

# **‘THE LAST COLONY OF AFRICA’**

## **THE WESTERN SAHARA- MOROCCO CONFLICT ANALYZED THROUGH THE LANGUAGE PRAGMATIC APPROACH.**

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**Bachelor thesis**

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## Abstract

'The last colony of Africa' is examining the Western Saharan Morocco conflict from the viewpoint of language pragmatic theory.

With action theory as background the language pragmatic approach is used to take a closer look at the (inter)actions of the actors. In the context of this thesis they are partly located within the Western Sahara, like Polisario, the Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic and the Sahrawi, as well as Morocco and the headquarter of the mission of the United Nations, and partly located outside the conflict territory, like Algeria and the United States of America. Within the Western Sahara is an ongoing unsecure geopolitical situation since 35 years. As soon as the Western Sahara gained freedom from Spain in 1975, they were directly occupied by Morocco (and (and Mauritania). Since then Morocco is occupying the territory and often regarded as 'colonizer'. The Sahrawi still have not accepted the occupation of their neighboring country and the conflict continues.

The outcome of this thesis takes a look at in how far theory and theoretical framework are applicable and tries to answer the question why the Western Saharan Moroccan conflict is still unresolved.

# 1. Introduction: 'The last colony of Africa'

## 1.1 Context and Relevance

### 1.1.1 Morocco and the Western Sahara

As in the 1960's most African countries gained independence, the struggle for self governance began. Two African countries then turned their selves into colonizers. Morocco and Mauretania occupied the territory of the former colony Spanish Western Sahara. They took over the role of Spain and Morocco is nowadays still in charge of ruling the territory of the Western Sahara. This caused a conflict with the people living in the territory, who call themselves Sahrawi. Some of them started a rebellion group called Polisario, *Frente Popular de Liberación de Saguía el Hamra y Río de Oro* ("Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguia el-Hamra and Río de Oro", Larosch, 2007). The conflict between the Polisario and Morocco is now going on for 35 years. Within the years more groups from other countries got interested, like Algeria and the United States who tried to intervene (Larosch, 2007). To solve the conflict there had been a United Nations Intervention, which failed (Durch, 1993). Currently Morocco is still ruling over the territory of the Western Sahara and the conflict between the actors is still going on (Stephan & Mundy, 2006).

The solution of the conflict is not foreseen. An effect of the ongoing complex conflict is that the international society, as well as the regional groups involved, is still fighting for their own economical and political interests. The context is clear, and the relevance of this topic is partly to put the inextricable situation on the Sahrawi back in the minds of people.

### 1.1.2 The language pragmatic approach

In Human Geography there has been a change in thinking, from classical geographical theories of Christaller and Weber, who analyzed space in order to get to know general patterns, to the behavioral approach, which tried to differentiate behavioral information by taking into account the physical geographical environment (Werlen, 1987). In the German speaking world this development did lead into new fields of geographical approaches, the action theory (Werlen, 1987). The theoretical background for my thesis will be the language pragmatic theory of Wolfgang Zierhofer. It is a theory which derives from the action theories in Human Geography. The various possibilities of this approach are that 'action' can be used for description and as explanation of human behavior (Werlen, 1987). This offers a broad analytical approach to understand socio-spatial dynamics, in my case the analysis of a geopolitical conflict.

The language pragmatic approach focuses on social structures and their reproduction (Zierhofer, 2002). In the case of the Western Sahara and Morocco conflict we are dealing with several social structures. "From a language pragmatic point of view, [there are] categories [and] instruments which are used to solve certain problems that emerge in certain conflicts" (Zierhofer, 2002). By using this frame of

reference I hope to get an impression of the socio-spatial dynamics which are the causes for the geopolitical conflict in the Western Sahara.

It is a challenge to combine this topic with the language pragmatic approach. There might be the possibility that the theory does not (always) fit to the case of the Western Saharan conflict, but as Zierhofer says:

“We do not have to split up the world just because it suits us to play different language games in different contexts” (Zierhofer, 2002, p. 1359)

One of the main aspects of this thesis will be to find the adjustments and difficulties which a western-based theory does have to make before being applied in development countries and their conflicts.

### **1.1.3 ‘Last colony of Africa’**

Since the beginning of the conflict a lot of literature was written about the ‘last colony of Africa’. The topic of decolonization and post-independence problems are discussed a lot. The focus on the Western Sahara as ‘colony’ of Morocco remains mostly unnoticed. The inquiry about the Western Sahara Morocco conflict is relevant, because up till now, even as there had been a UN intervention, no solution was found. It is an interesting topic to do research on the ‘last colony of Africa’. Nowadays there is not much interest from Western countries in the conflict, except from the USA who is supporting Morocco in the ‘war against terror’. I want to give my point of view on the conflict from different theoretical background through using the language pragmatic approach.

## **1.2 Research Objective**

The research objective of this inquiry is to get an overview about how the conflict evolved over the different years and what the role of the different actors has been and in how far all this has had influence in the non-solution of the conflict. To achieve this goal the research will be focused on the role of Polisario, Morocco, Algeria, United States of America and the United Nations and their (inter-) actions. By using the language pragmatic approach I hope to reveal why the conflict remains unsolved. The analysis of the conflict and especially the (inter-) action of the actors will hopefully give a precise overview about how there is still no solution found which suits all involved parties. The analysis of the situation in the Western Sahara will be from an unusual approach, because I do not expect to find the solution to the conflict, I hope to see whether a Western based theory can be applied on a Northern African situation. As finding a solution for the conflict is not possible, the main aims of the thesis will be the analysis of the (inter-) actions between the actors and its impacts on the conflict and whether a Western-based theoretical framework can be applied on an analysis in a not-western society.



### 1.3 Research Model




Figure 1 Research model

### 1.4 Research Question(s)

1. *What are the main (inter-) actions which cause the non-solution of the Western Sahara conflict?*
2. *In how far can a Western based theory be applied in a Northern African conflict situation?*

To examine the main questions there are the following sub questions:

- a) *What are the main influences of actors behind the non-solution of the Western Sahara conflict?*
- b) *In how far did the viewpoint of the several actors' influence the conflict?*
- c) *Has there been a change in the point of view of the several actors in the conflict in time?*
- d) *What are the current effects of the conflict for the Sahrawi people?*

### 1.5 Explanation of essential terms

**Sahrawi:** population of the Western Saharan territory (Larosch, 2007)

**OAU:** Organization of African Unity (OAU) or Organisation de l'Unité Africaine (OUA), sometimes also referred to as African Union (AU) (Larosch, 2007)

**Polisario:** abbreviation of *Frente Popular de Liberación de Saguía el Hamra y Río de Oro* ("Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguia el-Hamra and Río de Oro") is the Sahrawi liberation movement (Larosch, 2007)

**MINURSO:** United Nations peacekeeping mission in the Western Sahara. The name derives from "Mission des Nations Unies pour l'Organisation d'un Référendum au Sahara Occidental" ([www.un.org](http://www.un.org))

**DARS:** Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic; Democratic Arab Republic of the Sahara (Larosch, 2007)

**Language pragmatic approach:** A version of action theoretical perspective involving geographical aspects and regarding (inter) actions (see chapter 2.2).

**Action theory:** The theoretical background of language pragmatics (see chapter 2.1).

**Speech acts:** Method deriving from social science taken as blueprint for analyzing social actions (see chapter 2)

## 1.6 Research Methods and Strategy

In this research I will use qualitative methods with case study as strategy. A good outline of the conflict will be focusing on a short historical overview and the focus on the actors. The expectation is that the theoretical framework will not always provide a sufficient conclusion to explain the reasons of the non-resolution of the conflict is embedded in one of the research questions.

Secondary data analysis served for the first analysis and the historical background. The data collection was focused on document analysis, as well as academic writing as journalistic articles, books and travelogues.

The further research will be a case study (Yin, 2003) and a desk research as described by Flick (2009). This provides a broad and open-minded approaching of the topic. To manage the topic to stay within the frontiers of a Bachelor thesis I emphasize the situation of the actors and the combination with the theoretical framework. For this emphasize a discourse analysis is made for documents, written proclamations and speeches, of the direct actors. The approach of the topic as inductive as possible is tried to make the obtainment of credibility in the conclusion.

## 1.7 Research Advancement

This thesis covers six chapters. The introduction to the topic, as well as relevance and research questions are outlined in the first, this chapter. In the second chapter the theoretical framework is described. This



explains first the background of the theory and outlines afterwards the language pragmatic approach. The third chapter describes the historical background of the conflict and an actor analysis. With the combination and application of the theory in this case is dealt in chapter four. Chapter five gives the conclusion and is followed by an evaluation and discussion in chapter six. In the appendix are the texts used for the discourse analysis and an outline of the abbreviations and places names.

## 2. Theoretical Framework: The language pragmatic approach

This chapter contains the theory which will be used further in this research. To introduce the theory first a short description of its background will be given and then the language pragmatics will be outlined.

### 2.1 Action Theory

Action theory is a large theoretical framework (Zierhofer, 2002). It is a trans-disciplinary approach, which partly tries to combine geographical and social sciences (Werlen, 1987). The action theory in Human Geography derives from Weber and Schütz. Weber's idea was that the best access to the social reality can be gained by the access to social actions and relations (Werlen, 1987). Schütz developed a 'Handlungstheorie' (- action theory), which sees the act (Handlung) as goal-oriented activity and acting (handeln) as process of carrying out activity, which can also be seen as the continual flow of human activity (Campbell, 1981). Within this framework they try to realize the (effects of the) action, through analyzing the (inter-)dependence between the situational definition and the intentional project of the action (see figure 2.1; Werlen, personal communication, 10-09-2009).




Figure 2.1 Action Theory (Werlen, personal communication, 10-09-2009)

Within this theoretical framework Zierhofer developed his language pragmatics. He used especially Habermas, who has a social science background, and Werlen, whose ideas are more based on social geography. In the following paragraphs first Habermas' instrument for analysis and critique of society and a brief introduction to Speech acts is given, which will be followed by the outline of Werlen's ideas about Society, Action and Space.

#### 2.1.1 Habermas instrument for analysis and critique of society and Speech Acts

Speech acts are originally from the social sciences. They were used by Zierhofer as a trans-disciplinary approach to his theory. Habermas, whose theories were taken as background by Zierhofer, also worked with trans-disciplinary approaches, by regarding basics from psychological and economical concepts (Habermas, 1995). His instrument for analysis and critique of society is especially used in Zierhofer's

work. In this chapter the theory and background of Speech acts and Habermas' instrument for analysis and critique of society are depicted.

'Speech acts' in social science has several definitions. They all go back to Austin's and / or Searle's theory (Smith, 1990). I am using the definition of Zierhofer regarding Speech acts, because his understanding of the theory is a point of departure for his language pragmatics. His definition is:

"Speech acts bind activities of different people by demanding a particular behavior: they are successful to the extent that their words elicit a specific reaction" (Zierhofer, 2002, p. 1362).

Zierhofer uses the illocutionary way of abstracting speech acts. This means the indirect influence of Speech acts and given language on actions and reactions of others (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2007). The abstraction of language in this case has to be made in between *language* and the use of language in *speech* (Habermas, 1995). The importance of this is beyond the formal analysis and analytical levels. Habermas was dealing with this difference through replacing semantics of different levels of aggregation in coordination of actions (Zierhofer, 2002). Language is seen as the background, but has to be generalized in the formalization of speech (Habermas, 1995). According to Habermas (1991) social action therefore starts with understanding ('Verstehen') of the situation:

"Social Action is not independent of a socially binding definition of the situation. For this reason, observable social action must be grasped from the perspective of the acting subject himself, a perspective that is removed from direct observation; that is, it must be understood. The principle subjective interpretation, or better, of *verstehende* interpretation concerns access to social facts, the gathering of data." (Habermas, 1991, p. 54)

Thus 'understanding' (Verstehen) is the main point of behavioral norms. Without these understanding of each other it is not possible to communicate or interpret the actions of the other. The boundaries of these actions are drawn with the boundaries of language (Habermas, 1991). Habermas (1991) explains it like this:

"The limits of actions are determined by the range of possible descriptions. This in turn is established by the structures of language in which the self-understanding and worldview of a social group is articulated. Thus the boundaries of action are drawn by the boundaries of language." (Habermas, 1991, p. 71-72)

To describe and illustrate the actions, Habermas developed the typology of instrument for analysis and critique of society (and modernity) (Zierhofer, 2002). Habermas takes a look at the classes of validity claims, coordination of action, kind of binding (between actions), rationality and form of relation (table 2.2). With rationality Habermas refers to the qualities of the interaction, in particular the communication of organizations as collective project (Zierhofer, 2002). The form of relation is referred to the social structure(s) (Zierhofer, 2002). The validity and coordination are establishing to (existing) power relations, which depend on argumentation. "Rather, by restoring mutual understanding, and through its potential to regenerate agreement, argumentation is actually the means par excellence of reproducing all those kinds of power that are not directly based on violence" (Zierhofer, 2002, p. 1365).

The kind of binding is representing the success or failing of an action. It refers to whether the action is accepted by the other actor and includes as well the possibility of argumentation (Zierhofer, 2002).

<i>Classes of validity claims</i>	Truth and/ or efficiency	All sorts of validity claims
<i>Coordination of actions</i>	Systematic integration	Social integration
<i>Kind of binding</i>	Functional	Agreement
<i>Rationality</i>	Instrumental rationality	Communicative rationality
<i>Form of relation</i>	The system	The lifeworld

**Table 2.2: Illustration of Habermas's instruments for analysis and critique of society (Zierhofer, 2002, p. 1365)**

### 2.1.2 Werlen: Society, Action & Space

“‘Spatial Problems’ are to be understood as action problems. The main interest of social geography should be accordingly, not in spatial per se, but in the consideration of the meaning of the physical- material conditions of action for the constitution of social reality.”(Werlen, 1987, p. 288)

What Werlen suggests here, is the solution of problems in space not only within geographical concepts, but always with a physical condition in mind. Therefore he is opposing behavior (‘Verhalten’) and acting (‘Handeln’-action). Werlen chooses for the action- approach, because according to him the frame of reference is important and must be considered, as outlined above. In the behavioral approach it is not possible to outline the physical background conditions (Werlen, 1987). The description of action and acting is “eine Abstraktionsleistung zur Beschreibung und Erklärung menschlicher Tätigkeiten” (Werlen, 1987, p. 112) –‘the performance of abstraction to describe and explain human activities’ [author’s translation].

From the ideas of Schütz and Weber, Werlen identifies three major approaches to action oriented approaches (Werlen, 1987):

- Purpose-oriented action theory
- Norm-oriented action theory
- Understanding-oriented action theory

(Werlen, 1987, p. 288)

The purpose-oriented action theory comes from Weber, Pareto and decision theory. It is used for solving the technical aspect of problems ‘respectively, declaring to reach given goals’ (Werlen, 1987, p. 288). The norm-oriented action theory derives from Parsons and is used for the solving of problems which have social norms and values central ‘in the choice of goals or means and also in the social order’ (Werlen, 1987, p. 288). The understanding-oriented action theory comes from Schütz and the ethno methodologies. It is useful for problems with ‘diverging subjective compositions of meaning’ (Werlen, 1987, p. 288). In all these approaches the subjective and objective perspectives are in complementary relationship to each other and are not exclusive (Werlen, 1987).

From this background Werlen developed his theory:

		Signification:	
Rational	-consumption -production	→ allocative resources +auto...	METRIC
Normative	-politic (control)	→ authoritative +allocative	TERRITORIAL
Information	-symbolic	→ significance +authoritative +allocative	SYMBOLIC

Figure 2.3 Werlen's theory on society, action and space (Werlen, personal communication, 10-09-2009)

Figure 2.3 shows is an outline of the ideas of Werlen's theory. His logic of this model is the three major approaches outlined above. It combines the decision, as rational aspect, about consumption and production of the human being. The signification refers to the 'world binding theory'-background of Popper, who intertwines a physical-, mental- and symbolical- being in the world (Werlen, 1987, p. 37- author's translation). Werlen named them metric, territorial (physical) and symbolic. Allocative resources are the resources which humans need for daily life. The authoritative level refers to the political order in which we live in, and it builds up on our allocative resources. This is the normative level of the life of human beings. The last level of information has symbolic importance and is referred to the human identity, where as condition is needed the allocative and authoritative significations.

The main goal of this theory is the solution, or at least the suggestion of a solution to social problems (Werlen, 1987, p. 4). Werlen's conclusion to his theory is that the attitude of human beings is loaded and important rather than the space surrounding these human beings (Werlen, college, 2009).

## 2.2 Zierhofer: The language pragmatic approach

' ... [T]here is no reality to represent. Rather, reality is constituted through communication in order to create a precarious basis for the coordination of interactions' (Zierhofer, 2002, p. 1364).

The language pragmatic approach focuses on social structures and their reproduction (Zierhofer, 2002). It copes with several of the most basic problems of social sciences and gives a solution on one of the biggest issues in geography: how to conceive space (Zierhofer, 2002). It is one version of action theory and takes Speech acts into account as analytical concept. In language pragmatics space is assumed as transcendental and universalistic and regarded as instrument of observation (Zierhofer, 2002). Zierhofer, who like Werlen, took it from Popper, categorizes the world into three parts: the physical, subjective and social world (Zierhofer, 2002, p. 1361; Werlen, 1987, p. 37). These categories were also the starting points for Speech acts, from which the language pragmatics derive. According to his theory the action of actors and the re-actions from others have the goal to change a situation. These actions can produce intended and non-intended effects, which form units of interaction of social activity (Zierhofer, 2002, p. 1361). Through the use of words, and indirect communication as well, we are influencing social activity. "Language is [...] an instrument to coordinate actions and to regulate

everything that people do” (Zierhofer, 2002, p. 1362). To coordinate the actions Zierhofer uses ‘Speech acts’ as ‘meta-level’ of social reality: “Speech acts as the key to structuration of society” (Zierhofer, 2002, p. 1362). Zierhofer goes further than only Speech acts, because in contrast to them, he also takes into account actions with oneself. Zierhofer and the theory of Werlen differ profoundly insofar that Werlen ignored Speech acts as an analytical concept (Zierhofer, 2002). Zierhofer outlines the differences in his article ‘*Speech acts and space(s): language pragmatics and the discursive constitution of the social*’ (2002) at the example of comparing the ways of conceptualizing the classical problem of order (Zierhofer, 2002, p. 1362). The conclusion Zierhofer makes is that in language pragmatics they have the need to look further than the conceptions of meaning(s) (Zierhofer, 2002, p. 1362). Mutually interpretation and reflexively interaction is the goal of Speech acts. “[A]rgumentation is the medium to reassure mutual understanding in the broadest sense” (Zierhofer, 2002, p. 1363). This is because “argumentation always provides us with the *possibility* of evaluating and thereby (re)producing mutual understanding even this involves (dis)agreement” (2002, p. 1363). To analyze his ideas Zierhofer gives the illustration of Habermas’ instruments for analysis and critique of society as outlined in the paragraph 2.1.1. Zierhofer suggests in the model the classification of the “classical dualisms and dualities of ‘micro’ and ‘macro’ as well as ‘action’ and ‘structure’” (Zierhofer, 2002, p. 1365). His critique on the approach is that it is from a ‘one single perspective’ (2002, p. 1366). He wants a twin concept of Speech acts, which involves validity claims and also takes into account the physical conditions: “From a language pragmatics point of view, conceptions of space should be evaluated with respect to their use of particular purposes in particular concepts” (Zierhofer, 2002, p. 1370). Zierhofer sees space as being outside meaning and matter, but as *scheme of interpretation* (2002, p. 1368). He divides the scheme of interpretation in first-order and second-order space. In the first-order space it is almost impossible to draw distinctions (like dimensions, scales, etc) (Zierhofer, 2002). Therefore he separates several second-order spaces, where the drawing of distinction(s) is possible (Zierhofer, 2002). The (in)compatibility of the conception of space is a criterion for language pragmatics (Zierhofer, 2002, p. 1369). The avoidance of taking space as a sort of reality to represent is important. Space is rather to be seen as instrument of the observer, which can also be regarded as *scheme of reference* (Zierhofer, 2002). As Zierhofer puts it: “Spaces, in consequence, are seen as phenomena which are constituted and applied by agents pursuing particular projects by using their specific semantic competences.” (Zierhofer, 2002, p. 1371)

“From a language pragmatic point of view, [there are] categories [and] instruments which are used to solve certain problems that emerge in certain conflicts” (Zierhofer, 2002, p. 1359). These instruments and categories are mostly taken from Habermas’ model, but it includes Zierhofer’s idea of the physical dimension and a view at the re-actions of other (-s), by looking at the ‘intersubjectivity’ which “intends the coordination of actions” and in this case inter- and re-actions (Zierhofer, 2002, p. 1363). To do so, Zierhofer extends the model of Habermas instruments for analysis and critique of society. He uses the *classes of validity claims* to take a look in how far truth and or efficiency can be compared to other (or as well every kind) of validity claims. The *coordination of actions* is regarded through the levels of systematic and/ or social integration. This takes also into account the dualisms and dualities of some situations, where both levels can be observed. To analyze the acceptance of actions the *kind of binding* is important. Hereby the difference is to make in between functionality and agreement of actions. Functionality is based on the need to (inter)act. Agreement gives the possibility to successful acceptance

of actions. *Rationality* is contemplated through instrumental and communicative rationality. They both refer to the quality of interaction. The *form of relation* is divided in the system and the life world. The life world refers to the social life which is on a higher degree than to the structural level of the social, which is contemplated through the system. As described earlier, is the *physical dimension* taken into account, because it is an important scheme of reference. It will be analyzed through regarding the space of the actor(s) in general and the differences of the location(s) involving ethnological and cultural background. Thus this aspect will take a look at the particular purposes of a situation through contemplating their physicality. Furthermore this model will also take into account the *dimension of time*, which Zierhofer only mentions very shortly by explaining the different orders of space in the modern world. For him “Times represent a class of second order space” (Zierhofer, 2002, p. 1369). I will add the time dimension to see if there is difference and /or change in the development of the conflict. This will be regarded as a ‘temporal code’ to structure the circumstances and see if there are changes or differences over time. The last aspect is the most important and directing towards the *actions and reactions of other(s)*. It is incorporating connectivity of actions, thus representing action and their interactions at the same time (Zierhofer, 2002). Through regarding the (inter)action of actors, it is comprehensible whether they really understand each other and might share the same intersubjectivities. The instruments for analysis and critique which are outlined can be found in figure 2.4.

<i>Classes of validity claims</i>	Truth and/ or efficiency	All sorts of validity claims
<i>Coordination of actions</i>	Systematic integration	Social integration
<i>Kind of binding</i>	Functional	Agreement
<i>Rationality</i>	Instrumental rationality	Communicative rationality
<i>Form of relation</i>	The system	The life world
<i>Physical dimension</i>	Space	Location involving ethnological and cultural background (particular purpose)
<i>Time dimension</i>	Temporal structuration	Change/ difference in time
<b>Re-action of other (-s)</b>	Interaction	‘Intersubjectivity’

**Table 2.4: Instruments for analysis and critique**

As we are dealing in the models and with ideal types of reality it is hardly manageable to put it in reality. Habermas (1991) would say: “The basic assumptions refer to idealized action under pure maxims; no empirically substantive law like hypotheses can be derived from them” (p.48). There are limitations to the theory if you want to imply it on the empirical reality. As Habermas says that there can no hypotheses derive from idealized actions, he adds that in some ways we need hypotheses to understand and justify “the conditions of reproduction of a species that must preserve its life through labor and interaction” (Habermas, 1995, p. 97). Thus for analyzing human behavior we need to contemplate models to preserve and understand our life. Therefore Zierhofer is using Speech acts. The focus lies, as written earlier, in the perspective from more than one actor and the validity of the several claims of the actors. The limitation of a model in general would be that we need to be aware of its being a model which claims life in ideal forms:



“If these validity claims communication theory can locate a gentle but obstinate, a never silent although redeemed claim to reason, a claim that must be recognized de facto whenever and wherever there is to be consensual action. If this is idealism then idealism belongs in a most natural way to the conditions of reproduction” (Habermas, 1995, p. 97)

As Zierhofer says himself “... the validity of concepts and theories is limited to their particular context” (Zierhofer, 2002, p. 1357). Thus the limitation of a model is not only limited, because of its nature of being a model of idealized structures, it is also limited, because of the several possible particular contexts where they can or cannot contribute something to analyze a situation. This limits the outcome of applying models on empirical research, but they also give the possibility of structuring the complexity of reality. For this purpose we are going to try to see through the lenses of this theory. As Zierhofer says:

“We do not have to split up the world just because it suits us to play different language games in different contexts” (Zierhofer, 2002, p. 1359)

### **3. Analysis: Morocco- Western Sahara conflict**

For the analysis of the Western Sahara Morocco conflict, first this chapter will give an historical overview. After that an actor analysis of the most important actors (within the Western Sahara, Morocco, Algeria, United States of America (US) and the United Nations (UN)) will be outlined.

#### **3.1 Historical overview**

“Conflicts may result from one or more causes.

Some of the most intractable African conflicts have, as a root cause, the disturbance of social equilibrium as a result of historical disparities between the ethnic or tribal components of the population.”

(Khalil, n.d.)

As Khalil is arguing the roots of African conflicts have more than one component and are a result of historical disparities. To get to know to circumstances and the roots of the conflict between the Western Sahara and Morocco better I a short outline will be given of the most important happenings in that region over time and after that a short overview of the international influences.

##### **3.1.1 Regional History**

Most of the literature does not deal with the history of the current territory of the Western Sahara. Most of the researches start in 1884 with the declaration of Spain having the protectorate over the territory on the African continent next to the Canary Islands. In the division of the African continent by the European powers the Western Sahara was declared as Spanish.

Before the Spanish arrived at the Western Sahara coastline, most of the Sahrawi people were nomads (Stol, 1978). Only a few cities existed. Smara is one of the oldest cities in the Western Sahara (Zuijdgheest,

2004). In that time only a few people from not Sahrawi tribes were brave enough to travel through the region. Some Moroccans and others tried, but they never came far, because of theft and kidnapping. Theft and kidnapping belonged to the Sahrawi culture and was an important source of income. There were no frontiers in the region and the nomad tribes travelled through all the western parts of the Sahara (Stol, 1978).

In the beginning of the Spanish colonization Spain only conquered the cities at the coastline. In 1912 Spain and France made the frontiers of the territory of the Spanish Sahara, the at that time current name of the Western Sahara, with the French colonies French West Africa, Algeria and Morocco. From 1934 onwards Spain is also conquering the city of Smara and discovering the hinterland. A year later the first phosphate resources are discovered near Bou Craa. There are in the Western Sahara the fourth largest Phosphate deposits (Solarz, 1979).

In 1956 Morocco get its independence, this has influence in almost all (west) African countries and strengthens the African people demanding for independence, or at least thinking of it (Meredith, 2006). Some Sahrawi-Moroccan people try to fight for the independence of the Spanish Sahara from the decolonized Morocco, but their fight was not successful. Spanish and French military forces were stronger.


In the mean time if this development from 1956 till 1963 there was a big dry season in the region. It forced former nomads to leave the desert and move to the cities (Zuijdgeest, 2004).

In 1963 the United Nations identified the Spanish Sahara as one of the countries which need to get decolonized. It is an “urgently request” to the government of Spain to liberate “the Territori[y] [...] Spanish Sahara from colonial domination and, to this end, to enter negotiations on the problems relating to sovereignty presented” by the territory (General Assembly 20<sup>th</sup> session resolution 2072 XX, 1965). Ever since that date the United Nations restated the right of self-determination of the Sahrawi (Zoubir & Benabdallah-Gambier, 2004).

From 1968-73 there was another big dry season. More and more nomads are moving to the cities, which are growing fast. An important effect is that as a reason of this more and more Sahrawi came under the rule of Spain (Zuijdgeest, 2004). In the meantime the Sahrawi nationalism grew, like nationalism did in most of the colonies (Meredith, 2006). In 1967 the first organization to call for Western Sahara’s independence was set up by Mohammed Sidi Ibrahim Bassiri. It was called *Al-Tahrir Al-Sahra’* (Movement of Liberation of the Sahara). Their first public action was in 1970 when a group of demonstrators came together on a square in Al-‘Ayun (Stephan & Mundy, 2006). Inspired from this demonstration in 1973 a group of Sahrawi studying in Morocco formed “Frente Popular para la Liberación de Saguia el-Hamra y Río de Oro” (Polisario) (Stephan & Mundy, 2006).

In the 1970’s the political situation changed. “Spain, preoccupied with its own internal problems, was neither willing nor able to remain in the Western Sahara” (Khalil, n.d.). After attacks from Polisario the Spanish dictator Franco promised the Sahrawi population “a referendum on the territory’s final status by the end of 1975.” (Stephan & Mundy, 2006, p. 5)

As Spain decided to leave the Western Sahara, Morocco came at the centre of the stage, claiming the territory. Morocco's King Hassan II asked at the International Court of Justice in 1975 formally for the integration of the territory into the Moroccan kingdom. This was rejected and it was declared that the "right of self-determination for Western Sahara was paramount" (Stephan & Mundy, 2006, p.5). Solarz (1979) described the reason for Morocco's persistent interest in the territory: "a powerful nationalism



**Picture 3.1: Division of the former Spanish Sahara (Solarz, 1979)**

which has in recent times generated claims to all of Mauritania and parts of Algeria and Senegal as well; King Hassan's use of the "national cause" as a means of bolstering his internal political standing ; control over Saharan phosphates by a country which already provides 40 percent of world phosphates exports and could significantly enhance its market power by adding an additional 20-25 percent from Bu Craa<sup>1</sup>; and a concern about appearance of a shift in the regional power balance in favor of the Polisario's Algerian and Libyan backers" (Solarz, 1979, p. 8). After the request at the International Court of Justice, Morocco forced the Green March, military movement and about 350000 'civilian volunteers' Moroccans were sent to the Western Sahara to claim the territory for Morocco. During this invasion most of the ethnic Sahrawi fled to Algeria. The Saharawi population in the Western Sahara did demonstrate, but it was almost not mentioned in the media (Stephan & Mundy, 2006). "In its Resolution 380 of 6 November 1975, the UN Security Council 'deplored the holding of the march' and 'call[ed] upon Morocco immediately to withdraw from the Territory of Western Sahara all the participants in the march'" (Zoubir & Benabdallah-Gambier, 2004, p.6). Morocco never acted on this resolution.

With the Madrid Accords from November 1975 Spain agreed to leave his colony and divide it between Morocco and Mauritania (Stephan & Mundy, 2006). For leaving the territory Spain remained rights over the Phosphate mines and the fishing territory (Stol, 1978). The division is to see on the map in picture 3.1. This agreement and the settlement of the Green March were rejected by Polisario and they declared independence of their state and proclaimed the Saharan Arab Democratic Republic (DARS) in 1976 (Stephan & Mundy, 2006).

Since 1979 Polisario attacked the Moroccan colonizer, because they did not allow Polisario to establish in the Southern parts of the territory (Solarz, 1979). Polisario did get their arms and aid from Libya and Algeria. With their knowledge of the terrain and their high motivation Polisario fought against Morocco and Mauretania (Stephan & Mundy, 2006). Mauritanian troops had been defeated and also through Mauritanian internal problems they had left the territory in 1979 (Zuijdgheest, 2004). Morocco took over the former Mauritanian covered territory. Morocco organized a Pro-Moroccan demonstration in Dakhla

<sup>1</sup> Bu Craa or Bou Craa, it is the same city, but translated in different ways. This happens to with other place names as well, they are all outlined in a table in appendix 1.

to let the world see that Sahrawi's want to belong to Morocco (Solarz, 1979). By 1982 Moroccan control was reduced to 15 percent of the Western Saharan territory (Stephan & Mundy, 2006). Due to also this demonstration in Dakhla, Morocco got extreme support from the United States, France and Saudi Arabia after that. "This included counter-insurgency training and helping Morocco build an 800-mile sand-wall consisting of two fortified "berms", which closed off more than 80% of Western Sahara from penetration by Polisario fighters" (Stephan & Mundy, 2006, p.6).

In the late 1980's the Western Sahara has been divided in a Moroccan controlled area (about 80% of the Western Saharan territory) and the Polisario section. The Polisario section in the East is called the 'liberated zone' (Stephan & Mundy, 2006). According to Stephan and Mundy (2006) "there are approximately 180,000 Sahrawi refugees living in Polisario-administered camps in southern Algeria" (p.6).

During the armed attacks on the Moroccan's from 1975 until 1991, Sahrawi guerillas focused on targeting "security forces exclusively and consciously avoided civilian targets" (Stephan & Mundy, 2006, p. 19). Their methods and their rejection of terrorism afforded Polisario a level of international legitimacy. An effect of this is that the DARS is now recognized by more than 70 countries (Stephan & Mundy, 2006). In contrast with this the Moroccan fighters, according to Stephan and Mundy (2006, p. 7), violated Human Rights in their struggle against Polisario and while breaking down demonstrations. To solve the conflict there was a resolution of the UN Security Council. Zoubir and Benabdallah-Gambier describe the situation as follows:

"On 19 April 1991, the UN Security Council finally passed Resolution 690, which outlined a detailed plan for the holding of a free and fair referendum and the setting up of a UN mission (MINURSO) to conduct the referendum. King Hassan declared to the world in 1983, and before that in 1981 to the African nations, that he was favourable to the holding of a referendum in Western Sahara. However, as became increasingly clear, Moroccans wanted nothing less than a referendum that would confirm their annexation of the territory. The UN scheduled a referendum for early 1992, but then the UN postponed it time after time, owing mostly to Morocco's delaying tactics." (Zoubir & Benabdallah-Gambier, 2004, p.6)

The referendum, until now, never took place (Zuijdgheest, 2004). The biggest problem is to define the voters. It is not clear how many people live in the Western Sahara and how many of them are real Sahrawi (Zuijdgheest, 2004). This is mostly because of Morocco 'Morrocanized' the territory, through settling Moroccan's into the Western Sahara. Stephan and Mundy wrote: "The flow of Moroccan settlers into the Western Sahara continued, until Moroccan citizens outnumbered the indigenous Sahrawi population by a ratio of more than 2:1. As part of its "Moroccanization" policy, the Moroccan government has tried to assimilate Sahrawis by offering them jobs and free housing inside Morocco" (2006, p. 9).

The politic of Morocco towards the Western Sahara has not changed. Their interests are outlined by Zoubir and Benabdallah-Gambier:

“In sum, Morocco has upheld a steadfast attitude on Western Sahara. The foremost objective remains the integration of the territory into the Kingdom of Morocco. Moroccans have unwaveringly contended that Western Sahara is theirs and have only reluctantly accepted the idea of holding a referendum, even if they have made it obvious that this referendum could only be one that would validate their annexation of the disputed land. To facilitate this goal, King Hassan mobilised the entire country, the population at large as well as political parties. “  
(Zoubir & Benabdallah-Gambier, 2004, p.6)

In 1992 the UN peacekeeping mission MINURSO started. This did not change Morocco’s attitude towards the Western Sahara, but alleviated the Human Rights situation a bit (Stephan & Mundy, 2006). “The soldiers, officials and employees of the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO), who found themselves under intense surveillance by Moroccan security agents, reported witnessing acts of intimidation and repression against the indigenous population” (Stephan & Mundy, 2006, p. 8). There is a lot of critique over the ‘failure’ of MINURSO (Durch, 1993; Zoubir & Pazzanita, 1995; Zoubir & Benabdallah-Gambier, 2004; Larosch, 2007; Stephan & Mundy, 2006). According to Stephan and Mundy the reasons are that MINURSO has a weak leadership and a weak mandate and follows essentially the orders of the Moroccan government. Because if incidents of suppressed, mostly peaceful, demonstrations and the not-action of the peacekeepers Amnesty International blamed MINURSO in 1996 as a “silent witness to blatant human rights violations” (Amnesty International, 1996; in: Stephan & Mundy, 2006, p.8).

In between 1999 and 2005 smaller and sporadic demonstrations took place in the Western Sahara. The tension grew from summer of 2004 until spring of 2005 as a result of the stand-still of the peace progress lead from the UN (Stephan & Mundy, 2006). In 2005 the situation exploded. The incident began with a demonstration of families who wanted to see their imprisoned family members. After the Moroccan forces broke this demonstration, the next day further larger demonstrations broke out. “Sahrawis soon shouted pro-independence slogans and flew Polisario flags (an illegal act); some burned tires and threw stones at the Moroccan security forces” (Stephan & Mundy, 2006, p. 14). After the violently dispersion of these demonstrations and the invasion of neighborhoods and ransacking of houses, in the following month even more demonstrations were held. At Moroccan Universities, Sahrawi students organized solidarity demonstrations (Stephan & Mundy, 2006). After these clashes Moroccan military forces arrested dozens of demonstrators and even the organizers of the demonstrations within Morocco (Stephan & Mundy, 2006). Stephan and Mundy describe the actions which followed:

“Sahrawi activists arrested by Moroccan forces soon went on hunger strike to protest their conditions in prison and the grounds of their arrest. After fifty days of the hunger strike, the activists were reunited in Al-Ayoun’s “Black Prison.” Yet even with the well known nationalist activists in prison, smaller demonstrations continued in the following months, including almost nightly clashes between Sahrawi youth and Moroccan police. At the end of October, Moroccan security agents beat a Sahrawi youth to death. Hamdi Lembarki was hailed as the *Intifada’s* first martyr. Several more brutal deaths followed, placing a chill over Western Sahara.”  
(Stephan & Mundy, 2006, p. 14-15)

One of the reasons of the stand-still of the peace agreement was that in 2000 the UN Security Council, led by France and the US, they did not wanted a civil war. A similar situation took place in 2003. The referendum was blocked again by international forces (Stephan & Mundy, 2006). The political plans made were reluctantly accepted by Polisario were slightly in favor of Morocco. They never really were hardly implemented, but in the meantime Morocco continued the 'Moroccanization' of the Western Sahara (Stephan & Mundy, 2006).

The difference between Polisario and the, more and more international accepted, Saharan Arab Democratic Republic is small. In the refugee camps Polisario did built democratic control on the leadership of Polisario." The Polisario-led government in exile is also a founding member of the African Union [(O)AU], participates at all levels of the organization and even contributing to AU peacekeeping forces" (Stephan & Mundy, 2006, p. 31-32).

Over the time the conflict did not evolve towards solution. The positions of the actors will be further outlined in paragraph 3.2 and the reason of the non-solution will be analyzed in chapter 4 and 5.

### 3.1.1 International Influences

The international, external for the region, actors as described above have had some major influences in the Western Sahara.

This already started in the times of Spanish colonization. In order to get more power and control over more territory Spain had announced to have the protectorate over the territory. In 1912 Spain had to make adjustments with the French over the borders of their territory. France was afraid of military interventions in their colonies, which were surrounding the Spanish Western Sahara (Stol, 1978). The external international interests in the territory were already known at that time.

After the decolonization of Morocco in 1956 the influence of independence movement swept over to most of the African countries (Meredith, 2006). With the political insecurity which developed in post-independent Morocco King Hassan implied the idea of the big Moroccan empire, which included the territory of the Western Sahara up until parts of Senegal (Stol, 1978). The idea of this empire was based on a growing nationalism in Morocco (Solarz, 1979). The implementation of this thought was realized with the Green March in 1975. In the same year Spain left the territory and gave the authorities to Morocco and Mauretania.

"It will also show that Spain is fully responsible for not having fulfilled its legal obligation to bring decolonisation of the territory to its conclusion." (Zoubir & Benabdallah-Gambier, 2004, p.4)

As the UN gave Spain the assignment to install and implement of a Western Saharan independent government Zoubir and Benabdallah-Gambier are arguing the responsibility which Spain had, but did not fulfil (General Assembly 20<sup>th</sup> session resolution 2072 XX, 1965).

The effects of these developments were that after Spain left in the region the Polisario proclaimed the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (DARS). The DARS was recognized by Algeria a month after its proclamation. By this Morocco broke off the diplomatic relations with Algeria (Zoubir, 1990). The reasons for Algeria to be part of the conflict began with a strategic political counter against Morocco's expansion politics and, also Solarz (1979) thinks, maybe a secure passageway to the Atlantic Ocean (Solarz, 1979). These "has since ripened into an ideological commitment to the same sort of armed struggle for self-determination that Algeria itself engaged in two decades earlier and constitutes an important asset for Algeria's Third World diplomacy" (Solarz, 1997, p. 8-9). In 1963 it even ended in the Sand War in between Morocco and Algeria (Addi, 1999).

As indirect effects of the Cold War, Morocco got support of the United States because Polisario was seen more leftist (Stephan & Mundy, 2006). Polisario was supported with arms which came indirect from the Soviet Union via Algeria and Libya (Stephan & Mundy, 2006). In the beginning of the conflict Polisario was successful, mostly because of his growing diplomatic support (Solarz, 1979). The situation changed after the pro-Moroccan demonstrations in Dakhla when France, Saudi Arabia and the US started to support Morocco strongly. Solarz (1979) wrote about the US providing Morocco with arms. In the meantime more and more countries recognized the DARS as a country (Larosch, 2007). With the beginning of the MINURSO mission more and more international attention was drawn to the region. Unfortunately the mission is regarded as failed (Durch, 1993; Zoubir & Pazzanita, 1995; Zoubir & Benabdallah-Gambier, 2004; Larosch, 2007; Stephan & Mundy, 2006). The failure of MINURSO and the referendum is blocked by international forces. Stephan and Mundy (2006) outlined the US and France as the particular actors in the blocking of the enforcement of UN resolutions of the Western Saharan conflict.

In the recent years Morocco is arguing Polisario is in connection with Al Qaeda to maintain the support of the US. "As British journalist Toby Shelley has written, 'Attempts to tar Polisario with the Al Qaeda brush have been as cack-handed as the previous depictions of Polisario fighters as being, variously, Cuban mercenaries, Iranian-backed revolutionaries, and allies of [Palestinian terrorist leader] Ahmed Jibril.' It would be easier for Morocco to brand the Polisario as a terrorist organization, however, if it resumed armed struggle" (Stephan & Mundy, 2006, p. 19).

In 1979, Solarz described the case of the Western Sahara as illustration of the need of an international approach to foreign policy. This is still true for the complex issues of the conflict were that many actors have interests in, either political or economical. The interests of the most important actors are outlined in 3.2.

### 3.2 Actor Analysis

In the following paragraphs the direct actors, in the Western Sahara and Morocco, and the indirect actors, Algeria, United States of America (US) and the United Nations (UN) will be analyzed through literature research and discourse analysis. Each of the direct actors had two texts discourse analyzed



and each of the indirect actors one. The texts of the discourse analysis can be found in appendix 2. This empirical analysis will be used as basis for the case study in chapter 4 to imply the language pragmatic theory on the several actors.

Discourse analysis focuses on the use of language and how things are done through language. It is related to Speech acts and like Speech acts discourse analysis is regarding how the actors relate to each other and to the world. Language is seen as highly political and searches the claims about knowledge and belief. Gee (2004) describes the importance of language like this:

“Many people think that the primary purpose of language is to “communicate information.” However, language serves a great many functions and giving and getting information, even in our new Information Age, is by no means the only one. If I had to single out a primary function of human language, it would be not one, but the following two closely related functions: to support the performance of social activities and social identities and to support human affiliation within cultures, social groups, and institutions. “(Gee, 2004, p. 1)

According to Gee (2004) we are building things through language. For the analysis is the focus on significance, activities, identities, relationships, politics, connections and sign systems and knowledge. A discourse is therefore separated into *discourse*, *Discourse* and *Discourse models* (Gee, 2004). The *discourse* (with a small d) is analyzing how language is used “on site” to enact activities and identities (Gee, 2005, p. 7). It is seen as a ‘discourse as actual communication’. *Discourse* (with a capital letter D) is used to (re-)produce, sustain and transform a given form of life by using language and ‘other stuff’ to recognize yourself and others as meaning and meaningful in certain ways (other stuff is referring to ways of acting, interacting, feeling, believing, valuing, and using various sorts of object, symbols, tools and technologies) (Gee, 2005, p. 7). Gee also identifies *Discourse models*, which are (informal) theories shared by people belonging to a specific social or cultural group (Gee, 2005, p. 95). In the following table is an overview about the definitions (Table 7.1). To facilitate the analysis I will talk about discourses when I am referring to all of these types of different discourses.

<p><b>‘discourse’</b> = how language is used “on site” to enact activities and identities (Gee, 2005, p. 7).  ‘discourse as actual communication’</p>
<p><b>‘Discourse model’</b> = are (informal) theories shared by people belonging to a specific social or cultural group (Gee, 2005, p. 95).</p>
<p><b>‘Discourse’</b> = to (re-)produce, sustain and transform a given form of life by using language and ‘other stuff’ to recognize yourself and others as meaning and meaningful in certain ways.  (Other stuff = ways of acting, interacting, feeling, believing, valuing, and using various sorts of object, symbols, tools and technologies) (Gee, 2005, p. 7)</p>

**Table 3.2 Definitions Discourse Analysis**

With the language pragmatic background, which has a similar approach towards language, the discourse analysis would be the most representative for analyzing the complexity of the Western Sahara-Morocco conflict. In appendix 2 are the seven articles which are analyzed with discourse analysis and mentioned in the following analysis of the actors. These articles are chosen to represent the different actors and their way of acting and thinking. For the each of the direct actors two articles were analyzed, because



they are regarded as more important. For the indirect actors only one representative article was analyzed to stay inside the boundaries of a Bachelor thesis research.

### **3.2.1 Western Sahara: Sahrawi, Polisario and the Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic**

Polisario was formed in 1973 by a group of Sahrawi students, who were studying in Morocco. Polisario stands for “Frente Popular para la Liberación de Saguia el-Hamra y Río de Oro” (Stephan & Mundy, 2006). The Polisario movement was built to fight against the colonizer Spain and was supported by a majority of the Sahrawi people (Stichting Zelfbeschikking West-Sahara, 2006). With Spain withdrawing in 1976 Polisario proclaimed on 27 February 1976 the Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic. The analyses of this proclamation will be given further in this text. The basic fundamental rights of the DARS give Polisario the task as the official army to free the Sahrawi people (Stichting Zelfbeschikking West-Sahara, 2006). Polisario is not a political party; furthermore it has to be compared with freedom movements, such as ANC in South Africa and SWAPO in Namibia, during their struggles for freedom (Stichting Zelfbeschikking West-Sahara, 2006). Within Polisario are several political ideas, but the main, and shared, goal is independence. Polisario leaders get chosen in Congress every three to four years. The congresses are held throughout the whole period, even during the war against Morocco, to form the government of the DARS. After gaining independence the main goal of Polisario will be the establishment of a democratic system (Stichting Zelfbeschikking West-Sahara, 2006).

In the struggle against Mauritania and Spain the national feeling of the Sahrawi people grew (Hodges, 2004). According to Hodges (2004, p. 25) there was never a Sahrawi who showed agreement with integration with Mauritania and/or Morocco. In the late 1980's Polisario was in control of 20% of the territory in the East, which is called the ‘liberated zone’. There are also a lot of Sahrawi living in refugee camps in Algeria. According to Stephan and Mundy (2006) “there are approximately 180,000 Sahrawi refugees living in Polisario-administered camps in southern Algeria” (p.6). The refugee camps in Algeria are under control of the DARS government (Stephan & Mundy, 2006). Nowadays there are also some Sahrawi who are for integration with Morocco. They are not used to live without Moroccan occupation and fear the live without economic support of Morocco (Zuijdgeest, 2004).

The DARS is member of the African Union and is recognized by about 70 countries as legitimate government of the Sahrawi people (Stichting Zelfbeschikking West-Sahara, 2006).

In the proclamation of the Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic, announced in Bir Lahlou the 27th February of 1976 they are emphasizing their shared identity. The discourse analysis of the proclamation (appendix 2) shows that they are using *discourses* to emphasize their own identity as Sahrawi people and announce their own state including their right for their territory: “In the name of the Saharawi people, and in pursuance of their will, the flag of the Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic has been raised over the land of Saguia el-Hamra and Rio de Oro” (p. xxv).

To address the new shared institutions of the government, Polisario is making use of *Discourse models*: “Today the Saharawi people have decided to publicly take an important step: to set up the fundamental

institutions arising out of revolutionary legality, essential to succeed in the present struggle for liberty and to exercise truly democratic power" (p. vii). In order to address their struggle against the Moroccan imperialism they also make use of *Discourse models*: "We put this responsibility before all the peoples of the world, for it is their duty to assist the victims of aggression, so that the imperialist plot will fail" (p. vii). Thus, they are using Discourse models to announce their new government and institutions, but also to gain support for their struggle.

Polisario is using *Discourses* to ask for international recognition: "We state on this occasion our sincere desire to establish friendly relations and co-operation with all States on the basis of mutual respect and national sovereignty" (p. vii). They also ask for support in their struggle against their "neighboring brothers" for which they will take all responsibility: "the struggle of our people who are today defying the colonialism of the neighbour "brothers", for by their heroic struggle they brought the previous page of the foreign enemy's colonialism to an end" (p. xxvi). In their proposition of friendly relationships with all countries, they also want to fight for their territory "until final victory, whatever the sacrifices may be" (p. vii). xxvi

The proclamation shows their will of being a self-determine state. The proclamation was their first step to their own state. They address their shared identity as Sahrawi people and send a warning to the (at that time two) occupants. In comparison to the foundation manifest of Polisario in 1973 were they, according to Hodges (2004, p.23), did not name independence as goal. They used the words 'complete freedom', Hodges argues, so that they had some space left for negotiations (Hodges, 2004).

The discourse analysis of the article "Abdelkader Taleb Omar: We are in new phase, peace or military escalation" describes the situation in 2010 (appendix 2). The head of the Sahrawi government Abdelkader Taleb Omar argues that something needs to be done; either way towards peace otherwise there will be military escalation.

In the article *discourses* are given to introduce the subject, most important person, date and place of the publication. For the ending of the article a *discourse* is used as well. It is also used to identify the difficulties: "In his speech, the head of the Saharawi government reiterated, moreover, that the Saharawi conflict is an "unfinished process of decolonization" that "must find its solution in accordance with international law for all decolonization issues" (p. xxvi).

*Discourses* are taken to identify the (indirect) actors, who are important for the solution and (partly) responsible for the conflict, like the former colonizer France and Spain: "He also accused Spain, "the administering power of Western Sahara" to be "responsible for the tragedy" of the Saharawi people, and "has not been able to benefit from the involvement of UN to find a just and peaceful solution of the conflict" (p. xxvi). Also there appears to be a support for the DARS from platforms, like the "Platform All with the Sahara (Western)" (p. xxvi).

The *Discourse models* are outlining the future situation, as Abdelkader Taleb Omar sees it: “transition to a new stage where there can be only two solutions: the peace or military escalation”(p. xxvii). Also international recognized assumptions are *Discourse models*: “Recalling that "no country in the world" recognizes the sovereignty of Morocco on Western Sahara, the Saharawi official said Morocco "is a power of occupation where the international community and UN failed to find a solution to the conflict caused by this illegal occupation."" (p. xxvii). Even though the shared ideas of the supporters are also *Discourse models*: ““We are determined to continue our struggle for the Saharawi people”, said the Spanish actor, who called the Spanish government to recognize the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR)” (p. xxvii).

The head of the Sahrawi government is calling for action through threaten with either peace or war. He is taking the former colonizer Spain into responsibility, as well as he is hoping to get support from other international organizations, as they already agreed that the occupation is not right. Abdelkader Taleb Omar gets support from platforms, maybe these new ways can bring other countries to support the Sahrawi and find a solution.

During the last years the struggle for independence of the Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic continued. Polisario did not achieve the independence yet, but was successful in building a government, which is representative for the Sahrawi. The struggle continues and there is still no sign of solution within the near future. To take a closer look at the complexities of this geopolitical struggle a case study analysis including the theory of language pragmatics will be given in the next chapter (4.2.1).

### 3.2.2 Morocco

“For Moroccans, Western Sahara, which they have occupied since 1975, is an integral part of the kingdom, the so-called ‘southern provinces’. There is little dissent within Morocco concerning this issue.” (Zoubir & Benabdallah-Gambier, 2004, p. 24)

Morocco gained its independence from France in 1956 (Ottaway & Riley, 2006). By the time Spain decided to leave their Saharan colony Morocco asked at the International Court of Justice in 1975 formally for the integration of the territory into the Moroccan kingdom. Even though this was rejected Morocco persistently claimed the territory (Stephan & Mundy, 2006). The reasons for this claim was the idea of the great Moroccan kingdom reaching from Morocco, the Western Saharan territory, including parts of Algeria, Mauretania and even parts of Senegal (Solarz, 1979). King Hassan promoted it as ‘national cause’ to deviate from internal political standings (Solarz, 1979). Solarz (1979, p.8) also mentions that the phosphate resources and power relations with the pro-Polisario left oriented states as Algeria and Libya. Morocco acted on the claim of the territory through starting the Green March. The anniversary of the invasion with military and civilians of the Western Saharan territory is until today a Memorial Day for the Moroccan where the king gives a speech. Even though the UN Security Council called for withdraw (Zoubir & Benabdallah-Gambier, 2004, p.6), Morocco never reacted on the resolution. Since 1979 Polisario attacks the Moroccan ‘colonizer’. Morocco got, and still gets, a lot support from the US, because of their situation during the Cold War (Morocco was more oriented

towards the USA, in opposite to Polisario), the Gulf War (Morocco's position in the Arabic countries) and within the last years Morocco's use of the American 'war against terrorism' (Al-Manar Slimi, 2009). Only with this support Morocco could remain controlling about 80% percent of the Western Saharan territory in the late 1980's (Stephan & Mundy, 2006) and is still in control over most of the territory.

Within Morocco several political changes took place. Most important are the different forms of reign from the kings Hassan II and Mohammed VI. Hassan II introduced, during his last period of reign, some important changes regarding human rights and started introducing a development towards democracy. Mohammed VI continued his father's changes, and sets himself as the 'king of the poor' (Ottaway & Riley, 2006). Even though he continued to reform towards democracy, Morocco's reforms are still implied from above and the king is still the most important person in Moroccan politics. As Ottaway and Riley (2006) put it: "To date, there is no indication that Morocco is becoming a democratic country in which power resides in institutions accountable to the electorate. Instead, the king remains the dominant religious and political authority in the country and the main driver of the reform process" (Ottaway & Riley, 2006, p. 3).

As result from the Discourse analysis (appendix 2) Morocco's point of view has not changed over the years. The analysis of the speech of Mohammed VI at the 34<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the Green March had as result that Morocco's policy does not differ. The discourse analysis of his speech concludes the following:

In the speech, which can be found in appendix 2, King Mohammed VI sustains the identity feeling of all Moroccan people. To emphasize this he uses a lot of words like "we" and "us" and "ours". This is an example of (most of the time) *discourse* (with a small d), because it is about the actions of these people and the creation of an identity. Interesting to see is that the King is referring to "them" and "their", but he never utters who "they" are. This is also a *discourse*. He is creating "their" identity, even though we do not know directly who "they" are. He uses words like "enemy" and "adversaries", but further has that group no name. As if he wants that group not to exist, but he cannot deny that there is somehow someone like an "enemy".

He gives the "Saharan province" a special meaning through celebrating the anniversary of the Green March, but also through addressing its difficulties and summarizing some implementations. He introduces shared *Discourse models* by using the Moroccan identity he created with the discourse of using words like "us" etc. He speaks as if there is a shared agreement also among the people on these implementations. Examples are: "As we celebrate the thirty-fourth anniversary of the glorious Green March, we feel even more deeply committed to the oath of this epic event, to the preservation of the Kingdom's territorial integrity, to our sacred, immutable values, and to the country's sovereignty." (p. xxviii) and "It is just as important for the combined efforts of official and parallel diplomacy to be geared towards defending the Moroccaness of the Sahara and the autonomy proposal that we tabled, and whose seriousness and credibility were praised by the United Nations." (p. xxviii)

As *Discourse* the king refers to his friends, but also mentions other actors like Algeria. “In view of this distressing situation, Algeria and international organizations, especially the UNHCR, have to face up to their responsibilities and offer effective protection to the populations concerned, particularly by conducting a census” (p. xxix). This quote shows that he recognizes himself and others and gives these other actors a meaning. Another representation of that meaning-giving is : “Through fraud and deception, they are trying to use this issue like a business, both at home and abroad, to make cheap gains at the expense of the nation’s sacred values, with little regard for the inhuman conditions endured by our brothers in Tindouf” (p. xxix). Through the “nation’s sacred values” the king is giving a high value to the national identity. By saying that “they” are making business of it, even though we do not exactly know who they are, he lets them look like the bad ones.

The structure of the speech starts with the creation of a shared Moroccan identity, through all over Morocco, thus including the ‘Saharan province’. Then the king outlines what he will do to solve the difficulties in the province. After that he uses some internationally, for example through international law, shared Discourse models, to legitimate his intervention in the ‘Saharan province’. And then he declares everybody as not Moroccan if that person is not pro Morocco. “Let me clearly say there is no more room for ambiguity or deceit: either a person is Moroccan, or is not. There can be no more duplicity or evading of duties. Now is the time for clear, unambiguous stances, and for responsible conduct. One is either a patriot, or a traitor. There is no halfway house. One cannot enjoy the rights and privileges of citizenship, only to abuse them and conspire with the enemies of the homeland.”(p. xxix). Interesting is that, as already notices he is still referring towards “them”. Even though it is not obvious, but “they” would be Polisario. The reason of not using their name is that he maybe does not want to recognize “them” as a group or even as actor. He prefers to see “them” as “enemy”.

To get a more profound opinion about the point of view of Morocco a discourse analysis of a second text was made. In the interview Khalienna Ould Errachid (appendix 2) is interviewed by a Spanish radio station. Khalienna Ould Errachid is chairman of the Royal advisory council for Saharan affairs. He is defending Morocco’s position concerning the hunger strike of Aminatou Haidar.

Khalienna is using *discourses* to describe simple actions of Haidar and others. Examples are: “Aminatou Haidar used to fully enjoy her life with dignity and freedom” (p. xxix ) and “she travelled all around the world” (p. xxix) and “the police did not arrest her” (p. xxix). These are actions Haidar or in this case the police did, which had no special background meaning. Language in these cases is only used to describe activities and identities. He uses them to express her freedom.

He is using *Discourses* to explain Haidar’s special situation. “The hunger strike she is undertaking is a voluntary act; it is a result of her personal decision” (p. xxix). He creates her action as having only meaning for her. Khalienna uses these Discourses also to identify other groups than the Moroccan kingdom and Haidar, but they are indirectly related to her: “Now what Haidar does has nothing to do with human rights, she is taking a position against the vital interests of the kingdom of Morocco, its territorial integrity and sovereignty, in favour of the Algerians and the Polisario front based in Algeria, this is the mistake Aminatou Haidar is making” (p. xxix). He also uses *Discourses* for expressing

Morocco's foreign affairs: "the origin of this operation is a calculated political manoeuvre done by Algeria and the Polisario front. It is a will to infringe Morocco, and to hinder the relationship between Morocco and Spain; it is a diplomatic operation based on propaganda against Morocco and the interests of Spain" (p. xxx) and "no the relations between Morocco and Spain are not threatened at all, not from the case of Haidar, or from anybody else. They are relations which exceed tests of the kind, they are historical relations, good neighbourhood and common interests, relation with a strategy to manage emergencies, and nobody such as Mrs Haidar or anybody else could threaten these relations" (p. xxx).

Khalihenna is referring to *Discourse models* to explain and defend the occupation of the Western Sahara: "to say that the Sahara is not Moroccan hurts the entire country, with 35 Million people." (p. xxx) and "but saying that the sahara is not Moroccan, this not a political view anymore, it is an hostile towards the Moroccan territorial integrity" (p. xxx). According to him it is no question that Western Sahara belongs to Morocco. He also uses *Discourse models* to represent Polisario as being not "Sahrawi" thus not as part of this shared identity everybody is supposed to have in the Moroccan kingdom: "Because if she was really human rights activist, she would not be siding at the Polisario front. We are sahraouis, and we have nothing to do with the Polisario, why does she claim to side one of the two parties? Human rights has got nothing to do with the Polisario front, they are international rights" (p. xxx). He explains Morocco's struggle against Polisario as defending of their territory: "it is obvious for Morocco, as it is for Spain or any other country to take the necessary measures to defend its territorial integrity" (p. xxx).

As effect of his argumentation that everybody who lives in the Western Sahara is also Moroccan, gives Haidar no right to not having the Moroccan identity. According to this she thus has not the right to declare herself as (Western-) 'Saharan'. Morocco has according to his Discourse models no responsibility for her situation, because she has always been Moroccan (according to Morocco). The interview gives an outline how Morocco regards and treats his 'Saharan province' and the people living there.

The analysis show that the Moroccan claim of territory developed through the occupation of the Western Sahara in 1975. Over the time several UN resolutions could not convince Morocco to leave the occupied territory. Morocco's claim evolved to the belief, and the analysis of the texts show, that their 'Saharan province' is now regarded of them as belonging to the Moroccan kingdom.

### 3.2.3 Algeria

Algeria is formally part of the Western Saharan- Morocco conflict, even though they claim that they do not play a role (Larosch, 2007). Larosch (2007) suspects Algeria to have no interest in solution of the conflict. Even though Algeria hosts the Sahrawi refugee camp near Tindouf and was the first country to recognize the Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic one month after its proclamation (Zoubir, 1990). Algeria's interests in influencing the conflict are complex and sometimes ambiguous (Larosch, 2007). Solarz (1979) expected Algeria's interest to counter Morocco's expansion politics and a secure passage

to the Atlantic Ocean. Algeria is backing up the Saharan claims for independence and gives military support to Polisario (Larosch, 2007).

The paradox interests of Algeria on the one hand appear from the separatist movement in between the Algerian territory. An independent DARS could jeopardize the Algerian unity and government (Larosch, 2007). On the other hand has there been a historical rivalry in between Algiers and Rabat. Algeria does not want the Moroccan empire stronger, which claimed also to have rights over the western parts of Algeria. This even ended in the 'sand war' in 1963 and in 2002 there still were strong tensions between these countries (Zoubir & Benabdallah-Gambier, 2004). But despite these tensions Algeria and Morocco are important economic partners.

Over the last years Algeria opened up more and more for international economic relations with the United States and Europe. These relations indirectly effect the US and Moroccan relations.

The article 'Fighting over the Maghreb - Algeria vs. Morocco' outlines the indirect effects of the Western Sahara dispute for the relations of Algeria and Morocco at the Algerian Moroccan border region (appendix 2). The discourse analysis outlines the indirect effects of the Western Sahara dispute for the relations of Algeria and Morocco.

In the article *discourses* are used for giving place, date and source and for structuring the text: "And the typical news coverage between the countries resembles the back and forth of a tennis match:" (p. xxxi). Activities and actions of the identified actors, and a speech of the Moroccan king, are given as *discourses* as well: "Official Algerian media recently reported setting up a diplomatic branch in the disputed area of the Western Sahara in an effort to open up negotiations with the separatist movement there, the Polisario Front" (p. xxxi).

The whole dispute of the text, about the indirect effects for the border situation at the Algerian Moroccan border, is (mostly) a *Discourse*. It describes the recognition of the actors (Morocco, Algeria and Polisario, analyzed through the Moroccan and Algerian media) and their positions in the debate: "Algerian Al-Khabar daily used the king's speech to highlight Morocco's alleged criticism over Algeria's support over the Polisario's right to self-determination in the Western Sahara - without mentioning that Algeria funded and armed the pro-Algerian Polisario movement" (p. xxxi).

The text uses *Discourse models* for describing facts (like the four times failing of mediations, p. xxxi) and the ideas and theories of Morocco and Algeria, who have mostly different positions. The main argument of the article is also represented as a *Discourse model*: "With no real press coming from the disputed region, it is hard to know what the mood is on the ground in the Western Sahara" (p. xxxi).

The article identifies the Western Sahara dispute as being the main cause for the border problems at the Algerian-Moroccan border. The positions of both countries are so different that the opening of the border, after a long tradition of smuggling through the closed border, has several effects on both sides of the border. These effects were described as benefit for Morocco, but with a lot of negative effects for



Algeria. In how far the Western Sahara dispute is an effect of the border conflict is not mentioned, but in the media of both states are remarkable influences of the country's political positions.

Even though its sometimes ambivalent point of view regarding the conflict Algeria's position “rests on UN's approach tending to continuing the process of decolonisation of Western Sahara on the basis of the right of the Sahrawi people to self-determination, the peace plan of the United Nations and the Houston accords to which the two conflicting sides, Morocco and Polisario, subscribed” (Zoubir & Benabdallah-Gambier, 2004, p. 15). The position of Algeria in the conflict will as well be further regarded in the case study in chapter 4.2.3. And the position of the official Algerian represents who say that: ‘Algeria has no ambitions in Western Sahara or in Morocco, but only asks that international legality be implemented’ (Zoubir & Benabdallah-Gambier, 2004, p. 19) will be contemplated through the theory of language pragmatics.

### **3.2.4 United States of America**

“Some researchers have argued that US assistance to Morocco was intended to sustain the war, possibly out of a wish to support the American arms industry.” (Von Hippel, 1995, p. 10)

The United States of America have through the indirect effect on Morocco influenced the Western Sahara- Morocco conflict. The US has always had a close relationship with Morocco. In 1979, Solarz stated:

“Consequently, while we clearly have a an interest in a close relationship with Morocco, we have no obligation, morally or politically, to support Morocco in what is essentially an unjust and unwinnable war”  
(Solarz, 1979, p. 16)

Solarz (1979) also argues that through the arms supply policy the US supports the Moroccan point of view in the conflict. This is backed by the idea of Von Hippel (1995). She described Morocco as the “oldest political ally” of the US (Von Hippel, 1995, p. 8). Officially the US is regarded as being neutral in this conflict (Larosch, 2007). But through recent history the US always backed Morocco's government diplomatically and militarily (Larosch, 2007). Since the Cold War, they supported Morocco, because Polisario was seen as pro-Soviet and they feared the strength of an independent DARS with a pro-Soviet government (Larosch, 2007). In times of the Gulf War Morocco mediated in between the Arab and Maghreb world and the United States (Al-Manar Slimi, 2009). Over the last years the US is moving slowly towards a more balanced position, to improve their relations with Algeria (Larosch, 2007). As the United States started their “war against terrorism” Morocco used this war to claim Polisario to be terrorists and improved the relationship again (Al-Manar Slimi, 2009). Zoubir (1990) outlines the situation between Morocco and the United States as follows:

“The United States has used Moroccan territory for air bases and com-munications and will need to do so again if the Rapid Deployment Force is to become a reality. If Hassan were to lose the Western Sahara, his regime would probably be toppled. An unstable or unfriendly Morocco will hurt the interests of Israel, Egypt, and Zaire ... The



United States will have to provide money, arms, and food to help Morocco in the struggle against the Polisario. It is worth the price to keep Morocco friendly and stable.” (Zoubir, 1990, p. 11)

The discourse analysis of the article ‘The United States, Morocco and the Western Sahara Dispute’, by Abdel-Rahim Al-Manar Slimi a professor of political sciences at the Mohammed V University in Morocco published in June 2009 describes the current relations of the US and Morocco and their influences for the Western Sahara issue (appendix 2).

There are not many *discourses* used in this article. The only things are the note of the editor and further in the text the identification of the European States and their actions towards the conflict situation: “The region has not developed enough to turn into an area where the United States and Europe (particularly France and Spain which display a more profound understanding of the conflict) compete for influence (p.3).

*Discourses*, compared to the *discourses* (with a small d), were used more often. For example to recognize the US influence on the Moroccan actions in the Cold War era, the Gulf war etc. The US foreign relations towards Morocco did not change a lot over the time. Morocco was always regarded as an important ally of the US: “Morocco is an old ally that goes back to the Cold War and is a geostrategic gateway to southern Europe and Africa” (p. xxxiii). Those were the reasons for the US to provide Morocco with weapons, or not to intervene in the Western Sahara dispute, because it would destabilize the region and finally Morocco was using the ‘war against terrorism’ for its own purposes: “Aware of this, Morocco adopted a rhetoric that linked the threat posed by the ongoing Western Sahara issue to the threat of terrorist groups spreading in North Africa” (p. xxxiii). Inside the US the opinions are divided. Parts want to support Morocco as they always did and the others do not want to the UN mission to fail and finally the US foreign affairs with Algeria play a role: “The fluctuations in the U.S. position reveal Washington’s interest in maintaining room for maneuver between its two strategic allies, Morocco and Algeria. This policy left both Algeria and Morocco feeling dissatisfied, but not threatened. As a Security Council member, the United States often expresses its position on the dispute through its acts in the UN. That is, through pressing the UN to maintain an indefinite involvement in the region by playing the role of the “tourist policeman”.” (p. xxxiii).

The *Discourse models* show that the author of the article sees the Western Sahara conflict as “one of the most neglected international conflicts” (p. xxxiii). Further *Discourse models* are used to describe the common theories of US foreign policies like: “... when Washington realized that diplomatic efforts to resolve the dispute might fail and thus threaten to destabilize the region with renewed violence. Such instability could affect southern Europe negatively and jeopardize U.S. interests.” (p. xxxiii). It is also used to declare a theory of the author: “The U.S. approach to the Western Sahara dispute for the past thirty years offers many insights into U.S. policy toward Morocco” (p. xxxiii).

The United States rather prefer a stable ceasefire, not-solved situation instead of a destabilized region. Even though Von Hippel identifies the US non-intervention as an effect of the ongoing conflict:

“Because Washington has not adopted a hard-line policy towards the Western Sahara, even allowing the dispute to drag on virtually under its tutelage (by the provision of arms), this non-intervention has served only to fuel the conflict. (There is some evidence that the aid provided to the Moroccans has only been enough to maintain their stocks of weapons, not to increase them significantly.)” (Von Hippel, 1995 p. 10-11)

The US, as a member of the UN Security Council, supports the implementation of the referendum, but the fear of a destabilized region trickles down. The position will further be examined through help of the language pragmatic theory in chapter 4.2.2.

### 3.2.5 United Nations (Minurso)

“By assuming responsibility for resolving the Western Sahara conflict, the UN interjected itself into what was clearly an impossible situation. Both parties were determined to win the referendum under the UN Settlement Plan and had a strategy for doing so: Morocco by expanding and inflating the electorate to include as many Moroccans of Saharan descent as possible, and the Polisario by trying to keep it within the parameters of the 1974 Spanish census. Neither party hid its intentions vis-à-vis the referendum, although Morocco was more blatant about it, talking about a “confirmative” (for Morocco) referendum.” (Theofilopoulou, 2006, p. 14)

As Theofilopoulou describes in her quote the mission of the UN as clearly impossible. The intervention of the United Nations in 1965 with the resolution which identified the Western Saharan, at that time a Spanish colony, as territory which needs to gain independence. Since then the UN had a role as intervening party (Larosch, 2007). In 1987 they mediated face-to-face talks in between Polisario and Morocco, which led to a, from a UN-OAU cooperation, plan, which included an UN-supervised ceasefire and a planned referendum (Durch, 1993). In the post Cold War era the UN got more involved in the conflict, with the goal to achieve self-determination for the Sahrawi (Larosch, 2007). They established MINURSO, a UN mission for the referendum in Western Sahara, in April 1991, which has its headquarter in Laayoune ([www.un.org](http://www.un.org)). The success of this mission was not really successful.

In 1997 as Kofi Annan became Secretary-General of the UN he drew attention to the solution of the conflict in the Western Sahara. He addressed James Baker III as Special Representative of the Secretary-General. His mandate was to identify the process and to get the referendum back on track (Larosch, 2007). In the beginning Baker was successful. In September 1997 he introduced the ‘Houston Agreements’ and started to initiate negotiations outside the conflict territory, with indirect actors, such as the US and France (Larosch, 2007). In 2002 Baker set up the ‘Draft Freedom Agreement’ (also known as the first Baker plan), which favored the position of Morocco and was rejected by Polisario and Algeria (Larosch, 2007). Thus Baker rewrote the plan and called it ‘The Peace Plan for the Self-Determination of the People of Western Sahara’ (known as the second Baker plan) (Larosch, 2007). This time the plan was accepted by Polisario as basis of for solution, but was rejected by Morocco, because the final point of this plan was the ‘independence’ of the Western Sahara (Larosch, 2007). After this plan failed as well Baker resigned. In 2005 a new successor was found (Larosch, 2007).

Inside the UN are disparities about the outcomes of the solution of the conflict. The UN itself supports the self-determination, but the UN Security Council “refuses to commit itself to the possible outcome of

this self-determination process” (Larosch, 2007, p. 20). Here the position of the US in the Security Council is obvious. The US is afraid, as well as other countries, of a destabilized region. Thus they do not want to take responsibilities for an eventually post-independence conflict in the Western Sahara.

In the discourse analysis of the speech of Frank Ruddy, a U.S. Ambassador who was Former Deputy Chairman at the U.N. Peacekeeping Mission MINURSO, at the World Affair Council in 2007 he shares his experiencing in the Western Sahara and criticizes the UN (appendix 2).

He uses *discourses* most of the time to describe his own opinion and actions. Examples are: “As noted earlier, I had not seen the likes of it since I observed the apartheid government in South Africa in action against South African blacks when I visited there with Roy Wilkins, then head of the N.A.A.C.P., in the early 70’s” (p. xxxv) and “I attended the Capitol Hill conference he held, and I eagerly read the reports of his meetings in Morocco, Algeria, Lisbon and London” (p. xxxv). But he also uses them to indicate actions of other actors like: “That is the reason Chris Hedges of The New York Times had no trouble getting the facts he needed to expose in print the referendum for the sham it was” (p. xxxv).

*Discourse models* are very seldom in his speech. There are only some to represent common accepted facts: “The U.N.’s task was simple enough: Hold a referendum with one issue to be decided: independence or integration with Morocco” (p. xxxv); or to emphasize shared theories by media like the resource issue: “Translated from legalese, Morocco, as an occupying power but not the Administering power, must stop plundering the natural resources of Western Sahara” (p. xxxv).

The most parts of the speech are *Discourses* which explain who did what with which meaning and to which purpose. Even though he creates a critical picture of Morocco, he still represents them as an important ally of the US: “The point is, however, that however helpful Morocco is to us in carrying out diplomatic missions elsewhere, particularly in the Middle East, that same ally, Morocco, acted more like the Mafia in Western Sahara” (p. xxxv). In his *Discourses* he outlines the weaknesses of MINURSO: “The Secretary General prevented the 4th Committee, composed entirely of member states of the U.N., from hearing someone who just might have been able to tell them the U.N. was wasting close to a billion dollars on a mission and referendum going nowhere” (p. xxxv). He focuses on the situation of Morocco: “Morocco dictated the where and when of the voting registration, controlled entry to the U.N. voter Registration facilities, and even decided which Sahrawi’s got to register. The Moroccan observers at the voter registration sessions had observed right off the bat that the people of Western Sahara wanted independence, not integration with Morocco. The way for Morocco to deal with that unpleasant reality was to postpone the referendum indefinitely until it appeared unworkable, leaving Morocco just where it was, controlling Western Sahara. And that’s just what Morocco did” (p. xxxv). And he gives an overview about the international relations concerning foreign affairs and this conflict: “Western Sahara is also a full member of the African Union, the successor to the Organization of African Unity. These facts alone would seem to demand forbearance by the EU, but such was not the case. Despite all the diplomatic bloviating at the U.N. and Washington and elsewhere about the rights of people everywhere to self-determination, the countries that could make a difference in Western Sahara are willing to

jettison the rights of one small nation to determine its future to placate Morocco and its outrageous irredentist demands” (p. xxxvi).

All in all Ruddy outlines the problems of MINURSO and the underlying foreign affairs and international relations regarding the Western Sahara issue. He uses mostly Discourses, to express the different points of view, identities and emphasize the underlying meanings.

Durch (1993) describes MINURSO as negative example of a peacekeeping mission and takes it as example of too high UN ambitions and shortcomings the system. Larosch (2007) addresses the UN as political organization and not as unitary actor, which in this case is clearly outlined. The geopolitical position of the UN will be further contemplated through the lenses of language pragmatics in chapter 4.2.5. Even though Theofilopoulou describes the future of MINURSO like this:

“Western Sahara will remain on the UN agenda for many years to come. Already the situation has gone on for fifteen years and has cost over \$600 million. Morocco’s supporters inside and outside the Security Council must recognize that it is in Morocco’s long-term interest to resolve the conflict and obtain international legitimacy rather than feed its hope that it will get what it wants by just talking of compromise without making real concessions. The Polisario, on the other hand, needs to be realistic and recognize that the international community’s words in support of the principle of self-determination are quite different from its deeds. The former serve only to perpetuate the impasse, while the latter could help in resolving it.” (Theofilopoulou, 2006, p18)

## 4. Case study: Language Pragmatics in the Western Sahara

### 4.1 Language Pragmatics in the Western Sahara

In this chapter the conflict will be seen through the lenses of the theory of the language pragmatics. The access to social reality, in this case the Western Saharan Morocco conflict, will be approximated through the access of social actions and relations, as it is usual in action theory. The interdependence in between the intentional project of action and the situation has thereby a high relevance. Therefore the actor analysis was made to get to know more about the social actions and relations of the Western Sahara-Morocco conflict. Personal empathy and influence through the secondary literature could slightly influence objectivity here. But it was tried to keep a neutral perspective.

‘Verstehen’ (understanding) is the main point. Otherwise communication and interpretation would not be possible (Habermas, 1991). To reach this understanding the points of views of the most important actors were described. The boundaries of language are as well the boundaries of action (Habermas, 1991). This means that a concept of (shared) meaning is not provided outside a (shared) language to communicate with. It can be compared to the idea of Discourse models. A Discourse model does not exist outside a certain group, because it is not likely that outsiders will understand the meaning in the same way. To include the geographical note the analysis of the action problems will be seen as spatial problems, just like Werlen describes it (Werlen, 1987). The conflict in the Western Sahara is a good

example, because it is in the first sense a struggle about territory. Since Spain left its former colony, several actors are claiming of having a right to that piece of land. The actors who are still claiming the territory are now Polisario and Morocco. The physical dimension is thus (almost only) the territory of the Western Sahara. To analyze all dimensions, and the indirect actors, of the conflict we need an abstraction of the situation to describe and explain the activities (Werlen, 1987). Zierhofer's language pragmatics combines the concepts of (shared) meanings with the physical condition, but it also takes into account particular purposes and particular concepts. It needs to look further than these concepts and this means that the peculiar situation of the Western Sahara can be regarded from all its viewpoints and the reasons for the conflict may be pointed out.

Whether the conflict located in a developmental country can be analyzed through a Western based theory is important concerning the language pragmatics in the Western Sahara. But as Habermas describes it: "The system of exchange relationships is so little isolated from society as a whole that the social behavior of economic subjects cannot be comprehended independently of the institutional context" (Habermas, 1995, p. 49). In this case the focus lies on the conflict situation instead of the economic relation. Nevertheless both will be comparable in the same way, because they are regarding relations as important. This is because:

"These expectations are a facet of cultural tradition that is relevant to institutionalized action. Cultural tradition is a symbolic context that defines the worldview of a social group, articulated in ordinary language form, and therewith the framework of possible communications within the group. Thus social action exists only with reference to the system of traditional cultural patterns in which self-understanding of social groups is articulated. The methodology of the sciences of the action cannot avoid the problem of understanding meaning, of hermeneutically appropriating cultural tradition." (Habermas, 1991, p. 55-56)

Thus, the relevance of the cultural tradition is important by analyzing the conflict, but does not hinder the analysis of the African conflict through the lenses of a Western based theory framework.

In the following chapters the theory of language pragmatics will be implied on the different actors.

## 4.2. Application from Language Pragmatics on Actor's

"Every speech act, including jokes, is intended to be understood and accepted as a sincere expression. It tacitly claims to be valid. Although the concept of validity claims has been elaborated in connection with the notion of speech acts, it may be applied to actions and their tacit claims of efficiency in general. This opens a path to the analysis of the coordination of actions that focuses on the roles of physical settings in inter-actions. This is particularly relevant for geography, and it leads to an understanding of society not as a container of pure human interactions, but as a structure of human interactions which involves all possible nonhuman entities" (Zierhofer, 2002, p. 1356)

To understand in how far the different actors have different concepts of meaning we will analyze their actions and relations. For this purpose the table of the instruments for analysis and critique is used,

which already was mentioned in chapter 2. For the abstraction of the actions and re-actions the instruments in table 2.4, which are described in chapter 2, will first be outlined more specific in general and then implied on each of the actors.

<i>Classes of validity claims</i>	Truth and/ or efficiency	All sorts of validity claims
<i>Coordination of actions</i>	Systematic integration	Social integration
<i>Kind of binding</i>	Functional	Agreement
<i>Rationality</i>	Instrumental rationality	Communicative rationality
<i>Form of relation</i>	The system	The life world
<i>Physical dimension</i>	Space	Location involving ethnological and cultural background (particular purpose)
<i>Time dimension</i>	Temporal structuration	Change/ difference in time
<b>Re-action of other (-s)</b>	Interaction	'Intersubjectivity'

Table 2.4: Instruments for analysis and critique

The *classes of validity claims* are establishing (existing) power relations. These depend on argumentation. To further analyze the underlying power relations in between the actors all sorts of validity claims will be regarded and tested on their truth and/or efficiency level (Zierhofer, 2002). The *coordination of actions* also refers to the (existing) power relations, but it does focus more about the systematic and social integration by taking dualities and dualism of 'micro' and 'macro', as well as 'action' and 'structure' (Zierhofer, 2002). The *kind of binding*, which can be functional or achieved through agreement, regards the (non-)acceptance of actions and whether the argumentation was successful or not (Zierhofer, 2002). Hereby the possibility of argumentation is given, which is in direct connection with the (re)actions of other(s). The *rationality* is referring to the quality of the interaction. Communication of organizations is seen as collective project. In rationality is a difference made in between instrumental and communicative rationality, which are ideal types (Zierhofer, 2002). Communicative rationality is more focused on the binding force and instrumental more on the structural aspects of actions. The *form of relation*, which is taking into account the system and the life world of the actors, is referring to social structures, which are classes of interaction distinguished by 'qualities of interaction'. The reason that the life world does not belong under the system is that Zierhofer and Habermas regarded social life in a higher degree than the social structures (Zierhofer, 2002). The *physical dimension* is not directly taken into the models by Zierhofer of Habermas, but will be given the same attention as the other variables, because, like Werlen (1987) pointed out, spatial problems are action problems.

"Physical artifacts are not only the necessary basis of any oral and written communication, but, moreover, a profound aspect of sociality in general." (Zierhofer, 2002, p. 1364)

Zierhofer regards it as being part of validity claims, but to give it separate attention as well, the physical part will be an independent variable. Zierhofer, himself wrote that 'physical artifacts are a profound aspect of sociality' (Zierhofer, 2002). Therefore the physical dimension will in this case be taken into account and regarding the space and locational aspects of ethnological cultural background in their particular purposes. The *time dimension*, like the physical, is not in any earlier model of Zierhofer and /or Habermas. Zierhofer (2002) and Werlen (1987) regard time as a second order space. The dimension of time is thus more used to structure actions, but is not a named variable for analysis. In this case the time dimension will be regarded particularly for temporal structuration, to see whether actions and their re-actions evolved in time. The last and most important aspect is the *re-action of other(s)*. This aspect is referring to action and re-action of the actors at the same time. It is taking into account the interaction and 'intersubjectivity'. 'Intersubjectivity' is a kind of binding force between actions, which represents the basis for intentional integration of activities (Zierhofer, 2002).

The theory of Zierhofer was developed to analyze actions of individuals. In this case we are dealing with a highly complex geopolitical structure and the actors are institutions. Through the simplification of the institutions as individual actors it is done with the intention to get a more generalized overview about the complex geopolitical conflict situation. This is to keep the analysis of the empirical conflict through the model lenses of language pragmatics.

In the following paragraphs the most important actors and their (inter-)actions will be regarded through the variables of the instruments for analysis and critique as described here above.

#### **4.2.1 Western Sahara: Sahrawi, Polisario and the Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic**

To understand the point of view of the Western Sahara, in particular the Sahrawi, Polisario and the Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic, we have to see all the actors in a different light. For this analysis, if the point of view in a variable does not remarkably differ from the other actors inside the Western Sahara, it will not be mentioned and they will be taken as one Western Saharan institution.

The *classes of validity* of these groups have the most important validity claims in the proclamation of the DARS in 1976 and the forming of Polisario 1973. Their efficiency is proved in the struggle against Spain and Mauritania, where both countries left the Western Saharan territory. The truth for the actors of the Western Sahara is written in several UN resolutions which all contemplate self-determination.

The *coordination of actions* is split into the systematic integration, which in between the internal Western Sahara actors is a strong binding with the government of the DARS and Polisario, but in connection with external actors are the Sahrawi more and more structural integrated in the Moroccan society, which is developing inside the Western Saharan territory. On the social level the integration with Morocco is not successful with all Sahrawi. Even though there are some who think it is better to get completely integrated in the Moroccan kingdom, for mostly economical reasons (Zuijdgeest, 2004), there is a rising in the nationalist feeling of the Sahrawi people (Hodges, 2004).



The (existing) power structures which derive from the classes of validity and the coordination of actions are the superiority of Morocco, which in this case is based on military force. Argumentatively, regarding the UN resolutions and the conclusion of the International Court of Justice in 1975, the Western Saharan actors are in charge of power.

The *kind of binding* in between Morocco and the Western Saharan actors is functional. They are bound, because Morocco is present in their territory. Under the aspect of agreement there is no successful relation in between the actors. It is caused because of Morocco's presence and therefore only on functional level. In between the Western Saharan actors there is an agreement with the government of the DARS and Polisario, that Polisario represents the military force of the republic until they get there self-determination.

Almost the same points as in kind of binding are true for *rationality*. In communicative level there is a good relation in between the internal actors. Polisario is a kind of political party in between the DARS, they are elections in the refugee camps and so the rational communication inside the different actors of the Western Sahara is given (if Morocco does not intervene). In contrast to this the rationality in between the Western Saharan actors and Morocco is mostly functional, because the Western Saharan people need to deal with the Moroccan occupation.

The *form of relation* represents also the dealing with the occupation of Morocco as a system. Internal the system of the Western Saharan people is that the Sahrawi are representing all the people living in the Western Sahara, who are not from Moroccan or other origin. They have their government, which is the Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic. This republic was built by Polisario, which is a sort of political party, but does prefer to be referred to as a group of freedom fighters. The life world of the Sahrawi is much more the struggle for independence, the daily life in the Western Sahara under Moroccan occupation and the circumstances in the refugee camps.

This already described the *physical dimension* a bit. The space were everything is located is the territory of the Western Sahara, which is mostly occupied by Morocco, and the refugee camps of Sahrawi in Algeria near Tindouf. From the ethnological background the Sahrawi have always differed from other nations. They speak a different language, the Hassaniya-dialect of the Arab language, and have other tea rituals than the Moroccans (Hodges, 2004; Zuijdgeest, 2004).

Through *time* only little things changed. There is still no solution to what is referred as the Western Sahara issue. Polisario and the government of DARS did not change their opinion over time. The only things they accepted were that the second Baker plan could be taken as basis for negotiations. In general, because of Morocco being in charge over Western Sahara for such a long period, more and more (external) actors ask for a plan of integration into the Moroccan kingdom. Even though through interference of the UN the violent struggle ended and a ceasefire was achieved, but since then there was still no referendum as it was planned in 1991.



The *actions and re-actions of others* of the actors within the Western Sahara are foremost in interaction with the United Nations and Algeria. The interaction of Algeria is an effect of the refugee camps, which are hosted by Algeria and Algeria's support for Polisario. The interaction with the UN, because of they are mediating in between the conflict groups and the peacekeeping mission. Interaction in between the Western Saharan actors and Morocco, except for the daily life world, is almost not given. They tried to negotiate in 1991, but except for that date, they are almost no mentionable interactions. The most important interactions were the negotiations about the ceasefire. After that the only mentionable communications are the demonstrations, which are against the Moroccan occupation. Intersubjectivity in between the Western Saharan actors is mostly achieved, but with Morocco it is (almost) never provided. The Western Saharan actors share their opinion (mostly) with Algeria, and even the UN in their resolution shares their ideas, but in other contexts intersubjectivity is (almost) never given.

To put it all in a nutshell the situation in the territory of the Western Sahara did not change significantly. The relation in between the Western Saharan actors and Morocco as opponent is still bad and they do not share the same meaning. Even though the Sahrawi (and Polisario and DARS) got international recognition of their right to self-determination, nobody is hindering Morocco of occupying their territory.

#### 4.2.2 Morocco

In this part the actor Morocco will be regarded through the language pragmatic lenses. We will take the entire Moroccan kingdom and see it as institution and thus analyze its actions.

The *classes of validity claims* are grounded on Moroccan military force. The military superiority allows Morocco to occupy the territory of the Western Sahara for now 35 years. Their efficiency of occupation is not only based on military, but also on the successful migration of Moroccan people. These settlers started with the Green March and the immigration into the Western Sahara has not been stopped since then. It is so far that the Moroccans people are nowadays outnumbering the Sahrawi.

*Coordination of actions* is navigated by the Moroccan king. With the Green March he steered towards systematic integration of Morocco into the territory of the Western Sahara. He is using his own and external military assistance to reach his final goal: the integration of the Western Sahara in the Moroccan kingdom. The integration on the social level inside the Western Sahara is not (always) provided. The Sahrawi do not want contact with the Moroccan people and the Moroccan people inside the Western Sahara are mostly jobless and living from Moroccan government assistance.

The systematic integration of the Western Sahara is also the main point if you take a look at the *kind of binding*. The kind of binding is based on the agreement on ceasefire in 1991, but was since then nothing but functional in between Morocco and Polisario. They do not want to communicate, because both are persisting on their positions and do not want adjustments. The acceptance of the Green March and argumentation of Morocco needs to be separated and regarded internal and external. Inside Morocco they somehow regard their Saharan province as part of their territory. Inside the Western Sahara, the

Sahrawi do not see Morocco as their legitimate head of state. The binding in between Morocco and the UN is given and necessary, because they both are present in the territory.

*Rationality* displays the same as the former aspects. The instrumental rationality is based on the military superiority of Morocco. The communicative rationality is not given. The quality of interaction is (almost) not provided, because there is (almost) no communication in between the conflicting parties.

The *forms of relation* are also steered by the king of Morocco. The system inside the Western Sahara is governed top-down, like the rest of the Moroccan kingdom. Development towards a democratic system was introduced in reforms, but these were not far reaching enough and the king is remaining in his position of power controlling his country. Inside the Moroccan kingdom are different life worlds, like the southern parts where Berber live, which are not really integrated into the Moroccan society. Inside the Western Sahara the Moroccans and Sahrawi form two separate societies. Thus there are two separated life worlds of two different cultures present.

As *physical dimension* is the space where all is taking place in the Western Saharan territory, but as this text is about Morocco we do need to include the territory of the Moroccan kingdom as well. As already was pointed out the several ethnological groups in the specific regions in the forms of relation this will not be outlined here again.

Concerning the *dimension of time* it is interesting to mention that not much has changed since the Green March. Morocco celebrates the anniversary of the Green March every year. Some argue that the factor of time is in the strategy of Morocco to get the Western Sahara integrated just because they are present in that piece of land for such a long period. So, including this (theoretic) strategy time is an important factor in the conflict.

As we take a look at the *actions and re-actions of other(s)* Morocco is depending on the support from the United States and economically dependent from France. They have little real interaction and communication with the people from the Western Sahara, except for their police intervention in demonstrations. Morocco started to keep up the negotiations with Algeria after the Sand War and other differences in opinion. Morocco directly acts on the interventions of the UN, and tries to steer them, towards a positive outcome for them. As it concerns the 'intersubjectivity' Morocco's internal structure and opinion is clear and (almost) all Moroccan regard the Western Sahara as one of their legitimate provinces. Outside this shared context there is no intersubjectivity with other actors concerning their claim on the Western Sahara.

Morocco is using a strategy of not interacting with the enemy (Polisario) to use the (dimension of) time to be one day the legitimate government over the Western Saharan territory. They do interact with other states to engage their own purposes.

### 4.2.3 Algeria

In this paragraph we are taking a close look at the position and actions of Algeria by using language pragmatics. As in the former cases Algeria's government is institutionalized and taken as one actor.

Regarding the *classes of validity claims* Algeria intervened in the conflict supporting Polisario to have influence on the power relations in its region. The main reason was Algeria's fear of Morocco being too powerful and invading parts of Algeria's territory as well. There had been rivalry in between Morocco and Algeria for centuries. Algeria supported Polisario and in the first years it was very efficient, but as soon as Morocco got military support from the US, the success of Polisario declined.

Algeria and their *coordination of actions* are on the one hand systematically integrating the conflict into their own internal politics. Algeria has ambivalent interests to keep the conflict going, they are described in paragraph 3.2.3. On the other hand they are socially bound with the Sahrawi. Not only because of the refugee camps on their territory, but also because of a long relation of support with Polisario. Algeria was also the first country which accepted the DARS and helped them to become member of the OAU.

These are some reasons why Algeria is not accepting the actions and arguments of Morocco, if we take a look at the *kind of binding*. On the functional level Algeria is not supporting Polisario sufficient enough to beat Morocco, but exactly that much that they can keep on with their struggle. Another point is that the relation in between Morocco and Algeria got better within the last years, also as an effect of the importance of their economical relations. On the level of agreement we can assume that Algeria is accepting the actions of Polisario as they are supporting them. Given their friendly relationship this is not surprising.

On the aspect of *rationality* Algeria acts with instrumental and communication level with both conflicting parties. Even though Algeria has a stronger binding with the Sahrawi people, on instrumental level they host the refugee camps and support Polisario and they do communicate in as friendlier way with each other, Algeria started to improve its relations with Morocco. This is not always an easy process, but over the time the relations are slowly improving. The quality of interaction is still better with Polisario and not always the best with Morocco.

Concerning the *form of relation* the system regarding this conflict can be analyzed on different levels (internal, inter-African and international). Internal does the conflict state some difficulties, which are described in the actor analysis. Inter-African Algeria is still the biggest supporter and the most important assistant to the DARS. Taking a look at the international level Algeria is now promoting its own interests, which do not always include the support for Polisario. Especially the Algerian US relations are improving which has indirect influences on the Western Saharan conflict, as Algeria does not want to be seen as an actor in the conflict and the US start to reconsider their relations with Morocco on a more critical level than before. This could give major impacts on the conflict situation. As we take a look at the life world the refugee camps in Algeria play an important role as do also the life world situation of the Algerians. Most of the Algerians are pro Polisario and against Morocco, which is not surprising regarding the

history and rivalry between these states. In the refugee camps the daily life does not provide the best quality of living.

At the *physical dimension* the refugee camps are an interesting point to take into account. They are enclaves of the DARS in which the DARS government is in charge. These enclaves are completely depending on Algeria. The ethnological differences inside and outside the refugee camp area are significant.

The *dimension of time* shows that Algeria's politics is developing from a more closed, pro-Soviet, to a more Western oriented state. This has had influence on the development with their relations of their neighbor countries. As outlined in form of relation has the improving US Algerian relation a lot of direct impacts on the Western Saharan conflict.

The *actions and reactions of other(s)* have changed from the earlier pro-Soviet government towards a Western oriented Algerian state. This has influence on their foreign affairs. In the OAU Algeria is using its power to promote interests of the DARS as well and to keep the power of Morocco to a minimum. Within the last years the relation between Morocco and Algeria is slightly improving, but still not the best. Concerning Polisario Algeria is still the most important partner, but regarding the change in Algeria's foreign policy the future remains unclear.

All in all Algeria is indirectly one of the most important actors in the conflict in the Western Sahara. Regarding its ambivalent internal situation there is not always an interest in solution provided. If we regard Algeria's international position in the OAU and with the US and Morocco, Algeria could play an important role as a mediator.

#### 4.2.4 United States of America

In the former paragraph Algeria was outlined as the indirect actor effecting Polisario, now the focus will be on the indirect actor standing behind Morocco: the United States.

As it concerns the *classes of validity claims* Morocco and the US have been allies for centuries and their relationship is based on several aspects. Morocco does depend on the weapons which derive from the US and increase the US economy. The US depends on Morocco as bridge to the Arab countries and the southern European states. Thus, the existing power relations are ambivalent. Regarding the Western Saharan issue, as it is called in the US, Morocco does depend more on the US than the US depend diplomatically on Morocco.

The *coordination of actions* is as ambivalent as the power relations. The systematic integration in between Morocco and the US dates back to the Cold War and further (Von Hippel, 1995). As described in paragraph 3.2.4, the US placed several important military bases on Moroccan territory and their economical relation, especially through trade with arms, has significant impact. On the level of social

integration are the two countries very different and not really comparable. Morocco and the Western Sahara are Arab countries and the US with its modern western lifestyle is a total different world.

As for the *kind of binding* the relation between Morocco and the US is outlined in the coordination of actions, but if we take a look at the functional binding in the literature it is clear that the US knows about its indirect role within the Western Sahara conflict from the early beginning, but is accepting the situation and not intervening, because of its relation to Morocco and the fear of an unstable region. On the level of agreement the role of the US in between the UN is relevant. As outlined in chapter 3, the US and its role in the UN Security Council is important for the internal UN opinion of the Western Saharan conflict. Thus, the pro Moroccan position of the US depends on the kind of binding with Morocco.

The *rationality* concerning the involvement of the US in the Western Saharan conflict on instrumental level does depend on the relation with Morocco and the fact that they prefer a stable region instead of an unsure post-independence situation on Western Saharan territory. AS instrument they also use their indirect influence in the UN Security council. On the communicative level the US and Morocco has a good level of communication. But the US does not take into account communication with the Sahrawi to see their point of view, because that would jeopardize their relations with Morocco, which the US in some ways is depending on. Within the last years the US started to improve their relations with Algeria which has impact on the US-Moroccan relations and indirectly as well on the Western Saharan conflict.

The *forms of relations*, as far as they are not outlined above, do play in several systems. The US does only have influence on the conflict on the level of international relations. Their impacts on regional level are limited and indirect via foreign affairs with other countries located in that region. Concerning the life worlds they are totally different comparing the US life world with the life world of Moroccans or even Sahrawi. Thus, it is assumable that the Americans do not know much about the circumstances of the Western Sahara.

This assumption is also to be found if we regard the physical dimension. The space of the US foreign affairs (and interventions) is world wide, but still in between the territory of the actual conflict, the Western Sahara, and the United States of America is the Atlantic Ocean. Thus the ethnological differences between the indirect intervening actor and the actual place are significantly.

Regarding the *temporal dimension*, we need to take into account the development since the Cold War, were the US were supporting Morocco and against Polisario, because they were indirectly supported from the Soviets. This did change but Morocco still is in favor of US foreign relations, as diplomatic and economical partner. The development is described in chapter 3.

As we look at the last aspect, the *re-actions and actions of others*, there is the obvious relation with Morocco, and the interactions between these states depend on each others, economical and diplomatic, dependence. Even though Morocco does depend more on the arm supply, than the US do on their diplomatic relations. It could be in order to get more independence from Morocco's diplomacy in the Arab world the US also started to improve their relations with Algeria. This has indirectly important

impact on the Western Saharan issue, even though there is no real interaction with the Sahrawi. The role of the US in between the UN Security Council should also be taken into account, and will be outlined in the next paragraph about the outlined analysis and critique of the UN regarding their situation within in the Western Saharan conflict.

#### 4.2.5 United Nations (Minurso)

In this paragraph the more neutral actor, the United Nations and its mission MINURSO, are seen through the aspects of the language pragmatics.

As it concerns the *classes of validity* claims the existing power structure within the Western Sahara did not change significantly through the UN intervention and the MINURSO mission. MINURSO was not very efficient and had only limited power to self assertion against the (military) forces of the Moroccan kingdom.

Regarding the *coordination of actions* is the UN trying to implement their plans and try to solve the conflict. The outcome, whether the Western Sahara gets its self-determination or gets integrated into the Moroccan kingdom, does not play an important role for the UN as long as the conflict will be solved peacefully. On the level of social integration the solution of the conflict has much more diversity than only the political struggle. The situation inside the Western Saharan territory, where Moroccans and Sahrawi are living next to each other, but not with each is another lack of social integration which could be solved with UN intervention. Even though this would not provide a solution of the conflict it would be another way of implementing policies. On both levels of integration the UN mission was not successful in turning both sides' directions.

The *kind of binding* relates to the power structure in the region. Morocco's superiority, even over the UN mission, affects the whole peacekeeping mission. On the functional level this power structure needs to be taken more into account while formulating resolutions forward to a solution in the Western Sahara issue. On the levels of agreement the resolutions and plans of the UN exist, but their implementation does fail, because the direct and indirect actors do not accept the outcome. The possibility of argumentation is (almost) not provided because neither of the actors does want to negotiate on its point of view.

On the aspect of *rationality* has the UN to little influence and power at the instrumental level to have significant effect on the outcome. They need to alter the positions of Morocco and Polisario, as well as the indirect actors Algeria and the US. On the level of communication is too little action, so that it could have a quality of interaction.

The *form of relation* of the system is in this case again based on the power structures. The goal of the UN is to set up a solution of the conflict under the basis of international law. Within the system which is currently present in the Western Sahara will the goal of the UN not been reached. The life world of the

Sahrawi and the Moroccans is so different that it will take a lot of effort to solve their inhomogeneous situations.

The *physical dimension* if we look at the UN is in an organization which does include (almost) every country in the world and thus a lot of different opinions. With their headquarter in the US, and with the US as one of the major actors within the UN, it is difficult to really relate a physical dimension on the UN. If we concern MINURSO, with its headquarter in Laayoune, it is easier to give it physical impact. The UN is present within the Western Saharan territory, even though they are situated in the part which is occupied of Morocco.

Regarding the *dimension of time* the UN did identify the Western Sahara as territory to be handed in self-determination since 1963. The UN did address Morocco in 1975 to withdraw the occupation of the territory and has repeated since then the call for self-determination of the Sahrawi. The biggest success of the UN within the Western Sahara conflict was the establishment of a ceasefire in between the struggling actors and the acceptance of planning a referendum in 1991. Since then the UN did only achieve little development with its peacekeeping mission MINURSO. The history of MINURSO is outlined in chapter 3.

If we take a look at the *actions and re-actions of others* the UN interacts with all the other actors. Polisario and Algeria accepted the second plan of Baker as basis for negotiations, but it was neglected by Morocco, which did accept the first Baker plan. Thus the UN is trying to deal with the actors, but it is not an easy task to do. The role of the US in between the UN Security Council is also not deniable. Inside the UN are fears that if they would change the current situation within the Western Sahara, there would be violent struggles again and nobody wants to take the responsibility of a civil war. This is the intersubjective position inside the UN and reflects as well their position on the outside.

The UN tries to negotiate in between all the actors, but as far as it concerns their positions they do not want to argue about their point of view. The internal insecurity about the effects of a change in the current situation of the Western Sahara of the UN is also affecting the non solution of the Western Sahara conflict.

## 5. Conclusion

In this chapter the conclusion of this research will be given. For this purpose the research questions from the first chapter will be answered. The main questions are:

1. *What are the main (inter-) actions which cause the non-solution of the Western Sahara conflict?*
2. *In how far can a Western based theory be applied in a Northern African conflict situation?*

To answer the first question we take a look at the focus of the research at the main actors of the Western Sahara Morocco conflict, who are the people (and actors) in the Western Sahara, the Sahrawi, Polisario and the Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic, Morocco, Algeria, the United States (US) and the United Nations (UN), with their mission MINURSO. The case study shows that the conflict remains going and sees no solution, because of the indirect actors, who have (mostly) no interest or intentions in a suitable solution for the Western Saharan territory.

As the case study shows if it concerns Polisario they do not have the strength to encounter Morocco with enough force to determine their self-determination. They depend on Algeria, which gives too little support to strengthen Polisario sufficiently.

Morocco's interest, according to the research, in the Western Sahara territory is clear and they will not give up their occupation. Their military superiority is the main reason for their successful occupation. Contemplate the duration of the conflict; most of the Moroccan people regard the Western Saharan territory as their Saharan province. Morocco gets back up from the United States who is interested in good relations with Morocco. This and the fact that the US prefers a stable region, instead of an unclear post-independence situation, are the main reasons for the US not to intervene.

The United Nations tried to solve the Western Saharan issue, but through their limitation of resources and the superiority of Morocco, they cannot force intervention and failed to negotiate sufficiently in between the actors. This failure can also be a result of the ambiguous internal UN positions regarding the Western Sahara. The US has one of the (most) important roles in the UN Security Council and here as well their position of the preference of a stable region instead of an unclear post-independence situation is obvious.

The answer of the second main question is that the combination of a Western based theory in an African conflict situation was manageable. The research questions could get answered to a certain degree (for further explanation see the evaluation in chapter 6). It is not a typical subject to regard through the action theories, which normally look for a solution, but in this case the intentions of actions and the situational definition were clear, and so the realization of the inter and (re)actions could get identified. Through this unusual application of the theory the conflict situation in the Western Sahara could get analyzed through a different approach. As is outlined in 4.1 can, if the specific cultural aspects are taken into account, the Northern African conflict be analyzed through a Western based theory. As Werlen (1987) is paraphrasing Popper: "Die Forderung, bei der Erklärung menschlicher Handlungen Kausalgesetze durch ein Modell zu ersetzen, ist in Poppers grundsätzliche Überzeugung eingebettet,



dass menschliche Tätigkeiten nicht determiniert, sondern Erwägungen, Zielen und sozialen Regeln geleitet sind, die mittels Argumentation beeinflusst werden können“ (Werlen, 1987, p. 52). (The claim of the explanation of human actions, to replace the laws of causation through models is embedded in Popper’s fundamental belief that human activities do not get determined by, but are lead through considerations, goals and social rules, which van be influenced by argumentation [authors translation]). Thus, according to Popper the action of human behavior is determined not through laws of causation, but through human considerations. This implies that, taken into account the several aspects of the theory of language pragmatics, it is possible to regard the outcome as given for the moment, but that human behavior, thus their actions (on each level, even the institutional one), cannot be determined through a model but get constantly influenced by argumentation. The conclusion for question 2 is that analyzing the conflict through this theoretical framework was possible but it cannot tell all about the difficulties the geopolitical situation is facing and can definitely not give any information about the outcome.

To take a look more into the detail of this research the following sub questions will be answered. The sub questions are:

- a) What are the main influences of actors behind the non-solution of the Western Sahara conflict?*
- b) In how far did the viewpoint of the several actors’ influence the conflict?*
- c) Has there been a change in the point of view of the several actors in the conflict in time?*
- d) What are the current effects of the conflict for the Sahrawi people?*

The answer to sub question a) will be outlined per actor. To start with the actors within the Western Sahara, Polisario, the Sahrawi and the Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic, the analysis show that they experience a powerlessness against Morocco and through not sufficient support from Algeria and not enough help from the UN to implicate a solution. Their position which is described in the case study is not the strongest and against the (military) superiority of Morocco they do not have a chance. For Morocco the Western Saharan issue, is a conflict in their Saharan province, as they call the region. For Morocco only an official legitimate integration of the territory would be accepted as solution. Algeria’s position in this case is ambivalent. Because of the internal problems on the one hand could the independence of the Sahrawi could cause regional political instability. On the other hand, the analysis of the geopolitical conflict show that there has been a historical rivalry between Algiers and Rabat, and Algeria is afraid that of the Moroccan force if it might grow, and Algeria has always supported Polisario to encounter Morocco. It is outlined in chapter 4 that the United States have interest in keeping Morocco as an important ally, regarding their economical relations and their role as mediator in between the US and the Arab world. For these reasons the US do prefer a more stable situation like the current and do not intervene in the conflict. Even though this position does also trickle down in the UN implementations, through the UN Security Council, were the US has an important part. The United Nations try to solve the conflict, but as the case study shows are their approaches too weak to encounter Morocco and until now they failed to set up a fair referendum. Their main influences do come through the internal inconsistency, The Security Council is afraid of the effects of independence

within the Western Sahara, even though the UN itself repeats the need for self-determination of the Sahrawi.

Regarding sub question b) the viewpoint of the several actors had significant impact and influence in the conflict. As described in the case study and above the positions of Algeria and the US do not directly prefer a solution of the conflict, as well as the internal situation of the UN. These insecurities regarding the Western Sahara issue do have important impact on the non-solution of the conflict. Polisario does not have the resources to gain control over the Western Saharan territory unless Algeria increases their support. Morocco can only keep the occupation through the support of the United States. If these two parties would change their foreign policies, it would have major impacts for the Western Sahara. The UN does not want to take the responsibilities for an insecure post-independence situation in the Western Sahara and they are limited in their resources, thus an intervention, which really could solve the conflict is unlikely.

To answer sub question c), Larosch argues: "Over the years the arguments of both parties have varied and sometimes a solution has seemed close, but thus far the referendum has not taken place"(Larosch, 2007, p.19). During the whole research the arguments of the several actors have been outlined and described, but as Larosch says the referendum, which was planned in 1991 has never taken place. The referendum is seen as the solution to the Western Sahara issue, but whether both sides and the indirect actors would accept the outcome is another question. The case study in chapter 4 shows that the viewpoints of the actors have in general not differed significantly over the time. The mediation of the UN did lead to a ceasefire in 1991 and the plan to hold the referendum, but until now both parties could not accept the same plans, Morocco accepted the plans of integrating the Western Sahara into their territory, which was of course rejected from Polisario and Algeria. After a change of the plans Polisario and Algeria accepted them as basis for negotiations, but because they included the self-determination Morocco did reject them. So, in general there was no major change in the viewpoints of the main actor's which could lead towards a solution of the conflict.

For sub question c), the answer is only partly provided in this research and further research is provided. The analysis and case study outline the effects which are obvious for the Sahrawi. They live under Moroccan occupation with a high degree of police and military presence. Their daily life is affected through the Moroccan presence in their homeland. Since 1975 approximately 90000 Sahrawi refugees live in Algeria (European Union, 2010). Thus the people of the Sahrawi do either live under Moroccan occupation, which affects their daily life, or in refugee camps near Tindouf. Only small numbers do live in the liberated zone where Polisario does rule, because it is a desert region. The non-solution of the conflict leaves them in an insecure position about their future. Some of them living in the territory which is occupied does not want Morocco to leave, because they are afraid of the economical effects this might have.

## 6. Evaluation and Discussion

### 6.1 Research Evaluation

#### *6.1.1 Evaluation on this research*

This research was, as my supervisor called it, an ambitious goal. The combination of the action theory based language pragmatics in the Western Saharan conflict situation in my Bachelor thesis. As my first big academic project I really enjoyed the analysis of this case. To see the ‘forgotten’ conflict through different perspectives than used before was an unusual way of regarding the issue and an interesting way of approaching.

Even though I had no opportunity to actually visit the Western Sahara or to interview involved persons, the literature and the discourse analysis have given me a sufficient picture to answer my research questions sufficiently. Regarding the complexity of the whole conflict situation, there is much more space for investigation.

#### *6.1.2 Evaluation on this conclusion*

This research does only contemplate the surface of a very difficult, complex structure of the Western Saharan conflict, which lasts now for 35 years. The future of the Western Sahara is unsure, regarding the new developing relations of the indirect actors. This can provide important changes regarding the development of the conflict and can be used as starting point for new, and deeper, research on the conflict situation.

Further research could also provide the opportunity for mediating in between the main actors to, somehow, find at least a basis for negotiations.

### 6.2 Recommendation

As this research was focused on discovering the reasons behind the non-solution of the Western Saharan Morocco conflict, further research could try to find a way towards a solution. Even though, it is obvious that a solution is be a very difficult task, little steps like finding a basis for negotiations in between Polisario and Morocco would be a great achievement.

More awareness of these forgotten conflicts inside the international community could have indirect effect on the conflict situation and might improve the basis for negotiations.

#### *6.2.1 Space for discussion*

The unusual analysis of the Western Sahara conflict through the action theory based language pragmatics did provide a new perspective of regarding the conflict situation. It is laboriously to implicate

a complex theory on a complex situation, but I hope it gives fresh ideas for other ambitious projects. As the actual theory behind actions theories is to find a common basis, I hope that some day somebody comes with an ambitious idea to find common basis for negotiations in the Western Saharan territory.

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Photo on first page: <http://iffctr.com/images/tindouf-3.jpg>

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Further used sites:

- <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/minurso/>

- <http://www.swapoparty.org/>
- <http://www.anc.org.za/>

## Appendix 1: Abbreviations and place names

### Abbreviations:

US	United States of America
UN	United Nations Organization
OAU	Organization of African Unity
Polisario	“Frente Popular para la Liberación de Saguia el-Hamra y Río de Oro” (Larosch, 2007)(see also chapter 1.5, Explanation of essential terms)
MINURSO	UN mission for the referendum in the Western Sahara; French acronym for " <b>M</b> ission des <b>N</b> ations <b>U</b> nies pour l' <b>O</b> rganisation d'un <b>R</b> éférendum au <b>S</b> ahara <b>O</b> ccidental" (Larosch, 2007)
DARS	Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic; Democratic Arab Republic of the Sahara (Larosch, 2007)
EU	European Union
ANC	African National Congress (political party in South Africa) ( <a href="http://www.anc.org.za/">http://www.anc.org.za/</a> )
SWAPO	South-West Africa People's Organization (political movement formed 1960 for the liberation of Namibia) ( <a href="http://www.swapoparty.org">www.swapoparty.org</a> )

### Place names:

#### *Western Saharan places:*

<i>Place:</i>	<i>Also known as:</i>
Laayoune	El Aaiún, Al-‘Ayun, El Ayoun
Bou Craa	Bu Craa
Dakhla	Ad Dakhla
Smara	Semara

#### *Algerian places mentioned:*

Tindouf  
Algiers

#### *Moroccan places mentioned:*

Rabat

## Appendix 2: Discourse analysis

In order to analyze the actors and their behavior, in particular their Speech acts, a discourse analysis is made for some representative texts over them.

In these analyses the different discourses are represented in different colors marked in the text.

**Discourse** (with a capital letter D) is marked in blue, *discourse* (with a small d) is marked green and *Discourse models* are in red. After every text the most important points will be outlined and a conclusion will be made.

<p>'<b>discourse</b>' = how language is used "on site" to enact activities and identities (Gee, 2005, p. 7). 'discourse as actual communication'</p>
<p>'<b>Discourse model</b>' = are (informal) theories shared by people belonging to a specific social or cultural group (Gee, 2005, p. 95).</p>
<p>'<b>Discourse</b>' = to (re-)produce, sustain and transform a given form of life by using language and 'other stuff' to recognize yourself and others as meaning and meaningful in certain ways. (Other stuff = ways of acting, interacting, feeling, believing, valuing, and using various sorts of object, symbols, tools and technologies) (Gee, 2005, p. 7)</p>

Table 3.2 Definitions Discourse Analysis

### 2.1 Western Sahara: PROCLAMATION OF THE FIRST GOVERNMENT OF THE SAHARAWI ARAB DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

In the following paragraph are in the text with colors the discourses (*discourse*, **Discourse** and *Discourse models*), which are described in the paragraph before, marked. In brackets is the reason why I decided that it is that special discourse. The proclamation is from 1976, at that time Mauretania had also occupied a part of the Western Saharan territory. This is the reason why in the proclamation they are talking about neighboring brothers. For more information read the historical overview.

**Bir Lahlou, 27 February 1976**

In the name of the Saharawi people, and in pursuance of their will, the flag of the Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic has been raised over the land of Saguia el-Hamra and Rio de Oro. The birth of an African State with deep roots in the history of our people, with a civilisation which spread over the entire Maghreb was so proclaimed. The strength of this state arises out of the faith of its sons in their right to life and freedom, and its principal arm is their determination and perseverance in the struggle. *(the action of the state building and forming of an (territorial) identity)*

A new page has been started on which is written the struggle of our people who are today defying the colonialism of the neighbour "brothers", for by their heroic struggle they brought the previous page of the foreign enemy's colonialism to an end. *(recognition of themselves and their "brothers")*





Today the Saharawi people have decided to publicly take an important step: to set up the fundamental institutions arising out of revolutionary legality, essential to succeed in the present struggle for liberty and to exercise truly democratic power. *(shared institutions)*

In carrying out the will of our people the POLISARIO Front, with the unanimous agreement of the Provisional National Saharawi Council, decided to constitute a government which will assume responsibilities for the continuation of the battle, raising the flag of the liberation struggle always higher until final victory, which will guarantee peace and security for our people and open before them and brother Arabs and Africans the way to unity and liberation. *(produce a common interest in the idea of liberation)*

On this occasion we renew our commitment to the principles of the United Nations Charter and the Organisation of African Unity, in particular those concerned with defending the rights of man, territorial integrity and established frontiers, as a guarantee of African and international peace and security.

We want to draw the attention of the United Nations Organisation, the Organisation of African Unity and the Arab League to their historical responsibility towards a peaceful people, victims of an attempt at extermination, a veritable genocide. *(addressing other actors (organizations) to recognize their situation)*

We put this responsibility before all the peoples of the world, for it is their duty to assist the victims of aggression, so that the imperialist plot will fail. *(common struggle against imperialism)*

At this historical moment when the government of the Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic has been constituted on national soil and proclaimed at the same time in Algiers, Tripoli, Tananarive, Conakry, Bujumbura, we hold out a friendly hand to the brother peoples of Morocco and Mauritania, to ask them to support our liberation struggle and understand that the future belongs to peoples. We call on them to spare innocent blood by demanding that this war, imposed on us by their regimes to serve foreign interests and personal ambitions, be brought to an end. *(asking for help from the people living in the other countries)*

We hold out the hand of friendship to all the peoples and States of the world, asking them to support our just struggle and recognize the Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic. We state on this occasion our sincere desire to establish friendly relations and co-operation with all States on the basis of mutual respect and national sovereignty. *(meaning of peaceful aim of the DARS)*

We are determined to continue the struggle until final victory, whatever the sacrifices may be. For as long as this aggression lasts, until our people have completed the liberation of their national territory, there will be neither peace nor stability in this region. *(But: still demanding for their territory, even though they have to use violence)*

Source: <http://www.arso.org/03-1.htm>

## 2.2 Western Sahara: Abdelkader Taleb Omar: We are in new phase, peace or military escalation

In the following paragraph are in the text with colors the discourses (*discourse, Discourse and Discourse models*), which are described in the paragraph before, marked. In brackets is the reason why I decided that it is that special discourse.

**MADRID** (Spain) May30 , 2010 (SPS) (*date and place*) - Head of Saharawi Government Abdelkader Taleb Omar affirmed Saturday in Madrid that in the face of Western Sahara conflict's stalemate, Saharawi people have entered a "transitional phase in which there are only two solutions: peace or military escalation." (*introduction*)

"With the conflict's stalemate, the Saharawis have reached the end of their patience. We are today in a phase that reviewing our vision and our relations with MINURSO (United Nations mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara) seems to be inevitable," added Saharawi official in his closing address at the fourth Madrid Public Universities Meeting on Western Sahara. (*revision of what has happened*)

"Therefore, we began to transition to a new stage where there can be only two solutions: the peace or military escalation," he said. (*theory of the future*)

In this context, he urged the international community to intervene "urgently" to "preserve international law and ensure peace and safety", saying the only way to do this is to contribute to enable "the Saharawi people to exercise its legitimate right to self-determination and independence promote respect of human rights and the opening of the territory to international observers. (*recognizing other (involved) actors and giving meaning to a solution*)

For him, it is only in this context that the "essential conditions are met for negotiations between both parties (Frente Polisario and Morocco) are meaningful and can be taken forward." (*identifying and recognizing the most important actors*)

In his speech, the head of the Saharawi government reiterated, moreover, that the Saharawi conflict is an "unfinished process of decolonization" that "must find its solution in accordance with international law for all decolonization issues. (*language used to identify the difficulties*)

He indicated that any settlement must pass, through, the "free exercise of the Saharawi people to their right to self-determination, according to resolution (1514) of UN General Assembly.

Recalling that "no country in the world" recognizes the sovereignty of Morocco on Western Sahara, the Saharawi official said Morocco "is a power of occupation where the international community and UN failed to find a solution to the conflict caused by this illegal occupation." (*international assumptions*)

He castigated the "Friends of Morocco" which are the mouthpiece of the Moroccan theses on Western Sahara and trying to sow doubt about the viability of an independent Sahrawi state.

"These countries know or should know that Moroccan policy of expansionism is the only reason of instability among the Maghreb countries. That is the only obstacle for the countries and peoples of the region can unite their efforts in the fight against underdevelopment and against terrorism, illegal

immigration and drug trafficking, "he said. *(outlining of (in)direct actors and problems)*

The head of the Saharawi government considered France a country of "revolution and universal rights and freedoms of humanity, now protector of colonial policy of Morocco and participates in violations of human rights, "he denounced.

He also accused Spain, "the administering power of Western Sahara" to be "responsible for the tragedy" of the Saharawi people, and "has not been able to benefit from the involvement of UN to find a just and peaceful solution of the conflict. *(outlining of former colonizers and their responsibilities)*

On another hand, the closing ceremony of these briefings on Western Sahara, open since Wednesday, was marked by intervention of leaders of the "Platform All with the Sahara (Western)" as actors Willy Toledo Carlos Bardem (brother of Javier Bardem) and film producer Alvaro Longoria, who reiterated on this occasion their "firm support" to the fair Saharawi cause and criticized the "passivity" of their government to the "Sahrawi drama.

Willy Toledo recalled the Spanish government that the "Sahrawi people continue to suffer" and criticized Morocco for "repression, disappearances, rape, discrimination and systematic persecution" against the Saharawi civilians in the occupied Saharawi territories. *(support from platforms)*

"We are determined to continue our struggle for the Saharawi people", said the Spanish actor, who called the Spanish government to recognize the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR). *(shared theory of struggle by the supporters)*

This four-day meeting ended with the apotheosis music concerts given by the famous Saharawi singer Mariem Hassan, the "Voice of Western Sahara" which enthralled the audience in many several songs from her latest CD "Shuka. (SPS) *(description of the end of meeting)*

080/090/TRA 301025May2010SPS; Source: <http://www.spsrasd.info/en/detail.php?id=11843>

## 2.3 Morocco: Speech by HM the King on the occasion of the Green March

In the following paragraph are in the text with colors the discourses (*discourse, Discourse and Discourse models*), which are described in the paragraph before, marked. In brackets is the reason why I decided that it is that special discourse. The analysis will start with the speech itself and not with the summary above.

**HM King Mohammed VI said in his address Friday to the nation at the 34-th anniversary of the Green March, that "there is no room for ambiguity and duplicity: either to be Moroccan a citizen, or not".**

Let me clearly say there is no more room for ambiguity or deceit: either a person is Moroccan, or is not. There can be no more duplicity or evading of duties. Now is the time for clear, unambiguous stances, and for responsible conduct. One is either a patriot, or a traitor. There is no halfway house. One cannot enjoy the rights and privileges of citizenship, only to abuse them and conspire with the enemies of the homeland," he said.

HM the King added that "Now is the time for all government authorities concerned to strive doubly hard, show great resolve and vigilance, enforce the law and deal vigorously with any infringement of the nation's sovereignty, security, stability and public order, for they are the best guarantee for the exercise of freedoms."

**Here follows the full text of His Majesty's speech:**

Praise be to God    May peace and blessings be upon the Prophet, His Kith and Kin

*My loyal subjects, (customary salutation including religious aspects)*

As we celebrate the thirty-fourth anniversary of the glorious Green March, we feel even more deeply committed to the oath of this epic event, to the preservation of the Kingdom's territorial integrity, to our sacred, immutable values, and to the country's sovereignty. This commitment is best reflected by the close bond between the Throne and the people, and by the nation's unwavering unanimity on its founding principles. *(sustain the feeling of being a group, belonging together, he uses 'we' in the sentences to address and refer to the Moroccan people)*

The commemoration of this epoch-making event gives us the fortitude and inspiration we need to confront, in a wise, resolute manner, the conspiracies hatched by the adversaries of the Moroccanness of the Sahara. *(to recognition of the Moroccan people and their situation)* We shall press ahead with our constructive initiatives which are designed to achieve progress and consolidate unity in our southern provinces. Among our chief assets, in this regard, are a closely-knit home front and a vibrant democracy, both of which stem from the will of the nation. *(describes activities how to achieve a common identity)*

In view of the above, I have decided that the spirit of the Green March should be rekindled so that we may rise to current and future challenges with respect to our national cause. *(for the first time he is referring to his actions and his identity, which legitimates him the power to act in that ways)* To this end, I will launch an integrated plan which will centre on the following five actions: *(use of language to introduce something)*

First: ensure that our Saharan provinces feature prominently in the advanced regionalization system we wish for in order to enable the region's inhabitants to have more say in the running of their affairs.

Second: ask the government to make these provinces a model of devolution and good local governance, provide them with highly qualified staff, and grant them broad powers to be exercised under the supervision of Governors and Walis.

Third: restructure the Royal Advisory Council for Saharan Affairs by the end of the current mandate, reconsider its membership and open it to new members known for their competence and keen sense of patriotism, revamp the Council's structures and make sure they are pertinent, see that the Council's working methods are adapted to new challenges, and enable the Council to defend the Moroccanness of the Sahara and ensure the region's development more efficiently.

Fourth: review the area of competence and territorial jurisdiction of the Agency for the Development of the Southern Provinces by focusing its action on the Saharan provinces, on the implementation of

human development projects, and on local programs that create jobs for young people and enhance social justice; facilitate the homecoming of all those who repent and who want to return to their motherland from the Tindouf camps, make sure they are properly welcomed and facilitate their social insertion.

Fifth: see that political parties, trade unions, community organizations, the media and the nation's productive and creative forces discharge their mission in terms of helping citizens organize their affairs and promoting patriotism and civic values. This task should not be left to government institutions only; it requires the mobilization of all national and local players. *(transformation and usage of the Saharan provinces, gives an important meaning to the provinces, because of the special devotion of this speech)*

In this regard, I commend my loyal subjects in the Sahara, including the dignitaries, elected officials and civil society representatives, for their enduring faithfulness to their Moroccan identity. *(tries to address the people of the Western Sahara with a shared identity)*

My loyal subjects, *(addresses his people, again)*

The task of implementing policy and development guidelines that are appropriate for the current phase is not to be confined to the domestic front. It is just as important for the combined efforts of official and parallel diplomacy to be geared towards defending the Moroccanness of the Sahara and the autonomy proposal that we tabled, and whose seriousness and credibility were praised by the United Nations. *(shared implemented policies for the people living in the Western Sahara)*

As you know, *(addressing the people)* the adversaries of our territorial integrity have been adamant on hampering the negotiating dynamic triggered by our initiative at the United Nations. In fact, their increasingly hostile stances now verge on a blueprint for extortion, conspiracy, pressure, provocation and distortion of the spirit of international legitimacy. *(clear distinction between Moroccan 'our' and them 'adversaries', 'their')*

As we reaffirm our commitment to negotiation on our autonomy initiative under the auspices of the United Nations, we believe the time has come to deal with this escalation of aggression in a rigorous, appropriate manner, taking into account the requirements of patriotism and the need for everyone to shoulder their responsibilities. *(shared solution to deal with the 'other')*

I shall see *(his action)* to it that Morocco remains committed to the rule of law and the advancement of democratic values. But we will not allow respect for human rights and the freedoms enjoyed in our country to be exploited in a shameful way, anywhere, in order to conspire against the homeland's sovereignty and unity, or against our sacred values. *(shared agreement on human rights and freedom)*

Now is the time for all government authorities concerned to strive doubly hard, show great resolve and vigilance, enforce the law and deal vigorously with any infringement of the nation's sovereignty, security, stability and public order, for they are the best guarantee for the exercise of freedoms. *(reproduction of action of the government to guarantee freedom)*

Let me clearly say there is no more room for ambiguity or deceit: either a person is Moroccan, or is not. There can be no more duplicity or evading of duties. Now is the time for clear, unambiguous stances, and for responsible conduct. One is either a patriot, or a traitor. There is no halfway house. One

cannot enjoy the rights and privileges of citizenship, only to abuse them and conspire with the enemies of the homeland. *(he is directly addressing to the action and identity of the people)*

As for the adversaries of our territorial integrity - and those who consort with them - they know, better than anyone else, that the Sahara is a crucial issue for the Moroccan people, who unanimously support the Throne, which is the guarantor of the nation's sovereignty, national unity and territorial integrity. *(referring to the importance of the Saharan issue)*

By putting the Sahara issue at the heart of their hostile strategy, they confirm that they are, in fact, the party concerned in this artificial conflict, a reality which is inconsistent with the mutual fraternal feelings between the Moroccan and the Algerian peoples. *(division of Moroccan and Algerian people)*

The adversaries of our territorial integrity are endangering our future bilateral relations as well as the setting in motion of the Arab Maghreb Union, at a time when Morocco is seeking complementarity and integration so that we may rise, together, to crucial security and development challenges in the region. *(tries to address the Arab Maghreb Union for not intervening)*

We commend our friends' support for our just cause. *(addressing the identity of his friends and asks for support of cause)* I have, however, to ask some of them the following question: *(his action)* Is there a country which would tolerate a handful of lawless people exploiting democracy and human rights in order to conspire with the enemy against its sovereignty, unity and vital interests? *(building a shared common interest through asking an indirect question)*

Does the exercise of one's freedoms give one the right to destroy public and private property that has been obtained thanks to sacrifices made by citizens? Why should those citizens be punished? *(building a shared common interest through asking an indirect question)*

All national laws and international conventions agree that violence should be criminalized. They also regard conspiring with the enemy as high treason. *(addressing international laws)*

In this regard, I should like to insist on the fact that Morocco, a country deeply committed to freedom and openness, will not tolerate anyone claiming to go one better with respect to human rights, and certainly not regimes or groups who openly violate rights. *(claiming the Moroccan identity and respect to human rights)* Through fraud and deception, they are trying to use this issue like a business, both at home and abroad, to make cheap gains at the expense of the nation's sacred values, with little regard for the inhuman conditions endured by our brothers in Tindouf. *(reproduction of the situation and the enemy 'they' in the Western Sahara)*

In view of this distressing situation, Algeria and international organizations, especially the UNHCR, have to face up to their responsibilities and offer effective protection to the populations concerned, particularly by conducting a census, *(recognition of the other actors involved)* showing respect for these people's dignity, and enabling them to exercise their natural right to freedom of movement and their right of return to their homeland, Morocco. *(informal shared theory of the kings ideas and shared Moroccan identity)*

In keeping with our commitment to international legitimacy, we reiterate Morocco's constant readiness to engage in serious negotiations and to facilitate the task of the Personal Envoy of UN

Secretary-General as he pursues his predecessor's mission to achieve a mutually acceptable, realistic, lasting political solution, on the basis of the autonomy proposal, and within the framework of the Kingdom's sovereignty, national unity and territorial integrity. *(using Morocco's readiness for negotiations and communication)*

*My loyal subjects, (addressing his people)*

On this historic occasion, and as we honour, with humility and reverence, the memory of the architect of the Green March, my revered father His Majesty King Hassan II - may he rest in peace - and of the martyrs who gave their lives for the sake of our territorial integrity, I think the most fitting tribute we can pay them is by remaining true to our pledge not to give up or bargain over as much as a grain of sand from our Sahara. This is far more than just a question of borders. *(addressing interest and reasons for the Saharan province of Morocco)*

Once again, I would like to commend our Armed Forces, Gendarmerie, security and auxiliary forces and the territorial authorities for their mobilization and their vigilance in order to preserve the homeland's security and defend its territory. *(personal thank)*

We are confident that no matter how long this artificial conflict over our territorial integrity lasts, we shall emerge victorious, not only because it is our right, but because historical and legal legitimacy are on our side, and because all Moroccans believe in the justness and sacredness of their cause. *(addressing the whole people and the shared confidence)*

I shall remain at the forefront of the proud champions of the cause of the Kingdom's sovereignty, national unity and territorial integrity. I shall be forever faithful to our mutual pledge of allegiance and to constitutional obligations. *(his position as representative and model)* Ours is a strong, steadfast belief in the inevitability of victory, for Almighty God said: "Allah will certainly aid those who aid His cause; for verily Allah is full of Strength, Exalted in Might". True is the Word of God.

Wassalamu alaikum warahmatullah wabarakatuh. *(shared discourse model in the national faith, addressing not only political, but uses religious means)*

Source of the text:

<http://www.corcas.com/SearchResults/Kingsspeech/tabid/499/ctl/Details/mid/2945/ItemID/12204/Default.aspx>



## 2.4 Morocco: Mr. Khalienna Ould Errachid interviewed by the Spanish radio station "Cadena Ser"

In the following paragraph are in the text with colors the discourses (*discourse*, *Discourse* and *Discourse models*), which are described in the paragraph before, marked. In brackets is the reason why I decided that it is that special discourse. The analysis will start with the interview itself and not with the summary above. Also we will only focus on the answers of Khalienna Ould Errachid, because the questions do not have relevance, because the opinion of the interviewer is not important for the case. Before the analysis the history and outline of the situation of Aminatou Haidar is described from a different viewpoint than the one in the interview.

Aminatou Haidar was born in 1967 in El Ayoun in Western Sahara. In the 80's she joined a peaceful resistance against Morocco. They organized demonstrations for holding a referendum regarding the Western Saharan situation. She was put in jail for demonstrating and released in 1991 (Committee for the liberation of Aminatou Haidar, nd.). After her release she continued actions to improve human rights in the Western Sahara territory and made contact with international organizations (Committee for the liberation of Aminatou Haidar, nd.). She organized several actions to liberate political activists which were put in jail through Morocco. In 2003 she was injured by the police during a demonstration (Committee for the liberation of Aminatou Haidar, nd.). In 2005 she was beaten and arrested (Amnesty International, 2005).

The interview questions are about the incidents in 2009. Aminatou Haidar was refused entering the Western Saharan territory, because she refused to see herself and the Western Sahara as belonging to the Moroccan Kingdom (Democracy Now!, 2009). She started a hunger strike and gained international attention. At the end of December 2009 she finally could get back to the Western Sahara (Democracy Now!, 2009). The interview is from the middle of December, thus in the middle of her hunger strike and represents the position of Morocco.

12/14/2009



**The Chairman of the Royal Advisory Council for Saharan Affairs accorded a long interview to the Spanish radio Cadena Ser last Friday in which he commented the developments of the Aminatou Haidar case.**

Mr Khlienna confirmed in this interview that the affair of Mrs Aminatou Haidar is not a political one, but it has been "politicized", and it is "a diplomatic operation premeditated against Morocco and Spanish interests" by Polisario and Algeria, to "harm Morocco, and impede the relation between Spain and Morocco"

The chairman of the council expressed his sorrow that Haidar lost her role as a defender of Human rights, when she relinquished her Moroccan nationality, declared that she is a Polisario's militant, and supports the separation of Sahara, he added that her role "as a human rights activist was an important role needed in the region, but within the framework of what the Moroccan constitution grants"



Mr Khalienna asserted that Morocco does not forbid Haidar from returning to her homeland, provided she apologized to the Moroccan people to whom she harmed, and apply to get back her Moroccan nationality documents, in conformity with his desire and defence to his territorial integrity and sovereignty, affirming that those who support the separation of Sahara in Morocco are minority.

As to a question about the arrest of seven Sahraouis because of their political views, Mr Khalienna said the discredit of the Sahara being part of Morocco is a “hostile matter” which is not allowed, and to work against the interests of the kingdom in favour of Algeria and Polisario in order “to create a state of disorder in Morocco, and to threaten the territorial integrity of the country, requires to take the necessary measures similar to what is done in all democratic countries”

### **Full text of the interview:**

Mr Khalienna Ould Errachid interviewed by Spanish Radio Station CADENA SER  
Mr Khalienna had a long interview last Friday with the Spanish Radio “CADENA SER” in which he talked about the events concerning the so-called Aminatou Haidar

**CADENA SER:** Mr Khalienna Ould Errachid, Good morning, you are the chairman of the council, advisory council for the king for Saharan affairs, aren't you?

**Mr Khalienna:** *yes, and it is the Royal advisory council for Saharan affairs (he gives his position)*

**CADENA SER:** The Moroccan authorities are talking to the USA and Spain about the situation of Mrs Haidar?

**Mr Khalienna:** *Haidar complicated the matter herself to a large extent, of course when somebody takes a decision, he can not be stopped, this lady created this unfortunate situation. (description of how she came into her situation) Morocco is not responsible for such situation, (describing Morocco's responsibility) Morocco does not want to put Mrs Haidar in any trial at all, it is she who chose the timing, and what to do with, and accordingly she is doing the appropriate propaganda, but it is clear that Morocco is defending her interests, her dignity and the feelings of her people. (reproduces Morocco as defender for her rights) We are sorry for what is happening, but it is due to Mrs Haidar's willingness, and to the parties which push her to do what is up to now, particularly Algeria and Polisario, we are sorry for this situation that should not have happened normally. (apologizes for her situation, creates identity through using “we”, identifies also Polisario and Algeria as “others”)*

**CADENA SER:** do you believe that the government will give her back her passport, so she can return to Laayoune?

**Mr Khalienna :** *Aminatou Haidar was an activist in the field of human rights, at least that what she claimed, she used to enjoy her rights, and she often travelled abroad without any problems, no problems occurred at all, not at the airport, not at Laayoune, and not while she was receiving delegations, journalists and diplomats. (creating her identity and describing her actions) I do not know why she has chosen such timing, to challenge Morocco and Moroccans without any reason. I consider that it is not possible, to enjoy a situation as a person, and then have the desire to change it in no time, that is what she wanted to do, meaning I do not know why she wanted in her trip to say that she was*

not Moroccan, after forty years of enjoying the Moroccan citizenship, travelling with Moroccan passport and returning to the homeland, to claim the contrary; now is indeed a lie. I do not understand Mrs Haidar, therefore why she wanted to do what she is doing now. Morocco did not do anything against her, it did not confiscate her passport, it is her who willingly created this situation in a planned manner, in order to practice pressure on Morocco for other reasons which have nothing to do with human rights *(reproduces meaning of the special situation, outlines her and Morocco's identity)*

**CADENA SER:** now, there are persons who have been arrested, because they are Human rights activists ?

**Mr khalihenna:** **do you mean the seven persons who travelled to Laayoune?** *(question- actual communication)*

**CADENA SER :** yes

**Mr Khalihenna :** well , those seven young persons , they also used to say that they are human rights defenders, they use to travel often to Europe and to the rest of the world, nobody bothers them, and they were not stopped from travelling , but when they decided to go to Tindouf, to work with the Algerian intelligence services against the Vital interests of Morocco , it is obvious that Morocco has to put an end to this situation, and this obvious reaction exists in any country that wants to defend its security . They have made a serious mistake, to go to Tindouf and meet up with the Algerian intelligence services, and Polisario, they should not have made such mistake at all , having said that , when they used to go to Geneva , to the canary islands , to Madrid, to New york, nobody bothers them being defenders of human rights . but to go to Tindouf in order to meet the Algerian intelligence services in order to create troubles in Morocco, *(tries to give a explanation (meaning) and tries to represent them as terrorists)* **it is obvious for Morocco, as it is for Spain or any other country to take the necessary measures to defend its territorial integrity.** *(discourse model of defending your own state nationality)*

**CADENA SER:** well, this does not happen in Spain

**Mr Khalihenna :** **yes , yes it happens , that is what Spain does with whoever claims to defend terrorism and ETA, Spain takes the necessary measures, when the matter required to stop ETA's militants, Spain behaved that way without any problem .** *(shared discourse model about terrorism)*

**CADENA SER:** yes, concerning people who agree upon terrorism, yes.

**Mr Khalihenna:** **when those seven people used to travel to Geneva, or to the Canary Islands, they did it from the political point of view, and Morocco did not stop them, whereas when they went to Tindouf, it was for terrorist purpose, and this is the mistake they made.** *(creating their identity as terrorists, which has the meaning that they were acting against Morocco's security)*

**CADENA SER:** : what would be their fate?

**Mr Khalihenna:** **they will prosecuted normally, if they made any mistake, then the justice will solve this problem** *(normal action of justice described)*

**CADENA SER:** are you in Laayoune?

**Mr Khalihenna:** **no, iam not in Laayoune** (*indicate location*)

**CADENA SER:** do you know that the Spanish media talked about contacts between the Moroccan government and the United States?

**Mr Khalihenna:** **we have contacts with the USA, Spain, and the world,** (*having of contacts*) **this is normal** (*creating model through indicating its normal*)

**CADENA SER:** the European Union asks for the problem to be solved?

**Mr Khalihenna:** **how can we solve this problem, if** (*indicates solution*) **this lady** (*giving Aminatou Haidar an importance through calling her "that lady"*) **says that her country is Western Sahara, Western Sahara as a state does not exist? Do you think that there is a state in Western Sahara?** (*acting as if Western Sahara does not exist*) **Polisario front which claimed that the Sahara is separated from Morocco does not exist in the Sahara. It exists in Tindouf in Algeria, and if "Haidar" would like to become part of Polisario, she has to go to Tindouf in Algeria, but if she opts to be in Laayoune, there, there are only Moroccans.** (*model of Western Sahara being Moroccan*) **Mrs Haidar also was not born in Laayoune, but in Tan Tan, meaning she was born in an undisputed area. I do not know why she claims now that she is not Moroccan, up to now she travelled using a Moroccan passport, and she holds a Moroccan identity card, why does she claim the contrary? She is the one who has got the answer; Morocco does not forbid Mrs Haidar from returning to her country, if she decides now to win back her nationality, and to apologize to the Moroccan people to whom she hurt their feelings, feelings of 35 million Moroccans .....** (*creates Aminatou Haidars Moroccan identity, gives meaning to this identity*)

**CADENA SER:** ...but the UN says that this land is waiting for decolonization?

**Mr Khalihenna :** **no, Sahara is a Moroccan land, but there is a dispute, which is the object of the upcoming negotiations, but these negotiations will not say that the Sahara is independent,** (*Moroccan discourse model*) **because we will opt for one option only.** (*Morocco will only act in one direction*) **Now this land is Moroccan and it will remain so.** (*Moroccan discourse model*) **I do not know why Haidar complicate things, do you know? While she says her country is Western Sahara, she says she is not going to get back her Moroccan nationality; it is she who is adding difficulties to her situation, whereas we are in the process of politicizing an affair which is not a political one, she gives the impression that she is a human rights defender. Why does she say now that she is a Polisario militant, and support the independence of the Sahara?** (*giving meaning to her dispute about passport, creating her a Moroccan identity*)

**CADENA SER:** could a person who thinks or feels that he is a supporter of the independence live in Morocco ?

**Mr Khalihenna :** **no , a person can say that he is for a referendum , and that is what Mrs Haidar and others say, so nobody put them in the jail,** (*custom theory*) **but saying that the sahara is not Moroccan, this not a political view anymore, it is an hostile towards the Moroccan territorial integrity .** (*Moroccan discourse model*) **There is a difference between saying that you are in favour of a referendum, meaning expressing a political view, and she is free to say so and to think of it, and here**

where the confusion consists in. (explaining the ambivalence of the whole issue, which implies more than one opinion)

**CADENA SER:** She says that she did the same thing, thing she used to do always when she went back to Laayoune with her Moroccan passport, i.e. : she used to write Western sahara

**Mr Khalihenna :** If yourself goes to Laayoune from the canary islands, is that what you would put in the boarding card ? (tries to downplay the issue) definitely not , this resembles a person who goes to Laayoune from the Canary islands, and write down in the boarding card Canary Africa . (giving meaning and identity by giving the metaphor)

**CADENA SER:** but she used to do always the same thing, didn't she?

**Mr Khalihenna :** no , she made a statement before the public prosecutor , (describing action) Her uncle and the police forces that she refuses the Moroccan nationality, and this is the main mistake she made , now I am sorry about this situation , Haidar could say that she made a mistake, she would like to win back her Moroccan nationality and she can go back to laayoune this afternoon . (introducing her situation and her relatives, giving them a special identity)

**CADENA SER:** could you bring her passport here (Canary Islands)?

**Mr Khalihenna:** if she asks for it as a Moroccan, the Moroccan council in the canary is at the disposal of all Moroccans, of course he will give her her passport, but she has to ask for it as a Moroccan, and apologize to the Moroccans because she put Moroccans in a difficult situation and her involvement in this propaganda, for no truthful reasons. (meaning of her situation and identity) Aminatou Haidar used to fully enjoy her life with dignity and freedom, (her actions) she travels in so many occasions to the USA, Europe, Australia, Africa, and Asia, she talks freely, and nobody stops her from doing so up to now. (giving a special meaning to her free talking and creating emphasizing nobody is stopping her) Because if she was really human rights activist, she would not be siding the Polisario front. We are sahraouis, and we have nothing to do with the Polisario, why does she claim to side one of the two parties? Human rights has got nothing to do with the Polisario front, they are international rights. (Morocco's discourse model of Polisario (=terrorists)

**CADENA SER:** she says that human rights are violated in the Sahara; do people get arrested for their ideological beliefs?

**Khalihenna :** no , we do exactly what the European countries do : defending our territorial integrity and our union , what you do with ETA, what did the English with the IRA, what did the Italians with the Red brigades, and French with the Corse terrorists , it means what we do is what any democratic country does . (defending their struggle against Polisario with other international conflicts)

**CADENA SER:** but in Europe there are lawful political parties that call for independence without any problem

**Mr Khalihenna:** when Haidar used to receive foreigners in Laayoune, the police did not arrest her, and did not bother her when she travels, she travelled to Washington to receive human rights prizes, she went to Brussels and Madrid and Basques Morocco did not take any measures against the normal and

decent practices of human rights. *(describing her actions and position)* Now what Haidar does has nothing to do with human rights, she is taking a position against the vital interests of the kingdom of Morocco, its territorial integrity and sovereignty, in favour of the Algerians and the Polisario front based in Algeria, this is the mistake Aminatou Haidar is making . *(changing her actions into a negative meaning according to the Moroccan picture of Polisario)*

**CADENA SER:** Are there any violations of human rights in the Sahara?

**Mr Khalihenna:** No, definitely not, no violation of human rights in the Sahara, nobody is imprisoned for his beliefs, particularly since the creation of the council, i.e: four years ago, everybody is free to believe what he wants, but within the framework of the Moroccan constitution and the law, because Sahara does not live a state of chaos, and it is not a forest, there are laws to be respected *(Moroccan discourse model of their state)*

**CADENA SER:** a person is not allowed to say that he is a supporter of independence, and equally he can say anything else?

**Mr Khalihenna:** no, a person can say that he supports the referendum, and that he sympathise with Polisario front, but he can not say that Sahara is not Moroccan, because it is a hostile statement. If he wants to keep it for himself that is his problem, but saying it loud, is not allowed by the law and the Moroccan constitution *(giving meaning to the opinions of people and differentiating in between a Moroccan and Saharan identity)*

**CADENA SER:** do you think you will expatriate more people who do not feel Moroccans?

**Mr Khalihenna:** those who think like Aminatou Haidar are a minority, nobody in Laayoune, Smara, Dakhla, and in Aouerd is against the unity of Morocco, those who sympathise with the Polisario are a minority, very small, number of people, and I challenge they are not more than few thousands, but they do a lot of propaganda around them, and this is where the whole affair consists in. *(creates a minority of people against Morocco's occupation)*

**CADENA SER:** do you think a person like Haidar could harm any other person because of the way she thinks and remaining with her children in Laayoune?

**Mr Khalihenna:** to say that the Sahara is not Moroccan hurts the entire country, with 35 Million people. *(Moroccan discourse model)* Word is more important than the act itself, When Aminatou Haidar says that nobody should be put in the prison, because of his political views, she did not harm anybody, and Morocco did not put her in a jail , this is where the difference lies , and the delicacy of the problem . Human rights: yes *(describing actions and the difficulties of the issue)*

**CADENA SER:** you say that you arrest persons who do not feel Moroccans, why didn't you arrest her? Why did you kick her out, and you did not present her to justice?

**Mr Khalihenna:** This is the first case of its kind which occurred in Morocco, even during the seventies when the extreme left opposed the regime, nobody said that he is not Moroccan, the truth of the

matter is that Haidar said to the general prosecutor and to her uncle who is Moroccan that she is not Moroccan, this matter is not in accordance with the Sahraoui traditions. She said front of her uncle that she is not Moroccan, and that she is from Laayoune, whereas she is from tan tan, the way she said that is fallacious. *(describing the difficulties and giving special meaning to Haidar not seeing herself as Moroccan)*

**CADENA SER:** why didn't you arrest her instead of expelling her?

**Mr Khalihenna:** I do not know I was not at the airport then, may be it is because of the circumstances that occurred at the frontiers; *(actions against Haidar)*

**CADENA SER :** what is your view of the fact that Spain has accepted to bring her back?

**Mr Khalihenna:** the origin of this operation is a calculated political manoeuvre done by Algeria and the Polisario front. It is a will to infringe Morocco, and to hinder the relationship between Morocco and Spain; it is a diplomatic operation based on propaganda against Morocco and the interests of Spain, because if it was not a calculated operation, she would have said let me in and then put me in a prison, iam sorry that she spoiled her role, a role that the region needs being a defender of human rights, but by respecting the Moroccan constitution *(Discourse about the background of Haidars action)*

**CADENA SER:** How many years did she spend in prison?

**Mr Khalihenna :** it was in another period, before the creation of the council in year 2006, *(discourse model made: time before 2006 does not count? )* after this date she did not go to prison, she was free, with a passport, she travelled all around the world, and she was given awards from everywhere for human rights . *(describing her actions and possibilities)*

**CADENA SER:** the position of Morocco will not change. Will it?

**Mr Khalihenna :** this matter does not depends on us , but on her, if Mrs Aminatou Haidar would like to return to Laayoune, *(depending on her decision, Morocco has no responsibility)* she knows exactly what she has to do : to ask for the Moroccan nationality and apologize to the Moroccan people, who did nothing against her . *(description of her action)* The hunger strike she is undertaking is a voluntary act; it is a result of her personal decision. she put an end to her regrettable situation now, contact the Moroccan consul, and tells him that she is sorry for what she does, and that I want to go back to my country and my homeland which the kingdom of Morocco . *(Discourse about what she has to do and how Morocco has to act to represent a meaning)*

**CADENA SER:** can we understand that there is a threat from Morocco Vis a vis Spain for maintaining Aminatou Haidar's situation and go back to the immigration .....

**Mr Khalihenna:** no the relations between Morocco and Spain are not threatened at all, not from the case of Haidar, or from anybody else. They are relations which exceed tests of the kind, they are historical relations, good neighbourhood and common interests, relation with a strategy to manage emergencies, and nobody such as Mrs Haidar or anybody else could threaten these relations.

*(describing the meaning and the effects if Haidars action for the international relations from Morocco)*

Source: CORCAS

<http://www.corcas.com/SearchResults/AudiovisualPress/tabid/707/ctl/Details/mid/1373/ItemID/12482/Default.aspx>

## 2.5 Algeria: Fighting over the Maghreb - Algeria vs. Morocco

In the following paragraph are in the text with colors the discourses (*discourse*, *Discourse* and *Discourse models*), which are described in the paragraph before, marked. In brackets is the reason why I decided that it is that special discourse.

### Fighting over the Maghreb - Algeria vs. Morocco

Published on Menassat (<http://www.menassat.com>)

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ALGIERS, April 14, 2009 (MENASSAT) *(place, date and source)* – If it were up to official Moroccan and Algerian media outlets, it would be years before the two countries inked a viable agreement about how to handle a longstanding border dispute in the Western Sahara. *(Reproduction of meaning and identifying the actors)*

Critics on both sides of the border say official media has been battling over the legitimacy of the Western Sahara since Morocco annexed the territory after former colonial power Spain left in the 1970's. *(Reproduction of meaning and identifying the actors)*

Algeria has suggested letting the independence-minded Polisario movement vote for its own independence, while Morocco has offered the inhabitants in the Western Sahara a form of autonomy under Moroccan rule. *(activities and actions of the countries and their political view)*

Relations between the two countries have been at a standstill on the issue since 1994, when gunmen killed 2 Spanish tourists at a hotel in Marrakech, something Morocco blames Algeria for - charges the Algerian government flatly denies. *(fact about what happened)*

And the typical news coverage between the countries resembles the back and forth of a tennis match: *(instruction to the points of view)*

Official Algerian media recently reported setting up a diplomatic branch in the disputed area of the Western Sahara in an effort to open up negotiations with the separatist movement there, the Polisario Front. *(creating identity of Algeria supporting Polisario)*

The move preceded the April 9 re-election of Algerian president Abdelaziz Bouteflika to his third 5-year term, but Morocco lost its diplomatic cool on Monday (April 13) when it accused Algeria of sneaking some 1,400 pro-Polisario loyalists into Moroccan territory.

Moroccan papers quoted the foreign ministry of saying, "This incident is [in line with] repeated attempts by Algeria and Polisario aimed at scuttling UN efforts to relaunch the dynamic of [peace] negotiations"



over the border region. *(dispute about whether Algeria did or did not had influence on the incident)*

The official Moroccan press shot back that the Western Sahara is 100% Moroccan, adding that the (alleged) Algerian interference in Moroccan affairs is unacceptable. *(Morocco's shared idea)*

### **Recent attempts at peace - 2008**

Signs of progress between the two countries seemed to be heading in the right direction in early 2008, as the border was opened temporarily in 2008 in what Morocco said was its hope "to open a new page in the relationship between the two countries."

But prevailing elements in the ruling elite of both countries conspired against the normalization of relations, something that was duly reflected in the media. *(meanings of these actions (opening the border and the recognition of both actors on the borderlines))*

During a July 2008 speech to signify his 9th year of rule, Moroccan King, Mohammad VI, made a speech that was considered conciliatory to Algeria. *(identifying the king and his action of giving a speech)*

Accordingly, the official Moroccan newspapers described the king's attempt to open the frontiers as a practical means of addressing the concerns of Algerians and Moroccans living on opposite sides of the border, leaving families separated since 1994.

But the official Algerian press would have none of it, focusing instead on the Moroccan king's "intentions."

Algerian paper Al-Masa said the speech didn't carry any new provisions for resolving the border issues, instead the paper characterized the Moroccan king's offering as being an offer from a desperate man. *(analysis of the Algerian media about the actions of the Moroccan king)*

The paper described the offer as coming at a time when Morocco's economy could benefit from the influx of Algerian tourists that would visit Morocco when the borders were open in years past. *(shared theory in the Algerian media)*

French-speaking Algerian daily Al-Watan said the king's offer was just a means of glossing over the fact that Morocco had publicly blamed Algeria for having a hand in the 1994 hotel attack, and had deported an untold number of Algerians in the previous 14 years.

Al-Watan also suggested that the Moroccan king's 1998 peace offering was actually more of a threat because Morocco had refused several previous Algerian border dispute initiatives.

Algerian Al-Khabar daily used the king's speech to highlight Morocco's alleged criticism over Algeria's support over the Polisario's right to self-determination in the Western Sahara - without mentioning that Algeria funded and armed the pro-Algerian Polisario movement.

Moroccan newspapers like the pro-regime Aujourd'hui le Maroc said it was the Algerians that were a barrier to resolving the issue of the Saharan tribes, quoting Moroccan officials as saying Algeria's stance on the matter was contrary to the aspirations of the people of the Maghreb and detrimental to peace and development within the region. *(media dispute about opening the border and background reasons)*



With no real press coming from the disputed region, it is hard to know what the mood is on the ground in the Western Sahara. *(shared theory that the background of all is the Western Saharan dispute)*

### **Cross-border smuggling as a focus**

Bringing the issue to the present, border issues have continued to dominate the press dialog between the two countries. *(present situation)*

Although the Algerian-Moroccan frontier has been closed since 1994, the reality is that smuggling activities have continued unabated. *(fact)*

Predictably the press on both sides of the border have had very different takes on the issue. *(theory about smuggling and both border controls)*

Algerian newspapers like Al-Joumhouria wrote that “visiting Wajda (a Moroccan city on the frontiers) makes us think we are in Algeria, for most of the Algerian goods are present on all the shops’ shelves.”

Al-Joumhouria's columnist Souwarit Wassini suggested said that years of smuggling was having disastrous results on the economy. He specifically suggested that Algerian fuel smugglers were operating in Algerian border towns selling thousands of liters of fuel to Moroccan border towns.

“Any border resolution,” Wassini suggested recently, “would have no financial benefits for Algeria.”

Managing editor of Algerian weekly Al-Khabar Al-Ousboui wrote a lengthy report in March about smuggling entitled “The fuel republic and the drugs kingdom.”

Even with a vibrant smuggling trade, he suggested that Algerians were only smuggling basic goods into Morocco, including food supplies and fuel, while accusing Moroccan smuggles of flooding Algeria with drugs.

Al-Khabar Al-Ousbui also linked the smuggling to an increase in the Algerian prison system - mostly because of drug related offenses. *(smuggling dispute and outline of effects for (the Algerian) border region(s))*

As for the Moroccan press, pro-government dailies like Al-Sabah have characterized the smuggling as an international crisis requiring an international response. It likened the issue to the smuggling along the USA-Mexico border that has spiraled out of control in recent years.

Other Moroccan dailies have countered Algerian claims that Morocco is the only country benefiting from the illegal influx of basic goods.

Papers like the pro-regime Al-Alam cite the smuggling of produce like oranges and cranberries, as well as essential textile goods into Algeria via the disputed border region. *(Moroccan and international smuggling dispute)*

Moroccan press has also blamed Algeria and the Polisario of allowing Southern Saharan refugees into Morocco who are seeking refuge in Europe. *(shared theory of Moroccan media)*

Meanwhile, U.N. Secretary General Ban Ki-moon has suggested the U.N. Security Council press Western Sahara's independence movement and Morocco to resume negotiations on the future of the territory. *(solution of Western Sahara dispute via UN?)*

Four attempted mediation attempts have failed since 2007. *(fact)*

Source URL:

<http://www.menassat.com/?q=en/news-articles/6367-fighting-over-maghreb-algeria-vs-morocco>

## 2.6 United States of America: The United States, Morocco and the Western Sahara Dispute

In the following paragraph are in the text with colors the discourses (*discourse*, *Discourse* and *Discourse models*), which are described in the paragraph before, marked. In brackets is the reason why I decided that it is that special discourse.

Abdel-Rahim Al-Manar Slimi WEB COMMENTARY, JUNE 2009 :

*Editors' note: We received numerous responses to this article, part of the Voices from the Middle East series, taking issue with the author's assertions. To further the discussion, we've published two of the responses, including one by a former U.S. Ambassador to Morocco. (addition to text: the responses are available on the website)*

Although Morocco has been a strategic ally of the United States since the Cold War, the dispute over the **Western Sahara** does not trouble U.S. decision makers as much as other international conflicts do. Yet Morocco still views the United States as the most important external player in the controversy over the **Western Sahara**. The U.S. approach to the **Western Sahara** dispute for the past thirty years offers many insights into U.S. policy toward Morocco. *(recognition of the actors, giving meaning to the position of the US)*

The **Western Sahara** dispute pits Morocco, which had annexed the former Spanish-controlled territory, against the Polisario Front, which seeks independence for the territory with the backing of Algeria. The United States has taken multiple approaches to the dispute. Early on, it played a key role diplomatically in pressing Spain to meet Rabat's demands and accept the Madrid Treaty whereby Spain ceded the **Sahara** to Morocco in 1975. Since 1977 it has adopted a neutral stance toward the issue. *(outline of the situation)*

The U.S. approach to the **Western Sahara** dispute for the past thirty years offers many insights into U.S. policy toward Morocco. *(theory of the article)*

The beginning of President Carter's term saw a crisis in relations between the two countries that came to a head in 1978, when the U.S. froze arms sales to Morocco. The pretext was that Morocco had broken the terms of a bilateral military agreement signed in 1960 prohibiting the use of U.S. weapons outside internationally recognized borders. Tension eased the following year when President Carter approved the resumption of arms sales to Morocco under pressure from some members of Congress who saw Morocco as a strategic Cold War ally.

Relations recovered under the Reagan administration, which viewed the conflict in the **Western Sahara** as part of the Cold War, branding the Polisario Front a Soviet ally. However, U.S. policy took the form of “positive neutrality,” which meant supporting Morocco militarily but not politically. Moreover, the United States stopped short of backing Morocco’s call for a referendum in the mid-1980s, and did not push Morocco to develop a political approach to the conflict. The United States also did not defend Morocco’s case in international arenas. *(historical overview relations in between Morocco and the US)*

At the end of the Cold War, Morocco lost its strategic significance to U.S. policy as old alliances lost importance. This change also decreased American interest in the **Western Sahara** issue. *(stated theory in the article about US foreign affairs in Western Sahara)* However, what characterized George H. Bush’s presidency was the fact that it maintained a neutral stance and publicly called for a peaceful settlement of the conflict.

In the early 1990s, Morocco supported the coalition forces in the first Gulf War and expressed readiness to mediate between Israel and the Arabs to help the U.S.–initiated peace process. All these policies can be seen as efforts to sway Washington’s position with regard to the **Western Sahara** dispute. However, these attempts met with little success as President Bush reiterated to the late King Hassan of Morocco in 1991 that the **Western Sahara** dispute was a matter for the United Nations to address. By taking this position, the United States on the one hand tried to improve its image and reaffirm its respect for international legitimacy. On the other hand, this neutral position reflected its policy goals in the Maghreb region in the 1990s —aiming to keep Morocco as a geostrategic ally without harming its economic interests in Algeria. *(historical overview era G.H. Bush)*

During most of Clinton’s two terms, there was little change in the U.S. policy of neutrality that did not recognize **Western Sahara** as a Moroccan territory. However, toward the end of Clinton’s second term, a slight change occurred *(change in era Clinton)* when Washington realized that diplomatic efforts to resolve the dispute might fail and thus threaten to destabilize the region with renewed violence. Such instability could affect southern Europe negatively and jeopardize U.S. interests. *(shared theory of US foreign affairs to keep stability)*

Despite many instances of cooperation between Morocco and the United States during George W. Bush’s presidency, the United States maintained its neutral stance on the **Western Sahara**, although it intervened in other issues of interest to Rabat, such as mediating the dispute with Spain over Leila Island. *(no intervention because of good relations towards Morocco)*

The year 2003 saw a sudden shift in policy when the United States released a statement supporting the Baker plan, which offered two alternative solutions: either granting the Saharan provinces autonomy within a federal kingdom of Morocco with unspecified borders, or accepting the partition of the territory. However, this did not translate to a firm position as President Bush reiterated that any settlement would not be imposed on Rabat, acknowledging the sensitivity of the issue to Morocco’s internal politics. It was a stand that revealed the centrality of the war on terror in the Bush administration’s strategies, as it viewed the conflict in the **Sahara** as intertwined with Morocco’s cooperation in Washington’s antiterrorism campaign. *(change in US foreign policy: supporting Baker plan, but the need to keep good relations with Morocco)*

Aware of this, Morocco adopted a rhetoric that linked the threat posed by the ongoing **Western Sahara** issue to the threat of terrorist groups spreading in North Africa. However, the linking of the two issues had limited effect because both sides of the conflict, Morocco and Algeria, were involved in the U.S. war

on terror. Indeed, at times they were even forced by Washington to cooperate and exchange intelligence information on terrorism, particularly after the emergence of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). *(Morocco using US 'war against terrorism')*

One way to examine the importance of the **Western Sahara** dispute for the United States is to compare the positions taken by Congress and the White House. Congress is divided. Some support Morocco and emphasize Rabat's key role in the war on terror and the Middle East conflicts, the strength of the historic U.S.–Moroccan ties, and the democratic reforms in the kingdom; others support the Sahrawis' rights to self-determination and criticize Morocco's record on human rights and its exploitation of the territory's natural resources, dismissing argument about the historic nature of the relations between the two countries as a thing of the past. In recent years, the divide between the two camps has become more pronounced.

As for the White House, the Bush administration changed its stance repeatedly. First, former U.S. ambassador to the United Nations John Bolton threatened to force the withdrawal of the UN mission from the **Western Sahara**. Later, the Bush administration went to another extreme, threatening to elevate the **Western Sahara** dispute from a Chapter VI to a Chapter VII issue. Such a change would have forced the sides of the conflict to comply with UN resolutions or face the consequences. Eventually, the administration returned to a more neutral policy. The fluctuations in the U.S. position reveal Washington's interest in maintaining room for maneuver between its two strategic allies, Morocco and Algeria. This policy left both Algeria and Morocco feeling dissatisfied, but not threatened. As a Security Council member, the United States often expresses its position on the dispute through its acts in the UN. That is, through pressing the UN to maintain an indefinite involvement in the region by playing the role of the "tourist policeman." *(dispute in the US about how to act on the issue)*

The neutral role that the United States insists on maintaining also shows the different nature of its alliances with either side of the conflict. Morocco is an old ally that goes back to the Cold War and is a geostrategic gateway to southern Europe and Africa. It also provides the United States with political access to the Arab World, and Washington often uses Morocco as an "experimental field" in which it tests reforms and democratic efforts designed for the region. As for Algeria, the United States has taken an economic interest in the country following the end of the Cold War. The United States sees Algeria as a potential investment market and the scene of a future economic contest with China, a remnant of the Cold War rivalry. *(including Algeria as actor, international relations)*

Early indications of the direction of Obama's administration suggest that the **Western Sahara** dispute will be discussed in terms of tightly observed international legitimacy. *(future under Obama)*

**The Western Saharan dispute is one of the most neglected international conflicts.** *(common theory)* The region has not developed enough to turn into an area where the United States and Europe (particularly France and Spain which display a more profound understanding of the conflict) compete for influence. *(including European States and their actions)* Early indications of the direction of Obama's administration suggest that the **Western Sahara** dispute will be discussed in terms of tightly observed international legitimacy. This is particularly relevant as the region is beginning to relive the Cold War spirit following the severance of ties between Morocco and Venezuela over the **Western Sahara** dispute, and Iran hinting that it might begin to support the Polisario Front after a recent diplomatic standoff with Morocco. *(future perspective and international influences and examples)*

*Abdel-Rahim Al-Manar Slimi is professor of political sciences at the Mohammed V University in Morocco.*

Source:

[http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=23275&zoom\\_highlight=western+sahara](http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=23275&zoom_highlight=western+sahara)

## 2.7 United Nations: WESTERN SAHARA: AFRICA'S LAST COLONY

In the following paragraph are in the text with colors the discourses (*discourse*, *Discourse* and *Discourse models*), which are described in the paragraph before, marked. In brackets is the reason why I decided that it is that special discourse. Below the speech is a short outline and conclusion. The analysis will start further in the speech, because the introduction is not relevant and the background information is already outlined in the historical background and not important for the analysis to get to know the position of the United Nations.

**Frank Ruddy**

**U.S. Ambassador (ret.)**

**Former Deputy Chairman**

**U.N. Peacekeeping Mission (MINURSO)**

**For Western Sahara**

**World Affairs Council**

**Alaska**

**Juneau October 31**

**Anchorage November 2**

Members of the World Affairs Council, Distinguished Guests, Ladies and Gentlemen,

I am grateful to have been invited here to speak about Western Sahara. To prepare for my visit here, I saw the movie *Into The Wild*. I was expecting my accommodations here to be a used school bus. I was pleasantly surprised by a delightful hotel room. I do remain quite wary of any herbs in my salad. By definition, your Council has a healthy curiosity about what is happening all over the world. My predecessors at this podium have been the presidents of Mongolia and Iceland. I am so glad your attention is now focused on North Africa, Morocco and how the United Nations performed and is performing in resolving Morocco's invasion and retention of what is the world's last colony: Western Sahara. I am going to speak briefly about the history of the conflict over Western Sahara, my role in the initial and failed referendum and then the prospects here and now, in 2007, for resolving the conflict. I intend to leave plenty of time for your questions. The audience's questions are always the most interesting part of any presentation.

THE PLACE:

Western Sahara is country about the size of Colorado, just below Morocco, located just where the same says it should be, on the western edge of the Sahara. I am going to start in the middle of things as they say good stories should, with the 1995 congressional hearing into how the U.N. spends the money we

Americans appropriate for it. That led to the U.N.'s handling of the referendum scheduled for Western Sahara.

Finally, I will move to 2007 and what's happening now to resolve the issue.

In January 1995 I was a witness in that congressional hearing looking into U.N. spending of U.S. taxpayer money. Chuck Lichtenstein, a former U.S. ambassador to the U.N. and deputy to Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick. Despite, or perhaps because of his proximity to the institution, he was not a great fan of the U.N. You may recall his wellpublicized remarks in 1983. Chuck said: "If, in the judicious determination of the members of the United Nations they feel they are not welcome and treated with the hostile consideration that is their due, the United States strongly encourages member states to seriously consider removing themselves and this organization from the soil of the United States. We will put no impediment in your way, and we will be at the dockside bidding you a farewell as you set off into the sunset." It was Chuck who viewed the U.N.'s actions in Western Sahara as so outrageous, even by U.N. standards, that he gave up his place so that I could address the congressional committee that day.

#### A LITTLE BACKGROUND:

Western Sahara used to be a Spanish colony called Spanish Sahara. Under U.N. pressure to decolonize, Spain agreed to withdraw from Spanish Sahara but not before it organized a referendum to allow the inhabitants to vote on their own, decolonized, future. But even before Spain withdrew, Morocco had appeared before the World Court in The Hague and claimed sovereignty over Spanish Sahara. The World Court rejected Morocco's position and in its opinion made two very important points: First, that Morocco had no claim to sovereignty over Spanish, now Western, Sahara, and secondly, that the referendum organized by Spain should go forward. The day after that decision was announced, Morocco invaded Western Sahara in what was called "the Green March." Morocco has occupied Western Sahara ever since, leading to what has become the longest, most protracted conflict in the history of the United Nations. To put this in context, U.S. Congressman from Illinois, Jose Serrano recently proposed legislation, to let the people of Puerto Rico decide by referendum whether to remain part of the United States or become an independent state. I am taking the license of grossly oversimplifying the Serrano proposal to make a point, but imagine if the Serrano proposal were enacted into law, and the Supreme Court said such a referendum must be held, but the U.S. Government ignored that decision and sent in troops to take control of the island as U.S. property and postpone the referendum indefinitely.

Admittedly, this is a Twilight Zone scenario, but it does give a pretty good idea of what has been going on between Morocco and Western Sahara. The indigenous people of Western Sahara, nomads known as Sahrawis, through their military arm, the POLISARIO Front, forcefully resisted the Moroccan colonizers just as they had resisted the Spanish colonizers before them. Morocco eventually over-powered the POLISARIO but not before the POLISARIO, although vastly outgunned and out-manned, gave the Moroccans a bloody nose. The Sahrawis did not give in but created a government-in-exile in Algeria. In 1991, the U.N. Settlement Plan for Western Sahara provided for a cease-fire as well as for a U.N. supervised referendum on selfdetermination that would let the Sahrawis decide whether to be integrated into Morocco or become an independent state. If ever there were a job ready-made for the U.N., this surely was it. The referendum was scheduled for 1992 but was postponed until 1994. That's where I came in.

#### THE REFERENDUM:



The U.N. hired me to run the referendum in Western Sahara. It was the principal activity of a U.N. peacekeeping mission called MINURSO. *(describing his task)* All U.N. missions have names that sound like cough syrups. *(joke, to implicate the not serious part)*

I thought the U.N. was serious. *(expressing his opinion)* Maybe some in the U.N. were at the time, but the referendum was, and continues to be, one of those colossal and tremendously expensive flops that make a laughing stock of the U.N. *(giving the meaning to this UN mission in comparison to others)*

The U.N.'s task was simple enough: Hold a referendum with one issue to be decided: independence or integration with Morocco. *(model of task)* Or so the story was. In the event, however, it wasn't quite so simple. The U.N. turned over control of the referendum to Morocco. There really is no other way of describing what happened. Morocco dictated the where and when of the voting registration, controlled entry to the U.N. voter Registration facilities, and even decided which Sahrawis got to register. The Moroccan observers at the voter registration sessions had observed right off the bat that the people of Western Sahara wanted independence, not integration with Morocco. The way for Morocco to deal with that unpleasant reality was to postpone the referendum indefinitely until it appeared unworkable, leaving Morocco just where it was, controlling Western Sahara. And that's just what Morocco did.

Towards the end of my year in Western Sahara, I was instructed to make my reports jointly to the U.N. Secretary General's representative and the Moroccan representative. There was no longer even the pretense of an independent U.N. mission in Western Sahara. What I described to the Congress about the U.N.'s scandalous performance in Western Sahara was not some personal insight. Morocco's abuse of the people of Western Sahara, and the U.N. mission's impotence to stop that abuse, was open and notorious. The U.N. mission was a laughing stock at diplomatic parties in Rabat. The mission's abandonment of a free and fair referendum was common knowledge to all the peacekeeping soldiers assigned to the mission as well as to the U.N. staff. *(description of situation and meanings of what happened with whom)*

That is the reason Chris Hedges of The New York Times had no trouble getting the facts he needed to expose in print the referendum for the sham it was. *(action of a reporter)* One had to be cynical in the face of the U.N.'s high falutin' language and do-nothing results, but when it was announced in 1997 that former Secretary of State Baker was undertaking to get this referendum back on track, many people, myself included, were impressed. More than impressed. I was hopeful for the first time in a very long time. *(implementation of a possible solution)*

I attended the Capitol Hill conference he held, and I eagerly read the reports of his meetings in Morocco, Algeria, Lisbon and London. *(his personal actions)* He would resolve the impasse or, as he said, he would at least identify who was holding up the referendum. He was the great hope for a peaceful settlement. Sadly, Secretary Baker not only failed to get the referendum back on track, he failed to identify who was holding up the referendum, not that there was any doubt about it. He proposed a five-year period of so called autonomous rule by the Western Saharans, under the benevolent eye of the Moroccans, of course, to be followed by a referendum. It seemed an absurd proposal. If after so many years and so many millions spent, the U.N. was unable to hold a simple referendum, what kind of quixotic reasoning could justify putting one's faith in some other referendum five years hence, during which time the Moroccans would continue to send thousands of Moroccans into Western Sahara as homesteaders? *(background of the referendum under Baker)*

The Baker proposal was so clearly in Morocco's favor that no one expected the Sahrawis to accept it. *(shared theory)* But amazingly they did, in a gesture of conciliation. The Moroccans, for whom the proposal was a leontine pact, rejected it. Go figure. Horace, the Roman poet, wrote "The mountains

are in labor, and a mouse is brought forth.” We expected a great diplomatic Mt McKinley from Secretary Baker’s intervention but, sadly, he had presented us with a diplomatic mouse. It is appropriate that we talk about these things now because the world has just recognized, we can hardly say celebrate, the 32nd anniversary of Morocco’s invasion of Western Sahara. We can’t say celebrate unless we also celebrate Indonesia’s, murderous grab of East Timor which Morocco’s invasion most resembles. One other point worth noting is the great waste of money in the referendum, estimated at \$100,000 a day as far back as 1995. That was then a scandalous amount. These days, after the Volcker Report on the U.N. Oil for Food Scandal, it is chicken feed. But there are some similarities. U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan, whose son prospered through the Oil for Food Scandal, was head of U.N. peacekeeping, and therefore of Minurso when the referendum began. He exhibited there the same dereliction of management duty in MINURSO as would later be documented in the Volcker Report. *(expressing positions of actors through description of the difficulties of the meaningful referendum)*

What I had observed in MINURSO and testified to before our Congress was later verified by Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, various newspapers and journals, including The New York Times, The Economist, and on and on. *(shared theory by all these media and organizations)*

#### U.N. BAD FAITH:

Worse than the extravagant waste of money on this mission over the years was the U.N.’s duplicity in managing it: the U.N. sold out the nobodies, the Sahrawis for whose right to self-determination the referendum was to be held, to keep favor with a somebody, King Hassan II of Morocco, who had invaded Western Sahara, lost his claim to the territory in the World Court, but succeeded in convincing his old chum and fellow North African, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, to provide a U.N. fig leaf to cover Morocco’s naked aggression and occupation of Western Sahara. And this is an important point. To hear the Moroccans tell it themselves or through their multi-million dollar Washington lobbyists, the World Court ruled in Morocco’s favor back in 1975. As noted earlier, the Court did no such thing, and I invite all of you to google the decision and read it for yourselves. *(expressing positions of actors through description of the difficulties of the meaningful referendum)*

#### WHAT WENT WRONG IN THE REFERENDUM:

Those same well-paid lobbyists I just mentioned emphasize what a great ally of the United States Morocco is. *(actions of him and opinions of lobbyists)* Well, that happens to be the truth. Morocco is not evil incarnate. *(description of Moroccan identity)* The point is, however, that however helpful Morocco is to us in carrying out diplomatic missions elsewhere, particularly in the Middle East, that same ally, Morocco, acted more like the Mafia in Western Sahara. For example: Arabic speakers working for the U.N. came to me to report that Sahrawis coming in to register as voters were complaining to them (in Hassania, the local Arabic dialect) that members of their families and friends had registered to vote at the Moroccan-run centers but never appeared on the voters list. The Moroccans had disenfranchised them. Others complained that relatives and friends were on the list to register as voters, but the Moroccans refused to let them do so. The Moroccan police kept away everyone who wasn’t approved by the Moroccan authorities. People coming to register on a given day couldn’t just walk in. Only those with the Moroccan seal of approval could enter. In this way, the Moroccans controlled who registered to vote. Welcome to the Moroccan-run police state of Western Sahara. That’s just not the way it’s supposed to be, of course, and that’s not the kind of the process the U.N. is supposed to be funding. For this same reason we could not invite Sahrawis to fill out voter application at our centers. No Sahrawi



was allowed anywhere the Moroccan Government doesn't want him or her to be. It cannot be stressed too strongly, Western Sahara, under Moroccan control, is a police state, something we as Americans are not used to, a fully functioning and efficient police state. One other observation: Some Sahrawis who reported what the Moroccans were doing to them asked that our U.N. people keep an eye out for them in case they disappeared. Many said they were scared for their lives if the Moroccans saw them talking to U.N. people. Others asked not to be recognized outside the U.N. center. Terrorized is not too strong a word. Their comments reminded me of nothing so much as South Africa in the early 70's when blacks would talk to you freely in the safety of the U.S. embassy in Cape Town or Pretoria, and then pretend they didn't know you as soon as they left, lest they be observed by the South African Special Branch talking to "foreign trouble-makers." Morocco didn't and still doesn't want the referendum because the risks outweigh any possible gains. From Morocco's point of view, the status quo is not so bad. But for P.R. reasons, Morocco cannot afford to appear to be the villain of the piece and continues to find ways to delay any referendum until everyone is sick of it. This is a long-standing practice that sometimes is simply absurd. On one occasion, like something out of Ionesco, Morocco halted the identification process for over a week, at a cost, once again, of \$100,000 per day, on the question of the whether an adverb used in a schedule proposed by MINURSO was *le mot juste*. This resulted in an exchange of formal letters and a good deal of sophomoric quibbling. If Morocco had been interested in clarifying the matter, as opposed to simply delaying the process, it could have been done so in two minutes in a phone call to the French-speaking former Togolese ambassador, who drafted the letter. In the same month, the Moroccan liaison officer with MINURSO, one Mohammed Azmi, bragged publicly to a group of MINURSO people in a bar that he alone was the one to decide whether identification would go forward the next day, and to prove his point, he picked up the phone (it was then about midnight) and, in front of everyone, cancelled the next week's identification sessions. *(outline of Morocco's situation and behavior and relation as ally of the US (and UN))*

These are the actions of Machiavellians who do what they please with impunity from U.N. sanctions and without a care for the integrity of the referendum or the waste they are incurring. The identification process was supposed to begin on June 15, 1994, but the start was delayed two-and-a-half months, at a cost of millions of dollars, while the U.N., the Sahrawis and Morocco engaged in more time-wasting, this time negotiating over what to call the Organization of African Unity (O.A.U.) representatives who were to come to observe the identification. The Moroccans had walked out of the O.A.U. years before because it recognized the Sahrawi Arabic Democratic Republic (R.A.S.D.), the diplomatic name for the Sahrawi homeland, and now Morocco said they didn't want O.A.U. people involved in the referendum. The O.A.U. representatives were part of the referendum process and, as the Moroccan knew, had to be there. In the end a compromise about what they were to be called was reached, and the O.A.U. representatives were permitted to enter. The absurdity was that this had all been worked out in 1993 so there was no need, except delay for the sake of delay, to reinvent the wheel once the referendum was beginning. *(relations of Morocco and other organizations, such UN and OAU)*

#### THUGGERY:

Each person who registered to vote got a receipt, and when the list of those eligible to vote was made public, the persons on that list were supposed to turn those receipts in for a voter's card. *(model of elections for the referendum)* What was happening in Laayoune, the capital of Western Sahara, is that Sahrawis returning from the voter registration centers were being forced to turn in their receipts to the

Moroccans. This allowed the wrong people to present receipts and get voter cards. *(meaning of situation in Western Sahara)* In Chicago they call that voter fraud. *(addressing shared values)* The voter registration process began in earnest on August 28, 1994, simultaneously in Western Sahara and in Algeria, the location of the Saharawis' government-in-exile. *(action)* One can say that surely, as of this date, MINURSO ceased to be a U.N.-run operation and became the instrument for Morocco's domination of the voter identification process. You need government permission to buy space on Moroccan media, and Morocco had always denied the U.N. permission to buy space in the Moroccan newspapers or radio to alert people to register to vote. (Freedom of the press is also a casualty in a police state.) That was small potatoes compared to what was to come after August 28. Former British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan referred to the technique the Borgia brothers would use to take over a Northern Italian town. Watching the Moroccans at work, I thought of his description. *(procedure of the referendum)*

#### SOME FOR INSTANCES:

The evening before the voter registration process began in Laayoune, the Moroccan Liaison with MINURSO upbraided the MINURSO Chief-of-Mission, a Mr. Eric Jensen, in a public dining room before Moroccans and MINURSO staff, and directed him to remove all U.N. flags from the U.N. building where the voter registration was to take place, or he would close down the voter registration. Unfortunately, John Wayne the Chief-of-Mission was not, and he even ordered that the U.N. flag in the room where the opening ceremony was to take place be removed. During the days of the opening sessions in Laayoune, so-called Moroccan journalists photographed and videotaped every minute of every day and took the picture of each Sahrawi who came to be identified. These so called journalists were, as our press people and the German head of U.N. police observers verified, Moroccan security agents. Not one second of these hours of so-called television footage ever appeared on Moroccan television. A few weeks later, telephone taps were found on local and all international lines at MINURSO headquarters. The taps went to a local Moroccan line. This was hushed up. There was no investigation, but the U.N. employee who installed the taps was secreted away to avoid any evidence implicating the U.N. Mail had regularly been tampered with, and rooms of MINURSO personnel were regularly searched, but this was a new wrinkle. Big Brother was now listening to, as well as watching, us. In the following weeks, Morocco, not the U.N., dictated even our work and flight schedules. When the Moroccan observers agreed, the U.N. worked. The Moroccans also insisted that U.N. planes fly empty, and at great expense, from Laayoune where the planes are based, across the desert to the Saharawi camps in Algeria to shuttle Moroccan observers back home and, of course, to demonstrate their control of the process. In Laayoune, the Moroccans treated the U.N. voter identification facilities as their own, running in groups of visiting firemen whenever they liked and keeping the facilities open, if that's what it took, to accommodate late arrivals. On one occasion, when the Moroccan liaison with MINURSO arrived at the identification center, he was furious to find he had to wait a few moments for the gate to be unlocked so he could enter what he called "chez moi," my place. And that is how the Moroccans were permitted, through U.N. timidity, to think of the U.N. facilities in Laayoune, not as an extra-territorial U.N. compound, but as their own property. *( the Moroccan interference in the referendum)* In summary, during my time in Western Sahara, Morocco conducted, without a raised eyebrow from Boutros-Ghali's handpicked representative, a campaign of terror against the Saharan people. As noted earlier, I had not seen the likes of it since I observed the apartheid government in South Africa in action against South African blacks when I visited

there with Roy Wilkins, then head of the N.A.A.C.P., in the early 70's. *(personal experiences)* Morocco did not simply influence the referendum -- they controlled it -- down to what days the mission worked. Morocco tapped U.N. phones, intercepted U.N. mail, and searched the living quarters of U.N. staff with impunity. More importantly, the Moroccan authorities disenfranchised Saharan voters right and left and substituted Moroccan ringers in their place. (Morocco's action with important meanings)

Outsiders like me, as well as U.N. contract employees and veteran U.N. professionals, reported these outrages directly to Boutros-Ghali's representative in MINURSO, but we might just as well not have bothered. Boutros Ghali's man blew them off. He simply lacked the gravitas, or the moxie, to take on the King's gangster-in-chief in Western Sahara, Mohammed Azmi. If you read Graham Greene's *Our Man in Havana*, you would recognize him: a charming and ruthless flic, like Greene's Captain Segura, Batista's police chief. *(personal experiences)*

Before leaving the mission for good at the end of my year there, I sent a note to Kofi Annan outlining the fraud, waste and abuse I had observed in MINURSO, and I offered to discuss it with him in New York on my return. *(personal action)* His reply was that what I had told him was "not serious" (his words.)

Once I had testified before our congress, my written testimony was picked up by the wire services and went all over the world. It was, for example, the cover story in the very popular journal *Jeune Afrique*. Once the media picked up the story, the Secretary General was, like Captain Renault in *Casablanca*, "shocked, shocked" to hear such things were going on in MINURSO and put his brand new inspector general on the case. His inspection was a whitewash of the mission, as expected, but it was laughable, literally. John Bolton said at the time that had such a report been made by a federal inspector general, he would have been laughed out of town before the ink on his signature was dry. For example, U.S. Army Colonel Dan Magee, who commanded U.S. troops in MINURSO, had complained that a senior mission official regularly demeaned his troops as "a bunch of thieves" because they were underwhelmed by Morocco's manipulating of the mission. Magee thought the U.N. Inspector General would be interested to hear about that kind of anti-American attitude. Magee was wrong. The Inspector General opined that since the official disparaged other nationalities as well, and was, therefore an equal-opportunity bigot, the Inspector General wasn't interested. Incredible. But, as Casey Stengel used to say, "You could look it up." Another MINURSO staffer, a Lebanese-American named Mara Hanna, upset by what she saw Morocco doing in the mission, was told by the Inspector General's man: "If you answer my questions truthfully, you'll never work for the U.N. again." She did answer truthfully, and as she declared in the Rayburn House Office Building, she has been barred by the U.N. ever since. The Security Council, under the leadership of Argentinean Ambassador, Emilio Cardenas, rejected the Inspector General's Inspector Clouseau-like report within days of its appearance. According to The Washington Post, Ambassador Cardenas characterized the inspection report as "tall tales coming out of MINURSO." The reason the original inspection report was done so poorly was because, as the Inspector General himself later acknowledged, he really wasn't allowed, under U.N. rules, to do a lot of inspecting. He was prohibited, for example, from looking into the possibility that Morocco was behaving badly in the referendum. Morocco, you see, is a member of the U.N., and the U.N. Inspector General was not allowed to risk embarrassing a member state by acknowledging misbehavior during the U.N. referendum. It was rather as if a special prosecutor in our country, in carrying out his investigation, were prohibited from investigating possible felonies by someone who holds a high post in the federal government because it might offend the person or the office being investigated. Absurd, but welcome

to the U.N. Human Rights Watch based in New York published its 38-page Report on MINURSO, and it is devastating, documenting blatant human rights violations and vote fraud carried out by Morocco right under the figurative nose of the mission. The mission and U.N., as expected, had no answer. Perhaps the best example of business-as-usual at the U.N. was being invited, and then uninvited, to address the 4th Committee of the U.N. General Assembly. That's the committee on COLONIALISM! The Committee follows Western Sahara because it is the world's last colony. I consider it a badge of honor to say that Boutros-Ghali, the man himself, personally intervened to see to it that the 4th Committee did not hear what I had to say about MINURSO. I was, I am told, the first person ever barred from speaking before that committee in the U.N.'s 60-year history. The Secretary General prevented the 4th Committee, composed entirely of member states of the U.N., from hearing someone who just might have been able to tell them the U.N. was wasting close to a billion dollars on a mission and referendum going nowhere. One nice final touch about the U.N., about one quarter of whose expenses you and I and all of us U.S. taxpayers pay: When former U.S. Attorney General Dick Thornburgh was serving as Undersecretary for Management at the U.N., he submitted to Boutros-Ghali a report for streamlining the U.N., eliminating waste and fraud and saving hundreds of millions of dollars. Boutros-Ghali, as Thornburgh has stated publicly, had the report suppressed and the remaining copies shredded. (Fortunately, Dick kept copies.)

*(Discourse and discussion in between the UN)* But I don't want to leave on a misconception. Yes, I have been underwhelmed by the U.N., but despite all I have said here today, I am not anti- Morocco.

*(personal action)* Outside Western Sahara they may be our good ally. They even claim (erroneously) they were our first ally against the British. *(shared theory regarding foreign affairs)* My problem with them is *(personal opinion!)* that in Western Sahara they invaded as illegally as Indonesia did in East Timor, and once there Morocco has behaved notoriously, without any fear of sanctions from our State Department. It is sad for me as an American to see in those countries where I have served, in Equatorial Guinea and Western Sahara, that our government supports the thugs who run those places and ignores the good people who live there and want and deserve better. The United States has kowtowed to President Teodoro Obiang Mbasago of Equatorial Guinea. He is the brutal thief of his country's patrimony and torturer of his own people, and quite literally a world-ranked dictator (He was # 9 at last reckoning), because he has a lot of oil to sell. Secretary of State recently received him at the State Department, calling him a great friend of the United States. Similarly, we have not confronted Morocco's machtpolitik because Morocco is helpful in other areas. That explains why the otherwise insipid statement of David Welch, the State Department's Secretary for the Near East, in June of this year, endorsed Morocco's autonomy plan. Just following orders as someone once said. The late Daniel Patrick Moynihan, in his memoir as U.S. ambassador to the U.N. was more forthcoming. He acknowledged his job was to see that Western Sahara did not become an independent state, a charge, he said, he carried out very well. But that was during the Cold War, when Western Sahara had the wrong friends, and Henry Kissinger did not want another Angola on the west coast of Africa. The Cold War is long over. I had great expectations when we had John Bolton at the U.N. He knew where the bodies were buried, and he is a no-nonsense lawyer who worked on the Baker Plan with Secretary Baker. If there were ever a reason to hope for real reform in the U.N. and for a just settlement for Western Sahara, John Bolton personified that hope. But unfortunately, John Bolton did not make policy. He carried it out like any honorable presidential appointee, and that policy tilted heavily in Morocco's favor. *(Discourse on US foreign policy)*

## 2007: THE PROSPECTS FOR A SOLUTION TO THE STALEMATE:

In mid-August, 2007, shortly before representatives of the Saharawi people and Morocco met on Long Island to discuss for the umpteenth time the future of Western Sahara, on this occasion the latest Moroccan autonomy plan, twenty-four members of the U.S. Congress sent a letter to President Bush.

*(outline of situation and action)* The letter urged the president “to take steps to ensure that your administration demonstrates respect for the rights of the Saharawi people to democratically choose their own political and economic future.” That statement goes to the very heart of the conflict in Western Sahara. The conflict is not really about an autonomy plan, the latest in a long line of illusions that Morocco has created over the years to distract world attention from the real issue: Morocco’s brazen land grab of Western Sahara, a land grab that stole from the people of Western Sahara, not only their homeland but also any say in their own future. Morocco’s crime was contemporaneous with and as flagrant a crime as Indonesia’s seizure of East Timor. It was part of what the British journal *The Economist* called a double Anschluss. Facts are stubborn things, and despite Morocco’s efforts to hide them, they won’t go away. We have already mentioned the World Court’s opinion in the matter, a decision unfavorable to Morocco, and predictably Morocco ignored it and invaded. Despite dozens of U.N. Security Council resolutions since 1975 reaffirming the right of the Sahrawi people to self-determination, and despite the U.N.’s Committee on decolonization treating Western Sahara as a Moroccan colony, Morocco continues to put itself above the law and remains firmly in place, and in charge, in Western Sahara, Africa’s last colony. Anglo Saxon lawyers have an expression, *res ipsa loquitur*, the thing speaks for itself, that means in certain crystal clear situations, a simple recitation of the facts is sufficient, without more, to presume culpability. That is the case in Western Sahara. The Moroccans now propose a limited autonomy plan for Western Sahara, under Moroccan supervision, of course. The Moroccan limited autonomy plan for Western Sahara might sound like a step forward, at least until you read the not-so-fine print. Article 6 of the plan provides that Morocco will keep its powers in the royal domain, especially with regard to defense, external relations and the constitutional and religious prerogatives of his majesty the king. In other words, the Moroccans are offering autonomy, except in everything that counts. It gets even more disingenuous. The Moroccans say their plan will be submitted to a referendum, but a referendum to be voted on by whom? By the Moroccan people? That would be absurd on the face of it. By the Saharawis themselves? If so, what happens if the Saharawis reject the plan? Will that mean Sahrawi independence? You can be sure the Moroccans would never tolerate that result. The only referendum worth considering is one the Sahrawis can endorse, that is, where all the options are on the table. That’s not in the cards. Anything less is a sham. The history of the conflict is downright discouraging to anyone who believes in the rule of law. Voltaire, who had little faith in an international legal system, said in so many words after reviewing the most famous international law treatise of his day, Vattel’s *Droit des Gens*: “An international law for nations? Next they’ll be talking about a code of conduct for highway robbers and gangsters!” And things have not changed all that much in our day. Morocco has behaved unconscionably since its invasion of Western Sahara because it has tremendous internal political pressures to do just that. Those same domestic political pressures require spending billions of dollars since this conflict began to eliminate the possibility of an independent state to their south. *(discourse on Morocco’s legitimating)*

To recoup the extraordinary costs of their aggression, Morocco attempted, among other things, to exploit whatever oil resources exist off the coast of Western Sahara until, in 2002, the U.N. legal advisor,

Hans Corell, stepped in to say that “...the exploration and plundering of the marine and other natural resources of colonial and non-self governing territories by foreign economic interests, in violation of the relevant resolutions of the of the United Nations, is a threat to the integrity and prosperity of these territories.” *(discourse on Morocco’s legitimating)*

Translated from legalese, Morocco, as an occupying power but not the Administering power, must stop plundering the natural resources of Western Sahara. *(shared theory on resources)* Nothing deterred by this chastisement, Morocco recently entered into the European Union-Moroccan Fisheries Agreement whereby the EU pays Morocco an enormous amount of money to permit 119 EU member vessels to fish Morocco’s Atlantic waters, including those off Western Sahara. Here, for once, Morocco is not acting alone in the theft of Western Sahara’s natural resources; it is part of a conspiracy with the EU. This is business as usual for Morocco, but unfathomable for the EU that has to know its action flies in the face of the Corell declaration of the inviolability of Western Sahara’s natural resources. Western Sahara is currently recognized by 70 countries, although Morocco has been attempting by strong arm tactics to intimidate some of the smaller countries to withdraw their recognition. Western Sahara is also a full member of the African Union, the successor to the Organization of African Unity. These facts alone would seem to demand forbearance by the EU, but such was not the case. Despite all the diplomatic bloviating at the U.N. and Washington and elsewhere about the rights of people everywhere to self-determination, the countries that could make a difference in Western Sahara are willing to jettison the rights of one small nation to determine its future to placate Morocco and its outrageous irredentist demands. When the Germans invaded Czechoslovakia 70 years ago, Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain acquiesced to Germany’s need for lebensraum. Plus ca change... *(discourse on Morocco’s legitimation on Saharan resources)*

Fortunately for everyone interested in justice for Western Sahara, your Council now enters the debate over this conflict. Your work in arranging this presentation goes a long way to putting Western Sahara on the geo-political map for those unfamiliar with the issues, and for the rest of us, it explains why this 30 year old conflict is so important, not only to the Saharawis but to the great powers. It also emphasizes why Western Sahara is not a sideshow to be patronized by the U.N. as it concentrates on other hot spots in the world. After the September 11 terrorist attacks in New York, people all over the world said: “We are all New Yorkers now.” Through conferences like this one, I would hope that some day we might hear some one say: “We are all Saharawis now.” *(Discourse on solidarity)*

Thank you very much. *(common farewell)*

Source: Ruddy, F. (2007) Western Sahara: Africa’s last colony: Speech at the World Affairs Council, Alaska, Juneau October 31, Anchorage November 2