


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[A TALE OF TRANSFORMATION]

THE IMPACT OF GENTRIFICATION ON AN URBAN COMMUNITY

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Preface

Before you lies the thesis 'A Tale of Transformation'. With this research I look at the impact of gentrification on several important social characteristics of Klarendal's urban community. This is my master's thesis written in order to complete the course 'Urban and Cultural Geography' at Radboud University (RU) in Nijmegen. This thesis was written in collaboration with the Nijmegen School of Management where I was given the opportunity to do an internship. The research questions were established with the help of my supervisors Freek de Haan and Arnoud Lagendijk. Attempting to answer these research questions has taught me a lot, including the application of qualitative fieldwork and the ways in which this knowledge can add to the knowledge provided by quantitative sources. I can also say that after completing this thesis I am a lot more familiar with the ins and outs of the concept of gentrification and have a better understanding of its possible consequences.

I would like to say that I did it all by myself, but that would be historical denialism. In this case, I would like to thank both my supervisors for their excellent guidance and support during this process. I would also like to thank Dianne Meijsen for the many (sometimes too many) pleasant breaks in the University Library as well as her emotional support in the numerous situations in which the average psychotherapist would be dumbfounded. I hope you will enjoy reading this work.

Stefan Venema

Nijmegen, the 5th of April 2018.

Abstract

The aim of this thesis is to draw clear links between gentrification and several important social characteristics of Klarendal's community. The social cohesion within the community of Klarendal will be the first point of interest, establishing if and how gentrification has influenced the residents' perception of the social world surrounding them. This research will assess the impact of gentrification on social cohesion by looking at changes in the social solidarity of the people of Klarendal, the perceived quality of their social networks within the neighborhood and their feelings of belonging. Other social characteristics that will be studied within this thesis are the resident participation within Klarendal and the neighborhood-security as perceived by its residents.

The methods used were a combination of quantitative and qualitative research in an attempt to place Klarendal's gentrification in a wider context. Sources included long semi-structured interviews, municipal statistical data, policy documents and were used to conduct data analysis and discourse analysis.

The findings of the statistical analysis make a strong case for the positive impact of gentrification on the social cohesion of Klarendal. The majority of residents seem to agree with this assessment and report that they are very pleased with the high degree of social cohesion found in Klarendal. However, there are some critical longtime residents who report feelings of alienation within their own neighborhood. Several interviews indicate that there is still a significant social distance between the working-class residents and the new middle-class arrivals. Both the statistical analysis of the municipality's data and the stories told by residents conclude that the perceived neighborhood security has increased over the last few years. Even though the statistical analysis suggests that a link between social cohesion and resident participation doesn't exist in the case of Klarendal, there are several interviews that showcase mechanisms in support of this relationship.

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1. Introduction

1.1 General description of thesis topic

After decades of suburbanization it seems like middle- and high income families are returning to the inner-city. The social, economic, and physical impacts of gentrification often result in serious political conflict, exacerbated by differences in race, class, and culture. As wealthier residents flock back into once-low-income, often minority neighborhoods, longtime residents can be displaced. At the same time gentrification is heralded as a remedy for urban decay, curing the inner-cities after decades of white flight (middle-class flight) and residential abandonment. These perspectives ascribe wildly different consequences to the same phenomenon and despite much academic effort there is empirical evidence supporting both viewpoints, suggesting the impact of gentrification is highly dependent on contextual factors. Gentrifying neighborhoods is actively being pursued as a policy goal in cities all over the globe even though its often unclear what the ramifications will be for local communities subjected to this intrusive form of urban renewal. This thesis will focus on several ways in which the gentrification process relates to several important social characteristics of a local community. What happens when the residential composition of a previously poor neighborhood becomes more socially mixed? Does it result in peaceful co-existence or class polarization? Does it contribute to a sense of security and belonging within a neighborhood? Does it forge a bond of trust between neighborhood residents? Does it stimulate people's willingness to participate and help within their community?

Most of the theoretical insights regarding gentrification are produced within the liberal-economies of Anglo-Saxon countries such as the United States and the United Kingdom. The Dutch-context could have a surprising influence on how the gentrification process manifests itself within local communities. An important objective of this thesis is to provide an example of how this influence can be altered in a unique Dutch-context, which signals the relevance of the case-study on which this research will be based. Klarendal is a 19th, early 20th century district opposite of Arnhem's city center, that has been home to an authentic working-class community known for its in-group solidarity, no-nonsense attitude and territorial behavior. Until the 1960s Klarendal was a working-class neighborhood, many of its inhabitants employed at one of the major factories in Arnhem. After this chapter in Klarendal's history many laborers left, causing a steady deterioration of the neighborhood. In 1989 the neighborhood had been a bubbling pot of social problems for decades and its population finally had enough, causing social unrest in order to get the attention of local authorities. Since then, housing corporation Volkshuisvesting, owner of most residential buildings in the district, and the municipality of Arnhem are busy implementing structural renewal in the district. By many people this mission has been celebrated as a success; the image of the neighborhood has improved and commercial activities have returned. In response to these and other developments the neighborhood has seen a recent influx of middle-class residents. However,

it's still unclear how this compositional shift is changing the social dynamics within the community, a question that will be front and center in this thesis.

1.2 Societal relevance

Gentrification is one of the biggest forces affecting contemporary cities and neighborhoods today. The class-based remake of urban space is impacting many different aspects of city life. The neighborhood is an important environmental unit in which a large part of our social lives occur. Perhaps not surprisingly local governments in the Netherlands have grown increasingly interested in social cohesion and resident participation in relation to the neighborhood. Hopefully this research can address some of that curiosity by looking at the influence of gentrification on social cohesion, perceived neighborhood-security and resident participation.

There are long-standing claims, mostly from the US and the UK, that gentrification leads to displacement and new forms of socio-spatial segregation. (For US; Marcuse (1986), Wyly & Hammel (2004), for UK; Lyons (1996), Atkinson (2000). Case studies in Anglo-Saxon countries emphasize the workings of social tectonics and of clashing lifestyles and class conflict in previously poor areas newly gentrified by the middle class (Arthurson 2002; Butler & Rose 2003; Cole & Goodchild 2001; Ruming et al. 2004). It is ironic that gentrification, a process that according to a large number of academics results in segregation and polarization, is being promoted via social mix policies as the 'positive' solution to segregation. Thus social mixing policies require critical attention from researchers with regard to their ability to produce inclusive urban regeneration. Loretta Lees takes it even further by stating that "it is our responsibility as gentrification researchers to create the evidence base needed to refute or revise the claims of policy-makers about gentrification and social mixing as an inclusive form of urban renaissance" (Lees, 2008, P. 2464). If gentrification leads to a decline in the levels of social cohesion it might pose a serious threat to the quality of life in urban communities (Letki, 2008). It also undermines the efficiency of political and economic institutions (Inglehart, 1999; Letki, 2008; Putnam, 1993). A high level of social cohesion is believed to encourage normative behavior thus strengthening several key factors regarding institutional performance. If citizens were to experience more trust, reciprocity and solidarity within their community it would lower the general costs of policy implementation and law compliance, enhancing the reliability of economic and political measures and their impact on society (Boix & Posner, 1998; Inglehart, 1999).

The consequences of gentrification are highly dependent on contextual elements, making it essential to gauge its impact on several important social characteristics of Klarendal's community. This will yield an examination of the social health of this community based on measures of social cohesion, perceived neighborhood-security and resident participation. Negative outcomes of gentrification might be identified within the context of Klarendal, guiding future policy makers in the direction of possible solutions to these problems. Of course it's also possible that the results of this research are in full support of the celebration of gentrification and offer a better understanding of the positive effects this process can have

on a disadvantaged districts. In any case, whatever the findings, this research aims to be an extension of the empirical evidence concerning the impact of gentrification on Dutch communities. In and of itself, this research is also a blueprint of how the community of Klarendal has been influenced by gentrification.

1.3 Scientific Background

According to the majority of academics and urban planners the term gentrification describes the influx of middle class residents in working class neighborhoods. The topic has produced a tremendous body of literature over the years as well as passionate debates concerning the fundamental principles of gentrification: the causes, the consequences, and the scope of these developments. The most prevalent divide between academics writing about gentrification consists of the way in which they approach the root cause of this phenomenon; usually there is an emphasis on either economic or cultural forces as the driving force behind gentrification, although the majority of academics agree that there is a symbiotic exchange between these two forces. The consumption perspective, spearheaded by work of David Ley (2003), highlights the agency of the “consumers” of gentrification and suggests that urban developers and politicians are simply following cultural trends created by gentrifiers. The production perspective presents the feasibility of economic gain as the most important motive for the “producers” of gentrification to start investing in the redevelopment of housing in downtown areas. In this scenario the middle class doesn’t initiate the gentrification process but simply seizes an opportunity generated by the investments of urban developers (Smith, 1979).

An alternative approach to the explanation of gentrification is the institutional approach expressed by Uitermark (2007), which takes into account the unique characteristics of the Dutch-context. There are several state structure differences between the US and the Netherlands; American cities have to rely mostly on income generated by the municipalities themselves whereas Dutch cities receive financial support by the national government. Therefore, Dutch municipalities don’t facilitate gentrification in order to line their own pockets but use it to establish social order in neighborhoods that have become unstable due to different social problems (Uitermark et al, 2007). Based on this understanding of the gentrification process one could say that middle class gentrifiers are utilized by the state as ambassadors of effective governance.

Gentrification in the form of "neighborhood revitalization" is increasingly perceived as a way of decreasing the social exclusion of residents of poor inner-city neighborhoods and stimulating social interaction between people with different backgrounds (Walks & Maaranen, 2008). Social mixing is seen as an essential tool in a lot of urban regeneration policies and the outcome is expected to bring positive change within the community, spawning a slew of beneficial social implications for its population (Buck, 2005; Lees, 2008; Meen et al, 2005; Smith, 1996; Uitermark et al, 2007). This thesis will examine the dynamics of social mixing within the context of gentrification and how it impacts several important social dimensions of a community. Each of the research questions will focus on an important

characteristic of Klarendal's population. The first research question covers a broad operationalization of social cohesion, the second research question will focus on perceived neighborhood-security and the final research question delves into resident participation.


The consequences of social mixing can be hypothesized by both conflict theory and contact theory, creating contradictory prognoses for the impact of gentrification on the community of Klarendal. Allport's (1954) contact theory explains how continued interaction between groups with different backgrounds could reduce intergroup prejudice and create a more inclusive community. Based on the contact theory one would expect social mixing to have a positive impact on Klarendal; stimulating the social cohesion within its community. However, conflict theory is another essential concept to take into account when attempting to understand the dynamics of social mixing and its consequences. Conflict theory describes how intergroup hostility emerges because of conflicting goals and competition over limited resources (Baumeister & Vohs, 2007; Jackson, 1993; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). Based on the conflict theory one would expect gentrification to have a negative impact on Klarendal; damaging the social cohesion within its community. It will be interesting to see how the results of this thesis will reflect these theories.

The social disorganization theory will be used to examine how the unexpected neighborhood changes caused by gentrification influence the sense of security experienced by residents. This theory can be used to outline two divergent consequences of gentrification for the perceived neighborhood-security in Klarendal. Social disorganization theory states that community structure has an important effect on crime and fear of crime (Bursik, 1988; Kornhauser, 1978; Shaw & McKay, 1942; Skogan, 1986; Taylor & Covington, 1993). The classic work of Shaw and McKay (1942) states the disruption of social order within a community can be caused by three structural factors; a low economic status, ethnic heterogeneity and residential mobility. According to this theoretical perspective the compositional changes within communities could weaken the connections between neighbors, effectively curbing their ability to find common ground thus weakening their collective problem-solving capacity (Bursik, 1988; Kornhauser, 1978; Shaw & McKay, 1942; Taylor & Covington, 1993). Based on this explanation of social disorganization theory one would expect the gentrification of Klarendal to erode existing social networks thus curbing the collective resilience of the community, inciting feelings of alienation and increasing the overall fear of crime. In addition, an alternative hypothesis based on social disorganization theory predicts a decline in the fear of crime due to the improving economic conditions within gentrifying neighborhoods. The selective migration of more crime-prone individuals results in more internal stability (Kirk & Laub, 2010; Shaw & McKay, 1942). Gentrification also improves a neighborhood's physical appearance covering up signs of urban decay (graffiti, abandoned houses etc.) to reassure locals that social order has been restored (Hunter, 1978).

The final important concept within this research is resident participation, or in other words the extent to which residents are actively engaged in their neighborhoods and the ways in

which citizens invest in their communities in order to improve conditions for others and to help shape a community's future. The norms and collective efficacy model from Leventhal and Brooks-Gunn (2000) has been used to understand the dynamics of civic engagement. This model theorizes that living in a highly cohesive neighborhood, where people help each other and cooperate to serve the community, people will be socialized to civic norms and behaviors, learning how to contribute to shared goals (Leventhal and Brooks-Gunn, 2000). There seems to be plenty of empirical evidence to support the claim that higher levels of social cohesion are associated with a stronger civic engagement (Brown & Ferris, 2007; Duke et al., 2009; Flanagan, Cumsille, et al., 2007; Kahne & Sporte, 2008). Gentrification is expected to influence the resident participation within a community indirectly through its impact on social cohesion.

Figure 1: Schematic chart of the theories examined in this research.



1.4 Scientific relevance

This thesis will build on the foundation of gentrification theory as well as theories surrounding the notions of social cohesion, perceived neighborhood-security and resident participation in several small but pertinent ways. This thesis will test if the established theories regarding the link between gentrification and social cohesion can still be recognized within the context of a Dutch neighborhood. The ambition of this thesis is to expand the existing literature on the impact of gentrification on Dutch cities (Uitermark et al., 2007; Veldboer & Bergstra, 2010) and the importance of social cohesion within Dutch communities (Anderiesen & Reijndorp, 1989; Blokland-Potters, 1998; Van Beckhoven, & Van Kempen, 2006; Van Marissing, 2008) by looking at several important social characteristics of Klarendal at different stages of its gentrification. This will be done by looking at several dimensions of social cohesion, the sense

of perceived neighborhood security and resident participation. By interviewing the residents of Klarendal the thesis will also attempt to add to the body of knowledge concerning the experiences of social mixing on a day-to-day basis within a Dutch context.

A lot of research on the relationship between gentrification and the social cohesion within a neighborhood is based on 'objective' measures that use methodologically varied definitions of social cohesion (Atkinson, 2002; Jenson, 2010). However abstract concepts like gentrification and social cohesion will be hard to translate into numbers. One of the major challenges facing any researcher interested in social cohesion within a neighborhood will be the development of a good and efficient way to measure this ambiguous concept. By problematizing this time and place dependent as well as subjective indication of social cohesion within a neighborhood this thesis tries to showcase some of the shortcomings of the measurements used in its quantitative segment. Employing a mixed-methods approach offers the opportunity to complement the results of quantitative research with a more in-depth perspective on the possible flaws of the existing measurements of social cohesion. Criticizing the existing measurements used for social cohesion might offer a better understanding of how they fail to capture the way that this concept is experienced by the residents of a gentrifying neighborhood. It could also help inspire some alternative ideas concerning the application of neighbourhood-based social mix policies. One of the challenges will be forging a fixed yet inclusive definition for social cohesion, because it is the ambiguity of the concept that makes it adaptable to various political and academic situations. Instead this research will focus on possible improvements and additions by discussing some of the blind spots of the existing measurements of social cohesion. Although statistical measurements of perceived neighborhood security and resident participation appear to be more straight forward there is a world of complexities hiding in the shadow. The mixed methods approach will be used to uncover these complexities in order to critically reflect on how different observations of perceived neighborhood security and resident participation relate to each other and how these relations can be interpreted. The problematization of these three statistical measurements of several social dynamics in Klarendal may provide some general insight that could be applied when measuring the impact of gentrification on other local communities.

1.5 Aim and objective of research

The aim of this thesis is to draw clear links between gentrification and several important social characteristics of Klarendal's community. The social cohesion within the community of Klarendal will be the first point of interest, establishing if and how gentrification has influenced the residents' perception of the social world surrounding them. There are many different ways in which social cohesion has been conceptualized by both academics and policymakers. This research will assess the impact of gentrification on social cohesion by looking at changes in the social solidarity of the people of Klarendal, the perceived quality of their social networks within the neighborhood and their feelings of belonging. Another characteristic of the neighborhood that might be influenced by gentrification is the neighborhood-security as

perceived by its residents. The final social symptom that will be studied within this thesis is the resident participation within Klarendal.

It's interesting to gain more insight into these mechanisms because it reveals the possible implications of using gentrification as an urban planning tool and will clarify its impact on the community of Klarendal. Hopefully this thesis will also be able to shed some light on the applicability and relevance of the Anglo-Saxon gentrification theories within a Dutch framework. The final objective is to evaluate the statistical measures that are currently being used to inform the policies of municipalities all over the Netherlands. Criticizing the existing measurements might offer a better understanding of how they fail to capture the complex ways in which concepts like social cohesion and neighborhood security can be experienced by the residents of a gentrifying neighborhood.

1.6 Research questions

The following research questions will form the foundation of this research:

- 1) *Is there a link between gentrification and social cohesion within the community of Klarendal?*
- 2) *Is there a link between gentrification and neighbourhood-security as perceived by the residents of Klarendal?*
- 3) *Is there a link between gentrification and resident participation in Klarendal?*

2. Theory

2.1 Gentrification

(Intro)

For much of the twentieth century, urban-theorists, policymakers, and activists were preoccupied with the decline of inner-city neighborhoods across the United States and Europe, as people with money and options fled cities for the suburbs. But an increased interest in the city has reversed the trend of 'urban decay' described in the 50's and 60's causing an influx of middle-class as well as upper-class citizens in former low-income urban neighborhoods (Hackworth & Smith, 2001; Hamnett, 2000; Smith, 2002). The results are increased property values, the displacing of lower-income families and changes in the neighborhoods' character and culture (Atkinson, 2000; Lyons, 1996; Marcuse, 1986; Wylie & Hammel, 2004). Gentrification is perceived as both an economic development and a cultural phenomenon and has inspired many researchers from different disciplines. It has also ignited fierce debates concerning the nature of its effect on local communities in inner-cities. Gentrification has been a source of conflict in many Western cities, often along racial and economic fault lines. This chapter will elaborate on the history of gentrification as well as highlight some of the most influential theories within its academic field.

(History)

Over the last two decades gentrification has emerged as a 'global urban strategy' and has become clearly visible in a lot of inner-city neighborhoods all across the world (Lees, 2012). Gentrification has changed over time and has a history dating back to the early 20th century. From a historical perspective the demographic impact of the process of gentrification on Western cities has been small when compared to suburbanization or immigration. But since the late 1970s, gentrification has dramatically reshaped cities (Hamnett, 2000). Before Ruth Glass (1964) coined the term "gentrification" and shared her observations on its impact within the neighborhood of Islington in London, it was almost impossible for urban theorists to predict the ever-growing scale of this development and its popularity within the scientific community (Hackworth & Smith, 2001; Hamnett, 2000; Skaburskis, 2010). Inwards movement of middle- or upper-class urban residents, as opposed to the outwards movement to the suburbs, was an unexpected development even though its first signs can be traced back to the first decades of the 20th century.

The dawn of gentrification (1910s to 1920s)

In the first decades of the 20th century, American cities experienced what could be recognized as an early wave of gentrification (Hayward & Dolkart, 2010). Several decades before the concept of "gentrification" was established within the scientific community a new middle class was already moving into vacant and run-down buildings located within the central business

districts of cities or hugging its borders. Dilapidated 19th-century tenements, townhouses and industrial lofts were renovated and preserved in order to meet the housing needs of a growing middle class. During this time the majority of gentrification projects were initiated by individual investors who purchased old buildings and renovated them for white-collar professionals as well as landlords transforming crowded tenements into spacious apartments and studios for artists, musicians, and writers (Hayward & Dolkart, 2010).

These early cases of gentrification can largely be contributed to the considerable growth of the number of white-collar workers in American and European cities (Mills, 1951; Zunz, 1992). In 1870, less than 1 percent of the American labor force performed clerical work while in 1930, that number had risen to 10 percent of the population. Clerical workers, including sales employees, administrative assistants, bank clerks and managers within financial institutions or government bodies made up 37 percent of all American workers by the 1950s (Mills, 1951). A segment of this new white-collar labor force wanted to live somewhere with convenient access to the new skyscrapers, department stores and office buildings within the central business district. But the proximity of a wide variety of employers within the city center wasn't the only draw for the small group of white-collar professionals moving towards the inner-city, they also wanted to be part of an urban culture they considered to be dynamic and exciting as well as more socially inclusive towards alternative lifestyles. Some white-collar workers, many of whom young singles or childless couples, found suburban living unappealing because of its predictability and sought cheap housing within walking distance of the many distractions that can only be offered by an urban playground (Mills, 1951). The first to move into the affordable areas were artists, writers, and musicians adding to the alluring charm of certain neighborhoods (Jackson, 2006; Mills, 1951). Gay men and lesbians were another important group renouncing the suburbs in favor of a more tolerant culture found in the inner-city (Mills, 1951). The first public outcries against gentrification date back as far as the late 1920s when writers and artists complained that their bohemian lifestyles and the urban counter-culture in which they had immersed themselves were being threatened by the influx of the new middle class and large numbers of tourists (Reed, 2012). These newcomers and visitors were causing the rent prices to go up and displacing 'real' artists from their homes and workspaces (Reed, 2012).

The vast majority of white-collar workers, however, moved to the urban periphery. Neighborhoods bordering a city's central business district, within Park and Burgess' Concentric Zones Theory (1921) also known as the Zone of Transition, were often avoided by the middle class in their search for suitable housing. This can be attributed to the bad shape of the housing within these neighborhoods during the 1910s and 1920s. People tend to prefer new and quality housing, the majority of which was located in the periphery of the city because of the physical and financial limitations that emerged from lacking the required technology to efficiently build large structures in severely restricted spaces at a reasonable cost (Hoyt, 1939; Smith, 2002). This curbed the willingness to develop residential buildings in these small spaces mostly confining these incredibly expensive ventures to the construction of buildings with a

commercial function within the city's central business district (Hoyt, 1939; Smith, 2002). From a legal perspective it was also difficult to make sense of convoluted property rights when developing in the inner-city once again creating investment risks for private developers and ultimately discouraging them from undertaking residential redevelopment projects in the inner-city (Webster, 2007). During the first decades of the 20th century, the inner city was still considered 'unknown territory' by many, idealized by painters and poets but still very much characterized by delinquency and impoverishment. Living in the suburbs however was still perceived to be the pinnacle of success and climbing the social ladder, progressing one's career, getting married and having children would often result in a steady outward movement towards the city's periphery (Hoyt, 1939). The scale of suburbanization would steadily increase until its zenith in the 60s, symbolizing the values that defined the middle class in western societies during this era. Efficient and orderly urban planning created the perfect place to settle down for a law-abiding and homogenous community of home-owners. Changes were afoot however when gentrification got its first boost during the economic boom following World War II.

The first wave (1950s to 1960s)

The Great Depression and World War II caused the process of gentrification to slow down to a crawl, it wasn't until the early 50's that the concept picked up steam again in several cities and by the 1970s was no longer a small renovation trend that could be found in a few cities but an international phenomenon. The mass production of cars made them more available and affordable increasing the mobility of millions of people. The growing popularity of cars as a way to get around the city had a large impact on urban planning and ultimately fueled the dominance of the suburbanization trend during the 50s and 60s. However, while the process of suburbanization was visible in most major cities in the Western world and gained widespread popularity, it was also a time in which experimentation and grassroots activism inspired middle-class pioneers to migrate to impoverished inner-city neighborhoods (Caulfield, 1989; Hackworth & Smith, 2001; Ley, 2003; Osman, 2011). Gentrifying districts began to develop a political identity during these decades (Caulfield, 1989; Ley, 2003). Gentrification was still largely initiated by private investors and developers without the intervention of national or local governments thus prompting scholars to refer to this period as the 'first wave of gentrification' or the 'pioneer stage' (Hackworth & Smith, 2001). There were a plethora of reasons why people from the middle-class wanted to live in rehabilitated homes in central areas of the city, some of them very reminiscent of the aspirations held early gentrifiers from the 20s looking for a habitat in which they had the freedom to distinguish themselves from mainstream culture. Artists, musicians, writers and many others who were affiliated with fringe cultures wanted to move to a place that was tolerant of alternative lifestyles and even celebrated diversity (Caulfield, 1989; Ley, 2003; Osman, 2011). Certain middle-class gentrifiers settled in downtrodden inner-city areas because of economic reasons, avoiding the relatively high rents of housing in both the suburbs and enclaves that were already gentrified in the 1910s and 1920s (Ley, 2003). Generally these middle-class pioneers

were people who perceived life in the suburbs to be monotonous thus *“rejecting the perceived “inauthentic” homogeneity and cultural sterility of suburban landscapes in favor of inner city “character neighborhoods,” with distinctive architecture, social and cultural diversity, and proximity to downtown amenity and leisure opportunities”* (Ley, 1986, p. 521). As a vibrant realm full of excitement and possibilities the urban core was a draw for all sorts of people but new arrivals in gentrifying districts were shown to be mostly young, white, single, highly educated and employed in white-collar professions or the arts according to studies in several American cities (Gale, 1980).

When looking at the statistics the prevalence of gentrification was still fairly limited, but the phenomenon was widespread, with almost every city in the Western world going through a certain degree of gentrification (Black, 1980; Gale, 1984). In the 60s it was tough for gentrifiers to secure the financing and insurance they needed before buying and renovating a house within a certain inner-city neighborhood. Most banks didn't want to grant loans for these projects because redlining made it impossible to procure vital financial services such as insurance within inner-city districts (Badain, 1980; Dreier 1991; Hillier, 2003). Many real-estate agents also seemed to have a tendency to advice white clients against moving into areas with African American or Mexican-American residents (Gotham, 2002; Pearce, 1976). To make matters worse the public sector was still very focused on large-scale urban renewal projects as its primary policy for luring white middle-class residents back to the urban core. Many of these plans were rooted in the booming decades following World War II and consisted of demolishing dilapidated buildings and replacing them with new housing, completely ignoring the potential of gentrification as a tool for making the inner-city a more attractive place to life (Carmon, 1999; Carter, 1991; Hackworth & Smith, 2001; Primus & Metselaar, 1992).

The second wave (1970s to 1980s)

It wasn't until the mid-1970s that the public sector started to support gentrification and both local and national governments began to play a more active role in stimulating gentrification in a variety of different ways depending on the unique features of the local context (Hackworth & Smith, 2001). At this point in time an economic recession hit the global economy, exacerbating a lot of the problems inner-city areas were experiencing (Carmon, 1999; Hackworth & Smith, 2001; Hamnett, 2000). These problems can be attributed to a long list of converging and interacting economic circumstances and political developments (Brenner & Theodore, 2005). Globalism combined with the political tendencies of neoliberalism have resulted in the mobilization of capital and promoted labor force migration more than in the recent past, making national or regional economies less dependent on a local workforce (Hamnett 2000, Oesch & Menes, 2010). The rise of newly industrialized countries increased competition and employment in manufacturing as a share of total employment has fallen dramatically in the world's most advanced economies, a process that is often referred to as "deindustrialization". Thus the industrial capacity of many Western countries was

reduced and especially jobs in manufacturing and heavy industry were severely impacted by international outsourcing. Many cities throughout Europe and the United States went through some tough economic times when their industrial infrastructure diminished in the 1960's and 1970's. In the last decades the economies of many cities have recovered through the expansion of service and knowledge based economic activities (Brenner & Theodore, 2005; García, 2004; Hamnett, 2000; Hutton, 2004; Rousseau, 2009). During the 1960s and 1970s, however, many cities in the United States and Europe were confronted with protests by both civilians and academics targeted against several symptoms of urban decline; the destruction of communities, the demolition of housing blocks, the high number of vacant buildings, and budget deficits resulting in the suspension of funding for public housing (Jobse, 1987; Metzger, 2000; Von Hoffman, 1996). This forced many cities to shut down their urban redevelopment projects while trying to improve the quality of life in the inner-city with a different approach; municipalities started offering grants and tax incentives for private renovation and more flexible temporary use of old buildings (for US cases see Carmon, 1999; Hackworth & Smith, 2001; Hartman et al. 1982 for EU cases see Hamnett, 1973; Primus & Metselaar, 1992; Jobse, 1987 for a comparative study of both US and EU cases see Carpenter & Lees, 1995). This has introduced new players to the game of gentrification, besides the DIY middle-class pioneers it is now also played by urban developers, city planners, and speculators.

The official support from national and local governments marks the end of the so-called 'pioneers stage' of gentrification and the start of the second wave of gentrification. Although the private sector remained an important driving force behind the process of gentrification, state-sponsored gentrification became even more prominent in the 1980s. In some cases national and local governments had to stage interventions in order to shelter the urban underclass from displacement by the renovation projects of private investors. These state-led interventions were often in response to complaints by some of the first anti-gentrification groups, who in later years got the US government to pass several laws regulating property speculation (LeGates & Hartman, 1982). During this era many still observed gentrification as a positive trend that could be used to counter negative urban developments such as white flight and deindustrialization. Protests against the possible displacement of the urban-underclass as a result of gentrification were scarce because many believed that suburbanization, deindustrialization and state-sponsored redevelopment were the primary threats to low-income inner-city communities.

The third wave (from 1990s onwards)

In the 1990s and 2000s the gentrification process was given an even bigger boost by public-private partnerships between local governments and private capital (Hackworth & Smith, 2001; Lees, 2003). This opened up new possibilities for urban developments on an even larger scale with examples such as Barcelona's waterfront, Paris's La Défense, Moscow's International Business Center, and Berlin's Potsdamer Platz (Hackworth & Smith, 2001). Because of the impact of globalization on the real estate market international investors are

increasingly replacing middle-class pioneers as the primary party initiating gentrification (Coakley, 1994). Thus this third wave of gentrification has seen a huge expansion of the scale of investment and the portion of corporate capital that is being invested is bigger than ever, in many cases causing economic motives to overshadow the cultural approach (Hackworth & Smith, 2001; Smith & DeFillipis, 1999). Because of the growing number of middle- and upper-class residents moving back into the city and the large amount of capital flowing back to the urban core the process of gentrification is expanding. This means that gentrification is being both accelerated in the inner-city areas that were already influenced by earlier waves of gentrification and spilling over into new areas that were previously unaffected (Hackworth & Smith, 2001). In the past decades we've seen the emergence of neighborhoods that are so expensive it negatively affects the livability. Lees (2003) coined the term 'super-gentrification' to describe districts in New York and London that had gotten so incredibly expensive over the course of the 1990s and 2000s that it inspired global investment firms to use real estate in Manhattan and Brooklyn as a method to stash away large amounts of capital thus replacing private renovators or local entrepreneurs in spearheading the gentrification movement (Lees, 2003). This development is making it even more difficult for the working class to effectively combat gentrification and the displacement it causes (Levy et al., 2007). Property values in some districts rose to such dizzying heights that even affluent arrivals from the 1980s and 1990s were forced to move out of the area (Lees, 2003).

(Anglo-Saxon explanations: theoretical approaches by Smith and Ley)

There is an extensive library of work covering theories on both the causes and effects of gentrification. In order to understand the theoretical discourse surrounding this urban process an overview of some the most important theories will follow. A majority of the most influential theories were formulated by researchers from the US and the UK, posing an interesting question for comparative research; to what extent are these theories applicable in other cities around the world?

The geographer Neil Smith formulates his theory about the prerequisites of gentrification by highlighting an economic (production) explanation and states that "the so-called urban renaissance has been stimulated more by economic than cultural forces" (Smith, 1979). Smith's theory is called the Rent Gap Theory and emphasizes the role of the producers of gentrification. The actors that can initiate gentrification (the producers of gentrification) are the state, financial institutions, private investors and professional developers (Smith, 1979). Smith's theory describes the disparity between the current rental income of a property and the potentially achievable rental income (Smith, 1979). Only from this difference arises the interest of investors, to renovate a particular building (or entire neighborhoods), resulting in an increase in rents and also the value of the property. Investment in the property market will therefore only be made if a rent gap exists. Thus, it is often perceived as contrary to other explanations for gentrification related to cultural and housing preferences.

A cultural (consumption) explanation of gentrification is offered by David Ley who traces the origins of gentrification to social movements born out of the surge of counter-culture in the 60's (Ley, 2003). Youths, artists and members of counter-culture communities were looking for an "artistic urbane habitus" in order to be a part of the exciting city-life. The convenience, diversity, and vitality of urban neighborhoods were major draws, as is the availability of cheap housing, especially if the buildings are distinctive and appealing. The influx of these early "gentrifiers" increase the attractiveness, vitality and flair of a certain neighbourhood and will slowly accelerate the gentrification process, gathering momentum like a snowball. Few people are willing to move into an unfamiliar neighborhood across class and racial lines but the presence of other middle- or upper-class citizens signal the relative safety to other gentrifiers. Ley (2003) divided the gentrification-process into different stages based on the occupations of the new gentrifiers; *"within the first decade artists remained the most strongly overrepresented. Typically, social and cultural professionals and pre-professionals are early successors to artists, including such cultural producers as intellectuals and students, journalists and other media workers, and educators, to be followed by professionals with greater economic capital such as lawyers and medical practitioners, and finally by business people and capitalists"* (Ley, 2003, p. 2540). In the end it's the "urban pioneers" who determine which neighbourhoods will be gentrified, prompting Ley to state that it's the consumers who instigate the gentrification process instead of the producers (Ley, 2003). Although both of these perspectives are often pitted against each other both analysts were committed to searching for an explanation of gentrification that took into account both economic (production) and cultural (consumption) factors (Slater, 2006).

The consumption versus the production debate described in the previous paragraph has become incredibly prominent within academic literature on the causes of gentrification because it represents a more abstract ideological and theoretical struggle within human geography as a whole. This debate can be explained as a debate between people who are sympathetic to Neoclassical economic arguments emphasizing the importance of choice, culture and consumer demand, and Marxist geographers who see gentrification as a structural problem created by the flow of capital (Hamnett, 1991). The consumption argument favors explanations based on culture and human agency while the production argument is based on the fundamentals of capital and profitability. Hamnett (1991) attempts to refine this polarizing debate and the dichotomous perspective it has spawned by reminding us that *"both of the two principal theoretical perspectives on gentrification are partial abstractions from the totality of the phenomenon, and have focused on different aspects to the neglect of other, equally crucial elements (...) The two theoretical perspectives are complementary rather than competing"* (Hamnett, 1991, p. 175).

(Dutch explanation)

Since this thesis is based on a Dutch case of gentrification it is important to take this unique context into account when describing the causes of this process. The previous paragraphs

display a variety of explanations concerning the causes of gentrification all of which originated in societies where the liberal values of the free-market have had a huge impact on urban development (mainly in the US and UK) when compared to the relatively expansive welfare-state that was built in the Netherlands as a result of several decades of social-democracy. Uitermark et al (2007) argue that the Dutch context features an emphasis on state-led gentrification; *“the driving force of gentrification in these areas is not the local government's need to strengthen its tax base or developers' pursuit of profit. Gentrification is also not a response to the housing demands of a new middle class. Instead, we conceive of state-led gentrification in the Netherlands, and perhaps elsewhere as well, as an attempt by a coalition of state actors and housing associations at generating social order in disadvantaged neighbourhoods”* (Uitermark et al, 2007). Thus gentrification is conceived as an urban policy utilized as a means to create social order in deprived neighborhoods where the effectiveness of state-governance of is lacking (Uitermark et al, 2007). By installing middle-class gentrifiers into working-class neighborhoods the state attempts to strengthen their political base and influence thus increasing the effectiveness of their policies (Uitermark et al, 2007).

(The gentrification debate)

Generally, there are two perspectives on gentrification within both the political and academic realms; one framing gentrification as a process that negatively impacts local communities and the other portraying it as a process that stimulates the local economy and revitalizes entire neighborhoods. The social, economic, and physical impacts of gentrification often result in serious political conflict, exacerbated by differences in race, class, and culture. Earlier residents may feel alienated and excluded from their own communities, while gentrifiers are often baffled by accusations that their efforts to improve local conditions are perceived as hostile or even racist. The urban-theorist Tom Slater (2006) has been a vocal adversary of gentrification in his publications and argues that the rhetoric and reality of gentrification has been replaced by a different theoretical and policy language that consistently deflects criticism and resistance. According to Slater the focus on the benefits of ‘social mixing’ is one of the many ways in which the negative impact of gentrification is effectively disguised. In a systematic review of 114 published studies on gentrification, Atkinson (2002) found that the majority of research evidence on the impact of gentrification on a neighbourhood points to its detrimental effects; *“Research which has sought to understand its impacts has predominantly found problems and social costs. This suggests a displacement and moving around of social problems rather than a net gain either through local taxes, improved physical environment or a reduction in the demand for sprawling urban development”* (Atkinson, 2002, p. 20–21). This reinforces the image of gentrification as a serious social problem sweeping through inner-city neighborhoods, disrupting communities, making it impossible for working-class people to find affordable housing and thus increasing inequality.

Proponents of gentrification are somewhat less critical of the process and like to put forward that gentrification is a remedy for urban decay, curing the inner-cities after decades of white flight (middle-class flight) and residential abandonment, while increasing the tax base of local

governments (Sumka, 1979; Sternlieb & Hughes, 1983). In many ways Richard Florida's (2002) concept of the creative class is also in support of the gentrification process. His work has had a significant impact on urban policy, emphasizing the importance of luring in 'the creative class' in order to boost the economies of inner-city areas in an era of deindustrialization. Florida (2002) observed that metropolitan regions with high concentrations of technology workers, artists, musicians, lesbians and gay men have a higher level of economic development. Neighborhoods that are considered to be a creative cluster have a large population of creative workers and the process of gentrification in these areas is often well-established (Ley, 2003). These ideas have partially shaped how the gentrification process manifests itself in cities around the world and can be used to underline its importance as a tool to spur economic growth (Ley, 2002).

One notable critic of gentrification is Neil Smith (1996) who describes this process as the 'respectable classes' stealing the inner-city from the poor and minorities in his book 'The Urban Frontier'. Smith (1996) draws a parallel between the violent disposessions of native peoples and the displacement of the poor in gentrifying neighborhoods, putting an emphasis on the ways in which political rhetoric attempts to hide the injustice of these processes. Concepts surrounding the rising numbers of gentrifiers within a neighbourhood and its effect on the power relations between different class-fractions can be grouped within the revanchist city thesis. According to Smith the inner city is not an emancipatory space but more akin to a battlefield where a variety of capital (social, economic, human, cultural) is used by middle-class gentrifiers in order to retake the city. The emancipatory city thesis, however, underlines the positive effects of gentrification including the variety of ways the lower-class residents can benefit from the influx of middle- and upper-class residents. This school of thought is often implicit in the gentrification literature taking on the perspective of the gentrifiers themselves and looking at their forms of agency (Butler, 1997; Caulfield, 1994; Ley, 2003). These authors argue that *"gentrifiers subvert the dominance of hegemonic culture and create new conditions for social activities creating a liberating space attracting marginal groups to the inner city"* (Lees, 2000, p. 393). This boils down to the assertion that gentrification creates tolerance, a contested idea that is closely tied to the social construction of the emancipatory city. It's tantamount to realize that the gentrification process often leads to a clash between ideologies instead of a harmonious marriage. Organizations that rally against gentrification mostly consist of working-class people and/or ethnic minorities and some of their interests are incompatible with those of the gentrifiers. The liberal values held by a majority of gentrifiers can become problematic when interacting with people from radically different cultural backgrounds, which is bound to happen in international cities such as New York and London. Lees (2000) critiques the emancipatory city thesis by stating that *"the dream of gentrifying tolerance and equality has struggled to accommodate people who do not accept the idea that all values deserve equal protection (...) What struggles over gentrification everywhere do have in common is that the particular desires of gentrifiers win out over others because they are willing and able to pay more for the privilege (one's capital in such circumstances includes economic, cultural and social resources). By abstractly celebrating formal equality under the*

law, the rhetoric of the emancipatory city tends to conceal the brutal inequalities of fortune and economic circumstance that are produced through the process of gentrification” (Lees, 2000, p. 393-394).

2.2 Social cohesion

(Intro)

While the previous chapter offered an overview of the different perspectives on the causes and consequences of gentrification and provided a history of its rise to prominence, the current chapter aims to define social cohesion. Another pivotal concept within this research; social cohesion has a long history. It is not strictly an academic concept but used in policy discourse as well as casual conversation. The ambiguous definition of the word leads many to conclude that it's a catch-all word meaning many things. The premise that particular social bonds between an individual and the community are essential to survive for both the individual and the community has been an important theoretical steppingstone within sociology for quite some time, harking back to the work of Durkheim in which the cohesion of a social group was said to be a cure for moral decline and a prevention of suicide (Durkheim, 1897). His work assumed that the cohesion of a social group can have a plethora of merits for its individual members. Pierre Bourdieu's mission was the mapping of these potential benefits, accumulated by individuals for being a part of certain social networks (Bourdieu, 1985). These benefits were referred to as social capital, defined by Bourdieu as *“the aggregate of the actual or potential resources which are linked to possession of a durable network of more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance or recognition”* (Bourdieu 1985, p. 248; 1980). Bourdieu's definition suggests that social capital consists of the social ties themselves as well as the amount and quality of the resources that can be accessed through these social ties. Examples of the benefits an individual can derive from a social network are the access it provides to useful information and specialized skill sets. Bourdieu's work is often used to highlight the role of social capital in producing and reproducing inequality, an example being how positions of power can only be acquired by integrating into certain social circles. Social capital highlights the ways in which the social cohesion within Klarendal might benefit or limit the success of its residents. The degree of social cohesion in Klarendal could impact the number and quality of resources that can be accessed by the members of its community. The social cohesion of a community can have a major impact on the life of an individual. This thesis will be looking at social cohesion as the positive collective outcome of a neighborhood.

(Defining social cohesion)

Social cohesion is a difficult concept to define and policymakers and academics often use the metaphor of a kind of glue holding society together (Dekker, 2006). Robinson (2005) argues that the word is often used as *“an empty vessel into which the preoccupations of contemporary public policy were poured”* (Robinson 2005, p.1415). Social cohesion is given an increasingly prominent role in the policymaking arena at the local, national and international

levels (see chapter 4, p. 39) because many urban scholars believe it to be the key in combating the crumbling of social order (Kearns & Forrest, 2000). The obsession with social cohesion can partially be explained by huge societal changes, examples being the classic sociologist Durkheim describing the impact of industrialism on the social fabric of the Western world or contemporary sociologists trying to wrap their heads around the link between social cohesion and the transition to the informational age (Dekker, 2006; Forrest & Kearns, 2001). Social cohesion is an abstract concept that, according to Kearns and Forrest (2000), comprises of the following dimensions; *“common values and a civic culture; social order and social control; social solidarity and reductions in wealth disparities; social networks and social capital; and territorial belonging and identity”* (Kearns & Forrest 2000, p. 996). The impact of gentrification on the social cohesion of the community of Klarendal will be assessed by looking at changes in the social solidarity of the people of Klarendal as well as the self-perceived quality of their social networks within the neighborhood and feelings of belonging. This is why, for the purpose of this research, the following definition of social cohesion by Chan and Chan (2006) will be used; *“a state of affairs concerning the interactions amongst members of society as characterized by a set of attitudes and norms that include trust and a sense of belonging”* (Chan & Chan 2006, p. 290).

A lot of studies focus on social cohesion in cities, neighborhoods or other local communities. An overview of this work is provided by Kearns and Forrest (2000) who have found five different ways in which the concept was used in the context of a local community. These are: (I) common values and civic culture; (II) social order and social control; (III) social solidarity and reductions in disparities of wealth; (IV) social networks and social capital; (V) territorial belonging and identity. This thesis will highlight social cohesion as a combination of social solidarity and territorial belonging. The finding is that communities with high levels of social cohesion will provide resources to individuals, examples are shared informal child care among mothers in low-income neighbourhoods (Brisson & Usher, 2007) or higher levels of happiness (Helliwell, 2005). Other studies have shown that high levels of social cohesion also generate a collective resource leading to better development outcomes (Narayan & Pritchett, 1999) more innovation (Kaasa, 2007) or overall healthier societies (Kawachi et al., 1997).

2.3 Social Mixing

(Intro)

In the last decades problems concerning social mix and social cohesion have become increasingly popular on many urban policy agendas, often stating social mix and social cohesion as explicit goals, both on a city-wide level and within a neighbourhood context (Kempen & Bolt, 2009). Even though the concept of social mix is often ill-defined, it usually boils down to heterogeneity in socioeconomic and/or ethnic dimensions (Dekker & Bolt, 2005). Moreover, there is considered to be a positive relation between these two concepts: better social mix increases social cohesion. There are many other arguments supporting the ambition of policy-makers to create mixed districts because social mixing is expected to lead

to a range of positive outcomes, such as social mobility opportunities, better services, less crime, an improved neighbourhood reputation, and more residential stability (Arthurson, 2002; Bolt & Van Kempen, 2008; Van Kempen & Bolt, 2009; Kleinhans, 2004). Loretta Lees (2008) also summarizes several supportive claims made about social mixing stating that the middle class can be seen as advocates of public resources and their spatial proximity benefits the lower class, socioeconomically mixed neighborhoods have a stronger local economy and social mixing enhances social and economic opportunities (Lees. 2008). There are still a lot of questions regarding the legitimacy of these claims and the specific impact of social mixing on a community; Does interaction between people from different social classes actually alleviate the isolation of the urban underclass? Does interaction between people with different ethnic backgrounds actually accelerate the integration of ethnic minorities? Does it provide marginalized groups with any useful emancipatory tools to improve their living conditions? Does it foster a sense of belonging or increase in-group solidarity? These questions will be discussed in order to answer the following question; is there a positive relationship between social mix and social cohesion?

(The godfathers of social mixing)

The theoretical foundation concerning social mixing consists of classic works by Simmel (1903) and Park (1924) as well as prominent theories from social psychology, for example conflict theory and Allport's (1954) contact theory. An important notion when theorizing about social mixing is the concept of social distance, which provides an apt metaphor for mechanisms explaining social cohesion between groups. Social distance refers to the cohesion between groups within society based on all sorts of variables, such as social class, race/ethnicity or sexuality, that can have an impact on how the different groups interact with each other. It's important to emphasize that this concept has nothing to do with geographical distance but instead deals with a theoretical distance that can be conceptualized in different ways. Within sociological literature affective, normative and interactive distance seem to be the three most prevalent dimensions used to conceptualize social cohesion. Affective distance is based on how much or how little sympathy the members of a group feel towards another group (Bogardus, 1925). Because this conceptualization is highly subjective a more objective approach is proposed by measuring social distance based on collectively recognized group norms that differentiate group "insiders" from group "outsiders" or in other words "us" from "them" (Karakayali, 2009; Park, 1924; Simmel, 1903). Early sociologists such as Georg Simmel (1903) and Robert Park (1924) argued that social distance between two actors was inversely related to the familiarity with and knowledge of each other's group membership norms. A third conceptualization is the focus on the frequency and intensity of interactions between two groups (Karakayali, 2009). This builds on previous ideas concerning deviating group norms and their effects on social distance proposing that more interaction between the members of two groups automatically leads to increased mutual understanding and decreased social distance (Allport, 1954; Granovetter, 1973; Homans, 1950; Karakayali, 2009). In other words the frequency and length of interaction between two parties is used as measure of the

"strength" of the social ties between them (Granovetter, 1973). The concept of social distance provides a framework which reveals 3 different mechanisms through which social cohesion could be impacted by social mixing.

The interactive conceptualization of social distance already touched upon one of the most important questions within the field of sociology; what happens when groups of residents with different backgrounds interact? One of the most prominent works on intergroup contact is 'The Nature of Prejudice' in which Allport (1954) explains how continued interaction between groups could reduce intergroup prejudice thus reducing social distance between groups. The reduction of inter-group prejudice can be explained by several systems described by Pettigrew as the 'four processes of change' which include; learning about the out-group, changing behavior, generating affective ties, and in-group reappraisal (Pettigrew, 1998). Allport added that certain criteria needed to be met in order for the contact to be beneficial, discussing several criteria that facilitate optimal conditions for prejudice reducing contact between groups; common goals, intergroup cooperation, the support by social and institutional authorities and the equal status between the groups interacting with each other (Pettigrew & Tropp, 2005). Allport's contact theory is based on the assumption that social contact between groups of residents with different backgrounds will improve intergroup attitudes but it is important not to overlook the potential for negative intergroup contact to increase prejudice. Some research even suggests that negative contact may be more strongly associated with increased racism and discrimination than positive contact is with its reduction (Barlow et al., 2012). Within diverse neighborhoods people are exposed to negative as well as positive intergroup contact which is why it's important to remember that interaction between groups isn't necessarily beneficial to social cohesion.

Conflict theory is another essential concept to take into account when attempting to understand social mixing. Within the field of sociology conflict theories are perspectives that stress the social, material, or political inequalities between groups and their struggle for agency or power in society. Realistic conflict theory is a social psychological model of intergroup conflict (Baumeister & Vohs, 2007; Jackson, 1993; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). This theory describes how intergroup hostility emerges because of conflicting goals and competition over limited resources, while also offering an explanation for the feelings of prejudice and discrimination toward the outgroup that go along with intergroup hostility (Jackson, 1993; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). Groups may be in competition for a real or perceived scarcity of resources such as money, political power, military protection, or social status (Jackson, 1993). Feelings of animosity can develop in situations where the groups believe only one group is the winner and the other is the loser. In this scenario the competition over resources is seen as a zero-sums game in which only one of them can obtain the needed or wanted resources and the other group is unable to obtain these limited resources because the other group obtained the limited resources first. When the inter-group competition is perceived to increase, the feelings of prejudice and discrimination toward the outgroup become stronger and the social distance between these groups increases (LeVine & Campbell,

1972). This can take place when there are changes in the composition of all sorts of populations within a society including ethnic groups or social classes. A great example of this is the research done on racial attitudes in the US focusing on the impact of compositional changes within a neighborhood context and its effect on inter-group attitudes. These studies have shown that the racial hostility of white residents increases alongside the increase in racial diversity of the area they live in (Glaser, 1994; Kohfeld, 1989; Taylor, 1998). This relationship might be explained by a 'power threat' perceived by the dominant group that ultimately becomes hostile towards minority groups over the economic and social privileges they fear to lose. In addition to the realistic conflict theory, the integrated threat theory (Stephan & Stephan, 2000) focusses exclusively on describing the elements that produce a perceived threat between social groups. Within this theory a distinction is made between realistic threats concerning a group's power, resources, and general welfare and symbolic threats concerning a group's religion, values, ideology, philosophy, morality, or worldview. These perceived threats between groups can cause social tension which might be an obstacle when attempting to stimulate social mixing within a neighbourhood. Another popular theoretical perspective on the claim that diversity seriously undermines a sense of community and social cohesion is based on the principle of homophily: "*contacts among similar people occur more often than contacts among dissimilar people*" (McPherson et al., 2001, p.416). Thus, people living in heterogeneous neighborhoods are predicted to interact less frequently, resulting in lower levels of interpersonal trust and reciprocity. The gentrification of Klarendal is related to an influx of middle-class residents within a traditionally working-class neighborhood, increasing the diversity of backgrounds within this community. The growing presence of middle and upper-class residents could incite feelings of hostility with longtime residents who believe their way of life is being threatened. This tension could possibly damage the social cohesion within the community of Klarendal.

(Empirical evidence for the link between social mixing and social cohesion)

The theoretical assumption of Allport's (1954) contact theory concerning the positive relation between social mix and social cohesion is reflected by a wealth of empirical evidence. The empirical research that has been done in the past decades suggests that inter-group contact promotes social cohesion and is related to decreases in prejudice and social distance (Barlow, Louis, & Hewstone, 2009; Caspi, 1984; Hewstone et al., 2005; Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006; Works, 1961; Vonofako, Hewstone, & Voci, 2007; Yuker & Hurley, 1987). Positive contact experiences have been shown to reduce prejudice towards a wide variety of marginalized groups including black neighbors (Works, 1961), gay men (Vonofako, Hewstone, & Voci, 2007), the elderly (Caspi, 1984) and the disabled (Yuker & Hurley, 1987). This is just a small selection of the available studies that found a reduction of prejudice as a result of inter-group contact and a wide-scale meta-analysis was done that reached an identical conclusion (Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006). In addition, positive contact is linked to a decrease in physiological threat responses to members of the outgroup (Blascovich et al., 2001), and reduced differences in the way that faces are processed in the brain, suggesting that contact fosters perceptions of similarity

(Walker et al., 2007). All of this research shows that contact has a significant effect on reducing prejudice and social distance, at both the explicit and implicit level. This implies that inter-group contact creates mutual tolerance, which in turn will facilitate social cohesion within diverse neighborhoods, demonstrating their potential to bridge the gap between different groups within society.

However, other researchers find that diversity seems to erode the social interaction that takes place within a neighborhood. In accordance with expectations based on realistic conflict theory and integrated threat theory there is also empirical data supporting a negative link between social mix and several dimensions of social cohesion (Alesina & Ferrara, 2002). Alesina and La Ferrara (2002) found a significant negative relation between racial diversity and levels of interpersonal trust in several American states (Alesina & Ferrara, 2002). In a separate paper they hypothesize that diversity has a negative effect on interactions among individuals and their results show that *“individuals prefer to interact with others who are similar to themselves in terms of income, race, or ethnicity”* (Alesina & Ferrara, 2000, p. 850). This negative relation between diversity and intergroup contact is supported by other studies conducted in the US (Costa & Kahn, 2003; Popkin et al. 2002; Putnam, 2003; Rosenbaum et al. 1998). Some of these studies also suggest that more homogeneous neighbourhoods have higher levels of social interaction, which in turn translates into more social cohesion (Alesina & Ferrara, 2000; Costa & Kahn, 2003; Putnam, 2007). Putnam's work is the most prominent, focusing primarily on the lower levels of volunteering and neighbourhood trust found in socio-economically mixed districts when compared to more homogeneous areas; *“generally speaking, people who live in neighbourhoods of greater economic inequality tend to withdraw from social and civic life”* (Putnam 2007, p. 157). Letki's (2008) research on the impact of ethnic diversity on several dimensions of social cohesion in urban communities in the UK undermines the argument that ethnic diversity destroys intergroup relations. The study shows that when accounting for the association between ethnic diversity and economic deprivation, there doesn't seem to be any evidence pointing towards ethnic diversity having a negative effect on interactions within local communities (Letki, 2008). Ethnically diverse neighborhoods don't have a shortage of social networks, but there is a deficiency within economically deprived neighborhoods. However, ethnic diversity within a neighborhood does have a direct negative impact on the attitudes towards, and trust in, fellow residents (Letki, 2008). Perhaps the gentrification of Klarendal will displace the ethnic minorities that currently live here and turn the neighborhood into a more homogenous and cohesive district, whose residents are more trusting of their neighbors. This scenario clearly doesn't fit into the municipality's narrative pushing social mix as an important tool for creating an inclusive community. Also, it's important to stress that Letki's (2008) work has shown that economic deprivation explains the negative relation between ethnic diversity and the interactions within a community. The gentrification of Klarendal could improve the local economy which could subsequently strengthen its social networks, lifting the relative social isolation of its people.

Overall the studies described in the paragraph above seem to imply a shortage of social cohesion in mixed neighbourhoods and this result is, at least partly, replicated within a Dutch context by the studies of Völker et al. (2007) and Lancee & Dronkers (2011). Völker et al. (2007) determined the effect of both income and ethnic heterogeneity on two dimensions of social cohesion within 168 Dutch neighbourhoods: sense of community and the amount of neighbours in one's social network. Income heterogeneity was found to have a negative effect on sense of community, but had no impact on the amount of neighbours in one's social network. The opposite is true for ethnic diversity: no effect on a sense of community, but a negative effect on the amount of neighbours integrated in one's social network. Lancee & Dronkers (2011) found that ethnic diversity in the neighbourhood has a negative effect on the contact with neighbours.

The findings from the studies discussed above seem contradictory at first, but it's important to remember that the inclination to engage members of the outgroup and truly interacting with outgroup members might be impacted differently by the diversity within a neighbourhood. Mixed neighbourhoods might have a negative impact on the inclination of individuals to interact with fellow neighbours, however once the interaction takes place, its effect is positive. This positive intergroup contact erodes attitudes of hostility and prejudice, shaping people with a more favorable attitude towards others in general. The following paragraph seems to eloquently summarize the difficulties surrounding social mix and the concept behind it; *"Social balance or 'mix' is an argument about the consequences of social class patterns. It rests on the belief that there is an ideal composition of social and income groups which, when achieved, produces optimum individual and community wellbeing. The assumed social advantages of the balanced community have been at the heart of nearly all debate on new towns and urban renewal (...) The difficulty with the concept is that, despite numerous empirical investigations, very little is known about the advantages and disadvantages of different kinds of mix, nor at what level—street, neighbourhood, district, community—social balance would be a worthwhile goal for policy objectives"* (Pitt, 1977, p. 16). His statement challenges the political ideal of a perfect social mix and points out that scientific evidence for the benefits of social mix are still inconclusive. This thesis acknowledges that searching for the 'perfect' balance of backgrounds within a district is futile. Instead, it attempts to deconstruct the political notion of social mix as a tool for manufacturing a more cohesive and inclusive community.

(The impact of gentrification on social mixing)

Gentrification in the form of "neighborhood revitalization" is increasingly perceived as a way of decreasing the social exclusion of residents of poor inner-city neighborhoods and of increasing levels of social mix thus stimulating social interaction between people with different backgrounds (for instance socioeconomic status and ethnicity) (Walks & Maaranen, 2008). Social mixing is seen as an essential tool in a lot of city-center regeneration policies (Lees, 2008; Smith, 1996; Uitermark et al, 2007). In this context social mixing is often put into

practice by changing the socio-demographic composition of an area through housing diversification. The expected outcomes are positive population changes with beneficial social implications through social cohesion (Buck, 2005; Meen et al, 2005). The policy presumption that gentrification will stimulate social mixing, thereby increasing the social cohesion of inner-city communities, doesn't seem to be evidence based (Lees, 2008). In fact, it's even plausible that gentrifying neighborhoods will not remain socially mixed but will instead become more and more culturally and ethnically homogenous if the process continues without interruption. This thesis will attempt to answer whether neighborhood compositional changes result in more or less positive interaction between people with different backgrounds thus generating social cohesion.

In order to conclude if gentrification can become a tool for emancipation of marginalized communities empirical research needs to take place on whether social mixing is actually taking place in gentrifying neighbourhoods and if there are any possible benefits for disenfranchised groups living in this area. Case studies in Anglo-Saxon countries emphasize the workings of social tectonics and of clashing lifestyles and class conflict in previously poor areas newly gentrified by the middle class (Arthurson 2002; Butler & Rose 2003; Cole & Goodchild 2001; Ruming et al. 2004). Social mixing and spatial proximity incite negative stereotyping (Ruming et al. 2004) and class tensions (Arthurson 2002; Cole & Goodchild 2001). Many studies find that neighbourhoods are rapidly 'colonized' by more affluent groups, leaving a slowly decreasing amount of space for the less affluent original residents (Atkinson, 2003). During this process of 'class replacement', there is much discontent. The poorer long-term residents feel disempowered and experience a sense of relative deprivation whereas the more affluent gentrifiers, wanting a safe and homogenous neighborhood, display signs of mistrust and superiority (Atkinson, 2003). This thesis is concerned with how gentrification is experienced by both long-term residents and early gentrifiers, harboring the ambition to add to the existing body of knowledge discussed in previous paragraphs.

2.4 Sense of security

(Intro)

This thesis examines how the unexpected neighborhood changes caused by gentrification influence the sense of security experienced by residents within a local context. There are many factors that determine an individual's sense of security and the fear of crime within a neighborhood context is expected to be an important part of the equation. There are several examples of urban developments that have an effect on increasing crime rates and fear of crime including neighborhood disinvestment, demolition or construction activities, and deindustrialization (Skogan, 1986). There are also developments that can improve or sustain neighborhood stability such as; government programs, collective neighborhood action, or individual initiatives and interventions (Skogan, 1986). The fear of crime experienced by neighborhood residents does not always accurately reflect actual crime levels (Skogan, 1986). It stems from personal experiences or visible signs of physical and social disorder, awareness

of the actual crime rates in an area, or negative attitudes regarding shifts in the neighborhood ethnic composition. The livability and appeal of a neighborhood are partially determined by the sense of security residents experience while living there and this has always played an important role in urban decline. If fear of crime rises it will cause residents to withdraw from community life, weakening the informal mechanisms of social control that are preventing crime and social disorder. This will result in the deterioration of organizational life within a neighborhood and a reduction of the mobilization capacity of its community (Skogan, 1986; Taylor & Covington, 1991, 1993).

(The link between gentrification and fear of crime)

One of the most important theories linking community characteristics with delinquency is the social disorganization theory. Social disorganization theory states that community structure has an important effect on crime and deviant behavior (Bursik, 1988; Kornhauser, 1978; Shaw & McKay, 1942; Taylor & Covington, 1993). The use of social disorganization theory isn't limited to explaining trends in crime-rates, it can also be used to understand dynamics concerning the fear of crime within a community (Skogan, 1986; Taylor & Covington, 1993). The classic work of Shaw and McKay (1942) states the disruption of social order within a community can be caused by three structural factors; a low economic status, ethnic heterogeneity and residential mobility. According to this theoretical perspective both ethnic diversity and compositional changes within communities weaken the connections between neighbors, effectively curbing their ability to find common ground thus weakening their collective problem-solving capacity (Bursik, 1988; Kornhauser, 1978; Shaw & McKay, 1942; Taylor & Covington, 1993). Gentrifying urban communities are characterized by rapid compositional changes within its community, which prevents them from sufficiently controlling the deviant behavior of residents (Bursik, 1988; Kornhauser, 1978; Shaw & McKay, 1942; Taylor & Covington, 1993). This lack of social control poses an obstacle when attempting to collectively organize against undesirable groups moving into an area and has a considerable impact on the fear of crime within a community (Bursik, 1988; Faris, 1948; Kornhauser, 1978; Taylor & Covington, 1993).

The influx of new middle class residents settling in an area previously dominated by low-income residents creates conflicting emotions and uncertainty for both groups fueled by the degradation of existing social networks (Taylor & Covington, 1993). Feelings of alienation, insecurity, loneliness, anonymity and social isolation may arise because of these rapid changes in the demographic composition (Skogan, 1986; Taylor & Covington, 1991, 1993). This is due to the fact that safety is associated with predictability and reliability, familiarity and recognition as well as a sense of home (Bursik, 1988; Karsten et al., 2006; Skogan, 1986). Changing neighborhoods, both those downgrading or upgrading in status and stability, are defined by population turnover and, at least initially, by an increasing diversity in resident backgrounds. Gentrification is a process that has far-reaching consequences for the composition of its population, possible repercussions are summarized by Bursik and Webb:

“When the existing community changes almost completely within a short period of time, the social institutions and social networks may disappear altogether, or existing institutions may persevere in the changed neighborhood but be very resistant to the inclusion of new residents” (1982, p. 39–40). Based on this explanation of social disorganization theory one would expect the gentrification of Klarendal to erode existing social networks thus curbing the collective resilience of the community and inciting feelings of alienation, both of which increase the overall fear of crime.

Gentrification could also reduce fear of crime in several ways. Social disorganization theory explains how compositional changes caused by gentrification result in an elevated fear of crime but this theory can also be used to argue the exact opposite. Some of the earliest statements based on this theory emphasize the disorganizing effects of a community’s low economic status (Shaw & McKay, 1942). Gentrification often improves the economic status of a neighborhood due to the selective migration of low-income residents in order to make way for the newly arriving middle-class. This selective migration will improve the community’s stability in the long-term because it replaces existing social networks consisting of more crime-prone individuals with new social networks that might prove to be less permissive of crime (Kirk & Laub, 2010). Affluent neighborhoods often have lower crime rates when compared to poor neighborhoods (McDonald, 1986; Kreager et al., 2011). Off course this has a lot to do with the necessity of crime that is experienced within poverty-stricken communities but can also be attributed to their inability to sufficiently control the deviant behavior of residents (Bellair, 1997; Shaw & McKay, 1942). Crime-rates influence fear of crime (Bursik, 1988). Gentrification could mitigate the detrimental effects of poverty and structural isolation by regaining social control within inner-city communities thus whittling down the fear of crime (Bursik, 1988; Kornhauser, 1978; Shaw & McKay, 1942; Taylor & Covington, 1993).

Gentrification is usually accompanied by large-scale urban renovations. These attempts to reverse the physical decay within a neighborhood fit perfectly within gentrification’s implicit aim to regain social order. Hunter (1978) suggests that urban decline generates physical signs of social disorder such as litter, graffiti, and abandoned houses and lots. It also spawns a variety of other signs of social disorder such as drug dealers up and down the street or groups of unsupervised and unruly youths. As a result, residents believe that formal and informal forces maintaining public order are slowly losing power, increasing their risks of victimization. The improvements to a gentrifying neighborhood’s physical appearance might be the visual feedback needed to reassure the locals that social order has been restored. The aforementioned scenarios suggest that the gentrification of Klarendal will cause the fear of crime within this community to subside.

(The link between gentrification and crime rates)

After looking at the ways in which gentrification might affect fear of crime it’s interesting to review several studies preoccupied with the relation between gentrification and actual crime rates. McDonald (1986) proposed that there may be two divergent consequences of

gentrification for neighborhood crime. Social disorganization theory predicts that gentrification will increase crime rates because of a disruption of existing social networks and social control processes. It's also important to note that an increased opportunity for property crimes might also exacerbate the crime problem within a gentrifying neighborhood. An alternative hypothesis predicts a decline in crime because of the selective migration of more crime-prone individuals, whose displacement from gentrifying neighborhoods result in more internal stability.

McDonald (1986) studied a total of 14 different gentrifying areas in Boston, New York, San Francisco, Seattle, and Washington, DC. Surprisingly gentrification had no effect on property crime but the study found a negative relation between gentrification and personal crimes (homicide, rape, aggravated assault etc.) supporting the selective migration argument. Taylor and Covington (1988) found support for the social disorganization tradition, observing an increase in crime throughout gentrifying neighborhoods from 1970 to 1980. Several European studies have similarly found that the erosion of social networks in gentrifying areas causes increasing crime rates. A great example is the qualitative study of gentrification and displacement in London performed by Atkinson (2000) during the 1980s in which he found that gentrification causes the disintegration of close-knit communities due to a high population turnover rate. Ultimately this breakdown in social cohesion then leads to a rise in crime. Van Wilsem, Wittebrood, and De Graaf (2006) studied neighborhood change and its possible impact on victimization in the Netherlands. They found an increased likelihood of victimization in gentrifying neighborhoods when compared to non-gentrifying neighborhoods, while also showcasing that the relation between gentrification and victimization is heavily mediated by residential instability. The majority of empirical evidence discussed above suggests that gentrification leads to an increase in crime, but there is plenty of room for a third hypothesis; gentrifying neighborhoods endure a short-term rise in crime due to compositional changes and the following social instability and population diversity, but in the long run neighborhoods stabilize and a newly established social network exercises informal social control eventually causing a decline in crime (Kirk & Laub, 2010). This perspective is supported by the findings of Kreager, Lyons, and Hays (2011) in their investigation of trends in crime, both violent and property, throughout Seattle from 1980 to 2000. They discover a positive relation between property crime and gentrification during the early stages of gentrification, no effect was found on violent crime. These findings suggest that in the short-term gentrification causes an increase in property crime. Stability seems to return in the long run however, and the study reflects this by showing that both property and violent crime decreased more in gentrifying neighborhoods when compared to non-gentrifying neighborhoods (Kreager et al., 2011). These findings suggest that the gentrification of Klarendal will eventually lead to a safer community.

2.5 Resident participation

(Intro)

Another important concept within this research is resident participation, or in other words the extent to which residents are actively engaged in their neighborhoods and the ways in which citizens invest in their communities in order to improve conditions for others and to help shape a community's future. Resident participation has become a very complex notion and each resident will define it differently but it often involves combating issues that relate to the collective well-being of a community, which in a spatial dimension often involves participation at a neighborhood level. Even though participation is often associated with formal activities such as neighborhood councils and local committees, it can also encompass voting on a local referendum or more informal activities such as local initiatives to clean up the streets and parks in the area. Civic engagement is not only pursued by local governments but also by housing corporations and welfare organizations who try to actively involve citizens in the decision-making processes and has turned into an important tool of governance (Van Marissing, 2008). The motives for involving residents in policy are diverse. For example, residents can be considered experts, who possess valuable information, but they can also be seen as a necessary partner in order to increase support for a certain policy proposal (Elander & Blanc, 2001). Residents can also take initiative themselves and enforce a certain degree of participation, an example being volunteering in your own neighborhood (Hambleton, 2000). Volunteering is often acknowledged as a social and communal activity that strengthens the ties within a community and sustains a network of services that wouldn't exist otherwise (Putnam, 2000). These networks of civic engagement seem to be a prerequisite for both economic development and effective governance (Putnam, 1993). The benefits of volunteering to both society and the volunteers themselves have been described in several recent studies (Haski-Leventhal et al. 2010; Wilson & Musick, 2000).

Resident participation seems to be an increasingly prevalent topic of discussion within both the political sphere and certain policy domains. In the past decade the government has partially delegated some the responsibilities they've held traditionally to its citizens. A current trend is to have residents participate in the creation of neighbourhood communities and the production of social cohesion through small, informal and collective initiatives such as coffee mornings, neighbourhood festivities and projects such as the refurbishments of playgrounds, parks and squares (Wilde, 2015). It has proven to be difficult to engage every citizen and some groups within society tend to be underrepresented when looking at their degree of civic engagement, which is why the improvement of resident participation is a primary objective within many policy arenas around the world. This thesis will focus on whether and how the gentrification process impacts resident participation within a neighborhood context.

(The link between social cohesion and resident participation)

The ways in which neighborhood characteristics can influence the resident participation within a community are not fully understood. Recent studies stress that the local community is one of the primary contexts in which the socialization of people to civic society and its objectives takes place (Duke et al., 2009). This is where people internalize what a community should look like and how the people within this community are supposed to interact. This is where they get reprimanded for deviant behavior in a public space or learn about the effectiveness of civic engagement. Theories concerning civic engagement still suffer from a lack of clear mechanisms through which resident participation is supposed to be activated (Zaff et al., 2008). However, there are several studies suggesting a link between the social cohesion of a neighborhood and its degree of resident participation (Duke et al., 2009; Flanagan, Cumsille, et al., 2007; Kahne & Sporte, 2008; Lenzi et al., 2013).

Studies focused on the relation between neighborhood structure and civic engagement mostly concern themselves with the levels of social cohesion within a community. Residents that have a network of strong and supportive social ties within their local community are more likely to develop a deep emotional attachment to the neighborhood they live in (Whitlock, 2007). This personal attachment is an important forerunner of civic attitudes and fosters the desire to “give back” to the community (Flanagan, Cumsille, et al., 2007). Sampson et al. (1997) state that social ties produce mutual trust and shared values among residents and are detrimental when looking at the ability of a community to organize itself. In order to describe how the extent of social cohesion in a neighborhood translates into a certain degree of informal social control, Sampson et al., (1997) coined the term collective efficacy. It represents a community’s ability to maintain public order and conform the behavior of its members to socially accepted standards. According to social disorganization theory, collective efficacy (informal social control) is essential when monitoring and controlling deviant groups within the community, making it an efficient tool to use when predicting crime and deviant behavior (Shaw & McKay, 1942; Sampson et al., 1997). But besides predicting crime-rates the concept of collective efficacy can also be used to explain the resident participation within a community. The assumptions of the collective efficacy model have been adapted by Leventhal and Brooks-Gunn (2000) in order to facilitate the investigation of civic engagement. They theorized that living in a highly cohesive neighborhood, where people help each other and cooperate to serve the community, people will be socialized to civic norms and behaviors, learning how to contribute to shared goals (Leventhal and Brooks-Gunn, 2000). The results of empirical studies often show that when people believe they live in a neighborhood where neighbors trust each other and are willing to work together to solve shared problems, they also report a higher commitment to resident participation (Brown & Ferris, 2007; Duke et al., 2009; Flanagan, Cumsille, et al., 2007; Kahne & Sporte, 2008; Lenzi et al., 2013). This means there is plenty of empirical evidence to support the notion that higher levels of social cohesion are associated to a stronger civic engagement (Brown & Ferris, 2007; Duke et al., 2009; Flanagan, Cumsille,

et al., 2007; Kahne & Sporte, 2008) but this leaves the question; how does the process of gentrification fit into the equation?

(How does gentrification affect resident participation?)

The lack of literature concerning the direct impact of gentrification on the degree of resident participation makes it difficult to predict if this relation exists and if so, how this phenomenon influences civic engagement. However, there is a wide selection of work theorizing the impact of gentrification on social cohesion (see chapter 2.3, p. 22), a concept that can be linked to resident participation by using the norms and collective efficacy model (Leventhal & Brooks-Gunn, 2000) discussed in the paragraphs above. Gentrification is expected to influence the resident participation within a community indirectly through its impact on social cohesion. The pathways through which the gentrification of Klarendal might impact its social cohesion have been outlined by using the conflict and contact theories. Because these theories have already been thoroughly discussed in chapter 2.3 the following segment will provide a summary of their most important assumptions. The compositional changes caused by gentrification will ensure a more diverse population that will interact within the neighborhood context. One of the most prominent theoretical constructs on intergroup contact is provided by Allport's (1954) contact theory that explains how continued interaction between groups could reduce intergroup prejudice. The reduction of inter-group prejudice can be ascribed to several dynamics including; learning about the out-group, changing behavior, generating affective ties, and in-group reappraisal (Pettigrew, 1998). Based on the contact theory one would expect gentrification to have a positive impact on Klarendal; stimulating social mixing and improving the social cohesion within its community thus sparking more resident participation. Conflict theory paints quite a different picture (Baumeister & Vohs, 2007; Jackson, 1993; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). This theory describes how intergroup hostility emerges because of conflicting goals and competition over limited resources, while also offering an explanation for the feelings of prejudice and discrimination toward the outgroup that go along with intergroup hostility (Jackson, 1993; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). Groups may be in competition for a real or perceived scarcity of resources such as money, political power, military protection, or social status (Jackson, 1993). When the inter-group competition is perceived to increase the feelings of prejudice and animosity toward the outgroup become stronger. Based on the conflict theory one would expect gentrification to have a negative impact on Klarendal; discouraging social mixing and damaging the social cohesion within its community thus decreasing the level of resident participation.

Since gentrification causes rapid changes in the demographic composition of a neighborhood it's possible that the increase in community diversity explains the possible changes in resident participation. Several empirical studies have looked at the consequences of community diversity, and most of these studies reach the same conclusion; diversity reduces civic engagement (Alesina & Ferrara, 2000; Costa & Kahn, 2003; Putnam, 2007). In more diverse communities, people participate less, measured by how they allocate their time and their

willingness to take risks to help others. Socio-economically mixed districts score lower on volunteering than more homogeneous areas: “generally speaking, people who live in neighbourhoods of greater economic inequality tend to withdraw from social and civic life” (Putnam, 2007, p. 157). Using General Social Survey data, Alesina and La Ferrara (2000) find that organizational membership is lower in metropolitan areas that feature greater racial and ethnic diversity and higher income inequality. This collection of empirical studies suggests that the increase in community diversity, caused by Klarendal’s gentrification, will result in less resident participation.

3. Description of the case study

The history of gentrification and the fundamentals of many theories surrounding this concept have been described in previous chapters but this study will focus its efforts on the gentrification process that is taking place within the unique context of the neighborhood of Klarendal and within a wider framework created by the city of Arnhem. The following chapter will introduce readers to the case study and provide them with some background information in order to understand the wider framework in which this process is taking place.

3.1 Arnhem

Arnhem is a city located in the eastern part of the Netherlands, close to the German border. It is the capital of the province of Gelderland and home to approximately 150.000 inhabitants (<http://arnhem.incijfers.nl/>). Arnhem has been a working class city for the majority of its existence accommodating several different industries and serving as a transit hub connecting Amsterdam and Frankfurt by railway. There are several reasons why tourists consider Arnhem an attractive place to visit; it’s in close proximity of a national park (Hoge Veluwe), it offers several cultural attractions such as a historic city center, several museums, a zoo (Burgers Zoo) and many sites that have played a pivotal role in WWII. The city also functions as an educational center for the region featuring several institutions for higher learning, the most prominent of which are the HAN (Hogeschool van Arnhem en Nijmegen) and the ArtEZ Academy of Arts (Gemeente Arnhem, 2006).

Traditionally the city has a strong position in energy-related activities and the Energy and Environmental Technology sector is a cornerstone of its economy, relying heavily on the development of new technologies (Gemeente Arnhem, 2009). The majority of Arnhem’s residents work in the healthcare and business service sectors (Gemeente Arnhem, 2009). The creative cluster is also an important part of the municipality’s economic identity, which is understandable because one quarter of Arnhem’s workforce consists of creative classes (Gemeente Arnhem, 2009). The city of Arnhem will provide an interesting backdrop to this research but in order to study gentrification it was necessary to select a neighborhood in which

this process was taking place. This is why the following chapter will zoom in on Arnhem's most iconic up-and-coming neighborhood, Klarendal.

3.2 Klarendal

Klarendal is one of the oldest and most central districts of Arnhem, originally built just outside the city's long-gone medieval fortifications. It is a former working class neighborhood located just northeast of Arnhem's city center and largely built in the 19th century. The neighborhood is in close proximity to the city's core and both districts are separated by a railway line that increases the accessibility of the area. Klarendal is one of the most dynamic and recognizable neighborhoods of Arnhem which can largely be attributed to its cultural diversity; low rents creating a haven for artists, art students and immigrants. The demographic composition of Klarendal is quite interesting because the population can be roughly divided into three groups that are equal in size (Berry Kessels, 13/3/14, Rob Klingen, 7/4/14). The residents who have lived in Klarendal all their lives and who are often referred to as the "Oud-Klarendalers" have left an undeniable mark on the neighborhood and are still as vocal as ever. Secondly there are the non-Western immigrants, a majority of whom are of Turkish descent. It seems that the percentage of non-western immigrants in Klarendal is slowly declining after having reached its peak in 2003 (from 30% in 2003 to 24% in 2017; <http://arnhem.incijfers.nl>). Their presence in the neighborhood is noticeable due to a wide selection of Turkish businesses (barbershop, food or grocery stores), a mosque and an Islamic school. The final group are the so-called 'new arrivals', largely consisting of artists and fashion entrepreneurs. This last group is said to be growing slowly, perhaps one day threatening the cultural diversity within the neighborhood (Berry Kessels, 13/3/14).

As a catholic neighborhood in a protestant city, Klarendal has always struggled with problems relating to poverty (Chris Zeevenhooven, 20/3/14). The neighborhood has been characterized by a large concentration of social problems for years; "*unemployment, poor housing, unsafety, drug abuse, dumped rubbish, high percentage of migrants and low income*" are just some of the issues listed by the municipality as its 'key challenges' (Gemeente Arnhem, 2006, p. 15). Klarendal is one of the poorest districts in terms of average disposable household income (<http://arnhem.incijfers.nl>). Additionally, unemployment levels and the amount of families on welfare are higher than the city's average (Gemeente Arnhem, 2016; <http://arnhem.incijfers.nl>). This seems to be in stark contrast with the high economic activity within the neighborhood, which is stimulated by numerous start-up initiatives (Gemeente Arnhem, 2009, 2012). These start-up initiatives are part of a careful reinvention of the neighborhood as a Fashion Quarter; an authentic, former working class neighborhood offering high-end cafes, restaurants, art galleries and solid artistic schooling (Gemeente Arnhem, 2009, 2012). Policy makers have presented Klarendal as a neighborhood that has overcome its social and economic problems of the past and is now moving on by becoming an alluring attraction for visitors interested in art and fashion. Another important theme is quality food; renowned

restaurants Goed Proeven and Sugar Hill as well as popular cafes 'TAPE' and Caspar are located in Klarendal as well.

The neighborhood can be divided into several sectors, each with its own atmosphere and scenery. Most of the shops and activities can be found along the Sonsbeekseweg, Klarendalseweg and Hommelstraat (see map 1). The intersection of these 3 streets is by far the busiest part of the neighborhood and can be found in the southwest corner surrounding the tunnel that runs underneath the railway. The majority of business activity takes place here and besides being home to the advertised fashion boutiques and designer shops, it also features a lot of immigrants' businesses (bakeries, shops selling rugs or mobile phones, kebab and donner shops etc.). The branding of Klarendal as the Fashion Quarter is mostly fixated on the fashion boutiques and design shops along the Klarendalseweg. This is the most dynamic part of the neighborhood, especially because most of the buildings also have residential purposes. When going north towards Onder De Linden the height variation becomes more obvious and adds a unique flair to the area surrounding playground De Leuke Linde. This playground is perhaps the single most successful tool in bringing together the different groups within this neighborhood (Chris Zeevenhooven, 20/3/14; Ron Onstein, 15/06/2015). While their children are playing together, parents with different backgrounds get the opportunity to interact with each other within a positive environment. De Leuke Linde has embraced its function as a meeting place and organizes many social activities for the entire neighborhood (Ron Onstein, 15/06/2015). The playground's popularity has inspired countless residents to participate, which is why it is currently being maintained by the largest group of volunteers in Klarendal (Ron Onstein, 15/06/2015). The northeastern corner of the neighborhood serves a purely residential purpose and has a more spacious set-up, including bigger single houses with yards and front lawns. Bordering the neighborhood are Klarenbeek Park and Sonsbeek Park, two large public spaces providing the inhabitants of Klarendal with a place to walk their dog and have a pick-nick.

Map 1: Klarendal (Source: Studio Scale & Stipo, 2011)



3.3 History of Klarendal

Many of the social and political processes that are currently taking place within Klarendal can be better understood with the proper historical context. That's why this chapter will provide a brief summary of Klarendal's history including an overview of the most important urban development projects that have taken place over the decades. Klarendal is a neighborhood with a turbulent history and many different faces. Some of its streets were first constructed during the middle ages and when looking at maps from the 13th century it's already possible to identify important routes such as the Hommelseweg (to Deventer) and Rosendaalstraat (to Rosendaal). The area largely consisted of farmlands belonging to the Monnikenhuizen monastery. In 1635 the monastery sold its land and the associated farms to the mayor of Arnhem who decided to merge it with his estate and named it 'Claerenbeek'. The name

Klarendal was eventually derived from 'Claerenbeeck', believed to be a reference to the clear water of the brook that flowed through the valley of the estate.

It wasn't until the 19th century that the city of Arnhem expanded beyond its medieval fortifications. It was during this period in time that Klarendal was built in order to house the large influx of workers that had arrived to demolish the city's medieval fortifications and facilitate its expansion by building railway lines (Studio Scale & Stipo, 2011). Houses were built without the intervention of a city planner and followed the main arteries towards the city center. The large amount of workers that migrated towards the city fueled the haphazard expansion of Klarendal, creating a slum that attracted national attention (Gemeente Arnhem, 2003). The living conditions were subpar and the majority of the buildings were poorly constructed. The neighborhood consisted of sprawling and cheap housing without proper sewerage and no street lighting. Some decent housing for the elderly and the poor was realized through the charity of the church, for instance the Luther's Court at the Hommelseweg (Studio Scale & Stipo, 2011).

The majority of the workers settling down in Klarendal used to be farmers from the countryside east of Arnhem but breakneck industrialization forced them to move to Arnhem. They became a Catholic minority in a largely Protestant city where they were marginalized when attempting to carry out their culture (Hans Ansems, 24/2/14). This is why the community became very self-sufficient, relying heavily on solidarity and in-group norms. The culture of this tight-knit community persists within the fabric of Klarendal to this day but was especially prevalent up until the 1970's, when a new urban redevelopment program was implemented, rebuilding the district from the ground up (Hans Ansems, 24/2/14).

When the 19th century came to a close the living conditions in Klarendal were as dire as ever, eventually leading to a typhoid and diphtheria outbreak. The municipality reacted by evicting all residents and rebuilding the entire neighborhood from the ground up (Gemeente Arnhem, 2003). It was around this time that the municipality was introduced to the concept of city planning and the reconstruction of the neighborhood went according to a fixed blueprint (Gemeente Arnhem, 2003). Around 1905, Klarendal was largely built and its expansion stagnated due to the stricter requirements of the housing law (Gemeente Arnhem, 2003; Studio Scale & Stipo, 2011). The housing corporations also arrived on the scene and started to develop certain sections of Klarendal based on the 'Garden City' movement, emphasizing greenbelts and the spacious lay-out of buildings (Gemeente Arnhem, 2012). These sections exist to this day and add to the neighborhood's current charm and thus the popularity of its real estate with new middle-class arrivals looking for a place to settle down.

The first 'modern shopping center' of Klarendal attracted consumers from all over the city and was opened in 1926. The architecture was influenced by French-style Arcades, its structure reminiscent of old bazaars featuring an over-arching glass ceiling (Studio Scale & Stipo, 2011). The building has been demolished but its architectural-style has been incorporated into the current shopping center (built around the Albert Heijn supermarket), which also features a

passage covered by a glass-ceiling. Alongside the axis of Klarendalseweg, Hommelstraat and Sonsbeekseweg, a wide selection of small shops existed from the 1920's to the 1970's. Horse butcher Ernste has always symbolized the tenacity of some of these businesses and has been around for more than 100 years (Berry Kessels, 13/3/14). The entrepreneurial tradition of the neighborhood has frequently been commented on by interviewees and has always been propagated by policy makers as an important tool for reinvigorating Klarendal with vibrancy and life. The revival of commercial activities throughout the neighborhood became one of the main objectives when initiating the "Klarendal Kom Op" redevelopment campaign because many residents were very nostalgic of the hustle and bustle that accompanied the old shopping streets (Gemeente Arnhem, 2003).

The Second World War left the city in ruins and the municipality of Arnhem had to deploy all of its resources in order to rebuild. The suburbanization process, instigated by the postwar economic boom, created a situation in which many workers moved out of Klarendal. Only the most disadvantaged residents remained, creating a vacuum in which the social and economic problems of the neighborhood were exacerbated (Berry Kessels, 13/3/14). During this time Klarendal was still a working class neighborhood with at its core a tightknit community consisting of several large families that had lived in the area for generations (Gemeente Arnhem, 2003). Because it was a relatively cheap neighborhood in close proximity to the city center it also became popular with students, artist and immigrants. These new arrivals rarely interacted with the existing community of close tied working-class families (Hans Ansems, 24/2/14).

Another huge urban redevelopment program took place in 1972, demolishing large parts of Klarendal in order to realize the ideal of a self-sufficient neighborhood that could operate as an 'island in the city' (Gemeente Arnhem, 2012). At the time urban planners loved the idea of neighborhoods as distinguishable spatial entities that could exist without the framework provided by the city as a whole. One of the underlying ideals here was the improvement of social cohesion within the neighborhood context but unfortunately the entire redevelopment program turned out to be incredibly damaging to the social cohesion within Klarendal. The project failed because many Klarendal residents were forced to relocate and the majority of them never came back, destroying the existing social networks (Hans Ansems, 24/2/14). Another blow to the neighborhood was the disappearance of a myriad of commercial activities. Many small local businesses that had attracted many people to Klarendal for decades were killed by the rise of large scale retail and the surge of car ownership. The combination of these two time-dependent variables caused a deteriorating situation in which the rise of illegal prostitution, drug related crime and poverty became prevalent issues that were clearly visible when walking the streets of Klarendal (Berry Kessels, 13/3/14; Studio Scale & Stipo, 2011).

Throughout the 1970s and 1980's, the drug trade in Klarendal attracted many visitors, a majority of whom came from Germany to buy soft-drugs (Berry Kessels, 13/3/14). This created

an untenable situation which finally exploded on September 24, 1989; causing social unrest among the residents, who marched down to city hall and demanded the authorities to find achievable solutions and implement them effectively (Berry Kessels, 13/3/14). During the 1990's the municipality attempted to fix the deteriorating condition of Klarendal's public spaces and its drug related crime but wasn't successful because these were symptoms of a much bigger fundamental problem. The social cohesion in Klarendal had been severely damaged, causing a wide range of social and economic problems that had to be approached from a different perspective.

4. Policy Overview

Over the past couple of decades social mix and social cohesion have become an increasingly relevant domain for policy action on many policy agendas, often stating social mix and social cohesion as explicit goals, both on a city-wide level and within a neighbourhood context. This chapter will provide a brief summary of the ways in which these concepts have inspired policymaking within several different descending levels of governance.

4.1 Social cohesion within the EU

All over the world nations have applied policies to strengthen the social cohesion within their borders. Besides individual nations the European Union (EU) also declared that the economic and social cohesion of the European Union as a whole was a main policy goal. This ambition was confirmed in 1992 within the Treaty of Maastricht and its importance was restated during the announcement of the Lisbon Agenda in 2000 (Jenson, 2010). In order to realize this ambiguous objective the EU will be utilizing a wide range of social policies and new structures of governance promoting both an increase of active citizenship and the efficient identification of best practices (Jenson, 2010). The Council of Europe's notion of social cohesion was focused on safeguarding the social rights of its people and a revision of the Strategy for Social Cohesion in 2004 (Council of Europe, 2004: 3–4) underlined the importance of diversity (ethnic and/or religious) as a potential threat to social stability (Jenson, 2010). Within this strategy the concept of social cohesion is defined by the Council of Europe as a society's ability to guarantee the welfare of all its members, reduce inequality, combat social exclusion and ward off polarization. The Council of Europe has recognized several potential threats to social cohesion including high numbers of unemployment and a feeling of uncertainty regarding the sustainability of social security systems. Social and crime problems throughout the urban areas of Europe may pose a threat, impacting the level of security people experience in their daily lives. Another possible threat to social cohesion is the impact of multiculturalism on traditional identities. The policy strategy also mentions the emergence of new ways in which modern communication technologies produce social exclusion, resulting in the unequal access to certain information (Council of Europe, 2004; Jenson, 2010). The EU strives to reach these ambiguous and expansive policy goals by investing in mostly regional policies, some of which

include policies related to social mixing and the revitalization of inner urban neighbourhoods (Galster, 2002; Lees et al., 2008).

4.2 Social cohesion within the Netherlands

In the last decade or so issues involving social mix and its assumed link with social cohesion have been prominent on many urban policy agendas within the Netherlands (Bolt & Van Kempen, 2009; Uitermark, 2003). The complexity of the term social cohesion may be one of the reasons that the concept is often ill-defined in policy documents (Dekker 2006). Over the years there have been many urban planners and politicians who endorsed social mixing policies, expecting them to improve the social cohesion within neighborhoods (Bolt & Van Kempen, 2009; Uitermark, 2003). Living within a community consisting of strong social bonds allegedly protects its inhabitants of social and economic isolation. In the 1990's the fear of an emergence of US-style ghettos encouraged the Dutch government to invest a large amount of money in social mixing policies, even though some academics commented that this fear was unwarranted due to the relatively low income inequality in the Netherlands (Deurloo & Musterd, 1998). The 'Nota Stedelijke Vernieuwing' launched in 1997 and is regarded as one of the most ambitious and comprehensive social mixing policies the Netherlands has ever seen (Ministerie van VROM, 1997; Uitermark, 2007). The policy document mentions many threats to social cohesion including; high levels of unemployment, the disappearance of local businesses and neglecting the physical appearance of the neighbourhood (Ministerie van VROM, 1997, p.128). These threats can reinforce each other, trapping neighbourhoods in a negative trend that needs reversing. The large quantity of social housing is offered as one of the key explanations for the subordinate position of many problematic urban districts, suggesting that urban renovation is one of the most fruitful approaches when attempting to avoid further decline. By increasing the percentage of owner-occupied housing, and thus restructuring the composition of a community, it is deemed possible to improve the social cohesion within a neighbourhood (Ministerie van VROM, 1997, p. 128). Back in 1994 this general idea had already inspired the Big Cities Policy, in which the 31 largest municipalities within the Netherlands were asked to design a development programme containing plans and efforts to enhance the social, economic, and physical conditions within certain designated urban districts (Ministerie van VROM, 1997, p. 128). Another requirement was the creation of scientific tools to efficiently measure the progress that was being made within the development programme. The explicit goals stated within the policy document stress that a heterogeneous population composition ensures a bright future for Dutch cities, thus promoting the transformation of homogeneous neighborhoods into mixed neighbourhoods. This transformation was mostly initiated by demolishing a segment of the social-rented stock and replacing it with more expensive owner-occupied properties. This is a long term policy because it takes years to complete a project of this magnitude. The goals have remained largely the same but in 2001 the debate shifted its focus from the segregation of socioeconomic classes to the problems associated with the isolation of minority ethnic groups (Bolt & Van Kempen, 2009).

Housing diversification is presented as the main policy intervention to target segregation, which implies that homogeneous housing stock is the most severe threat to social cohesion and leads to the spatial concentrations of minority ethnic groups and low-income groups (Bolt & Van Kempen, 2008). It seems surprising that factors such as housing preferences and housing allocation systems have been glossed over when drawing up the blueprint for possible solutions to the problem of segregation. In early 2007 another dimension was added to the existing social mix policy; resident participation (Ministerie van VROM, 2007). A substantial budget was put aside to give residents the opportunity to take more responsibility for their neighborhood and its people by setting up citizen initiatives: activities or projects organized by residents to improve the quality of life within their neighbourhood. The link between the social composition of a neighbourhood and its level of social cohesion is an important assumption in this document. Unfortunately this relationship isn't clearly specified and the concept of social cohesion is only briefly described as the feeling of being at home in and having certain amount of agency over one's neighbourhood (Ministerie van VROM, 2007). Important pillars of the policy presented in this document include education, integration and safety while retaining a large emphasis on housing (Bolt & Van Kempen, 2009). In the end some important questions remain; "does social mixing automatically lead to social interaction?" and 'does social interaction automatically lead to more social cohesion?'. While attempting to answer some of these questions this thesis will also showcase the difficulties that arise when pursuing ambiguous goals such as social cohesion.

4.3 Social cohesion within Klarendal

The work of popular sociologists such as Robert Putnam (2000), Gordon Allport (1954) and Amitai Etzioni (1996) have promoted the importance of utilizing local communities as policy tools when attempting to increase social cohesion (Forrest and Kearns, 2001). The assumption is that a stronger community will, for example, prevent crime, enhance the overall quality of life and increase the effectiveness of local governance. That's why strengthening public engagement, creating a sense of local belonging, and enabling people to build social capital within their neighborhood have become important goals within many local communities (Forrest & Kearns, 2001; Lawless et al, 2010; Wilde, 2015). Social mixing between different socio-economic and ethnic groups is often seen as the most efficient tool that can be used to create or foster social cohesion within a neighborhood with a lot of diversity (Allport, 1954; Barlow, Louis, & Hewstone, 2009; Caspi, 1984; Hewstone et al., 2005; Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006; Works, 1961; Vonofako, Hewstone, & Voci, 2007; Yuker & Hurley, 1987). The growing prevalence of social cohesion on policy agendas all over the world affirms the inclusion of a social component within most urban regeneration policies. These social components often focus on showcasing a variety of ways to enhance the social cohesion of a disadvantaged neighborhood. This chapter will chronicle the impact of urban renewal policy on Klarendal over the course of more than 10 years. The policy overview provided by this chapter is based on a series of policy documents from the municipality of Arnhem and the stories of several

policy makers that were interviewed. Discourse analysis will be used on the policy documents and the stories of interviewees in order to reveal underlying processes intended to take place.

Klarendal Kom Op! (2000- 2004)

After decades of urban decline the residents of Klarendal had enough and marched down to city hall demanding to be taken seriously. In order to calm the social turmoil the city council had to address the many social and economic problems afflicting the neighborhood (Chris Zeevenhooven, 20/3/14; Berry Kessels, 13/3/14). Most of the complaints revolved around drug related crime and associated feelings of insecurity. The municipality decided to arrange meetings with the residents of Klarendal in order to create a more direct feedback-loop. These focus groups provided the municipality with valuable 'ground truth' that could be used by the planning department, who deployed a small group of professionals to examine the situation in Klarendal (Berry Kessels, 13/3/14). The mayor himself, Paul Scholten, visited the neighborhood in order to drum up support for a new policy campaign called "Klarendal Kom Op!" (Klarendal Come On) which marked the beginning of a drastic shift that took place in the following decade. The first phase of Klarendal's transformation was dominated by the "Klarendal Kom Op!" campaign and its vision was explained in the policy document "Klarendal Kleur en Karakter" (Gemeente Arnhem, 2003). One of the main objectives of this policy was the resurrection of the entrepreneurial spirit of Klarendal (Gemeente Arnhem, 2003). The accessibility and visibility of Klarendal had to be increased in order to foster commercial activities throughout the district and create a more appealing environment for entrepreneurs. An example is the walking route between the city center and the shops of Klarendal which had to be clearly marked to attract as much potential shoppers as possible. The policy had a clear focus on 4 factors that were deemed essential for the road to Klarendal's recovery: a safe neighborhood with good schooling and clean public spaces, and fostering social cohesion (Berry Kessels, 13/3/14).

The rise in drug related crime was blamed on the many coffee shops in the area and the customers they attracted (Chris Zeevenhooven, 20/3/14). This is why the municipality began to actively dismantle existing coffee shops as part of a "policy of extinction", (Gemeente Arnhem, 2012). In order to discourage a high concentration of coffee shops in one neighborhood the municipality wanted to maintain a maximum of 8 coffee shops throughout the entire city. The details of this policy are intentionally vague but the municipality has most likely tightened the restrictions surrounding the application process for any new permits and declined to renew existing permits. The high crime rates of Klarendal were further suppressed by more frequent police surveillance and opening a police office in the middle of the neighborhood (Gemeente Arnhem, 2012). These two measures were an attempt to regain control of the neighborhood by facilitating a swift response to crime and an increased visibility of law enforcement (Berry Kessels, 13/3/14).

Another important objective of the "Klarendal Kom Op!" campaign was the stimulation of resident participation in order to effectively face some of the issues that had been plaguing

Klarendal for a long time. A recurring issue was the decline of public spaces due to a severe garbage problem (Chris Zeevenhooven, 20/3/14). The contribution of local residents was key in the solution of this problem and new policies incentivized them to look after their own neighborhood and to report loitering. By solving the neighborhoods garbage problem the municipality showed that a degree of resident participation was needed in order to cure the neighborhood's ills. The local newspaper immediately communicated these small victories to the residents of Klarendal and involved them in all of the latest developments concerning Klarendal's renewal (Berry Kessels, 13/3/14). Of course it was impossible to solve all of Klarendal's problems in a few years but the most important result of putting these policies in place was rebuilding a mutually beneficial relationship with the locals by regaining their trust. For decades the local government had been perceived as incompetent, some residents distrusting any form of state authority and viewing them as a collective enemy. This attitude damaged the relationship between the residents of Klarendal and the municipality of Arnhem, fostering an unwillingness to work together for a common cause. The progress that has been made in the past decade can partially be attributed to the mended relationship between civil society and local government.

The inclusion of social cohesion and resident participation as distinct policy goals can be partially attributed to the launch of a national policy strategy called "Onze Buurt aan Zet" in the year 2001. This element within the overarching framework of the Big Cities Policy (see chapter 4.2, p.32) specifically targeted social cohesion and resident participation in disadvantaged neighborhoods. The municipality relied heavily on the subsidies provided by this policy program in order to set up projects that attempted to inspire resident participation. Immigrants and young people were primary target groups for many of these projects (Gemeente Arnhem, 2003).

Klarendal Gaat Door (2005-2008)

Talks between policy makers and local entrepreneurs about the revival of commercial activities within Klarendal were unsuccessful due to a general lack of commitment. Luckily Volkshuisvesting stepped in and provided the municipality with a suitable plan (Berry Kessels, 13/3/14). Richard Florida's (2002) thoughts concerning the importance of attracting and fostering a creative class influenced governments from all over the world. The work of Florida also inspired the municipality of Arnhem and Volkshuisvesting to involve the creative class, offering them a leading role in the rejuvenation of commercial activities within Klarendal (Berry Kessels, 13/3/14). It was impossible to recreate the hustle and bustle of the Klarendalseweg and its many small businesses because the current economic conditions favored large-scale retail. The "Klarendal Gaat Door" campaign (2005-2008) implemented Florida's ideas in order to reignite the district's long lost vibrancy, appealing to the collective nostalgia of local residents.

Arnhem's Academy of the Arts (ArtEZ) became intrinsic to Klarendal's renewal because its graduates were members of the allusive creative class. The alumni of ArtEZ Academy of the

Arts, some of whom remain in the city after graduating, guarantee a steady supply of creatives in the area. Many of these young artists aspire to start their own business and there are numerous start-up initiatives encouraging recent graduates to become entrepreneurs in Arnhem (Ondernemer in de Wijk, Ik Start Smart and GO! Gelderland Onderneemt) thus transforming the city into an attractive place for high-skilled labour (Studio Scale & Stipo, 2011; Gemeente Arnhem, 2009). Some of whom go on to create renowned fashion and design brands that proudly feature the label 'made in Arnhem' (for example Viktor & Rolf, Spijkers & Spijkers and Humanoid). Because many artists lacked the necessary funds to kick-start their own businesses, financial aid had to be provided. Volkshuisvesting started buying up real estate all over Klarendal, investing a total of € 12.500.000 from 2004 to 2005 (Chris Zeevenhooven, 30/4/14). To alleviate the financial strain for these young entrepreneurs, Volkshuisvesting offered them retail space and a place for an affordable rent. The prices for the available rental options were artificially kept below market value during the initial stages of the project and were slowly increased in the following years (Chris Zeevenhooven, 30/4/14).

The city's attempt to attract a creative workforce and develop a creative cluster is in perfect alignment with Richard Florida's (2002) economic strategy for deindustrialized Western cities. The municipality of Arnhem and Volkshuisvesting borrowed heavily from a similar case of urban renewal in the Belgian city of Antwerp, in which design and fashion were also used as a crutch to economically revitalize a disadvantaged neighborhood (Berry Kessels, 13/3/14). Over time the concept of "Klarendal the Fashion Quarter" had become a marketing tool that could be used by the city of Arnhem to cultivate its image as an artistic refuge, bursting at the seams with activities to attend and shops to visit. At the same time Klarendal was showcased as a peaceful and family- oriented neighborhood (Studio Scale & Stipo, 2011). The area was supposed to attract young families with children, which is reflected by policies targeting the improvement of safety and schooling in the area (Studio Scale & Stipo, 2011). Tranquility and vibrancy seem to be opposite ends of the spectrum but policy documents seem to imply that they aren't mutually exclusive and a combination of both can be found in Klarendal.

Expanding ambitions (2008-present)

The transformation of Klarendal was accelerated in 2007, after it was labelled as one of the country's "priority neighborhoods" (aandachtswijken) by the national government and became eligible for new grants (Studio Scale & Stipo, 2011; Ministerie van VROM, 2007). According to this classification the neighborhood needed immediate care in order to improve its barren conditions, which is a bit odd considering the significant progress that was made in the past years. The newly allocated funds that were associated with the label "priority neighborhood" would inject Klarendal with some much needed economic assistance. The Local Action Plan was designed after Klarendal's categorization as one of 40 priority neighborhoods in the Netherlands and the majority of its strategy was an extension of the trajectory that was lead out in the previous years (Gemeente Arnhem, 2008). It did however

feature a new policy dealing with the concentration of problematic households (Gemeente Arnhem, 2008). Volkshuisvesting started utilizing reports by Rijnstad, a social organization managing social services in Arnhem, to determine which households can be profiled as problematic (Rob Klingen, 7/4/14). The main objective was to prevent a concentration of problematic households on specific streets by relocating certain families to different parts of the neighborhood (Rob Klingen, 7/4/14). This was part of a continued effort to improve the safety of Klarendal and even though the zero tolerance approach of the early days was toned down a notch, it was still deemed important to support the police office that was opened in the middle of the district (Gemeente Arnhem, 2008). A citywide effort to renovate public spaces was launched in 2008 and included many streets and open spaces in Klarendal, adding to an overall improvement of the neighborhood's appearance.

By the year 2008 a total of 22 new shops had opened in Klarendal including the restaurant Goed Proeven, which became a much cited example of authentic and dynamic businesses returning to the district and achieving financial success (Berry Kessels, 13/3/14). The success of Goed Proeven attracted consumers from all over the city, inspiring policy makers to put a bigger emphasis on the development of a thriving food scene within Klarendal (Walter de Bes, 7/5/14). In 2009 a new festival called the "Night of Fashion" bolstered the neighborhoods alternative and artistic character. The trading association DOCKS was founded in 2008 to strengthen the position of local entrepreneurs, eventually becoming the economic support group within Klarendal's steering committee. The shared ambition of Volkshuisvesting and the municipality of Arnhem was expanded beyond its initial premise when both parties decided to aim for a total of 50 shops (Berry Kessels, 13/3/14). The general trajectory of many of the urban renewal policies that were applied within Klarendal had always been informed by an ideology but the execution was never fixed and goals shifted in order to efficiently respond to every scenario (Berry Kessels, 13/3/14).

In 2014 one of the final major urban renewal policies was implemented with the construction of a Multifunctional Center in Klarendal. This building is supposed to be the social spine of the neighborhood offering a wide assortment of activities such as: an elementary school, a kindergarten, a community center, after school care, the Center for Youth and Families, a clinic, a gym, a sports hall and a meeting place for residents. The scale of the building has been a point of discussion among the municipality and many residents of Klarendal, some of whom believe that the building is too large when considering its usage (Chris Zeevenhooven, 20/3/14).

Has Klarendal been gentrified?

The neighborhood of Klarendal has changed considerably in the last two decades and many would argue that the plethora of urban renewal policies discussed in the paragraphs above have contributed to these changes. The term gentrification has been avoided by policy makers and probably isn't included in the vocabulary of most local residents but the concept describes some essential characteristics of the transformation that is taking place in Klarendal. The

concept of gentrification can be explained in different ways but “the influx of middle class residents in working class neighborhoods” seems to be its most fundamental definition (Glass, 1964; Ley, 2003; Smith, 1979; Uitermark, 2007). By this definition it is fair to say that Klarendal is being gentrified due to the many young families and fashion entrepreneurs settling down in the district. Several policy documents describe a wide selection of measures facilitating the gentrification process by attempting to improve the local economy, forging a safe and vibrant living environment in order to attract young middle-class families (Gemeente Arnhem, 2003, 2008; Studio Scale & Stipo, 2011). A lot of time and effort has been invested in reinventing the neighborhoods identity to more accurately reflect the desires of a new target audience (Gemeente Arnhem, 2003, 2008; Studio Scale & Stipo, 2011). The displacement of non-western immigrants may not be immediately apparent to many residents and policy makers, even though the immigrant population has lost roughly one-third of its members since 2003 (see table 5 in appendix). Additionally, Klarendal is experiencing a lot of departures when compared to other neighborhoods in the period from 2004 to 2016 (see table 6 in appendix). Some of the actors who were interviewed argued against the idea of involuntary departures due to gentrification, claiming that non-western immigrants are leaving Klarendal for a host of unrelated reasons (Rob Klingen, 7/4/14, Charly Tomassen, 14/5/14). It was suggested for instance that non-western immigrants disliked the older housing stock available in Klarendal and would rather live in new apartments like the ones recently completed in Presikhaaf (Rob Klingen, 7/4/14).

Klarendal is in high demand and the prices of real estate have increased causing its housing market to become strained (Chris Zeevenhooven, 20/3/14; Berry Kessels, 13/3/14; see table 7 in appendix). Many of the local tenants acknowledge that the pressure on Klarendal’s housing market has increased because of the growing number of properties that are being sold by Volkshuisvesting (Aniek van der Meij, 28/07/2016; Sheira Remkes, 18/08/2016; Özlem Tan, 22/01/2016; Dini Poppinghaus, 27/08/2015). The increased prices of real estate in Klarendal could lead Volkshuisvesting to sell many of their rental units aiming to turn a profit and increasing the number of owner-occupied dwellings (Berry Kessels, 13/3/14). The addition of several waiting lists is also frustrating to prospective buyers and tenants, including local residents who want to move to a new house within Klarendal. However, it is important to stress that this is not a typical case of gentrification because the rents in Klarendal don’t seem to be increasing significantly and remain relatively cheap compared to other neighborhoods in Arnhem (Chris Zeevenhooven, 20/3/14). The gentrification process is being regulated by the municipality and Volkshuisvesting, who are warding off excessive rent inflation in order to keep the neighborhood affordable for the young entrepreneurs. These young entrepreneurs are, in many ways, the facilitators of the gentrification process in Klarendal and their businesses won’t survive in a volatile economic setting (Berry Kessels, 13/3/14). Policy makers are attempting to steer clear of the mistakes that were made during the urban renewal of Spijkerkwartier. This neighborhood had gotten considerably more expensive within a short period of time, which accelerated the class replacement that was taking place (Chris Zeevenhooven, 20/3/14). The property values of Klarendal are rising, which incentivizes

Volkshuisvesting to keep selling more of its real estate, driving up the rent and quite possibly displacing low-income residents in the near future (Berry Kessels, 13/3/14). However, when looking at the statistics provided by Volkshuisvesting it becomes clear that their housing stock within Klarendal is slowly shrinking after reaching a record high in 2013 (see table 4 in appendix).

Comparing neighborhoods

In the previous paragraph it has been established that Klarendal has been subjected to gentrification in the past decades but an important question remains; can the social changes within this neighborhood be attributed to gentrification? It is incredibly challenging to find a conclusive answer to this question but this thesis will attempt to distill the effects of gentrification by comparing Klarendal to several similar neighborhoods that haven't been gentrified in the past decades. The selected neighborhoods are Presikhaaf-West, Arnhemse Broek and Geitenkamp (see map 2 in appendix). In the early 2000's these neighborhoods were socio-economically vulnerable, similar to Klarendal, suggesting that all four neighborhoods had a comparable point of departure. Klarendal, Presikhaaf-West and Arnhemse Broek were even labelled as problem areas within the framework of the Big Cities Policy and received aid from the national government (Ministerie van VROM, 1997, p. 128). In 2016 all four neighborhoods were still characterized by a low average income and a large number of welfare recipients when compared to Arnhem's averages (Gemeente Arnhem, 2016; <http://arnhem.incijfers.nl>). However, Klarendal seems to be the only one of these neighborhoods that is currently in the middle of being gentrified.

As explained in the previous paragraphs several urban renewal projects improved the reputation of Klarendal due to the increased safety of the area and the return of commercial activities under the shared banner of the "Fashion Quarter" (Gemeente Arnhem, 2003, 2008; Studio Scale & Stipo, 2011). Many young families and fashion entrepreneurs were inspired to move into the district, causing the prices of real estate in Klarendal to increase (Chris Zeevenhooven, 20/3/14; Berry Kessels, 13/3/14; see table 7 in appendix). These achievements can most likely be attributed to the focused efforts of Volkshuisvesting, a housing corporation owning the majority of social housing in Klarendal, providing them with an incentive to invest heavily in several urban renewal projects and monitor their implementation carefully. Similar policies have been implemented in the other selected neighborhoods but these appear to be less effective, perhaps because their approach was too scattered or lacked funding (Ministerie van VROM, 1997, p. 128; Gemeente Arnhem, 2009; Vivare, 2011). The architecture of Klarendal's housing stock and its proximity to the city-center might offer additional explanations for the relative success of its urban renewal policies when compared to their counterparts in Presikhaaf-West, Arnhemse Broek and Geitenkamp. Gentrification includes a cultural and visual component which is why it's mostly limited to districts that exude an atmosphere that is hard to describe without relying on buzzwords like 'dynamic', 'unique' and 'authentic'. It's difficult to pin down which neighborhood characteristics create the most

favorable conditions for gentrification. One might argue that Klarendal's 19th century dwellings create a scenery that feels more inviting and desirable when compared to the post-war expansion apartment complexes that Presikhaaf-West has to offer. One might also argue that Klarendal's embrace of the hustle and bustle of the city's core attracts young creatives while the deafening silence of the remote Geitenkamp repels them. However, these are just theories and finding the cause of Klarendal's recent popularity is not the aim of this research. Klarendal was able to successfully reinvent its identity while Presikhaaf-West, Arnhemse Broek and Geitenkamp are still struggling to accomplish this goal through a variety of urban renewal policies. These neighborhoods have been selected because of their socio-economic similarities to Klarendal at the turn of the century, some of which persist to this day. They have also been selected because they lack any of the telltale signs of gentrification mentioned above. Hopefully a clear picture of the ways in which the gentrification of Klarendal has impacted its social characteristics will be provided by comparing the social cohesion, perceived neighborhood-security and resident participation within these neighborhoods and how they've developed over the years.

5. Methodology

This research relies on a combination of quantitative and qualitative methods and data. The mixing of qualitative and quantitative methods creates the opportunity to approach the impact of gentrification on urban communities from different perspectives, offering a more comprehensive way to study the subject. The qualitative sources consist of semi-structured interviews, policy documents and several articles from newspapers and magazines. Quantitative methods are applied by using statistical analysis on data collected by the municipality of Arnhem. The following chapters will outline the methodologies used in this case study and explain each of the aforementioned sources in detail.

5.1 Statistical data

The statistical data that has been used in this research was retrieved from the municipality's database (arnhem.incijfers.nl). The information is freely accessible to everybody and is collected from a large number of different sources that have been pooled together to create a huge public database. This database offers a wide-range of information ranging from the ethnic composition of Klarendal to its average level of income. More importantly, however, the municipality's database has been used to answer the research questions posed in this study. The information on social cohesion, perceived neighborhood security and resident participation can be accessed from the municipality's database but was originally gathered as part of the "Leefbaarheid en Veiligheid" questionnaire. The municipality of Arnhem has been using this questionnaire to monitor the livability and safety of Arnhem since 2001. The questionnaire was originally designed within the context of the Great Cities Policy and the national Security Monitor. The methodological changes within the Security Monitor

eventually prompted the municipality of Arnhem to conduct the research under its own supervision back in 2013, ensuring the prevention of trend breaches regarding relevant indicators. The majority of the data used in this research encompasses a period from 2001 (launch of urban renewal project Klarendal Kom Op!) to 2015 (last available data), making it possible to study Klarendal's social shifts during its gentrification. It was also possible to compare the numbers of Klarendal with other districts and the city's average.

The "Leefbaarheid en Veiligheid" monitor is based on a random sample of 14,000 Arnhem residents, aged 15 and up, drawn from the Basis Registratie Personen (Basic Registration Persons). The selection process was designed to select a maximum of one person per address and each year different people are asked the same set of questions thus creating random samples in different time periods (pooled cross sectional data). These people received a letter asking them to fill out a digital questionnaire and if the questionnaire has not yet been filled in, a reminder was sent. Eventually, the people who hadn't responded were approached by telephone and in 2015 a total of 4750 Arnhem residents completed the questionnaire; a response rate of 34%. Certain groups are traditionally underrepresented in the sample including; young people and immigrants. By using different methods of approach (digital, written and telephone) the non-response among these groups is avoided as much as possible.

It is difficult to define a concise and reliable statistical measurement of gentrification within the limited confines of the municipality's dataset. Thus the analysis will start off by studying possible changes within the community of Klarendal from 2001 to 2015. This time-frame was chosen because it captures the gentrification of Klarendal. Many of the latest urban renewal projects have been implemented during this period, contributing to the inception of Klarendal's transformation. It allows for comparisons between the community of Klarendal before the initiation of gentrification and its community during the different stages of this process. Gentrification is operationalized by comparing these changes over time between the neighborhood of Klarendal and similar neighborhoods in Arnhem that haven't been subjected to gentrification such as; Presikhaaf-West, Arnhemse Broek and Geitenkamp (for more information on neighborhood selection see p. 50). Of course gentrification has inspired a lot of changes within the community of Klarendal over the years but the analysis will be limited to its possible impact on several dimensions of social cohesion, perceived neighborhood security and resident participation. In order to answer the first research question we look at the impact of gentrification on the social cohesion in Klarendal. The operationalization of social cohesion is an average scale-score based on the answers to 4 statements; "The interactions between the people of my neighborhood are pleasurable and agreeable", "I feel at home with the people living in this neighborhood", "I live in a cozy neighborhood where there is a lot of solidarity", "The people in the neighborhood hardly know each other". Respondents had to indicate to what extent these statements resonated with them by using the categories "totally agree", "agree", "neutral", "disagree", "disagree completely" and "no opinion". Based on the answers to these various statements, so-called scale scores have been awarded a value between 0 and 10. A higher value on this scale score means a higher

appreciation from respondents, thus a more positive attitude regarding the social cohesion within Klarendal. Statements that were 'negatively' formulated have been converted to positive scale scores. The sense neighborhood security is measured by asking the residents of Klarendal the following question; "Do you ever feel unsafe in your own neighborhood?". Finally the resident participation within Klarendal was operationalized by asking the residents of Klarendal the following question; "Have you actively contributed to your neighborhood last year?". This question was added to the survey in 2005, limiting the data concerning this topic to the period of 2005 to 2015. Obviously these questions were translated from Dutch and might be interpreted somewhat differently in the language of origin.

5.2 Regression-analysis

The descriptive statistics used in this research offer a summary of the sample concerning the variables relevant to this study. With inferential statistics this study will extend beyond the immediate data and reach more definitive conclusions concerning the way in which the social cohesion within Klarendal develops over time. Has social cohesion in Klarendal grown significantly from 2001 to 2015? Does this growth significantly differ from those in other districts? Some of these questions will be answered by using regression analysis, a set of statistical processes for estimating the relationships among variables. This statistical tool will allow for an understanding of the probability concerning an observed difference between groups, showing if there is a dependable difference or one that might have happened by chance. In the schematic chart below there will be an overview of the different variables used in the regressions analysis and the relationships between them.

1) Simple linear regression

X: Independent (YEAR of measurement) (interval variable)

Y: Dependent (Average scale-score Social Cohesion) (interval variable)

2) Logistic regression

X: Independent (YEAR of measurement) (interval variable)


Y: Dependent (Feelings of security; "Do you ever feel unsafe in your own neighborhood?" yes/no (dichotomous variable)

3) Logistic regression

X: Independent (YEAR of measurement) (interval variable)

Y: Dependent (Resident participation; "Have you actively contributed to your neighborhood last year?" yes/no) (dichotomous variable)

Figure 2: Schematic chart of the relations that will be estimated by regression analysis.



5.3 Mixed methods approach

Mixed methods research includes the mixing of qualitative and quantitative data and methodologies in a research study. This research applies a mixed methods approach in which a quantitative approach is supplemented by qualitative data to enhance the scope of the study by providing deeper and more complex answers to its research questions. It is extremely difficult to capture the complexities of a social construct like gentrification because of the limited perspective offered by social research relying on a single method of research. Different methodologies may have particular strengths with respect to uncovering certain truths about the impact of gentrification. Thus using more than one method should provide this research with some much needed help to get a clearer picture of the social world. This research uses a qualitative element to demonstrate the shortcomings of the quantitative approach of measuring a complex phenomenon such as social cohesion. The qualitative data will provide a possible deviation from the statistics and offer a more exhaustive explanation for certain trends found in the statistical data. These semi-structured interviews will provide a different approach that might uncover hidden truths concerning the social cohesion within Klarendal. Employing a mixed-methods approach offers the opportunity to complement the results of this quantitative research with a more in-depth perspective on the possible flaws of the existing measurements of social cohesion. A total of three different sources of data will be used in unison to showcase the shortcomings of each of these sources and provide an analysis of the different ways in which gentrification can be experienced. Combining these different sources will make the crystallization of statements that might be biased or misleading less probable.

The findings of this study have to be placed in a theoretical context and will be compared with the theories discussed in chapter 2. It's crucial to be wary of the fact that the majority of these theoretical insights have been produced within an Anglo-Saxon framework. The historical,

economic and cultural differences between the Anglo-Saxon and Dutch models of gentrification need to be taken into account when applying certain theories on the results found in Klarendal. The impact of gentrification will be measured using quantitative data and the results will be expanded with a more in-depth narrative consisting of stories told by relevant actors. The ambition is to conduct discourse analysis on various data sources in order to reveal the contingent nature in which the gentrification of Klarendal impacts its community.

5.4 Interviews

In addition to the data that was gathered from the municipality's database, the primary objective of this research is to complement its quantitative segment with a more qualitative approach. This is why a wide selection of actors including policy makers, young entrepreneurs and local residents have been interviewed, elucidating their views on the gentrification process of Klarendal. The inclusion of many different perspectives tells a more comprehensive story regarding the impact of gentrification on the community of Klarendal. The following semi-structured interviews have been conducted;

- 1) *Hans Ansems* (ArtEZ professor and entrepreneur) (24/2/14)
- 2) *Berry Kessels* (housing corporation manager) (13/3/14)
- 3) *Chris Zeevenhooven* (former Klarendal's district manager) (20/3/14)
- 4) *Rob Klingen* (social worker of Rijnstad in Klarendal) (7/4/14)
- 5) *Esther Ruiten* (head of arts and culture and the creative industries of Arnhem, ARCCI) (7/4/14)
- 6) *Walter De Bes* (owner of Caspar Bar/ Restaurant in Klarendal, DOCKS) (7/5/14)
- 7) *Charly Tomassen* (Klarendal's current district manager) (14/5/14)
- 8) *Ron Onstein* (Long-time volunteer at playground De Leuke Linde) (15/06/15)
- 9) **Klarendal residents:** Henk Kok (08/06/2015), Olga Lozeman (17/08/2015), Dini Poppinghaus (27/08/2015), Mark van Doorn (15/01/2016), Özlem Tan (22/01/2016), Ruben Leijh (10/03/2016), Aniek van der Meij (28/07/2016), Iris Wuyster (02/08/2016), Samira Descelles (05/08/2016), Sheira Remkes (18/08/2016).
- 10) **Klarendal entrepreneurs:** Klaas Kuijt & Rita Bonte (09/12/2015), Leonie Mizze (02/09/2014), Sjoerd Stouten (09/03/2016).

5.5 Policy documents.

A wide variety of information has been gathered by studying policy documents. The municipality of Arnhem provided several documents that have been used to retrieve general information about the district of Klarendal and its history (for instance the Economic Agenda Arnhem 2015 released in 2009 and Structure Vision 2020 released in 2012). The policy overview in chapter 4 was constructed by using reports that focus on policy campaigns within the framework of Klarendal (Klarendal (Klarendal: Colour and Character, 2003; Klarendal: Local Action Plan, 2008; District Vision Klarendal 2022) and reports addressing national policies that impact the Netherlands as a whole (Nota Stedelijke Vernieuwing, 1997; Actieplan Krachtwijken, 2007). The discourse analysis applied to both the interviews and the policy documents consisted of a thorough reading while color-coding several subjects relevant to this research. Sentences referring to social cohesion were marked red while sentences referring to perceived neighborhood security and resident participation were highlighted with the colors yellow and blue respectively.

6. Results

6.1 Link between gentrification and social cohesion in Klarendal.

In the previous chapters the stage has been set by describing the case study of Klarendal extensively and setting out the historical background of the neighborhood. An overview of the urban renewal policies that have influenced the development of Klarendal has also been given concerning both local policies (either neighborhood specific or city-wide) and national policies. In this chapter the spotlight will be on the following question; “Is there a link between gentrification and social cohesion within the community of Klarendal?”. Describing the gentrification of Klarendal as a ‘clash of cultures’ might be a bit of an exaggeration but the established dominance of longtime residents has been challenged by an influx of new arrivals, increasing their interactions with middle-class residents and their exposure to middle-class culture. Has social mix resulted in a collision between the different groups within the community of Klarendal or has there been a peaceful coexistence? The consequences of social mixing have been hypothesized in previous chapters by both conflict theory and contact theory (see chapter 2.3, p. 22). Allport’s (1954) contact theory explains how continued interaction between groups with different backgrounds could reduce intergroup prejudice and create a more inclusive community. The gentrification of Klarendal will forge a mutual understanding between different groups, resulting in residents whose newly established intergroup connections will make them feel more at home in the neighborhood thus stimulating social cohesion within the community. However, conflict theory is another essential concept to take into account when attempting to understand the dynamics of social mixing and its consequences. Conflict theory describes how intergroup hostility emerges because of

conflicting goals and competition over limited resources (Baumeister & Vohs, 2007; Jackson, 1993; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). Based on the conflict theory one would expect gentrification to cause tensions between different groups within Klarendal, damaging the social cohesion of the community. The following chapter will provide an overview of the results of both qualitative and quantitative analyses, offering some insight into the link between gentrification and social cohesion.

The starting point of this story will be provided by the municipality's database. In order to keep close tabs on the health of its local communities and monitor the impact of its policies the municipality of Arnhem has been tracking the social cohesion within each of their districts since 2001. This is the only measure that is currently being used to monitor the social cohesion within Klarendal and studying its results will provide a general idea of how this neighborhood characteristic has evolved over the years. Thereafter, the limited scope of this statistical endeavor will be compared with relevant stories told by various actors, both from within the community of Klarendal and those concerned with its rapid transformation.

Table 1 shows the average scores that the residents of Klarendal have given several dimensions of the social cohesion in their neighborhood, as part of a periodic survey by the municipality. The score of social cohesion is based on the extent in which the residents of Klarendal agreed with the following 4 statements; "The interactions between the people of my neighborhood are pleasurable and agreeable", "I feel at home with the people living in this neighborhood", "I live in a cozy neighborhood where there is a lot of solidarity", "The people in the neighborhood hardly know each other" (see 5.1, p. 50 for a more detailed account of the operationalization). This score has steadily increased after a minor setback in 2003 but its growth has flat lined since 2011 (see figure 3). The year 2011 also marks the first time that the score for social cohesion within Klarendal was equal to the city's average. Both the social cohesion within Klarendal and the city's average have improved between 2001 and 2015. In 2015 the majority of the statements regarding the social cohesion in Klarendal are met with positivity rather than negativity, which is reflected in a score of 5.8. Especially the pleasant interactions between residents is positively experienced. The feeling of solidarity among residents is experienced to a lesser extent thus contributing less to the social cohesion in Klarendal when compared to the other statements. In 2015 there are still big differences between the neighborhoods of Arnhem with the score varying from a 4.8 in the city-center and Presikhaaf-West to a 6.8 in Velperweg and Heijenoord/Lombok.

According to the descriptive information provided by table 1 the social cohesion within Klarendal has improved between 2001 and 2015, but can this trend be explained by the process of gentrification. In an attempt to specify the effect of gentrification, a regression analysis was repeated to compare the outcomes, using the populations of Klarendal and several similar neighborhoods that haven't been affected by gentrification. The three neighborhoods selected for comparison are Presikhaaf-West, Arnhemse Broek and Geitenkamp. Chapter 4.3 will explain the reasoning behind the selection of these

neighborhoods. Because a specific measurement of gentrification is lacking in the municipality's dataset, the year of measurement will be used as a proxy when comparing its effect on social cohesion between Klarendal and for instance Presikhaaf-West. The use of regression analysis shows that there is a statistically significant positive relationship between the year of measurement and the score of social cohesion in Klarendal. When the year of measurement gets higher, the attitudes of the residents of Klarendal concerning the social cohesion within in their neighborhood get more positive. However, when looking at the populations of Presikhaaf-West, Arnhemse Broek and Geitenkamp there is no significant relationship between the year of measurement and the score of social cohesion within these communities. This supports the claim that the gentrification of Klarendal has had a positive impact on social cohesion. But this conclusion would be based on only one measurement of social cohesion; how do the residents of Klarendal explain their experiences concerning the social cohesion in their neighborhood?

The majority of residents provide positive responses when asked to evaluate the social cohesion in Klarendal. Many even argue that the changes brought about by gentrification have directly improved social cohesion, mentioning for instance the surge of new restaurants and cafes (Ruben Leijh, 10/03/2016; Aniek van der Meij, 28/07/2016; Samira Descelles, 05/08/2016; Sheira Remkes, 18/08/2016). They offer new and exciting places to meet people, improving the overall atmosphere and making the district seem more accessible, friendly and alive. Goed Proeven and Sugar Hill are by far the most popular establishments, offering an ambiance that seems to be particularly enjoyed by the new arrivals and at the very least respected by longtime residents. The infatuation that many Klarendal residents seem to have with the neighborhood's social dynamics aren't limited to the meeting places provided by these new venues but seems to spill over to the streets (Aniek van der Meij, 28/07/2016, Sheira Remkes, 18/08/2016). The atmosphere on the streets of Klarendal is often described as 'vibrant' and can be seen as a catalyst for social cohesion. In the summer many residents sit in their front yard in order to make small talk with neighbors walking by. Old people gather at the square in front of Klarendal's shopping center to talk about their lives and share the latest gossip. This makes people feel as if Klarendal is a tight-knit and comforting community, a village within a city if you will. People seem to know and support each other and their social lives seem to take place within the neighborhood. When compared to other Dutch neighborhoods the streets of Klarendal seem to have a more prevalent social dimension due to a higher density of foot traffic translating into a higher frequency of social interactions within the streets. This leads many Klarendal residents to conclude that the social cohesion within Klarendal is higher when compared to the other neighborhoods they've lived in or visited. Kid's playground Leuke Linde seems to be the most widely appreciated public space the neighborhood has to offer, with many parents expressing their appreciation for a safe and well-kept place to play with their kids (Ruben Leijh, 10/03/2016; Aniek van der Meij, 28/07/2016; Sheira Remkes, 18/08/2016). Parents like to see their kids making new friends but also enjoy the social interactions they themselves have with other parents from the neighborhood. The playground's supervisor is a dedicated volunteer named Ron Onstein, who

states that Leuke Linde is much more than just a playground and is considered to be a primary place to meet fellow Klarendallers (Ron Onstein, 15/06/2015). Another relevant meeting point is Klarendal's neighborhood center (MFC Klarendal), mentioned by several people who knew of its existence but had never actually set foot in the building (Özlem Tan, 22/01/2016; Aniek van der Meij, 28/07/2016). Some people acknowledged the neighborhood center to be an important contribution to the social cohesion within the neighborhood because its building features a primary school (Henk Kok, 08/06/2015). Good education within Klarendal ensures that kids have the option of attending school within their own neighborhood. This anchors many of their social experiences to the local context of Klarendal, enriching the neighborhood with another social dimension. Interestingly enough not all meeting points have to exist within the physical world. The connections made through the cyber realms provided by Facebook and WhatsApp chat groups have also improved the experienced social cohesion within the community (Ruben Leijh, 10/03/2016; Aniek van der Meij, 28/07/2016). These social media have forged a sense of community simply because they have created accessible platforms through which residents can help each other and keep up to date on local news.

Another element important to the social cohesion of Klarendal is the introduction of a host of new activities that strengthen the social ties within the neighborhood and promote the interaction of people with different backgrounds. Meeting new people at these events and places, most of them popping up over the last decade, seems to be an essential dynamic when attempting to explain what social cohesion means to a lot of people. These encounters don't have to be the start of a lifelong friendship but do have to provide people with a platform to socialize with their neighbors and greet them in the streets. For many people this seems to be the embodiment of social cohesion (Olga Lozeman, 17/08/2015; Mark van Doorn, 15/01/2016; Aniek van der Meij, 28/07/2016; Sjoerd Stouten, 09/03/2016). Nacht van de Mode is often cited as an example of longtime residents meeting new arrivals and getting along brilliantly. One of the organizers of these activities is Sjoerd Stouten, the owner of TAPE. As the owner of a local cafe he has organized a night with Turkish music and culture meant to foster the interaction between people with different backgrounds. The goal was to introduce his usual clientele of young creatives to the Turkish community of the neighborhood. In order to appeal to his intended target audience he decided to cooperate with local Turkish entrepreneurs who provided Turkish food and attended the event themselves bringing along their friends and families. The event Wijken voor Kunst has a similar goal and attempts to promote local artists regardless of their background by introducing their creative endeavors to their fellow Klarendal residents (Mark van Doorn, 15/01/2016). Perhaps the Ballroom Theater is the most ambitious encouragement of social mixing Klarendal has ever seen. The activities were organized by people representing different population groups within the district of Klarendal (Olga Lozeman, 17/08/2015; Dini Poppinghaus, 27/08/2015). The project offered a stage to all of the neighborhood's residents, each showcasing their own identity and interests, ranging from high to lowbrow culture. By combining more accessible cultural activities with so called high culture, a mixed arrangement was created that managed to appeal to a broad public. The main goal was to create unity within diversity but unfortunately

the event has been cancelled in 2008 after a falling out between its organizers. After the initial success of the project a series of misunderstandings between the organizers, exacerbated by their different social backgrounds, eventually led to the demise of this ambitious project (Olga Lozeman, 17/08/2015; Dini Poppinghaus, 27/08/2015). This perfectly indicates that there are several threats to the social cohesion of Klarendal that need to be taken seriously.

Some residents report an increasing feeling of alienation within a neighborhood that has changed drastically over the past decades (Dini Poppinghaus, 27/08/2015; Özlem Tan, 22/01/2016). They seem to have a hard time explaining the origins of this sentiment and often resort to describing a general fear of being driven out of their own neighborhood. Some of the interviewees felt that the needs of the new arrivals were prioritized by the local government. The majority of Klarendal's longtime residents are part of the working class and are unable to afford the items on the shelves of the new stores along the Klarendalseweg. In addition, the creative cluster that has been set up here doesn't really connect with the cultural experiences of the working-class. Longtime residents understand that many of these creative enterprises are targeted towards a different audience but are still frustrated by a lack shops that are interesting and accessible to them (Dini Poppinghaus, 27/08/2015; Özlem Tan, 22/01/2016). The accumulation of these factors leads longtime residents to feel left out of the party. Many changes have slowly taken place around them and they find themselves living in a gentrified neighborhood that doesn't seem to fully accept them. The loss of dominance within this social realm is a painful realization for some longtime residents and they feel that the local government isn't committed to protecting their place within Klarendal. This feeling is exacerbated by their failing attempts at opening their own stores within Klarendal (Dini Poppinghaus, 27/08/2015). Their proposal for a coffeehouse has been rejected several times and the real estate they were interested in has been allocated to creative entrepreneurs. The intent of these decisions by local government is unclear but old-school Klarendallers seem to interpret them as a personal vendetta. Finally, it's interesting to add that most residents say they have friends living in Klarendal but admit that all of these friends belong to the same social class as themselves (Dini Poppinghaus, 27/08/2015; Ruben Leijh, 10/03/2016; Aniek van der Meij, 28/07/2016; Samira Descelles, 05/08/2016; Sheira Remkes, 18/08/2016). This indicates that there is still a social distance between the working-class residents and the new middle-class arrivals.

These feelings of estrangement are also experienced by the Turkish community within Klarendal. One of the Turkish interviewees stated that the solidarity experienced by the Turkish minority in a pre-gentrification Klarendal is gone, people have become more distant and individualistic (Özlem Tan, 22/01/2016). The social network of the Turkish residents within Klarendal has eroded and many have decided to move to Presikhaaf, a neighborhood with a strong Turkish presence. According to government officials the migration of Turkish residents was most likely caused by the completion of several construction projects and the subsequent release of new and affordable housing in Presikhaaf (Rob Klinge, 7/4/14). The very same government officials are accused of being oblivious to what is going on in the Turkish

community but unfortunately there seems to be a lack of people willing to stand up for the communities' interests. Gerrit Dassen and Ron Onstein are great spokespersons for the longtime residents of Klarendal but similar voices representing the Turkish community have yet to surface (Özlem Tan, 22/01/2016). Several interviewees mentioned that the integration of ethnic minorities within the neighborhood's framework has always been a challenge. The Turkish community in Klarendal can still feel like an island at times, an example being the aversion of local Turkish shopkeepers to work together with other local shopkeepers (Leonie Mizee, 02/09/2014). Several shopkeepers along the Hommelseweg tried to persuade local Turkish shopkeepers to join their association of local entrepreneurs but their offer has always been declined. The membership fees of this association are minimal, leading some to assume that the decisions of the Turkish shopkeepers are based on a skeptical view of society outside of their own community. Another example of the isolation of the Turkish community is the fact that cultural activities, organized in an attempt to trigger social mixing in Klarendal, have seldom been able to reach ethnic minorities (Ron Onstein, 15/06/2015). These attempts at bridging the gap between the Turkish community and the other Klarendal residents have proven to be disappointing, quite possibly jeopardizing future efforts to engage ethnic minorities.

When examining the interviews it becomes clear that the majority of the residents experience a high degree of social cohesion within Klarendal. Their explanations are incredibly varied; ranging from their appreciation of certain popular public spaces to the introduction of activities believed to promote social interaction by injecting Klarendal with energy and excitement. Many of the elements mentioned by interviewees have been introduced to Klarendal during its gentrification and provide some insight into the mechanisms behind the rise of social cohesion that was found in the statistical analysis. The statistical results reflect the implications of Allport's (1954) contact theory and support the claim that gentrification has had a positive impact on social cohesion in Klarendal. The overwhelming majority of the stories told by the interviewees are supportive of a narrative in which the gentrification of Klarendal has been beneficial to the social ties within its community. The perception of Klarendal as a pleasurable and solidary social environment has increased and the sense of belonging within this social environment has been amplified for many residents. This trend implies that intergroup-relations have improved as well and many residents seem to endorse this point of view but an important question remains; has the gentrification of Klarendal really created sustainable connections between different groups within its community? When looking critically at the collection of stories praising the growth of social cohesion within the community, it becomes apparent that many of these stories do not necessarily describe interactions between people with different backgrounds. Many interviewees admit that they only have friends with similar backgrounds, their social network consisting mostly of people belonging to the same social strata and having the same cultural heritage or educational attainment. New cafes and cultural activities seem beneficial to an overall sense of belonging and cohesion but in reality they only provide residents with more opportunities to strengthen the social ties within their own group. If this is the case, Klarendal isn't a perfect example of a

harmonious social mix hosting frequent constructive exchanges between groups but rather a neighborhood in which a peaceful and self-chosen segregation has taken hold. This scenario is not necessarily undesirable but it does undermine the image of Klarendal as a true melting pot of people with different backgrounds and identities. The feelings of alienation that were reported by several longtime residents indicate that conflict theory is also relevant in the community of Klarendal. There are no explicit examples of intergroup violence but the adjustments made by longtime residents, in order to keep up with the compositional changes taking place in their neighborhood, have developed some animosity towards local-government and some bitterness concerning the wave of middle-class newcomers. These attitudes could be explained by conflicting goals and competition over limited resources.

In conclusion, the case of Klarendal isn't a clear-cut example of contact theory in action but rather a murky swamp of contradictory perspectives on the social merits of urban renewal. The findings of the statistical analysis make a strong case for the positive impact of gentrification on the social cohesion of Klarendal. The majority of residents seem to agree with this assessment and report that they are very pleased with the high degree of social cohesion found in Klarendal. However, it's important not to ignore the critical voices from longtime residents who report feelings of alienation within their own neighborhood. Several interviews indicate that there is still a significant social distance between the working-class residents and the new middle-class arrivals. Similar feelings have been found among Turkish residents and it inspired some to leave Klarendal and join other Turkish communities around Arnhem. It's plausible that the negative perspectives regarding social cohesion in Klarendal have become a statistical outlier due to the large-scale influx of middle-class residents. Even the loudest critics are drowned in a sea of yuppies, who seem very comfortable with the myriad of changes Klarendal has undergone to facilitate their needs.

Figure 3: Social cohesion by district, 2001-2015




Table 1: Social cohesion by district, 2001-2015

| | 2001 | 2003 | 2005 | 2007 | 2009 | 2011 | 2013 | 2015 |
|------------------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|
| Centrum | 4.7 | 4.8 | 5.2 | 4.9 | 4.8 | 4.8 | 4.6 | 4.8 |
| Spijkerkwartier | 5.0 | 5.1 | 5.2 | 5.2 | 5.3 | 5.2 | 5.3 | 5.3 |
| Arnhemse Broek | 4.8 | 4.9 | 5.4 | 4.5 | 5.0 | 5.0 | 4.8 | 5.1 |
| Presikhaaf-West | 4.7 | 4.7 | 5.0 | 4.7 | 5.1 | 4.8 | 5.0 | 4.8 |
| Presikhaaf-Oost | 5.6 | 6.1 | 5.8 | 5.6 | 5.8 | 5.6 | 5.4 | 5.5 |
| St.Marten/Sonsb.-Zuid | 5.4 | 5.8 | 6.2 | 6.1 | 5.9 | 6.1 | 5.9 | 5.9 |
| Klarendal | 5.0 | 4.8 | 5.4 | 5.4 | 5.6 | 5.8 | 5.8 | 5.8 |
| Velperweg e.o. | 6.5 | 6.7 | 7.0 | 7.0 | 6.4 | 6.6 | 6.6 | 6.8 |
| Alteveer en Cranevelt | 6.6 | 7.3 | 6.8 | 7.0 | 6.7 | 6.6 | 6.9 | 6.6 |
| Geitenkamp | 5.5 | 5.9 | 5.7 | 5.5 | 6.0 | 5.7 | 5.7 | 5.5 |
| Monnikenhuizen | 6.1 | 6.2 | 6.6 | 5.8 | 5.9 | 6.1 | 6.1 | 6.0 |
| Burgem.wijk/Hoogkamp | 6.3 | 7.0 | 6.9 | 6.8 | 6.6 | 6.6 | 6.8 | 6.5 |
| Schaarsbergen e.o. | 6.3 | 7.1 | 6.6 | 6.6 | 6.3 | 6.5 | 6.5 | 6.7 |
| Heijenoord/Lombok | 6.3 | 6.8 | 6.9 | 6.7 | 7.0 | 6.7 | 6.9 | 6.8 |
| Klingelbeek | 6.9 | 7.0 | 7.3 | 7.0 | 6.9 | 6.8 | 7.0 | 6.5 |
| Malburgen-West | 4.6 | 4.4 | 5.4 | 5.2 | 5.3 | 5.3 | 5.4 | 5.5 |
| Malburgen-Oost (Noord) | 4.9 | 4.8 | 5.3 | 5.0 | 5.2 | 5.3 | 5.3 | 5.5 |
| Malburgen-Oost (Zuid) | 5.0 | 4.7 | 4.9 | 4.8 | 5.2 | 5.2 | 5.2 | 5.0 |
| Vredenburg/Kronenburg | 5.5 | 5.6 | 5.5 | 5.3 | 5.3 | 5.4 | 5.4 | 5.3 |
| Elden | 7.3 | 7.3 | 7.3 | 7.1 | 7.0 | 7.0 | 6.6 | 6.7 |
| Elderveld | 5.7 | 6.1 | 6.2 | 6.1 | 6.1 | 6.1 | 5.9 | 5.9 |
| De Laar | 5.6 | 5.9 | 5.8 | 5.7 | 5.7 | 5.6 | 5.7 | 5.6 |
| Rijkerswoerd | 5.3 | 6.1 | 5.8 | 5.5 | 5.8 | 5.7 | 5.8 | 5.8 |
| Schuytgraaf | - | - | 6.8 | 6.2 | 6.5 | 6.4 | 6.2 | 6.0 |
| Arnhem | 5.5 | 5.8 | 5.9 | 5.7 | 5.8 | 5.8 | 5.8 | 5.8 |

Sources: gebiedsmonitor (2001), pilot Veiligheidsmonitor (2005), Veiligheidsmonitor (2009, 2011), enquête Leefbaarheid en veiligheid (2003, 2007, 2013, 2015)

6.2 Link between gentrification and sense of neighbourhood-security in Klarendal.

This second chapter will deal with the following question; “Is there a link between gentrification and the perceived neighbourhood-security within the community of Klarendal?”. The transformation of Klarendal over the last decades has had a huge impact on the appearance of the neighborhood and the composition of its residents. The social disorganization theory will be used to examine how the unexpected neighborhood changes caused by gentrification influence the sense of security experienced by residents. This theory can be used to outline two divergent consequences of gentrification for the perceived neighborhood-security in Klarendal. Social disorganization theory states that community structure has an important effect on crime and fear of crime (Bursik, 1988; Kornhauser, 1978; Shaw & McKay, 1942; Skogan, 1986; Taylor & Covington, 1993). The disruption of social order can be triggered by the compositional changes taking place within a gentrifying community such as Klarendal. Based on this explanation of social disorganization theory one would expect the gentrification of Klarendal to erode existing social networks thus curbing the collective resilience of the community, inciting feelings of alienation and increasing the overall fear of crime. An alternative hypothesis based on social disorganization theory predicts a decline in the fear of crime due to the improving economic conditions within gentrifying neighborhoods. The selective migration of more crime-prone individuals results in more internal stability (Kirk & Laub, 2010; Shaw & McKay, 1942). Gentrification also improves a neighborhood’s physical appearance covering up signs of urban decay (graffiti, abandoned houses etc.) to reassure locals that social order has been restored (Hunter, 1978). The following chapter will provide an overview of the results of both qualitative and quantitative analyses, offering some insight into the link between gentrification and perceived neighborhood-security.

Table 2 shows the percentage of Klarendal residents that have admitted that they feel unsafe in their own neighborhood. This percentage has steadily decreased after 2003 and is getting closer to the city’s average each year, signaling increased feelings of security within the community of Klarendal (see figure 4). The percentage of people that report feeling unsafe within Klarendal has almost been cut in half from 2003 (51%) to 2015 (27%). This remarkable drop suggests that the perceived neighborhood-security within Klarendal has improved between 2001 and 2015. It’s interesting to note that the percentages accounting for the city’s average have decreased as well, even though the drop less impressive when compared to the trend in Klarendal. Within the city of Arnhem as a whole the feelings of security within one’s own neighborhood have been increasing, but a quarter of the population still admits to feeling unsafe (25%). In 2015 there are still big differences between the neighborhoods of Arnhem. Residents in the Spijkerkwartier feel the most unsafe (46%), which is remarkable because of its status as a neighborhood moving along the final stages of gentrification (Chris Zeevenhooven, 20/3/14). This seems to be a relapse of some sort because in the previous

years there has been a significant drop in the percentage of Spijkerkwartier residents reporting to feel unsafe. Other areas of which a relatively high percentage of the population reports feelings of insecurity are the city-center (36%), Arnhemse Broek (35%), Presikhaaf-West (35%) and the three districts in Malburgen (West; 34%, Oost both Noord & Zuid; 36%). The residents of Klingelbeek seem to be enjoying a very positive perception of the safety within their neighborhood, with only 6% admitting to feelings of insecurity.

According to the descriptive information provided by table 2 the perceived neighborhood-security within Klarendal has improved between 2001 and 2015, but can this trend be explained by the process of gentrification. In an attempt to specify the effect of gentrification, a regression analysis was repeated using different populations to compare the outcomes, using the populations of Klarendal and several similar neighborhoods that haven't been affected by gentrification. The three neighborhoods selected for comparison are Presikhaaf-West, Arnhemse Broek and Geitenkamp. Chapter 4.3 will explain the reasoning behind the selection of these neighborhoods. Because a specific measurement of gentrification is lacking in the municipality's dataset, the year of measurement will be used as a proxy when comparing its effect on perceived neighborhood-security between Klarendal and for instance Presikhaaf-West. By conducting a regression analysis it becomes clear that there is a statistically significant negative relationship between the year of measurement and the amount of Klarendal residents feeling unsafe. When the year of measurement gets higher, the amount of people in Klarendal feeling unsafe decreases. However, when looking at the populations of Presikhaaf-West, Arnhemse Broek and Geitenkamp there is no significant relationship between the year of measurement and the perceived neighborhood-security within these communities. This supports the claim that the gentrification of Klarendal has had a positive impact on perceived neighborhood security.

When looking at the interviews it becomes immediately apparent that the residents of Klarendal are in unanimous agreement concerning their safety; the neighborhood-security in Klarendal has never been better (Dini Poppinghaus, 27/08/2015; Mark van Doorn, 15/01/2016; Özlem Tan, 22/01/2016; Ruben Leijh, 10/03/2016; Aniek van der Meij, 28/07/2016; Sheira Remkes, 18/08/2016). Many longtime residents shared their personal horror stories of living in Klarendal during its biggest struggles with drug-crime and violence, the 80's and 90's, and more recent settlers all knew of the neighborhoods unsavory reputation back in the day. However, all interviewees agree that the neighborhood-security in Klarendal has improved tremendously over the last decades. Many residents touched on similar topics when asked to identify the elements that caused the increase in neighborhood-security. People believed the urban redevelopment of Klarendal had shifted the resources of local government towards the neighborhood and local law-enforcement was used to safeguard these investments. The resulting crackdown on crime was efficient and the opening of a new police station in the middle of the neighborhood improved the visibility of police presence. Interviewees also told that the rapid response of local law-enforcement felt very reassuring and was greatly appreciated when they were in need of assistance (Klaas Kuijt & Rita Bonte,

09/12/2015). A good rapport between police and local residents is deemed essential as well because a good dialogue inspires trust and cooperation between both groups (Klaas Kuijt & Rita Bonte, 09/12/2011). Many residents were satisfied with how the police present themselves within the neighborhood even though there was one longtime resident who claimed that the relationship had become more distant over the past years (Özlem Tan, 22/01/2016). Back in the day the officers were believed to have a more personal relationship with the residents but this sentiment doesn't seem to be wide-spread.

Another recurring explanation for the improved neighborhood-security seems to be the surge of local Facebook and WhatsApp-groups that offer residents peace of mind courtesy of the watchful eyes of the collective neighborhood (Ruben Leijh, 10/03/2016; Aniek van der Meij, 28/07/2016). When threatened many residents believe that they can fall back on the support of their neighbors and this sense of community fosters feelings of safety. One of the interviewees also jokingly stated that she felt safe in Klarendal because of its proximity to the hospital (Sheira Remkes, 18/08/2016). However, even though the neighborhood-security is currently well-perceived there are still some residents pointing out issues that need fixing. The police are still working together with locals to identify hotbeds of turmoil within the neighborhood but its proven difficult to completely eradicate disturbances caused by local youth and drug-related crime. Some residents say that these occurrences can lead to temporary feelings of anxiety but many still feel safe in general (Henk Kok, 08/06/2015; Iris Wuyster, 02/08/2016). A local entrepreneur suggested the placement of camera's to aid the police in their search for these culprits, but local residents might get upset by this invasion of their privacy (Leonie Mizeee, 02/09/2014). Finally there were a few interesting remarks regarding the presence of ethnic minorities and its impact on perceived neighborhood-security. One of the interviewees admitted that they felt unsafe in neighborhoods where a majority of the residents were of Turkish or Moroccan descent (Aniek van der Meij, 28/07/2016). However, they felt safe in Klarendal because there was an equal distribution between the different groups living in the neighborhood.

Because social disorganization theory suggests that the perceived neighborhood security in Klarendal is dependent on the social cohesion within its community it's important to look back at the results discussed in the previous chapter (see chapter 6.1, p. 54). The findings presented in this chapter imply that the gentrification of Klarendal has improved social cohesion. According to the theoretical framework provided by social disorganization theory, the growth of social cohesion is bound to improve the collective resilience of Klarendal as a community, subsequently improving the perceived neighborhood security. Both the statistical analysis of the municipality's data and the stories told by residents can be used to reach an identical conclusion; the perceived neighborhood security has increased over the last few years. These findings are in line with the assumptions of social disorganization theory. The interviews also expose several mechanisms intrinsic to social disorganization theory; with several residents mentioning the improving economic conditions within Klarendal as the most important reason for the decline in fear of crime. The urban renewal of Klarendal and the increase in police

presence are often talked about in the same breath as neighborhood security and both of these factors seem to be associated with people experiencing more internal stability. The observations discussed in the paragraphs above support the claim that gentrification has had a positive impact on the perceived neighborhood security in Klarendal.

Figure 4: Sense of neighborhood-security by district, 2001-2015 (Do you ever feel unsafe in your own neighborhood? %yes)




Table 2: Sense of neighborhood-security by district, 2001-2015 (Do you ever feel unsafe in your own neighborhood? %yes)

| | 2001 | 2003 | 2005 | 2007 | 2009 | 2011 | 2013 | <i>marge</i> | 2015 |
|------------------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|--------------|------------|
| Centrum | 51% | 57% | 49% | 50% | 43% | 44% | 35% | 3,6% | 36% |
| Spijkerkwartier | 60% | 71% | 53% | 43% | 41% | 42% | 35% | 3,4% | 46% |
| Arnhemse Broek | 40% | 41% | 35% | 47% | 34% | 37% | 41% | 3,6% | 35% |
| Presikhaaf-West | 38% | 44% | 37% | 39% | 35% | 45% | 31% | 3,1% | 35% |
| Presikhaaf-Oost | 19% | 20% | 25% | 20% | 20% | 25% | 26% | 3,0% | 25% |
| St.Marten/Sonsb.-Zuid | 28% | 36% | 35% | 23% | 20% | 22% | 32% | 3,6% | 25% |
| Klarendal | 44% | 51% | 42% | 38% | 32% | 30% | 31% | 2,9% | 27% |
| Velperweg e.o. | 18% | 15% | 24% | 19% | 18% | 19% | 20% | 2,3% | 17% |
| Alteveer en Cranevelt | 15% | 18% | 15% | 16% | 10% | 15% | 10% | 2,8% | 13% |
| Geitenkamp | 29% | 28% | 38% | 36% | 30% | 28% | 34% | 4,0% | 26% |
| Monnikenhuizen | 27% | 25% | 21% | 12% | 27% | 21% | 14% | 3,6% | 20% |
| Burgem.wijk/Hoogkamp | 20% | 22% | 19% | 17% | 16% | 12% | 14% | 2,2% | 13% |
| Schaarsbergen e.o. | 14% | 16% | 26% | 12% | 13% | 20% | 7% | 4,4% | 11% |
| Heijenoord/Lombok | 11% | 15% | 14% | 21% | 16% | 18% | 12% | 3,3% | 18% |
| Klingelbeek | 20% | 15% | 21% | 21% | 14% | 16% | 9% | 3,9% | 6% |
| Malburgen-West | 40% | 56% | 38% | 38% | 31% | 35% | 40% | 4,2% | 34% |
| Malburgen-Oost (Noord) | 40% | 47% | 49% | 44% | 28% | 36% | 35% | 3,6% | 36% |
| Malburgen-Oost (Zuid) | 34% | 49% | 43% | 41% | 30% | 34% | 30% | 3,2% | 36% |
| Vredenburg/Kronenburg | 23% | 29% | 27% | 31% | 26% | 24% | 29% | 2,8% | 29% |
| Elden | 10% | 17% | 12% | 23% | 12% | 19% | 18% | 4,1% | 13% |
| Elderveld | 23% | 28% | 19% | 23% | 19% | 18% | 29% | 2,4% | 21% |
| De Laar | 23% | 29% | 30% | 27% | 23% | 23% | 23% | 2,3% | 26% |
| Rijkerswoerd | 17% | 15% | 17% | 21% | 19% | 19% | 18% | 2,0% | 19% |
| Schuytgraaf | - | - | 15% | 9% | 12% | 15% | 16% | 2,1% | 13% |
| Arnhem | 29% | 33% | 30% | 29% | 25% | 26% | 26% | 0,6% | 25% |

Sources: gebiedsmonitor (2001), pilot Veiligheidsmonitor (2005), Veiligheidsmonitor (2009, 2011), enquête Leefbaarheid en veiligheid (2003, 2007, 2013, 2015)

6.3 Link between gentrification and resident participation in Klarendal.

In the following chapter the third and final research question will be answered “Is there a link between gentrification and resident participation in Klarendal?”. The concept of resident participation refers to the extent in which residents are actively engaged in their neighborhoods and the ways in which citizens invest in their communities in order to improve conditions for others, shaping a community’s future in the process. The gentrification of Klarendal could have waned the willingness of its residents to actively contribute to their community but it’s also possible that the urban renewal has spawned a sudden spike in volunteers. A previous chapter has discussed the norms and collective efficacy model from Leventhal and Brooks-Gunn (2000) in a quest to gain more insight into the dynamics of civic engagement (see chapter 2.5, p. 32). This model theorizes that living in a highly cohesive neighborhood, where people help each other and cooperate to serve the community, people will be socialized to civic norms and behaviors, learning how to contribute to shared goals (Leventhal and Brooks-Gunn, 2000). There seems to be a wealth of empirical evidence to support the claim that higher levels of social cohesion are associated with a stronger civic engagement (Brown & Ferris, 2007; Duke et al., 2009; Flanagan, Cumsille, et al., 2007; Kahne & Sporte, 2008). Gentrification is expected to influence the resident participation within a community indirectly through its impact on social cohesion. The following chapter will showcase the findings of both qualitative and quantitative inquiries into the dynamics of resident participation.

Table 3 shows the percentage of Klarendal residents who have actively contributed to their neighborhood in the year the survey was being conducted. It’s hard to specify a clear trend here with the highest percentages being recorded in 2003 (27%) and 2013 (28%) while the lowest percentages can be found in 2009 (18%) and 2015 (18%). The city’s average doesn’t seem to follow a clear trend either, the differences between the percentages of each consecutive year seem to be haphazard (see figure 5). In 2015 there are still big differences between the neighborhoods of Arnhem. The highest percentages of residents actively contributing to their neighborhood can be found in Schaarsbergen (41%) and Klingelbeek (38%). These are some of the richest neighborhoods in Arnhem which poses a very interesting question for future research; can resident participation be explained by the economic conditions in a neighborhood? The resident participation within the city-center seems to be in rough shape with only 12% of its population actively contributing to the neighborhood. Residents can be active within their community in a variety of different ways: volunteering, cleaning up litter, maintenance of public spaces and organizing school activities or street parties. Other examples include the participation in a neighborhood association or a neighborhood watch. Off course this is only a selection of the many ways in which people can contribute to their community. The formulation of this question seems to be purposefully vague in order to capture the many different forms of resident participation. It could also be

a ploy by the municipality to support policies attempting to stimulate resident participation by presenting encouraging statistics.

According to the descriptive information provided by table 3 the percentage of residents in Klarendal who are actively contributing to their own neighborhood is smaller in 2015 when compared with 2003, but it's hard to recognize any sort of trend over the years. In an attempt to specify the impact of gentrification on resident participation, a regression analysis was repeated to compare the outcomes, using the populations of Klarendal and several similar neighborhoods that haven't been affected by gentrification. The three neighborhoods selected for comparison are Presikhaaf-West, Arnhemse Broek and Geitenkamp. Chapter 4.3 will explain the reasoning behind the selection of these neighborhoods. Because a specific measurement of gentrification is lacking in the municipality's dataset, the year of measurement will be used as a proxy when comparing its effect on resident participation between Klarendal and for instance Presikhaaf-West. All of the regression analyses, regardless of population, concluded that there was no significant relationship between the year of measurement and resident participation. The gentrification of Klarendal didn't seem to have an impact on resident participation.

Among the interviewed residents there were quite a few who volunteered within Klarendal (Ron Onstein, 15/06/2015; Olga Lozeman, 17/08/2015; Dini Poppinghaus, 27/08/2015; Mark van Doorn, 15/01/2016; Özlem Tan, 22/01/2016). These residents commented on the importance of feeling involved with the neighborhood's future and livability. Others wanted to participate in the decision-making process of local-government concerning issues and policies impacting Klarendal. The residents who didn't volunteer within their neighborhood often said that they were too busy and didn't have time to pick up other responsibilities besides things like work, hobbies and raising their kids (Aniek van der Meij, 28/07/2016; Samira Descelles, 05/08/2016). The accessibility of these voluntary organizations also plays a pivotal role in people's willingness to volunteer. Several residents mentioned that joining local voluntary organizations can seem a bit daunting when you don't know any of the volunteers involved (Aniek van der Meij, 28/07/2016; Samira Descelles, 05/08/2016). The social groups that are heavily involved with these voluntary organizations can seem closed-off to outsiders. If these organizations want to attract more followers they might want to develop strategies for the recruitment of people without any preexisting social ties to the initiative in question. The establishment of these links might tap into new social networks, thus increasing the overall accessibility of a voluntary organization.

The interviews have shown that there are actually quite a few voluntary organizations that operate within Klarendal. A prominent example is the neighborhood council (Bewonersoverleg Klarendal) which was established to promote civic engagement and give residents a chance to advise local government when designing policies. There are several other initiatives that seem to have a positive impact on the civic participation of Klarendal residents, for example the 'vereniging van eigenaars' (VvE). This is an association of home-

owners whose dwellings share the same building or are lined up along the same street. The association of owners arranges the maintenance of their apartment building or other shared interests. It also serves a social function because organizations like these give residents certain tools to protect their own interests as home-owners and also allows them to socialize with their neighbors in a unique way. The largest group of volunteers can be found at playground Leuke Linde (Ron Onstein, 15/06/2015). Under the supervision of Ron Onstein there are 70 volunteers who organize activities for the kids of Klarendal and their parents while also maintaining the playground. According to Ron there have been many government officials who wanted to use Leuke Linde as a blueprint for setting up similar voluntary organizations in other neighborhoods or municipalities. Some of them have visited the playground and interviewed the volunteers in an attempt to distill its success. The group of volunteers that has been gathered here bridges social strata and this social mix actually makes the organization more resilient. The specific skill-sets of certain volunteers, for instance bookkeeping or legal advice, have greatly helped the origination of Leuke Linde to grow and prosper. Even though the volunteer group of Leuke Linde has had great success with bridging the gap between longtime residents and new arrivals, it's unable to reach the Turkish minority in Klarendal (Ron Onstein, 15/06/2015). Turkish parents do visit the playground regularly but none of them want to get involved with volunteer work. Nevertheless, Ron and his volunteers must be doing something right because there seem to be more than enough people willing to volunteer at the playground. Wijken voor Kunst is a much smaller organization and is struggling to survive due to a shortage of volunteers (Mark van Doorn, 15/01/2016). The people of Klarendal could be lacking a substantial interest in art but the organizer of the Wijken voor Kunst initiative blames the scarcity of volunteers on a more general apathy of residents towards anything that puts pressure on their busy schedules. It's hard to pinpoint what exactly motivates people to start volunteering in their neighborhood. A high degree of involvement with what is going on in Klarendal seems essential but will hardly be the sole contributing factor. Some of the interviews imply that having preexisting social ties with members of a certain volunteer group also increase the willingness to join this organization.

The challenge for politicians and volunteers is that a lot of people will simply be apathetic towards their attempts at bringing them into the fold. There will always be a lack of civil initiative because many people simply don't want to sacrifice their weekends to a neighborhood activity. Individualism has been on the rise for a long time now and this could have an impact on resident participation. However, there might be a silver lining on the horizon because more civic participation might be created by local Facebook and WhatsApp groups. Within these social-media groups the locals connect with each other and share information. This new technology has the potential to efficiently mobilize large groups of residents and improve the democratization and self-sufficiency of the neighborhood. These digital forms of communication between neighbors seems to have a considerable impact on the social cohesion experienced by some of the locals and hopefully inspires them to volunteer within their neighborhood.

Because the norms and collective efficacy model from Leventhal and Brooks-Gunn (2000) suggests that resident participation in Klarendal is dependent on the social cohesion within its community it's important to look back at the results discussed in a previous chapter (see chapter 6.1, p. 54). The increased social cohesion in Klarendal, established in previous chapters, is expected to have a positive effect on the resident participation within the community. The norms and collective efficacy model from Leventhal and Brooks-Gunn (2000) theorizes that living in a highly cohesive neighborhood will socialize people to civic norms and behaviors, teaching them how to contribute to the community. However, statistical analysis has shown that the gentrification of Klarendal doesn't seem to have an impact on resident participation. This means that the higher levels of social cohesion in Klarendal don't translate into a stronger civic engagement of its residents, contradicting the theoretical model from Leventhal and Brooks-Gunn (2000). Even though these findings are not congruent with the assumption that a higher degree of social cohesion leads to more resident participation, the interviews do allow for some insight in the dynamics of civic engagement. Most residents who picked up volunteering in Klarendal were encouraged by friends, family, or neighbors who were already actively participating within the neighborhood (Ron Onstein, 15/06/2015; Mark van Doorn, 15/01/2016; Özlem Tan, 22/01/2016).

One of the greatest entrance barriers to volunteering appears to be a lack of familiarity with the people involved with these organizations. This implies that socialization processes are an important part of recruiting new volunteers; which does seem to reflect the assumptions found within the theory of Leventhal and Brooks-Gunn. The central idea of this theory is that a highly cohesive community consists of people who are socialized in a context teeming with reciprocity causing residents to become more prone to actively volunteer themselves. The interviews showcase that most volunteers have a network of strong and supportive social ties within their local community and have developed a deep emotional attachment to the neighborhood they live in. This personal attachment often fosters the desire to "give back" to the community. These mechanisms seem to suggest that the resident participation within a neighborhood is indeed dependent on the social cohesion of its community. Even though the statistical analysis suggests that a link between social cohesion and resident participation doesn't exist in the case of Klarendal, there are several interviews that showcase mechanisms in support of this relationship. When looking at the interviews it becomes clear that the question 'have you actively contributed to your neighborhood last year?' can be interpreted in a lot of different ways (Ruben Leijh, 10/03/2016; Aniek van der Meij, 28/07/2016; Sheira Remkes, 18/08/2016). For instance, helping your neighbor paint his shed might not be considered a traditional form of civic engagement by some but others will argue that this act of kindness has been their contribution to the neighborhood. The formulation of the question is a bit vague, quite possibly leading to the lack of a clear trend when looking at the municipality's data.

Figure 5: Resident participation by district, 2003-2015 (Have you actively contributed to your neighborhood last year? %yes)




Table 3: Resident participation by district, 2003-2015 (Have you actively contributed to your neighborhood last year? %yes)

| | 2003 | 2005 | 2007 | 2009 | 2011 | 2013 | 2015 |
|-------------------------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|
| Centrum | 17% | 24% | 22% | 15% | 13% | 17% | 12% |
| Spijkerkwartier | 24% | 25% | 25% | 21% | 20% | 26% | 20% |
| Arnhemse Broek | 15% | 29% | 28% | 18% | 17% | 23% | 17% |
| Presikhaaf-West | 18% | 19% | 20% | 14% | 17% | 15% | 21% |
| Presikhaaf-Oost | 16% | 25% | 16% | 12% | 14% | 16% | 21% |
| St.Marten/Sonsb.-Zuid | 18% | 22% | 23% | 19% | 17% | 20% | 17% |
| Klarendal | 27% | 24% | 25% | 18% | 20% | 28% | 18% |
| Velperweg e.o. | 25% | 24% | 26% | 22% | 15% | 25% | 33% |
| Alteveer en Cranevelt | 21% | 18% | 22% | 16% | 19% | 26% | 24% |
| Geitenkamp | 24% | 17% | 19% | 22% | 20% | 25% | 20% |
| Monnikenhuizen | 14% | 25% | 15% | 14% | 16% | 23% | 27% |
| Burgem.wijk/Hoogkamp | 19% | 23% | 17% | 19% | 23% | 22% | 29% |
| Schaarsbergen e.o. | 16% | 22% | 31% | 27% | 23% | 43% | 41% |
| Heijenoord/Lombok | 25% | 28% | 23% | 23% | 22% | 28% | 27% |
| Klingelbeek | 34% | 36% | 30% | 32% | 21% | 30% | 38% |
| Malburgen-West | 26% | 29% | 18% | 22% | 17% | 25% | 27% |
| Malburgen-Oost (Noord) | 26% | 20% | 23% | 11% | 18% | 24% | 19% |
| Malburgen-Oost (Zuid) | 24% | 22% | 16% | 19% | 15% | 22% | 16% |
| Vredenburg/Kronenburg | 16% | 21% | 19% | 15% | 15% | 20% | 14% |
| Elden | 17% | 19% | 15% | 24% | 17% | 20% | 21% |
| Elderveld | 17% | 24% | 26% | 15% | 16% | 18% | 26% |
| De Laar | 19% | 26% | 16% | 17% | 16% | 23% | 18% |
| Rijkerswoerd | 17% | 14% | 15% | 14% | 16% | 18% | 16% |
| Schuytgraaf | - | 32% | 34% | 25% | 29% | 26% | 24% |
| Arnhem | 20% | 23% | 21% | 17% | 17% | 22% | 21% |

Sources: gebiedsmonitor (2001), pilot Veiligheidsmonitor (2005), Veiligheidsmonitor (2009, 2011), enquête Leefbaarheid en veiligheid (2003, 2007, 2013, 2015)

7. Conclusion/Discussion

The final chapter contains the conclusions of this research, provides additional explanation and looks into possible improvements and extensions for follow-up research. The three research questions formulated in this research all relate to the impact of gentrification on several social characteristics of the community of Klarendal.

(Conclusion)

The starting point of this research was to contribute to the existing body of knowledge concerning the impact of gentrification on Dutch cities (Uitermark et al., 2007; Veldboer & Bergstra, 2010) as well as theories surrounding the notions of social cohesion, perceived neighborhood-security and resident participation in several small but pertinent ways. Established theories regarding the link between gentrification and several important social characteristics of Klarendal were put to the test within the context of a Dutch neighborhood. In order to approach the impact of gentrification on urban communities from different perspectives and provide a more comprehensive overview of the subject this research relies on a combination of quantitative and qualitative methods and data. The qualitative sources consist of semi-structured interviews, policy documents and several articles from newspapers and magazines. Quantitative methods are applied by using statistical analysis on data collected by the municipality of Arnhem.

One of the key-questions of this research is to what extent gentrification has an influence on Klarendal's social cohesion. Gentrification is believed to increase social mixing. The consequences of social mixing can be hypothesized by both conflict theory and contact theory, creating contradictory prognoses for the impact of gentrification on the community of Klarendal. The results of the statistical analysis illustrate that gentrification has a positive impact on the social cohesion of Klarendal. The majority of residents seem to recognize this trend within their neighborhood and state that the high degree of social cohesion is one of Klarendal's main attractions. These findings seem to correspond with assumptions made by Allport's (1954) contact theory; which states that continued interaction between groups with different backgrounds create a more inclusive community. However, several interviews indicate that the case of Klarendal is far more complex than the statistical analysis implies and offer some very conflicting opinions concerning the social benefits of gentrification. The critical voices belong to longtime residents who report feelings of alienation within their own neighborhood. These confessions are worrying and imply that there are still some significant social barriers between the working-class residents and the new middle-class arrivals. The social networks of many interviewees can be described as mostly homogenous, consisting of people belonging to the same social strata. This means that Klarendal residents often have friends with similar cultural heritage or educational attainment. If this is the case, Klarendal

isn't a perfect example of a harmonious social mix hosting frequent constructive exchanges between groups but rather a neighborhood in which a peaceful and self-chosen segregation has taken hold. Many residents mention the new cafes and cultural activities, that have sprouted up across Klarendal in the past decades, as primary catalysts for their sense of belonging and cohesion. These new potential platforms for social mix haven't necessarily bridged the gap between longtime residents and new arrivals, but have only provided residents with opportunities to strengthen the social ties within their own group. This lack of interaction between social groups hurts Klarendal's image as a melting pot of people with different backgrounds and could be a source of tension between the working-class and the middle-class residents in the future of the community. The feelings of estrangement reported by longtime residents appear to be in line with conflict theory which describes how intergroup tension surfaces in response to a perceived competition over limited resources and the difficulties that arise from incompatible goals (Baumeister & Vohs, 2007; Jackson, 1993; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). Both conflict theory and contact theory appear to be essential concepts when attempting to understand the dynamics of social mixing and its consequences. This conclusion couldn't have been reached without juxtaposing findings from statistics and interviews.

Another vital concept was the perceived neighborhood-security in Klarendal. The gentrification of Klarendal has influenced both the economy of the neighborhood and the composition of its residents. The social disorganization theory will be used to explain how these developments can impact the sense of security experienced by residents in ways both positive and a negative. Both the statistical analysis of the municipality's data and the stories told by residents can be used to reach an identical conclusion; the perceived neighborhood security has increased over the last few years. When analyzing the interviews it becomes clear that certain stories correspond with the mechanisms found within social disorganization theory. Some residents refer to the improving economic conditions within Klarendal as the most prevalent force behind the diminishing fear of crime. Others cite the neighborhood's improved physical appearance and the increase in police presence as essential contributions to the internal stability within Klarendal. These findings support the claim that gentrification has had a positive impact on the perceived neighborhood security in Klarendal.

The third and final research question revolved around the possible link between gentrification and resident participation in Klarendal. The concept of resident participation refers to the extent in which residents are actively engaged in their neighborhoods and the ways in which citizens invest in their communities in order to improve conditions for others, shaping a community's future in the process. The norms and collective efficacy model from Leventhal and Brooks-Gunn (2000) states that people who live in a highly cohesive neighborhood will be socialized in a context that values civic norms and behaviors, making them more likely to help their neighbors or volunteer to serve the community. The interviews illustrate that most volunteers describe their social network within the local community as strong and supportive. This creates a strong emotional attachment to Klarendal which often inspires people to "give

back” to their community. These mechanisms seem to suggest that the resident participation within a neighborhood is indeed dependent on the social cohesion of its community. However, the statistical analysis can’t seem to find a link between social cohesion and resident participation in the case of Klarendal. The many stories told by Klarendal residents only provide very limited insight into why some people don’t want to volunteer in their community. A lack of familiarity with the local volunteer organizations and its members is described by many residents as the primary barrier that is keeping them from volunteering. This implies that becoming familiar with volunteering through socialization is essential when recruiting new volunteers; which mirrors the assumptions found within the theory of Leventhal and Brooks-Gunn (2000).

(Discussion)

A prevalent problem within this research concerns its use of pooled cross section data in the statistical analysis in order to examine changes in variables over time, whereas the use of panel data would have been preferable. Panel data deals with the observations on the same subjects in different times whereas the pooled cross section data observes different subjects in different time periods. Panel data would have been more applicable when studying developmental trends across the life span of an individual or the attitudes throughout lifetimes or generations. The reason for this is that unlike cross-sectional studies, in which different individuals with the same characteristics are compared, longitudinal studies track the same people and so the differences observed in those people are less likely to be the result of differences across generations. Also, characteristics such as ‘group-identity’ or ‘time living in Klarendal’ weren’t used by the municipality when constructing this sample so there is no way to account for the possible differences between the attitudes of longtime residents and new arrivals.

In order to conclude if gentrification can become a tool for emancipation of marginalized communities, empirical research needs to take place on whether social mixing is actually taking place in gentrifying neighborhoods and if there are any possible benefits for disenfranchised groups living in this area. Future research could focus on the social networks of locals; are these social ties bridging group boundaries? What is the perceived quality of these intergroup relations and the frequency of these interactions?

Another side note concerning the statistical analysis is that even though it assumes causality it is impossible to actually prove a causal link between, for instance, social cohesion and perceived neighborhood security. This is why, when looking at the results, it’s important to keep in mind that correlation does not imply causation. In addition, comparing Klarendal to a selection of similar neighborhoods that haven’t been gentrified is resourceful but there are always unobserved differences that could throw off the results.

Measurements via a sample provide an estimate of reality. Due to the random nature of the sample, the estimated value may differ from the actual value. In addition, deviations may arise

as a result of under- and overrepresentation of certain categories of respondents, for example due to selective non-response. The sample used for this research was representative for the population of Arnhem as a whole and not the population of Klarendal. Because only the residents of Klarendal were selected for analysis this might result in the construction of a sample that is not representative for the population of Klarendal. A similar issue is the lack of interviews with members of the Turkish community. Only one Turkish family was willing to speak about the impact of gentrification on Klarendal, making it difficult to generalize their statements and paint a representative picture of the attitudes found within the Turkish community. There was an attempt to get in contact with the Islamic elementary school of Klarendal (Ibn-i Sina) and the local mosque (Milli Görüş Ayasofya) but unfortunately there was no response from either party.

A final limitation is the way in which gentrification has been operationalized within the statistical analysis. In order to distill the impact of gentrification the data for Klarendal was compared with data for Presikhaaf-West, Arnhemse Broek and Geitenkamp. These 3 neighborhoods have been selected because of their socio-economic similarities to Klarendal and the absence of signs indicating gentrification. The goal was to compare trends concerning social cohesion, perceived neighborhood-security and resident participation. Off course this set-up isn't ideal because the differences between these neighborhoods could have been explained by a whole host of variables that couldn't be controlled for because they weren't present in the municipality's database.

Follow-up research can also approach concepts like social cohesion from a different perspective. For instance, instead of looking at feelings of social solidarity and belonging, future researchers could study the social networks of Klarendal residents. They could assess the quality of these social ties and the benefits that arise from them. Investigating the frequency of social interactions between residents with different backgrounds might also yield relevant information regarding the mechanisms outlined in contact and conflict theory, especially if their attitudes towards different groups within Klarendal are measured as well. This thesis assumed that the gentrification process would increase the amount of interactions between people with different backgrounds but this assumption hasn't been put to the test due to the limitations of the municipality's database. Future research could attempt to fill in these blanks.

(Policy Recommendations)

A high degree of social cohesion is one of Klarendal's main attractions according to many of its residents; making it a crucial component in the development of the neighborhood. Popular public spaces have to be maintained and the municipality needs to make sure that the neighborhood is an attractive place to start a new business. New restaurants and shops will add to the hustle and bustle of the neighborhood. Both new and existing cultural activities need to be encouraged by local authorities because they inject Klarendal with energy and excitement which fuels a sense of belonging for many of its residents. Not everyone is

enchanted with the rapid transformation of Klarendal, the most prevalent critics being several longtime residents who claim that their sense of belonging has diminished over time. In order to quell these feelings of estrangement and create a more inclusive community the longtime residents need to be assured that there will always be a place for them in Klarendal. Perhaps this can be achieved by helping them with starting their own business along the Klarendalseweg, enriching the shopping experience by adding some of the diversity that can be found within the district. If this ambitious plan proves to be impossible to execute, supporting the working-class of Klarendal by helping them open up a central and visible hang-out, for instance an affordable bar or restaurant, might be sufficient.

The policy recommendations mentioned above might improve social cohesion in Klarendal, ramping up its resident participation in the process. Several local volunteers imply that their strong and supportive social networks within the community have inspired them to “give back”, thus suggesting that the resident participation within a neighborhood is indeed dependent on the social cohesion of its community. A lack of familiarity with the local volunteer organizations seems to be the prime suspect when residents are discussing the possible culprits for their lack of civil participation. Improving the outreach of these organizations will be a challenge but because socialization is essential when recruiting new volunteers it might be wise to start at the local schools. Each volunteer organization could give presentations at the local schools about what they do and invite the kids to an open day for some firsthand experience with volunteering. Off course similar methods can be used to reach adults, replacing the presentations at school with leaflets as a means of spreading the word.

Finally, the perceived neighborhood-security in Klarendal has improved significantly over the last decades providing ample incentive to stay the course as far as local safety policies are concerned. The relationship between the police and local residents must remain front and center at all times providing a productive exchange of information and trust on both sides. The results of this thesis don’t inspire a dramatic overhaul of safety policy. The frequency with which the locals mentioned Facebook and WhatsApp, as vital tools to increase perceived safety, validated the efforts made by local law enforcement to improve their usage of the internet as a means of communication.

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Appendix:

Table 4: Housingstock Volkshuisvesting in Klarendal

| | |
|-------------|-------|
| 2005 | 1.959 |
| 2006 | 2.095 |
| 2007 | 2.039 |
| 2008 | 2.006 |
| 2009 | 1.978 |
| 2010 | 1.954 |
| 2011 | 1.934 |
| 2012 | 1.789 |
| 2013 | 2.170 |
| 2014 | 2.145 |
| 2015 | 2.108 |
| 2016 | 2.078 |
| 2017 | 2.059 |

Source: BAG / WOZ gemeente Arnhem

Table 5: Population of Klarendal by immigration background

| | Native-Dutch | Non-western | Western |
|-------------|---------------------|--------------------|----------------|
| 2003 | 4.655 | 2.235 | 715 |
| 2010 | 4.620 | 1.850 | 765 |
| 2016 | 4.890 | 1.705 | 835 |

Source; BRP; bewerking O&S

Table 6: Total departures by district - Arnhem

| | 2001 | 2002 | 2003 | 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 |
|-------------------------------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| Spijkerkwartier | 1.606 | 1.810 | 1.683 | 1.654 | 1.813 | 1.706 | 1.661 | 1.706 | 1.592 | 1.826 | 1.805 | 1.837 | 1.791 | 1.731 | 1.962 | 2.039 |
| De Laar | 1.548 | 1.344 | 1.335 | 1.524 | 1.566 | 1.494 | 1.633 | 1.526 | 1.238 | 1.210 | 1.085 | 1.163 | 1.156 | 1.269 | 1.312 | 1.207 |
| Arnhemse Broek | 1.398 | 1.114 | 990 | 1.239 | 1.157 | 1.120 | 1.106 | 1.141 | 1.254 | 1.161 | 1.151 | 1.173 | 1.246 | 1.301 | 1.280 | 1.238 |
| Presikhaaf-West | 1.338 | 1.382 | 1.439 | 1.908 | 1.929 | 1.906 | 1.866 | 2.086 | 2.430 | 1.987 | 1.730 | 1.959 | 1.417 | 1.482 | 1.600 | 1.465 |
| Klarendal | 1.323 | 1.278 | 1.276 | 1.464 | 1.477 | 1.504 | 1.395 | 1.415 | 1.298 | 1.253 | 1.171 | 1.257 | 1.234 | 1.243 | 1.366 | 1.291 |
| Rijkerswoerd | 1.315 | 1.363 | 1.270 | 1.388 | 1.567 | 1.450 | 1.415 | 1.224 | 1.163 | 1.156 | 1.000 | 1.109 | 1.099 | 1.012 | 1.187 | 1.221 |
| Malburgen-Oost (Zuid) | 1.167 | 1.330 | 1.310 | 1.491 | 1.755 | 1.656 | 1.618 | 1.653 | 1.285 | 890 | 940 | 1.077 | 1.033 | 1.019 | 1.121 | 1.100 |
| Vredenburg / Kronenburg | 1.030 | 984 | 1.036 | 1.140 | 1.342 | 1.228 | 1.209 | 1.218 | 1.280 | 1.066 | 1.120 | 1.150 | 1.119 | 922 | 1.040 | 2.177 |
| Burgemeesterswijk / Hoogkamp | 995 | 962 | 951 | 1.118 | 1.087 | 1.128 | 1.015 | 1.034 | 904 | 1.026 | 910 | 956 | 990 | 1.034 | 984 | 1.012 |
| Elderveld | 957 | 907 | 838 | 914 | 948 | 848 | 975 | 961 | 790 | 762 | 769 | 747 | 781 | 825 | 752 | 881 |
| Centrum | 954 | 963 | 889 | 1.032 | 1.099 | 1.164 | 1.087 | 1.088 | 1.187 | 1.133 | 1.188 | 1.267 | 1.406 | 1.417 | 1.503 | 1.542 |
| St.Marten / Sonsbeek-Zuid | 909 | 922 | 932 | 1.012 | 1.026 | 1.150 | 998 | 1.046 | 1.022 | 1.005 | 1.017 | 980 | 1.061 | 1.121 | 1.080 | 1.076 |
| Malburgen-Oost (Noord) | 857 | 855 | 825 | 1.009 | 929 | 1.005 | 1.022 | 1.183 | 1.057 | 843 | 885 | 875 | 927 | 928 | 976 | 1.032 |
| Velperweg e.o. | 853 | 758 | 800 | 826 | 850 | 990 | 890 | 1.025 | 831 | 837 | 828 | 852 | 911 | 927 | 935 | 1.252 |
| Malburgen-West | 778 | 728 | 1.132 | 1.202 | 964 | 816 | 603 | 665 | 801 | 763 | 905 | 736 | 660 | 594 | 592 | 645 |
| Presikhaaf-Oost | 724 | 693 | 714 | 839 | 815 | 957 | 889 | 898 | 796 | 770 | 852 | 893 | 888 | 980 | 1.078 | 1.060 |
| Geitenkamp | 564 | 523 | 562 | 679 | 653 | 616 | 557 | 564 | 536 | 624 | 498 | 513 | 556 | 474 | 551 | 573 |
| Heijenoord / Lombok | 525 | 492 | 588 | 520 | 606 | 556 | 604 | 585 | 543 | 576 | 620 | 573 | 560 | 633 | 633 | 1.066 |
| Alteveer en Cranevelt | 343 | 294 | 299 | 345 | 414 | 352 | 322 | 368 | 304 | 326 | 340 | 324 | 324 | 364 | 413 | 390 |
| Monnikenhuizen | 298 | 503 | 354 | 357 | 389 | 388 | 389 | 415 | 309 | 299 | 298 | 350 | 379 | 368 | 428 | 395 |
| Schaarsbergen e.o. | 249 | 176 | 168 | 458 | 246 | 238 | 229 | 224 | 218 | 219 | 196 | 206 | 193 | 227 | 270 | 383 |
| Elden | 101 | 96 | 117 | 143 | 108 | 143 | 151 | 175 | 282 | 157 | 136 | 136 | 248 | 171 | 229 | 484 |
| Klingelbeek | 100 | 110 | 115 | 144 | 201 | 161 | 170 | 203 | 213 | 180 | 136 | 141 | 165 | 223 | 181 | 244 |
| Schuytgraaf | 20 | 15 | 20 | 12 | 58 | 85 | 171 | 272 | 391 | 420 | 499 | 674 | 729 | 797 | 980 | 1.205 |

Source: Basisregistratie personen (BRP); gemeente Arnhem.

**Table 7: WOZ-waarde of
the houses in Klarendal**

| | <= € 100.000 | € 100.001 - € 150.000 | € 150.001 - € 200.000 | € 200.001 - € 250.000 | € 250.001 - € 300.000 | € 300.001 - € 400.000 | > € 400.000 |
|-------------|------------------------|----------------------------------|----------------------------------|----------------------------------|----------------------------------|----------------------------------|-----------------------|
| 2005 | 14,2% | 70,5% | 9,9% | 3,1% | 1,1% | 1,0% | 0,2% |
| 2006 | 14,2% | 70,5% | 9,9% | 3,1% | 1,1% | 1,0% | 0,2% |
| 2007 | 7,0% | 66,1% | 21,4% | 3,4% | 0,9% | 0,7% | 0,4% |
| 2008 | 5,7% | 41,1% | 42,8% | 6,9% | 1,9% | 0,9% | 0,7% |
| 2009 | 5,2% | 33,6% | 47,4% | 9,2% | 2,2% | 1,2% | 1,2% |
| 2010 | 4,6% | 31,9% | 47,3% | 11,7% | 2,4% | 1,3% | 0,8% |
| 2011 | 7,7% | 43,6% | 37,5% | 7,6% | 1,8% | 1,4% | 0,4% |
| 2012 | 7,8% | 48,4% | 34,3% | 6,6% | 1,6% | 1,1% | 0,3% |
| 2013 | 9,0% | 54,5% | 29,2% | 4,7% | 1,2% | 1,1% | 0,3% |
| 2014 | 12,0% | 56,5% | 25,3% | 4,0% | 1,1% | 1,0% | 0,3% |
| 2015 | 15,7% | 59,9% | 19,1% | 3,1% | 1,0% | 1,1% | 0,2% |
| 2016 | 15,6% | 56,9% | 20,9% | 4,2% | 1,1% | 1,1% | 0,2% |
| 2017 | 15,9% | 52,6% | 23,6% | 5,1% | 1,1% | 1,5% | 0,3% |

Source: BAG/WOZ gemeente Arnhem

Map 2: Locations of Klarendal, Geitenkamp, Arnhemse Broek and Presikhaaf-West

