

# **HANDOVER OF PRT**

## **PROJECTS**

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# *Table of Contents*

<b>Table of Contents .....</b>	<b>2</b>
<b>Abstract.....</b>	<b>4</b>
<b>List of abbreviations .....</b>	<b>5</b>
<b>Acknowledgement .....</b>	<b>6</b>
<b>Chapter 1: Introduction and Research Questions.....</b>	<b>7</b>
1.1.1 Context: PRT.....	7
1.1.2 Projects .....	11
1.1.3 (Good) Governance .....	12
1.1.4 Ownership, Capacity Building and Sustainability.....	14
1.2.1 Societal and Scientific Relevance .....	16
1.2.2 Problem statement .....	17
1.2.3 Research Question.....	18
1.3.1 Operationalization .....	20
1.3.2 Methods.....	20
<b>Chapter 2: A model for Handover.....</b>	<b>24</b>
2.1.1. Available literature .....	24
2.1.2. Differences and similarities between military and development projects .....	25
2.1.3 A model for handover.....	26
2.1.4. How do factors for handover relate to sustainability and ownership?.....	30
2.2.1 Personnel .....	32
2.2.2 Material Capacity .....	33
2.3.1 Institutional capacity building.....	36
2.3.2. Information.....	38
2.4.1 Funding .....	40
2.5 Accountability .....	44
2.6 Participation .....	47
2.7 Additions and alterations to the model.....	50
<b>Chapter 3: Background .....</b>	<b>54</b>
3.1 History.....	54
3.2 Cultural information & Emergence of the Taliban.....	56
3.3 Desired situation and endstates .....	58
3.3.1 Uruzgan Campaign Plan.....	59
3.3.2 Effects .....	60
3.3.3 Timeframe .....	63
<b>Chapter 4: The Case Study .....</b>	<b>65</b>
4.1 Personnel .....	65
4.2 Material Capacity .....	68
4.3 Institutional capacity .....	71
4.4 Information.....	75
4.5 Funding .....	78
4.6 Participation .....	80
4.7 Accountability.....	81
4.8 Ownership .....	84
4.9 Sustainability.....	85
4.10 Coordination & Timeframe .....	86
<b>Chapter 5: Conclusion .....</b>	<b>87</b>
5.1 Factors for an effective handover from development literature.....	87
5.2 Factors for handover in military literature and possible adjustment.....	88

5.3 Planned and implemented activities in the model .....	89
5.4 Problems identified in the handover of governance projects.....	93
<b>Chapter 6: Discussion .....</b>	<b>96</b>
<b>References.....</b>	<b>98</b>
<b>Appendix.....</b>	<b>104</b>
Annex A – PRT organization .....	104
Annex B – Afgan National Development Strategy (visual) .....	105
Annex C - List of respondents.....	106
Annex D – Interview guide .....	107
Annex E - Model for handover.....	108
Annex F – Differences and similarities between military projects and development projects. ....	109
Annex G – Operationalization of factors from the model .....	110

## ***Abstract***

The focus of this research are the ‘governance’ projects of the Dutch PRT in Uruzgan, Afghanistan. Because these projects are more than the classic CIMIC projects and are intended to have a sustainable result the following research question was posed: What problems could arise during or after a handover of PRT projects? The projects that are the subject of this research are on the crossroads of the military and civil environment. For that reason it was decided to see whether it was possible to apply development literature on military projects. A model was derived from the primary model by Strachan: a model based on the handover of an operational development project to community management. The model was then consolidated with additional development literature. To ascertain that the model could also be applied to military projects, a literature study was conducted into military literature on handover. The factors for handover that are additional to the factors from the development model were then added to the model. This approach was necessary because few academic studies are done into development or military project handover.

Subsequently the model was used to study the handover of military projects from the Dutch PRT in Uruzgan. ‘Governance’ projects were chosen, because these are implemented by the military and are not CIMIC nor SSR. The case study consisted of data collection by means of interviews and a study of written sources, mainly military documents as far as they were available. The topics from the model served as an interview guide with members from PRT 6 and PRT 7.

The study shows that the model is indeed applicable to military projects and that the difference between the military projects and development projects that is so often emphasized is not as large as may seem. The nature of the projects allows for evaluation of the handover of military projects according to the same model as development projects.

### *List of abbreviations*

ANA	Afghan National Army
ANDS	Afghan National Development Strategy
ANP	Afghan National Police
CIMIC	Civil Military Cooperation
CSE	Cimic Support Element
DC	District Chief
DCoP	District Chief of Police
DDC	District Development Council
DEVAD	Development Advisor
ESCAP	Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific
GTZ	Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
INGO	International Non Governmental Organization
IO	International Organization
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force
MT	Mission Team
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO	Non Governmental Organization
POLAD	Political Advisor
PRT	Provincial Reconstruction Team
SSR	Security Sector Reform
TFU	Task Force Uruzgan
UNAMA	United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
USAID	United States Agency for International Development

## ***Acknowledgement***

“If you will call your troubles experiences, and remember that every experience develops some latent force within you, you will grow vigorous and happy, however adverse your circumstances may seem to be.”

James Russell Miller

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## ***Chapter 1: Introduction and Research Questions***

### **1.1.1 Context: PRT**

Soon after the intervention by Coalition Forces (United States/United Kingdom) in October 2001, the Bonn Summit took place to discuss the future of Afghanistan. Stabilization and reconstruction of the country was perceived as the most important task after the fall of the Taliban government, but due to the bad security situation it was decided to deploy an International Security Assistance Force (ISAF).<sup>1</sup> Through the assistance of the Afghan government in the maintenance of security in Kabul and its surrounding areas, ISAF was to help with the establishing and training of the new Afghan security forces. The mission was authorized in UN Security Council resolution 1386 and had a peace-enforcement mandate under Chapter VII. It was however not a UN force – the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) was established just a little later than ISAF in March 2002.<sup>2</sup> In August 2003 NATO took command of ISAF.<sup>3</sup>

The emergence of the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) started in November 2002 when the US selected the ‘Joint Regional Teams’ (JRT) as a plan for security and short-term peace stabilization of Afghanistan.<sup>4</sup> The mission in Afghanistan is not an average stabilization mission; the country has been ravaged by decades of internal conflict and there was still a very poor security situation. The JRTs were thus a solution for the problem of how to reconstruct in an unsafe environment. In response to the request of president Karzai and his government, the teams were renamed ‘Provincial Reconstruction Teams’, to emphasize the official structure of Afghanistan. President Karzai supposedly said: “Warlords rule regions; governors rule provinces.”<sup>5</sup> The initial PRT plan started out very small; until April 2003 there were only three teams in the whole of Afghanistan. The first PRT that started in early February 2003 even covered five provinces. However, plans to increase the number of PRTs were already in progress and in the summer of that same year the British PRT deployed in Mazar-i-Sharif together with other PRTs in other regions.<sup>6</sup> The teams were meant to be multinational from the start, in addition it was proposed that different coalition nations in turn

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1 The Bonn agreement (5 December 2001), Document no. S/2001/1154, Bonn.

2 UNAMA (2009), Background information. And NATO (2003), International Security Assistance Force mandate.

3 NATO (2003), International Security Assistance Force mandate.

4 Center for Humanitarian Cooperation (2003, May 31), The Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Afghanistan and its role in reconstruction.

5 McNerney, M.J. (2005). Stabilization and Reconstruction in Afghanistan: Are PRTs a Model or a Muddle?

6 Center for Humanitarian Cooperation (2003, May 31), The Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Afghanistan and its role in reconstruction.

And: Stapleton, B. J. (June 2003). The provincial reconstruction team plan in Afghanistan. A new direction?

would lead a PRT; this would also diminish the pressure on the US forces.<sup>7</sup> Initially, the goals of the PRTs were to extend the influence of the central government outside of Kabul, to pull Kabul based Non-governmental Organizations (NGO) and International organizations (IO) into the rural areas and to facilitate the conditions for reconstruction.<sup>8</sup> Over the years the objectives of the PRTs shifted; to extend the reach of the central government to the provinces still is one of the goals, but the goal to pull some NGOs and IOs out of Kabul disappeared when the ISAF mandate was extended in October 2003 to cover the whole of Afghanistan. 'Facilitating conditions for reconstruction' now goes together with reconstruction and the enhancement of security in the provinces was added to the list of objectives.<sup>9</sup> That security enhancement became one of the goals of the PRTs is not surprising: especially during the first years of the mission the security situation kept deteriorating and up until this date many regions in Afghanistan cannot be called 'safe'.<sup>10</sup> Although still evolving the objective of the PRTs now is:

“(... )helping the Afghan Authorities strengthen the institutions required to fully establish good governance and rule of law and to promote human rights. PRTs principal mission in this respect consists of building capacity, supporting the growth of governance structures and promoting an environment within which governance can improve.”<sup>11</sup>

There are currently 26 PRTs operating in Afghanistan, spread over 4 regions of command and they all fall under ISAF command. The regional command of the PRTs was stationed in Kabul to combine political, economic and military reconstruction efforts. However there is no actual PRT stationed there.<sup>12</sup> PRTs are not the only organizations that work on reconstruction; UNAMA and several national and international actors are also participating in reconstruction. Every PRT and country has its own approach for reconstruction; it is one of the core features of the PRT concept that there is a high degree of flexibility. Structure, operations and policy can vary according to location and lead-nation. It is also this flexibility that makes it hard to

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7 Stapleton, B. J. (June 2003). The provincial reconstruction team plan in Afghanistan. A new direction?

8 Ibid.

9 McNerney, M.J. (2005). Stabilization and Reconstruction in Afghanistan: Are PRTs a Model or a Muddle?

10 Stapleton, B. J. (June 2003). The provincial reconstruction team plan in Afghanistan. A new direction?

11 NATO (2003), International Security Assistance Force mandate.

12 McNerney, M.J. (2005). Stabilization and Reconstruction in Afghanistan: Are PRTs a Model or a Muddle?



maintain a common mission and to coordinate a diverse group of stakeholders.<sup>13</sup> Moreover, most lead-nations do not know the structure, operations or policy of other lead-nations.<sup>14</sup>

The Netherlands first took command over a PRT in Pol-e Khomri in the province of Baghlan in October 2004.<sup>15</sup> Its mission was practically identical to that of NATO's mission.<sup>16</sup> Its main activities were the execution of the 'Observation and Liaison teams'. After the PRT in Baghlan, the Netherlands took command over the PRT in Uruzgan in August 2006. It basically functioned the same way, with personnel rotations approximately every half year. This PRT too consisted of observation and liaison teams, although the actual composition of the PRT changed over time. From March 21<sup>st</sup> 2009 until the departure of the Netherlands from Uruzgan, the Dutch PRT was under civilian command; the civilian director, who is from the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, took over from the military director on March 21<sup>st</sup> 2009.<sup>17</sup> Both nature of the command and the composition of the PRT changed. With the PRT under civilian command, there existed a strict separation between the stability and security part of the mission on one side and the reconstruction and development part of the mission on the other side. The Battle Group focused on stability and security, whereas the PRT was working on the facilitation of reconstruction and development and on supporting the provincial authorities of Uruzgan.<sup>18</sup> The Mission Teams had several tasks, liaison and observation being just two of them. On patrol, the Mission Teams tried to build trust and relations with key leaders and assessed living conditions in order to decide on possible projects. But they also facilitated projects, coordinated structures, mediated in local clashes and made battle damage assessments and settlements.<sup>19</sup> The PRT consisted of four Mission Teams, a development advisor, political advisor, cultural advisor, a CIMIC Support Unit (CSE), several functional specialists and a Dutch Police Mentoring Team (PMT).<sup>20</sup> An organizational chart can be found in annex A. The PRT also had relations with several International Organizations (IOs) such as United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and the Australian government's overseas aid program (AUSAID).

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<sup>13</sup> Ibid.

<sup>14</sup> The author was present during a presentation of Dutch PRT veterans for a German colonel who did not know anything about the Dutch PRT activities. Meeting G9, Utrecht, October 19<sup>th</sup> 2009.

<sup>15</sup> Boef, M. (2009), Documentno. DVB/CV-383/2009, Stand van zaken brief Afghanistan. Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

<sup>16</sup> Homan, K. (2005) De krijgsman als ontwikkelingswerker?

<sup>17</sup> Development Cooperation also falls under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and will therefore not be mentioned separately.

<sup>18</sup> Annex D to Operational Guidelines 11418

<sup>19</sup> Presentation CO PRT 6 PRT Briefing (from Lkol. Wagtmans)

<sup>20</sup> Presentation MDV 9e les

They came in particularly handy when funding for projects is needed, because they have more funds available for individual projects.

In order to fulfill its mandate, the scope of work the PRT focused on is that of civil-military cooperation and liaison to civilian actors, but also a non-kinetic approach to security and the facilitation of development. Next to that they assisted the local Afghan government and tried to promote a link between the government and the population. Furthermore, the PRT engaged in the mentoring of the Afghan Police and the overall goal was to establish ownership over the reconstruction activities and to have cooperation between Afghans.<sup>21</sup> This scope of work fitted in the comprehensive approach the Netherlands and other countries had in mind for ISAF. This approach is called the 3D-approach and it was the policy behind the Dutch PRT. 3D focuses on the prime areas of post-conflict development and peace consolidation: Diplomacy, Defense and Development. This integrated approach combines all activities that aim to improve security and that promote sustainable development.<sup>22</sup> Setting up 'Good Governance' and improving rule of law thus fell under 'diplomacy', whilst SSR was part of 'defense'. In recent years it has become more apparent that reconstruction and the democratization process were often hampered by spoilers and, in the case of Afghanistan, by insurgents. So reconstruction could not be viewed separately from counterinsurgency in these kinds of operations; military as well as development activities need to go hand in hand to stabilize a state in conflict and to have sustainable development.

The 3D-approach can also be found in the Afghan National Development Strategy (ANDS, annex B). It leans on three pillars: Governance, Development and Security. Under these pillars fall several sectors. Security refers to a safe environment and (training of) the ANA and ANP, governance is covered by 'rule of law' and 'Good Governance' and the development pillar has six related sectors. Through the ANDS and the 3D-approach, the focus of the PRT was on 'Governance', 'Security' and 'Development'. That is also why the PRT had a Political and a Development Advisor from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The director of the PRT worked with the governor. The Political Advisor and the Mission Teams coached and worked with the District Chiefs; their goal was to enhance governance through promoting qualified leaders, the support of officials and the support of dialogue.<sup>23</sup> This was done by using development activities to support governance and to follow Afghan structures: mullahs and maliks were consulted and involved in decision making and the implementation of the

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21 Presentation General Briefing XO PRT (E) (from Lkol Wagtmans)

22 Gabriëlse, R. (2007) A 3D approach to Security and Development.

23 Presentation General Briefing XO PRT (E) (from Lkol Wagtmans)

projects. The security part of the PRT was controlled by the director of the PRT, the Political Advisor and the Police Mentoring Team (PMT). They worked with the Provincial and District Chief of Police, and their goal was to develop the Afghan National Army (ANA) and the Afghan National Police (ANP). This was done through mentoring and training of the ANP by the Police Mentoring Team and through dialogue with relevant chiefs. Through training and mentoring of the ANP, the provision of security did increasingly lie in the hands of Afghans themselves. This is also why the PRT more and more shifted to civilian personnel and focused more on development. Finally, the PRT extended its work to areas that were cleared of insurgents by the Battle Group. In this manner it slowly extended its influence, also called the inkblot strategy. The first actions in a cleared area were CIMIC activities.

### **1.1.2 Projects**

An explanation of the projects the PRT implemented will be discussed now, after which the subject of ‘governance’ is elaborated on. The PRT implemented several projects with the overall goal of enhancing ‘Governance’. The projects of the PRT were divided into several categories: Quick Impact Projects, CIMIC projects and PRT projects. The difference between these projects seems rather vague and is sometimes based on budget or donor and sometimes on the purpose the projects served.

Civil-military cooperation, as the full term reads, is “The coordination and cooperation, in support of the mission, between the NATO commander and civilian actors, including national population and local authorities, as well as international, national and non-governmental organizations and agencies”.<sup>24</sup> So called ‘quick impact projects’ are one of the projects that serve this goal by ‘winning the hearts and minds’ of the local population. Quick Impact Projects are by definition of non-recurrent nature, low in cost and have a short time span.<sup>25</sup> Although CIMIC is sometimes mistaken as the military doing development work, it should always be in support of the mission and thus consists of these ‘quick impact projects’, but also larger projects that exceed the characteristics of Quick Impact Projects.<sup>26</sup>

Examples of CIMIC projects are the building of small bridges and direct emergency support, as these directly influence the work environment and working conditions of the military. Development projects are initiated only after quick impact projects, because in

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<sup>24</sup> AJP-9(A) Doctrine for NATO Civil- Military Co-Operation (CIMIC)

<sup>25</sup> United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (2007, February 12), Quick impact projects.

<sup>26</sup> AJP-9(A) Doctrine for NATO Civil- Military Co-Operation (CIMIC)

contrast to Quick Impact Projects, support of the local population is a prerequisite for these development projects. This means one first needs the population on ones side in order to sustain the project. The development part was in the hands of the PRT director, the development advisor, the CSE, and the Mission Teams. The Dutch PRT did not actually perform reconstruction activities; it only assessed needs, decided on what projects would receive funding from the PRT and found contractors. It did not provide the manpower or material to execute the project. The exception was the training and mentoring of the District Chiefs and District Chiefs of Police.

The subject of this research is the handover of PRT projects that aim at ‘Governance’ and that are not defined as development projects but that have a time-frame that will outlast the mission. CIMIC projects therefore also fall outside the scope of this research, with an exception for the CIMIC projects that support the following projects. These projects will be referred to as military projects throughout this research. Military projects in this research are defined by all projects where military personnel initiates and implements projects and that are of recurrent nature or that are set in a long timeframe. These projects include the coaching and mentoring of District Chiefs and District Chiefs of Police and the CIMIC projects that support them. Although Security Sector Reform fits the ANDS pillar of ‘Governance and Rule of Law’, it is not part of this research. Including SSR would amplify the scope of this research to an extent that would compromise the possibility of an in-depth research of a single case study. This research is also not about the transfer of authority over the PRT itself.

### **1.1.3 (Good) Governance**

Because the projects that aimed at ‘Governance’ are subject of this research, a closer look is taken at ‘Good Governance’. Governance is the second pillar of the ANDS, joined by ‘Human Rights’ and ‘Rule of Law’. The term ‘governance’ often is precluded by the adjective ‘good’. ‘Good Governance’ is linked to (economic) development by the World Bank. Establishing it is actually the goal of the PRT, it is therefore important to know what ‘Good Governance’ constitutes to the PRT.<sup>27</sup> This would help to know when a sufficient amount of ‘Good Governance’ would be reached to have the projects handed over. According to the World Bank ‘Good Governance’ is conditional for structural economic growth and poverty reduction and is defined as:

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<sup>27</sup> Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Nederland in Afghanistan, BZDR6601/N/E

(...) the traditions and institutions by which authority in a country is exercised. This includes the process by which governments are selected, monitored and replaced; the capacity of the government to effectively formulate and implement sound policies; and the respect of citizens and the state for the institutions that govern economic and social interactions among them.<sup>28</sup>

The United Nations Development Program (UNDP) explains ‘Good Governance’ as participatory, transparent and accountable. It should be effective and equitable and promoting the rule of law. Broad consensus in society of what are political, social and economical priorities is also part of the ‘good’ in governance. Lastly even the poorest and most vulnerable should be heard in decision making.<sup>29</sup> But this is only one of many definitions and what is important is to know how ‘Good Governance’ was defined by the Dutch PRT. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is linked to the PRT through Development Advisors and the Ministry’s vision on ‘Good Governance’ may therefore be useful. In policy papers means, goals and actions are described that are expected to contribute to ‘Good Governance’, but a strictly specified definition seems to be lacking. From one of those policy papers the following means and goals can be extracted:

- strengthening of political parties and/or parliament
- strengthening of institutions
- to go against fixed interests
- to support change in society as to enlarge opportunities for development
- quality of government (capacity building)
- voice and accountability
- combat corruption
- strengthening of Rule of Law<sup>30</sup>

What is concrete now is a description, not a definition of ‘Good Governance’. Moreover, different organizations emphasize different aspects. It may not come as a surprise that the military emphasizes the security aspect of ‘Good Governance’: the government has the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force. SSR programs are therefore a way to

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28 Global Monitoring Report (2006), World Bank Institute.

29 Speth, J. G. (1997), Governance for Sustainable Human Development, A UNDP policy paper UNDP 1997.

30 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Nederland in Afghanistan, BZDR6601/N/E

enhance ‘Good Governance’. However, SSR is left out of this research, so for the purpose of this research the description of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs will be used.

Finally, PRTs were not supposed to create ‘Good Governance’, they merely helped to strengthen the institutions that are necessary for it. Which institutions are meant by this is not described, but some can be identified by the projects executed by the MT’s. For example, they promoted qualified leaders, the support of officials and the support of dialogue, mullahs and maliks were consulted and involved in decision making and the execution of the projects.<sup>31</sup> While the definition of ‘Good Governance’ still seems a little inconclusive, it may be clear what the task of the PRT was. How these were translated in an endgoal for ‘Good Governance’ (projects) will be covered in chapter three.

#### **1.1.4 Ownership, Capacity Building and Sustainability**

The effects of development need to endure in order to have sustainability, but how can this be achieved? Sustainability is usually linked to ownership and capacity building, the three concepts being sort of a trinity in development studies.<sup>32</sup> As the word ownership already suggests, people should feel that they own a project. It means that the beneficiaries of development programs feel that the results and the project belong to them and not an outsider. The rationale behind this is that if people feel that they ‘own’ the project, it represents their needs better and they are more committed to the project. Ownership also means that development projects meet the country’s needs and the people’s problems as they perceive them.<sup>33</sup> As Natsios puts it “When ownership exists and a community invests itself in a project, the citizens will defend, maintain and expand the project well after donors have departed.”<sup>34</sup> If that happens, sustainability is for a large part safeguarded. Ownership was an important part of the governance projects that were planned by the Dutch PRT; it can be seen in the consultation of mullahs and maliks. One consults the people from that community and gives them a voice in the shaping of a project; local social constructs can be important for this. Unofficial leaders may need to give their approval to projects as much as official leaders so that the project can truly be owned by the local population. The involvement in a project extends to the implementation phase of a project: why use (expensive) Western contractors if

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31 Presentation General Briefing XO PRT (E) (from Lkol Wagtmans)

32 Natsios, A. S. (2005). The nine principles of reconstruction and development. And: Rietjens, S.J.H., Bollen, M., Khalil, M. & Wahidi, S.F. (2009). Enhancing the footprint: Stakeholders in Afghan reconstruction.

33 Meyer, R.D. (2008). Provincial reconstruction teams aren’t for everyone:

When and Where PRTs can be a Useful Tool for SSTR Operations

34 Natsios, A. S. (2005). The nine principles of reconstruction and development.

you can hire local manpower? Even if local knowledge may not be sufficient, some people in the community can be trained so future projects can be implemented by them.<sup>35</sup> That leads us to the next section of the ‘development trinity’: capacity building.

During years of conflict, a lot of knowledge disappears together with the refugees. This knowledge may apply to various subjects and is a fundamental necessity if one wants to rebuild the country. In many cases refugees do not want to return to their country of origin, so knowledge has to be brought back in other forms: by educating, training and coaching new lawyers, doctors, policemen, governors or other. Capacity building is defined by Natsios as “the transfer of technical knowledge and skills to individuals and institutions so that they acquire the long-term ability to establish effective policies and deliver competent public services.”<sup>36</sup> But capacity building is more than just skills and knowledge; capacity building also refers to building institutional capacity. Just as ownership it is a very complex concept and it will be elaborated on in the next chapter. Capacity building can positively influence sustainable development because it enhances the countries’ ability to facilitate economic investments.<sup>37</sup> Capacity building in Afghanistan involves the training of the ANA and ANP, but also coaching of prison directors or District Chiefs.

The idea behind the 3D-approach is that the areas governance, security and development mutually reinforce each other. The 3D-approach therefore aims at sustainability of results of development and reconstruction activities; sustainability means that development and reconstruction programs are designed in such a way that their impact endures beyond the end of the project.<sup>38</sup> This also means that when the people who initiated and executed the project leave, the beneficiaries should not also abandon the project. They should be committed to it and be able to continue the project even without outside help. This can pose a problem if the project does not relate to the needs of the beneficiaries and their surroundings. In other words, those who design these programs should carefully reflect on whether the technologies, institutions or services they bring into an area will have a lasting effect and outlast a handover.

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35 Griffiths, J. & Lirhunde, C.B. (1983). Partnership between people and professionals in selecting community health workers.

36 Natsios, A. S. (2005). The nine principles of reconstruction and development.

37 Godfrey, M. et al. (2002). Technical assistance and capacity development in an aid-dependent economy: the experience of Cambodia.

38 Advisory Council on International Affairs (March 2009). Crisisbeheersingsoperaties in fragiele staten. De noodzaak van een samenhangende aanpak.

### **1.2.1 Societal and Scientific Relevance**

In the previous sections the specific goal of this research is discussed. In a wider context this study also aims to contribute to societal and scientific goals. From a societal viewpoint there are three contributions. Firstly, by investigating what has been achieved regarding ‘Good Governance’ in Uruzgan during the mission it could be easier to work with other partners towards maintaining those efforts. Secondly, by investigating and summarizing insights from development literature and applying this to military projects, this research can help to optimize military (CIMIC) efforts in future missions similar to ISAF. Thirdly, CIMIC is subject to some controversy in the development world, because it is said to be ‘military doing development work’. This is not entirely true and more importantly, the military are sometimes the only organization that can assist the local population, be it because of security reasons or access to a region. Identifying the strengths of the military in PRT projects could identify an area where there is stronger and more effective cooperation possible between the military and NGOs.

This research also aims to make scientific contributions. Firstly, there is little literature available on how the military hands over authority over non-military projects to civilians. There is some literature over transfer of authority after military missions, but little that refers to handover in the field of civil-military cooperation. There is also little in-depth empirical research available about how NGOs hand over responsibility or authority over development projects to their local counterparts. This is because for almost twenty years Western based NGOs no longer implement and unfold development projects themselves. Before that time, projects were initiated, unfolded and then handed over to the local population, but grassroots initiative has taken over the development arena since then.<sup>39</sup> This means that NGOs limit themselves to facilitation and funding of a project, making a handover no longer necessary.

However, it seems that the military in the form of the PRT is picking up the NGOs former way of working again. Yet there has been little research into the expansion of CIMIC efforts into a close cooperation with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This research will be a first step to combine or translate development literature with practical insights in the PRT-concept into scientific knowledge about military projects.

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<sup>39</sup> Grassroots initiative is a way of project development where ideas have to come from the people directly involved.



### 1.2.2 Problem statement

In the previous paragraph the context of this research was discussed. What is interesting in the description of the PRT regarding this research are the following points. Firstly, the PRT through its activities tried to be involved in the building of institutions.<sup>40</sup> Secondly, they assisted and supported the local Afghan government. Thirdly, they tried to establish ownership over the reconstruction activities. Lastly, CIMIC is not development work. Some of these points seem to contradict each other. The first two points take a lot of time; helping strengthen government institutions or establishing institutions and building government capacity takes a long time. This implies a long-term focus of the projects that serve these goals. But CIMIC-projects usually have a limited timeframe and the mission has a mandate limited in time. This possibly points to a different approach than CIMIC. The same applies to point three. “Establishing ownership” over something as vague and complicated as ‘Good Governance’ will need a secure and probably a long term approach. Point four raises some questions too. If CIMIC is not development work, than what is the difference between CIMIC and development projects? Is it *only* that CIMIC is in support of the mission or is there more? What kind of projects are the ‘Good Governance’ projects of the PRT?

The above leads to two assumptions:

- 1) The projects will probably have a long time-frame and outlast the mission, making a handover necessary/ desired.
- 2) CIMIC is not development work; therefore CIMIC literature will probably not offer enough context to study a handover.

Assumption two is based on the fact that CIMIC generally is about short-term projects, so a handover may not be a recurrent theme in military or CIMIC literature. In that case a handover will have to be studied from a mixed perspective, both military and development. The question arises whether literature on development project handover can be applied to military projects, or that the difference between the two is too large to bridge. Differences between military projects and development projects that come to mind are: relation to beneficiaries, motives for the project and to whom the project is transferred. These will be discussed more elaborately in chapter two. For now suffice to say that the projects by the PRT seem to fit the World Banks definition of a development project as described by Prakash:

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<sup>40</sup> Center for Humanitarian Cooperation (2003, May 31), The Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Afghanistan and its role in reconstruction.

“A project, ideally, consists of an optimum set of investment-oriented actions, based on comprehensive and coherent sector planning, by means of which a defined combination of human and material resources is expected to cause a determined amount of economic and social development. The components of a project must be precisely defined as to character, location and time. Both the resources required – in the form of finance, materials and manpower – and the general benefits – such as cost savings, increased production and institutional development – are estimated in advance. Costs and benefits are calculated in financial and economic terms or defined [if quantification is not possible] with sufficient precision to permit a reasoned judgment to be made as to the optimum set of actions.”<sup>41</sup>

### 1.2.3 Research Question

As it is not the goal or the intention of the military to stay long term committed to development activities, nor does the military have the means or possibility for this, how can their activities be sustainable? For their efforts to be sustainable, these have to be continued by other organizations, whether external or Afghan. After the end of their mission the task to further develop or reconstruct the country is left to NGOs, IOs and Afghans themselves. These groups will be referred to in this research as civilian stakeholders. In the case of the Dutch PRT governance projects in Uruzgan and the sustainability of achieved results, it is important to identify factors that could cause problems during or after a handover. So that after the departure of the Dutch troops, results will stay and the governance project does not fall apart. The main question in this research is therefore:

*What problems can be identified in the transfer of ‘Good Governance’ projects from the Dutch PRT to civilian stakeholders?*

To answer this question the following sub-questions are formulated:

- 1) Which factors for an effective handover have been identified in literature on development project handover that can be used to construct a model for handover?
- 2) Which factors for an effective handover have been identified in literature on military projects?

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<sup>41</sup> Prakash, D. (n.d.). Capacity building of agricultural cooperatives to meet the market and human resources development demands. A step by step approach.

- 3) To what extent are the factors for effective transfer of development projects applicable to military projects and how does the model, as constructed under 1, need to be adjusted with military literature to be applicable to military projects?
- 4) What are the activities and/or steps planned and implemented by the Dutch military in Uruzgan to prepare for a project handover to civilian stakeholders?
- 5) To what extent do the activities from the answer to question 4 fit the model as constructed under 1?

### 1.3.1 Operationalization

Before explaining how these questions will be answered, first the definition of a handover is discussed as well as how to define civilian stakeholders. What kind of projects are subject to this research was already defined at the end of paragraph 1.2.

With a project handover, authority over the project is also handed over. Authority is understood to be the full control over projects with the right and power to give orders and make others cooperate and to take specific action.<sup>42</sup> So, in this research when a project is handed over, it means that the PRT gave up its authority in favor of the local Afghan administration in a controlled or managed way. It is the ‘controlled or managed way’ that is most important. The handover of authority over a project can be as short and practical as one desires, but with an eye on sustainability of the results already achieved and with regard to long-term change, this cannot be rushed. ‘Handover’ thus also entails the sustainability of the projects.<sup>43</sup>

Civilian stakeholders are defined as local Afghan officials or representatives of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan on the provincial and district level. The official lines of government extend to the District Chiefs. Under him, his Staff and District Staff of Departments are positioned. Since the Dutch PRT tried to enhance governance through promoting qualified leaders, it seems likely that these are the people to whom the authority over these projects was handed over to. It is also possible that these projects were handed over to community management. As the unofficial structures of governance have been relied on by Afghans for a long time, and in a lot of cases still are relied on, the importance of unofficial leaders (mullah’s and maliks) to the local population cannot be downplayed. Yet another possibility is that neither local Afghan officials nor the community are ready or prepared enough to deal with these projects. In that case, an intermediary party such as an NGO or a follow-up nation would run the projects.

### 1.3.2 Methods

In this section the methods that are used in this research will be elaborated on. As the research question might already suggest, central to this research is the case study of Dutch military projects, performed by the PRT in Uruzgan, Afghanistan. First the motivation to do a case

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<sup>42</sup> Partly based on the Oxford American Dictionary

<sup>43</sup> Strachan, P. (1996). Handing over an operational project to community management in North Darfur, Sudan.

study will be discussed followed by a description of the methods used. This section ends with a discussion on how these methods will lead to answers to the research question and its sub questions.

### **Case study**

The main question of this research is what kind of problems might occur during or after a handover of military projects. The focus is on the Dutch PRT, PRTs from other nations are not included in this research. Other PRTs and their projects are not included because this would have lead to a broader or more general research, whereas the research objective is to have an in-depth case study of the handover of projects as defined in paragraph 1.2. To make sure that an in-depth research was possible, it was decided to have a single case study. “Single cases provide for in-depth investigation and rich description. Multiple case-designs allow literal or theoretical replication and cross-case comparison”.<sup>44</sup> As this case involves a subject that has not been studied before, it is preferred to have a single case study. The single case being: application of a model for handover for coaching of District Chiefs and District Chiefs of Police in the subject of ‘governance’ and the CIMIC projects that support that.

### **Literature research**

To answer sub question 1 and 2 the first part of the research will consist of a literature study. The goal of this literature study is to get an overview of the available theory on project handover, both military and development. The first phase thus has an exploratory design.<sup>45</sup> As became clear from a pre-research search to find suitable literature, little literature on handover of military projects exists. In part, this can be attributed to the fact that the PRT concept is relatively new and not all facets of it have yet been researched extensively. The other reason is that the project this research focuses on exceeds the average CIMIC project, so CIMIC literature might not offer enough substance to study the subject at hand. Because of the probability of little literature on military project handover, it was decided to do both a literature study into project handover in development literature and military literature.

From the literature on development project handover, a model was constructed. This model consists of factors and steps to follow in preparation for a project handover and possible problematic issues before or during a handover. Where possible this model was based on theory on the phases of a complete process of handover. Where needed extra

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<sup>44</sup> Tellis, W. (1997). Introduction to Case Study.

<sup>45</sup> Verschuren, P. & Doorewaard, H. (2005). Designing a research project.

information was added on separate phases or factors. One of the major points in project handover theory is that it will lead to a continuation of the projects or the continuation of intended policy. For this reason, literature on sustainable development was also included as this relates to continuation of projects or at least the project's effects. At the end of chapter two the model will be presented.

As theory on a phased process of military project handover was more limited than that of its development counterpart, this literature was not used to construct a similar model. Instead, the factors and steps that can be derived from theory on military project handover will be used to compare to the model constructed as to check the assumption from paragraph 2.2: namely, that the projects subject to this research can be researched with development literature. This would lead to an answer to both subquestion two, three and five.

### **Data collection**

Reports and documents from the Ministry of Defense were collected, to get an overview of the activities and steps *planned* to prepare for a project handover. To get an overview of the activities and steps *implemented* to prepare for a project handover, interviews were held. The following paragraph will elaborate on the reports and documents used. An explanation on how these relate to the objectives, end states and goals described in chapter three is also included. The interviews and the respondents are also described in the following paragraph. The answers to the interviews and information from the written sources will be discussed in chapter four and chapter three respectively. This will answer subquestion four.

### **Interviews**

Semi-structured interviews were held to get an overview of the steps and activities implemented to prepare a project handover. Interviews were held with PRT members of PRT 6 and PRT 7. This way of data collection was chosen because of limited access to information on the military activities of the PRT concerning governance projects. The reports of the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs seemed not specific enough and lacked certain information such as key players. This is a problem, because this research focuses on the micro level of the project; it is the people involved and their tasks that are important.

To get a complete overview, respondents were chosen from several PRT functions. Interviews were held with PRT commanders, Mission Team commanders, Deputy Mission Team commanders, members of the CIMIC Support Element, Functional Specialists Rule of

Law and Civil Administration, Political Advisors, Development Advisor, Military Advisor and members of the Dutch Consortium Uruzgan. A list of all respondents can be found in annex C. It was not possible to speak to all relevant persons that worked under PRT 6 and PRT 7, because some did not want to cooperate with the research and others could not be interviewed because of time limitations or other engagements.

Almost all interviews were held in January 2010, with some interviews prior to that date in order to orientate on the subject. During processing of the interviews it seemed that information on one or two aspects lacked and that others needed extra information from another perspective. Therefore some other interviews were held a little later to correct this want in information. Except for three interviews that were conducted via phone or Skype, all interviews were conducted at the workplace of the respondents and lasted about an hour.

The interview- guide is semi-structured and was also adjusted after interviews.<sup>46</sup> This was done to allow for connected subjects and relevant new questions to come up. The interview- guide mirrors the model: questions about projects, project-related tasks and information are clustered under headings that are in the model. This gave the opportunity to verify answers by other respondents and to cross-reference information. It was expected that some information would be restricted and that respondents therefore would not answer the question. This luckily only happened once and it could be explained by the fact that the answers during the interviews did not relate to specific dates, locations or persons, other than the local government representatives central to this research: the District Chiefs and District Chiefs of Police. The answers to the questionnaires are processed in chapter four. The interview-guide can be found in the appendix (Annex D).

### **Written sources**

To ascertain in-depth research it was decided to add written sources to the data collection. According to Verschuren en Doorewaard, this ‘triangulation of methods’ would help achieving depth.<sup>47</sup> Although there are restrictions on information from the area of operations (Uruzgan) it was possible to attain information on implemented or planned activities by the PRT from written sources. This information was retrieved from military documents and documents that explained the Uruzgan Campaign Plan and the Focal Paper. A more extensive description of these documents can be found in chapter three.

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<sup>46</sup> Gorden, R. L. (1992). Basic interviewing skills.

<sup>47</sup> Verschuren, P. & Doorewaard, H. (2005). Designing a research project.

## ***Chapter 2: A model for Handover***

### **2.1.1. Available literature**

There is limited literature on handover of military projects to civilian stakeholders. The majority of it are descriptions of handover of administrative tasks to the relevant authorities. The military could have taken over such tasks after a humanitarian emergency or during an intervention. Furthermore, these tasks are not the focus of this research because they are only temporarily and not meant as long-term reconstruction projects. The counterpart does not necessarily receive training by the military. As the focus on this research is on handover of projects, the use of CIMIC literature is also limited. CIMIC projects have a short timeframe and seldom require an elaborate handover.<sup>48</sup> There seems to be little literature about handover of long term military projects that have an emphasis on reconstruction or development.

There are two exceptions to this apparent lack of suitable literature. The first, an article by Bessler, tries to identify criteria for handover after relief operations. He states that up until now, disengagement criteria differ from operation to operation.<sup>49</sup> This implies that there is indeed no model for handover of military missions at all, let alone for PRT projects. The second one, a report by the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, is about the handover of reconstruction efforts related to assets.<sup>50</sup> The relevance of this article lies in the fact that it is not about the mission itself, but about reconstruction activities that might as well be implemented by other organizations, such as an NGO. However, this article is about assets and not about abstract concepts or institutions such as 'Good Governance'. These two articles will be used because the first identifies possible factors for handover which can also be of use for this research. The second will be used because it relates to reconstruction efforts, which relates to the work of the PRT.

As there is no existing model for the handover of military projects to their civilian counterparts, a model based on a development perspective will be used in this research. This may appear a little fallible. The similarities and differences between military and development projects will therefore be discussed to explain why a development perspective

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48 AJP-9 (A) Doctrine for NATO Civil- Military Co-Operation (CIMIC).

49 Bessler, J. (2008). Defining criteria for handover to civilian officials in relief operations.

50 Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, (2008, April 28), Transferring reconstruction projects to the government of Iraq: Some progress made but further improvements needed to avoid waste.



seems useful. Next, suitable development literature will be introduced and explained, followed by the model itself and possible additions to it.

### **2.1.2. Differences and similarities between military and development projects**

In chapter one it was already stated that development literature is used to research military projects. It is important to take into account the difference between military and development projects and thus possible implications for a handover. Both NGOs and the military emphasize differences between their approaches. An overview of differences between the two types of organizations, based on interviews with NGO members and military personnel, is included in the appendix. There are three things of importance to discuss here.

Firstly, it may seem that NGOs have a more reciprocal or equal relationship with the local community, because of emphasis on grassroots initiative and ownership. It could appear that NGOs do not initiate a project without consulting stakeholders or without asking their permission. But there are also cases where the military has close cooperation and deliberation with the local population. This difference therefore might be applicable to some military projects, but not generally applicable to all.

Secondly, considering the motives, the starting-point for NGOs and the military to implement projects seems very different. The PRT implements projects because there is a foreign military presence and the PRT is part of a military operation; the mandate is the starting point. NGOs often have more idealistically based motivations, like poverty reduction or access to education. It is however questionable whether motivation is actually of influence for the successful handover and sustainability of a project.

Lastly, essential to the PRTs is the visibility of the Afghan government and the restoration of government control in remote areas. The PRT follows government structures and are likely to handover to these structures, whereas among NGOs there seems to be a tendency to hand over to communities. An example of this is the handover of a smallholder's project in Sudan to community management.<sup>51</sup> However, there are also cases where a development project is picked up by government structures because of funding arrangements.

It could be concluded that there are some differences, but that these are not generally applicable. What applies to development projects can sometimes also apply to military

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<sup>51</sup> Strachan, P. (1996). Handing over an operational project to community management in North Darfur, Sudan.

projects. The distinction thus is hard to determine. Moreover, concepts such as ownership, capacity building and sustainability, which are strongly related to development projects, are also used for military projects. In light of the recurrent references to these concepts, the goals and the (presumably) long time-frame attached, development literature seems to be applicable to military projects in Afghanistan. A definitive answer to this question will be given in chapter five.

### **2.1.3 A model for handover**

There is only specific information about handovers of development projects by NGOs. This information is about factors that influence handovers, the sustainability of a handover or what breeds success in a development project. The phased *process* of handover as such seems to receive little attention in literature. This could partly be attributed to a different approach of NGOs. Grassroots initiative has taken over the development agenda: the initiative has to come from the local population or, if initiated by a (local) NGO, in close collaboration with the local population. A handover from initiator to members is therefore less necessary. The focus in literature is on different parts of what can contribute to successful management of a project by local stakeholders: capacity building, technical training, sustainability, ownership and information sharing. These factors are important to keep track of during or after a handover, because they are said to influence sustainability and independent functioning of the project.

Capacity building is a recurring theme in development literature and is referred to as an approach to people-centered development. Capacity building is used in a variety of projects and sometimes named technical cooperation.<sup>52</sup> It applies to different activities, one of which is training on the job of local employees by an expatriate expert. Capacity building can also consist of other approaches, depending on the kind of project and project initiator. Capacity building for effective democratic local governance for example, can also comprise of organizational strengthening, institutional learning, exposure, horizontal sharing and solidarity.<sup>53</sup> Capacity building is also a lengthy process in which motivation and incentives for ‘trainees’ are fundamentally important for its success; continuing on Bandyopadhyay: “Capacity can be defined as the totality of inputs needed by an actor to realize its

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<sup>52</sup> Morgan, P. & Baser, H. (1993, July), Making technical co-operation more effective. New approaches by the international development community.

<sup>53</sup> Bandyopadhyay, K. K. & Tandon, R. (n.d.). Capacity building for effective democratic local governance. Experiences from India.

purposes.”<sup>54</sup> Bandyopadhyay distinguishes three types of capacity building: material capacity, intellectual capacity and institutional capacity. His definitions of the three types of capacity are made in relation to governance, which is very useful as this research deals with the handover of governance projects. The definitions are:

**Material Capacity:** This includes material resources, physical assets, funds, systems and procedures to mobilize revenues; access and control over physical and natural resources and infrastructure; systems and procedures required for adequate management of funds and such infrastructure.

**Intellectual Capacity:** This implies capacity to think, reflect and analyze reality independently and in pursuit of self-defined purposes of local self-governance.

**Institutional Capacity:** This implies procedures, systems, structure, staffing, decision-making, transparency and accountability, planning, implementation and monitoring. It also includes mechanisms for building linkages with other institutions and actors.<sup>55</sup>

‘Capacity’ will be further discussed with the use of other articles that focus on one of these types of capacity.

Just as any project, development projects need monitoring and evaluation to check how the project and its participants are performing. A recurring factor in development literature is therefore monitoring and evaluation as part of a project and as a means to increase management capacities among participants of a project.<sup>56</sup> According to Lieberman, Miller, Eckerson, and Kellar, information capabilities can be seriously reduced after a financial handover, causing the project to perform less well as possible.<sup>57</sup> Capacity (for information) is therefore a factor that should receive sufficient attention when preparing a handover and will be included in the model.

Several articles argue that development organizations advocate accountability as a means to help project members become independent from donor help. Both Hauge and Brett state that holding people accountable for the functioning of a project is a way to build management capacity.<sup>58</sup> It is also a way to secure that the project is in safe hands and that funding arrangements are not misused. Because accountability is named as being an

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<sup>54</sup> Ibid.

<sup>55</sup> Bandyopadhyay, K. K. & Tandon, R. (n.d.). Capacity building for effective democratic local governance. Experiences from India.

<sup>56</sup> Feuerstein, M.T. (1988), Finding the methods to fit the people: Training for participatory evaluation.

<sup>57</sup> Lieberman, J., Miller, D., Eckerson, D. & Kellar, H. (1987, December), An evaluation of the factors of sustainability in the Gambia mass media and health practices project.

<sup>58</sup> Hauge, A.O. (2002). Accountability – to what end? And: Brett, E. A. (2003). Participation and accountability in development management.

important factor for ending donor-dependence it will also be included in the model for handover.

Participation receives a lot of attention in relation with the aforementioned factors. Brett states that capacity building depends on participation and that it would improve accountability.<sup>59</sup> Secondly, capacity building by way of 'training on the job' could only take place if members participate in the project. Thirdly, according to Prakash it would also be a way to check if a project is indeed responding to the need of the local population.<sup>60</sup> Since participation is strongly linked in development literature to the other factors it too is included in the model.

These factors are recurrent themes in development literature because of their importance for sustainability of a project when handed over to local stakeholders or project members. Although the above mentioned authors do relate them to some of the other factors, none of them relates them to all factors that could influence a handover of development projects. There is one article that stands out and which offers a possible model for the handover of a project. Strachan describes the handover of a development project established by Oxfam in Kebkabiya, Darfur where management of the project is handed over to the local community.<sup>61</sup> His model includes all the aforementioned factors and it describes the complete process of handing over the project; from the decision to plan a handover to a look at future possible threats to sustainability of the project. His article is suitable as a basis for the model, because he describes the process, whereas the other authors describe only one factor, albeit with an indication how they relate to the other factors. The integral model of Strachan preempts this. The article is very comprehensive and his model gives an overall image of the process of handover which is divided into 3 main phases: operational, management and financial handover. Because of the division into three phases, the model could be easier adjusted to fit another kind of project; phases could be added or deleted to the specific demands of other projects. This would be more difficult with a model that is an integrated whole. Precisely because of its conceptional division into three phases, the model detaches from the strict development perspective making it also applicable to military projects. Furthermore, motives and ground for the project are not taken into account in the model. Strachan's model is based on a development project, but what exactly constitutes a development project is rather vague as was explained in chapter one.

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59 Brett, E. A. (2003). Participation and accountability in development management.

60 Prakash, D. (n.d.). Capacity building of agricultural cooperatives to meet the market and human resources development demands. A step by step approach.

61 Strachan, P. (1996). Handing over an operational project to community management in North Darfur, Sudan.

Strachan's three phases cover several factors; operational handover consist of 'personnel' and 'material additions', management handover consist of 'management training' and 'monitoring mechanism', financial handover covers 'funding arrangements'. Finally, 'ownership' is mentioned as something that needs to be established before management handover is completed. If not, then the project would risk being run on behalf of the community, rather than by it.<sup>62</sup> Based on his textual model, a visual model was created which can be found in the appendix (annex D).

Strachan's model is based on the case of a smallholder's organization in Darfur and the explicit factors within the phases mirror this. In this research the model will be consolidated with other development literature on the same factors, although they are frequently referred to under different names. One of them is 'capacity building'; Strachan brings up activities, such as management training and material additions, which in development literature commonly is referred to as 'capacity building'. Yet Strachan never uses this term in his article. Because the term is used in other articles and relevant for military projects, it seems appropriate to apply this term to those activities. Institutional capacity seems to correlate most with what Strachan describes as 'management training', and material capacity with 'material additions'.

The monitoring mechanism that Strachan describes and which is necessary for a successful management handover seems to correlate with what Lieberman, Miller, Eckerson, and Kellar and Feuerstein name 'information needs'. 'Monitoring mechanism' is therefore renamed 'information' in the model.

Accountability is briefly touched upon by Strachan when discussing democratic accountability, because of the democratic structure of the project.<sup>63</sup> As both Hauge and Brett state that holding people accountable is a way to build management capacity and Bandyopadhyay places it under institutional capacity it seems too important to leave out. Because Strachan mentions accountability again when alternative solutions for funding are discussed, it is placed under both management as financial handover and it will be discussed in relation to these factors.

This finally leads to the model for handover in figure 1. The model can be read as the process of handover (the arrow) moving through the phases of handover placed in blocks, namely operational, management and financial. Participation is placed under the model, because it is embedded in the project itself and not a separate part of a handover.

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<sup>62</sup> Ibid.

<sup>63</sup> Strachan, P. (1996). Handing over an operational project to community management in North Darfur, Sudan.

Accountability and sustainability (the outcome of the handover) are both referred to in Strachan's article but are not elaborately discussed. However, these will be included in the model as they seem to be important in other development literature used in this research and are related to other factors of importance.




Figure 1: model for handover

#### 2.1.4. How do factors for handover relate to sustainability and ownership?

First will be explained how the model relates to sustainability and ownership, before discussing the model. These factors are discussed in this section, because they are not so much factors that can be dealt with in specific actions, but need to be kept in mind when deciding on other factors, for example 'information'. They are themes that are always present in the background. Sustainability is a goal of handover: if the handover is successful, the project and its results will be sustainable. Sustainability refers to the continuation of the project (or integration into daily life or institutions) after handover. Strachan argues that a handover can only be sustainable if it is treated as a complex set of activities, requiring a long time framework, much like any other developmental process.<sup>64</sup> Sustainability is also important to military projects, because when (Dutch) ISAF troops leave, the project should be continued by its members, possibly with help from NGOs in the beginning.

Ownership is not elaborated on, but Strachan states that ownership should be established before handover is completed otherwise the project will not be rooted deeply

<sup>64</sup> Strachan, P. (1996). Handing over an operational project to community management in North Darfur, Sudan.

enough in the community. Ownership is a precondition; it is only briefly touched upon in the financial handover part of Strachan's model and is relevant for the success of the project itself, it seems less relevant for the process of handover. Even so, ownership is important for development *and* military projects. Natsios emphasizes the importance of ownership in US policy in Afghanistan when he states that it takes longer to engage local leaders in their own development than to impose from the outside, but that the results are better.<sup>65</sup> Because it is not explicitly included in Strachan's model it will not be discussed in the next section. Despite this, 'ownership' will be included in the interviews, because it is important for the sustainability of the project after handover and is therefore relevant for this research.

Before presenting the model, a short explanation on terms used: the local stakeholders who are supposed to benefit from the project and who participate in it are referred to as 'project members'. The organization that implemented the project and from who the project will be taken over is referred to as 'founder'.

The model itself will now be presented and described. Relevant military literature on project handover and possible alterations to the model, based on military literature will be discussed at the end of this chapter.

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<sup>65</sup> Natsios, A. S. (2005). The nine principles of reconstruction and development.

## 2.2 OPERATIONAL HANDOVER

### 2.2.1 Personnel

As may be clear from the introduction, the problem that could arise during operational handover has to do with replacing donor staff with local staff. During operational handover staff will be employed by the project organization instead of the by the donor. As this implies a cutback in salary, there is little incentive for donor-employees to stay with the project, if alternative employment by the donor or in the region is available.<sup>66</sup> Strachan does not clarify whether staff is expatriate or local, only the difference in payment between donor and project organization. Other articles on development project specifically refer to the problem of difference in salary between expatriate staff and local staff.<sup>67</sup>

Donor employees are frequently expatriates and their wages are simply too high for the project organization to pay without sufficient funding.<sup>68</sup> To keep them focused on the task they need other incentive like higher wages, mainly because they have little linkage to the community.<sup>69</sup> This could be preempted by finding a sufficient capable local employee who has more linkage to the area. However, it might be hard to find such a person with the sufficient knowledge, and sometimes the project has a technical level for which local knowledge is not sufficient. In those cases expatriates could stay on a project for a very long time, but if local and expatriate (outsiders) work on the same project together, the level of their wage can become reason for ill feelings as the expatriate will earn several times more than their local colleagues or counterparts.<sup>70</sup> Those ill feelings may negatively influence their dedication to the project thus endangering the sustainability of the project.

High wages become a bigger problem once the project will be handed over. After handover another way of funding project activities needs to be found. In many projects it is the government that takes over funding, either partially or completely.<sup>71</sup> As the government does not have the same resources as the former donor, cuts will have to be made in project spending.<sup>72</sup> As in most development countries, wages on government-paid jobs are relatively low. Paychecks are the first way to cut back costs while not cutting back on the project itself. This sometimes means that local staff will need to complement their income with other

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66 Strachan, P. (1996). Handing over an operational project to community management in North Darfur, Sudan.

67 Muriithi, N. & Crawford, L. (2003) Approaches to project management in Africa: implications for international development projects.

68 Strachan, P. (1996). Handing over an operational project to community management in North Darfur, Sudan.

69 Ibid. And: Muriithi, N. & Crawford, L. (2003) Approaches to project management in Africa: implications for international development projects.

70 Muriithi, N. & Crawford, L. (2003) Approaches to project management in Africa: implications for international development projects,

71 Olken, B. A. (2007). Monitoring corruption: Evidence from a field experiment in Indonesia.

72 Muriithi, N. & Crawford, L. (2003) Approaches to project management in Africa: implications for international development projects.



earnings; this is referred to as ‘moonlighting’. Staff can do that by not spending all their time on the project, but partially on other jobs or alternative livelihoods, thus reducing the effort spent on the project which could endanger the sustainability of the project. Moreover, other jobs on the side could severely influence their work, not only in the hours dedicated to the project, but also on the quality of the work itself. The job could be poorly executed by lack of time, or corruption could seep in to compliment the low wage. In many cases, corruption takes the form of an added tax for providing services, and in some cases the staff might dedicate the project entirely to benefiting only themselves and their families.<sup>73</sup>

Low wages and thus less time available for the project not only influences the quality of the handover, but also its duration.<sup>74</sup> Because their local counterparts cannot dedicate as much time to the project, it is likely that a handover period needs to be longer than strictly necessary. If not, one risks hurrying the handover and not addressing all relevant issues or addressing them too little. ‘Training on the job’ of local counterparts risks being insufficient. Another way to cut back costs is a reduction in staff, but this will directly influence the project as less people will have to do the same amount of work or even more. Strachan does not touch upon this issue, but it is imaginable that this too could influence the entire process of handover as it will slow down all phases.

### **2.2.2 Material Capacity**

In order for a handover to at least have a chance of success, there must be a critical level of capacity. Capacity building in development projects aims at reaching this critical level specifically in terms of human capital, but operational capacity is just as necessary as it influences the project’s progress immediately. For example, an agriculture program is not likely to be successful if there is not enough water for the farmers to irrigate their crops. According to Strachan, when donors are still closely involved in the running of the project this does not pose a problem; when donors signal the need for certain supplies, they can easily obtain and transport them to locations needed.<sup>75</sup> This is perhaps more difficult for their local counterparts. A solution to this problem is the addition of certain requisites. In the Kebkabiya smallholders’ project, the project participants would at times need drugs for their livestock which was harder for them to acquire than for the donors. The establishment of a

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<sup>73</sup> Olken, B. A. (2007). Monitoring corruption: Evidence from a field experiment in Indonesia.

<sup>74</sup> Cliff, J. (1993) Donor-dependence or donor control?: The case of Mozambique. In: Community Development Journal, 28(3).

<sup>75</sup> Ibid.

veterinary pharmacy circumvented this problem and it even added to the project's income as it made a small profit.<sup>76</sup>

Lieberson, Miller, Eckerson and Kellar add to this, that for a project to be independently sustainable a country must offer the necessary human, material and financial resources required for the project to be successful.<sup>77</sup> Here, infrastructure also qualifies as material resources, because the Kebkabiya example shows that logistical challenges may be a reason why some goods that are vital to the project may be difficult to obtain due to bad infrastructure. Following Rondinelli, problems also arise when the government falls short because of other reasons, such as corruption, inter-ministerial rivalries or conflict.<sup>78</sup> It may then be that goods never reach the project. Nevertheless the ability of the government of a development country to provide the necessary infrastructure -or even some other development services, like training facilities- is very limited, as Lieberson, Miller, Eckerson, and Kellar state.<sup>79</sup> Sometimes a simple demand in government services like the provision of necessary veterinary drugs implies other demands that the government is not capable of meeting. Even if the project organization would pay for the costs of the aforementioned drugs, the stocking and logistical demands on distribution would add so much to the costs that it would become too expensive.<sup>80</sup> The project organization would then again need external donors. Even more, it would pose too great a cost for the government itself as development countries usually do not have adequate budgets.

Cliff concludes that the choice of project technology should reflect the level of development in a given country.<sup>81</sup> A highly successful technique in a Western country may be depended on other factors that are just not available in a development country. Muriithi emphasizes the use of local appropriate technologies as a key issue, as people must also be able to use these technologies.<sup>82</sup> This applies as much to skills as to actual equipment. Project equipment supplied by the donor may prove to be inappropriate to local conditions and

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76 Strachan, P. (1996). Handing over an operational project to community management in North Darfur, Sudan.

77 Lieberson, J., Miller, D., Eckerson, D. & Kellar, H. (1987, December), An evaluation of the factors of sustainability in the Gambia mass media and health practices project.

78 Rondinelli, A. D. (1976). International assistance policy and development project administration: The impact of imperious rationality. P. 588.

79 Lieberson, J., Miller, D., Eckerson, D. & Kellar, H. (1987, December), An evaluation of the factors of sustainability in the Gambia mass media and health practices project.

80 Cliff, J. (1993) Donor-dependence or donor control?: The case of Mozambique.

81 Lieberson, J., Miller, D., Eckerson, D. & Kellar, H. (1987, December), An evaluation of the factors of sustainability in the Gambia mass media and health practices project.

82 Muriithi, N. & Crawford, L. (2003) Approaches to project management in Africa: implications for international development projects. P. 317.

needs.<sup>83</sup> It could be possible that the car that was very often used when donors were running and funding the project, may now be rusting away, because it does not meet recipients needs, like a bigger car or a more fuel efficient one. Muriithi calls this ‘Rolls Royce type project solutions’: the preference for overseas suppliers that are perceived to be of better quality.<sup>84</sup> But focus should be on what works for people in local terms. People are to use equipment and techniques that are not too exotic to them. A very good reason for this is that equipment needs to be maintained locally, so material for reparations needs to be at hand or at least easily obtainable.

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83 Lieberman, J., Miller, D., Eckerson, D. & Kellar, H. (1987, December), An evaluation of the factors of sustainability in the Gambia mass media and health practices project.

84 Muriithi, N. & Crawford, L. (2003) Approaches to project management in Africa: implications for international development projects. P. 318.

## **2.3 MANAGEMENT HANDOVER**

In this part of Strachan's model mainly capacity building is discussed. During this phase a focus on institutional strengthening is necessary: are staff and management able to deal with the tasks at hand? If not, management handover cannot be completed, because for a management handover to be successful, the project organization should be able to manage the project independently. As pointed out, there is a difference in institutional and intellectual capacity. During management handover, both are addressed.

### **2.3.1 Institutional capacity building**

Management handover includes institutional capacity building; it can be a byproduct of the introduction of equipment. Lieberman, Miller, Eckerson and Kellar explains how in a certain health project a radio station was established to inform people about the project.<sup>85</sup> By working with project personnel at the radio station, local employees increased their technical skills and understanding of radio making significantly. It has to be stated though, that this is more intellectual capacity. Mostly capacity building is intentionally and it can be stated that operational capacity and human capacity are closely linked, as people need to know how to work with the techniques that are introduced. Sometimes the introduction of new technology may be the core objective of a project, which makes it crucial for the success of a project to teach people how to deal with that new technology.

The availability of trained personnel and institutional strengthening are fundamental for the success of a project. According to Muriithi, failure of the project is very often attributed to these factors.<sup>86</sup> But capacity building is more, it is also ensuring that people can run the project independently from donors and possibly even design and implement new projects.<sup>87</sup> Teaching people to work with a certain technique can take a long time and may be challenging, but it can also be done with relative ease, depending on the complexity of the technique. Learning a new technique for agriculture may be a lot simpler than learning management skills, especially since management theories also depend on cultural values; Muriithi points out that some management theories simply won't work in African culture, because it fails to recognize cultural realities like the importance of family networks.<sup>88</sup> This

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85 Lieberman, J., Miller, D., Eckerson, D. & Kellar, H. (1987, December), An evaluation of the factors of sustainability in the Gambia mass media and health practices project.

86 Muriithi, N. & Crawford, L. (2003) Approaches to project management in Africa: implications for international development projects.

87 Eade, D. (1997). Capacity-building: An approach to people-centred development.

88 Muriithi, N. & Crawford, L. (2003) Approaches to project management in Africa: implications for international development projects.

kind of error is frequently made in overseas projects in a variety of countries and projects whereby staff or trainers originate from a different culture, for example in some development projects. This means that project trainers or staff that originate from another culture should be very aware of this and make changes when necessary.

When capacity building is successful, other issues need attention that could become problematic if they are not reflected on at an early stage. In his article Strachan refers to the problem that the founder and principle donor of the project (Oxfam) offers the best pay in the region.<sup>89</sup> Meaning that when the project is handed over and payment will have to come from the project organization itself, wages will be a lot lower. Thus creating a situation whereby local Oxfam employees have little incentive for staying with the project. Better payment elsewhere can also be an incentive for local people for whom the project was intended to find work elsewhere. Indeed, capacity building then fails to fulfill its purpose. It might therefore be better to slowly decrease paychecks or find other incentives for people to stay committed to the project. It is also possible that rather than leaving, people can stay endlessly committed to a project even when their function becomes redundant. According to Muriithi, this is related to problems of high unemployment or poor economic perspectives and will most likely happen if wages are higher than non-project jobs. “The key issue in the transfer of authority over a project is ensuring both a definitive cut-off and the sustainability of operations.”<sup>90</sup>

Capacity building in the form of teaching staff management skills can also pose problems if staff management of the project is subject to democratic shifts. Where development projects are community led, it is possible that adequately trained staff needs to make way for a non-trained successor if the community decides to make changes in project management.<sup>91</sup> Thus a sufficient amount of personnel needs to be trained, in order to have qualified personnel present if there is a job opening. Training in this way should be cyclical, rather than linear. Especially when a certain concept or technique is new to an area updates and retraining are necessary. So planning for training and retraining becomes part of the handover of a project.<sup>92</sup>

The lack of trained personnel can form the basis for another problem: until people are sufficiently trained for their function, expatriates are frequently used to plug a temporary gap.

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89 Strachan, P. (1996). Handing over an operational project to community management in North Darfur, Sudan.

90 Muriithi, N. & Crawford, L. (2003) Approaches to project management in Africa: implications for international development projects.

91 Chaskin, R. J. (2001). Building community capacity: A definitional framework and case studies from a comprehensive community initiative.

92 Lieberman, J., Miller, D., Eckerson, D. & Keller, H. (1987) An evaluation of the factors of sustainability in the Gambia mass media and health practices project.

However, if their role is poorly defined as Cliff states, it will not lead to genuine capacity building by ‘training on the job’ but only gap-plugging.<sup>93</sup> ‘Training on the job’ may also be hard when there is a severe shortage of qualified local personnel; one can only ‘train on the job’ when there is a local counterpart. It can thus be concluded that capacity building should be an integrated part of the project from the start on and that it should not only focus on people directly related to the project or to staff functions.

### **2.3.2. Information**

For management of the project to be successfully carried out, management staff will need information.<sup>94</sup> Strachan identifies several information needs such as a monitoring system (that serves the need of local staff), a standardized set of management-information indicators and performance indicators.<sup>95</sup> This should help project staff to make informed management decisions, but also to be more accountable towards project members. Information on performance of the project can be used to inform project members, so that staff can be held accountable. “A proper management information system helps project managers determine how well their project is performing and which methods work most effectively.”<sup>96</sup> A continuing flow of information is needed so that program approaches could be reevaluated and redesigned as the project unfolds. When a project is still (for a large part) in the hands of the founder or during external funding, projects usually have an effective information feedback system. It has to be there, because financiers want to know what happens with their money. Once external funding ends or when management is handed over, this information feedback system could be drastically reduced. Consequently only limited information capacity remains in the project.<sup>97</sup> This can be preempted by introducing participatory observation by project members early in the project. This way (potential users and) project members can be involved in decision-making and the monitoring and evaluation process.<sup>98</sup> Ismail also finds that development programs should have a built-in monitoring and evaluation system. This monitoring tool should also provide information on ‘process’ so that

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93 Cliff, J. (1993). Donor-dependence or donor control? The case of Mozambique.

94 With Local management staff people are meant who were local to an area as oppose to expatriate. It does not in any case implies the presence of a headquarter.

95 Strachan, P. (1996). Handing over an operational project to community management in North Darfur, Sudan.

96 Lieberman, J., Miller, D., Eckerson, D. & Kellar, H. (1987, December), An evaluation of the factors of sustainability in the Gambia mass media and health practices project.

97 Holliday, A. (1995). Handing over the project: An exercise in restraint.

98 Brett, E. A. (2003). Participation and accountability in development management.

management of the program can be improved when necessary. Information should always be brought about timely; this gives the opportunity to adjust error on operational or management level.<sup>99</sup> Monitoring systems are an opportunity to include the needs and concerns of project members. This can intentionally or as a side effect enhance forms of ownership.<sup>100</sup> A simple example of this is that relevant material or reports are available in local languages. According to Chesterman there are some requirements a monitoring instrument used by local management staff project members should have.<sup>101</sup> It should be developed and designed by them with indicators that directly relate to their activities. Secondly, it should be understandable by local standards, which means that literacy levels should be taken into account and written reports could be complemented with pictorially information. Ownership can also be enhanced by letting the project members elect the best media to share information. For instance, if village news is always spread through village meetings on specific days like days of worship, it might be wise to accept that this will also be used to spread news about the project. This can be formalized and adjusted when necessary; more importantly what works for graduate, expatriate staff, might not work for local management staff, as Strachan also points out. A related problem to expatriate staff has to do with an increase in development projects. In areas where there is one (successful) development project, more are initiated. This brings about a flow of consultants, each only on behalf of their own project, which makes consulting local population uncoordinated and repetitive.<sup>102</sup> Next to that, reports resulting from those consults are usually meant for donors, not for the local population and are therefore not available in a local language or drawn up in such a way that they are incomprehensible for local management staff. Reports coming from the project, either by staff or participatory monitoring, should not necessarily be uniform, according to Chesterman, because an 'own way of working' would be part of achieving participation and thus ownership.<sup>103</sup>

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99 Ismail, S., Immink, M., Mazar, I. & Nantel, G. (2003). Community-based food and nutrition programmes: what makes them successful? A review and analysis of experience.

100 Chesterman, S. (2007). Ownership in theory and in practice: Transfer of authority in UN statebuilding operations.

101 Ibid.

102 Cliff, J. (1993). Donor-dependence or donor control? The case of Mozambique.

103 Chesterman, S. (2007). Ownership in theory and in practice: Transfer of authority in UN statebuilding operations.

## **2.4 FINANCIAL HANDOVER**

In the last part of the model, Strachan only describes the problem of finding alternative funding for the project, so the project can function independently from the founder. Funding can cause the project organization to be independent, but it can also reshape the project to become part of government programs or structures. In this sense it strongly relates to accountability, but as already pointed out in 2.1.7 this will be discussed separately.

### **2.4.1 Funding**

Whether in a development program in a conflict ridden country or in an ultra modern private business project in a Western country, funding is a primary prerequisite for a project. This is not only true for its operationalization, but also when it is still in its planning or consolidation phase. Plans can only be made when the budget is known; it is necessary to know how much money can be spend on staff, material, logistics, and other things relevant to the project. During the consolidation phase of the project there are still running costs for which payment needs to continue.

According to Strachan a financial handover is the final and most difficult part of a handover. It is important because it is a step towards financial independence.<sup>104</sup> As donors cannot stay committed forever to funding the project, it is important for the new project organization to find ways to achieve financial independence by acquiring other sources of financing. Cliff also mentions the importance of funding, as it turns out that projects are often unsustainable after donors leave.<sup>105</sup> It is this acquiring of other sources of financing that poses a challenge after handover. Some projects are simply not designed to be financially self-sufficient; still others can become dependent on other kinds of donors, for example the government. But as funding shifts from donors to another outside source it will still not address the case of financial independence. Dependence on government funds can lead to a lack of continuity on the side of the project because a change of government or policy sometimes causes cancellation of funds.<sup>106</sup> In some cases a project can become part of government structures, because of dependence on government funds. In such cases the project becomes entangled in government structures from which it will not necessary benefit: “poor and worsening economic performance often means government ministries and

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<sup>104</sup> Strachan, P. (1996). Handing over an operational project to community management in North Darfur, Sudan.

<sup>105</sup> Cliff, J. (1993). Donor-dependence or donor control? The case of Mozambique.

<sup>106</sup> Ibid.



departments that are expected to take over operating the facility may not have adequate operating budgets, seriously undermining the obtaining of benefits”, not to mention the political volatility of a (post-)conflict area.<sup>107</sup> The phase of financial handover is therefore appropriate to ascertain an independence from other structures, such as the government. This is very difficult, because it implies that a project should be profitable, otherwise it needs outside donors.

With outside donors comes yet another possible problem: according to Groves and Hinton, “Most donors still suffer from the visibility syndrome.”<sup>108</sup> This means that if the results of the project are not visible to the donor’s constituency, it is unlikely that the project receives much funding. This is counterintuitive to the idea that if a project is successful and absorbed by the community results are very likely to be invisible, because they are part of the community.<sup>109</sup> More importantly, it could mean that donors use their role to influence the direction the project is steered to by its members.

Long term financial planning can only be successful if the organization knows where its money will come from on a long term. When it comes to donor contributions -completely funded or partially- the organization needs to know the extent of, and the time span the funds will be provided for.<sup>110</sup> As most project aid is short term it makes long term planning almost impossible. Even if the new donor is not a government agency, dependence can still be an issue because with funding comes influence. As organizations or people provide funds for a project, it permits them to set the terms under which the money will be given. More importantly, donors tend to tie their funds to their own projects.<sup>111</sup> The project Strachan describes had a strong gender component for example, but the women who participated in the project indicated that their participation met more problems than that of the men. It is doubtful whether the new local organization will continue supporting this component. So external funding therefore poses a threat for ownership of the project; members of the project have little to say about the performance of the project. It is because of this reason that Strachan considers subscription payments for membership of the project. Paid membership “will help to consolidate a sense of ownership and will emphasize the members’ right to

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107 Muriithi p. 9 , Strachan, P. (1996). Handing over an operational project to community management in North Darfur, Sudan. P. 214.

108 Groves, L.C. & Hinton, R. B. (2004). Inclusive aid: Changing power and relationships in international development.

109 Schiavo-Campo, S. (June 2003). Financing and aid management arrangements in post-conflict situations.

110 Strachan, P. (1996). Handing over an operational project to community management in North Darfur, Sudan. P. 214.

111 Liebersohn, J., Miller, D., Eckerson, D. & Kellar, H. (1987, December), An evaluation of the factors of sustainability in the Gambia mass media and health practices project. P. 21.

accountability.”<sup>112</sup> Paid membership however must not be too costly. As development projects are usually set up to help especially the poorest or the community as a whole, it is important that even the poorest members of the community can pay the subscription so they too can benefit from the project.

Another option reflected upon by Strachan is the profit that could be made by some parts of the project. In Strachan’s example it is the veterinary clinic that was set up as part of a smallholders’ project that renders a small profit, because outsiders to the project also used the clinic. The problem is that although some parts may be capable of providing a small profit, the project as a whole usually is not designed to be profitable. Members of a project are the very poor that simply do not have the means to pay for what they need to relief their poverty.<sup>113</sup> This means that either the principle of equal access is compromised by charging for services, or setting up a (complicated) system of paying more or less according to user’s ability to pay.<sup>114</sup> The first would almost certainly withdraw service from the poorest. The second would need a huge effort from the project’s administration, but as the administration at this stage may not yet be capable of this effort it would pose quite a burden, thereby endangering the successful continuation of the project. A third option in Strachan’s model would entail fundraising activities, although he admits that such activities probably are more successful in rich countries.<sup>115</sup> According to Wells, fundraising techniques from rich Western countries have been included in capacity building programs of many NGOs, however to little avail.<sup>116</sup>

What possible solution may be of use, decisions should be made timely, because an “unplanned or abrupt end to funding or a major change in funding may prove to be too great a shock for a developing institution.”<sup>117</sup> Planning towards financial independence should thus be made timely, but also in close cooperation between donor and project organization. Too early in the process a major effort towards financial independence could pose so great a distraction that it might compromise other activities.<sup>118</sup> To assure proper post-project maintenance donors can stay committed to a project. This may help sustain post-project

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112 Strachan, P. (1996). Handing over an operational project to community management in North Darfur, Sudan.

113 Potter, R. B., Binns, T., Elliott, J.A. & Smith, D. (2004). Geographies of development.

114 Strachan, P. (1996). Handing over an operational project to community management in North Darfur, Sudan.

115 Ibid.

116 Wells, R. (2001). Ensuring NGO independence in the new funding environment.

117 Lieberman, J., Miller, D., Eckerson, D. & Keller, H. (1987) An evaluation of the factors of sustainability in the Gambia mass media and health practices project.

118 Strachan, P. (1996). Handing over an operational project to community management in North Darfur, Sudan. P. 214.

activities and preserve the project's achievements.<sup>119</sup> This does not imply that a definitive handover should be endlessly postponed or even avoided. It is merely a way to bridge a gap between earnings and annual budgetary requirements as to secure sustainability of the project.<sup>120</sup> Even when donors partly provide the funds necessary, it is the local organization that needs to be responsible for management of those funds. However, few donors are willing to give management responsibility over funds they donated to a project.<sup>121</sup> This means that sometimes donors appoint observers to oversee the way funds are spent, thus interfering with the way local people work on a project and challenge the feeling of ownership of the project as a side effect. It also disables capacity building by way of experience. Because of its complicated nature and dependence on the capacity of the project organization, a financial handover needs a good preparation and a wide time span during which the ways to gain financial independence should be carefully reviewed.

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119 Lieberman, J., Miller, D., Eckerson, D. & Keller, H. (1987) An evaluation of the factors of sustainability in the Gambia mass media and health practices project.

120 Strachan, P. (1996). Handing over an operational project to community management in North Darfur, Sudan. P. 215.

121 Cliff, J. (1993). Donor-dependence or donor control? The case of Mozambique.

## 2.5 Accountability

Accountability is referred to by Strachan in relation to management handover and financial handover. The fact that it relates to two phases of the process of handover gives us an indication of how important accountability is. The first time accountability is mentioned is because of the democratic structure of the organization and Strachan presents it as a possible problem. Democratic accountability of the project organization means that there will be turnover of trained staff.<sup>122</sup> This in turn means that training of staff has to be repeated every time a new staff member is elected. Although democratic accountability as Strachan presents it may place the organization for unexpected problems, the problem he describes is in fact a sign of institutional capacity. The second time accountability is referred to, it relates to alternative ways of funding the project. As accountability refers to several different aspects of a project, it will now be discussed in relation to those aspects, the first being funding.

Paid subscriptions are not only an alternative way to fund a project, but according to Strachan it would also evoke a right to accountability by its members.<sup>123</sup> If you pay for something you have the right to expect something, is the underlying thought. The same goes for donors; they too feel that because they are funding the project, they are entitled to accountability. This seems very normal and would not pose a problem if indigenous capacities for accountability are sufficient to meet donor demands. However, according to Hauge “the weaker indigenous capacities for accountability, the more donors have felt inclined to establish their own control arrangements- which ultimately results only in increasing aid dependence.”<sup>124</sup> Hence for a handover to be successful, it must address the capacity of the local organization and its members to account for projects’ activities and what happens with funds. Accountability thus not only relates to funding of the project, but also monitoring the functioning of the project. As donors hand over authority over their projects, they need to know that the project will be secure in the hands of the recipients. Equal standards of monitoring and evaluation are therefore their requirements.

Subsequently, accountability is important for monitoring and for funding arrangements, but to whom should the project organization be accountable to and why? In many projects the capacity to monitor only applies to the project itself, not to people outside the project. But as Strachan already determined, accountability is not only needed towards

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<sup>122</sup> Strachan, P. (1996). Handing over an operational project to community management in North Darfur, Sudan.

<sup>123</sup> Ibid.

<sup>124</sup> Hauge, A.O. (2002) Accountability – to What End?

donors, but also to domestic public. By not expanding the capacity to monitor outside the borders of the project, a gap in capacity arises that will influence the project later, when accountability is needed towards domestic public.<sup>125</sup> Next to that, the project organization is not the only one that needs to be accountable. Donors, as much as recipients need to be clear about their actions, demands and expectations as well.<sup>126</sup> For example, if a project should fail, founders as well as members should be held accountable and explain to the members why the project failed and where mistakes were made. The project members are entitled to know why the time and effort they too invested in the project did not give back any returns. Barnes puts it this way: accountability needs to be worked on from two ways.<sup>127</sup> The rationale behind this is that if the project members demand little accountability, the project management will deliver little. This in turn will leave the project members to expect even less, thus creating a downward spiral. But accountability is also a typical construct of Western NGOs. In other cultures, to be held accountable is a right of only elders or persons high up in the hierarchy.<sup>128</sup> Not all people want to be held accountable, as for some cultures it is an honor that is only for the chief. Holding the wrong people accountable could seriously cause a stir in social cohesion or patterns.

The next question is how accountability should then take shape as to offer donors sufficient security that the project is in the right hands while at the same time keep social patterns undisturbed. The obvious conclusion is that accountability mechanisms for management, monitoring as well as funding should be decided upon in close consideration with stakeholders. This relies on institution-building that has had to be started long before accountability mechanisms can be negotiated. Although development literature has embraced the idea of local population managing the project, in governance projects there is still some controversies over this. There is still some reluctance to accept that members of the project can manage the project as well. Mechanisms of accountability are also a way to institutionalize the participation of stakeholders, which in turn can promote a sense of ownership. There are some that argue that sufficient participation by the local population is in itself already a means for accountability.<sup>129</sup>

The how of implementing accountability is facilitated by a good understanding of what accountability means. For people to be accountable, they need to have the means to do so.

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<sup>125</sup> Hauge, A.O. (2002). Accountability – to what end?

<sup>126</sup> Brett, E. A. (2003). Participation and accountability in development management.

<sup>127</sup> Barnes, C. (2006, September). Agents for change: Civil society roles in preventing war & building peace.

<sup>128</sup> Johnson, H. & Wilson, G. (2000). Biting the bullet: Civil society, social learning and the transformation of local governance.

<sup>129</sup> Ibid.

One can only be held accountable if one has sufficient information, resources and organizational experience.<sup>130</sup> More importantly, accountability needs sanctions for failure or incentives for success otherwise accountability is an empty shell that will not be effective in any way. Mechanisms, norms, practices, sanctions and incentives for should be accepted by stakeholders, they cannot be imposed by the donor. In any case, strengthening accountability takes time, in some projects it needs to be build up from scratch, in other projects appropriate ways need to be found to merge already existing structures for accountability with new ones.<sup>131</sup>


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130 Brett, E. A. (2003). Participation and accountability in development management.

131 Ibid.

## 2.6 Participation

‘Participation’ does not explicitly have a place in Strachan’s model, although it is present in the background, in the sense that he describes a *community* project. A community project by definition involves the participation of the community. The fact that he describes the training of community members to take on tasks in the project, that project management has to be elected from community members from period to period and that woman’s participation is almost at the aspired level gives way to the assumption that participation is definitely relevant for his project. As the project he describes is meant to “offer a possible model to other operational projects considering their eventual future” after handover, it seems fair to place ‘participation’ in the model.<sup>132</sup> In any case, participation is frequently referred to in development literature as embodying positive norms and practices and described as a means to achieve a variety of goals. These goals range from transcending social divides (Johnson & Wilson) to capacity building and creating



**Figure 2: Participation ladder**

accountability (Brett).<sup>133</sup> Many state that participation is imperative for development projects as those who are affected should have a say in the project and this would also enhance ownership. More pragmatic arguments focus on project effectiveness: according to Johnson and Wilson participation avoids exclusion, would enhance cost effectiveness and “reveal(s) the complex social dynamics that surround them and thus enable interveners to take these into account when planning and implementing interventions (projects).”<sup>134</sup>

Not only do the motives for participation matter, also the level of participation. Strachan already mentioned in his article that the level of participation of women was almost similar to that of men, thus implying that there are different levels of participation. Johnson and Wilson specify this more explicitly when they state that participation can range from a simple consult when decision making is still in the hands of the donor organization to full

<sup>132</sup> Strachan, P. (1996). Handing over an operational project to community management in North Darfur, Sudan. page 1

<sup>133</sup> Brett, E. A. (2003). Participation and accountability in development management. – participation and accountability. And:

Johnson, H. & Wilson, G. (2000). Biting the bullet: Civil society, social learning and the transformation of local governance.

<sup>134</sup> Johnson, H. & Wilson, G. (2000). Biting the bullet: Civil society, social learning and the transformation of local governance.

participation in project definition and implementation.<sup>135</sup> But what Strachan's statement also demonstrates and what Johnson and Wilson pass by in their article, is *which* persons participate in the project. Musch's extensive writing on this topic offers a solution to this. He not only describes the level of participation in a 'participation ladder' (figure 2), but also distinguishes rules for decision making, so it becomes clear *who* participates.<sup>136</sup> There are four types of decision-making rules:

**Constitutional:** Rules which defines who is in the decision making process, under which conditions, the exact level of authority and how decisions are reached.

**Operational:** This defines what actions can be taken by whom and how they are ordered, processed and terminated.

**Information:** The establishment of channels of information and how and when they are used.

**Aggregational:** How different interests of the group and of individuals are weighed in one decision.<sup>137</sup>

It may be clear that with these rules participation in the project by members can be arranged. This is also of interest for the planning of a handover, because by these rules inclusion of several groups can be monitored. If in a project the participation and inclusion of women is especially important, these rules can be used to monitor that and if their participation is below standard, handover can be postponed or measures can be taken. The ladder



**Figure 3: Dimensions of participation by Musch**

itself is very useful, as it offers a tool to gradually enhance and monitor participation as a handover comes to a close. Even more, this ladder has an addition in the form of dimensions of participation in a project; execution, decision making and costs and benefits, which coincides more with the basic model Strachan offers, i.e. operational, management and financial handover. It shows great overlap with the model by Strachan which is also divided into the same three dimensions, although the dimensions are named differently. The names may differ, but the meaning and division are the same. This similar model from Musch

<sup>135</sup> Johnson, H. & Wilson, G. (2000). Biting the bullet: Civil society, social learning and the transformation of local governance.

<sup>136</sup> Musch, A. (2001). The small gods of participation.

<sup>137</sup> Ibid.



shows very clearly to what extent local population is included in level of control over the project. Musch does not apply this division on a handover but on participation, but handover can be seen as the last step in full participation, so the dimensions are still useful. An important issue is brought up by Alonso and Brugha, who describe the rehabilitation of the health system in East Timor after conflict and the gradual handover from NGO leadership in health practices to that of government control. They state very clearly that the assumption of responsibilities by local actors would have been hindered if NGOs would remain too long in that capability.<sup>138</sup> This can be interpreted as the necessity to involve local actors as soon as possible.

Finally, it needs to be added that Brett offers strong guidelines for the use of participation as a means to hand over control over development projects. He warns for a semi-handover where local actors are little more than consulted, and where blame and costs can be shifted to them in stead of the project initiator.<sup>139</sup> To control this he suggests a system of effective accountability, which paradoxically is constructed through a strong participatory system. In such a participatory system people are entitled to participate in all dimensions that are part of Strachan's basic model and Musch' dimensions: execution, decision making and costs and benefits.

It becomes clear that participation and accountability are strongly interrelated and that they are both important aspects of the process towards handover. With this concluding factor the model for handover has been constructed and discussed. In the following chapter, the case of Afghanistan will be discussed in the light of military projects.

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138 Alonso, A. & Brugha, R. (2006). Rehabilitating the health system after conflict in East Timor: A shift from NGO to government leadership.

139 Brett, E. A. (2003). Participation and accountability in development management.

## 2.7 Additions and alterations to the model

Strachan's model is a sober one and is derived from the handover of just one development project. To give the model more body it is complemented with other literature on development projects. Especially since several factors for handover are left a little implicit in Strachan's model, whereas other authors consider them to be very relevant for development projects. These factors are made more explicit in the model, making it more robust. The additional factors for effective handover of military projects will be discussed in this paragraph. Firstly the articles will be introduced after which the factors for handover will be identified and discussed.

Bessler tries to define criteria (factors) for handover to civilians after relief operations by the military.<sup>140</sup> His article is relevant for this research, as it concerns handover to civilians as well. Bessler identifies the following factors which are relevant for this research: timeframe, capacity building, cooperation with other parties and support of implementation of local control.<sup>141</sup> The article by Natsios is more focused on reconstruction and names nine factors of importance for reconstruction and development when the military is engaged in a project or mission. The relevance of this article lies in the fact that it specifically identifies factors for reconstruction *and* development, thus in a way implying relevance of development themes for the military. According to Natsios these factors are: ownership, capacity building, sustainability, selectivity, assessment, results, partnerships, flexibility and accountability.<sup>142</sup> Lastly there is an article by the Special Inspector General for Iraq reconstruction. The report specifies factors where the handover of reconstructed assets from USAID to relevant government agencies needs improvement.<sup>143</sup> The main factors from this report are: 'a uniform process, cooperation', 'management control' and 'clear agreements or communication'.<sup>144</sup>

It is interesting to see that some of the factors are also recurrent themes in development literature. As Natsios' article refers to development as well as reconstruction this may not be surprising, but it assures the relevance of these themes for the military. Leaving the factors out that overlap with the model or that are mentioned in two or more of the above described articles we are left with: **Selectivity, assessment', 'management**

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140 Several authors have different names for 'factors', such as 'criteria', 'principles' or 'points of interest', for clarity these will all be referred to as 'factors'.

141 Bessler, J. (2008). Defining criteria for handover to civilian officials in relief operations.

142 Natsios, A. S. (2005). The nine principles of reconstruction and development.

143 Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, (2008, April 28), Transferring reconstruction projects to the government of Iraq: Some progress made but further improvements needed to avoid waste.

144 Ibid.

**control**, **communication**, **flexibility**, **uniform process**, **timeframe**, **results**, **cooperation with other parties** and **support of implementation of local control**. ‘Selectivity’ and ‘assessment’ refer to the choice to engage in one project and not in another and therefore less relevant for handover. ‘Management control’ as named by the Special Inspector General is about the necessary management structure to manage a handover, so that people can be held accountable if this goes wrong.<sup>145</sup> As such it can be placed in the model under ‘accountability’. ‘Communication’ as mentioned by Special Inspector General, shows overlap with ‘information’ in the model, because it refers to information that should be shared with both donor and project member to assure that the project runs smoothly. ‘Communication’ will therefore not be added to the model, but equated to ‘information’ in the model. ‘Flexibility’ and ‘uniform process’ seem to contradict each other, but both refer to different things. When Natsios mentions ‘flexibility’ he wants to emphasize that reconstruction efforts are supposed to be adapted to local and political circumstances. As such it seems to coincide with what Bessler names ‘timeframe’. Especially since Natsios states that flexibility must be balanced with time and that good development takes time and requires continued effort.<sup>146</sup> The ‘uniform process’ SIGIR describes has got to do with “standardized and transparent policies and procedures”. This is relevant for ‘information’ in the model and will therefore be added to this factor, but not separately included in the model. ‘Results’ indicate a clear point that is worked towards after which handover can begin. It means that objectives and goals are formulated that structure the efforts in a project and its handover. It seems to be more of a checklist than an actual factor that can influence handover. In fact, if there is enough ‘material capacity’ or ‘information’ in a project, than it could be assumed that this is a ‘result’, after which handover can take place. It is therefore not separately included in the model.

It can be concluded that there seems to be more similarities between military and development literature than differences. From the factors described above only a few remain that seem to offer added value the model. These are: ‘timeframe’, ‘cooperation with other parties’ and ‘support of implementation of local control’. These will now be discussed.

According to Bessler the **timeframe** is important because tasks are only assumed by the military until civil authorities or designated groups have enough capacity to regain the

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<sup>145</sup> Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, (2008, April 28), Transferring reconstruction projects to the government of Iraq: Some progress made but further improvements needed to avoid waste.

<sup>146</sup> Natsios, A. S. (2005). The nine principles of reconstruction and development.

tasks.<sup>147</sup> This means that a timeframe needs to be determined in close cooperation with civil authorities in which important goals are set. A timeframe could take a lot of time depending on the kind of mission or project. If ownership needs to be established over a project, this could take a long time according to Natsios, because it is a “laborious process that emerges with time and effort”.<sup>148</sup> The problem is that timeframes in peace operations “lack definable timetables for transferring responsibilities, and are often conducted in a fluid and increasingly political environment”. This could imply it could take years if a definite enddate is not set. According to Strachan a handover requires a long time and a seemingly simple phase like an operational handover alone can take around three years.<sup>149</sup> As the military is not always at liberty to set their own enddates, this could mean that a project meets an abrupt end; before all necessary steps have been conducted. Or that all steps have to be fit in a short timeframe. This does not mean that the project is over: it is emphasized in one article to “remain mindful that the end of military operations does not mean the end of relief operations; it only means that civilians are in control.”<sup>150</sup>

**Coordination** with authorities may fit just as well under ‘information’, but it also regards the cooperation between stakeholders. Coordination is necessary according to Bessler to develop milestones and a proper timeframe.<sup>151</sup> Natsios states that is important to have a strong partner on the ground who can manage the program; for this cooperation is necessary. A lack of cooperation can also lead to other problems. In Iraq reconstruction efforts by the US suffered from a lack of cooperation, as can be read in a report by the special inspector general on the hand over of assets. The report refers to assets that after reconstruction (by USAID, Department of Defense and Department of State) were handed over to provincial or local government officials.<sup>152</sup> This can also be applied to projects and project officials. The insufficient coordination led to “unilaterally transferring projects to (...) provincial or local officials without assurances that ministry officials with budget authority were prepared to sustain the transferred asset.”<sup>153</sup> A unilateral handover could endanger a project because there is no assurance that project officials will invest or indeed *have* the necessary resources to sustain the project or keep it functioning at the intended level. Sufficient cooperation and

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147 Bessler, J. (2008). Defining criteria for handover to civilian officials in relief operations.

148 Natsios, A. S. (2005). The nine principles of reconstruction and development.

149 Strachan, P. (1996). Handing over an operational project to community management in North Darfur, Sudan.

150 Bessler, J. (2008). Defining criteria for handover to civilian officials in relief operations.

151 Ibid.

152 Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, (2008, April 28), Transferring reconstruction projects to the government of Iraq: Some progress made but further improvements needed to avoid waste.

153 Ibid. P. 1.

communication is also important to ascertain that the organization to which the handover is directed has the capabilities to assume the project or mission. Although there seems to be no reason why it is not also important to development projects, it is not mentioned by Strachan or other development literature. Coordination seems to be an important factor for the military to hand over a project. It will therefore be included in the model.

‘Support of implementation of local control’ can be added to ‘coordination’, because to support the implementation of local control both coordination and participation are needed. The first just has been discussed; the other has been discussed a few pages back.

Strangely enough, ‘security’ or level of security has neither been named by development literature or military literature. It is especially strange because their prime responsibility is security and maintaining order according to Bessler and more importantly as can be read in the Military Strategic Vision 2010: “Our role needs to be clear: the military is primarily a security instrument. Our contribution in the integrated approach is primarily, but not exclusively, supportive.”<sup>154</sup> An explanation could be because the military may only unfold reconstruction projects in an already permissive environment. But even in development literature external factors, such as the situation in a country where the project is implemented, are not included. Strachan does not so either, even though the project is located in Sudan -which in 1996 was not a very stable country- the countries’ conflictous situation is not included in the model.

To conclude, several factors for handover that are named as being important in development literature are also important in military literature. From military literature, two more factors for handover have been added to the model. The adjusted model can be found in the appendix. The appendix also includes the operationalization of the model. ‘Security’ seems not to be as relevant for handover as may be expected. This can also be ascribed to the 3D approach; the military and development agencies such as NGOs are increasingly cooperating and efforts are made to make the two types of organizations beneficially build on this cooperation.<sup>155</sup> This mix of military and development means even has its own name: 3D approach. This is also described by Homan, who is in favor of more institutionalized civil-military cooperation for complex missions.<sup>156</sup>

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154 Militaire Strategische Visie Maart 2010. And: Bessler, J. (2008). Defining criteria for handover to civilian officials in relief operations.

155 Natsios, A. S. (2005). The nine principles of reconstruction and development.

156 Homan, K. (2005). De krijgsman als ontwikkelingswerker?

## ***Chapter 3: Background***

### **Introduction**

In this chapter the background to the case study of Afghanistan will be discussed. As this research is about the handover of governance projects, the focus in this chapter lies on information on the current status of ‘governance’ in Afghanistan. This information includes initiatives from the Dutch PRT and TFU as well as a look into Afghan history. Focus will be on those aspects of history that are relevant to what ISAF wants to contribute to a stable Afghan state.

First I will give an overview of Afghan history and its political structures before the coup in 1973. Secondly, information on culture and customs regarding governance will be discussed as well as powerbrokers and the structures of governance that have re-emerged during the 30 year old civil war. Lastly the plans and effects for ‘governance’ in Uruzgan originated from the Dutch PRT and TFU will be discussed.

### **3.1 History**

Afghanistan became independent with the proclamation of king Amanullah in 1919. At that time Afghanistan had internationally recognized borders, a centralized bureaucracy in Kabul and tax and justice systems.<sup>157</sup> Independence did not equal stability as political leadership changed in 1929 when Amanullah was abdicated due to his reforms.<sup>158</sup> In those days attempts to modernize Afghanistan -for example by abolishing the veil for women and allowing women to be educated- frequently encountered strong resistance, not only by Islamist movements but also because of tribal politics. Several successors were assassinated before Mohammed Zahir Shah came to power. In 1963 Zahir Shah attempted to replace the constitution of Afghanistan that was introduced in 1931.<sup>159</sup> Changes in the constitution were already proposed by Mohammed Daoud Khan who envisaged “a strong, neo-patrimonial, one-party regime, where the king would retain only a ceremonial role and the traditional Loyah Jirgah would serve as a booster for an all-powerful head of cabinet”.<sup>160</sup> Daoud was made Prime Minister by Zahir Shah in 1953 and it is described as a bold decision by the Shah, as

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157 Olesen, A. (1995). Islam and politics in Afghanistan.

158 Ibid.

159 Griffiths, J. C. (2001). Afghanistan: A history of conflict.

160 Saikal, A. (2006). Modern Afghanistan: A history of struggle and survival. P. 142.

Daoud was not from the same tribe as him.<sup>161</sup> Zahir Shah wanted to counter the ideas of Daoud and after appointing a constitutional commission and a Loyah Jirgah, the new constitution was adopted in 1965 thus starting a decade of democracy. The new government had a representative system with a parliament (Shura) that consisted of the directly elected Wolesi Jirgah (house of the people) and the partly elected and partly appointed Meshrano Jirgah (house of elders).<sup>162</sup> The Wolesi Jirgah consisted of 216 members and was subject to elections every four years with a single direct vote system. All Afghans –including women– over the age of twenty were allowed to vote.<sup>163</sup> The Meshrano Jirgah had 84 members, 28 of which directly represented the provinces and were also subject to elections every four years. 28 representatives were elected every three years by provincial councils and 28 representatives were appointed every 5 years by the King. The Loyah Jirgah (great assembly) that was rehabilitated in 1930 as a body of delegates from every tribe and province also got a place in the new government structure.<sup>164</sup> It was now composed of members of the Wolesi and Meshrano Jirgah, but only partly had formal functions. Zahir Shah reigned until 1973 when he was dethroned in a fairly bloodless coup led by Mohammed Daoud Khan. Following the coup on 18 July 1973 Daoud was elected president, Prime Minister, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Minister of Defense by the central committee.<sup>165</sup> It may be clear that his Presidency was not backed by popular support. Among the first things Daoud did was suspension of the 1965 constitution. His rule ushered in a period of turmoil and internal strives, which did not end with the invasion of the Soviet army in 1979 or their leave in 1989. In fact, according to several sources in 1992 central authority as the locus of power had completely seized to exist.<sup>166</sup>

From the short history of governance in Afghanistan, several things become clear. First of all is that several cultural institutions or religious customs were also part of the official government structures of Afghanistan, such as the Jirgah and Shari'a (Islamic law). The Jirgah is a tribal assembly of elders which takes decisions by consensus. From the above can be understood that this can also be a formally organized assembly. Although some customs such as the Jirgah are related to the Pashtun (an ethnic Afghan group or tribe) they can be found throughout Afghanistan's ethnic groups. Second is that a centralized government

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161 Griffiths, J. C. (2001). *Afghanistan: A history of conflict*.

162 Saikal, A. (2006). *Modern Afghanistan: A history of struggle and survival*.

163 Olesen, A. (1995). *Islam and politics in Afghanistan*.

164 Ibid.

165 Griffiths, J. C. (2001). *Afghanistan: A history of conflict*.

166 Griffiths, J. C. (2001). *Afghanistan: A history of conflict*. And: Olesen, A. (1995). *Islam and politics in Afghanistan*.

in Afghanistan is only functional up to a certain level. Daoud's attempt at centralization failed due to a lack of administrative personnel but Afghanistan has only had few central governments throughout history. It is therefore a plausible assumption that a strong central government in Afghanistan has no viability. Third is that due to the constant changes in government, administrators had either little or no experience, leaving their administrative skills inadequate. Moreover, due to the violent changes in government the barely built government or administrative capacity was again destroyed, leaving at the end no government capacity to speak of. A fourth point of interest is that ethnic, tribal and religious fragmentation has always been a factor of importance in Afghanistan and something that has to be addressed when trying to build a stable government. Finally, with the different ethnic, religious and tribal customs and with almost no history of stable national government, there seems to be a lack of a national system of governance. A national system would need approval of all tribes and ethnic groups and with this approval could be used as a base for a government structure.

### **3.2 Cultural information & Emergence of the Taliban**

In 1992 Zahir Shah was asked to regain power, but the former king was not willing to cooperate with any body who gave so much representation to such a divided group as the Mujahedeen.<sup>167</sup> The Mujahedeen were an insurgent group based on the teachings of Islam and originally fought against communist rule. The Mujahedeen took over the government and called the Islamic state of Afghanistan under rule of Rabbani.<sup>168</sup> I believe this to be technicalities; there was no central government with administrative capabilities to speak of and Rabbani's government had only control over Kabul and some areas in the North-west and North-east. He was constantly in conflict over power with other factions, for example with Hekmatyar's Hezb-e-Islami group. He was however regarded as the official government of Afghanistan by the UN.<sup>169</sup> The Mujahedeen ruled until 1996 when the Taliban took over. Their official governance was accepted by Pakistan, Saudi-Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.<sup>170</sup> The Taliban introduced an even stricter theocratic regime based on Shari'a. The Qur'an and the sayings of the prophet Mohammed are the basis of Shari'a and it can be as liberally or rigidly interpreted as one desires. The stoning of people of who are *said* to have

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<sup>167</sup> Saikal, A. (2006). Modern Afghanistan: A history of struggle and survival.

<sup>168</sup> Berg Harpviken, K. (1997). Transcending traditionalism: The emergence of non-state military formations in Afghanistan.

<sup>169</sup> Ibid.

<sup>170</sup> Saikal, A. (2006). Modern Afghanistan: A history of struggle and survival.



sexual relations outside marriage is only one example of the strict rules and punishments.<sup>171</sup> The Taliban's regressive version of Shari'a discarded all other systems of justice.<sup>172</sup> The Taliban, as all powerholders in Afghanistan did not have so much control over the entire country that they could prevent legal problems being solved according to pashtunwali.<sup>173</sup> Pashtunwali is the code of honor of the Pashtun tribe and it includes several themes such as hospitality, but also the existence of bloodmoney.<sup>174</sup> Bloodmoney is a payment in cash or in kind to a victim or its relatives to make up for the death or injury of another person. The payments differ depending on the exact damage. The customs and rules of pashtunwali are also used by other tribes under different names. For example, a Jirgah (traditional tribal meeting) is named 'Shura' by non Pashtun.<sup>175</sup> Although pashtunwali is an old system and more or less abandoned by people who live in big cities, it is probable that it is still valid in mountainous or isolated regions, such as Uruzgan where the majority is Pashtun.<sup>176</sup> Jirgah's consist of men of the village holding authority. Authority can be traditional as well as competent; traditional authority is based on personal qualities, social status and leadership skills, competent authority is based on the recognized expertise and skills of the person.<sup>177</sup> The role of the Jirgah is to get a ruling that is satisfactory to all parties. The clergy stands outside the group and as such can fulfill a role as intermediate. These structures and customs were very much alive in Afghanistan and Uruzgan during the years of Mujahedeen and Taliban rule. Partly because Taliban as the so called 'central government' could not control all regions and in part because traditional institutions of justice are too strong in rural Afghanistan.<sup>178</sup>

Even with the Taliban as 'official government', warlords of the Northern Alliance ruled the Northern part of Afghanistan. Warlords are a consequence of the war and the factional fighting, just as the emergence of large scale political and military organizations within ethnic populations.<sup>179</sup> These "tribal entrepreneurs" are frequently referred to as warlords, but they are in fact not, they can rather be called strongman; tribal leaders. Actual warlords transcend the ethnic or tribal divides and can confront a military threat to their

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171 Amnesty International USA, '1998 Annual Report for Afghanistan'.

172 Wardak, A. (2004). Building a post-war justice system in Afghanistan.

173 Giustozzi, A. & Ullah, N. (September 2006). "Tribes" and warlords in southern Afghanistan, 1980-2005.

174 Vogelsang, W. (2002). Afghanistan. Een geschiedenis.

175 Wardak, A. (2004). Building a post-war justice system in Afghanistan.

176 Vogelsang, W. (2002). Afghanistan. Een geschiedenis.

177 Wardak, A. (2004). Building a post-war justice system in Afghanistan.

178 Ibid.

179 Giustozzi, A. & Ullah, N. (September 2006). "Tribes" and warlords in southern Afghanistan, 1980-2005.

territory.<sup>180</sup> The Taliban regime ended with the US-led military campaign, but the Bonn Agreement foresaw in the reinstatement of several warlords as key political and military leaders.<sup>181</sup> In this situation it is the task of the PRT as part of Taskforce Uruzgan (TFU) to help enhance ‘governance’. How this is done will be discussed in the following paragraph.

### 3.3 Desired situation and endstates

Coalition forces have a certain idea on how Afghanistan should look like when ISAF leaves. This desired situation must leave Afghanistan stable enough to function on its own, yet there will be enough left to develop over time. The emphasis is on those aspects that are necessary to make Afghanistan function as a stable, democratic state from where it can focus on its own development, possibly with the help of others. For this, several goals have been determined by ISAF.

TFU and the Dutch PRT have handed over command to the United States in august 2010, but before that the Netherlands had set some goals to be reached during their stay and preferably before their departure.<sup>182</sup> These goals have been set in several documents. Some documents reflect Afghan national initiatives, like the ANDS, while others are purely meant to guide reconstruction activities in Uruzgan by the Dutch PRT. The objective of the PRTs as described in the ISAF mandate has already been discussed in chapter 1, so focus will now be on the goals, objectives and desired endstate that have been articulated by the commanders of TFU.

An ‘endstate’ is the final goal set for a mission. This is always on a higher level than other goals (overarching) and can be political or military. For example, The desired endstate for Afghanistan as defined by NATO is “a self-sustaining, moderate and democratic Afghan government, in line with the relevant UNSCRs, able to exercise its authority and to operate throughout Afghanistan, without the need for ISAF to help provide security”.<sup>183</sup> The Netherlands do not diverge from NATO’s endstate. This endstate is both political and military as it refers to the government and a safe and secure environment. It is important to note here that not all donors and stakeholders agree over this endstate. This is the case on an international level, as stakeholders seem to have differing opinions on the endstate or

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180 Berg Harpviken, K. (1997). Transcending traditionalism: The emergence of non-state military formations in Afghanistan.

181 Wardak, A. (2004). Building a post-war justice system in Afghanistan.

182 Because of the 3D-approach I refer to ‘the Netherlands’ instead of referring to ‘the Ministry of Defense’ or ‘Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ [and Development].

183 Coelmont, J. (Ed.) (March, 2009). End-state Afghanistan.

different interpretations of it.<sup>184</sup> McNerney described the mission and the initial role of the PRTs as ‘vague’, and based on comments of PRT members, this also seems to be the case for the goals of the PRT now.<sup>185</sup> The endstates as they are described in official military documents will be discussed in the following paragraph.

To achieve an intended endstate, goals are set. There are two types of goals; ‘mileposts’ and ‘tasks’. Mileposts are measurable achievements, for example: GTZ has a permanent team in Tarin Kowt. Tasks are exactly what the word refers to and are intended to achieve the goals. For example: find an office space for GTZ. The military does no longer only set goals, but has chosen for an effect-based approach. An effect is the intended outcome of a task or goal. By defining ‘effects’ rather than goals, people are free to achieve the intended effect as they see fit and the intended higher goal is indicated.

It could be argued that by calling it ‘effects’ rather than ‘goals’, the function of the military as implementers of these effects is not a requisite. The fact that some effects can be achieved by TFU while other effects are to be achieved by other actors, adds to this assumption.<sup>186</sup> I will come back to this after discussing the desired effects from the FP and the UCP that are relevant to this research, and that are implemented by the military, not by other parties.

### **3.3.1 Uruzgan Campaign Plan**

The Uruzgan Campaign Plan (UCP) is one of the documents in which effects to achieve and to contribute by the TFU in Uruzgan are explained. The UCP is meant to function as a planning guide for the entire TFU in which the very conceptual comprehensive approach is translated to very concrete activities in the field.<sup>187</sup> The effects that are set in this document are in line with both the higher military strategy and the ANDS but are specifically chosen for their relevance to Uruzgan. They address the issues for Uruzgan and are situation specific, which means that the UCP needs to be updated ideally every six months, to keep up with changing situations.<sup>188</sup> It was decided to choose this iterative approach because of the complexity of the mission and the situation on the ground in Uruzgan. This means that for the long term very broad effects are set, more specific goals for the medium term and realistic and

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<sup>184</sup> Ibid.

<sup>185</sup> McNerney, M.J. (2005). Stabilization and reconstruction in Afghanistan: Are PRTs a model or a muddle?

<sup>186</sup> Uruzgan Campaign Plan (2009)

<sup>187</sup> Bemmel van, I.E., Eikelboom, A.R. & Hoefsloot, P.G.F. (2010). ‘Comprehensive and iterative planning’ in Uruzgan.

<sup>188</sup> Uruzgan Campaign Plan (2009)

specific goals for the short term.<sup>189</sup> This also means that if a situation does not improve, goals will stay the same, whereas if the situation improves, goals are set higher. It might be argued to have a situation stabilize first before again trying to improve it. Moreover, this would seem as an ad hoc approach; a well constructed roadmap could have been composed earlier with small adjustments when needed.

The UCP can be considered to be an update of the Focal Paper (FP) and was constructed more or less the same way as the FP. The UCP however, is the product of both the military commander and the civil representative of the PRT. It might therefore be interesting to see whether there are noticeable differences between the two documents; is a civil approach different than the military approach? Due to their link to the ANDS, both the Focal Paper and the UCP have a division into three main sectors: “Governance” (including Rule of Law), “Socio-economic development” and “Safe and Secure environment”. Only “Governance” is relevant to discuss for this research.

### 3.3.2 Effects

The mission of the PRT consists of building capacity, supporting the growth of governance structures and promoting an environment within which government can improve.<sup>190</sup> The effects cited in the UCP are supposed to contribute to this mission. The relevant effects will be described before discussing a final conclusion on the endstate(s). Desired effects are described in relation to history and culture.

The first is that the PRT aims at contributing to clear relations between the central government of Afghanistan and the provincial government of Uruzgan.<sup>191</sup> This could be read as an attempt to establish institutionalization of hierarchic relations. As the province of Uruzgan has barely received governance from a provincial level or from national level for a long time, this seems a difficult task.<sup>192</sup> It would mean that local and provincial leaders in Uruzgan accept guidance from the central government and do not act as leaders in their own right. If this would succeed this would lead to a hierarchical system of governance with the main authority in the hands of the central governance. But for this to be even tried, ‘governance’ would also need transparency, because transparency would lead to more

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189 Bommel van, I.E., Eikelboom, A.R. & Hoefsloot, P.G.F. (2010). ‘Comprehensive and iterative planning’ in Uruzgan.

190 NATO (2003), International Security Assistance Force mandate.

191 Uruzgan Campaign Plan (2009)

192 Singh, K. R.(2004). Post-War Afghanistan: Reconstructing a failed state.

acceptance of the government and government decisions.<sup>193</sup> This is also taken into the UCP as an effect. Transparency means that the population and lower government officials now why and how the government makes decisions and how these are going to be implemented.<sup>194</sup> How exactly transparency should be achieved is not indicated in the documents and how it could contribute to good governance while government structures are not yet firmly established is also unclear. ‘Firmly established and reinforced government structures’ is namely also an effect named in the UCP.<sup>195</sup> This time a specific way to contribute to this effect is mentioned, namely the official appointment of all District Chiefs.<sup>196</sup> This seems to be at odds with the requirements for Good Governance, as the population should have a say in which persons are appointed government officials. However, the UCP is not very specific in its description of this action, so it could be that this action merely relates to the formal appointment of District Chiefs by the governor after approval of the population. While the population has the right to popular participation as cited in the constitution, the attempt to firmly establish government structures sidelines the population if indeed the formal appointment of District Chiefs happens without consulting the population. It would seem that this will not add to popular support for the government (structures) and thus not a firm establishment of it, because the government needs acceptance of the population in order to have authority as history shows.

Secondly, it could be assumed that the PRT envisages an endstate where the government officials of Uruzgan are capable to provide administrative governance, because the Uruzgan Campaign Plan also provides a training program for government officials.<sup>197</sup> This will also include literacy and basic skills training, as many of the government officials (at least on district level) are still illiterate. Operational capacity should at least be met, but management capacity is also needed. This is more amply and concretely deliberated upon in the Focal Paper. Administrative skills are not the only thing a strong government needs; the UCP intends for the provincial as well as the district government to have control over the ANA and the ANP. A government can only be perceived as functional in terms of ‘good governance’ if it can safeguard a state of law and order. For this the army and police must be accountable to the civil authorities. This means that the PRT and TFU would need to get groups in the ANP to give up their loyalty to their former factional patrons. An example of the

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193 Speth, J. G. (1997), *Governance for Sustainable Human Development*.

194 Marita Vos, Evelyn Westerhoudt, (2008). *Trends in government communication in The Netherlands*.

195 Uruzgan Campaign Plan (2009)

196 Ibid.

197 Uruzgan Campaign Plan (2009)

importance of tribal bonds over that of loyalty to the government is the following: the judiciary and the police lack cooperation which seems due to the fact that the police predominantly consist of former Northern Alliance militia who are dependent and loyal to their factional patrons.<sup>198</sup> Governors, District Chiefs and Afghan National Police are supposed to be officially appointed by a democratically elected government. However, from the above it could be concluded that their appointment may have more to do with tribal bonds or corruption than with their qualifications for the job.

Thirdly, it can be stated that only legal and governmental instruments that are in harmony with Afghan cultural traditions and legal norms can be used to make additions to a system of justice and governance. This statement is backed up by Wardak who also states that only those aspects of Shari'a that not conflict with Afghan culture and customs are used.<sup>199</sup> This may be a reason why the PRT tries to involve the local population in governance by way of community Shura's. The UCP provides in the development of Community Development Councils that have the support of the local population.<sup>200</sup>

It appears that positions in the government are subject to tribal politics, as much at present times as they were in the 1950's. This is easiest illustrated with an example; Saikal notes that the boldest decision of the king was to let the new government in 1963 be formed by a non-Mohammadzai; Zahir Shah himself was from the Mohammadzai tribe and it was unthinkable that he would give so much power to a non-tribe member. That tribal politics are of influence in the appointment of government leaders now can be understood from the many accounts of corruption.<sup>201</sup> It seems therefore strange that the Focal Paper does mention 'tribal issues', but the UCP does not. 'Tribal issues' include 'tribal representation', 'tribal conflict' and 'tribal aspects' (tribal customs). As both documents are based on an iterative approach, this would imply that the issue of tribal relations is no longer of importance. But tribal structures, throughout the history of Afghanistan have always been cause for unrest and power shifted from tribe to tribe through time. To have a tribally balanced government would seem illusive in an unstable Afghanistan, but it is an identified effect in the Focal Paper.<sup>202</sup> Moreover, it could be understood from the above that the people of Afghanistan have little confidence in the new official government structure and its representatives, as they are still

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198 Wardak, A. (2004). Building a post-war justice system in Afghanistan.

199 Ibid.

200 Uruzgan Campaign Plan (2009)

201 Hughes, M. (September 7, 2010). Corruption is the enemy in Afghanistan but who is going to kill it?

202 Focal Paper ( 9 April 2008)

subject to nepotism and corruption.<sup>203</sup> Furthermore Jirgah's seem to represent a sufficient resource of justice and government in some remote areas and that authority is something people should earn as oppose to something that can be bestowed upon them.

The years of conflict and 'community' governance have led to a deterioration of government buildings and local conditions and technology in Uruzgan are minimal.<sup>204</sup> Possibly the most attainable of all effects is therefore the improvement of government buildings.<sup>205</sup> It is however unclear if this only refers to the building itself or also the required material and furniture. The benefit of improved government buildings is that it would offer a more recognizable location where people can turn to for their civil service needs.

It needs to be emphasized again that these actions and effects are only valid for the Afghan Development Zones. These are zones that are cleared of insurgents and that are stable and secure enough to start reconstruction activities. These zones also form the basis for the so called inkblot strategy. This strategy implies that security and reconstruction can be spread from these zones; from the safe zones the military clears other areas and start reconstruction activities. During the mission Task Force Uruzgan learned that the several Afghan Development Zones were too big for one Mission Team, so the zones were split into smaller ones.

### **3.3.3 Timeframe**

The enddate in the Focal Paper is set for second half of 2010; the official date for the ending of Dutch contribution as lead nation. If everything went according to plan, this date, august 2010, should have coincided with the desired endstate. But as may have become clear the outcome is uncertain and more importantly was influenced by other actors as well. From the effects it could be concluded that the endstate envisaged for august 2010 is to have provincial and district government operational with facilities and material needed, paychecks in order, all government functions filled with capable people or at least in training and a population that participates in 'governance' through councils. At least, this is how it can be perceived. Although there will be worked towards the effects, there is no assurance that these will be met before the enddate. The long-term that is sometimes referred to in military documents relates to 2050 which is set by several parties as the date when the government of Afghanistan can function in a stable independent way. A final endstate for the long term seems to be a

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203 Hodes, C. & Sedra, M. (2007). Chapter two: Spoiler groups and the anti-government insurgency.

204 Mandel, R. (1980). Roots of the Modern Interstate Border Dispute.

205 Uruzgan Campaign Plan (2009)

functioning, democratic, transparent, official, accepted, non-corrupt government with some traditional features and full control over rural areas. What the exact endstate entails, if defined as a specific situation, cannot be easily explained. Several Dutch stakeholders like the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Defense have formulated ideas about the endstate, but a lot seem rather vague or indeed as intended effects.

The timeframe as it is discussed in military and government documents does not include a moment for the introduction of other parties with the work of the Dutch PRT or TFU. Effects do seem to cross the official end date of 2010, but a relapse in achieved effects because of handover to another party is not taken into account, thus leaving a gap in the timeframe. It therefore seems that a time-driven approach has priority over the effect-based approach. From the viewpoint of continuity of operations, it would seem wiser to handover projects, instead of rushing something within a certain timeframe in order to prevent handover. Or does this mean that there are two completely ways of working? This could indeed be the case as the Dutch PRT and TFU only do business with official authorities, the US however does business with relevant powerbrokers even if they are not the official authorities.<sup>206</sup> It would seem that it would be a tough job to try to institutionalize official structures if one also acknowledges other authorities.

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206 Goodhand, J. & Sedra, M. ( August, 2006). Bargains for peace? Aid, conditionalities and reconstruction in Afghanistan.



## ***Chapter 4: The Case Study***

In this chapter the case of Dutch PRT in Afghanistan is examined through the framework, constructed in chapter two. A closer look will be taken as to how the military projects by PRT 6 and PRT 7 fit the different aspects of the framework. Both PRT 6 and PRT 7 projects will be discussed per factor and all different groups of informants are used per factor and not mentioned separately. In chapter one it was indicated that the subject of this research are ‘military projects’ that focus on ‘Good Governance’ and the CIMIC projects that correspond to that. This means that in this chapter the projects are discussed in general, not separately. The projects that were discussed in the interviews are: coaching of the District Chiefs (DCs), District Chiefs of Police (DCoPs) and the provincial governor. The formation and support of the Community Development Councils (CDCs) and Provincial Development Councils are also included in these projects. The essence of governance projects is the ‘formation and reconstruction of official government structures and popular participation in governance’. The individual projects are not compared with each other, because there was not enough specific information available to get a good view of them. However, all these projects together could be perceived as the ‘Good Governance’ project at large. The chapter will conclude with general findings. Each factor will now be discussed with a short conclusion per factor.

### **4.1 Personnel**

In chapter two the demands for a proper completion of the factor ‘personnel’ were explained. The operationalization of these factors is listed in the appendix. In the following part will be examined in how far the projects of the PRT meet these demands.

Firstly the extent to which all positions are filled is discussed. When it comes to hiring local staff, the PRT indeed did this, but only for the less demanding jobs: mainly contractors for CIMIC projects. For the governance projects Dutch Functional Specialists were hired, such as a judge and a prison ward to train their local counterparts.<sup>207</sup> For the CIMIC projects this could not be done, because according to one respondent the local population would complain to the District Chief when outsiders were hired.<sup>208</sup> This was emphasized by another respondent, who adds that by hiring outsiders, no local would benefit from paid jobs. It did

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<sup>207</sup> Respondent 17

<sup>208</sup> Respondent 4, Respondent 5

happen that an outsider would be hired to do a project, but this would be a bigger, complicated project for which local knowledge was insufficient.<sup>209</sup> Nonetheless the local population did not approve of the result, according to one respondent.<sup>210</sup> All of the positions of the District Chiefs were filled, although the provincial governor was also District Chief of Tarin Kowt, which led to an inadequate performance of the job as District Chief.<sup>211</sup> One of the District Chiefs was not from the region, but he was appointed in Kabul, so the PRT could not really do something about this. The governor of Uruzgan, Hamdam, officially was also District Chief in Tarin Kowt, but that job was neglected.<sup>212</sup> For Daoud a secretary was arranged who could read and write. All job positions at district administration level were filled, not with adequate staff, but mainly local leaders.<sup>213</sup> That is also because there is a severe shortage of qualified personnel. It is therefore no surprise that it took the governor a lot of time to get enough personnel.

Secondly, sufficient payment or the recurrence of moonlighting is discussed. There is a great deal of corruption and moonlighting. Money for salaries is transported over the road, so at every step in the transportation system, a little money disappears.<sup>214</sup> The District Chief in Deh Rawod did not even get his salary because of corruption and teachers had not been paid for months when PRT 7 started.<sup>215</sup> It (probably) got stuck somewhere and the PRT had to talk to the governor to get the payment for the District Chief. As long as the PRT guides the governance projects this could be solved in this way, but how will this be done when the governance project is handed over? Moreover, some teachers simply sold goods from the school to provide a living for themselves, as they were supposed to be paid by the District Chief, but this did not always happen.<sup>216</sup> Taking money or things from your work is not perceived as corruption by Afghans but more as a ‘tip’ for your work.<sup>217</sup> It was therefore not always dealt with by the PRT: if the ‘tip’ was within limits, nothing was done.

Thirdly, the motivation to work with the project must be clear. In Afghanistan, corruption is influenced by family bonds. This also relates to the fourth point of the factor ‘personnel’. One District Chief, all judges and District Chiefs were from the region and this

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209 Respondent 5

210 Respondent 9

211 Respondent 17

212 Respondent 12

213 Respondent 9

214 Respondent 8

215 Respondent 6

216 Respondent 14

217 Respondent 14

can be problematic, because they are linked too strongly to people in the region, which can lead to nepotism and corruption. For local Afghans family comes first.<sup>218</sup> The District Chief in Tarin Kowt was illiterate and only got the job because his father was District Chief first and got shot and he had to succeed him.<sup>219</sup> On the other hand, people put more trust in leaders they know; the judge in Tarin Kowt is an important mullah in the region and the population likes him.<sup>220</sup> The corruption stands in the way of paying people the appropriate salary and incentives they need to keep focused on their job. The PRT tries to get schooled judges and prosecutors to Uruzgan, but this is hard. Being a judge in Afghanistan makes you a target, so extra incentives are needed.<sup>221</sup> Incentives for judges and prosecutors would be safe housing and sufficient salary. The salaries for judges have gone up, but are still relatively low, which makes them sensitive for bribery.<sup>222</sup>

Other points of interest that emerged during the interviews were quality of work. The quality of work of contractors (for CIMIC projects) is overall sufficient if related to local standards. The quality of work of the District Chief and District Chief of Police stay behind. The quality of the governance projects was inadequate: people were appointed jobs for several reasons, but many are not literate or schooled in what they are supposed to do. For example, the prison director in Tarin Kowt had no idea how many people were in prison or for what or for how long.<sup>223</sup> The PRT appointed somebody to do the administration in the District Centre of Deh Rawod because the District Chief could not write.<sup>224</sup>

Concluding, the factor personnel of the framework is insufficiently settled. Yes, almost all staff is local, but they lack necessary knowledge, their embeddedness in the local community only leads to corruption and incentives for other staff to stay committed to the project also lack. Even salary is not regularly paid. Moreover, not all positions are filled or only in name.

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218 Respondent 9

219 Respondent 21

220 Respondent 1

221 Respondent 9

222 Respondent 16

223 Respondent 16

224 Respondent 14

## 4.2 Material Capacity

The first demand for ‘material capacity’ is the availability to the project of all resources and necessary material without extensive costs. The topic of availability of material is rather ambiguous in the case of Uruzgan. On the one hand the bazaar in Tarin Kowt offers a variety of materials and goods, and with enough money anything can be bought.<sup>225</sup> On the other hand, most material originates from either China or Pakistan, because there is no local industry.<sup>226</sup> There seems to be a lot of material, but not all material needed for governance projects is available. Material for governance projects can be furniture for the District Centre, office supplies or computers. Some projects are refused by the PRT, because of lack of material.<sup>227</sup> If proper material seems unobtainable for the PRT, how will this change after handover? The District Centre in Deh Rawod could be built, but there was no furniture, thus the PRT donated a phone and a desk. The unavailability of material influences the work of the District Chief of Police, who has no ammunition to distribute to the ANP. It also prevents schools being built, because there is no furniture or means to equip those with.<sup>228</sup> The most hindering for the governance projects is lack of communication material; only the facilities of the District Chief and District Chief of Police have a land phone connection. There is now a mobile phone network in the region, but there is still a serious lack of means of communication in the districts.<sup>229</sup> Traveling is usually too dangerous, causing the District Chiefs to not communicate much with the governor, thus negatively influencing the project.

Secondly, resources and infrastructure necessary for the projects’ sustainability should be available. From the interviews it is not possible to extract a single viewpoint on the sustainability of resources. A lot of material is now smuggled into the country and all other material has to be imported, because there is no local industry.<sup>230</sup> At times this is in conflict with PRT policy, which states that material for projects should be locally made or locally acquired and, more importantly can be locally maintained.<sup>231</sup> When the PRT leaves, will there be enough money to buy the material needed? And will there be the same level of trade, legally or illegally? The tendency in the interviews is that the level of infrastructure is insufficient and facilities for governance are also lacking. The wall of the prison collapsed and

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225 Respondent 6

226 Respondent 3

227 Respondent 10

228 Respondent 10, Respondent 3

229 Respondent 8

230 Respondent 3

231 Respondent 4

when determined that the prison does not meet Western standards it was decided to build a new one.<sup>232</sup> The construction plan for the new prison is still subject of debate.<sup>233</sup> There was no court building, so that too had to be built. The safe housing for judges, mentioned under ‘personnel’ is also necessary infrastructure.<sup>234</sup> Most importantly, there was no bridge over the river Helmand which makes projects on the other side of the river unsustainable.<sup>235</sup>

The third demand for ‘material capacity’ is that project techniques, technology and materials reflect the level of development in a given area. New technologies like internet or mobile phones are not likely to be sustainable if there is no one to fix UMTS stations. Respondents frequently state that local population does use mobile phones for texting, despite the fact that they are illiterate.<sup>236</sup> So it could be concluded that the technology used for some projects does reflect local capacity. CIMIC projects that support the governance project could not always be monitored by the Mission Teams. The focal areas of the Mission Teams were too large to completely cover these areas, so monitoring was difficult. Digital cameras were lent to local constructors to let them monitor it.<sup>237</sup> This can be labeled as participatory observation and it regularly used in development projects. In this manner, solutions include the needs and possibilities of the local population and are adaptive to local circumstances.

Fourth, maintenance of project assets, materials or resources should also be done locally with locally available material. Based on the interviews, it can be concluded that the overall quality of available material in Uruzgan is low. Building material is local (mostly mud bricks) and of poor quality. For example, the walls of the prison came down in bad weather.<sup>238</sup> However, according to respondents the local population can fix “anything with anything”.<sup>239</sup>

Concluding, although there is the possibility of acquiring material, material is costly, difficult and takes a long time before it is available. It is therefore doubtful that the level of material capacity is sufficient for the projects sustainability. The techniques and materials used by the PRT are however adapted to local levels of development, so that will probably not negatively influence sustainability. It is however not sure that after handover, material will stay

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<sup>232</sup> Respondent 16

<sup>233</sup> Respondent 17, Respondent 21

<sup>234</sup> Respondent 17

<sup>235</sup> Respondent 8

<sup>236</sup> Respondent 9

<sup>237</sup> Respondent 14

<sup>238</sup> Respondent 16

<sup>239</sup> Respondent 4 and Respondent 5

available. As one respondent pointed out, there has emerged somewhat of an economy because of the presence of the military and it is not sure whether this will stay when the military has left.<sup>240</sup> It could also be that material would become more expensive.

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<sup>240</sup> Respondent 18

### 4.3 Institutional capacity

For ‘institutional capacity’ the first demand is that personnel can work with (newly) introduced techniques or technology and are trained in those techniques if necessary. The main focus of the PRT is to train and stimulate ‘governance’, but what skills and institutions are present in the villages of Uruzgan? The following is a description of some government officials in Uruzgan constructed of the comment of respondents. There are many differences in the qualifications of the District Chiefs in Uruzgan. One District Chief, is described by several respondents as being an old ANA colonel, able to read and write, charismatic, with a high level of integrity, honest and a good speaker.<sup>241</sup> Another, is illiterate, young (24), has no experience and only got the job because his father was shot in an accident. Nonetheless he did seem very enthusiastic about his new job and eager to perform well.<sup>242</sup> The young one could not speak English and neither one of them could write it.<sup>243</sup> As long as many leaders in the province are not able to read and write, it seems impossible to expect things like planning or policymaking.<sup>244</sup> The effects that are set for Uruzgan seem therefore hard to attain. These effects are described in chapter two and are for example that the government is capable of planning and financial management. But the police station has no people available who can deal with issues like human resources and finances on a basic level.<sup>245</sup>

‘Management skills’ is also included in introduced techniques. According to respondents, some District Chiefs are qualified leaders, but because of the new government structures, some amount of training is necessary.<sup>246</sup> Training falls short because the organizations that are supposed to train them are not present yet.<sup>247</sup> Because of this the Mission Teams have taken on the task of ‘mentoring’ District Chiefs. Several respondents pointed out that they find themselves not the right persons to take this on as they have no experience or education in administrative tasks.<sup>248</sup> It is suggested by respondents that the District Chiefs “learn as they do”.<sup>249</sup> One respondent stated that training should have started much earlier.<sup>250</sup> There is also a lack of general institutionalization on the side of the

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241 Respondent 3, Respondent 21

242 Respondent 7, Respondent 6

243 Respondent 9

244 Respondent 10

245 Respondent 17

246 Respondent 3, Respondent 21

247 Respondent 9,

248 Respondent 7, Respondent 13, Respondent 21

249 Respondent 8

250 Respondent 19

population. Although there are now official government structures, they have no idea how to work with these structures.<sup>251</sup>

Secondly, personnel should be able to function independently from the project initiator. This seems easiest achieve if techniques and technology are compatible with local customs. The cultural compatibility between the new government structures and the old is very low. Officially, tribal structures have no place in the new government structure, but a respondent stated that it is virtually impossible to prevent village elders and tribal structures to play an important role in village politics.<sup>252</sup> An attempt is made to link the old with the new by establishing development Shura's.<sup>253</sup> But these structures include an amount of democracy that is not native to villages in Uruzgan.<sup>254</sup> One respondent stated that informal leaders should try to integrate in the official government through official channels.<sup>255</sup> It has already been explained in chapter three that unofficial leaders (not part of the government structure) have always been an important part of rural areas in Afghanistan. It is therefore highly questionable if these new institutions will work and be sustainable.

The third demand is that qualified personnel is available if positions become vacant. This should no problem if training is cyclical and people do not leave the project after training to find a (better paid) job elsewhere. All respondents indicate that there is too much focus on the 'high level jobs' like the District Chief and the District Chief of Police, but not on the everyday business of civil servants. This really is a point of concern for many respondents.<sup>256</sup> This means that there is not something like a course that trains people to become more and more qualified for higher positions. In fact it is stated by one respondent that all ANA and ANP personnel does learn to read and write, whereas there is no such education for administrative personnel.<sup>257</sup> Another respondent put it this way: there is a lot of focus on the end: the positions that have to be filled, but nothing to prepare them for it, to anything in between.<sup>258</sup> This is correct; several government officials did receive training from the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ), but there was no program to prepare successors.<sup>259</sup> When people are trained, it is important that they stay committed to the

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251 Respondent 15

252 Respondent 14

253 Respondent 21

254 Respondent 18

255 Respondent 20

256 Respondent 18, Respondent 16 (among others)

257 Respondent 8

258 Respondent 17

259 Respondent 3



project, at least until successors are trained. In Uruzgan, training has only just begun, so this can become problematic. Osman is described as a man who is willing to undergo a lot of training to improve his qualifications. He in fact did receive some training, but according to several respondents his ambition was to get an even higher position in Kabul.<sup>260</sup> It is hard to establish whether this means he does stay with the project or that he leaves. If a successor is not found in time, it means efforts are lost.

Fourthly, expatriates should not be used for 'gap-plugging'. The 'mentoring' or coaching the Mission Teams have taken on is in fact not really gap-plugging as they do not take over the job of the District Chiefs and District Chiefs of Police. Gap-plugging specifically refers to outsiders doing the job that local employees should do. Nevertheless, the Mission Teams in this respect take over the job of GTZ and other organizations that should train government officials. It also borders on gap-plugging, because the Mission Teams advise the District Chiefs on their job. According to one respondent it also seems that the idea exists within the local population that ISAF will take tasks on if they will not do it. And in they will thus only put in effort in certain tasks, until ISAF is really gone.<sup>261</sup> Respondents of an NGO active in the region state that it was good that the PRT initially took on the process of reconstruction, but that it should have been handed over by now, because sufficient alternative organizations are present now.<sup>262</sup>

As far as participation, it can be assumed that participation does lead to capacity building. One of the District Chiefs did learn from his job. Whereas in the beginning he was very shy, at the end he was the head of a Shura where he had people arrested when things got out of hand.<sup>263</sup> Of course this has to be put in a cultural perspective and it is not sure if this was a display of power or a lack thereof.

Concluding, institutional capacity has just taken a start and it can be perceived as a false start. Positions are filled, but there is no attention to educate successors or to make an official system that is more compatible with the unofficial systems. A lack of training and education of the adult population does prevent a sufficient amount of institutional capacity, especially with an eye on sustainability. This could become problematic after handover, because it could mean that the small capacity in the project will slowly flow off and there will be no

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<sup>260</sup> Respondent 14, Respondent 3, Respondent 21

<sup>261</sup> Respondent 14

<sup>262</sup> Respondent 18

<sup>263</sup> Respondent 4

successors. Then the project would end unsuccessfully, because the goal is to eventually have a functioning government.

## 4.4 Information

The first demand for ‘information’ is that sufficient systems of information for project personnel to function adequately are at hand. The monitoring mechanisms suffice for the PRT and cooperating organizations, but there is no monitoring mechanism to leave behind when the PRT leaves. This is because according to respondents from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Development Advisor should be in charge of monitoring.<sup>264</sup> In a way this is already the case, as PRT projects need approval from the Dutch Embassy in Kabul. The Mission Teams in this way function as the eyes and ears of the PRT.<sup>265</sup> The Mission Teams go out and report what they see and what they are told by local Afghans. But as one Mission Team members point out: ‘you just have to believe them’.<sup>266</sup> There is almost no way in checking if what they receive as information is correct. Participatory observation may therefore be a way to increase ownership, but it is a flawed way to receive correct information in a conflict setting. Information is a tricky thing for military projects in Afghanistan in that information could also be used against them: information can be used strategically and Afghan people know this.<sup>267</sup> Military members can be perceived as both on the population side as well as unwanted. It is for this reason that information is only shared if it is not endangering the military members that work on the Battle Group.<sup>268</sup> The system described next seems to work for the donors as a way of monitoring or as information feedback-system. Many respondents claim to have good contact with mullahs and other key leaders.<sup>269</sup> But as a way to install a monitoring system that can also be used after leave of the Dutch, the current ways of monitoring lack vision. This may be called monitoring by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but it is in fact an information feedback system for donors.

Secondly, information should be shared with all relevant stakeholders and in ways that are adaptive to local customs. Information sharing is improving, but not on a sufficient level by far. Respondents state that the governor did not even want to talk to some District Chiefs.<sup>270</sup> There is extensive communication with other project initiators such as Cordaid, who were present at many daily meetings.<sup>271</sup> There is also much communication between the

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<sup>264</sup> Respondent 19

<sup>265</sup> Respondent 19

<sup>266</sup> Respondent 10

<sup>267</sup> Respondent 2

<sup>268</sup> Respondent 20

<sup>269</sup> Respondent 7, Respondent 11 (among others)

<sup>270</sup> Respondent 9

<sup>271</sup> Respondent 18

embassy and the [local] ministries. This information system is in fact parallel; the local representative Development or Political Advisor from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs reports back to both the embassy and the afghan ministries. This is also used as a way to improve communication between the Afghan ministries.<sup>272</sup>

Thirdly, project information should not be uniformly presented or delivered; there should be some flexibility to adapt to circumstances or recipient. According to one respondent there was talk of appointing a local inspector for a project, but this idea was abandoned as it was not in line with Dutch policy. A local inspector would help to provide understandable and clear information for the District Chief; it would not need to be translated. However, the inspector would receive a percentage of the projects funds. This is typically Afghan as some state: officials in Afghanistan always take a percentage for themselves. In this case flexibility clashed with Dutch ideas about corruption, so this was not implemented.

The fourth demand is that relevant information is available in local language(s) and adapted to local needs and skills. On general, when it comes to information-sharing adapted to local needs and skills, there are successes and missteps. For example, instructions for the District Chief come by phone or by fax, but according to respondents there is only one District Chief who can read and write.<sup>273</sup> But instructions over the phone do not work either, because they are not written down. Obviously this could distort the message, but on the other hand, if they have always worked like this, it may simply work well enough for them.<sup>274</sup> Project communication in the form of contracts proves maladapted to local customs and skills. The contracts are elaborate, although most of the beneficiaries don't even know how to read and write. One respondent pointed out that losing face is much more important to Afghans.<sup>275</sup> Several respondents stated that having a witness there while the contract and its obligations are discussed, is much more a guarantee that people will keep their promise and stick to the contract.<sup>276</sup> Still, despite the knowledge of the recipients, the PRT has to draw up a contract as specifically as possible.

Lastly, information should reflect local standards in terms of literacy. A proper planning system or reporting system may prove futile if people cannot read. Either a reporting system using pictograms should be designed or all the leaders should learn to read and write. Local communication is also hindered by the fact that people mainly communicate

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<sup>272</sup> Respondent 19

<sup>273</sup> Respondent 17

<sup>274</sup> Respondent 14

<sup>275</sup> Respondent 2

<sup>276</sup> Respondent 11, Respondent 12, Respondent 13

to people who they now and from their own tribe.<sup>277</sup> Professional communication can thus not be seen separate from political and personal background. Many District Chiefs and other local officials were more than willing to talk to PRT members who had contact with the governor.<sup>278</sup>

Concluding, the way information is dealt with now does not prepare for a more or less independent running of the projects after handover. Basically, after handover there will be no monitoring system or management indicators and there is no information feedback system. More importantly the way information and communication are handled now does not take into account that it should be accessible for illiterate people or people who are still learning to read and write.

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<sup>277</sup> Respondent 16, Respondent 12, Respondent 13

<sup>278</sup> Respondent 9, Respondent 21

## 4.5 Funding

The first demand on ‘funding’ is that financial independence should be slowly worked towards and not be unilaterally. Project funding in Afghanistan is a seriously complicated matter. As a way of enhancing Governance and government structures, the funds are directed at the government of Afghanistan who should direct it via official structures to the provinces.<sup>279</sup> Eventually this is supposed to happen with all project funds, but for now the PRT still has its own funding arrangements. Government funds barely reach the districts in Uruzgan province and it is unlikely that this will change for the better when the PRT leaves. In every step down the system, a little money ‘disappears’.<sup>280</sup> There is not a sufficient level of institutional capacity yet, so according the model it would be too early to expect the District Chief or other official leaders to find new funding arrangements.

Secondly, staff should be capable of finding alternative funding for the project or the project should be financially independent or self-sufficient. Finding Funds is complicated because currently the government of Afghanistan receives funding from GTZ, United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) and NGOs, and when money is needed on a lower level, these financiers all refer the applicants back to the government.<sup>281</sup> But because of corruption almost no money finds its way to the districts. According to respondents, the government on district level now has learned to tax electricity which results in a small fund for maintenance, but tax laws give little room to maneuver in this.<sup>282</sup> Finding funds is a challenge and too much to ask of a province which has nothing to tax; roads, industry or other. Moreover, respondents all state that receiving funds for any project is an exercise in bureaucracy; how then can a government without any institutional capacity take this over? The organizations all differ in budgets they have available for projects. Respondents state that this is bad in case of a handover to a follow-up organization, because it negatively influences continuity.<sup>283</sup> Costs for the governance project are too high for the districts to acquire sufficient funding on district level through tax. Project costs are the costs for training, administration, furniture, etc. Traditionally, administrative personnel or civil servants receive little payment, but receive meals from their employers.<sup>284</sup> Still government costs on district

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<sup>279</sup> Respondent 20

<sup>280</sup> Respondent 8

<sup>281</sup> Respondent 13, Respondent 12

<sup>282</sup> Respondent 15

<sup>283</sup> Respondent 18

<sup>284</sup> Respondent 15

level consist mainly of personnel, transport and food.<sup>285</sup> One respondent stated that districts have to ask the provincial government for everything they need and in turn receive material and not financing. This might work better as it circumvents possible corruption at a low government level. The governance project is not designed to be profitable. This differs from CIMIC projects which can be a little profitable and beneficial to the project. The hydro electric power plants are a good example for this: respondents state that owners of hydro electric power plants now receive small payments from users which they can use for maintenance.<sup>286</sup> Projects now provide local contractors with a small income, this will very likely change after handover, because the PRT is no longer there to provide contractors with CIMIC projects.

Thirdly, funding should not be dependent on single donors or Western donors with ‘visibility syndrome’. Several respondents state that “one has to score during the rotation period” thus leading to very visible projects that not necessarily contribute to the goals of the ANDS or a sustainable result.<sup>287</sup> The capacity building process takes a lot of time before you have something to show for. Fortunately the PRT focuses less and less on CIMIC projects and more on the governance projects, PRT 7 almost started very few CIMIC projects, even though coaching is less visible than CIMIC projects.<sup>288</sup> There was no data available for the other aspects that matter for funding: profitable additions to the project, membership and fundraising activities or even if budget is known to the District Chiefs.

Concluding, it is still too early to have local official government representatives find alternative funding or to communicate with the higher levels of government about funds necessary. Funding appears to be a tricky, complicated, bureaucratic issue that proves too hard for the little institutional capacity that exists in Uruzgan. It is unclear how this will be after handover, as the funds from the PRT are strictly separated from that of the official government.

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285 Respondent 15

286 Respondent 15

287 Respondent 9, Respondent 22

288 Respondent 7

## 4.6 Participation

For participation the first demand is that it is established by constitutional, operational, information and aggregational rules who participates in what way. The Dutch PRT aims to let the local population participate up to a high level, but this heavily depends on the kind of project so there is no clear answer to this. For the CIMIC-projects the idea for what the local population needs comes from the community, just as the contractors and the material is locally purchased.<sup>289</sup> Only the funding for it comes from the PRT. Also District Development Shura's are organized to have the local population participate, but this stays at the level of consultation.<sup>290</sup> It is emphasized by respondents from the Mission Teams that the District Chiefs are to be in control and the PRT only coaches.<sup>291</sup>

Secondly, Participants of all groups are included in the project. The PRT only lets people participate in the governance projects if they contribute to enforcement of government structures. This comes down to people that are not (too) corrupt and who do not have too many ties to the old regime.<sup>292</sup> The PRT also organized women Shura's and even a youth Shura.<sup>293</sup> It is clear that the PRT tries to involve all people in the project. But because of local structures and fear of reprisals from the Taliban, usually the same people show up at Shura's; tribal leaders, self appointed contractors, sometimes mullahs and maliks.<sup>294</sup>

Concluding, participation seems rather limited. Indeed, the local population is participating, but only through the leaders they already had. In CIMIC-projects they are participating on a high level, but CIMIC-projects are not intended to cover a long time span; in the long term this will not necessarily lead to capacity or skills. Other people that are participating in the governance projects are only the high level people: District Chief, District Chief of Police and Governor. Participation is not likely to lead to ownership and it is too soon to say whether this will lead to sustainability. Lastly, participation will not lead to accountability as long as local actors are not involved in all phases of handover. It is not clear how this will be after handover, but it may seem that if the local population was meagerly participating in the projects when the PRT was present, it will not be much better when the PRT has left (after handover) because there may be even less to be gained.

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<sup>289</sup> Respondent 4

<sup>290</sup> Respondent 19

<sup>291</sup> Respondent 7

<sup>292</sup> Respondent 9

<sup>293</sup> Respondent 7, Respondent 8

<sup>294</sup> Respondent 10



## 4.7 Accountability

As accountability is also supposed to be the result of ‘participation’, participation and accountability will be first discussed before discussing the demand on accountability.

There is no reason to assume that participation in governance projects will actually lead to accountability. The salary for the teachers and District Chief getting ‘stuck somewhere’ is just one example of this.<sup>295</sup> Some Mission Team members claim that ‘their’ District Chief or the people they worked with are not corrupt and there is a detectable difference between people who want to enrich themselves and people that are committed to the community.<sup>296</sup> As (tribal) groups argue or fight over control, not only now, but since the last thirty years, and a ‘democratic’ government is only a few years in place, it is too much to expect democratic accountability of people related to the project. At best, the tribal leader speaks for the entire tribe or group. The Community Development Councils were hard to organize, because members could not agree over who would be participating in the council.<sup>297</sup> One comment of a respondent seems emblematic for the level of democratic accountability: “People [here] aspire total power and work towards that goal. There is a lot of attention for the position they can attain”.<sup>298</sup> The accessibility of governance (project) is low. The governance projects suffer from a lot of corruption, thus disabling access to the projects by groups other than the one in charge. The PRT wanted to work with Afghan structures, but because Durrani were in charge in one area, the Ghilzai could not do projects in that area.<sup>299</sup> Every tribe had its own contractors and they are not accepted in areas of other tribes.<sup>300</sup> The CIMIC projects are connected to the governance projects as a way to promote governance, but this only makes corruption enter these projects too.<sup>301</sup> CIMIC projects too suffer the same limited access. The limited access to the project strongly determines which groups benefit from the projects. This comes down to only powerful groups or groups with good connections. The PRT tries to divide the projects as equal as possible over all groups, to prevent agitation and avoid disadvantaging other groups.<sup>302</sup> However, this does not prevent that CIMIC projects are sometimes only beneficial to the contractor or the person that

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295 Respondent 6

296 Respondent 14

297 Respondent 7

298 Respondent 15

299 Durrani and Ghilzai are names of tribes in Uruzgan.

300 Respondent 11

301 Respondent 14

302 Respondent 4, Respondent 5

becomes owner of the construction. The limited access is intensified by the fact that project proposals from the local population now have to be validated by a tribal leader.<sup>303</sup>

The first demand on accountability is that there should be control arrangements and these arrangements should come about in close collaboration with stakeholders. Also capacity and means (information) for accountability is needed. The governance projects seem to have no strict, official internal control arrangements, nor do the CIMIC projects. The CIMIC projects are monitored by the Mission Teams and as a way to ensure completion of those projects, payment is coupled to milestones in the project. This kind of monitoring is not possible for the governance as these projects entail less tangible results. The Mission Teams still function as “the eyes and ears of the PRT”, according to some respondents, but internal control mechanisms are necessary so monitoring can be handed over to others when the PRT leaves.<sup>304</sup> In some areas the monitoring is taken over by NGOs but this still does not enhance indigenous capacities for accountability.<sup>305</sup>

Secondly, there should be incentives for failure or success in order for accountability to work. There are just as few sanctions as there are control mechanisms. The governance projects heavily depend on relation building, so sanctions are by definition hard to impose.<sup>306</sup> The PRTs main task is to facilitate reconstruction and offer support, so proper sanctions seems to be lacking. The progress of the project would be negatively influenced if the means for reconstruction would be withdrawn. Several respondent name one means to encourage the District Chief, District Chief of Police or other leaders to commit to the rules of the project: take down their poppy fields.<sup>307</sup> This correlates in fact with demand three: accountability demands should be in coherence with local customs.

Thirdly, donors should be clear about expectations, the people should demand accountability from both project staff and donor, and project staff should be accountable towards each other and donor. But as a result from poor controlling mechanisms and sanctions, there is little accountability from recipients to donors. Respondents state that every Afghan related to the projects has one time or more been caught lying about something and not respecting or ‘misinterpreting’ agreements.<sup>308</sup> Some respondents also state that, in order to not be held accountable, people postpone decision making, eventually leading to organizing a

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303 Respondent 4, Respondent 5

304 Respondent 19

305 Respondent 19

306 Respondent 12

307 Respondent 9, Respondent 12, Respondent 6

308 Respondent 7, Respondent 16, Respondent 17, Respondent 4

Shura to enforce a decision.<sup>309</sup> Accountability is needed as much from recipients to donors as it is from donors to recipients and even to domestic public and co-workers. Accountability from the PRT to recipients is almost completely lacking. The successive PRT finds new ways of doing their work and according to respondents there is no way to secure knowledge and experience.<sup>310</sup> Instead it is frequently stated that Afghans should show more initiative.<sup>311</sup> The low level of accountability from recipients to the PRT also has to do with the fact that in Afghan culture, people first have a responsibility to their family, the tribe and the village. Only after that comes responsibility to others. This implies that accountability to domestic public, or in-in accountability, would be much higher. In fact it is not, according to respondents. The governor had to be persuaded to talk to the District Chief, corruption is widespread and nepotism is more rule than exception.<sup>312</sup>

Concluding, accountability barely has a place in the project and with high corruption in government circles; it seems that this will not improve after handover. It is also doubtful that this will change soon; accountability towards the in-group is present, but accountability for 'governance' would also need accountability towards other groups. The conflictuous past and the turbulent present are expected to influence capacity for accountability for some time to come.

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309 Respondent 9

310 Respondent 9, Respondent 12

311 Respondent 20

312 Respondent 11

## 4.8 Ownership

The governance projects do not contribute to a sense of ownership of the local population. The system has no link to what used to be the government structures of Uruzgan because the tribal system is completely ignored.<sup>313</sup> To improve the position of the government, traditional structures are used to enhance participation of the local population with the system, for example through the Community Development Councils. These councils are not traditional structures, but can be compared to Shura's. Because of this lack of familiar structures, ownership is not created. The fact that the official government system works top down, with a general in charge of the 'southern provinces' (the south is not a natural construction in Afghanistan) does not contribute to this either.<sup>314</sup> When it comes to CIMIC projects that support governance, ownership is not supported either. The contractors and subcontractors are expensive because of the security situation and this negatively influences accountability and ownership.<sup>315</sup> It is also questionable whether participation would lead to ownership. One respondent said that the population from other villages does not come to the judge in Tarin Kowt, because they do not feel it relates to their way of life.<sup>316</sup>

Concluding, although the PRT tries to enhance ownership, by not simply 'giving' or 'donating' projects, or by talking with the local population about their needs, this does not automatically translate in a sense of ownership. This might improve after handover, because the population and project participants may make changes in the project that make it more in concordance with their needs and desires.

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313 Respondent 2

314 Respondent 1

315 Respondent 18

316 Respondent 17

## 4.9 Sustainability

Sustainability of results is supposed to be the outcome of a successful handover. As such it is the final phase of the model, the result of all phases of handover. When it comes to the topic of sustainability the majority of the respondents is unanimous in that there are attempts to make projects sustainable, but that a lot is missing. The attempts are mainly directed at material used: products are to be maintained locally and indeed are.<sup>317</sup> But on the non-material side what is missing is the willingness for a long-term commitment. To drastically change a justice system takes years, generations even according to a respondent. Institutional capacity here also refers to a change in attitude in the local population. PRT projects are also unsustainable because of missing infrastructure: at the time of these interviews there was still no bridge that connected the outer areas with the districts thus excluding a large part of the population from PRT projects on the subject of governance.<sup>318</sup>

To conclude, it is too soon to say if the participation of local population in the projects will lead to sustainability. It has to be pointed out though, that if the District Chiefs that are now in power are not re-elected or reappointed, that all effort in coaching and training is gone and therefore no sustainable result achieved. Moreover, as one respondent pointed out, if the project moves too fast and people are participating on a level above their capabilities, things can go wrong.<sup>319</sup> This in turn would influence their trust in the project and this will influence sustainability.

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317 Respondent 6, Respondent 12

318 Respondent 8

319 Respondent 1

#### 4.10 Coordination & Timeframe

The first demand is support of implementation of local control. This is exactly what the PRT did by coaching of the District Chief. The PRT was not supposed to have local control; that is in the hands of local official government. This subject might be more relevant for the Afghan National Army and Police, but this falls outside the scope of this research.

Secondly there should be cooperation between stakeholders. As the PRT communicated and cooperated with local authorities, unofficial leaders, the population, NGOs and IOs in the region this factor is to a large extent met. In the region were/are the following NGOs and IOs present: UNAMA, GTZ, World Council of Credit Unions (WOCCU), Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations (FAO), Growing Sales Exchange (GSE), Cordaid<sup>320</sup>, International City Manager Association (ICMA), Afghan Health and Development Services (AHDS), Education Quality Improvement Programme (EQUIP), World Food Program (WFP) and Development Alternatives International (DAI). When the PRT had assessed needs which could not be met by implementing CIMIC projects or military projects, the PRT tried to engage one of these organizations to take over. This was for example the case with GTZ.

For the factor timeframe 'results' are important. Certain results have to be established within the limited timeframe of a mission. Unfortunately, none of the respondents could say more than that a timeframe was established, but that it remains to be seen whether effects are achieved within that timeframe.

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<sup>320</sup> Cordaid is organized in the Dutch Consortium Uruzgan together with Healthnet and Save the Children.

## ***Chapter 5: Conclusion***

### **5.1 Factors for an effective handover from development literature**

The factors for an effective handover have been described in chapter two and shall be summarized here before moving on to sub question two. The factors are: personnel, material capacity, training, information, accountability and funding. These five factors are divided over three phases of handover, namely operational, management and financial.

The factors from the first phase are relatively easy to implement because they depend to a lesser extent on institutional capacity and ownership to be successful. Ownership results from connecting to local customs and culture and involving the local population in every aspect of the project. Creating a sense of ownership is a way to ensure commitment to the project and it is expected to have a positive effect on sustainability. Sustainability is the intended outcome of an effective handover. If a complete handover is successful, the results of the project endure after the end of the project or the project even becomes embedded in a community.

If factors of operational handover, ‘personnel’ and ‘material capacity’ do become problematic during later phases, they are also relatively easy to solve. ‘Training’ (institutional capacity building) and ‘information’ on the contrary do depend more on ownership and need a certain level of institutional capacity to be implemented successfully. When training and information do not connect to the local level of institutional capacity and culture, then a sufficient level of ‘ownership’ is also harder to achieve. ‘Funding’ is described as most likely the most difficult part of a complete handover. This is because it is not clear how a project should be financed. A project could become self-sufficient or be embedded in government structures, but the latter does not necessarily benefit independence or sustainability. ‘Accountability’ relates to both management as well as financial handover. Sufficient levels of accountability are necessary to avoid corruption and to make sure that the intended group benefits from the project. Accountability is important from recipients to donors but most surely also vice versa. From donors to recipients it is important to level expectations from recipients with goals of donors. Participation was identified as a factor that should be included in every part of the project, because it would enhance ownership and accountability and facilitate capacity building.

## **5.2 Factors for handover in military literature and possible adjustment**

The factors for handover of military projects have also been discussed in chapter two and will be summarized here. A factor of importance for military handover is cooperation; the conditions that need to be achieved before a project could be handed over need to be accurately determined with other stakeholders. But tasks for this must be developed on the ground. Communication with the civil environment, both counterpart and local population need to be correct and timely. This will pre-empt problems resulting from bad communication and help to take away (unfounded) fear of the local population for deteriorating security situation. Sufficient cooperation and communication is also important to ascertain that the organization to which the handover is directed has the capabilities to assume the project or mission. Proper communication will help this, but also an early engagement with civilians for cooperation. Early engagement could provide good insight into parties' capabilities and help to align expectations. Good communications and insight into parties' capacity will prevent problems like unilateral transfers. Unilateral transfers will very likely negatively influence the sustainability of the handover; it is unclear whether the recipients have sufficient capacity to sustain the project. Time seems to be an important factor, the high levels of coordination and planning within the military organization and the strict enddate are reasons to plan tasks and goals (effects) very precise.

Adjustment of the model for handover was barely necessary because it appeared that many factors correlated with those mentioned in development literature. In chapter two this was more amply discussed and 'cooperation' and 'timeframe' were added to the model. This seemed necessary, because cooperation with other stakeholders was scarcely mentioned in development literature, whereas for the military it is very important. It was the same for 'timeframe', because in terms of importance, time seems to be higher on the list with the military than with development agencies.



### **5.3 Planned and implemented activities in the model**

The applicability of the framework will be discussed per factor from the framework. All factors will be discussed so that per factor there is an overview of applicability of the model and an assessment of positive and negative correlation with the factors.

Firstly, ‘personnel’ is discussed. This factor is indeed applicable to military projects, as the PRT works to help fill all positions in the district government. This factor is thus addressed. However, there are some defects; there are not enough judges and the District Chief in Tarin Kowt is also the Provincial Governor. In practice this means that not all tasks can be sufficiently performed. For the judiciary this means that it takes a long time before cases can be brought before court. Other constraints are incentives such as salary to work on government jobs. Salaries are sometimes not paid and if this keeps on, people will not stay committed to their jobs and the project. For now the PRT can commit itself to help get salaries from the government, but when the project is definitively handed over, who will do this? Corruption is wide-spread in Afghanistan. Positive element is that for simpler tasks (secretary), with a little effort, people can always be found that have the necessary skills. More importantly, some District Chiefs are very eager to learn and from the local community, making their commitment more likely after handover.

Secondly, material capacity is important. In a lot of cases ‘material capacity’ is addressed with CIMIC projects, so the applicability of this factor for military projects is present. Availability of material is not really an issue, as almost anything can be obtained, the only issue is the price. This might become a problem after handover of the project, as the project members have to pay for material themselves. Now the PRT pays for a lot of things and it is unclear if, after handover, the government will provide the District Chiefs with sufficient funding to include material needs. On the plus, people seem to make themselves familiar with new techniques and technology, such as cellphones, rather fast. Implementation of new techniques and technology can therefore be perceived as successful. Infrastructure for governance is also created, so that too is a positive element for operational handover.

Next, ‘institutional capacity building’ by way of training people to assume certain task within a project seems less relevant to a military project. It was not mentioned in the military literature that was used for this research. But that is partly due to the fact that literature on SSR was left out of this research. Training is a very common component in SSR projects and the military thus has experience with training as part of a project. However, SSR- related training has got nothing to do with the ‘Good Governance’ projects that are the focus of this

research. For this kind of training, other organizations are necessary; the PRT can only signal the need for training. It strongly depends on the mandate and mission whether the military takes on training and thus whether this has to be handed over. In this case the military did take on training, but only because there were no other organizations who took this on sufficiently.

Fourthly, ‘information’ is very important in military projects so the applicability of this factor for military projects can be determined. However, the information needs that are discussed in the context of development project handover are for a large part that of the recipients. The information needs that are described in the context of military missions or projects are largely that of the military; what do they need to do their work properly? Information passed on to civilians serves to ease the work of the military. In many cases the military actually needs some information to remain classified and not shared at all. Information systems are therefore not constructed to function outside the military which leaves no system to be handed over.

Subsequently, ‘funding’ is discussed. In the model this refers to financial arrangements *after* handover. This is in fact not really applicable to military projects in this research, because the PRT only allocated funds to projects, but it is not a project funding organization and funding is not its most important task. This third phase of handover implies a long-term commitment that does not apply to military projects, because they would have left before that. More importantly funds come from the international community, or for many Dutch PRT projects (except the CIMIC-budget), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In many cases another organization, possibly a UN organization takes over a project from the military organization, when their presence is no longer necessary. The job of finding alternative funding is therefore in the hands of the follow-up organization; in this case, the US.

Sixthly, ‘accountability’ is not referred to in the military literature that was used for this research. I consider it to be applicable to military projects, as in military literature there is emphasis on coordination and communication, which would seem to enhance accountability. From the results of the interview it can be understood that it was very important in Uruzgan. Project beneficiaries are very often checked, projects are frequently monitored and participants are expected to account for what they do. Accountability in PRT projects is more or less on the same level as in the framework. However, within the project (towards other Afghans) accountability is rather low and accountability from donors (PRT in this case) to recipients falls a little short. This is not supposed to be like that, according to the framework. After handover, it will be hard to implement and maintain mechanisms for accountability.

The following factor from the model is 'ownership'. In military literature 'ownership' was barely mentioned, but 'flexibility' was. Flexibility can be perceived as a more 'hands on' interpretation of 'ownership' in that it also relates to adjusting to local circumstances. It is therefore applicable to military projects. The actions and projects of the PRT depend predominantly on the ISAF mandate which in turn is based on the Bonn agreement. This causes the military organization to have limited room to maneuver, i.e. they cannot fully engage the local population in every aspect of the project, which is an important condition for ownership. This does not mean that the concept of 'ownership' is not introduced in military projects at all. It may not have been mentioned elaborately in the literature, but from the interviews it becomes clear that for projects local products and techniques are used and customs are as much as possible taken into account. This may relate less to 'ownership' than to cultural sensitivity, but it seems not unfair to say that 'ownership' from the framework and 'ownership' from the interviews do aim at the same goal.

Eight, 'participation' is very relevant for the military projects in this research. The Community and Provincial Development Councils show that the population is encouraged to participate. A positive element for this factor is that over time local leaders did see the benefits of participating and tried their best to do so. A negative element is that people who are participating also run a risk in terms of security. As long as Coalition Forces are there, this might be less of a problem, but it might imply that levels of participation drastically go down after handover.

Ninth, 'coordination' and 'timeframe' are discussed. These come from military literature and therefore applicable is not disputed. Coordination happened to a certain extent with stakeholders, although some NGOs did not want to work with the military. But these were not organizations who were very important to 'governance' projects. A negative element of 'coordination' was that from the interviews it became clear that for Westerners it is difficult to make appointments with Afghans. This can be attributed to unfamiliarity with local customs, but the impossibility to make strict agreements (both time and content) with the local population was also attributed to uncertainty if the Mission Teams could get somewhere because of security reasons or bad roads. This made it hard to coordinate with people in the remote areas.

Lastly, 'sustainability' is supposed to be the outcome of an effective handover, according to the model. Sustainability of results is also of relevance for the military, however in the model this comes *after* financial handover and only operational handover has sort of been addressed up until now.

Concluding, the framework is applicable to military projects. The nature of the military projects is such that it can be evaluated by the same way as development projects. The factors are listed above and discussed and it can be conclude that all factors are applicable to the projects but also that the framework itself is applicable.

## **5.4 Problems identified in the handover of governance projects**

In this section the main research question will be answered by discussing the case study, the consequences of the military entering the development field and the effectiveness of the implemented approach. It is noted that the factors from the framework were discussed in the former paragraph, so focus will now be on those factors or elements that could become problematic after handover of the project

The purpose of the PRT is to assist in reconstruction by way of the 3D approach. The combination of defense, diplomacy and development should lead to an integrative approach that would be more effective in reconstruction efforts. The mission consists of building capacity for governance, supporting the growth of governance structures and promoting an environment within which governance can improve. In chapter four is discussed how this exactly takes shape and how this fits in the factors from the framework. The application of the model to the PRT projects shows some mismatches. These mismatches identify the points that are likely to cause problems after handover. In other words, results that were achieved during the mission are not likely to be sustainable.

The first issue that is likely to become problematic is that of qualified personnel. Judges for a proper functioning legal system are hard to find and even harder to get to Uruzgan. There are more or less qualified District Chiefs now, but democratic structures mean that they will eventually be replaced. The district centre has only very limited administrative staff. This is not yet a problem, but can become problematic after handover of the project. There is no sufficient level of institutional capacity yet to handle these issues.

That brings us to the second issue that could become problematic. This issue relates to training, or more importantly cyclical training. The District Chiefs receive training and assistance to help them do their job properly. New possible District Chiefs are not educated yet, but democratic structures will eventually demand elections after which new District Chiefs are put into place. The system of governance consists of people who are supposed to have enough capacity. Early indication of this need would lead to preparatory training of possible District Chiefs. When the PRT handed the project over, it did not leave human capacity behind. This ensures only limited institutional capacity.

Another factor from the framework that received too little attention from the PRT is the building of information structures. Exchange of information is now facilitated by the PRT, either by actual transferring information from the District Chief to the governor or by talking on behalf of the District Chief when the governor does not want to talk to him. Afghan tribal

structure makes it harder to communicate across tribal boundaries. As long as the PRT is present these problems with communication can be taken up by the PRT, but when it is gone this is no longer possible. An efficient information feedback system could limit the impact of tribal relations in communication. The communication between parties is likely to deteriorate further after handover of the project.

Communication also influences accountability, the fourth factor of the framework that could become problematic. Information structures are necessary to ascertain accountability; democratic accountability is just one of them. To be held accountable means to know what is going on, to know what is going on means to have information. Communication however, is not the only thing that influences accountability. Moonlighting and corruption cause accountability levels to drop to very low levels. But with the uncertainty of not knowing where your next paycheck is coming from, or no district funds available, it is not surprising that people have another job on the side or that money goes 'missing'. Structures for accountability also depend on institutional capacity which is not yet achieved in Uruzgan. With regard to the lacking necessary information feedback system another reason can be identified. Information is also a powerful weapon in the fight against terrorists. It is understandable that information and who has access to it, is handled with care. In some cases this may be too careful for the efficient functioning of projects.

The fifth problem is that of funding. Projects in the districts of Uruzgan are now funded by several donors, one of which is the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and funds are supposed to run via government lines. This means that the government of Afghanistan receives funding which goes down through the several government levels to end at district level. Eventually the government, on district level as well as on national level, should be able to raise funds themselves, either through taxes or government companies. But for the foreseeable future the government will depend on external funds from the international community. A small step in that direction would have been to help form structures on district level to raise funds.

As a final remark on the preparation for handover the following can be stated. It is likely that the project would survive an operational handover: enough material capacity is build or constructed that can be handed over. Even on the matter of 'personnel' there are improvements that indicate that this phase may well be successfully concluded. What they did in Uruzgan with the mentoring of government officials is mainly gap-plugging: there were none, or not enough organizations which could pick up this task. It is no surprise that an

operational handover will probably pose no problems: when it comes to the operational level, the military has a 'hands-on' mentality. The PRT members that guided and helped the District Chiefs are not trained to do that. They have no education or experience in public administration, not surprisingly because that is not their regular job. The experience on operational level probably outweighs that of other organizations. But this very practical attitude prevents durable results for a management handover.

But the time is not right for a management handover to local civilian stakeholders; there is simply not enough institutional capacity for this. A handover would need to take place to an interim organization before a handover to local officials could take place. There are more and more organizations coming to Uruzgan to whom the project could be handed over to, but with the military gone, it is likely that the security situation deteriorates to such a level that these organizations will not go to Uruzgan either or the ones who are present now might decide to leave. There will be elaborated on matters of security in the next chapter, as it was not mentioned in development literature or literature on military project handover, but it seems to be of influence for handover. To have sustainable results, an interim organization is necessary to safeguard the results already achieved.

## ***Chapter 6: Discussion***

Hopefully with the research I have contributed to the scientific goal set out in chapter one. This would be a link in knowledge about development projects and reconstruction missions. With the application of a development framework to military projects a large step is taken to build a bridge between the two. The gap between military projects, usually CIMIC projects and development projects is often said to be large. Especially NGOs hesitate to work with the military, although in Uruzgan there are a few who cooperate with the PRT under the name of Dutch Consortium Uruzgan. There are other NGOs who are more reluctant to work with the military because they are perceived as biased by the population. This research shows that the nature of a military reconstruction project and a development project are such that it can be evaluated in the same way as development projects. The difference may be more on what the other tasks of the military is and the goals of NGOs at large. Hopefully the gap in knowledge about project handover by the military in reconstruction mission is now a little diminished.

There were some things that made this research rather difficult. It has been mentioned a couple of times in this research, but there is really few literature on the process of development project handover. There is also little literature on military projects that are neither classical CIMIC projects nor Security Sector Reform (SSR). This sort of ‘in-between’ project of reconstruction in a 3D approach is not much discussed from a viewpoint of handover. For that matter it might have been better to include literature on SSR. Another point that made this research a little difficult was the classification as ‘secret’ or ‘confidential’ of many military documents. Fortunately the cooperation and information I received from many respondents made up for this want in information collection. Although the respondents could not specify certain information, I have to say that all of them were most helpful and it made the research a little easier.

What I am still a little surprised about is that ‘security’ seemed not an issue in literature on military (reconstruction) projects. It seems that it could severely influence the project or at least the possibilities within a project after handover. It may be that sufficient levels of security are a ‘sine qua non’ for the military and that it is therefore not referred to, but I think it is strange that development literature also did not refer to it. Many development projects are implemented in post-conflict settings, so surely there must be some information about this related to handover? Finally, I hope that this research can make a contribution to a better adaptation to development needs in military projects. At least for as long as the military, through a 3D approach or other will not limit itself to classic CIMIC projects.





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
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## Appendix

### Annex A – PRT organization



CIVREP	Civilian Representative
OS(T)AD	Development Advisor (and Tribal) Advisor
Polad	Political Advisor
Funtioneel Specs	Functional Specialists
MT (1-5)	Mission Teams

Not part of the NL PRT but aligned on working level:

DynCorp	United States organisation for training Afghan National Army/ Police
PEP	Poppy Elimination Programme
PMT	United States Police Monitoring Team
USAID	United States Agency for International Development

The various CIMIC capacities are not concentrated in one CIMIC Support Element (CSE), but have been integrated in both the staff and the mission teams. Each PRT rotation has implemented organisational changes but the chart as presented above serves as a blueprint. The organisation of the PRT as listed above was valid until March 2009.



## Annex B – Afgan National Development Strategy (visual)

Figure 3.1	Pillars, Sectors & Themes from the I-ANDS						
Pillar 1 Security	Pillar 2 Governance Rule of Law & Human Rights	Pillar 3 Economic and Social Development					
Sector 1 Security	Sector 2 Governance, Rule of Law & Human Rights	Sector 3 Infrastructure & Natural Resources	Sector 4 Education	Sector 5 Health	Sector 6 Agriculture and Rural Development	Sector 7 Social Protection	Sector 8 Economic Governance & Private Sector Evelopment
Gender Equity (Cross cutting theme 1)							
Counter Narcotics (Cross cutting theme 2)							
Regional Cooperation (Cross cutting theme 3)							
Anti-Corruption (Cross cutting theme 4)							
Environment (Cross cutting theme 5)							

Based on the visual from the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan National Development Strategy 1387 – 1391 (2008 – 2013). A Strategy for security, governance, economic growth & poverty Reduction.

## Annex C - List of respondents

Colonel	Gino van der Voet	03 December 2009, The Hague
Political Advisor	Said Fazili	04 December 2009, The Hague (by phone)
Captain	Imre Bokodi	07 December 2009, Apeldoorn
Captain	Richard Stolwijk	07 December 2009, Apeldoorn
Captain	Harm Heutinck	11 December 2009, Utrecht (by phone)
FS Law	Jan Janssen	18 December 2009, Zoetermeer
Lieutenant Colonel	Jacco Wagtmans	18 December 2009, Utrecht
Dutch Consortium Uruzgan (Cordaid)	Paul van den Berg	29 December 2009, The Hague
Major	Metin Öge	04 January 2010, Stroe
Captain	Petri Tiebout	04 January 2010, Stroe
FS Governance	Jasper Regatlie	06 January 2010, Deurne
Captain	Morvan Dreischor	07 January 2010, 't Harde
Major	Wermink	07 January 2010, Garderen
Major	Tony Selhorst	10 January 2010, Rijswijk
Captain (temporary)	Michiel Rovers	14 January 2010, Oirschot
Captain (temporary)	Bram Leeuwrik	15 January 2010, Roosendaal
Captain	Jeffrey van der Veer	15 January 2010, 't Harde
Development Advisor	Wiesje Elfferich	17 February 2010, Kabul (by Skype)
Dutch Consortium Uruzgan (Healthnet TPO)	Stefan van der Laar	31 March 2010, Amsterdam
Lieutenant Colonel	Han Bouwmeester	20 May 2010, 't Harde
Major General	Mart de Kruijf	12 May 2010, Utrecht


*Due to specific request two respondents are not listed. The respondents number in chapter four does not relate to the order of the respondents on this list.*

## Annex D – Interview guide


*(These questions are only a guide and give an indication on the topics that were discussed during interviews)*

- What was your function and what activities were involved in it?
- In what region were you active (TK, Ch, DR, DehR)?
- What projects did you work on during your stay and how did the idea emerge to do those projects?
- How did requests from the local population get to the PRT, how was this processed? Indien coaching, hoe ging dat?
- In what way did 'governance' receive special attention as a topic?
  - How did you perceive the local population's attitude towards 'governance'?
  - Did you notice anything about other non-official leaders?
  - What, in your opinion, were reasons for people to go to the official government?
- [ownership] how were the relations with the local population?
- (How) was participation of local population promoted?
- How do people know where to find information?
- How was the information exchange and cooperation with official authorities?
- Were there sufficient material or workers for projects?
- Did you notice 'tribal issues' within official government structures?
- Accountability?
- Were you able to plan activities?
- How did you prepare the follow-up?

## Annex E - Model for handover



Model based on Strachan, P. (1996). Handing over an operational project to community management in North Darfur, Sudan. *Development in Practice*, 6(3), pp. 208-216.



Model adjusted with literature on military projects.

## Annex F – Differences and similarities between military projects and development projects.

### Differences and similarities between Military projects and NGO projects

	<b>Military</b>	<b>NGO</b>
	Presence requested by UN, NATO or government of the country in question.	Presence requested by local population, other organizations or unilateral decided.
	CIMIC or military projects are in support of the mission. It is a secondary task.	Promoting development as primary task.
	Support the mission.	Support the population.
	Handover when mission ends (end date) or when measurable benchmarks for success are accomplished.	Handover when self-support by local population is possible (long term).
	Handover to official structures, whether government or other organizations (NGO's, UN)	Handover to local population (community organization).
	Focus on capacity building.	
	Cooperation with each other → 3D approach.	
	Both (can) operate in non-benign areas.	

This table is based information from presentations and discussions between members of NGO's and the military, during CIMIC Basic Course at the CIMIC Centre of Excellence.

Date: 30 August 2009 until 11 September 2009

## **Annex G – Operationalization of factors from the model**

### Personnel:

- All necessary positions in the project are filled and will also be filled after handover, either by the project organization itself or an NGO.
- All personnel receive sufficient payment so they do not need to complement their income with earnings on the side (moonlighting) and thus can focus at their job.
- Motivation to work with the project is clear and does not interfere with project objectives or its sustainability. (Reason to work with the project: family, status or money)
- Background of personnel does not interfere with project objectives or sustainability of the project. (Local, national or expatriate)

### Material capacity:

- All resources and necessary material are available to the project without extensive costs.
- Resources and infrastructure necessary for the projects' sustainability are available and obtainable without extensive costs.
- Project techniques, technology or materials reflect the level of development in a given country or area. (local appropriate techniques/materials)
- Maintenance of project assets, materials or resources can also be done locally with locally (?) available material.

### Institutional capacity:

- Personnel can work with (newly) introduced techniques or technology, if necessary by training.
- Qualified personnel for replacements are available. (democratic shifts: trained personnel)
- Personnel can function independently from donor/ project initiator.
- Expatriates are not used to plug gaps. (they only help, or training on the job)

### Information:

- Sufficient information for project personnel to function adequately is at hand: a monitoring system, a standardized set of management-information indicators and performance indicators.
- Information always is timely.
- Information is shared with all relevant stakeholders and in ways that are adaptive to local customs. (Media should be chosen by locals: what works best)  
Relevant information is available in local language(s) and adapted to local needs and skills.
- Information reflects local standards (i.e. literacy).
- Project information should not be uniform.

### Funding:

- Budget should be known to project staff.
- Staff should be capable of finding alternative funding for the project or the project should be financially independent/self-sufficient. (could be donors like government)
- Funding should not be dependent on single donors. (i.e. only on government funds (to prevent non-sustainability or corruption) or western donors with visibility syndrome)
- Payments to the project should not compromise project objectives.
- Financial independence should be slowly worked towards and not be unilaterally.

### Accountability:

- Capacity for accountability is needed: project employees should have the means (information, resources and organizational experience) and the capacity. (monitoring)
- Project initiator/donor and project personnel should hold equal standards for monitoring and evaluation.
- Donors/project initiators should be clear about expectations and demands.
- Public should demand accountability: who is responsible for what? (Accountability is towards participants (local public) as well as donors.
- Project personnel/staff should be accountable to each other.
- Accountability demands should not collide with local culture or be in coherence with local customs. (ownership)
- Accountability mechanisms should come about in close collaboration with stakeholders.
- There should be incentives for failure or success in order for accountability to work.

#### Ownership:

- Cultural values and customs of local staff should be leading in the organization of the project, unless the seriously interfere with project objectives or the sustainability of the project.
- Reports are available in local languages
- More

#### Participation:

- Who participates in what way is established by constitutional, operational, information and aggregational rules.
- Participants of all groups are included in the project.
- Local actors are involved in all phases of handover and in all aspects.
- Participants are involved in decision making.

#### Coordination:

- Support of implementation of local control
- cooperation between stakeholders

#### Timeframe:

- Results

Note: technology here also reflects newly introduced law.