

I'll See It When I Believe It:  
Russian Foreign Policy Elite,  
Historical Analogies and Metaphors

Master Thesis

I'll See It When I Believe It: Russian Foreign Policy Elite, Historical Analogies and Metaphors

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“Россия – это не проект, это судьба. Вы знаете, это жизнь.”

– Владимир Владимирович Путин (2013a),

*на заседании международного дискуссионного клуба «Валдай», 19 сентября 2013.*

“Russia is not a project – it is a destiny. You know, it's life”

– Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin (2013b)

*at the meeting of the international discussion club «Valdai», 19 September 2013.*

### Abstract

This research addresses the use of historical analogies and metaphors as the basis for foreign policy decision-making by the Russian foreign policy elite towards the Russian intervention in Syria in 2015. The research question of this thesis is to what extent can Russian foreign policy towards Syria in 2011 to 2015 be explained through the use of historical analogies and historical metaphors with respect to the belief systems of the Russian foreign policy elite. The study is a single case study with empirical materials studied in Russian. Theories used in this research are belief system theory and schema theory, from which the concepts of consistency seeker and cognitive miser are drawn. The method for analysis is theory-testing process tracing and qualitative content analysis. The results of the study indicate that members of the Russian foreign policy elite cannot be classified as cognitive misers. In addition, there is evidence suggesting that the decision-making of the Syrian intervention is based on historical analogies of past military interventions.

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## Chapter 1 – Introduction

This thesis is about the use of historical analogies and metaphors in foreign policy. Robert Jervis stated in 1976, “Learning from history is revealed dramatically when decision-makers use past events as an analogy for a contemporary one” (p. 218). This is the academic version of the family talk in the kitchen of how one can use their past as learning experiences to alter the future. Relying on what has happened in the past can provide for a tool to analyse the present and influence the future. Personal lives are on this point no different than those of foreign policy makers in the realm of international politics. Past experiences can provide a framework to rely on when a new foreign policy situation arises. Here, these decision-makers try to use available information to assess the situation and determine a path forward. One approach in these scenarios is the possibility rely on history and refer to it in the form of historical analogies and historical metaphors. The usage of these tools remains a comparison since no situation is identical to the other, however, lessons can be learnt. Especially in situations of high uncertainty, politicians seek ways justify, foreign policy decisions, i.e. manipulate the audience or mobilize support, or attempt to grasp the situation on the past.

A famous example of such a use is the Korea analogy to frame the Vietnam War. In this analogy, the reference is made to the US actions against North Korea and its supporters to preserve South Korea’s freedom. Since the Korean analogy did have the desired result, US politicians used the Korea analogy to frame the situation in Vietnam. The reasoning here is based on a swift victory in Korea, which is analogous to a swift victory should be attainable in Vietnam. Consequently, the US initiated the intervention in Vietnam in 1965 (Khong, 1992, pp. 99-102). This example shows the impact that a historical reference can have in foreign policy.

As was the case in the Vietnam War, the ongoing conflict in Syria provides for a foreign policy situation of high uncertainty. March 2011 marked the start of the conflict when peaceful demonstration was met with violence by the forces of government leader Bashar al-Assad. The war did not remain a problem between two parties but became the playing field of a variety of state and non-state actors, both national and international. Apart from the internal power struggles between the protesters and the government, there is also an array of terrorist factions active in the region. As a result, Syria became ground zero for a war that knows several layers, from civil issues to religious ones. The consequences include a wave of refugees into the surrounding countries and Europe, a surge in terrorist hits, and problems related to extremist ideology, civil society and human rights. The Syrian war is a conflict where the sheer number of actors involved blurs the core of it and makes it highly difficult for the outside world to understand what is unfolding and why that is (Akhtar & Nageen, 2019, pp. 7-8).

### 1.1. Research Puzzle

One of the actors that actively participates in the Syrian conflict is the Russian Federation. Russia supported Assad since the outbreak of the war in 2011 (Rahman-Jones, 2017). The reasons for this support are multifaceted. Kozhanov (2013) argues that the Russian support for the Assad regime cannot be reduced to their political relations, nor to their economic cooperation or their military alignment but

that it is more complicated (p. 25). Even though these points constitute aspects of the reasoning, there are other elements such as “influence” in the Middle East and “taking revenge on the US” that guide Russia’s behaviour, yet its support is based more on the “principle” of being taken seriously in the region (Kozhanov, 2013, p. 30). This form of reasoning appears rational, but history speaks against Russia, or in this case, the Soviet Union operating in the Middle East. In the Soviet-Afghan war of 1979 to 1989, the USSR attempted to aid the Afghan communists through a military intervention. The actual war was not a necessary one and, above all, it was the consequence of a wrongful interpretation of the foreign policy situation from the perspective of the Afghan communists and the USSR (Maley, 2002a, p. 6). As a result, the Soviet Union lost its ten-year war, which Sullivan (2018) calls “the USSR’s ill-fated military adventure in Afghanistan” (p. 48). Due to the many deaths, the entire affair became a large question mark for their families and made them wonder why this was a necessary step (Maley, 2002b, p. 153).

The Soviet-Afghan War is a black page in the proverbial history books. It is therefore remarkable that Russia decided to intervene in the Syrian conflict in 2015. Since the Soviet-Afghan war, Russia has not set foot in the Middle East in a military campaign up until this intervention (Pieper, 2019, p. 365). Knowing this piece of Soviet history, a bit more light is shed on Russia’s collective memory in the Middle East. Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov (2013c) stated in an interview in 2013 that Russia would not repeat the experience in Afghanistan. Regardless of the intention, the decision to intervene was in stark contrast to the foreign policies of the past; non-intervention. Therefore, the **research puzzle** is based on the perplexing situation why Russia would intervene in the Middle East while its foreign policy in the region has been non-interventionist since their defeat in Afghanistan in 1989.

In addressing the research puzzle, the **research question** of this thesis is to what extent can Russian foreign policy towards Syria in 2011 to 2015 be explained through the use of historical analogies and historical metaphors with respect to the belief systems of the Russian foreign policy elite.

The independent variable is the belief system of the Russian foreign policy elite. The dependent variable is the Russian foreign policy towards Syria in 2011 to 2015.

To answer the research question, several hypotheses are formulated.

1. As consistency seekers, the Russian foreign policy elite distinguishes, and responds to, foreign policy cues on the basis of pre-existing belief systems.
2. As cognitive misers, the Russian foreign policy elite distinguishes, and responds to, foreign policy cues on the basis of cognitive shortcuts in their belief system.
3. The Russian foreign policy elite bases, interprets and justifies the Russian intervention in 2015 on historical analogies and metaphors of past military interventions.

These hypotheses are formulated on theories derived from academic literature. The first hypothesis on consistency seekers is based on belief systems theory through the works of primarily McGuire (1960), Scott (1959), Fiske and Taylor (2013), and Rosati (2000). The second hypothesis on

cognitive misers is based on cognitive miser theory through the works of mainly Tetlock (1991), Orbell and Dawes (1991), Taylor and Fiske (2013) and Lau, Smith and Fiske (1991). The third hypothesis is derived from the concepts of historical analogies and historical analogies. The main works used for historical analogies are Holsti and Rosenau (1977), Taylor and Rourke (1995), Brändström, Bynander and 't Hart (2004) and Boscarino (2019). For the historical metaphors, the works primarily used are Paris (2002), Shimko (1994) and Zerubavel (1994).

The methodological framework in this thesis is outlined here. The research design of this thesis is a single case study, in which the unit of analysis is the Russian Foreign Policy Elite's belief system and the unit of observation is the belief of several members of this elite. The purpose of this thesis is to analyse the belief systems of the Russian Foreign Policy Elite between 2011 and 2015 by analysing their use of historical analogies and metaphors in speeches in this timeframe. The data collection is done qualitative by analysing speeches of members of the Russian foreign policy elite, namely President and former Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov and former President and Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev.<sup>1</sup> Consequently, the data is analysed by making use of the methods process tracing and content analysis. For process tracing, the main works consulted are Beach and Pedersen (2013) and Mahoney (2015). The works consulted for content analysis are mainly Pashakhanlou (2017), Weber (2011a; 2011b) and Neuendorf (2019).

The unit of analysis of this research is the Russian foreign policy elite's belief system. Linked to this is the unit of observation, which is beliefs of the members of the Russian foreign policy elite. The recording units are speeches of this elite.

The causal mechanism is theorized as, The use of historical analogies and metaphors (X1) is an essential and stable element of the belief system of the Russian foreign policy elite (X2) that leads to an influence in Russian foreign policy decision-making (X3).

- X1: the recurrent presence of historical analogies and metaphors in speeches of the Russian foreign policy elite in 2011-2015
- X2: the definition of the Russian foreign policy elite being a consistency seeker or a cognitive miser
- X3: foreign policy decisions made by the Russian foreign policy elite

The empirical materials used in this thesis comprise of primary data collected through speeches of Putin, Lavrov and Medvedev published on Russian governmental websites. The speeches have been selected on two criteria. First, the speeches should address foreign policy situations and frame them in a certain way. Second, the speeches should contain reflections of the politician's thinking process, not solely be an announcement with context. Next, the website for Putin's speeches in Russian is Президент

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<sup>1</sup> President Putin and Foreign Minister Lavrov are currently directly responsible for Russia's foreign policy and Medvedev was Russia's President in 2012 (President of Russia, n.d.; The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, n.d.).

России - Стенограммы (President of Russia, 2020)<sup>2</sup>, Lavrov's website for his Russian speeches is Министерство иностранных дел Российской Федерации - Выступления Министра<sup>3</sup> (The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, 2020) and the website for Medvedev's speeches in Russian is Правительство России – Новости (The Russian Government, 2020).<sup>4</sup> The speeches selected for Putin are his speech at the UN in 2015 (Putin, 2015a), addressing the Russian government in 2014 (Putin, 2014a) and addressing the Valdai Club in 2013 (Putin, 2013a). For Lavrov, the speeches selected are his speech at the UN in 2015 (Lavrov, 2015a), addressing the UN in 2014 (Lavrov, 2014a) and his addressal at the Munich conference in 2013 (Lavrov 2013a). The speeches selected for Medvedev are an interview for the TV channel Россия<sup>5</sup> in 2015 (Medvedev, 2015a), an interview with CNBC in 2014 (Medvedev, 2014a) and an interview with Russia Today in 2013 (Medvedev, 2013a).

The reason for selecting the timeframe of 2011 to 2015 is based on several points. First of all, the start date of the Syrian crisis began in March 2011. This was the moment the Russian government started to become more involved up to the moment when it intervened in Syria in 2015, September 30<sup>th</sup>. Therefore, to select the material, this timeframe is appropriate, because this thesis mainly addresses the Russian intervention. Secondly, the timeframe provides for sufficient empirical materials for analysis. Since this thesis uses a speech of the politicians in 2015 as a base speech to compare it to earlier speeches, this timeframe would provide for that opportunity. Any speech is between those two moments in time will give insights in how the politicians frame the Syrian crisis since its start in 2011 up to 2015.

The **aim** of this thesis is to investigate the use of historical analogies and metaphors by the Russian foreign policy elite to explain Russian foreign policy in the Syrian crisis from 2011 to 2015.

1. To analyse academic literature on cognitive belief systems, historical analogies and metaphors and Russian foreign policy towards Syria.
2. To examine the belief system of members of the Russian foreign policy elite through analysis speeches in the period of 2011 to 2015.
3. To analyse the meaning of historical analogies and metaphors used in the collected speeches by the Russian foreign policy elite.

## 1.2 Scientific and Societal Relevance

First, this study will add to International Relations literature in general, and in specific, on Russian foreign policy analysis in the Middle East. In the field of foreign policy analysis, no research has been done on analysing the belief systems of the Russian foreign policy elite by reviewing their use of historical analogies and metaphors in the period of 2011 to 2015 as a basis for their foreign policy decisions regarding the Syrian crisis. The scientific relevance of this thesis is to bridge this gap in the

<sup>2</sup> The translation for Президент России – Стенограммы is President of Russia – Transcripts.

<sup>3</sup> Often the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation is abbreviated to *mid*, since it is the abbreviation of the Russian translation. The translation for Министерство иностранных дел Российской Федерации - Выступления Министра is the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation – speeches of the Minister.

<sup>4</sup> The translation for Правительство России – Новости is the Government of Russia – News.

<sup>5</sup> The translation for Россия is Russia.



literature. In addition, in this thesis there is an overview of relevant scientific literature that helps researchers to map the academic debate in terms of theories and concepts.

The Russian role in the Syrian crisis has a concrete impact on the Syrian people, but also on the surrounding countries and even the world. Examples of this impact are the refugee crisis and terrorist activities that ensured people fleeing from Syria towards surrounding countries and further. Since Russia's role is prevalent and is a guiding factor in the development of the Syrian crisis, it is important to understand why Russia is involved the way they are. Since there is already literature on this topic, this thesis adds to the understanding by taking a different angle through belief systems and historical analogies and metaphors. As a result, the societal relevance is a better understanding of the Russian intervention and an overall image of Russian foreign policy decision-making in Syria. This thesis can be used to draw conclusions on current and future foreign policy decisions by the Russian foreign policy elite, since it includes a conclusion on the belief systems that do not rapidly change over time.

This thesis will in the following manner. In chapter 2, there is an overview of the academic literature concerning theories on belief systems, historical analogies and metaphors. In chapter 3, the methodology of this thesis is outlined. In chapter 4, there is a description of the data collected from the speeches by the Russian foreign policy elite. In chapter 5, the data collected is analysed and interpreted. In chapter 6, there is a conclusion in which the research question is answered, conclusions are discussed and the limitations of the thesis are mentioned. Next the references are included and the appendix is attached.

## Chapter 2 – Theory

### 2.1 Introduction

In the theoretical chapter, there is an overview of academic literature that maps theories on belief systems. Hereby, this thesis discusses the consistency seeker model, the cognitive miser model, but also cognitive managers and cognitive dissonance theory. For these theories and concepts, applied academic studies are included to highlight the scale of their respective applications. Furthermore, the concepts of historical analogies and historical metaphors are outlined on a theoretical level and there are studies included that use these concepts in an applied study. This chapter ends with a reasoning of why the models of consistency seeker and cognitive miser have been selected to be included in this thesis, next to the reasoning why historical analogies and metaphors have been selected.

### 2.2 Belief System Theory and the Consistency Seeker Model

Theory on belief systems has developed over time and is subject to various interpretations. Sartori (1979) defined a general belief system as “as the system of symbolic orientations to be found in each individual” and more specifically one that “consists of the set of beliefs according to which individuals navigate and orient themselves in the sea of politics” (p. 95). Every person has their own respective belief system that they use to interpret incoming information and let it guide them to interpret foreign policy situations. Belief systems of politicians help to understand information and direct them towards making decisions. Here, the study of elite belief system becomes relevant.

Belief systems theory addresses the elite belief systems in how strong beliefs are stable and resistant to change. Rokeach (1966-1967) states that “all beliefs and attitudes” are structured in “a central peripheral dimension of importance” (p. 533). This indicates that certain beliefs are more important than others. Rokeach (1963) addresses the notion of when beliefs are strong enough to resist change and thus remain stable, while in other instances it does change (p. 377; p. 385). Derived from this theory, the concept of consistency seeker has been developed to define people's belief systems.

The term consistency-seeker itself can be traced back to research done by McGuire (1960). In the experiment, McGuire (1960) indicates that the subjects who took part had the tendency to achieve “greater mutual consistency” of their opinions over time (p. 347). A careful conclusion can be drawn that people can be considered as consistency-seekers. Moreover, this desire for consistency is embedded in “[a] cognitively consistent attitude” through which an individual prefers to be consistent from a situation to their “goals” (Scott, 1959, p. 219). Results indicated that “consonance of an attitude with other cognitive elements, such as values and expectancies, serves to stabilize it and increase its resistance to change under externally imposed pressures” (Scott, 1959, p. 229). Hereby, it determines that people have the natural tendency to refuse to shift their positions to remain logically consistent.

In foreign policy situations, a politician's belief system can be defined as a cognitive consistency seeker. Jervis (1976) defined 'consistency' as "the strong tendency for people to see what they expect to see and to assimilate incoming information to pre-existing images" (p. 177). It refers to the idea that leaders have a belief system that is based on structures already present in the mind. In this model, politicians are seen as consistency-seekers, who were decrease "discrepancies" in their beliefs (Fiske & Taylor, 2013, p. 27). However, external circumstances can change the previously held beliefs towards new ones. The belief system would be gradually converted into a different one, yet this would still be a stable and consistent belief system. Even though the former beliefs changed into new ones, now these new beliefs are "balanced" or close to that (Hirshberg, 1993, p. 248). Hereby, the constancy of the belief system is maintained, even through change.

### 2.3 Cognitive Dissonance Theory

Related to consistency-seeker is the theory of cognitive dissonance. Considered as the founder of cognitive dissonance theory in psychological research, Festinger (1962) puts forward the notion that people will always attempt to make their choice more and more "consistent" with respect to the choice that has placed in the rejection pile (p. 93). While at the same time, these people attempt to fit bits and pieces of information into their system to seek for logical consistency, but when two pieces of information cannot be placed into the system, then they are "dissonant" on a psychological level (Festinger, 1962, p. 93). However, this does not imply that people do not change their mind on certain subject when new information enters; this can still happen. Festinger (1962) states that changes in someone's perception or behaviour affect the manner in which information is interpreted; this has the purpose to decrease dissonance in someone's belief system, which is called "dissonance-reducing changes" (p. 93). Not to dive too deep into the realm of cognitive psychology, it is worth analyzing how political scientists have taken this concept and used it for their own research.

One of the main uses of cognitive dissonance revolves around voting behaviour. Research done by McGregor (2013) analyses how "political attitudes" are affected by "behaviour" and "election results", amongst others, and applies cognitive dissonance theory with a case study of Canada (p. 174). The results indicate that casting votes by an individual has a causal relationship with a change in political attitudes. In specific, conditions such how important the vote was, "partisan attachment", "expending unpleasant effort, TOVD" and election results "vis-à-vis vote choice" cause a shift in political attitudes (McGregor, 2013, p. 174). Another study by Beasley and Joslyn (2001) analysed voting behaviour during elections of US President between 1972 and 1996, six in total, and applied cognitive dissonance theory (p. 521). The focus mainly highlighted that those who voted during the elections and who had the choice between two candidates, made their choice clearer after they had made the choice. This is in line with the concept of "dissonance reduction behaviour" (Beasley & Joslyn, 2001, p. 535), since the voters will create a state of perception that is in line with their worldview, i.e. the choice they had just made.

Cognitive dissonance theory is not only useful in analysing voting behaviour, it is also effective in analysing foreign policy. Cognitive dissonance theory applied through “turning-point decisions” in foreign policy has been researched by Auerbach (1986, p. 534). This research focused on the key point of cognitive dissonance theory that states that all individuals seek consistency in their system and any “disturbance” pushes a “discomfort (dissonance)” forward that results in a change in their cognitive beliefs (Auerbach, 1986, p. 539). By taking the example of Israeli foreign policy towards West-Germany in period of 1950 to 1965, Auerbach (1986) investigates the decision-making of Israeli political parties and how that affected attitude changes with regards to “postdecisional dissonance” (p. 545).

## 2.4 Schema Theory and the Cognitive Miser Model

In contrast to belief systems theory, schema theory stipulates a different belief system. A schema, in contrast to a belief system, can be defined as “cognitive structures of organized prior knowledge, abstracted from experiences with specific instances” (Fiske & Linville, 1980 p. 543). Schema theory and belief systems theory are similar in that both focus on beliefs priorly present to process new cues, but these theories differ strongly on the coherency of the belief system. While belief systems theory stipulates consistency of the belief system over time, schema theory argues that people’s belief systems use “different beliefs or schemas” in different circumstances to interpret the situation at hand (Rosati, 2000, p. 57). For example, in situation A someone might refer to belief A, while in a similar situation B, someone might refer to belief B; consistency seekers would be more likely to refer to belief A in both situations. As expected, the schema theory sees someone’s cognitive belief system as complicated and perhaps even a bit chaotic. This does not mean that the belief system does not function properly, but this person can be perceived as cluttered (Rosati, 2000, p. 57). These people are also referred to also cognitive misers.

The cognitive miser model contradicts the consistency seeker model. Cognitive misers are people who try to “increase or maintain the efficiency of a capacity-limited cognitive apparatus” (Fiske & Taylor, 2013, p. 27). This means that people’s belief systems work in such a way to save mental energy in decision-making. These people are relying on limited input in making their decisions, which is in a way “cognitively lazy” (Tetlock, 1991, 457-458). Moreover, cognitive misers have the tendency to show certain types of behaviour. An example is put forward by Orbell and Dawes (1991), who state that people who are cognitive misers “expect other to behave as they themselves behave” (p. 525). It is not only that they are inactive on a cognitive level, they also view others through their own colored lense. Cognitive misers make use of a technique that achieves this reduction of their mental capacity, which is called a cognitive shortcut or heuristic reasoning. Tversky and Kahneman (1982) show that this tool limits the complicated thinking process and helps a person to come to a conclusion, which is based on “heuristic principles” (p. 3). Here, the authors add that heuristics are practical to apply, it bears a risk of making serious mistakes (Tversky & Kaheman, 1982 , p. 3). Research done by Miler (2009) shows that the “political elites” use heuristic reasoning or “mental shortcuts (p. 863). The implication of its use opens the elites up to mistakes in uncertain situations. It is not only leaders who can act as cognitive misers but also voters. Research done by Lau, Smith and Fiske (1991) shows that voters can be cognitive misers in how

they “simplify” policy implications proposed by politicians during an election period (p. 648). It becomes clear that people are creative in attempting to reduce the burden of thought and find ways to do so.

## 2.5 Cognitive Managers

A different model is the one of cognitive managers. Cognitive managers use cognitive shortcuts when they need to be used, not out of a mistake in their cognitive structures. Firstly, a cognitive manager uses their cognitive energy when they need to make an important decision. This is a useful manner to use their energy if there is “a net material or psychological gain”, but when there is none, then they save up their cognitive energy (Suedfeld, 1992, p. 449). As a result, cognitive managers are more flexible in their behaviour. Suedfeld (1992) states, “[g]ood cognitive managers exhibit integrative flexibility” (p. 449). This type of flexibility allows for a leader to go for the best use of their mental capacities, also in comparison to those who are considered to be cognitive misers. Political leaders should weigh mental energy against the problems they have to solve, which the cognitive manager model allows for through the use of cognitive shortcuts and the consequent decision-making process (Suedfeld, 1994, p. 339). In this research, Suedfeld (1994) applied the cognitive manager model to the policy-decisions of the US President Bill Clinton. The conclusion indicated that the cognitive structure of the US President mirrors an unsuccessful cognitive manager, who failed to adequately respond to the problems Clinton faced at the time (p. 348). Even though the cognitive manager model appears to be combining the best of both, it is not the last theory that has attempted to better understand the cognitive decision-making processes of political leadership.

## 2.6 Operational Code, Historical Analogies and Metaphors

One of the most influential techniques in the analysis of elite belief systems is the operational code. Initially, the concept of the operational code was introduced by Nathan Leites (1951) as applied to the Soviet Politburo and by Leites (1953) to the Bolshevik elite. Built on these works, the famous scholar Alexander George further developed this concept. George (1969) refers to Leites’ (1953) work as “an older study that had pioneered in the analysis of elite belief systems” (p. 191). Without going too deep into Leites’s (1953) work, it is specifically this work where George (1969) took the concept of “operational code” from that he used to analyse foreign policy elites and made the relevant conclusion that elite beliefs affect yet not fully governs policy decisions; it is a valuable part but not the only one (p. 191). George (1969) defines the operational code as the “political leader’s belief about the nature of politics and political conflict, his views regarding the extent to which historical developments can be shaped, and his notions of correct strategy and tactics”(p. 197). In this definition, it shows that a set of beliefs are guiding one’s behaviour.

In turn, Holsti (1970) took the operational code a step further and analysed the belief system of the former Secretary of State of the US, John Foster Dulles (p. 124). This study is proof of how the operational code, amongst other variables, can be used to explain choices in policy. Thus, the operational code is a tool for analysing, but it does not cover the entire explanation of these policy choices. It is part

of a framework that also aims to discuss how these beliefs have developed, not solely the effect of them (Holsti, 1970, pp. 153-157).

The operational code continued to be influential in academic research. Walker (1990) traced the process of how the operational code developed from the moment that it was introduced by Leites. It is concluded that up to 1990, the research done using the operational code helped to keep this concept as a central tool to analyse the political behaviour of policymakers (Walker, 1990, p. 416). However, the importance did not stop there. Research done using the operational codes focused on Cuba's Fidel Castro and North Korea's Kim Il Sung (Malici & Malici, 2005), on leadership in Ireland in 1916 (Schafer, Robinson & Aldrich, 2006), on China's government from 1998 to 2015 (Yang, Keller & Molnar, 2018). It shows that research that included the operational code as an analytical tool is still relevant.

In the operational code analysis, several questions are posed to address the belief system of the political elite. George (1969) indicates that these questions are "philosophical and instrumental" in nature, which are derived from Leites' (1953) book and summarized into these questions (p. 201). In the philosophical questions, there are specific references made to the history. On the basis of Leites' (1953, pp. 85-92), George (1969) formulated questions 4 as "*How much "control" or mastery can one have over historical development? What is one's role in "moving" and "shaping" history in the desired direction?*" (p. 204). This is an example of how operational code analysis includes the historical approach to belief systems. It is here that a bridge can be made towards the use of references to history in one's belief system. George (1969) states that elites in politics handle current situations based on "past experiences" by making use of its teachings (p. 216). It is not surprising that elites would use analogies or metaphors based in the past to interpret present events.

The use of metaphors and analogies in arguments is a heuristic tool. According to Vertzberger (1986) people use analogies and metaphors with historical roots that are mirrored in "judgemental heuristics, such as *representativeness*, *anchorings*, and *availability*, which are shortcuts to inferential tasks" (p. 230). Here, there is a reference to historical analogies and metaphors as heuristic devices in the minds of people. In the realm of politics, this is no different and, therefore, can be applied to the belief systems of politicians and their heuristic use of historical analogies and metaphors.

An historical analogy is a tool to analyse the present and future while using the past. Brändström, Bynander and 't Hart (2004) defined historical analogies as the use of "personal and / or collective memories, and/or parts of 'history', to deal with current situations and problems" done by one or more people (p. 193). It shows that historical analogies are ways that political leaders attempt to their policy issues. Boscarino (2019) further defines the concept as "figures of speech that forge an implied comparison between two or more objects, events, or individuals on the basis of a shared characteristic" (p. 23). Moreover, Taylor and Rourke (1995) present that decision-makers on foreign policy in the US use historical analogies often through debates on foreign policy and state that "lessons for the present can be derived from historical events" (p. 460). Historical analogies are often used to solidify the stance on

certain policy options by politicians, and through these analogies there are lessons to be learnt of their belief systems. Questions such as why a certain historical analogy is applicable or not, and why does this politician use a certain historical analogy over others, are important to be discussed.

There are several historical analogies that have been influential enough to influence policy debates. First of all, the historical analogy of Munich and Vietnam is often retrieved from the collective memory when discussion of foreign policy and war policy come up. In a study published by Taylor and Rourke (1995), the results indicated that, during the Congressional discussions regarding the Persian Gulf war, the Vietnam analogy but also the Munich analogy were put forward by members of Congress as a justification of their policy in hindsight rather than a reason for the policy in advance (p. 466). This point can be confirmed by Angstrom (2011) who signalled that the historical analogy of Munich in 1938 was used as a means to respond to “perceived threats” and, hereby, was an example to push for more US boots on the ground in Vietnam (p. 225). Moreover, Angstrom (2011) even mentions that the war on terrorism is as strongly linked to the historical analogy of Vietnam, that it “gradually became common” (p. 233). However, the war on terrorism, as it is still an ongoing policy, is subject to a variety of analogies. Angstrom (2011) showed in the research that there are in fact “competing analogies” with respect to the war on terror, in which the following are used, “(a) the Second World War, (b) the Crusades, (c) the Vietnam War, (d) the Cold War” (p. 237). It means that historical analogies are used for justification of a certain policy in advance and post-hoc, and that there can be several analogies used for similar or even the same purpose(s).

Academic literature surrounding historical analogies appears to be predominantly focused on US policymakers and its citizens but also Europe’s experiences in the First and Second World War. In analyses concerning American foreign policy, as previously indicated, the Vietnam analogy plays a dominant role, but also the Second World War. Research done by Schuman and Rieger (1992) divides the American people in two, namely those who were born during or after the Second World War and those predominantly affected by the Vietnam war (p. 324). The study shows that the Americans who are on the one side favored WWII analogies regarding the Iraq entering Kuwait, while the other side sees the Vietnam War as a more suitable analogy regarding novel “military interventions” (Schuman & Rieger, 1992, p. 324). These authors have shown that the age and the experience of the US citizens affected their perception of the analogy that was most influential for them when reviewing US foreign policy decisions. A more contemporary study by Cohen (2004), for example, puts forward the historical analogy of an “empire”, which would be the US, and that this empire “can and should be compared with imperial powers of the past” (p. 49). This notion comes from Alexander the Great’s experience in Afghanistan, which has been replicated by the US’ tours in “the ancient imperial heartland of Mesopotamia” (Cohen, 2004, p. 49). It becomes quite clear that the historical analogy used here is not in the slightest a modest one. Moreover, Kornprobst (2007) takes this a step further by noting that there is a limitation in historical analogies since it is often based “on Europe and the United States” since WW1 (p. 38). This is an aspect

quite clearly observable in the literature, but that does not mean that there are no works which analysed analogies beyond the limitations imposed here.

Several works focus on historical analogies that lie outside of the beaten path described above. The first example is the analogy of Iran's Islamic Revolution in 1979. In 2011, Netanyahu, Israel's Prime Minister, used the historical analogy of Iran's Islamic Revolution to understand the Egyptian Revolution of the same year. It was then used to understand the relations of Israel and Egypt, yet it did not work well enough to draw certain conclusion about the behaviour of Egypt at that moment (Yossef, 2012, pp. 63-64). Similarly, during the Iranian hostage crisis of 1979, Houghton (2001) reveals that for the Iranians "ghostly images of 1953 haunted the streets" (p. 144). This perception was the driver to act for the students since they feared an intervention by the Central Intelligence Agency (Houghton, 2001, p. 144). Another study shows how historical analogies can also be missing from dialogue. Mendeloff (2008) shows that in response to the Kosovo crisis in 1999 that historical analogies were not particularly mentioned by the Russian elite (p. 34). Yet, the Russian elite focused on "the Myth of Slavic Brotherhood" and how they have helped the Serbian people in the past in order to justify their policy response (Mendeloff, 2008, p. 49). It is exactly this response, which is of particular interest, since it does not refer to an analogy, but to a metaphor.

Historical metaphors are, similarly to historical analogies, used to justify foreign policy by political leaders. Metaphors differ from analogies, which means that their use and the impact is therefore also different. In this following section, there will be an outline of research involving historical metaphors. Historical metaphors can be defined in the following manner. Firstly, metaphors can be defined as language tools that "draw attention to similarities across different domains" and allows people to understand a situation by referring it to another one in a different domain (Paris, 2002, p. 427). Since analogies compare two situations while they are in the same domain, metaphors compare two situations which are not. Metaphors are apt tools in political speech since "they can often be summoned subtly with trigger phrases or oblique references that evoke the metaphor without necessarily making it explicit" (Paris, 2002, p. 428). Moreover, Paris (2002) states that "[h]istorical metaphors are implicit or explicit comparisons between the present and the past" (p. 428). From this definition, it becomes apparent that analogies and metaphors are close to one another. Another scholar who pointed this out is Shimko (1994) who confirms that metaphors and analogies differ in the sense that metaphors "are between- or across-domain parallels" while and that analogies "are within-domain comparisons" (p. 664). Moreover, metaphors and analogies do not affect policy identically. Analogies are expected to have a stronger effect due to the example provided resides close to the situation, while a metaphor stands a bit farther away. Even though the "cognitive dynamics" between the two are equal, the consequence of the use of the one has another effect than the use of the other (Shimko, 1994, p. 664). We can derive from these points that analogies and metaphors are close yet far removed from one another.

Scholarly research has found several historical metaphors that are used in political dialogue. Firstly, the last point of defense of the Jewish community in 73AD, the Masada castle, fell against the



Roman forces. This event in time has been used to indicate “a national struggle for freedom and the readiness to fight for it to the bitter end” (Zerubavel, 1994, p. 77). This historical metaphor has been used during various occasions outside its original realm, while it stood for these values and lessons learnt. Zerubavel (1994) researched how this historical metaphor, and also the metaphor of the Holocaust, impact the collective memory of the Jewish people and the state of Israel (pp. 91-93). It shows that the collective memory is influenced by impactful events in the past that transcend their realm, in this case for Israel, but this also counts for Russia. The metaphor of “Russia as the Third Rome” is prevalent for their geopolitical movements of Russia, for example (Sidirov, 2006, p. 318). In this case, the metaphor indicates almost a prophecy for the country on the basis of the past. Political leaders try to use metaphors to interpret the world around them and to analyse it. Another example is the study by Paris (2002), in which the foreign policy debates about the Kosovo crisis in 1999 involved a variety of historical metaphors that included, for example, the countries in the Balkan area and their actions during the first World War, referred to as the “ “Balkan powderkeg”” or the “ “Balkan tinderbox”” (p. 432, figure 1). Historical metaphors involve events quite far in the past, such as the Masada example or relatively recent ones such as the Balkan example. The example of Russia as the Third Rome is also based on an example far in the past, which can be seen as a prophecy for the future.

The scholarly literature focuses heavily on US (foreign) policy decision-making and incoherently on countries such as Russia, Israel or others. Foreign policy decision-making can be researched through the analysis of belief systems and there are several ways to approach this analysis. On the basis of the reviewed literature, a gap has become visible. Regarding the Syrian crisis from 2011 to 2015 and the military intervention in 2015 in specific, there is no research yet that analyses the belief systems of Russian foreign policy elite, namely Putin, Lavrov and Medvedev, making use of historical analogies and metaphors in speeches. To perform the research, this thesis analyses three speeches by each of the foreign policy elite members. Thus, this thesis aims to bridge this gap.

In this thesis, the main approach to belief systems are belief systems theory and its concept of consistency seeker on the one hand, and schema theory and its concept of cognitive miser on the other. In the analysis, the Russian foreign elite is analysed for their use of historical analogies and metaphors. This analysis will determine whether the members of this elite can be considered a consistency seeker, a cognitive miser or none of the above.

From the literature, the following hypotheses can be formulated.

1. As consistency seekers, the Russian foreign policy elite distinguishes, and responds to, foreign policy cues on the basis of pre-existing belief systems.
2. As cognitive misers, the Russian foreign policy elite distinguishes, and responds to, foreign policy cues on the basis of cognitive shortcuts in their belief system. Maybe not necessary

3. The Russian foreign policy elite bases, interprets and justifies the Russian intervention in 2015 on historical analogies and metaphors of past military interventions.

The first hypothesis is derived from belief systems theory and its concept consistency seeker. The second hypothesis is based on schema theory and its concept cognitive miser. The third hypothesis is based on the literature on historical analogies and historical metaphors.

In the following section, the methodological part of this thesis is addressed.

## Chapter 3 – Methodology

In this section, the methodological part of the thesis is discussed and formulated. First, this thesis makes use of a single case study. The theory surrounding case studies is mapped to explicitly define its meaning. Next, the manner of collecting the empirical materials is stated, namely qualitative data collection through speeches in Russian by the foreign policy elite. Then, the data analysis includes two methods, namely process tracing and content analysis. The type of process tracing is theory-testing and the type of content analysis is qualitative.

### 3.1 Research design

A case study research design is a specifically limited study. Gerring (2017) defined a case study as “an intensive study of a single case or a small number of cases which draws on observational data and promises to shed light on a larger population of cases” (p. 28). Essentially, it is a highly focused study on a particular cases or set of cases that goes in-depth. The importance of properly defining case study research design has been highlighted by Putney (2010), because academics disagree on whether it is “a research design, an approach, a method, or even an outcome” (p. 2). However, it is used as a research design, as shall be done in this thesis, which is also fitting with political science. Case studies have been used often in the past within the field of political science, just as for example in psychology or history for that matter. As long as the field allows for “in-depth analysis and description of each case”, then there are possibilities to use a case study research design (Putney, 2010, p. 2). It shows that case study research design is commonly found in the field of political science.

Even though it seems clear what a case study is, it is important define what a case is exactly, and what it means in the context of this thesis. For example, there could be an analysis of a single country, a single people or a single age-group. But what a case is exactly remains unclear. Toshkov (2016) gives an answer to this question and defines a case specifically as research that only uses data from that specific case, or “exclusive use of within-case evidence” (p. 286). A further explanation of Toshkov (2016) involves stating that the variables should not be spread across several cases, but that the variables, in their words “observations of different aspects of the case”, have to come from one case (p. 287). A case study means to narrowly look at information from a specific case, without comparing it to other cases, but staying with the evidence found inside this case.

The present thesis shall make use of a single case study. The purpose of this thesis is to analyse the belief systems of the Russian foreign policy elite on the basis of speeches about the Syrian crisis of 2011 to 2015, which means that the case study at hand is the Russian foreign policy elite. The members of the foreign policy elite that shall be analysed are Russian President Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin, (former) Prime Minister Medvedev and the Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov.

The case selection strategy applied in the study is the typical case. The aim of a typical case is applicable since the research puzzle is present inside the case. This research aims to “better explore the

causal mechanism at work in a general, cross-case relationship" (Seawright & Gerring, 2008, p. 299). In this study the variables are present and the causal mechanism is zoomed into.

### 3.2 Qualitative Data Collection

The method of collecting evidence will be qualitative. First of all, to gather the data needed for this analysis, spoken and written speeches of the Russian foreign policy elite were gathered. The within-case evidence shall be based on speeches, which falls within the qualitative category of data collection. Eisenhardt (2011) shows that material found for research can be based on "words", rather than "numbers" which would be quantitative (p. 4). For this analysis, the speeches will be part of the category of "source documents", which can be any document in any form that include information about the case at hand (Putney, 2010, p. 5). The speeches used for this analysis shall be those, which are concerning the subject of Russian foreign policy towards the Middle East. Apart from the speeches, which are primary sources, there shall be made use of secondary sources in addition.

### 3.3 Data Analysis

The methods for data analysis are outlined in this section.

#### 3.3.1 Process Tracing

Process tracing is a method widely used but defining the method is of importance. First, Collier (2011) already indicated this related to qualitative evidence analysis by stating that researchers do not fully comprehend the method or use it "rigorously" (p. 823). The idea initially was to go deeper into the process of causality, further than pointing out "correlations between independent variables (Xs) and outcomes (Ys)" (Beach & Pedersen, 2013, p. 1). Pinpointing causality in a research can be done through performing two "tasks"; finding the independent variables that may cause the outcome in a case and to check whether a certain independent variable leads to the outcome in a case (Mahoney, 2015, p. 200).

Analysts often use these procedures when they seek to make causal inferences about a single case or a small number of cases (Mahoney, 2015, p. 200). Mahoney (2015) refers to the first type as "the theory construction task" and to the second one as "the theory testing task" (p. 201). The researchers Beach and Pedersen (2013) took this a step further and identified three types of process tracing. They also identified, what they call "[t]heory-testing process tracing" and "[t]heory-building process-tracing", but they included a third type, namely "explaining-outcome process-tracing" (Beach & Pedersen, 2013, pp. 14-19). In the first type of testing the theory, the independent and dependent variable are known and there is the possibility to state a "causal mechanism" through observed "conjectures" or from theory (Beach & Pedersen, 2013, p. 14). The second type of creating a new theory stems from evidence that builds up a "hypothetical causal mechanism" inductively (Beach & Pederson, 2013, p. 16). The third type of process tracing explaining outcome does not try to generate inference across multiple cases, as does process tracing of type 1 and 2. This type focuses solely on the a single case by formulating a causal mechanism that only works for this specific case, stepping away from a theoretical approach (Beach & Pedersen, 2013, p. 19). Lastly, in an attempt to summarize process tracing briefly, Reilly (2012) states that

“[p]rocess tracing is a data analysis method for identifying, validating, and testing causal mechanisms within case studies in a specific, theoretically informed way.” (p. 2). Process tracing aims to reveal causal mechanisms and to make them explicit.

There are several researchers who have turned process tracing into a practical method for the analysis of case studies in the field of political science and, more specifically, international relations and security studies. Firstly, Reilly (2012) indicates that the researchers Alexander George and Timothy McKeown (1985) in their famous study, “Case studies and theories of organizational decision-making”, took the first steps to promote causal reasoning into case studies (p. 2). From this moment onwards, the use of this method has increased up to the point that it became a method widely used. Especially within the field of political science, process tracing has been used frequently as a method. While making use of process as the method of their study, the following examples of studies have been published. Research has been done on the link “between oil and ethnic war” (Tang, Xiong & Li, 2017, p. 362), on how social conservatism started and then changed over time in Canada and the US (Farney, 2019, p. 140) and on Montenegro’s “illiberal policies” (Komar, 2020, p. 61). It shows that process tracing has wide application opportunities, yet Bennett and Elman (2015) indicates that for the field of international relations in the US, process tracing is popular (pp. 170-171). Research done in international relations by Recchia (2016) uses process tracing on the question of when the US requests “UN or NATO approval for military interventions” (pp. 80-93). This example shows the application of the method within the frame of US politics in international relations.

Other research that made use of process tracing is more directed towards the field of security studies. To illustrate Tannenwald (2015) shows that process tracing as a method gave a valuable addition to this field (p. 227). For example, Lin-Greenberg (2018) analysed “Japan’s post-3/11 relief efforts” with regards to “security dilemma dynamics” (p. 297) and Ceccorulli and Coticchia (2015) reviewed Italy’s military efforts and its intervention in Libya. These are mere examples of the applications of process tracing being used as a method to conduct studies in the field of political science, more specifically international relations or security studies.

In this study, there is made use of theory-testing process tracing and qualitative content analysis as methods. First, the theory is reviewed and hypotheses are drawn from it. Then, these theories are tested through the hypotheses.

### 3.3.2 Content Analysis

To perform the analysis of the data collected, this thesis shall also include content analysis as the second method. Content analysis has been disregarded in academic literature for quite some time yet it is making a comeback in the field of international relations. In a historical context, Pashakhanlou (2017) determined two different generations in content analysis, which have been called “first wave” and “second wave” (p. 459). The first wave can be found in the years between the 1940’s and 1960’s, of the past century, which focused mostly on quantitative analysis. The second wave is located in the 21st century which added “computer-aided content analysis”, which shows that the qualitative version has

been “ignored” by academia mostly (Pashakhanlou, 2017, p. 459). This does not mean that qualitative content analysis has not been developed or used, but the focus remained on the counterpart of quantitative.

Qualitative content analysis reviews source material for interpretation. Firstly, the main purpose of content analysis is “to make valid inferences from text” that can be about the author of the text, the text itself or for those intended to receive the text, or also referred to as “the message” in the text (Weber, 2011a, p. 2). Secondly, usage of content analysis as a method can be done in a quantitatively or qualitatively. Payne and Payne (2011) show that content analysis was set on “evaluating written texts” in a quantitative manner, but it has now included “Visual Methods” as well; such as “films, TV, video and still photography” (p. 2). Through the analysis of these source materials, qualitative content analysis highlights “interpretation and subjective meaning” (Payne & Payne, 2011, p. 2). Thirdly, the unit of analysis of content analysis differs from process tracing. Neuendorf (2019) states that it is “messages rather than human beings” (p. 2). Through the analysis of messages, information becomes available that it useable. Neuendorf (2019) hereby states what content analysis can achieve, namely the “integrative model of content analysis, which recognizes that whereas content analysis itself can only *describe* message characteristics or identify *relationships* among message characteristics” (p. 7).

There are two concepts that require attention when using content analysis specifically, namely reliability and validity. First, since the method aims to place a text into several categories, it could affect “the consistency or reliability of text classification” that shows in “ambiguity of word meanings, category definitions, or other coding rules” (Weber, 2011b, p. 2). Secondly, it is the subjective part of content analysis that draws in its issues, which happens to the validity of the method. Weber (2011b) emphasizes that issues with validity is more problematic since it stems from whether the researcher analyses the variable that they wanted to analyse (p. 2). Even so, acknowledging this limitation, there is still information to be gained from the use of content analysis.

In this thesis, there shall be an analysis of speeches both in a spoken and written form that content analysis is useful in drawing inferences from. Weber (2011b) mentions that there is the possibility to create a coding scheme by following the series of steps;

- “1. Define the recording units.” (p. 7)
- “2. Define the categories.” (p. 8)
- “3. Test coding on sample of text.” (p. 8)
- “4. Assess accuracy or reliability.” (p. 8)
- “5. Revise the coding rules.” (p. 8)
- “6. Return to step 3.” (p. 8)
- “7. Code all the text.” (p. 8)
- “8. Assess achieved reliability or accuracy.” (p. 8)

The focus of using content analysis is mostly applied lies mostly within the field of media studies or communication, but is not limited to those. Examples includes a focus on “media frames” in journals (Matthes, 2009, p. 349), on “mass media effects literature” (Potter & Riddle, 2007, p. 90), but there are other examples when these two fields overlap with political science. Research done by Sahin (1973) uses content analysis to focus on how the political situation is framed in the magazine New York Times (p. 685) or a study done by Semetko and Valkenburg (2000) who looked at how European Union political topics were framed by the Dutch media (p. 97). It shows that content analysis is mostly used within communication and media studies, but has overlap with political science (in this case). The main point is that these researchers often focused on how information was framed in the media.

In the first step, the categories of themes are based on how often there is a reference made to a particular historical event. This can be done in the form of a historical analogy or historical metaphor. The definition of the belief system, whether the politician is a consistency-seeker or a cognitive miser, is based on whether the use of the analogy or metaphor is present during earlier speeches than the base speech. Second, there is a level of abstraction here. There is made of an analogy or metaphor when there is a reference made to a certain historical event that is used to explain another situation. For example, the historical event of the disintegration of the USSR in 1991 can serve as a historical analogy. Any reference to this historical event, may it be direct or indirect, shall be counted as one use of the historical analogy. These findings shall be represented in a table where mentions of this event are noted down. In the appendix, there shall be a list of the words said, both in Russian and their accompanying English translation. As a result, there will be a conclusion of whether the specific politician has a belief system as a consistency seeker or a cognitive miser. Moreover, there shall be an analysis of the overarching themes that can be derived from the speeches. Hereby, it is possible to conclude a politician bases their foreign policy decisions on historical analogies and metaphors. In this case, whether it has been done in speeches concerning the Russian intervention in Syria on the 30<sup>th</sup> of September 2015.

The first task is to note which historical analogies and metaphors are used in the speeches of the Russian foreign policy elite addressing the Russian intervention in Syria. In a table for each politician, there is an overview of which analogy or metaphor was used, when it was used and whether there is overlap between the speeches. This is done through a system of turfing.

The second task is to interpret the historical analogies and metaphors that the foreign policy elite decided to base their reasoning on. These historical references are then explained and interpreted to determine how the elite frames the Russian intervention. Lessons drawn and noted down in academic literature help to interpret the use of the references. In addition, this thesis shall address overlapping themes if members of the elite use certain historical references in their speeches. This could signify that this historical event is of particular interest or importance to them. Also, the omittance of certain analogies or references could potentially be of importance as well. This point is, therefore, also addressed in this thesis if needed.

The speeches by the Russian foreign policy elite shall be analysed for their use of historical analogies and metaphors. By following the steps outlined above by Weber (2011b, pp. 7-8), it is possible

to categorize these texts for their mentioning of historical analogies and metaphors and, consequently, the interpretation of them. Since the recording units are speeches and this thesis is specifically searching for historical analogies and metaphors, the categories are historical events that happened within the realm of politics (analogy) or outside of it (metaphor). The original statements highlighting the analogy or metaphor can be found in the appendix, and the categories are noted in a table per member of the Russian foreign policy elite. In this thesis, a system of coding is used to track the analogies or metaphors used.

The assessment of accuracy and reliability are high. First, accuracy is high, because the references made in the speeches are directly mentioned the historical event or phrased in such a way that understanding that a certain event is meant is clear. Reliability is high, because the method is consistently applied to speeches drawn from the same website and are available in both Russian and English. Hereby, the replicability of this research is also high, since they are drawn from public records.

### 3.4 Operationalization of variables

This section addresses the operationalization of the variables used in the hypotheses. In order to measure the variables, they need to be defined explicitly. To reiterate, the following hypotheses are formulated;

1. As consistency seekers, the Russian foreign policy elite distinguishes, and responds to, foreign policy cues on the basis of pre-existing belief systems.
2. As cognitive misers, the Russian foreign policy elite distinguishes, and responds to, foreign policy cues on the basis of cognitive shortcuts in their belief system.
3. The Russian foreign policy elite bases, interprets and justifies the Russian intervention in 2015 on historical analogies and metaphors of past military interventions.

From these hypotheses, the following variables can be derived, namely 'consistency seekers', 'cognitive misers', 'belief systems', 'cognitive shortcuts', 'historical analogy' and 'historical analogy'.

#### Belief system

The term belief system is operationalized based on the work of Sartori (1979), who defined a "political belief system", which "consists of the set of beliefs according to which individuals navigate and orient themselves in the sea of politics" (p. 95). Since this thesis analyses the cognitive belief systems of politicians, a definition more specified into that field seemed most appropriate than a rather general description. This combination of different beliefs are formed through the information these people receive and process. In this analysis, there are two types of cognitive belief systems that can be identified, namely consistency seeker and cognitive miser.

#### Consistency seekers

The following definition is drawn from literature, namely that politicians are seen as consistency-seekers, who were decrease "discrepancies" in their beliefs (Fiske & Taylor, 2013, p. 27). To operationalize the concept of consistency seeker, politicians who use certain historical analogies and metaphors not only in



their base speech, but also in one or more other speeches, then it is likely that the politician is a consistency seeker.

### Cognitive miser

Cognitive misers are people who try to “increase or maintain the efficiency of a capacity-limited cognitive apparatus” (Fiske & Taylor, 2013, p. 27). To operationalize this definition, this thesis indicates that the historical analogies and metaphors found in the base speech in 2015 of each member of the foreign policy elite should not be referred to in the other speeches. This will indicate that the politician uses historical analogies and metaphors in an inconsistent manner, and is likely a cognitive miser.

### Historical analogy

The operational definition of the concept of historical analogy is based on the work of Jervis (1976). Jervis (1976) mentions that historical lessons show themselves once “decision-makers use a past event as an analogy for a contemporary one” (p. 218). This definition sums up the idea that a politician use a political situation in the same realm in the past, which is outlined in the theoretical part of this thesis, and then uses it to understand one in the present. In this thesis, the analysis of speeches gives by these politicians shall determine whether these people use historical analogies to understand and perhaps justify their policy-position and decisions. By making use of process tracing and content analysis, it is possible to categorize these analogies and check how often they are mentioned.

### Historical metaphor

The operational definition of the concept of historical metaphor is based on Paris (2002). In this work, Paris (2002) states that “[h]istorical metaphors are implicit or explicit comparisons between the present and the past” (p. 428). In addition, these metaphors differ from historical analogies, since they are used to “draw attention to similarities across different domains” (Paris, 2002, p. 427). This definition indicates that historical metaphors are used to compare a situation that happened in the past and to apply it to a situation in the present from another domain. In the present thesis, this is an operational definition since it is possible to locate a historical metaphor in the speech of a politician and to identify whether this is retrieved from another domain. For instance, if the Russian foreign policy elite would use a historical comparison retrieved from the field of physics or chemistry, then it would be identified as a historical metaphor rather than a historical analogy. Similar to the historical analogy, through process tracing and content analysis, these metaphors can be categorized and checked how often they are used.

### Military Intervention

The concept of military intervention is operationalized in the following manner. Based on the work of Sullivan and Koch (2009), the operational definition of military intervention is “a use of armed force

that involves the official deployment of at least 500 regular military personnel (ground, air, or naval) to attain immediate-term political objectives through action against a foreign adversary” (p. 709).

## Chapter 4 – Empirical Materials

In this chapter, the empirical materials used in this thesis are explained and how they are part of the whole thesis. In total, there are three speeches selected for each of the members of the foreign policy elite; for Putin, Lavrov and Medvedev. For each of the speeches, a reason for their inclusion in the analysis is mentioned to explain and justify these choices. To place these speeches into context, first, there is a section about the background of the Syrian crisis and, second, a section on widely used historical references in foreign policy. Last, for each speech there is a table of the used historical analogies and metaphors. In chapter 5, there is the analysis of the collected empirical materials.

### 4.1 The Syrian Crisis

The crisis ongoing in Syria captured the attention of the international community and divided it at the same time. In 2011, the situation in Syria turned from a peaceful wave of demonstrations into a fierce civil war. Syria's President, Bashar al-Assad, began to violently oppress the protesters that marked the turning point of the country's internal struggle. Yet, the internal issues were the symptoms of a larger problems with a complexity that would soon involve a variety of different act, both state- and non-state. As Akhtar and Nageen (2019) state here, "[t]he Syrian war is not a conventional war between two clear-cut states" (p. 7). What initially started as the government against protesters caught the attention of the international community, because the war brought forward a "humanitarian emergency" that endangered the balance of power in the Middle East (Allison, 2013, p. 795). State actors, ethnic- and religious groups became a part of the conflict. Examples are "Turkey, Iran, Israel, and Saudi Arabia" as the state actors, "Sunni Arabs, Alawi, Druze Shia, Christians and Kurds" as the ethnic- and religious groups, while this conflict became the terrain of pro-Syrian Russia against the United States (Akhtar & Nageen, 2019, p. 8). Furthermore, there are also terrorist groups that took the opportunity to establish a foothold in Syria. An example is the infamous 'Islamic State'. Hashim (2014) indicates that the leadership of this group chose to side in the anti-Assad camp, at least partially based on differences in religious conviction (p. 77). This highlights the complexity of the conflict due to the divide in states and groups.

Russia plays an exceptionally important yet double-sided role in Syria through its continuous support to the Assad regime. This can be shown through three stages. First of all, the first of Russia's support to Assad is diplomatic. Allison (2013) signifies that Russia is the most fervent supporter of the Assad regime on an international level through offering "a diplomatic shield" (p. 795). Lynch (2015) confirms that Russia backed Bashar al-Assad from the start of the civil war in 2011 through blocking U.N. resolutions that aimed to take away Assad's influence. An example is the resolution initiating an inquiry into the "alleged chemical weapons attack" in Syria (Damascus) in 2018 written by the US was vetoed by the Russian Federation (UN News, 2018). This shows the support Russia has been providing Assad, since it is the Syrian regime that is suspected of using chemical weapons against its own population. One of the gravest usages of these weapons is the one in Ghouta in 2013, which prompted the international community to think about intervening. Russia and the US created a strategy for removing

chemical weapons from Syria, which was seen by the former as “a diplomatic triumph” (Averre & Davies, 2015, p. 821). In this conflict, Russia played the role of international power broker, yet blocking a number of UN resolutions, amounting to 14 vetoes by the end of 2019 (Nichols, 2019). From Russia’s behaviour, it is clear that Russia has taken Assad’s side of the conflict and is using diplomatic means to help enforce this support.

In the second stage of aid to Assad, Moscow increased its arms deliveries throughout the conflict. Allison (2013) indicates that Russia claims that these deliveries are not against international law, because the weaponry is “defensive”, and not offensive (p. 806). This signifies one of the main reasons why Russia declined to remove Assad from power. If Assad would no longer be President of Syria, Russia would risk losing its weapons’ deals (Allison, 2013, p. 805). However, during the Moscow-1 and Moscow-2 meetings, it became apparent that the Russian government had a stronger voice in these international discussions due to the support it provided militarily and diplomatically to Assad (Kozhanov, 2016, p. 55). Yet, this reason does not cover all the grounds for Russia’s support. The other one is based on the fear that instability in Syria will cause Islamic terrorism to “spill over” into Russia (Allison, 2013, p. 809). The increasing support of Russia for Syria ensured that Assad maintained his position as President of Syria and safeguarded Russian interests in the region.

The third stage entered into force when Russia organised a military intervention in Syria. In September 2015, the Russian government predicted that the Assad government was about to topple. This prediction was based on that the support Russia was giving Syria would not prove to be sufficient for the regime to be kept in place. For Russia, this was not an acceptable scenario (Kozhanov, 2016, p. 61). As a consequence, the Assad government invited Russia to intervene in the war. With Russia’s help, Assad was able to win back several cities while stabilizing its control over other parts of the country (Sullivan, 2018, p. 48). Lukyanov (2016) claims that the Russian intervention was not solely based on willingness to help the Syrian government, but also to ensure that the US engaged with Russia “on a more equal footing” (p. 35). In March 2016, Putin announced that there would be “a partial withdrawal” from Syria, but it was not close to an actual one (Kozhanov, 2016, p. 71). This meant that the Russian strategic objectives were met. Russia proved that it could militarily intervene, engage but not become entangled in the country (Lukyanov, 2016, p. 15). Putin showed that Russia’s aid to Syria has been successful in the three aforementioned stages.

#### 4.2 Widespread Historical References

Foreign policy elites can base their justification regarding foreign policy decisions on a wide variety of historical analogies and metaphors but there are a few that are most prevalent. First, the historical reference to the Second World War is widely used as a justification here. In specific, the analogy of Munich is widely used. In 1938, the Second World War was at the doorstep of history which was stoppable if the European governments were willing to wage war on Germany when it attacked Czechoslovakia. The Munich analogy carries the option that an early attack can fend off a war (Record, 2007, pp. 163-164). However, any reference to an element of the Second World War is useable as a

potential historical analogy or metaphor. This event carried such a strong impact on history, which is still applicable for more current foreign policy dilemmas. The second one is the reference to the Korean war in 1950 to 1953. During the policy choices of the US during the Vietnam War, the government referred to its actions during the Korean War (Khong, 1992, p. 97). The third reference here is the analogy of Vietnam itself. Record (1995) showed that the US policy-decisions during the Vietnam War led to an endless conflict, which is applied during the US-Iraq issue in the early 2000s (p. 164). The last historical event is the French failure at Dien Bien Phu. The Vietnamese army won against the French at Dien Bien Phu that represented a wider loss of France concerning their colony. It proved to become an analogy that showed a torn France with a broken down army in a battle that they did not win (Khong, 1992, pp. 148-149). Khong (1992) phrases this concisely, "the French were defeated", which was then "notable" due to omission in US dialogue about the Vietnam War in 1965 (p. 149). The policy disaster of the French in Dien Bien Phu also placed its mark on future dialogue about wars and interventions. A very famous historical metaphor is applicable to one country. "Afghanistan, Graveyard of Empires" is a historical metaphor for all the countries that tried to conquer this land, yet failed (Bearden, 2001, pp. 17-18). These historical references are important for how often they are used and the impact they have.

## 4.2 Putin's Speeches

As the President of Russia, Putin is the first and foremost member of the Russian foreign policy elite. His decisions carry strong implications in Russia's foreign policy. In the following section, there is a description of the three speeches that have been selected for analysis. The speeches have been selected from the period of 2011 to 2015.

### 4.2.1 Speech #1: Putin's Syria Policy in 2015

The baseline speech given by Russian President Vladimir Putin is his UN addressal on the 28<sup>th</sup> of September 2015 (Putin, 2015a). This speech shall serve as the base speech with which the other speeches are compared to. The content of the speech addresses a variety of foreign policy situations, in which the Russian president refers to the past at times. Especially, a considerable amount of words is used to frame the Syrian conflict and Russia's battle with terrorism.

The reason for selecting this speech as the base speech for analysis is based on the content and timing of the speech, namely that Putin (2015a) addresses the need for action in Syria and that the actual intervention happened two days later. Reflecting on the date that this speech was given, the 28<sup>th</sup> of September 2015, this thesis argues that this speech was in fact a prelude to the Russian intervention in Syria. In the speech, Putin (2015a) argues that the Assad regime and the Kurds are singlehandedly battling against terrorism and that the situation in Syria is dire. To ensure the security and stability in the country, it is needed to help the Assad regime in an all-encompassing effort (Putin, 2015a). Therefore, this speech is an announcement to the international community of the upcoming intervention two days later. Important to note that this intervention was done on Assad's request and was approved by the Russian Federation Council (Wilhelmsen, 2019, p. 1101). Thus, it provides a ground of legitimacy.

The UN addressal in 2015 by Putin has an appropriate length for analysis. The video of the speech is exactly 23 minutes long with an accompanying transcript both in Russian and in English. Hereby, it is possible to gain insights into the cognitive belief system of President Putin regarding the Syrian conflict and specifically on the Russian intervention. In this thesis, the Russian version of the speech shall be analysed to prevent internal validity issues due to an analysis of the translation into English. The speech is called, “70-я сессия Генеральной Ассамблеи ООН” (2015a) or translated as “70<sup>th</sup> session of the UN General Assembly” (2015b). For this analysis, I shall categorize the use of historical analogies and metaphors by analysing the Russian version of the speech, but for purposes of comprehension I shall include the English version into the tables as well. On the official website of the President of Russia, there is both a transcript in Russian (Putin, 2015a) and in English (Putin, 2015b), in addition to video-material of the speech itself.

#### 4.2.2. Speech #2 Putin’s Speech on Crimea in 2014

The second speech selected in this thesis is President Putin’s addressal to his government on March 18<sup>th</sup>, 2014. President Putin (2014a) discusses the results of the referendum held on Crimea two days earlier that signify that Crimea had joined Russia. This topic is widely discussed in academic literature (see for example Karagiannis, 2014; Mankoff, 2014; Allison, 2014; van den Driest (2015), Bebie (2015) and Deliagin (2015). In this speech, Putin (2014) mentions reasons for why Crimea is important to Russia. The historical ties going back to early Russian history to the Soviet Union. Putin (2014a) says that the decision to hand over Ukraine to Crimea was inconsistent with the constitutional principles effective in 1954. In addition, Putin (2014a) speaks about the crisis in Ukraine, the Maidan demonstrations, and discusses and justifies Russia’s actions.

This speech fits the analysis based on two reasons. First, Putin (2014a) addresses a foreign policy decision and provides for a frame in which this has been taken. Second, the speech itself is 50:49 minutes long. Thus, the speech is appropriate in length for the analysis. Furthermore, The Kremlin website published a Russian transcription (Putin, 2014a) and an English translated one (Putin, 2014b).

#### 4.2.3 Speech #3 Putin’s Speech at the Valdai Club in 2013

The third speech of President Putin (2013a) is the one given at the ‘Valdai International Discussion Club’ in 2013, September 19<sup>th</sup>. During the session at the Valdai Club, Putin (2013a) gave the opening speech and also answered questions by the host and colleagues. The topics of this speech are more varied than the initial speeches, since the discussion starts with references to the Russia’s history, its identity, and continues to analyse Russia’s behaviour throughout history to the present moment.

The reason for the selection of this speech is based on two reasons. First, the length of the speech is sufficient. The accompanying video is 24:49 minutes long, which provides for a speech long enough to analyse. Second, Putin (2013a) frames Russia’s role in foreign policy as applied to situations such as the Syrian crisis, yet places it in a larger context. In addition, Putin (2013a) comments made by other guests on foreign policy matters. Furthermore, this speech has an original Russian version (Putin, 2013a) and one translated into English (2013b).

### 4.3 Lavrov's Speeches

As the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sergey Lavrov is directly involved in the Russian foreign policy towards Syria. In the upcoming sections, the three speeches given by Lavrov are mentioned and explained. All these speeches have been taken from the period of 2011 to 2015.

#### 4.3.1 Speech #1 Lavrov's Syria Policy

For the Minister of Foreign Affairs Lavrov, the chosen speech is his address to the UN Security Council on the 30th of September 2015. In this speech, Lavrov discusses the developments in the Middle East and, in specific, the announcement of the involvement of the Russian forces in Syria. This is the most important speech for Lavrov because he provides for justifications of the Russian policy in Syria and interprets the Syrian crisis. In this speech, Lavrov discusses the terrorist groups active in Syria and how Russia is fighting against these groups to prevent these activities to disperse. Furthermore, Lavrov mentions that Putin's (2015a) speech was in fact an evaluation of the Syrian crisis. Therefore, this speech shall be the base speech that will be compared to other speeches selected in a period of 5 years to this date (30th of September 2015). The speech can be found in Russian (Lavrov, 2015a) and a translated one in English (Lavrov, 2015b).

#### 4.3.2 Speech #2 Lavrov at the 69th UN General Assembly in 2014

The second speech by Lavrov (2014a) was given at the 49th Security Conference in Munich on the on the 2nd of September 2014. Regarding foreign policy situations, Lavrov (2014a) discusses the East-West dichotomy in international security and condemns the role of the US and the EU in their actions in Ukraine. The underpinning of the speech is the contribution of Russia to international affairs and Lavrov (2014a) uses this speech to frame foreign policy situations. This is the reason for choosing this speech in particular. Another valuable aspect of this speech is that its given at the UN, which is a formidable platform and can be considered to have a strong effect (Lavrov, 2014a). Furthermore, this speech is available in Russian (Lavrov, 2014a) and in a translated English version (2014b).

#### 4.3.3 Speech #3 by Lavrov at the 49th Munich Security Conference in 2013

The third speech of Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov (2013a) is the one he held at the 69th session of the UN General Assembly. In this speech, Lavrov (2013a) touches on different foreign policy points, which include international terrorism, the Arab Spring, and NATO's actions in a more general sense.

The main reason for selecting this speech is because Lavrov (2013a) frames foreign policy situations and that the speech is sufficient in length. Also, the speech is in 2013, which provides for sufficient length in between the selected speeches to perform the analysis. In addition to the Russian version, there is also one translated into English (Lavrov, 2013b).

#### 4.4 Speeches by Medvedev

Dmitry Medvedev is the last member of the Russian foreign policy elite in this thesis. A few quick words shall be spent on his political career. Medvedev was Russia's President after Putin stepped down in 2008, and continued as such until 2012. From this year to the end of 2019, Medvedev was Russia's Prime Minister until the entire Russian government "resigned" (Rainsford, 2020). This means that Medvedev is no longer the Prime Minister. For this analysis, Medvedev is still relevant. Until 2012, Medvedev was the President of Russia and, therefore, influential in determining its foreign policy. This influence did not end once Putin took over once more, since Medvedev then returned to the position of Prime Minister.

Medvedev did not give a speech such as Putin (2015a) or Lavrov (2015a), in which there was an announcement of the Russian intervention in Syria. However, on the 17th of October 2015, Medvedev (2015a) gave an interview on the TV-channel "Russia", in which there is a discussion on the Syrian crisis, in which the use of Russian armed forces is referred to.

##### 4.4.1 Speech # 1 Medvedev's Syria Policy

The base speech in this analysis is Medvedev's (2015) interview with the Russian news channel News on Saturday on the 17th of October 2015. In this interview, Medvedev (2015) discusses the Russian policy more extensively and highlights the use of Russian armed forces in Syria, which makes it an appropriate base speech for the analysis. Medvedev (2015) does not only discuss the events that unfolded in 2015, but refers to the start in 2011 as well. This shows that the interview are representable of his foreign policy views on the Syrian crisis. Aspects that Medvedev (2015) highlight are the Assad regime's ongoing battle against terrorism, such as with Islamic State. Unfortunately, there is no sufficient translation available online.

##### 4.4.2 Speech #2 Medvedev's Interview with CNBC

The second speech by Medvedev (2014) is the interview given with CNBC, hosted by Geoff Cutmore. In this speech, Medvedev (2014) provides a foreign policy framing of the Ukraine crisis and the Syrian crisis. Other aspects that are highlighted in this speech include the Russian-Chinese relationship, corruption and economic ties with other countries, such as Germany and China (Medvedev, 2014).

The reason for choosing this speech is Medvedev's (2014) lengthy answers to Cutmore's questions in which foreign policy situations are referred to.

##### 4.4.3 Speech #3 Medvedev's Interview with Russia Today

The third speech by Medvedev (2013) is the interview given to Russia Today on July 24<sup>th</sup>, 2013, with its host Oksana Boyko. In this speech, the main topic is the Georgian-Russian war of 2008 and the then current developments between Georgia and South Ossetia.<sup>6</sup> Medvedev (2013) discusses the reactions of the EU to the war, and war in general. The reason for selecting this speech is on the basis of his framing

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<sup>6</sup> For more information on the Georgian-Russian War and the developments in South-Ossetia, see Karagiannis (2013). For an analysis of the Georgian-Russian War and consequences for the region, see Mikhelidze (2009).



of the foreign policy on the Russian-Georgian war and the length of the answers provide (Medvedev, 2013).

## Chapter 5 – Analysis of the Empirical Material

### 5.1 Introduction

In this section of the thesis, there is an analysis of the primary material collected in chapter 4. The analysis is based on the methods of process tracing and content analysis. As a result, it is possible to test the hypotheses.

First, the analysis will determine what type of belief system President Putin, Foreign Minister Lavrov and former Prime Minister Medvedev will have. In the tables outlined in the following sections, there is a review of when Putin, Lavrov and Medvedev used a historical analogy or metaphor to frame the Syrian crisis and, in particular, the Russian intervention. For each member, there is a table that includes a turfing system of which historical and metaphors were used, how often and during which speech they were used. Based on this table, conclusion will be drawn concerning the belief system of these members of the Russian foreign policy elite.

The second task is to determine what the meaning of the historical analogies and metaphors is that the members of the political elite used in their base speech. This section highlights themes that might be important for the members of the foreign policy elite, since they base their foreign policy decisions on these events. In turn, this will provide an insight in how their belief system links to Syrian crisis to other situations. It will clarify how the elite frames foreign policy situations.

The historical references in the speeches are coded by the rules of content analysis. In the table, there is a shortened phrasing of a historical reference that includes various ways in which the elite can refer to. In the second part, there is an explanation of what these events mean. In the appendix, there are table with the Russian phrasing of analogies and metaphors used alongside with their English translation. Appendix 1 to 3 are Putin's speeches, appendix 4 to 6 are Lavrov's and 7 to 8 are Medvedev's speeches.

#### 5.2.1 Analysis of the belief system of President Putin

Table 1.

*Historical Analogies Used By President Putin*

Historical analogy	UN speech 2015	Frequency of the Analogy	
		Crimea speech 2014	Valdai speech 2013
Anti-Hitler Coalition during the Second World War	II	I	
Yalta Conference / Yalta system in 1945	II		I
The Cold War 1945-1975	I	I	I
Iraq War in 2003	I	I	
Intervention in Libya 2011 / UN Security Council Resolution 1973	I	I	II

NATO's expansion policies after the Second World War	I	I
Warsaw Pact	I	
Disintegration of the Soviet Union	I	I
A new Migration period	I	
Crimea's transfer to Ukraine		I
NATO's intervention in Kosovo, Serbia/Yugoslavia in 1999		III
Actions by Stepan Bander during the Second World War		II
Afghanistan war in 2001		I
Colour revolutions		I
Presidential elections in Ukraine 2004		I
Historical containment policy of Russian 17th-20th century		I
American Declaration of Independence of 1776		
Unification of East- and West-Germany		I
Congress of Vienna of 1815		I
Treaty of Versaille of 1919		I
Second World War 1941-1945 (in general)		II
Egyptian crisis / Muslim Brotherhood		I
London Riots in 2012		I
Soviet Union (in general)		I
Imprisonment of a nuclear scientist in Israel		I

In this table, the historical analogies are organized in four columns. In the first column, the historical analogies are written down that Putin used in his speeches. In columns two to four, there is a turfing system, in which the references to these historical events is turfed in his addressal to the UN on 30<sup>th</sup> 2015 (the base speech), his Crimea speech in 2014 (the second speech), and his speech at the Valdai Club in 2013 (the third speech). Also, the amount of mentions is indicated with "I", which is a single mentioning of a specific historical event. However, when Putin mentions the event multiple times in a speech, the number of turfs increases by "I". For example, if he mentions an event two times, then "II" will be noted down. The same system for turfing is used for Lavrov and Medvedev.

In the table, there are several historical analogies that are present in each of the three speeches. These historical analogies are references to "The Cold War 1945-1989" and to the "Intervention in Libya

2011 / UN Security Council Resolution 1973". This indicates that these three analogies are pre-existent in the belief system of President Putin when he gave the speech at the UN in 2015. Yet, there are also historical analogies that were not present in all three speeches, but in the base speech and in the second speech and not in the third speech. These historical analogies are "Anti-Hitler Coalition during the Second World War", the "Iraq War in 2003" and "Disintegration of the Soviet Union". This indicates that these historical analogies have been present in Putin's belief system when he gave the speech in 2015. The fact that he did not use these analogies consistently in all three speeches reveals the possibility that he relies less on these references to frame foreign policy situations. The same counts for the historical analogy that was present in his base speech, not in the second speech but then again in the third speech. This analogy is the "Yalta Conference / Yalta system in 1945" and "NATO's expansion policies after the Second World War". Also, these beliefs are pre-existing in the belief system of Putin.

In the next table, there is an overview of the Putin's usage of historical metaphors in his three speeches.

Table 2.

*Historical Metaphors Used By President Putin*

Historical analogy	Frequency of the Metaphor		
	UN speech 2015	Crimea speech 2014	Valdai speech 2013
Soviet Union exported social experiments	I		
Export of democratic revolutions	I		
Cold War-era bloc mentality	I		
A new Migration period	I		
Silicon Valley		I	

In this table, the first column shows references to historical metaphors as used in Putin's speeches. In columns two to four, there are the turfs of when which historical metaphor was mentioned during which speech. The second column shows the number of references to the base speech at the UN in 2015, the third column shows the references made in the second speech about Crimea in 2014 and the fourth column shows the references made in the third speech at the Valdai Club in 2013. From table 2, it becomes evident that none of the historical metaphors have been used more than once. Based on the data collection and the analysis performed, it is evident that Putin has made use of historical analogies in his base speech and one or two other speeches. There are also historical analogies that have been made use of once and were not repeated in any other speech.

### 5.2.2 The Meaning of the historical analogies and metaphors in the belief system of Putin

In this section, there is an analysis of the use of historical analogies and metaphors in order to frame the Syrian crisis in the speech of 2015. The references made in the base speech, which are also present in speech 2 or 3, or in both are being analysed specifically. However, the references present in speech 2 and/

or 3 but not in the base speech shall not be taken into account in this analysis. The main purpose is to understand how Putin framed the Syrian crisis through reviewing on which historical events the decision for intervention was based.

The first historical analogy is the “Anti-Hitler Coalition during the Second World War”. The anti-Hitler coalition refers to a historic partnership between the USSR and the Western countries that was formed to fight against Hitler (Roberts, 1992, p. 61). Initially, the Soviet Union did not have plans to engage with the Western countries in a partnership. Two talks were held simultaneously, namely one with the Western countries and the other one with Nazi Germany. The talks with the West were called, the “Anglo-Soviet-French triple alliance negotiations” (Roberts, 1992, p. 58). The failure of these talks was a prelude to catastrophe, since it was a serious chance to create a power bloc against Germany that could have had far-stretching consequences for the Second World War. Roberts (1996) speculates that it could have kept Germany at bay or that the bloc could have been victorious more easily (p. 409). The second talks with Nazi Germany ended up in the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact, essentially an agreement that refrained the Soviet Union and Nazi from using military forces against one another. This agreement was signed on August 23rd, 1939 and is also referred to as the “Non-Aggression” pact (Roberts, 1995, p. 673). However, the moment Nazi Germany attacked the Soviet Union in 1941, the Soviets had to side with the Western powers involuntarily and gave it a “negative character” (Roberts, 1996, p. 409).

The second historical analogy used by Putin is the “Yalta Conference / Yalta System”. The analogy refers to a series of meetings between the heads of state of Great Britain Winston Churchill, of the US Franklin Roosevelt and of the Soviet Union Joseph Stalin. In specific, to the meeting at Yalta in February 4<sup>th</sup> to 11<sup>th</sup>, 1945. Here, these powers discussed future of politics on a global level. Especially, the powers decided on how much power they would have in which section of the world, which turned into a system (Fehér, 1987, pp. 1-8).

The third historical analogy is the “Cold War between 1945-1975”. This refers to the well-known conflict between the Soviet Union and the US in the years of 1945 to 1975. Its main characteristic is that it never become a hot conflict and that there was a focus on stability between these two powers. This divided the world into a bipolar one, between these two powers (Mearsheimer, 1990, pp. 13-31).

The fourth analogy is the “Iraq War in 2003”. This analogy includes a reference to the start of the Iraq War in 2003 as started by the US intervention in the same year. The intervention was based on the terror attacks on September 11<sup>th</sup>, 2001 on US soil. (Mercille, 2010, pp. 327-334). For a deeper insight into the causes of why Iraq failed from 2003 onwards, see Dodge (2007).

The fifth analogy used by Putin in his speech is the “Intervention in Libya 2011 / UN Security Council Resolution 1973”. The UN Security Council Resolution 1973 is the gateway into the actions in Libya (UN, 2011). Actions by NATO in response to this Resolution are not well-received by all members of the UN, even though the Libyan intervention was a means to protect the Libyan people and succeeded at least partially in that (Glanville, 2013, pp. 325-338).

The sixth analogy is “NATO’s expansion policies after the Second World War”. Otherwise also framed as the NATO enlargement, it is the adding of new members into NATO defence structure. Several

Central and Eastern European countries were asked to join in the 1990s. These countries are “Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland” (Schimmelfennig, 1998, p. 198). NATO is continuously in the process of gaining members. They indicate that from the end of the 1940s, 18 new members accessed to the defence bloc (NATO, 2020).

The seventh analogy in Putin’s base speech is the “Warsaw Pact”. The Warsaw Pact was an agreement amongst different states in Central and Eastern Europe, with the Soviet Union. This pact was signed on May 14th, 1955 and all the states that were included were called “the Eastern Bloc”, while NATO was called the “Western Europe”; the parties to the Warsaw Pact were “Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary and Romania” (NATO, n.d.).

The eighth analogy used in Putin’s speech in 2015 is the “Disintegration of the Soviet Union”. This analogy refers to the historical event of the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991. For more detailed information on this specific historic event, Taylor (2003) sheds an interesting light on it.

The final analogy Putin (2015) uses in his speech is “New Migration Period”. This refers to the time in history called “The Migration Period”, which is a time in which large numbers of people moved throughout Europe and in a way determined statehood seen today (Tvauri, 2012, pp. 25-26). The time indications of this period is “AD 300 – 500” (Dreßler et al, 2006, p. 35). Arguable, Putin refers to the Migration Period when discussing the Syrian refugee crisis, in which lots of people are moving as well. Putin (2015a) calls this a new Migration Period.

Next, Putin used three metaphors in his 2015 speech. The first is “Soviet Union exported social experiments”. Arguably, there is a reference communist leadership in European countries. During the time of the Soviet Union, there were “ruling Communist parties” in the Eastern and Central part of Europe, but these countries were not the same; this is shown also after the Soviet Union collapsed that different new communist parties were created that were different comparatively (Kuzio, 2008, pp. 398-398). The reason for classifying this reference as a metaphor is based on the word “exported”, which indicates that the term in this sense is used from the realm of transport.

The second metaphor used by Putin (2015a) is “export of democratic revolutions”. This is used as a logical contradiction to the previous metaphor. This metaphor refers to the democratic transitions that these former communist countries went through. Bernhard (1993) shows that these types of countries are, for example “Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary” (p. 307). Mainly, Putin (2015a) uses this metaphor to indicate that what the Soviet Union did with communism, namely exporting it, the West did as well through democracy. This metaphor is similarly also taken from transport.

The final metaphor is “Cold-War bloc mentality”. Even though this metaphor refers to the Cold War, it has a specific meaning of cooling certain conflicts based on a mindset to prevent them from being active in a military sense. Pechlivanis (2020) mentions that the “Cold War bloc mentality” can sure that hot conflicts become restful, such as the dispute over Cyprus between Greece and Turkey (p. 3). This is the reason why it is a metaphor, mainly because it comes from the realm of psychology.

Based on the interpretation of the analogies and metaphors, Putin uses several historical analogies that include an intervention, namely in Iraq and Libya. These two analogies are used to base his foreign

policy decision on intervening in Syria. Libya can be called a military intervention since it had more than 500 soldiers active in Libya; the US sent 8000 forces for example (The Guardian Datablog). Also, the Iraq was a military intervention according to the operationalization of the definition in this thesis. As was published by Reuters (2011), the US intervened in Iraq with approximately 125.000 active troops. Hereby, it is clear that Putin used historical analogies based on military interventions to base the foreign policy decision for intervention in Syria.

### 5.3 Analysis of the belief system of Foreign Minister Lavrov

In this section, the analysis of the belief system of Lavrov is performed. In Table 3, there is the analysis of the historical analogies used in Lavrov's three speeches. The table with the use of historical metaphors is not present, since Lavrov did not make use of any historical metaphors in foreign policy comparisons.

Table 3.

#### *Historical Analogies Used By Foreign Minister Lavrov*

Historical analogy	Frequency of the Analogy		
	UN speech 2015	UN speech 2014	Munich speech 2013
Iraq War in 2003	I	I	
Intervention in Libya 2011 / UN Security Council Resolution 1973	I	II	
Conflict in Yemen	I		
SC Resolution 1624	I		
Israel-Palestine conflict	I	I	
NATO's intervention in Kosovo, Serbia/Yugoslavia in 1999		I	
Afghanistan war in 2001		I	
Colour revolutions		I	
Cold War 1945-1975		I	I
Diplomatic relations of the Soviet Union in 1933		I	
US blockade of Cuba		I	
World War II – The Battle of Stalingrad			I
World War (general)			I
Soviet threat			I
Inauguration speech by Obama			I

The interpretation of table 3 is identical to table 1. To reiterate, the first column contains the specific analogy used by Foreign Minister Lavrov, and in columns 2 to 4, there is noted down how often they are used and during which speeches that was. What becomes apparent is the use of historical analogies to the

Iraq War and the Libyan War. These analogies are used in speech 1 and in speech 2, which indicates pre-existing beliefs to interpret foreign policy cues on.

There are three historical analogies used in the base speech and in the second speech. These are “Iraq War in 2003”, “Intervention in Libya 2011 / UN Security Council Resolution 1973” and “Israel-Palestine conflict”. There are no specific analogies which Lavrov uses in the base speech and in the third speech. However, there is an analogy that appears in speech 2 and 3, but not in the base speech, namely “Cold War 1945-1989”. From table 3, the conclusion can be drawn that there are foreign policy cues which are based on historical analogies that return over time and, therefore, are consistent in Lavrov’s belief system. Lavrov’s belief systems functions, therefore, as one interpreting cues on pre-existing beliefs.

### 5.3.2 The Meaning of the historical analogies and metaphors in the belief system of Lavrov

In Lavrov’s (2015a) speech, it contains five references to historical analogies. Of these five, “Iraq War in 2003” and “Intervention in Libya 2011 / UN Security Council Resolution 1973” are the same as in Putin’s speech. Therefore, these shall not be explained again. The remaining three analogies are explained below. The first analogy Lavrov uses is the “Conflict in Yemen”. Here, Lavrov (2015) most probably refers to the intervention done by Saudi Arabia in the Yemen conflict. The intervention started on March 26th, 2015 (Griffiths, n.d.). The second analogy Lavrov bases his decisions on is “SC Resolution 1624”, in which ‘SC’ stands for ‘Security Council’. This Security Council Resolution has been adopted on September 14<sup>th</sup>, 2005. The resolution addresses international security, and in specific counter-terrorism. Here, the community highlights the necessity to take action (UN, 2005). The last analogy Lavrov (2015a) makes use of is “Israel-Palestine conflict”. This reference to, as the analogy already mentions, the conflict between the states of Israel and Palestine. This is a longstanding conflict with plenty of complexities (see Rubenberg, 2012).

Similar to Putin, Lavrov also uses the Iraq War and the Libyan War as justifications for the foreign policy decision to intervene in Syria. Both of these situations include a military intervention. Therefore, the conclusion can be made that Lavrov made the foreign policy-decision based on two historical analogies that includes military interventions.



#### 5.4 Analysis of the Belief System of Dmitry Medvedev

In this section, the belief system of Medvedev has been analysed. In Table 4, the use of historical analogies by Medvedev is noted. Regarding historical metaphors, Medvedev does not make use of them during his speeches. Therefore, the table of historical metaphors is not present.

Table 4.

##### *Historical Analogies used by former Prime Minister Medvedev*

Historical analogy	UN speech 2015	Frequency of the Analogy	
		Crimea speech 2014	Valdai speech 2013
Iraq war in 2003		I	I
Afghanistan conflict in 2001		I	
Sanctions against the Soviet Union in 1925		I	
World War II		I	
Sanctions on the Urengoy-Pomary-Uzhgorod pipeline		I	
Sanctions in the 1990s against the Soviet Union		I	
Sanctions against Iran		I	
Sanctions against the People's Republic of China in 1989		I	
Intervention in Libya 2011 / UN Security Council Resolution 1973			I
Nuremburg Trials			I

In this table, column 1 indicates the specific historical analogy that Medvedev used. In columns 2 to 4, the frequency of the use of the analogy is noted for each speech. From table 5, this study concludes that no historical analogies have been used in the first speech. There is one analogy used in speech 2 and 3, namely "Iraq War in 2003". The results are remarkable, since one would expect historical analogies or metaphors to be used in discussing the Syrian crisis. Even though Putin and Lavrov refer to past historical events, Medvedev does not do this during his speech in 2015. In the other speeches, Medvedev does use historical analogies, which even has a slight indication of a consistency-seeker since one historical analogy returns in speech 2 and 3. However, based on these results, it is not possible to determine in which category, cognitive miser or consistency seeker, Medvedev belongs in. Also, it is, therefore, not possible to determine whether Medvedev bases the foreign policy decision to intervene in Syria on historical analogies or metaphors that include military interventions.

## Chapter 6 – Conclusion

In conclusion, this thesis addressed historical analogies and metaphors used in foreign policy. The research question was formulated as the following, to what extent can Russian foreign policy towards Syria in 2011 to 2015 be explained through the use of historical analogies and historical metaphors with respect to the belief systems of the Russian foreign policy elite. To answer the research question, three hypotheses have been formulated. On the basis of belief systems theory, the first hypothesis was formulated, the second hypothesis is based on schema theory and the third hypothesis is based on the literature of historical analogies and metaphors.

1. As consistency seekers, the Russian foreign policy elite distinguishes, and responds to, foreign policy cues on the basis of pre-existing belief systems.
2. As cognitive misers, the Russian foreign policy elite distinguishes, and responds to, foreign policy cues on the basis of cognitive shortcuts in their belief system.
3. The Russian foreign policy elite bases, interprets and justifies the Russian intervention in 2015 on historical analogies and metaphors of past military interventions.

To test these hypotheses, the methods are process-tracing (theory-testing) and qualitative content analysis. So, for each foreign policy elite members, three speeches have been selected in the timeframe 2011 to 2015. For Putin, these speeches are the UN addressal in (2015a), the speech to his government (2014a) and to the Valdai Club (2013a). In the analysis, it became clear that Putin used several historical analogies in the base speech and in one or two other speeches. This signifies consistency in the belief system. This means that hypothesis 1 cannot be falsified, since it stipulates that an elite member should not use a historical analogy or metaphor more than once. This is the case in Putin's speeches. Consequentially, hypothesis 2 is falsified. This hypothesis stipulated that the elite member does not use a historical analogy more than once across speech. Since Putin did use several historical analogies in the base speech and across different ones, this means that hypothesis 2 does not hold. Concerning hypothesis 3, Putin makes use of historical analogies that are based on military interventions, namely Iraq and Libya. Hereby, the third hypothesis cannot be falsified. Regarding the historical metaphors, Putin does not use them across speeches.

For Lavrov, the speeches are the addressal to the UN (2015a), a different addressal to the UN (2014a) and the speech at the Munich conference (2013a). From the analysis, Lavrov uses two historical analogies in the base speech and then in one other speech. This indicates a matter of consistency in the belief system. Regarding hypothesis 1, on basis of the evidence, it cannot be falsified. Since it stipulates that an elite member should be consistent in the use of historical analogies and metaphors across the base speech and another speech, the first hypothesis holds. In contrast, based on this reasoning hypothesis 2 can be falsified. Hypothesis 2 requires that the elite member does not use a historical reference more than once in a speech and not across speeches. Lavrov uses two historical analogies in two different speech, of which one is the base speech. Thus, hypothesis 2 can be falsified. Concerning hypothesis 3, similar to

Putin, Lavrov uses the historical analogies of the Iraq War and the Libyan War, which include a military intervention. Since hypothesis 3 stipulates that the historical analogy should not be based past military interventions, and since Lavrov does this, therefore it cannot be falsified. Concerning historical metaphors, Lavrov (2015a) did not use them in the speech in 2015. Thus, no conclusions can be made on them.

For Medvedev, the speeches selected are the interview with 'Russia' (2015a), the interview with 'CNBC' (2014a) and the interview with 'Russia Today' (2013a). The analysis shows that Medvedev does not make use of historical analogies in his base speech, which means that hypothesis 1 and 2 cannot be answered. There is, however, an indication towards consistency, because there is evidence showing that Medvedev uses a historical analogy in speech 2 and 3. Furthermore, this all means that hypothesis 1 and 2 cannot be falsified due to lack of data. This counts for hypothesis 3 as well, since this needs the use of historical analogies or metaphors to be falsified.

All in all, the several members of Russian foreign policy elite interpret foreign policy cues on the basis of pre-existing beliefs and make use of historical analogies involving military interventions to base their decision for intervention in Syria in 2015. Therefore, historical analogies and metaphors can explain Russian foreign policy towards Syria up to a certain extent. It depends on the extent to which the Russian foreign policy bases their decision-making on their use of historical analogies and metaphors. In this regard, especially knowing the use of the Iraq war and the Libyan war, these analogies explain the elite's thought process on how they interpret foreign policy cues. In this analysis, the causal mechanism functions properly.

In terms of generalizability, the results show overlap among Putin's and Medvedev's belief systems, excluding Medvedev. They both are not cognitive misers, which leaves open the option of consistency seeker. Another overlap is their use of particular historical analogies. These analogies are the Iraq and Libyan war and its intervention. Based on these two aspects, an inference can be made about the Russian foreign policy elite in general. There is a likelihood that members of the Russian foreign policy elite are not cognitive misers but lean towards being a consistency seeker. It is not yet possible to make a strong statement stating they all are consistency seekers, but there is evidence showing that at least highly representable and influential members are not cognitive misers.

The case of Medvedev could have a different result if the foreign policy decisions taken do include any historical analogy or metaphor in the base speech. In hindsight, there is a possibility that Medvedev did maintain the influence after Medvedev stepped down as President in 2012. The Libyan case is a difficult one for Russia, because Russia abstained during the voting process to justify the intervention in 2011. Meyers (2015) argues that the developments after the abstention were as disastrous that Putin decided to come back as President next year, hereby setting aside Medvedev. Since there are few materials of Medvedev concerning foreign policy matters, there is the question of why that is.

## 6.1 Limitations

There is a possible bias in this research since the author has studied in Moscow, Russia. The prolonged time spent in Russia can have an influence on how the study is conducted. However, the author is aware

of this point and attempted to minimize any potential bias on this front.

In this thesis, the most care has been applied to ensure valid and reliable results. Internal validity is the question of whether the causal mechanism is being measured through the use of the variables in an accurate manner (Leighton, 2012, p. 2). In this thesis, attention has been paid to maintain internal validity throughout the study.

External validity is the question of whether the results found in research can make causal inferences of another or larger group (Mitchell, 2018, p. 2). In this thesis, it is arguably difficult to make inferences about the entire Russian foreign policy elite on the basis of the belief systems of Putin, Lavrov and Medvev. However, there are trends visible amongst at least some members of the foreign policy elite, such as the main analogies that the Russian intervention in 2015 was based on, that indicate similarities amongst its members.

Regarding the empirical materials, this study used primary materials for the speeches in their original language. These have been collected in both Russian and English for purposes of transparency and replicability. Furthermore, reliability is the extent to which “a measuring device” holds the same results when repeated under the same circumstances (Payne & Payne, 2004, p. 2). Since all the materials are publicly available for free, it is possible to carry out the same research under the same circumstances.

## 6.2 Further research

Recommended further research would take this analysis a step further. For example, a metaphor analysis could be done to further investigate the role that specific metaphors play in the decision process. Also, the framework proposed by Khong (1992), namely the Analogical Explanation Framework would be an appropriate form of analysis to continue with (pp. 19-46). Next, it would be useful to analyse more members of the Russian foreign policy elite to clarify whether the results are generalizable to the wider elite as indicated in this research.

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## Appendices

### Appendix 1 – Historical Analogies and Metaphors in Putin's Speech in 2015

<b>Исторические аналогии</b>	<b>Historical analogies</b>	<b>Situation</b>
“Лидеров антигитлерской коалиции”	“Anti-Hitler coalition”	70 <sup>th</sup> anniversary of the UN and its current state
“На Ялтинской встрече”, “Ялтинская система”	“At the Yalta Conference”, “Yalta System”	70th anniversary of the UN and its current state
“окончания «холодной войны»”	“the end of the Cold War”	70th anniversary of the UN and its current state
В их числе бывшие иракские военнослужащие, которые в результате вторжения в Ирак в 2003 были выброшены на улицу	“former Iraqi soldiers who were left on the street after the 2003 invasion”	Syrian conflict & situation in Middle East and Northern Africa
“Ливия, чья государственность была разрушена в результате грубого нарушения Резолюции № 1973 Совбеза ООН	“Libya whose statehood was destroyed as a result of a gross violation of UN Security Council Resolution 1973”	Syrian conflict
“Лидеров антигитлерской коалиции”	“Anti-Hitler Coalition”	Syrian conflict (anti-IS)
“линия на расширение НАТО”	“policy of expanding NATO”	Syrian conflict and Ukraine conflict
Варшавский блок прекратил своё существование	“the Warsaw Pact had ceased to exist”	Syrian conflict and Ukraine conflict
“Советский Союз распался”	“the Soviet Union had disintegrated”	Syrian conflict and Ukraine conflict

<b>Исторические метафоры</b>	<b>Historical metaphors</b>	<b>Situation</b>
“Примеры из истории Советского Союза” – “Экспорт социальных экспериментов”	“Soviet Union exported social experiments”	Situation in Middle East and Northern Africa
Новое великое переселение народов	“a new, tragic Migration Period”	Syrian conflict (Refugee crisis)



Блоковое мышление времён «холодной войны»	“Cold War- bloc mentality”	Syrian conflict
И экспорт теперь уже так называемых «демократических» революций продолжается	“export revolutions, only now these are “democratic” revolutions”	Situation in Middle East and Northern Africa
Буквально захлестнул	Literally engulfed	Situation in Syria

## Appendix 2 – Historical Analogies and Metaphors in Putin’s Speech in 2014

<b>Исторические аналогии</b>	<b>Historical analogies</b>	<b>Situation</b>
Большевики ... включили в состав Украинской союзной республики значительные территории исторические юга России	“Bolsheviks...added large sections of the historical South of Russia to the Republic of Ukraine”	Crimea situation
СССР распался	The USSR fell apart	Crimea situation
Бандеры – приспешника Гитлера во время Второй мировой войны	“Bandera, Hitler’s accomplice during World War II”	Crimea situation
Косовский прецедент	Kosovo precedent	Crimea situation
“в Югославии ... в 1999 году	“Yugoslavia”, “1999”	Crimea situation
Афганистан	Afghanistan	Crimea situation
Ирак	Iraq	Crimea situation
Нарушения резолюции СБ ООН по Ливии	UN Security Council resolution on Libya (no-fly zone and bombing)	Crimea situation
«цветных» революции	Colour revolutions	Crimea situation
В 2004 году, чтобы продавить нужного кандидата на президентских выборах	“In 2004, to push the necessary candidate at the presidential elections”	Crimea situation
Политика сдерживания России, которая проводилась и в XVIII, и в XIX, и в XX веке, продолжается и сегодня	Containment policy to Russia, led in the 18 <sup>th</sup> , 19 <sup>th</sup> and 20 <sup>th</sup> centuries, continues today	Crimea situation
В период «холодной войны»	“during times of the Cold War”	Crimea situation

Со времён основания этого государства, принятия Декларации независимости	Since the foundation of their nation and adoption of the Declaration of Independence	Crimea situation
Косово	Kosovo	Crimea situation
По объединению ФРГ и ГДР	Unification of East and West Germany	Crimea situation
Но он никогда не будет бандерским	Bandera's footsteps	Crimea situation
Риторика «холодной войны»	"rhetoric of the cold war"	Crimea situation

<b>Исторические метафоры</b>	<b>(Historical) metaphors</b>	Situation
Силиконовую долину	Silicon Valley	Crimea situation

## Appendix 3 – Historical Analogies in Putin's Speech in 2013

<b>Исторические аналогии</b>	<b>Historical analogies</b>	<b>Situation</b>
Венский конгресс 1815 года	Congress of Vienna of 1815	Russia's active participation towards peace
Ялтинские соглашения 1945 года	"agreements made at Yalta in 1945"	Russia's active participation towards peace
Версаль	Treaty of Versaille	Russia's active participation towards peace
Второй мировой войны	Second World War	Russia's active participation towards peace
НАТО не выйдет за восточную границу бывшей ФГР	NATO would not expand beyond the former Federal Republic of Germany's eastern border (Munich Speech)	Syrian conflict
Второй мировой войны на восстановление конкретных предприятий советское правительство выделило, по-моему, 1,5 триллиона рублей	After World War II, the Soviet government allotted somewhere around 1.5 trillion rubles to restore certain companies	Ukraine crisis
«Братья-мусульмане» были в подполе	Muslim Brotherhood was forced underground	Syrian conflict
Известные военные действия в	Famous military actions in Libya	Syrian conflict

Ливии		
Акция в Ираке была ошибкой	Operations in Iraq	Syrian conflict
Ливии	Libya	Syrian conflict
Беспорядки в Лондооне	London riots	Bolotnaya riots
«советскую империю	Soviet empire	Ukraine crisis
Физика-ядершика, который предал гласности наличие ядерного оружия в Израиле	Nuclear physicist, who disclosed the existence of Israel's nuclear weapons	Syrian conflict

## Appendix 4 - Historical Analogies in Lavrov's Speech in 2015

<b>Исторические аналогии</b>	<b>Historical analogies</b>	<b>Situations</b>
Ираком	Iraq	Syrian conflict
Ливией	Libya	Syrian conflict
Йеменом	Yemen	Syrian conflict
Ливаном	Lebanon	Syrian conflict
Резолюцией СБ 1624	SC Resolution 1624	Syrian conflict
Многолетнего-израильских делах	Many years of doldrums in the Palestine-Israel affairs	Syrian conflict

## Appendix 5 - Historical Analogies in Lavrov's Speech in 2014

<b>Исторические аналогии</b>	<b>Historical analogies</b>	<b>Situation</b>
Натовские бомбардировки Югославии	NATO bombardment of Yugoslavia	Ukraine crisis
Вторжение в Ирак	Intervention in Iraq	Ukraine crisis
Нападение на Ливию	The attack against Libya	Ukraine crisis
Провал в Афганистане	Failure of the operation in Afghanistan	Ukraine crisis
«цветных революций»	Colour revolutions → relations to Ukraine	Ukraine crisis
«холодной войне» (2)	Cold War (2)	Ukraine crisis
Дипломатических отношений с Советским Союзом в 1933 году	Diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union in 1933	Ukraine crisis
Американской блокады Кубы	US blockade of Cuba	Ukraine crisis
В Ливии, разбомб эту страну в нарушение резолюции СБ ООН	Bombing this country in violation of a UNSC Resolution (Libya)	Ukraine crisis
Конфликтов, прежде всего	Israeli-Arab conflict	Ukraine crisis

арабо-израильского		
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## Appendix 5 - Historical Analogies and Metaphors in Lavrov's Speech in 2013

<b>Исторические аналогии</b>	<b>Historical analogies</b>	<b>Situation</b>
Второй мировой войны – Сталинградская битва	World War II - “the battle of Stalingrad”	Russian foreign policy decision to cooperate with NATO
Мировой войны	“world war”	Russian foreign policy decision to cooperate with NATO
Холодная война	“Cold War”	Russian foreign policy decision to cooperate with NATO
Советской угрозе	Soviet threat	Russian threat
Ссылкой на Президента Б. Обаму	“reference to President Barack Obama”	Russian foreign policy

## Appendix 7 - Historical Analogies in Medvedev's Speech in 2014

<b>Исторические аналогии</b>	<b>Historical analogies</b>	<b>Situations</b>
“В Ираке”	Iraq	Syrian crisis
“В Афганистане”	Afghanistan (bad decisions)	Syrian crisis
“Санкции были выданы в отношении Советского Союза в 1925 году”	Sanctions were imposed against the Soviet Union in 1925	Sanctions imposed by the international community
“Второй мировой войны”	World War II	Sanctions imposed by the international community
“Санкции пытались вводить в отношении газопровода Уренгой-Помары-Ужгород после афганских событий”	Sanctions on the Urengoy-Pomary-Uzhgorod pipeline after the events in Afghanistan	Sanctions imposed by the international community
“Санкции пытались вводить в 1990-е годы”	Sanctions in the 1990s	Sanctions imposed by the international community
“Санкции против Ирана”	Sanctions against Iran	Sanctions imposed by the international community
“Санкции против Китайской Народной Республики в 1989	Sanctions against the People's Republic of China in 1989	Sanctions imposed by the international community

году”		
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## Appendix 8 - Historical Analogies in Medvedev's Speech in 2013

<b>Исторические аналогии</b>	<b>Historical analogies</b>	
“Ирака”	Iraq	Syrian crisis
“В Ливии”	Libya	Syrian crisis
“Гитлеровских преступников на Нюрнбергском процессе”	“Hitler's criminals at the Nuremburg trials”	Georgian-Russian war