



The deviant Nordic Christian Democrats: a comparative analysis on Nordic and Continental Christian Democratic voters

Iris Krause s1022621

**Nijmegen School of Management
Radboud University, Nijmegen, The Netherlands**

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Abstract

Academic literature on Western European Christian Democratic parties often highlights the uniqueness of Nordic Christian Democratic parties. Although there are some uniting factors between Nordic and the Continental parties, some go as far as to argue that the Nordic parties represent a separate party family in their own right. Analysing both the Nordic Christian Democratic and the Continental Christian Democratic parties' key ideological dimensions, we can see how the two differ on crucial defining concepts. This thesis aims to evaluate whether the claimed distinctiveness of the Nordic Christian Democratic parties materialises itself among their voters in comparison to the voters of the Continental style of Christian Democracy. This research compares the Christian Democratic electorates from three Nordic countries and four Continental countries. Aligned with the existing theories, this thesis concludes that the two styles of Christian Democratic electorates deviate in relation to key identifying features, however these differences are not as clear in all of the proposed dimensions. The conclusions from this research show that it is more accurate to see the two styles of Christian Democracy as sharing family resemblance, rather than as separate party families in their own right.

Key words: Christian Democracy, Nordic Christian Democratic parties, Continental Christian Democratic parties, Nordic party systems, party classification, voters, political cleavages.

Chapter 1. Introduction

Theory on European party politics has often claimed that Christian democracy is a misunderstood and under-researched area of politics (van Kersbergen, 2008: 259; Kalyvas & van Kersbergen, 2010). Although this has been corrected by many in the last decade (e.g. *ibid.*, Hanley, 2002; Van Hecke & Gerard, 2004; Accetti, 2019) the more ‘unusual’ cases of Christian Democratic parties have been less thoroughly researched.

The Nordic fraction of Christian Democratic parties are classified as deviant cases in the Christian Democratic party family (Karvonen, 1993: 45) and as the *footnotes* in the Christian Democratic literature (Madeley, 2004: 217). These parties have been researched in the latter part of the 20th century where they were treated as the ‘odd ones out’ in the European Christian Democratic literature.

The Nordic Christian Democratic parties emerged late in their party system, as both moral and political protest parties (Karvonen, 1993) as a direct reaction toward the growing secularisation of society and politics. In contrast, the dominant Continental style party has been very much part of the establishment and is classified as a mainstream or a ‘catch-all party’ (Krouwel, 2012: 135; Kalyvas, 1998: 308).

This line of thinking led academics to argue that the Nordic parties are not Christian Democratic in the Continental way but that they are “new species of the genus Christian Democracy” (Madeley, 1977: 267) and that they represent a distinct party family in their own right (Karvonen, 1993; 1994; Madeley, 2000; 2004).

Although more contemporary literature on the Continental style of Christian Democracy has now widely covered their ideology, voters and party strategy, the research on Nordic Christian Democracy has only focused on the historical development of the parties and their ideological stances. More importantly, the claims of the Nordic distinctiveness have remained on the theoretical level, where this argument leans on the structural time and place dependent effects. However, in this thesis the central question is: *how does the claimed distinctiveness of Nordic Christian Democratic parties materialise itself in comparison to Continental Christian Democracy, and more importantly, is this distinctiveness visible among their voters too?* The research on the Nordic voters in comparison to

the Continental voters has not yet been done but the expectation is that if the Nordic parties are said to represent a party family in their own right, separate to the Continental parties, the voters are different too.

A comparative analysis on the Nordic voters alongside the Continental voters opens an opportunity to examine whether the Nordic voters display the distinctiveness that the existing analysis on the parties claim. In-depth research on the Nordic, as well as Continental for that matter, Christian Democratic voters compared to the other parties in their respective party systems would only reveal the predictable features in relation to the other national parties, namely that they attract more religious voters who advocate for Christian values and ethics.

However, looking at the two styles of Christian Democracy their key characteristics and ideological stances have crucial differences between them. The question that is yet to be answered is do the two parties attract different types of voters in their party systems? In other words, are the explanatory factors for being a Nordic Christian Democratic voter significantly different to that of the Continental voter?

Party classification has remained a contentious topic in party system theory. Whether a party should be classified, for example, based on their manifesto, based on their policy stances or on the leader of the party remains without consensus in the academia. None of the ways in which to classify a party remains without its benefits nor its downsides. Analysing a party based on its voters is an additional way to classify a party, which comes with its problems but also with its merits. Classifying the party based on its voters, or indeed any specific way of party classification, is not superior to other ways, but it is an additional way to evaluate the nature of a party. In other words, if an analysis on the Nordic and Continental Christian Democratic voters confirms the differences that other types of research has already concluded, this would offer further substantiation to those claims.

This research will look at the deviant nature of Nordic Christian Democratic parties in terms of the voters. The objective is to perform an in-depth analysis of the existing theories that claim that the Nordic style is essentially distinct to the Continental style. From there we can further test whether the protest nature and the ideological differences between the Nordic and the Continental Christian Democrats are visible among the voters as well.

In order to evaluate the research question, Chapter 2 will analyse the existing theoretical framework on both characteristics of Continental Christian Democracy and the claims on the Nordic parties' distinctiveness stemming from contextual factors. Chapter 3 looks into the data and methods that I aim to use to answer the research question and test the hypotheses and Chapter 4 will have the results and analysis on the results. Chapter 5 concludes this research with additional questions that came up during the research and possible features to analyse in future research.

Chapter 2. Theoretical framework

A closer focus on the key characteristics and the contextual effects of their emergence shows that the Continental and the Nordic Christian Democratic parties have significant differences between them (Karvonen, 1993; Aardal, 2002; Madeley, 2004). It is important to note that research knows very little about the Christian Democratic voters, particularly of the Nordic kind. Comparative research between the two has not been based on voters before, but on the parties' historical context and ideological stances. Does the distinctiveness and the deviant nature of Nordic Christian Democrats materialise amongst the voters as well? If, as it has been argued, the Nordic Christian Democratic parties represent a style of Christian Democracy in their own right, does these differences surface when looking at the voters? If the theory thus far sees them as separate party families, are these differences visible among the voters as well?

This chapter will begin by introducing a way in which to classify a party, namely through the voters. Because the research on the Nordic Christian Democratic voters is missing in academia, this is crucial to elaborate at the start. From there follows an explanation of *relevant* parties in order to elaborate why it is important to study Nordic Christian Democratic parties, even though they enjoy small levels of electoral support. Next, the chapter looks at two ways in which a party family is defined in party political theory. From there follows a closer look at the Continental Christian democratic parties, particularly their key characteristics and structural effects, such as the political cleavage that they represent. From there an analysis on the same features from the Nordic Christian Democratic parties reveal that the differences between the two are significant enough to further research them. The chapter will conclude on the hypotheses which derive from previous theory and aims to test the claimed differences.

2.1. Party classification through voters

Their late emergence, their deviant and protest party nature caused the scholars to conclude that the Nordic¹ Christian Democratic parties represent a distinct style of Christian Democracy, separate to

¹ Nordic countries include Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden. Iceland is a fifth Nordic country, however it had only a brief experiment with Christian Democracy in the 1990s but gained only 0,3% of the electoral support in two elections in 1995 and 1999 and has thereafter consequently dissolved. Therefore, it is excluded from this paper.

that of the dominant Continental style (e.g. Karvonen, 1993; Aardal, 2002; Madeley, 2004). This chapter looks in depth into the existing conclusions on the Nordic distinctiveness. While these have remained on a theoretical level based on the parties' historical development, the question left unanswered is whether research on the voters can confirm their deviant nature in relation to the Continental voters?

If the Nordic parties are indeed protest parties with the religious dimension being ideologically more significant than the economic dimension, as Aardal (2002) argues, do these characteristics materialise among the voters? In other words, if the ideologies and issue stances highlighted in existing literature unfold among the voters as well, this gives further support to the claims of Nordic distinctiveness.

One strand of party classification advocates the idea that parties, and the parties' ideologies, are defined based on their voters, more specifically based on their electorate's socio-demographic characteristics and attitudes. Following the logic of Lipset and Rokkan's political cleavage-theory (1967), the electorate is seen as the representation of a particular social group (Mudde, 2007: 36). Voters represent the mobilisation of a political cleavage. When a conflict takes place in a society, people who regard the issue as important mobilise themselves on either side of the conflict. There they advocate for their values and represent the opposition to the opposing side of the cleavage. With the Nordic Christian Democrats, they have been claimed to represent the morality – secularity cleavage, although its significance is speculated mainly because it affects only a small number of the religiously active in the Nordic societies (Arter, 1999: 153). This cleavage is elaborated more throughout this chapter.

Classifying a party based on its voters has its problems, such as the electorate changing while the party's core ideology does not change (Mudde, 2007: 36). In addition, it is questionable whether the electorate for a party can be treated as a homogenous group. However, with adequately large sample sizes one can draw conclusions about the general trend of the characteristics and values of the voters. If the Nordic parties are indeed deviant, distinctive, and materialisations of a different cleavage, in comparison to the Continental dominant style of Christian Democracy, it should be visible among the voters. Political parties do not operate in a vacuum, but their existence is dependent on the electoral support they get, which means that the electorates' ideological positions and stances on important issues must match with the parties' positions, at least to a certain extent.

2.2. Relevant parties

Focus on more recent research on the Nordic Christian Democratic parties is rare because they enjoy small, albeit varying, levels of electoral support in each Nordic country. In Norway, the party enjoys the highest level of support and, in relation to its size, it is considered a significant party in the party system. In Finland, Denmark and Sweden the support has been smaller and particularly in the late 1990s and early 2000s they experienced a general trend of declining electoral support (Hansen & Kosiara-Pedersen, 2017: 117).

Nevertheless, because for Nordic Christian Democratic parties the economic dimension is less important than the religious dimension (Aardal, 2002: 132), which will be discussed in length later in this chapter, it gives them the ability to work with the left and the right, creating significant coalition potential for them. Due to this coalition potential, the Christian Democratic parties in Nordic countries have been able to get parliamentary representation and positions in the government through which they have exercised their political influence (Hansen & Kosiara-Pedersen, 2017: 117; Madeley, 2004: 229).

The most predominant academic who opposes the use of mere raw numbers of electoral support and seats in government in order to define the relevant parties is Giovanni Sartori. In party system theory the system is often defined by calculating the electoral support of the biggest parties through which it can be said to be a one-, two-, two-and-a-half-, or a multi-party system, based on the number of *effective parties*. However, Sartori argues that this perspective misses a lot of relevant actors from the party system and analyzing mere numbers is not sufficient for recognizing the *relevant parties*. Blackmail, or indeed coalition potential, can have crucial effects in the party system and therefore parties that have either of those should be viewed as relevant parties in the system (Sartori, 1999: 16). As a result, Nordic Christian Democrats are relevant in their respective party systems and further research on their voters is important to gain knowledge on the Nordic party systems.

2.3. Defining party families

One way in which party families were previously defined was by following Lipset & Rokkan's political cleavage theory (Lipset & Rokkan 1967), where if parties emerged in the similar historical context to represent the same political cleavage they were seen as belonging to the same party family. However, more contemporary political theory has elaborated this further, and some argue that similar

ideology, party name and transnational linkages are an improved way to define a party family (Mair & Mudde, 1998 as cited in Jungar & Jupskås, 2014). Similar ideology means that the parties have relatively similar stances on key issue dimensions, which often coincides with similar party names. Transnational linkages mean that the parties co-operate across national borders, for example in supranational institutions. Therefore, whether Nordic and Continental Christian Democracy represent separate party families is dependent on which definition is used.

If the older Lipset & Rokkan's definition is used, it is argued that the Nordic and the Continental Christian Democratic parties are separate party families in their own right because the former is said to represent a separate cleavage, namely morality vs. secularity - cleavage (Arter, 1999: 153) and the latter the well known religious vs. secularity cleavage (Kalyvas & van Kersbergen, 2010). On the other hand, applying the newer way of defining a party family, the Nordic parties have changed their names to Christian Democratic parties to resemble the Continental parties (except for the Norwegian Christian People's Party) and when the parties obtain enough votes in the European Parliamentary elections the Nordic parties join the Continental parties in the European People's Party group (EPP) in the EU. However, it is debated whether Nordic Christian Democratic parties share their *ideology* with the Continental parties, which is one way to tell party families apart, and arguably the most important way to define a party family (Jungar & Jupskås, 2014: 221). Existing theory argues that the Nordic parties diverge from the Continental ideology on several key issue dimensions exactly because they had different contexts in which they emerged.

In this paper I will look at whether the two styles or sub-sections of Christian Democracy deviate in relation to relevant ideological characteristics, and the conclusions should be seen as further support to the debate on whether the two parties are separate party families. The Continental style is the dominant style of Christian Democracy and is therefore often synonymous with Christian Democracy. However, looking at the key concepts of which the two styles of Christian Democracy are defined, existing theory claims that there is significant difference between the two and therefore, some argue, the Nordic style should not even be called Christian Democracy (Aardal, 2002: 132).

2.4. Continental Christian Democracy

Research on Christian Democratic parties in Europe has gained increasing attention in academia since the 1990s (eg. Kalyvas & van Kersbergen, 2010; Gerard & van Hecke, 2004) while prior to that it was deemed as an under-researched area (van Kersbergen, 2008). The parties' history, ideology and

contribution to European politics has been the focus of many contemporary scholars since their influence and legacy on the politics of 20th century Europe cannot be dismissed. Most of the research on Christian Democracy, apart from a few individual book chapters or some footnotes, focuses on the Continental style of which is viewed as the dominant strand (Madeley, 2004: 219)². In addition, the Continental Europe is often seen as the primary place of Christian Democracy (Lamberts, 1997: 9).

Table 1: Contemporary Christian Democratic parties in Western Europe*

Country	Party
Austria	Österreichische Volkspartei, ÖVP (Austrian People's Party)
Belgium	Christelijke Volkspartij, CVP (Christian People's Party, Flemish; currently Christen-Democratisch en Vlaams, CD&V)
Germany	Christlich-Demokratische Union, CDU (Christian Democratic Union); Christlich-Soziale Union, CSU (Christian-Social Union, Bavaria)
Italy	Partito Popolare Italiano, PPI-DC (Italian People's Party); Centro Cristiano Democratico, CCD (Christian Democratic Center; currently merged into the Unione dei Democratici Cristiani e Democratici di Centro, UDC)
Luxembourg	Chrëschtlech Sozial Vollekspartei, CSV (Christian-Social People's Party)
Netherlands	Christen-Democratisch Appel, CDA (Christian Democratic Appeal)
Portugal	Partido Popular/CDS-PP (Center Social Democrats/People's Party)
Switzerland	Christlich-Demokratische Volkspartei, CVP (Christian Democratic People's Party)

Source: Kalyvas & van Kersbergen (2010)

* The Irish parties (Fianna Fáil, Fine Gael) are not included since they are not in the Continental Europe. Also, I have excluded the Nordic Christian Democratic parties from this typology for the sake of clarity.

² Madeley (1994) suggests that there is another style of Christian Democracy, namely the Anglo-Saxon style. It is said that this style does not have overtly religious parties and no claims to religious inspiration. Because it is thoroughly under-researched, only by Michael Fogarty in the 1950s (1957) and briefly mentioned by Madeley (ibid.), this style is not analysed in this research.

These parties represent the religious cleavage, a theory developed by Lipset and Rokkan (1967), in which Catholic (and Protestant to a lesser extent) churches were influential as political entities at mobilising against the secular elite. Through a national conflict of how the state should be organised, the religious cleavage came to represent those who advocated religion in politics as a guiding force and retaining the church's political power, and those who advocated for a clear separation of church and state and secular politics with no special position for the church.

2.4.1. Key characteristics

Although often treated as non-distinctive and 'middle-of-the-road' parties the Christian Democratic parties are essential in the European political landscape, particularly in order to understand European integration and the prevalence of social welfare. The non-distinctiveness of the parties stems from their flexible ideology (Hanley, 2008: 87) and often claimed 'catch-all' nature, where the parties remain relatively ambiguous on important topics in order to attract votes from many heterogeneous groups (Kalyvas and van Kersbergen, 2008: 186-187). Regardless of their claimed non-distinctiveness, literature on Christian Democracy recognises conservatism, social welfare and the European integration project as their key characteristics.

Christian Democratic parties in Continental Europe are defined as conservative in economic aspects, with market liberal proposals. The European People's Party, EPP, in the European Parliament which most Continental Christian Democratic parties are members of, embraces the conservative label (van Kersbergen, 2008: 266). Moreover, particularly since the 1980s the Christian Democrats have adopted neoliberal values of market liberalization (Accetti, 2009: 228) and are seen as conservative right-wing parties (Krouwel, 2012: 172). However, it is crucial to note that although the Continental Christian Democratic parties are advocates of market liberal policies they do not occupy the extreme right on the economic dimension in their party systems. In academia, the Christian Democratic economic positioning is described as "social capitalism" which is a combination of welfare focused social concern and defence of capitalism (van Kersbergen, 1995: 223-221) and as having moderate social policy aims with a wish to uphold capitalism (Pombeni, 2000: 298). In other words, on the economic dimension the Christian Democrats are defined as centre-right or right-wing parties, but not as extreme right parties.

Despite their conservative nature, the second key feature of the Continental Christian democracy is the class compromise, which does not oppose class differences, but introduced social welfare in order

to help the poorest of the society, in accordance with Christian ethics (Kalyvas & van Kersbergen, 2010). In other words, although they are placed more to the right on the economic dimension, in the non-socialist block, they advocate for a social welfare policy that protects the groups in the society that most need it. This is particularly visible in Christian Democratic parties advocating for this redistributive element for families (Hanley, 2008: 87), who according to them are the “cornerstone of the society” (Fogarty 1957, as cited in van Kersbergen, 1995: 186).

The third characteristic is European integration, which the Continental Christian Democratic parties largely orchestrated in the 20th century. The use of transnational Christian Democratic party networks that were developed after the Second World War were crucial in enabling the implementation of the integration process. The initial process of the European Union began as the Christian Democratic project, they were influential in deepening it and the parties remain strong supporters of it (Kalyvas & van Kersbergen, 2010: 195-196). The Christian Democratic devotion to create a united Europe resulted from the wish to decrease divisions between countries and to improve economic co-operation between European countries (Marks, Wilson & Ray, 2002: 538).

2.5. Nordic Christian Democracy

As the research on the origins and ideologies of the Christian Democratic parties in Continental Europe grew, scholars on Nordic politics began to highlight the differences and the distinctiveness of Nordic Christian Democratic parties. The Nordic Christian Democrats were late-comers in their party systems, and they were part of the newly emerging group of parties which are said to have thawed the frozen Scandinavian five-party system. More importantly, the Nordic Christian Democrats mobilised as a response to a different conflict than that of their Continental counterparts, so arguably they represent a different political cleavage.

The Nordic faction of Christian party development began in Norway in the 1930s (Arter, 2008: 124) where the party, to this day, enjoys the highest level of electoral support in the Nordic countries. The Finnish and Swedish parties followed in the next few decades, and the Danish party³ in the early 1970s, all with an almost literal translation of the Norwegian party manifesto (Karvonen, 1993: 30).

³ Because the Danish Christian Democratic party has too small of a sample size for the analysis performed in chapter 4, it is excluded from this analysis. Furthermore, it was the last to emerge and has enjoyed the smallest level of support of the Nordic parties and has failed to gain any seats in the parliament since 2005.

Table 2: Nordic Christian Democratic parties first into parliament

	Year founded	Year first into parliament
Norway- Kristelig Folkeparti	1933	1933
Finland- Kristillinen Liitto	1958	1970
Sweden- Kristen Demokratisk Samling	1964	1985
Denmark- Kristeligt Folkeparti	1970	1973

Source: Arter, 2008: 124.

The Danish, Swedish and Finnish parties have since changed their names into Christian Democratic parties in the late 1990s to early 2000s.

Looking into the theoretical framework on the existing literature, the context and ideological stances reveal the essential distinctiveness of the Nordic Christian Democratic parties. Firstly, the Nordic countries have remarkably homogeneous societies, particularly in relation to religion. The population is overwhelmingly protestant and an exceptionally high percentage of people are members of the Protestant Lutheran state Church. At the time when the Nordic Christian Democratic parties began to emerge, the level of church membership in the four countries varied between 93 and 98 percent (Madeley, 1977: 271). However, one cannot make conclusions about the level of religiosity based on Church membership, since in the Nordic countries the actual attendance of Church services is low and personal religiosity is not comparable to the membership levels. This *religion paradox*, where a society has high levels of Church membership, yet people's personal level of religiosity is low (ibid.; Karvonen, 1994: 121), has sparked a reaction in which multiple revivalist movements began to criticise this 'nominal Christianity' and advocate for a more personal faith and re-introducing Christian standards into everyday life.

This religious opposition, which later mobilised into politics through Christian democracy, was against the religious established institutions (Aardal, 2002). The criticism and opposition to the 'nominal' and 'mainstream' religiosity sparked into a movement in which the aim was to re-introduce religion into politics and policy-making because the state church was less interested to do so. The growing dissatisfaction amongst the religiously activist minorities has been an influential driving force in the development of these reactionary protest parties (Madeley, 2000: 38).

It is crucial to note that although these revivalist movements come from within the Lutheran denomination, they see the state Church as an institution with a bureaucratic nature which they are

indifferent to (Madeley, 1977: 271-274). Therefore, they represent their own religious movements through their congregations.

2.5.1. Thawing of the Scandinavian five-party system

Another contextual factor that has influenced the Nordic Christian Democratic parties to be significantly distinct in comparison to the Continental parties is their relatively late emergence and the introduction of multidimensionality into the party-political system.

Traditionally, Scandinavian countries⁴ have had a five-party system, which has shown remarkable stability in the 20th century. These parties include Conservatives and Liberals on the right, Agrarian party in the center and Social Democrats and Communists on the left (Madeley, 2000; 2004.) The party systems' endurance began to shake after the 1970s "earthquake elections" after which some claimed that the frozen Scandinavian system began to thaw⁵ (Arter, 1999: 143). The fragmentation of the party system and electoral volatility became apparent when new political parties entered into the system and started to attract voters from the established parties. One of the newly emerging parties⁶ was the Christian Democratic party, which did not fit in any of the existing five party families in the system. Moreover, it was not easy to place them on the left-right scale because their core ideology does not stem from the left-right conflict. Rather, their identity was based on value dimensions other than the economic dimension.

The Scandinavian five-party systems have been characteristically unidimensional but the breakthrough of the new parties, in the "earthquake elections" (Arter, 2012: 824-827) introduced an element of multidimensionality into their party system. In the Nordic party system, the left-right alignment was, and arguably still is, a strong determinant factor for voters (Hansen & Kosiara-

⁴ The distinction between Scandinavian and Nordic countries is topic-dependent and to a certain extent dependent on the author too. Geographically the Scandinavian countries include Sweden, Denmark and Norway because as a concept it refers to the Scandinavian Peninsula. However, due to cultural similarities, the Scandinavian culture includes Finland and Iceland too. Nordic countries include Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden. Because theory on party systems refers to the *Scandinavian* five party-system in this sub-section the terms 'Scandinavian' and 'Nordic' are used interchangeably, however the term 'Nordic' is used in all other sections of the paper in order to avoid confusion.

⁵ The frozen five party system in Scandinavia can be questioned, most notably from the point of view that perhaps the systems were never that frozen and stable to begin with and that the changing system is not an exception, but a rule. Mair (1997, 45-66) argues that the newly emerged parties and electoral volatility in 1970s do not necessarily reject the theory of a frozen party system, rather it would only be so if new political *cleavages* emerged. Unfortunately, the scope of this paper does not allow going into more depth on this topic (see Sundberg, 1999 for more details).

⁶ Other new parties emerging at the time were the Greens and the populist radical right (Arter, 2008: 128).

Pedersen, 2017) but other values and issues became salient in addition to issues relating to the left-right alignment, such as religion, anti-establishment sentiments or environmental protection.

2.5.2. Secularisation conflict and the morality-cleavage

Lipset and Rokkan's religious cleavage (1967) in its traditional form has been argued not to be as prevalent in the Scandinavian and Nordic countries since the predominant church and the state has had a close relationship (Lindberg, 2013) and therefore a non-existent or merely a small conflict between them. In the Continental countries, Catholic churches were influential in creating the religious cleavage by mobilising the Christian Democratic parties (Krouwel, 2012: 135) to protect themselves against the secular attacks from the Liberals. These parties defended the Churches point of view and acted as the political extension of the Church (Kalyvas, 1998: 295-298).

By contrast, the Nordic Christian Democrats have never represented, nor have they ever claimed to represent, the official standpoint of the state church. Also, they have not acted on behalf of the church (Karvonen, 1994: 126; Aardal, 2002: 132). Rather, the Nordic Christian democracy represents a different cleavage. Because it emerged in a different time and societal context as a response to a different conflict, it is argued that the Continental and Nordic Christian Democratic parties represent a different political cleavage. The Nordic cleavage, from which the Christian parties developed from, is often described as the "morality vs secularity" cleavage (Arter, 1999: 153).

The conflict that sparked the development of Christian Democratic parties in the North was about the growing secularisation of the society, which was left un-opposed by all other parties and societal actors. As a movement, their primary characteristic was the direct opposition against these changes in the Nordic societies. In their party-political system, they began to represent a moral-religious dimension, defending Christian morality and advocating against secular policies. This was in opposition to all the other parties in the system. Whenever government policies have had an (implicit or explicit) aim towards a more secular society, the Nordic Christian Democracy has had an incentive to mobilise itself in opposition against it (Madeley, 2000: 35-38).

In Norway⁷, this anti-secularisation was sparked by opposition towards a 'blasphemous' theater play and the repeal of prohibition, whereas in Finland it was about a political conflict of the empowered

⁷ Initially, the Norwegian Christian party emerged in 1933 as a *regional* religious party in the southwest of the country. However, the time in which it emerged as a *national* party in 1945, was during the last few months of the Nazi occupation

Communist party's atheism as well as debates about religious education in schools and more lenient liquor laws. The Swedish 'moral vigilantism' focused on opposing increasing promiscuity in society, censoring films and supporting religious education in schools (Karvonen, 1993, 29-32; Madeley, 2000: 32-34; 2004: 224-228).

Due to the new politics of religious defense, the Nordic Christian Democratic parties became known as the moral religious protest parties (Madeley, 1977: 282-283; van Kersbegen, 1995: 255). Because they developed ultimately against the whole society and political establishment they have obtained the character of a protest party. Nordic societies are almost unanimous in opposing religion in politics (Madeley, 1994: 144) and political parties at the time failed to oppose the secularisation of the society. Conservative parties captured the support of the conventional 'nominal Christians' (Madeley, 2004: 228), which was due to their devotion to traditions and traditional values, not religious values and opposition to secularisation.

Their deviant nature has explained their marginal support (Karvonen, 1993, 25), exactly because they have not attempted to be catch-all parties (Madeley, 2004: 232) but maintained their hardline stances on moral and societal issues.

2.5.3. Diffusion of the Nordic parties

The Norwegian party has become the archetype of the Nordic Christian Democracy, establishing itself early in the 20th century and having the largest amount of electoral support in comparison to the other Nordic parties (Aardal, 2002, 131). The Norwegian *Kristelig Folkeparti* emerged in 1933 and gained its first parliamentary position that same year. When the Finnish *Kristillinen Liitto* and the Swedish *Kristen Demokratisk Samling* were founded in late 1950's and early 1960's, as already mentioned, their party manifestos were almost literal translations of the Norwegian party manifesto and they adopted most policy, issue and ideological stances from the Norwegian party (Aardal, 2002: 132). This *diffusion* of party policies is the key ingredient in the Nordic style of Christian Democracy. Since these newly emerged parties were not easily placed on the left - right scale and were not clear on their political stances on topics outside the core principles of Christian morality, the following Finnish and Swedish parties copied the stances of the Norwegian archetype (Karvonen, 1993: 30).

in Norway. The party's desire was to strengthen the national religious heritage and to voice protest against the prevailing system (Madeley, 2004: 224).

The similarity of the Nordic societies and the Christian parties' diffusion on stances and ideology as well as the similar protest nature against the increasingly secularised political 'establishment' (Karvonen, 1993: 34) allows us to treat the Nordic Christian Democracy as a coherent, unitary party family. Particularly in relation to the five-party structure of the political arena, that is consequentially thawed, as well as the religious aspect, namely the homogeneity of the society's religious denomination, Nordic societies show enough similarity that the Nordic Christian Democratic parties can be seen as representing a coherent party family. In order to evaluate whether the Nordic and the Continental parties represent different party families, I aim to test whether their voters have significantly different ideologies in relation to their key characteristics.

2.6. Comparative aspect between the Nordic and the Continental styles

2.6.1. Protest party – mainstream party

The crucial difference between the Nordic and Continental Christian Democracy is the parties' nature, protest party for the former and 'catch-all' for the latter⁸. The underlying variation that stems from the parties' context and structural effects, has had a selective process on the voters. The aforementioned 'catch-all' and un-distinctiveness of the Continental parties ensures that their electorate is broader, more heterogeneous and more within the mainstream politics. In comparison, the claimed protest nature of the Nordic parties is a protest against secular politics and a defence of Christian values (Madeley, 2004: 217). The protest materialises itself as strong stances on Christian morals and values and consequent debates on the topics (Karvonen, 1993: 32), which leads to small but strong partisan identification (Arter, 1999:153). The protest is a reaction to the social phenomena which is being against the "establishment" and the dominant parties (Karvonen, 1993: 34). In comparison, the Continental parties are the "establishment" in their party systems and they do not uphold the discontent towards the establishment.

The Nordic Christian Democratic parties stand alone in representing the morality side of the 'morality vs. secularity - cleavage' (Arter, 1999: 153) where all the other parties in the party systems do not actively oppose secularisation or do not actively implement policies that explicitly follow Christian ethics.

⁸ Whether this is seen as strategic or ideological positioning, is irrelevant for this paper. However, this brings up an additional question which research should look in to: what are the underlying reasons for the Christian Democratic identities? Are they purely strategic or ideological or a mix of both? Unfortunately, the scope of this thesis does not allow space to delve into this question.

When all other parties in the party-system do not represent the voter's wish to implement more anti-secular policies, *or*, if the parties do not oppose policies and initiatives that can be seen as secular, the Nordic citizen internalises discontent and dissatisfaction towards the mainstream politics. Therefore, I expect feelings of distrust towards the political establishment to have a positive effect in Nordic Christian Democratic voting. However, this is not expected for the Continental voters since the Continental Christian Democratic parties are part of the establishment and seen as the ruling parties in their respective party-systems. This leads to the first hypothesis:

Hypothesis 1a: *Ceteris paribus*, distrust towards the “political establishment” has a positive effect on voting for Nordic Christian Democratic parties.

Hypothesis 1b: *Ceteris paribus*, distrust towards the “political establishment” has no effect on voting for Continental Christian Democratic parties.

2.6.2. Religiosity

In comparison to the Continental Christian Democratic parties, the Nordic parties have claimed to be more religious (Kalyvas & van Kersbergen, 2010: 188; Madeley, 2004: 219). They attract the more religiously active on the one hand (Madeley, 1977: 270) but also voters who adhere to Christian standards (Arter, 2011: 841). The identity of Nordic Christian Democratic parties is to be opposed to secularisation and to ‘nominal’ Christianity, therefore strong and active religiosity is a key characteristic for them. The parties have not attempted to tone down their religiosity in order to catch wider electoral support, on the contrary, they have retained their identity as the highly religious (relative to the majority of Nordic society) parties and continue to represent the religiously active in politics. Moreover, as mentioned earlier, the Nordic Christian Democratic parties see the religiosity dimension more important than the economic dimension.

On the contrary, the Continental parties have for long toned down their Christian identity as a strategy to capture more electoral support and to not scare away the non-religious voters (Kalyvas & van Kersbergen, 2010). This is precisely why the Continental parties are defined as ‘catch-all’ parties. When discussing the Christian Democratic parties in Europe, Kalyvas declares that the “parties are unquestionably secular” (1998: 293) which presumably is aimed only toward the dominant, Continental style of Christian Democracy.

Although, arguably, the Nordic societies are less religious than the Continental societies, the Christian democratic parties' ideologies are *vice versa*. In the North, the parties have had small levels of support because they represent the actively religious who make up only a small population in Nordic countries. In the Continent, the religious message is toned down in order to attract as many voters as possible, which has led to the Continental parties being far more electorally successful than the Nordic ones.

Therefore, I expect that the voters in Nordic societies who have high levels of religiosity wish to implement policies that are according to Christian ethics, or oppose policies that are not, vote for Nordic Christian Democratic parties, but I expect that to have a *smaller* effect on voting for Continental parties. In other words, the expectation is that religiosity has a positive effect in voting for Nordic parties, but less so for Continental parties.

Hypothesis 2: *Ceteris paribus*, a vote for Nordic Christian Democratic parties is more associated with high levels of religiosity than a vote for Continental Christian Democratic parties.

2.6.3. European integration

The third crucial topic in which the Nordic and the Continental Christian Democracy are considerably different is the European Union and the European integration process. As this is seen as the great accomplishment of the Continental parties, positive feelings toward the European integration is very much a defining feature and a key ideological stance for them.

The Nordic societies were seen as “reluctant Europeans” until the mid 1970s and thereafter the societies as a whole have been suspicious about joining a supranational union (Phinnemore, 1996). Aligned with this, the Christian Democratic parties were ambiguous, if not outright opposed, to the European integration particularly in comparison to the Continental Christian Democratic parties (Madeley, 2000: 37; Marks, Wilson & Ray, 2002: 538; Hanley, 2002). When joining the European

Union became topical in the Nordic countries in the early 1990s⁹, the Finnish Christian Democrats were strongly opposed to joining the Union. Similarly, in Norway the party was opposed to joining the EU, although perhaps not as strongly as in Finland. In Sweden, the party took a positive stance toward joining the EU, but this decision was not unanimously accepted which lead to internal dissent (Madeley, 2000).

Since Sweden and Finland have joined the EU and Norway has not, the issue on *joining* the EU is no longer salient, however the parties' stances on the EU cannot be said to be pro-European, especially to the extent that the Continental parties are. I expect there to be some internal differences between the Nordic Christian Democrats, for example the Norwegian party to be more anti-EU than the Swedish party who have joined the EPP and gained seats in the European parliament. Regardless of the differences, the assumption is that the stance on the EU is not a defining feature for the Nordic parties.

Therefore, I expect that the more a voter is in favour for European integration the more likely they are to vote for a Continental Christian Democratic party. However, I do not expect the stance on European integration to have relevance in voting for a Nordic Christian Democratic party.

Hypothesis 3a: *Ceteris paribus*, a positive stance on European integration has a positive effect on voting for Continental Christian Democratic parties.

Hypothesis 3b: *Ceteris paribus*, the stance on European integration has no effect on voting for Nordic Christian Democratic parties.

2.6.4. Economic dimension

In comparison to the Continental Christian Democratic parties, the Nordic parties have claimed to be more left wing (Kalyvas & van Kersbergen, 2010: 188; Madeley, 2004: 219), or as Karvonen (1993: 37-40) concludes: the voters occupy the middle in issues related to the economy. However, it is not clear do these claims take context into consideration. For example, the Nordic Christian Democrats

⁹ Denmark joined the EU already in early 1970s and it was slightly more affiliated with being 'European' since it lays in the Continental Europe. At the time in which joining the union was topical the Danish Christian Democratic party had no official stance and remained ambiguous on the topic (Madeley, 2013: 112).

might be more left wing than the Continental ones, but this might be the case with Social Democratic and Conservative parties as well. In other words, the left-right alignment of the parties is difficult to compare cross-nationally because the political culture and national context has a strong effect. The differences between Continental and Nordic Christian Democratic voters' self-positioning on the left-right scale might be due to national differences rather than as support for distinctive party families.

However, in general, the Continental Christian Democratic parties are seen to be more focused on the economic dimension than on the religious dimension, which is *vice versa* for the Nordic parties (Aardal, 2002: 132). The Continental parties have embraced their conservative right-wing identity and, particularly since the 1990s, they actively advocate for neo-liberal market policies. In comparison, the Nordic Christian Democrats have remained ambiguous on the economic dimension, as a strategy to have coalition potential both with the left and the right.

Therefore, I expect the positioning of voters on the economic dimension to be an explanatory factor for voting Continental Christian Democratic parties, but I expect this not to be the case for their Nordic counterparts. This leads to the final hypothesis:

Hypothesis 4: *Ceteris paribus*, a vote for Continental Christian Democratic party is more likely associated with economic positioning, than a vote for Nordic Christian Democratic parties.

Chapter 3. Data and methods

In this chapter, firstly I will present the case selection process with its criteria and list out the parties which will be included in the analysis. Secondly, I present the data used for the hypothesis testing as well as the operationalisation of the relevant concepts with variables. The final part explains the method that is used for the analysis and why this is suitable to answer my research question.

3.1. Case selection

To analyse whether the voters represent the differences between Nordic and Continental parties I assess three out of the four Nordic parties: the Swedish *Kristdemokraterna* (KD), and Finnish *Kristillisdemokraatit* (SKD) Christian Democratic parties and the Norwegian *Kristelig Folkeparti* (KrF), Christian People's Party. The Danish Christian democratic party, *Kristendemokraterne*, is excluded from the analysis due to the small sample size and the low level of electoral support.

The focus of the analysis is to test whether the voter bases for the two styles of Christian Democracy are different, which is why most of the Nordic cases are in the analysis and the quintessential Continental parties are there as a comparison.

For the Continental style of Christian Democracy, I chose four prototypical parties to represent the Continental voter base. The German *Christlich-Demokratische Union*, (Christian Democratic Union, CDU) which in German national election forms a union with the *Christlich-Soziale Union*, (Christian-Social Union, Bavaria, CSU), the Dutch¹⁰ *Christen-Democratisch Appel*, (Christian Democratic Appeal, CDA), the Austrian *Österreichische Volkspartei* (Austrian People's Party, ÖVP), and the Swiss¹¹ *Christlich-Demokratische Volkspartei*, (Christian Democratic People's Party, CVP)

¹⁰ The Dutch party system has another relevant Christian party: the Christian Union (*Christen Unie*, CU). Compared to CDA, CU is a small, fundamentalist, ultra-protestant party that gains little electoral support in the Netherlands (Otjes, 2018: 172-173). van Kersbergen suggests that CU is more similar to the Nordic parties because of its Protestantism, protest nature and small levels of support (1995: 255). This claim would be interesting to test, but unfortunately the sample sizes for CU in European Social Survey are very small. Perhaps, a qualitative study on the similarities of the Nordic parties and the CU would be best suited to answer this question but unfortunately the scope of this paper does not allow performing this additional research.

¹¹ The Swiss party system has two additional Christian parties in its party system: Evangelical People's Party (*Evangelische Volkspartei der Schweiz*, EVP) and Christian Social Party (*Christlich-soziale Partei / Parti chrétien-social*, CSP). Because the Swiss party system is unusually fragmented, the religious cleavage has increasingly vanished since the 1990s (Kriesi & Trechsel, 2008: 84-86) and these two minor parties enjoy very small levels of electoral support and cannot be categorized as relevant parties in the system, therefore they are not included in the analysis.

represents the fourth Continental Christian Democratic party (Kalyvas & van Kersbergen, 2010; see Table 1 in page 11).

In addition, these parties all belong to the European People's Party, EPP, in the European Parliament (except for the Swiss party since Switzerland is not an EU country). This is a further indicator that they represent a party family with a mutual ideology.

The case selection criteria follow Kalyvas and van Kersbergen's typology (2010: 190), Table 1 in this paper, where Contemporary Christian Democratic parties are listed. Data on the Luxembourgish parties is extremely small since the *European Social Survey* has been conducted there only two times in the early 2000s, therefore it is not included in this research. I do not include the Portuguese *Partido Popular* in the analysis since it declared itself as a Christian party in its manifesto in 1993, but after has not explicitly adhered to Christian ideology or standards (ibid.). Also, Italy is excluded since its Christian Democratic party has dissolved, re-emerged as slightly different, and merged into another party but more importantly it is argued that Christian Democracy, as a whole, has collapsed in Italy (Leonardi & Alberti, 2004). Similarly, the Belgian parties are excluded in this research since there are three Christian parties in the system to represent the country's languages and it is unsure how much these three resemble each other. Also, the main Flemish speaking party (only one of the three which is included in Kalyvas & van Kersbergen's typology) has gone through a name change in the time in which the analysis covers. Therefore, for the sake of clarity, Belgium is excluded from this analysis as well.

3.2. Operationalisation

The European Social Survey (ESS) offers individual level data on the voters and their relevant characteristics for this research. I use all available¹² ESS rounds, from 1 to 8 which cover the years 2002 to 2016 for the electorates of Norway, Sweden, Finland, Germany, the Netherlands, Austria and Switzerland. The ESS data is convenient in that it is easily available, and it has sufficiently large sample sizes for each country. The disadvantage is that ESS is a survey questionnaire so relying on it presumes that the answers respondents gave were truthful, accurate and without external influence.

3.2.1. Dependent variable

¹² ESS 9 from 2018 has not yet published data for all of the countries I use in my research, therefore it is not included in the analysis.

The dependent variable is which party the respondent voted for in the last national election (item prtvt¹³ in ESS data). The answer categories include approximately ten of the relevant parties in the system in which the respondents chose which they voted for. In this research, this variable is re-coded into a nominal dichotomous variable in which if a respondent voted for a Christian Democratic party they get a coded answer 1, if they voted for any other party in the party system they get a 0, including the non-specified category ‘other’. If the respondent did not vote or was not eligible to vote they are not included in the analysis by treating them as missing scores.

Figure 1: Bar chart of the Christian Democratic voters in the sample for each country.




Figure 1 describes the number of Christian Democratic voters in the data. Germany has the highest number of Christian Democratic voters, but the highest percentage of Christian Democratic voters is Austria with 37,7 percentage of the votes in the sample. Finland has the smallest number of the votes and the smallest percentage with a score of 3,3. For more descriptive information, see the country specific descriptive Tables 5-11 in the appendix.

¹³ Information on the ESS item names and their respective survey questions and answer categories, see appendix Table 12 for item labels.

3.2.2. Independent variables

For hypothesis 1a and 1b, the protest element is measured by creating a variable that measures distrust towards the political establishment. In order to measure distrust, I combined two ESS variables that measure political trust: trust in parliament (trstprl) and trust towards politicians¹⁴ (trstplt). These two are added together and divided by two to get a political trust variable where respondents answers range from (0) no trust at all to (10) complete trust. This combined variable is able to capture a sense of trust and distrust that a respondent has towards the political establishment, which enables to test the hypothesis.

The mean scores for this variable show that the Nordic countries have a more similar score ranging between 4,65 (Sweden) and 4,77 (Finland) but the Continental countries have more variation between them: 3,46 (Austria) and 5,00 (Switzerland and the Netherlands). The theoretical and observed scores range between 1 and 10.

For hypothesis 2, how religious a person is, I use a variable from ESS (rlgdgr) where the survey question asks the respondents subjective degree of religiosity. The response scale is measured with a scale from (0) not at all religious to (10) very religious.

For the Nordic countries the mean values of religiosity range between 3,41 (Sweden) and 5,15 (Finland). For the Continental countries the means are slightly higher, with a range from 4,30 (Germany) and 5,17 (Switzerland).

In order to see whether this variable measure religiosity adequately, and to capture nuances of religiosity, I include another ESS variable as a robustness check for this hypothesis, a variable that measures religious attendance (rlgatnd). The survey question asks how often the respondent attends a religious service apart from special occasions such as weddings and funerals, and the responses are coded between (1) every day and (7) never. The mean score for all of the seven countries ranges between 5,18 (Austria) and 5,94 (Sweden) which indicates that religious attendance is relatively similar between all the countries in the samples.

¹⁴ Only a few ESS rounds measure trust towards *political parties*, a third political trust variable. Including this in the analysis would decrease the sample size significantly, therefore it is excluded from the analysis. Nevertheless, the variable trust towards political parties correlates significantly with the two political trust variables (0,71 and 0,87, see appendix Table 13 for the correlation matrix details) therefore it is safe to exclude it from the analysis and rely on the two instead.

Religious attendance variable is included in a separate model to see whether it produces similar results as the level of religiosity. Note that higher the religious attendance score is the less often the respondent attends religious services, whereas for the religious degree variable the higher the respondents score is, the more religious they are. Therefore, if the religious degree has a positive effect, that effect should be negative for the religious attendance variable, and vice versa, if both measure same phenomena but different aspects of it.

For hypothesis 3a and 3b the stance on the EU is measured with ESS European integration variable that asks whether European unification has gone too far (0) or that unification should go further (10) (euftf). The higher a respondent places themselves on this scale the more positive their attitude towards European integration is, and vice versa.

The mean scores for the attitudes on European unification are slightly higher for Continental parties than for the Nordic parties: all Continental countries mean scores are above 5 (Austria as an exception with a mean score 4,29) and all Nordic countries' means are below 5.

Also, the ESS data includes a variable that measures trust towards the European Parliament (trstep). The response categories range from (0) no trust at all to (10) complete trust towards the European Parliament. This is included in a separate model as a robustness check for the European integration variable, to test whether the two similar variables produce similar results to gain further support for the hypothesis test. Neither of these variables specifically asks the respondents on their stance or feeling towards the EU, but these two variables together give an adequate indication of the respondent's general feeling towards the EU. It is unlikely that a respondent would be sceptical towards the EU and yet would advocate for further European unification and have a high level of trust towards European Parliament.

All of the countries have a lower mean score on the level of trust towards the European Parliament compared to the European unification variable, except for Norway and Finland. The most distrustful towards the Parliament is Austria with a mean of 3,97 and the most trustful is Finland with a mean of 5.

For hypothesis 4 the economic self-positioning variable (lrscale) is the respondents subjective self-positioning on the left-right dimension where the on the scale 0 indicates left and 10 indicates right.

Perhaps it is not surprising that the median score for left-right positioning for all seven countries is 5, right in the middle. However, the mean scores reveal that the range of means vary between 4,59 (Germany) and 5,68 (Finland). It is surprising that the Nordic countries' mean scores are between 5,15 (Norway) and 5,68, and in comparison, the Continental countries' means are between 4,59 and 5,25 (the Netherlands). The expectation is that Nordic countries would position themselves more to the left, since their political systems practice a more left-leaning social democratic regimes. However, it is crucial to note that perhaps the self-position is done in reference to the national context. For example, the Finnish respondents would see themselves slightly more ring-wing leaning than the current status quo, although this would not necessarily be the case if the self-positioning was done in relation to international context.

In the theoretical framework section, I concluded that Continental Christian Democratic parties are centre-right or right-wing parties in their party systems, not extreme right parties. Because the economic positioning is a scale from left (0) to right (10), I do not expect the effect to be a linear one. Rather the expectation is that the economic positioning has a quadratic relationship to the outcome, which is why the analysis includes the economic positioning variable as well as that variable squared. This expectation is discussed in depth in the next chapter where the results of the linearity assumption is elaborated on.

3.2.3. Control variables

The analysis includes several control variables in order to avoid results that are skewed by another confounding variable. As an example, the relationship between individuals' left-right positioning and the party that they vote can be influenced by their income or education level. Therefore, I have included socio-demographic characteristics in the analysis that can affect the relationship between the independent and the dependent variable. These control variables are often used in similar vote-choice models (see e.g. Bélanger & Meguid, 2008; Dassonneville, 2016; Rooduijn, 2018) and they are accepted in political science academia as possibly having an effect in determining which party a voter votes for. To capture the unique effect that the predictor has, it is necessary that these confounding socio-demographic variables are controlled for.

The first control variable I include is the ESS variable age (agea), that measures the respondents reported age at the time of the survey. The mean for all countries is relatively similar, where all countries mean age for the respondents is between 44 and 49.

The second ESS variable gender (gndr) is dummy coded for my research where males are the reference category. Therefore, female respondents get a value 1, and male respondents get a value of 0. Non-responses are coded as missing values. The gender frequencies for all countries is very close to 50/50 distribution, the highest number female respondents are in the Dutch sample with 55,12% and the lowest number of female respondents are in the Norwegian sample where 47,37% of the respondents are women.

Thirdly, to measure the effect of income I used two ESS variables, hinctnt and hinctnta, where the former was used in ESS rounds 1 to 3, and the latter for ESS 4 to 8. Both variables were measured by asking the respondents to place their whole household's income level to country specific income categories. The earlier variable had a range from 1st to 12th decile, and the latter had a range from 1st to 10th income decile. For the purposes of this research I recoded the first variables 11th and 12th deciles to be included in the 10th decile category. After that, combining the two variables together the effect of income can be controlled for through all ESS rounds.

In order to control for the effect that education has, as the fourth control variable, I use the ESS variable which measures the respondent's highest achieved level of education (original values and categories are in Table 12 in the appendix, item label eisced). This was recoded into more continuous style, following the recoding of Roodjuin (2018: 359): (1) less than lower secondary education, (2) lower secondary education completed, (3) upper secondary education completed, (4) post-secondary non-third level education completed, and (5) third level education completed.

The median response for all countries was 3, and there was only small variation between the countries means. The lowest mean score was 3,01 (the Netherlands) and the highest mean score was 3,56 (Norway). It is important to note that Finland, Sweden and Austria had a high number of responses for the category (0) 'cannot be applied to these education categories', which is why the full model for these three countries is performed both with and without the controlling effect of education. If excluding 'education' for these three countries has significant effects for any hypothesis testing it will be discussed in the next chapter (see appendix Table 17 without the education variable).

I include and treat social welfare as control variable as well, because both styles of Christian Democracy are strong advocates for social welfare. Although there are contextual differences in the degree of social welfare that is desired to be implemented, they are not comparable between parties

because the Nordic countries are more social welfare focused than the Continental ones, so the level of social welfare is already higher to begin with. Therefore, we can presume that both styles of Christian Democracy are advocates for social welfare policies in their respective party systems. In other words, social welfare is not a demarcation line that separates the two styles of Christian Democracy, rather it is something that unites them. By controlling for the effect of a voter supporting social welfare and voting for Christian Democrats, we are able to interpret the unique effect of the other predictors in the analysis.

Social welfare is measured in the ESS data by asking the respondent should the government reduce differences between income levels (gincdif), with a scale from (1) agree strongly to (5) disagree strongly. Reducing differences in income levels captures whether a respondent favours implementing social welfare or not, because income redistribution (through taxation) allows implementing welfare schemes and policies (Milanovic, 2000). If a respondent advocates for social welfare, they are very likely to advocate it through income redistribution.

For social welfare the median response for all countries was 2, and the mean score ranged between 2,07 (Finland) and 2,58 (the Netherlands). As expected, the mean score of social welfare was slightly lower for Nordic countries which means the Nordic respondents in general favour more income redistribution than the Continental respondents (the only exception for this was Austria, which had a mean score lower than Sweden and Norway).

In addition, to control for the year fixed effects I dummy-coded each ESS round and include them as control variables. Since the research question does not include a longitudinal aspect, the year-fixed effects are included in the analysis but not displayed in the regression tables. This means that the year-effects are accounted for but not included in the interpretation.

Variables measuring education, income and left-right alignment are treated as continuous variables to ease the interpretation of their effects.

More descriptive information on the country specific distribution and range of the variables see appendix Tables 5-11.

3.3. Method and assumptions

I want to analyse firstly, what the Christian Democratic voter bases have in common, within the Nordic countries and within the Continental countries, and secondly what do the two styles differ on. Is there a sufficient amount of differences in the key characteristics between the two to draw the conclusions that they represent two separate styles of Christian Democratic parties?

In order to test this, I perform separate logistic regression analyses for each country's electorate. It is *not* a pooled analysis where voters are nested in countries but a separate logistic regression analysis for each country's electorates in order to capture information on them in their own respective party system¹⁵. This method allows us to analyse whether all Nordic electorates share the expected characteristics and the separate analysis for each Christian Democratic party's electorate reveals which features show a general trend across Nordic and Continental electorates, and whether these trends are significantly different, as expected.

Performing separate tests for each country means that the country effects cannot be studied but that the country specific differences are kept constant, which means that when this method is used the country specific effects are incorporated in the intercept (i.e. the mean) for each country's regression analysis (Bryan & Jenkins, 2016). The downside of this method is that some individual level variables can be influenced by country specific characteristics and this *causal heterogeneity* cannot be captured in separate regression analyses. Some predictors' values can be similar among individuals in a country due to country specific effects. For example, when a country has a stable and responsive government the level of political trust is likely to be higher than in countries where the government is less responsive. Each logistic regression tests the hypotheses for each country separately, which ensures that differences between countries do not skew the results but rather each test is focused on one country only. This allows finding out more accurately of what unites the Christian Democratic party voters in their respective party systems across countries, i.e. all results are country specific.

Performing separate analyses for each country create an additional problem, where the effect sizes of the predictors are not comparable across countries. This means that the sizes of the predictor coefficients cannot be compared between countries because each parameter is country specific (Bryan & Jenkins, 2016). Because this is exactly what the research question aims to determine the problems of interpreting the effects between countries must be addressed. Firstly, the sample sizes for each

¹⁵ Another option would have been to do a time-series analysis including multiple time points, where the voters are pooled in years. However, this method is only useful to answer longitudinal research questions, and since that is not the aim of this paper this method is not used here.

country's electorate are different. Comparing the effects of separate samples with different sample sizes produces skewed results and should be avoided. A solution for this is *standardizing* the independent variables¹⁶ which allows the analysis to compare the effect sizes across countries. If the scores of the variables are standardized, the effect (coefficient) is measured in standard deviations, i.e. an increase of one standard deviation on the predictors increases/decreases the predicted log-odds of voting for a Christian Democratic party. The downside of this method is that the effect sizes are less intuitive and more technical to interpret, but because this method allows comparing the effect sizes between the seven countries the scores in the analysis are standardized.

However, standardizing the independent variable does not solve the problem of unobserved heterogeneity in the samples. It means that there is an unobserved predictor that is not included in the model but that affects the dependent variable. If the unobserved heterogeneity is different and has different sized effects in each country it can lead to inadequate conclusions about comparing the log-odds between countries. The simplest solution for this is looking at the coefficients: if they are consistently bigger or smaller in one group compared to other groups then unobserved heterogeneity might be a problem for comparing the countries log-odds (Mood, 2010:74).

An additional problem would arise if the predictors that are used for each country would be different, but since ESS uses same survey questions and variables for each country this is not a problem in my data. For example, the control variable income, has the answer categories which range from 1st to the 10th decile of the country specific *national* income level, which is different for each country. If the range was between the lowest and highest decile in Europe it would be impossible to model the effect that income has. The variable measuring education can vary across the countries, because the average level of education is not the same in all of the groups. However, since this is only a control variable I include it in the analysis without country specific alterations.

Logistic regression method is the most suitable method of analysing causal relationships when the dependent variable is a categorical and nominal measurement level (Field, 2018). In the sample all respondents either fall into the category where the event is present, or to a category where the event is not present, and no-one falls into both or neither. In this research, the categories in the dependent variable are 'voted for Christian Democratic party' or 'voted for non-Christian Democratic party'. As

¹⁶ This method is called *partially standardized coefficients*, where the independent variables are transformed into their standardized scores and their effect is tested against the predicted probability of the dependent variable (Menard, 2004: 219).

mentioned, other categories such as 'not eligible to vote' or 'don't remember' are treated as missing values and therefore not included in the analysis. That makes the dependent variable not a ratio or interval measurement level, but a dichotomous variable which is why the most obvious choice of linear regression analysis is an inadequate method for this analysis.

Logistic regression uses different tests to evaluate which coefficients have a significant effect on the dependent variable and how well does a model explain the variance in the data. Whereas linear regression uses ordinal least squares method and F-tests, the logistic regression uses Wald's χ^2 test and maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) to test whether the predictors have a significant effect on the predicted probabilities that the event will occur (Peng, Lee & Ingersoll, 2002). The significance score indicates whether including the predictor in the model is significantly different from zero. To interpret the significance of the results, this paper uses alpha-level of 0.05.

Variance and model fit in this research is tested based on log-likelihood test whether the new models' variance is improved compared to the previous model's variance (which is the model only including the constant). This test is also used for the goodness-of-fit of the interaction model, which includes the quadratic effect of the economic positioning. Log-likelihood values show how much unexplained data there is after the model is fitted (Field, 2018). From this score, χ^2 for the model tests the model fit and Nagelkerke pseudo- R^2 values measure how well the model explain the variance in the data. The pseudo- R^2 values are not perfectly comparable to the linear regression models R^2 values (Menard, 2002), which show the level of variance on the dependent variable explained by the independent variables. Nevertheless, the pseudo- R^2 gives a rough indication of how much variance the model explains, the higher the score the more of the variance in the sample it explains. To compare the goodness-of-fit of the models with different combinations of predictors, and more importantly across samples, I use the Akaike information criterion (AIC) (Field, 2018) because it allows comparison between two separate models that are not even necessarily nested models (Cavanaugh & Neath, 2019: 5). The smaller the AIC number is, the better the model fits.

Logistic regression as a method estimates whether the predictors maximise the likelihood of voting for a Christian Democratic party. Logistic regression produces information on the likelihood through logit predictions whether an event will occur or not. Logit is the natural log of the odds through which the logit scores can be transformed into probabilities (Peng, Lee & Ingersoll, 2002). When reporting the logistic regression results in Table 4, in addition to individual logit coefficients, I will display the odds-ratios which are convenient for interpreting the predicted effects through percentage scores.

In addition, this analysis uses ESS own design weights which corrects for the respondent's probability to be sampled which is different in different countries due to population size and density differences. Missing values are excluded listwise in the logistic regression analysis.

When performing a logistic regression analysis there are assumptions that must be met in order to get results that are not skewed or biased. The first group of assumptions are about using a methodology that fits with the data. Firstly, the dependent variable must be a nominal dichotomous variable when using logistic regression as a methodology. In addition, the first group of assumptions also include adequately large sample sizes and one or more independent variables that are either continuous or nominal and independent observations. These assumptions are met in the data.

The second group of assumptions deals with the characteristics of the data. The categorical dependent variable violates three of the linear regression assumptions: additivity, linearity and homoscedasticity¹⁷. Because of the categorical dependent variable, the regression line does not follow a linear distribution but an S-shaped distribution of the log-odds. However, logistic regression analysis has its own assumptions that solve these violations. If the assumptions are not met, the logistic regression creates standard errors that are too large which lead to biased coefficients and invalid inferences.

Firstly, the linearity assumption should be present in logistic regression analysis between the independent continuous variable and the logit transformations of the dependent variable. Box-Tidwell (Laerd Statistics, 2015; Field, 2018) approach is a way in which to test the linearity of independent variables on the logit transformations of the dependent variable. Transforming the independent variables into their natural logarithms and creating an interaction term with the natural logarithm and the original variable the linearity assumption can be tested.

Secondly, the independent variables should not correlate significantly with each other. A high level of multicollinearity creates biased standard errors and therefore estimates are biased too (Field, 2018). Using VIF and tolerance tests we can estimate whether the sample has problems with multicollinearity.

¹⁷ Homoscedasticity is not an assumption in logistic regression which is why it is not further discussed nor tested here.

Thirdly, the logistic regression should not have a significant number of outliers in the data and the outliers should not have influentially high values. To test this, I have conducted analysis on the standardized residuals for the independent variables in the model and looked at the Cook's distance of the outliers.

The results of the assumption tests and the analysis are discussed in the next chapter.

Chapter 4. Results and analysis

This chapter will begin by elaborating on the results of the assumption tests that must be met in order to make meaningful conclusions about the logistic regression results. From that follow the results of the hypotheses tests and an explanation and evaluation of the results.

4.1. Assumption tests

To test whether the independent continuous variables have a linear relationship with the dependent variable's logit transformations I use the Box-Tidwell procedure (Laerd Statistics, 2017). This requires creating an interaction term with the natural log of the continuous independent variable and its original form. The results of this test indicate whether the linearity is present. For my data the linearity assumption was met for all of the independent variables, except for the economic positioning variable (results not displayed).

As already briefly mentioned, the expectation is that the economic positioning variable's effect on the logit transformation for voting Christian Democrats is non-linear which is why the linearity assumption was not present. The expectation is that the effects display diminishing returns when reaching extreme values on the axis, which is best modelled with a quadratic effect. Whether the left-right positioning variable in fact has a quadratic effect requires two types of tests (Osborne, 2015). Firstly, when the quadratic term (left-right positioning squared) is included in the model we can use the log-likelihood test to evaluate whether the model fits the data better. Log-likelihood tests' significance value shows whether this more complicated model is a better fit than the simpler model. The results reveal that when the quadratic term is included in the models it improves the models fit significantly for all seven countries (results not reported). Secondly, to confirm the effect, the quadratic term it must be statistically significant ($p < \alpha$ of 0.05), and these results are displayed in Table 4. See Table 15 in the appendix for the model where the quadratic effect is not included.

Therefore, the effect of the economic positioning variable on the logit transformed dependent variable has a downward bend on the high values (ibid.). In other words, because the economic positioning variable is positive, and its quadratic term is negative it means that when the economic positioning variable increases, initially the odds of voting for Christian Democratic party increases too, but when the independent variable's values reach extreme values the effect on the odds decreases (see Figure 2 in the appendix for an example of what the effect looks like).

Multicollinearity has proven not to be a problem for the variables I use, except for the economic positioning and its quadratic interaction term. It is logical that the two variables have high multicollinearity scores since the quadratic term is the economic positioning variables squared. If the tests show VIF scores bigger than 10 or tolerance scores 0,10 or smaller, multicollinearity is a problem in the data (Laerd Statistics, 2017). However, none of the other scores for the independent variables are close to these thresholds so the assumption of the absence of significant multicollinearity is met. See Table 14 in the appendix for the independent variables' multicollinearity scores.

The third assumption requires to analyse whether there are too many outliers in the data. Standardized residuals over 2,5 are considered as outliers in the data. The samples for Continental countries have no outliers and the Nordic samples have less than 0,35% of outliers in the data. Following Field's criteria (2018) if less than 1% of the standardized residuals have absolute values over 2,5 then outliers are not a problem. Due to the separate logistic regression for each country the outlier scores are not reported. To test whether any of these outliers were influential, I looked at the Cook's distance for the Nordic countries. However, none of the Cook's distance scores were above 1 (criteria from Field, 2018), so influential outliers were not a cause for concern in the data.

4.2. Results

The first model includes all the variables and control variables for the hypothesis testing. In the second model the level of religiosity is substituted with the religious attendance variable to capture the effects that two different variables measuring religiosity differently can have on the probability of voting for a Christian Democratic party. The third model is also a robustness check model where the stance on the EU is measured with trust towards the European Parliament, in comparison to the stance on European integration as in the full model. The results of the full model are presented below in Table 3 and 4, model 2 and 3 will be only discussed briefly. For specific scores of the two robustness check models see appendix Tables 18 and 19.

4.2.1. Full model

First, I do an analysis for the full models which includes all variables, apart from the two robustness check variables, for every country. From the full model we can conclude whether the four hypotheses are supported, or should they be rejected. This shows the unique effect of each variables while holding the effects of the other independent variables constant. Each country's electorate is treated separately in a separate logistic regression analysis.

Year fixed effects are included in the models but not displayed, therefore the results represent the overall averages of years 2002 to 2016.

Table 3 shows the overall results with significant effects highlighted in grey and whether the direction of the effect is positive or negative (+/-). The specific scores and non-significant results are displayed in Table 4 and unstandardized scores are displayed in Table 16 in the appendix.

Table 3. Logistic regression analyses explaining voting for a Christian Democratic party. Full models

	<u>Nordic parties</u>			<u>Continental parties</u>			
	KrF	KD	SDK	CDU	CDA	ÖVP	CVP
Political trust	+			+	+	+	+
Religiosity	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
EU integration	-	-	-	-	+		+
Left-right position	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Left-right* left-right	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Social welfare	+		-	+			
Age					+	+	
Education		+	+		-		-
Income	-					+	
Gender					-		
Nagelkerke pseudo-R ²	0,35	0,24	0,24	0,26	0,27	0,25	0,13
N	6766	3710	4011	9438	7164	1886	4016

Dependent variable: Voted for Christian Democratic party in the last national election (dummy).

KrF = Norwegian Christian People's party, KD = Swedish Christian Democratic party, SDK = Finnish Christian Democratic party, CDU = German Christian Union (includes the union with CSU), CDA = Dutch Christian Democratic Appeal, ÖVP = Austrian People's party, CVA = Swiss Christian Democratic People's party.

Grey areas are significant at $p < 0.05$. +/- indicates the direction of the effect.

Year dummies included in the model but not displayed.

Source: European Social Survey, 2002-2016.

Table 4: Logistic regression analyses explaining Christian Democratic voting. Full models with standardized coefficients.

	<u>Nordic parties</u>						<u>Continental parties</u>							
	KrF		KD		SKD		CDU		CDA		ÖVP		CVP	
	<i>B</i>	<i>OR</i>	<i>B</i>	<i>OR</i>	<i>B</i>	<i>OR</i>	<i>B</i>	<i>OR</i>	<i>B</i>	<i>OR</i>	<i>B</i>	<i>OR</i>	<i>B</i>	<i>OR</i>
Political trust	0,26*** (0,04)	1,30	0,14 (0,09)	1,15	0,08 (0,06)	1,08	0,25*** (0,05)	1,28	0,25*** (0,04)	1,28	0,35*** (0,04)	1,42	0,16*** (0,04)	1,17
Religiosity	1,87*** (0,04)	6,47	1,08*** (0,07)	2,94	2,06*** (0,10)	7,83	0,29*** (0,04)	1,34	0,59*** (0,03)	1,81	0,49*** (0,04)	1,63	0,54*** (0,04)	1,72
EU integration	-0,44*** (0,04)	0,65	-0,62*** (0,08)	0,54	-0,44*** (0,06)	0,65	-0,12** (0,04)	0,88	0,16*** (0,04)	1,17	0,04 (0,04)	1,04	0,15*** (0,04)	1,16
Left-right scale	3,55*** (0,22)	34,75	3,52*** (0,53)	33,70	1,23*** (0,27)	3,42	1,84*** (0,23)	6,32	3,52*** (0,24)	33,68	4,18*** (0,28)	65,55	3,40*** (0,23)	30,05
Left-right* left-right	-3,14*** (0,20)	0,04	-2,50*** (0,43)	0,08	-1,08*** (0,24)	0,34	-0,80** (0,23)	0,45	-2,72*** (0,21)	0,07	-3,03*** (0,26)	0,04	-3,13*** (0,22)	0,04
Social welfare	0,07* (0,03)	1,07	0,14 (0,08)	1,15	-0,37*** (0,06)	0,69	0,21*** (0,04)	1,23	0,01 (0,03)	1,01	0,00 (0,04)	1,00	0,01 (0,03)	1,01
Age	-0,02 (0,03)	0,98	-0,09 (0,07)	0,92	-0,09 (0,06)	0,91	0,04 (0,04)	1,04	0,34*** (0,04)	1,40	0,21*** (0,04)	1,24	-0,04 (0,04)	0,96
Education	-0,04 (0,03)	0,96	0,30*** (0,08)	1,35	0,32*** (0,06)	1,38	-0,10 (0,05)	0,90	-0,07* (0,03)	0,93	0,01 (0,05)	1,01	-0,15** (0,04)	0,87
Income	-0,10** (0,04)	0,90	-0,05 (0,07)	0,95	0,03 (0,06)	1,03	0,03 (0,05)	1,03	-0,08 (0,04)	0,93	0,20*** (0,05)	1,27	-0,06 (0,04)	0,94
Gender	0,03 (0,03)	1,03	-0,12 (0,06)	0,89	-0,06 (0,5)	0,95	0,00 (0,04)	1,00	-0,07* (0,03)	0,94	0,01 (0,04)	1,01	-0,05 (0,03)	0,95
Intercept	-4,04*** (0,10)	-	-4,17*** (0,18)	-	-5,07*** (0,14)	-	-0,28*** (0,10)	-	-2,77 (0,11)	-	-1,51*** (0,06)	-	-2,10*** (0,09)	-
Chi² for model	3961,56	-	535,01	-	1033,61	-	810,08	-	1736,07	-	895,50	-	773,940	-
Log likelihood	9374,92	-	2037,45	-	3732,23	-	498,52	-	7516,46	-	4622,40	-	7607,00	-
Nagelkerke pseudo-R²	0,35	-	0,24	-	0,24	-	0,26	-	0,27	-	0,25	-	0,13	-
AIC	9637,07	-	1886,82	-	3822,17	-	4378,49	-	7413,82	-	4459,85	-	7564,60	-
N	6766		3710		4011		9438		7164		1886		4016	

Dependent variable: Voted for Christian Democratic party in the last national election (dummy).

*p< 0.05, **p< 0.01, ***p< 0.001. Year fixed effects included but not displayed.

Source: 2002-2016 European Social Survey.

Although Austria, Sweden and Finland have a lot of missing cases for the control variable education, I include that variable in the displayed full model. Including education does decrease the sample size, however when it is included, the sample sizes remain adequately large (see appendix Table 17 for the results when education is excluded for the three countries). Excluding education from the model changes some of the control variables from not significant to significant, but only two of the effects that change are related to the hypotheses: Austria's EU-integration score changes from not significant to significant and positive, and Sweden's political trust changes from not significant to significant and positive. The interpretation of these changes is further discussed in the section 4.3.1. and 4.3.3.

4.3. Analysis on the results

4.3.1. Protest party - hypothesis

For the first hypothesis, 1a, the expectation is that feelings of distrust towards the political establishment is related to voting for Nordic Christian Democratic parties because of their claimed protest-nature. The hypothesis expects that this internalised discontent towards the political establishment is an explanatory factor explaining voting for Nordic Christian Democratic parties.

In the full model, only Norway shows a significant effect, and the positive direction is opposite to what was expected. If there was support for the hypothesis that Nordic Christian Democratic voters are associated with low levels of political trust the direction should be negative. Because there is only one significant effect and it is positive, and for Sweden and Finland the effect is not significant, we cannot conclude statistical support for hypothesis 1a.

Including education as a control variable reduces the sample size for Sweden and Finland to the extent that I performed a separate model without the education variable (see appendix Table 17). When education is excluded from the model the effect of political trust becomes significant and positive for Sweden. Nevertheless, this does not align with the expectations, therefore the results of the hypothesis test do not change.

Although the two robustness checks, stance on EU and religiosity, do not relate to this hypothesis there are some changes in the political trust variable in model 2 and 3 worth discussing. When religious attendance is included in the model (instead of subjective level of religiosity) the results align with the full model. However, in the third model where trust towards the European Parliament

is included in the model (instead of European unification variable) political trust is significantly and positively related to Christian Democratic voting for Norway *and* Finland, opposite to what was expected. Stance on the EU can have an indirect effect on both political trust and voting Nordic Christian Democrats, perhaps through a slight mediation effect. Testing the effect of political trust when both EU related variables are excluded, but with same control variables as in the other models, the results show a positive and significant effect only for Norway and not significant effects for Sweden and Finland (results not displayed).

In conclusion, there is no statistical evidence for hypothesis 1a, but the results do not indicate a clear opposition to the assumptions either. The results vary depending on the other variables included in the model, and the only stable effect is the positive effect for KrF in all the models which is opposite to the expectation.

Hypothesis 1b expected that the level of trust towards the political establishment has no effect on voting for a Continental Christian Democratic party. However, all of the models (including the model for ÖVP where education is excluded from the model) show that political trust is positively associated with voting for Continental Christian Democratic parties while controlling for the effect of other variables in the model. Therefore, we can conclude that there is no statistical support for hypothesis 1b.

Overall analysis on the first hypothesis does reveal that there is a clear demarcation between the Nordic and the Continental electorates in relation to political trust in that the effect that political trust has on voting for Christian Democratic parties is consistent for the Continental electorate, but this pattern is not present for the Nordic electorate.

4.3.2. Religiosity- hypothesis

The second hypothesis expects that high level of religiosity is more associated with Nordic Christian Democratic voters than that of Continental voters. The Continental Christian Democracy is said to have toned down their religious message but for the Nordic parties, religiosity is a defining characteristic.

Religiosity is a significant explanatory factor in the full model for seven out of the seven countries' electorates, as well as in the two robustness check models, even with a more conservative alpha (smaller than 0,001). Religiosity remains as a strong explanatory factor for voting for Christian

Democratic parties in both styles of Christian Democracy while holding for the effects of other variables in the model constant. In each countries party system, religiosity and frequent attendance in religious services is positively associated with voting for Christian Democratic parties, regardless of whether it is a Nordic or Continental party.

Table 18 in the appendix notes that the religious attendance measurement scale is opposite to that of level of religiosity. A low score in religious attendance indicates attending a religious service often, and a high number in level of religiosity indicates high level of subjective religiosity. Both of these effects are present in every Christian Democratic electorate in the sample.

However, the hypothesis expected that the effect of religiosity is stronger for Nordic electorate and weaker for Continental electorate. Looking at the standardized coefficients in Table 4 religiosity has a stronger effect for voting for Nordic Christian Democratic parties than for Continental parties. For the Nordic countries the standardized odds-ratios range between 2,64 (Sweden) and 7,83 (Finland), which means that one standard deviation increase in level of religiosity increases the predicted odds of voting for Christian Democratic party by 164 percent in Sweden or by 683 percent¹⁸ in Finland while holding the effects of other variables constant. The range for the increase in predicted odds for Continental parties was between 34 percent (Germany) and 81 percent (the Netherlands). Therefore, we can conclude that there is statistical evidence for the second hypothesis: religiosity is a stronger explanatory factor for electorates voting for Nordic Christian Democratic parties in comparison to the Continental parties' electorates.

4.3.3. European integration- hypothesis

Hypothesis 3a expects that a positive stance towards European integration is related to voting for Continental Christian Democratic parties. In the full model, there were three significant effects, two positives for the Dutch CDA and the Swiss CVP, and one negative effect for the German CDU and for the Austrian ÖVP the effect was not significant. This trend continues in the religiosity robustness check model (see appendix Table 18) which indicates that there was no general trend amongst the Continental electorates between favouring European integration and higher probability for voting for Christian Democratic parties. Moreover, when testing for the robustness of the stance on EU in model

¹⁸ From odds-ratios we can calculate the percentages of the increase/decrease of predicted odds. Subtracting the calculated odds-ratio by one and multiplying it by hundred the score represents the change in the predicted odds in percentages. $(OR-1) * 100 = \%$

3 (appendix Table 19) the effect vanishes for the Netherlands leaving only two statistically significant effects: one negative for Germany and one positive for Switzerland. Therefore, we can conclude that there is no statistical support for hypothesis 3a.

When education is excluded from the model for Austria (see appendix Table 17), the stance on EU becomes a significant and positive effect for Austrian electorate voting for the Christian Democratic party. If the conclusions are taken from the full model where education is excluded as a control variable, then the only exception to the Continental style and stance on the EU is Germany. Nevertheless, there is no statistical evidence for hypothesis 3a, because there is no consistent relation between stance on the EU and voting for Continental Christian Democratic parties. The results show variation on this concept that the hypothesis did not expect.

Hypothesis 3b expected that there is no significant causal effect between the stance on European integration and voting for Nordic Christian Democratic party. In the full model the analysis found three significant and negative effects for stance on the EU and predicted probability for voting for Christian Democratic parties in the Nordic countries. Robustness model 3, testing the stance on EU based on trust towards the European Parliament, showed a clear trend amongst the Nordic countries: negative stance towards the EU is associated with voting for Christian Democratic parties in the Nordic countries. The effect sizes from the full model show that the effects are slightly stronger for Nordic countries electorates than for the German electorates which is the only Continental country with a significant and negative effect.

In other words, a sceptical view on the EU is related to voting for Christian Democratic parties in the Nordic countries. The expectation was that this effect is not relevant in Nordic countries, but also that it might differ amongst them. It was thought *not* to be a defining feature of the Nordic Christian Democracy; however, the analysis does not offer any support for these assumptions. Rather, the effect is significant and negative for all the three counties showing a clear trend for the Nordic style, particularly in comparison to the Continental countries which firstly, do not show a unified trend amongst them and secondly, show both negative and positive as well as not significant results. Rather than interpreting this as expression of dis-unity within the Continental style, perhaps the results indicates that the stance on the EU is no longer a defining feature for Continental Christian Democracy.

The Nordic parties' unanimously negative stance toward the EU could be brought back to the protest-party hypothesis. Rather than protesting on the national level, perhaps the Nordic parties' protest

element materialises itself in opposition to European integration and distrust towards the European Parliament. High levels of distrust and opposing further integration can be interpreted as anti-establishment sentiments, although directed towards a supranational institution rather than towards a national establishment.

Although Switzerland is not an EU country, the electorates' (and the parties') stance on the EU is relevant and salient due to the on-going discussion on bilateral agreements (for more see Kriesi & Trechsel, 2008). The two EU variables do not measure the aspiration to join the union, but rather the attitudes towards the co-operation with the EU from the outside. Therefore, the hypothesis on the EU is not treated differently nor excluded for the Swiss electorate.

4.3.4. Economic positioning- hypothesis

The expectation of the fourth hypothesis was that economic positioning is more associated with voting for Continental Christian Democratic parties than for Nordic parties. In other words, the expectation is that the economic positioning shows a trend of significant effects for Continental electorates and non-significant effects for the Nordic electorates.

The Continental countries show a clear consistent trend for economic positioning: the Christian Democratic electorate are more associated with being on the centre-right or right-wing in economical positioning, however the economic positioning squared the negative effect indicates that the effect that economic positioning has on voting for Christian Democratic parties declines when the respondent is situated in the extreme right scores.

The hypothesis expected that the economic positioning is *not* an explanatory factor for voting Nordic Christian Democratic parties, however from Table 3 and 4 we can see that this is clearly not the case. The economic positioning follows the same trend for the Nordic countries as it does for the Continental countries. Additionally, although the effect sizes vary between the seven countries electorates, there is no clear demarcation that one of the styles of Christian Democracy would have smaller or larger effect sizes. For example, Sweden and Norway have similar effect sizes as the Netherlands and Switzerland.

In conclusion there is no statistical evidence that economic positioning is more associated with voting for Continental Christian Democratic parties than voting for Nordic parties.

4.4. Further comments

For the variance explained by the models and overall model comparison across countries Nagelkerke R^2 values offer less information because the values are not comparable across models/cases but rather they only offer information on how much variance in the sample the model captures. For example, from the full model we can conclude that the model explains 32 percent of the variance for Norway and 22 percent for Sweden, but these scores are not comparable, i.e. we cannot conclude that the model explains the Norwegian sample better than Sweden's sample. To compare which model explains the effect best and to compare the model across the countries the AIC values offer more information (Field, 2018; Cavanaugh & Neath, 2019). Based on the AIC values, the model fits Sweden best which means that the goodness-of-fit of the model explains the variation of voting for the Swedish KD the best. The goodness-of-fit AIC for Norway is the largest, i.e. the least well fitting, which means that the model fits least well for the Norwegian sample.

The full model captures only 13 percent of the variance for Switzerland, with the Nagelkerke pseudo- R^2 score 0,13. For other countries the range of the variance is between 24 percent and 35 percent in the full model. The unexplained variance in the Swiss sample can indicate that there is an underlying predictor explaining the Swiss vote choice that is not included in the model. Nevertheless, the predictors included in the model show significant results so the low pseudo- R^2 is not a cause for concern.

In conclusion, this research has found statistical evidence for the religiosity-hypothesis: religiosity is more associated with voting for Nordic Christian Democratic parties than of Continental parties. In addition, the research found trends among the Nordic electorates and among the Continental electorates which demonstrates that when comparing the results related to the key characteristics the two groups of electorates show some differences. For example, the political trust hypothesis test shows that while the effect varies between the Nordic countries, the effects for Continental countries is consistent. Similarly, the stance on the EU is consistent in all of the models for the Nordic countries with significant and negative effects, whereas the effect varies significantly for the Continental electorates. The uniting factors for all of the electorates are firstly, that religiosity has a statistically significant and positive effect for voting for Christian Democratic party in all of the countries, yet as mentioned before, this effect is stronger among the Nordic electorates. And secondly, the economic positioning shows a similar trend for all of the seven countries.

An additional remark is that there is a clear trend of dis-unity for all of the electorates in relation to the control variables: effects are different across all the countries. However, because they are only control variables in this research their effects are not further interpreted.

In a broad sense the results from Table 3 and 4 demonstrates that analysing the voter bases is an appropriate way to evaluate theoretical claims of party ideology. Although the results do not show identical effects to the expectations, the analysis found some results that align with existing theoretical framework as well as unexpected results which show further indication of demarcation between the two styles.

Chapter 5. Discussion and conclusion

Research on the uniqueness of the Nordic style of Christian Democracy has remained on the theoretical level in academia. Although the relevant distinctions between the Nordic and Continental styles can be identified from existing literature whether these differences are present among the voters is yet to be researched. This paper aimed to test this and from the findings we can conclude that there is evidence from analysing the voters that there are indeed two separate styles of Christian Democracy but that these findings do not offer support to the claim that the Nordic Christian Democracy is a distinct party family in its own right. In this paper, the demarcation is perhaps not as clear cut on all the aspects that existing theory claims that it is, which is why it would be inaccurate to conclude that the two styles have completely separate ideologies and party families. However, the results of this paper indicate that there are certain influential concepts of which the two differ in and therefore it is more accurate to conclude that the Nordic and the Continental Christian Democracy have some resemblance and differences between them.

The results of this research can conclude that although there is some consistency among both styles, such as the importance of religiosity and economic-positioning, there are also trends among the Nordic Christian Democratic voters that are not present among the Continental and *vice versa*. For the Continental parties the effects in the analysis showed noteworthy consistency for all of the hypotheses, except for the stance on EU. The Nordic electorates are unanimously sceptical about the EU, which is not present among the Continental electorates. In addition, the voters for Nordic Christian Democrats are more religious than their Continental counterparts. The analysis concludes that trust (or distrust) towards the political establishment is a clear indicator to separate the two styles. Although the results for the Nordic electorates were not aligned with the expectation but rather showed results which were not significant for the Swedish and Finnish electorates, and significant and positive results for the Norwegian KrF voters, nevertheless the demarcation in relation to this concept is that the Continental style showed a united trend and the Nordic trend showed a trend of dis-unity.

Of the Nordic parties, the Norwegian KrF has enjoyed the highest level of electoral support which has translated into frequent seats in the government. These results could signal that the KrF *used to* be seen as a protest party opposing secularisation but has throughout decades toned down their protest voice and slowly became part of the establishment. Although perhaps not a mainstream party, arguably when a party is frequently in the government it cannot remain actively against the

government but becomes part of the establishment. The analysis conducted in this paper cannot be used to test these mentioned claims, answering these questions requires additional research.

This brings about a more general argument about the Nordic Christian Democracy that some academics have already suggested, and it is necessary to point out. Some authors have argued that the Nordic Christian parties have taken a deliberative ideological shift toward the Continental style which unfolds by changing their names into “Christian Democrats” and toning down their religious emphasis to capture a wider electorate and thus become more mainstream (Madeley, 2004; Arter, 2008). The claims of this “shift” lack any empirical evidence and often stem from the mere name change. Future research could look into party manifestos, policies and supranational co-operation (e.g. in the EPP) and through qualitative research further investigate if the Nordic Christian Democratic parties’ deviant protest nature is on the way out in order to resemble their Continental counterparts. Testing whether the shift towards a more mainstream party has taken place among the voters between the 1990s and the 2010s, when the claimed shift is argued to have taken place (ibid.), is impossible due to the lack of cross-national data. However, a longitudinal analysis with more comprehensive national data could be used to try to test whether the claimed shift has taken place among a Nordic Christian Democratic party. Moreover, this relates to the strategies that Nordic Christian parties have employed as a response to declining levels of support. How are these parties reacting to declining levels of support, and more importantly do these strategies work?

This leads to pointing out the possible limitation of this research. Because of low levels of electoral support, the Nordic Christian Democratic parties are less topical in contemporary political science, which is why most of the literature on the parties is from the 1990s or early 2000s. Therefore, the claims of the distinctiveness are from older theoretical frameworks that are then tested with newer data. If ESS had the data from the 1990s, a fruitful option would have been to research the research question longitudinally and evaluate whether the explanatory factors for the Nordic party voters have changed across times.

In this thesis I have compared the key characteristics of the Continental and Nordic Christian Democratic parties, particularly in relation to the features that the theoretical framework highlights as the crucial differences between the two styles. But it can be the case that some variables that were used in the analysis have failed to capture the differences brought up by other scholars. For example, although the protest nature of Nordic Christian Democratic parties is claimed to be both moral and political (Karvonen, 1993), it can be argued that the level of political (dis)trust does not capture this

“protest”. Rather, it can be seen as a protest towards the secularisation of the society and therefore discontent towards the society, or protest against the direction in which the society is going, which means that variables measuring attitudes toward the society could be a more adequate way to capture the protest nature. Unfortunately, ESS does not offer data that would capture attitudes toward society. Future research could use different data sets that include variables measuring attitudes toward society and see whether the claimed protest nature has materialised through them.

Conceptual ambiguity is a common phenomenon in social sciences, and political science scholars have built multiple conceptual frameworks to deal with the problem of classifying parties (Sartori, 1970; Collier & Mahon, 1993). In party classification it is often the case that a group of parties seem to represent a party family although the parties do not share characteristics in all of the relevant aspects, or that there is not a single attribute that they all share (Barrenechea & Castillo, 2019). This idea of *family resemblance* was coined to party political theory by Collier & Mahon (1993) to further elaborate on the groups of parties that share many, but not all, attributes with one another. This can be seen as a weak categorisation (ibid.), however it is a helpful analytical tool to do comparative research, particularly for this thesis because there are some features that unite the Continental and Nordic parties, although they deviate on many key ideological positions. One can argue that religiosity, or more specifically Christianity¹⁹, is a necessary feature for all Christian Democratic parties, however as this research has concluded the level of religiosity of the electorates vary between Continental and Nordic countries. This is a typical feature of family resemblance, that the question is not whether an attribute is present on a group or not, but rather that the strength of the attribute varies between the cases.

Nevertheless, based on existing theoretical framework and the results of this paper we can conclude that the two styles of Christian Democracy belong to a family resemblance category of Christian Democratic parties. In other words, the Nordic and Continental parties can be seen as “brothers” or “sisters” in Christian democratic party family, sharing a family name and some defining characteristics, but also deviating from one another in some ideological features and positions. Based on the findings of this research we can suggest that the Nordic style contains attributes of high levels of religiosity and EU-scepticism, whereas the Continental style contains only some level of religiosity

¹⁹ Since the early 2000s, the Swedish Christian Democratic party has widened its religious scope to also attract Muslim and Jewish voters who support a similar agenda to the Christian voters, such as a focus on family policies (Madeley, 2004: 232).

and comparatively high levels of political trust. The two overlap in similar positions on the economic aspect.

Moreover, there is no reason to restrict the analysis on Christian Democracy in Western Europe, as this paper and many other researches has done. Christian Democracy is a growing ideology in Latin American countries (Mainwaring, 2003; Mainwaring & Scully, 2003; Fleet, 2014) as well as in Eastern European countries (Sakwa, 1992; Karatnycky, 1998; Bale & Szczerbiak, 2008; Grzymala-Busse, 2013). Rather than portraying the dominant Continental style as the object of comparison, further analysis could broaden the scope of Christian Democracy around the world in order to establish definitions of the Christian Democratic family with its sub-styles, or the “cousins” of Western European Christian Democracy such as the Eastern European or Latin American style. Analysing the features of other styles of Christian Democracy enables a more comprehensive family resemblance category of the parties which elaborates on what attributes these four types overlap, but also deviate on.

In conclusion, this research has aimed to contribute to the existing academic debate on the claims of whether the Nordic Christian Democratic parties represent a party family in their own right due to their ideological distinctiveness by including the voters in the analysis. Firstly, it analysed the theoretical framework to conclude which are the most relevant characteristics that the two styles differ on. Secondly it has concluded that based on the tests on the differences, the two groups of Christian Democratic parties represent their own styles of Christian Democracy, albeit not as clearly as existing theory claims. Therefore, we can conclude that the two styles share family resemblance and in spite of having a focus on the Nordic parties, the analysis has raised questions and suggestions that future research on Christian Democracy parties and voters should focus on.

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Appendix

Table 5: Descriptive statistics for Norway, 2002-2016

Variable	Valid <i>N</i>	Minimum	Maximum	Mean/ percentage	Standard deviation
Party vote (dummy)	9865				
For Christian party	733	0,00	1,00	7,90%	n/a
Political trust	13177	0,00	10,00	4,80	2,00
EU integration	9240	0,00	10,00	4,70	2,15
Religiosity	13211	0,00	10,00	3,83	2,73
Left-right scale	12934	0,00	10,00	5,33	2,09
Social welfare	13191	1,00	5,00	2,42	1,01
Age	13247	15	104	46,07	18,03
Education	13178	1,00	5,00	3,58	1,17
Income	12713	1,00	10,00	6,65	2,81
Trust EP	11414	0,00	10,00	4,85	2,07
Religious attendance	13236	1,00	7,00	5,85	1,20
Gender (dummy)	13248				
Female	6276	n/a	n/a	47,37%	n/a

Source: 2002-2016 European Social Survey.

Table 6: Descriptive statistics for Sweden, 2002-2016

Variable	Valid <i>N</i>	Minimum	Maximum	Mean/ percentage	Standard deviation
Party vote (dummy)	11281				
For Christian Democratic party	589	0,00	1,00	5,40%	n/a
Political trust	14200	0,00	10,00	4,67	2,10
EU integration	10203	0,00	10,00	4,76	2,27
Religiosity	14314	0,00	10,00	3,39	2,81
Left-right scale	13744	0,00	10,00	5,19	2,30
Social welfare	14117	1,00	5,00	2,28	0,93
Age	14378	15	114	48,06	19,13
Education^	6643	1,00	5,00	3,37	1,25
Income	13344	1,00	10,00	6,68	2,52
Trust EP	12695	0,00	10,00	4,51	2,23
Religious attendance	14372	1,00	7,00	5,94	1,16
Gender (dummy)	14384				
Female	7189	n/a	n/a	49,98%	n/a

Source: 2002-2016 European Social Survey.

^ Many responses had to be excluded from the education variable since a lot (53%) of the responses were coded as 0 = 'not possible to harmonise into es-iscd'.

Table 7: Descriptive statistics for Finland, 2002-2016

Variable	Valid N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean/ percentage	Standard deviation
Party vote (dummy)	10493				
For Christian Democratic party	352	0,00	1,00	3,30%	n/a
Political trust	16074	0,00	10,00	4,76	2,11
EU integration	12081	0	10,00	4,44	2,23
Religiosity	16152	0,00	10,00	5,15	2,74
Left-right scale	15472	0,00	10,00	5,68	2,02
Social welfare	16034	1,00	5,00	2,07	1,00
Age	16200	15	100	48,67	18,95
Education^	8075	1,00	5,00	3,28	1,34
Income	14925	1,00	10,00	6,09	2,53
Trust EP	15581	0,00	10,00	5,00	2,20
Religious attendance	16184	1,00	7,00	5,72	1,14
Gender (dummy)	16200				
Female	8323	n/a	n/a	51,38%	n/a

Source: 2002-2016 European Social Survey.

^Many responses had to be excluded from the education variable since a lot (50%) of responses were coded as 0 = not possible to harmonise into es-iscd.

Table 8: Descriptive statistics for Germany, 2002-2016

Variable	Valid N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean/ percentage	Standard deviation
Party vote (dummy)	14925				
For Christian Democratic party	5102	0,00	1,00	35,30%	n/a
Political trust	23144	0,00	10,00	3,53	2,19
EU integration	16847	0,00	10,00	5,30	2,81
Religiosity	23249	0,00	10,00	3,95	3,05
Left-right scale	21762	0,00	10,00	4,50	1,85
Social welfare	22983	1,00	5,00	2,29	1,05
Age	23157	15	102	48,24	18,17
Education	23213	1,00	5,00	3,39	1,02
Income	19174	1,00	10,00	5,89	2,65
Trust EP	21698	0,00	10,00	4,18	2,36
Religious attendance	23268	1,00	7,00	5,78	1,35
Gender (dummy)	23343				
Female	11567	n/a	n/a	49,55%	n/a

Source: 2002-2016 European Social Survey.

Table 9: Descriptive statistics for the Netherlands, 2002-2016

Variable	Valid N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean/ percentage	Standard deviation
Party vote (dummy)	11528				
For Christian Democratic party	2358	0,00	1,00	21,10%	n/a
Political trust	15008	0,00	10,00	4,97	1,94
EU integration	10759	0,00	10,00	5,17	2,37
Religiosity	15140	0	10,00	4,73	3,09
Left-right scale	14404	0	10,00	5,21	2,01
Social welfare	15053	1,00	5,00	2,54	1,08
Age	15181	14	97	49,83	17,81
Education	15143	1,00	5,00	3,04	1,33
Income	13182	1,00	10,00	6,28	2,52
Trust EP	14174	0,00	10,00	4,70	2,06
Religious attendance	15174	1,00	7,00	5,89	1,52
Gender (dummy)	15186				
Female	8371	n/a	n/a	55,12%	n/a

Source: 2002-2016 European Social Survey.

Table 10: Descriptive statistics for Austria, 2002-2016

Variable	Valid N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean/ percentage	Standard deviation
Party vote (dummy)	6211				
For Christian Democratic party	2167	0,00	1,00	37,70%	n/a
Political trust	10506	0,00	10,00	3,48	2,35
EU integration	8079	0,00	10,00	4,19	2,77
Religiosity	10631	0,00	10,00	4,97	2,86
Left-right scale	9365	0,00	10,00	4,74	1,96
Social welfare	10337	1,00	5,00	2,13	1,04
Age	10691	15	97	46,47	17,86
Education^	3794	1,00	5,00	3,16	0,95
Income	7099	1,00	10,00	6,34	2,35
Trust EP	10027	0,00	10,00	3,90	2,55
Religious attendance	10644	1,00	7,00	5,24	1,48
Gender (dummy)	10723				
Female	5768	n/a	n/a	53,79%	n/a

Source: 2002-2016 European Social Survey.

^ Many Austrian responses had to be excluded from the sample since a lot (75%) of the responses were coded as 0 = not possible to harmonise into es-ised.

Table 11: Descriptive statistics for Switzerland, 2002-2016

Variable	Valid <i>N</i>	Minimum	Maximum	Mean/ percentage	Standard deviation
Party vote	6384				
For Christian Democratic party	887	0,00	1,00	13,7%	n/a
Political trust	13481	0,00	10,00	5,00	1,97
EU integration	9855	0,00	10,00	4,98	2,46
Religiosity	13757	0,00	10,00	5,16	2,92
Left-right scale	12913	0,00	10,00	5,03	1,96
Social welfare	13659	1,00	5,00	2,38	1,05
Age	13846	14	102	48,10	18,33
Education	13803	1,00	5,00	3,19	1,04
Income	11117	1,00	10,00	6,72	2,71
Trust EP	12293	0,00	10,00	4,63	2,21
Religious attendance	13830	1,00	7,00	5,48	1,39
Gender	13859				
Female	7221	n/a	n/a	52,10%	n/a

Source: 2002-2016 European Social Survey.

Table 12: ESS item labels

Item name	Survey question	Response set /Answer categories (scale)
<u>Dependent variable</u>		
prtv [country code]	Which political party did you vote for in the last national election?	Numerical list of approximately 10 parties in the party system. 66 = not applicable, 77 = refusal, 88 = don't know, 99 = no answer.
<u>Independent variables</u>		
trstprl	Please tell me on a score of 0-10 how much you personally trust each of the institutions I read out. 0 means you do not trust an institution at all, and 10 means you have complete trust. Firstly... ..[country]'s parliament?	0 = no trust at all, 10 = complete trust, 77 = refusal, 88 = don't know, 99 = no answer.
trstplt	Please tell me on a score of 0-10 how much you personally trust each of the institutions I read out. 0 means you do not trust an institution at all, and 10 means you have complete trust. Firstly... ..politicians?	0 = no trust at all, 10 = complete trust, 77 = refusal, 88 = don't know, 99 = no answer.
rlgdgr	Regardless of whether you belong to a particular religion, how religious would you say you are?	0 = not at all religious, 10 = very religious, 77 = refusal, 88 = don't know, 99 = no answer.
euftr	Now thinking about the European Union, some say European unification should go further. Others say it has already gone too far. Using this card, what number on the scale best describes your position?	0 = unification already gone too far, 10 = unification go further, 77 = refusal, 88 = don't know, 99 = no answer.
lrscle	In politics people sometimes talk of 'left' and 'right'. Using this card, where would you place yourself on this scale, where 0 means the left and 10 means the right?	0 = left, 10 = right, 77 = refusal, 88 = don't know, 99 = no answer.
rlgatnd	Apart from special occasions such as weddings and funerals, about how often do you attend religious services nowadays?	1 = every day, 7 = never, 77 = refusal, 88 = don't know, 99 = no answer.
trstep	Using this card, please tell me on a score of 0-10 how much you personally trust each of the institutions I read out. 0 means you do not trust an institution at all, and 10 means you have complete trust. Firstly... ..the European Parliament?	0 = no trust at all, 10 = complete trust, 77 = refusal, 88 = don't know, 99 = no answer.

<u>Control variables</u>		
agea	Age of the respondent.	Age in years; 999 = not available.
gndr	Gender of the respondent	1 = male, 2 = female, 9 = no answer
eisced	Generated variable: Highest level of education, ES - ISCED	0 = Not possible to harmonise into ES-ISCED 1 = ES-ISCED I, less than lower secondary 2 = ES-ISCED II, lower secondary 3 = ES-ISCED IIIb, lower tier upper secondary 4 = ES-ISCED IIIa, upper tier upper secondary 5 = ES-ISCED IV, advanced vocational, sub-degree 6 = ES-ISCED V1, lower tertiary education, BA level 7 = ES-ISCED V2, higher tertiary education, >= MA level 55= Other 77 = Refusal 88 = Don't know 99 = No answer
hinctnta	Using this card, please tell me which letter describes your household's total income, after tax and compulsory deductions, from all sources? If you don't know the exact figure, please give an estimate. Use the part of the card that you know best: weekly, monthly or annual income.	1 st – 10 th decile, 77 = refusal, 88 = don't know, 99 = no answer
hinctnt	Using this card, please tell me which letter describes your household's total income, after tax and compulsory deductions, from all sources? If you don't know the exact figure, please give an estimate. Use the part of the card that you know best: weekly, monthly or annual income.	1 st – 12 th decile, 77 = refusal, 88 = don't know, 99 = no answer

Source: European Social Survey, europeansocialsurvey.org

Table 13: Correlation matrix for political trust variables

	Trust in parliament	Trust in politicians
Trust in parliament		
Trust in politicians	0,74***	
Trust in political parties	0,71***	0,87***

Valid N: 88958

*p< 0.05, **p< 0.01, ***p< 0.001 (two-tailed test).

Source: European Social Survey 2002-2016, all countries.

Figure 2: Scatterplot of the quadratic effect of the predicted probability for voting for Christian Democratic party and economic positioning in Germany.




Table 14: Multicollinearity tests for all countries, 2002-2016

	Norway	Sweden	Finland	Germany	Netherlands	Austria	Switzer- land
Political trust	0,93 (1,08)	0,88 (1,14)	0,86 (1,17)	0,88 (1,14)	0,87 (1,15)	0,88 (1,14)	0,96 (1,04)
Religiosity	0,91 (1,11)	0,92 (1,09)	0,84 (1,19)	0,90 (1,12)	0,92 (1,09)	0,88 (1,14)	0,91 (1,10)
EU integration	0,96 (1,04)	0,90 (1,12)	0,88 (1,14)	0,88 (1,14)	0,88 (1,14)	0,82 (1,22)	0,80 (1,25)
Left-right position	0,06 (16,99)	0,07 (13,44)	0,06 (16,80)	0,09 (11,01)	0,06 (16,26)	0,09 (11,82)	0,07 (14,98)
Left-right* left-right	0,06 (16,76)	0,08 (13,17)	0,06 (16,73)	0,09 (10,83)	0,06 (15,99)	0,09 (11,50)	0,07 (14,42)
Age	0,88 (1,14)	0,84 (1,20)	0,78 (1,28)	0,94 (1,07)	0,89 (1,12)	0,88 (1,13)	0,90 (1,11)
Gender	0,94 (1,06)	0,93 (1,07)	0,92 (1,08)	0,95 (1,05)	0,95 (1,05)	0,97 (1,03)	0,92 (1,09)
Education	0,86 (1,16)	0,77 (1,30)	0,71 (1,41)	0,86 (1,17)	0,78 (1,29)	0,84 (1,19)	0,84 (1,19)
Income	0,92 (1,09)	0,83 (1,20)	0,79 (1,26)	0,86 (1,16)	0,81 (1,23)	0,91 (1,10)	0,87 (1,15)
Social welfare	0,82 (1,21)	0,80 (1,25)	0,82 (1,22)	0,91 (1,11)	0,79 (1,26)	0,96 (1,05)	0,85 (1,17)
Trust EP^	0,76 (1,31)	0,56 (1,77)	0,52 (1,93)	0,61 (1,63)	0,57 (1,77)	0,51 (1,97)	0,68 (1,46)
Religious attendance^	0,96 (1,05)	0,94 (1,06)	0,89 (1,13)	0,91 (1,09)	0,94 (1,07)	0,88 (1,13)	0,91 (1,10)

Tolerance scores for each country's variable, VIF-scores in brackets.

^ These two robustness check variables' multicollinearities were tested separate from the similar variables in an analysis with the same independent and control variables.

Year fixed effects are not included.

Source: 2002-2016 European Social Survey.

Table 15: Logistic regression analyses explaining Christian Democratic voting. Full models with standardized coefficients, excluding the quadratic term (left-right squared).

	<u>Nordic parties</u>						<u>Continental parties</u>							
	KrF		KD		SKD		CDU		CDA		ÖVP		CVP	
	<i>B</i>	<i>OR</i>	<i>B</i>	<i>OR</i>	<i>B</i>	<i>OR</i>	<i>B</i>	<i>OR</i>	<i>B</i>	<i>OR</i>	<i>B</i>	<i>OR</i>	<i>B</i>	<i>OR</i>
Political trust	0,27*** (0,04)	1,31	0,18* (0,08)	1,20	0,09 (0,06)	1,09	0,25*** (0,05)	1,29	0,24*** (0,04)	1,28	0,33*** (0,04)	1,39	0,17*** (0,04)	1,19
Religiosity	1,84*** (0,04)	6,31	1,08*** (0,07)	2,94	2,02*** (0,09)	7,54	0,30*** (0,04)	1,35	0,59*** (0,03)	1,81	0,49*** (0,04)	1,64	0,56*** (0,04)	1,75
EU integration	-0,41*** (0,04)	0,66	-0,61*** (0,08)	0,54	-0,43*** (0,06)	0,65	-0,13** (0,04)	0,88	0,18*** (0,04)	1,19	-0,02 (0,04)	0,97	0,12** (0,04)	1,12
Left-right scale	0,22*** (0,03)	1,24	0,60*** (0,07)	1,83	0,07 (0,05)	1,07	1,08*** (0,06)	2,94	0,61*** (0,04)	1,83	0,70*** (0,05)	2,02	0,20*** (0,04)	1,22
Social welfare	0,06* (0,03)	1,07	0,18* (0,07)	1,19	-0,38*** (0,06)	0,68	0,21*** (0,04)	1,24	0,04 (0,03)	1,04	0,03 (0,04)	1,03	0,03 (0,03)	1,03
Age	-0,05 (0,03)	0,96	-0,12 (0,07)	0,89	-0,11 (0,06)	0,90	0,03 (0,04)	1,03	0,32*** (0,04)	1,38	0,24*** (0,04)	1,27	-0,05 (0,04)	0,95
Education	-0,06 (0,03)	0,94	0,33*** (0,08)	1,39	0,33*** (0,06)	1,39	-0,11* (0,05)	0,90	-0,09** (0,03)	0,91	0,03 (0,05)	1,03	-0,17*** (0,04)	0,84
Income	-0,10** (0,03)	0,91	-0,04 (0,07)	0,96	0,03 (0,06)	1,03	0,03 (0,05)	1,03	-0,07 (0,04)	0,93	0,24*** (0,04)	1,27	-0,05 (0,04)	0,95
Gender	0,05 (0,06)	1,05	-0,21 (0,13)	0,81	-0,10 (0,10)	0,91	0,01 (0,08)	1,01	-0,11 (0,06)	0,90	0,04 (0,07)	1,04	-0,13* (0,06)	0,88
Intercept	-1,99*** (0,38)	-	-3,57*** (0,22)	-	-5,92*** (0,39)	-	-1,77*** (0,42)	-	0,02 (0,41)	-	-0,97*** (0,07)	-	-3,09*** (0,36)	-
Chi² for model	3601,93	-	489,65	-	1009,83	-	797,94	-	1520,30	-	670,33	-	465,99	-
Log likelihood	9734,54	-	2082,81	-	3756,01	-	4210,66	-	7732,23	-	4847,57	-	7914,42	-
Nagelkerke pseudo-R²	0,32	-	0,22	-	0,23	-	0,26	-	0,24	-	0,19	-	0,08	-
AIC	9995,28	-	1925,30	-	3844,27	-	4395,53	-	7630,79	-	4672,05	-	7869,66	-
N	6766		3710		4011		9438		7164		1886		4016	

Dependent variable: Voted for Christian Democratic party in the last national election (dummy).

*p< 0.05, **p< 0.01, ***p< 0.001. ESS year fixed effects included but not displayed.

Source: 2002-2016 European Social Survey.

Table 16. Logistic regression analyses explaining voting for a Christian Democratic party. Full models with unstandardized coefficients.

	Nordic parties						Continental parties							
	KrF		KD		SDK		CDU		CDA		ÖVP		CVP	
	<i>B</i>	<i>OR</i>	<i>B</i>	<i>OR</i>	<i>B</i>	<i>OR</i>	<i>B</i>	<i>OR</i>	<i>B</i>	<i>OR</i>	<i>B</i>	<i>OR</i>	<i>B</i>	<i>OR</i>
Political trust	0,11*** (0,02)	1,12	0,06 (0,04)	1,06	0,03 (0,02)	1,03	0,10*** (0,02)	1,11	0,10*** (0,02)	1,11	0,14*** (0,02)	1,16	0,07*** (0,02)	1,07
Religiosity	0,62*** (0,01)	1,86	0,36*** (0,02)	1,43	0,68*** (0,03)	1,98	0,10*** (0,01)	1,10	0,20*** (0,01)	1,22	0,16*** (0,01)	1,18	0,18*** (0,01)	1,20
EU integration	-0,16*** (0,01)	0,85	-0,23*** (0,03)	0,80	-0,16*** (0,02)	0,85	-0,05** (0,02)	0,96	0,06*** (0,01)	1,06	0,01 (0,01)	1,01	0,05*** (0,01)	1,06
Left-right position	1,58*** (0,10)	4,88	1,57*** (0,23)	4,81	0,55 (0,12)	1,73	0,82*** (0,10)	2,28	1,57*** (0,11)	4,82	1,87*** (0,13)	6,47	1,52*** (0,10)	4,57
Left-right* left-right	-0,13*** (0,01)	0,88	-0,14*** (0,02)	0,90	-0,05*** (0,01)	0,96	-0,03** (0,01)	0,97	-0,11*** (0,01)	0,89	-0,14*** (0,01)	0,87	-0,13*** (0,01)	0,88
Social welfare	0,07* (0,03)	1,07	0,14 (0,08)	1,15	-0,37*** (0,06)	0,69	0,20*** (0,04)	1,23	0,01 (0,03)	1,01	0,00 (0,04)	1,00	0,01 (0,03)	1,01
Age	-0,00 (0,00)	0,99	-0,01 (0,00)	0,99	-0,01 (0,00)	0,99	0,00 (0,00)	1,00	0,02*** (0,00)	1,02	0,01*** (0,00)	1,01	-0,00 (0,00)	0,99
Education	-0,03 (0,03)	0,97	0,25*** (0,06)	1,28	0,26*** (0,05)	1,30	-0,09 (0,04)	0,92	-0,06** (0,03)	0,94	0,01 (0,04)	1,01	-0,12** (0,04)	0,89
Income	-0,04** (0,01)	0,96	-0,02 (0,02)	0,98	0,01 (0,02)	1,01	0,01 (0,02)	1,00	-0,03 (0,01)	0,97	0,07*** (0,02)	1,08	-0,02 (0,02)	0,98
Gender	0,05 (0,06)	1,05	-0,23 (0,13)	0,79	-0,11 (0,10)	0,89	0,00 (0,08)	1,00	-0,13* (0,06)	0,88	0,02 (0,07)	1,02	-0,11 (0,06)	0,90
Intercept	-10,43*** (0,35)	-	-10,41*** (0,83)	-	-8,85*** (0,52)	-	-4,45*** (0,38)	-	-9,39*** (0,38)	-	-9,23*** (0,45)	-	-6,56*** (0,37)	-
Chi ² for model	3961,56	-	535,01	-	1033,61	-	810,08	-	1736,07	-	895,50	-	773,40	-
Log likelihood	9374,92	-	2037,45	-	3732,23	-	4198,52	-	7516,46	-	4622,40	-	7607,00	-
Nagelkerke pseudo- R ²	0,35	-	0,24	-	0,24	-	0,26	-	0,27	-	0,25	-	0,13	-
AIC	9996,58	-	1925,06	-	3845,27	-	4396,16	-	7630,08	-	4673,88	-	7866,93	-
<i>N</i>	6766		3710		4011		9438		7164		1886		4016	

Source: European Social Survey, 2002-2016.

* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** 0.001. Standard errors in brackets.

ESS year fixed effects included but not displayed.

Table 17: Logistic regression analyses explaining Christian Democratic voting. Full models for Sweden, Finland and Austria (excluding education) with standardized coefficients

	KD		SKD		ÖVP	
	<i>B</i>	<i>OR</i>	<i>B</i>	<i>OR</i>	<i>B</i>	<i>OR</i>
Political trust	0,14** (0,05)	1,15	0,04 (0,04)	1,05	0,17*** (0,03)	1,19
Religiosity	1,11*** (0,04)	3,04	2,00*** (0,06)	7,35	0,51*** (0,03)	1,67
EU integration	-0,39*** (0,05)	0,68	-0,42*** (0,04)	0,66	0,13*** (0,03)	1,14
Left-right scale	3,06*** (0,30)	21,25	1,47*** (0,19)	4,37	3,35*** (0,17)	28,57
Left-right* left-right	-2,02*** (0,24)	0,13	-1,36*** (0,17)	0,26	-2,46*** (0,16)	0,09
Social welfare	0,06 (0,04)	1,07	-0,16*** (0,04)	0,86	0,17*** (0,03)	1,19
Age	-0,16*** (0,04)	0,85	-0,29*** (0,04)	0,75	0,14*** (0,03)	1,14
Income	-0,05 (0,05)	0,96	-0,09* (0,01)	0,91	0,23*** (0,03)	1,26
Gender	- 0,13** (0,04)	0,88	-0,05 (0,03)	0,95	-0,06* (0,05)	0,94
Intercept	-3,86*** (0,14)	-	-4,69*** (0,10)	-	-1,33*** (0,05)	-
Chi ² for model	1326,96	-	2030,18	-	2100,91	-
Log likelihood	5489,32	-	8401,01	-	9797,92	-
Nagelkerke pseudo-R ²	0,23	-	0,22	-	0,28	-
N	7685		7702		3303	

Dependent variable: Voted for Christian Democratic party in the last national election (dummy).

*p< 0.05, **p< 0.01, ***p< 0.001.

ESS year fixed effects included but not displayed.

Source: 2002-2016 European Social Survey.

Table 18: Logistic regression analyses explaining Christian Democratic voting. Religiosity robustness check: model 2 with standardized coefficients

	KrF	KD	SKD	CDU	CDA	ÖVP	CVP
	<i>B</i>	<i>B</i>	<i>B</i>	<i>B</i>	<i>B</i>	<i>B</i>	<i>B</i>
Political trust	0,23*** (0,04)	0,12 (0,09)	0,00 (0,06)	0,24*** (0,05)	0,23*** (0,04)	0,30*** (0,04)	0,16*** (0,04)
Religious attendance	-1,90*** (0,04)	-1,14*** (0,07)	-1,84*** (0,06)	-0,32*** (0,04)	-0,52*** (0,03)	-0,64*** (0,04)	-0,73*** (0,03)
EU integration	-0,36*** (0,23)	-0,63*** (0,09)	-0,39*** (0,07)	-0,12** (0,04)	0,18*** (0,04)	0,02 (0,04)	0,16*** (0,04)
Left-right scale	3,64*** (0,23)	3,20*** (0,52)	0,78** (0,28)	1,81*** (0,23)	3,70*** (0,24)	4,11*** (0,29)	3,20*** (0,23)
Left-right* left-right	-3,22*** (0,21)	-2,34*** (0,43)	-0,63* (0,25)	-0,75** (0,23)	-2,93*** (0,21)	-3,25*** (0,26)	-2,95*** (0,22)
Social welfare	0,03 (0,03)	0,15 (0,08)	-0,40*** (0,07)	0,21*** (0,04)	0,02 (0,03)	0,05 (0,04)	0,03 (0,03)
Age	0,08* (0,03)	-0,03 (0,07)	-0,10 (0,06)	0,04 (0,05)	0,36*** (0,04)	0,21*** (0,04)	-0,09* (0,04)
Education	-0,00 (0,03)	0,28*** (0,08)	0,34*** (0,06)	-0,10 (0,05)	-0,10** (0,03)	0,05 (0,05)	-0,12** (0,04)
Income	-0,04 (0,04)	0,07 (0,07)	0,13* (0,06)	0,03 (0,05)	-0,07 (0,04)	0,23*** (0,05)	-0,03 (0,04)
Gender	0,15*** (0,03)	-0,06 (0,06)	-0,07 (0,05)	0,02 (0,04)	-0,02 (0,03)	0,02 (0,04)	-0,04 (0,03)
Intercept	-3,97*** (0,11)	-4,38*** (0,18)	-4,11*** (0,12)	-0,25** (0,10)	-2,58*** (0,11)	-1,52*** (0,06)	-1,97*** (0,09)
Chi² for model	4941,44	570,54	1513,43	816,17	1807,02	987,26	1007,58
Log likelihood	8473,23	2029,29	3316,05	4192,09	7457,97	4527,57	7362,92
Nagelkerke pseudo-R²	0,43	0,25	0,34	0,26	0,28	0,27	0,17
N	6770	3713	4011	9440	7176	1887	4021

Dependent variable: Voted for Christian Democratic party in the last national election (dummy).

*p< 0.05, **p< 0.01, ***p< 0.001.

ESS year fixed effects included but not displayed.

Source: 2002-2016 European Social Survey.

Table 19: Logistic regression analyses explaining Christian Democratic voting. Stance on EU robustness check: model 3 with standardized coefficients

	KrF	KD	SKD	CDU	CDA	ÖVP	CVP
	<i>B</i>	<i>B</i>	<i>B</i>	<i>B</i>	<i>B</i>	<i>B</i>	<i>B</i>
Political trust	0,32*** (0,03)	0,19 (0,10)	0,25*** (0,07)	0,26*** (0,05)	0,29*** (0,04)	0,29*** (0,05)	0,20*** (0,04)
Religiosity	1,66*** (0,03)	1,14*** (0,06)	2,04*** (0,08)	0,27*** (0,04)	0,60*** (0,03)	0,50*** (0,04)	0,52*** (0,03)
Trust EP	-0,31*** (0,03)	-0,33*** (0,09)	-0,36*** (0,07)	-0,11* (0,05)	0,04 (0,04)	0,08 (0,05)	0,10** (0,04)
Left-right scale	3,77*** (0,18)	4,67*** (0,56)	1,41*** (0,26)	2,01*** (0,22)	3,60*** (0,19)	4,15*** (0,28)	3,61*** (0,22)
Left-right* left-right	-3,34*** (0,17)	-3,42*** (0,46)	-1,15*** (0,23)	-0,90*** (0,21)	-2,86*** (0,17)	-3,29*** (0,26)	-3,30*** (0,20)
Social welfare	-0,01 (0,02)	0,12 (0,07)	-0,38*** (0,05)	0,20*** (0,03)	-0,01 (0,02)	-0,00 (0,04)	0,04 (0,03)
Age	-0,10*** (0,03)	0,00 (0,07)	-0,19*** (0,05)	0,07 (0,04)	0,31*** (0,03)	0,22*** (0,04)	-0,04 (0,03)
Education	-0,03 (0,03)	0,32*** (0,07)	0,28*** (0,05)	-0,10* (0,05)	-0,04 (0,03)	0,01 (0,05)	-0,15*** (0,04)
Income	-0,17*** (0,03)	-0,08 (0,06)	-0,04 (0,05)	0,01 (0,04)	-0,07* (0,03)	0,22*** (0,05)	-0,05 (0,04)
Gender	0,08*** (0,11)	-0,16** (0,06)	0,00 (0,04)	0,03 (0,03)	-0,05 (0,02)	0,03 (0,04)	-0,12*** (0,03)
Intercept	-3,85*** (0,10)	-4,35*** (0,18)	-4,98*** (0,13)	-0,34** (0,10)	-2,77*** (0,10)	-1,49*** (0,07)	-2,22*** (0,09)
Chi² for model	5407,93	685,65	1284,89	1071,48	2414,01	872,18	994,42
Log likelihood	14767,74	2574,45	4922,23	5433,79	11059,81	4542,84	9501,17
Nagelkerke pseudo-R²	0,32	0,24	0,23	0,26	0,26	0,25	0,13
N	8464	4638	5058	12232	9576	1848	4986

Dependent variable: Voted for Christian Democratic party in the last national election (dummy).

*p< 0.05, **p< 0.01, ***p< 0.001.

ESS year fixed effects included but not displayed.

Source: 2002-2016 European Social Survey.

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