

Israeli Human Rights Violations and Hamas Support

Researching Perceptions of Palestinian refugees in Jordan



Lidwien Wijchers

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Cover photo Lidwien Wijchers

Banner in Irbid refugee camp, Jordan:

“The Palestinian case and Jerusalem are always in the heart and consciousness
 of his Majesty the King”

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Preface

This thesis is submitted as part of the Human Geography Master specialization Conflicts, Identities, and Territories at the Center of International Conflict Analysis and Management associated with the Radboud University Nijmegen. It is the result of fieldwork conducted in Jordan from August 2012 until March 2013.

Throughout the process of writing this thesis, many people have been of help to me. Not in the least the respondents of my questionnaire, and experts with whom I conducted interviews. I hereby express my appreciation to all of them.

Furthermore, I would like to extend gratitude to Dr. Siniša Vukovic who supervised me through the writing stages of the thesis, and to my second reader Dr. Joas Wagemakers. Acknowledgment must also be given to Dr. Gearoid Millar, for his guidance in the initial stages of the project.

Four other individuals deserve recognition. Lauren Salathiel and Mohamed el Atfy; thank you for your willingness to be sounding boards. Hashim Taani and Rakan Odeh, I am much indebted to you both for the amount of time and help you have selflessly given.

Last but not least, I would like to thank my parents for their patience and support. When confronted with the initial unexpected setbacks this project tackled me with, you were there to raise me to my feet.

This thesis proved more challenging than initially foreseen, mainly due to a forced change of research location. It has nonetheless been an extremely educational experience. Before commencing a disclaimer must be made, that in no way should any of the comments, statements, or conclusions made be interpreted as being of an anti-Semitic nature.

Executive Summary

The title of this thesis reveals the topic researched that resulted in this Master thesis to a great extent. Throughout roughly nine months of fieldwork carried out in Palestinian refugee camps in Jordan, the hypothesis of perceptions of Israeli rights violations adding to support for Hamas was tested. This thesis discusses the outcomes of this research with the purpose of adding to human rights and the reactionism discourse. It is seen as an expansion of Social Movement Theory and the grievances debate, by arguing that perceptions of human rights violations can add to motivations for individuals to support political movements of an Islamic nature. Hamas exemplified such a movement in this research.

The main hypothesis was separated into two sub-hypotheses based on a handful of research questions meant to guide the research. The sub-hypothesis identified the two main variables of human rights violations, and support for Hamas. A survey was composed in such a way that one section of the questions would answer how human rights are understood, experienced and evaluated by respondents. This section included examples of Israeli policies the international community views as illegal. In addition to the questions addressing demographics and human rights, a part was dedicated to Hamas and its policies. Data extracted from participant answers addressed research questions regarding the understanding of Hamas and acceptance of violence by respondents.

Surveys were conducted in ten refugee camps managed by the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) across Jordan. While envisioned to apply the Snowball Sampling Method, this proved difficult in the local circumstances. Thus respondents were approached randomly and participated on a voluntary basis. In a few camps, contacts were used. Upon having visited ten camps and generating a participant pool of 197 respondents, outliers were approached for in-depth interviews. This, in combination with interviews with people of knowledge (experts), comprises the qualitative methodology used.

Quantitative data was analyzed with simple descriptive statistics using SPSS. Frequency distributions make up the most part of the data analysis, complemented by correlations and split file analyses. The generated data was enhanced by both written

answers given to questions on the survey, and those given in the interviews. Expert interviews added to the assessment of its relevance academically and socially.

The quantitative and qualitative data supports the hypothesis. It was found respondents perceive their human rights to be violated, most notably the right to return. Israeli policies referred to triggered large amounts of anger and responses clearly exhibited frustration and in some cases hatred. The correct response to the perceived violations committed by Israel was seen to be carried out by Hamas in their violent policies. While violence proved not to be the all time favorite tactic of respondents, they saw it as the only effective and just response.

These conclusions result in the recommendation for further research in the field of human rights perceptions and support for religious movements in general. Additionally, the research suggests that Israeli attitude and policy change regarding Palestinians is imperative. The fact that young and educated Palestinian refugees felt most strongly violated in their human rights, and most approving towards Hamas proves that the movement's support is unlikely to dwindle in the near future. Readiness to co-exist with people of the Jewish religion was found, showing despise of policy and not of people.

Table of Contents

Cover Page	i
Title Page	ii
Preface	iii
Executive Summary	iv
Table of Contents	vi
List of Figures and Maps	vii
1. Introduction	1
2. Background	3
2.1. The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict	3
2.1.1. Israeli Independence and Ensuing Wars	4
2.2. Refugees in Jordan	6
2.2.1. Defining Refugees	6
2.2.2. Palestinian Refugees	7
2.2.3. UNRWA Camps in Jordan	8
2.3. Social movements	9
2.3.1. History of Hamas	10
2.3.2. Hamas Policies	11
2.3.3. Hamas as a Social Movement	12
2.4 Human Rights	13
2.4.1. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights	13
2.4.2. The Geneva Conventions	14
2.4.3. Basic Human Rights	15
2.5. Social Relevance	16
3. Theoretical Framework	18
3.1. Human Rights Theories	18
3.2. Reactionist Theories	19
3.2.1. Social Movement Theory	20
3.2.2. Mobilization Theories	21
3.3. Scientific Relevance	23
3.3.1. Previous Research	23
3.3.2. Validity of this Research	26

4. Research Design	27
4.1. Hypothesis and Research Questions	27
4.2. Quantitative Methodology	29
4.2.1. Snowball Sampling	30
4.2.2. Reproducibility and Gatekeepers	31
4.2.4. Survey Composition	32
4.3. Statistical Methodology	33
4.4. Qualitative Methodology	34
4.5. Camp Analysis	36
4.5.1. Irbid	36
4.5.2. Martyr Azmi el-Mufti camp (Husn)	37
4.5.3. Jabal Hussein, Amman	37
4.5.4. Zarqa	38
4.5.5. Wahdat (Amman)	38
4.5.6. Souf	38
4.5.7. Baqa'a	39
4.5.8. Gaza camp/Jerash camp	39
4.5.9. Hitten/Schneller	39
4.5.10. Talbieh	40
4.5.11. General observations	40
5. Data Analysis and Interpretation	41
5.1. Simple Descriptive Statistics of Ethnography	41
5.1.1. Camps	41
5.1.2. Ages	42
5.1.3. Sex	43
5.1.4. Professions	44
5.1.5. Education	46
5.1.6. Religion and Registration	48
5.1.7. Region and Year of Departure	49
5.1.8. Reason for Leaving	53

5.2. Simple Descriptive Statistics of Human Rights Related Questions	55
5.2.1. Familiarity With The Term ‘Human Rights’	56
5.2.2. Familiarity With The Geneva Convention	59
5.2.3. Familiarity With The Universal Declaration of Human Rights	61
5.2.4. Personal Fundamental Rights	63
5.3. Perceptions of Violations	67
5.3.1. Feelings Towards the West Bank Wall	68
5.3.2. Feelings Towards the Gaza Barrier	70
5.3.3. Settlements	72
5.3.4. Gaza War	73
5.4. Regarding Prisoners	76
5.5. Possibilities to Return	81
5.6. Political Positions	84
5.6.1. Fatah	84
5.6.2. Hamas	86
5.6.3. Islamic Jihad Movement	86
5.7. Support for Hamas’ Policies	88
5.7.1. Rocket Strategies	88
5.7.2. Ceasefire	90
5.7.3. Non-Negotiation	91
5.7.4. Non-Recognition	93
5.7.5. Terrorist Label	94
5.7.6. Prisoner Exchange	95
5.7.7. Social Welfare Projects	96
5.8. Other Statistical Analysis	97
5.8.1. Correlations	98
5.8.2. Split File Variables	100
6. Discussion	104
6.1. Summary of Findings	104

6.2. Human Rights	106
6.3. Hamas Support	106
6.4. Challenges	107
6.5. Recommendations	110
7. Conclusion	112
Bibliography	114
Appendix	
A. Survey English	123
B. Survey Arabic	127
C. Correlation Human Rights Knowledge and Course	133
D. Correlation Violations and Support	133
E. Correlation Party Support	134
F. Correlation Hamas Support and Policies	134

List of Figures and Maps

Figure 1	{Camps}	42
Figure 2	{Age Groups}	43
Figure 3	{Sex}	43
Figure 4	{Employment}	45
Figure 5	{Education}	47
Figure 6	{High School Students}	47
Figure 7	{Registration}	49
Map 1	{Palestine Regions}	50
Map 2	{Modern day Israel}	50
Figure 8	{Origin}	51
Figure 9	{Greater Region of Origin}	52
Figure 10	{Year Of Departure}	52
Figure 11	{Other Years of Departure}	53
Figure 12	{Reasons for Leaving}	54
Figure 13	{References}	54
Figure 14a	{Human Rights Knowledge}	56
Figure 14b	{Human Rights Knowledge}	56
Figure 15	{Example of Human Rights Given}	57
Figure 16	{Examples of Human Rights}	58
Figure 17	{Familiarity with GC}	59
Figure 18	{Knowledge Author GC}	59
Figure 19	{Examples of GC Rights}	60
Figure 20	{Familiarity UDHR}	61
Figure 21	{Knowledge Author UDHR}	61
Figure 22	{Examples of UDHR}	62
Figure 23	{Rights Felt Violated}	64
Figure 24	{Personal Fundamental Rights}	65

Figure 25	{Feelings West Bank Wall Commencement}	68
Figure 26	{Feelings West Bank Wall Now}	69
Figure 27	{Feelings Gaza Barrier Commencement}	71
Figure 28	{Feelings Gaza Barrier Now}	72
Figure 29	{Feelings Hebron Settlements}	73
Figure 30	{Feelings Israel’s Gaza War Position}	74
Figure 31	{Feelings Hamas’ Position Gaza War}	75
Figure 32	{Knowledge Prisoner}	77
Figure 33	{Reasons for Incarceration}	78
Figure 34	{Feelings Unfair Incarceration}	80
Figure 35	{Feelings Unjust Treatment of Prisoners}	81
Figure 36	{Possibility to Return}	82
Figure 37	{Feelings Inability to Return}	83
Figure 38	{Feelings About Fatah}	85
Figure 39	{Feelings About Hamas}	86
Figure 40	{Feelings Islamic Jihad Movement}	87
Figure 41	{Hamas’ Rocket Strategy}	89
Figure 42	{Hamas’ Refusal To Extend Ceasefire}	90
Figure 43	{Hamas’ Non-Negotiation Policy}	91
Figure 44	{Hamas’ Non-Recognition Policy}	93
Figure 45	{Terrorist Label}	94
Figure 46	{Hamas’ Prisoner Exchange}	96
Figure 47	{Hamas’ Social Welfare Projects}	97
Figure 48	{Split File Age Groups – Violation}	101
Figure 49	{Split File Education Level – Violation}	102
Figure 50	{Split File Region – Violation}	102
Figure 51	{Split File Region – Hamas Support}	103

1. Introduction

The Palestinian-Israeli conflict has dominated Middle Eastern politics for a large number of years now. Many aspects of the conflict have been researched; history has been written, re-written and contested according to various points of view. Facts hardly ever seem undisputed, aside from the one that this is a difficult to manage and sensitive conflict with deep roots. Recent developments in the contested areas have added to the increasingly urgent need to resolve the issue, yet to this day there seems to be no movement in a positive direction. The peace process has been stranded for quite some time, while violence and hatred increases.

This research project was established as an attempt to contribute to the knowledge about the conflict from a different perspective. There seems to be a lack of attention for Palestinian refugees in Jordan, in addition to there being no clear theory regarding reasons for supporting a political Islamic movement. Through the examination of perceptions of human rights violation, this thesis hopes to add to the establishment of at least part of such a theory. With recent radicalizations worldwide – towards the right political wings in the West, and increasing popularity of religious movements in the Middle East, an understanding of such a trend needs to come to life.

The idea for this topic came about while reading an article about human rights violations, and some basic research generated the conclusion that no extensive or influential research has been conducted. Underlying motivations are hoped to be dug out in this thesis, looking at the humane side of decisions made. Literally, since it looks at perceptions of violations of human rights. If human rights are perceived, does this influence the support given to Islamic movements? Hamas is used as specific exemplification of such an Islamic movement. Reasoning behind this will be discussed in the upcoming chapters.

First of all, the background of the conflict will be recounted in a historical sense. This will be done in the first chapter, followed by sub-sections regarding refugees in Jordan and social movements. Human rights, being one of the key concepts of this thesis will then be explained to gain a universal understanding of the term as it is used in this project. The social relevance of this topic is also examined.

Scientific relevance is discussed in the succeeding chapter, which focuses on the theoretical framework of this research. It will discuss previous theories regarding both human rights and reactionism. Through this discussion the relevance in an academic sense will become clear. As was said and will be proven, theories lacking the specific hypothesis tested in this research are lacking thus the scientific relevance is direr than the social relevance and more attention to this will be paid.

After having discussed these two necessary topics, the actual research will be outlined in the chapter Research Design. Methodology, both quantitative and qualitative will be explained, and why this is the appropriate method for this topic will be clarified. Thereafter, the method of statistical analysis will be explained. This chapter also describes in detail the sub-hypotheses, which will be answered at the end of the thesis.

These answers will be given through the methodologies used, and the outcomes of the research will be discussed in Data Analysis and Interpretation. The conclusions derived from this will be summed up in the Discussion and Conclusion chapter, at the close of the thesis.

2. Background

Before proceeding to the specifics of the research it is key that there is a shared understanding of several principle matters, which are at the core of the project. Without basic knowledge of these matters, one cannot be expected to understand the significance of this research. Thus, a brief history of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict will be provided. It is important to realize that it is nearly impossible to do justice to the complicated history of the issue in such a compact capacity. Yet, it has been attempted to create a brief account fairly considering the suffering of both parties.

The establishment of Palestinian refugee camps in Jordan occurred as an extension of the conflict. Since these camps are the backdrops of the fieldwork, fundamental information on them will also be provided. Additionally, there are some so-called key concepts, which need explaining. These are notions that are multi-interpretable and therefore are in need of clarification. Not only so misunderstandings do not occur, but also because some of these terms are sensitive to misconceptions. The terms *human rights* and (human rights) *violations* will be discussed, also in a historical context. Not all of the thesis' historical context will have been discussed in the first sub-chapter, but this will be elaborated upon in the section providing insight into social movements, focusing specifically on Hamas. Additionally, prior to establishing the societal relevance for this thesis, the concept of *political Islam* will be explored.

2.1. The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict

The history of the Israel-Palestinian conflict has different interpretations, depending on cultural bias. Israeli/Jewish discourse is often quoted as having perceived the current state of Israel as a land without a people for a people without a land. Palestinian/Arab discourse tenaciously objects to this.

The Israeli/Palestinian territories in the Middle East have been contested since the early 1900s.¹ Historically, the region of the Levant – thus including the Israeli/Palestinian territories – belonged to the Ottoman Empire, as much of the Arab world did. In the First

¹ Cleveland, W.L. & M. Bunton (2009). *A History of the Modern Middle East*. USA: Westview Press; Kamrava, M. (2005). *The Modern Middle East*. USA: University of California Press.

World War, the Ottomans chose the wrong side, so to speak, and were forced to hand over their territories to the winning parties. Palestine was handed over to the British Empire, becoming the British Mandate of Palestine.

Meanwhile, the Zionist movement had been provided with a treatise by Theodor Herzl's *"The Jewish State."*² The work proposed the establishment of a Jewish state, ending the historic oppression suffered by the Jewish people. This inspired the signing of an ambiguous document in 1917, the Balfour Declaration, "[declaring] ... sympathy for Jewish Zionist aspirations."³ The implementation of the Declaration and consequently the composing of 'the White Paper' aimed at consoling the Arab population, raised tensions in the area in which previously Jewish, Christian, and Muslim populations had lived together in peace.

The initial lack of widespread support for Herzl's treatise or what it proposed is seen in the low numbers of immigrants moving to Palestine in between 1919 and 1926; (approximately 80,000).⁴ Nazi Germany's policies and execution of an extensive program aimed at exterminating the world's Jewish population during the Second World War changed this. In the fifteen years Hitler and his anti-Semitic attitude gained popularity and control, the Jewish population in Palestine doubled⁵ in an attempt to find a safe-haven. Globally there was, and to some degree still is to this day, a feeling of guilt and need for atonement subdued by providing a new Jewish homeland.

2.1.1. Israeli Independence and Ensuing Wars

This homeland was made official when Israel declared independence in 1948, after in 1947 the separation of the land into "separate Arab and Jewish states ... [with] international status [accorded] to Jerusalem"⁶ was consented to by the newly established United Nations' General Assembly in Resolution 181, also known as the Partition Plan. A day after Ben-Gurion's proclamation, Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Transjordan, and Iraq declared war on the new state by sending invading troops. This war led to the so-called first wave of internally

² Cleveland & Bunton, p. 242.

³ Idem, p. 244.

⁴ Idem, p. 254.

⁵ Idem, p. 255.

⁶ Idem, p. 264.

and externally displaced persons. While the exodus started as a natural response to violence, the Jewish defense forces, also known as the Haganah, seized this opportunity to implement 'Plan D'. Arguably it was meant to serve a different goal, but was interpreted to "giving [officers] authority to undertake the systematic expulsion of the Palestinian Arabs,"⁷ both inside and outside Israel's concurred borders. Aside from that, through their cease-fire agreements, Egypt and Transjordan justified control of the Gaza Strip and the West Bank respectively while Israel maintained control over the rest of the territory.

Some years of relative peace followed, though individual states in the region did come head to head with the newly established state of Israel, such as Egypt in the 1956 Suez Crisis. After some regional tensions and in response to false reports of an Israeli invasion of Syria, Egypt's Jamal Abd el-Nasser used his Pan-Arabism discourse to mobilize an alliance against Israel, which was joined by Syria, Jordan, and Iraq.⁸ Israel responded to the perceived threat such an alliance posed by way of an air strike on June 5th 1967. Thus was launched the 1967 or Six-Day War, and the second wave of refugee exodus when Israel, upon its victory, took control over the (Egyptian) Sinai and Gaza Strip, the (Jordanian) West Bank and East Jerusalem, and the (Syrian) Golan Heights. In its victorious acquisition of these lands, Israel transformed itself into an occupier in the eyes of not only Palestinians and potentially other Arab populations, but also according to the United Nations.⁹ Thus hereafter, the collective name for the West Bank and Gaza is, in accordance with international common practice, the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT).

Geographically, not much has changed for Israeli/Palestinian borders since the conclusion of the 1967 war. Israel still controls sixty percent of the West Bank, 33 percent of the Gaza Strip, and 33 percent of Palestinian land in Jerusalem.¹⁰ Politically, Palestinians were disheartened by the effects of Arab military support and started relying on homegrown political movements such as al-Fatah (or Fatah). Militarily, no other major wars have been

⁷ Cleveland & Bunton, p. 268.

⁸ Idem, p. 338.

⁹ Idem, p. 345.

¹⁰ Giacomelli, G. (2000). Question of the Violation of Human Rights in the Occupied Arab Territories, Including Palestine. *Soemoed*, 28:2, p. 26.

fought on Israeli/Palestinian soil though this does not mean that there has been a lack of violence or a prevalence of peace in the region.

2.2. Refugees in Jordan

Before examining the situation of refugees in Jordan, it is imperative some issues are attended to. Though not mentioned earlier, the term refugee does not have an undisputed definition. As a result, what criteria one must adhere to in order to be classified as a refugee will be listed, specifically regarding those of Palestinians seeing as they are often considered a class of their own. Additionally, prior to judging the situation of refugees in Jordan, the issue must be addressed that it is easy to forget what kind of impositions such a large influx of persons can pose to a country. Though this matter is not in the confines of this thesis, it is important not to let go unnoticed that the majority of Palestinian refugees fled to Jordan. As of June 2010, "Palestinians constituted 1.9 million of Jordan's total population of 6 million."¹¹ Palestinian migration since 1948 "has played a key role in [the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan's] politics, economy, and society."¹² Therefore it has "constantly posed a challenge to the Jordanian regime."¹³

2.2.1. Defining Refugees

The definition of a refugee is subject to debate. Sociological theories "assume that refugee status is both a temporary transition state between one place of settlement and another and a temporary phenomenon affecting only the cohort that actually experiences the 'act' of displacement."¹⁴ According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), a refugee is "[a] person who can show that they have fled their country of origin owing to a well-founded fear of persecution because of their race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion."¹⁵ The United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) lists as a condition for a refugee to be eligible for their aid to be "a person whose normal residence was Palestine for a minimum of two years preceding the conflict in 1948, and who, as a

¹¹ Chatelard, G. (2010). Jordan: A Refugee Haven. *Migration Information Source*, August, p. 2.

¹² Idem, p. 1.

¹³ Idem.

¹⁴ Abu-Lughod, J. L. (1988). "Palestinians: Exiles at Home and Abroad." *Current Sociology*, 36:2, p. 63.

¹⁵ Lawand, K. (1996). "The Right to Return of Palestinians in International Law." *International Journal of Refugee Law*, 8:4, p. 538.

result of this conflict, lost both his home and his means of livelihood and took refuge in 1948 in one of the countries where UNRWA provides relief.”¹⁶ UNRWA, in accordance with UN General Assembly (GA) Resolution 2252 (ES-V),¹⁷ has an additional term for people having fled the West Bank in and after 1967. They are referred to as ‘displaced persons’ instead of refugees, as previously they were part of the Jordanian mandate¹⁸ and according to the GA, “have been unable to return to the Palestinian territories occupied by Israel since 1967.”¹⁹

In this thesis the definition of a refugee is that of a person or group of persons who are or were exposed to “a sudden, involuntary severance from one's native place.”²⁰ Contrary to the UNRWA, a distinction is not made between those fleeing from Gaza or the West Bank in 1948 or 1967. Additionally, Palestinians living in Kuwait and Iraq who had to seek refuge from yet another war in either the 1990s or after 2003 are also included in this definition and research. In accordance with Edward Said’s definition, none of these people should be seen as migrants, because of the “condition of terminal loss caused by a discontinuous state of being.”²¹ A Palestinian will be seen as anybody who is either a direct refugee and was therefore born in the previous Mandate or territories known as Palestine, in addition to their offspring regardless of their place of birth. These Palestinians will be refugees or sons and daughters of refugees, who have lived in Jordan for varying amounts of time.

2.2.2. Palestinian Refugees

As stated above, there were two main moments of mass exodus from Palestine, namely in 1948 and 1967. These people ended up scattered between refugee camps in the OPT, Egypt, Lebanon, Syria, and Jordan, and some left the region entirely. In 1948 the refugees were initially absorbed by “local charity organizations, in addition to some international NGOs; the International Committee of the Red Cross, the League of the

¹⁶ Lawand, p. 538, footnote 25.

¹⁷ El Abed, O. (2004). “Palestinian Refugees in Jordan.” *Forced Migration Online, February 2004*. Online <http://www.forcedmigration.org/research-resources/expert-guides/palestinian-refugees-in-jordan>. Last accessed 1 April 2013, p. 4.

¹⁸ United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA). Online <http://www.unrwa.org/index.php>. Last Accessed July 30th 2012.

¹⁹ El Abed (2004), p. 4.

²⁰ Abu-Lughod, p. 61.

²¹ Idem.

International Red Cross and Red Crescent, the American Friend Service Committee, the Quakers. They constructed the first refugee camps, and organized the first humanitarian aid, and before that also registered people.”²²

Jordan hosts the largest amount of Palestinian refugees in the region, approximately 42% of the total amount of nearly five million registered refugees.²³ In addition to its hospitality being put to the test the most, it is also most lenient towards their ‘guests’. While refugees in other host countries are stateless, the majority of refugees in Jordan have Jordanian nationality, with the exception of refugees coming from Gaza in and after 1967. Reason for this is because, as mentioned earlier, the area known as the West Bank was part of a previous Jordanian mandate between the 1948 and 1967 war, thus its citizens were regarded as Jordanians. Gaza was under Egyptian auspices, and as a consequence the Kingdom of Jordan did not feel the same amount of responsibility for its inhabitants. This means that this specific group of refugees in Jordan does not have citizenship rights.²⁴ Consequences of this denial of a fundamental civil right causes Gazan refugees difficulties in being accepted to university, starting a business, and finding employment.²⁵

2.2.3. UNRWA Camps in Jordan

Currently, the UNRWA is in control of ten refugee camps in Jordan, four of these were constructed after 1948 and six more, labeled as ‘emergency camps’ were assembled in 1967. The ten camps are located in various parts of the country but concentrated around the nation’s bigger cities. As of January 1st 2012, there were almost 2 million registered refugees,²⁶ and an unknown number of non-registered refugees in Jordan. Of the registered refugees, 17%²⁷ live in UNRWA camps, others moved out and have been absorbed into Jordanian society. Additionally, there are three ‘unofficial’ camps for Palestinians, which are managed by the Jordanian government – Madaba, Prince Hassan (Nasser), and Sukhneh.²⁸

²² Anonymous. Personal Interview. March 14th 2013.

²³ Bocco, R. (2010). “UNRWA and the Palestinian Refugees: A History Within History.” *Refugee Survey Quarterly* 28:2-3, p. 238.

²⁴ El Abed, O. (2006). “Immobile Palestinians: ongoing plight of Gazans in Jordan.” *Forced Migration Review*, 26, p. 17.

²⁵ Idem, p. 17-18.

²⁶ UNRWA.

²⁷ Idem.

²⁸ El Abed (2004), p. 13.

Not much is known about these camps, and in talking to people it was found that not many are aware of their existence. While researching the camps, there was nearly nothing to be found about these camps or their locations except for a brief mention in UNRWA reports.

It is important to know that due to the longevity of these camps, they do not appear as one may imagine them to. In the 1950s, UNRWA built proper shelter to replace the initial tents set up by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).²⁹ Understandably, the longer the refugees were in Jordan, the more infrastructure they added to the shelters UNRWA had provided them with, resulting in the camps bearing close resemblance to the Jordanian neighborhoods they are surrounded with. However, in most cases a great difference can be seen in street-width and cleanliness, and the sheer size of (apartment) buildings. Jordanian architecture does not have a culture of high rise buildings or skyscrapers, yet some complexes reach higher than ten stories. This is unheard of in the UNRWA camps, the buildings are much smaller and there are no high rise complexes. The UNRWA acknowledges this and the lack of basic infrastructure in some camps, but “further construction is forbidden.”³⁰ Though most inhabitants of the camps live under similar socio-economic conditions according to UNRWA,³¹ there are still differences amongst the camps and their inhabitants, and their general outlook on life and the topic of my research.

2.3. Social movements

Seeing as Islamic movements are being discussed in the surveys conducted and the hypotheses, it is important to have an understanding of them. As is the case with non-religious social movements, there is no one specific framework through which Islamic social movements work. Here, only the specifics necessary for understanding the thesis will be discussed. Different opinions and theories regarding (Islamic) social movements will be analyzed in the upcoming chapter.

Social movements, or social movement organizations, are groups who attempt to mobilize a larger segment of the population. They do this with the aim to create contention and work towards specific political goals. Support is usually gained through recruitment,

²⁹ UNRWA.

³⁰ Al Hussein, Jalal. Personal Interview. March 7th 2012.

³¹ UNRWA.

made more manageable by social institutions the movement may create. This support is key to any social movement, as their power and *raison d'être* comes from their followers. Usually, a social movement is associated with being created in an environment where political dissatisfaction is abundant and these movements work towards changing that. According to Quintan Wiktorowicz, this is especially the case in the Middle East where he sees social movements, usually forms of Islamic activism, as a reaction to the distress caused by the arguably bad conditions in the Middle East.³²

In this research project, Hamas was chosen to be the exemplification of an Islamic social movement. The reason why only one was chosen is purely pragmatic. If multiple movements in the OPT were scrutinized, the scope of the research would have become too large. Additionally, Hamas is the most successful and prominent, in addition to conceivably being the largest and most influential in the OPT. It is not merely an Islamic movement, but focuses specifically on politics. Other Islamic movements can be argued to be less active in the political field, and have arguably been less successful in their mobilization efforts. Furthermore, Hamas is well known and notorious in the West, more so than the Islamic Jihad Movement for instance. This could be linked back to the influential (political) role they play in recent Palestinian history. The combination of these factors made Hamas the most interesting and suitable party to test the theory on.

2.3.1. History of Hamas

Hamas, acronym for 'the Islamic Resistance Movement' in Arabic, is a Palestinian Islamic movement. It is dubbed a terrorist one in popular Western opinion and public discourse, and claims to use the doctrine of jihad in its struggle against Israeli occupation. It emerged from the Muslim Brotherhood (MB), which was established in Egypt by Hassan al-Banna and six compatriots but has, in some form or other, spread to other countries such as Syria and Jordan.

Hamas emerged from the Palestinian MB during the first Intifada in 1987 when its more outspoken and activist nature gained momentum. Growing economic deprivation and

³² Wiktorowicz, Quintan, "Introduction: Islamic Activism and Social Movement Theory." In: Quintan Wiktorowicz (ed.), *Islamic Activism – A Social Movement Theory Approach*, Bloomington & Indianapolis, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 2004, p. 7.

political failure gradually shifted loyalties from secularist groups as the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) to the Islamists.³³ They urged the Palestinian population to start boycotting Israeli goods and use violence against Israeli targets, which was reciprocated.³⁴ The same pattern of providing an alternative to a popular secular movement erupted after the Al-Aqsa Intifada of 2000. As the Palestinian economy degenerated further, Hamas seemed to provide a significant alternative to Fatah, the secular nationalist movement established by Yaser Arafat. This shift in loyalties appeared most obviously when Hamas won the 2006 general elections. In response to their taking control of the Gaza Strip in 2007 the international community, considering Hamas a terrorist organization, imposed embargoes,³⁵ resulting in the Gaza Strip being hermetically closed off from the world.

2.3.2. Hamas Policies

The focal point of the movement's policies is the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, manifested in the Charter as it was published in 1988.³⁶ The Charter states that the battle with the Jews will continue until "the victory of Allah is sure"³⁷ in addition to "Allah [being] its goal, the Prophet ... its model, and the Qur'an ... its constitution."³⁸ They refuse to recognize or negotiate with Israel, declaring "[t]here is no solution to the Palestinian problem except by Jihad. ... The Palestinian people are too noble to have their future, rights, and destiny [subjected to] vanity."³⁹

This jihad was previously carried out in several ways including suicide bomb attacks in cooperation with the Islamic Jihad Movement (IJM). Today it is almost consistently carried out through rocket-firing methods against Israel. On December 27th 2008⁴⁰ Israel launched a surprise air strike on the territories, in a supposed attempt to stop the Hamas rockets. The

³³ Roy, S. (2004). "Religious Nationalism and the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict: Examining Hamas and the Possibility of Reform." *Chicago Journal of International Law*, 5:1, p. 261.

³⁴ Idem, p. 261.

³⁵ Soeterik, p. 210.

³⁶ Reference is made to the translation by Muhammad Maqdisi, as it appears in; Mishal, S. & A. Sela (2000). *The Palestinian Hamas: Vision, Violence and Coexistence*. New York: Columbia University Press, p.175-199.

³⁷ Mishal & Sela, p. 176.

³⁸ Idem, p. 178. Article 5.

³⁹ Idem, p. 178.

⁴⁰ UN OCHA (2009). *Locked In: The Humanitarian Impact of Two Years Blockade on the Gaza Strip*. Report August 2009, p. 2.

destructive three-week offensive, named Operation Cast Lead, was the last large escalation of violence to date, while Operation Pillar of Defense in November 2012 also managed to cause death and destruction on both sides.

Important to note, is that Hamas does not only focus on their intended destruction of Israel. Additionally, they carry out social services programs aimed at helping the Palestinian population in the Gaza Strip. They do this by way of their social institutions,⁴¹ which provide education and health care, amongst others. Regarding the position of Hamas in Jordan, it has been stated to have close links “with the Jordanian Brotherhood, receiving spiritual, political and financial support from the Brothers.”⁴² The main recruitment areas in Jordan are known to be “urban areas, refugee camps, and villages.”⁴³

2.3.3. Hamas as a Social Movement

Hamas and the Islamic Jihad Movement are classified as Islamic social movements because they fit the profile of a social movement, while referring to Islamic sources and culture to motivate their actions and mobilize their followers. In no way is this meant to be a term which should be interpreted in any other way than being descriptive. Regarding the political nature of a social movement as discussed previously, in combination with the movement’s position of control in Gaza Strip, Hamas is also seen as a movement practicing political Islam. In this context this refers to the use of Islamic doctrine in political parties for political goals, in accordance with the definition of the concept according to Mishal and Sela; “Return of Islam to international attention has carried a distinctly political overtone, manifested by the appearance of political organizations and movements... labeled in the West as ‘Islamists’, based on Islamic convictions ... labeled in the West as ‘Islamism.’”⁴⁴

Thus political Islam(ism) may show itself through the formation of a political party, political participation in elections, and political frames. As discussed, Hamas participated in the 2006 elections that it subsequently won and led to their control over the Gaza Strip. As

⁴¹ Robinson, G.E. (2004). “Hamas as a Social Movement.” In: Wiktorowicz, Q. (ed.) *Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Approach*. Bloomington & Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, p. 126.

⁴² Tal (1995), p. 147.

⁴³ Sahliyeh, p. 114.

⁴⁴ Mishal, S. & A. Sela (2000). *The Palestinian Hamas: Vision, Violence and Coexistence*. New York: Columbia University Press, p. 4.

their Covenant states,⁴⁵ their main goal is to regain control over all the territories they consider to be Palestinian and all their actions are designed to further this goal. Therefore, in this context and in line with abovementioned definition, Hamas would be considered a political Islamist movement.

2.4 Human Rights

In recent years, the concept of human rights has become a well-known and widely accepted term to use. Therefore, as Stenner explains, because “[t]hey articulate and protect what we humans have in common... there is an understandable tendency to ‘black box’ the possibility that different people might have rather different things in mind when discussing human rights.”⁴⁶ However, “‘human rights’ is far from being a simple and singular object about which opinions can be straightforwardly expressed,”⁴⁷ which is why a brief history and explanation of the term is needed.

Though we may all refer to the same sources from which we derive our definition of human rights, most importantly being the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), and for some also the Geneva Convention (GC), interpretations of consensuses like these “lack unitary meaning”⁴⁸ and may differ according to cultural backgrounds. Seeing as the abovementioned conventions were used in the survey conducted for this research project, these are the only two that will be elaborated upon. Basic knowledge only is required seeing as perceptions are being investigated.

2.4.1. *The Universal Declaration of Human Rights*

The General Assembly (GA) adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights on December 10th, 1948.⁴⁹ It was written in the aftermath of World War II, “... as a common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations, to the end that every individual and

⁴⁵ Hamas (2007). “The Covenant of the Islamic Resistance Movement HAMAS.” In: *Islam in Transition*, ed. J.J. Donahue & J.L. Esposito. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

⁴⁶ Stenner, P. (2011). “Subjective Dimensions of Human Rights: What Do Ordinary People Understand by ‘Human Rights’?” *The Intern 15:8*, p. 1216.

⁴⁷ Idem, p. 1216.

⁴⁸ Idem, p. 1216.

⁴⁹ United Nations General Assembly (UNGA). (1948). *Universal Declaration of Human Rights*. Online <http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/>. Last Accessed April 4th 2013.

every organ of society, keeping this Declaration constantly in mind...”⁵⁰ Thus it was truly meant to be universal, to protect citizens from any type of violation the world recently experienced. The articles are applicable to both Israel and Palestine seeing as is written in Article 3; “... no distinction shall be made on the basis of the political, jurisdictional or international status of the country or territory to which a person belongs, whether it be independent, trust, non-self-governing or under any other limitation of sovereignty.”⁵¹ Despite at first glance being an all-encompassing document, definitions of key terms such as freedom, discrimination, and justice are still “open to definition.”⁵²

2.4.2. *The Geneva Conventions*

The Geneva Conventions⁵³ are specifically focused on treatment of persons in time of war. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) admits that “[i]t adds no specifically new ideas to International Law on the subject, but aims at ensuring that, even in the midst of hostilities, the dignity of the human person, universally acknowledged in principle, shall be respected.”⁵⁴ The Geneva Conventions are a revision of previously constructed conventions, which were written before the Second World War and were found necessary to adjust in its aftermath. During a series of expert meetings, congregations by Red Cross agencies, and a confluence of government representatives over time, the articles were revised until a draft was represented at The Diplomatic Conference for the Establishment of International Conventions for the Protection of Victims of War in 1949.⁵⁵ The Final Act was signed by fifty-nine nations – some of which no longer exist – including Israel, Lebanon, and Syria. Jordan signed the Conventions in 1951.⁵⁶ Palestine, represented by the Palestinian

⁵⁰ UNGA, Preamble.

⁵¹ UNGA, Article 3.

⁵² Israeli, R. & R. Ehrenfield (1986-7). “Between the Peak and the Pit: Human Rights in Israel.” *Syracuse Journal for International Law and Commerce* 13, p. 403.

⁵³ International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) (1995). *The Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949*. Geneva.

⁵⁴ *Idem*, p. 29.

⁵⁵ *Idem*, p. 21.

⁵⁶ International Committee of the Red Cross (2012). “States Party to the Following International Humanitarian Law and Other Related Treaties as of 15-Nov-2012.” Online PDF: [http://www.icrc.org/IHL.nsf/\(SPF\)/party_main_treaties/\\$File/IHL_and_other_related_Treaties.pdf](http://www.icrc.org/IHL.nsf/(SPF)/party_main_treaties/$File/IHL_and_other_related_Treaties.pdf), p. 4.

Liberation Organization (PLO), requested to be a signatory in 1989,⁵⁷ but due to the equivocal status of Palestine as a state this was rejected.⁵⁸

The Fourth Geneva Convention, which, as its subtitle states is “Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War...”⁵⁹ is of greatest importance to this thesis. It provides protection for any person who “... in any matter whatsoever, find[s] themselves, in case of a conflict or occupation, in the hands of a Party to the conflict or Occupying Power of which they are not nationals.”⁶⁰ Thus this Convention specifically outlines rights of refugees and those under occupation,⁶¹ which they specifically refer to as “protected persons.”⁶²

Whether or not there is a unified understanding of the 4th Convention and the UDHR is not of significance to this thesis. As stated there are multiple perceptions that can be held, and these perceptions are more important for the purposes of this thesis than actual meanings. Thus the definition of human rights may alter from anything that is written or interpreted by others in the Conventions and UDHR according to the definition given by the research subjects’ perceptions. Thus violations are also those, which may be viewed differently than common use dictates and not be in accordance with international law.

2.4.3 Basic Human Rights

Mentioned above is that only basic knowledge of human rights is required to be able to understand this thesis. However, what constitutes basic knowledge may differ per person. Thus here will be discussed which rights are deemed most important and basal by the researcher. Most of these will be based on the UDHR. The below rights were chosen to constitute “basic” rights, because the belief is held that regardless of where one may reside or what belief they may adhere to – these rights are truly universal.

The first article of the UDHR lists the most fundamental human right awarded to all humans, that of freedom of life in dignity. Article 3 expands on this by including liberty and

⁵⁷ ICRC (2012), p. 6.

⁵⁸ *Idem*, p. 6.

⁵⁹ ICRC (1995), p. 151.

⁶⁰ ICRC, “Geneva Convention Relative To The Protection of Civilian Persons In Time Of War of 12 August 1949.” Article 4, p. 152.

⁶¹ ICRC, 4th Convention, Part III, Section III, p. 166-177.

⁶² ICRC, “Geneva Convention Relative To The Protection of Civilian Persons In Time Of War of 12 August 1949.” Article 4, p. 152.

security. Article 5 focuses on treatment of human beings; also while being punished, and judges nobody should be degraded, treated cruelly or inhumanly. Torture is explicitly included. Recognition of a person, discrimination and equal protection are listed in articles 6 and 7 respectively. Arbitrary arrest, detention or exile is considered violating human rights in article 9, while 10 addresses the right to a fair and public hearing in court. A person should be free to move and reside where they please, according to article 13.1, which also states they should be able to leave and return to their country. Nationality is also a basic human right (15.1), and right to owning property (17.1). Freedom of expressions and opinions should be universal, as well as economic, social and cultural rights (19 and 22). One should be allowed an adequate standard of living (26) and to enjoy education (26.1).

Right to return to the location where one was forced to flee from as a result of fear is seen as lawful in Article 134 of the 4th Geneva Convention. This article states persons are entitled to return to “their last place of residence.”⁶³

These rights are viewed to condemn any type of construction built which would impose limits on the freedom of movement of an individual, in addition to laws that discriminate against them resulting in the same limitations. Detention without a charge or fair trial, and collective punishment of a population also fall into the category of a violation according to above-mentioned examples. Selective justice is viewed as being discriminatory.

2.5. Social Relevance

The specific societal problem that triggered this project is the continual construction of separation walls on Palestinian territories and its borders. Particularly the separation wall in the West Bank whose construction commenced in 2002 (which the International Court in July 2004 held to be unlawful⁶⁴), and the Gaza barrier constructed in 1994 to separate the Gaza Strip from Israel. This raised attention for human rights violations on the part of the Israeli government in the backlash of the Al-Aqsa Intifada.⁶⁵ This was the second grand movement of protest and a clear show of dissatisfaction with the status quo since the first Intifada in the late 1980s.

⁶³ ICRC, p. 197.

⁶⁴ Kattan, p. 94.

⁶⁵ Gordon, N. (2004). “Rationalising Extra-Judicial Executions: the Israeli Press and the Legitimation of Abuse.” *The International Journal of Human Rights*, 8:3, p. 306.

This brings the phenomenon of social activism to the forefront. It seems to be apparent what they are protesting against, and naturally such phenomena have been researched. However, of specific importance in this thesis is whether refugees perceive internationally recognized violations as such, and whether this contributes to their willingness to support retribution acts or movements who perform such acts against Israel. If the results of the research conclude there is a relationship between (perceived) violations and (support for) violence, this would uncover possibilities for changes in United Nations and lobbying groups' policies. Thus the beneficiaries are potentially plentiful.

3. Theoretical Framework

The historical and societal background to the research has been established, but what is also important is to identify the theoretical framework. Any researcher needs to have a solid understanding of what theories have been hypothesized previously. Not only to decide which position one may take in the debate, but also to define the scientific relevance of one's own contribution. Thus for this thesis one needs to know what research has been conducted into the two main variables of the research, in this case human rights and social movements, which can also be termed reactionism. In other words, what is this project expanding on or contributing to?

3.1. Human Rights Theories

The concept of human rights has been around for decades. What human rights entail has been reviewed to a certain degree in this thesis. In the defining of the term it became apparent there is much to be said about the interpretability of the concept and of the UDHR articles. This is an observation to be found in the majority of articles discussing human rights, and one of the rare consensuses reached by various scholars.

In the restricted examining of human rights discourse, a grave fact cannot be left unnoticed, namely that there are more nations violating human rights than respecting them.⁶⁶ Therefore it is to be expected that research has been conducted into this matter abundantly, most commonly comparing human rights situations between countries. The focus of such research has often been on one of three aspects, examination of legal documents, level of enjoyment by populations, and government policy outcomes.⁶⁷ Concluded from this can be that plenty of research has been done based on factual findings, but less of perceptions or experiences. Where experiences are discussed, they are those in situations where violations are recognized and need to be reported but people are fearful of doing so.

Needless to say, human rights theories do not limit themselves to just that and this project is not the first to look at perceptions of human rights violations. However, articles

⁶⁶ Landman, T. (2004). "Measuring Human Rights: Principle, Practice and Policy." *Human Rights Quarterly*, 26:4, p. 907.

⁶⁷ Idem, p. 911.

found have focused on “... whether citizens' perceptions of human rights conditions in a country are systematically related to that country's actual conditions of government repression.”⁶⁸ Having said that, in their article, Anderson and Regan attempt to find the relationship between perceptions and the real life political situation in the countries under investigation. This research has been expanded upon by Carlston and Listhaug,⁶⁹ in the sense that they broadened the scope of their research from eighteen to 55 countries. The latter also focuses on what can be of influence on the perceptions, whether gender and political preferences play a role,⁷⁰ and note the importance of education or “cognitive capacity”⁷¹ on strengthening human rights values.⁷²

It appears that among scholars there is not only a debate about the specific meaning and interpretations that can be given to the concept of human rights, but also what influences their perceptions. This is a case of political reality versus cultural background being of [greater] influence.⁷³ Though Carlston and Listhaug present an interesting case, one of the things they lack is inclusion of the Middle East. This seems to be common practice, as will be discussed in the Scientific Relevance section.

3.2. Reactionist Theories

The definition of a social movement has been discussed previously, and of course there are theories trying to uncover what makes social movements function and appealing to the public. The mainstream theory for this, which other theories have been derived from or added to, is Social Movement Theory (SMT). In this section, this theory will be discussed in addition to other theories examining reactionism or mobilization. First it is valuable to note that SMT has not often been applied to social movements in the Arab world and Middle East. Quintan Wiktorowicz was first to do so in 2004 as he believes, rightfully so, that there is no reason as to why Islamic movements cannot be studied using SMT.

⁶⁸ Anderson, C.J, P.M. Regan & R.L. Ostergard (2002). “Political Repression and Public Perceptions of Human Rights.” *Political Research Quarterly*, 55:2, p. 439.

⁶⁹ Carlson, M. & O. Listhaug (2007). “Citizens’ Perceptions of Human Rights Practices: An Analysis of 55 Countries.” *Journal of Peace Research*, 44:4, p. 465–483.

⁷⁰ Idem, p. 465.

⁷¹ Idem, p. 468.

⁷² Idem.

⁷³ Idem.

3.2.1. Social Movement Theory

Social Movement Theory is a method used to try and understand the emergence of, and actions by social movements. The foundation of all derivative theories lies in the classical approach claiming the existence of some sort of “psychological discomfort”⁷⁴ about one or more issues or circumstances in the form of “political strains.”⁷⁵ According to classical theorists, often referred to as *functionalists*, a social movement helps solve these issues or can be a “coping mechanism.”⁷⁶

Resource Mobilization Theory (RMT), is a derivative of SMT and states that social movement organizations are “rational, organized manifestations of organized action,”⁷⁷ extracting the view that rational thinking, and not emotions, are the basis of social movements from Rational Choice Theory (RCT). According to RMT, social movement organizations work bureaucratically and create institutions through which contention can be organized and coordinated. They can be seen as an enterprise, which needs the support of the population to continue their existence.

The idea of Political Opportunities and Constraints emphasizes the importance of “exogenous factors,”⁷⁸ meaning the social and political context in which movements are established, assuming that actors participate in such movements to further goals in such contexts.⁷⁹ When opportunities and constraints, in the form of risks, are observed, social movements react rationally according to the theory, also known Political Opportunity Structure. Thus social movements adapt themselves to specific situations as to function optimally, and gain as much as possible.

In summary, social movements are created in reaction to some sort of social or political problem, and appeal to their potential supporters through discourse opposing the status quo or proposing an alternative, in such a way that it resonates amongst them. This is

⁷⁴ Wiktorowicz, p. 6.

⁷⁵ Idem.

⁷⁶ Idem.

⁷⁷ Idem, p. 10.

⁷⁸ Idem, p. 13.

⁷⁹ Idem, p. 14.

known as framing.⁸⁰ Movements in the Middle East are usually of a religious nature, thus use religion “as the source of a mobilizing ideology and organizational resources.”⁸¹

3.2.2. Mobilization Theories

There are not merely theories discussing the reasons why social movements are established, but also which attempt to clarify motivations for supporting them. To some degree this has been stated above, saying that social movements provide an alternative. However, joining a movement and becoming active in a rebellious movement such as Hamas may have different motivations. Also, “much of the literature on political mobilization assumes that people are informed about the costs of the status quo,”⁸² which may not always be the case.

One theory which attempts to explain why an activist inclination could nest itself in an individual’s mind and potentially lead to supporting a social movement is Relative Deprivation (RD) theory, used to explain the theory of one feeling he is not achieving all he feels he is supposed to be able to achieve. In other words, it is explained as a person holding a “perception of discrepancy between their value expectations and their value capabilities.”⁸³ This feeling usually manifests itself when one compares himself or herself to another person, but can also stem from another point of reference.⁸⁴ The felt deprivation can be economic, social or political, and the theory is commonly used in sociology. It fits within the larger framework of identifying grievances as a potential cause for conflict, specifically identifying inequality as a major contributor to feeling aggrieved. This notion has been philosophized about for centuries, and great names such as Aristotle can be linked to it.

Gurr looks at whether a feeling of relative deprivation can lead to a person or group of persons turning violent, while Khawaja uses this, as well as resource mobilization theory, as a background to his research into state repression and collective action.⁸⁵ According to Gurr, “if men are exposed to noxious stimuli that they cannot avoid or overcome, they have

⁸⁰ Wiktorowicz, p. 15.

⁸¹ Idem, p. 5.

⁸² Anderson & Regan, p. 440.

⁸³ Gurr, T.R. (1970). “Relative Deprivation and the impetus to violence.” In T.R. Gurr, *Why Men Rebel*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, p. 24.

⁸⁴ Idem, p. 25.

⁸⁵ Idem, p. 25.

an innate disposition to strike out at their sources.”⁸⁶ Khawaja agrees with this when arguing, “that greater frustration leads to aggressive behavior.”⁸⁷ Or, as Collier and Hoeffler state, “rebellion occurs when grievances are sufficiently acute that people want to engage in violent protest.”⁸⁸ Gurr’s conclusion is that this theory “is sufficiently general to comprise or be related to most of the general ‘preconditions of revolution’ identified in other theoretical analyses.”⁸⁹

Humphreys and Weinstein add to the theory by arguing that mobilization is possible due to three motivating factors, being social class, ethnic and political grievances, and personal dislocation and what may be called social-political paralysis.⁹⁰ To undo this suffering, attempts are made to regain or redress what was lost. Both for reasons of self-interest, and “with passion, self-righteousness, and solidarity with their kindred.”⁹¹

Another reason for people identifying with a movement is due to ethno cultural identity. Gurr (1996) explains this to relate to people sharing “common descent, cultural traits, and historical experiences.”⁹² He goes on that loyalty to a movement that defines their interests in a frame close to their own values and identity is easier.⁹³ Hamas’ framing of Islam and the Palestinian identity is used successfully to mobilize their followers. This identity and ability to associate with it is strengthened by the different treatment of Palestinians and non-Israeli Arabs, making them “more self-conscious about their common bonds and interests.”⁹⁴

The theory of greed applied to civil wars is usually seen as one opposing that of grievances, stating that economic benefit or natural resource control is at the heart of

⁸⁶ Gurr, p. 22-23.

⁸⁷ Khawaja, M. (1993). “Repression and Popular Collective Action: Evidence from the West Bank.” *Sociological Forum* 8:1, p. 48.

⁸⁸ Collier, P. & A. Hoeffler (2004). “Greed and Grievance in Civil War.” *Oxford Economic Papers*, 56, p. 564.

⁸⁹ Gurr, p. 37.

⁹⁰ Humphreys, M. and J.M. Weinstein (2008). “Who Fights? The Determinants of Participation in Civil War.” In: *American Journal of Political Science*, 52:2, p. 440.

⁹¹ Gurr, T.R. (1996). “Minorities and Nationalists: Managing Ethnopolitical Conflict in the New Century.” In C.A. Crocker and F.O. Hampson (eds), *Managing Global Chaos: Sources of and Responses to International Conflict*. United States Institute of Peace Press, p. 169.

⁹² Idem, p. 167.

⁹³ Idem.

⁹⁴ Idem, p. 168.

conflict. When greed is a motivating factor, “rebel groups often more than cover their costs during the conflict.”⁹⁵ In the case of the Gaza Strip specifically, and the West Bank to a certain extent, this motivation seems questionable. Violent actions such as suicide bombings have led to the construction of the Separation Wall, while the mere electoral win of Hamas lead to larger economic suffering. International aid has been cut off, and trade has been made nearly impossible due to sanctions and Israeli policies. Neither the population, nor Hamas leadership seem to have significantly prospered as a result of their policies. However, possible economic gain could come from Palestinian diasporas and governments hostile to Israel.

3.3. Scientific Relevance

As can be seen, there are theories either generally or lightly touching on the topic at hand in this research. Human rights perceptions have been researched, somewhat, and there are plenty of theories hypothesizing why one would support a social movement. To a lesser degree these philosophies have been applied to the Middle East and/or Islamic movements. What will be discussed in this sub-section is to what extent this thesis is able to make use of previous theories, and contribute to their evolution.

The scientific relevance of this research is more pressing than its social relevance. This is based upon the bold statement that no publication dedicated specifically to this issue has been found, with the exception of Shaw J. Dallal’s 1987 piece in the *Syracuse Journal for International Law and Commerce*.⁹⁶ The author of this piece admitted it is difficult to find such publications in personal correspondence, and as can be seen in the above analysis of human rights theories, the Middle East is not a commonly researched region.

3.3.1. Previous Research

Therefore it is not strange that in line with this tradition, perceptions of human rights violations have not been inquired into at all in the case of the Israeli/Palestinian conflict. Additionally, Carlston and Listhaug acknowledge a lack of research that seeks “to examine

⁹⁵ Collier & Hoeffler, p. 564.

⁹⁶ Dallal, S. J. (1987). “Israeli Human Rights Violations and Palestinian Violence.” *Syracuse Journal for International Law and Commerce*, 14, p. 109-124.

the structure and role domestic perceptions play when [human rights] abuses transpire.”⁹⁷ They elaborate on this by saying “Although a large body of scholarship has examined cross-country differences in human rights practices, few studies have sought to systematically examine citizens’ perceptions of their own country’s human rights conditions.”⁹⁸ This identifies the lack of attention for the issue of perceptions of human rights, whether they are confirmed violations or not. The same authors acknowledge that understanding perceptions of human rights violations can explain motivations for engagement in political activism,⁹⁹ and hope that future research will look into “whether those with negative evaluations [of the human rights situation] are more likely to engage in specific political activities.”¹⁰⁰

There seem to be factors that indicate support for movements such as Hamas and IJM. Economic distress,¹⁰¹ greed and grievances¹⁰² have been listed, but no research into human rights violations specifically has been conducted in the past two decades. Theories on suicide bombings as retaliations or revenge have been developed to some extent,¹⁰³ in addition to theories on popular support for Islamic movements,¹⁰⁴ as mentioned above. However, their publication dates generally stem from a time when suicide attacks were in a “cyclical pattern.”¹⁰⁵ These theories do not explain why Hamas gained so much popular support, enough to win the 2006 elections.

As demonstrated, relative deprivation theory could contribute to justifying this. It can even justify why Hamas receives support while obviously supporting violent actions against their identified enemy. As Gurr states, “when the angered person sees an attackable object or person that he associates with the source of frustration [aggressive responses tend to

⁹⁷ Carlson, M. & O. Listhaug (2007). “Citizens’ Perceptions of Human Rights Practices: An Analysis of 55 Countries.” *Journal of Peace Research*, 44:4, p. 465.

⁹⁸ Idem.

⁹⁹ Idem, p. 466.

¹⁰⁰ Idem, p. 479.

¹⁰¹ See: Abu-Amr, p. 20.

¹⁰² See: Dekmejian, p. 4, 53; Milton-Edwards, B. (1996). *Islamic Politics in Palestine*. London & New York: IB Taurus, p. 42, 145; Mishal & Sela, p. 2, 19, 41, 60.

¹⁰³ See: Abu-Amr, p. 58; Dekmejian, p. 164; Hatina, M. (2001). “Islam and Salvation in Palestine.” *The Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies, Dayan Center Papers 127*. Tel Aviv: Tel Aviv University, p. 123; Milton-Edwards, p. 139, 154-5, 166; Mishal & Sela, p. 57.

¹⁰⁴ See: Hatina, (2001), p. 135; Mishal & Sela, p. 41, 60; Dekmejian p. 52-3;

¹⁰⁵ Hajjar, L. Personal correspondence with author. Received Thursday February 2, 2012.

occur].”¹⁰⁶ Additionally, different treatment can stimulate loyalty to a movement as it “contributes to a group psychology of comparative advantage or disadvantage.”¹⁰⁷ This disadvantage can be felt to be human rights violations, thus examining the level of these perceptions would add a different dimension to this theory.

Though the greed theory is not enthusiastically followed, winning the conflict may severely improve the financial positions of Palestinians. Thus there might be an economic component to the conflict. If the desire to regain control over of all the land including the most fertile parts now belonging to Israel is merely to be seen as an economic wish, seems shortsighted however. The social situation may be much more important to local populations. This research therefore places itself in the debate of whether greed or grievances are a larger motivational factor in support for social movements and more applicable.

Regarding Dallal’s 1987 piece, it is relevant but does not examine the exact issue of human rights violations and Palestinian violence extensively. Moreover, it does not address the question of whether there is a relationship to be found between perceptions of violations and support for Islamic political movements. The author does hint at this, saying that “Palestinian violence is basically a form of armed struggle aimed at restoring to the people of Palestine their civil liberties and human rights as sanctioned by international law.”¹⁰⁸ Arguably this research could not be done in close range to the year he published this article, as violence and support for political Islamic movements only became more widespread in the years succeeding its publication.

Therefore, the paper has become outdated, but proves significance for the subject to be studied. Other previous research mentioned is also not entirely irrelevant. Carlson and Listhaug’s finding that gender and political preference are of influence on perceptions may

¹⁰⁶ Gurr (1970), p. 34.

¹⁰⁷ Gurr (1996), p. 168.

¹⁰⁸ Dallal, S. J. (1987). “Israeli Human Rights Violations and Palestinian Violence.” *Syracuse Journal for International Law and Commerce* 14, p. 109.

be of value. The same counts for Hatina's statement regarding resonance for Hamas' messages being found mainly amongst newly educated youth in Gaza.¹⁰⁹

In summary, in human rights discourse, scholars have not previously linked perceptions of human rights violations to influencing any non-legislative or social occurrences by scholars. Attention has not been given to the fact that reactionism, whether violent or merely in the form of support for a social movement, may have anything to do with rights. Therefore, this research will contribute to the broadening of the scope of the fields of law, sociology and politics. Not only because of the topic it addresses, but also the method of research used – which will be the object of next section's focus.

3.3.2. Validity of this Research

This thesis will differ from other research in that it is an ethnographic study, and not merely an outline of violations committed by the Israeli government(s) and responses. Therein lies the cruciality of the project. There is need for research to be done in the field, as there are many opinions and theories regarding the Palestinian and Israeli region, yet no fieldwork has been done to investigate this particular aspect in this particular way. It is important for this to be done seeing as interpretations of violations may be more significant than actual violations.

Unfortunately, due to insuperable problems, the research and surveys, intended to be conducted in Bethlehem, have instead been carried out among the Palestinian refugee population of Jordan. This does not affect the core validity or importance of the project, however, as the issue at hand has not been inquired into in this context either. Undeniably, it does affect the greater applicability and generated different results than if the research had been able to be carried out in its original setting and set-up. Regardless, the fact that Dr. Dallal and Carlson and Listhaug have indirectly and directly stimulated, over a period of twenty years, the commencement of research into this topic and that to this day it has not been carried out, only attests to its urgency.

¹⁰⁹ Hatina, M. (2001). "Islam and Salvation in Palestine." *The Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies, Dayan Center Papers 127*. Tel Aviv: Tel Aviv University, p. 29-30.

4. Research Design

The chapters up to this point have discussed the background to which this thesis was written. This chapter will outline the hypothesis, sub-hypotheses and research questions and discuss the quantitative and qualitative methods used to discover their validity. Additionally, this chapter will discuss practical matters, discuss the actual research conditions, as well as some expected challenges. These will also be addressed in chapter 6. The last sub-chapter will be an in-depth camp analysis, to provide empirical background and ensure the reader has full understanding of the local situation before the data analysis.

4.1 Hypothesis and Research Questions

As mentioned, the title of this thesis reveals much about the hypothesis. A hypothesis is basically an assumption, and though often in scientific research it is said that one should not assume anything before starting the research, one undeniably has a general expectation of their findings. This expectation is transformed into a theory generating the hypothesis that is to be proven or disproven in the research project.¹¹⁰

This research differs from others in the way that it does have a dependent and independent variable, but there is no manipulation of the variable to attempt to assess changes in outcome. The independent variable is the perception of human rights violations. Examined in this research is if this adds to support for Hamas, being the dependent variable. These variables are combined in the main hypothesis of the thesis, and separately assessed in two sub-hypothesis.

Before expanding on the specifics of this research, it is eminent to address the main hypothesis of the project. This hypothesis, and this research project, aims to merge theories mentioned in the Theoretical Framework section.

Hypothesis: Perceptions of Israeli human rights violations add to support given to political Islamic movements in the Occupied Palestinian Territories, such as Hamas.

¹¹⁰ See: Field, A. (2009) *Discovering Statistics Using SPSS*. California: Sage Publications, Inc.

Previously conducted research, specifically the so-called 'grievances' theorists, suggests there is a direct link between dissatisfaction and violence, as recognized earlier. Thus this would lead one to believe that the reasons for dissatisfaction could also lead to violence, in the specific case of the OPT this would be the Israeli occupation and its consequences.

To be able to find out whether the hypothesis is correct, two sub-hypotheses were tested by way of the conducted survey. The sub-hypothesis (SH) was tested by answering research questions. The first sub-hypothesis is,

Sub-Hypothesis 1. Human rights are perceived to be violated.

Three interlinked research questions were designed to test this. These research questions ask how human rights are understood, how they are experienced and how they are evaluated. They have the specific function of analyzing the extent of knowledge the research population has of human rights declarations, such as the UDHR and Geneva Convention. Once the first section of the survey has addressed this, personal experiences of human rights are asked to be expanded on before asking the respondent to evaluate them. The latter is discovered by explicitly asking if personal fundamental human rights are felt as being violated or not.

The second section of the survey lists various examples of Israeli policies or actions, which were anticipated to be seen as violations. The level of perceived Israeli human rights violations is assessed through the examination of feelings towards these examples. Various examples were identified in the survey, which were anticipated to be seen as violations. Additionally, there is a general international consensus regarding the illegality of all listed actions, such as the West Bank and Gaza Barrier and settlements in Hebron. Questions regarding the Gaza War were asked due to it being controversial with both Israel and Hamas using defense rhetoric.

Sub-Hypothesis 2. Hamas support stems from acceptance of their work and policies.

Once more three research questions were posed to assess validity of this sub hypothesis. They ask how the work of Hamas is understood, whether the population accepts (acts of) violence, and if this is seen as justified. Questions posed in the third and last section

of the survey are used to assess this. First by specifically asking for the level of support towards Fatah, Islamic Jihad Movement, and Hamas followed by asking the same with regard to Hamas policies. Knowledge of the movement is assessed by asking about the social welfare.

While acceptance of violence and seeing it as being justified may seem to be addressing the same point, in this thesis the possibility of a population accepting such acts when they happen, but still disagreeing with the general method is taken into account. Assumed is that the population does accept violence and sees it as a correct response, due to the fact that Hamas is a movement very sensitive to public opinion. If violence was not tolerated the movement would have less support and therefore have to change their strategies.

The combined results of the questions providing answers supporting or not supporting these sub-hypotheses will finally satisfy the main research question, of whether there is a relationship between perceived violations and support for Hamas. The result can be used to explore tangible effects of changes in policies. Recommendations regarding what changes in policy may affect support for Hamas could be considered the most valuable social outcome of this project. This outcome is intended to address the social relevance of the conducted fieldwork.

4.2. Quantitative Methodology

This section will discuss the methods through which the hypotheses were tested. It will address the proposed methods and the actual way the fieldwork was conducted. The method considered producing the most reliable results was data collection through conducting surveys. This so that the largest amount of respondents would be reached, in addition to the consideration that it is the only method through which the desired information would be acquired. The general lay-out of the survey has been revealed in the previous section, but will be addressed comprehensively in the Survey Composition section.

The first step in conducting research is becoming acquainted with local customs and populations, as it allows the discovery of any challenges or sensitivities to be taken into account. Due to the politically sensitive questions asked in the survey, what needed to be

found out in this specific context, was to what extent people would be willing to participate. Due to the fact that the research location was different from the one initially envisioned extra preparations and informal studies needed to be conducted. The gained background knowledge on the host country did not suggest the envisioned quantitative method should be abandoned. However, a change of location implied a need for adjustment to the survey.

Originally written in English, the survey was translated with aid of Arabs in Jordan, and corrected by a third party. The survey is attached as appendix in both languages. The review of third parties also aimed at eliminating any inconsistencies or unclearness. In the process of composing the survey, it was decided to change the title as to not specifically list the goal of the survey. While the chances of knowledge of the goal could potentially influence answers given, the main reason for doing this were related to the potential of it frightening respondents.

4.2.1. Snowball Sampling

Due to the sensitivity of the topic, the method of snowball sampling was assumed to be the best way to reach the largest amount of respondents. Although Cohen and Arieli state this should not be the first choice,¹¹¹ it seemed to be the only method providing the required results in the limited time available. It is important to note that their article refers to qualitative research methods, and to be aware that "... qualitative sampling designs are nongeneralizable, but provide maximum theoretical understanding of a social process."¹¹² This nongeneralizability extends further as the conventionally qualitative sampling design is used as a quantitative research method. Due to the provided time frame for conducting research, there was not sufficient time for trial-and-error in methodology.

As the topic being researched may not be easily discussed and requires a high level of trust from respondents, the Snowball Sampling Method (SSM) was considered the only way to contact a large number of respondents. In addition to time constraints, the possibility of an "atmosphere of distrust"¹¹³ was considered. Such an atmosphere makes it more difficult

¹¹¹ Cohen, N., & T. Arieli (2011). "Field Research in Conflict Environments: Methodological Challenges and Snowball Sampling." *Journal of Peace Research*, 48:4, p. 427.

¹¹² Faugier, J. & M. Sargeant (1997). "Sampling Hard to Reach Populations." *Journal of Advanced Nursing*, 26:4, p. 791.

¹¹³ Cohen & Arieli, p. 425.

“to engage people to expose their personal circumstances and views.”¹¹⁴ Furthermore, the Palestinian issue is a popular topic for Western studies. Though Jordan is under-researched, while planning the fieldwork the chance that inhabitants of the camps could be popular research subjects was taken into account. This could possibly result in research-fatigue, and a, to some degree, hostile stance towards Western researchers. These factors would also influence the ability to find respondents in another type of methodology.

This was not the case however. Apart from heresy about the popularity of the Husn refugee camp as a research site, any obvious research fatigue was not encountered, nor did that ever seem to be the reason for refusal to participate.

It was planned to come into contact with several people who do work in the camp regularly, and gain their trust. These people would have been asked to request camp residents if they were willing to participate in the study, and provide a testimonial for trustworthiness and discretion. The persons first approached would be asked to provide yet another testimonial for their friends and family. Presumed was that in this way an increasingly more and larger “circle[s] of acquaintances”¹¹⁵ would be formed. The aim was to “begin by talking to the most knowledgeable people to get a line on relevancies and leads to track down more data and where and how to locate oneself for a rich supply of data.”¹¹⁶

The researcher faced difficulties trying to get into touch with persons working or living in the camps, with the exceptions of Husn, Baqa’a, Gaza and Marka. In the latter camp the contact did not provide much help, nor was it needed. In the other three it proved very helpful to have contacts.

4.2.2. *Reproducibility and Gatekeepers*

Prior to commencement, problems accompanying this type of methodology were acknowledged as mainly relating to the reproducibility of the research, and validity limitations.¹¹⁷ However, as the research focused on perceptions and emotions this problem were not expected to be as urgent as in another research projects. Exclusion of individuals

¹¹⁴ Cohen & Arieli, p. 425.

¹¹⁵ Idem, p. 427.

¹¹⁶ Coyne, I.T. (1997). Sampling in Qualitative research. Purposeful and Theoretical Sampling; Merging or Clear Boundaries? *Journal of Advanced Nursing*, 26:4, p. 624.

¹¹⁷ Cohen & Arieli, p. 428.

who do not fit into the research was deemed unlikely as a result of this focus. It was acknowledged that the “gatekeeper bias”¹¹⁸ may have posed more difficulties if a contact were to have personal objectives and refused to refer certain people as respondents because they (gatekeepers) do not agree with their (potential respondents’) opinions. The only camp in which the possibility of this problem was presented was the Gaza camp, as the gatekeeper was not allowed to be accompanied as done in the other camps. Therefore, the level of control over this camp was less, but the data set does not show a clear bias to a group of people with a certain idea set.

The previously proposed solution to this was to identify more than one gatekeeper simultaneously, and have these different informants come from different social groups and/or communities. However, seeing the difficulty in finding one gatekeeper or local contact, it was not realistic to attempt to find another. Consequently the snowball sampling method was meant to overlap with what Penrod et al call “chain referral sampling.”¹¹⁹ This method was used according to willingness of respondents to refer others. Flexibility and creativity were important assets throughout the research process.

4.2.3. Survey Composition

In composing the survey, the importance of maintaining focus¹²⁰ was kept in mind, thus the questions purely revolve around the issues of human rights violations and potential support for Islamic movements in Palestine. These are the earlier identified two main variables under scrutiny. However, the survey in its final form can be divided into three sections, disregarding the ethnographical and general information questions from such a division. The first section of the research is preoccupied with examining understanding of human rights agreements and personal fundamental human rights. The second section focuses on Israeli policies, which may be perceived as violations, including a block of questions about prisoners. The last division asks about support for movements in the OPT and Hamas policies. These sections aim at uncovering three variables, respectively understanding (of rights), feelings (of violations) and support (for Hamas).

¹¹⁸ Idem.

¹¹⁹ Penrod, J., D.B. Preston, R.E. Cain & M.T. Starks (2003). “A Discussion of Chain Referral As a Method of Sampling Hard-to-Reach Populations.” *Journal of Transcultural Nursing*, 14:2, p. 102.

¹²⁰ Morse, J.M. (2000). “Determining Sample Size.” *Qualitative Health Research*, 10:3, p. 3.

The questions posed were attempted to be as neutral and non-leading as possible. Nonetheless, examples given specifically in the second section of Israeli policies can be seen to imply what violations are expected to be felt, as explained in the hypothesis sub-chapter. A selection had to be made, as to keep the survey as short as possible – reasons for this decision will be listed shortly. Thus the questions asked referred to the most widely known and concurrently predominantly viewed as illegal policies of wall and barrier construction, settlement building, and the Gaza War.

The survey needed to remain as short as possible to avoid people not wanting to participate due to the length or time needed to answer the questions, and to maintain focus. More expansive and in-depth answers were hoped to be acquired by the qualitative methods by contacting a percentage of ‘outliers’ – respondents that had ‘deviant’ answers. The specifics of this method will be discussed in the next section on qualitative methodology.

Regarding translations of the respondents’ answers, this was done in cooperation with the two companions who traveled to the camps as well. In rare cases, even they were not able to decipher the answer; if this was the case this has been clearly marked in the statistical analysis. The two companions also helped to ensure that words were properly translated in cases of multiple meanings of cultural semantics.

4.3. Statistical Methodology

The data was broadly analyzed on location in order to determine outliers. More extensive analysis using SPSS would only be conducted upon completion of all the research, including the qualitative methods. The analysis will be conducted through simple descriptive statistics, intended to describe the main aspects of the data collected and summarize it. Simple descriptive statistics look at frequency distribution; how many people answered questions with a certain answer. From this, a general trend can be deducted. Additionally correlation statistics will be applied.

Correlations are sometimes mistaken to investigate causality, however this is not the case in most statistical analyses. There is no way of knowing if an uninvestigated third variable (the tertium quid) played a role in the reasons for people feeling the way they do or

at least saying they feel the way they do. Correlational research is used to make observations, and provides no information about contiguity,¹²¹ thus co-occurrence is analyzed. In all the correlational analysis conducted, bivariate correlations were used meaning only using two variables. Seeing as the data set is non-parametric, which is when there is no clear numerical interpretation but preferences or feelings are measured, Kendall's tau formula was used. This is seen by some as a more robust method and preferred over Spearman's.¹²²

In addition to looking at correlations, the split-file function of SPSS was used to see to what extent people who gave a specific answer to question A, for example, answered question B in a particular manner as well. However, seeing as in a split-file analysis there cannot be more than eight split-file variables, some values had to be grouped together – such as origins.

4.4. Qualitative Methodology

The qualitative methodology was seen as an additive to improve the validity of the research - not intended to compose the bulk of the research. The specifics of the qualitative methodology and why it was thought to contribute to the validity of the outcomes will be explained below.

Though the Snowball Sampling Method may not be considered a reliable method, the use of multiple methods, would increase reliability.¹²³ Thus the qualitative interviews conducted should provide reliability and more clarity by enabling more in-depth responses and providing personal accounts. The number of outliers interviewed was dependent on the total number of respondents reached, but each so-called category was supposed to provide the same amount of in-depth interviews. Quotations obtained from such interviews “are important for revealing how meanings are expressed in the respondents' own words”¹²⁴ in

¹²¹ Field, p. 170.

¹²² Idem, p. 181.

¹²³ Baxter & Eyles, p. 506.

¹²⁴ Idem, p. 508.

the final product. This would also add to the reliability of results, especially if there is also a discussion of why these specific voices are heard in the thesis.¹²⁵

It was intended for the interpreted interviews to be returned to the respondents to ensure there occurred no misunderstanding or misinterpretation.¹²⁶ This means the interviews were to be recorded, and transferred into Word documents provided the interviewees concurred. There was no occurrence of a respondent not agreeing with the recording or transcribing of the interviews. It was assumed in advance that a translator might be asked to help in this process. Questions were not to be asked directly, however, as a respondent may only be answering that specific question because it is asked and would not have done so voluntarily.¹²⁷

To not let the questions asked be guiding, elaborations on the respondents' answers to the survey questions were inquired. Hence the interviews were of a semi-structured nature. To ensure all interviewees were asked the same questions or touched upon the same topics, an "interview checklist"¹²⁸ was kept at hand. Luck had it that the companions who visited the camps were also available for the conducting of the interviews. Thus a separate search for this person was not needed, and the interviewees were familiar with this person already. The presence of an interpreter was necessary to avoid any misunderstandings. Additionally, a local Arab speaker listened to the recording alongside the interpretation of the transcribed text as an extra measure to ensure proper understanding.

In addition to conducting interviews, people of knowledge were contacted, also referred to as the 'expert interview'. Meant by this are members of Non-governmental Organizations (NGOs) or scholars specialized in human rights, Islamism, or violence. These interviews, conducted in English, were recorded and transcribed in a Word document. Permission for use of quotes from the survey was asked, and where necessary special arrangements were made on an individual basis. Baxter and Eyles note it is important to

¹²⁵ Baxter & Eyles, p. 508.

¹²⁶ Idem, p. 512.

¹²⁷ Becker, H.S. (1958). "Problems of Inference and Proof in Participant Observation." *American Sociological Review*, 23:6, p. 655.

¹²⁸ Baxter & Eyles, p. 519.

realize why specific quotations are used.¹²⁹ Throughout this research, quotes were used as factual sources or to underscore a certain finding.

4.5. Camp Analysis

Some of the general information regarding the Palestinian refugee camps managed by UNRWA has already been discussed. This section aims to provide a more detailed image and understanding of the specific circumstances under which the fieldwork was conducted. This is important to do before data analysis, because the small social differences may have been of importance to the statistical differences between the camps. The decision to conduct research in camps was because the most concentrated amount of Palestinians could be found there.

As stated above, the survey was adjusted from its original form to address certain unique situations in the camps, such as whether refugees were registered or non-registered, and of course it had to be asked when and where their ancestors departed from. Additionally, as the UNRWA offers a human rights course in their schools, and began a human rights promotion campaign in all UNRWA camps in 2000, it was important to know whether or not people participated in this. The social and economic differences mentioned previously and observations made during the fieldwork will be discussed below in small summaries of the camps , in the order in which the camps were visited.

4.5.1. Irbid

The refugee camp in Irbid is located adjacent to the city center. Established in 1951 it now houses over 25,000 registered refugees.¹³⁰ Refugees in the area not living in the camp itself can also make use of the UNRWA installations.¹³¹ Major problems UNRWA identifies are overcrowding in schools and overpopulation in general, poverty, and lack of ultrasound equipment in its small health center.¹³²

If one were not aware of the presence of a camp, one would not realize they walked into one in Irbid. This camp was the first to be visited thus a learning experience. A minimum

¹²⁹ Baxter & Eyles,, p. 512.

¹³⁰ UNRWA.

¹³¹ Idem.

¹³² Idem.

age was installed once the researcher noticed younger respondents were frivolous. Targeting stores provided more fruitful as referrals were more likely, thus this strategy was adopted.

4.5.2. Martyr Azmi el-Mufti camp (Husn)

This camp is located around 7 kilometers from Irbid, 80 from Amman,¹³³ and is not incorporated into city planning as Irbid camp is. It was established as an emergency camp in 1968 and now houses 22,000 registered refugees,¹³⁴ thus making it one of the smaller camps in Jordan. UNRWA states the schools are overcrowded, has a high rate of unemployment and poverty, and that three in four houses are unsuitable for living in.¹³⁵

The level of exclusion the inhabitants of this camp experience due to their location on a somewhat isolated hill was clearly noticeable to the researcher and companion. The contact in the camp was therefore relied upon to provide all respondents, though difficulties were still faced. These were mainly to do with distrust. Inhabitants did not seem to understand the coding system was designed to safeguard their personal information. Especially questions about Hamas seemed to raise suspicion and alarm.

4.5.3. Jabal Hussein, Amman

Jabal Hussein camp is located on one of Amman's seven hills, known as mountains (*jabal*), represented by the points of the white star on Jordan's flag. This camp was established in 1952 to host the first wave of refugees, and now houses more than 29,000 registered refugees.¹³⁶ It is severely overpopulated and there is no space for further building according to UNRWA.¹³⁷ As in most of the camps, poverty is a major problem in addition to the bad condition of housing and a high unemployment rate.¹³⁸ However, the mountain is a popular place to go shopping for Jordanians, and fully incorporated into city life in the same manner any of the other mountains or city districts are.

¹³³ UNRWA.

¹³⁴ Idem.

¹³⁵ Idem.

¹³⁶ Idem.

¹³⁷ Idem.

¹³⁸ Idem.

4.5.4. Zarqa

Established in 1949, Zarqa camp is the oldest in Jordan.¹³⁹ Though it was first established near the town of Zarqa, it has expanded in such a way that it has blended into the city. Zarqa camp is located next to the city's bus station. The camp houses more than 20,000 registered refugees, and its main problems are to do with sanitation, housing facilities, and unemployment.¹⁴⁰

4.5.5. Wahdat (Amman)

Wahdat is located on another of Amman's mountains, and easy to reach with public transportation. It is one of the biggest camps, the second biggest located in the city and was established in 1955.¹⁴¹ It houses more than 51,500 registered refugees alone, and UNRWA acknowledges major problems of the camp to be high unemployment and poverty rates, bad state of infrastructure, and lack of social security and health care schemes.¹⁴² The inhabitants of this camp are known to have troublesome relations with the government.

4.5.6. Souf

The Souf camp is located about fifteen minutes by car from the archeologically significant city of Jerash, not far from the actual small city of Souf. It is a rather remote village in the mountains. An emergency camp first established in 1967, it was forced to be abandoned due to harsh weather conditions.¹⁴³ The replacing temporary camp was cast aside in 1968 after "an escalation in military operations in the area,"¹⁴⁴ and the Souf camp has been inhabited since, now sheltering over 20,000 registered refugees. The camp is known to be overcrowded and have high unemployment rates "despite high level of education."¹⁴⁵ Due to a clear pro-Hamas sentiment present in the camp, Jordanian secret services keep a close eye on any developments.

¹³⁹ UNRWA.

¹⁴⁰ Idem.

¹⁴¹ Idem.

¹⁴² Idem.

¹⁴³ Idem.

¹⁴⁴ Idem.

¹⁴⁵ Idem.

4.5.7. *Baqa'a*

The Baqa'a camp is the biggest in Jordan and locally known for its inhabitants' great amount of political involvement. It is located on the outskirts of Amman, around 20 kilometers away.¹⁴⁶ It was established as an emergency camp in 1968, and today houses more than 104,000 registered refugees.¹⁴⁷ UNRWA lists poverty, falling education level, inter-family marriage, unemployment and bad infrastructure as the camp's biggest problems.¹⁴⁸ The researcher, through use of connections, had three contacts in this camp.

4.5.8. *Gaza camp/Jerash camp*

The name of the camp already implies the ancestry of most of its inhabitants. The majority of people living here are refugees from Gaza, having arrived in Jordan in 1967. The camp is located just outside of the archeologically significant city of Jerash, and can be reached from there within ten minutes with public transportation. It is a city in its own right, and not a part of Jerash city planning. Major problems are the fact that most of the roofing of the camp's structures is made of "corrugated zinc and asbestos sheets",¹⁴⁹ which carries obvious health risks. It houses more than 24,000 registered refugees and UNRWA acknowledges poverty, over crowdedness, unemployment, and the bad state of the camp's infrastructure to be the biggest problems.¹⁵⁰ Resistance from authorities forced the researcher to leave the majority of survey conducting to a contact in the camp.

4.5.9. *Hitten/Schneller*

The Hitten camp, locally known as Schneller is located in the Marka district of Amman. It was established in 1968, and many of its residents originate from the Gaza Strip.¹⁵¹ The camp consists of 53,000 registered refugees, but also caters to refugees in the area not living in the camp itself.¹⁵² According to UNRWA, bad sanitation, double-shift schools, insufficient health care centers and lack of an ambulance are the major issues the camp faces.¹⁵³ The

¹⁴⁶ UNRWA.

¹⁴⁷ Idem.

¹⁴⁸ Idem.

¹⁴⁹ Idem.

¹⁵⁰ Idem.

¹⁵¹ Idem.

¹⁵² Idem.

¹⁵³ Idem.

Marka district lies on the outskirts of Amman but is not comprised of just the camp meaning this camp is incorporated into the city.

4.5.10. Talbieh

Talbieh camp is located 35 kilometers from Amman, off one of the main highways connecting Amman to cities in the South of Jordan. It was established as an emergency camp in 1968, housing what UNRWA refers to as 'displaced persons'. Many of these people are from Bedouin origin.¹⁵⁴ It is neither an obvious camp in location nor famous, apparent in lack of knowledge amongst the researcher and companions regarding its location. It is the smallest in population, comprising of 'only' 7,000 registered refugees, regardless of its land area being the largest.¹⁵⁵ The camp's major problems are unemployment and poverty, and no social security or proper health insurance.¹⁵⁶

4.5.11. General observations

Before commencing the statistical analysis section, it is important to elaborate on non camp-specific observations. This, again, should help in understanding the internal differences between the camps in addition to providing more background information. Specific issues to do with statistical analysis will be addressed in the upcoming chapter.

In looking at the data, it is important to know that UNRWA provides education for its camps' inhabitants from grade one to ten. This is why some participants did not complete education after this, and not all participants completed the Jordanian final high school exam named Tawjihi. It was found that women respondents were harder to find due to cultural impositions.

Respondents did not seem to understand the coding system. Respondents were found to either be willing to provide any contact information, or to refuse to participate at all – even when the researcher guaranteed anonymity. Participation was not pressured, though explanations regarding purpose and safekeeping of data were given. Anonymity of respondents provided some challenges in the identification of outliers, as not all of them could be contacted.

¹⁵⁴ UNRWA.

¹⁵⁵ Idem.

¹⁵⁶ Idem.

5. Data Analysis and Interpretation

This chapter will reach the most important part of the research and thereby thesis. The actual findings of the fieldwork will be laid out and analyzed. This section will systematically look at the answers' statistics, ordered the same way as the questions were presented to the respondents. Prior to analyzing the data statistically, while entering the data some general observations were made, denoting general trends. Thereafter, simple descriptive statistics were applied to analyze the data. This is followed by split file analysis and correlations.

The overall circumstances of the fieldwork have been laid out in the previous chapter. Not discussed were initial observations, such as questions 22-27, those questions relating to the feelings regarding what may have been viewed as violations, almost consistently being answered with "furious." Regarding question 29, not everybody seems to have realized that if they know nobody in jail, the following questions do not need to be answered. Another observation is that some people claim neutrality regarding all political parties, but support all the listed Hamas strategies. This will be looked at in more detail in the statistical analysis.

5.1. Simple Descriptive Statistics of Ethnography

This section of the chapter will analyze the first set of answers from which no conclusions can be drawn, but provide background information on the respondents. Most of this section will deal with ethnographical information, showing the social composition of the response group. The second half of the section deals with the background of the respondents in the "refugee" sense; when they were made refugees and how – according to themselves. This section will not show any statistical analysis, only percentages. Some of this information will come back in the slightly more complex statistical analysis later.

5.1.1. Camps

The camps have been described, but what follows is a chart showing the exact amount of respondents from each camp. The codes have been removed to safeguard the identities of the respondents. As said earlier, the amount of refugees is an estimate and do not include the refugees, which have not been registered. It was the aim to have an equal amount of respondents from every camp, though due to local situations this was not always possible.

Figure 1 {Camps}

Camp	Amount of Refugees	Refugees Surveyed
<i>Irbid</i>	25,000	20
<i>Husn (Martyr Azmi el-Mufti)</i>	22,000	19
<i>Jabal el-Hussein</i>	29,000	20
<i>Zarqa</i>	20,000	20
<i>Amman New (Wahdat)</i>	51,500	5
<i>Souf</i>	20,000	24
<i>Baqa'a</i>	104,000	31
<i>Jerash (Gaza)</i>	24,000	23
<i>Marka (Schneller/ Hitten)</i>	53,000	17
<i>Talbieh</i>	7,000	18
Total	355,500	197

5.1.2. Ages

In the camp analysis in the previous chapter, it was explained that after the first camp was visited – Irbid, the choice was made to note a minimum age. This is why there are not many respondents whose ages are below fifteen. In some cases, younger respondents were allowed to participate if it became clear that they would take it seriously. Thus it was more a judgment of maturity than of age. Age groups have been created shown in the chart under the graph. These were created by grouping together decades beginning by the youngest given age, and grouping together the last three decades (60-90) due to the small amount of respondents falling in that group.

Figure 2 {Age Groups}


Age Groups		Frequency	Percent
Valid	12-20	26	13.2
	21-30	91	46.2
	31-40	37	18.8
	41-50	24	12.2
	51-60	10	5.1
	61-91	8	4.1
	Total	196	99.5
Missing	0	1	.5
Total		197	100.0

As can be seen in Graph 1 {Ages}, the disparity between ages is quite large. The majority of the interviewed population is between 21 and 30 years old (46.2%), with a clear majority of respondents being 21 years old. This disparity can also be seen in the graph {Ages}. This is in correspondence with UNRWA’s estimates of the average age of refugees, showing the alarming amount of young inhabitants of the camp.

5.1.3. Sex

As was mentioned in the research design, it was hard to reach females due to culture. Had the fieldwork been conducted with a female companion, this may have been different though in that case the amount of males may have been drastically less, or perhaps even the total amount of respondents. Thus it is important to remember that this is not a reliable

Figure 3 {Sex}



source to judge the gender composition of the camps upon. One can observe from the adjacent pie chart that the majority of the surveyed population was male. The specific number was 164 (83.2%) males and 33 (16.8%) females. Due to the aid of contacts in the camps, the amount of female respondents is higher than it may have been without.

5.1.4. Professions

The professions of the population are a good indication of the social status of the respondent group. Once more, the UNRWA has already released some figures and observations about this, and this data supports that.

The employment classifications were done according to the “International Standard Classification of Occupations” (ISCO), specifically the ISCO-08 ‘Group Definitions’ final draft¹⁵⁷ as was constructed by the International Labor Organization (ILO). In addition to their ten general categories, four more were added; ‘housewife’, ‘student’, ‘retired’, and an input for lacking data. In case of uncertainty regarding categorization, the OSCI correspondence table¹⁵⁸ was consulted. If there was no listing for the job given by the respondent, a similar listed occupation would be searched and classification would occur in accordance. This was the case for, for example, ‘coffee shop employee’, and ‘fixing broken tires’.

Additionally, some respondents recorded a vague term. Though it would have been an option to create a separate category for this, it was found this would create too many groups and increase the risk of unclearness. Thus those stating their profession to be ‘employee’ and ‘worker’ were classified in the “Elementary occupations” category.

The chart below provides a clear overview of the variation in employment. There were four missing data sets, which are not included in the chart. Therefore, the total number of data sets incorporated is 193. As can be seen, an obvious majority of respondents work in the services and sales sectors, specifically 22.8%. The most common professions within this category, are shopkeepers and store owners. The second most recurring category is that of students, namely 17.8% of the respondents. Professionals are the third most recurring, coming close to the amount of students with 16.7%. Most of these are either teachers or accountants.

¹⁵⁷ International Labour Organization (2009). *ISCO-08 ‘Group Definitions’ Final Draft*. Online <http://www.ilo.org/public/english/bureau/stat/isco/isco08/index.htm>. Last Accessed April 26th 2013.

¹⁵⁸ International Labour Organization. (2009). *OSCI-08 Correspondence Table*. Online <http://www.ilo.org/public/english/bureau/stat/isco/isco08/index.htm>. Last Accessed April 26th 2013.

Figure 4 {Employment}

Employment		Frequency	Percent
Valid	Armed forces occupations	6	3.0
	Managers	3	1.5
	Professionals	30	15.2
	Technicians and associate professions	8	4.1
	Clerical support workers	3	1.5
	Service and sales workers	45	22.8
	Craft and related trades workers	11	5.6
	Plant and machine operators, and assemblers	12	6.1
	Elementary occupations	22	11.2
	Housewives	9	4.6
	Unemployed	8	4.1
	Student	35	17.8
	Retired	1	.5
	Total	193	98.0
Missing	No answer	4	2.0
Total		197	100.0

What can be concluded from these statistics is that the majority of the inhabitants of the camps surveyed do not work in high-end jobs, which are associated with higher salaries. Only 1.5% of the respondents held category 1 positions in management level, while combined, crafts and technical support jobs were held by only 11.7% of the research population. The amount of

unemployed respondents is relatively low, only 4.1% which is only .05% less than the amount of housewives (4.6%). The latter percentage is quite high, however, seeing as there were only 33 respondents and that 9 of them were housewives would mean that accounts for 27%. These results are not surprising if one looks at the demographics of Jordan where Palestinians run the majority of businesses, in accordance with the stereotype against them. What is surprising is that 3.1% of the respondents are or used to be in the armed forces.

5.1.5. Education

In any host country, UNRWA offers education according to the system of the host country. Thus the education Palestinian refugees receive in Jordan is equal to that of Jordanians. The Jordanian system is comparable to the American system of having 12 grades. Grades one through six are elementary school classes, seven through nine are middle school, and ten through twelve are high school. Thus Palestinians in Jordan have sponsored education until the first year of high school, 10th grade.

The last year of preparatory education, twelfth grade, is denoted as the 'Tawjihi' year. Tawjihi are the national exams that all high school students have to pass to be able to apply to universities. These are generally understood to be very difficult, and the passing of Tawjihi exams is cause for big celebration across the country. Some universities have a minimum Tawjihi score requirement, thus attracting only the best learners.


University in Jordan is not dissimilar to the European system. There are three degrees that can be awarded. The first is called the 'Diploma', which you receive after successfully finishing the two years of a college program. Colleges are more affordable than universities, yet the Diploma is not regarded to be of much value. Usually those attending College are those who did not achieve high Tawjihi scores. The Bachelor degree is a university degree, as it is widely known, just like the Master's degree.

Observed is that the largest percentage of respondents completed their Bachelor degree. This is in accordance with the age group to which the majority of respondents belong. The second largest group represented is that of those who have finished the Tawjihi exams. However, seeing as only four people are in the actual age group in which they would still be doing their Tawjihi (18-19), it can be concluded that Tawjihi is the highest level of education enjoyed by most. The fact that Tawjihi graduates are the second largest groups also explains the employment levels analyzed in the section previous to this one.

Figure 5 {Education}

		Frequency	Percent
Valid	Elementary	5	2.5
	Middle	29	14.7
	High	34	17.3
	Tawjihi	36	18.3
	Diploma	22	11.2
	University	19	9.6
	Bachelor	46	23.4
	Master	1	.5
	No schooling	1	.5
	Total	193	98.0
Missing	0	4	2.0
Total		197	100.0

Figure 6 {High School Students}



Regarding the fact that the amount of respondents below the age of 18 is only 12, the fact that Middle and High school have such high response rates is worthy of attention. Especially when keeping in mind that UNRWA sponsors education until 10th grade. To analyze to what extent people who were classified in the “High school” category reached this

grade another graph was prepared. The largest amount of people in this sub-category – 20 out of 34 – did not specify what grade they finished, but merely wrote down “high school.” Eleven people wrote down 10th grade, and only 3 the 11th.

In the local context it is not strange that only one person completed a Master's degree. The majority of Jordanians do not continue studies to pursue a Master's degree, thus this is also not to be expected from Palestinians. What is more shocking is that there is one person who did not have any schooling. Thus what can be concluded from these figures is that people do not finish the program that UNRWA offers, and the overall level of education is not very high.

5.1.6. Religion and Registration

In this section two questions have been grouped together owing to practicality. Particularly due to the incompleteness of the statistics regarding religion; 100% of the respondents were Muslim. This was not as expected, seeing as people of the Christian religion experienced the same history as Muslims. A Christian non-camp refugee argued this to possibly be the cause of a higher social status of Christians, or perhaps merely different final destinations.¹⁵⁹ A UNRWA employee stated that of course there are Christian refugees, but they are "not easily identifiable."¹⁶⁰ This same person stated that even in the Christian suburb of Fuhays, there are mostly Jordanians, and the only way to possibly search out the Christian Palestinians would be to go to churches in areas where a lot of Palestinians are known to live.¹⁶¹

Registration of refugees has been touched upon earlier. Since it was not mandatory for refugees to register with UNRWA, and they took over the files of the ICRC who had initially hosted the refugees in 1948, there were some discrepancies between actual amounts of refugees and those that were registered. It was thought some families or persons were registered twice, leading to the "rectification of relief roles"¹⁶² policy. This meant that refugees would have to re-register, and the new registration of refugees was paused for a while. To be able to register, documents had to be presented proving that prior to 1948 the refugee actually lived in the OPT, which not all refugees could do.¹⁶³


¹⁵⁹ Anonymous 2. Personal Interview. March 31st 2013.

¹⁶⁰ Anonymous. Personal Interview. March 14th 2013.

¹⁶¹ Idem.

¹⁶² Idem.

¹⁶³ Idem.



The majority of respondents are registered refugees; 81.2%. However, this does mean that the number of refugees UNRWA knows about may only be 80%, if this research population is regarded as a representatable group. What was noticed while inputting the data, was that the majority of refugees from Gazan origin were not registered.

Although this would be interesting to analyze, it is far beyond the confines of this research.

5.1.7. Region and Year of Departure

These answers were grouped together according to regions since not all respondents listed both city and region of origin. Additionally, if a value were to be given to every town mentioned there would be an overflow of information. A website¹⁶⁴ listing all villages according to region was consulted for this. This website provided a very helpful tool, seeing as some villages were unfamiliar or written illegibly, but in could be recognized when compared to the list.

Map 1¹⁶⁵ below shows the 1946 situation, and Map 2¹⁶⁶ is a modern map of Israel to provide an understanding of where the regions laid geographically in a context we are nowadays more familiar with.

¹⁶⁴ Palestine Remembered. Online <http://www.palestineremembered.com/>. Last Accessed May 13th 2013.

¹⁶⁵ Idem.

¹⁶⁶ CIA World Fact Book. Israel. Online <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/is.html>. Last Accessed May 13th 2013.

Map 2 {Palestine Regions}



Map 2 {Modern day Israel}



Figure 8 {Origin}

The regions are listed according to the Arabic alphabetic method on the site. In total there were found to be 16 regions. A seventeenth value was added for the two unclear answers “Palestine” and “Jordan.” As can be seen, the largest amount of refugee respondents originated from Gaza. Some respondents provided two regions of origin because they were forced to flee twice. This will also be seen in the Year of Departure section. If this was the case, the first place of departure was noted as the origin of the refugee.

Both Hebron and Gaza generated 20.8% of the refugees. It appears that regions lying closer to the Jordanian border are more represented amongst the refugees.

Reasons for Gazans having traveled farther could be that Egypt was not as open to refugees, in addition to the Sinai being occupied for some time by Israel.

		Origin	
		Frequency	Percent
Valid	Jericho	1	.5
	Beer Sheba	10	5.1
	Bethlehem	1	.5
	Baysan	5	2.5
	Haifa	11	5.6
	Hebron	41	20.8
	Ramallah	11	5.6
	al-Ramla	17	8.6
	Safad	1	.5
	Tiberias	2	1.0
	Tulkarem	15	7.6
	Acre	3	1.5
	Gaza	41	20.8
	Jerusalem	10	5.1
	Nablus	8	4.1
	Jaffa	18	9.1
	Total	195	99.0
Missing	0	2	1.0
Total		197	100.0


Figure 9 {Greater Region of Origin}

Greater Region of Origin		Frequency	Percent
Valid	Other	2	1.0
	Lost Territories	76	38.6
	West Bank	78	39.6
	Gaza	41	20.8
	Total	197	100.0

This data was also subdivided into greater regions of origin. The regions were named according to their status right now; Lost Territories (those lands now comprising Israel), West Bank, and Gaza. Again, the ‘Other’ values belong to the two respondents

who did not provide a clear answer. This chart shows that in general, the smallest amount of respondents originated from Gaza. This is logical seeing as there are only two camps in inhabited by mostly Gazans (Jerash and Schneller), while the other eight host those from other regions. This is consistent with data about the total number of refugees from Gaza.

Figure 10 {Year Of Departure}



As mentioned, there are several years of departure listed. Some people were made refugee twice, first internally, and then externally. The chart shows, however, that the majority of refugees were made in 1948; 62.9% (124 respondents). This is in accordance with the amount of refugees from Lost Territories and the West Bank exceeding the amount of Gazan refugees, most of who came to Jordan

in 1967. These account for 26.9% (53 respondents). Only three respondents stated they were twice refugees, while seven respondents did not specify a year of departure – some people did not know the year of their ancestors’ departure was found on location. The latter are not represented on the chart.




Figure 11 {Other Years of Departure}

As can be seen, there are six other years in which people said their ancestors left Palestine. Of these, the greatest amount said they left in 1964 and in 1968. One person said his ancestors left in 1946.

At first it was guessed this was the respondent stating their ancestors left Palestine left due to work, but this did not seem to be the case. This respondent also said that it was due to the war, which is unlikely seeing as at this point there had not been one yet. It is interesting to see not all refugees left as a result of one of the Arab-Israeli wars, but also in the years in between, even if this only comprises 5.1% of the respondents.

5.1.8. Reason for Leaving

This question generated some interesting responses with language used sometimes raising eyebrows or being cause for stupefaction. For example, “rape” seems to be a word many used to describe the acts of the Israeli government. Once more, answers were grouped into categories. These categories were created out of the observation that many answers had the same underlying notion. Some answers were more specific than others, for example listing a year for the war. As such specifics were not of added value to the data set, they were grouped together in the main category of “War.” As much as possible, the original answers have been kept in tact. If there was an answer that did not match a specific category and did not occur more than once, this was put in the ‘other’ group. Additionally, some wording was interesting thus statistics were run according to some of the vocabulary used as well.


Figure 12 {Reasons for Leaving}

Reasons for Leaving		Frequency	Percent
Valid	War	48	24.4
	Aggression	15	7.6
	Injustice	3	1.5
	Occupation	66	33.5
	Fear	5	2.5
	Refuge	4	2.0
	Nakba	6	3.0
	Rape	6	3.0
	Other	25	12.7
	Total	178	90.4
Missing	0	19	9.6
Total		197	100.0

The largest proportion of the research population listed the occupation as the reason why their parents left. The Nakba refers to the Arabic name for the declaration of Israeli independence and ensuing wars, thus this could be said to mean the same thing. However, because the meaning and connotation given to the term are quite distinct it was felt it should be given a separate category. Another word which was used the same amount of times as Nakba

was 'rape'. This again was given a category because of the loaded meaning of the word. It clearly portrays a very violent image of how the respondent believes their ancestors fled Palestine. War was given as a reason for departure by 24.4% of the research population, which is second place to the 33.5% of people giving the occupation as a reason. Aggression could have been lumped together with war, but there is a great distinction between the two terms and possible interpretations. Once more, some people did not answer, comprising 9.6% of the answers, and the answers of twenty-five people were not able to be classified in the above categories.

Figure 13 {References}



Some other interesting terms which were used were “Jews”, “Zionists”, and “Israel.” In some cases, the only reason given was “The Jews” (this would be classified in the ‘other’ category). The use of these terms is outlined in the above chart, where the majority of respondents did not use any of the three terms. Yet, amongst the 35.5% of respondents that did label the aggressor, “Zionists” is most frequently used with 44.3% (31 respondents). A term which could be interpreted as being discriminatory, “Jews”, was used the least amount of times, though still comprises 24.3% (17 respondents).

When looking at the actual worded answers it is interesting to see the different emotions conveyed in the answers. Some could be seen as emotionless (e.g. “The occupation”), while others are clearly loaded with anger (“Hunger, loss, and rape of freedom”, “Fear and panic that accompanied the massacre which the Zionist entity carried out”, “The Israelis attacked us while we were an unarmed people”). Still others are worded in a more matter-of-fact manner, such as “The events that took place”, and “The things the Jews did” (though in the latter case the use of the term “Jews” does imply some emotion).

Another interesting observation, is that some respondents clearly feel like the victim of a larger conspiracy – which was also found in other answers given and conversations held. For example, “Collaboration between Zionist and neighboring countries”, suggests that Arab nations were involved in the occupation of Palestine, as does “The Arab injustice.” Other answers clearly pass judgment and are political statements; “So-called Israel”, “Jewish rape of Palestine”, “Entrance of the bad Israeli army”, and “Israel’s assault on the Palestinian state”.

5.2. Simple Descriptive Statistics of Human Rights Related Questions

As the title elaborately states, this sub-chapter will examine the simple statistics of the answers given to the questions related to human rights. This will be done in the same manner as the ethnographics were analyzed. The questions in this sub-division of the survey were asked to gain a greater understanding of the knowledge people have regarding human rights, in order to test Sub-Hypothesis 1. This understanding was examined in a general sense, regarding the GC and UDHR, and lastly rights respondents deemed most fundamental for themselves. Additionally, it was asked if they felt their rights were violated and how.

Before delving into the specific questions looking at human rights knowledge, it is interesting to note that most participants seemed to think the Geneva Convention and Universal Declaration of Human Rights were written by either the United States or the United Nations. A small minority thinks the European Union wrote them, with even a smaller percentage knowing that the Red Cross wrote the Geneva Convention.

Equally interesting is that the majority of respondents had not followed the UNRWA course. Though this question was asked last, it will be discussed here as it pertains to human rights knowledge. Of the 197 respondents, one person constitutes a missing value. 156 people said they did not follow the course, meaning 79.2%, and only 40 persons said they had followed the course; 20.3%. This should be kept in mind as specific knowledge is assessed.


5.2.1. Familiarity With The Term ‘Human Rights’

The most general question regarding human rights was asked to analyze familiarity with the term, which was large as can be seen in the chart. 73.1% of the research population is familiar with the term, while only 26.9% is not. Even if the UNRWA course was not followed in great numbers, the fact that it is offered could increase awareness of the term itself. The fact that 144 of the respondents knew the term, does not mean that they could also give an example of a human right.

Figure 14a {Human Rights Knowledge}

Human Rights Knowledge		Frequency	Percent
Valid	Yes	144	73.1
	No	53	26.9
	Total	197	100.0


Figure 14b {Human Rights Knowledge}



The largest amount of the population could provide an example, precisely 136 respondents (69%). This means that of the people familiar with the term, 94.4% could give an example.

The chart on the next page presents an overview of the examples, again categorized. Terms most used were given a category, and unique terms were listed in the 'other' category.

Figure 15 {Example of Human Rights Given}



Interesting to note is that education is by far the most listed example of a human right. This is not surprising, seeing as Jalal al Hussein said “Education for the Palestinians in the 70s was really sacrosanct; the way towards statehood, liberation and return is education.”¹⁶⁷ According to the data, it can be observed that education is still a right that people

remember they have.¹⁶⁸ Second to education is the right to freedom of expression with 9.7%, followed by dignity.

What follows are the other examples of human rights that were given, which account for 8.1% of the answers. One respondent seemed to view human rights as a law, listing “Smoking under the age of 18” as an example. Others used this space to voice an opinion, such as “rights belong to all humans”, or “Be silent, be afraid, believe in the USA as a hero.” Social and economic rights and social solidarity were mentioned more than once, in addition to children’s rights (and once “right to play”), women’s rights, respect, no racism, and receiving good treatment as a prisoner.

To clarify, the number of responses greatly exceeds 197 due to the fact that space was given for three examples. Of the people who gave examples, some gave less than three and some gave more, but all were incorporated in the dataset.

¹⁶⁷ Al Hussein, Jalal. Personal Interview. March 7th 2013.
¹⁶⁸ According to Article 26 of the UDHR.

Figure 16 {Examples of Human Rights}


Examples of Human Rights

	Frequency	Percent
Valid Other	31	8.1
Illegible	1	.3
Freedom	27	7.0
Education	73	19.1
Life	29	7.6
Return	22	5.7
Dignity	35	9.1
Work	8	2.1
Expression	37	9.7
Peace	5	1.3
Equality	14	3.7
Justice	9	2.3
Health	12	3.1
Ownership	11	2.9
Homeland/Citizenship	12	3.1
Shelter	7	1.8
Safety	20	5.2
Security	16	4.2
Religion	6	1.6
Political Participation	3	.8
Movement	5	1.3
Total	383	100.0

5.2.2. Familiarity With The Geneva Convention

The amount of respondents familiar with the Geneva Convention is in stark contrast with the


Figure 17 {Familiarity with GC}



number familiar with human rights in general. Whereas 144 respondents were familiar with human rights, the same amount of respondents is *not* familiar with the GC. Thus it is no surprise that the amount of people who knew who wrote it was also small, as can be seen in Graph 9.

As was mentioned earlier, one observation made prior to analyzing the data was that the United States of America was often given as an answer. Yet, the number of people thinking the UN wrote the Convention exceeded this number, 35 to 14

Figure 18 {Knowledge Author GC}



respondents. Still, the largest amount of people, 61.9% (122 respondents) did not know who wrote the GC. This is not odd, seeing as 144 people pronounced not to be familiar with the Convention.

The largest segment of the research population was not able to provide an example of any of the clauses in the Convention. 87.3% (172 people) could not give an example, and one respondent's answer was illegible. Below is an overview of the examples that were given by the twenty-four people who did give an example, resulting in a total of 43 examples. These categories were made in the same way the previous ones were made, with the most frequent answers being listed separately from the 'others'.

Figure 19 {Examples of GC Rights}


Examples of Geneva Convention Rights

		Frequency	Percent
Valid	Other	2	.5
	Illegible	1	.3
	Rights	4	1.0
	Education	2	.5
	Rule of law	1	.3
	Peace	3	.8
	Writing of Treaties	1	.3
	Fate of Palestinians	5	1.3
	Prisoners of War	2	.5
	War conduct	5	1.3
	Right to return	2	.5
	Civilian treatment in war	7	1.8
	Red Cross	5	1.3
	Freedoms	3	.8
	Total	43	11.2
Missing	System	340	88.8
Total		383	100.0

What can be viewed as impressive is that even though the amount of examples is few, most of them correctly have to do with wartime law. Five answers even mentioned the Red Cross and its establishment. Once more education is mentioned, though not significantly often. Rights and freedoms as general concepts were also given as examples. Not surprisingly seeing the research population, reference was made to the fate of the Palestinians. The answer referring to Treaties also referred to a treaty written giving the Palestinian lands to Zionists.

5.2.3. Familiarity With The Universal Declaration of Human Rights


Figure 20 {Familiarity UDHR}



There is greater familiarity with the UDHR than with the GC. One respondent did not provide an answer and is not included in the graph. Percentages show that the numbers of familiarity and unfamiliarity are close together (41.6% yes, 57.9% no). A great difference with the GC is not observed. Yet, variance between people knowing the UN wrote the UDHR and not knowing at all is greater - 22.8% knowing versus 59.9%.

Once more, examples were asked from the respondents, and three spaces were given. These numbers show that while the term UDHR may be familiar, listing examples proved a more difficult task. Once more there was one illegible answer, but 150 people (76.1%) could not give an example of an

Figure 21 {Knowledge Author UDHR}



article or idea encompassed in the UDHR. A summary of examples given by the remaining 23.4% follows according to the established tradition of categorization in this thesis.

Figure 22 {Examples of UDHR}

The list of categories shows many resemblances with the list of examples given earlier for general human rights. The top three in this list consists of 'Other', Education (4.2%), and Freedom (2.9%). Most noticeably, however, is the fact that the right to return is mentioned for the first time - be it only 6 times. Due to the large data set previously, SPSS interpreted the now present blank fields as missing.

Some of the answers provided insight into political opinions and shed some light upon

Examples of Universal Declaration of Human Rights

		Frequency	Percent
Valid	Other	19	5.0
	Illegible	1	.3
	Freedom	11	2.9
	Education	16	4.2
	Life	6	1.6
	Return	6	1.6
	Dignity	7	1.8
	Work	7	1.8
	Expression	12	3.1
	Peace	6	1.6
	Equality	5	1.3
	Justice	4	1.0
	Health	5	1.3
	Ownership	1	.3
	Independence/Citizenship	3	.8
	Shelter	4	1.0
	Safety	7	1.8
	Security	4	1.0
	Religion	2	.5
	Political Participation	1	.3
	Movement	1	.3
	Total	128	33.4
Missing	System	255	66.6
Total		383	100.0

what may be called a 'conspiracy theory', namely the answer that an article of the UDHR is aimed to "Protect American and her allies' interests, especially those of Israel." Others refer to just war principles, for example; "Protect civilians, protect prisoners, provide help for

prisoners”, “Respect for country's and people's sovereignty and their right to choose their fate”, “No entering or assault on any person in this world”, “no use of prohibited weapons against defenseless people”, “to put rules to treat people in war situations, right to exit from a nation in war situations and come back to it.”

5.2.4. Personal Fundamental Rights

This section looks at what people think their rights are, regardless of whether or not they are written in a convention or declaration. This question was asked to gain clear insight into what understanding of personal rights there are, meaning those that are not written in either of the international agreements. Additionally, different answers may arise due to a change in thinking. Meant by this is that if an example of something is asked, it is more likely one will try to think along the lines of the ICRC or UN in this case. When one is forced to remove guidelines or barriers, different answers may materialize. This was not entirely the case. Although there was much likeness between the examples given for general human rights, UDHR rights, and personal fundamental rights, some different ones did appear.


Again, there were no actual missing values but SPSS interpreted them to be there as all the rights were entered into a data set with a larger amount of variables. Also, one person’s handwriting remained illegible, and some answers did not fit in the categories and will be recapitulated separately. At this point, most categories are in accordance with those created in the earlier human rights answers. Nonetheless, for any deviant answer occurring more than once, a separate category was created. This is the case for any and all of the categories used until now, as can be seen upon close examination of the actual categories.

As can be seen in the chart below, the most recurrent right felt to be fundamental on a personal level, is education again. This was mentioned 50 times (12.2%), closely followed by the right to return (41 respondents, 10%). As said, this is only the second time it was mentioned. It was not mentioned in the general human rights question, but only in the UDHR question. This could mean that people do not think of this as a general human right, but nonetheless regard it important. This is also supported by a UNRWA employee’s professional opinion, saying “The Nakba for the Palestinians, in their perception [it] is the biggest disaster that happened to them in the sense that in one go they lost their citizenship from the Palestinian Mandate... Certainly if you talk about the Nakba, for the Palestinians

that is certainly a human right, the collective description of human rights violation, the largest human rights violation that befell the Palestinians as a people, as a group of refugees.”¹⁶⁹ When viewed in the context Jalal al-Husseini put it, as quoted earlier, education was seen as a method to return so perhaps still relates closely to the right to return for Palestinians.

Another right mentioned often is life in dignity (7.3%). Even while inputting the data reoccurrence of this term was observed. Slightly more popular is freedom of expression (37 times, 9%). The collection of rights mentioned, and the fact that it is known that not all of them are fulfilled – such as the right to return – is meaningful. Perhaps the most fundamental rights in the eyes of the Palestinian refugee population in question are exactly those to which they do not have access. This is likely seeing as 140 respondents (71.1%) answered, “yes” to the question if they felt their most fundamental human right was being violated. This is an overwhelming majority, and in stark contrast with the 25.4% who said “no.” Seven values are missing again.

Figure 23 {Rights Felt Violated}



¹⁶⁹ Anonymous. Personal Interview. March 14th 2013.

Figure 24{Personal Fundamental Rights}

In a general overview, it appeared to be the case that persons answering that the right to return and freedom of expression were fundamental rights, also felt these rights were being violated. This can be seen more clearly in the overview of people identifying which specific rights people felt were being violated, though not all respondents answering “yes” to this question also provided an example. Perhaps because they felt they had already identified them in the question asking what they saw as

Personal Fundamental Human Rights

		Frequency	Percent
Valid	Other	18	4.4
	Illegible	1	.2
	Freedom	25	6.1
	Education	50	12.2
	Life	19	4.6
	Return	41	10.0
	Dignity	30	7.3
	Work	13	3.2
	Expression	37	9.0
	Peace	9	2.2
	Equality	14	3.4
	Justice	13	3.2
	Health	13	3.2
	Ownership	5	1.2
	Independence/Citizenship	6	1.5
	Sustenance	11	2.7
	Safety	14	3.4
	Security	16	3.9
	Religion	2	.5
	Political Participation	4	1.0
Movement	7	1.7	
No Racism	9	2.2	
Total	357	86.9	
Missing	System	54	13.1
Total		411	100.0

their most fundamental rights. Thus there are only 116 responses, and the chart below provides an overview of which rights were listed as being violated.

As expected, the right to return was listed the most amounts of times – 34 out of 116. However, in combination with the answer that the occupation is a violation this number could be seen as being 49 (42.2%). After all, the occupation is what is preventing the refugees to return. Adding “Rape of Palestine” (6), which identifies the same underlying issue – the fact that the respondents were made refugees who are not allowed to return to their homeland – would create a total of 47.4% (55 times answered). These answers were not grouped together in the same category, however, as this would potentially distort the data. Also, different terms were used denoting specific emotions or understandings, which cannot be generalized in order to safeguard the comprehension of refugees’ understanding of their rights.

The conclusion reached is merely an interpretation derived from the circumstances and local knowledge. The fact that almost half of the respondents felt violations had to do with their current situation, is not surprising seeing as the Palestinian cry for justice manifests itself in the call for right to return. “The right to return is the reparation for the injustice, which they suffered through the Nakba. The Nakba is the injustice; the call for right to return is the reparation, the right for justice.”¹⁷⁰

Violation of freedom of expression and claims of discrimination were also mentioned, written 11 and 10 times respectively. Lack of nationality was given as a violation 8 times, presumably by Gazan respondents, seeing as they are the only group of Palestinians not having any citizenship. Eight respondents said that there were no rights, four had to do with financial situations relating to work or not being able to find it. Some of the answers grouped in the ‘other’ category (17 answers, 14.7%) seem to refer to the occupation as well, for example “we were humiliated”, “what happened in life”, “to not obey the global Zionist entity's decisions and not to give the Palestinians their rights in their homeland”, “vagrancy” and “defense.” Some answers were not entirely clear, a respondent listed “announcement of love” for example. Other respondents felt there was favoritism which was seen as a violation, and some saw the lack of rights as due to the Arab government or said the “sources are in the states.”

¹⁷⁰ Anonymous. Personal Interview. March 14th 2013.

It is known that Palestinians do not get offered the same possibilities for employment as Jordanian nationals, even with the same identification papers. Names in Arab countries often clearly denote where a person is from, thus from a person's last name it can be concluded they do not belong to one of the Jordanian tribes. Thus nepotism (*wasta*) is abundant, which could be perceived as discrimination. Also, as mentioned in the camp analysis, it became clear in visiting the camps that the Jordanian government closely watches the populations. To what extent this limits them in their abilities to express themselves or in their freedoms is unknown.

5.3. Perceptions of Violations

This sub-chapter will continue to deal with perceptions of violations, and provide a continuation of proof or disproof on the justness of assumed sub-hypothesis 1. The questions asked in this part of the questionnaire provide key insight into the amount of anger felt towards Israeli policies potentially to be viewed as human rights violations.

The questions in this sub-section of the questionnaire were not asked in a way that it was immediately clear it regarded violations of international law. It was decided that the questions would be asked in a more subtle way, as not to scare off potential respondents in addition to not influencing answers in any way. The questions were asked in the most neutral way possible, merely asking for feelings towards certain well-known policies or actions carried out by Israel. As said previously, not many respondents were aware of the existence of a Gaza barrier. Additionally, the violence in Gaza and Israel in November of 2012, which took place in the time the survey was distributed, may have been of influence on answers.

Answers to the questions could be given on a scale of 1-10, ranging from 'Happy', to 'Neutral', and 'Furious'. Written answers were labeled as 'other', but some people chose a value and also decided to write something to more clearly express their opinion. Thus the numbers of written answers quoted and values for 'other' may not always be in agreement.


The issues chosen are controversial and opinions differ as to what international law says about its legality. In this thesis the opinion that the wall and settlements are illegal is followed. Regardless of agreement with this judgment, it is widely known that the two

policies are at the least frowned upon by the international community, and mostly condemned as the United Nations does. The Gaza barrier receives less attention internationally, perhaps because it is not a recent event nor is the construction as imposing as the Separation Wall or bare as great a resemblance to the Berlin Wall.

5.3.1. Feelings Towards the West Bank Wall

The first question asked was regarding the West Bank wall when construction started, and is followed by a second question regarding the same Separation Wall. The difference in the questions is that feelings of now and ‘then’ are asked. This was done to see if anger cools down after a time of the (perceived) violation occurring.

Figure 25 {Feelings West Bank Wall Commencement}




The graph above clearly shows the ‘extremism’ of the respondent’s feelings. The obvious majority was furious when construction of the wall commenced, 91.4%, meaning 180 respondents. Even within the less extreme emotions, the majority lay on the furious side, with one respondent ticking a 6, two a 7, and four an 8 and a 9. This means that 191 respondents were furious in various gradations (97%). Four people claimed to be neutral (2%), one person chose ‘4’ to represent their feelings, and one person claimed to be happy.

Whether this person understood the question correctly can be questioned, not necessarily due to the fact that this is an unexpected answer but more so due to the fact that a second person responded the same. Yet when interviewed this person said of course he wasn't, but had understood the question wrong. This person's answers were then altered in the data set. The second 'happy person' was not available for an explanatory and in-depth interview.

The following question asked how respondents feel now regarding the Separation Wall. Below the graph shows the various answers in a bar chart. The 'other' filled out did not provide a different feeling in any case, but merely an underscoring of their anger and some respondents expressed disappointment with the international community for not doing anything about it. One respondent gave a reason for their anger, saying it "separated the Palestinian lands." Another was angry "because of the Palestinians response" in contrast with "the Palestinian people don't deserve that", and a third stated, "I feel that I can't trust the Arabs because they are cheaters." The relevance of this answer to the wall is unclear.

Figure 26 {Feelings West Bank Wall Now}



Once more, 'furious' was the answer most people identified with – 87.8% (173) of the respondents. This shows that there is not a great difference between feelings then and now. If people did 'cool down', it was only slightly, seeing as 9 was given seven times; only three


times more than in response to the question regarding commencement of construction. Seven people are neutral to the wall now, also three more than previously. This accounts for six of the differences in frequencies. There was an increase of one person saying they were happy about the wall, and the 4 category was not selected again. Values 7 and 8 were both chosen twice. One person states, "I want to demolish it", one does not consider it "an important topic." "Palestinians in refugee camps don't have any opinions or words that can be heard," exhibits the helplessness of a respondent, which another expresses through "the UN condemned it with no avail or action." The person linking the wall to Arabs did this again in response to this question "I feel that Palestine was separated into two parts because of the Arab cheaters."

5.3.2. Feelings Towards the Gaza Barrier

This question used the same approach as the West Bank wall questions. First asking about feelings when the barrier commenced, then asking about feelings now. Surprising was the discovery that more people seemed to know about the West Bank Separation Wall than the Gaza barrier. Even though the latter was built in 1994, and the former's construction only commenced in more recent years. That there was no knowledge of the Gaza barrier does not come back in the data, but was observed on location.

Answers are possibly an "if I was alive, I would have felt..." type of response. Or, as one respondent wrote "I don't know about this but any separation of Palestinian lands will make me very angry" implying that it does not matter whether there is knowledge, if something is said to happen and it is not in accordance with a respondent's opinion they would be angry nonetheless.

Figure 27 {Feelings Gaza Barrier Commencement}




This could explain the majority of respondents responding to the question with ‘furious’. This answer was chosen 169 times to express respondent’s feelings (85.8%), and 8 people were neutral to the barrier (4.1%). The number 9 was chosen seven times, 8 thrice, 7 four times and 6 only once. Thus the people falling into the angry category, be it extremely furious or a milder variety composes a total of 184 people. Two people also chose ‘other’, but like in the previous questions this did not imply that they had a completely different emotion from those offered to them on the scale. One person provided an even more extreme category of ‘11’, and one was “very very furious” regarding all these questions. One person denied the existence of such a wall. Another said, “I feel there is a monster that wants to destroy Palestine.” One person saw this as a positive development, explaining that he “felt hopeful for my Arab brothers.”

Question 25 poses the question ‘how do you feel about the Gaza barrier now?’ to which once more the majority of respondents answered ‘furious’. This is not extremely surprising, there is only a difference of 4 respondents; 165 answered ‘furious’ (83.8%). What is surprising is that now 14 people are neutral, meaning this amount doubled. Reasons for this are unknown since interviews possibly clarifying this change of heart were hard to conduct. In general, more people chose numbers in the happy to neutral category; 5. The

amount of people remaining variations of angry (values 6-9) is 11. It would have been very interesting to see the reasons as to why people became milder to the Gaza barrier. One person who did not become milder stated “I felt that all of Palestine was gone,” another “I wish that they would leave.”


Figure 28 {Feelings Gaza Barrier Now}



5.3.3. Settlements

The question following the two comparisons between now and then is the one relating to the building of Jewish settlements in Hebron. Once more, the majority of respondents were ‘furious’. This is an expected trend. Of the total number of respondents, 91.9% (181 people) chose the maximum of fury you could have. The two lesser variations received 5 (‘9’) and 2 (‘8’) ‘votes’. Both values 6 and 7 were chosen once. Two persons were happy – explanations for which remain a mystery – and three were neutral. Another two chose ‘other’, one of which as said earlier chose this for every value and wrote “very very angry”, the other wrote “I’m going crazy because of them.” Technically this would add another two people to the 10 category. The graph below clearly shows the disparity between the values chosen.

Figure 29 {Feelings Hebron Settlements}



5.3.4. Gaza War

The last question regarding Israel’s actions is question number 27, asking feelings regarding Israel’s position in the 2008/9 war, labeled “Operation Cast Lead.” This question was asked in a rather vague way, as not to influence people’s responses. If a different word than “position” had been used, for example ‘actions’, this could have been seen as a more specific question leading people to perhaps only think about their military actions, in addition to possibly having been perceived as a value judgment held by the survey composer.

A staggering 93.9% said to be furious about Israel’s position. This is the most anger expressed in all of the questions. There were four people who said they were happy, in this case perhaps less surprising seeing as they could have viewed this as being proof of Israel’s actions of injustice – which is an interpretation. Only one person was neutral or checked ‘8’ as expressing their anger, while four checked ‘9’. Thus the total number of people being angry about this is much higher than in any of the other questions as well – 190 respondents. Two wrote in the space provided for comments, labeled as ‘other’, one felt “very sad for the people of Gaza who were killed and were robbed and there was no one who stood with them” another said that he wished he was there because he would have

fought them and a third wrote “God damn them.” One person expressed his dissatisfaction and perhaps desperation with the words “How would you feel, we have 60 years with no avail.” All these answers show anger.

Figure 30 {Feelings Israel’s Gaza War Position}




The last question asking for feelings also regarded the Gaza War, but referred to Hamas’ position in it. This was asked to introduce the issue of Hamas to the respondents, and to see if this type of reactionism was appreciated or not. Other reactionisms, as shall be seen, can be viewed as less direct and are also long-term Hamas policies.

In this data set, one person’s input was missing leaving the total responses at 196. The emotional values were kept the same, thus 1 was still happy, 5 neutral, and 10 furious. The majority of people said they were happy with Hamas’ position during the war – 113 respondents (57.4%). The variation between answers was larger in this question’s responses. For example, 31 people were neutral (15.7%), followed closely by 28 who were furious (14.2%). This was the only question in which every value received a respondent.

Four people checked ‘2’, three checked ‘3’, and four checked ‘4’. Leaving the total number of people with varying levels of happiness (or support) for Hamas’ position at 124

(63.3%). One person expressed their anger in the number '6', two in '7', '8' and '9'. This leaves the total amount of angry or dissatisfied people at 17.6%. There were also more variations in the written answers labeled as 'other'. One person said, "I pray for the relief", which does not necessarily make his opinion or feeling clear. The answers "they don't know anything about Islam or politics", clearly states disagreement with the party. One respondent just wrote "Jewish assholes." Others were supporting and more politically correct, saying "Honorable", "Because God is with Hamas", "I wish to be with the nation's people, it [the war] is a cowardly action", and "Protecting the rights of the country and the Palestinian people", "Also, Hamas and all who cooperated with them." The answer "Happy with some of their positions and hopeless with other positions" may have been written by a person saying he was neutral. The majority of the written answers express clear support for Hamas and sometimes clear hatred towards Israeli's/Jews.

Figure 31 {Feelings Hamas' Position Gaza War}



It is interesting to see that people seemingly got angrier as they filled out the questions. There is a slight increase in the amount of respondents having chosen the answer denoting the most fury. Whether this was because they were constantly reminded of what Israel is doing and has done, or whether this is a coincidence is an interesting question that can be asked. Once more, such ponders were hoped to be cleared up through the qualitative

method of in-depth interviews, which unfortunately could not be held as expected or wanted. Luckily, some people wrote worded answers in addition to providing a value for their feelings, giving a little more insight into the reasoning.

People also could have been angrier regarding the Gaza War because it caused the most visible suffering. The West Bank wall and Gaza barrier of course have consequences on the lives of people, yet the Gaza War was widely publicized and condemned. Even the most recent violence was covered, showing gruesome pictures of victims and their families' emotions. Death is more likely to trigger more extreme responses than economic suffering caused by the two Israeli constructions.

What has to be kept in mind is that people may have been used to ticking the '10' box. Not a great amount of people seemed to spend a lot of time taking the questions in consideration and weighing their feelings off. Most of the time spent on the survey was on the first part, where people were required to think more. There is also a chance that at this point of the survey, people had already become a little tired from filling out the survey and viewed it as taking longer than expected. As said earlier, however, there was no way to retrieve a reliable amount of data with a lesser amount of questions.

5.4. Regarding Prisoners

As the title suggests, this section will deal with the question asked about prisoners. This was a clear adaptation from a question, which would have been asked had the survey been conducted in Bethlehem. Nonetheless, prisoners are still being held captive, and as a UNRWA employee said, "[the] prisoner issue right now is a huge issue, which is brewing in the West Bank. In Gaza there are hardly any Palestinians being arrested anymore, because Israel is not active in Gaza with the exception of airstrikes and such. It is mostly a West Bank issue, and for all political parties it is a big issue."¹⁷¹ Seeing as all the questions are about occurrences manifesting in the OPT, this question seemed to be able to fit within the greater picture.

The first question regarding the topic of prisoners was whether or not the respondent knew anybody in their direct environment who was detained. This was phrased


¹⁷¹ Anonymous. Personal Interview. March 14th 2013.

in this way, as to avoid people answering “yes” when they had ‘heard of someone’. This could have created a much larger response of people saying they are familiar with a person in jail, as this could include friends of friends, and other more distantly related or known persons.

Not a lot of refugees seemed to know (of) prisoners. One person did not answer this question. 51 of the remaining respondents (25.9%) said they knew somebody in an Israeli prison. This is slightly more than a quarter of the population, relatively speaking viewed as quite a large outcome. Other countries are not expected to have generated a similar response rate. The respondents who answered yes were then asked some more questions, while respondents answering ‘no’ were told to skip these.

Figure 32 {Knowledge Prisoner}

29. Do you know of anybody in your direct environment who is detained in Israel?




Not all people seemed to have understood this, as quite a lot of respondents carried on to answer every question regarding prisoners even after stating they do not know one. These data sets have been left out of the coming analysis. Nonetheless it may be of value to note that of those people who had misunderstood, all said that they were angry regarding reasons of

detainment and treatment. Again, it seems to be the case that it does not matter if there is knowledge about a (perceived) violation of any right, as long as it is an action carried out by Israel against the Palestinian population or a segment of it, the response seems to be anger.

Of the 51 respondents saying they knew somebody from their direct environment in prison, 46 respondents answered the question if they knew the reason why. The five people who did not respond could have not known the answer and therefore left the field blank. Still, other people who did not know the reason for incarceration did specify this, making up 21.7% (10 respondents) of the answers. Below is an overview of the answers given.

Figure 33 (Reasons for Incarceration)



Interesting to see is that the majority of incarcerated individuals seem to be in Israeli prisons because they were somehow part of the resistance; 26.1% (12 answers). Some respondents specified these people were part of Hamas while others used the term “Jihad” or did not particularize at all. One person said that the detainee was arrested for “exploding a bus.” Apart from the “I don’t know” answer (10 times meaning 21.7%), “defense” is the second most given reason for incarceration - six times (13%). To a degree this could be seen as also implying being part of the resistance, but this term was not used thus a different category was created. For example, one respondent stated, “he defended the right to return”, and another “for defending Palestine and the freedom of the land”, whether this was done through a form of resistance such as through a party as Hamas is not specified and therefore cannot be assumed.

The category ‘Protest’ was created for people who said their acquaintance was detained for participating in a demonstration, or saying they voiced their opinion (3 respondents, 6.5%). ‘Political participation’ was used to group together answers regarding people who were a member of a political group, or “political activism.” One person stated the reason was “unjust”, and others claim that the prisoner was “wrongfully accused” (4

times, 8.7%). Included in the category 'no reason' (6.5% - 3 times), is the answer "Israeli policies".

The two respondents making up the 'other' category said that the person was arrested for "killing Jewish assholes, like any Palestinian who loves his country and protects it" and "flight from Palestine." Because the former answer is so specific and once more did not mention Hamas or Jihad, it was not incorporated in the 'Resistance' category. The second answer is unclear as to its specific meaning.

More interesting than seeing the reasons people give for detainment, were the answers given to the question of whether or not the respondent felt this was a fair reason. All 51 respondents answered this question, and surprisingly the only person who said "yes" earlier had stated not to know the reason for detainment. The other 50 did not feel the reason for incarceration was justified. This says a lot about to what extent the Palestinian populations' reactions are accepted. A person who does not think that causing the explosion of a bus, or killing people is a just reason to incarcerate the person carrying out this action would appear to feel that any means is justified.

It is acknowledged that the following question asking about feelings regarding unjustified reasons for incarceration can be viewed as suggestive. However, this question was composed in accordance with the general set-up of the survey, and it was assumed that respondents would react to this question furiously. This assumption proved correct as most respondents were furious about this, which was apparent in their answers to "If not fair, how does this make you feel?" 50 respondents responded with various degrees of anger, including the person who said they felt it was a fair reason. Only one person was happy. The majority of anger was extreme, expressed by the number 10, which was denoted by 47 people.

Figure 34 {Feelings Unfair Incarceration}

If not fair, how does that make you feel?

		Frequency	Percent
Valid	1 Happy	1	.5
	6	1	.5
	8	1	.5
	9	1	.5
	10 Furious	47	23.9
	Total	51	25.9
Missing	System	146	74.1
Total		197	100.0

The percentages in the chart are not correct since it assumed a total of 197 answers. The actual percentage of people saying 'furious' is 92.1%. One person was only slightly angry ('6'), and '8' and '9' were also chosen once. Thus again, overall, people were angry.

The subsequent question disregarded incarceration reasons

and inquired to the treatment of the prisoners. This was worded as 'just treatment', once more as to not risk influencing the thinking process or associations of the respondents. This question was answered by 49 respondents, of whom 46 (93.9%) did *not* feel the prisoner was getting just treatment. In the interviews carried out, it was mentioned that every Palestinian is being tortured. Another person whose grandfather was incarcerated claimed in the interview that he was tortured in order to gather information from him – which the grandfather did not succumb to. Specific measures of torture were not given.

The question asking how respondents felt regarding unjust treatment of prisoners show that once more the majority is furious; 84.3%. One person states, "I feel for all the prisoners." Again the percentages are incorrect. Anger variations comprise most of the answers, with 1 neutral person, and two '4' and '3' thus edging towards being happy. Worded answers to the questions also show a great amount of anger from one person who answered, "Because Israel is the rapist" to question 32, and to question 34 "Because Israel doesn't know God and they want to be justified. Fuck their mothers."

Figure 35 {Feelings Unjust Treatment of Prisoners}

If no, how does that make you feel?


		Frequency	Percent
Valid	3	1	.5
	4	1	.5
	5. Neutral	1	.5
	7	1	.5
	9	3	1.5
	10 Furious	43	21.8
	Other	1	.5
	Total	51	25.9
Missing	System	146	74.1
Total		197	100.0

5.5. Possibilities to Return

This section will only look at the two questions regarding possibilities to return. The answers to these questions imply not everybody had understood them properly. It was noticed that some people claimed to be able to return, while they came from regions where people are *not* allowed to return to. Additionally, the second question (Question 36) is yet again an “if... then...” question, meaning that if they had answered differently to question 35 this question could have been skipped. Also because in the interviews with respondents, it became clear that the actual situation differed. For example, if they had said they are allowed to return, upon questioning they said that was not the case but they would like to. Presumed is, that this is the case for more respondents than just the ones interviewed. A third reason for skepticism is that the right to return was felt to be violated, yet people claim to be able to return.

Question 35 asked whether the respondent had the possibility to return, and they were given three options. ‘Yes’, ‘not at all’, and ‘only for visits’. As said, these statistics may be faulty due to misinterpretation of the question, even though it could not have been stated in a clearer way.

Figure 36 {Possibility to Return}



Nonetheless, the majority of respondents did claim they could not return to the territories at all - 60.9% (120 respondents). 12.7%, or 25 respondents said they could return for a visit, which one of the interviewees explained was possible for some through a travel agency. However, he personally could not go back to his actual place of origin. The

green segment in the chart shows the amount of people who said they could return, accounting for 52 respondents (26.4%). One can only speculate how many of these people can actually return, and how many wish it were the case and misunderstood the question. Yet another reason why the correctness of this percentage is in question is because it makes one wonder why they had not returned if they had the possibility. Again, it was hoped this would have been cleared up through the interviews, which proved to be impossible in the time given.


Once more, some people provided worded answers in addition to choosing one of the three options. Most of these answers expressed hope to return, such as “I hope so”, “I will go back”, “When ready for the sake of God”, and “God willing, the return is near and Palestine will be free.” One person said, “Because Arabs aren't in agreement”, what they were referring to precisely remains unclear. The fact that some people may have interpreted it to mean what their wish was becomes clear from answers such as “Of course we will return”, and “Yes because we must return to our country if it takes too long.”

Others acknowledged that it was not possible, saying “Impossible”, “Possibility to return if justice happens”, “But land Palestine”, and “Only once the country is liberated.” One person seemed very frustrated, saying “No and what is the use of a visit, Miss????? ... ‘And there is no power but God.’” Two other respondents also show disillusionment and blame others for this; “We will never go back because of Arab kings and leaders are students

of America” and “Because the Zionist entity is not committed in international decisions. Because the strongest nations of the world are with the Zionist enemy. Because the Arab nations are complicit with the Zionist enemy. We will be back, the right to return is our holy right.” One person said, “Not unless people go back to God, and establish Arab unity for the sake of establishing the state of Palestine and its capital Jerusalem.”

The question following asked how the respondent felt if they could not go back at all or only for visits. More people responded to this question than the 145 who gave the specified answers. Again, some of the answers listed as ‘other’ were given in addition to grading their feelings on a scale from 1 to 10 provide further insight. A total of 154 people answered this question, of which 47.2% are furious, 15.7% happy, and 5.6% neutral. Doubts of respondent understanding of these questions are underscored due to the amount of answers indicating happiness. Some people who said they would not be able to return, or only for a visit, nonetheless claimed to be happy. This could be interpreted to mean they truly are happy because they do not want to return unless the country is fully Palestinian, or that they are happy because they interpreted the question to mean how they would feel if they would be able to go back. Of course there is also a chance that some of these people are happy with the status quo.

Figure 37 {Feelings Inability to Return}



There were also a number of people who gave an “in-between” answer; one person ticked ‘2’, and one ‘4’. This leaves the amount of people in the so-called happy-zone at 33. Two persons claimed they were leaning towards anger with a ‘6’, five said ‘7’, and three persons ticked both ‘8’ and ‘9’. This leaves the amount of angry people at 106, and four people gave a worded answer. Additionally, some others wanted to word their feelings.

As said, it has been speculated upon whether people were truly happy, and one person’s answer implies that this may not be the case now but in the future only; “I feel the return to Palestine is near and I will be happy”, “I’ll be happy if I go back to Palestine.” Others are ok with a visit, saying “The visit is better than nothing especially if there is no possibility to return”, which could also be a reason for a person being happy; they attempt to look at the bright side. Still others are not satisfied at all, saying “I don’t just want to return for a visit, I want to return to my country”, “I appreciate that but it’s not enough and also there is no time to go back”, “Personally, I visited my country but they didn’t allow me to enter because it’s for Jews now”, and “I feel disappointed because Palestine is gone and will not return.”

5.6. Political Positions

This section looks at the answers given in the section focusing on the political opinions of respondents. The answers to these questions provide insight into the amount of support given to political movements, the understanding of Hamas’ work, and accepting of violence. Thus the answers test the second, third, and fourth sub-hypotheses. For some people, this section raised some suspicions and had to be persuaded to fill it out. Yet this section is the most important with regard to the research question, as it shows to what extent there is support for the political movements present in Palestine. In the next sub-section the correlations between answers to these questions and human rights will be explored.

5.6.1. Fatah

The first three questions were meant to get a general idea of the opinions people held towards three movements in the OPT; Fatah, Hamas, and the Islamic Jihad Movement. It merely asked, “how do you feel”, and answers ranged from 1-10, 1 being supportive and 10 being not supportive. Again, 5 denoted neutrality.

Figure 38 {Feelings About Fatah}

37. How do you feel about Fatah?

	Frequency	Percent
Valid 1 Approving	38	19.3
2	1	.5
3	4	2.0
4	3	1.5
5 Neutral	92	46.7
6	3	1.5
7	4	2.0
8	3	1.5
9	2	1.0
10 Disapproving	44	22.3
Other	3	1.5
Total	197	100.0

The chart shows that the majority of respondents are neutral towards Fatah - 46.7% (92 people). A total of 56 people were in the disapproving range between 6 and 10, with 22.3% of the total amount of respondents completely disapproving. 46 people were in the approving range, with 19.3% completely approving. Again there were worded answers. Some of these will be discussed now, and others will be grouped together with the responses to the questions asking

about Hamas and IJM to show the contrasts.

Some people only worded their opinion regarding Fatah, and these will be discussed now. Others responded to all three questions regarding the general opinion about the three political parties, which will be looked at after the statistics have been presented. One person replied "other than that" to all three questions, and one person stated to be "very approving" of Fatah. Yet another person stated to be severely disappointing, wording it "Hypocrisy after Abu 3Amaar's¹⁷² death", and one, presumably disapproving person, said "Because they don't know anything about human rights or politics or religion."

¹⁷² Nickname given to Arafat.

5.6.2. Hamas

Figure 39 {Feelings About Hamas}

38. How do you feel about Hamas?

		Frequency	Percent
Valid	1 Approving	91	46.2
	2	2	1.0
	3	4	2.0
	4	1	.5
	5 Neutral	74	37.6
	6	3	1.5
	7	2	1.0
	8	1	.5
	9	3	1.5
	10 Disapproving	12	6.1
	Other	3	1.5
	Total	196	99.5
Missing	System	1	.5
Total		197	100.0

As can be seen, the largest majority is approving of Hamas, with 46.2% completely approving, and the total ranging 1-4 being 98 people. 74 respondents are neutral, and 17 people are in the disapproving range. This shows that a greater number of people are approving or supportive of Hamas than of Fatah. One value is missing, and three respondents only gave a worded answer. One person said that he wanted “National unity between Fatah and Hamas”, and one person stated to be “Politically not supportive, only

religiously.”

5.6.3. Islamic Jihad Movement

IJM received the most varying amount of answers, in which all of the ranges were chosen. Still, the majority was approving with 42.6%, followed closely by people being neutral; 39.1%. The total amount of people in the disapproving range between 6 and 10 was 19, starkly contrasting the 98 people in the 1-4 range of approving. These numbers do not vary greatly from the ones attributed to Hamas.

Figure 40 {Feelings Islamic Jihad Movement}

This can be interpreted to mean that the Islamic movements who both use violence as part of their policies receive more support in the 10 camps than Fatah. Below, the contrast between the opinions is shown through the display of the worded answers. Once more as a reminder, question 37 regards Fatah, 38 Hamas, and 39 IJM. In these answers, the general trend seemed to be disillusionment with Fatah – as also shown above in the answer about the movement after Arafat’s death – and appreciation of Hamas and the Islamic Jihad Movement because of religious regions.

39. How do you feel about the Islamic Jihad Movement?

	Frequency	Percent
Valid 1 Approving	84	42.6
2	2	1.0
3	7	3.6
4	5	2.5
5 Neutral	77	39.1
6	3	1.5
7	2	1.0
8	1	.5
9	3	1.5
10 Disapproving	10	5.1
Other	3	1.5
Total	197	100.0

This is shown most clearly in the answer “Fatah is made by Israel. Fatah is a cheater. Hamas is the basis of Islam. I am a Hamas supporter. [IJM is] a movement that applies Islam.” One respondent said the following about the three movements, “37 - ... Because 22 years of negotiations didn't do anything for the Palestinian people. / 38 - It's the new plan to settle the Palestinian issue. / 39 - I believe in the Islamic Jihad Movement until freedom of all the soil.” Another observes that Fatah’s “position is not stable. 38 - I respect them and put them above my head.¹⁷³ 39 - I agree because what is taken by force must be returned by force.” This was agreed with by the respondent saying, “37 - I see they aren't stable. / 38 - I respect them. / 39 - I respect them.” One person seemed to think Fatah was not necessarily relevant; “37 – Normal [3ady], Hamas is currently in Palestine / 38 - I wish they take the authority / 39 - Their positions/opinions are great.” Though this person contradicts

¹⁷³ Arabic idiomatic expression of great respect.

themselves in first saying Hamas is currently in Palestine, and then hoping for Hamas to take power.

Though there is this disparity between support for the three movements, some people are approving of all; “Fatah and others are all brave Palestinian people. Hamas and others are all Palestinian champions. 39 - Every honorable, sincere, and fair party lived Palestine”, and “37 - The most important of the resistance present in Palestine. 38 - They are resisters and heroes.”

Others are not supportive of any of the movements, as one person said, “they are trading with peace” about all three movements. Another was rather neutral or perhaps politically realistic, saying about all three movements that they “Agree with them in some decisions”, and a third stated, “37 - I don't agree with too many things. 38 - I agree with some things and don't agree with others. 39 - Approving of their positions which are in agreement with Islam, the right [*al-7aqq*].”

5.7. Support for Hamas’ Policies


This section will look at whether people also support Hamas’ strategies. The most well known, and perhaps also most violent ones were highlighted as they would show the extent of support to the greatest degree. In this context the word policy is used for any action that Hamas carries out on a regular basis, and may support with argumentations in their covenant. Five specific policies are addressed; rocket launches, ceasefire, non-negotiation, non-recognition, and prisoner swap. Additionally, feelings are asked about the terrorist label the West has given to the movement, and the social welfare projects they carry out. The latter question is specifically meant to see if support for Hamas goes further than mere political policies.

5.7.1. Rocket Strategies

The first graph shows a great amount of support for Hamas’ rocket strategies. Rocket strategies refer to the rockets Hamas shoots at Israeli territory in general, thus not specifically in response to an Israeli action. 125 respondents were approving of the rocket strategy, 34 were neutral, and 14 were disapproving. Three persons ticked ‘2’, five ‘3’ and ‘4’. This means that the total amount of people approving to some degree is 138, or 70% of

the respondents. The amount of people in the disapproving range is 23, meaning 11.7%. One person did not respond to this answer thus constitutes a missing value, and one person was listed as “other.” It is interesting to see that with 17.3%, there were more people neutral than in the total range of disapproving.

Figure 41 {Hamas’ Rocket Strategy}




Worded responses to this question show that people do feel the rockets are justified, one person saying “An eye for an eye”, and “A sword for a sword, an eye for an eye, 10 rockets for 1 rocket, and who starts will lose.” The answer ““I agree with it very much, because what is taken by force does not return without force, because your enemy does not respect you unless you are strong” implies the same mentality.

One person added the word “strongly” to his answer that he approves, and one person was quite cynical saying, “What can a rocket do compared to American technology?” Other answers showed a great amount of anger in their support, such as “I agree with them to destroy Israel and burn them”, “I wish the Israeli's would get out of Palestine”, “Israel needs to taste the fear and know that God is right”, and “I feel proud and appreciation of

Hamas' positions. God let them win." Only one person had a more neutral stance saying, "Depends on who attacked first."

5.7.2. Ceasefire

Figure 42 {Hamas' Refusal To Extend Ceasefire}



41. How do you feel about Hamas refusal to extend the ceasefire?

The same trend of approving of Hamas' tactics seems to continue in the answers asking about opinions regarding their refusal to extend the ceasefire, even though not all people agreed with the wording of this question.

Some did not completely seem to understand the question, like the person who stated, "Disagree with the question, there is no ceasefire." Others seemed to be wrongly informed. Another possibility is that they were thinking of the November 2012 negotiated ceasefire. Hamas did not keep to the 2009 ceasefire, because they once again started using their rocket tactics mentioned above. These disagreeing people comprised some of the answers belonging to the 'other' category.

As the chart shows, the largest number of respondents approved of Hamas' refusal, specifically 105 people. This does show that the amount of support for this policy is not as great as for the rocket strategy. The number of neutral people increased to 43, and the disapproving people also increased to reach 25 respondents. The value '2' was chosen six times to express feelings, and '3' and '4' both four times. This leaves 119 in the approving


category (60.4%), and with three '6's, two '7's and one '9' the amount of disapproving people comprise 15.7% (31 respondents).

The written answers to show a large amount of support again, with two people stating they are proud one of which elaborated saying that this is “because they are heroes because they refuse to let them take their land.” Two respondents have respect “because it proves we are stronger”, and “because it's the reason for our strength.” Some wrote clearly religious answers, such as “Because all Arabs and Hamas fear God and obey Islam and the Sunna of our lovely Muhammad, peace and blessings be upon him.” What is meant by the answer “The Arabs fight each other” is not entirely clear.

One person wrote a very long answer that clearly portrays the passion felt, even more so in Arabic; “This is what they said, the people that made us victorious and respected in old times. If they [Israel] are inclined to peace, they will take it. And if Israel denies and refuses the ceasefire and burn them, oh Hamas. And if they don't withdraw from Palestine, burn them oh Fatah. And if they don't leave our country, burn them oh Islamic Jihad.”

5.7.3. Non-Negotiation

Figure 43 {Hamas' Non-Negotiation Policy}



The non-negotiation policy did not raise as much dispute as the previous question. As can be seen above, once more there was a lot of support for this tactic. A total of 55.3% (109 respondents) approve completely, denoted by the '1'. However, there is a larger amount of disparity in the disapproving category – meaning that the answers vary more between 6 and 10. The whole range was used (four times '6', one '7', and two times '8' and '9') while 4 people chose '2', and three '3'. This does not change the fact that the range of disapproving people is only 12.3% (25 people), but 25.9% were neutral, which is still a greater number. Approving are 58.9% of the people, and five persons fall into the 'other' category.

Some persons do not seem to disagree saying, "There must be a negotiated position", and "The authority is with people who don't have a brain." Others seem to be approving, reasoning "Because they didn't keep their word in any treaty" – 'they' assuming to refer to Israel – and "If not negotiating means not to obey Israel, I agree with that." "Free Palestine", " I respect their opinion", and " I respect them and agree with them" are also given as answers to the question.


One person is a bit more explicit in his answer, saying, "No deal with Jews. Sons of pigs and monkeys don't have a country." Two more respondents also use some degrading terms; "Because Israel cheats in their promises, they are pigs", and "Israel are Pharaonic, they don't want negotiations and they are liars and hate the Arabs and Palestine and the people of Palestine." In the Islamic context, the words 'pig' and 'dog' are curse words because both animals are considered to be impure or unclean.

Though stated there was less dispute about this answer, one person again "disagree[d] with the question." This was the same person who claimed there was no ceasefire earlier. Even in discussing the question with this person, they were not moved from their standpoint and reasoning. Another person seems to agree with him, though, saying " Hamas is negotiating with the Zionist entity to solve the Palestinian issue after America promised the Muslim Brotherhood to dominate governance in the Arab countries." These types of answers, listing the USA as a factor for the problems show the misrepresentation of that nation and the belief in conspiracy theories.

5.7.4. Non-Recognition

The policy receiving the most support seems to be the one of non-recognition. Hamas does not recognize the existence of Israel, which is clearly stated in their covenant. A total of 139 people approve of this (69.5%), with only 23 neutral and 21 disapproving completely. Besides these ‘extreme’ answers, four people found ‘2’ to be most representative of their support, one person ‘3’, and three persons ‘4’. Three persons disapproved with a ‘6’, one with a ‘7’ and ‘8’, and two with a ‘9’. Only one person is listed in the ‘other’ category.

Figure 44 {Hamas’ Non-Recognition Policy}



This means that a total of 144 persons are in the ‘approving’ range (73%), 11.7% are neutral, and 14.2% are disapproving. Not all respondents seem to have faith that Hamas will stick to this policy, however, such as the person saying “Soon they will recognize them, just like Fatah did.” Others seemed to find a pragmatic reason plausible; “Temporary recognition.” The exclamation of one person shows the feeling of upset they felt; “How do you recognize an enemy that occupies your land and your country??!!!”


One person clearly agrees, arguing “Palestine is for us, not for Israel.” It seemed to be almost natural to have this policy for some, “Of course no recognition of Israel”, “I agree

with them because Israel will go”, “I agree with them because Israel will go and because they don't recognize Palestine.” Some showed the indisputability of the policy in their own persistence of non-recognition; “Israel is not a place and doesn't exist between us” and “There is no Israel.”

5.7.5. Terrorist Label

The fact that a terrorist label had been given to Hamas infuriated a 157 respondents, 79.7%. Additionally, six people checked ‘9’ to denote their fury, two ‘8’, and one ‘7’ and ‘6’, accounting for a total of 167 people, or 84.8%. Merely 2% of the people were happy (4 persons), and 11.2% (22 respondents) were neutral. One person denoted ‘4’ and ‘2’, and two people are in the ‘other’ category.

Figure 45 {Terrorist Label}



One person said this makes him sad, and another stated, “Hamas is not a terrorist organization.” Another reasoned “That is not right because they raise for Palestine and Palestinians rights and the right to return” and “It's the Palestinian resistance people's right to return to the occupied nation.” The logic of another person is not entirely clear “Because they are fighting under one flag. There is no God but God and Muhammad is his Messenger.”

The use of the *Shahada* – the proclamation that basically makes a Muslim a Muslim - here is interesting, however. Another answer is also multi-interpretable “They are the terrorists, in their eyes.” Who ‘they’ and ‘their’ refer to, is not clear, but could mean Hamas are the terrorists in Israel’s/the West’s eyes. These answers, in addition to “Because Hamas is the legitimate defender” seem to be reasons as to why they do not think of Hamas as a terrorist organization, however.

Asking, “My question is, what did Israel do in Gaza and Jenin and Beirut?” implies that this person views Israel to be terroristic. Two other answers show that the understanding of the term ‘terrorist’ is not shared; “If when they protect their nation and it is called terrorism, then what is terrorism?” and “If to protect our nation and families is terrorism, then they are terrorists.”

5.7.6. Prisoner Exchange

The last question specifically regarding policies or tactics that Hamas uses is the one regarding the prisoner exchange with Israel. At the time of writing the initial survey, this was a very current event. Nonetheless, as said earlier, the question of prisoners is a hot topic in the OPT thus did not make it less relevant. This can be seen in the answers of the respondents as well.


A large amount of respondents were happy with this exchange, 129 respondents accounting for 65.5%, with only 4.6% angry (9 respondents) and 20.3% (40 people) were neutral. Two persons did not answer this question, explaining the missing values, and three people are listed in ‘other’. Values 6 through 9 all have one ‘vote’, while ‘2’ has five, ‘3’ has two, and ‘4’ has three. This means the total amount of happy persons in varying degrees totals to 139 respondents, or 70.6%, and 13 people in the angry range (6.6%).

Explaining the happiness are answers such as “Any Palestinian that is released from the occupation's prison will make me happy”, “Helping the people return to the family, how would you be?”, “I wish there was more of that.” One person considers it “Public benefit”, and another “I consider it an achievement for my brothers in Hamas,” perhaps also because of another person’s answer stating “Because our prisoners are more [outnumber] their [Israeli] prisoners.” Answers such as “I am a fan of that” merely show appreciation and offer

no further insight. One female answered “Happy for the prisoner's families”, showing a greater sympathy for the humane side than for the politics of the swap.

This is also the case for some answers that were unclear once more; “Because of the pressure that Hamas puts on Israel”, and “Our honor.” The latter was written twice. Another person is not entirely happy with the exchange saying it is “Somewhat acceptable”, and a second argues, “The numbers of victims weren't proportional.” Only one person answered, “I don't know.”

Figure 46 {Hamas' Prisoner Exchange}




5.7.7. Social Welfare Projects

The last question asked regarding Hamas was about the social welfare projects they carry out. Five people clearly wrote that they don't know about these projects, with one of them adding that it is not important to them. Another said, “We are in sweet Jordan, we don't know so how do we judge?” which could imply that this person also does not know about it. One person stated, “It's a successful project, they help the resistance”, which is not entirely true. Another said, “If it's useful then I'm happy.” Two other respondents provided a written

answer, one of which denied any social welfare projects, “There is no projects or services by Hamas” and the other respondent was not happy about it, “It only serves their goals.”

The graph still shows a majority of respondents to be happy, which could be because of what one respondent wrote; that anything they do makes them happy if it helps. This cannot directly be assumed, but is an interesting follow-up question to ask. 108 respondents claim to be happy about the social welfare projects, meaning only slightly more than half the research population (54.8%). Of the 197 respondents, 57 were neutral (28.9%) which could mean they have no knowledge of the projects. Seven people were furious, or 3.6%. Regarding the other values, two chose ‘2’, five ‘3’, two ‘4’, one ‘6’, two ‘7’, one ‘8’ and four ‘9’. This means that the total number of people in the ‘happy’ range is 117 (59.4%), and in the angry range there are 15 respondents (7.6%). Eight people are in the ‘other’ category, which answers have already been discussed.

Figure 47 {Hamas’ Social Welfare Projects}



5.8. Other Statistical Analysis

Now that we have seen the descriptive statistical analysis of all the questions in the questionnaire, in this sub-chapter correlations will be investigated. As mentioned in the

Research Design chapter, correlations do not point to causality. The way a correlation works is that it looks at co-occurrence, and this is denoted with numbers ranging from -1 to +1. The most extreme form is either a perfectly positive correlation (+1) or shows a negative relationship (-1).¹⁷⁴ A zero shows that there is no correlation at all, and the value of +/- .01 (1%) show a small correlation, +/- .03 (3%) medium, and +/- .05 (5%) a large one.¹⁷⁵

To be able to help answer the research questions and hypothesis, only those questions that are relevant to this will be analyzed using Kendall's tau correlation formula. It is not interesting to see the correlation between all questions, in addition to it taking too much time. Four correlations were looked at; between having taken the UNRWA course and the amount of knowledge about human rights, correlations between feelings of violation and support for the three parties, between the three parties themselves, and between support for the parties and Hamas' policies.

Split-files were used to analyze add to this data, specifically regarding people in relation to support with Hamas. The four split files looked at the ages, education, and origin of people saying they felt their most fundamental human right was violated, and origin of people who supported Hamas. Though this may not specifically answer the research questions, it does provide more information about Hamas' supporters in Palestinian refugee camps in Jordan. The charts generated in this analysis can all be found in the Appendix.

5.8.1. Correlations

As suggested, this section looks at the correlation between people who took a UNRWA course and have knowledge of human rights. All three general knowledge questions were posed against the answers given to whether or not a respondent participated in the UNRWA course. Between the UNRWA course and general knowledge of human rights, there was a correlation of .194. Between the course and knowledge of the Geneva Convention, there was a correlation of .091, and with UDHR .171. This means that generally speaking people who took the UNRWA course, knew most about human rights in general. However, the numbers show that the significance is not great. Between the course and general

¹⁷⁴ Field, p. 170.

¹⁷⁵ Idem.

knowledge there is significance at the .01 level, and with the UDHR only at the .05 level meaning it is minimal for both but slightly more for general knowledge.

For the correlation between the feeling of the most fundamental right on a personal level being violated and support given to the different political movements, the answers for the movements were categorized between supportive and not supportive. Those ranging 1-5 were supportive, and 6-10 not supportive. Though this greatly simplifies the data, it was the only method to get reliable results. The relation between violation and support for Fatah was $-.092$, for Hamas $.044$, and for Islamic Jihad Movement $-.010$. This means that if people felt their rights were violated there was a small inverse correlation to their support for Fatah and Islamic Jihad Movement, meaning that they would not be as likely to support them. As for Hamas, they would, but the correlation is so small it can hardly be deemed significant.

Correlations regarding support for the three parties show more significant results. Here what will be specifically looked at is the relation between Hamas and Islamic Jihad Movement support, Hamas and Fatah support and Fatah and IJM support. For the full table, refer to the Appendix. The correlation between Hamas and Islamic Jihad Movement was $.600$ – a significant correlation at the .01 level. Hamas versus Fatah was $.104$, and Fatah and IJM was $.202$. The latter again is a significant correlation of 1%. Thus people who support Hamas are more likely to support Islamic Jihad Movement than Fatah. Yet those who support Islamic Jihad Movement may be slightly more inclined to support Fatah also. So if a person supports any Islamic movement that had some violent policies, they are more likely to support the other Islamic movement given as an option as well. Hamas supporters are less likely to support Fatah. Although in this wording causality may simmer through, this is not at all applied, as it is known that this cannot be measured in this way. It is nonetheless interesting that there is a correlation between support for Islamic political parties.

The last correlation looks at support for a party and feelings regarding the Hamas policies presented to the respondents. Starting with Fatah, the correlation between support and feelings regarding rocket attacks was $-.078$ meaning people are less likely to support the rocket attacks if they support Fatah. Negative correlations were also found regarding non-negotiation; $-.014$, and the prisoner swap; $-.030$. Regarding the ceasefire it was $.035$, non-recognition $.005$, the terrorist label given to Hamas $.048$ and the welfare projects Hamas

carries out .034. This means that there is a slight positive correlation, though not a significant one between these last policies and support for Fatah, meaning they can support both.

As expected, the only negative correlation with Hamas was with the terrorist label given to them denoted by $-.303$. This is significant at the .05 level, and means that if they support Hamas they would not be happy about the terrorist label. The other correlations were also all significant at the .05 level with $.420$ for the rocket attacks, $.412$ for the refusal to extend the ceasefire, $.438$ regarding the non-negotiation policy, $.335$ as to the non-recognition of Israel, $.247$ for the prisoner swap, and $.421$ for the welfare projects. This means that the most significant correlation was between support for Hamas and their non-negotiation policy, interpreted to mean that if they support Hamas they would be more likely to support the non-negotiation policy. Yet it seems that even though the statistics do not reveal great significance, support for the movement is somehow correlated to support for their policies.

This same conclusion can be drawn regarding support for the Islamic Jihad Movement and for Hamas' policies, though the figures are slightly smaller. Once more the only negative correlation is in connection with the terrorist label given to Hamas; $-.232$. The other correlations were significant at the 5% level but not more so than with Hamas. Regarding the rocket strategy, the correlation was rated at $.328$, ceasefire $.314$, non-recognition $.281$, non-recognition $.257$, the prisoners swap $.165$, and welfare projects $.324$. This shows that people who support IJM are less likely to support the prisoner swap conducted by Hamas than people who support Hamas ($.247$ versus $.165$). In general, as said, the support for all the policies was slightly less.

5.8.2. Split File Variables

The split file function is used to see what percentage of a certain group of people answered a question in a specific way. Since this research project has as main cause to find out opinions about Hamas, split file analyses were only applied to questions concerning them. To be able to do this, some variables had to be grouped together. This was the case for the first split file to be looked at; the age groups of people supporting Hamas. The table below shows the age groups and the distribution in the same manner as in the descriptive statistics

section as “Total Respondents.” One person was noted as a missing value thus the total of respondents displayed in the chart is 196.

Figure 48 {Split File Age Groups - Violation}

Age group	Yes Violated	No Violated	Total	Total Respondents	Missing
12 – 20	19	6	25	26	1
21-30	68	19	87	91	4
31-40	25	10	35	37	2
41-50	16	8	24	24	0
51-60	7	3	10	10	0
61-81	4	4	8	8	0

The chart shows that the largest number of people who feel their rights were violated is between the ages of 21 and 30, which is interesting to note because they are the age group that has not consciously experienced the gravest violations against them. However, as the most valuable human right was stated to be the right to return, they can still feel that this is being violated.

Figure 49 outlines the amount of people saying they feel their personal most fundamental right is violated according to their education level. In this chart there is a total of 5 missing values, meaning these numbers are based on 192 answers. Within the subcategories it is interesting to see that the largest group of education, those with a Bachelor degree, are also the ones who mostly feel their most fundamental right is being violated. In general it seems that the higher educated people seem to feel their rights are being violated the most. Another interesting observation is that of the middle school students, a large number of respondents did not actually answer this question.

Figure 49 {Split File Education Level - Violation}

Education Level	Yes Violated	No Violated	Total	Total Respondents	Missing
Elementary	3	2	5	5	0
Middle	4	1	5	29	24
High	21	8	29	34	5
Tawjihi	21	13	34	36	2
Diploma	15	5	20	22	2
University	15	4	19	19	0
Bachelor	35	9	44	46	2
Master	1	0	1	1	0

Figure 50 {Split File Region - Violation}

Region of Origin	Yes Violated	No Violated	Total	Total respondents	Missing
Other	2	0	2	2	0
Lost Territories	51	23	74	76	3
West Bank	56	19	75	78	3
Gaza	31	8	39	41	2

The above chart shows to what extent people from which regions have said that they feel that their fundamental rights are being violated. Shown is that the largest amount of people who feel their rights are being violated are from the West Bank. This includes cities such as Hebron, of which it is known that Israel is committing violations according to international law through the construction of settlements.

Figure 51 below uses the same regions, and only examines the people who listed ‘1’, meaning they are completely supportive of Hamas. Seeing as the ‘Other’ category was not

represented in this group, they have been obliterated from the graph. Answers ranging from 1-5 were noted to be supportive, the remaining variance of 6-10 were said to not be supportive. Though this is a great generalization, it can be seen is that there is not an overtly large amount of people from any of the regions who feel more supportive of Hamas. From Gaza 63.4% is represented, from the West Bank 47.4%, and from the Lost Territories 36.8%. This shows that Gazans do support Hamas more, but not differing greatly with West Bank originators.

Figure 51 {Split File Region - Hamas Support}

Region of Origin	Support	Total Respondents
Lost Territories	28	76
West Bank	37	78
Gaza	26	41

6. Discussion

Now that all the statistics regarding the research have been discussed in detail, it is time to discuss its implications. This chapter will first reflect on the general outcomes of the research before doing this in a more detailed manner. This contemplation of results sets the stage for recommendations and the conclusion of the thesis. Additionally, faced challenges will be discussed.

6.1. Summary of Findings

The research population reflected on the demographic make-up of most Arab countries, which are predominantly made up of youth. 46.2% of the respondents were aged between 21 and 30. The split files showed that this age group also perceived their fundamental human rights to be violated on a greater scale. Education levels were alarmingly low, with a large segment of the population only having graduated high school, if that. Nonetheless, a Bachelor degree was obtained by a significant segment of the research population, who coincidentally also noted that their human rights were violated. The education levels reflect on the employment sectors most respondents are active in, with high-end jobs being carried out by only a few. Jobs in sales and manual labor are held by a large majority of the subjects.

While the largest segment of the population was obviously born in Jordan seeing their ages, this did not demise their passion for their homeland. Hebron and Gaza were where the largest proportion of refugees originated from, with 62.9% of their ancestors having fled in 1948. Reasons for their expulsion were mostly due to war and the occupation.

The human rights course offered by UNRWA was only followed by an insignificant amount of the research population. Nonetheless, 73.1% of the respondents are indeed familiar with the term. Education and the right to return were seen as the most fundamental personal rights, with the latter being felt to be violated by 29.3% of 116 respondents who answered the question.

Passion for Palestine became apparent throughout the answers given in the questionnaire both by referring to the occupation as 'rape' and using offensive and vulgar language apropos Israel and its population. Furthermore, the fact that all of the questions relating to violations were largely answered as provoking extreme anger attests to this

passion. Any example of an act carried out by Israel was seen as infuriating, while any act opposing them was warmly welcomed. This was also seen in the questions related to incarceration, with a majority of acquaintances having been arrested due to their participation in resistance. Though a large number of people did not know the reason of incarceration, the reasons for this were seen to be unjust in any case.

Approving of acts opposing Israel was also noted not only by the disparity in support for the three mentioned political movements. Most respondents were neutral towards Fatah. The Islamic Jihad Movement received a large amount of support, while a significant faction also being neutral towards them. Hamas is obviously the most popular of the three movements, and its supporters were shown to be less inclined to be approving of Fatah. The correlational statistics also showed that a respondent that was supportive of one Islamic movement would be more likely to also support the other. Furthermore, the split file analysis shows that the largest quantity of Hamas supporters originate from Gaza.

If respondents felt their fundamental human right was violated, they would be more inclined to support Hamas than either Fatah or the Islamic Jihad Movement. The fact that Hamas is deemed terroristic by the West was viewed as unjustified, with respondents claiming that Israel is the terrorist. The great level of alignment with Hamas was seen in the answers regarding their tactics; with the most unanimous answers being given to the most violent measures the movement takes. Those supportive of Hamas were also generally supportive of all their policies as was noted in both observations and correlational statistics results. The policy of non-recognition received the most disparate response, with a significant segment of the research population claiming to feel neutral. It appeared these people were skeptical of the tactic, referring to Fatah initially carrying out this policy, and expecting Hamas to discard it in a similar manner.

Problematic questions were those referring to the possibility to return, and Hamas' social welfare projects. The former was seen as being misinterpreted by some respondents, apparent in their worded answers regarding the feelings they experienced. Nonetheless, it became explicitly clear that the research population would not be satisfied with any type of return other than a permanent one to their place of origin. With regard to the social welfare projects, it was noted that a large number of respondents were not familiar with the fact

that Hamas is active on other fronts than Israel. Nonetheless, they were overwhelmingly happy.

6.2. Human Rights

It is clear that a large amount of people are familiar with the term ‘human rights’ but the understanding of these rights varied greatly. Specific knowledge seemed to be lacking, though a number of rights written in the Universal Declaration were recognized in respondents’ answers. What the answers to the questions regarding human rights show, is that there is a specific understanding of human rights in the local context.

The fact that rights are perceived differently than what they may officially be, is important for the human rights debate. This debate has been lacking attention for perceptions in the Middle East, and these results prove that this is unjustified. Additionally, the fact that human rights are seen to be important and closely tied to existentialism is relevant, seeing as the scholar Muhammad Abu Rumman held the opinion that “most of them [...] are not interested. This is like most of the people in the world. Nobody talks about, they are interested in their daily lives, they are interested to hear about their country.”¹⁷⁶ The passionate answers regarding the perceived violations floor his argument of disinterest.

6.3. Hamas Support

Understanding of Hamas as a movement with a wider set of policies than focusing on Israel and violence towards it appears to be lacking. The movement’s social welfare program was observed to be largely unknown to the research population. The fact that the majority of respondents still noted being happy about this proves that any action carried out by Hamas, as long as it is seen as being beneficial to the Palestinian population, is approved of.

The understanding of the movement is influenced, as was the case with human rights, by the local experience of the research population. This proves that grievances indeed influence reasons for mobilization, with in this case the grievance being a human right violation. Jalal al Hussein also mentioned this, saying that the international consensus of human rights violations “favored the emergence, it played a role of course, it played a role, it helped the Palestinian resistance movements; Islamist and non-Islamist. It started with the

¹⁷⁶ Abu Rumman, Muhammad. Personal Interview. March 12th 2013.

non-Islamist Fatah et cetera, Hamas started slowly, slowly and Hamas prospered when Fatah, mainly Fatah, failed.”¹⁷⁷ A UNRWA employee concurs, saying that “... The struggle is more focused on a human rights discourse. It is more about undoing violations of Palestinian rights... you can say that the search for a solution increasingly focuses on undoing the human rights violations and abolishing inequality.”¹⁷⁸ A movement promising to eliminate this inequality is Hamas, which also uses this type of discourse to gain popularity according to Abu Rumman. He adds, however, that their focus is more on the prisoner issue than on others such as the West Bank wall.¹⁷⁹

The feeling of relative deprivation and accompanying despair motivates support for and appreciation of violent responses. Notwithstanding, whether violence is seen as a correct response is still up for debate. Reason for this is one interviewee’s reasoning that they did not agree with violence, that they wanted democracy but that violence was the only way to reach their goal right now. Others stated that it was a matter of “an eye for an eye.”

Expressed readiness to co-exist peacefully with the Jewish people shows the anger is directed at policy, not at people. Interviewees explained the religion was not what their hatred was extended to, but the injustice that had been done was. It was said that if Israel stops bombing and actually wants peace, then there would be peace. Nonetheless, this same person stated he would want to use violence himself as a suicide bomber if he got the chance to do so in Israeli territory. One person was not supportive of the fact that Hamas stopped bombing, and another stated they were less supportive because of the shift in focus after they became a governing power.

6.4. Challenges

Throughout this research project, challenges faced during the research have been touched upon. In this section these challenges will be grouped together and how they were dealt with or should be dealt with in the future in any case of renewed research into this question will be discussed.

¹⁷⁷ Al Husseini, Jalal. Personal Interview. March 7th 2013.

¹⁷⁸ Anonymous. Personal Interview. March 14th 2013.

¹⁷⁹ Abu Rumman, Muhammad. Personal Interview. March 12th 2013.

The first problem expected was the language barrier, however, this did not seem to be the biggest obstacle of the research, as largely respondents were not willing to talk to a female researcher. Willing persons were very understanding of limited language skills. Additionally, having two companions assisting in the fieldwork relieved some pressure.

Once a relative amount of knowledge of a language is present, the issue of a translator inevitably also making contributions to the research, and the fact that he or she “may alter the nature of the research”¹⁸⁰ and “what is found”¹⁸¹ as “they also form part of the process of knowledge production”¹⁸² is diminished to some extent. Though details may go unnoticed, one will perceive when large segments are translated differently or left out. Creative translation may also occur in other instances, as different meaning may be given to words or perspectives vary,¹⁸³ for that reason it needs to be recognized “that people using different languages may construct different ways of seeing social life.”¹⁸⁴ Seeing as the possibility of this occurring was acknowledged before commencement of research, it was planned that the recording would be discussed with the translator and possible differences in perspective or meaning addressed.

Different forms of bias, or interpretation thereof by others, are always obstacles in research. The amount of bias was attempted to be reduced by clearly deciding upon things that could and could not be said by both companion and researcher in the field. Beforehand, the importance of the display of integrity, transparency, continuity and sensitivity¹⁸⁵ was acknowledged. In the writing of the thesis, bias by omission was attempted to be avoided by including all respondents’ worded answers. This could not be done with regard to the interviews conducted, but was nonetheless kept in mind in the writing process. “Objective reality can never be captured”,¹⁸⁶ but through triangulation of qualitative, quantitative, and

¹⁸⁰ Temple, B. (1997). “Watch Your Tongue: Issues in Translation and Cross-Cultural Research.” *Sociology*, 31:3, p. 607.

¹⁸¹ Idem, p. 614.

¹⁸² Temple, B. & A. Young (2004). “Qualitative Research and Translation Dilemmas.” *Qualitative Research*, 4:2, p. 164.

¹⁸³ Idem, p. 616.

¹⁸⁴ Idem, p. 164.

¹⁸⁵ Cohen & Arieli, p. 432.

¹⁸⁶ Denzin, N.K., & Y.S. Lincoln (2005). “The Discipline and Practice of Qualitative Research.” In: N.K. Denzin & Y.S. Lincoln (Eds.), *Handbook of Qualitative Research* (3rd ed., p. 1-32). California: Sage Publications, Inc, p. 5.

note taking methods, this was attempted to be accomplished to the maximum degree possible.

Regardless of these challenges taken into account before conducting fieldwork, other unforeseen issues were expected to possibly arise. The main issue, which arose in this research project, was the need for the change of location. This is a unique experience, however, and in the end did not influence the actual fieldwork process.

Another challenge was the difficulty experienced in reaching both expert persons and respondents for interviews. The expert interviews were conducted at the very last moment, and valuable other contacts, which were provided in these interviews, could not be used due to a lack of time. This is something that needs to be taken into consideration, and regarding the Arab culture of last-minute plans should have been taken into account in advance. A great relief was the amount of worded answers given in the survey, which added value and to a limited extent made up for the fact that only three in-depth interviews were held. These answers definitely provided more insight that otherwise would have been missed out on. This was not an expected challenge, however, seeing the amount of people who willingly gave their contact information.

An unexpected occurrence that has been touched upon numerous times was the so-called problematic answering of some of the survey questions. While it was attempted to phrase the questions in an unambiguous way, there remained instances in which the respondents' interpretation did not appear to coincide with that of the researcher. This was specifically noted in the cases of the possibility to return question, and taken into account with the data analysis. Some respondents did not agree with some questions stating facts – such as that Hamas refused to extend the ceasefire reached in 2009. Nonetheless the conviction that there was no better way to have worded these questions still holds. Additionally, as was also mentioned earlier, the question regarding feelings towards unjust reasons of incarceration may be seen as suggestive. While it may be argued that this question would not generate surprising responses, one could argue the same for all questions if one assumes a certain mindset to be present amongst the respondents. The fact that this question was asked shows the lack of such an assumption.

Upon the first stage of data analysis, it was found that the persons with the most 'outlying' answers were also the ones who in greater numbers did not provide contact details. Additionally, some numbers were faulty and other respondents were not reachable. Those who were reachable did not always show up for the appointment made to conduct the interview. This comprised the largest challenge in fieldwork, and these types of setbacks must be taken into account in future research.

The biggest challenge in the actual writing of the thesis was the dealing with statistics. It is not advisable to take on a project of this size and importance and at simultaneously have a first-ever statistical analysis released on it. A lot of time could have been saved, had there been previous knowledge about statistics and the SPSS program. Regarding the simple statistics this was not as much of a problem as with the correlational statistics. Although the program greatly simplified the statistical process, extra time was spent on learning about the different statistical analyses and their relevance to this research. This was done after the fieldwork was concluded, which in itself is a less than ideal method of deciding on a statistical method. Nonetheless, it is found that another type of statistical method could not have been applied to this research due to its nature.

6.5. Recommendations

The main recommendation of this research is to conduct more in-depth research into human rights perceptions and the effect they have on support for political Islamic movements. Research conducted in the original envisioned site of Bethlehem, or another city or region in the OPT would add to the validity of any argument made. This specific population should be looked into before widening the scope of research to other locations.

Research amongst populations in the greater diaspora would add to the discussion of whether greed or grievances are at the core of mobilization and rebellion. Looking into whether answers given to the same survey by economically successful Palestinians in the United States of America and Canada differ greatly from those given by the research population in this thesis could assist in this. Such research would also still be useful to answer the same hypothesis as was posed in this project.

Additionally, an expansion of this research project should include other political Islamic movements in more detail, and distinguish between Hamas and their military branch, the Al Qassam Brigades. A broader look at the topic should also be considered, such as the bigger framework and context, which has led and may continue to lead to the surge in popularity of political Islamic movements. The Israeli political situation should also be included in this, what effect radicalization there has on its policies and how that trickles down to Palestinians. The fact that so many people both inside Palestine and Israel and on a more international level, are looking towards religious groups for solutions of their political and economic problems suggests that there are more reasons for support than religion. However, to further make a distinction between the specific reasons for support, this research should be applied to other religious groups as well.

Though the actual output of this thesis was of course more focused on Hamas and Israel than on Jordan, the latter's political situation cannot be ignored. Observed throughout the time spent in Jordan was that although Jordanians and Palestinians live together peacefully in the same nation, underlying tensions are mounting and dissatisfaction from both sides with peoples from a different ancestral background is growing. These tensions may not be apparent on a national level, but in inter-personal relationships clearly surfaced. Research into reasons and solutions for these tensions should be looked into, more so seeing as the amount of refugees from other Arab nations (Iraq and more recently Syria) are adding to pressure on Jordan's scarce natural and human resources. A nation hosting more refugees than nationals cannot be expected to deal with this in as a hospitable and tolerant manner as it has been doing in the past sixty or so years. How far this hospitality stretches and how long the country can continue to be a (seemingly) serene island in a region of increasing chaos must be investigated.

7. Conclusion

As the hypothesis states, perceptions of Israeli human rights violations were assumed to add to support given to Hamas. The data collected and generated provides proves this, as will be outlined in this final chapter.

It is clear that human rights are understood within a local context of existentialism. This conclusion is drawn from the fact that the right to return is regarded as the most fundamental human right. Right to education was number two on the list, and was seen to have been of main importance in earlier decades because it was thought to give access to return. The most fundamental rights in the eyes of the Palestinian refugee population are linked to their identity as a refugee and those rights providing an escape from that identity. These rights are felt to be violated by a majority of the research population.

Reactions to Israeli violations in the general categories of collective punishment and administrative detention were seen to infuriate the respondents. This anger is constant and deeply rooted, tracing back to existentialism once more. The work of Hamas, like human rights, is understood in this context. Hamas is seen to purely be a movement of resistance and in that an advocate for the right to return. Additionally, they are the only alternative for the meagerly supported Fatah and its failed diplomatic efforts.

Hamas take the grievances and deprivations experienced by the Palestinian population to heart, and promise to maintain a stronghold against Israeli occupation and power until these feelings (or Israel) no longer exist. Policies formed as part of this struggle are accepted and supported, fueled in part by the level of anger felt apropos Israel. Violence as part of these policies is received favorably, because Palestine is perceived to be in a state of war with Israel, and it is regarded to be self-defense. There are no boundaries or limits to what is permissible in the struggle for Palestine, seems to be the consensus.

It is not infrequently assumed that supporters of Islamic movements are lower class and uneducated individuals. Scholars such as Wiktorowicz have contested this in their contributions to Social Movement Theory, and the results of this research support their stance in the debate. Human rights were being perceived as violated in the large part by the young and educated in the studied refugee camps. While religion was a component for

some, and referred to by respondents in their answers, shared dogma is not the main motivating factor.

The main rationale behind support for Hamas is because they are understood to be the defier of Israel. It is a reaction to the perceived deprivation and violation of human rights, attesting to the argument Gurr and other scholars make in the grievances debate. Though there was a financial component in the feelings of rights violations, the emphasis was not placed on this. Greed in this research project was not found to be a large motivating factor for support.

This conclusion supports the general hypothesis that perceptions of human rights violations add to support for Hamas, yet the data adds a worrying specification. The younger generations are more passionate about the cause, indicating that Hamas' leading role in the violent struggle against Israel is not likely to recede in the near future. After all, the redress of disadvantages, as Gurr has named it, is not merely kept in place out of stubbornness, but also due to conviction and hopes of a better future.

The combination of these results generates the judgment that Israel must alter their policies regarding Palestinians. At the minimum, they should avoid and not initiate any (new) actions that can spark (new) anger. Present anger will not fade away, but efforts must be made to prevent fresh reasons for discontent. Once the main cause for grievance and the felt threat to Palestinians' existence is diminished or eliminated, violence would not be the go-to response for respondents. Once support for their violent policies ceases, Hamas – being an organization very sensitive to public opinion – would likely consider altering them. The fact that they have not felt the need to do this indicates that at this point in time, it is seen as the only and best method to achieve their goals.

While no guarantees are given, this change in policy is worth a try, seeing as the alternative is falling further in the seemingly bottomless pit of violence, death and destruction. The already icy peace process can only be paralyzed further as a result of this and the increase of hate it will generate. The amount of support for Hamas and their violent policies should be seen as a clear sign of the gravity of the situation in the region. One can only wonder, if refugees have this amount of rage, how do the people that are confronted by the consequences of Israeli policies on a daily basis feel?

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APPENDIX A

Opinions on Events Related to the Palestinian Issue

1. Age
2. Sex
3. Profession
4. Highest level of education completed
5. Religion
6. Registered or unregistered refugee?
7. City and region in Palestine you departed from
8. Year of departure or ancestor's departure from Palestine
9. Reasons for leaving
10. Are you familiar with the term "human rights"?
 - a. Yes
 - b. No
11. Can you name (*mention*) three examples of "human rights"?
 - a. _____
 - b. _____
 - c. _____
12. Are you familiar with the Geneva Convention?
 - a. Yes
 - b. No
13. Do you know who wrote the Geneva Convention?
 - a. The United States
 - b. The United Nations
 - c. The International Committee of the Red Cross
 - d. The European Union
 - e. Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International
14. Can you list three aspects from the Geneva Convention?
 - a. _____
 - b. _____
 - c. _____
15. Are you familiar with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights?
 - a. Yes
 - b. No
16. Do you know who wrote the Universal Declaration of Human Rights?
 - a. The United States
 - b. The United Nations
 - c. The International Committee of the Red Cross
 - d. The European Union
 - e. Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International
17. Can you list three aspects from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights?
 - a. _____
 - b. _____
 - c. _____

29. Do you know *of* anybody in your direct environment (friends, family) who are detained in Israel at the moment? (If no, go to question 35)
- Yes
 - No
30. If yes, do you know for what they are being detained? (If yes, explain)
- Yes _____
 - No
31. If yes, do you believe this is a fair reason?
- Yes
 - No
32. If no, how does that make you feel?
- | | | |
|-----------------|---------|---------|
| 1 | 5 | 10 |
| Happy | Neutral | Furious |
| a. Other: _____ | | |
33. Regardless of the reason of detainment, do you feel the person is getting a fair trial and just treatment?
- Yes
 - No
34. If no, how does that make you feel?
- | | | |
|-----------------|---------|---------|
| 1 | 5 | 10 |
| Happy | Neutral | Furious |
| a. Other: _____ | | |
35. Do you have the possibility to return to the territories (*your hometown*)?
- Yes, for visits only
 - Yes, I have the possibility to return
 - No, no possibility to return
36. If only for visits or not at all, how does that make you feel?
- | | | |
|-----------------|---------|---------|
| 1 | 5 | 10 |
| Happy | Neutral | Furious |
| a. Other: _____ | | |
37. How do you feel about Fatah?
- | | | |
|-----------------|---------|--------------|
| 1 | 5 | 10 |
| Approving | Neutral | Disapproving |
| a. Other: _____ | | |
38. How do you feel about Hamas?
- | | | |
|-----------------|---------|--------------|
| 1 | 5 | 10 |
| Approving | Neutral | Disapproving |
| a. Other: _____ | | |
39. How do you feel about the Islamic Jihad Movement?
- | | | |
|-----------------|---------|--------------|
| 1 | 5 | 10 |
| Approving | Neutral | Disapproving |
| a. Other: _____ | | |
40. How do you feel about Hamas' rocket tactics?
- | | | |
|-----------------|---------|--------------|
| 1 | 5 | 10 |
| Approving | Neutral | Disapproving |
| a. Other: _____ | | |

APPENDIX B

أراء عن الاحداث التي تمر بها المنطقة مرتبطة بالقضية الفلسطينية

- 1-العمر:
- 2-الجنس:
- 3-المهنة:
- 4-مستوى التعليم:
- 5-الديانة:
- 6-مسجل او غير مسجل بوكالة الاجئين:
- 7-المنطق و المدينة المهاجر منها في فلسطين:
- 8-سنة الهجرة او سنة هجرة الاباء:
- 9-اسباب الهجرة:
- 10- هل انت مطلع على مصطلح حقوق الانسان. -نعم. -لا
- 11- هل تستطيع ذكر ثلاثة امثلة على مصطلح حقوق الانسان:
ا-:
- ب-:
- ج-:
- 12- هل انت مطلع على ميثاق جنيف؟ -نعم. -لا
- 13- هل تعرف من كتب ميثاق جنيف؟
ا- الولايات المتحدة الامريكية
ب-الامم المتحدة
ج-اللجنة الدولية للصليب الاحمر
د-الاتحاد الاوربي
ه-منظمة العفو الدولية، هيون رايتس وتش

14- هل يمكن ان تذكر ثلاث اشياء من ميثاق جنيف

ا-:.....

ب-:.....

ج-:.....

15- هل مطلع على الاعلان العالمي لحقوق الانسان؟ -نعم. -لا

16- هل تعرف من كتب الاعلان العالمي لحقوق الانسان؟

ا-الولايات المتحدة الامريكية

ب-الامم المتحدة

ج-اللجنة الدولية للصليب الاحمر

د-الاتحاد الاوربي

ه-منظمة العفو الدولية، هيون رايتس وتش

17- هل يمكن ان تذكر ثلاث اشياء من الاعلان العالمي لحقوق الانسان؟

ا-:.....

ب-:.....

ج-:.....

18- ما هي الحقوق الاكثر اهمية بالنسبة لك في مجال حقوق الانسان؟

ا-:.....

ب-:.....

ج-:.....

19- هل تشعر بان اهم حقوق لك يتم انتهاكها؟ -نعم. -لا

20- اذا كانت الاجبة نعم. كيف يتم ذلك؟.....

21- هل تشعر بان اي حقوق اخرى منتهكة بالنسبة لك؟ اذا كانت الجبة نعم، فما هي تلك الحقوق ولماذا.

.....

بالجزء التالي حدد من 1-10 ما مدى شعورك بالنسبة للسؤال.
22- كيف شعرت عندما بدأ العمل ببناء الجدار العازل؟

10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
شديد الغضب					محايد				سعيد

غير ذلك.....

23- كيف تشعر الان بالنسبة لبناء الجدار العازل؟

10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
شديد الغضب					محايد				سعيد

غير ذلك.....

24- كيف شعرت عندما بدأ العمل ببناء حاجز غزة (1994)؟

10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
شديد الغضب					محايد				سعيد

غير ذلك.....

25- كيف تشعر الان بالنسبة لبناء حاجز غزة (1994)؟

10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
شديد الغضب					محايد				سعيد

غير ذلك.....

26- كيف تشعر بالنسبة لبناء المستوطنات في الخليل؟

10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
شديد الغضب					محايد				سعيد

غير ذلك.....

27- كيف تشعر بالنسبة لموقف اسرائيل في حرب غزة 2008/2009؟

10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
شديد الغضب					محايد				سعيد

غير ذلك.....

28- كيف تشعر بالنسبة لموقف حماس في حرب غزة 2008/2009؟

10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
شديد الغضب					محايد				سعيد

غير ذلك.....

29- هل تعرف اي شخص في محيطك المباشر (اصدقاء، عائلة) محتجز في اسرائيل في الوقت الحالي. (اذهب الى سؤال 35 اذا كانت الاجابة لا) -نعم -لا

30- اذا كانت الاجابة نعم فهل تعلم سبب الاحتجاز؟ اذا كانت الاجابة نعم فما هو سبب الاحتجاز؟

نعم..... -لا

31- هل تعتقد بان سبب الاحتجاز عادل؟ -نعم -لا

32- اذا كانت الاجابة لا، فكيف تشعر حيال ذلك؟

10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
شديد الغضب					محايد				سعيد

غير ذلك.....

33- بغض النظر عن سبب الاحتجاز هل تعتقد انا الشخص يحصل على حكم ومحاكمة عادلة؟

نعم -لا

34- اذا كانت الاجابة لا، ما هو شعورك؟

10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
شديد الغضب					محايد				سعيد

غير ذلك.....

35- هل من الممكن لك العودة لمدينتك التي خرجت منه؟

ا-نعم فقط للزيارة.

ب-نعم يمكنني العودة.

ج-لا سبيل للعودة.

36- اذا كانت العودة فقط للزيارة او لا مجال للعودة، فكيف تشعر بالنسبة لذلك؟

10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
شديد الغضب					محايد				سعيد

غير ذلك.....

37- كيف تشعر بالنسبة لفتح؟

10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
غير متفق					محايد				متفق

غير ذلك.....

38- كيف تشعر بالنسبة لحماس؟

10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
غير متفق					محايد				متفق

غير ذلك.....

39- كيف تشعر بالنسبة لحركة الجهاد الاسلامي؟

10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
غير متفق					محايد				متفق

غير ذلك.....

40- كيف تشعر بالنسبة لاستراتيجية حماس بطلاق الصواريخ؟

10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
غير متفق					محايد				متفق

غير ذلك.....

41- كيف تشعر بالنسبة لرفض حماس تمديد وقف اطلاق النار؟

10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
غير متفق					محايد				متفق

غير ذلك.....

42- كيف تشعر بالنسبة لسياسة حماس بعدم المفاوضة؟

10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
غير متفق					محايد				متفق

غير ذلك.....

43- كيف تشعر بالنسبة لسياسة حماس بعدم الاعتراف باسرائيل؟

10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
غير متفق					محايد				متفق

غير ذلك.....

44- كيف تشعر بالنسبة للتسمية لحماس بالمنظمة الارهابية؟

10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
شديد الغضب					محايد				سعيد

غير ذلك.....

45- كيف تشعر بالنسبة لاتفاقية تبادل الاسرة بين حماس واسرائيل؟

10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
شديد الغضب					محايد				سعيد

غير ذلك.....

46- كيف تشعر بالنسبة المشاريع الاجتماعية التي تقوم بها حماس؟

10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
شديد الغضب					محايد				سعيد

غير ذلك.....

47- هل شاركت ببرامج تعليمية عن حقوق الانسان بواسطة وكالة الغوث؟ -نعم -لا

APPENDIX C

Correlation Human Rights Knowledge and Course

Correlations

			Have you participated in the UNRWA human rights education program?	Are you familiar with the term ?human rights??	Are you familiar with the Geneva Convention?	Are you familiar with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights?
Kendall's tau_b	Have you participated in the UNRWA human rights education program?	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	1.000 .007 196	.194** .007 196	.091 .205 196	.171* .017 195
	Are you familiar with the term ?human rights??	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	.194** .007 196	1.000 .001 197	.239** .001 197	.353** .000 196
	Are you familiar with the Geneva Convention?	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	.091 .205 196	.239** .001 197	1.000 .000 197	.451** .000 196
	Are you familiar with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights?	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	.171* .017 195	.353** .000 196	.451** .000 196	1.000 .000 196

** . Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

* . Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

APPENDIX D

Correlation Violations and Support

Correlations

			Do you feel your most fundamental human right is being violated (is being humiliated)?	Fatah feelings yes no	Hamis feelings yes no	Hamis feelings yes no
Kendall's tau_b	Do you feel your most fundamental human right is being violated (is being humiliated)?	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	1.000 .000 190	-.092 .208 190	.044 .545 189	-.010 .888 190
	Fatah feelings yes no	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	-.092 .208 190	1.000 .000 197	.298** .000 196	.261** .000 197
	Hamis feelings yes no	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	.044 .545 189	.298** .000 196	1.000 .000 196	.755** .000 196
	Hamis feelings yes no	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	-.010 .888 190	.261** .000 197	.755** .000 196	1.000 .000 197

** . Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

APPENDIX E

Correlation Party Support

Correlations

			37. How do you feel about Fatah?	38. How do you feel about Hamas?	39. How do you feel about (the movement) Islamic Jihad?
Kendall's tau_b	37. How do you feel about Fatah?	Correlation Coefficient	1.000	.104	.202**
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.	.095	.001
		N	197	196	197
	38. How do you feel about Hamas?	Correlation Coefficient	.104	1.000	.600**
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.095	.	.000
		N	196	196	196
	39. How do you feel about (the movement) Islamic Jihad?	Correlation Coefficient	.202**	.600**	1.000
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.001	.000	.
		N	197	196	197

** . Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

APPENDIX F

Correlation Hamas Support and Policies

Correlations

			38. How do you feel about Hamas?	40. How do you feel about Hamas? rocket tactics (strategy)?	41. How do you feel about Hamas? refusal to extend the ceasefire?	42. How do you feel about Hamas? non-negotiation policy?	43. How do you feel about Hamas? non-recognition (of Israel) policy?	44. How do you feel about the terrorist label that has been given to Hamas?	45. How do you feel about the prisoner swap (exchange) conducted by (between) Hamas and Israel?	46. How do you feel about the social welfare projects Hamas carries out?
Kendall's tau_b	38. How do you feel about Hamas?	Correlation Coefficient	1.000	.420**	.412**	.438**	.335**	-.303**	.247**	.421**
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
		N	196	195	196	196	196	196	194	196
	40. How do you feel about Hamas? rocket tactics (strategy)?	Correlation Coefficient	.420**	1.000	.541**	.404**	.279**	-.358**	.279**	.352**
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
		N	195	196	196	196	196	196	194	196
	41. How do you feel about Hamas? refusal to extend the ceasefire?	Correlation Coefficient	.412**	.541**	1.000	.459**	.340**	-.266**	.212**	.300**
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.	.000	.000	.000	.001	.000
		N	196	196	197	197	197	197	195	197
	42. How do you feel about Hamas? non-negotiation policy?	Correlation Coefficient	.438**	.404**	.459**	1.000	.357**	-.224**	.291**	.442**
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000	.	.000	.001	.000	.000
		N	196	196	197	197	197	197	195	197
	43. How do you feel about Hamas? non-recognition (of Israel) policy?	Correlation Coefficient	.335**	.279**	.340**	.357**	1.000	-.260**	.334**	.339**
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000	.000	.	.000	.000	.000
		N	196	196	197	197	197	197	195	197
	44. How do you feel about the terrorist label that has been given to Hamas?	Correlation Coefficient	-.303**	-.358**	-.266**	-.224**	-.260**	1.000	-.138**	-.237**
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000	.001	.000	.	.037	.000
		N	196	196	197	197	197	197	195	197
	45. How do you feel about the prisoner swap (exchange) conducted by (between) Hamas and Israel?	Correlation Coefficient	.247**	.279**	.212**	.291**	.334**	-.138**	1.000	.304**
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.001	.000	.000	.037	.	.000
		N	194	194	195	195	195	195	195	195
	46. How do you feel about the social welfare projects Hamas carries out?	Correlation Coefficient	.421**	.352**	.300**	.442**	.339**	-.237**	.304**	1.000
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.
		N	196	196	197	197	197	197	195	197

** . Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

* . Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).