Between physical and mental borders

Tracing back the borderising migration trajectories and processes from Barcelona to Ceuta and Melilla

by

Radboud Universiteit

Jim van Moorsel

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Author: Jim van Moorsel
Student number: 4020006
Contact: jimvanmoorsel@outlook.com

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Thesis supervision: prof. dr. Henk van Houtum – Radboud University
Internship supervision: dr. Xavier Ferrer-Gallardo – Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona

Radboud Universiteit

Universitat Autònoma
de Barcelona

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Executive summary

Spain has a long history with migration. While its image as immigration country might be rather new, migrants have already been arriving for decades on its soil. It forms one of the main gates to Europe. This may in some cases be interpreted literal, and in other cases be seen as an epitome. The enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla physically border the so-called Global South, being located on the African continent. This particularity, along with ambiguous and vivid geopolitics, creates two very paradoxical places. Barcelona, on the other hand, is a metaphorical 'gate to Europe'. Its cognitively constructed image shows a Europe of possibilities, a *new life*. However, before getting to Barcelona, as well as before being able to start such a new chapter, migrants encounter many borders. With borders, one should not only think about physical borders. Yet, the ultimate physical borders that separate two tiny pieces of Europe within Africa play a gigantic role. It is here where a big deal of the mediatised *border spectacle* happens. However, when having overcome this border, this does not mean one has reached his goal. The migration process is far longer, and involves administrative, mental and social borderising dynamics of different kinds, which create exclusion and immobility.

While we live in an increasingly mobilised world, mobility possibilities are not equal for everyone. All fluidity that guarantees mobility arguably comes with dynamics and patterns, suppliers of immobility. This is manifested and performed at borders, making them highly uneven and even skewed, as is the case at the Spanish-Moroccan border. This physical border is officially impermeable for irregular migrants, forming part of an excluding 'negative list'. Yet, they find their ways to succeed in entering. Then, the particularities of Ceuta and Melilla prove to be a playground for 'migrant processing centres'. An administrative border is created that does not permit migrants to move either forward or backward – leaving them in a *limbo*. When rendered completely immobile, they become completely dependent of foreign powers, and just the fact they are humans is preserved. They are *bare humans*, placed in a state of exception. This state of exception, and therefore also 'the migrant status', is unpredictable and indefinite. All depends on the whims of the *border*, which in this case functions through dynamics of the nation-state.

In the case of power division along the borders of Ceuta and Melilla, there are two involved entities – a national (Spain) and a supranational (the European Union) one. Then, Morocco might play the role of third power through outsourcing politics stimulated by the EU. Yet, for migrants, exiting the *limbo* of the enclaves seems rather a game of luck than strictly being dependent on policies and politics by those powers. This involves some decisions of which the consequences cannot be overseen. Is applying for asylum actually a good idea? Everything is turned towards the possibility to get transported towards the Peninsula. Often, this means in practice irregular migrants get transported to the mainland to be either detained and deported, or left in freedom. However, the concept 'freedom' seems to be undermined here, as a deportation order often stays valid and can be carried out later on. In Barcelona, this means in practice an irregular migrant has to live a discreet life, wandering between irregular circuits to be able to survive. How does one participate in society when being hindered by administrative and social borders? The notion 'irregularity', often

mediatised as 'illegal', seems to play a ubiquitous role in this situation. On a social level, it carries negative connotations, further *othering* and excluding the migrant. When taking into account the administrative border, it becomes an impassable hurdle that separates the migrant from the rest of society, creating a *citizen gap*. Overcoming this gap may come together with surpassing a 'tangle of borders'. While the concept of *arraigo* in Spain can successfully lead to regularisation, how does one come to that point with the possibilities and restricted mobilities of an irregular? Irregularity often means following routes, and moving and travelling around to be able to support oneself and survive. Yet, not sticking to one working and living place further diminishes the chances to regularise.

Therefore, migration is a process. Arguably when one stays in one place, either voluntarily or rendered immobile, but remains excluded, that process is still on going. For a migrant to create a new home, and actually 'feel at home', travelling from A to B is not sufficient. Creative thinking, the occasional bit of luck, and perseverance seem to be needed to 'transform' from the Other, to forming part of society. In a pessimistic sense, it is possible this moment will never arrive for many. When not being able to participate, but at the same time being far from home, a migrant might enter in a vicious circle of irregularity. *On ne parvient pas deux fois*, Hannah Arendt (1996) stated. Is migration, although being a phenomenon of all times, an incompatible concept within today's society, rendered around the patterns and dynamics of the nation-state? Such dynamics impose a borderising influence on the mobility and the inclusion of the migrant. Arguably, imposing borders leads to more borders and more exclusion. Irregularity finds itself manifolded with more irregularity. Arguably, the time has come to redevelop the debate around citizenship, and blend this in with the migration process. As of now, migrants will keep on arriving in Barcelona, a mental representation of Europe, hoping to pursue their dreams. By tracing back the route migrants take – from the external EU-level in Ceuta and Melilla to the city level of Barcelona – it becomes clear how all mechanisms and dynamics are intertwined and affect each other.

Acknowledgements

Now that I am writing this last part of my master thesis, I would like to take the opportunity to acknowledge the support I have had throughout the project. When I started the master degree (MSc.) in Human Geography, following the trajectory Migration, Globalisation and Development, I already had a vague idea about the to be carried out research for this master thesis. Yet, I could not foresee I would finish two years later, being enriched by so many new experiences, insights and knowledge. I am very thankful for all the new doors this master and the research have opened for me.

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never-ending support and curiousness during my studies. Their big interest in this research has always been a big drive for me. Thank you!

Jim van Moorsel

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Preface

Wednesday 2 September 2015, Barajas Airport (Madrid, Spain)
I am boarding on Iberia flight IB3214, which will take me from Madrid to Brussels. Whilst the boarding takes place without any issues or delays, the plane does not depart on time. It will finally take off two hours later. In the meantime, the plane stays stationed at the terminal with the passengers and crew on board. For one hour and a half, the cabin crew refuses to give any details about the cause of the delay. It would supposedly be an issue of technical nature. Just some minutes before final take-off, the true nature of the caused delay is revealed. Around 35 Ghanaians, originating from Accra with a connecting flight from Madrid to Brussels, are halted by the customs control and are not given permission to enter the plane. Their luggage is already on board and for safety reasons it must be tracked and taken off. Some Ghanaians trickle in just before departing and can count on the curious and suspicious faces of the other passengers. They must have made it through the customs control in the end.

One month earlier: 31 July-3 August 2015, Keleti Station (Budapest, Hungary)
A sense of desperation is tangible at Keleti Station, the biggest railway station of Budapest. Hundreds of migrants are stranded here, most of them being Syrians. Their journey seems to have come to an abrupt halt. After entering Europe in Greece and crossing Macedonia and Serbia, Hungary is the last transit country for most of them. After Hungary, they will reach their final destinations, mainly Austria, Germany and Sweden. Some already seem to be lodging here for weeks. They have made improvised sleeping places in corners of the station, to be as little an annoyance to the Hungarians and the tourists as possible. As abominable as their situation might be, people do not beg for food or money. One's dignity has to be preserved.

Three months earlier: 9-10 June 2015, parking lot (Ceuta, Spain)
I am in Spain, but this is Africa, as Abdelay seems to keep on reminding me. The 21-year-old talks a broken French, peppered with some typical Andalusian Spanish words one learns when living in Ceuta. Is Ceuta what he expected it to be? No, it certainly is not. It is a prison, as migrants who managed to enter the fenced enclave cannot move in or out anymore. They just have to wait anxiously to see what the Spanish authorities will do with them. However, being Guinean normally means having good chances. And in Ceuta, life is still hundred times better than in Guinea, plagued by Ebola and escalating political conflicts. The Cameroonians, Nigerians and Congolese have also noticed the 'advantages' of being Guinean. Why not pretend you speak French and name yourself Henry, Bubacar or Abdulay, instead of Victor, Michael or Joseph? It seems worth the chance if that means to be taken to the Spanish mainland instead of an express deportation back to Africa.

Four months earlier: 6-8 May 2015, the CETI (Melilla, Spain)
Melilla is overflowed. The CETI has expanded beyond its own fences with a dozen of tents. Luckily, summer is coming and their temporary inhabitants do not have to fear for the cold as of yet. On the contrary, it's only May and the sun in combination with the warm Sahara winds

is already doing its work. Shadow spots under the trees just outside the CETI remain popular throughout the day. They seem to provide more privacy than staying inside the CETI, where population has doubled capacity. Melilla is a new hotspot for Syrian refugees, as it seems. In Turkey they are treated second-class burglars, in Greece even worse, the Bulgarian government is too corrupt, and let's not speak about the precarious boat journeys from Turkey to Greek islands, or from Libya to Lampedusa. It does remind of the Senegalese and Mauritanian *cayucos*[1] departing for the Canary Islands, only some ten years ago. Coming to Melilla is safer. For Syrians who do have money, that is. Most of them manage to catch a plane to Algeria or Morocco, and continue their journey onto Melilla. This is not without paying thousands of euros to smugglers. However, when they are finally inside, paradise begins. The Spanish government has launched a whole special refugee programme for Syrians in Melilla, which includes the possibility to already request asylum at the Moroccan-Spanish border, as well as regular chartered ferries which will take them to the mainland ports of Málaga, Motril or Almería…

…When I hear Adnan daydreaming of Europe, he suddenly stops talking and listens to the speaker that blares over the CETI. He stands up and apologises. 'Sorry, I have to go, they call my name', translates Amine. Adnan only speaks Arabic and Amine has offered me to act as interpreter, so I can communicate with the Syrians. We form a good duo. When Adnan comes back half an hour later, he is overjoyed. His family is selected for the crossing to Almería tomorrow. We celebrate drinking coke and eating falafel.

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[1] *Cayucos* are (larger) fisher's boats, which are used by migrants for the *mbëkë mi* ('the trip' in Wolof) from the ports of Senegal, Mauritania and the Western Sahara to the Canary Islands (Andersson, 2013). When these wooden boats are used to cross the Strait of Gibraltar or the Mediterranean Sea to arrive in Ceuta, Melilla or mainland Spain, they are called *pateras* (Carling, 2007a).

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List of abbreviations

ACATHI	Asociació Catalana per a la Integració d'Homosexuals, Bisexuals i Transsexuals Immigrants
ACNUR	Alto Comisionado de las Naciones Unidas para los Refugiados (UNHCR)
APDHA	Asociación Pro Derechos Humanos de Andalucía
CCAR	Comissió Catalana d'Ajuda al Refugiat
CEAR	Comisión Española de Ayuda al Refugiado
CETI	Centro de Estancia Temporal de Inmigrantes
CIE	Centro de Internamiento de Extranjeros
CNP	Cuerpo Nacional de Policía
IMPCD	International Centre for Migration Policy Development
IOM	International Organization for Migration
MSF	Médecins Sans Frontières
PP	Partido Popular
PSOE	Partido Socialista Obrero Español
SASEMAR	Sociedad de Salvamento y Seguridad Marítima
SIVE	Sistema Integrado de Vigilancia Exterior

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1. Introduction

Barcelona is the dynamic cosmopolitan city of many: of the young and the old, of the Catalans, the Spanish[2] and the immigrants. However, most immigrants might not always feel it that way. They may reside in Barcelona, but that does not automatically mean it is their city. Their miserable living and working conditions have come more to the social surface due to the economical crisis during the last years. It shows another side of that happy, cultural and modern city. If these immigrants cannot participate in society and are excluded, can it still be called *their* city? Their Barcelona is often composed by *buscarse la vida* ('make a living') and survival. After having commenced on a, often extremely dangerous, journey with lots of hurdles they have had to take to arrive in this city, deception could not be bigger for many. The reality in Barcelona, often an epitome of Europe, is not what many had hoped for. Borders continue to loom and the road to participation in society is long.

Migration is not a new phenomenon, but rather a substantial part of human history. Throughout the centuries, people have been on the move with different causes and consequences to be linked to this concept (Castles, de Haas & Miller, 2013; King, 2002). However, recently it has become a hot and hyped item, as if it were something new, intangible, and particularly framed as 'unstoppable'. This is partly caused, and further fostered, by stigmatising the migrant as being poor and uneducated, and illegal instead of irregular (Pinyol-Jiménez, 2012), and that his arrival would eventually lead to a lack of opportunities for himself and a lack of benefits for the hosting country. Already in 2002, King pleaded for new geographies and a new migration map of the European continent, in which false assumptions and stereotypes should be thrown overboard. Moreover, migration should be more linked to mobility, making it an interdisciplinary kind of study. Following up on that, Castles (2000) already argued migration should not be seen as just crossing borders, but as a concept that encompasses all aspects of life migrants go through:

> This dynamic whole may be referred to as the *migratory process*, a term which underlines that migration is not a single event (i.e. the crossing of a border), but a life-long process which affects all aspects of a migrant's existence, as well as the lives of non-migrants and communities in both sending and receiving countries. (pp. 15-16)

1.1. Current affairs

In 2015's Europe, migration is more than ever linked to borders and seen as a movement of the poor, the losing and the threatening. Securitising policies have *othered* and excluded the immigrant, might he be living for years already in a French *banlieue* (Dikeç, 2006; Mattelart & Hargreaves, 2014), or be on a *patera* trying to the reach the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla (Dünnwald, 2011; Ferrer-Gallardo & van Houtum, 2014; Pinyol-Jiménez, 2012). This securitisation is clashing with migrational movements towards Europe due to the on-going Syrian civil war, as well as violence and political conflicts on the African continent. The

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[2] It is not my intention to interfere or give my opinion in any way on the on-going debate about the Catalan independence. My concern is to focus on the group of international migrants, which encounters the borders this thesis deals with, and not those who migrated internally within Spain to Barcelona.

securitisation process of a continent to protect itself against the so-called 'waves of immigrants' is explained by van Houtum (2010a) through the terms *bordering, ordering* and *othering*, stating that fortification will in the end only lead to more clandestine migrants, who will subsequently be excluded from participating in society due to growing xenophobia. In 'fortified Europe' countries all make their own 'rules' when it comes to practice. Nowadays, Spain can admit Syrian migrants who arrived in Melilla clandestinely, and ship them to the Iberian Peninsula, while in Hungary, for example, Syrians commit a crime when they cross the Serbian-Hungarian border fence, and can be taken to prison (Nolan, 2016). However, even within Spain it might as well lead to a totally different outcome if one crosses the border in Ceuta instead of Melilla. These differences painfully reveal the flaw of such securitising policies, and the consequences they have for migrants searching for a safe refuge (van Houtum, 2010a; Pinyol-Jiménez, 2012). They are confronted with *borders* that do not only act physical, but also administrational and political, blocking them in their mobility and excluding them from society. Those are not described by law, and can disappear just as fast as they surge.

The reality of the European Union is one that acts increasingly introvert, makes fortresses out of its outer border towns and alienates the ones seeking to enter. The Spanish activist and photographer José Palazón captured this European attitude very well in Melilla

two years ago.[3] We see African refugees sitting on a razor wired border fence while they are looking down on an in-use and perfectly maintained golf club. Although as of lately the media hype has moved more towards the eastern borders of the EU, we should not forget Ceuta and Melilla have always been these outer border cities in Africa where migrants are coming in and where securitising policies have been at stake for centuries. Very particular for Ceuta and Melilla is that they are very small surfaces and geographically separated from the European continent. These are not final destinations for migrants, as they would not provide anything for them and would implode if their population would surge in such a rapid mode. This practical notion aside, migrants most of the time already have an idealistic image of Europe before they arrive there. They portray a European city full of opportunities where they will be able to start a new life, find a safe refuge, and come out of poverty. Barcelona is one of those metaphoric European cities. Mbaye (2014) even goes as far saying for a lot of them it is 'Barcelona or die!' while they are travelling. Migrants are known for screaming 'Barça, Barça!' when they jump the fences of Ceuta and Melilla. However, is Barcelona really the paradise they portray it to be? And which positions do Ceuta and Melilla take in this story?

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[3] Photo by José Palazón (2014). Retrieved from http://verne.elpais.com/verne/2014/10/22/articulo/1414007054_000118.html.

1.2. Public salience and the securitising debate

On 1 February 2015, approximately 400 sub-Saharan migrants unsuccessfully tried to cross the border between Morocco and Melilla. It was the third large attempt already since the beginning of the year, and was followed by three other small attempts in the same month (Sánchez, 2015). After such events there are often deaths or major injuries to be mourned about. The normality of such actions and also the salience and coverage in the media have increased public awareness, as Brian and Laczko (2014) observe. However, figures of illegal border-crossings or numbers of the dead and injured reported in the media do not capture the whole image, as Weber and Pickering (2011) argue. While photos and images shown in the media demonstrate how serious the situation is, they fail to report the true numbers involved. ''For every dead body washed up on the shores of the developed world, experts estimate there are at least two others that are never recovered'' (Weber & Pickering, 2011, p. 1).

In other words, there is a lack of available data, covering the real magnitude of deaths and tragedies involved at the borders. The public awareness of these events might already be bigger than before, but this has not led to any public and administrative concrete projects or initiatives that try to prevent and downsize them. Therefore, Brian and Laczko (2014) see the development of better data on the amount of border-crossing, missing and dying migrants as a huge need. It could spur greater actions that would eventually prevent these huge tragedies, they argue. Furthermore, it could combat a political lack of responsibility and concerns for safety or wellbeing of the migrants. This would result from the idea that concrete data are highly confronting and make hiding behind vagueness almost impossible.

However, this does not mean states have not been acting at all when they were confronted with a new migrant border crossing tragedy. Already in 1995, Spain fenced its two enclaves Ceuta and Melilla in order to 'protect' them and to confirm their status as EU-outer borders. When Spain joined the EU in 1986, it became obliged to regulate its migration policies according to EU-standards. It arguably lost a big part of its say about the future securitisation of Ceuta and Melilla when it became clear they were two migrant border-crossing hotspots (Carling, 2007b; Ferrer-Gallardo, 2008; Saddiki, 2010). During the past few decades, the EU-policies have moved towards a softening of the internal borders (to an almost disappearance) against a hardening of the external borders, exemplified by Ceuta and Melilla (Castan Pinos, 2009; Moffette, 2014). They underpin the idea of a Fortress Europe, which tries to securitise and fortify the union to keep undesired elements out. Carling (2007a) argues the EU has adopted this discourse as a strategy to make aware of the 'threats' of irregular or unauthorised migrants, hovering around the migration-security nexus (Pinyol-Jiménez, 2012; Nyberg Sørensen, 2012). As Dünnwald (2011) and also de Haas (2008) state, the intensity of this political discourse shows disparities with actual immigration numbers. Therefore, it would be better not to talk of security methods, but a whole discourse of securitisation. In other words, a security threat is established and spread in public discourse, while evidence or facts often are not present or deficient (Dünnwald, 2011).

Within this securitising discourse also fit the plans of the EU to integrate neighbouring countries into border control and surveillance, as well as the detainment and expulsion of migrants. In the case of the Ceuta and Melilla external borders, these partners are Morocco, Algeria, Mauritania and Senegal (de Haas, 2008; Rodier, 2013; Zapata-Barrero, 2008). These countries also allow European forces to operate within their sovereign territories in order to

control the situation far before the migrants reach international waters or European territory (van Houtum & Mamadouh, 2008). Within this context, the creation of the European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union (Frontex) in 2004 should not be seen as a surprise. Dünnwald (2011) underlines the ambiguous position this agency has. According to their official website, it has an 'official, supportive, coordinative, and assisting role'. However, he and Walters (2014) argue Frontex has taken an increasingly independent and powerful role within the field.

Together with separate EU-member states, Frontex is involved in pilot projects and joint operations where the member state acts as a leading operator and Frontex coordinates the operation (Casas-Cortes, Cobarrubias & Pickles, 2012; van Houtum, 2010a). However, since Frontex officially still is an assisting agency, it relies on the diplomatic relations between EU-members and neighbouring countries, for example the relations Spain maintains with Morocco and Mauritania. As it compiles data and analyses risks in its data centres, this means it would remain a rather passive entity when it comes to border activities and interventions. However, Frontex has been increasingly trying to enhance its competences and act individually. This would also for a part arise from the unreliable character of the relations with North-African states after the occurrence of the Arab Spring and other tensions that may exist between neighbouring countries, the Spanish-Moroccan conflict on the sovereignty of Ceuta and Melilla being an example (Castan Pinos, 2009; de Haas, 2008).

The way Frontex tries to portray itself, Dünnwald (2011) and Rodier (2013) argue, as a necessity needed to stabilise the Mediterranean region and 'protect it from the large influxes of irregular migrants' is similar to the securitising discourse a lot of European media and politicians have adopted. As stated before, hypes and scenarios of 'huge waves of poor, mainly sub-Saharan migrants, that would invade Europe' attract them. Exactly because the dramatic actions of crossing land- or sea-borders often lead to deaths or injuries, those deliver the corresponding images. Still, most of the people that end up as irregular migrants in Europe are those who have entered Europe legally but overstay their tourist visa or residence permit (Bousetta, 2008; Collyer, 2010; de Haas, 2008). This way of 'invading Europe' might be less newsworthy, appropriate and catchy for the purposes of a securitising discourse.

1.3. Concepts and research objectives

The idea for this thesis surged partly after the publication of the photo by José Palazón in the international media, and partly because of a special personal interest for the migration topic, as well as the positions of Ceuta and Melilla within the European notions of place and space. Although experts and politics are aware of the situation in Ceuta and Melilla, the salience of their geographical, geopolitical and historical notions and dynamics seems to remain small. The photo by Palazón can be seen as an attempt to change this unfamiliarity, as well as to raise awareness of the harsh contradictions that are to be found on the Afro-European borders. However, a popular misconception is that the external European borders form the only hurdle that has to be taken. Eventually inside Europe the migrants, who have now become immigrants, also need to find their way, which is obstructed by a variety of borders. These physical and mental borders lead to their exclusion of participation in society for many of them, often fostered and caused by their irregular status. A lack of documents can be

explained by the way Europe is fortifying itself, which leaves migrants with no other alternative than to act and to live clandestinely.

To illustrate and exemplify the migration process as a continuous road of borders, this thesis will pave a way between Ceuta and Melilla and Barcelona, and will connect an array of different voices and opinions collected during an extensive fieldwork period in Barcelona, as well as during trips to Ceuta and Melilla. It is certainly clear that Barcelona is not everyone's dreamed destination, nor is it the final destination for all migrants, yet it has proven to be a good starting point and a base to talk with migrants and organisations. This also counts for Melilla and Ceuta, cities so small that migration is a tangible and sensible topic on every street corner. During my interview with Rebeca Acedo Calvete from Accem Ceuta, she put this perfectly into terms stating Ceuta has 'an explosive character, acting like a pressure cooker'.[4] Migrants who have entered Ceuta and Melilla see Barcelona as a point of reference, be it as a first goal, or a more fixed destination, which should make this connection legitimate. This thesis does not cover the route of a whole migrant's journey, as neither Ceuta and Melilla nor Barcelona can be seen as starting or ending points. I would like to underline again the idea of Castles (2000) and argue migration is not a simple border-crossing act or a journey from A to B, but rather a life-long process.

A rather moral topic that also should be touched on is whether migrants or refugees should be given the opportunity to decide what is their 'ideal' destination, or if they should just be given a fixed place provided by the European society. This is a case that nowadays makes feelings run high across Europe. While it is a legitimate question, it is also rather inapplicable in this master thesis. For example, Spain does not have a big history of asylum applications nor procedures, which means a lot of migrants in the end do not apply for asylum in Spain and try their luck further north. On the other hand, Spain's legislation makes it somewhat easier for irregular migrants to become regularised than in most other EU-countries because of the existence of the *arraigo*.[5] Also, the topic of migration and all its opinions and subtopics it has produced are far too widespread to deal with in a master thesis. Therefore, not all questions that may rise will be answered nor clarified. I experienced that conducting fieldwork and interviewing organisations and migrants in general generated more questions than answers.

In this research, I will focus on the physical, administrative and mental borders migrants experience when living in Barcelona. Then, my intention is to trace back to the external EU-borders in Ceuta and Melilla to understand their effect on the local city level of the Catalan capital. Which borderising mechanisms work through on different levels and can be perceived as such? This leads to the following main research question:

How do the external EU-borders in Ceuta and Melilla affect on borderising inclusion and exclusion dynamics impacting on migrants in Barcelona?

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[4] The interview with Rebeca Acedo Calvete took place on 10 June 2015 in Ceuta. Accem is a Spanish NGO working with migrants and refugees recently arrived and those in danger of being excluded from society. See also the list of Acronyms and Terms.

[5] The *arraigo social* grants legal residency in Spain for irregular migrants who can produce documents confirming they have lived in Spain for a minimum period of three consecutive years (without gaps), as well as a working contract of at least one year (see also Chapter 2).

Besides the main research question, the following sub questions, divided in three categories, will serve to give more structure to the thesis and research.

- Internal city level (Barcelona)

Does this city's reality correspond to the imaginary place formed by migrants? When discussing the possession, or rather the non-possession, of the right documents, how does this exclude them from participation in society or border them in their movements? And how do such borders push them to live in the shadows, eventually manoeuvring themselves between the margins of the informal sector?

- External EU-level (Ceuta and Melilla)

Which role(s) do Ceuta and Melilla play within the European border frame of migration? And which different perspectives and dynamics are related to their role? Also, who manages to enter Ceuta and Melilla and how is this related to different policies and dynamics? Finally, what can be said about the numbers of migrants arriving and continuing their journey to the Peninsula?

- Concept of borders

When speaking about borders, these are not only meant physical, but also administrative, political, social and mental. They include all hurdles migrants stumble upon and that form part of different borderising stages within the migratory process (as described by Castles, 2000). How are these borders actually formed and in which way are they justified by governmental and organisational entities? Can these justifications be seen as legitimate based on humanitarian and legislative grounds? How do they effectively in- or exclude and determine im/mobility?

In the end, these questions will help to determine how the European borders in Ceuta and Melilla affect the 'internal borders' in Barcelona, and which impact can be felt and experienced by migrants locally. Subsequently, this will also lead to take the main research question one step further, as in how do the local border effects influence on national and European policies again.

1.4. Scientific relevance

Although not new, the study and research on migration have become increasingly popular and salient nowadays. It is a highly interdisciplinary field, with relevant areas including geography, sociology, political science, history, economics, law and cultural studies (Castles, de Haas & Miller, 2013). As interdisciplinary as it might be, Schapendonk and Steel (2014) evoke that ''migration has mainly been studied from the position of fixed locations: the A and the B, the push and the pull, the place of origin and the destination'' (p. 262). Although, mainly due to time and focus constraints, I will not be able to discuss every point on the migration trajectory, I will not study the classical A and B either. As argued earlier, migration should be seen as a longer process, and not merely as a classic journey with one origin and one destination. In this thesis, I will just focus on the moment migrants arrive in Ceuta and Melilla, and later, on, in Barcelona. From Barcelona, either a temporary or final destination,

the trajectory will be traced back to an in-between phase in the enclaves to give a view of the migration mobility within EU-territory and to be able to indicate and discuss the bordering dynamics within this mobility. Such borders can also lead to exclusion from social participation, of which the lack of having the right documents can be both a cause and a consequence.

This research will fit into the current interdisciplinary trend of migration studies and will link to important existing theories and combining fields such as mobility, geopolitics and history, forming together parts and aspects of the migration trajectory that can be traced back from Barcelona to Ceuta and/or Melilla. The scientific relevance of this project will be formed by the information gathered by combining various components of this interdisciplinary trend of migration studies with a migration trajectory approach. The geopolitical component is very present in this research, also caused by the disputed authority status of Ceuta and Melilla by Morocco. This makes Ceuta and Melilla very ambiguous and paradoxical places. It will be important to find out how their ambiguities play a role within this migration trajectory, as well as Barcelona's function within the whole migration process. Subsequently, hopefully it will become clear how organs and entities react to borderising effects on local and European levels, and how different effects influence each other, leading to more and/or new borders.

1.5. Societal relevance

Migration nowadays forms an important subject for the European Union, which increasingly faces big migrant inflows at several outer borders, such as Ceuta and Melilla. Ferrer-Gallardo and Albet-Mas (2013), as well as van Houtum (2010a) state the EU is becoming a fortress with selectively permeable borders for outsiders. In a lot of cases, migrants are outsiders while those borders are impermeable and remain closed for them. As a consequence, they will try in a clandestine way to get closer by their objective of entering the EU and going metonymic places like Barcelona, standing for European prosperity and success. Trying to cross the border illegally is a risky and dangerous undertaking that has provoked many deaths as of lately (de Haas, 2008; van Houtum & Boedeltje, 2009). Even when migrants have succeeded in entering the EU, they are at risk of being alienated and excluded of participation in society. In Barcelona this has led to big informal sectors wherein those migrants try to move and survive. They are 'naked people' without the right documents to prove their stay. This forces them to live in the shadows of society, fearing of getting caught and sent back to their home countries. Bordering political, social and administrational dynamics that impede or block their mobility impose their nakedness and sometimes can generate multiple layers of (social) exclusion.

The idea of the EU shaping a policy based on ethnic preferences is increasingly becoming a reality. The Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla, bordering the land where 'the other', the non-European, resides, form a big oxymoron. They are not only positioned in the centre of the European migration debate, but their authority is also increasingly questioned. Within this lack of authority and being torn in two ways between Spanish/EU-legislation and their own sustainability, they have become waiting zones, or 'limboscapes' (Ferrer-Gallardo & Albet-Mas, 2013) for those irregular migrants that were actually able to cross the border. In the European Union of nowadays, standing for one Europe and the fraternisation of ethnicities

and cultures, is it legitimate that Ceuta and Melilla are becoming suchlike 'nowhere lands' for migrants? And is it subsequently legitimate that these bordering dynamics take people's freedom and mobility?

I would like to address the aforementioned paradoxes of societal relevance and to make the argument that strengthening controls or closing borders will never be the solution for one who wants to live in an open world where cultures find themselves intermingled and where poor people should also be granted opportunities, as well as argue that those policies will only lead to more irregular migrants and xenophobia within society. Furthermore, I think it will be of a big interest for political entities to know how migrants are moving around in informal sectors, or less formal sectors as a result of the lacking services they have not provided to help them. On a more geopolitical side, the Spanish government and the EU should ask themselves if Ceuta and Melilla are sustainable entities. Now, they are becoming fortresses closed to the outside world – oxymorons in today's EU. Finally, from both a governmental and organisational perspective, this thesis will be useful to think of more adequate policies and provide more assistance directed to help the migrant and not treat him as 'the Other' through imposed borders.

1.6. Structure of the thesis

Following this introduction, the second chapter will provide a more detailed background and historical information. First, more details and context will be given for the enclaves Ceuta and Melilla, with a division made into historical, geopolitical and functional subcategories. In continuation of the earlier expressed feeling that the general salience of the enclaves seems small, I think this will provide a good background for the empirical chapters that will follow later on. The same can be said about the second part of this chapter, which will focus on the contextual background regarding the Spanish immigration policies, which will be useful for comprehending the daily situation which migrants face while living in Barcelona.

Next on, the theoretical framework will be presented, providing a state of the art of the theories that will be followed and discussed in this thesis. The concept of im/mobility will be touched upon, as explained by Sassen (2002) and Urry (2007), among others, and will be later on connected to the emergence of transit and waiting zones, also called *limbos*. Such zones lead to exclusion, which is linked to theories on *othering* and alienation, as explained by van Houtum (2010a/b) and Newman (2006). Adding a more personal zoom on the migrant as a subject of the migrant process, the imposed forced immobility and exclusion will also be discussed, put into concept by the term 'bare life', which finds itself in a 'state of exception', as argued by Agamben (1998; 2008) and Arendt (1976; 1996). Finally, Derrida's (1973; 2001) philosophy of hospitality will also be studied. In the end, the theories are all connected by the borderising factor exposed in the main research question that imposes immobility, exclusion and a restriction on freedom. The fourth chapter will describe the methodology used while conducting fieldwork, as well as during the writing process of this thesis. I have made use of different methods. Such a combination is also known as triangulation. This has led to different approaches that can be found back in the empirical chapters, and which roughly can be divided into four: quantitative analysis, ethnography, discourse analysis and normative analysis.

The following chapters of this thesis encompass the empirical chapters, as well as the conclusion. The fifth chapter will embark on a quantitative analysis. As already alluded in the conception and research objectives of this thesis, there will be given room to the numerous sources that provide data and numbers on migration towards Europe, and especially on migrants who enter Europe through Ceuta and Melilla. These will also be compared to other Spanish and European entry points. It must be said that a lot of these numbers are often biased, outdated or inaccurate. Instead of counting on it as the factual truth, this chapter should be read as an indication of the migration process and its magnitude within the trajectory case. It serves as a quantitative introduction and provides some more numbers behind the stories that follow in the next chapters. The sixth and seventh chapter will outline the images produced and collected during the fieldwork periods in Barcelona, Ceuta and Melilla. The different stages in the migratory process (Barcelona versus Ceuta and Melilla) will be connected to the borderising dynamics that capture and form them. To be able to discuss the legitimacy of the borders migrants encounter, these will be subject to a more extensive normative analysis in the eighth chapter. The last part will form the conclusion of this thesis. All findings and experiences of the research will be set out to give an answer to the main research question, as well as subsequent and adhesive remarks. Finally, some space will be reserved for several reflections and recommendations for further studies.

2. Contexts behind the stories: the enclaves and the Spanish immigration system

2.1. Introduction

The Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla are not ordinary border towns that connect Spain with the outer world. They are separated from the Iberian Peninsula by the Mediterranean, located on the African side of the shore and bordered by the Moroccan provinces of Tétouan and Nador. While they are geographically not European, they administratively compose two of the outer borders of the European Union, a transnational factor that only further symbolically juxtaposes two different worlds: European and African, Christian and Islamic; Spanish and Arabic; former coloniser and former colonised; EU and non-EU; prosperous north and impoverished south… They arguably form the 'border of borders' (Ferrer-Gallardo, 2006). Which roles do these outer EU-borders play within the migration process, and how do the performed border policies there effect on other borderising levels (e.g. the local scale in Barcelona)? Also, to what extent are their structures based upon those complex paradoxical dichotomies that meet and interact with each other there?

In the past decades, and as will be discussed in this chapter, it has become clear Ceuta and Melilla play a key role within the international immigration process, as well as in the European and Spanish spheres connected to the migration-security nexus. To better understand the current situation in the enclaves, as well as the bigger scope on the situation of migrants in Spain, it is important to know the context of the current immigration policies imposed by Spain, and indirectly by the European Union. This will later on also help to study the correlating and intertwined effects imposed by different borders on different scales. The second part of this chapter will give a quick overview of the most important principles of the Spanish immigration system, as well as of frequently used terms.

Map 1. Map of the Western Mediterranean with Ceuta and Melilla

Source: Marrocos.com (retrieved on 22 July 2016).

2.2. A history that challenges present and future

The paradox of two different worlds – Christian and Islamic – living just a stone's throw away from each other, or even in coexistence[6], is a historical heritage from the Spanish Medieval Ages. Between 711, with the mooring of the Berber Tariq ibn Ziyad in Gibraltar, and 1492, when Islamic Granada is captured by the Catholic Monarchs, there has been a constant Islamic presence on the Iberian Peninsula. The recapturing of territories by the Christians, dubbed as the *Reconquista*, carries heavy symbolism in the sense of a Christian victory over the Muslims, and a subsequent demarcation that divides between the Christian and Islamic worlds. Initially, the objective of the *Reconquista* is to drive the Muslims out of the Iberian Peninsula and regain all the lost territory. However, its heroic symbolism leads to a crossing of the Mediterranean to conquer Maghreb territories and ultimately show Christian power superiority. Within the context of this heroic and 'divine' campaign, Ceuta is captured by Portugal in 1415 (and ceded to Spain two centuries later), and Melilla falls into Castilian hands in 1497 (Affaya & Guerraoui, 2006; Bennison, 2011; Ferrer-Gallardo, 2008; Figueiredo, 2011; Kenney, 2011, de la Serna, 2001).

While Ceuta and Melilla are always defended against attacks and revolts coming from surrounding Berber areas, they never get the full attention of the Spanish after the discovery of the New World in 1492. They remain underdeveloped for centuries and to protect them they are first and fore mostly inhabited by militants. In 1863, both get the status of free ports and become commercially interesting. When Spain loses its last colonies Cuba, Puerto Rico and the Philippines in 1898, it starts to keep an eye on the enclaves and their surrounding territories. This leads to the

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> ### *Convivencia* or confrontation?
>
> The organisation and ordering of powers in Ceuta and Melilla is allegedly based on the concept of *convivencia*, a living together of different ethnic and religious groups. The concept is usually used to refer to the heterogeneous demography of both and to promote the various cultures that have persisted for touristic purposes by the city government. These cultures are the Christian, the Muslim, the Jewish and the Hindu, albeit the last two being represented by very minor groups (Ferrer-Gallardo, 2011; Moffette, 2010).
>
> However, as Rebeca Acedo Calvete (Accem Ceuta; 10 June, 2015) states, the gypsies, mostly blended in society and less recognisable, and the migrants should also not be forgotten. While migrants may only be temporary inhabitants, both enclaves have long traditions of accommodating them. That also counts for the Moroccan *porteadores*, which daily cross borders for trading purposes. The promoted heterogeneity is far from being complete and leaves out the marginalised and the outsiders. Yet, this may not be the only friction here. As becomes clearer after my interviews in Ceuta and Melilla, these cities do not really know a culture of living together, but rather only have a multicultural character. There are many different socio-cultural dynamics that trouble the social cohesion.
>
> In the end, the different religious, cultural and social communities live quite segregated from each other. Table 1 and the corresponding Map 2 show social segregation in Melilla. Conflicts and hazardous situations are not always far away when these worlds meet. When activities or events take place, one should always bear in mind the different sensibilities lurking around here, Acedo Calvete (10 June, 2015) stresses. Although they might not always play an active role in confrontations, immigrants may often be used as 'black sheep' for these situations that trouble the social and political cohesion of the enclaves.

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[6] Ceuta and Melilla both inherit a large Muslim population, of which a large part has only received Spanish nationality over the last decades (see Carr, 1997; Ferrer-Gallardo, 2007).

creation of the Spanish Protectorate, including big parts of Northern Morocco, which lasts from 1912 until Moroccan independence in 1956. Ceuta and Melilla and some small islets just off the Moroccan coast will remain Spanish.

During the first decades of the Protectorate, the Spanish army battles out a series of bloody campaigns to protect the two cities and the territory from Berber invasions. These events provide Ceuta and Melilla with strong military legions. Through inheriting strong militarist and nationalist sentiments, the enclaves later on converted into strongholds of Francoist Spain. When Spain accessed the European Union in 1986, the African borders became 'European borders'. In 1991 followed the 'Schengenisation' of Spain. It now became impossible for mainly Northern African working migrants to come to Spain without a visa, something they had become used to during the past decades (de Haas, 2008). This meant regular seasonal circular migration was more restrictive, and people became either included or excluded within the new EU borderising parameters, subsequently fostering irregular migration. The first attempt to materialise the new demarcations came with the first fencing of the Ceuta and Melilla borders in 1995. Paradoxically, around the same time when the borders became less permeable the idea and development of a Mediterranean cooperation between EU-member states and other countries around the Mediterranean started to take shape, leading to more economic liberalisation, as well as cooperation on areas as immigration and drug trafficking. This interest was further developed with the creation of the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) in 2008 (Carr, 1997; Casas-Cortes, Cobarrubias & Pickles, 2012; Driessen, 1992; Ferrer-Gallardo, 2008; Tomasoni, 2009; Trinidad, 2012; Zurlo, 2005).

2.3. Cultural segregation rooted in historical identities

Spain has managed to keep Ceuta and Melilla under its control, yet their sovereignty does not remain undisputed. Ever since its independence, Morocco has laid a claim on both cities, stating they are located on Moroccan soil and should be part of the Alaouite Kingdom. This has led to periods of political unrest and diplomatic disputes between the two countries, also affecting other areas in which they should normally cooperate, such as immigration. The Moroccan claim also forms the reason behind the original Berber population of the enclaves only receiving its Spanish nationality in the 1980s, as well as the remaining big military presence. As Carr (1997) and Moffette (2010) analyse, the Christian population has been paralysed over centuries by the idea Muslim supremacy may take over culturally and politically. This would reawaken tensions, fostered even further by the negative and stereotyped representation of Islam nowadays and the fact the Muslim population of both cities is growing faster due to a higher birthrate and Moroccans who have immigrated.[7] These tensions and the fear of the 'Moor' are inherited directly from the *Reconquista*, when Islam was seen as the enemy, and thus firmly rooted in Spanish identity. It often leads to confrontations between Christian and Muslim factions in the enclaves and also between Spain and Morocco, such as the Perejil Island crisis in 2002 (Atmane, 2007; Benkhattab, 2012; Cajal, 2003; Castan Pinos, 2009; Ferrer-Gallardo, 2006; González Campos, 2007; González Enríquez, 2008; Saddiki, 2010).

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[7] Exact numbers are difficult to be found, but Castan Pinos (2009) speaks about a Muslim population of approximately 40% in Ceuta and 50% in Melilla. An approximate number of 30.000 Moroccans who daily cross the border for trading purposes should be added to these percentages.

As can be seen in Table 1 and Map 2 (see next pages), which picture the situation in Melilla, this 'eternal confrontation' can be translated into social segregation in the enclaves. The main two cultural groups, the Hispanics and the Riffians, live quite spatially segregated from each other. There are only two districts that see a fairly mixed population, these being the transitional districts from the nucleus of Melilla to the peripheral zones. Between the peripheral districts, a slight difference in 'peripheralness' can be noted. Districts 6, 7 and 8 are to be found near the airport of Melilla and the only official border crossing point at Beni Enzar, entry to Nador and the Moroccan hinterland. The Centre for Temporary Stay of Immigrants (CETI) and an informal border crossing leading to the Moroccan village of Farkhana used for trading purposes are also located in district 8. Districts 4 and 5 are geographically seen the most handicapped as they are located the furthest from the urban nucleus of Melilla. They do not lead to any major transport or processing point, nor are they close by to any Moroccan settlement on the other side of the border. The Muslim Riffian population majorly inhabits these two districts.

Although governmental institutions and tourism campaigns may promote a feeling of living together and equality, the Riffian population in Melilla is geographically very disadvantaged and marginal, as can be deducted from the figures in Table 1 (Ponce Herrero, 2010). In Ceuta, a similar pattern can be discovered. Those segregated *barrios*, notably Príncipe Alfonso in Ceuta and La Cañada de Hidum in Melilla (located in districts 4 and 5), often reach the news for being hotbeds of crime, delinquency and Islamic fundamentalism, constantly struck by a lack of opportunities, poverty and strife (Atmane, 2007; Benkhattab, 2012; González Enríquez, 2008; Kenney, 2011; Pérez-Ventura, 2014). Príncipe Alfonso became even that stereotyped that it provided the setting for a crime series on Spanish television.[8] González Enríquez (2008) states the cultural and demographical divide is very notorious for starting at a young age, as there is also an educational divide along ethnical and cultural lines. Schools are culturally and demographically segregated and children of marginalised neighborhoods rarely leave their living areas, making exclusion already very vivid at a young age.

Table 1. **Distribution of cultural groups in Melilla per district in 2001**

DISTRICT	Hispanics	Riffians	Jews	Mixed
1	82%	12%	-	-
2	52,9%	35,3%	5,9%	5,9%
3	30%	60%	-	10%
4	14,3%	81%	-	4,8%
5	16,2%	75,7%	-	8,1%
6	61,5%	15,4%	7,7%	15,4%
7	71,4%	14,3%	-	14,3%
8	73,6%	19,4%	-	6,9%
TOTAL	53%	38%	1%	8%

Sources: adaptation to Mayoral del Amo (2005) and Ponce Herrero (2010).

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[8] *El Príncipe* is a Spanish hit series created by Aitor Gabilondo and César Benítez for the channel Telecinco. The neighbourhood Príncipe Alfonso is its main setting, while its main themes and topics play with the current events Ceuta and notably Príncipe Alfonso deal with, i.e. drug and human trafficking, terrorism and cultural and religious segregation. See also http://www.telecinco.es/elprincipe/.

Notes:

- Mayoral del Amo (2005) and Ponce Herrero (2010) have both used the same dataset from the Pacto Territorial por el Empleo, a campaign substituted by the EU and Spain to stimulate employment in Melilla. The numbers used for this campaign date from 2001 and seem to be the most recent to be found when it comes to distinguishing different districts. The district numbers correspond to those indicated in Map 2.
- The distribution of cultural groups is not equal to the distribution of religions. Muslims in Melilla may well have a Hispanic background, for example.[9] The group of 'Riffians' may both indicate autochthonous Berber population from Melilla, but also immigrated Moroccans from nearby areas.

Map 2. Distribution of cultural groups in Melilla per district in 2001

Sources: adaptation to Ponce Herrero (2010) and Google Maps (2015).[10]

Notes:

- The coloured map indicates the districts corresponding to Table 1. Sometimes these districts are further divided within this map, indicated by for example '401', '402', '403' and so on.
- The map shows a colour range that darkens when the percentage of Riffian inhabitants gets higher and can be read as follows. The city centre and the port of Melilla encompass district 1, while districts 2 and 3 are transitional districts between the centre and the periphery, which is formed by districts 4 to 8.

2.4. Ambiguous and paradoxical dimensions

The difficult and ambiguous status of the enclaves has already been evoked in the previous paragraphs, but it has not been fully put into place nor divided into dimensions. To avoid a big entangled jumble of causalities, effects and consequences that all play a role in the Ceuta and Melilla border and migration topic, those different dimensions can be created to clear up some matters. In believing so, I am basing myself on a tripartite theoretical model developed and described by Xavier Ferrer-Gallardo (2006, 2007 and 2008) that distinguishes between

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[9] Probably also the case for the small Jewish population in both enclaves, this group of Hispanic Muslims has its origins in the Medieval Islamic Spain, when Muslims, Christians and Jews were all fairly represented. The term *convivencia* also originates from this period, although historians dispute if it fairly represented Al-Andalus due to the many military and religious campaigns the Islamic conquest and the Christian *Reconquista* produced (Bennison, 2011; Ferrer-Gallardo, 2008).

[10] Retrieved on 11 November 2015.

geopolitical, functional and symbolic dimensions. Since it is not always needed to re-invent the wheel, this dimensional categorisation is kept in the following subparagraphs.

2.4.1. Geopolitical dimensions

The Spanish Protectorate in Northern Morocco was some sort of colonial entity Spain contented itself with after it had definitely lost all its other colonies in the late nineteenth century. New in the context of the coloniser and the colonised, however, was the fact Spain was Morocco's neighbour, bordering its own colony directly through the enclaves. This rarity as well as the fact the greater part of Morocco was French territory created a weird model that resulted into blurred border dynamics. Therefore, the current geopolitics then had a weaker and less discordant profile, as Ferrer-Gallardo (2006) argues. However, Driessen (1992) opines this discordant Spanish-Moroccan relationship started ever since Spain decided to occupy territory, alternating between ''open confrontation and delicate entente'' (p. 36). This could be seen as intrinsically woven in Spanish history, and as a part of the whole *Reconquista* process that formed Spanish identity. The Spanish-Moroccan geopolitical border dynamics have been contested and elastic ever since. The Spanish twentieth century-focus on Morocco can be seen as a necessity to recover colonial space and as potential alternative space for a Spanish 'lebensraum'.

On the other hand, the creation of the Spanish Protectorate also reinforced the Spanish identity of Ceuta and Melilla and protected them better against hostile attacks (Ferrer-Gallardo, 2008; Velasco de Castro, 2014). In *De la Ceca a la Meca*, Juan Goytisolo (1997) argues the wars in Morocco and the Spanish Protectorate are even what made Franco's dictatorship more popular and lengthy: ''Franco, Sanjurjo, Millán Astray, Mola, Yagüe, and Muñoz Grande forged their spirit of war in Morocco and from there prepared their bloody 'salvation' of Spain'' (p. 47)[11]. While the Moroccan wars and the creation of the Protectorate took place before Franco's dictatorship, his image is present from beginning to end. In 1921, Franco defended Melilla against a Berber revolt while being a commander of the Spanish army. This also explains the conservative and Francoist nature of the Hispanic populations of Ceuta and Melilla.[12] As Castan Pinos (2009) writes, a majority of Melilla's inhabitants even still see Franco as a liberator of the city. He restored and maintained the Spanish space in Africa, while at the same time he gave new life to Spanish imperialism.

These imperial aspirations were abruptly cut short when Morocco gained independence. The border dynamics in Ceuta and Melilla began to take its current form, although due to protectionist policies on both national economies, they did not have its current high profile. The Rif had never been an economically interesting region, and the Spanish Protectorate had thus always functioned more as a status symbol. This meant Spain did not see any interest in maintaining relations with this territory when it had lost it, leaving aside its fear over Morocco claiming the enclaves. This interest changed, alongside a significant change in geopolitics and border dynamics, when Spain joined the European Union in 1986. As Ferrer-Gallardo (2008) argues, the Spanish-Moroccan border had not ceased to exist, but was ''overlapped, superimposing two different and meaningful territorial

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[11] English translation by Bermúdez (2006).
[12] In fact, Ceuta and Melilla are the only Spanish cities that still possess monuments related to Franco and his dictatorship, and there seems little pressure over removing them according to Castan Pinos (2009).

lines'' (p. 306). According to Kramsch (2006), it can be seen as increasingly problematic that now the European Union borders some former colonies of its member states, 'acting as a postcolonial superpower that draws boundaries'. One could say that with this 'postnational' and postcolonial imposition, but even more after Spain became part of Schengen, the equilibrium in Spanish-Moroccan border dynamics started to be well off balance politically (Cajal, 2003; Naum, 2010). On top of that, the Spanish-Moroccan borders in Ceuta and Melilla are to be considered the most economically unequal in the world, even topping the US-Mexican border (de Haas & Vezzoli, 2013; Castan Pinos, 2009; Moré, 2006; Ribas-Mateos, 2012).[13] Yet, this does not imply there is currently no Spanish economic involvement in Morocco, as was the case during Franco's dictatorship. The EU-Mediterranean Partnership does not have only seen the launch of the Mediterranean Union, but has also led to an economic integration of neighbouring countries, such as Morocco, as well as a relaxation of borders in an economic sense, as Ferrer-Gallardo (2008) explains. However, in Ceuta and Melilla, this type of border relaxation forms a great paradox when one bears in mind the anti-immigration fences that have been built at their borders during the last decades.

The 'postnational' character of geopolitics that has come with the EU's involvement in bilateral relations between the two countries can also be noticed within the discordant sphere of these relations. While Morocco does not miss an opportunity to emphasise its claim on the sovereignty on Ceuta and Melilla, this could be seen within a broader perspective. Ferrer-Gallardo (2008) speaks about a ''complex intertwining of territorial claims across the Strait of Gibraltar'' (p. 307). In the claims Morocco pursued in the United Nations, it attempted to draw analogies between Ceuta and Melilla and Gibraltar (Atmane, 2007; Cajal, 2003; Castan Pinos, 2009; González Campos, 2007; González Enríquez, 2008; Iglesias, 2010; Trinidad, 2012; Zurlo, 2005). However, it has been unsuccessful in putting Ceuta and Melilla on the UN Decolonisation List, yet Spain has managed to get Gibraltar on there. Besides turning a bilateral discussion into international triangular geopolitics, drawing in the UK and the UN, this incongruent treatment by the UN involving disputed areas within the sphere of the Strait of Gibraltar could also well be understood as another case of neocolonial politics, contributing to the distorted border dynamics and the unstable bilateral relationship of the two countries.

The late Spanish PSOE-politician Cajal (2003) argued the Spanish argumentation over the sovereignty of Ceuta and Melilla might be legally a solid case, but politically and culturally it is certainly not. He pointed out it is merely based on historical treaties, which subsequently create some new neocolonial anomaly, whilst ignoring recent cultural, political and demographic events. Cajal (2003) consequently adopted the stance the enclaves should eventually be ceded to Morocco, as they would as a matter of fact be inheritances of Spanish colonialism, an argument shared by Saddiki (2010) and Benkhattab (2012). This colonialist mentality was also demonstrated according to Cajal (2003) during the Perejil Crisis in July

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[13] According to the World Bank, the GDP per capita in 2014 was $33.835 in Spain, almost fivefold of Morocco's $7.198 per capita. Between the United States and Mexico, the economic power inequality was less big, as the US GDP per capita ($54.629) was only 3,3 times bigger than the Mexican GDP per capita ($16.370) (Retrieved from http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.PP.CD?order=wbapi_data_value_2014+wbapi_data_value+ wbapi_data_value-last&sort=desc on 2 November 2015).

2002.[14] Although the real importance of this crisis might have been low (Ferrer-Gallardo, 2008), it produced a bilateral crisis, huge media coverage, and it temporarily undermined cooperation at the border controls. This caused migrants to fall between two stools (see also Chapter 7), as the system of inclusion and exclusion did not function properly anymore. Arguably, both the temporary diplomatic crisis and the reconfirmed status quo were reinforced by Spanish colonial arrogance, Egurbide thinks (2003). In order to break this status quo, Cajal (2003) called for a Spanish acceptance of the 'Moroccan nature' of the enclaves. Seeing them as intrinsically Spanish would be an outdated and unjustified image of reality. Finally, the disadvantaged geopolitical position of Morocco may however also be sought in an indirect consequence of its decision to invade the Western Sahara, another former Spanish colony, in 1975 while the UN had called for an independency referendum, negatively affecting its lobbying for a call on the sovereignty of the enclaves. Although intrinsically linked to the debate on Ceuta and Melilla, and also the immigration debate, Spain has consequently searched to stay away from the Saharan political battlefield (Abedrapo Rojas, 2015; Castan Pinos, 2014a; Trinidad, 2012).[15]

2.4.2. Functional dimensions

As mentioned earlier, the paradoxes and ambiguities surrounding the permeability of the Ceuta and Melilla borders are great. This emerges most strikingly when reflecting on their functional dimensions. Anderson (2001), Ferrer-Gallardo and Espiñeira (2015), and van Houtum (2010a) argue this selective permeability at borders leads to human blacklisting, starting the othering of people directly *at* and even *before* the border (see also van Houtum & van Naerssen, 2002; Newman, 2006). The border paradox, and also the enclaves' paradox, may well be explained as a relaxation of border controls for economic purposes on the one hand, and a more rigid and impermeable border to control migration on the other. As Ferrer-Gallardo (2008) argues, this is the ambiguous outcome of an administration with securitising, economical and political needs that implements EU-policies and provides required sustainability for the enclaves simultaneously (Buoli, 2014; Ferrer-Gallardo, 2007; Ferrer-Gallardo & Albet-Mas, 2013; Mimoun, 2009).

Ceuta and Melilla have these particularities of city enclaves that do not possess their own hinterland, which means their economic sustainability depends on interaction and trade with hinterlands located at the other side of the border. This has led to a Spanish-Moroccan agreement permitting the cross-border flow of Moroccans originating from the surrounding provinces of Tétouan and Nador. Although tolerated and accepted by the European Union,

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[14] The Perejil ('Parsley') Island is an uninhabited islet 8 kilometers west of Ceuta. It formed the scene of a bilateral crisis between the two countries in July 2002 (see La Parra Casado, Penalva Verdú & Mateo Pérez, 2007; Monar, 2002; Tomasoni, 2009; Trinidad, 2012).

[15] The Western Sahara was a Spanish colony between 1884 and 1975. Although it has been seeking independence ever since, it remains until today a part of Morocco (Hodges, 1984; Castan Pinos, 2014a). The territory has also been continuously involved in the migration topic during the last decades, as coastal cities Laâyoune and Dakhla have served as departure points for *cayucos* heading for the Canary Islands. Geographically, they are much closer to the archipelago than Mauritania and Senegal. Laâyoune is at only 115 kilometres from the southern tip of Fuerteventura. Arguably, the conflicted status of the sovereignty of the territory, sometimes leading to political crises and temporary local power vacuums, has also encouraged sub-Saharan migrants to choose the Western Sahara over other departure and transit countries (Andersson, 2013; Papadopoulou-Kourkoula, 2008; UNODC, 2010).

those flows form an exception within the legal framework of Schengen (Castan Pinos, 2009; Ferrer-Gallardo, 2007; Figueiredo, 2011; González Enríquez, 2008; Moffette, 2010). In practice this means these Moroccans are exempted from visa requirements, although they are supposed to arrive and leave on a daily basis without staying overnight in the enclaves. This is not always verifiable and it has spurred Moroccans inhabiting Ceuta and Melilla without the required documents (Acedo Calvete, 10 June 2015; Ortega García; 6 May 2015). These 'Schengenised' Moroccan passports have fared well on the black market during the past decades, as they are not only interesting for Moroccans from other provinces, but also for other Maghreb or Arab migrants to irregularly cross borders (Cimadomo & Martínez Ponce, 2006; Driessen, 2007; Ferrer-Gallardo, 2008; Johnson, 2013; Mateaș, 2014). Other migrants with other facial characteristics, mainly sub-Saharan Africans and South-Asians, would not have this option, which means even the irregular 'non-existing' sectors do discriminate and *other* them as a consequence of border policies.

The cross-border smuggling of migrants does not come out of the blue considering the border is impermeable for many of them. While a particular group of Moroccans is needed to economically contribute to the enclaves, other 'outsiders' are undesired and thus preferably kept outside, in conformity with the EU and Frontex policies. As pointed out earlier, since Spain joined the EU in 1986, the 'bordering' of the enclaves started, leading to an increasing gap between Spain and Morocco and stimulating the illegal flows of goods and people (Ferrer-Gallardo, 2008; Goldschmidt, 2006). Dutch-Moroccan author Abdelkader Benali describes this telling situation in his novel *Bruiloft aan zee* (*Wedding by the sea*, 2000):

> **Contraband as economic lifeline**
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> Julia Ortega García (6 May 2015) does not mince matters. As she argues, Melilla 'lives' from the border, as it has no own economical motor to sustain itself. Although figures are unknown, contraband and smuggling (primarily of goods, but also human trafficking) account for up to 70% of the local economy.
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> Planet (2002) and Figueiredo (2011) state Ceuta and Melilla have developed a system in which legality and illegality go hand in hand and have to operate that way to guarantee economical sustainability. The smuggling is organised in such a way that *porteadores* ('carriers'), mostly female, cross borders with bags full of goods to sell in the enclaves. These *porteadores* get paid for their job to cross borders with the trading goods, and in reality can thus be seen as smugglers (Castan Pinos, 2009).
>
> However, this 'permitted' form of contraband does not limit itself to smuggling goods. The cross-border smuggling of migrants is very common. This counts as well for the trade in false passports and drugs in both enclaves. Of course, these forms of smuggling do not 'fit' in the framework of smuggling turned a blind eye on. However, when 'legality' and 'illegality' go hand in hand, where to start tackling this problem? It can be seen as another paradoxical feature that characterises the uniqueness and ambiguity of the semi-permeable borders of Ceuta and Melilla.

> Then there's the border town of F., home to waiting taxis and Africans, which serves as the gateway to the Spanish crown colony of Melilliaar [Melilla, ed.] – the city where it's so much cheaper to buy soap, margarine and Tide detergent, items smuggled by the thousands under dresses and burnooses... (p. 2)

When Spain joined Schengen in 1991, this also meant the end for Moroccans crossing the borders of the enclaves without a visa, with the aforementioned exception (Buoli, 2014;

Carling, 2007b; Ferrer-Gallardo, 2011; Johnson, 2013). In the 1990s, the first clandestine migrants arrived at the enclaves, prompting Spain and the EU to implement new securitising techniques and to reshape the border zones physically. As stated before, Ceuta and Melilla provide the only land borders between the EU and Africa, acting as ''magnets for would-be illegal immigrants to continental Europe from all over the African continent'' (Gold, 2000: 120). Throughout the years, we have seen that arriving migrant groups are much more diverse, as Syrians and Southern Asians, for example, also have found their way to the enclaves. However, the way in which clandestine immigration is perceived as a security threat has not changed throughout the years (Dünnwald, 2011; Ferrer-Gallardo, 2008; van Houtum, 2010a). This has ended in the sealing off of the enclaves' borders for migrants, including a double fencing (triple in Melilla) and an extensive electronically monitoring by the SIVE (Integrated System of External Surveillance). However, as could be noticed through the past years, when such systems are implemented migrants will find other ways to enter the EU. This might be through using other routes, but also through breaches in the Ceuta and Melilla security systems, including stow-away arrivals in vehicles, jumping over or through holes in the fences, and arrivals at the coasts in *pateras* (Ferrer-Gallardo, 2011; Figueiredo, 2011; de Haas, 2006; Mutlu & Leite, 2012).

2.4.3. Symbolical dimensions

A consequence of border securitisation is the othering and human blacklisting of migrants, who officially cannot cross the semi-permeable borders of Ceuta and Melilla. As Ferrer-Gallardo (2008) points out, this sealing off of the border not only has a functional dimension, but also a symbolical one, as in to ''(re)mark and (re)mind the limits of the socio-spatial identities delimited by the border'' (p. 314). It fits a traditional categorisation that divides between 'us' and 'them', but also between 'European' and 'non-European'. These European values spatially and geographically overshadow the differentiation between 'Spanishness' and 'Moroccanness' and are also more applicable when it comes to the use of the delimitation 'us-them'. As ethnic Berbers and Moroccans also inhabit the enclaves, this delimitation does not lead to two groups divided by the border. The EU sees Morocco as a partner, but it does not consider it as 'European'. This practically means Ceuta and Melilla cloud an otherwise very clear divide between Europe and Africa, Christianity and Islam, and other delimitations. Ceuta and Melilla ''enable the simultaneous embrace'' (Ferrer-Gallardo, 2008: 314) of various poles of identity (González Enríquez, 2008; Moffette, 2010; Mutlu & Leite, 2012).

To ensure the 'Europeanness' of the enclaves and securitise them from the 'immigration threat', a strengthening of divide and demarcation would be needed. Since Ceuta and Melilla cannot provide this due to their heterogeneous populations, more general European terms as 'Fortress Europe' and 'European wall' have arisen to indicate the newly set perimeters that reflect the European securitisation, processing 'who's in and who's out' (Albrecht, 2002; Bermejo, 2009; Casas-Cortes, Cobarrubias & Pickles, 2015; Driessen, 2007; Geddes, 2000; van Houtum & Pijpers, 2007; Leitner, 1997; Papastavidris, 2010). However, while providing an actual delimitation would not be possible looking at the demographics of Ceuta and Melilla, historical delimitations and identifications have often been sufficient to demarcate borders, as mentioned before. The *Reconquista* has marked and shaped Spanish identity and Spanish-Moroccan relations through the ages. The result is an ever-present

cultural and symbolical divide, reinforced by the Spanish occupation of Northern Morocco in the last century (Castan Pinos, 2009; Driessen, 1992; Ferrer-Gallardo, 2011; Morales Lezcano, 1993). This divide is, however, less noticeable when looking at the exclusion of, mainly sub-Saharan, migrants, who are seen as 'others' by both the Hispanic and Riffian populations. This collective *othering* of the migrant may actually bring the heterogeneous populations of the enclaves closer together, forming some kind of *borderising* gated community, permanently excluding the migrant (van Houtum & Pijpers, 2007; van Houtum 2010a; Shamir, 2005; Zaiotti, 2008).

2.5. The Spanish immigration system

Spain is a young immigration country and in that sense different from most Western European countries. Until very recently the Spanish were mostly emigrating themselves to mainly Northern Europe. While this still happens on a big scale, and has been reinforced due to the economical crisis, since the 1990s Spain has made the transition from an emigration to an immigration country (Arango & Jachimowicz, 2005; Bover & Velilla, 1999; Carling, 2007b; Gonzalez & Ortega, 2013; Jubany-Baucells, 2002; Martín-Pérez & Moreno Fuentes, 2012; Muñoz de Bustillo & Antón, 2010; Zapata-Barrero, 2008). Today, the image of Spain as a receiving country is noticeable in its demographics after a steady growth during the last decades.[16] Spain might be at the same percentage level of immigrants as other Western European countries, but it has a considerably shorter history and experience compared to France, Germany, Belgium and The Netherlands. As Zapata-Barrero and de Witte (2007) write, since the beginning of the 2000s, when the immigration boom really started, Spain has continuously been searching for a legal framework that could manage its immigration policies. While other countries have taken ages in the past century to develop and sharpen such frameworks, the Spanish recent immigration legislation is more liable to changes provoked by current immigration flows. Problematical would be the different stances the main political parties take regarding this topic and the more populist and little structural approach to look at immigration as a problem of how many people could enter, instead of what could be done when they arrive in Spain (Koff, 2014; Pinyol-Jiménez, 2007; Zapata-Barrero & de Witte, 2007).

2.5.1. Mass-regularisations vs. asylum procedures

During the last decades, Spain has surely followed the European immigration policies concerning its borders, but it has also decided to deviate from those on various occasions. When Spain asked for a European support of reinforcement of its outer borders in 2006, other countries heavily criticised the Spanish socialist immigration politics and denied support. They stated Spain would ask for help in times of crisis, while it did not care for the opinion of other countries when it carried out a mass-regularisation of immigrants in 2005. While most of the 800.000 regularised immigrants originated from Latin America, Spain was blamed for making its own land and sea borders porous with such a movement, as well as for pulling

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[16] According to INE (Instituto Nacional de Estadística), on 1 January 2015 there were roughly 4.46 million immigrants in Spain over a total population of 46.44 million, equalling over 10% of the population. In 2002, this percentage was around 4,75% (Retrieved from http://www.ine.es/inebaseDYN/cp30321/cp_inicio.htm and http://www.ine.es/jaxiT3/Tabla.htm?t=9674 on 12 November 2015).

'mass irregular immigrant influxes'. Besides that, Spain has also been accused of actively favouring the regularisation of Latin Americans and Romanians instead of regularising refugees (Carling, 2007b; Finotelli & Arango, 2011; de Haas, 2008; Sabater & Domingo, 2012; Zapata-Barrero & de Witte, 2007).

The mass-regularisations in Spain are largely to be seen as a consequence of the high percentage of irregular migrants, the *sinpapeles*, in the country. Arango and Jachimowicz (2005) state Spain has one of the biggest informal economies in Europe, as well as an ever-existing demand for low-skilled and cheap labour, mainly in the agricultural sector (Barbero, 2012; Fernández-Macías, Grande, del Rey Poveda & Antón, 2015; Vickstrom, 2014).

However, a spurring of irregular migrants in the country can actually also be thrown back to the strict border controls. Although these might be strict in most cases, the Spanish policies do not provide an adequate follow-up for the group of migrants that has entered the territory. Next to this come various other factors, such as a too static and stagnating administrational and financial bureaucracy to manage immigration, well-developed migrant networks in cities as Madrid, Barcelona and Bilbao, and geographical proximity to the migrants' countries of origin.

Another, often not mentioned, big factor playing a role in the existence of many *sinpapeles* is the flawing, repressive and practically non-existent Spanish asylum system. While in most of Western Europe a system has been adopted that actively divides so-called 'economical migrants' from refugees and potential asylum seekers, this division is not present in Spain. Jubany-Baucells (2002) explains the possibility of applying for asylum is available, but the chance of getting the status of asylum seeker is very small. The result is an enormous and varied group of irregular migrants. Especially notorious is the so-called *resolución de inadmisión* ('inadmissibility procedure'), which means asylum applicants have to go through a screening with various

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> **Arraigo: an individualised regularisation concept unique within Europe**
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> The concept of *arraigo* originated from a law modification in 2004 and after critical feedback from Northern Europe on the Spanish immigration system and its mass-regularisations. Rather than carrying out one-off regularisations *en masse*, this follows a more individual approach and can be seen as unique in its form within European immigration policies (Finotelli & Arango, 2011).
>
> The concept generally has two routes that lead to a regularised status. The first is through **labour settlement**, which requires two years' residence (through registration of residency) and proof of a one-year dependent employment relationship. The second route is through **social settlement**, requiring residence during three years, completed with either the existence of family links in Spain or social integration in the local community (which has to be verified by local authorities).
>
> While of course it is not an easy nut to crack for irregular migrants to obtain these required documents, the uniqueness of the *arraigo* within Europe perhaps indicates it might still be one of their best shots at regularising their situation. However, one also has to take into account that the form of labour settlement would imply a company denouncing that it has illegally employed the applicant for *arraigo* (Baldwin-Edwards, 2014; Espinola Orrego, 2007; Moffette, 2014; Trinidad García & Martín Martín, 2012).

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inadmissibility categories. Only when the applicant does not fall into one of these categories, the application will be carried on (Carrillo Salcedo, 2002; CEAR, 2006; Mecoleta Ruiz de Larramendi, 2002; Pilar Colchero & Carmelo García, 1995). Once the application is deemed inadmissible, often translated as 'unfounded', the applicant is an irregular migrant not entitled to any benefits. Gil-Bazo (1998) argues that by creating such a system, Spain prefers to keep the number of applicants low and 'rather denies access than having to protect refugees'.

Migrants seem to be aware of this, as only 0,95% of the asylum applicants in 2014 within the European Union was taken care of by Spain.[17] The Spanish NGO CEAR (2015, and see also Romero; 11 June, 2015) warns the Spanish government is taking illegal measures to further reduce the number of applicants by freezing their procedures to await the evolution of certain conflicts.

2.5.2. The reformed Ley de Extranjería *and the concept of* arraigo

When the number of irregular migrants is only growing due to repressive measures to apply for and gain asylum, some crisis management has to be done once in a while to keep the situation manageable, as Finotelli and Arango (2011) frame it. The mass-regularisations are a form of crisis management that have characterised the Spanish migration politics over the past decades, as they state. ''Regularisations were a key tool to readjust the balance between ineffective state regulations and large flows of immigrants.'' (p. 509) However, these shock regularisations were and are not the only measures Spain uses to lower the contingents of irregular immigrants in its territory. Under the conservative Partido Popular government in 2000, a modification on the *Ley de Extranjería*, the Foreigner's Law, entered into force. This new law permitted the Spanish government to detain 'irregulars' without the necessary permits to stay and expel them from the country within 72 hours. The necessary permits in this case refer to the documents on staying, working and residing in Spain these 'illegals' would have to produce. This affects, as a consequence, also the refugees who have been trying to apply for asylum but have been rejected during the process (Achon Rodríguez, 2014; Barbero, 2012; Relaño Pastor, 2004; Ruiz de Huidobro de Carlos, 2000; Solanes, 2010).

This abrupt decision-making is also connected in a way to the system of periodical mass-regularisations. Barbero (2012) mentions that after those of 2000, big cities that had to accommodate the majority of the newly-regularised refused to even consider document applications for legalising the situation of immigrants in the next years, even if these persons would meet certain requirements. This led to big regional differences, as Barcelona denied 71% of the applications in 2001, while this was only 14% in Girona in the same year. With the *arraigo* formula, as well through the inclusion in 2011 of some exceptional rules to apply regularisation, such as family reunion (sometimes also dubbed *arraigo familiar* (family settlement), those differences have been tried to diminish. The modifications in 2011 of the centre-left PSOE would also make it easier to renew a residence permit, even after loss of employment. When in 2012 the conservative PP won the elections, the law was about to get amended again, following the pattern of unstable politics troubling the immigration system. After this change, basic healthcare was not accessible anymore for persons in irregular situations except for minors, pregnant women and emergency cases. This even caused uproar between the different autonomous regions as Andalusia, the Basque Country, Catalonia and

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[17] This Spanish number (5.937) of asylum applications is very low compared to other EU countries, such as Germany (202.645), Sweden (81.180) and Italy (64.625), together receiving half of all applications (625.000), but also compared to other EU-external border countries such as Hungary (42.775), Bulgaria (11.080) and Greece (9.430) (CEAR, 2015). The Spanish population was 9,17% of the EU total in 2014, while its land area is even at 11,4% of the EU total. When ideally equally distributing these 625.000 asylum applications over the total EU population, Spain would have to take 71.250 applications instead of 5.937. Retrieved from http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/tgm/table.do?tab=table&language=en&pcode=tps00001&tableSelection=1&footnotes=yes&labeling=labels&plugin=1 on 15 November 2015.

Navarra initially refused to comply this law (Baldwin Edwards, 2014; Llop-Gironés, Vargas Lorenzo, García-Subirats, Aller & Vázquez Navarrete; Moffette, 2014; Trinidad García & Martín Martín, 2012; Vázquez, Terraza-Núñez, Vargas, Rodríguez & Lizana, 2011).

2.5.3. CIEs and deportation programmes

As mentioned earlier, the number of irregular migrants in Spain is one of the highest in Europe. While only a very small percentage can profit from the *arraigo* or other regularisation processes, most migrants stay in an irregular vacuum for years. As a consequence, and after the Foreigner's Law of 2000, the government has sought forms to effectively detain and eventually deport those who do not on any official ground have the right to stay in the country. This also includes 'irregulars' who might be already residing for years in the country, but never had the opportunity to obtain the required status and documents to apply for *arraigo*. The local police corps have been ordered to battle this problem by carrying out random identity checks in public and open spaces, although this has been heavily criticised by many NGOs as it would also encourage and facilitate racism (Aysa-Lastra & Cachón Rodríguez, 2015; Jarín Morrán, Rodríguez García & de Lucas, 2012; Moffete, 2010).

The migrants that are actually labeled as 'illegal' can be detained after document checks, or after even more specialised raids in the case the police has obtained specific information. This detainment is carried on when the person in question cannot provide the necessary documents that guarantee his or her stay in Spain. A considerable amount of these persons are then transferred to one of the CIEs (Immigrant Detention Centers), that have the official aim to confine those immigrants awaiting deportation, as Barbero (2015) states. These specially designated detention centres are located strategically in Madrid, Barcelona, Valencia, Murcia and Algeciras, with a complementary two centres on the Canary Islands. They are operated by the police (Policía Nacional) and governed by the Ministry of Interior. Migrants officially can only be held there if the to be carried out expulsion is realistic. This detainment can take place in an initial stage of their stay in Spain, but also after several years if they have not been able to regularise their status. The maximum stay in a CIE equals 60 days (Jarín Morrán, 2015; Manzanedo, 2013).

As Jarín Morrán (2015) states, the deportation of a migrant is a very complex process in which different political, administrative and juridical entities intervene and often act without communal applicative criteria. As she mentions, every individual part of the process is characterised by the personal circumstances of the migrant, the managing capacities of the official in charge and the political, bilateral, economical and social contexts involved. The bilateral context can be the determinant factor when the country of origin of the migrant has signed a readmission agreement with the Spanish government. The respective country would then be under the obligation to readmit the migrants in irregular conditions on European territory. Complementary to this functions the Spanish-Moroccan agreement that obliges Morocco to readmit its own citizens after having crossed the Ceuta and Melilla borders in a clandestine way. Migrants originating from countries with an agreement are immediately escorted when transport is available to deport them. When there is no agreement with the country in question, a consul is needed to recognise the migrant in question as a national before his or her expulsion. As stated, migrants can only be held in a CIE if there is a viable

chance they will be deported within 60 days after arrival. However, when a deportation cannot be carried out and the person in question is liberated, this does not mean the order of expulsion is also annulled. This order stays valid for a certain period of time, dependent on the whims of the system, which impedes the migrant to regularise his administrative situation, placing him in a juridical and administrative limbo. This limbo and the valid order of expulsion facilitate a rapid course of events when the migrant would be illegible for deportation later on (Andersson, 2012; Campaña Estatal por el Cierre de los CIE, 2014; Gortázar, 2001; Jarrín Morrán, 2015).

Deportation is either organised by the Spanish government or by Frontex. In the first case, it is carried out by the Spanish airline Air Europa, after a deal was settled between the authorities and this company. Normally, it concerns special planes that have been reserved for these deportation purposes, but very occasionally these deportations are also carried out on commercial flights. In the latter case, the deportation can only be carried out if the other passengers and the flight personnel have no objections. When the flight is organised by Frontex, it normally touches down in various European countries to pick up the migrants to be deported. Likewise, these flights may also have various destinations and can have various stopovers. In some cost-cutting situations, deportations can also involve other transportation types. In the case of Algerian immigrants, most of them are returned to Algeria by boat, for example (Andersson, 2013; Campaña Estatal por el Cierre de los CIE, 2014; Fekete, 2011; Human Rights Watch, 2002; Jarín Morrán 2015).

2.6. Concluding remarks

As stated earlier, the positions of Ceuta and Melilla continue to play an important national and international role in the migrant nexus. They form entities that may be seen as anachronic and neocolonial by some, or as integral parts of Spain and the European Union by others, but fact remains that they form a point of controversy that blazes up every now and then. This has immediate consequences for the Spanish-Moroccan relations, and indirectly also affects the EU and its immigration policies. They are the only direct gateways from Africa to the EU and as of such attract many migrants. However, their limited surfaces easily cause friction between migrants and the population, but also amongst the polarised heterogeneous population itself. Ceuta and Melilla are parts of the EU where its policies might not always be applicable. When economical sustainability of the enclaves needs to be sought in the allowance of the irregular and contrabandist flows of goods, the irregular flows of people will also exist. Various interests, as well as necessities to provide the political and economical sustainability of Ceuta and Melilla are at stake here.

These different interests and necessities often cause friction with the migration policies imposed by Madrid and Brussels, as stated earlier. However, also between Madrid and Brussels there have been quite some differences in directions. This includes the popular North-South discourse within the EU, where the southern countries accuse the EU they have to handle and process the incoming immigration on their own. It is also very remarkable how rapidly Spain, a relatively new immigration country, has changed its immigration system during the last years. This was influenced by the EU, but also comes forth out of a lacking juridical and political framework. Subsequently, this has resulted in mass-regularisations, the lack of a functional asylum procedure system and the creation of the *arraigo* concept. Spain

has one of the largest numbers of irregular migrants on its soil that often find themselves in a status of juridical and administrative limbo, which impedes them moving backward or forward. While mainland Spain is not limited in surface area, opposed to the limited and flawed gated communities of Ceuta and Melilla, a parallel can be drawn comparing a city like Barcelona with the two enclaves. The enclaves may facilitate impermeable borders, but in Barcelona a same borderising and futureless situation seems to be present. That parallel will be further elaborated in this thesis.

3. Theoretical framework: conceptualising *borders*

3.1. Introduction

This chapter aims to set out the conceptual framework, drawing around the notion of borders, which is to be connected later on to the chosen EU-Spanish case study. To concur with the current mobility tendency within migration, this paradigm will be discussed first. It is of particular importance here because of the link mobility has with the so-called *limbo* stages and transit zones, which impede and restrain migrant mobility. Do Ceuta and Melilla arguably form such *limbos* or transit zones? Restricted mobility will also be linked to the theories of Giorgio Agamben, Hannah Arendt and Jacques Derrida. Agamben describes the image of the 'bare life' migrants live, awaiting eventual decisions made by external sovereign powers. While expounding his theory, Agamben seems to elaborate on several assumptions that were made earlier by Arendt. Their theories accordingly form a logical extension within this conceptual framework. German-Jewish philosopher Arendt stated that with the figure of the refugee, an individual without any rights and qualities except for the mere fact of being human, the concept of human rights had collapsed, forming a state of exception that would have to lead to either naturalisation or repatriation. Could such a created state of exception be connected to the imposed borders in Ceuta and Melilla, and perhaps also to borderising elements in Barcelona? Derrida's hospitality theory explores the relation between immigration and hospitality of the receiving society. How does the process of welcoming the stranger relate with the possible identification of a supposed Other? This *othering* may either be expressed by the idea the stranger should assimilate or by the apprehension this stranger might just occupy 'our land'. The act of hospitality may very well then also conclude in borderising dynamics that either include or exclude migrants.

3.2. The role of mobility within the migration process

As has been mentioned in Chapter 1, migration should be seen as a long-lasting process, and not merely as a journey that covers the life of the migrant when travelling from A to B (see Castles, 2000). The concept of mobility is an important notion within this new approach on migration, also influenced by 'the transnational turn', and is often also dubbed 'the mobility turn'. Transnational migration has been an important and inspirational factor in the mobility debate as of lately, using this debate as a tool to enrich our understanding of transnational migration, including the interconnectivity and deterritorialisation of communities, which may be described sometimes as living in imaginary or 'trans-worlds' (Ernste, van Houtum & Zoomers, 2009; Schapendonk, 2011).[18] Appadurai (1996) states these imagined worlds transcend national boundaries and nation states. Within this debate, mobility and immobility would not be opponents, but rather interrelated effects, as Urry argues in *Mobilities* (2007). Both mobility and immobility are involved in the construction of the role of fixed

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[18] Castles, de Haas and Miller (2013) tie the new theories on transnationalism and transnational communities that have emerged in recent decades to globalisation, which would have increased the ability of migrants to maintain networks over longer and bigger distances. It has become easier for migrants to maintain relations and close links with their countries and societies of origin through modern communication forms. This development, on the other hand, would help emerging 'deterritorialised nation states', with important consequences for the migrant communities (living in their 'trans-worlds'), but also for national identity and international politics.

infrastructures, networks and places in mobility processes, but may imply at the same time phases of rest and blocked mobilities. Such an interrelation also involves questions around greater notions, notably power and justice (Blunt, 2007; Büscher & Urry, 2009; Schapendonk & Steel, 2014; Sheller & Urry, 2006).

Sassen (2002) argues there is no possible fluidity in mobility without a reserved slot for immobility patterns and dynamics. Within this system, all places are tied through networks of mobility and immobility. Therefore, Braudel (1995) takes the view that 'ever since trading routes in the Mediterranean are in function, 'islands' do not exist anymore'. Sheller and Urry (2006) substantiate that the recent mobility paradigm is thus not a worldwide novelty of mobility today, although the speed and intensity of flows and networks may be greater than before, but ''rather part of a broader theoretical project aimed at going beyond the imagery of 'terrains' as spatially fixed geographical containers for social processes'' (p. 209). As being part of this broader system, they argue, the new mobility paradigm does not claim or intend to simply replace the sovereignty of nation-states and replace it by a single system of mobility, leading to a 'smooth world'. This would imply no fixed boundaries and a high level of deterritorialisation. While some aspects of this 'smooth world' may be found in today's world, the immobility factor interwoven in the mobility paradigm, essential according to Sassen (2002), blocks such an evolution. It is immobility that shows fixed boundaries, nation-states and entities, which regulate and facilitate movements within or at the borders of their territories. Mobilities cannot act without the necessary spatial, infrastructural and institutional elements that configure and enable them, eventually leading to the creation of what David Harvey (2001) calls the 'spatial fix' (Hannam, Sheller & Urry, 2006).

As it happens, it is often exactly the political character of power and justice that shapes the systems of mobility and immobility and that reflects the differences in access, speed and movement between people. Their mobility potential is thus very dependent on their position in time and space, which may lead to highly elevated levels of inequality. This is characterised by privileging the movements of some, whereas others are staggering in their movements due to stigmatising, hindering or even blocking them (Schapendonk & Steel, 2014; Shamir, 2005; Urry, 2002). Those 'others' are encountering themselves with effectively imposed borders that are not or only semi-permeable for them. States or supranational entities manage those borders and facilitate mobility for the 'desirable groups', while the others are kept out. This is very noticeable with EU-policies, which have led to the facilitation of free movements between member states, contrasting at the same time with fortified outer borders that restrict mobility (Broeders, 2007; Ferrer-Gallardo & van Houtum, 2014; van Houtum, 2010a; Verstraete, 2001; Zaiotti, 2011). As Sheller and Urry (2006) exemplify, the rights to travel even between neighbouring countries may be highly uneven and skewed, as in the case Spain-Morocco. Van Houtum (2010a) mentions the creation of a 'positive list' that would prioritise and facilitate the movements of people of a select group of countries. A 'negative list' would then hinder or block the mobility of the world's majority.[19]

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[19] In the case of access to the European Union, the 'positive list' consists of 60 countries (almost half of it comprised of countries within the EU itself) of which people do not need a visa, while the 'negative list' contains 135 world states with citizens that need to obtain a visa to enter the EU (van Houtum, 2010a).

3.3. Manifestations of facilitated immobility

As has been mentioned, power-ridden political and juridical activities often facilitate systems of mobility and immobility. Within the European Union, one has seen on the one hand a deterritorialisation with the opening of internal borders, while on the other hand external borders are fortified and regulated, as Ceuta and Melilla exemplify. Chimni (1998) argues the created European border mechanism is a 'non-entrée regime' designed to facilitate the blocking of all migration not permitted by the policies through deterring, intercepting, interdicting and returning. Johnson (2013) sees this regime as completely managed around the notion of 'irregularity'; this being the mobility that takes place outside the facilitated and regulated border regimes. To be able to cut these irregular movements, security increasingly has become a 'boundary function', according to Bigo (2007). He adjacently sees internal and external security converging inside the state to become common property, eyeing to create a less and less acceptable Other. However, what happens when non-documented migrants still happen to get in? To give a necessary outcome to this common security nexus (see Nyberg Sørensen, 2012), Johnson (2013) explains this is the moment when a controlled zone emerges as the ultimate way to control migration and facilitate immobility, dubbed 'the Camp', but often also named *limboscape*, waiting zone, exceptional space and 'nonplace' (Andersson, 2013; Andrijasevic, 2010; Davidson, 2003; Ferrer-Gallardo & Albet-Mas, 2013; Miggiano, 2009; Perera, 2002). They are transit zones located just across the border that seem to glue and stick migrants and leave them immobile.

Lavenex (2006) argues the European border regime has created such spaces to prevent 'unwanted migrant flows to spread out over Europe'. These exceptional zones, such as Ceuta and Melilla, but also camps in 'third countries' like Morocco, are located 'before common territory', and thus before those so-called 'flows' would make a real common impact around Europe. This is

> **A 'scape' as a representation of fluidity and unevenness**
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> Brambilla (2015) states the concept of borderscapes is heavily connected to the suffix '-scape' as described by Appadurai (1990). This suffix would stand for the fluid and uneven form of landscapes influenced by globalisation. Brambilla argues the borderscape is therefore by no means a static line, but 'a mobile and relational space'. It can be seen as the spatial outcome of globalisation, while questioning the dual inside/outside and centre/periphery oppositions. It develops along a set of cultural, historical, social and political relations that are never a given, but fluctuate according to the climate of these relations and the events corresponding them.
>
> Such a definition of 'scape' may also count for the *limboscape*, arguably the most fluid scape one can think of. This fluidity and unevenness comes to the surface through the 'nonplace' that is created, and where otherwise regular rights and justice become fluid to cope with the situation of irregularity and illegality. The control of the regime on the irregular migrants is absolute and makes all humanitarian rights and principles fluid, leaving them in an extremely vulnerable situation and an immobile position (Andersson, 2013; van Houtum, 2010b; Johnson, 2013). The fluidity of such scapes also could lead to the understanding of the interconnectedness and circular effect of borders. They impose the same dual sets that include and exclude, and therefore effect each other, as can arguably be seen when connecting Ceuta and Melilla with Barcelona.

where the securitisation of borders is carried out and where the policies of the regime become visible. The regime goes as far as in controlling every step and action the migrant undertakes, leading to his extreme vulnerability. Johnson (2013) underlines migrants are often too frightened to raise their political voice or claim their humanitarian right due to a sense of

being 'stuck', or 'caught', but above all of encountering themselves in a 'nonplace' and becoming more and more 'inexistent'. In practice, their lives are being managed by a sovereign power. They have to accept that they are not only excluded from society, but also 'being removed'. Due to neither possessing over documents nor mobility possibilities, they seem to be slowly slipping of all radars while staying in an 'eternal waiting zone'. In fact, such a place, as well as the situation of migrants residing there, is filled with arbitrariness, as it forms part of the nation-state, but at the same time seems to present some sort of exceptionality, created by a lack of freedom and powerlessness (Johnson, 2013).

The development of exceptional spaces often goes hand in hand with the creation of a detention camp, often called a 'holding centre'. Countries as Italy and Spain possess over a variety of those centres (see Chapter 2 and 7). As Andrijasevic (2010) denotes, these centres, of what type they may be, are often set up with the rationale they would ensure the effective functioning and facilitation of expulsion procedures. However, as she mentions, they often do not meet the standards of basic humanitarian rights. The right to asylum would get violated, as it would be made more difficult to apply. The prohibition of collective expulsions, as well as the European non-*refoulement* principle, ''the prohibition of forcible return of anyone to a territory where they would be at risk of persecution'' (Andrijasevic, 2010, p. 3), would both also get violated on a regular scale. Besides these, human downgrading, torture, overcrowding allowance are other critical points to be taken into account. All of these were collected in January 2005, when ten European NGOs took legal actions against the Italian government with regard to the situation in the Lampedusa detention camp, as well as the fact that Italy cooperated on many terrains with Libya, a country without a refugee policy. This 'outsourcing' and externalising of European border policies arguably leads to discontinuous and porous spaces within European border areas and blurs the notions of being 'inside' or 'outside'. This blurring fits into the broader territorialisation marked by the 'nonspaces' or *limboscapes* (Buoli, 2014; Ferrer-Gallardo & Albet-Mas, 2013; van Houtum, 2010b; Riccio, 2001).

3.4. Perceiving the Other

At border-crossings every individual gets classified on regularity/irregularity and graded on *otherness*. Such a border examination, as Salter (2007) and van Houtum (2010b) argue, creates a state of exception. At this place and time, the application of Law is suspended until ''the sovereign decides about the legality of those who wish to enter'' (van Houtum, 2010b, p. 287). This means that in the case of supposed irregularity (or 'illegality'), the bordered subjects are 'outlawed' and may pass from *subject* to *suspect* within a securitising political system that focuses on perceiving supposed security threats (Nyberg Sørensen, 2012; Pinyol-Jiménez, 2012). When an individual does not belong to any of the 'pre-given categories', and therefore fails 'the test', he may be seen as such a threat and falls into the category of the 'unlawful'. While the migrant thus does not speak and act the same language of categories, he would then create his 'own border' through internalising the performance carried out by the border control. The consequence of such own (b)ordering is becoming an excluded *outlaw* (see also Barbero, 2012). Since the law is performed in a language the migrant is not familiar with, it becomes an empty phenomenon. An eternal waiting seems to be the only perspective, and may only be passed through if the constant reproducing of time-spatial (b)ordering is

broken or changed (van Houtum, 2010a and 2010b). A border makes and is made at the same time. Its spatial component constantly performs separations that lead to processes of internationalisation/externalisation, as well as the creation of the Inside and the Outside, and therefore, the exclusion of the Other (van Houtum & van Naerssen, 2002). However, b(ordering) processes are not exclusive to borders, and while time-spatial (b)ordering may impose itself through a (semi)fixed reproducing, often a product of territorial strategies, these processes itself are not fixed in time and space. They shall rather be understood as ''an on-going strategic effort to make a difference in space among the movements of people, money or products'' (van Houtum & van Naerssen, 2002, p. 126).

> **From spatial outlaw to place-making**
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> While migrants outlawed by a time-spatial (b)ordering system are often seen as prone to discrimination and poverty, they may not always be entirely defenseless against the system. Migrants are spatially bordered in their movements, but that does not mean they cannot engage in place-making. As Gill (2010, p. 1157) states, "place-making has long been recognised as a way for migrants to forge a collective identity".
>
> Castles and Davidson (2000) argue that when migrants have started to settle down, but still seem to be excluded by the system, they will start their own place-making, creating a place reassembling home. A place-bound community is formed and later on migrants may see this place as 'owned' in some sense. Smith and Winders (2008) talk about a social reproduction, which may also be manifested in the created working possibilities and the offered manpower by migrants in the host country, often centralised around certain areas or meeting points. In the case of the sub-Saharan migrants in Spain, Traoré (2012) sees «la plaza de Chad» as the epitome of such meeting points (see Chapter 8).

The anxiety created by the (b)ordering system that *others* people is thus often internalised by migrants. They will subsequently become completely aware of their status and vulnerability. Such a space of examination at the border creates a hyper-authenticity performance of the border-crosser, Jestrovic (2008) states. The hyper-authentic internalisation puts him into the corset of the host's language, which ultimately makes him 'his own gatekeeper'. This would generate a waiting *before* the Law, as the migrant has already 'emptied' himself *before* the border through internalising control. This 'waiting before the Law' also symbolises the continuous reproduction of othering and (b)ordering as van Houtum (2010b, p. 290) suggests, leaving the migrant's Self 'in a continuous flux of 'not yet' and constant be-coming'.

Newman (2006) states migrants have swapped one form of inclusion for another form of exclusion, to ultimately discover the reality at the other side of the fence, which differs sharply with their imagination. He links the (b)ordering system to the notion of multiculturalism, giving a different interpretation to this term. Multiculturalism is ''for some, the ability of States to successfully cope with difference within their midst while, for others, it reflects the failure of the border crossing process beyond the relatively superficial level of physical entry into a new geo-political space'' (p. 179). It shows crossing a border does not only take place on national and international levels, but also on city and neighbourhood levels on another moment in time. The border that presents the level of inclusion and exclusion within society is probably harder to cross than the superficial physical one that separates states, although it may not perceived as such in the beginning. In fact, this border might never be fully crossed successfully within a migrant's life. When migrants remain segregated and ghettos arise, voluntarily or involuntarily, one may argue they are re-creating their society

through place-making, but at the same time it could show their inability to cross the border of inclusion, which influences the level of 'feeling at home' (Gill, 2010; Newman, 2006).

3.5. Agamben's state of exception and *bare life*

> If in the system of the nation-state the refugee presents such a disquieting element, it is above all because by breaking up the identity between man and citizen, between nativity and nationality, the refugee throws into crisis the original fiction of sovereignty. (Agamben, 1995, p. 117)

Refugees, or irregular migrants in general, form an exceptional group living in an exceptional state, as Italian philosopher Giorgio Agamben (1995) argues here. They do not fit within the concept of the nation-state, subsequently 'throwing into crisis' its supposed sovereignty. Naturally, the political power of a state's sovereignty resides in 'law and order' (*Ordnung*). However, problematic is the fundamental localisation (*Ortung*) that goes with the notion of sovereignty: the spatialisation of political power. State sovereignty does not only limit itself to define what is inside and outside its sphere, but also draws a threshold between the two. It is then at the border area between inside and outside where a state of exception is created, and where the normal situation meets chaos. This state of exception easily falls into a state of emergency when the chaotic situation develops itself, and evolves later on in an extra-judicial zone placed outside the law. This attached extra-judicial character could arguably be seen as an attempt by the sovereign nation-state to get grip on the state of exception through permitting what is lawfully 'out of the ordinary'. Increasing violent actions would be justified to control these zones, which are outside the common sphere of influence on the border of 'inside' and 'outside' (Agamben, 1998, 2008; Damai, 2005; Humphreys, 2006; Rosén, 2005; Taylor, 2009; Turner, 2007).

As Damai (2005, p. 255) states, what before was ''a provisional attempt to deal with political exigencies'' is increasingly becoming a permanent practice forming part of the securitised policies of governments. The world is becoming more exceptionalist in that sense, as what before was exceptional now becomes common ground. According to Agamben (2005), a process is taking place that illustrates the abandonment of life to law, which leads to the existence of a ''legally unnamable and unclassifiable being'' (p. 3) – a *bare human*, which lives a *bare life*. Such a development lays bare the biopolitical threshold of exception, an extreme and uncommon zone where law is deactivated. Law officially remains, but it cannot exert pressure over the exceptionalities. Agamben (2005) states that law in this case, as it finds itself in a blurred state, only functions in order of violence by creating a place of anomy, breaking down communitarian and judicial norms.

Yet, views around the state of exception are not unified around Agamben's perception. He identifies two main schools of thought around the concept of which each somewhat contradicts the other. The first group speaks about ''an integral part of positive law because the necessity that grounds it is an autonomous source of law'' (2005, p. 23). Humphreys' (2006) take on this is that when a state is faced with a life-threatening public emergency, many international constitutions and treaties permit the state to suspend the protection of certain basic rights. The existence of such treaties derogatory from these basic humanitarian rights is often seen by this group as an 'inevitable concession' in times of emergency to

somehow control exceptional state measures. This derogation model subsequently creates a gap between fundamental rights and the rule of law, which makes transgressing of individual rights possible. Tom Hickman (2010) speaks about a 'double-layered constitutional system': ''both layers exist within a regime of legality, but only one exists within the human rights regime'' (p. 335). Governments are thus permitted to step outside the human rights system while their actions are still subject to judicial supervision, a necessary and inevitable tool according to the first group.

The second group identifies the state of exception as 'essentially extra-juridical', something placed outside law, overruling it in this case. This approach sees the derogation of law illustrated by the state of exception as recognition of 'limited constitutional dominion' (Humphreys, 2006). Standard judicial mechanisms and procedures would not be appropriate or desirable when certain circumstances are threatening to endanger the safety of nations. This comes perhaps close to what Dikeç (2006) sees as the legitimation for the securitising state and environment, albeit followers of this second approach also state the extra-judicial aspect is of extreme importance. A legal space must be opened to be able to restore the constitutional order, because ordinary rights and law should not get infected with 'extraordinary elasticity' (Agamben, 2005; Humphreys, 2006). Hickman (2010) does not see very sharp contrasts between the first and the second approach when the idea of the 'double-layered constitutional system' is put into practice. This system is much more resistant from critique of the ones that advocate for an extra-judicial measures model, as fundamental and ordinary human rights would be insulated from getting contaminated. Agamben (2005), however, rejects both approaches, as he states the state of exception is not of necessity inter-judicial nor extra-judicial. It forms this threshold zone of indifference ''where inside and outside do not exclude each other but rather blur with one another'' (p. 27).

Blurred zones of exception do not only exist within military autocracies or in dictatorships, as one may argue, but are rather to be found as a threshold of indeterminacy between democracy and absolutism, to be called 'protected' or 'securitised' democracies. However, this does not mean the state of exception does not have links with absolutist and autocratic periods in history. In *Homo Sacer* (1998), Agamben connects the roots of the state of exception to the French Revolution, confirming its form as a modern institution. Later on, it gains dominance in the mid-20th century as 'the paradigmatic form of government'. Starting with World War I, it becomes noticeable that an increasing number of countries start denaturalising and denationalising their own citizens. The most famous example is Nazi Germany, which divided between citizens with full rights and citizens without political rights, later on succeeded by special laws and restrictions for the Jewish community. Agamben (2008) reasons that ''such laws – and the mass statelessness resulting from them – mark a decisive turn in the life of the modern nation-state as well as its definitive emancipation from naive notions of the citizen and the people'' (p. 91). It can be named decisive because every time (stateless) refugees no longer represent individual cases but rather a 'mass phenomenon', organisations and nation-states have proved to be incapable of facing the problem in an adequate manner, let alone solving it. The major reasons for such impotence, as Agamben (1998; 2008) mentions, are not only to be linked to the selfish and blind character of bureaucratic mechanisms and apparatuses, but also to the ambiguous notion of the *native* in the judicial order of the nation-state. In this case, the *native* would stand for life, while the

refugee, who does not have the rights of a nation-state citizen, would be deprived of it. This would leave the refugee as a *homo sacer*, living a *bare life* in which only the human in the sense of a person of flesh and blood appears, deprived of all rights and functions within civil society (Fitzpatrick, 2001; Humphreys, 2006; Lechte & Newman, 2013; Plonowska Ziarek, 2012).

Agamben dubs the state of exception as 'the Camp', hereby giving a further spatialisation to the concept. The Camp can be seen as a space of containment that operates to exclude individuals from the nation-state's normal judicial and social order, and at the same time as a space that keeps them and prevents them from returning to that normal order. It is a site of control where disruptive elements or supposed dangers for the nation-state can be managed (Johnson, 2013). In Agamben's (1998) words, ''the camp is merely the place in which the most absolute *conditio inhumana* that has ever existed on earth was realized'' (p. 95). As he argues, such camps are not born out of normal law-making, but out of a violence-generating state of exception and martial law. A parallel with Nazi Germany can be drawn again as the concentration camps during the Second World War may come closest to this condition of 'inhumanity', which had a juridical foundation in the Prussian concept of *Schutzhaft*, that was intended to give the leader of the Reich the possibility to re-establish the public order. This juridical institution was interpreted

> **Rancière's 'those who have no part…'**
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> As Johnson (2013) suggests, it makes sense to involve Jacques Rancière (1999), as there is an interesting discrepancy between the theories of Agamben and Rancière. Rancière (1999) argues: "there is politics when there is a part of those who have no part, a part or party of the poor; [...] politics [...] causes the poor to exist as an entity" (p. 11). Opposed to Agamben, he states the starting point of politics is the exclusion, and the effects that make this possible. Politics are therefore momentary and are not about achieving agreements, but about challenging and resisting the created exclusion. While Agamben thinks inclusion is indispensable to participate in political agency, Rancière suggests politics are based around the power-ridden contrasts of inclusion and exclusion, which can be challenged at any time.
>
> While Johnson agrees with Agamben in seeing a downward movement leading to dehumanisation and eventual removal, this movement could also be combated, she argues. "The fleeting interruptions and flashes of resistance that occur in the everyday lives of migrants create politics itself within this state of exception. Within such moments, these migrants find a voice and demand an equality of place" (p. 88). This means that while Agamben sees no way out in the state of exclusion, Rancière and Johnson argue there are actually moments in which 'those who have no part' actually take part and try to bridge the gap between inclusion and exclusion in the social and juridical order.

by the Nazis as the allowance to take individuals 'into custody' independent to any criminal behaviour or activities, but solely on the mere base of avoiding danger to the state's security. However, different to the previous Prussian and Weimar states and constitutions, now the sovereign is no longer seen as limited:

> The sovereign no longer limits himself […] to deciding on the exception on the basis of recognizing a given factual situation (danger to public safety): laying bare the inner structure of the ban that characterizes his power, he now de facto produces the situation as a consequence of his decision on the exception. (Agamben, 1998, p. 97)

This evolution taking place during the Holocaust, and which has become more common ever since (albeit not in the form of extermination camps), shows that every question or doubt

discussing the legality or illegality of the activities or events occurring there does not make sense anymore: ''the camp is a hybrid of law and fact in which the two […] have become indistinguishable'' (Agamben, 1998, p. 97). Therefore, one should not ask the question of how such atrocities against human beings are committed, but rather how these actions cannot any longer appear as crimes according to juridical procedures. Such developments have led to the dehumanising transformation of the Camp's inhabitants into *homo sacer*. The constantly acting threshold that blends fact with law and vice versa causes their deprivations of rights and 'normal life'. This evolving mechanism subsequently acts as a sovereign power that decides over life and death of the inhabitants (Agamben, 2000). As a result inhabitants lose their complete sovereignty, but are also completely exposed to temporary and unpredictable turns imposed by independent powers. According to Johnson (2013), who has carried out her research in Melilla and Oujda (Morocco), the consequence is that the inhabitants are denied political agency of any type, laid bare to the decisions of the nation-state to not only exclude them, but also to eventually remove them entirely in a later phase.

3.6. Arendt's avant-gardist and stateless refugees

In *We refugees* (1998), Agamben reflects on the role Hannah Arendt has played over the past century within the debate about the conditions refugees and migrants live in, and analyses the same-titled article published by Arendt in 1943. The work of Arendt has been particularly important and influential because of her own situation, as she had been living herself in a stateless situation. Arendt wrote that while a refugee may have lost all rights, he would always have an 'inestimable advantage' if he does not want to assimilate and be stripped of his national identity. Her argument was founded on the French phrase *on ne parvient pas deux fois*. In other words, a migrant can assimilate and let loose of his own culture, but he will never come as close in being identified as such as before within his own culture (Arendt, 1996). Later on, she also believed the banished European Jews represented the 'vanguard' at that time, being a big group of refugees that particularly did not want to or could not assimilate to a new identity (Daly 2004). ''Refugees expelled from one country to the next represent the avant-garde of their people'' (Kenzari, 2013, p. 17). Agamben (1998) argues it is worth putting this argumentation in today's context. The refugee is of all times and may nowadays especially standout in the sphere of nation-states, their sovereignty and traditional legal-political categories. His figure shows the corrosion of such traditional categories and may be classified 'avant-garde' until the dissolution of the nation-state and its sovereignty would have come to an end. Until then, the refugee remains the sole category that uncovers the limits and shortcomings of our political community and the construction and representation of its subjects. Gündoğdu (2015) thinks the images of the refugees and the rightless 'continue to haunt our present in many ways'. Their salience may very well have created what is called the 'citizen gap', leaving millions without the guarantee and protection of 'citizenship rights' (see also Berkowitz, 2013; Larsen, 2012; Volk, 2010).

The refugee institutes the radical crisis of the concepts of the rights of the man and the modern nation-state as he does not fit within its model, Agamben (1998) pursues. Arendt (1976) wrote about this:

The calamity of the rightless is not that they are deprived of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, or of equality before the law and freedom of opinion—formulas which were designed to solve problems *within* given communities—but that they no longer belong to any community whatsoever. Their plight is not that they are not equal before the law, but that no law exists for them; not that they are oppressed but that nobody even wants to oppress them. (p. 375)

The first phases of rights deprivation may not always directly threaten the lives of the rightless, as she illustrates the case of the Jews. Before being sent to concentration and extermination camps, they were first deprived from their legal rights and cut off from the society by the Nazis. This order suggests a condition of complete rightlessness is created before the right to live is challenged, a far evolved stadium of the concept. First and foremost, ''they are deprived, not of the right to freedom, but of the right to action; not of the right to think whatever they please, but of the right to opinion'' (Arendt, 1976, p. 376). Although this may seem merely threatening and violent towards the rightless, it can also become fatal for the nation-state, which collapses in ruins when confronted with the existence of men who have truly lost everything, apart from being humans (and thus, the 'right to live'). Therefore, Agamben (1998) argues that the lack of autonomous space within the nation-state's constructional and political order for 'the bare man' implies that being a refugee cannot be considered an enforced way of living, but a temporary status that should either lead to naturalisation or repatriation.

Gündoğdu (2015) points out that when Arendt embarked on her description of the 'rightless man', the final aim was a profound critique on the ordering principles of the constructed international system, obviously including nation state's sovereignty and nationality, but also human rights. Through her description of the precarious conditions of the stateless, Arendt was able to expose the paradox surrounding human rights: ''precisely when one appears as nothing but human, stripped of all social and political attributes, it proves very difficult to claim and exercise the rights that one is entitled to by virtue of being born human'' (Gündoğdu, 2015, p. 3). Therefore, Arendt questions the idea that human rights would be natural rights. Whereas they would or should be inherited by birth and inherent in human dignity, she argues their effectiveness can only be guaranteed when relying on membership within an organised socio-political community. While they still appear and are embodied as such, those men deprived from such a community can hardly be recognised as human beings, as they are not entitled to equal rights. They have to live of the goodness or compassion of others, which might vary from day to day. On the other hand, their alienation might also be seen as a barbarity ready to be banished from the community. Such stereotyped and generalised thoughts may effectively drive the rightless away from that community or from the company of other human beings altogether (Gündoğdu, 2015; Holm, 2013).

Nation-states are in possession of the right to denaturalise, which means they can be fully held responsible for the existence of stateless peoples deprived from their national and civil rights, Berkowitz (2013) argues. He observes the creation of refugees and stateless people not as an exception, but as a problem inherent to the regime of nation-states and influenced by its performance. It unveils 'the tragic flaw of the modern system of the nation-state'. The created 'flows of stateless people' subsequently lead to the paradox surrounding

the availability of human rights, but also of one's own sovereignty. That is, the sovereignty of the stateless and the rightless may be endangered in later phases of created rightlessness, and additional alienation, which may very well lead to a blending of self-determination with the power of the nation-state, opening the doors to eventual genocide or ethnic cleansing (Berkowitz, 2013). A consequence of such events may also be the nation-state's power and sovereignty averting such designations. A great dilemma rises when it comes to sovereignty and the way democracies make use of it. On the one hand, as Benhabib (2004) points out, sovereignty and its implicated self-determination give an undivided authority the right to protect a demarcated territory. However, on the other hand, how does this guarantee the adherence to universal human rights, regardless of nationality and other categories?

Larsen (2012) argues the two principles of state sovereignty and human rights are often in contradiction, as the nation-states only grant and guarantee rights to their own citizens, while according to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights these rights should be granted to all human beings regardless of their citizenship. However, refugees have no status before the law, as Arendt argues in *The Origins of Totalitarianism* (1976). They are not per se oppressed by law and the nation-state, but are first and fore mostly insufficiently visible. They are left with no voice and are unable to join a political community. This total expulsion from all communities and political organisations can be seen as the fundamental core problem of the refugees, or the stateless in general. This is enforced in such a way that even criminals and slaves may feel more tied to communities. As law does not hinder them, refugees may enjoy total freedom. However, this does not mean they can put this into practice as they do not have the possibility to utter their voice: ''it is the freedom of a fool to whom no one listens'', as Larsen (2012) portrays it. Arendt's conclusion lays in the idea that refugees have lost 'the right to have rights', which makes them incompatible in today's constituted world of nation-states. It has become impossible for them to find a new home, as they cannot be assimilated into a community nor a territory where they can create a new home and a new community on their own. This leads to an everlasting exclusion. In that sense they have become avant-gardist, as they form some kind of creation that is not yet compatible with today's formed world. Some may try their luck through assimilation, but according to Arendt (1996) one only does succeed once, meaning the exclusion will not completely disappear if one tries to assimilate or imitate other cultures than his own.

3.7. Derrida's *foreigner* and the hospitality theory

> Isn't the question of the foreigner [*l'étranger*] a foreigner's question? Coming from the foreigner, from abroad [*l'étranger*]?
> Before saying *the* question of the foreigner, perhaps we should also specify: question *of* the foreigner. How should we understand this difference in accent?
> −Jacques Derrida (Bal & de Vries, 2000, p. 3)

In his lecture about the 'Foreigner Question' (10 January, 1996) Jacques Derrida raises the question: '*who* is the foreigner?' Does this depend on if the foreigner is the one who asks the question, or the one the question is addressed to? To answer this question, he addresses Greek philosophy and recalls Plato's dialogues, where it is often the Foreigner (*xenos*) who

questions.[20] After arrival, the Foreigner starts contesting the authority of the father, and his *logos*, as well as the power of hospitality of this authority. Will this authority, a city or a State, treat him as someone who does not speak the same language, or will it incorporate him within the 'family'? The central question is: must we require that the foreigner already understands and speaks the language, before being welcomed in the country? If so, if he already speaks the same language and shares everything through that language, could he still be considered a foreigner? And would it still be accurate and applicable to grant him asylum and to welcome him with hospitality? Reflections on 'being foreign' and hospitality treatments are occurring nowadays within 'a possible rigorous delimitation of thresholds or frontiers'. These are to be found ''between the familial and the non-familial, between the foreign and the non-foreign, the citizen and the non-citizen, but first of all between the private and the public, and the private and public law'' (Bal & de Vries, 2000, p. 49). However, this delimitation may not be all that recent, Derrida argues (Caputo, 1997). Drawing on the etymology of French structural linguist Benveniste (1973), he names an example from Latin, where the difference between hospitality and enemy is very small, using both *hostis* and *hospes* to indicate a stranger or a guest. While *hospes* stands for 'to be welcomed with hospitality', *hostis* stands for 'enemy'. A small word difference and a choice between the two (either 'favourable stranger' or 'hostile stranger') inflicted thus a big difference in hospitality and perception (Candea & da Col, 2012; Turner, 2007).

Although a stranger may nowadays not automatically get the designation 'hostile', differences between inclusion ('inside') and isolation ('outside') in society may still be small. According to Turner (2007, p. 300), ''ancient relationships between host and stranger have been transformed by globalization and a new type of xenophobia has emerged'' (see footnote 20). Due to the effects of globalisation, all modern societies to some degree have become plural and multicultural. While at the same time diasporic and transnational communities are appearing, the stranger can now present himself as both proximate and distant within the host society. In various occasions the distance is enlarged by the type of work and the status the stranger has. Migrant labour is often connected to the lower marginalised classes, which can lead to segregation and even isolation of the community. Irregular, or semi-irregular, migrants often live within a very disadvantaged situation. Because of the lack of possibilities, they are obligated to manoeuvre within the informal sectors. The stranger is then often deduced to an anonymous displaced person without any citizenship rights. He is a member of an underclass, often associated with crime and terrorism by nation-states. This assumption makes us move around in a circle and leaves us with a 'friendly stranger' becoming or being perceived as a 'hostile stranger' (Caputo, 1997; Turner, 2007).

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[20] However, interestingly enough, from the Greek concept *xenos* we derive 'xenophobia', as Turner (2007) points out. While in the ancient Greek world, this term defined a pact between the stranger and the host community, requiring certain obligations, this definition was later replaced with a new classification of what is 'inside' and what is 'outside' the *civitas*, binding people to nation-states and political communities. The ancient norms of *xenia* also contrast with the modern world in the sense of the to be perceived and admitted stranger in society. While in the Ancient World this stranger was always to be seen as the nomad or the enemy, the creation of nation-states has come with a new system of 'classificatory niches'. These include the stateless person, the migrant, the refugee, the asylum-seeker and the guest worker. While in the ancient Greek world, the 'naturalisation' or admittance of such men was to be decided by the bureaucracy, naturalisation could nowadays be successfully reached or declined through a battery of roles, circumstances and contributions to the host society.

Inspired by Swiss linguist de Saussure, Derrida argues in *Speech and Phenomena* (1973) that meaning or sense in the system of language, words and signs is only formed by contrasts. This critical point of view on the creating of meaning is what according to him formed *deconstruction*, which is forged by the desire to revalue or reassert certain Western common senses, properties and values (Chérif, 2006). This revaluation could also be translated into new hospitality and the welcoming of strangers, he stated later on (Caputo, 1997). It would make deconstruction look perhaps more acceptable than is expected by the community:

> If you were intent on making deconstruction look respectable, it would not be a distortion to say that deconstruction is to be understood as a form of hospitality, that deconstruction *is* hospitality, which means the welcoming of the other. Deconstruction would thus mean−again in a nutshell− ''Let the other come!'' ''Welcome to the other.'' If deconstruction had an international headquarters, say in Paris, it would have a large banner hanging over its front door saying *''Bienvenue!''* (Caputo, 1997, pp. 109-110)

'Hospitality' can thus be seen as inviting or welcoming a stranger, either personally, by the state, or by a community. Its deconstructive nature is to be found in the etymology of the word itself, which carries two opposites within, as we have already seen (the Latin *hostis* and *hospes*). Hospitality can be seen as an instrument of the host to welcome the guest, while remaining in control at the same time. This would lead to the equilibrium of both the alterity and 'otherness' of the stranger (*hostis*) and the power *(potential)* of the host, which are not to be altered or annulled by hospitality. This equilibrium preserves the distance between the host and the stranger, between the owner and the invited. Maintaining sovereignty as a host is fundamental, but at the same time shows the tension and inability that comes enclosed within hospitality. How can the 'gift' of welcoming the guest still be perceived as something positive without losing sovereign power? Hospitality is *impossible*, Derrida suggest (Caputo, 1997), as its own thresholds block it. Therefore, Kant's famous argument that ''the Law of World Citizenship shall be limited to Conditions of Universal Hospitality'' would hold no value (Candea & da Col, 2012, p. S4). Such a law would mean the deconstruction of one's sovereignty, and eventually of communities and the nation-state. Kant leaves out exactly what Derrida comprehensively describes as the border that blocks such universal hospitality. When this border would be crossed, a gift 'beyond hospitality' is given. The guest really experiences hospitality and feels at home without being affected by an unequal power relation. Expressing its rareness, Derrida analyses this point as 'a moment of madness and an act of excess' of the owner. If there is even such a thing as hospitality, he argues, it is scarce and can only be reached through surpassing imposed thresholds (Arrigo & Williams, 2000; Caputo, 1997; Chérif, 2006; Gunaratnam, 2009; Introna, 2010).

Hospitality is always something to come or to be demanded, but which is (almost) never met or reached. Derrida rather sees hospitality as something to be experienced, and which cannot be objectively described (Caputo, 1997). For the stranger, it forms an 'enigmatic experience' in which he or she does not know what will come, or what has to be expected. It is received as a gift and an act of generosity, which goes *beyond* the host himself.

On the other hand, the stranger is absolutely unknown to the host, who should use hospitality as a tool to 'abide dangerous elements' to come forth of the meeting with this unknown stranger. Although the guest is an unfamiliar figure, this does not mean the view from the guest cannot be expressed or projected. Candea and da Col (2012) exemplify this with the Mandarin language, which has the term *keguan*, meaning 'the view from the guest', an 'objective expression' or 'outsider's view', contrasting with *zhuguan*, the 'subjective or the insider's view' of the host. According to them, following the theory of Serres (1982), the guest can be seen in many cases as the parasite, which would have ''the ability to cross ontological boundaries and confusing the subjectivities of host and guest'' (p. S13). The parasite is a figure, which can only exist by exploiting the host(s), and can be exorcised through gift-giving of that same host. This means that capture of the host by a moment of madness and excess may actually 'cure' the parasite, as the hospitable generosity of the host has a surprising and confusing effect. However, should the parasite be assumed as a problem, or is he to be the standard 'product' that results of hospitality's own boundaries? Even if it only was for to be slightly sure what to expect and where we step, Serres (1982) argues:

> It might be dangerous not to decide who is the host and who is the guest, who gives and who receives, who is the parasite and who is the *table d'hôte*, who has the gift and who has the loss, and where hostility begins with hospitality'' (p. 16).

Beyond a nation-state: Mediterranean citizenship

When the Algerian academic Chérif (2006) asks the French-Algerian Jew Derrida what would be needed for the two sides of the Mediterranean to become closer to each other, and to provide a communitarian identity to everyone that feels identified and connected with the Mediterranean, Derrida opts for a 'Mediterranean citizenship'. He names Spain as the most striking example of a Mediterranean space where the Greek-Roman, Jewish and the Arabic-Islamic cultures cannot be seen apart from each other and are interwoven within culture and identity. Through ages and centuries, both parts of the Mediterranean have been connected on multiple levels and share an identity. As of lately, this identity has blurred as a consequence of the European unification and the image of the southern Mediterranean as conservative, non-secularist and fundamentalist.

Such stereotypes are fostered by the creation of the European secular hegemony and marginal, but vivid and extreme, fundamentalist and conservative sentiments on the southern Mediterranean shores. Such sharp contrasts have made the region in times of crisis, may they be political or humanitarian, a space of 'spectacularisation', as Brambilla (2016) argues. Stateless refugees fall between two stools through the sharpened and fortified borders between North and South. They enter in a 'process of invisibility', as Arendt described. However, the local shared identities are also blurred in favour of the 'Mediterranean division', 'shaped and carved' to political and ideological satisfaction. While certain places may seem almost twinned in terms of identity, culture and mutual exchange of inhabitants in the form of immigrants, this seems unacknowledged, underestimated or misunderstood by both shores. While the border here only forms a small sea strip, the political and ideological Mediterranean border is much bigger and impacting.

However, while deciding *who* is *who* may lead to some expectations, it does not lead to a universal pattern, Candea and da Col (2012) think. Human life and hospitality cannot simply be reduced to some 'reciprocal logic of exchange' in which the roles can be stereotyped and generalised. Derrida (2007) says it is important for hospitality that the host retains his power, but at the same time he likes to say 'hospitality' is an uncertain concept that can only be understood through experiences and 'moments of madness and excess'. Hospitality certainly

can be defined by culture, as there is no culture without hospitality, but it cannot be seen as an ethic comparable to others. Hospitality is above all culture that rests outside the right and does not fall into any juridical category.

> Hospitality is culture itself and not simply one ethic amongst others. Insofar as it has to do with the *ethos*, that is, the residence, one's home, the familiar place of dwelling, inasmuch as it is a manner of being there, the manner in which we relate ourselves and to others, to others as our own or as foreigners, *ethics* is hospitality. (Derrida, 2001, pp. 16-17)

Of course, there has to be some reference point to make us understand and identify hospitality, but above all to be able to control and appropriate it, he points out. Thus, while 'the law of hospitality' is unconditional and cannot be restricted to categories, it can be possibly limited through a perversion in order to master hospitality. After such a perversion, the stories around hospitality are created and marked within our history. Commonplaces of hospitality, such as a 'city of refuge', have been created and developed under juridical and communal standards. This has led to an urban or communal right to hospitality, repressing the *unconditional* hospitality. A paradox is formed. Although cities, communities and places of refuge may appear to be hospitable to everyone, as they are termed and propagated as such, in the end they can only guarantee the right of hospitality to their own citizens. Derrida describes The Great Law of Hospitality – an unconditional law – as perverted, because such a law could only exist when ''[…] borders be open to each and every one, to every other, to all who might come, without question or without their even having to identify who they are or whence they came'' (Derrida, 2001, p. 18).

3.8. Concluding remarks

The position of the Other and the borderising dynamics that suppose influence and effect on it have been central topics in this chapter. The view on migration not being a journey from A to B, but a long-lasting (or even life-lasting) process has gained popularity and is propagated by authors as Castles (2000). The mobility paradigm has also been discussed in the light of the transnational turn. By transcending boundaries and borders of nation states, but also on the levels of infrastructure, networks and places, mobility and immobility are not really opponents, but may rather be seen as interrelated effects (Urry, 2007). As Sassen (2002) states, there is no mobility without immobility. However, at the same time it is immobility that blocks elements from moving, leading to the spatial fix described by Harvey (2001), which configures and enables certain necessary spatial and infrastructural elements required for mobility.

However, such 'fixes' may also be installed by nation-states or supranational institutions, as is showed by the facilitated immobility at and around borders. Within the European Union, there is a process of deterritorialisation and a weakening of the sovereignty of nation-states taking place, while its outer borders have been fortified and are heavily controlled, as can be noticed in Ceuta and Melilla. This has brought a border mechanism that functions around irregularity, as Johnson (2013) analyses, trying to filter and keep out all 'irregular and undesired effects', fertilised by securitising politics that make the Other less

acceptable. It has created zones of immobility around borders, also to be called *limboscapes*, 'non-places' or waiting zones, where migrants cannot move forward or backward. They are stuck in a state of exception in which they do not have citizen rights, because they are not perceived as citizens. Van Houtum (2010b) argues this blind-alley leads to a situation of internalising *emptiness*. The migrant encounters himself in a constant flux, which cannot be defined as something definitive, but yet continues to exclude.

Agamben (1998; 2005; 2008) refers to the excluded as not fitting within the concept of nation-states. They become 'bare humans', or *homo sacer*, a faceless and depolitised subclass residing outside society. They encounter themselves in a state of exception, which can easily fall into a state of emergency due to the extra-judicial character of the waiting zones and 'their inhabitants'. These *bare humans* are deprived of life through the consequences of a constantly acting threshold, which blends law with facts and vice versa. It makes place for an indistinguishable life and a hybrid control system, in hands of sovereign powers. Such a situation can be seen as a threshold between democracy and autocracy that has risen because the figure of the refugee, or the stateless, does not fit into today's categories of sovereign nation-states. Arendt therefore has argued the situation of refugees is fairly dead-end in the current political system. They have lost the 'right to have rights', making them incompatible in this world. Of course, one can always try to find and create a new home through assimilating, whenever having the chance, but the excluded will somehow always remain excluded, she states.

Exclusion is very connected to hospitality, as we have experienced with Derrida's theory. From a linguistic perspective, the difference between 'guest' and '(hostile) stranger' has been incredibly small ever since the Greek and Roman civilisations. This particularity would come forth out of the idea that *hospitality is impossible*, Derrida suggests. A gesture of hospitality, really letting the guest feel at home, is only possible when passing hospitality's own threshold, as formed within society. Surpassing means having a moment of excess and madness: a scarcity. Such an unconditional hospitality is repressed in today's world, as it does, once again, not fit into the current system. Unconditional hospitality, the only 'true hospitality', Derrida argues, would require open borders for everyone. It would put to end the interrogations about one's identity, as well as the stereotyping of such, something that can only be achieved through *deconstructing* certain values that have shaped nation-states and their sovereignty. This certainly seems not compatible with the EU's current border policies, consisting of soft internal borders versus fortified external borders. These external borders would later on continue to work through on the situation of migrants as in not being offered hospitality and remaining excluded.

4. Methodological strategies: between preparation, spontaneity and luck

4.1. Introduction

As this master thesis has also covered a fair share of fieldwork, methodology forms a core subject. This chapter will elucidate on the methodological choices that have been made. The ethnographic fieldwork was carried out in Barcelona, Melilla, Ceuta, and bordering parts of Morocco[21]. To expose over a big variety of data sources, I decided to use different methods and draw in a wide array of actors and groups at stake within the migration debate. In the fifth chapter I have included a small quantitative research, as the current 'border spectacles' in the Mediterranean shown in the media mainly talk about numbers. Therefore, it seems important and interesting at the same time to incorporate a statistical component. Still, these statistics only provide some background information. They cannot be seen as an interpretation of my research or as facts, as most numbers come from dubious sources, are not updated, or may be misinterpreted by the collecting database (Last & Spijkerboer, 2014).

For the qualitative studies, I aim to apply a multi-method social research, also called a triangulation. Such a strategy of using various methods can help when the collected data may show an eventual weakness when analysed by a certain approach, which could then be cancelled by the strength of another approach. In the end, the use of triangulation aims at enhancing the credibility (and variety) of a research study (Benavides & Gómez-Restrepo, 2005; Hastings, 2010; Miller, 2003). The triangulation of this research roughly consists of four parts: an empirical research, a critical ethnography, a discourse analysis and a normative analysis. All parts, as well as the quantitative research, will be amplified in the upcoming paragraphs. Finally, I would like to argue that a good preparation of course is important, but for a good and satisfactory fieldwork research it is even more important to be flexible, spontaneous and empathising with the involved actors, and also to have the occasional bit of luck.

4.2. Empirical sources: inspiring, connecting and confirming

> Every form of border produces its own spectacle, its own representations. When we speak of the border spectacle, we emphasize the need to be aware of these various moments and forms of production and of the power-knowledge-networks that constitute the border regime and give rise to their public image. (Kasparek, de Genova & Hess, 2015, p. 68)

Arguably, this quote exactly summarises the problematic perspective often given by the media on migration, and more specifically on the current 'migrant crisis' in the Mediterranean. As Brambilla (2016) argues, the aesthetics of politics have led to a 'spectacularisation' of the situation. For me, it was therefore important to find secondary

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[21] When the possibility arose, I also got to know a little bit about the migrant community in Lleida. Agricultural Lleida forms an interesting contrast to urban Barcelona. I also included a personal experience in Budapest (Hungary), dating from August 2015, as I felt it fit well into the outline of the current cumulative 'media events' I describe in the prologue.

empirical sources that provide other, less spectacularised, visions and perspectives. *The Land Between* (2014) by David Fedele is a film that shows something rather different.[22] It focalises on migrants that try to enter Melilla, while showing them living in unbearable conditions in the woods close to the border. The focus lays on their current situation after having given up everything at home in search for a better life. The sphere of a total limbo between space and time, with an almost impossibility to be lucky and cross the border without being caught, stirs up political engagement and shows the meaninglessness of border regimes. However, while the film succeeds in showing the 'bare life' of the migrants and their inhumane living conditions, it could have arguably zoomed in more on their own 'flesh and blood'. *Tout le monde aime le bord de la mer* ('We All Love the Seashore', 2015) by Keina Espiñeira[23] exactly demonstrates this missing component. More centralised on fiction and aesthetics, it could be seen as the counterpart of Fedele's film. Filmed in a similar setting in the Moroccan woods close to Ceuta, it portrays the lives of a group of Guinean migrants hoping to arrive one day in Europe. While they are waiting in the so-called limbo, they let their imaginations play. The local Barcelonese NGO Fundación Guné has published the documentary *Por una vida digna* (2014), directed by Anna Alié Zanini.[24] It portrays the shadow side of the West-African migrant community in Barcelona and shows how migrants without legal documents survive through collecting *chatarra* (scrap parts) in the rubbish containers of the city. Human rights are arguably violated through not providing a 'dignified life' for these migrants. The documentary corresponds very well to the current state of events in Barcelona and was therefore a good preparation for later observation.

As has already been mentioned in Chapter 3, concerning so-called 'popular culture', I also became interested in the sphere and stories captured in the Spanish TV series *El Príncipe*, relating the story of a police team in El Príncipe Alfonso, a marginalised neighbourhood in Ceuta, which deals with smuggling, terrorism, irregular immigration and crime. While the stories of course are fictional, I could certainly grasp, connect and confirm some of the elements exposed when visiting Ceuta (albeit showed in different levels, gradations and settings). Especially the highly segregated aspect of the population of Ceuta along religious and ethnical lines in the series, but also in reality, has convinced me to do a more deeper studies on this topic and to include some relevant points in Chapter 3.

The autobiographical book *Partir* para *contar* (2012) by the Senegalese Mahmud Traoré and Bruno le Dantec is a great read to start immersing in the world of migratory business, borders and hiding, a world that connects Africa through the Mediterranean with Europe. Carefully elaborated in chapters, the book relates the complete journey of Traoré, from Dakar upon his arrival in Seville, passing through a handful of African countries and

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[22] This film can be watched online at http://thelandbetweenfilm.com (last consulted on 15 February 2016). As will be mentioned later on in this chapter, I was able to interview David Fedele together with my fellow interview colleague Mireia García Gonzalez in Barcelona in June 2015.

[23] This film is made in cooperation with the EUBORDERSCAPES Project (see www.euborderscapes.eu) and the UAB. A trailer can be watched at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qgCTlQiwMMc (last consulted on 15 February 2016). Through my colleague researcher Mireia García Gonzalez, who collaborated with Keina and actively contributed to the production of this film, I was able to meet Bubacar, one of the main characters of the film, in June 2015, when he had managed to arrive in Barcelona.

[24] This documentary can be watched online at https://vimeo.com/114543418 (last consulted on 15 February 2016). See also http://www.fundaciogune.org/es/projects/documentales/ (last consulted on 15 February 2016) for more information on the documentary.

ending up in limbos in a dozen cities. Although not forming part of the scope of this thesis, it is particularly interesting to read how young migrants chose their itinerary after leaving their hometown or city. A big spark of spontaneity and trying out their luck emerges, as in-between locations seem to either grade as positive or negative depending on the day. A seesaw effect arises as a consequence of carried out local, regional or international politics. Sometimes it might be worth to take a detour of thousands of extra kilometres if that increases the chances to reach Europe, as Traoré justifies and explains the decisions he took on his journey. Alicia Español (2016) has noticed something similar while conducting research in the Ceuta-Tétouan border region. She mentions it becomes very clear 'the border' is an issue in the sense that people ask each other 'how is the border today?' as if it were a fluctuating entity that provides better possibilities today than tomorrow, or vice versa. It demonstrates the vulnerability of irregular migrants and the manipulability of their situation by the border regime, but also by the 'migration business'. This is uncovered in a more detailed way in Ruben Andersson's *Illegality Inc.* (2013), a report drawn on his research on that business in Spain, Morocco, Mauritania, Mali and Senegal, core countries on the Western Mediterranean Route. While media and politics often focus on the migrants as being 'the issue', this book focuses on the developed business behind migration and lays bare its structures.

4.3. Dealing with numbers

As Last and Spijkerboer (2014) argue, quantitative analysis in migration studies is of utmost importance. Still, at the same time one should not take data too literally, how paradoxical that may sound. Numbers may lead to understanding the extent of migration around the Mediterranean towards Spain. They are possibly more able to impress and lead to prevention than stories and experiences, as they are 'cold' and come without the emotion of the writer and/or teller. A lack of numbers can also be seen as a lack of evidence, and a hitch towards evidence-based solutions. While stories and qualitative studies may also not always be readily available, a double gap in evidence is created, which provokes the neutralisation of current happenings, including border mortalities, and the legitimisation of the current border policies. Going back to quantitative analysis, various academics state such research on the topic of irregular migration is too problematic, as in the end it would lead to 'human number games' (van Dijk, 1996; Weber, 1998). On the other hand, Düvell, Triandafyllidou and Vollmer (2010) suggest quantitative studies serve a purpose, as they do bring awareness on the size of irregular migration. This consequently ''has implications both for the urgency of the problem of irregular migration and for the solutions that need discussing'' (p. 228).

At the same time, one should not forget the impact numbers could have. While this might be a possibility to raise awareness and gain media coverage, bad interpretation or a lack of verification could undermine quantitative studies and the generated attention. A particular hitch in quantitative studies on irregular migration is that verification or double-checking of numbers is often not possible (see Chapter 5). After all, irregular migration is a non-registered phenomenon and official univocal numbers do not exist. This raises an ethical issue, as used numbers then become particularly prone to abuse by media and politicians. ''If numbers are abused, whether through malice or incompetence, genuine harm is done'' (Vardeman & Morris, 2003, p. 21). Irregular migrants can easily be demonised, while often it is not even made clear what published numbers actually represent, as Greenslade (2005) observes. Border

arrivals, border refusals and even border deads may be often conflated in mass media for the sake of comprehensibility and to generate stir and sensation.

In Chapter 5, I have combined some databases and sources to give a comparative quantitative analysis. This also shows how sources can fluctuate in their numbers, as well as their incomparability. While all types of borders might hinder irregular migration, the phenomenon itself does not know any borders. Where does one start or stop counting? Mapped routes often prove to be out-dated and do not match with the leaps migrants have to make to get further or to by-pass borders. While comparisons between databases that compare numbers of 'irregular arrivals or mortalities in Spain' will be made, the next chapter will also include some intra-EU comparisons. This gives a good overview of irregular migration in the Mediterranean, but in the end it can also fairly mislead. The Spanish border hotspots of Ceuta, Melilla and the Canary Islands are very small and relatively difficult to reach compared to the totality of Greek islands or Balkan countries where migrants in the Eastern Mediterranean may end up. A difference in numbers thus does not always say something about the impact or urgency of the situation. Therefore, I agree with Düvell, Triandafyllidou and Vollmer (2010), who argue that the best way to proceed in a research on irregular migration would be a combination of quantitative data and estimates, and qualitative analysis that places the numbers in an adjusted and suitable context.

4.4. Making a start with ethnography and gaining access

> Ethnography moves from its conventional single-site location, contextualized by macro-constructions of a larger social order, such as the capitalist world system, to multiple sites of observation and participation that cross-cut dichotomies such as the ''local'' and the ''global'', the ''lifeworld'' and the ''system.'' (Marcus, 1995, p. 95)

The ethnography approach in this thesis is in line with multi-sited ethnography as described by Marcus (1995) above. I have aimed at conducting research at various locations, which varied in periods of time. Using Barcelona as a base, I moved myself around the city while trying to grasp the daily situation around migrants and created borders, but also to interview different actors in their own settings. Next to Barcelona, I also conducted fieldwork in Ceuta and Melilla, and I made some occasional visits to Morocco (Tétouan and Tangier) and Lleida. While this indeed indicates the ethnography to be multi-sited, it fits even more the title of 'trajectory ethnography', as described by Schapendonk (2013). Trajectory ethnography, opposed to multi-sited ethnography, does not necessarily research the relation of influence within different places and how this is manifested, but rather follows the path as a connection between and through places. Schapendonk (2011) argues the trajectory is then seen as an 'important building block of world systems'. Multi-sited ethnography might look at the causes and effects of interconnected places, while the path in trajectory ethnography is 'both cause and effect'. Of course, both approaches also show a lot of similarities. Marcus (1995) talks about the assumption of a certain cultural formation that is produced in several different settings or places, rather than it being a study of a certain specific set of conditions. Additional to this broadening cultural perspective comes also the mapping of terrain, which in this case is led by the migrant trajectory with numerous borders and 'in-between' places along the way. Still, one should bear in mind that 'mapping terrain' does not lead to an ethnographic

image of the world system. Its goal is not giving a holistic representation, but showing that the object of study is cultural formation. Culture is produced and may be studied in several different locales, which subsequently means a global-local hierarchy is absent here. Yet, this does not mean the global aspect is absent within multi-sited ethnography. It rather fulfils the role of studying the connections among different sites. The ethnographer tries to construct a literal and physical presence around these connections and at the sites themselves. Presence and direct interaction at the research field is what marks ethnography (Crang, 2003; Marcus, 1995).

This thesis might have a slightly chameleonic or ambiguous character, as it focuses on migrants, while at the same time migrants are not always subject of their own migration trajectories. They have very little power over the whole border business that lures behind, which makes a lot of different actors, communities and groups to be involved. Therefore, I agree with Law and Urry (2004), who argue that the subject often is decentred within social sciences to the point that it has become a 'commonplace'. Migration cannot be gathered together in one single model or display, but is inherently interwoven with its business, and border-making, as is argued in this thesis. Consequently, as everyone has his own stake and relations within this process, there are also multiple objects, as actors have to shift and manoeuvre themselves between these different stakes and modalities. This might mean, as 'I move along with my subject and investigate how related and along to this subject people, objects, information and ideas move' (Büscher & Urry, 2009), this subject is liable to changing. Can a migrant without any other rights than the bare right of being human, as described in Chapter 4, for example, still be considered an independent subject? Such a question corresponds to Hart's (2004) argumentation, which builds upon the idea that a well-conducted research, leading to a 'processual' and relational understanding, refuses to take identities, places, events, subjects and objects as a given. ''Instead, it attends to *how* they are produced and changed in practice in relation to one another'' (p. 98), valuing this as a geographical method for 'advancing to the concrete'.

> **Between preparation, luck and trust**
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> Migrants are human beings. In theory, they are human beings that do not possess the right documents to stay at the place they are staying with you at the moment you are meeting or interviewing them. Any little notability or mistake may have big consequences for them and their future, or indirectly for other irregular migrants and people who support and look after their cases.
>
> When I arrived in Barcelona, I was aware of the difficulties of gaining access to the migrant community and building a relationship of trust. Knowledge, however, does not mean in this case that conducting fieldwork is easier and mistakes are not be made. Already in the first weeks I experience the huge deal a lack of trust can be and the obstacles it incurs. I manage to get in touch with Amadou, a Senegalese activist who devotes himself to improve the living conditions of irregular African migrants in Barcelona. After a nice first conversation, he promises Mireia and me are welcome to visit 'an African house' (probably an *assentament*, see Chapter 6).
>
> What happens next is a strange mixture of Amadou keeping us up to date, but also not showing up on certain occasions. While he keeps maintaining contact telephonically with either Mireia or me, we decide to be a bit more patient. When we are successful in meeting him, he assures he will introduce us to an African migrant community. He had some difficulties convincing a group of Cameroonians we were 'only students'. After this meeting, we try to meet up with Amadou twice more, before we decide to call it a day. After the last attempt, Amadou does not call us anymore. Of six planned meetings, Amadou showed up twice, but maintained contact with us until the last attempt.

To advance to such a concretisation, I evaluated it would be valuable to be able to speak to some migrants directly, but to also engage with a much wider range of existing official entities, organisations and communities. During this process, I was very lucky to hear that fellow researcher Mireia Garcia Gonzalez at the UAB was planning to conduct a research very interlinked to mine. We decided to, where possible, collaborate together and form a team while trying to gain access and planning interviews. This worked very well, as we both could maintain our own scope, but at the same time intertwine our topics. The fact that Mireia is a native Catalan and not 'another foreign student begging for an interview' also helped in some cases to gain access. In the end, we were both very satisfied and excited about the quality of the interviews we managed to collect and the different perspectives presented by the interviewed actors and collectives. On our way to gain access, Xavier Ferrer-Gallardo acted as a supervisor and provided us where needed with interesting articles and news bits about current events, as well as certain names and organisations to be contacted.

Gaining access is a matter of good preparation, presentation and luck, I would say. As mentioned in the anecdote on gaining access in Barcelona on the last page, irregular migrants are not free to do as they please everywhere and on each occasion. This also includes communities or individuals that support the migrant case, shy of (media) attention that may have an influence in any form. When in Ceuta and Melilla, I was in two minds seeing the circumstances in which migrants had to live or had to cope with. What would be the most respectful, but at the same time effective and harmless way to approach these people? As Crang and Cook (2007) argue, gaining access is and will always be a matter of making compromises. Wary of awkward situations, especially the unequal welfare-ratio and power relation between the researcher and the approached person may in this case play a big role.

4.5. Fieldwork: between 'shadowing', participating, small talk and interviewing

Of course, there are various methods to gain trust. When trying to plan a conversation with a collective or organisation, playing it the formal way and explaining the project, as well as having contact telephonically before meeting often paid off. When trying to gain access to (irregular) migrant communities, a 'less formal way' has to be adopted. But where does one start? After good preparation, you probably already know the 'hotspots' or public spaces where those communities normally gather. So one goes there, and then? Brambilla (2016) formulates it clearly: sometimes shadowing may be needed for your research. This possibly sounds more disrespectful than it really is. As Czarniawska-Joerges (2007) argues, it is useless to classify research techniques and methods to gain access, and value their advantages and disadvantages. One is often dependent on the current situation, and while this situation might change from minute to minute, so may the used method. The only big division that can be made should be between non-participant and participant observation. Shadowing is an important non-participative technique, permitting to preserve an attitude of 'outsidedness', which at the same time may guarantee objectiveness. Its main issue encompasses knowing how to behave responsibly, showing respect and sympathy to others, instead of parasitising or acting as 'a fly on the wall'. To maintain an

> "The field is where other people live and work, which means that my life and work can become elements of a field of practice to be studied, as well. Fieldwork is an expression of curiosity of the Other – of people who construct their worlds differently than we researchers construct ours."
> (Czarniawska-Joerges, 2007, p. 9)

agreeable sphere, the act of shadowing must therefore be constantly re-negotiated. Some initial discomfort or small awkwardness could happen unconsciously and could easily be dealt with, but in the end, a sphere of trust is a requisite that must always be reached, even when it concerns only shadowing. It is, in all situations, important to stay open, flexible and sympathetic (Czarniawska-Joerges, 2007; Fraser, 2012; Gill, Barbour & Dean, 2014; Koning & Ooi, 2013).

An open attitude is needed, because fieldwork can often feel like a 'throwntogetherness' of methods, actions and conversations, as Fraser (2012) recalls. When one goes to a place to conduct fieldwork for the first time, shadowing might indeed be a good technique to start with. However, this does not mean one should stick to that same method. Flexibility is key, as has been mentioned already. I experienced that, when the possibility arises, participation may be acquired in a very natural and reciprocal way, and often is much more satisfying in both obtained results and feelings afterwards than sticking to prepared roles. An often-natural way to start participating could be achieved with 'small talk'. This may mean getting yourself on board and showing some courage, but it often pays off as I experienced, especially after having done some passive observation to show you intend on investing serious time. Geertz (1998) even names 'hanging around' – spontaneous observation that could lead to participation – still to be the core business of doing fieldwork.

Driessen and Jansen (2013) also see hanging around and small talk as far more important than doing interviews when it concerns the eventually to be obtained data. However, the boundary between small talk and open and/or informal interviews is 'thin and fluid'. Furthermore, they state small talk forms an important link in triangulation, as it can correct or complement the data obtained by other research methods. Especially receiving certain understandings of the local culture that otherwise through established interviews would not or very difficultly have been acquired could form a big advantage of doing small talk. In the end, small talk remains a very simple technique, far away from methodological complexities:

> Engaging in small talk in the widest sense of the term, nonverbal behavior included, has a crucial connective function in this fluid and mobile world. People connect by looking, smiling, exchanging words, making connective gestures, and other micro-international forms. This connection facilitates the establishment of […] the overcoming of strangeness, newness, and otherness by multisensory and multilayered exchange as a meant to bridge the personal and cultural divide. (Driessen & Jansen, 2013, p. 252)

Small talk can help to establish, but also maintain and expand the contact with respondents or interlocutors within determined networks. At the same time, it often leads to the enunciation of the most 'poignant and salient' details or quotes within a relaxed, informal sphere. Of course, there are also dangers and disadvantages attached to small talk. When often using the same language within the same atmosphere or community, small talk may come across as unnatural and may be received with a hesitant stance from the interlocutor. This is the turning point when small talk 'takes over' and eats up flexibility and spontaneity, which always should be averted. In my experience, it is better to 'waste time' (which eventually almost

never ends up 'wasted') and be a little more patient, than force one's company upon the interlocutor or community and poison the until-then seemingly 'neutral' contact (Beaudry, 2008; Driessen & Jansen, 2013; Koning & Ooi, 2013). It is therefore important to stay patient as a fieldworker, even when your time might be limited. In the end, you are carrying out a qualitative research, which means it is not all about the quantity and the collection of data.

For me, non-participative observation and small talk were essential when proceeding to gaining access within migrant communities and spheres, especially in Ceuta and Melilla. While you are in a very informal environment, planning interviews often did not make sense, as I felt. Tomorrow, if it was not today, these people, residing in socially and legally vulnerable positions[25], could have moved on to other locations or situations. They were not going to wait for me to interview them if new possibilities were waiting for them. This meant I often spent large days in the same places, sometimes just observing, and sometimes engaging in small talks and informal interviews. The most fruitful string of such events for me was in the surroundings of the CETI in Melilla (see the adjoining text box). Not only here, but also in other situations, I felt very clueless at first sight, not knowing 'how to start'. However, when actually overcoming this and accepting that acquiring interesting data is not immediately going to happen, I often experienced this would lead to actually gaining access and be respected by the interlocutors for having been patient by respecting their habits, ways of living and time-spending. When talking eventually found place, I experienced their welcoming attitude and their human interest in me, and more specifically, the place 'Holland'. While conversing often meant

> **Between observation and participation in Melilla**
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> When starting my fieldwork in Melilla, I hear from fellow researcher Martina (who I met through the campaign Tanquem els CIEs) everyone is free to visit the area around the CETI, although entering is not possible. Of course I want to make use of this unique opportunity to talk with migrants and observe their situation, but I also find myself in an internal moral conflict. How am I going to justify my hanging and strolling around there? As I am, opposed to Barcelona, limited in my fieldwork hours, I go there immediately, taking some rounds around the area. Maintaining a non-participative position becomes something natural for me when I arrive there, also due to the impact only observing such a place already has. I do not want to intrude people's very delicate private sphere and I decide to wait and see what happens.
>
> Suddenly, Amine, a young Moroccan, stands in front of me. «¡Hola! ¿Cómo estás?» ("Hi, how are you doing?") (6 May, 2015). For some seconds, I remain baffled because of his light-footed cheerfulness, then adapting to the newly created situation where I move from observation to participation. Amine is very enthusiastic and immediately understands the purpose of my visit, as well as the objectives behind my fieldwork. He tells me about his experiences, but also shows me the way around. He studied English and speaks Spanish very well, so communicating is not an issue. As most migrants are newly-arrived Syrians, he offers me to act as an interpreter and introduces me to various friends. In the coming hours and days, I have no problems at all to make contact and always see someone familiar. I am still wondered about the hospitality and the cheerfulness these people maintain. Although occurring events prevent me from seeing Amine again in the following days (see Chapter 7), he has been my key to gaining access in the migrant community in Melilla.

code-switching between Spanish, French, English and non-verbal expressions, 'Holland' often was a connecting factor that put a smile on people's faces. While we were talking about

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[25] Due to their often very vulnerable and sensitive legal and social positions, I decided to use fictitious names for the migrants I talked to or interviewed. Through guaranteeing their complete anonymity in my research, they were also often more willing and relaxed to participate and converse with me.

'the country of soccer, tulips and blonde people', I often managed to draw in some interesting questions. These sometimes came from the prepared interview guide (see below) I had memorised, but often also arose spontaneously.

Even when interviewing representatives or collectives, I often felt the most interesting data was to be acquired in the small talk before or after the planned interview. In Barcelona, Mireia and I often concretised and planned interviews days beforehand and then planned place and time with the to be interviewed interlocutor, sometimes running on tight schedules and having up to three interviews a day. We prepared the interviews individually and I could often fall back on my interview guide. However, in Ceuta and Melilla, I felt this tactic did not work. *This was Africa*. I had e-mailed or called several organisations beforehand, but most of them contested by saying I just had to 'show my face' and then we would have a nice talk. This indeed seemed to be the tactic to go by, while in a cosmopolitan city as Barcelona, people would have too tight schedules or were too occupied to have spontaneous conversations that resulted in lengthy interviews. On the other hand, in Barcelona the interviewed organisations often agreed to have the interview taped, so that we could later transcribe it fully. In Ceuta and Melilla, perhaps influenced by the powerful EU-border and all its narratives being very nearby, they often preferred me taking notes, as they were seemingly more worried about me directly quoting or misinterpreting them. In general, I used this interview guide as groundwork:

A. MIGRANTS
- <u>Life in Barcelona</u>
    1. How would you describe your daily life here?
    2. How do you see your own circumstances in Barcelona right now?
    3. Do you consider yourself as free and able to do whatever you wish (also in terms of moving around)?
    4. Is Barcelona the place you expected or imagined it to be?
    5. Does Barcelona provide you the opportunities and chances you expected or wished for?
    6. Do you encounter any difficulties that you would like to describe as 'borders' that prevent or limit you?
    7. How do you feel about your position in Barcelona (i.e. how do you feel regarded by others)?
    8. How would you compare your life in Barcelona right now to the life you had in your home country and during your journey?
    9. Do you feel the journey you made and had to endure before you arrived here has had an influence on your stay here (political, administrative, economical, cultural and social aspects)?
    10. Did you expect you would eventually end up in Barcelona and live a new life here?
    11. What is your opinion about the (migrant) organisations that try to help you/have helped you in the past?
    12. What do you think about the Spanish government and the way it treats migrants or provides them with opportunities (if this is the case)?

- <u>Life in Ceuta/Melilla and trajectory</u>
    1. How would you describe your journey in some keywords?
    2. Which places did you pass along or stay during your journey?
    3. What was the reason you decided to undertake this journey (political, economical, cultural and social aspects)?
    4. Where and when did your journey differ from how you imagined it to be?
    5. Was Barcelona always your final destination you had in mind?
        a. If yes, how did you come to the conclusion Barcelona is the 'place to be'?
        b. If not, how did you become convinced Barcelona is the 'place to be'?
        c. Do you plan to stay here?
    6. Did you travel individually or with a group?
    7. Would you say migrants going in the direction of the Iberian Peninsula are small or big in numbers?
    8. Where would you place the 'borders' you faced during the journey (i.e. national border, EU-border, detention border, visa border, asylum border)?
    9. How did you experience your stay/crossing into Ceuta and/or Melilla and how has this influenced your life?
    10. How do you feel about the way the EU-borders are controlled regarding migration?
    11. How do you feel about the way you are/were treated and your social position in Ceuta/Melilla?
    12. How would you picture/describe the cities of Ceuta/Melilla and their borders?
    13. How do/did you feel about your moving possibilities and freedom after the moment you crossed the EU-borders?

B. MIGRANT/REFUGEE ORGANISATIONS

1. How would you describe the group of migrants that come here/you encounter in Barcelona (and/or Ceuta/Melilla)?
2. Is this group representative for the group of migrants that try to reach Spain or Barcelona specifically?
3. Can you say anything about the number of migrants that reside in Barcelona (with/without documentation)?
4. Can you describe any special features about the group that does not make it until Barcelona?
5. Is Barcelona often the imagined final destination migrants have in mind?
6. What does Barcelona make this 'ideal destination' for migrants?
7. Does Barcelona provide enough opportunities for migrants (e.g. does it live up to its image)?
8. How would you describe life for migrants in Barcelona (and/or Ceuta/Melilla)?
9. Do you encourage migrants to stay in Barcelona or to look for mobility opportunities (or both)?
10. To which extent do you think/observe migrants in Barcelona are able to express themselves and are being heard?

11. Do you feel migrants are influenced, experienced or traumatised by the journey and their experiences?
12. What do you opinion about the Spanish and Catalan governments when it comes to migration policies?
13. What are the opinions you hear from migrants about the Spanish government and its policies?
14. Do you have an opinion/idea about the role Ceuta and Melilla take within the migration process and the experiences migrants have?

C. GOVERNMENTAL INSTITUTIONS

1. How would you describe the group of migrants in Barcelona? Are they big or small in numbers?
2. Do you feel the group now residing in Barcelona is representative for the whole group of migrants that tries to reach the city?
3. Do you have the idea Barcelona has a specific pull factor that attracts many migrants?
4. Do you think migrants often see Barcelona as their final destination?
5. Would you say Barcelona lives up to its image for migrants?
6. How would you describe the process that migrants need to undertake in Barcelona in order to be able to stay or be forced to leave?
7. How would you describe life for migrants in Barcelona (and/or Ceuta/Melilla)?
8. To which extent do you think/observe migrants in Barcelona are able to express themselves and are being heard?
9. What do you think of the way policies on (im)/migration in Barcelona/Spain are implemented right now? Is there room for improvement?
10. Do you have an opinion/idea about the role Ceuta and Melilla take within the migration process and the experiences migrants have?

I used the formulated questions for category C several times, but I did not have the chance to interview many official representatives, as it was often very difficult to gain access or to get them interested in the project. I felt the topicality of the topic often was an issue, as I was obviously not the only one being interested in gaining access and interviewing people. However, Mireia and I did manage to interview a National Police representative in Barcelona. We also interviewed Creu Roja in Barcelona, often through governmental support operating as semi-governmental, and I had a similar meeting with a Cruz Roja representative in Ceuta. Also in Ceuta, I tried to gain official access to enter the CETI, as I read somewhere online this was possible. However, the request had to be sent to the responsible department in Madrid, and eventually resulted in a negative answer. It was interesting to experience the different mechanisms of the CETIs in both Ceuta and Melilla. While in Ceuta, everything seemed to gear to official policies from Madrid and even only approaching the CETI without valid reasons was forbidden, in Melilla I could hang around the CETI whenever I wanted. This possibly had to do with the unequal situation in migrant numbers residing in the centres, as I learned later, and Melilla's incapability to steer everything in the 'right' (i.e. policy-following) directions (see also Chapter 7).

In my research proposal, I also had included the category 'Academics', but in the end my conversations with academics often ended up in more spontaneous conversations leading to good ideas and suggestions, and thus not having the structure of an interview and being suitable for data collection. However, they were very fruitful for the development of this research as they helped me a great deal along the way. In some cases, I also engaged in events and social gatherings organised by collectives in Barcelona, such as ACATHI[26] and Tanquem els CIEs[27], during which I could socialise with the participants and at the same time enlarge my network. In the end, the number of interviewees and the sample data may not be considered as 'ideal' when classified in the different categories, as they do not seem outbalanced. However, as the topic requires a fairly qualitative approach, instead of focusing on numbers, I am quite satisfied with the amount of ethnographical research done. It has provided me with heterogeneous information and many different perspectives, which I perhaps would not have obtained when focusing more on 'numbers' and especially when placing the core of the interviews more in the category of the migrants, instead of the organisation and entity representatives. Although migrants often had interesting personal stories and opinions, they were often very 'unanimous' and 'reiterative' regarding the border topic in all its different appearances and shapes.

4.6. Analysing the discursive and the normative

As van Dijk (2001) argues in *The Handbook of Discourse Analysis*, critical discourse analysis cannot be viewed as an 'obedient research':

> Critical discourse analysis (CDA) is a type of discourse analytical research that primarily studies the way social power abuse, dominance, and inequality are enacted, reproduced, and resisted by text and talk in the social and political context. With such dissident research, critical discourse analysts take explicit position, and thus want to understand, expose, and ultimately resist social inequality. (p. 352)

Later on, he adds critical discourse analysis should above all be seen as a different 'mode' or a 'perspective' of theorising, analysing and applying throughout the field, and not as a distinct approach or direction among scholars. It arguably provides a critical addition to a field such as ethnography when used within a methodological triangulation. Before bringing this value, a number of requirements would have to be met. For example, while other studies might increasingly study 'current fashions', critical discourse analysis primarily focuses on structural social and political issues. An empirically adequate discourse analysis can therefore

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[26] The Asociació Catalana per a la Integració d'Homosexuals, Bisexuals i Transsexuals Immigrants ('Catalan Association for the Integration of Homosexual, Bisexual and Transsexual Immigrants'), ACATHI, not only dedicates itself to its main cause, but increasingly also contributes to changing lives of migrants with all types of backgrounds where it can and where its budget allows. It provides special housing for the aforementioned groups, as well as activities, Spanish and Catalan language courses and fund-raisings and clothes distributions open to all immigrants and 'friends' solidary with their cause. See also http://www.acathi.org.

[27] Tanquem els CIEs ('Close the CIEs'), officially a campaign founded by volunteers, challenges the closure of the Spanish CIEs, immigrant internment camps, operating from Barcelona and with sister campaigns in Madrid and Oviedo. It acts as a collective with frequent gatherings, activities and demonstrations and has strong ties with Asociación PRODEIN (its campaigns often being called 'Frontera Sur') in Melilla, the association found by photographer José Palazón. See also http://www.tanquemelscie.cat and http://melillafronterasur.blogspot.com.

be seen as multidisciplinary and extensive. As it often functions complementary, CDA has to be 'better' than other research methods to be accepted as such. It tries to do so through not merely describing discourse structures, but especially explaining them within contexts of social structures and intercourses. This analysis involves the way ''discourse structures enact, confirm, legitimate, reproduce, or challenge relations of *power* and *dominance* in society'' (van Dijk, 2001, p. 353). As Wodak (2002) argues, CDA should be seen nowadays as a critical tool to linguistically analyse discourses and units of communication that eventually leads to an explanation of social structures. This argument contrasts with Habermas' (1988) critical theory, which explains CDA as a tool that helps to understand social problems, communicated through 'mainstream ideology and power relationships'. Taking an intermediary position, Fairclough (1989) defines three stages within discourse analysis: '*description* of text, *interpretation* of the relationship between text and interaction, and *explanation* of the relationship between interaction and social context' (see also Sadeghi & Jalali, 2013).

Still, such contrasting grounds may not form that big of an obstruction when carrying out CDA. Van Dijk (2001) argues, since it is not a specific research direction, but often functioning in a complementary sense, CDA does not have a well-defined theoretical framework. While reaching for different aims and departing from different points, there may well be space for many types of CDA. This does, however, not mean those different types do not have overall conceptualities or commons. He states most CDA's will start questioning the genres or contexts of the to be analysed text to be able to understand the way specific discourse structures function and how these are embedded in the reproduction of social dominance. This often implicates a quite standardised list of notions such as 'power', 'dominance', 'reproduction', 'class', 'gender', 'race', 'social structure', 'social order' and 'discrimination' (van Dijk, 2001, p. 354). According to Anthonissen (2001), critical discourse analysis in the end always seeks to analyse (or rather *prove*) how apparently neutral texts that often seem purely informative, such as news and government publications, in fact may contain just as much of an ideological attitude as opinion texts. These 'hidden' intended ideologies could be more easily injected to the minds of targeted groups of people, as these may be less aware and would pose a less critical stance towards them than towards columns or propagandising texts, for example (Sadeghi & Jalali, 2013).

In the case of my research, particularly the notion of (re)producing inequality is interesting. Van Dijk (2006) goes as far as in saying this could possibly be seen as the essence and part of the foundation of CDA, as it would always have argued against the (re)production of inequality. Yet, Forchtner (2010) points out such a statement still would have to be theoretically justified. What can be considered as 'illegitimate' and what would be in the 'best interest' of the manipulated; and where can a border between the two be found? Van Dijk (2008) states this issue still remains unclear, and could therefore be seen as a weak spot of CDA. Due to a lacking theoretical framework such questions are difficult to answer. There is yet to be developed, if ever, a set of ethical points that allows CDA researchers to judge discourses because they would violate fundamental human rights, and therefore be illegitimate (see also Fairclough, 2009; Forchtner, 2010). However, to say attempts at creating a framework for applying such ethics have never been done would be a bit of a stretch. When suggesting his *theory of communicative action*, Habermas (1989) pleaded for a standardised

language that rejects discrimination, inequality and suffering, and consequently its reproduction. Would this be feasible, or utopian? Forchtner (2010) argues there is something to be said for this stance, but one should not reduce the power of language to 'merely' a tool of domination. Habermas (1989) sees a striving for 'undamaged intersubjectivity' as ideal, unravelling the undistorted basis of distorted communication and searching for the ground 'undamaged' discourse component of discourse.

While the possibility of unravelling the 'undamaged component' of language in discourse may form a point of discussion among them, most scholars agree analysing discourses on constructed legitimation is useful and attainable. Before delving into this, it is important to recognise the different types of legitimation. Van Leeuwen (2007) has made a very clear categorisation:

- *Authorisation* (legitimation with respect to 'the authority of tradition, custom and law' and persons and/or organs to which institutional authority is ascribed);
- *Moral evaluation* (legitimation related to, often indirect and/or hidden, value systems);
- *Rationalisation* (legitimation with regard to 'the goals and uses of institutionalised social action', and subsequent cognitive 'validation' of them by society);
- *Mythopoesis* (legitimation passed on through discourses, whose effects and/or outcomes can be seen as compensating legitimate actions and penalising which are considered as 'illegitimate' actions).

Consequently, these different categories could appear independently, but also combined, in order to legitimise and/or to de-legitimise and to critique. The difficulty of normative analysis lays in the fact that (certain) legitimations may be easily spotted and are 'out in the open' in a text, but they may also be indirectly incorporated or well hidden. For example, they can appear in autocratic forms as 'because I say so!' supported by 'expert(s) talking' or formulations which show 'taken for granted'-attitudes, as 'the tradition' or 'the practice' has 'always been like this', which are all forms of *authorisation*. *Moral evaluations* are expressed through statements about what is 'good' or 'bad', in often contrasting and complementing evaluative adjectives such as natural-unnatural, useful-useless, healthy-unhealthy, and so on. These moralising comparisons can also be uttered through abstracting terms. *Rationalisation* is a type that is often more difficult to detect. Its essence often lies in a moralised activity,

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The migrant and moral evaluation: life in Ceuta

"They have treated me very well in Ceuta", Moussa (10 June, 2015) tells with certain relief. "Especially after Morocco and Algeria, where life was *very hard*, I could finally be more out in the open here". He is especially positive about the welcoming reception of the CETI, immediately providing him with clothes, blankets and toiletries upon arrival. Henry (11 June, 2015) agrees with him: «Ceuta, c'est quand même bon. En Guinee, il y a la guerre, l'ébola...» ("Even so, Ceuta is good. In Guinee there is war, ebola...").

When valuing their stay in Ceuta, it is regarded as of 'higher quality' than Morocco and Algeria, and (even) home country Guinee. However when I ask Henry if he then would like to stay in Ceuta, his answer is negative, as life in Ceuta is still 'far from ideal'. Both Moussa and Henry legitimate their stay in Ceuta through morally evaluating ('the CETI provided me immediately with...') and comparing it with stays in other countries. Paradoxically, Ceuta and the compared places are located in Africa, but only Ceuta can be considered as 'European'. Would this *per se* cognitively legitimate Ceuta as a 'better place' to live, regardless of the compared living conditions? This is further discussed in Chapter 8.2.

which in the discourse is deemed as 'necessary' for a certain wished development or action, or an expert-based prediction of a certain outcome. *Mythopoesis* takes place through 'story-telling', often making the domain or life-world bigger, with the purpose of legitimising or de-legitimising certain actions when put in a bigger perspective and explained through principles embedded in society (van Leeuwen, 2007; van Leeuwen & Wodak, 1999; Sadeghi & Jalali, 2013).

With regard to the combination of different types of legitimation, Diez (2013) exemplifies Europe (read: the EU) as a normative legitimising power. He cites Manners (2002), who argues that through legitimising its own actions, the EU 'shapes conceptions of the normal'. Seeing the EU as a normative power could be backed up by the status of 'civil hegemony' it has acquired as an institution. Yet, arguments that oppose against the declaration made by Manners (2002) are also very numerous. As Diez (2005) argues himself, there are many inconsistencies to be found in the EU's behaviour when it comes to legitimising that could together advocate against the denomination of 'normative power'. He observes the 'normative' may be something that is ideally achieved, but often such legitimations may more adequately be referred to as driven by interests. Still, in the end, both possibly become an, impossible to be proven by whichever argument, interlinked tangle: ''[…] in most cases, a normative argument can explain behaviour as much as an interest-based argument, as norm and interest are ultimately ontological categories that are next to impossible to prove (Diez, 2013, p. 201). This may look like a big sequence of inconsistencies, but norms, or ways to achieve and legitimise them, often compete with each other. We are able to decipher when we analyse the true motivation behind certain political actions and policies. The example in the box on this page shows such a case, topically linked to this thesis. Norms and interests stay as two terms that are difficult to distinct, which can be seen as an issue, but may also be viewed as something complementary to the also overlapping different forms of legitimising (Haukkala, 2011, who talks about norms and interests as an 'inseparable complex within legitimisation').

> **The EU-Maghreb relationship: competing norms**
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> As most authors agree upon (Lavenex, 2006; Moffette, 2010), relations with the Maghreb countries to better control and regulate migration are seen as of big interest for the EU. However, when normatively assessing the EU-policies towards the Maghreb, Diez (2013) argues the outcome is quite problematic. Is it legitimate to negotiate with the authoritarian regimes of countries as Morocco and Libya? Interests of the EU that have to be implied in cooperation with these countries regarding migration control have to come at a price. That is, in this case, working with and financially supporting countries that have no press freedom and do not share the same norms and values, and could do without any 'hegemonic' European critique on that.

In the end, both discursive and normative analysing are research methods where reading between the lines is required. On the one hand, Habermas (1989) has introduced concepts such as 'standardised language' and 'ideal-speech situation', but as Haukkala (2011) and Forchtner (2010, p. 26) point out, ''communication is not always driven by language'', and can especially not be freed of validity claims in order for it to be seen as 'standardised' or 'neutral'. The implicitness of such validity claims, which may perform legitimation, cannot be neglected by society. Habermas (1993) has mitigated some of his own concepts throughout the years, as he has also argued that societies 'cannot live without validity claims' as linguistics and especially the grammar-driven languages would then 'collapse'. But what are

validity claims? Habermas defines them as 'the truth', corresponding to rightness and sincerity (Heath, 1998). Then, the question arises when something is 'valid' and thus can be claimed as the truth. Ama Oji (2015) links the relation of validity with the concept of *reasonableness*. When something is rationally thought of as reasonable, it often applies for validity, and consequently for justification. She argues reasonableness is often very susceptible to subjectivity, because when can something be called reasonable? Intensification of the action may make it more reasonable, standard or objective. Yet, at the same time such a theory can also lead to 'greater inculpability', when the frequency of an action deems it 'reasonable'. The only way to reasonable actions would be through legal definiteness (see also Lissitz, 2009).

Legal definiteness leads us indirectly to human rights, which should then define the legitimation of action and discourses. However, as has been exposed in the previous chapters, borderising dynamics often create places or spheres of exception in which human rights are not always applied or cannot be guaranteed. Weissbrodt (2008) and Spijkerboer and Vermeulen (2005) state still much has to be done

> **Non-refoulement: breaches and gaps in human rights treaties**
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> The *non-refoulement* principle, which contains the principle of not sending back a refugee to (the frontiers) of territory where his or her life would be threatened on any account, is one of the key facets of refugee law in the Refugee Convention (Article 33, 1951). This has often led to a debate about so-called safe third countries. In the case of Europe, these are mainly Turkey and the Maghreb (i.e. Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya and Mauritania). Can these countries be called safe for expelled refugees and migrants? This has become an increasingly important question after several EU-member states and Frontex have negotiated the principle by stating *non-refoulement* does not apply when rescues occur *exterritorialy* and within the waters of these third countries. Immediate refusals at the border, sometimes not complying with the right of applying for asylum either, also play a role here. To what extent can discourses that legitimise these actions be justified (Fischer-Lescano, Löhr & Tohidipur, 2009; Wunderlich, 2013)?

to ensure the human rights of the migrants, stateless and 'non-citizens'. Continued discriminatory approaches and procedures that these groups have to go through or experience show that more defining is needed. At this moment, these borderising actions can still be legitimated, as such marking in those situations is too weak or non-existent, leading to *dehumanising* cases. As long as there is no universal ratification of the most important human rights treaties that deal with these cases[28], a critical normative analysis on the legitimation of borderising actions is essential.

4.7. Concluding remarks and methodological reflections

While fieldwork can be a great way of doing research and collecting data, it can at the same time be rich in unforeseen issues and experiences. Although such may have been frustrating and stressing at times, I am nevertheless convinced the final data collection is valid in terms of applying to the research objectives and methods I described earlier.

Choosing for Barcelona as a 'base' and carrying out fieldwork from there, in combination with an internship at the UAB, has proved to be a fructiferous choice. I was lucky to meet some great colleagues in the field, to speak to many different organisations and

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[28] See UNHCR (2016) for a full list of the most important human rights treaties and instruments: http://www.ohc hr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CoreInstruments.aspx (last consulted on 10 March 2016).

people, and to plan my fieldwork using all the possibilities a major city has to offer. If I had stayed in either Ceuta or Melilla, this would not have been the case. Both cities are very small and have limited options, especially in terms of present and to-be-interviewed experts. The thesis would have then relied more on the data collected from migrants themselves. However, organisations often have a much bigger overview and could share their rich experiences regarding the borderising dynamics I have intended to study and analyse in this research. The final selection of interviews certainly is very varied, and cannot be seen as one clear homogeneous data collection. Luck and (un)foreseen issues in doing fieldwork, but also my own interests have played a role in this. Although I had a previously prepared interview guide, divided in special categories according to different actors, I experienced along the way I preferred a more spontaneous and organic way of collecting and interviewing. I have let loose of striving for an equal number of interviews per actor group, ethnicity, age, gender, and so on, to go instead for the possibilities that have arisen and that in my eyes were interesting for this research.

Interviewing often requires much quality time in this area of research. Both organisations and migrants often appeared hesitant at first sight to participate in the project. Many good arguments, sometimes demonstrating what would be the benefit for them to participate, and luck, patience and drinking coffee were needed to gain trust and to guarantee privacy. When the representative agreed upon recording the interview, Mireia and I were satisfied. This would mean no information would get lost. Later on, we experienced the huge pile of work we had when transcribing all the interviews. When the organisation did not agree upon recording, we tried to make as much notes and catch important quotes as possible. In Ceuta and Melilla, I experienced much hesitance towards recording, so I entirely relied on interviewing and making notes at the same time in most of the cases. When I made notes, I always made sure I would immediately type them all out (and all other interesting details I still had in mind) when I arrived at home that same day.

Regarding the communication, I always made sure I changed or paraphrased the questions I had in mind (or which I took from the interview guide) according to the background of the interviewee, i.e. organisation, official entity or migrant. In Ceuta and Melilla, I did 'interviews' with migrants that resembled more to small talk. Of course, planning interviews with them would not have worked out, as most lived by the day and had more important issues to care and think about. This improvising sometimes also included code switching, as the preferred language by the migrants I talked with differed. In Barcelona, I could do all the interviews and small talks in Spanish. In Ceuta and Melilla, however, I often had to go by a mix of Spanish, English and French. This meant I later had to decipher my notes and choose for a uniformed language when I typed them out in a document. I decided to leave the quotes that most stood out in the original language. In Melilla, a migrant (the Moroccan Amine) later acted as an interpreter for me when talking to Syrian refugees (see the box on page 49).

I noticed I could especially gain trust within the migrant communities by leaving small talks open-ended and through applying cyclical participant observations. Especially in Ceuta and Melilla, this worked fairly well. The migrants took notice of my regular visits and would start to welcome and salute me, also when meeting by chance in other places, making the contact multi-sited. In some occasions, they would say I was more relaxed than other

researchers they had met, as I would take more time to be with them, but also talk about topics and issues that interested them but were not directly related to my research. This included watching soccer together, talking about Northern Europe in general, learning languages and eating together. Sometimes this led to the risk of not receiving all the answers on research questions I may had wanted, because of the limited time I had in the enclaves. However, I dare to take the view it is more important to have an authentic discussion than to come home with a more complete data collection. As the research concerns a very current topic, both organisations and migrants were often experienced in interviews with researchers, and I sensed that going the more informal way would provide me with spontaneous answers and quotes, while the other way around they would have given me robotic responses learned by heart by then.

As my research does not only focus on ethnographic fieldwork, I always tried to incorporate the two analyses within the periods of data collection. This meant I already tried to think about possibly interesting discursive and normative issues, both while interviewing and when putting the data into place later on. I am convinced this is the way triangulation should work. While one may not be able to work on all parts of the triangular research at the same time, it is important to keep this broader overview on all parts, especially while conducting fieldwork.

5. Risks of becoming an irregular migrant: a quantitative approach

5.1. Introduction

This chapter sheds some light on existing migration data. In concrete, it will set out the numbers that exist for migrants entering the European Union via Ceuta and Melilla, comparing those to other Euro-Mediterranean border areas. Eventually, the available data on 'death numbers' will also be incorporated: the number of irregular migrants that dies along the journey. Sometimes this can be interpreted as a fatality on the edges or fringes of the border, but fatalities also take place in 'created borders' long before the physical border that separates the European Union from Africa, in this case. Yet, this chapter does not serve to provide a comprehensive database. Such a tool simply does not exist and cannot be created, because many researches and databases are poorly updated and liable to subjectivity and research bias. The double counting of cases should also be mentioned as a possible flaw. The data below cannot be seen in any case as the factual truth and should just be viewed as a statistical indication. The goal of this chapter is to provide and categorise the available data and to give an indication of irregular migration numbers on the Spanish case, and more specifically the Ceuta and Melilla border when possible, and its corresponding trajectories.

5.2. Migration trajectories and numbers

> The diversity of paths, and the complexity of forms of migrations, have meant that it is now almost impossible to map movement with a series of arrows, on a flat two-dimensional representation of the world. There would be a greater number of arrows going in multiple directions, and also the time scale would have to be so contracted and irregular that the map would lose its objective of representing movement. Looking for patterns in such maps would be like looking for order in chaos theory (Papastergiadis, 2000, pp. 23-24).

To be able to map numbers of irregular migrants, if even possible, it is important to also map the ways they travel and set out the ways of transport they use. However, as Papastergiadis (2000) and also Sheller and Urry (2006) and Schapendonk (2009) argue, this is almost an impossible task. The new mobilities paradigm with all its possibilities and hybridities is difficult to capture in one sole map. Of course, there are always certain routes and hubs along the way that have become popular, but that does not mean all irregular migrants frequent them. Such routes and hubs are displayed in Map 2, showing the Interactive Map on Migration designed by The International Centre for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD), Europol and Frontex. The tool on their website also demonstrates how certain routes fade in and out of use over time, which has to do with migrants circumventing new obstructions and new facilitations created by border agencies and networks. On another note, these new obstructions and/or border control activities might also lead to a higher death toll, due to an upgraded level of difficulty to reach the desired other side of the border (Last & Spijkerboer, 2014).

Map 2. The Interactive Map on Migration

Source: IMCPD, Europol and Frontex (2015)[29]

As said, the facilitation and use of routes are also linked to the ways of transport migrants use. Some might arrive on a precarious boat, jump border fences, or travel as a stow-away on a ferry, while others travel by air, car, bus, truck or train. In this research, the focus will be on the Western Mediterranean Route that connects Northwest Africa through Ceuta and Melilla with the Iberian Peninsula. During recent years, this route has become less popular in favour of routes from Tunisia and Libya to Italy and from Turkey to Greece and Bulgaria. However, Frontex (2014, see footnote 30) stated in its first quarterly Risk Analysis of 2014 that the biggest growth of illegal border-crossings reported took place in Ceuta and Melilla.

When talking about numbers, it is important to document the number of irregular migrants that died while attempting to cross borders and enter southern Europe, many scholars seem to argue (Grant, 2011; Last & Spijkerboer, 2014; Weber & Pickering, 2011), as it clearly creates a disturbing and alarming view on the situation. The lack of such accurate data would prevent the development of debates on how to move forward towards 'evidence-based solutions'. Besides that, one should also think about possible human rights concerns if it would result evident there are elements connected to migrant mortality carried out by official organisations or state authorities. Another argument could be that lacking accurate numbers are actually the reason European societies have so long 'turned a blind eye' on migrant mortality in the Mediterranean (Weber, 2010). Some media hypes and securitisation discourses may have made societies more aware of irregular migration, but they do not capture the total image nor do they reflect the real situation.

5.3. Available data on border-crossings and arrivals
Numbers on border-crossings and arrivals on Spanish soil can highly fluctuate, as migrants may be intercepted and returned directly or very shortly after, and also may try their luck on various occasions (Carling, 2007a). The Asociación Pro Derechos Humanos de Andalucía (APDHA) (2014) talks about a sharp increase of migrant arrivals in the past few years, with

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[29] Retrieved from http://www.imap-migration.org.

even noting a 60% increase of arrivals in Ceuta and Melilla in 2015 compared to 2014 (see Figure 2a). Frontex (2014) also accentuates more frequent attempts by migrants to cross the fences of Ceuta and Melilla, despite tightened border controls. The Spanish Ministry of Interior provides data on successful border-crossings as well, but these are released on an irregular basis, and are mostly split between arrivals at the Canary Islands, the Peninsula and the Baleares, and Ceuta and Melilla. Figures 1, 2a, 2b and 2c on the next pages only include successful attempts of border-crossings and, thus, arrivals in Spanish territory. Only the latest years are covered in these figures to give a more recent image, but also due to a lack of comparable data.

When concentrating on a larger period of time, one notifies Melilla and Ceuta were the most frequented and popular border hotspots in the 1990s and early 2000s, but this changed when they became even more fortified through an intensification of controls and a strengthening of their fences in 2005. Claire Rodier (2013, p. 99) talks about a sealed off Strait of Gibraltar, which made it almost impossible for migrants to enter Ceuta and Melilla or embark on a *patera* directly to the Andalusian shores. Also the fact that several Africans were fatally shot by border guards while trying to jump the fence evoked more resistance to take this route (Blanchard & Wender, 2007). A few years earlier, the Western African route had steadily started to gain popularity. Rodier argues it was predictable that sooner or later *cayucos*, precarious wooden boats, would embark for the Canary Islands. Those journeys mostly started at ports in the Western Sahara or Mauritania. Soon, various detention and deportation agreements were made with Morocco and a detention centre was built in the Mauritanian port of Nouadibhou with Spanish and European money (Andersson, 2012). Following these developments the route moved further southward, with now most people leaving from the Senegalese ports. This led to more than 30.000 migrants arriving at the archipelago in 2006.[30] Later on, the Spanish government saw itself obliged to ameliorate its diplomatic relations with Senegal to be able to work together and get grip on the situation (Rodier, 2013; Traoré & Le Dantec, 2012).

As the Spanish Ministry of Interior boasts in its graphics, those numbers have shrunk no less than 99% between 2006 and 2014. The goal seems to depict this decrease as fairly impressive, but in the end it is just the consequence of a relocation of migration routes. A few pages down, a same comparison is made for the migrants entering Ceuta and Melilla, reporting an increase of 34% between 2005 and 2014, and even 77% between 2013 and 2014. In other words, the centre of gravity has just been relocated to another 'hotspot'. Andersson (2012), Dünnwald (2011) and Rodier (2013), among others, observe a 'limited expiration date' of the Frontex missions. Its first mission Hera caused this sharp decline of arrivals at the Canary Islands, but also created an unforeseen bubble elsewhere. This has been the case with all its operations until now, as Rodier argues, relocating so-called 'hotspots' further eastward every time. Another unforeseen and undesired consequence of these operations, as she states, is that migrants are willing to undertake riskier journeys, leading to more border deaths, as we will see later on in this chapter.

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[30] The Spanish Ministry of Interior (2015) speaks about 39.180 arrivals, while Frontex (2015/2016) has counted 31.600. Retrieved from http://www.interior.gob.es/documents/10180/3066430/Balance+2014+de+la+lucha+cont ra+la+inmigración+irregular/4a33ce71-3834-44fc-9fbf-7983ace6cec4 and http://www.frontex.europa.eu/trends-a nd-routes/western-mediterranean-route on 6 June 2016.

Figure 1. **Irregular migrants succeeding in crossing the southern borders of Spain**

Sources: APDHA (2014/2016)[31]; Frontex (2015/2016, see footnote 30); Gobierno de España – Ministerio del Interior (2013[32]/2015)

Notes:

- The data includes arrivals at Ceuta and Melilla, the peñones[33], the coastline of the Peninsula, the Canary Islands and the Baleares;
- Those intercepted before crossing borders by the authorities of Morocco, Algeria or Senegal or Frontex and other organisms are not counted;
- Frontex' 2016 numbers correspond to the period January-March.

In Figure 1, as well as when comparing Figure 2c to Figures 2a and 2b, it is very noticeable Frontex has registered far less sharp increases than APDHA and the Spanish Ministry of Interior, especially for the years 2014 and 2015. Would Frontex ascribe more value to its operations than is actually the case? This supports the idea 'border hotspots' are to be relocated elsewhere when one of them is under heavy vigilance by Frontex. The Western African route has seen sharp declines and this seems to have given an indirect effect to the numbers of migrants entering through Ceuta and Melilla or directly arriving at the Andalusian shores. In Figure 2a, the data collected by APDHA confirms this assumption, as both Ceuta and Melilla and Andalusia have seen a high increase in arrivals during the last years. The Frontex operation at the Canary Islands has displaced the major migration trajectory connecting Western Africa with Spain further east, concentrating around the Strait of

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[31] Retrieved from http://www.apdha.org/media/informe-frontera-sur-2016-web.pdf on 6 June 2016.

[32] Retrieved from http://www.interior.gob.es/web/interior/prensa/noticias//asset_publisher/GHU8Ap6ztgsg/content/id/1915582 on 29 October 2015.

[33] The peñones are nine islets in the Mediterranean Sea that form, next to Ceuta and Melilla, all together the *plazas de soberanía*. These are the Spanish places of sovereignty, closely located to the Moroccan coast. *Peñon* literally means 'rock'. When Morocco became independent, Spain did not give up these minor territories as it stated they did not form part of the Spanish protectorate. Just as Ceuta and Melilla, they were already in Spanish hands long before the Spanish and the French colonised Morocco (Ferrer-Gallardo, 2008; Figueiredo, 2011).

Gibraltar again. This resembles the situation before the Canary archipelago being a 'hotspot' in the 2000s.

Figure 2a. Arrivals according to geographical area (APDHA)

Source: APDHA (2014/2016, see footnote 31)

Figure 2b. Arrivals according to geographical area (Spanish Ministry of Interior)

Source: Gobierno de España – Ministerio del Interior (2015, see footnotes 30 and 32)

Figure 2c. Arrivals according to geographical area (Frontex)

Source: Frontex (2015/2016, see footnote 30)

Notes:

- Data for 2006 and 2007 for Ceuta-Melilla and the Peninsula is not available;
- Data for 2006 corresponds to the period January-March.

5.4. Available data on rejections and deportations

Besides data on arrivals, the Spanish Ministry of Interior (2015) also provides insights on rejections and deportations, which can be divided into four categories. One speaks of *rejection* when entry is denied at a habilitated border crossing, usually a port or an airport. Secondly, a *return* is carried out when migrants have tried to enter Spain through non-habilitated border points. Thirdly, a *readmission* takes place in virtue of agreements with third countries. In many cases, this means in theory the agreement between Spain and Morocco that states Morocco agrees on readmission of migrants that have entered Ceuta and Melilla through Moroccan territory. In practice, this is susceptible to

Melilla vs. Ceuta

Julia Ortega García from Accem Melilla (May 6, 2015) notices Melilla is very popular within the Syrian community through informal and social networks. It is not the most close-by option for them, and, as she has heard, most of the Syrians who arrive here see Melilla as a last opportunity, after having tried other options in the Eastern Mediterranean. For another part, she thinks the popularity of Melilla can be explained by the recent opening of the office for asylum applications at the Melilla-Beni Enzar border. Accem also works there, providing first aid and translators. However, she hopes sooner or later the Syrians will also decide to try their luck in Ceuta instead of Melilla, because the situation is critical right now. The city is overflown. The way of working in Melilla differs a great deal from Ceuta, as I hear from Alejandro Romero (CEAR Ceuta; June 11, 2015). While in Ceuta an office for asylum applications has also opened at the border, it does not seem in use. Melilla might be more chaotic and overflown, yet it seems more experienced and organised. In Ceuta, there are no translators at the border to give assistance and all border-crossings take place in a clandestine way. Migrants can apply for asylum later on, when they are registered at the CETI (Centre for Temporary Stay of Immigrants) or the police office. Now, the Syrian preference of Melilla over Ceuta seems crystal clear.

diplomatic relations (see also Chapter 3). The last category consists of *deportation*, which means the migrant will be deported to his country of origin according to the causes stated by the Spanish Immigration Act through administrative files derived from the illegal stay in Spain. In Figure 3 we see the numbers compared for 2013 and 2014.

While there has been a general increase of arrivals (see Figures 1 and 2a), the numbers of rejected and deported immigrants by Spain have declined in all four categories. This incongruence might be explained through a higher number of asylum claims, due to more Syrians arriving in Spain and the instalment of offices for asylum applications at the Ceuta and Melilla borders (although the very majority of them choose Melilla). The Spanish Ministry of Interior (2015) speaks about 273 Syrians arriving in Ceuta and Melilla in 2013, while this increased with 1211% to 3.305 in 2014. For 2015, Frontex (2015) reported a number of 4.294 Syrians arriving through the Western Mediterranean Route between January and August.

Figure 3. Rejections and deportations

Source: Gobierno de España – Ministerio del Interior (2015, see footnote 30)

Rejection numbers may have declined in the past years, but they still seem noteworthy compared to the total number of migrant arrivals in Spain. When one counts the sum of arrivals, rejections and returns, roughly 65% was rejected and returned directly at the border in 2013. On top of this 65% come the readmissions and deportations, which are normally executed in a later stadium of the migrant process. This percentage goes well together with the 66% of rejections and returns Spain accounted for in the whole of the European Union in 2013.[34] In other words, Spain took a share of 66% for the total of rejected and returned immigrants within the EU, tallying up an astronomic number of 172.185 of a European total

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[34] Retrieved from http://epthinktank.eu/2015/04/27/irregular-immigration-in-the-eu-facts-and-figures/ on 29 October 2015.

of 260.375.[35] This percentage at the same time coincides with Morocco and Algeria, both closely located to Spain and one even sharing a land border, being in the top ten of nationalities refused entry in the EU. Yet, eastern EU-member states that have higher numbers of migrant arrivals at the moment (see the next paragraph), like Hungary (13.195 refusals) and Greece (6.495 refusals), come nowhere close to Spain's numbers. Perhaps its effectiveness when it comes to rejecting and returning immigrants can be linked to an almost non-existent asylum system (see Chapter 2) and a smoother returning system, of which the detention centres (CIEs) and centres for temporary stay in Ceuta and Melilla (CETIs) form key elements.

5.5. Intra-EU comparisons

When Frontex started an operation to stop the arrivals of *cayucos* at the Canary Islands, migrant routes were relocated to the east, as was earlier mentioned. The Strait of Gibraltar, including the Ceuta and Melilla borders, as well as the Andalusian coast, has seen arrival numbers soar. Some migrants started to try their luck even further east. Not only Spain (leaving aside the Canary Islands) has seen this increase, but the whole Mediterranean area. In the past years, the 'hotspots' have varied from the southern coasts of Italy and the island of Lampedusa to the Greek-Turkish border and the Greek islands. Since the start of the Syrian war, as well as due to numerous other conflicts, numbers have increased. In the previous paragraphs only comparisons within Spanish territory were being made. Now, some intra-EU-data will be compared to get a better bird's-eye view on current affairs.

When observing the data from Figure 4a and 4b, it becomes clear the number of migrants Spain receives and processes through CETIs, CIEs and various procedures cannot be placed in the same league as those in Italy and Greece. This is a mayor difference compared to the situation ten years ago, when the Western African Route was still very popular. Due to a combination of the Frontex operation and the awareness of the great dangers this route brings along, the interest of migrants in this journey has wined. While the journeys from Libya to Italy and from Turkey to Greece might be very precarious and lead to many fatalities, they may not be comparable to the journeys over the Atlantic Ocean sub-Saharan Africans undertook to arrive at the Canary Islands. The long distance from Senegal and Mauritania caused most of these journeys to last a week or longer. Missing the mark and drifting out to the Atlantic Ocean was a huge risk. It may be called a miracle that so many migrants survived such a journey and arrived at Spanish soil during these years (Andersson, 2013; Last & Spijkerboer, 2014; Traoré & Le Dantec, 2012).

A figure somewhere between 30.000 and 40.000 migrants arriving at the Canary coasts in 2006 may seem small compared to the numbers Greece, Italy and Hungary are now dealing with. With a tallied up total of 359.171 arrivals according to Frontex, the Eastern Mediterranean Route has now become the most popular, often followed up by the Western Balkan Route that functions as second part in this trajectory. However, in contrast to the

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[35] The European Parliamentary Service (2015) calculates the total of rejected and returned immigrants much higher than the Spanish Ministry of Interior (2015), because the study of the latter does not include rejected and returned immigrants that have arrived by air and have tried to enter Spain through an airport. Yet, the lion's share of migrants seeks to enter the country upon arrival at airports and seaports. See also de Haas (2008) and Moffette (2014).

numbers reported at the Canary Islands in 2006 and the migrants still arriving in Ceuta and Melilla, these routes pass through various countries. The risk of double counting and inflation is quite big, as Frontex (2016) also disclaims for the 2015 numbers. One should also be aware of the fact countries in the eastern corner of the Mediterranean function particularly as transit areas, as migrants often wish to continue their journey. This is very different from the arrivals that take place in Ceuta and Melilla. Due to their particular geographies, migrants are not able to continue their journey and the cities are overflown very quickly. Ceuta and Melilla are also transit places, but the cities do not provide any 'natural escapes'[36] for migrants (Blanchard & Wender, 2007; Ferrer-Gallardo & Espiñeira, 2015). These have to be provided by the Spanish government. Numbers may vary quite a great deal between the different Mediterranean regions, but at the same time they do not say that much. It is important to also take into account other factors, which will become exposed in the next chapters of qualitative analysis.

Figure 4a. **Arrivals according to geographical EU-area (Frontex)**

Source: Frontex (2015/2016, see footnote 30)
Notes:
- The numbers for 2016 correspond to the months January-April (January-March in the cases of the Western African Route, the Western Mediterranean Route, the Albania-Greece Route and the Eastern Borders Route).
- The following migrant trajectories are taken into account and compared:
1. Western African Route: sea passages from Western Africa (Senegal and Mauritania) to the Canary Islands;
2. Western Mediterranean Route: sea passages from Morocco (or Algeria) to the Iberian Peninsula and the Spanish-Moroccan land borders at Ceuta and Melilla;
3. Central Mediterranean Route: sea passages from Libya (or Tunisia and Algeria) to Italy (including Lampedusa, Sicily and Sardinia) and Malta. It also includes movements and passages that connect the Apulia and Calabria regions with Albania, Greece, Egypt and Turkey;

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[36] Stowaways in ferries and cargo ships and hazardous crossovers to the Iberian Peninsula in *pateras* can be seen as exceptionalities. These can also take place with no intended arrival in Ceuta or Melilla, concerning ferries and cargo ships, but also *pateras*, that depart directly from Morocco (and in some cases Algeria) (Carling, 2007a).

4. Eastern Mediterranean Route: all sea and land passages from Turkey to Greece, Bulgaria and Cyprus;
5. Eastern Borders Route: all land passages at the eastern borders, connecting the eastern member states with Ukraine, Russia, Moldova and Belarus;
6. Albania-Greece: the circular route from Albania to Greece;
7. Western Balkan Route: land passages from the Western Balkan countries to the EU (mainly Hungary, Romania and Croatia), either by Western Balkan nationals or as a secondary movement after use of the Eastern Mediterranean Route.

The Missing Migrants Project from the IOM (2015) also releases numbers on arrivals that are kept updated on a regular scale. They cannot be compared to those released by Frontex, as the IOM prefers to differentiate arrivals according to country of arrival, and not according to the route taken by migrants. This is more in line with the recent academic tendency, arguing there are no fixed routes, as those are very liable to change, caused by a whole array of factors, such as the securitising policies of Frontex, the EU and the countries themselves. The subsequent alternatives migrants have to turn to also play an important role, and sadly also often lead to more dangerous elements being included in their journeys (Grant, 2011; Schapendonk, 2009; Sheller & Urry, 2006).

Figure 4b. **Arrivals according to geographical EU-area (The Missing Migrants Project)**

Source: The Missing Migrants Project (IOM, 2015)[37]

5.6. Available data on fatalities

Although data on an accurate and updated level might be lacking when it comes to the most obscure part of migration data collection, this does not mean there are no numbers on migrant fatalities in the Mediterranean available at all. The international NGO UNITED for Intercultural Action compiles a list on migrant fatalities in Europe. It is fully based on media reports and civil society organisations and has as of yet been updated from 1 January 1993

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[37] Retrieved from http://missingmigrants.iom.int/en/mediterranean-update-23-october-2015 on 29 October 2015.

until 19 June 2015, now counting over 22.000 migrant deaths across Europe.[38] All data available about the migrant (i.e. name, nationality, age and cause of death) is included, as well as the source that has reported about the fatality. Similar to UNITED is the Fortress Europe Project by Italian journalist Gabriele Del Grande. It lists a total of over 27.000 migrants who died or went missing since 1988 until 2 February 2016.[39] Just like UNITED, it bases primarily on media sources and uses civil society organisations as a secondary source. Last and Spijkerboer (2014) note these databases as quite comparable in numbers, but with both having their own gaps and data lacking. While their data mainly comes from news media, big incidents with huge media coverage are normally well presented and recorded. It can also vary from location to location if fatalities are reported. As Cuttitta (2014) argues, some places have developed into mediatised 'border theatres'.

The IOM's Missing Migrants Project (2015) released a world map on migrant deaths on World Migrant Day in 2013. It counted 707 migrant deaths in the Mediterranean, while it estimated between 2.000-5.000 deaths in total for migrants coming from Africa and the Middle East.[40] It also gives regular updates on the situation, including maps with figures. Several European journalists launched a similar project in cooperation in 2013, called The Migrants Files. It counts all migrants who died on their way to Europe since 2000. On their website, the journalists state ''the various data sources often lacked compatibility since each organization structures its intelligence differently''.[41] They also state they have the most 'complete' database, with more than 28.000 migrants estimated to have died since 2000 and data being available for 13.742 of them.

Recently, Last and Spijkerboer (2015) launched their own database in cooperation with the VU University of Amsterdam, after having published various articles about border deaths in the Mediterranean. Their database includes deaths that have been discovered and reported, as well as missing persons that have never been found. It is the first database that is compiled after collecting official documents from 563 civil registries and some additional offices. Media reports are not included. The database has a time scope from 1990 until 2013, but it still being updated with new information. It contains until now 3.191 cases.[42]

On a more specific scale, the Asociación Pro Derechos Humanos de Andalucía (APDHA, Andalusian Association for Human Rights) reports about migrants who died or went missing on their way to Spain (APDHA, 2014, p. 53). This means, however, that cases that have taken place on African soil are also counted. In 2012, a peak of 225 mortalities was reached, while in 2015 195 fatalities were counted.[43] In addition to sources from civil organisations, the Spanish Ministry of Interior and the Algerian Government have released numbers, which are probably derived from reports from the Guardia Civil and the Marine Nationale Algérienne (the Algerian National Navy). They are also far from complete, as they get published irregularly or in aggregated form (Bouklia-Hassane, Hammouda, Labdelaoui &

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[38] Retrieved from http://www.unitedagainstracism.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/Listofdeaths22394June15 .pdf on 6 June 2016.
[39] Retrieved from http://fortresseurope.blogspot.com on 6 June 2016.
[40] Retrieved from http://www.iom.int/newsletters/migrants on 29 October 2015 and http://missingmigrants.iom .int/mediterranean on 6 June 2016.
[41] Retrieved from http://www.detective.io/detective/the-migrants-files on 6 June 2016.
[42] Retrieved from http://www.borderdeaths.org/?page_id=425#_Toc418884032 on 29 October 2015.
[43] Retrieved from http://www.apdha.org/media/informe-frontera-sur-2016-web.pdf on 6 June 2016.

Mebroukine, 2013; Last & Spijkerboer, 2014). Therefore, figures from these sources could not be included in Figure 5.

Figure 5. **Migrant fatality numbers between Africa and Spain (2010-2014) – comparing different datasets**

Sources: UNITED (2016); APDHA (2016); Fortress Europe (2016); The Migrants Files (2015); Missing Migrants Project (2015) and Border Deaths (VU, Last & Spijkerboer, 2015)

Notes:
- The data includes fatalities both on the Western African Route (towards the Canary Islands) as the Western Mediterranean (towards Ceuta, Melilla and the Peninsula), as some sources do not differentiate between these and only count deaths per country. However, the numbers of fatalities on the Atlantic Ocean approaching the Canary Islands has diminished along with diminishing numbers of migrants undertaking this journey;
- Fortress Europe's data for 2016 is collected until 2 February;
- IOM's data for 2016 is collected until 31 March;
- The Migrants Files' data for 2016 is collected until 31 May;
- The Border Deaths database by Last & Spijkerboer (2015) is still constantly being updated and thus incomplete.

In Figure 5, a comparison is drawn between the different accessible datasets. As can be seen, differences can be quite big, as well as the fact that organisations can be sloppy in updating or publishing their data, which makes the published data even more unreliable. In these datasets, the cause of death is not always provided, nor the migrant's intentions or his provenance. The cause can be directly related to physical borders, as for example the razor wire fences in Ceuta and Melilla or shootings and beatings practiced by Moroccan border guards. However, the majority seem to die in cases only indirectly related to border control, for example on a boat suffering drowning or dehydration, or as a result of suffocation being stowed away on a ferry (de Haas, 2008; Last & Spijkerboer, 2014). Another issue remains the fact most of the dead migrants cannot be identified as they do not carry any documents or have lost them on the way. Double counting can as well be problematic, as different media sources that might be

used by the different databases report about the same events (Grant, 2011; Weber & Pickering, 2011). The numbers from APDHA in general tend to be higher than those from other databases. However, they do not back up their numbers with sources in their report. Besides that, as stated before, APDHA also counts missing and dead migrants that seemed to be on their route to Spain. It may well be the case that the discovery of fatalities in the deserts of Niger and Algeria is counted onto the database of APDHA, while this is not the case with the other databases.

5.7. Concluding remarks

Last and Spijkerboer (2014) warn for the current state in which the counting or saving of migrant fatalities develops. Initiatives such as The Migrants Files, but also several academics, tend to focus on cleaning and checking the system of past cases rather than monitoring the current situation and events. Once again, we must therefore be aware of the unreliability when we cite these databases. Although without them there would be no information at all, hard numbers cannot be underpinned due to a lack of good sources, the unreliability of updating databases and publishing reports, and also the different focuses these databases tend to have. However, the same can be said about numbers of irregular border-crossers or migrants that actually succeed in reaching Spain. Every organisation or governmental body seems to have its own way of counting, collecting and comparing. While data exists and gets published, comparing between different sets is difficult, let alone jumping to some conclusions.

Until we dispose of better and accurate data, 'myths' about irregular migration will continue to spread around, as de Haas (2008) explains. These will probably continue to foster the current securitising politics, without generating a more sustainable alternative for the future. Governments can hide behind securitising politics exactly because accurate numbers are often lacking. While these are provided by different organisations and even by governments themselves sometimes, there is not enough to compare and form a trustworthy view. Since humanitarian rights might be at stake during the migration process, the governments are arguably not even the legitimate entities to provide such data. However, NGOs do have their own stakes in every data output as well to evidence or invigorate their point of view. An alternative would be a national or European observatory body that would solely have the task to develop these datasets about migrant fatalities and border-crossings. At this moment, Frontex does have this observatory status, but also acts as an active player to carry out securitising policies developed by the EU, and thus cannot be seen as completely objective anymore. A new observatory institution could be formed to provide the needed data and at the same time investigate alternative policies applicable in the future (Grant, 2011; Last & Spijkerboer, 2014; Papastavidris, 2010; Weber & Pickering, 2011).

6. *Welcoming* vs. *borderising* Barcelona

6.1. Introduction

> Before my journey, I would see Barcelona as the paradise. That image has now changed a lot. It has turned out to be a lot tougher than I expected. During my journey, I would always preserve the image of a paradise so that it could give me strength and hope. (Amina; 26 March, 2015)

Barcelona is the city of many, as I stated in Chapter 1. It is a highly vibrant cosmopolitan and multicultural city. The multicultural image is something of the last decades, as the number of migrant habitants has rapidly grown. When thinking about it, there may be some parallels to detect between the Spanish construction madness, a bubble that exploded in the 2008 economic crisis, and the increasing number of arriving migrants, which has staggered a bit in the last years, also due to sharper controls. This does not mean the city has lost any of its pull factors, as its appeal is as shiny and bright as ever. Yet, under this shiny surface hide some rough edges. For migrants, Barcelona may not be *their* city. That is, it is not the city they had imagined when leaving their home soils. This chapter will show this side of Barcelona, and contrast it to its welcoming other side. It is the fruit of extensive fieldwork in and around the city and numerous interviews and talks with migrants, migrant organisations and official entities in and around the city. It deals with the experiences migrants may have when arriving at the city, but also at later stadiums, as well as contrasting these to their imaginaries. It shows how the city is connected in a way with the external EU-borders in Ceuta and Melilla through affecting policies and influencing elements that shape up new borders of different kinds.

6.2. Barcelona's appeal

Barça walla barzakh, 'Barcelona or die', has become a famous Wolof expression among Senegalese migrants (Andersson, 2013; Dieye, 2007; Mbaye, 2014; Schapendonk, 2011). It shows on the one hand the grave reality of fatalities along the way on migrant trajectories (Mbaye, 2014), but also focuses on the migrant's determination of reaching Barcelona, or Europe in general. The expression suggests there is no other choice or faith, although *death* in this sense may be more widely interpreted. Getting stuck along the journey somewhere in Africa may be seen as 'mortal', as it often implicates migrants lose their mobility, such as is the case in Ceuta and Melilla, and for example the camp in Oujda, Morocco (see Johnson, 2013). Schapendonk (2011) argues it may also be seen as a choice imposed on African youngsters: choosing for a 'social death' and staying economically disadvantaged, or embarking on the *mbëke mi*, 'the journey' in Wolof (Andersson, 2013). Bakary and Basiru (9 April, 2015), from the Gambia, agree on this:

> For now, in Africa they only see 'the North' as where the potential lies, so you rather sacrifice your life than suffer and endure starvation in your home country. The importance of the fact that youth should be informed better also lies in the huge numbers of migrants who die along their journey, which means a huge loss of youth population for an African nation, which endangers their future.

Traoré (2012) argues in his autobiographic story that things are not that black and white, on the condition that migrants are not always persecuted in their home country or fleeing for violence and war, as he argues the human being cannot only be seen as a *homo economicus*. Migrants are just as curious to see the world as more advantaged tourists from other parts of the world. The big difference lies in the disparity in permeable borders for the migrant, on the one hand, and the tourist, on the other (see van Houtum 2010a). Contrasting to this view, or perhaps additional in some cases, is the big migration industry behind. When in Senegal, Andersson (2013) becomes familiar with the expression *fixer les jeunes* ('fix the youngsters'). To what extent is the decision to leave and become an irregular migrant really a personal one?

Be that as it may, 'Barça' holds a great attraction to Africans, and to all types of migrants in general, as it seems. However, can Barcelona really be seen as the fixed destination of many?[44] While the city may indeed be a definite goal for many, Schapendonk (2011) thinks it can also stand for a broader European ideal, that comes with 'social success, economic progress, freedom and adventure', to such a scale that Barcelona forms the *epitome* of Europe and the goal 'Barça' can be reached without ever having been in this city. It may in that sense stand for a Europe without borders, which they do not have access to, but also how Barcelona itself is idealised. That is, instead of Barcelona, it could also be Madrid, Rome, Paris or Berlin. What is it that makes Barcelona ideal for portraying this role of an imagined and idealised Europe? Although of course football (almost every migrant, originating from Dakar to Aleppo, is a fan), the Mediterranean lifestyle and the open culture may play a big role, there are other factors that explain why Barcelona stands out. Pascalle Coissard (CCAR; 11 May, 2015), states many migrants coming to Barcelona come through networks. This underlines Andersson's (2013) view that (almost) no one is travelling alone without getting involved in the industry or its networks. Such networks effectively foster 'paradise Barcelona' through telling about experiences. This adds up to the collective notion 'Barça' has, Schapendonk (2011) explains. Its image, how concrete, definite or abstract it could be, stands for 'Europe', and is created through collective and imaginary minds.

As quoted earlier, Bakary and Basiru (9 April, 2015) believe the youth should be better informed before leaving. This is exactly the problem exposed when taking into consideration the power networks and social ties have (see also Castles, de Haas & Miller, 2013; Collyer, 2005; Ryan, d'Angelo & Erel, 2015). Whether these networks may consist of relatives or more professional migrant industries (and smuggling or trafficking activities), they are spreading images that most of the time can be considered too bright, showing only the positive sides of Europe, fostering the image of the always sunny, friendly 'Barça', 'a place full of opportunities where dreams come true'. In this sense, one may see parallels between this image and the 'American Dream', both creating an imaginary world of unending possibilities. Bakary and Basiru mention that they know many migrants that camouflage their

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[44] When looking at the non-EU and non-Latin American (ex-colonially tied to Spain) immigrant population in Barcelona categorised by origins, Pakistan, China and Morocco are, next to sub-Saharan Africans, represented by the highest numbers. Such statistics of course only count the documented migrants, leaving out the irregular group (see Ajuntament de Barcelona (2015, January), Informes Estadístics. La població estrangera a Barcelona, retrieved from http://www.bcn.cat/estadistica/catala/dades/inf/pobest/pobest15/pobest15.pdf on 15 March 2016). While irregular immigrants are difficult to count, the municipality of Barcelona is as of March 2016 in discussion about providing this group with a special identification card (Congostrina, 2016).

life in Barcelona for their family at home. They would spend the little money they have on renting expensive cars and jewellery to show off and to impress their relatives. This would only motivate more potential migrants to leave their country, also caused by their blindness when listening to the stories of their relatives in Europe, not believing their failures and even going as far as accusing them not 'allowing' them having an European life as well.

> If the reality about the hard time in Europe is told, which might be somewhat confusing, lingering between suffering and successes, the Gambians don't believe it until they see it with their own eyes. This means bad stories do not prevent them from going. New creative ways that create strong information flows should be developed so people in the Gambia believe reality. (Bakary & Basiru; 9 April, 2015)

Barcelona may therefore stand for an imaginary picture of Europe, while at the same time this picture can be fostered by collective imagination, as well as by 'experiences' from relatives. To prevent people from leaving through changing their mental images about 'Barça', new strategies have to be developed, Andersson (2013) agrees. He notes awareness campaigns to be very valuable in countries as Senegal, as they would create at least a *sensibilisation* of the mental image. In Western African nations, primarily Senegal, The Gambia and Mauritania, such campaigns can be supported or even organised by relatives from migrants who drowned in the Atlantic Ocean, trying to reach the Canary Islands, such as the now famous Mother Mercy, who made a lucrative business out of it. This is *Illegality Inc.*, as Andersson (2013) names it, as everyone, the relatives of the migrants included, try to capitalise on their departure, or even over their death. If this happens through remittances send from Europe or in some lucrative way over dead bodies often appears to be vague and fused. Within this vague and blurred world, half imaginary and half real, the question is how one can still decipher and value if a migrant has chosen himself to embark on a journey to Europe without being forced by (a mix of) networks, collective images and other blended-in dynamics. Migrants may appear mobile, choosing their ways to arrive to Europe but can also be made completely immobile by the networks and the overpowering migrant industry, that takes decisions for them. It shows that even for them, seeming to detach themselves from any 'home' while being on the journey, the theory of Sassen (2002) that implies an essential immobility factor holds good. It is a myth that physical borders or EU-policies are the only factors that block migrants, as forced migration (or broader: forced movement) often happens from inside the own community. One of the most recognisable examples of forced migration is probably human trafficking, involving groups such as refugees, but also potential modern slaves (see the box at page 76).

6.3. The road to arrival in Barcelona

When migrants arrive in Barcelona, they often have experienced a long journey with many hurdles and obstacles, forming various types of borders that try to render them immobile, which will be discussed later on in Chapter 7 and 8. However, it is also possible that migrants set their first feet on Spanish soil at the nearby airport of El Prat, as many potential stayers may first try to get a tourist visa before undertaking an over-land or over-sea journey. Many then overstay their visa and try to build a future with eventual family reunification and legal

documents (Catherine Heintz, Apropem-nos and Punt d'Acollida Poblenou; 14 May, 2015). De Haas (2008) argues this group could possibly even outnumber other groups that arrive via 'more traditional' ways, but the traditional routes are still highly mediatised nowadays, as they are more 'spectacular' and 'dramatic' (see also Chapter 2).

Human trafficking to Europe: the slave industry

Rosa Cendón from SICAR (14 May, 2015) relates about the bizarre reality of young African girls, many of them from Nigeria, Cameroon and The Democratic Republic of the Congo, who get captured in a network that promises them a better future. Even here, the image of 'Barça' plays a role. Getting offered 'waitress, hairdresser or receptionist jobs', they are easily persuaded. However, they often end up either in the sex industry, as modern slave or begging on the streets. When embarking on the trip to 'Barça', they are immediately made *immobile*, as the network arranges their journey and sometimes even lets someone travelling with them. Although they could become prematurely aware of the true intentions of the network, often selling them as slaves or obligating them to prostitute, they may still choose to 'stay under the umbrella' of the network. Their experiences as a female migrant travelling alone through Africa before reaching Europe are often traumatising and could make them blind for what is reality or imaginary, and what is true or false.

      Sometimes they already start 'working' before reaching their destination. The network may have the intentions to sexually exploit them in Morocco or Algeria, until they are pregnant. The fact of being pregnant would later facilitate their stay in Barcelona and getting documentation. In another occasion, their journey might be paid, but on location they will hear they have outstanding debts that need to be paid soon. This debt is where the blurring of networks, family and mafia begins. Ali Mohamed Duduh, representative from the CNP (27 May, 2015), explains when African girls do not comply this debt, they are often reminded to do so through voodoo tactics. If they won't pay, something 'bad' will happen to them. This goes as far as their own mother, who takes care of their children in Nigeria, for example, threatening them with the children's lives. The mother can for example also occupy the role of head of the whorehouse, with another male relative occupying the role of pimp. Both the police and organisations, principally SICAR in Barcelona, struggle to free those girls. It is often an extremely difficult task, as they have no one to trust and are made completely immobile, both physically and mentally.

The way of entering Barcelona possibly does not even matter that much in terms of reception and future in the Catalan capital. In general, one can enter legally or in a more irregular way. Of course, the irregular option is far more difficult when arriving by plane, as it would involve a fairly authentic-looking false passport and passing through security controls with it. However, it is far more likely when it involves an overland journey where the migrant or refugee does not possess the required visa documentation to be in Spain. Entering Barcelona irregularly and intending on building up a new life would therefore require staying out of the public and administrative eye, especially in the initial period. As will be explained in Chapter 7 as well, migrants who enter through Ceuta and Melilla and are later transferred to the Peninsula are often free to go (within Spain) after an initial welcoming period arranged by an NGO.[45] That is, when they are not directly transported to a CIE upon touching mainland Spain. In theory, that means those reception centres are generally designed for migrants that have requested asylum or are going to apply for it, as they cannot be detained in CIEs under

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[45] In general, migrants that have been transported from Ceuta or Melilla to the Peninsula have been provided with a document, often called a *laissez-passer*, which obliges expulsion and/or leaving the Spanish territory within a certain period of time. However, these documents expire, for example due to the migrant being received by an NGO for an initial period or a not carried-out deportation (Blanchard & Wender, 2007; Castan Pinos, 2014b; Sandra Queraltó & Robert Bonet, Tanquem els CIEs; 13 April, 2015; see also Chapter 7 and 8).

international asylum law. However, since the Spanish asylum system is not greatly developed (see Chapter 2.4), in practice it means the 'lucky ones' that have slipped through the administrational net inhabit the reception centres (Alejandro Romero, CEAR Ceuta; 11 June, 2015). The political and sanitary situation in the country of origin can be a big factor, as has been the case in the past years for war-torn Syria and Ebola-struck Guinea. Welcoming reception centres, organised by Cruz Roja, Andalucía Acoge or Accem, and often located in rural areas or small cities, provide an instrument to the government to more equally divide the migrants over the country (Cristina Fernandez-Bessa, Tanquem els CIEs; 14 May, 2015). However, they often have limited spaces and means at their disposal. This means that after a certain period (i.e. up to two, three or six months, Amadou; 25 March, 2015; María Cirez, Accem Barcelona; 24 April, 2015) the migrant in question has to leave the centre and is provided with a bus or train ticket to his chosen destination within Spain. If there was no asylum requested, the migrant enters in irregularity once again. Then he may end up in the same situation as a migrant who was directly transported to a CIE on the Peninsula, but who could not be deported from Spain within 60 days.

> "In Nador, I got aboard a *patera* to the Andalusian coast during night. Spanish coast guards captured us and I was detained in an unknown place for 51 days [probably the CIE in Algeciras, ed.]. Then I was transported to a migrant reception centre in Alcaudete (Andalusia). I didn't know anyone in Spain, but I asked a man who made the same journey if I could come with him to Barcelona, where his brother lived..." (Amina; 26 March, 2015)

6.4. Reception in Barcelona

After being given such a transport ticket, there is quite a high possibility the migrant will end up in Barcelona. Besides the reasons behind the appeal of Barcelona given in the previous paragraph, choosing for the Catalan capital may in some cases also provide the best perspectives to stay out of a detention centre. The migrant may be provided with the aforementioned ticket, but this often only happens when he can prove he has a relative in the country. When not having a relative, chances are bigger one will end up in a CIE again. Amadou (25 March, 2015) explains that the African migrant community in Barcelona, for example, often fakes being family or a relative for newly arriving migrants that do not have any true relatives in Spain. The bureaucratic border is then by-passed and migrants arrive in Barcelona without being detained directly. However, a long and possibly dead-end situation in irregularity often awaits. Therefore, it may often be difficult to not lose track on migrants after arrival. They can completely disappear into the city when they decide to try their luck within the irregular circuits. Possibly after years, or after one or various detainments and provided temporary housing, they go to reception points and ask for help and juridical and social services, as mentioned by Heintz (14 May, 2015), who works at the migrant reception point (Punt d'Acollida) in the neighbourhood of Poblenou. Migrant workers and NGOs in general apply the term *novingut* ('novice') for migrants that have stayed in Barcelona for less than three years to distinguish these from the more 'typical' longer-stayers, she explains.

While help from institutions and organisations is often scarce through limited means and services, Cirez (24 April, 2015) cites social networks as the real game changers in the life of migrants that may eventually provide them with new perspectives. Such an argument falls into the category of scholars that perceive social capital as 'paramount importance to irregular

migrants' (van Meeteren, Engbersen & van San, 2009), while others tone it down and state that cultural capital 'has become a major factor', not only determining the position on the market of an individual, but of its entire ethnic and/or cultural group (Grzymała-Kazłowska, 2005). Especially the knowledge of the spoken language and/or of important foreign languages would be a decisive factor. Yet, Kosic and Triandafyllidou (2003) argue that in many cases cultural capital does not avail migrants at all, as they would often see themselves forced to do work that does not correspond to their educational levels. This also has to do with the fact that homologation of qualifications is a very difficult and a slow 'Kafkaesque' and borderising process (Coissard; 11 May, 2015). Bakary (9 April, 2015) experiences this, as he tells his Gambian diplomas are generally seen as less worthy and devaluated in Europe. The homologation of his Gambian high school diploma, one of the requisites to enter a Spanish university, has proven to be a very slow process, as it requires various papers from both the Gambian Ministry of Education and the Spanish embassy in Dakar, Senegal.

On a governmental and NGO-basis, in Spain generally prevails the idea that learning the language definitely can make a difference. Most institutions and NGOs designated for the reception of migrants in Barcelona provide free language courses, either in Spanish or in Catalan, such as is the case with Creu Roja and SAIER (Manoli Moya & Gerard Català; 3 June, 2015), Migrastudium (Luis Muñoz; 25 May, 2015), CCAR (Coissard; 11 May, 2015), Accem (Cirez; 24 April, 2015) and the migrant reception point in Poblenou (Heintz; 14 May, 2015). However, one must also not forget, as Coissard (11 May, 2015) mentions, that Spain is hit by a labour crisis. On top of that comes the fact that asylum applicants that are permitted to work after six months[46] are often not prepared to do so, because they have not had the time to learn speak Spanish or Catalan at a reasonable level. In practice, this means most of them will struggle to get a job and to provide for a living in Barcelona.

As Moya and Català (3 June, 2015) mention, the first reception of refugees in Barcelona is normally arranged. This counts only for those who have already requested asylum (for example during their temporary stay in Ceuta or Melilla) or those who are highly potential asylum seekers, and thus does not include the majority, a heterogeneous group of irregular migrants. For the first group, several NGOs arrange with government subsidiaries temporary accommodation upon arrival.[47] The economic crisis has made it very difficult for all the entities to offer accommodation and help, and has often led to more sober welcoming programmes. Some special welcoming programmes and accommodation exist for LGBT-asylum seekers (organised by ACATHI) and for women alone or with a child. Moya (3 June, 2015) mentions the accommodated periods for women alone are often short as this offered

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[46] After applying for asylum, the refugee is provided with a Spanish red card (*la tarjeta roja*), which acknowledges their situation and which has to be renewed every six months. When refugees possess this card for six months or longer, they are allowed to work in Spain. However, when the asylum procedure is cancelled or the request is denied, the card can no longer be renewed and the person enters in an irregular situation. When they do possess the card, they often do not succeed in finding a job as they lack language skills or are not prepared to work as of yet due to heavy emotional and psychological backgrounds connected to their escape from war or conflict zones (Coissard; 11 May, 2015).

[47] A system of governmental asylum seekers' centres is not thoroughly developed in Spain, as there are only four CARs (Centros de Acogida a Refugiados) – two in Madrid, one in Valencia and one in Seville, next to the CETIs (Centros de Estancia Temporal de Inmigrantes) in Ceuta and Melilla. This means the accommodation of asylum-seekers in Barcelona is fully taken care of by NGOs, supported by some governmental funds and subsidiaries. See http://extranjeros.empleo.gob.es/es/ProteccionAsilo/car/ (consulted on 14 April 2016).

help is often strongly connected to the trafficking and prostitution industries. For irregular migrants, mostly sub-Saharan Africans, who may not qualify (directly) for asylum and have to arrange accommodation on their own, organisations as Creu Roja, Apropem-nos, Punt d'Acollida Poblenou and Accem often offer integrating programmes. In general, these programmes last for only three months, or six in cases of extreme vulnerability, and are not long enough to really make a difference in many cases, Moya (3 June, 2015) laments. Coissard (11 May, 2015) has a similar opinion. CCAR has well-organised programmes for those who are in asylum procedures, but organising and funding programmes for denied asylum-seekers has been proven much more difficult. Cirez (24 April, 2015) adds that, in the end, the organisations are always fully dependent on the Ministerio del Trabajo y Seguridad Social (Ministry of Employment and Social Security) for financing.

6.5. Detainment in Barcelona: the CIE in Zona Franca

Over the past years, the procedures surrounding the CIEs and their mere existence have been very controversial and contested in Spain. This has not been different in Barcelona, where the local campaign Tanquem els CIEs, managed by volunteers, strives for the closure of the CIE in Zona Franca. Immigrants in the CIEs, contrary to those in the CETIs of Ceuta and Melilla, are detained and cannot leave the centre. Besides organising manifestations, Tanquem els CIEs has a juridical commission that deals with the compliance of human rights within the CIE. In the case these would be neglected, they try to talk with the official lawyers assigned to the migrants. However, when involving a deportation, this takes place within such a short space of time that there is often no room for appeals or proves, as Fernandez-Bessa (14 May, 2015) explains.

In general, there are three ways to enter a CIE. The first one is after the migrant has crossed the border and enters Spanish territory, provided that he has not applied (or will not apply) for asylum. This means that, in theory, all migrants that do not claim asylum and get transferred from Ceuta and Melilla to the Peninsula could end up in the CIE in Zona Franca.[48] The same counts for non-documented arrivals at the airport(s). The second way of entering is after a migrant gets released from prison for having committed an offence or a crime. Normally, the CIE then functions as 'waiting zone' until administration is sorted out and the migrant can be deported to his country of origin. The third option is through police raids in public and private spheres in the city. When the migrant cannot present valid documentation, he can be transported immediately to a CIE. Figure 5 shows these three main ways of entering. Mohamed Duduh (25 May, 2015) states that in theory all migrants that enter Spain in Ceuta or Melilla eventually go to a CIE on the Peninsula. However, there may be (personal) circumstances that lead to judicial authorities not permitting the entry in a CIE.

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[48] This general rule does not apply for entering Spanish territory at the Canary Islands. This difference lies in the fact the Canary Islands have their own CIEs (one on Tenerife, one in Las Palmas and a temporarily closed one on Fuerteventura), while Ceuta and Melilla have their CETIs. While migrants can only be held for a maximum of 60 continuous days, they cannot be detained in another CIE if they would be transported to the Peninsula. The only options for the Spanish administration in this case are direct deportation (if possible) or release. The Canary CIEs, due to the Western African Route not being popular under migrants anymore, often also accommodate migrants that have lived on the Peninsula already but have been condemned for an offence or have been caught during a raid (Fernandez-Bessa; 14 May, 2015). This also matches with the personal experiences of Abdou in Lleida, who arrived in a *cayuco* at the coast of Tenerife in 2006 (28 June, 2015).

Cirez' (24 April, 2015) point of view is that the government does not have a protocol about transporting the migrants and acts in its own way. That might be entry in a CIE, but the next time NGOs could be asked to create more places to accommodate them, while often no extra budget is given.

Figure 6. **Different ways of entering (and exiting) the CIE in Zona Franca**

Sources: Campaña Estatal por el Cierre de los CIE (2014); Fernandez-Bessa (14 May, 2015); Mohamed Duduh (27 May, 2015).

As stated earlier, the maximum stay in a CIE is 60 days. Within this period, the migrant must have been deported to his country of origin. If this is not the case, the Spanish administration is obliged to set him free. However, this does not mean the migrant cannot be detained again in the same (or in another) CIE. The administrational documents and procedures remain valid, which means that a deportation could be easier to facilitate the next time (Muñoz; 25 May, 2015). That is, while the migrant may be released and free, the state may continue carrying out a deportation procedure. According to Fernandez-Bessa (14 May, 2015), this will effectively and eventually facilitate detainment again, or even 'express deportation'. This leads to less stays in the CIE without a carried-out deportation and less 'useless' and degrading raids on the streets. Those general raids have become more of a rarity nowadays, after denunciations by the Barcelonese civil society, which also have gotten picked up later on by international organisations and the United Nations. This generated negative publicity for Spain, and prompted forging 'smarter' raids (see 6.7), and more individual approached methods to detain and deport.

> "After 60 days, if they are lucky and not sent back to their countries, they are released and have to get by on their own again. They know there is not much 'on offer' for them and that they have to continue with the same, with the distinctive feature they are now kept an eye on closely. For the smallest thing they do they could be expelled."
> (Manel Andreu; Xarxa Solidaria de Suport als Assentaments; 11 May, 2015)

When ahead of detention could be confirmed that the migrant in question is not 'deportable', there is no juridical ground to detain him in a CIE, Queraltó (13 April, 2015) stresses. However, what happens is that such verifications may not always be complied before detainment. There is a group of migrants from countries such as Zimbabwe or East Timor, which is held in the CIE and cannot be deported, and subsequently will be granted freedom again after 60 days. Deportation to such far-away countries is too costly, or bilateral relations may not exist. A big part of being able to carry out a deportation is confirming the nationality of the migrant (Jarín Morrán, 2015; see also Chapter 2). Therefore, Fernandez-Bessa (14 May, 2015) underlines migrants are mostly brought to CIEs in the cities where their country of origin is represented by a consulate or embassy (in the case of Madrid). In practice, this means Barcelona has received many Malians over the years, she states, while there are many Algerians in Murcia, for example. This would later on facilitate the process of the consul recognising the migrant as citizen of his country. If the migrant cannot be recognised, deportation cannot be legally carried out and the migrant should be released from the CIE. Cirez (24 April, 2015) has experienced that, even when dealing with the bureaucracy surrounding the CIE procedures, social networks could possibly make a difference. As long as they do not have a strong verification of a person not being deportable, «todos por el CIE» ('all to the CIE')… This especially counts for people who arrive alone and do not have any relatives in the city, as they are considered 'untraceable'. This perfectly explains the strong willing within the African migrant community to fake being a relative of newly arrived migrants (Amadou, 25 March, 2015).

> "These people are deprived from their freedom in a CIE, when it could be known from the start they are not going to be deported. *Extranjería* [the Immigration Department from the Ministry of Interior, ed.] itself says that when it is known that a deportation cannot be carried out, the person should be released from the CIE and left in freedom."(Fernandez-Bessa; 14 May, 2015)

6.6. Applying for asylum or 'staying irregular'?

> There are people that end up without any aid. For example, in August last year the CIE of Barcelona released a number of 20-30 persons without any assistance from an organisation. This occurred on top of an already swamped situation in Barcelona when it comes to persons without a home. So those people stayed on the streets… (Cirez; 24 April, 2015)

Sadly, Cirez does not report an exception here. Moya and Català (3 June, 2015) also talk about poignant situations in Barcelona. There are many Syrian refugees, who even have applied for asylum, living in over-occupied apartments in the neighbourhood El Raval, in bad sanitary and hygienic conditions. These do certainly not meet the standard expectations when asking for international protection. Barcelona's pull factor seems to form a big part of the bottleneck that is the overflown irregular sector in the city. As Coissard (11 May, 2015) mentions, NGOs often have to persuade or force migrants to leave (temporarily) to other regions, where the reception and accommodation of migrants and refugees is far under capacity. The new image of Spain as an immigration country seems to go by fits and starts. The system in Barcelona is not prepared and does not receive enough budget, while other regions may have more aid to offer, but do not receive the same amount of migrants. The

reception centre in Extremadura is closed, while at the Canary Islands numbers are far below capacity. These stand in sharp contrast with the situation in Barcelona. Due to very small budgets, organisations as Accem and CCAR can only offer up to 18 and 28 accommodation places for the whole region, respectively. This is very low considering the fact Barcelona has a CIE that releases irregular migrants, and that in 2014 no less than 786 persons applied for asylum in the Catalan autonomous region. This means that CCAR, primarily dedicated to give aid to asylum applicants, could not even provide accommodation for 5% of the total number of applicants (Coissard; 11 May, 2015).

Such small budgets make the work for organisations very difficult, Cirez (24 April, 2015) confirms, as the resources they can provide normally only guarantee a 3-6 month aid. This would count for both irregular migrants and asylum applicants. When applicants after six months can work legally, there is normally no budget anymore to help them, even if they fail in finding a job (Coissard; 11 May, 2015). Still, she mentions the opinion that, although the Spanish system may not be functioning ideally, everyone has the right to opt for asylum and to be guided through the process. One of the most important spearheads of organisations such as Accem and CCAR in Barcelona is to inform migrants about their rights to apply for asylum and to inform them how to enter in the procedure. It is the job of the NGOs to get to know the migrant and look at the possibilities for applying. Through profound and extensive interviews with the persons in question, they got off the ground many applications. While many irregular migrants think asylum is reserved for persons originating from war or conflict zones, Cirez (24 April, 2015) stresses this is certainly not always true. Also for migrants coming from The Gambia, with a dictatorial regime, for example, it may be worth applying. Still, it sometimes remains difficult to stay positive and believe that asylum would provide light at the end of the tunnel. Coissard (11 May, 2015) reminds that before the Syrian war, almost 90% of the asylum applications were rejected in Spain (see also Chapter 2 and CEAR, 2015; Gil-Bazo, 1998). After rejection, former applicants normally have 15 days to leave the country. Most of them do not leave and enter in an irregular situation, just as many others in Barcelona. Duduh (27 May, 2015) stresses, contrary to Cirez' argument, that people and also the NGOs need to comprehend that in general asylum is only granted when people are indeed fleeing from a war or are persecuted in their own country:

> In the case of the sub-Saharans, some may defend the political cause. More than defending, they apply for asylum although they know perfectly that, except for some exceptions, to apply there has to be taking place a war, an ethnical persecution, or a generalised risk that applies not to only one person but to a specific population. […] There is no doubt that also within the strategies of these organisations, when looking at the problems and the difficulty that may bring entering our country, they use this strategy of political asylum, but I see this just as a strategy. It's a mechanism that as a matter of fact is used.

However, the situation may not always be that clear. Coissard (11 May, 2015) and also Alejandro Romero (CEAR Ceuta; 11 June, 2015) denote that sub-Saharans fleeing from wars and persecutions may often not be recognised as such. Contrary to the widely mediatised wars in Syria and Ukraine, whose refugees enter in a regular programme organised based upon EU-

policies, refugees from countries as Mali and Ivory Coast often fall between two stools when applying for asylum. While Coissard mentions that it was possible, even for Malians that already migrated before the conflict but were now unable to return, to apply for asylum, Romero argues the Spanish state has been illegally tending to not handle and process the procedures of these asylum applicants.

> So, as the lawyer of those asylum appliers, I called and they [the Spanish State Office for Asylum of Refugees, ed.] told me they got instructions to not process the cases of Ivory Coast as of yet. They waited until there was a situation of greater security, to be able to deny later on the applications from Ivory Coast. This goes against all law and can be considered an illegal practice. (Romero; 11 June, 2015)

Another issue, as mentioned by Cirez (24 April, 2015) is the presumed image of Spain as a transit country. While a city as Barcelona may be attractive to many, migrants often want to leave their options open to be able to travel further north to France or Germany when they cannot find a job. This was mainly a consequence of the Dublin Regulation of 2003, which states one should apply for asylum in the first European country he enters. However, with the larger migrant numbers Europe has received in the last years, this regulation sometimes faded into the background and was partially suspended. This was notably to 'prevent certain countries getting overflown' with asylum applications, but also because migrants continue their journey to northern countries in big numbers (Belloni, 2016; Brekke & Brochmann, 2015). Still, the regulation in theory remains in force, and the migrant numbers sent back to Barcelona are high. ''Lately, many returned migrants from Norway arrived. People want to be reunited with their family or friends, but it is not possible for them. They often feel trapped in Spain'', Moya and Català (3 June, 2015) explain. That is, these migrants get returned to Spain when they actually have applied for asylum here. If they do not have applied for asylum within Europe at all, they can immediately be deported to their country of origin, Coissard (11 May, 2015) explains. Cirez (24 April, 2015) says organisations try as best as they can to inform migrants about the dangers of continuing their journey, but they still see many going. They hope to persuade people to refrain from going by arguing that in countries like France, a maximum period in detention centres does not exist. ''They can be held for a much longer time, which makes the chances bigger they will be deported, especially in the case of Algerians.'' Besides that, in other countries it has been proven much more difficult to regularise your status than in Spain, she continues. On the other side one finds the expanding illegal network in northern Spain, especially in Bilbao and San Sebastian (Cirez; 24 April, 2015; Ortega García; 6 May, 2015), that traffics people without documentation to the other side of the border. They know when and which routes to take to avoid controls.

> Then, for every law there is a loophole… Maybe a ticket to Paris costs 120 euros, but I pay you 180 euros and you give me a passport. It's a business, a business that takes advantage of the dramatic situation because then you can exploit [people] however you like. (Cirez; 24 April, 2015)

6.7. The irregular limbo

Manel Andreu (11 May, 2015) is and has always been very concerned with the sub-Saharan community in his neighbourhood Poblenou through the network of communities called Apropem-nos. While he also sees (mainly) newly arrived migrants heading to Northern Europe, the majority tends to stay in Spain, he argues. This has been proven by the social construction of several migrant communities in Barcelona, particularly the Pakistani and the sub-Saharan ones. While the Pakistanis are often more dispersed over the city, sub-Saharans tend to live (close) together. A big difference is that while Pakistanis in most cases arrived with documentation and could later on regularise themselves, the sub-Saharans did and could not. Andreu (11 May, 2015) states that this is the largest irregular group of migrants in Barcelona. They often find themselves without any job possibilities and future perspectives and end up collecting scrap. They shack together in neighbourhoods like Poblenou, Besòs and Gorg, where old dilapidated and abandoned yards and factories, the so-called *asentamientos*, provide them a living space.[49] Some are even as big that they can be seen as mini villages within the city, with up to hundreds of people living there.

"How can we help refugees? Through getting to know them!" Informative meeting organised by Veins i Veïnes de Poblenou ('Neighbours of Poblenou') (Apropem-nos, 2015).

While newly arrived migrants or released persons from the CIE may be provided with some aid from organisations like Accem, Cirez (24 April, 2015) repeats that for the people in these large irregular migrant spaces there is often no budget. ''The receiving social networks are burned out; they cannot help everyone because at the same time they have to keep their head above the water despite of the difficulties they are experiencing'', Moya and Català (3 June, 2015) add. The *asentamientos* often thus need to be

> Elhadji (from Senegal) explains that during the first period of his stay here, everything was easier. When the crisis started, the problems arose. Since 2009, he is officially unemployed. Although he has a residence permit since 2005, the social services would now refuse to help him. [...] He did not expect this administrative boundary. (Elhadji; April 8, 2015)

self-supportive, or are dependent on the goodwill of people like Andreu (11 May, 2015) and Heintz (14 May, 2015), both involved in Apropem-nos. They mention Poblenou as a very special and generous neighbourhood within the city, where there has always been solidarity with the migrants and where a good network of organisations organises activities that put the autochthonous, the migrants and the authorities in touch with each other. In Poblenou, Andreu (11 May, 2015) comments, the (irregular) migrants blend in better than in the more hostile Besòs, and more opportunities seem to be created, how small they might be. However, this does not mean the economical crisis has not taken its toll here. Before, there were more opportunities to regularise eventually and to obtain documents through *arraigo*. When not being able to obtain a fixed working contract or to move out of irregular housing,

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[49] The main nationalities in the *asentamientos* (*assentaments* in Catalan) are, according to Andreu (11 May, 2015), Gambian, Senegalese, Malian and Nigerian.

the way to regularisation seems full of impermeable borders (Amadou; 18 March 2015; Moya & Català; 3 June, 2015). Muñoz (25 May, 2015) speaks about 'years of survival', and mentions staying in contact with organisations and learning and improving languages and other skills as the best bet on obtaining a fixed job and *arraigo*. During these years without documents, the topic of staying out of the public eye to not end up in a CIE and get deported remains relevant. The possibility of such a situation occurring and its risks seem contradictory and difficult to assess. Muñoz (May 25, 2015) argues:

> Compared to other European countries, such as Belgium, Germany, France and Great Britain, we perhaps do not pressure irregular persons that much in Spain. The words 'irregular' or 'illegal' may have a more stigmatised connotation there. In northern communities, there may be stronger sentiments that these persons should not have any rights within society, while I think in Spain that is different.

Such differences may come forth out of the fact that Spain is a relatively new immigration country, and that the northern European *banlieues*, despite the fair share of *asentamientos* in Barcelona, for example, still do not exist on a big scale here, Muñoz argues (and see also Módenes, Bayona & López-Cólas, 2013; Muñoz de Bustillo & Antón, 2010). However, it could, on the other hand, be questioned if taking a more relaxed stance on irregularity is actually a good thing, Bakary and Basiru (9 April, 2015) argue:

> The procedure for migrants is different there [in Germany, ed.]. They normally enter in an asylum procedure where they are offered a place to stay at least; they give you *Heim*, opposed to Spain. Also some provision and money is offered. In Spain, nothing is regulated and you have to 'find' your own life: *buscarse la vida*. There is no 'official' or general place to start your life here. That's also a reason why people end up in informal sectors, for example to sell drugs.

Also contradictory to relative relaxation in Spain regarding irregularity might be the way in which, although legally forbidden, police raids have taken a specifically ethnic character during the last years, as Andreu (11 May, 2015), Fernandez-Bessa (14 May, 2015) and Queraltó and Bonet (13 April, 2015) state. Fernandez-Bessa argues this may especially count for sub-Saharan migrants as they ethnically stand out – «¡a buscar negros!» (''searching for blacks!''). Queraltó explains that Moroccans and Algerians are also targets, as they are often the easiest and cheapest to expel. This also counts for 'express deportations', when particular ethnicities and nationalities are sought to fill an organised flight (Bonet; 13 April, 2015; Muñoz; 25 May, 2015). Such raids may take place in busy spots, such as metro entrances, but more likely is that they are organised at places where many migrants reunite and meet, such as in the neighbourhoods Raval, Poblenou and Encants, where the collection of *chatarra* mostly takes place. These raids may also expose trafficking and prostitution networks, Cendón (14 May, 2015) stresses, but she interprets that as 'coincidental' as those in general are operating and located within spaces with many migrant population. Heintz (14 May, 2015) mentions a method that was developed in 2014 in cooperation with Frontex, carrying out surveys about the 'vulnerability of every individual', which turned out to be raids that

conveyed people to the CIE. Raids may also occur under the pretext of a committed crime or of rounding up drug trafficking, which sometimes may be legitimate, but could also be overly stigmatised and generalised. ''Sometimes it occurs that, dependent on which persons and which police officers, law and justice are taken into own hands during raids'', Andreu (11 May, 2015) argues.

Such racial profiling, not only committed during raids, has many negative consequences, Bakary and Basiru (9 April, 2015) underline. Correlating with that is the often miscalculated or underestimated amount of sub-Saharans in Barcelona, they explain. They remain very invisible as a group. Just a few of them have their own business in Barcelona, while other groups like the Chinese or Pakistani have hundreds of them. This perhaps coincides with the fact the sub-Saharans form the biggest irregular migrant group in the city, as well as that they often live in the irregular *asentamientos*, segregated from society. The authority's view on those irregular settlements has changed over the years, Andreu (11 May, 2015) mentions. After a fire took place in one of them and four people died, more attention for the situation was generated and the municipality developed a plan for changes. While the intentions for this plan were initially good, Andreu says the outcome has left many of the

> Abdou evokes that, sometimes, after not being able to show a document, he had to spend a night in prison. However, they always freed him the next day without any further consequences. At the moment, he cannot be sent back as his expulsion order expired after three years. There is thus no current procedure that could send him straight back to Senegal.
> (28 June, 2015)

former inhabitants of the *asentamientos* worse off. Their evictions have often happened in a violent way, with cooperation of the Mossos d'Esquadra and the Policía Nacional, converting it at the same time in a raid carried out within private space (Heintz; 14 May, 2015). After several of such events, the sub-Saharan community has now become much more dispersed in Poblenou and Besòs. After eviction, former inhabitants were sometimes provided with short-term accommodation, but then ended up on the streets again. Now, they mostly live in occupied and overcrowded flats, probably awaiting another eviction to happen.

Besides recollecting *chatarra*, another very frequent job performed by irregular sub-Saharans is street vending (*la venta ambulante*). Especially in summer when there are many tourists, this seasonal job, along with working in the agricultural sector (see 6.8), provides more work for the irregular migrants, Moya and Català (3 June, 2015) stress. However, as Fernandez-Bessa (14 May, 2015) explains, this job cannot be practised without the same incidental risks that mark the irregular

> "Sometimes I have had to run for the police when I was selling my goods at the Maremagnum shopping mall. Once I had to pay a fine, because it came from the administration of justice. If the fine comes from the municipality, the migrants normally don't pay, because there is no control on it."
> (Ibou; 26 March, 2015)

migrant community in Barcelona. Since street vendors work irregularly in public spaces, they can be removed or persecuted, according to a law that protects the security of civilians in those public spaces. However, the first step would be to ask for documentation, and then the same story starts all over again. In a good situation, the vendors may only need to pay a fine, but they could also be arrested and detained in the CIE, to be eventually deported. If the vendor is unable to pay this fine, it could later on block regularisation processes through *arraigo*. On the other hand, Heintz (14 May, 2015) mentions that the police already knows most of the vendors (and also the *chatarra* collectors) and shows them solidarity when they

can. This also depends on pressure from the Spanish and European authorities and the current 'securitising conjuncture'. Besides this topic of irregularity, sub-Saharans may often lose out to the Chinese vendors, as Ibou (26 March, 2015) argues, who can sell their products cheaper in their shops.

> I have heard that, sometimes, the police make an agreement, 'a deal', that they will not bother them. «Si yo no te veo, no te pillo» ('If I don't see you, I don't catch you.'). It's tolerating, but at the same time it's very subjective and it depends from case to case how the police reacts. What you see in the film *Biutiful*, for example, is not a fantasy. The only thing that exists is an unwritten form of agreements that are about certain tolerance. (Heintz; 14 May, 2015)

Oumar (8 April, 2015), from Guinea-Bissau, participates actively in the newly formed Asociación Guinea-Bissau y Simpatizantes in Sabadell, a city at some 20 kilometres north of Barcelona. He believes it is important to spread information about the migrants, the African culture and human rights, with a special focus on racism and discriminated groups. The association tries to participate in many events and also goes to schools to inform and talk with students. This seems the only forward, as also Bakary and Basiru (9 April, 2015) from the Gambia Asociación en Catalunya, underline. The African migrant community is, opposed to other migrant communities, quite invisible and mostly only associated with irregularity and the *asentamientos*. When forming a community and engaging with society, acts-of-citizenship through showing visibility are definitely possible. Andreu (11 May, 2015) recalls the moment in 2001 when the migrant *encierros* in Barcelona took place. The migrants from countries as Pakistan, Morocco, India, Senegal and Romania, the so-called *sinpapeles*, occupied churches and parishes and demanded for papers under the exclamation «Papeles, vivienda, trabajo» ('Papers, home, work'). Apart from these occupations, some were already camping for a year in corners of remarkable *plazas* in the Catalan capital. Barbero (2012) marks that situation as 'grotesque'. The Spanish authorities had left the migrants in a legal limbo. The magnitude of this manifestation, as well as the participating diversity of migrant ethnicities and the support of the Barcelonese community came completely unexpected to them, he states. As a result, the participants were able to regularise their irregular status. Andreu (11 May, 2015) deems the *encierro* as a big success for the migrant community and their place within society. Afterwards, many associations, such as Apropem-nos in Poblenou, were created to help and show solidarity with the migrants, as well as to help create forms of coexistence within Barcelona. He and Heintz (14 May, 2015) depict how the *asentamientos* have shown that irregularity within the migrant community is still a big existing issue in Spain. Their evictions have not prompted less irregularity. There is now a situation of more dispersion, which has made it very difficult for the migrants to mutually reunite and to act and present themselves as a visible entity.

6.8. From Barcelona to rural areas (and back)

We get to know some Senegalese migrants through contacts in Barcelona and we are invited for dinner. They talk about their life which is in between Barcelona, Lleida, Tortosa and Andalusia (mainly Jaén) due to them working in the agricultural sector. The specific orange

and olive productions, for example, only offer work for a few months and then they have to move to another place or go back to Barcelona during winter. (Logbook - Lleida; June, 2015)

When Barcelona ends up as not the 'expected place to be' and irregular migrants struggle to keep their head above water, they might consider seasonal work in rural areas or even moving completely out of the Catalan capital (Mohamed Duduh; 27 May, 2015, and see also Achón Rodríguez, 2014; Traoré & Le Dantec, 2012). However, Schapendonk (2011) mentions the living conditions in rural areas are in general 'very harsh' and not different from what migrants experience in Northern Africa. While seasonal work is mostly associated with the agricultural sector, street vendors may also move from more coastal areas to cities according to seasons, Barcelona forming an

> "They don't have work and they go back to recollect scrap or work in the agriculture. These are regularised persons, because without papers they cannot be hired in the agriculture. However, before there were many people working without papers in those sectors. Now that happens less, although surely there still are. They are settled in Barcelona, 'do a season' in Lleida, Alicante or Jaén, for example, and return."
> (Heintz; 14 May, 2015)

exception as it has year-round tourism. Migrants moving within Spain for work opportunities may also change our perception of borders and 'being in transit', as these conceptions are not always connected with spatial outcomes and 'embarking on a journey', but also with more practical reasons, as we see here. It is not merely a journey 'up north', but a life that may include various circles and go-backs.

When comparing lives between Barcelona and 'moving around', Abdou (28 June, 2015), who now lives in Lleida, remains undecided. On the one hand, he prefers the agricultural sector, especially in southern cities like Huelva and Jaén, because ''you're in a quiet and secure place''. He has always been able to work there, as they never ask for documentation and offer good working conditions. His friend Mamadou (28 June, 2015) agrees with him. He could work and live in Jaén between 2006 and 2011 and during this stable period he was even able to opt for *arraigo* and receive documentation. Compared to the countryside, Barcelona is a much more attractive place, but finding work there is difficult. However, on the other hand, as he explains, you cannot permit yourself getting sick in the agricultural sector, as you're quickly replaced with

> Mamadou doesn't like it too much in Barcelona. He has worked there as a street vendor and as promoter for clubs, but he prefers to stay in smaller cities where it's easier to find work. Still, the work at the countryside is hard. He now works 12 hours a day, gaining 5 euros per hour, while the Catalan minimum wage is 7 euros per hour. Of everything he gains, he at least sends half of it to his family in Senegal.
> (Mamadou; 28 June, 2015)

someone else. In that sense, Barcelona is more relaxed, but does not provide a stable income when selling on the streets. There seems to be a certain discrepancy between the story of Abdou and Heintz' explanation (see box), however Mohamed especially names Andalusian Huelva and Jaén as 'quiet and secure places'. Perhaps, a more relaxed view on irregular migrants could be found in the traditional PSOE-stronghold Andalusia, while in other more PP-oriented regions documentation controls might be stricter. João (8 April, 2015), from Guinea-Bissau, and Mehdi (8 April, 2015), from Morocco, could also regularise their status while working in the agricultural sector. Mehdi argues that undocumented employment is a big problem for those who have documentation, as in most sectors the companies still prefer to contract undocumented migrants when they can. Some may try to still get those jobs with

false documentation and mislead their bosses to be able to work, as Faiçal (8 April, 2005) did and experienced (see also Espinola Orrego, 2007; de Haas, 2008). When the migrant has a residence permit but remains unemployed for a long time, his regularised status may not be continued and he enters in an irregular situation once again. This also implies he may not have access to social services, as Elhadji (8 April, 2015, see box on page 84) and Mehdi (8 April, 2015) experience. Mehdi has gone from contracted work and a residence permit to no permanent home and basically sleeping on the streets in Sabadell, an 'undignified life', he adds. As the existence of such extreme cases would prove, Moya (3 June, 2015) mentions that most migrants might be better off in smaller cities or villages:

> They think the work is to be found in the cities, but in the end this does not seem to be the case. Here, they are unemployed or they recollect scrap. On top of that, the city is much more anonymous. In a village it's easier to build up a network of contacts, which can later help to encounter work as well.

6.9. Concluding remarks

Barcelona's appeal on migrants is created by imaginaries about 'the good life in Europe', and also fostered by the consequent 'filtering out of the bad stories' in countries of origin. However, the reality in Barcelona does not match with the imagined one, but is based on merely keeping heads above water and not suffering too much. Obtaining documentation has become a long-term process and seems more and more a case for the lucky few migrants in Spain, where crisis has hit hard and especially affects the worst-off. Organisations and NGOs in Barcelona have to cope with clearly insufficient budgets and try to do the best they can. The situation therefore feels chaotic and overflown. While long-term irregular migrants generally have to cope with the situation themselves, the newly arrived and asylum applicants may be somewhat luckier, especially if they have nationalities that have gotten big media coverage as of lately. Still, in general the Spanish immigrant and asylum system seems unprepared for the migrant quantities that are to be found on the Barcelonese streets right now. They may not be detained in a CIE or caught on the small areas of Ceuta and Melilla, but they remain in an irregular situation and still face many forms of immobility.

Raids may become reality sooner or later, with the possibility of ending up in the CIE and getting deported. Some may try their luck travelling up north (although these are normally the 'newer ones', who still have the motivation and energy), but chances of getting caught and send back to either Spain or the country of origin are very present. If they manage to stay out of the eye, or have the right contacts and are 'tolerated', they may be able to slightly improve their situation and find other types of jobs, or even apply for *arraigo*. The key factor, as Bakary and Basiru (9 April, 2015) also argue, seems to become more present as a migrant community. This has worked in favour for the Chinese and Pakistani communities, and may also count for the sub-Saharans. Being more visible would provide more knowledge about their presence, and at the same time probably give them more opportunities to improve their status through networks and contacts. Until then, irregular migrants might be better off in smaller cities or villages, where they are less anonymous and where getting those opportunities seems easier, as Moya (3 June, 2015) argues and João (8 April, 2015) and Mamadou (28 June, 2015) have experienced.

7. Border realities in Ceuta and Melilla

7.1. Introduction

> ¡Oh ciudad de los gitanos!
> La Guardia Civil se aleja
> por un túnel de silencio
> mientras las llamas te cercan.
>
> (Oh, city of gypsies!
> The Civil Guard moves away
> through a tunnel of silence
> while the flames enclose you.)
> (*Romance de la Guardia Civil Española*, Federico García Lorca, 1998, p. 113)

Times may have changed in Spain, and the Guardia Civil is no longer persecuting minority groups under the military regime of Franco. However, its archetype has remained omnipresent, especially in the migration context. The borders of Ceuta and Melilla are associated with the controls carried out by the centre-staged Guardia Civil, and mediatised pictures of the border spectacle in both enclaves often show its humanitarian side, Andersson (2013) argues. They show a police that rescues refugees from shaky *pateras*, one that takes care of them after having jumped the fence, and one that provides them with first needs. Is this the full image corresponding to the truth? The particular nature of Ceuta and Melilla arguably gives them a double border: the *land* and the *sea*. Such a double-edged border also permits two independent ways of acting (Andersson, 2013): one of 'humane' *rescue* and one of 'tough' *repulsion*. This double-faced 'friend or foe'-image is often migrants' first introduction to Europe, as will be further elaborated in this chapter. It is the fruit of short fieldwork periods in Ceuta and Melilla and functions as a trajectory traced back, from Barcelona to the external borders of the European Union. As will be argued, many of the borderising dynamics that are performed on a city level in Barcelona (see Chapter 6), have their origins at these external borders and continue to affect.

7.2. The border spectacle

> For me, a border, not *the border*, but this fence, is manmade, it's temporary; it is not really achieving anything at all. For me, migration is like water: when a river flows it's going to flow. If you put something to stop it, it finds another way to continue. All they do is make it more difficult and injure and kill people in the process but they don't stop the problem and they don't do it with humanity. (David Fedele; May 28, 2015)

> A group of 119 sub-Saharan immigrants, according to calculations by the police, have taken advantage of the low tide this Saturday to illegally enter Ceuta, skirting the breakwaters at the northern border of Benzú, according to information of the Government's Delegation in Ceuta. The huge assault settled with six of the immigrants

being hospitalised for cuts and bruises, although their conditions do not show serious injuries, according to the same sources. (*El País*; April 23, 2016)

Ceuta and Melilla are different in many ways. They are not on the European continent, providing the double land and sea border that separates them from mainland European territory. Besides that, these enclaves have materialised and outsourced fences that long existed before they became *fashionable* again in countries like Hungary in the wake of the mediatised 'refugee crisis' of last years. This made Ceuta and Melilla, and perhaps Spain in general, less attractive for migrants seeking to enter Europe. However, everything is relative, and migration *flows as it flows*, as documentary maker Fedele (May 28, 2015) argues.

How to enter Ceuta or Melilla as a migrant or potential asylum-seeker? That is the question. As Ferrer-Gallardo and Espiñeira (2015) underline, the perception of especially the Ceuta border[50] as difficult and impermeable has led to the search of alternative routes to enter Europe, creating an eastward direction towards Italy, Malta and Greece (see Chapter 5). However, especially when taking into account their grade of fortification supposing more difficulties, one can argue Ceuta and Melilla are still relatively popular entry points among migrants. This has been shown also by growing numbers of arrivals in the last years and new *entradas masivas*, that were common in 2005 and 2006 but seem to be back in swing ultimately, and which means the entry of a large number of migrants at once. Are these 'massive assaults' necessary? What do they actually show us, except from highly mediatised *border spectacles*? In general, as Romero (CEAR Ceuta; 11 June, 2015) describes it, the only possible way for migrants to enter the enclaves is the irregular one. When I travel on 9 June 2015 from the Tangier Ibn Battouta Airport to Ceuta, I experience this myself. Comparing this route to the one from the Nador-Al Aroui Airport to Melilla, where I travelled one month earlier, one could argue it would give a similar 'border experience'. However, it did not. While approaching Melilla, I only saw Moroccan daily vendors on the streets, crossing the borders and back. No sub-Saharan migrants to be seen. The situation I saw alongside the road to Ceuta was completely different. It seemed like the Moroccan police and the migrants were playing a cat-and-mouse game. When the police was absent and the territory seemed easier to look over, groups of sub-Saharan

> **What's in a name?**
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> The airport of Tangier is named after the famous Ibn Battouta, a fourteenth-century Moroccan-Berber traveller and scholar. His travels, that lasted over a period of thirty years visiting the Islamic world, but also non-Muslim places, made him one of the most famous travellers of all time. His journeys extended from Morocco to Persia, China, India, and sub-Saharan Africa (see also Salameh, 2016).
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> It is rather striking that this airport bears his name, while the closest land-border just some 90 kilometres further on is not permeable for most 'travellers' of these times that try to improve, enrich and develop their lives. Aren't they the modern Ibn Battouta's, travelling through half a continent? What would Ibn Battouta think of them not being able to continue their journey? "The human being is not only a *homo economicus*", and "the adventure is a lesson; what you don't gain in money, you gain in spirit", Traoré (2012, p. 9/11) argues.

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[50] The geography of the Ceuta border region is much more mountainous and steep, while Melilla has some border zones that are rather flat and straightforward. Besides that, at the Melilla border both sides can be seen as urban, with Melilla on the Spanish side and Beni Enzar and the village of Farkhana on the other sides. Ceuta does not border to Moroccan urban centres. This means at the Melilla border there are more places to hide and eventually jump over the border, while this is not the case at the Ceuta border, Romero (11 June, 2015) explains.

migrants appeared, walking next to the road and evaluating their chances.

These chances should be well balanced and considered, as possible consequences could bring them into big trouble. Almost all migrants I speak with, especially in Ceuta and Melilla, but also in Barcelona, talk about their anxiousness and hardship experienced in the Maghreb countries. Moussa (10 June, 2015) mentions the times in Algeria and Morocco as unbearable, as he always had to hide himself. ''I had enough of hiding myself, I now wanted to be out in the open and wanted the people to know I was in Ceuta.'' Bakary (8 April, 2015) mentions the importance for him to skip countries as Morocco and Algeria, as he was afraid of the stories about discrimination, racism and harassment, both by the police and the people.

> Emigration is a shared fate for sub-Saharans and Maghrebis, but the role of the *gendarme* that corresponds to the Alaouite kingdom opposed them to each other. Despite of the poor in Morocco being just as poor as those from Senegal, they have wanted to convince them that black lobsters were invading them. (Traoré & Le Dantec, 2012, p. 10)

Traoré loses no time in expressing his experiences in Maghreb countries as Libya, Algeria and Morocco, but at the same he recognises the political impact and influence on the local populations. Spanish and EU-outsourcing politics in Northern Africa in that matter have split the African continent. As Andersson (2013) mentions and has experienced, the EU's politics to restrain and control immigration are increasingly moving even further south. There are no unilateral European agreements on this *outsourcing*, but there is often done an appeal on the bilateral relations of Southern European countries, sometimes in combination with the power and capacity of Frontex. While firm agreements between Spain and Morocco exist, their political relation can be seen as one with firm ups and downs (see also Chapter 2), leaving 'open wounds' (Andersson, 2013). Therefore, other contacts have been tapped in the last decade in an attempt to keep a firmer hand on the migration situation in Africa. This has above all been the case with Mauritania and Senegal, as this EU-strategy was developed when the Western African Route was considered the most popular one (Andersson, 2013; Carling, 2007b; Rodier, 2013). There, at the Senegalese coastal shores, appears again the figure of the Spanish Guardia Civil:

> "When I started working in Ceuta, the relations between the government of Aznar and Morocco were very bad. Morocco was pursuing some sort of 'dirty war' while controlling the border. There, Morocco let go through everyone as it wanted, and the [Spanish, ed.] police in this 'dirty war' returned all the migrants illegally through the gate that would lead them into Morocco again without Morocco's knowledge." (Romero; 11 June, 2015)

> ''Look at the boat there!'' Mohammadou suddenly exclaimed. ''It's the *garde espagnole*.'' The Guardia Civil's patrolling vessel came every day, he said. It was just sitting there, observing, like a well-trained beast ready to pounce on any trespassers. ''It can't stop us,'' he said. ''If no money comes soon from Europe we will set off again…'' (Andersson, 2013, p. 45)

Could then still be argued Ceuta and Melilla are *the borders* in this story anyway? It seems there have been many investments in creating more borders earlier along the ways migrants take towards Europe. This does, however, not mean the EU-borders at the enclaves have lost their importance, as they still are the places where 'the border spectacle' happens, and where the threshold between worlds is at its most flagrant (Andersson, 2013). At the Moroccan side of the border, the situation for migrants still leaves much to be desired up until now. While Morocco has always provided help to the EU and promised collaboration, this for a part seems acted out of self-interest (expecting to get a compensation and financial aid out of it), while not shunning the violation of the most basic human rights (Fernandez-Bessa; 14 May, 2015). Of course, both Spain and the EU are aware of this and prefer 'to look away', as there might be no other option than dealing and negotiating with countries that do not have the same European standards when it comes to human and asylum rights, Romero (11 June, 2015) thinks. Organisations such as MSF and ACNUR warn about the situation of migrants in Morocco and their returning to this country at the Melilla and Ceuta borders, as no one knows what happens with them afterwards, Ortega Dolz (2016) writes. What happens in Morocco with migrants, especially after having been rejected at the border, seems indeed a blurred part of the whole story. Johnson (2013) and Andersson (2013) mention that large contingents of migrants used to be sent in western and southern directions, sometimes even as far as practically breaching laws and dumping them at the other side of the border in Algeria or Mauritania. Johnsson (2013) tells about her experiences in a camp in Oujda, which seems to be the biggest migrant and refugee hotspot, close to the Algerian border. It functions as a dumping place of what Morocco does not want to see and where newly arrived and experienced migrants gather and count their chances for another journey towards Melilla or Ceuta (Carling, 2007b; Schapendonk, 2009).

Romero (11 June, 2015) goes as far as in saying that, basically, Morocco controls and decides who is entering Europe. ''Morocco is controlling who can enter Spain. We are selling sovereignty. Europe is selling sovereignty. After Morocco lets someone pass, then it is the Spanish police who does a second control.'' This means that in practice, potential asylum-seekers cannot reach the Spanish side to apply for asylum, going against international refugee and humanitarian laws (see also Weissbrodt, 2008), and families often end up being separated, some having crossed the border and others staying behind (see box). Morocco, but also Algeria in a more indirect way, which started in 2015 asking Syrians for travel visas, holds on to the need of the right documentation (Ortega Dolz, 2016), officially not letting

> **Border split-ups**
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> Romero (11 June, 2015) recalls the story of an Iraqi family in Ceuta that still had an underage daughter left behind in Morocco, as they could not cross the border all together. The Spanish police argued Morocco did not let her pass, as she did not possess the right documentation to enter Spain. He argues that such situations in the end enrich the mafia, as the girl had to cross the border illegally. Having all the equipment and aid for asylum-seekers ready at the Spanish side is not enough, he states, as long as the Spanish simply reconcile with the fact that the Moroccan police does not let migrants pass.
>
> I had already experienced the consequences of the whims of the Moroccan police one month earlier. Just outside the CETI in Melilla I talk with the 19-year old Syrian Ammar (7 May, 2015). He stays in Melilla for 8 months and is already offered a pass to the Peninsula. However, he is stuck in Melilla while waiting for his family, which got spread between Algeria and Oujda, as the police there do not permit them to move either back or forth.

anyone pass (Rebeca Acedo Calvete, Accem Ceuta; 10 June, 2015). After very discerning reports from various organisations, and especially after a proposal from CEAR, an asylum office opened at the Beni Enzar-Melilla border in 2015 (Coissard; 11 May, 2015).[51] However, there is still talk of selectivity, as this office was only made for the Syrians, leaving all the others as 'second class migrants' (Romero; 11 June, 2015). As Julia Ortega García (Accem Melilla; 6 May, 2015) relates, Accem can now at least provide direct aid at the border in terms of sending translators, having up to eight people working there now. Something similar is not working as of yet in Ceuta, Acedo Calvete (10 June, 2015) laments. While officially in Ceuta there would be the possibility as well to apply for asylum, no one has done it as of yet. It remains unclear if this can be blamed on Moroccan controls, the Spanish police, or either an outcome of actions of the two. Claire Rodier (2013, pp. 90-91) argues that, in general, ''the immigration laws [and practices, ed.] in the Maghreb countries are more in line with offering guarantees to the European Union than with their own realities''.

> As Ortega García (6 May, 2015) underlines, migrants often have to wait for months in Nador and spend a lot on hotels or apartments before their networks give the green light to smuggle them to the other side of the border. There is an enormous black market dealing in passports, although the Syrians do not need those anymore after the asylum office at the border was opened.

The discrepancy between Melilla and Ceuta could possibly be explained through several factors. The geography of Melilla and its immediate Moroccan hinterland is much more accessible and at the same time provides more possibilities to enter irregularly, and now as well offers the direct asylum option for Syrians. Traoré (2012, p. 106) mentions that, ''every nationality weaves its own networks, routes and local contacts''. From my own experiences, the biggest particularity is that Melilla is mainly popular by Syrians, as well as Algerians and Moroccans seeking to enter Europe, while Ceuta contains a bigger African contingent (see also the box on p. 65). Acedo Calvete (10 June, 2015) explains:

> Many migrants, instead of Ceuta, would prefer Melilla as it is more collapsed and overflown. While this could be seen as a disadvantage, it also means that there are more ways out to the Peninsula in practice. Because of a more imminent situation, Melilla also receives more resources than Ceuta.

She also mentions that migrants are well aware of all this, although at the same time when they have experienced a long exhausting and psychologically challenging journey, they may not even know where they exactly are or where they entered Europe. In this case, the group and network factor also seems to play a big role (Cruz Roja Ceuta; 11 June, 2015). Moussa (10 June, 2015) argues it was his 'destiny or fate' to arrive in Ceuta. He had not chosen Ceuta over Melilla, but just went for the best opportunity for him. Besides networks and contacts, choosing destinations in the end is a big gamble, which can either lead to luckiness or moving backwards again after being deported, as Traoré (2012) sees it. Andersson (2013) also speaks of a 'game of risk'.

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[51] Melilla only possesses of one official border-crossing, Ortega García (6 May, 2015) explains, as the other border-crossings are internationally unofficial and only used for the 'semi-illegal' smuggling of goods (see also Chapter 2).

7.3. Irregular ways of entering and being sent back

A risky situation it is, when trying to enter Ceuta or Melilla irregularly. In general, one can distinguish four irregular ways of entering, apart from the regular way in Melilla through applying for asylum directly at the border. One is by entering Spanish territorial waters in the Strait of Gibraltar in small *pateras* or motorised boats. They may be originating from nearby cities as Fnideq, Tétouan, Beni Enzar or Nador, but they could also have been sailing for days. The Guinean Abdelay (10 June, 2015), for example, embarked on a *patera* in Al Hoceima, and it took various days to arrive in Ceuta. He describes this part of the journey as 'very hard and traumatising'. Normally, organisations such as Cruz Roja do not know their origin, they are just brought in when the boats get intercepted and the Salvamento Marítimo brings the migrants to the coasts of the enclaves.[52] The second and third way involve passing the official border-crossing irregularly, either hidden in a (double-layered) car or truck, of which a high percentage involves human trafficking and slavery (Romero; 11 June, 2015), or with a bought false Moroccan passport (Moroccans from the neighbouring provinces can

> "The quantity of 52 arriving last Sunday is not something new. [...] It should have been a medium-sized *patera*, because those can exactly take 51 or 52 persons. In fact, many of them arrived with contusions because of not having been able to move. And they all suffer hypothermia. They had been travelling for two days and two nights. They came from the region of Al Hoceima, they said." (Manuel; Cruz Roja; 11 June, 2015)

enter, see Chapter 2), which of course is only possible when the migrant in question can pass for a Moroccan. The 'false passport tactic' therefore is mainly popular under Moroccans (from other provinces), Algerians and other Northern African and Middle Eastern nationalities. As can be understood from this, even when entering irregularly, the enclaves do select on ethnicity and nationality. ''They do not let a black person pass with a Moroccan passport. However, when someone has Arab expressions, they do not even check the passport'', Romero (11 June, 2015) relates. It is therefore that the last option, jumping the *valla*, the double fenced no-man's-land between the enclaves and Morocco, arguably the most dangerous one, is only used by the most unfortunate groups, especially the sub-Saharans. As said earlier, this is a relatively easier undertaking in Melilla than in Ceuta due to the terrain being more even and providing more places to hide, while in Ceuta in the mountains the migrants are detected earlier and faster by the Moroccan *gendarmerie* (Acedo Calvete; 10 June, 2015; Manuel; 11 June, 2015; Ortega Dolz, 2016; Ortega García, 6 May, 2015).

Most sub-Saharans see 'mass jumps' as the only feasible way of 'overcoming the border', as Traoré (2012) explains. By carefully preparing and 'assaulting' the border with hundreds at the same time, chances are big at least a part of the migrants will end up in Spain. It is a way of becoming independent, Traoré argues, as only the migrants 'win', while the authorities and all those who profit from the migrant industry would 'lose'. Such 'assaults' were often prepared in abominable camps in the forests close to the border. Gourougou, next to Melilla, was the most famous one, especially after David Fedele made his documentary *The Land Between* there. However, it is not known if these self-created camps are still in use. In 2014 and 2015, international media reported that Moroccan police had destroyed the camps

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[52] The Salvamento Marítimo, officially the Sociedad de Salvamento y Seguridad Marítima (SASEMAR) is a public sea and rescue organisation, under direct governance of the Spanish Ministry of Public Works and Transport. See http://www.salvamentomaritimo.es.

and attacked and deported the migrants inhabiting them (Campo Bello, 2014; Kassam, 2015), while Moroccan media stated the migrants were 'evacuated' as the situation was not safe in the camps (Amiar, 2014), leaving the Moroccan Ministry of Interior even feeling the need to claim the migrants were not deported.[53] Although they perhaps were not deported in all cases, they often were dropped in the middle of nowhere of the country without any resources, Campo Bello (2014) writes. Nowadays, they seem to live a clandestine life in the cities, waiting for their next big opportunity to cross the border to 'paradise Europe'. When I am in Tangier, my taxi driver claims that the 'biggest migrant neighbourhood' of Morocco is next to the airport in Boukhalef, as does Hortiguela (2015). However, she states this 'migrant slum' was also dismantled last summer, with migrants being deported or 'evacuated' to other parts of the country.

    Speaking about deportation, this topic should also be discussed from the Spanish border perspective. Something absolutely illegal, Cirez (24 April, 2015) and Romero (11 June, 2015) argue. We are talking here about the infamous *devoluciones en caliente* ('hot returns'), which imply directly sending back migrants to Morocco after they have just crossed the border and have set foot on Spanish territory. There is an official law that states Moroccan citizens can be send back to Moroccan territory immediately after having entered Ceuta or Melilla in an irregular way, Acedo Calvete (10 June, 2015) explains. However, this does not count for other nationalities and thus can be seen as completely unconstitutional, Romero (11 June, 2015) argues. ''It is the case that a person that now enters Ceuta is immediately sent back to Morocco without having had the opportunity to apply for international protection in Spain.'' Such *devoluciones en caliente* would occur through a so-called loophole in the law that protects the security of civilians.[54] In this case, migrants are returned to a third country (Morocco) without the assistance of translators and interpreters, which is completely against international humanitarian laws. As both the Spanish and Moroccan states are aware of the illegality of such actions, there is much discretion, Fernandez-Bessa (14 May, 2015) tells. It is not known when they

> "The migrants have to pass a double control. First comes the Moroccan control, which prevents that they arrive at the *valla*, and [then] the Guardia Civil that returns them to Morocco when possible." (Romero; June 11, 2015)

are performed, and if it is seen as a first choice after a migrant crosses the border. She also names the political relations between the two countries at the concerning moment crucial. During the Perejil Island crisis (see Chapter 2), Morocco would not accept the return of anyone, not even of its own citizens, she adds. What happens after such direct returns remains again unclear. In the worst-case scenario, as Andersson (2013) explains, migrants may experience various immediate expulsions. He names the backward-route from Morocco to the Algerian or Mauritanian border, and then to Mali, where its capital Bamako would form a new ''centre of deported migrants'' (p. 248). In fact, it is a new third country where all nationalities are dropped, where ''Europe's border regime is producing a border no longer 'at the border' (p. 269).'' One should not forget, on the other hand, that the whole migration process and trajectory is a moneymaking industry, as Andersson (2013) has already argued. Traoré and Le Dantec (2012, p. 247) confirm this as well, as Traoré has experienced a

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[53] See http://www.ccme.org.ma/fr/medias-et-migration/41007 (retrieved on 28 April 2016).
[54] This is the same law (called Ley de Protección Ciudadana) as the one mentioned in Chapter 6, where the expulsion of street vendors in public spaces is discussed.

Moroccan soldier letting loose 'come back whenever you want'. The Maghreb countries have their own stake in this migrant business as transit places.

7.4. The CETIs: a hollow freedom

> Those so ''rescued'' soon found themselves incorporated into the enclaves' new role on the migratory circuit: as offshore processing centers. Fences and walls, border theorists have observed, might shut out the unwanted but can also serve to keep people in. This is what was happening in Ceuta and Melilla. (Andersson, 2013, p. 173)

As already has been pointed out, Ceuta and Melilla stand out as EU border regions as they do not share their borders with continental Europe, and therefore do not provide direct and free access to Europe for migrants. Their fortified and fenced appearance seem to make them appropriate to shut out people, but also to keep them in if needed, as Andersson (2013) suggests. The CETIs, but also the cities in general, therefore become offshore processing centers that come in very handy for the EU, as it is not needed to cooperate and negotiate with a third country in this case.

Normally, as Acedo Calvete (10 June, 2015) explains, migrants voluntarily go to the National Police after they have successfully crossed the border. For many, it is a relief they have reached *Europe* and now do not have to live the clandestine life anymore. At the police office, they are registered and they receive a paper that confirms and documents their stay in Ceuta or Melilla. However, those are of very questionable quality and can normally be seen as a deportation order. After registering, the migrant is taken to the CETI. In general, all migrant nationalities can enter the CETI, except for Moroccans because of the Spanish-Moroccan agreement that implicates the immediate return to Morocco. However, in practice this looks as another selection at the entrance of the CETI, as especially in Melilla there are many Moroccans, and also Algerians, sleeping on the streets without a place to stay.[55] Due to the big difference in numbers between Melilla and Ceuta, the CETI of Ceuta normally also accepts Algerians, Acedo Calvete (10 June, 2016) explains. Comparing both CETIs, the centre in Melilla is mainly inhabited by Syrians (Ortega García; 6 May, 2015), while the Guineans form the biggest group in Ceuta (Maite Perez López; Centro de Inmigrantes San Antonio; 10 June, 2015). However, Perez López adds it is very possible that between them, especially in the case of the Guineans, there may be migrants with other nationalities. Spain does not have an agreement with Guinea and the migrants cannot be deported due to the political and sanitarian situation in that country right now, she explains.

> Moussa (10 June, 2015) arrived very wounded in Ceuta, after having jumped over the fences. Therefore, he needed immediate medical care. After that, he went voluntarily to the police office to register himself. "I had enough of hiding myself, I now wanted to be out in the open and I wanted the people to know I was in Ceuta."

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[55] Moroccans minors cannot be returned to Morocco and are officially under tutelary of the enclaves. They normally are accommodated in special centres (Centros de Menores), but many state the bad violent situation in there and prefer to sleep on the streets, waiting their chances to travel to the Peninsula irregularly (Acedo Calvete; June 10, 2015). This also has to do with the fact they can be deported when they turn eighteen. See also the stories of Amine, Walid and Youssef in the corresponding box on the next page, and Bonet (2014) for a photographic report on the 'street boys of Melilla'.

The indefinite stay of migrants in the CETIs seems to be the biggest difference with the CIEs on the Canary Islands and the Peninsula. While the CIEs function as detention centres, the CETIs create another detaining situation, based on a more loose approach. Migrants can leave the centre during daytime, but often find themselves in a hopeless and immobile situation that keeps them in the enclaves. In general, when the CETIs, and thus the enclaves, become overpopulated, there are transfers to the Peninsula to remove some of the pressure on Ceuta and Melilla. When migrants become aware of the 'trap' they have entered, Acedo Calvete (10 June, 2015) argues, the only thing they want is leave Ceuta or Melilla. Although they are offered Spanish classes and other activities within the CETI, and also through associations and organisations such as San Antonio (in Ceuta), Accem and Cruz Roja, they become quickly disinterested and only try to gain some money and leave. Perez López (10 June, 2015) underlines that San Antonio tries to create a more relaxed environment for the migrants and to offer an alternative to the overcrowded CETI.

Another factor that especially plays a big role in Ceuta is the fact that the sub-Saharan migrants mostly did not expect the city to have a multi-religious character, which especially affects the female migrants. Acedo Calvete (10 June, 2015) explains:

> They do not feel at ease and do not see the advantage of leaving [the CETI, ed.]. Sometimes, this is also related to the hostile image that many of the sub-Saharan migrants have of the Moroccans, after how many of them were treated in Morocco.

Both Acedo Calvete and Ortega García (5 May, 2015) mention the multicultural character of the cities, which implicates coexistence, but not cohabitation, as a big factor. The big variety in cultural and religious groups on such a small surface can easily lead to confrontations and hostilities, giving both cities an explosive character. Therefore, Ortega García (5 May, 2015) grades the situation in Melilla as 'very precarious'. As the population in the enclaves is traditionally very conservative, it easily excludes the poorer groups, which include both the segregated

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The boys of the streets

Amine (6 May, 2015), Walid (6 May, 2015) and Youssef (7 May, 2015) are not in the CETI. They sleep on the streets. Amine and Youssef are from Morocco, while Walid is Algerian. Walid was forced to apply for asylum if he wanted to enter the CETI, but he did not. Their stories show the irregular, uncaptured side of the migration politics in Melilla. Their daily life basically consists of playing a cat-and-mouse game with the local authorities.

One has to be a good runner to do this 'street life'. When entering the enclave, the boys ran for their lives and later celebrated their victory. To exit Melilla, their only possibility lies in hiding as a stowaway on ferries that go to the Peninsula. This is not without risks, as the police chase them. Capture obviously leads to deportation. The boys have experienced this already, and have entered Melilla again.

Hopefully, one day their dream will come true and they will enter Europe. Until then, they are the anonymous citizens of Melilla, which can be for a very long time. When I speak Youssef, he is already in Melilla for ten years, first as a registered minor, then deported, and now as one of the others.

During my stay in Melilla, Amine is captured by the police and deported to Nador. A few days later he talks to me on Facebook, explaining that he is back in Fez, his hometown. He was fed up of the 'Melilla life', where he was 'a nobody', caught in an administrative trap. Youssef feels they are always confronted with the same closed door. "That's how this game is played." That game is not without dangers, as in the last year various youngsters have died while trying to enter Melilla or trying to jump on a ship to exit the enclave, Cenizo (2016) writes.

Muslims and the migrants in the CETI. The population prefers to turn a blind eye, which in the end creates more polarisation and inequality. The recent demonstrations of Syrian migrants in the city centre of Ceuta to ask for better living conditions in the CETI were contested with ignorance and incomprehension from the locals (Acedo Calvete; 10 June, 2015).

7.5. The dilemma of applying for asylum

The experience of having fallen into a trap and wanting to leave as soon as possible also has other consequences. As Romero (11 June, 2015) explains, Ceuta and Melilla do not form part of the European Schengen Zone because of the bilateral Spanish-Moroccan agreement that permits Moroccans from neighbouring provinces to enter the enclaves. In reality, this agreement also forms the backbone of the economies of Ceuta and Melilla through the smuggling of goods. Ortega García (6 May, 2015) mentions that ''Melilla lives of the border, because it does not have an engine itself''. 70% of the economy of Melilla would arguably consist of smuggling, she adds. Permitting Moroccans to enter in Ceuta and Melilla is needed for their economic viability and sustainability. However, to be able to cut off their unauthorised entry to Peninsular Spain and further inland, Schengen cannot be performed in the enclaves. This reasoning is completely legal, Romero (11 June, 2015) argues, but it is not legal that asylum-seekers are also subject to this provision. Will migrants choose to apply for asylum in Ceuta and Melilla when they know they will probably have to stay there until their asylum procedure is finalised? Besides the fact this could take up to multiple years, a rejected application in Ceuta or Melilla probably would automatically mean deportation.

Acedo Calvete (10 June, 2015) stresses many migrants initially already have a very hesitant feeling about applying for asylum in Spain, let alone in Ceuta or Melilla. Some have concrete plans to travel up further north and applying for asylum in Spain would stipulate their obligation to stay there, according to the Dublin Regulation. Organisations still try their best to persuade migrants to apply for asylum as soon as possible, and preferably directly after arrival in Ceuta or Melilla, as it is officially obligatory to apply for asylum within a month after touching Spanish soil for the first time. She adds that, for some groups, it is incredibly difficult to persuade them and keep them in the enclaves, as it has been proven very difficult to arrange their asylum procedure. After all, Ceuta and Melilla are provincial-sized towns. When there are nationalities such as Bangladeshis or Pakistanis, for example, that want to apply for asylum, it is often very difficult and too expensive for the NGOs to hire an interpreter or a translator from the Peninsula.

The biggest reason for migrants to not apply for asylum in the enclaves remains the fact that they are then probably earlier transported to mainland Spain, and thus to Europe.[56] In the next paragraph will be explained how this transportation – the *laissez-passer* – works. The reason for exclusion of asylum applicants on these transports is the fact that they are not

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[56] The exception to this practice seems to be the case of the Syrians in Melilla. As most of them apply for asylum directly at the border, the amount of asylum-seekers is much bigger. Besides that, Spain is obligated to grant asylum to them according to EU-policies. This means that there is less space for own interpretations and practices of the law, guaranteeing a smoother transportation to the Peninsula (Coissard; 11 May, 2015; Ortega García; 6 May, 2015).

deportable and cannot be detained in a CIE until their application is taken into account and their case is closed, Romero (11 June, 2015) notes:

> We have to admit and tell as well that persons who apply for asylum sometimes may be discriminated when it comes to the transportations to the Peninsula. On the other hand, a person with a deportation order paradoxically does achieve reaching the Peninsula with a *laissez-passer*.

This has led to a complete demotivation among migrants to apply for asylum. Especially in Ceuta, the percentage remains very low. There are people from Syria and Iraq, fled from war situations, who do not apply. Romero (11 June, 2015) argues it looks like the Spanish state does not want people to apply for asylum in Ceuta and Melilla. Coissard (11 May, 2015) agrees that the fear migrants have that they will not leave the enclaves if they have applied for asylum is justified, as has been learned by experience. However, she adds that ultimately, the situation for asylum applicants in Ceuta and Melilla has improved, also through the agency of CEAR. The so-called unwillingness of the State regarding asylum procedures links more or less with the earlier expressed sentiment (see Chapter 2 and 6) and experience that Spain illegally drags asylum cases. It waits until the security situation in the countries of origin has improved to be able to deport the migrant in question. Another sign that confirms this behaviour, obviously infused with bureaucratic mismanagement, is the experience that sometimes a dossier of someone who has applied for asylum in the enclaves is not sent to the Peninsula (Coissard; 11 May, 2015). This would mean that, in practice, a migrant has to enter in the same procedure from the very start again when arriving in Barcelona.

> "An asylum applicant in Ceuta, who has his friend that did not apply and was transported to the Peninsula with a deportation order, is going to think they are sticking his application up their ass." (Romero; 11 June, 2015)

7.6. The *laissez-passer* to the Peninsula
Our interview is cut short because we hear his name being announced through the speakers of the CETI. He anxiously leaves and we wait outside. He comes back incredibly happy. He and his family are chosen to be transported the next morning with a ferry to Almería. ''Finally I can turn the page to start a new one and forget about the past. I want to live my European dream with my family.'' (Logbook - Melilla; Adnan; 6 May, 2015)

As already could be sensed, transportation to the Peninsula is an unwritten rule, and seems to be applied whenever the time is ripe. Romero (11 June, 2015) argues the police have the final word on this, and it thus happens when 'the police feel like it'. The so-called *laissez-passer* (literally a 'pass through'), as this is how this form of transportation of migrants is called, is not foreseen within Spanish law. This part within the administrative system therefore seems to be hold together through spontaneous activities. Bonet (13 April, 2015) explains that the *laissez-passer*, in general, can be seen as a type of safe-conduct, performed after the CETIs have reached their maximum capacities. This does not mean that the deportation order the migrant gets upon arrival in Ceuta or Melilla is waived. He adds he has heard this order would guarantee a one to three months stay in peninsular Spain without being deported. Of course,

this also depends on luck. If the migrant enters a CIE directly after the safe-conduct, that full period of three months may not be completed. In general, migrants may be transported to a CIE, directly deported, or transported to accommodation organised by an NGO (Fernandez-Bessa; 14 May, 2015). While the *laissez-passez* basically is an extension of the deportation order, Mohamed Duduh (27 May, 2015) underlines that it also extends the documentation the migrant carries and it facilitates controls, especially in the cases when the migrant does not have any documentation upon arrival in Ceuta or Melilla or is considered stateless.

The organisation of such *laissez-passer* transportations remains thus very blurred, helped by the fact migrants can stay for an indefinite period of time in a CETI. Perez López (10 June, 2015) tells what she has heard from the migrants that frequent the San Antonio. According to their stories, there are two possibilities. Firstly, there is a list of chosen migrants published by the CETI, which is composed by the CETI in cooperation with NGOs such as CEAR. The attitude and behaviour of the migrants would be taken into account, as well as their personal situation and vulnerability. In general, women and children go first, Acedo Calvete (10 June, 2016) explains, but the distribution of the *laissez-passer* is not fixed and depends of the moment. In the second occasion, migrants may show up at the police office to ask for a *laissez-passer*. If there are still places left, this may work out. However, chances are great they are directly sent to a CIE on the Peninsula, Perez López (10 June, 2015) adds. The migrants know this, but sometimes they would take the risk or prefer this over a longer stay in Ceuta. Romero (11 June, 2015) mentions a system involving the *laissez-passer* with red and white cards. The white card would guarantee transportation to the Peninsula, while the red card means a longer stay in Ceuta, with possible direct deportation. In general, these seem to work as complementary to the loose system Perez López explains. Romero is involved with the CETI in composing a list of candidates for the passage, but in the end the police decides. Through instructions of the Ministry of Interior, or even independent actions, as there is no dictated law, some nationalities or asylum-seekers may be discriminated. As has already been mentioned, the transportation to the Peninsula normally is carried out in cooperation with an NGO (mainly Cruz Roja and Andalucía Acoge), which takes care of the migrants upon arrival (if there is no immediate deportation or detainment in a CIE) (Fernandez-Bessa; 14 May, 2015; Mohamed Duduh; 27 May, 2015).

> Moussa (10 June, 2015) hopes he will soon be provided with a *laissez-passer* to go to the Peninsula. He argues he and the other Guineans are very nice and friendly people. They show good behaviour to get on the CETI transportation lists. As Spain does not have agreements with Guinea at the moment, they make a good chance. "The Algerians are a lot more troublesome", he mentions, but that could also have to do with the fact many of them get deported...

7.7. Concluding remarks

The exceptional border realities that function in Ceuta and Melilla have been extensively discussed in this chapter. Due to their particular geographies, they will always be a crossroads of cultures, identities, policies and practices. In a migrational context, this is shown best by the double-faced nature of acting by the police and the authorities. Various dynamics and interests have a big influence on the blurred outcome that can be seen as the border realities of both the enclaves. While a smooth border regime is indispensable for the economic vitality of both cities, it becomes discredited while it rubs against the implied migration policies and

humanitarian conditions. This is the case, for example, with the 'friend or foe'-archetype the Guardia Civil has acquired. It is also the reality for asylum-applicants getting stuck in the enclaves, while migrants who do not apply continue through to the Peninsula in some cases. Although obviously some major improvements have been made ultimately, such as the possibility to apply directly for asylum at the Melilla border, the border permeability still runs along the lines of ethnicities and nationalities.

Discrimination along the 'border spectacle' even affects the irregular migration industry that runs rampantly. Sub-Saharan migrants seem to be the biggest victims, as the border in general remains impermeable for them, having to resort to dangerous methods to 'jump the border'. If successful, they are welcomed at the other side and get a fair treatment in the CETI, while Moroccans and Algerians may have it easier to cross the border, but are stuck in irregularities at the other side. For migrants, a big part of the enclaves' realities surrounds around being stuck and immobile. Border mechanisms are still performed and are capturing them in a 'fake Europe', as this is still Africa and also 'looks like Africa' (Amine; 6 May, 2015). 'Does the rest of Spain looks like Melilla?' (Rifat; 8 May, 2015). Those border dynamics, affecting different levels and connecting the enclaves with Barcelona, will be discussed in the next chapter.

8. Chasing *border* dynamics: from the enclaves to Barcelona

8.1. Introduction

While this thesis up until now has been built upon the leitmotiv of tracing back the migrant trajectory from Barcelona to Ceuta and Melilla, this chapter will break that pattern to follow the more traditionally studied trajectory. After Chapter 6 and 7 have shown the borderising realities migrants experience in Barcelona and have experienced earlier in their migratory process, this chapter will focus in more detail on those connecting elements. They will be linked to the bigger migration process within Spain and the European Union and will be subject to a normative analysis to discuss their legitimacy. It will be argued the existence of such a migration process is actually founded upon continuously borderising elements that migrants encounter and from which they cannot ease or free themselves. However, through the more scarcely offered possibilities of mobility and community generation, the other more positive side of this process will also be given attention. The intrinsic connection of migration to the 'illegality industry', as Andersson (2013) likes to call it, will also be discussed. Finally, it will be questioned how the migration process is still linked to that one physical border, and how that border keeps succeeding in generating attention, fear, conflict and 'spectacle'. At the end, a small conclusion will be given as a foretaste before leaping into the final conclusion of Chapter 9.

8.2. 'Good cop vs. bad cop'

> When clandestine West African migration is framed as a risk and the ''junk'' risk is heaped onto North African partners, unforeseen tensions are stoked. This has often been starkly spelled out by the Moroccan authorities, who insist that they pay a high price for cooperating in controls. The externalities of externalization—worsening relations with fellow African states, social malaise caused by migrant destitution and blockage, a dented image of Morocco abroad—are adding up. (Andersson, 2013, p. 277)

The Maghreb and sub-Saharan people traditionally have the same faith and the same goals, Traoré (2012) argues. Yet, the role that has been assigned to the Maghreb countries, especially Morocco, splits the African nations. The externalisation of the EU-policies, making of the Maghreb a 'bad cop', has consequently led to worsening relations with other African nations and, above all, a negative international image within the migration perspective (Andersson, 2013). Can this be considered as bad hospitality, or are the Maghreb countries obliged to treat migrants as 'hostile intruders'? Derrida (2001) argued real hospitality could only exist when all borders are open for everyone, without questioning one's identity or origin. However, then remains to be discussed if in this case the North African countries are the ones to refuse offering hospitality, or if this just falls into the *borderising* pattern within a migration policy framework they are esteemed to carry out. In his autobiographical book, Traoré (2012) mentions the good and the bad experiences he had during his journey throughout the Sahel region and North Africa. The migrant is framed as a 'hostile guest' by the media spectacle, influenced and imposed by politics. He stresses the hospitality and

generosity commonly found in this region still exists, but they are subordinate to this media spectacle and political securitisation. Can the negative image of the Maghreb – often also shared by the European press – be legitimised in all cases? This might be difficult to answer, but it again shows real hospitality cannot be offered when borders are not permeable for everyone. Hospitality remains manipulated and facilitated by policies and 'the illegality industry'.

Subsequently, the question arises if such cooperation between the EU and Morocco, a country that arguably does not share the European human rights values, is legitimate. Still, the immediate deportations (*devoluciones en caliente*, see Chapter 7) show a Europe that does not seem to respect those values thoroughly either. The EU-Maghreb cooperation is in this case mainly the shutting down of the EU-border for certain groups and processing that refusal elsewhere. As Rodier (2013) states, this cooperation may be in theory reciprocal, but at the same time it fore mostly serves the European interests. By processing the 'dirty part' outside the EU, its positive image will be maintained and the 'bad cop' remains out of sight. In practice, of course, this idea is not always carried out in that way. Morocco may not come into action if it does not benefit sufficiently from it, or if political relations have recently worsened. Such mishaps within the externalisation system can lead to dubious images of the Spanish Guardia Civil shooting with baton rounds, as the Moroccan police had not prevented the migrants from entering.[57] In reality, Moroccan and Spanish border guards often work together to militarise the border and impede the entrance of migrants to the enclaves, Ferrer-Gallardo and Albet-Mas (2013) stress. However, when such realities become more visible, it would damage the archetypal image of the Guardia Civil, while normally the Moroccan *gendarmerie* would carry out the dirty jobs (Andersson, 2013; Rodier, 2013).

> «Ceuta, c'est quand même bon. Ça va, on dort bien, on mange bien...», Henry (11 June, 2015) argues. The services provided by the CETI make his stay a lot better than what he has experienced before on his journey. However, it is not ideal. He would not like the idea to stay here for a long time. There is not a lot to do, except for working in the parking lots of supermarkets, accompanying clients with their purchases to their cars, and guarding their cars.

> Amine (6 May, 2015) experiences Melilla very differently from what he had expected. The area around the border and the CETI looks just like sub-Saharan Africa, "worse than Morocco!" The better zones are to be found in the centre, where the migrants are 'not welcome'. He is tired of the lack of possibilities in Melilla for Moroccans like him. It seems unfair he always has to play the 'migrant game' without given a real opportunity for a better life.

Such stereotyping and division of roles function above all on the surface. This works, as can be noticed from my conducted interviews with migrants and organisations. Moussa (10 June, 2015) and Henry (11 June, 2015) mention the hard times they have had in Algeria and Morocco before entering Ceuta. Henry had to sleep in the forests to hide for the Moroccan police, who always seem to be the ogre in this 'game of hunter and prey'. Acedo Calvete (10 June, 2015) mentions many migrants voluntarily go to the Spanish police to register themselves upon arrival in Ceuta or Melilla after the difficult time they have had hiding themselves from the authorities in Morocco. The dented image of Morocco, be it either veracious or embroidered, is widely dispersed. It forms a mental border

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[57] See, for example, Human Rights Watch (2014), https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/10/21/spain-excessive-force-melilla (retrieved on 7 May 2016).

as being welcomed and hospitality would not seem a given for migrants in North Africa. Still, one must recognise that migrants often prefer Morocco to going home again, seeing it as a 'second-best option' that provides more possibilities than their often poorer or less secure place of origin, as Carling (2007b) and Collyer and de Haas (2012) also agree.

Could it be legitimised to place Morocco, 'the bad cop', against Spain, 'the good cop'? While it probably comes in handy for the European Union to leave the dirty part outsourced, it also overshadows the 'friend or foe'-image, which the enclaves' system portrays towards the migrants. Initially, they are still content with the treatment they will get in the form of good care by the CETI, a proper sleeping place, and general attention and care generated towards them. However, later on they will realise how they are caught in a *limbo*, and made immobile. Arguably, the EU and Spain use the bad 'mediatised' experience the migrants have had in North Africa to keep those negative elements outside the EU on the one hand, and to cover up the often dead-end situation – the *limbo* – that for many of them is performed in Ceuta and Melilla, on the other hand. In other words, the enormous administrative border in the enclaves, possibly one of the less permeable ones in the trajectory studied in this thesis, is hidden through a veil of good initial hospitality that tries to differentiate itself from earlier experienced hardship.

8.3. The Ceuta and Melilla *limbo*
The realities in Ceuta and Melilla are definitely not corresponding to the Europe they had hoped for, as most of the migrants I speak agree about. The *limbo* performed in the Spanish enclaves has become an icon of fenced-off Europe, Ferrer-Gallardo and Albet-Mas (2013) state, even talking about 'purgatorial geopolitics'. Andersson (2013) names the Spanish enclaves 'offshore processing centres', where the unwanted might be shut out, but where people can also be kept in eternally. Very complex dynamics are interwoven, and at the same time sabotaging each other, as could be concluded. On the one hand, many people are excluded and do not succeed in integrating, may it be either migrants or native population, while at the same time the enclaves are economically viable thanks to the border. Irregular migrants are shut out, but smuggled goods come in as the order of the day. Melilla and Ceuta maintain themselves with illegal contraband and smuggling to keep up an economic standard. Smuggling forms the economic motor of Melilla, Ortega García (6 May, 2015) denotes, so it could possibly be rationally legitimised. However, could it be morally legitimised that illegal goods have no difficulty entering the highly fortified enclaves, while human beings are shut out? At the same time, perhaps it is exactly this what makes the Europeanisation and fortification of Ceuta and Melilla weak. They are 'African' and are not intrinsically different from what can be encountered at the other side of the border, as they *need* the border and the Other, thus a complete shut down would never function. This leaves us with a model that discriminates on ethnicity and origin, and which could be dubbed a 'contradictory enterprise', Andersson (2013) argues.

Initially, migrants do not want to listen to less bright stories about their stay in the enclaves and Europe in general. ''They have had a very hard time, so now they just want to enjoy and then they will see later'', as Ortega García (6 May, 2015) has experienced. Especially misleading are the papers they are provided with. As they have not been offered official documents during the previous stages of this journey, they see this as something

positive that will bring them further. Most of the times, they do not realise it just serves for being identifiable within the enclaves, and later works as an expulsion order (Acedo Calvete; 10 June, 2015). Especially the spontaneous nature of Spanish migration policies in Ceuta and Melilla, without well-defined laws and procedures, is what arguably makes the whole situation misleading for migrants. In a sense, they may not realise they are the Other within the administrative border, as initial hospitality has covered this. This hospitality may be for a part provided at the start in the form of a more fixed place to stay, the CETI, and more official and administrational encounters.

Nonetheless, initial positivity is probably also forged out of expectations and the image of Europe. Most migrants have already coped with many setbacks, but they have kept hope that everything would get better when arriving in 'Europe'. The *limbo* in Ceuta and Melilla delivers the first blow to this image, and is a reality-check for some. The sky-high expectations that most migrants bring with them may for a part surge out of surviving, as Amine (see box on p. 105) also tells, but may certainly also be explained through *mythopoesis*. This story telling, often with embroidered or untrue elements, is spread through emigrating countries, legitimising the migration process and the reason for many to set off on a journey towards Europe. Bakary and Basiru (9 April, 2015) name this the biggest problem within the whole process. Realities will never meet with expectations, as these keep on getting fed with false realities. During their journey, migrants have had to hide for authorities in Algeria, in Morocco, in Libya… They could not enjoy the rights of being a human there, but that was to be expected, as some even try to avoid crossing those countries. Migrants that fork to Spain know North Africa will probably be the hardest part of the process. They are nobodies there, *bare humans*. Then, they still not know arriving in the enclaves will not intrinsically change that.

'Don't worry, your time in Morocco has ended', as migrants are often told by the administration and NGO-workers in Ceuta and Melilla. They are safe now, and they do not have to hide anymore. However, it cannot be denied these migrants were originally undesired, as they were supposed to not go beyond the enclaves' fences. As they have succeeded in one way or the other to enter Ceuta or Melilla, another solution must be found for this group. While the borders were supposed to facilitate immobility, this immobility is now moved further inside, transforming the enclaves for migrants into an immobile 'Camp' (Johnson, 2013), although this will only be realised later on. Migrants think they have crossed the last barrier, the last *physical* border, and that all their problems have vanished (Ortega García; 6 May, 2015; Traoré & Le Dantec, 2012). They are welcomed and helped, just as it would fit a 'civilised European community'. However, there is a vital discrepancy between this initial hospitality, and being accepted within community. Migrants in Ceuta and Melilla remain the complete Other, just as they were before. There are no possibilities to integrate, as they are made immobile and cannot leave the spheres of either the CETI, or the irregular circuits. Perhaps, the hospitality in the two cities could therefore be seen as a farce, only provided because 'that is how it done in European civilisation'. By providing the CETIs with unlimited staying possibilities concerning migrants, the authorities take over their lives. The geographical exceptionalities of Ceuta and Melilla are in this case exploited by authorities through implementing a state of exceptionalism that leaves the migrant completely disarmed, or *bare*, as Agamben (1998; 2008 argues. In such a state of exceptionalism, the control on

human rights has become fluid and legal definiteness is not strongly present (Andersson, 2013; van Houtum, 2010b; Spijkerboer & Vermeulen, 2005).

The anxiety migrants encounter when they realise their fate is not in their own hands in such a state of exception is often internalised, van Houtum (2010b) argues. It becomes a 'waiting before the Law' that *empties* the inner Self and leaves the migrant in a continuous state of 'not yet'. When I talk with migrants in both Ceuta and Melilla, I notice a difference between 'older' inhabitants and 'newer' inhabitants. The Moroccans Amine (6 May, 2015) and Youssef (7 May, 2015) express their bitter disappointment in life in Melilla and their doubts about their futures. The newer inhabitants still have bright future plans, as the Syrians Rifat and Firas (8 May, 2015) demonstrate. The Guinean Moussa, Abdelay and Henry (10 and 11 June, 2015) show some more doubts, reinforced by an already more lengthy stay in Ceuta. The state of exceptionalism disappoints, but fore mostly *empties* and suffocates, as Traoré (2012) also experienced (see box). It takes away dreams, plans and imaginations, leaving migrants extinguished. During their journey, many have experienced hardship in its most perceptible form, while the now facilitated *limbo* works in a more refined way. Migrants may therefore morally evaluate their stay in the enclaves as 'not too bad'. Initial hospitality and the refinedness of the *limbo* blinds them in a way, as it tries to morally legitimise the way the state of exception works. Creating a state of exception that separates the Other proves not to be that difficult in a city where multiculturalism and

> "After the initial relief, I was invaded by a feeling of suffocation. I remain in an alley without exit, deprived of my freedom. I continue to not be in control of my fate. I am trapped in a corner of Africa which they consider European but that has covered me like a spider web." (Traoré & Le Dantec, 2012, p. 215)

coexistence are everywhere, but where cohabitation seems to be lacking and segregation is rampant and notorious. Ortega García (6 May, 2015) argues this leads to an administrational border that excludes almost everyone. In that sense, the facilitated *limbo* for migrants is merely a superlative degree of the existing excluding politics in the enclaves.

The imposed sovereign power that decides over the mobility, or even over 'life and death' of migrants (Agamben, 2000) forms a particularly strong threshold in Ceuta and Melilla. Rancière (1999) argues the exclusion of people is merely power-ridden, and can always be challenged. Migrants could then bridge the gap and form part of the inclusionary community. Yet, this has proven to be extraordinary difficult in the exceptionalities of Ceuta and Melilla. Ortega García (6 May, 2015) underlines the society is already precarious and people prefer to look away from that. In practice, this means the existence of exclusion is rather denied or ignored than acknowledged. Acedo Calvete (10 June, 2015) describes migrants meet a wall of incomprehension when they try to get involved, participate or group together. The particular geographies of the enclaves have meant that the societies, although multicultural and coexistent, are traditionally conservative and wary of changes within the mentioned precarious state of society. Migrants are rather expected to stay close to the CETI or in the peripheral zones. They are *expected* to live in the state of exception, making their immobility even within the city restricted in that sense. Moffette (2010) also states irregular migration is often seen as a potential threat to the local order of things, among as well the 'Muslim threat' created by a Moroccan influx in both enclaves, creating different categories of Others. However, in the end all may blur together in a 'pocket of illegal immigrants', as he argues. The securitising discourse remains thus very vivid, also among inhabitants of Ceuta

and Melilla, and can therefore be seen as double-layered. The discourse at the border performed by the authorities is shared by discursive practices of the local inhabitants, wary of changes within the sociocultural and demographical scape.

Could such an imposed *limbo*, a state of exception, be seen as validity? And, in that case, could it be seen as in the 'best interest' of the manipulated: the excluded migrants? Coming back to Manners (2002), the danger of seeing the *limbo* as 'normal' or 'valid' means that the European Union itself can shape conceptions of the normal, something that is already happening. Its status as civil hegemony would provide the authority to legitimise its actions. Diez (2005), on the other hand, notes the legitimisation of actions is far more a mere outcome of different norms competing. Mutlu and Leite (2012) state that exceptionalism cannot be seen as something 'lawless', but rather as an attempt at reshaping the legal order through widening or moderating its boundaries. The border actions and dynamics in Ceuta and Melilla may certainly not reproduce the European image, but they are contextually not very deviant from other border situations, as they argue. Sovereign presence seems always present at border-crossings, especially those that would shift between (imaginary) different cultural, administrational and political worlds, ready to strip persons from their most basic rights and freedoms. Ceuta and Melilla are such extreme cases, influenced by their particular geographies, where through media and politics the Other can easily be seen as a threat.

Is it then morally justifiable to keep migrants for an indefinite time in the enclaves, leaving them immobile and acting as a sovereign power over them? As said earlier, the EU still tries to exclude after migrants have already crossed the border and put them confronted with another, administrative, border. Ceuta and Melilla prove to be the appropriate places for such politics. They are 'offshore processing centres', *limbos*, 'nonplaces', and so on. It probably is thus not possible to morally, or even legally through humanitarian and refugee rights, legitimise the existence of such spaces of exception. Nation-states, although illegal according to many basic rights, are able to denaturalise persons, as Berkowitz (2013) states. This would mean that the creation of exceptional spaces with persons deprived from their freedom is inherent to the existence of nation-states. Then again, Arendt (1976) sees the existence of the mere concept of rightless people as a failure of the nation-state, while Agamben (1998) adds the 'bare human' should always be a temporary one, before leading to assimilation or repatriation. Indefinite spaces of exception do not fit within this image, as they would undermine the existence of nation-states and their constructional and political order. This could arguably be seen within Ceuta and Melilla through Schengen not being applicable there, as well as the in-your-face contraband smuggling, not hidden from the authorities at all.

The creation of exceptionalism seems to generate a loss on different territories within those so-called constructional and political orders, leading subsequently to more exceptions. The precariousness of nation-states can also be noted in Ceuta and Melilla in a smaller, local order of things, as Moffette (2010) states. The societies of both cities have always been multicultural, and their social concepts are rendered around the idea of living-together. As Ortega García (6 May, 2015) and Acedo Calvete (10 June, 2015) have already expressed, this idea is often being presented as too glorious, as both Ceuta and Melilla form very exclusionary communities for various groups. Moffette (2010), therefore, goes one step further and calls this living-together above all a 'Christian Spanish' concept that would permit the Christian communities of the enclaves to remain in power and maintain the current

precarious social division. Within this social division that leads to segregation, there is also room for spaces of exceptionalism that accommodate and retain irregular migrants in a sphere of juridical fluidity, spatial immobility and moral hopelessness. However, while those spaces of exceptionalism cannot be morally justified, it must also be said that the migrants are at least provided with the essential life necessities within the CETI spheres of Ceuta and Melilla, as Andersson (2013) denotes, mentioning Spain as the country that relatively takes most care of the migrants compared to its Mediterranean EU-neighbours. The *trampa* ('trap') may be unbearable and 'the Camp' may function as a pressure cooker within the precarious societies of Ceuta and Melilla, but the basic humanitarian facilities are there. Moussa (10 June, 2015) talks about the good treatment he has received from the Spanish in the CETI, and Henry (11 June, 2015) grades his stay in Ceuta as 'okay', with at least a place to sleep and eat, and even sometimes being able to gain some money. Of course, as already mentioned earlier, this relative good treatment – a sign of hospitality – could also be seen as a veil to cover the *limbo* that later on would be discovered and profoundly felt.

8.4. Remaining uncertainty and exclusion: a continuous limbo?

''All of Spain is like Melilla, right?'', Rifat asks me. I do not know how to respond. Obviously, I do not perceive Melilla culturally as very similar to peninsular Spain, maybe only to Andalusia. But what good would that do for him? My case is not the same as Rifat's. Will the mental blind alley vividly lived in 'trapped Melilla' follow him throughout Europe, or will he be able to choose his own destiny and integrate in society? (Logbook - Melilla; 8 May, 2015)

Perez López (10 June, 2015) mentions the fact many migrants prefer to leave Ceuta (or Melilla) with a *laissez-passer*, although they know they will probably enter a CIE in peninsular Spain, with the possible later consequence of being deported. Still, migrants want to leave as soon as possible when they realise they are caught in a trap in Ceuta or Melilla. The free in-and-out policy of the CETIs, contrary to the CIEs, is basically a farce, as migrants cannot move in or out from the small surfaces of the enclaves. However, will a *laissez-passer* to the Peninsula get them out of that suffocating *limbo*? When it comes to mobility, some more spatial freedom, when not detained in a CIE, will probably be gained. However, internally performed administrative borders increasingly seem to have the same characteristics as the enclaves' borders, as Fernandez-Bessa (14 May, 2015) depicts. They have the same exclusionary effects on migrants, subsequently creating new *borderising* waiting zones. An example of an internal set-up border is the documentation controlling on the streets. Such identity controls or raids are justified and validated by the authorities to control the presence of people, and more specifically the movements of migrants. However, when looking at Ama Oji's (2015) discourse methodology that connects validity with reasonableness, could it be called reasonable to perform a selective raid based on someone's race? Fernandez-Bessa (14 May, 2015) mentions the raids in Barcelona may have in some occasions a very racial character when the police only stop persons with ethnical sub-Saharan characteristics. Then, it remains very doubtful if selecting on ethnicity can be seen as reasonable when taking into account basic human rights. Many locals have denounced these administrative racial profiling practices, as a result of now the raids are performed in a more subtle way. However, that does not mean these controls are now freed from ethnical motives,

especially when a plane scheduled for deportation has to be filled with certain nationalities (Campaña Estatal por el Cierre de los CIE, 2014; Queraltó & Bonet; 13 April, 2015). An exclusionary border for certain groups of migrants seems then created *ad-hoc* for practical and logistical purposes, as forming a part of the authorities' deportation policies. While the place, time and 'victims' of such raids always change, the border has become here something fluid, as well as an obstacle for whoever does not comply with the document requirements of the constructional order of society.

The occasional raids are part of the unexpected or unimagined lives of migrants in Barcelona. Envisaged as the European paradise before and upon arrival, life in the city often disappoints. As has been described in earlier chapters, detainment in the CIE with possible deportation is a constant risk that migrants have to cope with as long as they do not have the required documentation, obtained through *arraigo* or an asylum status. Amadou (25 March, 2015) argues that expectations facing reality in Barcelona may even have a more shocking effect on migrants than the often-traumatising journey to Europe. The difference between both is that the journey is expected to be bad. The first blow, as argued in the last paragraph, is then experienced in the enclaves, where the *limbo* to facilitate their immobility is performed. Does life in Barcelona form a continuation on this immobility? It arguably does in many ways, performing the final blow that leaves the migrant delusionary, striking all expectations and imaginaries. The state of 'not-yet' seems to continue, leaving a life in the irregularities for many as often the only possibility. As Cirez (24 April, 2015) phrases it, the perspective for many is 'the street'. The only resource most migrants can often count on is their own social network, which is most visible in the case of the irregular mass dwellings in the *asentamientos*. They remain fairly excluded from society, caught by the spatialisation of power that again forms an excluding threshold (Agamben, 1998). As mentioned in Chapter 6, such irregular livings often get demolished or closed by the authorities with the reasoning they are unsafe (Andreu; 11 May, 2015). However, often there is no long-term solution provided, and people end up 'on the streets' again, but now more dispersed and with weaker social ties than before.

> "To muddle through, I see myself forced to confess to my chief that I work for him under a false identity. He smiles with an understanding air: "Now that you say it, you don't look a lot like the photo on the residence permit that you showed me." That morning, while I move away after having offered my resignation, I feel weighed down. "Does your life here make sense, Mahmud? You don't have the right to work; you don't have the right to anything. Everything you do is illegal; you are illegal." [...] Throughout the journey that I did to arrive up to here, I never imagined that life in Europe could be so difficult." (Traoré & Le Dantec, 2012, p. 228)

Traoré (2012) asks himself if the life in Europe makes any sense, as everything one does to survive is 'illegal and against the law'. One cannot even walk quietly on the streets, while this may sound paradoxically as 'the street' is the only option one often has. Abdou (28 June, 2015) lives 'an illegal life' in Spain for ten years already. Contrary to his friend Mamadou (28 June, 2015), he has not been very lucky and has not had the chances to obtain documentation or apply for *arraigo*. He has seen himself obliged to accept irregular work time after time, which means he could not build up time being registered at the same living for a longer time. While keeping yourself registered may later on provide chances for *arraigo*, ending up without work in a certain place often impedes following 'the route to work'. Economy and administration spatialise and borderise Mamadou's chances throughout the

year, which in practice means he often has to move between seasons to be able to find work, mostly in the agricultural sector. He fears one day he will fall into 'a trap' and will be sent back to Senegal. Paradoxically, Mamadou encounters thus forced mobility to find work, while at the same time this leaves him for a big part immobile as it carries on the vicious circle of irregularity. Could this be seen as the consequence of Harvey's (2001) spatial fix, or rather the ever-present immobility facilitated by authorities and nation-states that blocks evolution, as argued by Sassen (2002)? Perhaps, both theories are applicable here. Fact is that Mamadou's evolution within the constructed Spanish society and nation-state as a whole seems to be firmly blocked by an imposed spatialisation that requires being on the move, but which leads to greater immobility and prolonged irregularity on the long term.

Hannah Arendt's quote *on ne parvient pas deux fois* seems very appropriate here. Besides administrative hurdles, it seems unfeasible for many migrants to penetrate and get included within Barcelonese society. And even when things might go a little better, will they ever be considered as culturally belonging to and identified as such? Effectively, the constructional and political order of the nation-state seems fairly responsible for this imposed border, blocking identification and inclusion through alienation. From the other perspective, one could also see migrants as causing corrosion to such traditional categories within the established orders (Agamben, 1998). Arendt (1996) calls migrants that would not or could not assimilate to a new culture the 'vanguards' of society. They may very well find themselves in the citizen gap, another type of *limbo* that leaves them short of the guarantee and protection of citizenship rights. Leaving short of citizenship might not be the right term to express this gap, as the importance of these rights becomes very evident with the case of irregular migrants. Mehdi (8 April, 2015) talks about a life without dignity, and 'a situation

> **Racial profiling**
>
> "If you're black, you're an immigrant. If you're white, you're an expat." Although Basiru (9 April, 2015) laughs while he pronounces this, he also underlines this is a serious issue. There is still a huge visa gap between African countries such as The Gambia, and other developing countries, such as Brazil, for example. "If Europe needs you, no visa is required anymore." When you arrive for job or business purposes, then you subsequently pass from immigrant to expat. This leaves us with a 'negative list' of less wished sub-Saharan foreigners, 'the migrants', as van Houtum & Mamadouh (2008) also argue.
>
> While sub-Saharan immigrants seem to be the most disadvantaged before and upon arrival, they also experience the most racial profiling while residing in Barcelona, Basiru (9 April, 2015) argues. Their number is often miscalculated and they remain heavily othered through being often associated with crime, *asentamientos* and unemployment. Chinese or Pakistani may be accepted and integrated a lot easier within society, often due to them having their own shops or businesses, while sub-Saharans remain very invisible and isolated. 'The negative list' therefore seems a recurrent topic for this group of migrants that maintains thresholds facilitating immobility.

comparable to how animals live', without having a fixed roof over one's head and fully depending on charity to survive. Oummar (8 April, 2015) agrees with this, adding that there will always be some kind of obstacle or block that impedes to move on from this hopeless situation. On top of that comes the daily insecurity of being in an irregular situation, and officially not having the right to stay within the physical perimeters of the Spanish state. In Agamben's (2005) terms, one becomes a 'legally unnameable and unclassifiable being' condemned to a *bare life*.

8.5. Overcoming borders through acts of citizenship

However, what do we exactly mean by being a citizen? Barbero (2012), following Isin's argumentation (2002), advocates to challenge the traditional meaning of citizenship and to make it a more flexible notion. There is a need to question this traditional meaning, as it only references to a scene in which citizenship does already exist or has already been created. It therefore leaves out the *bare human*, which remains excluded from society and cannot obtain citizenship by any form, as it seems. The interpretation by Isin (2002) differs from this classical view through arguing that ''otherness is constructed towards strangers, outsiders and aliens and acts of citizenship are related to the way in which each of these subjects celebrate, perpetuate, impose, resist and break the modes of being political with each other'' (Barbero, 2012, p. 534). Consequently, Isin (2009, p. 383) defines acts of citizenship as ''those acts that transform forms (orientations, strategies and technologies) and modes (citizens, strangers, outsiders, aliens) of being political by bringing into being new actors as activist citizens (that is, claimants of rights) through creating and transforming sites and stretching scales''. Through this approach, bringing the citizen concept in a flux, the *bare humans*, the undocumented and the irregular, or the *sinpapeles*, could be seen as more inclusive within society. While they may not (yet) be considered as citizens, not having access to the corresponding rights, they do have access to perform acts of citizenship. This assumption subsequently can be connected to Rancière's theory of 'those who have no part', which promotes the idea that created exclusion can be challenged.

> Mamadou (28 June, 2015) and his companions always wait on a square in the centre of a city, for example in Lleida, Jaén or Huelva. ''There, the bosses pass with their cars to select their employees. When a boss likes your efforts, he will call you every year to come back when there is work.''

Traoré (2012, p. 233) mentions the same phenomenon of the squares – the *plazas*, often called «la plaza de Chad», – where the sub-Saharan *parados*, the unemployed, wait for the chiefs to contract them and pick them up for a job, typically in the agricultural sector or the constructional industry. As *othered* or segregated as those migrants may remain, they create their own spatialities. Such place-making, as is argued by Newman (2006), is perhaps comparable to the creation of ghettos and the inability to cross the border and perpetrate society. The unemployed migrants are arguably condemned to gather together and remain excluded from society in the hope of getting another illegal job. Their portrayed exclusion on these *plazas* is confirmed by Traoré (2012), who talks about the experienced hostilities coming from the local population, which is afraid of losing out to the gathered migrants on job possibilities. In this sense, such own-initiative place-making, albeit very forced by the need and mobility to find a job, is indeed another display of the deep exclusion of migrant contingents within local societies. On the other hand, one could also look on this from Rancière's perspective. While exclusion remains vivid, the migrants are using their visibility and number to get to new possibilities. For the Guinea-Bissauan Oummar (8 April, 2015) and the Gambians Bakary and Basiru (9 April, 2015), this is a key element. The sub-Saharan immigrant contingent in Barcelona, for example, has been and remains fairly invisible. Gathering together and place-making on such public *plazas* arguably makes them much more

visible and also takes away a part of the stereotyping and racial profiling, as the local population becomes more familiar and educated with the topic (Castles & Davidson, 2008; Gill, 2010). However, one should of course not see this place-making as the ultimate option, or the magic potion, to integrate within society. Migrants may still be seen as the ones who take away the jobs, or who profit from public benefits (Bakary & Basiru; 9 April, 2015; Traoré & Le Dantec, 2012). In the case of more recently arrived migrants, including refugees and asylum-seekers, this is not always different. The Syrian refugees in Ceuta challenged social and administrational orders when they camped in the city centre in 2014 to generate more attention for the bad living conditions in the CETI. While they became involved in challenging exclusion and the local social order, this place-making was not accepted or viewed as a positive development by the local population.

Would failed attempts on challenging the established order by the nation-state then generate a leaning to the own identity? This may certainly be the case, but one should also not mitigate the impact of both the journey and irregularity on migrants. The Moroccan Youssef (7 May, 2015), residing for almost ten years in Melilla and still attempting to get into Europe, feels he is more *melillense* than anything else. The irregularity that most migrants are forced into when they undertake their journey leaves them without documentation. They still have an identity and roots, but those are not officially demonstrable anymore. Some may even opt for another nationality, if that comes in handy or if it increases better chances (Perez López; 10 June, 2015). When irregularity continues within Europe's borders, the possibilities to maintain ties with one's own identity or origins get even slimmer. Abdou (28 June, 2015) has not been able to go to Senegal and see his family for over ten years. And even if there is the possibility, is one still welcomed with *hospitality* at home when not being able to tell about a European success story? Mehdi (8 April, 2015) argues this culminates into another limbo. He is not able to go back to Morocco, because there, he would be the Other as well, a *fracasado* ('loser'). This generates big immobility, while not being able to move forward or backward, and also a loss of identity. When you do not succeed to participate within a new society, but you are not welcome to go back to the other either, you end up being alienated everywhere. Arendt's *on ne parvient pas deux fois* resonates again.

New possibilities and a better future for migrants in Barcelona or within Spain are often found on less frequented routes. Bakary (9 April, 2015) feels migrants should be informed in more creative ways about their possibilities to develop themselves, and especially to make them aware the reality in the city does not resemble what they had or have pictured in mind. When they work on presenting themselves and becoming more visible, he continues, more possibilities will arise that would possibly get them out of immobility and exclusion. When migrants know what it takes to get to opportunities that would lead to less exclusion and at the same time gather together in associations to not forget about their own identity, it could pave a path to more luck and success. When talking about creativity, migrants arguably would also be better off when thinking 'more original'. As has been said before, many think of Barcelona as where the opportunities are to be found. However, smaller places might actually provide more job possibilities, and might also be easier to feel included in society and create a network outside the migrant community (João; 8 April, 2015; Mamadou; 28 June, 2015; Moya; 3 June, 2015). Migrants that live in a *transworld* (see Schapendonk & Steel, 2014) may fall in between two societies, ending up being excluded from both, as Mehdi (8

April, 2015) experiences. Bakary's view (9 April, 2015) on this phenomenon differs in the sense that migrant's visibility and presentation may be the key to become included. Improving this through a migrant's association that also stimulates the own identity arguably helps to generate more of a sense of belonging. At the same time, it could overcome borders and improve the level of 'feeling at home', which subsequently could change the dynamical definition of the Other within society.

8.6. Concluding remarks

This chapter has focused on the continuous stream of borders that migrants encounter along their way from Ceuta and Melilla to Barcelona. While lifting out cases and anecdotes within the broader migration process, various connections have been linked up with the studied theories and methodologies. Firstly, the intrinsic connection with the 'illegality industry' has been discussed in the sense that, during the journey, but also after arrival in Europe, irregularity always seems to be a key factor that goes hand in hand with facilitated immobility. This immobility initially might seem hidden (the 'good cop vs. bad cop' situation), showing Europe as an open and mobile place that welcomes everyone after having succeeded in crossing 'the ultimate physical border' to arrive in Ceuta or Melilla. Later on, migrants actually experience their stay in the enclaves as a *limbo*, being surrounded by impermeable borders. Some will never come out of this *limbo*, as Ceuta and Melilla seem to be bottomless pits for them. Others might be lucky and end up being transported to the Peninsula, although detainment in a CIE may very possibly await them.

After this initial blow, the image of Barcelona will later prove to not correspond to reality either. This is for a part caused by *mythopoesis*, the embroidered storytelling between migrants about their lives in Europe. When they do not succeed to get out of an irregular situation, migrants will feel obliged to make stories up about their experiences to not come across as *fracasados*. Besides that burden from the community at home, they are under constant pressure of getting detained after document controls or raids. The *arraigo* seems one of the only possibilities to get out of this *limbo*, which facilitates immobility and exclusion in Barcelona, but it is not achievable for many, exactly due to their irregular circumstances that require moving for job possibilities. Isin (2002) perhaps provides an access to inclusion through opting for a more flexible notion of the term 'citizenship' within the nation-state, which would also allow *sinpapeles* to integrate and feel more included. Another possibility is arguably to be found in finding more creative ways to integrate, as for example in smaller communities than Barcelona, as well as through making the migrant community more visible through associations. Such associations can, at the same time, provide a higher standard of 'feeling at home' and influence the dynamical definition of the Other within society.

9. Conclusion

9.1. Introduction

Throughout this thesis and during my fieldwork period, I have tried to unravel the borderising mechanisms within the migration process between two places, with Ceuta and Melilla, on the one hand, and Barcelona, on the other. To take a somewhat unusual path and perspective, I decided to trace back from Barcelona, where many migrants arrive and stay for either a shorter or longer period of time, to Ceuta and Melilla, two of the outer manifestations of 'Fortress Europe'. Based in Barcelona, I first grasped a notion of what is life for migrants in this big city, before I later went on separate field trips to Ceuta and Melilla, as well as a more spontaneous trip to Lleida (see Chapter 4). The thesis maintains the same sequence and traces back down from one chapter to the other, until the last chapter breaks with this rule and ends up in Barcelona again. One could therefore see it as a cycle, starting and ending in the Catalan capital, which can be interpreted in various ways. It arguably represents a vicious circle, resembling the various borders and *limbos* that migrants encounter. It can also stand for the migration process as a whole, showing that migration is not just the crossing of borders, which could be represented by drawing a line from A to B, but rather a concept that encompasses all aspects, experiences and dynamics of life that migrants go through. This process is intrinsically linked to mobility and the possibilities one has to move around.

Sometimes, the migration process left me very confused, as more fieldwork and research often led to an ever-growing tangle of information. My main research question was a real leitmotiv that guided me through the research and the writing process of this thesis. It helped me to maintain an overview, although it could not always prevent me from delving into the smallest details. In this final chapter, I will first present and discuss my findings that correspond to the main and sub research questions. This will subsequently lead to several implications and concluding remarks, before moving on to some final reflections and recommendations.

9.2. Findings

This thesis represents a large range of voices, discourses, insights and hypotheses, as well as consequences and conclusions, which correspond to the migration process as experienced in Barcelona and Ceuta and Melilla. The borderising dynamics that are involved and which influence and facilitate this process are not unambiguous, nor positive or negative *per se*. Many different types of borders, imposed by such dynamics, and often forming a tangled whole, have been analysed and described. Here, I try to somewhat disentangle that whole through repassing my findings.

Barcelona is seen as the open and vibrant city that welcomes everyone. It is the city of *all*, as migrants often think. 'Barcelona or die!' There is simply no other option or motto likewise as powerful and that gives the same amount of strength to those who are experiencing hardship along their journey, passing obscure corners of Africa and entering open seas to reach their goal. Barcelona, however, should in this case be interpreted as the representation of Europe, as the vibrating cosmopolitan gate of the continent. The discrepancy between such representations and imaginations, and reality, however, often creates a huge

mental border. Within its representation, Barcelona forms the epitome of a new life, including freedom and safety for those who seek refuge, but as well of adventure and social and economical success. ''The adventure is a lesson; what you don't earn in money, you earn in spirit'' (Traoré & Le Dantec, 2012, p. 9). It is a common mistake to think migrants only arrive to seek refuge or economical winnings. Of course, many among them will cite these as possible motivations, but curiosity and interest also drive the human, as he is not only a *homo economicus*. We may often forget borders are not equally permeable for everyone. While the lucky ones among us may rather easily travel from one place to another, this is not self-evident for others. Many migrants encounter racial profiling and discrimination at the border, where they are simply denied access or required to have a visa to pass. The existence of a negative list of countries that are worst off when it comes to mobility is not a fable. The reality seems there is often a widely recognised war or a serious health threat needed for people to be accepted at the physical border, as has shown the Syrian case. Such cases also make for dynamics that separate and discriminate between different nationalities. The Syrians now have a chance to immediately apply for asylum at the border, while the sub-Saharans are condemned to enter Ceuta or Melilla in a clandestine way.

When having crossed that ubiquitous and all-decisive physical border that separates two tiny pieces of Europe within Africa of the rest of the continent, a fairly ambiguous game is played. Ceuta and Melilla, ambiguous territories per se, small in size, and complex in history, geopolitics and demographics, are arguably not the most suitable to provide hospitality to migrant contingents of all sorts and origins. However, this is Europe. It should be 'welcoming' and 'receptive' to worse-off migrants that have just experienced hardship and deprivation during their journey, often on the brink of a literal or mental dead-end. The illegal migrant industry, full of opportunists, and hopeless situations have often taken their toll on those who arrive at the external borders of Europe. They have been kept going by the idea 'Barça' is waiting for them, not least of all by the legitimising stories that are told within social networks and communities which often glorify reality – the mental border. These stories often also focus on the bad treatment in the Maghreb countries, leading to discrimination, hostilities and a *bare life*, excluded from the basic human rights. The initial welcoming facilitations in the enclaves try to capitalise on this, suggesting a 'good cop vs. bad cop' situation. It seems, however, difficult to legitimise such a comparison, as the situation of migrants in these EU-neighbouring countries seems to be first and fore mostly a result of the externalisation and outsourced facilitation of European policies. Is hospitality, thus, something that comes naturally in this case? With the border spectacle in full swing, it seems more of a state affair, which allows manipulation and facilitation of the hospitality concept at the same time.

Behind a façade of hospitality in the enclaves – a welcoming reception and a provision of clothes and basic needs – emerges a big administrative border, especially tailored to the natural and social orders in the enclaves. Within a matter of time, the gates to Europe change to processing zones that drift off from the European continent to form the ultimate ambiguous migrant enterprises. While the illegal migration industry lives from the non-documented migrants, illegality and exclusiveness is now facilitated by the State. This means a nation-state, or a transnational entity as the EU, can shape spatial conceptions of the normal. In Ceuta and Melilla, this has led to an institutionalised state of exceptionalism in which

migrants seem to live. It can, perhaps, also be seen as a nation-state's resort to cover the gap that has been created by the arrival of non-documented migrants that do not have, or should not be permitted, to have the citizen rights of that nation-state in question. On the other hand, such 'nonplaces' might be inherent to nation-states, as these are in the position to denaturalise persons or deprive them from their rights. While it is doubtful if it could be ever legitimised to start with, such a situation of deprivation of rights, transforming persons into *bare humans*, should always be a temporary one. There should be a perspective, a future. The administrative *limbos* in Ceuta and Melilla are fundamentally lacking perspectives and are created to facilitate irregularity for an indefinite period of time liable to convenience and without official jurisdiction. Even when being a possible asylum-seeker, the enclave's *limbo* seems to be inescapable. After all, no one knows when the time is ripe to leave these places and reach the European continent, the 'real Europe'. That uncertainty creates a seemingly insurmountable bureaucratic border.

As a consequence, in Ceuta and Melilla, migrants remain in a state of exception that deprives them from their mobility. Immobility is facilitated by the administration as part of the constructional order to such a level they are not able to either move forward or backward. When they arrive at the Peninsula, more perspectives seem to arise. Barcelona seems now within reach. However, in administrational terms, not much has changed. A large number of migrants remain irregular, as often the only document they possess is a deportation order (the *laissez-passer*). More conformable to the idea all humans should have perspectives in life, the detention centres (CIEs) can only detain the migrants for a maximum of 60 days. However, we also see here a facilitation of exceptionalism, as they subsequently can be detained for this period as frequently as desired when being caught on the streets without documentation. In the city, mobility and freedom have partly been acquired, but irregularity and exclusion remain as borderising mechanisms. Administrative, but also social borders, are therefore never far away and can appear all of a sudden. The reality in Barcelona is not what one had expected or one had hoped for, and many have to get by and muddle through within irregular circuits. A state of 'not-yet' in many cases seems to continue in the form of immobility and uncertainty, blocking possible evolution. Is it unfeasible to integrate and get included in the Barcelonese society as one only succeeds once to do so, as Hannah Arendt suggested?

One could see the phenomenon of irregular migrants as corrosion to the traditional configuration and ordering of the nation-state. They encounter themselves in a 'citizen gap', another administratively and socially borderising *limbo* that excludes them from society, as they do not fit in that fixed image. The ambiguity in outcome and proceeding of this negative view now lies in the difference of dealing with this exclusion. Reconciling oneself to the idea of an irregular and excluded perspective within society may give a fairly different outcome compared to challenging the established orders that block evolution and facilitate immobility. As the migration process involves all aspects of life and has proven to be a long road, this challenge may not yield fruits immediately. After all, looking for a way out in a 'borderising circle' is not an easy task. When falling between two identities and two societies, and eventually being alienated by both, one can recur to an anonymous 'bare life' in the shadows of a city such as Barcelona. One can also opt to improve on visibility and presence, which could be achieved by gathering together. A *plaza de Chad* may echo discrimination, racial profiling and segregation, but it improves presence at the same time, something that could

also be gained by participating in associations that focus on one's origins. While leaning towards origins often gets condemned, as it would be showing a lack of integration, it can also provide a safe haven for those that are caught in the 'citizen gap'. It acts as a stable factor that arguably improves the sense of belonging, and it might as well positively influence one's feeling at home. Such improvements can subsequently change the self-implicated and dynamical definition of the Other, which is now no longer in a continuous battle with the Self, but straightens out. The internalised otherness by migrants then may also get another form and the anxiety to perform within border dynamics may diminish. When such inner anxiety may no longer block evolving, creative ways of integrating may be encountered and frequented, leading to new contacts and opportunities on the horizon. Borders could then vanish just as rapidly as they appeared.

9.3. Implications and final remarks

How does one distinguish between 'illegal' and 'irregular' migrants, and how to use both terms? This has been quite a difficult task. When talking about the illegal migrant industry, one talks about illegal practices such as human trafficking. 'Illegality Inc.' (Andersson, 2013) is full of people and mechanisms that take advantage of the non-documented character, which migrants often possess. However, when having crossed the border and entered in a *limbo* facilitated by the administration that reproduces so-called illegalness, would that also be called illegality? Arguably, here is where 'illegal' becomes 'irregular', as the migrant simply does not have a choice. In Ceuta's or Melilla's waiting zone, the person's freedom is transferred to a sovereign power that decides and facilitates (im)mobility and exclusion. When all what is left is a *bare human* rendered completely immobile, calling him 'illegal' would implicate more own will, and perhaps the freedom to act in so-called illegal activities. From a humanitarian point of view, one can take into account the 'negative list' that makes people automatically 'illegal' when crossing a border as if a crime were committed. Racial profiling would subsequently define who is illegal. Such degrading is also very present in the media and fostered by securitising policies, formed by the migration-security nexus. Calling non-documented migrants 'illegal' instead of 'irregular' therefore immediately brings negative connotations and fosters the hyped topicality of a 'tsunami of immigrants that invades Europe'. Instead, migration should be seen as an essential part of mobility that has always existed and probably will always exist. Connecting migration with stereotypes or assumptions that implicate illegality is not the way forward.

The dichotomy that separates Africa from Europe fades away in Ceuta and Melilla. Traditionally multi-ethnic and complex societies, the enclaves prove to be the ultimate projections of Fortress Europe. The geographies and spatial orders of the enclaves lend themselves for a new type of outsourced policies. While the performance is carried out within geopolitical European territory, it is the geographical separation from the continent that has made the creation of a state of exception very effective. Natural characteristics in this case seem to legitimate policies that facilitate and reproduce immobility and irregularity among migrants, including those who apply for asylum. When it urges, one could always fall back on the performance of neighbouring Morocco, which covers effectively the most dubious and illegitimate parts that serve to close the web for migrants and to render them immobile, as well as to place them outside the normal social and juridical order.

Very remarkable within the case of this thesis has been the fact that the Spanish immigration system leaves the possibility of irregularity open. While especially Northern European countries may adopt a very negative stance against the idea of 'illegal migrants' residing there, this is not the case in Barcelona, and Spain in general. After facilitating an imposed irregularity in the enclaves, many migrants continue without a status when reaching and residing in the Catalan capital. This can be seen as beneficial, as it gives migrants that do not qualify for asylum still the chance to seek for a better living. Yet, it can also be analysed as a consequence of Spain's shaky asylum system, which seems rather partly non-existent. In the past, this has manifested in various mass-regularisations, while it also utters itself in the objections migrants have to apply for asylum in Spain. Irregularity may well be more beneficent for some, but can widespread irregularity then still be seen as legitimate within Spain's society? The migrants have passed through a non-documented trajectory on the way to Europe. Subsequently, they are held in an excluding *limbo* – an ultimate border that leaves them immobile and irregular. And finally, they remain irregular as this is considered the only option available to encounter work and to get by in general. When tracing back from Barcelona to the enclaves, the continuation, facilitation and reproduction of irregularity stands out. Such a continuation blurs the differences between past, present and future, laying bare a flaw within today's nation-state's structure and the international order. It proves the migrant status is still not a temporary one that automatically would lead to inclusion and participation within society.

9.4. Reflections and recommendations

The intention of the research for this thesis was to experience the lives of migrants in Barcelona and Ceuta and Melilla, as well as the borderising dynamics that are influencing or imposing those types of lives. Such dynamics produce various types of borders that I have tried to document, describe and analyse. While delving into this study, as well as during the interviews and the writing process, I had to accept the fact that a research often produces more questions than answers. This has nevertheless, on a brighter side, also led to many informative conversations, formal and informal talks and many spontaneous and informal moments along the way. The main research question and the different topics that come with it have implicated a multifaceted thesis, in which a wide spectrum of perspectives and opinions was scrutinised. The concept of the 'border' comes back in every chapter, taking different forms and dimensions. In doing so, I have tried to reinforce the meaning of the migration process as a long route of borders that can take any shape, and which can facilitate or influence irregularity. The mobility concept, which is implicated in this topic, is highly complex and ambiguous. After thorough experiences during my research, I would like to agree with Sassen (2002) that immobility is an intrinsic part of the modern mobilities. In this thesis, immobility and borders go hand in hand with irregularity, as the Spanish case also has pointed out. While I tried to involve the Spanish immigration system as much as possible, I feel there are still many possibilities surrounding this topic that could be interesting for further researches. Why does Spain not possess of a working asylum system? And why is irregularity seen as relative normality compared to Northern Europe? The same counts for the human right laws. While these are certainly very fascinating when analysing the legitimation of

discourses about migration, it was often too out of scope to delve deeper into the judicial implications of such discourses.

As I reflected in Chapter 4, I think having chosen Barcelona as a base during my research has proven to be a good decision, as it provided me with all the incentives and ideas a big creative city has to offer. Although Ceuta and Melilla are thoroughly interesting places, they remain very small and have a very 'provincial' feeling. This means there is, albeit the topical situation, not a great variety of organisations actively stationed there. On the other hand, I learned a great deal from the more practical and improvised interviews that I conducted in the enclaves, something that was less possible or likeable in Barcelona. The chameleonic forms of interviewing and gathering data I adopted have generated a heterogeneous data collection. I felt this was in the end also in line with the triangulation of methodologies I have tried to adopt. Rather than collecting a strict and comprehensive data collection, my preference was to discuss as many perspectives and to give the thesis a playful character through adding fieldwork anecdotes, interview quotes and other bits and pieces that have fascinated and interested me throughout the research and writing processes.

The societal relevance for this thesis has focused on the unequal permeability of borders, nowadays often established and fixed along ethnic lines. An important question throughout the whole thesis focused on how one can legitimise such inequality, afterwards leading to facilitated immobility. Shaping policies based on ethnic preferences is increasingly seen as normality, fostered by securitising dynamics and media reporting about 'migrant waves'. Reports intrinsically connect migration with illegality, and vice versa. This is where the core of the issue in this thesis can be found. Through facilitating and dispersing the 'illegal stereotype', the security-migration nexus is strengthened, leading subsequently to more policies to combat so-called illegality. Such utterances can be found in Ceuta and Melilla, where border impermeability is facilitated to leave the 'illegal Other' out. However, the excluded will not give up and find an irregular way of entering, which again fosters the perception of illegality, eventually generating a full circle. The stereotype of illegality remains then further active through facilitated irregularity within Europe. This remains a big issue in Spain, where options to regularise are scarce. Even within Spain, but especially in the European Union, such connections not always seem to be made. Perhaps this happens on purpose, because it could make it easier to legitimise mass-regularisations, on the one hand, and to almost close a border, on the other hand. However, it has also shown Spain is not ready and has not been ready for years to accommodate migrants properly and to set up an efficient and functioning immigration system. The EU in general has shown a similar position as of lately through stumbling from crisis to crisis and from agreement to agreement when it comes to migration. As the migrant remains portrayed as the 'illegal Other' this will probably not change, as *othering* facilitates irregularity.

It would arguably help political entities to gain more information on how migrants use illegality networks to overcome imposed borders, instead of focusing on the notion of illegality and its media hypes. Such networks, often complete industries operating as mafia, are actually benefitting from the fortifying and *othering* policies the EU is carrying out under the name of security, and legitimising it that way. Closing physical borders eventually then culminates into the notorious and mortal disasters on the Mediterranean everyone talks about, as migrants have no other option to recur to then the 'illegality industry'. This industry is not

without risks. Adequate creative policies are needed to ban out the *othering*, which in the end thus benefits this mortal industry. Leaving out the supposed Other has led to very risky and deadly undertakings that in the end also undermine the securitising policies. Imposing borders has not created a more secure situation at all, as the 'borders spectacles' have not ceased to be devastating and chaotic.

Regarding the scientific relevance, this thesis shows the circular effects creating, facilitating and managing irregularity has and how it influences the life of migrants in Spain, as well as the discourses concerning migration and securitisation policies. Through choosing a case model, tracing back from Barcelona to Ceuta and Melilla, the borderising dynamics within this migration process could be shown through a continuation of irregularity. Such irregularity becomes more state-facilitated when migrants enter the EU, arguably the point where illegality shifts to irregularity. The 'illegality'-factor, mainly placed outside the EU-borders, has perhaps not had much attention within this thesis and its research. While there already exist thorough studies on the migration trajectories from Western Africa and the Middle East, this is not really the case when tracing back that same route. More 'inverse studies', such as Andersson's (2012) work, and this thesis within the EU-scope, would better demonstrate the outsourcing in third countries of borders that normally are to be encountered within the European Union and the role they have. Such borders arguably go together with the early development of illegal migration activities in the form of trafficking and smuggling.

One could then conclude that all imposed and facilitated borders, also outside the EU, create and generate illegal migration enterprises along the route, while at the same time supposed illegality delivers the legitimation for creating those borders. The creation of borders therefore functions as a circle, affecting and working on different levels, as we have seen in this thesis. This circle implies that further irregularity also fosters *othering* and exclusion, leading to the migrant not fitting anymore in today's model of the nation-state, as Agamben (1998; 2005) and Arendt (1976; 1996) already have concluded. The existence of excluded 'Others' permits a state of exception, not fitting within the nation-state and its society, eventually generating new excluding borders. Until the definition of the Other is not made fluid, reconsidered or redefined within society, the circle of irregularity will be kept intact. I would like to advocate bringing the status of the 'irregular migrant figure' in the debate and studying more fluid and creative forms of citizenship, which could exist and function without being impeded by borders. Such a different approach would arguably give new insights and help to form sustainable policies on migration and border politics, eventually getting to the believe that excluding and impermeable borders do not form the solution, but are rather part of the problem.

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Appendix I – Overview interviews

A. MIGRANTS

Date	Name	Location	Country of origin	Occupation
18/03/2015 25/03/2015	Amadou	Bogatell/Gloriès (Barcelona)	Senegal	Activist/volunteer
26/03/2015	Ibou	Port Vell (Barcelona)	Senegal	Street vendor
26/03/2015	Amina	Port Vell (Barcelona)	Senegal	Street vendor
08/04/2015	Oumar	Sabadell	Guinea-Bissau	President of organisation
08/04/2015	Elhadji	Sabadell	Senegal	Unemployed
08/04/2015	Mehdi	Sabadell	Morocco	Unemployed
08/04/2015	João	Sabadell	Guinea-Bissau	Unemployed
08/04/2015	Faical	Sabadell	Guinea-Bissau	Unemployed
09/04/2015	Bakary	Raval (Barcelona)	The Gambia	Activist
09/04/2015	Basiru	Raval (Barcelona)	The Gambia	Activist
06/05/2015	Amine	Melilla	Morocco	Unemployed
06/05/2015	Walid	Melilla	Algeria	Unemployed
06/05/2015	Adnan	Melilla	Syria	- (in CETI)
07/05/2015	Youssef	Melilla	Morocco	Unemployed
07/05/2015	Rifat	Melilla	Syria	- (in CETI)
07/05/2015	Firas	Melilla	Syria	- (in CETI)
07/05/2015	Ammar	Melilla	Syria	- (in CETI)
10/06/2015	Moussa	Ceuta	Guinea	Parking lot assistant
10/06/2015	Abdelay	Ceuta	Guinea	Parking lot assistant
11/06/2015	Henry	Ceuta	Guinea	Parking lot assistant
28/06/2015	Abdou	Lleida	Senegal	Agricultural sector
28/06/2015	Mamadou	Lleida	Senegal	Agricultural sector

B. MIGRANT/REFUGEE ORGANISATIONS and C. GOVERNMENTAL INSTITUTIONS

Date	Location	Organisation/Institution	Name(s) of Representative
13/04/2015	Raval (Barcelona)	Tanquem els CIEs	Sandra Queraltó Robert Bonet
24/04/2015	Eixample (Barcelona)	Accem Barcelona	María Cirez
06/05/2015	Melilla	Accem Melilla	Julia Ortega García
11/05/2015	Raval (Barcelona)	CCAR	Pascalle Coissard
11/05/2015	Poblenou (Barcelona)	Apropem-nos	Manel Andreu
14/05/2015	Poblesec (Barcelona)	Tanquem els CIEs	Cristina Fernandez-Bessa
14/05/2015	Sants (Barcelona)	SICAR	Rosa Cendón

14/05/2015	Poblenou (Barcelona)	Apropem-nos/Punt d'Acollida Poblenou	Catherine Heintz
25/05/2015	Ciutat Vella (Barcelona)	Migrastudium	Luis Muñoz
27/05/2015	Ciutat Vella (Barcelona)	Policía Nacional	Ali Mohamed Duduh
28/05/2015	Eixample (Barcelona)	- (Filmmaker)	David Fedele
03/06/2015	Poblesec (Barcelona)	Creu Roja Barcelona	Manoli Moya Gerard Català
10/06/2015	Ceuta	Fundación San Antonio	Maite Perez López
10/06/2015	Ceuta	Accem Ceuta	Rebeca Acedo Calvete
11/06/2015	Ceuta	Cruz Roja Ceuta	Manuel
11/06/2015	Ceuta	CEAR Ceuta	Alejandro Romero