	9	1.1%
Helping migrants	Primary aid	11. FDP Refugees	Wir halten das Menschenrecht auf Asyl für nicht verhandelbar.	9	1.1%
Helping migrants	Secondary aid	11. FDP Refugees	Arbeitsverbote für Flüchtlinge sollen aufgehoben werden	6	0.8%
Helping migrants	Secondary aid	11. FDP Refugees	Wir fordern ein sofortiges Teilnahmerecht für Flüchtlinge am Unterricht.	9	1.1%
Helping migrants	Secondary aid	11. FDP Refugees	Wir müssen Flüchtlinge schneller in den Arbeitsmarkt bringen	8	1.0%
Helping migrants	Secondary aid	11. FDP Refugees	Wir fordern ein sofortiges Teilnahmerecht für Flüchtlinge am Unterricht	9	1.1%
Helping migrants	Primary aid	11. FDP Refugees	Wir sind die Partei des Rechtsstaats, das gilt auch in der Flüchtlings- und Asylfrage.	14	1.8%

Text from the Twitter feeds of German political parties coded as 'irregular migration'

Category	Code	Case	Text	Words	% Words
Irregular migration	Irregular migrants	01. CDU Refugees	Asyl und Einwanderung sind zwei unterschiedliche Dinge. Asyl ist nur für Schutzbedürftige gedacht.	13	1.5%
Irregular migration	Border protection	01. CDU Refugees	Fluchtbewegungen steuern und ordnen	4	0.5%
Irregular migration	Causes of flight	01. CDU Refugees	Fluchtursachen bekämpfen	2	0.2%
Irregular migration	Irregular migrants	01. CDU Refugees	Müssen klar trennen zwischen Flucht/Asyl auf der einen Seite und #Einwanderung auf der anderen	15	1.7%
Irregular migration	Causes of flight	01. CDU Refugees	Weniger Flüchtlinge durch mehr sichere Herkunftsländer, sagt	7	0.8%
Irregular migration	Irregular migrants	01. CDU Refugees	Merkel in Stuttgarter Zitg: Gemeinsam mit der Türkei wollen wir die illegale Migration möglichst stark verringern.	16	1.9%
Irregular migration	Irregular migrants	01. CDU Refugees	Ohne Anspruch auf Schutz müssen Rückführungen konsequent erfolgen. Daran müssen sich auch SPD, Grüne und Linke in den Ländern halten. Mit neuen Maßnahmen will die Bundesregierung geltendes Recht konsequent durchsetzen.	30	3.5%
Irregular migration	Irregular migrants	01. CDU Refugees	Bekämpfung von Asyl- und Sozialmissbrauch	5	0.6%
Irregular migration	Irregular migrants	01. CDU Refugees	abgelehnte Bewerber konsequent zurückführen	4	0.5%
Irregular migration	Irregular migrants	01. CDU Refugees	Ausreisepflicht durchsetzen, Abschiebungen erleichtern!	4	0.5%
Irregular migration	Irregular migrants	01. CDU Refugees	Identität leichter feststellen	3	0.3%
Irregular migration	Irregular migrants	01. CDU Refugees	Gewahrsam vor Abschiebung ausweiten	4	0.5%
Irregular migration	Irregular migrants	01. CDU Refugees	Abschiebehaft leichter ermöglichen	3	0.3%
Irregular migration	Irregular migrants	01. CDU Refugees	Angela #Merkel im #Sommerinterview: "Ich verfolge einen Ansatz der Reduzierung der illegalen Migration und der Steuerung und Ordnung."	18	2.1%
Irregular migration	Border protection	01. CDU Refugees	Wir wollen Schleppern das Handwerk legen und illegale Migration stoppen	10	1.2%
Irregular migration	Border protection	02. CDU EU	Schlüssel zur Lösung der Flüchtlingsfrage: europäische Außengrenzen sichern.	8	0.8%
Irregular migration	Border protection	02. CDU EU	Wichtiges Signal, dass EU Außengrenzen weiter verstärken wird.	8	0.8%
Irregular migration	Irregular migrants	03. CSU Refugees	Unser Asylrecht darf nicht für Armutswanderungen missbraucht werden!	8	0.5%
Irregular migration	Irregular migrants	03. CSU Refugees	"Wenn nur die, die entsprechend unserem Grundgesetz Anspruch auf Asyl haben, in unser Land kämen, hätten wir viel mehr Platz."	20	1.2%
Irregular migration	Irregular migrants	03. CSU Refugees	muss Blockadehaltung zur Einstufung weiterer sicherer Herkunftsstaaten aufgeben.	8	0.5%
Irregular migration	Irregular migrants	03. CSU Refugees	"Das Asylrecht ist für Kriegsflüchtlinge gemacht und nicht für Wirtschaftsflüchtlinge."	10	0.6%
Irregular migration	Irregular migrants	03. CSU Refugees	#Bayern beschleunigt Verfahren für Asylbewerber ohne Bleibeperspektive	7	0.4%
Irregular migration	Irregular migrants	03. CSU Refugees	"Bei Ablehnung muss abgeschoben werden."	5	0.3%
Irregular migration	Causes of flight	03. CSU Refugees	Bekämpfung der Fluchtursachen	3	0.2%
Irregular migration	Irregular migrants	03. CSU Refugees	"Bei aller Humanität, wir können nicht alle Flüchtlinge aufnehmen. Wir brauchen einen realistischen Blick auf die Dinge."	17	1.0%
Irregular migration	Border protection	03. CSU Refugees	Rückenwind für Seehofers Asylpolitik. 68% befürworten eine zahlen-mäßige Obergrenze für die Aufnahme von Asylbewerbern. 78% befürworten Grenzkontrollen an der deutschen Grenze.	22	1.3%
Irregular migration	Border protection	03. CSU Refugees	Joachim Herrmann will an Grenzkontrollen festhalten, solange die EU-Außengrenzen nicht anständig geschützt werden.	14	0.8%
Irregular migration	Causes of flight	03. CSU Refugees	Beste Obergrenze ist, wenn Flüchtlinge in die Lage versetzt werden in ihrer Heimat zu bleiben.	15	0.9%
Irregular migration	Border protection	03. CSU Refugees	"Es muss auch das Interesse der SPD sein, die eigene Grenze und das eigene Staatsgebiet zu schützen."	17	1.0%
Irregular migration	Irregular migrants	03. CSU Refugees	"Wir müssen wieder nach dem Gesetz handeln und den Flüchtlingsstatus jedes Syrers genau prüfen."	14	0.8%
Irregular migration	Border protection	03. CSU Refugees	Bundesverkehrsminister Alexander Dobrindt: Dt. Binnengrenzen kontrollieren, falls illegale Migration an EU-Außengrenzen nicht gestoppt wird.	15	0.9%
Irregular migration	Irregular migrants	03. CSU Refugees	Asylrecht ist nicht für Wirtschaftsmigranten gemacht, sondern für Menschen, die wirklich Schutzbedarf haben.	13	0.8%
Irregular migration	Border protection	04. CSU EU	"Wir müssen in Nordafrika das Ablegen der Todesboote verhindern."	9	0.6%
Irregular migration	Border protection	04. CSU EU	#Klartext von @sebastiankurz: Es gab keine rechtliche Grundlage für eine Politik der offenen Grenzen.	14	0.9%
Irregular migration	Border protection	04. CSU EU	Brüssel lehnt weitere Verlängerung von Grenzkontrollen ab? Für uns ist klar: Sicherheit zuerst. Das sollte auch für die EU gelten.	20	1.3%
Irregular migration	Border protection	04. CSU EU	Europa geht nicht gut, wenn die EU den Schutz der Außengrenzen nicht hinkommt und dann den Mitgliedstaaten eigene Grenzkontrollen verbieten will.	21	1.4%
Irregular migration	Irregular migrants	05. SPD Refugees	"Wir müssen legale Migrationsmöglichkeiten schaffen."	5	0.5%
Irregular migration	Causes of flight	05. SPD Refugees	Solidar. Flüchtlingspolitik = illegale Migration eindämmen, legale Fluchtwege schaffen + Fluchtursachen bekämpfen	10	1.0%
Irregular migration	Irregular migrants	05. SPD Refugees	Solidar. Flüchtlingspolitik = illegale Migration eindämmen, legale Fluchtwege schaffen + Fluchtursachen bekämpfen	10	1.0%
Irregular migration	Causes of flight	05. SPD Refugees	Gute Migration: Fluchtursachen bekämpfen, Flüchtlinge in EU solidar. verteilen, anerkl. Flüchtlinge besser integrieren	13	1.3%
Irregular migration	Irregular migrants	06. SPD EU	Beschleunigung der Asylverfahren	3	0.3%
Irregular migration	Border protection	06. SPD EU	"Das Hochziehen nationaler Grenzen innerhalb Europas führt uns in eine Sackgasse." Brauchen europäische Lösung.	14	1.4%
Irregular migration	Border protection	06. SPD EU	"Wir bleiben bei unserer Überzeugung: nationale Grenzen lösen Probleme nicht, wir brauchen eine europäische Lösung."	15	1.5%
Irregular migration	Causes of flight	07. Linke Refugees	So kann es nicht weitergehen! Wir müssen #Fluchtursachen statt #Flüchtlinge bekämpfen.	11	1.3%
Irregular migration	Irregular migrants	07. Linke Refugees	Keine braunen, schwarzen oder grüne Mauern gegen Flüchtende. Hilfe und Solidarität für Menschen in Not!	15	1.7%
Irregular migration	Border protection	07. Linke Refugees	Keine braunen, schwarzen oder grüne Mauern gegen Flüchtende. Hilfe und Solidarität für Menschen in Not!	15	1.7%
Irregular migration	Causes of flight	07. Linke Refugees	"Wir verteidigen das Recht auf Asyl. Ohne Obergrenzen. Aber unser Fokus ist es, die Fluchtursachen zu bekämpfen."	17	2.0%
Irregular migration	Causes of flight	07. Linke Refugees	Nicht gegen Flüchtlinge, sondern gegen Fluchtursachen kämpfen!	7	0.8%
Irregular migration	Causes of flight	07. Linke Refugees	"Wir müssen die Kriege, die Fluchtursache Nr. 1, bekämpfen, nicht die Flüchtlinge."	12	1.4%
Irregular migration	Border protection	07. Linke Refugees	Grenzen dicht, auf Flüchtlinge schießen ist keine Lösung!	8	0.9%
Irregular migration	Irregular migrants	08. Linke EU	"Das Einzige was Schleusern wirklich das Handwerk legt, sind legale Fluchtwege und eine europäische	15	1.0%
Irregular migration	Border protection	08. Linke EU	Wir verteidigen die offenen Grenzen - von Mauern haben wir genug! Die EU nicht den Nationalisten überlassen!	16	1.1%
Irregular migration	Irregular migrants	09. Greens Refugees	Wir brauchen endlich eine EU-Seenotrettung und legale Fluchtwege!	9	1.0%
Irregular migration	Border protection	09. Greens Refugees	Helfen statt Abschotten!	3	0.3%
Irregular migration	Border protection	09. Greens Refugees	Wer helfen will such Wege. Wer nicht helfen will, schließt Grenzen.	11	1.2%
Irregular migration	Causes of flight	09. Greens Refugees	"Wir müssen die Fluchtursachen bekämpfen. Nicht die Flüchtlinge! Deshalb braucht es uns Grüne." Claudia Roth auf der	17	1.9%
Irregular migration	Causes of flight	11. FDP Refugees	Wir müssen die Fluchtursachen bekämpfen, nicht die Flüchtlinge.	8	1.0%
Irregular migration	Border protection	11. FDP Refugees	"Schließung der dt. #Grenzen wäre ein Debakel für #Flüchtlinge wie für unsere Wirtschaft +Bürger"	14	1.8%
Irregular migration	Irregular migrants	11. FDP Refugees	Kooperieren Herkunftsländer bei Rückführungen nicht, muss DE Wirtschaftshilfen kürzen.	9	1.1%
Irregular migration	Border protection	11. FDP Refugees	Sollte #Merkel beim EU-Gipfel keine europäische #Asyl-Lösung erreichen, muss DE dringend zu #Dublin-III zurückkehren	17	2.1%

Irregular migration	Irregular migrants	11. FDP Refugees	#Flüchtlinge aus sicheren Drittstaaten zurückweisen	5	0.6%
Irregular migration	Irregular migrants	11. FDP Refugees	Die #FDP will ein Einwanderungsgesetz, um zwischen Flucht, Asyl und Einwanderung zu unterscheiden	13	1.6%
Irregular migration	Irregular migrants	11. FDP Refugees	Zwischen #Asyl, #Flucht und qualifizierter #Zuwanderung muss präzise unterschieden werden	10	1.3%
Irregular migration	Causes of flight	12. FDP EU	Die EU muss langfristig Ursachen der Flucht bekämpfen	8	0.6%
Irregular migration	Border protection	12. FDP EU	Merkel muss in der EU den Schutz der Außengrenzen und ein faire Verteilung durchsetzen	14	1.0%
Irregular migration	Border protection	12. FDP EU	Abschottung ist der falsche Weg.	5	0.4%
Irregular migration	Border protection	12. FDP EU	Marshallplan für Afrika, Europäische Außengrenze schützen & Einwanderungsgesetz für D	9	0.6%

Text from the Twitter feeds of German political parties coded as 'resettling migrants'

Category	Code	Case	Text	Words	% Words
Resettling migrants	Number of migrants	01. CDU Refugees	"Zahl der #Flüchtlinge ist echte Herausforderung. Sie ist keine Überforderung für Deutschland."	12	1.4%
Resettling migrants	Number of migrants	01. CDU Refugees	Zahl der Flüchtlinge reduzieren	4	0.5%
Resettling migrants	Number of migrants	01. CDU Refugees	Wir sind die Volkspartei, die Lösungen findet. Werden die Anzahl der Flüchtlinge reduzieren.	13	1.5%
Resettling migrants	Number of migrants	01. CDU Refugees	Weniger Flüchtlinge durch mehr sichere Herkunftsländer, sagt	7	0.8%
Resettling migrants	Number of migrants	01. CDU Refugees	Merkel in Stuttgarter Ztg: Gemeinsam mit der Türkei wollen wir die illegale Migration möglichst stark verringern.	16	1.9%
Resettling migrants	Number of migrants	01. CDU Refugees	"Unser Ziel ist, dass es deutlich weniger #Flüchtlinge werden als 2015."	11	1.3%
Resettling migrants	(Dis)advantages migration	01. CDU Refugees	Bekämpfung von Asyl- und Sozialmissbrauch	5	0.6%
Resettling migrants	Number of migrants	01. CDU Refugees	Migration steuern und reduzieren	4	0.5%
Resettling migrants	(Dis)advantages migration	01. CDU Refugees	Fußfessel für Gefährder	3	0.3%
Resettling migrants	Number of migrants	01. CDU Refugees	Angela #Merkel im Sommerinterview: "Ich verfolge einen Ansatz der Reduzierung der illegalen Migration und der Steuerung und Ordnung."	18	2.1%
Resettling migrants	(Dis)advantages migration	01. CDU Refugees	Wir müssen hart gegen sexuelle Straftaten vorgehen. Aber kein Generalverdacht gegen Ausländer und Flüchtlinge.	14	1.6%
Resettling migrants	Distribution	02. CDU EU	Alle Länder in der EU müssen ihrer Verantwortung für eine gemeinsame Asylpolitik wahrnehmen	13	1.4%
Resettling migrants	Number of migrants	03. CSU Refugees	"Wenn nur die, die entsprechend unserem Grundgesetz Anspruch auf Asyl haben, in unser Land kämen, hätten wir viel mehr Platz."	20	1.2%
Resettling migrants	Number of migrants	03. CSU Refugees	Wir haben bei der Anzahl an Flüchtlingen Dimensionen erreicht, die auch national mehr Verantwortung erfordern	15	0.9%
Resettling migrants	Distribution	03. CSU Refugees	Wir brauchen eine gerechtere Verteilung der Flüchtlinge in Europa.	9	0.5%
Resettling migrants	Distribution	03. CSU Refugees	#Flüchtlinge müssen besser in Europa verteilt werden!	7	0.4%
Resettling migrants	Distribution	03. CSU Refugees	Es darf beim #Flüchtlingstipfel nicht nur um finanzielle Fragen und fairere Verteilung der Flüchtlinge gehen.	15	0.9%
Resettling migrants	Distribution	03. CSU Refugees	"Deutschland wird die Krisen dieser Welt nicht alleine lösen, auch wenn Herr Hofreiter fordert: "Macht hoch die Tür, die Tor macht weit"."	22	1.3%
Resettling migrants	Distribution	03. CSU Refugees	#Deutschland nimmt etwa so viele Flüchtlinge auf wie 23 andere #EU-Mitgliedsstaaten zusammen	13	0.8%
Resettling migrants	(Dis)advantages migration	03. CSU Refugees	Vermeidung von Missbrauch	3	0.2%
Resettling migrants	Number of migrants	03. CSU Refugees	"Bei aller Humanität; wir können nicht alle Flüchtlinge aufnehmen. Wir brauchen einen realistischen Blick auf die Dinge."	17	1.0%
Resettling migrants	Distribution	03. CSU Refugees	CSU-Chef Horst Seehofer fordert die EU, Bund und Länder zum Handeln auf, um die Flüchtlinge gerechter zu verteilen und Zustrom zu begrenzen.	23	1.4%
Resettling migrants	Number of migrants	03. CSU Refugees	CSU-Chef Horst Seehofer fordert die EU, Bund und Länder zum Handeln auf, um die Flüchtlinge gerechter zu verteilen und Zustrom zu begrenzen.	23	1.4%
Resettling migrants	Number of migrants	03. CSU Refugees	Für die bayerische #Asyl-Politik gelten die Grundsätze: Die Begrenzung des Zustroms und die Integration Schutzbedürftiger.	16	1.0%
Resettling migrants	Number of migrants	03. CSU Refugees	Rückenwind für Seehofers Asylpolitik. 68% befürworten eine zahlen-mäßige Obergrenze für die Aufnahme von Asylbewerbern. 78% befürworten Grenzkontrollen an der deutschen Grenze.	22	1.3%
Resettling migrants	Number of migrants	03. CSU Refugees	#CSU-Generalsekretär @AndiScheuer bei @n24: Wir müssen endlich über eine Obergrenze für Flüchtlinge reden!	14	0.8%
Resettling migrants	Distribution	03. CSU Refugees	#Bayern wird #Flüchtlinge auch direkt in andere Bundesländer weiterleiten, wenn diese sich weigern, Bayern Flüchtlinge abzunehmen.	16	1.0%
Resettling migrants	Number of migrants	03. CSU Refugees	Wir haben Belastungsgrenze überschritten! Deshalb müssen wir über Obergrenze reden.	10	0.6%
Resettling migrants	Distribution	03. CSU Refugees	Bessere Verteilung in EU nötig! Frankreich nimmt gerade einmal so viele Flüchtlinge auf wie in Bayern ein Landkreis im Allgäu.	20	1.2%
Resettling migrants	Distribution	03. CSU Refugees	Die Politik des Durchwinkens ist skandalös und muss ein Ende finden!	11	0.7%
Resettling migrants	Distribution	03. CSU Refugees	Innenminister Herrmann kritisiert, dass Österreich weiterhin tausende Flüchtlinge an die bayerische Grenze weiterleitet.	13	0.8%
Resettling migrants	Number of migrants	03. CSU Refugees	Bayern hat eine Visitenkarte der Humanität abgegeben, jetzt muss aber die Begrenzung das Thema sein.	15	0.9%
Resettling migrants	Number of migrants	03. CSU Refugees	Dabei ist es wichtig, offen zu kommunizieren, dass Deutschland nicht mehr alle aufnehmen kann.	14	0.8%
Resettling migrants	Number of migrants	03. CSU Refugees	"Die Belastungsgrenze ist erreicht. Dieses Signal bracht es."	8	0.5%
Resettling migrants	Number of migrants	03. CSU Refugees	Wir verlieren wertvolle Zeit, um eine Reduzierung der Flüchtlingszahlen zu erreichen.	11	0.7%
Resettling migrants	Number of migrants	03. CSU Refugees	Allerdings sei es dazu notwendig, die Zahl der #Flüchtlinge wegen der damit verbundenen hohen Integrationskosten erheblich zu reduzieren	18	1.1%
Resettling migrants	(Dis)advantages migration	03. CSU Refugees	Wenn Asylbewerber/Flüchtlinge Übergriffe begehen, ist das eklatanter Missbrauch des Gastrechts. Dann muss Abschiebung folgen!	15	0.9%
Resettling migrants	(Dis)advantages migration	03. CSU Refugees	Asylbewerber und Flüchtlinge, die Straftaten begehen, müssen unser Land schnellstmöglich verlassen.	11	0.7%
Resettling migrants	Number of migrants	03. CSU Refugees	Es gibt kein Land der Welt, das unbegrenzt Flüchtlinge aufnimmt.	10	0.6%
Resettling migrants	(Dis)advantages migration	03. CSU Refugees	#Klartext von Bayerns Innenminister Joachim Herrmann: Straffällig gewordene Flüchtlinge schneller abschieben!	11	0.7%
Resettling migrants	(Dis)advantages migration	03. CSU Refugees	Nach der Festnahme mutmaßlicher IS-Terroristen fordert @AndiScheuer Komplettdurchleuchtung aller in unser Land gekommenen Flüchtlinge.	15	0.9%
Resettling migrants	Number of migrants	03. CSU Refugees	Deutschland braucht eine Obergrenze für Flüchtlinge Wir werden das durchsetzen!	10	0.6%
Resettling migrants	Number of migrants	04. CSU EU	CSU-Chef Horst Seehofer fordert die EU, Bund und Länder zum Handeln auf, um die Flüchtlinge gerechter zu verteilen und Zustrom zu begrenzen.	23	1.5%
Resettling migrants	Distribution	04. CSU EU	CSU-Chef Horst Seehofer fordert die EU, Bund und Länder zum Handeln auf, um die Flüchtlinge gerechter zu verteilen und Zustrom zu begrenzen.	23	1.5%
Resettling migrants	Number of migrants	04. CSU EU	Eine #Obergrenze ist auch bei einer Einigung mit der #Türkei notwendig.	11	0.7%
Resettling migrants	Distribution	04. CSU EU	Kein rein deutsches Flüchtlingskontingent.	4	0.3%
Resettling migrants	Number of migrants	05. SPD Refugees	Bleiberecht für junge Flüchtlinge verbessern	5	0.5%
Resettling migrants	Distribution	05. SPD Refugees	"Es muss eine gemeinsame europ. Asylpolitik, mit einer sinnvollen Verteilung der Flüchtlinge auf ganz Europa, geben."	16	1.6%
Resettling migrants	Distribution	05. SPD Refugees	Es ist eine Schande, dass Mehrheit der EU-Mitgliedsstaaten so tut, als gehe sie das Thema Flüchtlinge nichts an.	19	1.9%
Resettling migrants	Distribution	05. SPD Refugees	Sigmar #Gabriel in #Heidenau: Brauchen faire Verteilung der #Flüchtlinge in #Europa.	11	1.1%
Resettling migrants	(Dis)advantages migration	05. SPD Refugees	Vorurteil: Die sind alle kriminell! Fakt: Flüchtlinge sind nicht krimineller als deutsche. Dort, wo die Kriminalität steigt, liegt das nicht an den Flüchtlingen!	23	2.3%
Resettling migrants	(Dis)advantages migration	05. SPD Refugees	Vorurteil: Die nehmen uns die Jobs weg! Fakt: Deutschland braucht Zuwanderung! Besonders Fachkräfte werden gesucht. Viele Flüchtlinge, die bei uns Asyl beantragen, sind gut ausgebildet um zum teil hoch qualifiziert. Wir brauchen nun eine doppelte Integration: erstens die Integration der Flüchtlinge, zweitens die Integration von Arbeitslosen Bürgerinnen und	49	4.9%
Resettling migrants	Distribution	05. SPD Refugees	Wer Flüchtlinge in andere Bundesländer schieben will, verhält sich unwürdig gegenüber föderalen Prinzipien.	13	1.3%
Resettling migrants	(Dis)advantages migration	05. SPD Refugees	Deutschland ist ein Land der Vielfalt. Migration ist ein selbstverständlicher Begleiter unserer Geschichte.	13	1.3%
Resettling migrants	Distribution	05. SPD Refugees	Gute Migration: Fluchtursachen bekämpfen, Flüchtlinge in EU solidar. verteilen, anerk. Flüchtlinge besser integrieren	13	1.3%
Resettling migrants	Number of migrants	06. SPD EU	"Wir schaffen das. Aber Deutschland schafft es nicht allein. Die EU muss ihre Verantwortung annehmen."	15	1.5%

Resettling migrants	Distribution	06. SPD EU	"Wir schaffen das. Aber Deutschland schafft es nicht allein. Die EU muss ihre Verantwortung annehmen."	15	1.5%
Resettling migrants	Distribution	06. SPD EU	Die Bewältigung der Flüchtlingskrise ist eine europäische Aufgabe. Einzelne Länder dürfen sich nicht aus der Verantwortung ziehen.	17	1.7%
Resettling migrants	Distribution	06. SPD EU	Brauchen solidarische Flüchtlingspolitik und faire Verteilung von Flüchtlingen in der ganzen EU.	12	1.2%
Resettling migrants	(Dis)advantages migration	07. Linke Refugees	Menschen ohne deutschen Pass zahlen mehr in die Sozialkassen ein, als sie an Leistungen erhalten. Allein 2012 betrug der Gewinn +22.000.000.000 EUR.	25	2.9%
Resettling migrants	(Dis)advantages migration	07. Linke Refugees	Flüchtlinge kriegen mehr als Hartz-IV-Empfänger! Richtig ist: Anerkannte Asylbewerber erhalten in den ersten 15 Monaten deutlich geringere Leistungen als bei Hartz IV und auch später nicht gleichgestellt.	29	3.3%
Resettling migrants	(Dis)advantages migration	07. Linke Refugees	ein zusätzliches Wirtschaftswachstum in Deutschland durch Flüchtlinge entsprechend einer zusätzlichen Wirtschaftsleistung in Höhe von 50 Milliarden Euro in den nächsten fünf Jahren erwartet.	23	2.7%
Resettling migrants	Number of migrants	07. Linke Refugees	Wir lehnen die Diskussion über #Obergrenzen ab! Für ein #Menschenrecht gibt es keine Obergrenze!	14	1.6%
Resettling migrants	Number of migrants	07. Linke Refugees	"Wir verteidigen das Recht auf Asyl. Ohne Obergrenzen. Aber unser Fokus ist es, die Fluchtursachen zu bekämpfen."	17	2.0%
Resettling migrants	Number of migrants	07. Linke Refugees	Wir zeigen klare Kante gegen Rechts. Mit uns gibt es keine Obergrenzen. Das Recht auf Asyl ist nicht verhandelbar.	19	2.2%
Resettling migrants	Number of migrants	09. Greens Refugees	Wie soll Integration gelingen, wenn ihr Flüchtlinge von ihren Familien trennt?	11	1.2%
Resettling migrants	Number of migrants	09. Greens Refugees	Eine Obergrenze ist wie eine Feuerwehr, die fünf Brände löscht und beim sechsten zuschaut.	14	1.5%
Resettling migrants	Number of migrants	09. Greens Refugees	#Familiennachzug für #Flüchtlinge muss weiter möglich bleiben. Familien gehören zusammen!	10	1.1%
Resettling migrants	Number of migrants	09. Greens Refugees	Familien gehören zusammen! Familiennachzug für Flüchtlinge muss weiter möglich bleiben.	10	1.1%
Resettling migrants	Number of migrants	09. Greens Refugees	"Für die Integration ist es enorm wichtig, Ehepartner und Kinder bei sich zu haben."	14	1.5%
Resettling migrants	Number of migrants	09. Greens Refugees	Schnelleren #Familiennachzug für Flüchtlinge ermöglichen - denn Familien gehören zusammen!	9	1.0%
Resettling migrants	Number of migrants	09. Greens Refugees	Schnelleren #Familiennachzug für Flüchtlinge ermöglichen - denn Familien gehören zusammen!	9	1.0%
Resettling migrants	Number of migrants	09. Greens Refugees	"Nur 6 Prozent aller weltweiten Flüchtlinge kommen nach Europa."	9	1.0%
Resettling migrants	Number of migrants	09. Greens Refugees	65 Millionen Menschen sind derzeit weltweit auf der Flucht. 90% von ihnen werden von Entwicklungsländern	16	1.8%
Resettling migrants	Number of migrants	09. Greens Refugees	"#Familiennachzug macht #Integration leichter und erfolgreicher."	6	0.7%
Resettling migrants	Number of migrants	09. Greens Refugees	Untergrenze heißt ja nichts anderes, als dass das #Asylrecht gilt	10	1.1%
Resettling migrants	Distribution	10. Greens EU	„Es braucht mehr europäische Solidarität und eine gerechte Verteilung bei der Flüchtlingsaufnahme.“	12	1.3%
Resettling migrants	Distribution	11. FDP Refugees	Lambsdorff fordert Sondergipfel der EU-Regierungschefs. Druck auf Staaten erhöhen, die keine #Flüchtlinge aufnehmen	14	1.8%
Resettling migrants	(Dis)advantages migration	11. FDP Refugees	Einige Städte überlegen, leere Gebäude für #Flüchtlinge zu beschlagnahmen. Gefährliches Konzept	11	1.4%
Resettling migrants	(Dis)advantages migration	11. FDP Refugees	"Schließung der dt. #Grenzen wäre ein Debakel für #Flüchtlinge wie für unsere Wirtschaft +Bürger"	14	1.8%
Resettling migrants	Distribution	12. FDP EU	EU braucht unterschiedl. Geschwindigkeiten für Flüchtlingsverteilung	6	0.4%
Resettling migrants	Distribution	12. FDP EU	EUTheurer fordert einen Lastenausgleich in der EU	7	0.5%
Resettling migrants	Distribution	12. FDP EU	Es muss ein gerechter Lastenausgleich in der Europäischen Union geschaffen werden, an dem sich alle Mitgliedstaaten beteiligen.	17	1.2%
Resettling migrants	Distribution	12. FDP EU	Merkel muss in der EU den Schutz der Außengrenzen und ein faire Verteilung durchsetzen	14	1.0%

Text from the Twitter feeds of German political parties coded as 'values'

Category	Code	Case	Text	Words	% Words
Values	Humanity	01. CDU Refugees	Flüchtlinge finden offene Herzen in unserem Land	7	0.8%
Values	Security	01. CDU Refugees	„Gute Integrationspolitik ist gute Sicherheitspolitik.“ #DeMaiziere kündigt mehr Sprachtraining & psychol.	10	1.2%
Values	Freedom	02. CDU EU	Si eist eine einzigartige Solidar- und Wertegemeinschaft. Gemeinsam werden wir unsere Werte wie Freiheit, Demokratie und Rechtsstaatlichkeit im globalen Wettbewerb weiter behaupten können.“	23	2.4%
Values	Solidarity	02. CDU EU	Si eist eine einzigartige Solidar- und Wertegemeinschaft. Gemeinsam werden wir unsere Werte wie Freiheit, Demokratie und Rechtsstaatlichkeit im globalen Wettbewerb weiter behaupten können.“	23	2.4%
Values	Peace	02. CDU EU	Die größte Sicherheit und das größte Friedensprojekt für uns ist die Europäische Union.	13	1.4%
Values	Security	02. CDU EU	Die größte Sicherheit und das größte Friedensprojekt für uns ist die Europäische Union.	13	1.4%
Values	Solidarity	03. CSU Refugees	#Flüchtlinge aus Bürgerkriegsgebieten brauchen unsere Solidarität. Das ist aber Aufgabe von ganz #Europa!	13	0.8%
Values	Equality	03. CSU Refugees	„Bayern ist das Land der gelingenden Integration und die CSU die moderne Volkspartei für alle Menschen in Bayern.“	18	1.1%
Values	Solidarity	03. CSU Refugees	Hilfe & Solidarität Schutzbedürftige	3	0.2%
Values	Humanity	03. CSU Refugees	„Bei aller Humanität; wir können nicht alle Flüchtlinge aufnehmen. Wir brauchen einen realistischen Blick auf die Dinge.“	17	1.0%
Values	Humanity	03. CSU Refugees	Bayern hat eine Visitenkarte der Humanität abgegeben, jetzt muss aber die Begrenzung das Thema sein.	15	0.9%
Values	Human rights	03. CSU Refugees	Wer bei uns ein Grundrecht auf Asyl wahrnehmen will, der muss auch die Grundrechte anderer respektieren.	16	1.0%
Values	Equality	04. CSU EU	Wir setzen uns für eine #EU ein, die Einheit in Vielfalt gestaltet, statt Zentralismus und Gleichmacherei.	16	1.1%
Values	Security	04. CSU EU	Brüssel lehnt weitere Verlängerung von Grenzkontrollen ab! Für uns ist klar: Sicherheit zuerst. Das sollte auch für die EU gelten.	20	1.3%
Values	Solidarity	05. SPD Refugees	Solidar. Flüchtlingspolitik = illegale Migration eindämmen, legale Fluchtwege schaffen + Fluchtursachen bekämpfen	10	1.0%
Values	Solidarity	05. SPD Refugees	Gute Migration: Fluchtursachen bekämpfen, Flüchtlinge in EU solidar. verteilen, anerk. Flüchtlinge besser integrieren	13	1.3%
Values	Peace	06. SPD EU	Europa und die Europäische Union sind ein Glücksfall für Frieden und Wohstand.	12	1.2%
Values	Peace	06. SPD EU	Die EU muss zu einer Globalen Friedensmacht werden.	8	0.8%
Values	Solidarity	06. SPD EU	„Wer keine Flüchtlinge aufnimmt, verhält sich nicht solidarisch und der kann dann nicht mit unserer Solidarität rechnen.“	17	1.7%
Values	Solidarity	06. SPD EU	Brauchen solidarische Flüchtlingspolitik und faire Verteilung von Flüchtlingen in der ganzen EU.	12	1.2%
Values	Equality	07. Linke Refugees	Internationale Woche gegen #Rassismus. Wir sagen: „#Flüchtlinge willkommen!“	8	0.9%
Values	Humanity	07. Linke Refugees	Eine Frage der Humanität und des Mitgefühls diese Menschen aufzunehmen	10	1.2%
Values	Humanity	07. Linke Refugees	Gegen #Rassismus und Menschenfeindlichkeit. Am 20. Juni auf die Straße!	10	1.2%
Values	Humanity	07. Linke Refugees	Verschärfung des #Asylgesetzes ist Entmenslichung per Gesetz!	7	0.8%
Values	Human rights	07. Linke Refugees	Wir lehnen die Diskussion über #Obergrenzen ab! Für ein #Menschenrecht gibt es keine Obergrenze!	14	1.6%
Values	Solidarity	07. Linke Refugees	Keine braunen, schwarzen oder grüne Mauern gegen Flüchtende. Hilfe und Solidarität für Menschen in Not!	15	1.7%
Values	Equality	07. Linke Refugees	Am #TagGegenRassismus und an jedem anderen Tag: #Flüchtlinge Willkommen!	9	1.0%
Values	Human rights	07. Linke Refugees	„@dieLinke verteidigt das Grundrecht auf #Asyl und will eine soziale Offensive für alle.“	13	1.5%
Values	Equality	07. Linke Refugees	Die #Gewalt gegen #Flüchtlinge steigt bundesweit. So kann es nicht weitergehen! Gemeinsam gegen #Rassismus!	14	1.6%
Values	Human rights	07. Linke Refugees	Werden uns an keiner Regierung beteiligen, die das Grundrecht auf Asyl schleift.	12	1.4%
Values	Human rights	07. Linke Refugees	„Das Grundrecht auf Asyl ist für uns nicht verhandelbar. Wir wollen es wieder herstellen.“	14	1.6%
Values	Human rights	07. Linke Refugees	„Wir verteidigen das Recht auf Asyl. Ohne Obergrenzen. Aber unser Fokus ist es, die Fluchtursachen zu bekämpfen.“	17	2.0%
Values	Human rights	07. Linke Refugees	Wir zeigen klare Kante gegen Rechts. Mit uns gibt es keine Obergrenzen. Das Recht auf Asyl ist nicht verhandelbar.	19	2.2%
Values	Humanity	07. Linke Refugees	In Berlin haben wir die Turnhallen leergezogen und Flüchtlinge endlich menschenwürdig untergebracht!	12	1.4%
Values	Peace	08. Linke EU	SPD und Grüne: Wollt ihr mit der CDU die EU zur Militärmacht ausbauen, oder mit uns eine EU des Friedens schaffen?	21	1.4%
Values	Freedom	08. Linke EU	Wir müssen die Auseinandersetzung mit der EU auch als eine Freiheitsdebatte führen.	12	0.8%
Values	Freedom	08. Linke EU	Die EU ist kein Friedenprojekt, das ist ein Wunsch aber leider nicht Realität.	13	0.9%
Values	Human rights	09. Greens Refugees	Söder stellt das Grundrecht auf Asyl in Frage. Wozu eigentlich noch das C für Christlich und das S für Sozial?	20	2.2%
Values	Human rights	09. Greens Refugees	Georg Restle: "Die #Türkei ist kein sicherer Herkunftsstaat. Es darf keinen BIP-Vorbehalt beim Grundrecht auf #Asyl	18	2.0%
Values	Humanity	09. Greens Refugees	"Eine humane Asyl- und Flüchtlingspolitik ist Kernbestandteil grüner Politik und grüner Identität."	12	1.3%
Values	Humanity	09. Greens Refugees	Keine Deals wie den mit Erdogan mehr! Bei Merkels #Nordafrika-Reise muss gelten: Flüchtlinge müssen human behandelt werden - egal wo.	20	2.2%
Values	Humanity	09. Greens Refugees	Die wenigen #Flüchtlinge, die #Orbán überhaupt nach #Ungarn lässt, werden jetzt in Lagern eingesperrt. Und mit ihnen die Menschlichkeit.	19	2.1%
Values	Humanity	09. Greens Refugees	„Wer Menschen in Lager sperrt, schließt die Menschlichkeit gleich mit weg.“	11	1.2%
Values	Human rights	09. Greens Refugees	Bedingungen für Koalitionsbeteiligung: Ökologische Reformen, Grundrecht auf Asyl, verlässliche Außenpolitik.	10	1.1%
Values	Human rights	09. Greens Refugees	„Wer vor Krieg und Verfolgung flieht, muss Asyl bekommen. Das ist unser Grundgesetz -daran halten wir uns.“	17	1.9%
Values	Human rights	09. Greens Refugees	„Untergrenze heißt ja nichts anderes, als dass das #Asylrecht gilt.“	10	1.1%
Values	Solidarity	10. Greens EU	„Es braucht mehr europäische Solidarität und eine gerechte Verteilung bei der Flüchtlingsaufnahme.“	12	1.3%
Values	Human rights	10. Greens EU	Die #Türkei muss wieder auf den Weg zu #Demokratie & Menschenrechten zurückfinden!	11	1.2%
Values	Peace	10. Greens EU	„Die EU ist der beste Kriegsvermeidungsmechanismus, der jemals erfunden wurde.“	10	1.1%
Values	Peace	10. Greens EU	60 Jahre Europäische Verträge. Das heißt: 60 Jahre Frieden, Zusammenhalt und Demokratie. Wir sagen: Happy Birthday	16	1.7%
Values	Humanity	11. FDP Refugees	Für #Flüchtlinge bedeutet das Taschengeld Eigenständigkeit und Würde	8	1.0%
Values	Human rights	11. FDP Refugees	Wir halten das Menschenrecht auf Asyl für nicht verhandelbar.	9	1.1%
Values	Human rights	11. FDP Refugees	Wir sind die Partei des Rechtsstaats, das gilt auch in der Flüchtlings- und Asylfrage.	14	1.8%
Values	Humanity	12. FDP EU	„Wir wollen die europäische Einbindung, die humanitäre Verantwortung und rationales Handeln.“	11	0.8%
Values	Human rights	12. FDP EU	#Erdogan will Europäische #Menschenrechtskonvention teilweise aussetzen. @Lambsdorff sagt: Notbremse ziehen	10	0.7%
Values	Human rights	12. FDP EU	Menschenrechte, Meinungs- und Presse-#Freiheit sowie Rechtsstaatlichkeit sind für uns nicht verhandelbar.	12	0.8%