# Ethnic segregation and integration

The case of the Greek minority in Istanbul

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
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*The beauty of a landscape resides in its melancholy*
Ahmet Rasim

*There are places where history is inescapable, like a highway accident –*
*places where geography provokes history*
Joseph Brodsky

*I poured my soul in the city's streets and there it still resides*
Orhan Pamuk

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# Summary

Recently several European politicians such as Angela Merkel, Nicolas Sarkozy and David Cameron, have all condemned the multicultural society as an utter failure. These politicians agree on the idea that the several ethnic minority groups did not go through the desired process of integration but instead coexist within their own ethnic communities side by side rather than living together with the majority population. In essence, the utter failure of the multicultural society should therefore be considered in the light of the relationship between ethnic segregation and integration. The several European politicians seemingly consider ethnic segregation and integration as two opposites, whereby ethnic segregation is seen as undesirable since it hampers the integration of the ethnic minorities.

Whereas the European politicians already concluded on the relationship between ethnic segregation and integration, this relationship is still highly contested in the academic world. The discussion among scholars revolves around the question whether or not ethnic segregation and integration should be considered as two concepts that are the complete opposite of each other. To put it in other words: does ethnic segregation indeed hamper the integration of ethnic minorities or is it possible that ethnic minorities are integrated into society while at the same time they are living ethnically segregated?

In general thus two views on the relationship between ethnic segregation and integration can be distinguished. The former view, wherein ethnic segregation and integration are considered as two opposites, is embodied in the 'contact hypothesis'. In this hypothesis contact between the majority population and ethnic minorities is promoted so that socio-economic opportunities as well as ethnic-cultural elements are shared and this eventually could lead to the integration of ethnic minorities. Ethnic segregation is in this hypothesis therefore perceived negatively since it hinders the integration by obstructing the contact between the majority population and ethnic minorities.

The latter view, wherein ethnic segregation and integration are not regarded as two extremes, is to certain extent embodied in the 'conflict hypothesis'. In this hypothesis it is argued that contact between the majority population and ethnic minorities should be avoided in order to reduce conflicts. More importantly, in this hypothesis ethnic segregation is perceived positively since it is assumed to have a variety of positive outcomes. In fact, the conflict hypothesis holds that through these positive outcomes ethnic segregation can facilitate the integration of ethnic minorities into mainstream society. It is therefore not necessary to reduce the level of ethnic segregation. The conflict hypothesis therefore states that ethnic segregation and integration should not be considered as two opposites since they can be present at the same time.

This research was conducted in order to bring more clarity with respect to the academic discussion on the relationship between ethnic segregation and integration. In that context the city of Istanbul proofed to be the perfect location for this research. It was learned from the articles by Pinarcioğlu and Işik (2009) and Ayata (2008) that in the city of Istanbul ethnic segregation is absent. This is an interesting and important fact when it comes to the question of integration. Following the contact hypothesis wherein it is explained that ethnic segregation hampers the integration, the absence of ethnic segregation might suggest that the ethnic minorities living in Istanbul can be considered as integrated into society.

Several ethnic groups reside in Istanbul but this research merely focused on the Greek minority in that city. The Greek minority has a distinctive, violent history in Turkey. The same can be said of the Armenians in Turkey or the Kurdish people in Turkey, but the Greek minority was more suitable for this research. First of all, compared to other ethnic groups such as the Armenians or the Kurdish people, this ethnic group is small in terms of size. Secondly, this research had a time restriction and within that time restriction it was the Greek minority group that could be studied the best. Since it was already learned from the articles by Pinarcioğlu and Işik (2009) and Ayata (2008) that in the city of Istanbul ethnic segregation is absent, it was thus merely the Greek level of integration that needed to be measured in order to make statements on the relationship between ethnic segregation and integration in general.

The process of measuring the Greek level of integration in Istanbul was done by means of a survey, whereby the socio-economic dimension of integration as well as the ethnic-cultural dimension of integration were incorporated. With respect to the socio-economic dimension of integration the survey asked the Greek respondents about their educational level, their employment, their sector of employment and their level of income. On the other hand, the ethnic-cultural dimension of integration in this research was measured by asking the Greek respondents about their orientation towards Greece and Turkey, their identity and their informal contacts with the Greek population of Istanbul as well as with the Turkish majority population.

The results of the survey were clear. While paying attention to the socio-economic dimension of integration, it becomes evident that the Greeks of Istanbul are doing rather well. It was statistically shown that, compared to the Turkish majority population, the Greeks of Istanbul are higher educated, less unemployed, more often employed as a white-collar worker and earning a higher income. It can therefore be concluded that the Greek minority of Istanbul is socio-economically integrated. Also for the ethnic-cultural dimension of integration it can be argued that the Greeks of Istanbul are integrated. With respect to this latter dimension, the results generated by the survey provide reasons to believe that the Greeks in Istanbul developed feelings of belongings towards Turkey. It was illustrated that the Greeks of Istanbul prefer to live in Turkey rather than in Greece and it was also shown that all respondents in this research are able to speak Turkish. Apart from these orientations towards the mainstream society, the members of the Greek minority of Istanbul feel Greek and are also seen as such by the Turkish majority population. Moreover, all members of the Greek presence in Istanbul are able to speak Greek and a vast majority of this group consider themselves as Eastern Orthodox. In addition to that also the frequency of informal inter-Greek contact on the level of the neighbourhood prevails over informal contact with the Turkish majority population. All of these indicate that the Greek minority of Istanbul holds on to their own cultural traits. These cultural traits combined with the orientation towards the mainstream society indicates that the Greek minority of Istanbul is also integrated in the ethnic-cultural dimension of integration.

The absence of ethnic segregation in Istanbul combined with the high level of integration of the Greek minority of Istanbul could be perceived as support for the contact hypothesis. However, the ethnic-cultural dimension of integration cannot merely be grasped in a quantitative way and it was therefore that brief conversations were held with the majority of the respondents in order to gain a more in-depth view on the Greek situation in Istanbul.

From these brief conversations it was learned that the history of the Greek minority of Istanbul is vital to comprehend the current Greek situation in Istanbul, including the current

level of integration, whereby one should go back to the year in which the Ottomans conquered Istanbul (1453). In this year an intense cultural symbioses was inaugurated by means of the Millet system, wherein a high degree of autonomy was granted to various religious categories such as the Greek Orthodox minority of Istanbul ('Millet-I Rum' or 'Rum Milleti). While still ultimately subject to the authority of the Ottoman state, there seemed, however, to be a form of equality within the Ottoman society and the Greek minority benefited from this by gaining a powerful economic position within the Ottoman Empire. This situation, however, changed completely after 1923 with the fall of the Ottoman Empire, the subsequent Greco-Turkish War and the eventual establishment of the Turkish state. From a cosmopolitan society during Ottoman times in which ethnic heterogeneity was tolerated, the Turkish state now set ethnic homogeneity as the standard by means of the policy of 'Turkification'.

The establishment of the Turkish state in 1923 demarcated the beginning of a period wherein the Greek minority of Istanbul suffered severely from the measures and events initiated by the Turkish government. In that respect one could think of the property confiscation (1936), the Varlık Tax (1942), the Istanbul Pogrom (1955), the Cyprus conflict (1964) and the Turkish invasion in Cyprus (1974). All of these events caused a certain fear among the Greeks of Istanbul towards the Turkish state. In fact, from the brief conversations held with the respondents in this research, it was learned that all these events made many of the respondents state that among the Greeks of Istanbul there is the deep-rooted idea that the Turkish state planned the systematic eradication of Greeks in Turkey since 1923. In short, it can be said that the Turkish government had substantial influence on the lives of and causing fear among the Greeks of Istanbul and it was particularly this fear caused by the Turkish government that made the Greeks of Istanbul feel a certain pressure to integrate.

The results generated by the survey combined with the absence of ethnic segregation in Istanbul could be perceived as support for the contact hypothesis. However, it is not the absence of ethnic segregation but the influence of the Turkish government that explains the current level of Greek integration. Instead of supporting the contact hypothesis, the findings of this research provide ample support for the rejection of the contact hypothesis. In other words, based on the findings of this research the concepts of ethnic segregation and integration do not have to be perceived as two extremes, whereby this conclusion to certain extent corresponds with the conflict hypothesis. It should be stressed, however, that the rejection of the contact hypothesis does not necessarily lead to an immediate acceptance of the conflict hypothesis. Instead, merely a few elements of the conflict hypothesis can be supported through the results of this research.

European politicians such as Angela Merkel, Nicolas Sarkozy and David Cameron, who have all condemned the multicultural society as an utter failure, based their ideas on the assumption that ethnic segregation and integration are two extremes, whereby ethnic segregation is supposed to hamper the integration of ethnic minorities. From the findings of this research, however, it becomes clear that ethnic segregation and integration should not be seen as two opposites. It is not the level of ethnic segregation that determines the level of integration. Instead, it is the role of the government that should not be underestimated while explaining the level of integration. The failure of the multicultural society should therefore not be seen in the light of ethnic segregation but perhaps in the light of failing governments.

# Chapter 1 – Introduction

Recently several European politicians such as Angela Merkel, Nicolas Sarkozy and David Cameron, have all condemned the multicultural society as an utter failure (DailyMail, 2011; see Modood, 2007; see Nye, 2007). These politicians agree on the idea that the several ethnic minority groups did not go through the desired process of integration but instead coexist within their own ethnic communities side by side rather than living together with the majority population. In essence, the utter failure of the multicultural society should therefore be considered in the light of the relationship between ethnic segregation and integration.

The relationship between ethnic segregation and integration is highly contested in the political domain as well as in the academic world. The discussion among politicians and scholars revolves around the question whether or not ethnic segregation and integration should be considered as two concepts that are the complete opposite of each other. To put it in other words: does ethnic segregation hamper the integration of ethnic minorities or is it possible that ethnic minorities are integrated into society while at the same time they are living ethnically segregated?

## 1.1 The two views on ethnic segregation and integration

The former view is supported by both politicians and several researchers. They state that the persisting presence of ethnic segregation in particular neighbourhoods of cities is impeding the integration of the ethnic minority living there. Their view is mainly based on the work of Lewis (1966, in Musterd, 2003, p.624), who states that "concentrations of poor and long-term unemployed people living in poor areas create local 'cultures of poverty', which become an independent factor that contributes to future social problems". In their turn these social problems hamper the integration. It may be clear that ideas in this view have been developing and that nowadays it is assumed in this view that the poor are regarded to be the same as the ethnic minority (Poulsen, 2009). An other influential author who contributed to this view is Wilson (1987, in Musterd, 2003, p.624) who argued that "inhabitants of black ghettos experience extra social problems simply because they are living in a segregated world". Although this claim was done in the context of the American society which is rather different from the European society, it still indicates the view on ethnic segregation, the social problems that come along and the direct consequences for the level of integration.

Others however strongly disagree with this view. According to the opponents, the concepts of ethnic segregation and integration should not necessarily be perceived as two extremes. In this latter view, ethnic segregation can occur in particular neighbourhoods while the ethnic minorities living there are still integrated in society. Those in favour of this view point at the fact that there is insufficient empirical support for the fact that ethnic segregation would hamper integration (Bolt, Özüekren & Phillips, 2010; Musterd, 1996; Musterd, 2003). In this respect Engbersen and Gabriëls (1995) refer to the situation in the United States where minorities like the Chinese, the Irish, the Puerto Rican and others live spatially separated but that this does not imply that they are not integrated into society. In fact, the authors point at the fact that these minorities are perfectly integrated, whereby they maintain links with both mainstream society as well as their own ethnic group.

The discussion concerning the relationship between the concept of ethnic segregation and integration is probably most clearly formulated by Musterd:

> In short, there are many conflicting ideas about the relationship between [ethnic] segregation and integration in society. Politicians tend to believe that such a relationship exists, and many researchers do as well. Other researchers have expressed their doubts, especially in contexts where welfare states actively support integration processes. (Musterd, 2003, p.629)

This quotation is quite important, since it shows that in the former view there is the assumption that there is a causal relationship between ethnic segregation and integration. Furthermore the quotation also shows that in the latter view there is the assumption that there might be something else (e.g. the role of the government) which can explain the level of integration other than the variable of ethnic segregation.

This research was conducted in Istanbul. One could argue that the current presence of ethnic minorities in Istanbul is not the result of recent immigration (as is predominantly the case in Western Europe) and that therefore questions concerning the relationship between ethnic segregation and integration are not relevant. It is, however, a fact that the current presence of ethnic minorities in Istanbul is the residue of a larger population which migrated to this city before or during the era of the Ottoman Empire (Anastassiadou, 2009). After the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, the newly established Turkish government affected the lives of its ethnic frequently, whereby there are indications that this had influence on the level of integration. Keeping in mind the quotation of Musterd (2003) in which it is argued that the role of the government could explain the level of integration other than the variable of ethnic segregation, the case of Istanbul is then perhaps an interesting and valuable lesson in the understanding of the relationship between ethnic segregation and integration. Paragraph 1.4 will elaborate on this matter in more detail.

## 1.2 The concept of ethnic segregation

In order to understand the concept of ethnic segregation, the concept of residential segregation should perhaps be explained first. The reason for this is, that ethnic segregation is a specific dimension of residential segregation and as such the understanding of ethnic segregation is simplified when the more general concept of residential segregation is described in advance. There are several definitions available for the concept of residential segregation and one is provided by White (2004, p.13250), who defines the concept of residential segregation as "the differential distribution of social groups across geography". This definition is in line with the definition of residential segregation provided by Massey (2004, p.13263), who considers residential segregation as "the differential location of social groups across neighborhoods of a city". From the definitions provided by White (2004) and Massey (2004) it is just a small step to the understanding of the concept of ethnic segregation. Ethnic segregation can be considered as the differential distribution or the differential location of several ethnic groups across geography i.e. neighbourhoods of a city. However, this still does not explain the entire concept since there is still some ambiguity concerning the word 'ethnic'.

Yiftachel mentions the following when it comes to the concept of ethnicity:

> Ethnicity is based on the Greek root 'ethnos', meaning 'blood connection', as distinct from the 'demos', which was a territorial-civil association. Over the centuries, ethnicity changed its meaning, alternatively being associated with tribal, regional, religious, class, and national affiliations. (Yiftachel, 2009, p.601)

This description of the concept of ethnicity corresponds with the description provided by Hoppe (1987), who emphasizes that ethnicity refers to those linkages (e.g. race, religion, language, etc.) which bonds individuals together into a distinct group. However, despite the fact that ethnicity refers to all of these socio-cultural elements, in the context of ethnic

segregation ethnicity usually merely refers to the origin of the individual (Musterd, 2005). So it is therefore that we can consider ethnic segregation as the differential distribution or the differential location of people across geography based on their origin.

## 1.3 The concept of integration

From a psychological point of view it was Plato who first discussed the idea of intercultural adaption (Rudmin, 2003). Intercultural adaption is better known as 'acculturation' and should be understood as "phenomena which result when groups of individuals having different cultures come into continuous first-hand contact, with subsequent changes in the original culture patterns of either or both groups" (Redfield, Linton & Herskovits, 1936, p.149). The 'fourfold theory' is one popular approach to acculturation, wherein it is presumed "that a person can appreciate, practice, or identify with two different cultures independently of one another (Rudmin, 2003, p.3). Within this fourfold theory four types of acculturations are distinguished, which describe the interaction between the minority culture and the dominant majority culture: integration, assimilation, separation and marginalization. Distinguishing these four acculturations offers a practical way of describing the type of acculturation within a particular society. Later on attention will be paid to this fourfold theory in more detail. For the moment, however, it is sufficient to merely focus on the acculturation of integration here, as it is a central concept in this research. The Dictionary of Human Geography describes this concept as follows:

> The creation and maintenance of intense and diverse patterns of interaction and control between formerly more or less separate social spaces. Integration involves the bringing together of different systems of meaning and action founded in different sets of social relations. It takes place in different registers – economic, political and cultural – and so is an inherently uneven process. (in Gregory, Johnston, Pratt, Watts & Whatmore, 2009, p.387)

Veenman (1994) clarifies this concept even further. According to him the concept of integration has two aspects: a behavioural aspect (participation) and an attitudinal aspect (orientation). The behavioural aspect can further be sub-divided into *formal participation* and *informal participation*. The thoughts of Veenman (1994) are schematically shown in Figure 1.1.



Figure 1.1: Aspects of integration (*Source: Veenman, 1994)*

Participation refers to the participation of ethnic minorities in society. This can either be formal (e.g. participation in education or the labour market) or informal (e.g. the contact between ethnic minorities and the majority population outside the formal institutions). Orientation on the other hand is more abstract. It refers to the cultural adaptations that ethnic minorities have to make in order to fit into the 'host society'. What is important to note is that both aspects, behavioural and attitudinal, are interdependent. This follows from the fact that orientation (attitude) affects participation (behaviour) but that participation (behaviour) also affects orientation (attitude).

**1.4 Location of the research: The case of Istanbul**

In the above it is briefly explained that in general there are two views when it comes to the relationship between ethnic segregation and integration. After that these two concepts were looked at more closely by showing what the thoughts of several authors are concerning these two concepts. It was also briefly explained that the case of Istanbul could provide a valuable lesson with respect to the relationship between ethnic segregation and integration. In that sense it should be said that Istanbul has all the characteristics of an 'edge city': "ethnically mixed, culturally heterogeneous, socially differentiated and spatially multi-functional" (Ayata, 2008, p.27). Several ethnic groups are living there, ranging from Greeks and Jews to Kurds and Armenians, whereby the size of each ethnic group differs. Some are quite extensive like for instance the Kurds, while other groups are small which is the case for example for the Greek minority. Istanbul is thus characterized by several ethnic groups and despite the size of some of these groups, ethnic segregation is not present in Istanbul.

Pinarcioğlu and Işik (2009, p.472; see also Erkip, 2000) state that "segregation in Turkish cities particularly in Istanbul is based not on place of origin or ethnicity, or religious affiliation, but on socio-economic status". Ayata (2008) agrees with Pinarcioğlu and Işik (2009) since he also mentions that rigid ethnic segregation in most districts of Istanbul does not exist. This is an interesting and important fact when it comes to the question of integration. Following the view in which it is explained that ethnic segregation hampers the integration, the absence of ethnic segregation might suggest that the ethnic minorities living in Istanbul are properly integrated into society. But the question then still remains whether there is a causal relationship between ethnic segregation and integration or that there might be an other variable intervening, whereby this latter would support the other view when it comes to the relationship between ethnic segregation and integration.

As mentioned, there are several ethnic groups living in Istanbul, but this research merely focused on the Greek minority in that city. The Greek minority has a distinctive, violent history in Turkey. The same can be said of the Armenians in Turkey or the Kurdish people in Turkey, but the Greek minority was more suitable for this research. First of all, compared to other ethnic groups such as the Armenians or the Kurdish people, this ethnic group is small in terms of size. According to Bouwman (2008) it is estimated that there are around 4,000 Greeks left in the whole of Turkey, the majority of them residing in Istanbul. Secondly, this research had a time restriction and within that time restriction it was the Greek minority group that could be studied the best.

**1.5 Research goals and research questions**

The relationship between ethnic segregation and integration is what is central in this research. More specifically, as mentioned, this research focused on the situation of the Greek minority in Istanbul and as such this research should be seen as an other study in order to understand the relationship between ethnic segregation and integration. By focusing on the situation in the city of Istanbul this research therefore first of all aimed to contribute to the understanding of the relationship between ethnic segregation and integration. To be more specific: since ethnic segregation is absent in Istanbul, one could suggest that the Greek minority is properly integrated into society. The second aim of this research was therefore to measure the level of integration of the Greek minority living in Istanbul. In case the level of integration of the Greek minority is high, this might support the idea that ethnic segregation indeed hampers integration. However, the question then remains if this is indeed so and in order to provide more clarity on that matter attention will be given to the history of the Greek minority in both

Istanbul and Turkey, since explanations for the current level of integration could also be found in the historical context.

These research goals led to the following central research question:

*To what extent can the Greek minority of Istanbul be considered as integrated into society, and what does this mean for the relationship between ethnic segregation and integration in general?*

This central research question is divided into the following sub-questions:

1. What is the history of the Greek minority living in Istanbul?
2. How can the level of integration be measured?
3. How can the level of ethnic segregation be measured?
4. To what extent is the Greek minority integrated in society?
5. What can be concluded for the relationship between ethnic segregation and integration based on the level of integration of the Greek minority in Istanbul?

### 1.6 Research method

This research was the product of three successive and overlapping phases: (1) the collection of the literature, (2) the collection of the data and (3) the analysis of the data.

When it comes to ethnic segregation and integration quite some literature is already dealing with either the two concepts apart but also in relationship to each other. Therefore it was not difficult to find literature about these two concepts, especially when following up on the references provided in the end of every article or book. By doing so, one could simply point out and collect the most influential ideas and get a decent overview concerning the subject. Collecting literature about general views and concepts was therefore easy but collecting literature about ethnic segregation or integration specifically for the situation in Istanbul was rather difficult. The main reason for this was that there are just a few authors who published about ethnic segregation and/or integration in Istanbul and just a few of these articles are published in English. But those articles that do deal with ethnic segregation and/or integration in Istanbul and are written in English are of high quality and were therefore very useful. The collection of the literature was not only limited to the concepts of integration and ethnic segregation. In this phase attention was also given to the history of the Greek minority in Istanbul, which is also quite extensively described in the literature.

This research deals with the relationship between ethnic segregation and integration and therefore it would have been the best in this research if the levels of both concepts would be measured. This was, however, not possible due to time and data limitations. When it, for example, comes to measuring ethnic segregation in Istanbul, it was almost impossible since the Turkish government does not collect data based on ethnicity. Nevertheless, some authors were somehow able to measure the level of ethnic segregation and they found that rigid ethnic segregation in Istanbul is absent (Ayata, 2008; Pinarcioğlu & Işik, 2009). This fact was used as a starting point and from there on this research elaborated. But the fact that the Turkish government does not collect data based on ethnicity also had consequences for the measurement of integration. In the Western world it is common to use the data collected by the government (on all levels) and analyze those. Such data is unfortunately absent in Istanbul and thus such data needed to be collected from scratch by means of a survey (Appendix 1). This survey, which was designed in order to measure the level of integration, was presented to

those belonging to the Greek minority living in Istanbul. Further below attention will be paid to this survey in more detail.

The data collected through the surveys only and specifically deals with the Greek minority in Istanbul. However, this data alone does not necessarily indicate a level of integration, because this collected data first needs to be compared with data from the majority population in order to make claims regarding the level of integration. This comparative data was in a certain way provided by the Turkish Statistical Institute (TSI). But as mentioned before, the Turkish government does not collect data based on ethnicity and as a consequence of that the data provided by the TSI already included the Greek minority. Anyhow, for the moment this was the best data available for the comparison between the majority population and the data collected from the survey. That is also the reason why the statistics provided by the TSI were used in this research. However, this was only done for the socio-economic dimension of integration and not for the ethnic-cultural dimension of integration, a distinction which will be explained later on in more detail.

The analysis of this research consisted of the interpretation of the surveys which were completed by 239 inhabitants of Istanbul with Greek origins. A part of these respondents were approached with the help of Mr. Laki Vingas (Representative of the Greek Orthodox community and Council Member of the General Directorate of Foundations Representative of the non-Muslim Foundation) by e-mail. The majority of the respondents, however, were approached near and outside Greek churches, as suggested by Ms. Cilia Martin (a researcher working at the Palais de France in Istanbul). By asking the respondents to fill out the survey, their level of integration was determined. Subsequently, with this information a more general comment could be made for the Greek population at large in Istanbul. From this analysis statements were eventually made regarding the relationship between ethnic segregation and integration in general.

**1.7 Structure**
This introductory chapter will be followed by Chapter 2, wherein a theoretical framework will be offered. Extensive attention will be given in this chapter to the concept of integration by initially focusing and elaborating on the fourfold theory and the aspects of integration as explained by Veenman (1994). It will also be shown in Chapter 2 that the two views on ethnic segregation and integration, on a more general level, are embodied in respectively the 'contact hypothesis' and the 'conflict hypothesis'. In Chapter 3 attention will then be given to the method of measuring the Greek level of integration in this research. It will be shown that the aspects of integration, as distinguished by Veenman (1994), play a valuable role in this part. With respect to ethnic segregation, the assumption in this research is that ethnic segregation is absent in Istanbul. This assumption was derived from the articles by Pinarcioğlu and Işik (2009) and Ayata (2008) and from there on this research will depart. In their respective articles, however, they did not elaborate on their point nor was it explained how they got to that point. Therefore in Chapter 3 attention also will be given to the way how ethnic segregation could be measured. After these more theoretical chapters, Chapter 4 will provide an extensive historical overview on the Greek presence in Turkey and Istanbul in particular. This chapter will clearly illustrate the negative attitude from the Turkish government towards the Greek minority. Subsequently, with respect to the relationship between ethnic segregation and integration, Chapter 5 will first briefly focus on the situation in the past before moving on to illustrate the current level of integration of the Greek minority living in Istanbul. This will be done by providing the answers on the questions as posed in the survey. Chapter 6 forms the conclusion, wherein an answer will be formulated on the central research questions.

# Chapter 2 – Theoretical framework

Residential segregation is a process that has been occurring already for several centuries. Sjoberg (1960) notes that this process was already visible in the pre-industrial city, in which the people with the higher incomes and status were living in the city-centre while those with the lower incomes and status were living near the ramparts. Or as Van Kempen and Özüekren (1998, p.1631) formulate it: "In many medieval cities in Europe, the city centres were inhabited by the well-to-do, while the outer districts were the areas for the poorer segments of the population". What is interesting to note is that in the past only one form of residential segregation was being distinguished, namely socio-economic segregation (Sjoberg, 1960; Van Kempen & Özüekren, 1998). Nowadays, however, multiple other forms of residential segregation are being distinguished and, as mentioned in Chapter 1, ethnic segregation is one of those.

An other difference between the present and the past is that residential segregation, and ethnic segregation in particular, nowadays is considered to be undesirable (Musterd, 1996). Mainly politicians who suppose a causal relationship between ethnic segregation and integration point at the perceived negative effects of ethnic segregation. These perceived negative effects of ethnic segregation come forth from the theoretical framework of the 'contact hypothesis'. However, as pointed out in the first chapter, there are also those who do not assume a causal relationship between ethnic segregation and integration. In their view ethnic segregation can have positive effects as well and according to them there is no need to perceive the concepts of ethnic segregation and integration as two extremes. Their thoughts are to certain extent framed in the so-called 'conflict hypothesis'.

This chapter will extensively deal with both the contact hypothesis and the conflict hypothesis. But before that first some comments will be made regarding the concept of integration. As was explained in the previous chapter, integration can be seen as a type of acculturation when it comes to ethnic minorities. But there is also an other, strongly related type of acculturation, namely assimilation. To clarify the difference between these acculturations both will be explained below.

### 2.1 Types of acculturation: Integration and assimilation

In Chapter 1 the fourfold theory was introduced, wherein four types of acculturations were distinguished: integration, assimilation, separation and marginalization. These distinguished acculturations schematically can be shown as follows:

|  |  | Minority culture (M) | |
|---|---|---|---|
|  |  | + | - |
| **Dominant Culture (D)** | + | Integration | Assimilation |
|  | - | Separation | Marginalization |

Table 2.1: Scheme of the fourfold theory (*Source: Rudmin, 2003*).

Table 2.1 should be read from the perspective of an individual from a minority group. If such an individual is open towards the dominant culture in a society but at the same time preserves its own culture, it can be labelled as integration: the two cultures coexist in some form of biculturalism (+M +D). Almost the same can be said for assimilation but the only difference here is that the individual is not holding on to their own culture or is not allowed to hold on to their own culture and the dominant culture is favoured (–M +D). Separation occurs whenever

the minority individual holds on to his own culture and at the same time rejects the dominant culture in society, whereby then the minority culture is favoured (+M –D). Lastly, marginalization occurs whenever the individual does not have any relation with both the dominant culture and the minority culture: both cultures are diminished (–M –D). In short, Table 2.1 shows that

> each culture can have a positive or negative valence, representing a person's positive and negative attitudes, preferences, attachment, identification, and other inferred psychological states or representing the presence or absence of cultural behaviors, language use, ethnic names, dress, foods, and other observable manifestations of culture. Metaphorically, this might be considered to be acceptance or rejection of each culture, or saying "yes" or "no to each culture. (Rudmin, 2003, p.3)

Although the fourfold theory is a widespread and an often used approach to acculturation, it did, however, receive a vast amount of criticism. One major point of criticism is focused on the rather rigid distinction of four types of acculturation. The distinction made in the fourfold theory almost implies that the distinguished acculturations are mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive and that "in-betweenness" cannot be considered as a possibility. The criticism therefore consists of the idea that there is no "focus on subcultures, dominant group attitudes, or acquisition of cultural skills" (Rudmin, 2003, p.4). In addition to that, an other point of criticism is that the fourfold theory merely focuses and emphasizes on minority groups and that the majority group is left out. Rudmin formulates this criticism by saying that

> A fixed focus on the acculturation of minorities implies that acculturation is something that happens only to minority people and that the cultures of dominant people are somehow monolithic, immutable, and without acculturative origins. To suggest that minorities are psychologically reactive to intercultural contact and that dominant groups are not almost implies that minority people are a different species of psychological being, one distinct from the majority. (Rudmin, 2003, p.6)

There is indeed a vast amount of criticism on the fourfold theory and although these might be justified it goes beyond the scope of this research to elaborate on these. Despite the criticism the theory, however, does provide a practical way to describe the type of acculturation within a particular society. Moreover, in the context of this research the sole purpose of the theory here was to introduce the various acculturations, whereby in the below merely attention will be given to integration and assimilation, since some consider these latter two concepts to have a direct relationship with ethnic segregation. As it was said in the above, these two acculturations are different: integration refers to the situation wherein two cultures coexist in some form of biculturalism, whereas assimilation refers to a situation wherein the dominant culture is favoured over the minority culture. Nevertheless, in many articles these two concepts are often regarded as the same:

> The terms integration and assimilation are often used interchangeably. In the American literature on spatial segregation, for instance, spatial assimilation and residential integration are regarded as synonymous (Alba & Nee, 1997). Similarly, residential segregation studies testing the theories of American scholars in the European context also use assimilation and integration as synonyms. However, the term integration is more often used in the European literature, while assimilation is more prevalent in American research. (Bolt, Özüekren & Phillips, 2010, p.172)

Despite the fact that the concepts of integration and assimilation are often used interchangeably, they definitely have different meanings. Assimilation can be seen as "the policy of transforming all racial/ethnic groups to the cultural norms of the majority group" (Poulsen, 2009, p.63). In this type of acculturation, members of ethnic minorities are not allowed to retain their own cultural identity but they are required to adapt to all cultural aspects of the 'host society'. Therefore in this kind of society there is no room for differences,

everyone has to adapt to and accept the dominant culture. Assimilation is thus all about 'disappearing in society' with the important notion that society does not make any adaptations. This is different in the type of acculturation in which integration is central. In this latter type of acculturation, the process of adaptation comes from both the ethnic minority and society. Ethnic minorities still have to adapt to society, but society does make some adaptations also in order to support the ethnic minorities in their process of adapting (Commission Blok, 2004, in De Graaf, Kok & Berkhout, 2004). In short, ethnic minorities are allowed to preserve some of their distinctive cultural traits but in such a way that it fits into the 'host society' (Berry, 2001, in Bolt et al., 2010). It should, however, be stressed that despite of this all, one should keep it mind that regardless its perceived importance, the meaning of integration is still often unclear and thus a single definition cannot be given (Murdie & Ghosh, 2009; Phillips, 2009; Van Liempt, 2011).

## 2.2 Dimensions and spheres of integration

As shown in the first chapter, integration has two aspects: a behavioural aspect (participation) and an attitudinal aspect (orientation) (see Figure 3.1).



Figure 3.1: Aspects of integration (Source: Veenman, 1994) (Figure 1.1 repeated)

Most of Figure 3.1 is already explained in Chapter 1. What has not been explained yet is the distinction made by Veenman (1994) between the socio-economic position and the ethnic-cultural position. According to Veenman (1994) formal participation leads to a better socio-economic position. In other words: participation in education, the labour market, etc. leads to socio-economic integration. On the other hand, informal participation in combination with orientation leads to an improved ethnic-cultural position. This means that the contact between ethnic minorities and members of the majority population in combination with the possible cultural adaptations towards the 'host society' can eventually lead to ethnic-cultural integration. Based on Figure 3.1 one could therefore argue that integration has two dimensions: a socio-economic dimension and an ethnic-cultural dimension.

Based on Figure 3.1 another important conclusion can be drawn: full integration does not only take place through education, participation in the labour market and not only by social contacts. It is a combination of these and more. Engbersen and Gabriëls (1995) therefore argue that integration takes places in all different areas of society. They call these areas 'spheres of integration' of which they distinguish seven: labour, education, housing, politics, religion, law and culture. For a proper integration in both dimension, integration should take place in all of these spheres. Despite the fact that seven different spheres of integration are being distinguished by Engbersen and Gabriëls (1995), the areas of labour, education and housing are generally still considered to be the most important spheres of integration and among those three spheres it is education which is considered to be the most important determinant of both socio-economic integration and ethnic-cultural integration (Musterd & Ostendorf, 2009; Odé & Veenman, 2003). For a long time it was argued that integration could be reached be reached best in those spheres belonging to the socio-economic dimension of

integration but it should be noted, however, that lately an increased focus on the ethnic-cultural dimension of integration is noticeable (Musterd & Ostendorf, 2009).

## 2.3 Segregation and the contact hypothesis

It may be clear that those who suppose a causal relationship between ethnic segregation and integration will point at the negative effects that ethnic segregation may have in society. Those who support this view find their ideas embodied in the contact hypothesis, which was already briefly introduced in the beginning of this chapter. The contact hypothesis is a theoretical view on society invented by Allport (1954) in which he distinguished two forms of contact: *casual* and *acquaintance*. According to Allport (1954) casual contacts are superficial, only increases prejudices and are therefore not desirable with respect to integration. Instead, Allport (1954) stresses the importance of extensive acquaintance contacts since these promote mutual understanding and acceptance between people of different backgrounds. Ireland (2008, p.1334) clarifies this further by stating that the contact hypothesis "holds that spatial proximity encourages interaction among members of racial and ethnic groups, thereby building knowledge and understanding that lead to tolerance and improved relations". The contact hypothesis is sometimes also referred to as the 'isolation theory', which

> holds that ethnic concentration will hinder the ethnic bridges between ethnic minorities and the native population […]. As contact is limited or even non-existing, one will preserve his or her own language, habits, values, norms and culture. As a result of the limited contact, socioeconomic opportunities, such as access to the labour market and educational attainments are also restricted. (Geraedts, 2009, p.13)

Ireland adds that

> [Ethnic segregation] can hinder human capital acquisition (Benabou, 1993), hasten the spread of social problems and deviant values (Häussermann, 2000), weaken social networks (Reingold, 1999), lead to the stigmatisation of neighbourhoods (Zenou and Boccard, 2000) and reduce opportunities and participation in the labour market, educational system and political and cultural life (van Beckhoven and van Kempen, 2003). (Ireland, 2008, p.1334)

And lastly Van Kempen and Özüekren also explain the contact hypothesis:

> In the main, the authors suggest that segregation and concentration curtail the opportunities for people to participate in civil society. This restriction comes from a lack of contact with relevant individuals and institutions. Ideas, beliefs and types of behaviour are reinforced by their social milieu (see also Schill, 1992). Morris (1987), for example, poses that spatial concentration of the long-term unemployed may have a devastating effect on their social contacts. In turn, the absence of such contacts may generate inaccessibility to information on the availability of jobs (see also Hughes and Madden, 1991). (Van Kempen & Özüekren, 1998, p.1633)

Furthermore, it is argued by Atkinson and McGarrigle (2009, p.77) that "if one is on a low income and lives in an area with many other people on low incomes, it has been suggested that such neighborhoods tend to further the reproduction of poverty". This could be seen as a serious issue since Poulsen (2009, p.63) states that "residentially segregated areas within Western cities are primarily ethnic enclaves of unskilled workers, and as such are low socioeconomic areas". If this is indeed the case, people living in such neighbourhoods are trapped in a vicious circle from which they cannot escape. "This concentration of poverty generates attitudes, behaviors, and values that impede the ability of residents to grasp whatever opportunities exist for social mobility" (Musterd, 2010, p.625). Moreover, "the residents of concentration districts may [develop] a negative image among the urban populace. That could lead to all kinds of self-fulfilling prophecies. Thus, concentration

neighbourhoods can turn into breeding grounds for misery because they are so perceived" (Van Kempen & Priemus, 1999, p.649; Musterd, 1996; Van Kempen & Özüekren, 1998). According to some, all these (perceived) disadvantages are caused by ethnic segregation. And since these disadvantages are most visible in those spheres of society that are generally considered to be the most important, the integration of ethnic minorities is being impeded (Deurloo & Musterd, 1997; Musterd, 2005; Van Kempen & Özüekren, 1998; Van Kempen & Priemus, 1999). In their view therefore the only solution to improve the integration of ethnic minorities is to get rid of ethnic segregation, since integration is the exact opposite of ethnic segregation. By doing so, minorities will get in contact with the majority population, which eventually should lead to a better integration in all spheres of society.

**2.4 Segregation and the conflict hypothesis**
The conflict hypothesis to certain extent can be seen as the complete opposite of the contact hypothesis. Whereas in the contact hypothesis contact between members with different ethnic backgrounds is stimulated in order to improve integration, the conflict hypothesis argues that these contacts should be avoided in order to reduce conflicts (Geraedts, 2009). It may therefore be obvious that the conflict hypothesis emphasizes the positive effects of ethnic segregation, whereby these positive effects are often overlooked (Bolt et al., 2010; Van Kempen & Priemus, 1999). Some of these advantages of ethnic segregation are presented by Ireland:

> Ethnic enclaves may boost electoral power and visibility (Musterd and de Winter, 1998), reduce the likelihood of conflict (Reijndorp, 2004) and compensate for welfare state mechanisms that have not been integrated well enough (Ireland, 1994). Segregation might reduce the contempt that familiarity breeds among people with diverse cultural frames of reference and create a safe haven for migrants to form their own social networks, circumvent linguistic barriers and incubate small businesses (Rath, 1995). (Ireland, 2008, p.1334)

Simpson adds that

> there is a positive impact of common culture among those living close to each other, both for their own social support and for the acquisition of skills that allow new immigrants' integration into work, education and other activities provided for all (Dunn, 1998; Peleman, 2002). (Simpson, 2004, p.664)

And lastly Van Kempen and Priemus also mention the positive effects of ethnic segregation:

> Social contacts can lead to the emergence and preservation of a culture that is not based on the norms and values of mainstream society but on those of a specific group (Boal, 1976). The effort to maintain a minority culture entails more than particularistic attitudes and behaviour. It is also manifest in the persistence of shops, clubs, and religious institutions (Peach & Smith, 1981). Through their networks, people are able to derive benefit from each other and offer one another support (Portes & Sensenbrenner, 1993). This is especially important for newcomers in the area. The interaction can take many forms, ranging from a pleasant conversation over a cup of coffee to using a neighbour's washing machine or freezer all the way to borrowing money at low (or no) interest. (Van Kempen & Priemus, 1999, p.650)

In the conflict hypothesis the concepts of ethnic segregation and integration are not perceived as two extremes. One can live ethnically segregated and still be integrated into society. Thus in the hypothesis ethnic segregation does not hamper integration but facilitates it (Bolt et al., 2010).

In short, those who support the conflict hypothesis state that it is not necessary at all to reduce the levels of ethnic segregation. Ethnic segregation provides several advantages to those who live ethnically segregated and eventually this also leads to a better integration into mainstream

society. Therefore in this view ethnic segregation should not be and cannot be seen as the complete opposite of integration.

**2.5 Conclusion**

In this chapter it was shown by means of the fourfold theory that in general four types of acculturation are distinguished. Two of these acculturations, integration and assimilation, are often seen as the same and often used interchangeably. This is, however, an often made mistake because the concepts of integration and assimilation do differ: whereas integration is a two-way process, assimilation is merely a (forced) one-way process. After explaining the difference between integration and assimilation, the chapter then continued to explain the aspects of integration. It is important here to emphasize on the socio-economic dimension of integration and the ethnic-cultural dimension of integration because this distinction was also used in the survey. Lastly, attention in this chapter was given to the two views on the relationship between ethnic segregation and integration as set forth in Chapter 1. It was shown that on a more general level these two views are embodied in respectively the contact hypothesis and the conflict hypothesis. In the context of this research, it depends on the Greek level of integration in Istanbul in order to determine which hypothesis can be supported. The measuring of the Greek level of integration in Istanbul is thus crucial and in the next chapter it shall carefully be explained how this was done in this research.

# Chapter 3 – Measuring integration and ethnic segregation

As already mentioned, ethnic segregation in Istanbul is absent (Ayata, 2008; Pinarcioğlu & Işik, 2009). Because of this fact, one could argue that the Greek minority living in Istanbul is properly integrated into society and as such it could be argued that this thought would be in line with the contact hypothesis. However, whereas there is clearness regarding the level of ethnic segregation in Istanbul, it is unclear what the level of integration is of the Greek minority living in Istanbul. In order to understand the relationship between the two central concepts it is therefore necessary and crucial to measure the level of integration of the Greek minority living in Istanbul. Whenever the level of integration appears to be high, one could argue that the contact hypothesis is justified. But whenever the level of integration appears to be low one could perceive this as support for the conflict hypothesis.

Since the Turkish government does not collect data based on ethnicity, the measuring of the level of integration in this research was done by means of a survey. In this chapter extensive attention will be paid to this survey but before that the concept of integration will be operationalized first. As will be shown, both the distinguished dimensions of integration as well as the closely related 'spheres of integration' play an important role in this survey. In the last part of this chapter comprehensive attention will be given to the 'index of dissimilarity', the most common way of measuring ethnic segregation.

## 3.1 The spheres of labour, education and culture

As shown in the previous two chapters, Veenman (1994) distinguishes two dimensions of integration: the socio-economic dimension and the ethnic-cultural dimension. These two dimensions are related to seven different 'spheres of integration' as distinguished by Engbersen and Gabriëls (1995). For determining the level of integration of the Greek minority in Istanbul it would have been the best for this research to take all these seven spheres into account. Due to restrictions regarding time and data, however, only a few of these spheres were and could be taken into consideration in this research. For the socio-economic dimension, the spheres of labour and education were chosen, whereas for the ethnic-cultural dimension attention was given to the sphere of culture.

The sphere of labour belongs to the socio-economic dimension of integration and relates to formal participation in society. In that perspective it is often stated that a job is a crucial asset and will stimulate integration into society. For example Gans (1991, in Engbersen & Gabriëls, 1995) claims that unskilled immigrants in the United States primarily integrated into society via the sphere of labour. A job makes it possible to earn an income and with that income social mobility can be gained and integration can be achieved. Gans (1991, in Engbersen & Gabriëls, 1995) also claims that generally speaking the first two generations of immigrants in the United States integrated into society via the sphere of labour. Through that sphere they were able to gain social mobility and that made it possible that later generations were provided the opportunity to integrate via the sphere of education. The sphere of education also belongs to the socio-economic dimension of integration and also relates to the formal participation in society. Education is also an important sphere of integration, because decent education increases the chances on a good job on the labour market and as a consequence of that again social mobility can be gained and integration can be achieved.

The reason for measuring the level of integration through the spheres of labour and education was already given in the previous chapter. It was said there that the areas of labour, education and housing are generally considered to be the most important spheres of socio-economic

integration (Musterd & Ostendorf, 2009). Data regarding the sphere of housing was, however, not available and also difficult to obtain within the time restriction of the research. It was therefore that in the socio-economic dimension of integration only the spheres of labour and education were taken into consideration.

Since ethnic segregation in Istanbul is absent, it can be claimed that the Greek minority living there are properly integrated into society. Keeping in mind the two spheres of labour and education, this would mean that the members of the Greek minority have a job and are educated to certain extent, whereby there should be no significant difference notable with the majority population. After all, integration can be seen as the equal attainment by ethnic communities in education and the labour market (Poulsen, 2009).

When it comes to the ethnic-cultural dimension of integration only the sphere of culture was taken into consideration. This sphere refers to the orientation of an ethnic minority, or to be more specific, to the cultural adaptations that ethnic minorities have to make in order to fit into the 'host society'. Important elements in this sphere are, for instance, the orientation towards the country of origin, the perceived identity and the frequency of informal contacts with the majority population (De Graaf, et al., 2004; Gijsberts & Dagevos, 2009). At this point a rather important point should be made. In the previous chapter attention was given to the difference between integration and assimilation. In the case of assimilation all the elements of orientation would be pointing completely towards the mainstream society, whereas in the case of integration the elements of orientation will be pointing both to mainstream society as well as the own ethnic group. After all, integration means that ethnic minorities are allowed to preserve some of their distinctive traits but in such a way that it fits into the 'host society' (Berry, 2001, in Bolt et al., 2010). Just to give a simple example in which only one element of orientation is taken into consideration: whenever the Greek minority living in Istanbul only speaks Turkish, this could be interpreted as assimilation. But whenever the Greek minority living in Istanbul would speak both Greek and Turkish, this could be seen and labelled as integration.

Everything mentioned in the above, in an operationalized way can be shown as follows (Figure 4.1):



Figure 4.1: Operationalization of the concept of integration

### 3.2 The survey

As already mentioned in the above, for a proper measurement of the level of integration it would have been the best to include all seven 'spheres of integration'. Due to several restrictions this was, however, not possible and in order to at least get a decent indication of the level of integration of the Greek minority in Istanbul, it was then decided to include the spheres of labour and education for the socio-economic dimension and the sphere of culture for the ethnic-cultural dimension.

The survey (Appendix 1) with which the level of integration will be measured consists of three parts. All the questions in the first part are dealing with either the sphere of labour or the sphere of education and are thus referring to the socio-economic dimension of integration. The data that was generated in this part of the survey will be compared to data provided by the Turkish Statistical Institute (TSI). In case there is no significant difference between the two sets of data, or in case the Greek minority is doing better than the Turkish majority, one could argue that integration of the Greek minority in Istanbul took place in socio-economic terms. As mentioned before, the data made available by the TSI already includes the Greek minority, however, at the moment there is no better data available to compare the results from the survey with.

The questions in the second part of the survey relate to the ethnic-cultural dimension of integration through the sphere of culture by paying attention to elements such as the orientation towards Greece and Turkey, the identity of people and the informal contacts. Lastly, the third part of the survey aims to obtain some background information from the respondent.

All questions in the survey were derived from the *Jaarrapport Integratie 2009*. The *Jaarrapport Integratie* is the annual report for the Dutch government when it comes to the level of integration of ethnic minorities in the Netherlands. This report takes into account more 'spheres of integration' than was done in this research and as such it measures the level of integration in a more comprehensive way. It would have been better if this research would have done the same but, as said earlier, this was not possible here. Due to the fact that the Turkish government does not collect data based on ethnicity, not all 'spheres of integration' could be taken into account. In addition to that, one could also question whether or not integration is measurable (only) in quantitative terms. One could, for example, argue that integration into society is a different 'journey' for every individual and thus should be seen as a qualitative process rather than a quantitative one. Measuring integration in quantitative terms is nonetheless possible whenever this is done in a precise and limited manner (CERI, 2008). However, in order to meet the criticism regarding the qualitative aspect of integration in this research, brief conversations were held with those people who filled out the survey whenever that was possible for the respondent. By doing so, a more in-depth view on the Greek situation in Istanbul was obtained in terms of emotions, feelings and experiences.

### 3.3 The index of dissimilarity

In Chapter 1 it was said that "segregation in Turkish cities particularly in Istanbul is based not on place of origin or ethnicity, or religious affiliation, but on socio-economic status" (Pinarcioğlu & Işik, 2009, p.472; see also Erkip, 2000). To emphasize on the idea of this sentence, namely that ethnic segregation in Istanbul is absent, Ayata (2008) was mentioned because he clearly states that rigid ethnic segregation in most districts of Istanbul does not exist. This research started and elaborated from this point but it should be mentioned, however, that both Ayata (2008) and Pinarcioğlu and Işik (2009) did not specify how they got

to this point. In neither article attention was given to the method which eventually led to the conclusion that ethnic segregation in Istanbul is absent. The 'index of dissimilarity' is used most often as a method to measure residential segregation (and therefore also ethnic segregation) and perhaps both Ayata (2008) and Pinarcioğlu and Işik (2009) also used this method to come to their point that ethnic segregation in Istanbul is absent.

In 1955 Duncan and Duncan (in Massey, 2004) introduced the 'index of dissimilarity' with which residential segregation could be measured. The index of dissimilarity "has a theoretical range from 0 to 1, where 0 reflects no segregation and 1 indicates perfect segregation" (Wong, 2009, p.72). Sometimes this 'score' is also expressed as a percentage so that "it measures the percentage of minority population that would have to move to create an even distribution" (Atkinson & McGarrigle, 2009, p.78).

After Duncan and Duncan (1955, in Massey, 2004) many researchers tried to come up with alternative and improved methods to measure the level of residential segregation but in general only the work by the American sociologists Massey & Denton is considered to be as leading (Massey, 2004; Wilkes & Iceland, 2004; Wong, 2008; Wong, 2009). Massey and Denton (1988) claim that residential segregation consists of five spatial dimension and therefore the concept should be seen as multi-dimensional. These five dimensions are *evenness*, *exposure*, *clustering*, *concentration* and *centralization*. Table 4.1 explains these five spatial dimensions in more detail.

| Evenness | - | Involves the differential distribution of the subject population. Or to say it in other words: it refers to the differential distribution of two social groups among areal units in a city. It is not measured in any absolute sense, but it is scaled relative to some other group |
|---|---|---|
| Exposure | - | Refers to the degree of potential contact or the opportunity for interaction between minority and majority group members within geographic areas of a city |
| Clustering | - | Refers to the degree to which areal units, which are inhabited by minority group members, adjoin one another, or cluster, in space |
| Concentration | - | Refers to the relative amount of physical space occupied by a minority group in the urban environment. Groups that occupy a small share of the total are in a city are said to be residentially segregated |
| Centralization | - | Indicates the degree to which a group spatially located near the centre of an urban area |

Table 4.1: The five spatial dimensions of residential segregation *(Source: Atkinson & McGarrigle, 2009; Brown & Chung, 2006; Kaplan, Wheeler & Holloway, 2004; Massey, 2004; Massey & Denton, 1988; Wilkes & Iceland, 2004; Wong, 2008; Wong, 2009)*

Along with the introduction of these five spatial dimensions of residential segregation, Massey and Denton (1988) also introduced the concept of 'hypersegregation' (Kaplan, Wheeler & Holloway, 2004; Massey, 2004). "Hypersegregation occurs whenever a group experiences high segregation on at least four of the five dimensions at once" (Massey, 2004, p.13264; Kaplan et al., 2004; Wilkes & Iceland, 2004). The occurrence of hypersegregation is considered to be undesirable since it is assumed to intensify the negative effects of residential segregation (Kaplan et al., 2004; Massey & Denton, 1988).

Massey and Denton (1988) distinguish five spatial dimensions of residential segregation and each of these dimensions has its own index with which the level of segregation can be measured. But despite the fact that the work by Massey and Denton (1988) is highly

recognized, the emphasis nevertheless still remains on the dimension of *evenness* and thus on the index of dissimilarity and as a consequence of that the index of dissimilarity is the index which is used most often in order to determine the level of residential segregation (Massey, 2004). Or to put it in the words of Wong (2009, p.71): "Among the five dimensions, the evenness dimension has been regarded as the most important dimension, and the index of dissimilarity *D* or segregation index is regarded as the most effective measure for this dimension".

Despite the general consensus there is nevertheless some criticism on the work by Massey and Denton (1988). This criticism for example focuses on the applicability of the five spatial dimension in the European urban context which differs from the American context wherein the theory was developed (Atkinson & McGarrigle, 2009). Brown and Chung (2006) in that respect note that the work by Massey and Denton (1988) is perhaps globally applicable "but these endeavours gloss over local-level variations, thus slighting, if not losing, the spatiality of segregation". In addition to that Brown and Chung mention that the five spatial dimensions can in fact be reduced to two dimensions:

> Firstly, *concentration* is the other extreme of *evenness*, i.e. if a racial/ethnic group *concentrates* in a certain section of a city, that generates an *uneven* distribution overall. Secondly, and similarly, *clustering* is a geographical representation of low *exposure*; if members of a racial/ethnic group locate close to each other, especially if in a large *cluster*, their *exposure* to other groups will be lessened. [….] Finally, in today's increasingly polycentric multinodal and sprawled city, *centrality* has little meaning. Accordingly, we conclude that the five dimensions of intra-urban clustering/segregation in fact reduce to two – *concentration-evenness* and *clustering-exposure*. (Brown & Chung, 2006, p.126)

Apart from the criticism on the five spatial dimensions, there is also criticism specifically focussing on the index of dissimilarity and with that on the dimension of *evenness*. For example, some criticism is based on the fact that the index of dissimilarity is only able to compare two groups, which follows from the fact that "the dissimilarity index *D* was developed in North America when African-American was the dominant minority group. Therefore, the two groups used in the formulation of the index were white and black" (Wong, 2009, p.72). "In this sense [the index of dissimilarity] may be more useful for cities where there are only two ethnic groups, though clearly most cities today are multiethnic" (Atkinson & McGarrigle, 2009, p.79).

Everything mentioned in the above regarding the index of dissimilarity was presented here to provide an idea of how both Ayata (2008) and Pinarcioğlu and Işik (2009) could have measured ethnic segregation and eventually came to the conclusion that in Istanbul ethnic segregation is absent. The index of dissimilarity is regarded as the most effective measure in order to determine the level of ethnic segregation and it might be assumed that both Ayata (2008) and Pinarcioğlu and Işik (2009) used this as well. Despite the fact that these authors did not specify their method, their work can be seen as reliable and thus their point that ethnic segregation in Istanbul is absent will be taken as a starting point in this research.

### 3.4 Conclusion
The aim of this chapter was to elaborate on the survey with which the Greek level of integration in Istanbul will be measured in this research. The survey incorporates the distinction made by Veenman (1994) into a socio-economic dimension of integration and an ethnic-cultural dimension of integration. These two dimensions of integration are closely related to the seven societal spheres of integration as distinguished by Engbersen and Gabriëls (1995). Due to several restrictions, only three of these spheres were taken into account in the

survey: the spheres of labour and education with respect to the socio-economic dimension of integration and the sphere of culture for the ethnic-cultural dimension of integration. The questions in the survey are derived from the *Jaarrapport Integratie 2009*, are focused on the spheres of labour, education and culture and therefore refer back to either the socio-economic dimension of integration or the ethnic-cultural dimension of integration.

The idea that ethnic segregation is absent in Istanbul forms the starting point for this research and this idea was provided by Pinarcioğlu and Işik (2009) and Ayata (2008). In their respective articles, however, they did not explain how they got to this idea. Therefore in this chapter attention was given to the index of dissimilarity, which is the most common used method of measuring ethnic segregation. Although it cannot be said with any certainty, it might be assumed that both Pinarcioğlu and Işik (2009) and Ayata (2008) used the index of dissimilarity to come to their point that ethnic segregation in Istanbul is absent.

After providing the theoretical framework for this research in the previous chapter and explaining the method of measuring integration in this chapter, the next chapter will provide an extensive historical overview on the Greek presence in Turkey. The main goal hereby is to describe the fall of the Ottoman Empire, the establishment of the Turkish state in 1923 and the change and consequences for the Greek presence in Turkey and Istanbul in particular.

# Chapter 4 – The history of the Greek minority in Turkey and Istanbul

In a report by the Human Rights Advisory Commission (HRAC) in 2004 it was proposed to replace the word 'Türk' for the word 'Türkiyeli' (Bouwman, 2008; Oran, 2011; Grigoriadis, 2007). According to the authors of the report the word Türk refers to one specific ethnicity, namely the ethnic Turk. But the authors state, however, that in Turkey multiple ethnic groups are present such as the Armenians, the Kurds and many others. Because of this the authors were suggesting the usage of the word Türkiyeli, since this word "has a territorial meaning and is encompassing all ethnic-religious communities in the country" (Oran, 2011, p.1). By replacing the word Türk for the word Türkiyeli a member of the Armenian minority would then for example be able to say 'I am an Armenian from Turkey' instead of the incorrect statement 'I am an ethnic Turk' (Oran, 2011).

Although the suggestion done in the HRAC-report is extensively argued and maybe even justified, it generated a tremendous amount of criticism in Turkey.

> For example, one members [sic] of the Commission instigated an attack and tore the papers held by the Chairman of HRAC. The attacks included all sorts of threats and insults. For example, we witnessed some trade unionists issuing death threats in their statements to newspapers. One member of the parliament took the floor and spoke outside the agenda and said: "People looking for minorities by producing this report should ask their mothers about who their fathers are". I must provide an explanation here for foreign readers. I do not know what this statement amounts to in their respective countries, but you cannot imagine a worse insult in Turkey, and this person was finally acquitted in court. (Oran, 2011, p.1)

The heated discussion that followed after the publication of the HRAC-report can be seen as indicative for the tensed relationship between Turkey and its ethnic minorities. Somehow the Turkish government does not accept any diversity and therefore all ethnic groups need to identify themselves as ethnic Turks. These tensed relationships should be seen in the context of the rather violent history in Turkey regarding the ethnic minorities. In that respect three major ethnic minority groups can be distinguished: the Armenians, the Kurds and the Greeks (Bouwman, 2008). When thinking of the Armenian minority in Turkey, one almost immediately can think of the ongoing discussion regarding the Armenian genocide by the Turkish government during the first World War and the assassination of the Turkish-Armenian journalist Hrant Dink (see Bouwman, 2008; see Hankel, 2010). When one thinks of the Kurdish minority in Turkey, almost immediately the news items on the ongoing fight from the Turkish government against the PKK in the Southeast of Turkey come up in mind (see Bouwman, 2008; see Van Bruinessen, 2000). Lastly, when it comes to the Greek minority, several events can be mentioned in order to illustrate the tensed relationship with the Turkish government and since it is the Greek minority which is central in this research, detailed attention will be given to these events in this chapter.

## 4.1 The Millet system in the Ottoman Empire
In order to understand to origins of the tensed relationship between the Turkish government and the Greek minority living in Turkey one should go back in time and start in 1453, the year in which the Ottomans conquered Constantinople, the heart of the Byzantine Empire[1]. The Byzantine Empire obviously fell and subsequently the Ottoman Empire rose and it would last for about 500 years (Alexandris, 1992).

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[1] What is interesting to notice is that "for Westerners, 29 May 1453 is the Fall of Constantinople, while for Easterners, it is the Conquest of Istanbul". (Pamuk, 2005, p.156; Mak, 2007).

It is said by Alexandris (1992) that with the conquest of Constantinople by the Ottomans an intense cultural symbioses was inaugurated and as such Istanbul became the centre of Muslim-Christian coexistence. The main reason for this is the introduction of the 'Millet system' by the leaders of the Ottoman Empire. It is important to mention here that these leaders were Muslims and ruled according to Islamic law. Apart from Muslims, however, the Ottoman Empire encompassed a variety of other religions and it is said that under Islamic law other religious communities should be allowed a certain level of autonomy and it was therefore that "the Islamic ruling class granted a substantial degree of self-government to the non-Muslim religious minorities" (Alexandris, 1992, p.21; Macar & Gökaçatı, 2009). In short this is the essence of the Millet system: accommodating and recognizing minorities and enabling certain autonomous institutions as an example of tolerance (Isin, 2005).

The Millet system divided the various non-Muslim minorities within the Ottoman Empire in separate religious categories. Each of these religious categories were seen as a separate millet and "the leader of each millet was the highest ecclesiastical office-holder of the respective community and was directly accountable to the head of the Ottoman government for the management of the internal affairs concerning his particular 'flock'" (Alexandris, 1992, p.22). The religious category to which the Greek minority within the Ottoman Empire belonged to was named the 'Millet-I Rum' or 'Rum Milleti' and apart from the Greek Orthodox also Orthodox groups from the Balkans, several parts of Asia and some Arab provinces belonged to this millet. The leader of the Rum Milleti, the Greek patriarch, had substantial influence on daily life since he "controlled not only the ecclesiastical, educational and charitable institutions of the Ottoman Orthodox, but also the regulation of matters relating to personal status, such as marriage, divorce and inheritance" (Alexandris, 1992, p.22).

It is said that with the introduction of the Millet system by the Ottoman rulers, a cosmopolitan society arose in which a variety of subjected non-Muslim minority groups all lived together tolerantly. This tolerance was, however, based on 'looking away' according to De Amicis (1878, in Mak, 2007) who visited Constantinople in 1878. If we may believe him, he perhaps witnessed the most multicultural city known to mankind: a bizarre mix of Europe and Asia, a place where West and East meet. In the streets one cold hear Turkish, Greek, Armenian, Italian, French and English and at that time many people were fluent in several of these languages (Pamuk, 2005). At the same time, however, De Amicis (1878, in Mak, 2007) observed that all these people from all these different backgrounds walked past each other without noticing or even paying attention to the other. This lack of interaction among the several groups was clearly visible in the structure of the city: some neighbourhoods were Islamic, some were Armenian and others were Greek and because of that foreign visitors must have been feeling like if they were stepping from one culture into another when leaving one and entering a new neighbourhood (Mak, 2007).

During the hegemony of the Ottomans, the vast majority of the Greeks residing in Istanbul was living in Pera, the area which is now known as Beyoğlu (including the Tarlabaşı area). Most of these Greeks were part of the skilled urban working class and were doing good: they gained a powerful economic position within the Ottoman Empire and as such they were the second most important ethnic group in the rich cosmopolitan Ottoman society (Alexandris, 1992). They were able to get into such a position mostly because of "the establishment of the doctrine of equality as official Ottoman policy. Sultan Mahmud II (1808-39) declared that in his view all his subjects, of whatever creed, were equal" (Alexandris, 1992, p.25; see also Vingas, 2010). It is of utmost importance here to emphasize on the idea of equality here,

because the position of the Greeks in Turkey would change radically after the ending of the Greco-Turkish War in 1923.

## 4.2 The Greco-Turkish War

The Megali Idea is an idea that has been present in Greece already since the conquests in the period of Alexander the Great, whereby the Megali Idea is based on a territory spread over two continents and five oceans (Tatsios, 1984). After the period of Alexander the Great the Megali Idea was kept alive for still some time but it was only after the First World War when the Megali Idea was revived.

The First World War, in which the Ottoman Empire belonged to the side of the defeated nations, was ended after the signing of the Mudros armistice in 1918, which also included the partition of the Ottoman Empire among the winners of the First World War (Alexandris, 1992). During the First World War, Greece had been a minor member of the allied forces "during the latter stages of the war but had contributed substantially to the final Allied victory on the Balkan front" (Alexandris, 1992, p.52). As a reward for their contributions Greece was then invited to the Paris peace conference which formed the stage on which the Greek prime minister Eleftherios Venizelos put forward the Greek territorial demands (Alexandris, 1992). It was common knowledge that Greece interpreted this peace conference as an opportunity to revive the Megali Idea which was indeed shown by the Greek territorial claims which were laid to Northern Epirus, the Aegean islands, Izmir and its hinterlands and the whole of Thrace (Alexandris, 1992). The pursuing of the Megali Idea was then put into practice by Greece with the invasion of Izmir and other nearby areas in the middle of 1919 (Karpat, 1970).

> The invasion of western Anatolia and Thrace was a step in the implementation of the Greek kingdom's expansionist agenda. An irredentist *Megali Idea* ('Great Idea') harking back to the Byzantine period had motivated Greek nationalists since the turn of the nineteenth century. The centrepiece of the expansionist project, Constantinople, was now under international control; but western Anatolia, which had many Greek-plurality towns, and the south-eastern coast of the Black Sea, or ancient Pontus, where conversion and expulsion had much diluted the Greek presence, seemed within reach to form a new greater Greece. (Kayali, 2008, p.120)

The Greek invasion caused a visceral response in Turkey and provided the impetus for the emergence of a vigorous and cohesive Turkish nationalist resistance movement led by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, who is considered to be the founder of the Turkish Republic (Alexandris, 1992; Kayali, 2008). This new movement rejected the foreign supremacy in Turkey and their first act was the bringing down of the sultan. After they succeeded, their focus shifted to the foreign presence in Turkey, which eventually resulted in the Turkish War of Independence. Within two years, forces under command of Atatürk realized the retreat of British, French and Italian forces. In 1921 the Greeks were also considering the option of a retreat but under pressure of Britain they eventually decided to continue their presence. In the short term this decision resulted in several territorial gains. However, the moral of the Greek forces was declining, since the war was now already going on for several years. In combination with other factors, the Greek forces were eventually defeated by the forces under command of Atatürk. In Turkey this moment in history is known as The Great Victory.

> The Great Victory, as the August offensive is known and celebrated in Turkey, put Ankara in a position of strength to renegotiate the terms of an armistice with the Allies in Mudanya (11 September 1922). The agreement ceased the hostilities between Turkish and Greek forces and stipulated Greek withdrawal to the east of the Maritsa River in Thrace, abandoning Edirne in return for Ankara's agreement not to send forces to demilitarised areas and to consent to the continued Allied presence in Istanbul until a comprehensive peace treaty could be concluded. In Mudanya, the contours of the new state of Turkey

took shape. It was to receive international recognition at Lausanne eight months later. (Kayali, 2008, p.141)

Eight months later, on 24 July 1923, the agreement of Mudanya was formalized in the internationally recognized Treaty of Lausanne (Karpat, 1970; Kayali, 2008). As such the Greco-Turkish War as part of the Turkish War of Independence was ended and Turkey was acknowledged as an independent state.

### 4.3 The Treaty of Lausanne

The negotiations after the Greco-Turkish War started in November 1922 in Lausanne. These negotiations "took place around issues pertaining to the status of non-Muslims, economic privileges of foreign merchants and governments, the reassignment of the Ottoman debt and, most significantly, the determination of the boundaries of the new [Turkish] state" (Kayali, 2008, p.141). Due to diplomatic pressure by the League of Nations, the negotiations eventually resulted in a peace treaty: the Treaty of Lausanne. It is stated by Coufoudakis (2008) that the Treaty of Lausanne provided the foundation of peace in a region after a decade of war, especially since it marked the death of the Greek Megali Idea. The Treaty of Lausanne furthermore settled territorial issues: the borders of Turkey were officially set and Turkey had to give up claims on specific territories, such as Cyprus (Coufoudakis, 2008; Kayali, 2008). But probably the most important aspect of the treaty was that it provided the legal basis for ethnic cohesion in both Greece and Turkey through a massive, compulsory population exchange (Alexandris, 1992; Anastassiadou, 2009; Coufoudakis, 2008; Karpat, 1970; Kayali, 2008; Kirişci, 2008; Koufa & Svolopoulos, 1991; Tekin, 2010).

> Under the auspices of the Treaty of Lausanne, more than a million ethnic Greeks of Anatolia were compelled to settle in Greece, while around 400,000 ethnic Turks headed the opposite direction. Excluded from the Treaty were the ethnic Greeks of Istanbul, Gökçeada (Imbros) and Bozcaada (Tenedos), as well as the ethnic Turks of Western Thrace. (Tekin, 2010, p.85)

The new Turkish government did not prefer the presence of Greeks in Turkey and at the same time the Greek government did not prefer the presence of Turks in Greece. In that respect the compulsory exchange of population as part of the Treaty of Lausanne has been "praised as a very effective and realistic means of evacuating the unassimilated masses or fragments of the populations of the two states concerned and eliminating those troublesome differentiations which obstructed their paths towards ethnic homogeneity" (Koufa & Svolopoulos, 1991, p.276). The general attitude towards the Treaty of Lausanne is, however, predominantly negative since it has been "fiercely criticized as contrary to human dignity and as a flagrant violation of international public order and international morality, which resulted in a human tragedy" (Koufa & Svolopoulos, 1991, p.276). In that respect Mak (2007) even used the term 'ethnic cleansing' in order to describe the events after the signing of the Treaty of Lausanne, which can even be justified since the population exchange between Greece and Turkey was based on the theory developed by Georges Montandon. In his theory, Montandon argues that in order to prevent future international conflicts regarding ethnic minorities, these 'non-nationals' should be 'cleaned' from the country. A view that was compatible with the feelings of fierce nationalism in both Greece and Turkey.

It is said that the population exchange between Greece and Turkey "was deemed necessary because of the ethno-religious animus that warfare had exacerbated" (Kayali, 2008, p.143). For example, the Greek invasion in Izmir in 1919 was characterized by extreme violence towards Turkish soldiers and several Muslim villages (Bouwman, 2008; Kayali, 2008). While later on, when the Turkish forces almost achieved their Great Victory, it were the Turkish

forces who used extreme violence against Greek residents of Izmir (Koufa & Svolopoulos, 1991). The Treaty of Lausanne stopped this violence and concurrently it provided a legal basis for the minorities in both Greece and Turkey:

> It recognized the Muslims in Western Thrace, and Greeks, Jews and Armenians in Turkey as the official minority groups, and provided the legal framework that protects their religious, economic, social and cultural rights, bringing minorities on par with the rest of the population. Nevertheless, during the following decades, Turkey and Greece have both consistently violated these rights not only marginalizing their minorities but also bringing them to near extinction by coercing them to emigrate, as in the case of Greeks in Istanbul. (Tekin, 2010, p.85)

It is interesting to briefly focus on the Greeks of Istanbul here. As it was already mentioned, the Greeks of Istanbul were excluded from the population exchange between Greece and Turkey as agreed in the Treaty of Lausanne. During the peace negotiations the Greek government stressed that Greece was unable to absorb this enormous group and it that respect stated that the expulsion of the Greeks of Istanbul "would amount to an unprecedented political, economic and social catastrophe" (Koufa & Svolopoulos, 1991, p.282; Alexandris, 1992). The Turkish government nevertheless insisted on the complete expulsion of the Greeks from Istanbul since they were seen as corrupt, disloyal and thus a danger to the Turkish country (Alexandris, 1992). The League of Nations, who were supervising the peace negotiations in Lausanne were, however, supporting the Greek view. The League of Nations

> were also aware that with the final expulsion of the Greeks the extensive Anglo/French commercial interests in Istanbul would suffer severely. For the overwhelming majority of managerial and administrative positions in the major concessionary foreign companies were occupied by Constantinopolitan Greeks. (Alexandris, 1992, p.86)

In other words, "the Greek population was vital to the existence of Istanbul as a great centre of commerce and industry and without it, that city would be in danger of losing its authority, wealth and trade" (Koufa & Svolopoulos, 1991, p.282; Vallianatos, 2006). After the League of Nations expressed and explained their concerns to the Turkish delegates in Lausanne, the Turkish government

> agreed to the exclusion from the exchange of the Greeks born in Istanbul, because the [League of Nations] had urged that the elements which constituted a factor of commercial and economic importance should not be removed all of a sudden from a city such as Constantinople. (Koufa & Svolopoulos, 1991, p.282)

Article 37 to 45 of the Treaty of Lausanne are the minority clauses which regulate the legal status of minorities in Turkey (Alexandris, 1992; Kurban & Hatemi, 2009; Kurban & Tsitselikis, 2010; Soner, 2005) (see Appendix 2). All of these clauses have been violated after the signing of the Treaty of Lausanne by the Turkish government leading to the marginalization and near extinction of the Greeks of Istanbul (Tekin, 2010). Numerous measures and events aimed against the Greeks of Istanbul can be described in order to illustrate these violations. Here, however, attention will be given only to two major events: firstly, the introduction and enactment of the Varlık Tax and, secondly, the Istanbul Pogrom.

### 4.4 The Varlık Tax
Although Turkey successfully maintained a somewhat uneasy neutral, non-belligerent position during World War II, it was due to European dependence unable to "escape the severe economic strains felt throughout Europe during 1939-44" (Alexandris, 1992, p.208).

> Despite the industrialization programme initiated by Atatürk in the 1930s, Turkey was self-sufficient for little more than basic food, clothing, shelter and solid fuels. From 1939 war activity curtailed importations of foreign goods, and external sources themselves tended to run dry. When shortages of spare parts and raw materials affected Turkish domestic supplies as well, urban dwellers, including high state officials, increasingly became disappointed and often desperate in their hunt for goods long taken for granted. Exasperated high-level bureaucrats found themselves queuing along with the lowliest porters and boot-blacks for grossly inadequate supplies – all alike were forced to pay astronomical charges from fixed salaries and low wages which fell victim to inflation. (Clark, 1972, p.205)

The Turkish army had been mobilized since 1939 and this mobilization cost more than 1,000,000 Turkish Lira (TL) per day (Alexandris, 1992). In 1939 the Turkish national defence expenditure was 163,941,000 TL but by 1943 this had increased to 542,516,000 TL and merely a third of this expenditure was covered by existing taxation (Alexandris, 1992).

> In normal times the existing Turkish tax structure was outmoded; in wartime it proved totally inadequate to cope with unprecedented inflation and distorted personal income. An emergency tax measure was drafted, and on November 11, 1942, the Turkish national assembly passed what ostensibly was a justifiable bill for the assessment of untaxed wealth. (Clark, 1972, p.206)

The Varlık Tax[2] was levied in order to create resources for the Turkish mobilization during World War II but was firstly "intended to deflate the economy by providing the treasury with funds. Deflation, it was hoped, by withdrawing surplus purchasing power in circulation would cause a fall in prices" (Alexandris, 1992, p.212; Clark, 1972; Tekin, 2010).

It was especially in Istanbul where during the war several people were able to accumulate large fortunes on the black-market for goods such as wheat and cereals. These people were known as the 'war-rich' and this group was constituted of both Muslim as well as non-Muslim businessmen (Alexandris, 1992, Clark, 1972). It were, however, only the non-Muslim businessmen who were accused of speculation, black-marketing and stockpiling, or in more general, it were the non-Muslim minorities (especially Greeks and Jews) who were seen as the cause of the poor economic status in Turkey. This view was even shared and propagated by the Turkish government:

> By portraying Turkey as the victim of a number of unscrupulous entrepreneurs, the [Turkish] government sought to conceal its shortcomings in the economic field. Chanelling [sic] discontent to an unpopular target such as the non-Muslim minorities would, the government felt, divert criticism and satisfy emotionally the hard-pressed Turkish masses. (Alexandris, 1992, p.213)

The Varlık Tax claimed to combat all war profiteering by businessmen in Turkey, including those profits amassed by the war-rich, but in its application it clearly differentiated between Muslims and non-Muslims (Kirişci, 2008).

> The tax was disproportionally directed to non-Muslim minorities (especially Greeks and Jews, whose wealth exceeded that of the majority of the Turkish population), who had to endure heavy financial hardships resulting from it. Greek Orthodox community which constituted 0.55 percent of the population at the time was obliged to pay 20 percent of the revenues yielding from the capital tax. (Tekin, 2010, p.86)

The Varlık Tax had to be paid "within fifteen days of assessment. Another fifteen days were allowed, but with high interest penalty" (Clark, 1972, p.206). The properties of those who were unable to pay the Varlık Tax were confiscated and auctioned and the person himself

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[2] The Varlık Tax can be found in the academic literature by its Turkish name 'Varlık Vergisi' or by the English names 'Wealth Tax' or 'Capital Tax'.

would be arrested and sent to a working camp in Eastern Anatolia, the Siberia of Turkey (Alexandris, 1992; Clark, 1972; Kirişci, 2008). It should be mentioned, however, that this penalty was only applied to non-Muslim persons: "all but a few of the 6,000 – 8,000 people who were sent to labour camps were non-Muslims. Muslim taxpayers who failed to pay in full received lighter sentences" (Kirişci, 2008, p.182).

The Varlık Tax should be seen as a small-scale bloodless financial massacre and ruined the lives of the non-Muslim minorities in Turkey, particularly of the Greeks and the Jews (Alexandris, 1992; Kirişci, 2008). By distinguishing a group of Muslims and a group of non-Muslims and levying the Varlık Tax differently on these groups, the Turkish government clearly violated the Treaty of Lausanne in which all inhabitants of Turkey, regardless place of birth, nationality, language, race or religion, were supposed to be treated equally. As said before, the Turkish government violated the Treaty of Lausanne several times and the differential application of the Varlık Tax is one just one example. Another major violation of the Treaty of Lausanne by the Turkish government was about to happen thirteen years later in Istanbul.

### 4.5 The Istanbul Pogrom

The Istanbul Pogrom, also referred to as Septemvriana, are the nights of 6 and 7 September 1955 wherein primarily Greek minorities in Istanbul were attacked and their houses, shops, schools, hospitals and places of worship were destroyed. De Zayas (2007, p.137) argues that what happened during that night is "comparable in scope to the November 1938 Kristallnacht in Germany, perpetrated by the Nazi authorities against Jewish civilians". He describes that what happened during the Istanbul Pogrom as follows:

> Besides the deaths, thousands were injured; some 200 Greek women were raped, and there are reports that Greek boys were raped as well. Many Greek men, including at least one priest, were subjected to forced circumcision. The riots were accompanied by enormous material damage, estimated by Greek authorities at US$500 million, including the burning of churches and the devastation of shops and private homes. (De Zayas, 2007, p.138)

This outburst of violence against the Greeks at first glance seemed to be

> a spontaneous outburst against the affluent Greeks, especially against the property of the Greeks: it was merely a property crime. Others insist that Cyprus, and the Cypriots' struggle for independence, triggered the pogrom. Still other Turks argue that an explosion in the Turkish consulate in Thessaloniki was the fuse for the rage of the Turks in Istanbul against their Greek neighbors. After all, the Thessaloniki incident threatened the house where, myth has it, Ataturk was born. So, with Kemal being the "father" of Turkey, the Turks sought revenge. (Vallianatos, 2006, p.136)

But the Istanbul Pogrom was not spontaneous at all. What precisely happened on those nights is perhaps best described and explained by one of Turkey's biggest novelist and the winner of the Nobel Prize in literature, Orhan Pamuk. In his book *Istanbul* he mentions the following regarding the Istanbul Pogrom:

> Nineteen-fifty-five was the year the British left Cyprus, and as Greece was preparing to take over the entire island, an agent of the Turkish secret service threw a bomb into the house where Atatürk was born in the Greek city of Salonika. After Istanbul's newspapers had spread the news in a special edition exaggerating the incident, mobs hostile to the city's non-Muslim inhabitants gathered in Taksim Square, and after they had burned, destroyed and plundered all those shops my mother and I had visited in Beyoğlu, they spent the rest of the night doing the same in other parts of the city.
> The bands of rioters were most violent and caused greatest terror in neighbourhoods like Ortaköy, Balıklı, Samatya and Fener, where the concentration of Greeks was greatest – not only did they sack and burn little Greek groceries and dairy shops,  but they broke into houses to rape Greek and

Armenian women. So it is not unreasonable to say that the rioters were as merciless as the soldiers who sacked the city after it fell to Mehmet the Conqueror. It later emerged that the organisers of this riot – whose terror raged for two days and made the city more hellish than the worst orientalist nightmares – had the state's support and had pillaged the city with its blessing.

So for that entire night, every non-Muslim who dared walk the streets of the city risked being lynched; the next morning the shops of Beyoğlu stood in ruins, their windows smashed, their doors kicked in, their wares either plundered or gleefully destroyed. Strewn everywhere were clothes, carpets, bolts of cloth, overturned refrigerators, radios and washing machines; the streets were piled high with broken porcelain sets, toys (the best toy stores were all in Beyoğlu), kitchenware, and fragments of the aquarium and chandeliers that were so fashionable at the time. (Pamuk, 2005, p.157)

As it becomes clear, the Istanbul Pogrom was a thoroughly prepared and executed plan by the Turkish government led by Prime Minister Adnan Menderes, whereby the British government also played an important role. It was namely the British government that kept enabling the Turkish government to

keep causing trouble to Greece, neutralizing Greece's efforts to assist Cypriots in achieving political independence from Turkish colonial rule. In fact, Britain knew it probably had pulled the trigger for the pogrom. British diplomats used to urge the Turks to start a riot on their behalf, and the Turks obliged, but for their own purpose. (Vallianatos, 2006, p.136)

The role played by the British government provided the Turkish government an excuse to pursue their own racist, nationalist agenda and as such the Istanbul Pogrom was centrally organized:

many of the rioters were recruited in Istanbul and in the provinces by the Demokrat Parti authorities and taken into Istanbul by train, in trucks, and by some 4,000 taxis with instructions on what to destroy and what was to be spared. They were given axes, crowbars, acetylene torches, petrol, dynamite, and large numbers of rocks in carts. Predictably, the riots got out of control, with the mobs shouting ''*Evvela mal, sonra can*'' (''First your property, then your life''). The Turkish militia and police who coordinated the pogrom refrained from protecting the lives and property of the Greek victims. Their function was, rather, to prevent Turkish property from being destroyed as well. (De Zayas, 2007, p.138)

As De Zayas (2007) claims, the actions of the Turkish government in 1955 can be labelled as genocide, ethnic cleansing or otherwise at least as a crime against humanity. Due to a military coup in 1960, the Menderes government fell and soon after that Menderes and other organizers were arrested, put on trial in the famous 'Yassıada trials', convicted and eventually executed.

### 4.6 The declining number of Greeks in Istanbul

As it was already mentioned before in this chapter, during the peace negotiations in Lausanne after the Greco-Turkish War the Turkish delegates demanded the complete expulsion of Greeks in Turkey, including the Greeks in Istanbul. It was eventually due to the pressure by the League of Nations that this demand was withdrawn and as such the Greeks of Istanbul (including those on the island of Gökçeada and Bozcaada) were excluded from a massive population exchange between Greece and Turkey.

It is estimated that by the beginning of the 20th century about 200,000 Greeks were living in the urban area of Istanbul and this Greek community shrank by more than one-third in the time that elapsed up to the Treaty of Lausanne (Anastassiadou, 2009; Mak, 2007). As said, the Treaty of Lausanne did not affect the Greek presence in Istanbul. Both Greece and Turkey even propagated policies of rapprochement after 1923 but the deep-rooted animosities between Greece and Turkey were nevertheless always present and dominant. This deep-rooted animosities became visible in Turkey for example when the Turkish government

introduced the Varlık Tax in 1942 or during the government-orchestrated Istanbul Pogrom in 1955. Due to these events, among many other measures and events, the number of Greeks in Istanbul declined. Whereas in 1960 about 100,000 Greeks were still living in Istanbul, in present times that number has dropped to somewhere between 1,500 and 4,000, especially because of enormous exoduses of Greeks out of Istanbul and Turkey in 1965 and 1974 (Alexandris, 1992; Bouwman, 2008; Kirişci, 2008; Mak, 2007). What was demanded by the Turkish delegates in Lausanne was realized but only decades later.

### 4.7 Conclusion

The fall of the Ottoman Empire and the subsequent rise and establishment of the Turkish state had a significant impact on the lives of the ethnic minorities, particularly for those living in Istanbul. Whereas in Ottoman times ethnic minorities were treated as equals and religious differences were tolerated by means of the Millet system, the opposite became the standard with the signing of the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923.

As explained in this chapter, the Greek minority in the Ottoman Empire belonged to the 'Millet-I Rum' or 'Rum Milleti'. Within this millet they were (almost) considered as equals and a certain level of autonomy was allowed, whereby the leader of the Rum Milleti controlled the "ecclesiastical, educational and charitable institutions of the Ottoman Orthodox, but also the regulation of matters relating to personal status, such as marriage, divorce and inheritance" (Alexandris, 1992, p.22). With the fall of the Ottoman Empire polyphony was demolished, tolerance towards religious difference was ended and instead ethnic-cultural homogeneity (Turkification) was set as the standard (Vingas, 2010). It is also in that context in which the massive population exchange between Greece and Turkey should be understood.

The ethnic Greeks of Istanbul, Gökçeada (Imbros) and Bozcaada (Tenedos), as well as the ethnic Turks of Western Thrace were excluded from the population exchange (Tekin, 2010). For these groups the minority clauses of the Treaty of Lausanne were designed, which regulates their legal status (Alexandris, 1992; Kurban & Hatemi, 2009; Kurban & Tsitselikis, 2010; Soner, 2005). However, during the peace negotiations in Lausanne it became clear that the newly established Turkish government was not supporting these minority clauses. Instead, the Turkish government demanded the complete expulsion of Greeks in the whole of Turkey, including the Greeks in Istanbul. Due to diplomatic pressure by the League of Nations, however, the Turkish government eventually did agree with the minority clauses in the Treaty of Lausanne and as such the Greeks in Istanbul were allowed to stay.

After the signing of the Treaty of Lausanne, however, all minority clauses have been violated by the Turkish government frequently and systemically (Alexandris, 1992). In that respect, two major events were elaborated on in this chapter: the Varlık Tax and the Istanbul Pogrom. These two events in combination with other measures and events eventually led to the marginalization and near extinction of the Greeks of Istanbul (Tekin, 2010). It was therefore that this chapter concluded that what was demanded by the Turkish government at the peace negotiations in Lausanne was achieved decades later.

It was clearly illustrated that the Turkish government had substantial influence on the lives of the Greeks in Istanbul. It could therefore be argued that the government possibly also had influence on the Greek level of integration, especially when keeping in mind the policy of 'Turkificiation' in order to achieve ethnic homogeneity within Turkey. The next chapter will try to provide more clarity on that matter by providing the results of the conducted survey.

# Chapter 5 – The Greeks of Istanbul and their level of integration

An important point learned from the previous chapter was that during the reign of the Ottomans a cosmopolitan society arose in Istanbul in which a variety of subjected non-Muslim minority groups were all living together tolerantly. This cosmopolitan society in Istanbul was built upon an immigration of townspeople coming from different parts of the Ottoman Empire. The character of this immigration was at first instance, however, not permanent but temporarily, which is confirmed by the available sources regarding the influx of immigrants to the capital of the Ottoman Empire. The Ottoman administration was quite precise concerning its 'taxable subjects' and it shows that the number of people leaving Istanbul was almost identical with the number of people arriving in Istanbul (Anastassiadou, 2009).

The migrants who travelled to Istanbul often travelled in groups for the obvious reason that the long journey to their destination was full of dangers and therefore people avoided travelling alone (Anastassiadou, 2009). "The more distant a place of origin was from Istanbul, the larger the number of immigrants who arrived in a group" (Anastassiadou, 2009, p.154). It is highly interesting to emphasize on the fact that even upon arriving in Istanbul these migrants often decided not to split but to settle together in the same neighbourhood:

> in the mechanism of the process of migration, the strongest link seems to be the geographical one. It is probable that for individuals coming from the same region physical proximity was a guarantee of security in the urban jungle with which they were confronted. [….] But there is another side to this coin: by remaining together and settling near their 'fellow countrymen', the workers who migrated to Istanbul invariably also chose not to blend into the local society, and not to establish proper roots in the capital. (Anastassiadou, 2009, p.155)

The clustering of the 'fellow countrymen' resulted in separate neighbourhoods based on place of origin, which was to certain extent already illustrated in Chapter 4 when it was said that in Ottoman times some neighbourhoods in Istanbul were Islamic, some were Armenian and others were Greek and because of that foreign visitors must have been feeling like if they were stepping from one culture into another when leaving one and entering a new neighbourhood (Mak, 2007). Because ethnic segregation can be seen as the differential distribution or the differential location of people across geography based on their origin, it can therefore be argued that ethnic segregation was present in Istanbul during Ottoman times. In addition to that, the quotation in the above shows that integration was not the priority of the migrants since they were not intending to stay in the city for an indeterminate period of time. Instead, most of the migrants planned to leave the city again when the demand for their labour declined. In that respect Anastassiadou mentions the following:

> if one leaves aside the historical centre of Istanbul, where a great deal of the professional and commercial activities were concentrated, the sectors on the outskirts of the city were those that attracted the greatest number of migrants. First and foremost, the massive presence of immigrants here indicates that these areas were especially suited to the settlement of 'strangers'. The message is clear: as long as the immigrants remained at the gates of the city, they did not enter it or become integrated, and were hence always inclined to leave again. (Anastassiadou, 2009, p.155)

## 5.1 The Greek immigrants

In her insightful article on the Greek immigrants of Istanbul, Anastassiadou (2009) tries to identify those mechanisms which might explain how this specific group was able to lose their rural identity and concurrently supported their integration in the urban society of Istanbul in such a way that this group proudly bore the identity of 'Constantinopolitans'. In order to

understand that, it is perhaps useful to know some background information of the Greek immigrants:

> What are the places of origin – cities, villages or small hamlets – of the Greek immigrants of the 1850s? The Ottoman documentation allows us to know this with great precision. Most immigrants came from the European provinces of the Empire, mainly from Epirus and Macedonia. However, Anatolia and particularly Cappadocia, sent a sizeable workforce to Istanbul. In comparison with other communities (most notably the Armenians, who are also present in the archives), the geographic origins of the Greek immigrants seem much more fragmented and diversified. On the other hand, the Greeks emigrated in relatively small groups compared with other non-Muslim rural populations. (Anastassiadou, 2009, p.156)

The migration to Istanbul initially had a more or less predictable and regular rhythm of coming-and-going but throughout time the pattern of this 'migration game' changed. In Ottoman times Istanbul gradually established itself as the centre of business which led to different modes of settlement which eventually became more structural. In earlier times the Greeks from Nevşehir (Cappadocia) would settle in Cibali and Galata, and to lesser extent in Üsküdar and would leave again after their business in Istanbul was finished. But since Istanbul was now establishing itself as the Eldorado for those who wished to escape the poverty of the countryside, many migrants decided to stay and as a consequence of that their settlement resulted in several Greek neighbourhoods (Anastassiadou, 2009). Within just a few decades, "a generation emerged that defined itself as being wholly from Istanbul" (Anastassiadou, 2009, p.158). In just 20 to 30 years, no more than a generation, the Greek immigrants were detached from their rural identity and successfully went through the process of integration into urban life in Istanbul. It is said by Anastassiadou (2009, p.163) that it were mainly the element of education in schools and the element of social ties created by charity and philanthropy that played an important role in this urban integration process so that "these individuals and families who came from afar quickly felt themselves members of a community, and acquired the awareness of a proper Istanbul identity".

It was already explained that the Greeks of Istanbul take a rather peculiar place in the Turkish history since they were exempted from the obligatory population exchange which was part of the Treaty of Lausanne. According to Anastassiadou (2009) the reason for this exemption was that the Greeks from Istanbul were not seen by the Turkish government as Greeks but as authentic Istanbulliots. As was shown in the previous chapter, this idea is incorrect since the Turkish delegates at the Lausanne conference explicitly demanded the expulsion of all remaining Greek elements from Turkey (Alexandris, 1992). Greeks in Turkey were seen as a Trojan horse: corrupt, disloyal and thus a potential danger for the stability of the newly formed nation (Alexandris, 1992; Mak, 2007). Although the Greeks of Istanbul were properly integrated in the urban society and considered themselves to be part of the city's identity, they were not seen as such and their presence was not welcomed by the Turkish government.

The relationship between integration and ethnic segregation is the subject of study in this research and it is in that respect valuable to notice that about a century ago Greek immigrants in Istanbul were properly integrated into the urban society by means of (ethnically segregated) education and social ties created by charity and philanthropy. At the same time these Greeks resided in neighbourhoods such as Cibali, Galata, Üsküdar and especially Pera (Beyoğlu) and it can be argued that therefore ethnic segregation was present in Istanbul, which implies that both integration and ethnic segregation were present at the same time if one looks at the Greek minority in Istanbul at that time. In contrast with the past, it was already concluded by Ayata (2008) and Pinarcioğlu and Işik (2009) that nowadays ethnic segregation in Istanbul is

absent. The level of integration of the Greek minority in Istanbul is unknown but based on information from the past it can be assumed that their level of integration is (still) high.

It was explained before that in this research, integration is assumed to have two dimensions, a socio-economic dimension and a ethnic-cultural dimension. Below, detailed attention will be given to both of these dimensions regarding the level of integration of the Greek minority in Istanbul by presenting the results from the surveys which were held among this minority group.

## 5.2 The Greek level of socio-economic integration

The socio-economic integration of the Greeks in Istanbul was determined in this research by means of four questions in the survey (Part 1), which were referring back to either the sphere of education or the sphere of labour. The first question, for example, asked the respondent about his or her highest level of completed education. The answers of 239 respondents on this question are shown in Table 5.1.

| Participation in Education (%) | Greek respondents | Turkish population (2009 – 2010) |
|---|---|---|
| Primary education | 100 | 98.17 |
| Secondary education | 97.48 | 64.95 |
| Higher education | 69.03 | 30.42 |

Table 5.1: Participation in education (*Source: Turkish Statistical Institute, 2010*)

Table 5.1 shows the percentage of Greek respondents in this research that completed a particular level of education. It shows that, for example, all 239 respondents completed primary education. 97.48% of the respondents completed secondary education which comes down to a number of 233 people. Lastly, with respect to the participation in higher education, it is shown in Table 5.1 that 69.03 % of the respondents participated in the highest level of education. These percentages indicate that the respondents in this research are doing rather good in terms of education, which corresponds with the general Greek population of Istanbul: Although the Greek population of Istanbul is highly segregated in educational terms and while segregated education has a rather negative connotation, the Greek population of Istanbul is doing rather well at school (H. Theodorelis-Rigas, personal communication, 27 April, 2011). This is important to mention in light of the Greek integration, since it shows that the respondents could be considered as a representative sample of the Greek population of Istanbul.

Apart from the percentages for the Greek population of Istanbul, Table 5.1 also shows the percentages with respect to the Turkish majority population, which were taken from the Turkish Statistical Yearbook 2009.While comparing the percentages between the two categories shown in Table 5.1, it is in respect to the aspect of integration interesting and noteworthy that the level of participation in education is higher for the Greek minority compared to the Turkish majority population. It should be calculated by means of hypothesis tests of proportions in order to determine if these differences in each level of education are significant or not.

The hypothesis tests of proportions were conducted with $\alpha = 0.05$, which corresponds with a critical value of $Z = 1.645$. Whether or not there is a significant difference between the Greek

minority and the Turkish majority regarding the participation in primary education was then calculated as follows:

$$Z_{\text{primary education}} \cong \frac{\hat{p} - p_0}{\sqrt{\dfrac{p_0 \cdot (1 - p_0)}{n}}} = \frac{1 - 0{,}9817}{\sqrt{\dfrac{0{,}9817 \cdot (1 - 0{,}9817)}{239}}} = 2{,}11$$

Here '$\hat{p}$' denotes the sample proportion, '$p_0$' denotes the hypothesized population proportion and 'n' denotes the number of respondents. With respect to the outcome of the test it can be said that since 2.11 > 1.645, it can be concluded with $\alpha = 0.05$ that there is enough evidence to assume that the level of participation in primary education by the Greek minority population is significantly higher compared to the Turkish majority population.

In a similar fashion it can be calculated whether or not there is a significant difference between the Greek minority and the Turkish majority regarding the participation in secondary education:

$$Z_{\text{secondary education}} \cong \frac{\hat{p} - p_0}{\sqrt{\dfrac{p_0 \cdot (1 - p_0)}{n}}} = \frac{0{,}9748 - 0{,}6495}{\sqrt{\dfrac{0{,}6495 \cdot (1 - 0{,}6495)}{239}}} = 10{,}54$$

Since 10.54 > 1.645, it can be concluded with $\alpha = 0.05$ that there is enough evidence to assume that the level of participation in secondary education by the Greek minority population is again significantly higher compared to the Turkish majority population.

Lastly, the same calculation can be done in order to determine whether or not there is a significant difference between the Greek minority and the Turkish majority concerning the participation in higher education:

$$Z_{\text{higher education}} \cong \frac{\hat{p} - p_0}{\sqrt{\dfrac{p_0 \cdot (1 - p_0)}{n}}} = \frac{0{,}6903 - 0{,}3042}{\sqrt{\dfrac{0{,}3042 \cdot (1 - 0{,}3042)}{239}}} = 12{,}97$$

Since 12.97 > 1.645, it can be concluded with $\alpha = 0.05$ that there is enough evidence to assume that the level of participation in higher education by the Greek minority population is significantly higher compared to the Turkish majority population.

Education is just one aspect in the socio-economic dimension of integration. The remaining questions in the first part of the survey were designed in order to include the aspect of labour, whereby these question tried to obtain information from the respondent regarding employment. In other words, is the respondent employed, unemployed or perhaps already retired? The answers from the respondents are shown in Table 5.2.

| Labour (2010) | Greek respondents | Istanbul | Turkey |
|---|---|---|---|
| Employment rate (%) | 73.22 | 41 | 43 |
| Unemployment rate (%) | 10.46 | 14.30 | 11.90 |

Table 5.2: Labour participation (*Source: Turkish Statistical Institute, 2010*)

All 239 respondents answered the question and the results in Table 5.2 show that 73.22 % of the respondents are employed. This does not imply that the other part of the respondents is unemployed. As Table 5.2 indicates, only 10.46% of the respondents is unemployed, which comes down to a number of 25 people. The remaining 39 respondents are retired and thus no longer active on the labour market.

Both Alexandris (1998) and Anastassiadou (2009) mention that in the past the Greek minority in Istanbul were rather prosperous and it could be argued that this fact is the consequence of a rather high employment rate. As Table 5.2 indicates, the level of employment among the respondents in this research is rather high and it could therefore be assumed again that the respondents are to certain extent a representation of the general Greek population of Istanbul. By assuming that the respondents could indeed be seen as a sample of a larger population, it is then again useful to compare the collected data from the survey with data about the majority population. The Turkish Statistical Yearbook 2009 provides data on the employment and unemployment rate for both Istanbul and Turkey, which are both shown in Table 5.2. In order to determine if the differences between the Greek minority population and the Turkish majority population (in both Istanbul and Turkey) regarding the employment and unemployment rates are significant, again hypothesis tests of proportions can be used.

The tests of were conducted with α = 0.05, which corresponds with a critical value of Z = 1.645. Whether or not there is a significant difference between the Greek minority and the Turkish majority of Istanbul and Turkey regarding the employment rate was then calculated as follows:

$$Z_{Istanbul} \cong \frac{\hat{p} - p_0}{\sqrt{\dfrac{p_0 \cdot (1 - p_0)}{n}}} = \frac{0,7322 - 0,41}{\sqrt{\dfrac{0,41 \cdot (1 - 0,41)}{239}}} = 10,13$$

$$Z_{Turkey} \cong \frac{\hat{p} - p_0}{\sqrt{\dfrac{p_0 \cdot (1 - p_0)}{n}}} = \frac{0,7322 - 0,43}{\sqrt{\dfrac{0,43 \cdot (1 - 0,43)}{239}}} = 9,44$$

Since 10.13 > 1.645 and since 9.44 > 1.645, it can be concluded with α = 0.05 that the Greek minority of Istanbul has a significantly higher employment rate compared to the Turkish majority population in both Istanbul and Turkey.

In the same way it can be calculated if there is a significant difference between the Greek minority and the Turkish minority of Istanbul and Turkey regarding the unemployment rate. The same formula can be applied here again:

$$Z_{Istanbul} \cong \frac{\hat{p} - p_0}{\sqrt{\dfrac{p_0 \cdot (1 - p_0)}{n}}} = \frac{0,1046 - 0,1430}{\sqrt{\dfrac{0,1430 \cdot (1 - 0,1430)}{239}}} = 1,69$$

$$Z_{Turkey} \cong \frac{\hat{p} - p_0}{\sqrt{\dfrac{p_0 \cdot (1 - p_0)}{n}}} = \frac{0,1046 - 0,1190}{\sqrt{\dfrac{0,1190 \cdot (1 - 0,1190)}{239}}} = -0,68$$

Regarding the differences between the Greek minority in Istanbul and the Turkish majority population of Istanbul, it can be concluded with α = 0.05 that since 1.69 > 1.645, there is a enough evidence to assume that the unemployment rate for the Greek minority is lower compared to the unemployment rate for the Turkish majority population in Istanbul. It should be noted, however, that this is only a minor difference.

Regarding the differences between the Greek minority in Istanbul and the Turkish majority population in the whole of Turkey, it can be concluded with α = 0.05 that since -0.68 < 1.645, there is not enough evidence to assume that the unemployment rate for the Greeks of Istanbul differs significantly from the unemployment rate of the Turkish majority population in the whole of Turkey.

Following up on the second question in the survey, in respect to the aspect of integration, it is perhaps interesting to know in which economic branch the respondents are active. The goal of the third question was to obtain this information, whereby both the employed part of the respondents as well as the currently retired respondents were asked to answer this question. The results are shown in Table 5.3.

| Activity per economic sector (%) | Greek respondents | Turkish population |
|---|---|---|
| Agriculture, foresting and fishing | - | 24.69 |
| Mining and quarrying | - | 0.48 |
| Manufacturing | 22.89 | 18.56 |
| Electricity, gas, water supply | - | 0.36 |
| Construction | 3.74 | 5.87 |
| Wholesale and retail trade, restaurants and hotels | 16.35 | 21.35 |
| Finance, insurance, real estate and business service | 45.79 | 6.29 |
| Community, social and personal services | 11.22 | 17.31 |

Table 5.3: Activity per economic sector (*Source: Turkish Statistical Institute, 2010*)

From all respondents, 214 people answered the third question in the survey. Table 5.3 gives an overview in which economic sector the respondents are or used to be employed. It can hardly be a surprise to notice that none of the respondents is employed in either the sector of 'agriculture, foresting and fishing' nor in the sector of 'mining and quarrying', if one keeps in mind the highly urbanized environment which the city of Istanbul is. In addition to that it is also noteworthy that 45.79% of the 214 respondents is employed in the economic sector of 'finance, insurance, real estate and business service', a sector which is predominantly characterized by 'white collar workers', which could indeed again indicate that the Greek minority of Istanbul is doing rather well in socio-economic terms. A more detailed indication could be derived from the level of income, which was the subject of the fourth question in the survey.

| Income (TL) | <4.345 | 4.345 – 7.908 | 7.908 – 11.453 | 11.453 – 16.706 | 16.706 – 35.093 | >35.093 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Greek population of Istanbul (%) | - | 8.36 | 17.15 | 6.27 | 40.58 | 27.64 |

Table 5.4: The Greek minority of Istanbul and their level of income (*Source: Turkish Statistical Institute, 2009*)

Keeping in mind that the respondents in this survey are representatives of a larger population, Table 5.4 indicates that a majority of the Greek minority of Istanbul (68.22%) has a household income which is situated in one of the two highest categories for household income. This fact becomes even more interesting if one compares this with the average household income in Turkey in 2009 (15,102 Turkish Lira) and the average household income in Istanbul in 2009

(12,795 Turkish Lira). This gives a decent indication of how the Greek minority of Istanbul is doing with respect to household income. It could even be argued that the relatively high income-position follows from the fact that the Greek minority group is rather well-educated.

It was already explained in Chapter 3 that with respect to the socio-economic aspect of integration the spheres of labour, education and housing are considered to be the most important. Data regarding the sphere of housing was, however, not available and also difficult to obtain within the time restriction of the research. It was therefore that in the socio-economic dimension of integration only the spheres of labour and education were taken into consideration. But even though not all spheres were incorporated and more comprehensive questions could have been asked in the survey, the questions that were posed nonetheless provided a decent indication of the Greek level of socio-economic integration in Istanbul. In that sense it can be said that the current level of socio-economic integration can be seen as a continuation of the past: The Greek minority in Istanbul is well-educated, predominantly employed as a white-collar worker and in most cases earning a high income compared to the average level of incomes for Istanbul and Turkey. In short, based on the answers of 239 representative respondents, from a socio-economic perspective it can be said that the Greeks of Istanbul in general are still rather prosperous.

### 5.3 The Greek level of ethnic-cultural integration
In the second part of the survey the Greek level of integration in the ethnic-cultural dimension was measured. This was done by paying attention to elements such as the orientation towards Greece and Turkey, the identity of people and the informal contacts. For example, the first question in the second part of the survey asked the respondents if they would rather prefer to live in Greece or in Turkey. The results on this question are presented below in Table 5.5.

| 1= Greece 5 = Turkey | Preference for Greece or Turkey | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| Greek population of Istanbul (%) | 0.8 | - | 2.9 | 10.0 | 86.2 |

Table 5.5: The Greek population of Istanbul and their preference to live in Greece or Turkey

From Table 5.5 it becomes clear that merely two respondents (0.8%) would prefer to migrate from Turkey to Greece. Apart from those two respondents, 7 respondents (2.9%) are not able to choose between Greece and Turkey. The overwhelming majority of the respondents (96.2%), however, states that they (clearly) prefer to live in Turkey rather than Greece. It could be argued that this result could be generalized for the broader Greek population and therefore gives initial rise to the idea that the Greek minority in Istanbul is predominantly oriented towards Turkey. The second and third question in the second part of the survey, in which was asked about the ability to speak Greek and Turkish, could provide more clarity in that sense. The results on these two questions are presented in Table 5.6.

| | Speaking Greek | Speaking Turkish |
|---|---|---|
| Greek population of Istanbul (%) | 100 | 100 |

Table 5.6: The Greek population of Istanbul and their ability to speak Greek and Turkish

Table 5.6 cannot be misinterpreted. All 239 respondents are able to speak both Greek and Turkish. It could be argued that this result also excludes the possibility of Greek assimilation into the Turkish society. After all, assimilation would imply that the Greek minority of Istanbul would have given up all cultural aspects (such as language) and would 'disappear in society'. Instead, the Greek minority of Istanbul is still able to speak their 'own' language and

therefore holds on to one of their 'own' cultural traits. The fact that the majority of the respondents would prefer to live in Turkey rather than Greece in combination with the fact that all respondents are able to speak both Greek and Turkish could be seen as an indication that the Greek minority in Istanbul is oriented towards Turkey while concurrently being aware of their own culture.

Apart from language, religion can also be considered as an important cultural trait. In case the Greek minority of Istanbul is indeed holding on to their own cultural traits, it could then be argued that this minority group considers themselves as Eastern Orthodox. Question 8 in the survey therefore asked the respondents to what extent they would consider themselves as Eastern Orthodox. The results are presented in Table 5.7.

| 1= Not at all<br>5 = Completely | Considering themselves as Eastern Orthodox | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| **Greek population of Istanbul (%)** | 12.1 | 1.7 | 10.0 | 10.9 | 65.3 |

Table 5.7: The Greek population of Istanbul and their level of Eastern Orthodoxy

Although 57 respondents (23.8%) do not consider themselves as Eastern Orthodox or are more or less neutral towards it, it becomes clear from Table 5.7 that the majority of the Greek respondents (76.2%) does consider themselves to be an Eastern Orthodox. Again, it should be stressed that holding on to cultural traits could be measured in a more comprehensive way, but for the moment the results from both Table 5.6 and Table 5.7 do indicate that the Greek minority in Istanbul is to certain extent indeed holding on to their own cultural traits (language and religion).

The idea of holding on to ones own culture could be seen as embodied in identity. With that idea in mind question 9 and 10 were posed in the survey in order to obtain information about how the Greek respondents identify themselves and how they are identified by the Turkish majority population. The results on these questions are presented in Table 5.8 and Table 5.9.

| 1= Greek<br>5 = Turkish | Feeling Greek or Turkish | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| **Greek population of Istanbul (%)** | 100 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |

Table 5.8: The way the Greek population of Istanbul identify themselves

| 1= Greek<br>5 = Turkish | Considered by majority population as Greek or Turkish | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| **Greek population of Istanbul (%)** | 74.1 | 25.9 | 0 | 0 | 0 |

Table 5.9: The way the Greek population of Istanbul is identified by the Turkish majority population

With respect to identity, Table 5.8 shows that all 239 respondents identify and feel themselves Greek. Allegedly this identity resonates also in their daily lives because it is assumed by the respondents that the Turkish majority population considers them to be Greek indeed as is illustrated in Table 5.9.

A last aspect of ethnic-cultural integration is contact with the majority population and that was measured by means of question 11 to 14 in the survey. The frequency of contact from the minority population with the majority population initially depends on the composition of the neighbourhood. Question 11 and question 13 therefore first asked what part of the

neighbourhood is populated by Greeks and what part is populated by Turks. The results are given in Table 5.10 and Table 5.11.

**Percentage of neighbourhood that can be considered Greek**

| < 20 % | 20% - 40% | 40% - 60% | 60% - 80% | > 80% |
|--------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-------|
| 100 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |

Table 5.10: Greek presence in the neighbourhood

**Percentage of neighbourhood that can be considered Turkish**

| < 20 % | 20% - 40% | 40% - 60% | 60% - 80% | > 80% |
|--------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-------|
| 0 | 0 | 0 | 12.1 | 87.9 |

Table 5.11: Turkish presence in the neighbourhood

Table 5.10 makes clear that the neighbourhoods of all 239 respondents consist less than 20% of Greek people. Instead, as Table 5.11 indicates, the neighbourhoods are predominantly inhabited by the Turkish majority population: 87.9% of the respondents states that their neighbourhood consists more than 80% of the Turkish majority population. Hypothetically this could mean that for the Greek minority population it is fairly easy to have contact with the Turkish majority population. In order to see if this is indeed the case question 12 and question 14 were posed in the survey. Question 12 looked at the frequency of informal contacts with Greeks in the neighbourhood and question 14 looked at the frequency of informal contact with Turks in the neighbourhood. The results are presented in Table 5.12 and Table 5.13.

**Informal contact with Greek people in the neighbourhood (%)**

| Never | 1 or 2 times a week | 3 or 4 times a week | Every day |
|-------|---------------------|---------------------|-----------|
| 0 | 17.6 | 48.5 | 33.9 |

Table 5.12: Informal contact with Greek people in the neighbourhood

**Informal contact with Turkish people in the neighbourhood (%)**

| Never | 1 or 2 times a week | 3 or 4 times a week | Every day |
|-------|---------------------|---------------------|-----------|
| 0 | 73.2 | 18,0 | 8.8 |

Table 5.13: Informal contact with Turkish people in the neighbourhood

The results from Table 5.12 and Table 5.13 are rather remarkable. Whereas the neighbourhoods of the respondents are mostly inhabited by the Turkish majority population, the informal contact from the Greek minority in Istanbul with the majority population in the own neighbourhood is predominantly limited to 1 or 2 times a week (73.2%). At the same time is it interesting to notice that the neighbourhoods of the respondents consist less than 20% of Greeks but that the frequency of informal inter-Greek contact on the level of the neighbourhood predominantly varies from 3 or 4 times a week to every day (82.4%). These percentages could indicate that the Greek minority group is to large extent oriented to their own ethnic group. It should be emphasized, however, that these percentages refer to the level of the neighbourhood and therefore do not and cannot say anything about the informal contacts between the Greek minority group and the Turkish majority population on other, higher geographical scales.

With respect to the ethnic-cultural part of integration it was shown in this paragraph that the Greek minority of Istanbul is undoubtedly oriented towards Turkey: they prefer to live in Turkey rather than Greece and they are able to speak Turkish fluently. At the same time this minority group is very much aware of and preserves its own identity: the Greeks of Istanbul all consider themselves as Greeks, predominantly consider themselves as Eastern Orthodox and are also fluent in Greek. Although the respondents stated that they are more oriented towards Turkey than Greece, on the level of the neighbourhood it becomes clear that informal inter-Greek contact prevails over informal contact with the Turkish majority population. The frequency of informal contact with the majority population is, however, substantial.

Whereas the socio-economic dimension of integration can be measured perfectly in a quantitative way, this is slightly different for the ethnic-cultural dimension of integration. This latter dimension can be described in a quantitative way (as was done in this paragraph) and the results can indeed indicate a certain direction but nonetheless it remains slightly complicated. It could be argued that particularly for the ethnic-cultural dimension of integration a combination of emotions, feelings and experiences are involved. In order to modestly incorporate these more qualitative aspects in this research for both the socio-economic dimension as well as the ethnic-cultural dimension of integration, whenever possible, brief conversations were held with those who filled out the survey.

## 5.4 The role of the Turkish government

During the brief conversations held with some of the respondents, with respect to the Greek level of integration in Istanbul, it was often stated that integration for them was a natural process: they were born in Turkey and therefore feel related to Turkey, they are part of the Turkish society and therefore speak Turkish. But apart from this 'voluntary' attitude towards integration they were also very much aware of their origin, identity and history. It that sense it was often told that there is a widespread fear among the Greeks of Istanbul towards the Turkish state and that therefore the Greeks of Istanbul more or less experienced a form of pressure to integrate. This idea of Greek fear for the Turkish state corresponds with what was said in a report produced by Human Rights Watch (1992, in Tekin, 2010, p.86), wherein the Greek population in Istanbul was described as "dwindling, elderly and frightened".

In an interview with Mr. Haris Theodorelis-Rigas (personal communication, 27 April, 2011) the topic of Greek fear for the Turkish state was elaborated on. It was stated that among the Greek minority of Istanbul there is indeed a certain level of fear towards the Turkish state, whereby this fear is based on the idea that the Turkish state planned the systematic eradication of Greeks in Turkey. In 1936, for example, the Turkish government asked all foundations, both Muslim and non-Muslim, to declare the real estate they owned.

> The foundations adhered to this call and submitted to the state lists of real estate they owned at that time. Decades later, the lists of properties that non-Muslim foundations had declared to the state in 1936 were interpreted by the [Turkish state] to be their 'founding statutes' [...]. On the basis of no legal rule whatsoever, the [Turkish state] concluded that community foundations were not entitled to own. (Kurban & Tsitselikis, 2010, p.12)

The purposely distorted interpretation of the property declaration made it possible for the Turkish government to confiscate all properties acquired by non-Muslim foundations after 1936 (Kurban & Tsitselikis, 2010). Although the confiscation of property took place decades later, the basis for this measure was laid in 1936. Keeping that in mind, a few years later in 1942 the Varlık Tax was introduced by the Turkish government and it was explained in Chapter 4 that this tax ruined the lives of many Greeks in Istanbul. As it was also explained in

the previous chapter, the Istanbul Pogrom took place in 1955: another government-orchestrated attempt in order to again ruin the lives of the Greeks in Istanbul. In 1964 Greek-Turkish relations were harmed again, this time due to the Cyprus-conflict. "It was at this juncture that Turkey decided to employ once again the Constantinopolitan Greek factor in its diplomatic confrontation with Greece" (Alexandris, 1992, p.280). The majority of the Greeks in Istanbul were holding Turkish passports but an estimated 10,000 Greeks from Istanbul were holding a Greek passport "because their ancestors had come from the provinces of the Ottoman Empire that were incorporated in the Greek kingdom in 1830 and later" (Alexandris, 1992, p.281). Despite the fact that most of these Greeks from Istanbul with a Greek passport never visited Greece, they were nonetheless deported to Greece by the Turkish government.

> At first the Turks claimed that the expulsions were individual measures aimed at those [Greeks] involved in activities dangerous to the internal and external security of Turkey. Accusations against the expelled ranged from smuggling foreign currency to having sent money to the Greek terrorists in Cyprus. Soon, however, it became evident that the deportees comprised highly respected individuals, who until that moment had never been involved with the authorities. As a result the Turkish government had to admit to the collective character of the deportations. (Alexandris, 1992, p.282)

Again a few years later in 1974 the Turkish army invaded northern Cyprus. Due to the hostile environment in Turkey towards the Greeks, the majority of the still remaining Greeks in Istanbul decided to leave Turkey. As a consequence of that the Greek element in the whole of Turkey almost completely disappeared (Alexandris, 1992).

A closer look at the years in which the Greeks of Istanbul were negatively affected by the actions of the Turkish government gives indeed rise to the idea that the Turkish state planned the systematic eradication of Greeks in Turkey. About every ten years an incident took place causing the number of Greeks in Istanbul to gradually decline. It is exactly this constant reoccurrence of negative events and measures that caused fear among the Greeks of Istanbul towards the Turkish state. And, as was repeatedly stated during the brief conversations, it is this fear that made the Greeks of Istanbul feel a certain pressure to integrate, especially and particularly in socio-economic terms. After all, if one is prosperous it becomes easier to recover from, for example, the Varlık Tax and the Istanbul Pogrom.

**5.5 Conclusion**

This chapter started with an overview on the article by Anastassiadou (2009) in which the Greek immigrants and their modes of integration in Istanbul were explained. From this article several important lessons were learned. First of all, it was learned that during Ottoman times the Greek migration to Istanbul had a more or less predictable, temporal character of coming-and-going. This, however, changed after Istanbul established itself as the centre of business. The Greek immigrants then decided to settle in Istanbul in neighbourhoods such as Cibali, Galata, Üsküdar and especially Pera (Beyoğlu). The result of this settlement were several Greek neighbourhoods, which was already more or less described by Mak (2007). Based on these Greek neighbourhoods it can be concluded that ethnic segregation was present in Istanbul.

An other important lesson learned from the article by Anastassiadou (2009) is that after the Greek decision to settle in Istanbul this ethnic minority group successfully and quite rapidly went through the process of integration. This process of integration was able to be successful due to the element of education in schools and the element of social ties created by charity and philanthropy. Within just a few decades, "a generation emerged that defined itself as being wholly from Istanbul" (Anastassiadou, 2009, p.158). The fact that Greeks in Istanbul

successfully went through the process of integration combined with the fact that this minority group used to be living ethnically segregated supports the view in which ethnic segregation and integration are not seen as two extremes. Instead, both ethnic segregation and integration are able to be present at the same time.

With the fall of the Ottoman Empire and the subsequent rise and establishment of the Turkish state, the emphasis shifted from religious difference and tolerance to uniformity and conformity. The Turkish state aimed to create an ethnically uniform nation through the assimilation policy of Turkification (Vingas, 2010). The results produced by the survey in this research show, however, that the Turkification policy failed with respect to the Greek minority of Istanbul. Instead of being assimilated, as was the aim of the Turkish government, the Greeks of Istanbul are 'merely' integrated.

Integration consists of a socio-economic dimension and an ethnic-cultural dimension. The socio-economic level of integration of the Greeks in Istanbul was measured in the survey by means of the educational level, the employment rate, the branch of economic activity and the level of income. Compared with the data on the Turkish majority population it becomes clear that the Greeks of Istanbul are well-educated, predominantly employed (especially as white-collar workers) and in most cases earn a high income. In short, the Greek minority is in general rather prosperous and therefore socio-economically integrated, which is more or less a continuation of the Greek situation in the past.

It is slightly more difficult to express the Greek level of ethnic-cultural integration in terms of 'high' or 'low'. Yet still the quantitative result generated by the survey in this research do provide reasons to think that the Greeks in Istanbul developed feelings of belongings towards Turkey. For instance, the results produced by the survey in this research illustrate that the Greeks of Istanbul prefer to live in Turkey rather than in Greece. It was also shown that all respondents in this research are able to speak Turkish. Successful assimilation through Turkification can, however, be excluded as an option because of the fact that the Greek minority in Istanbul is holding on to their own cultural traits. The Greek minority group in Istanbul is, for example, feeling Greek, is able to speak Greek and all consider themselves as Eastern Orthodox. Moreover, on the level of the neighbourhood it becomes clear that informal inter-Greek contact prevails over informal contact with the Turkish majority population.

From the brief conversations held with the respondents it was learned that among the Greeks in Istanbul a certain fear exists towards the Turkish state. This fear is related to the idea that the Turkish state planned the systematic eradication of Greeks in Turkey since the peace negotiations in Lausanne in 1923 were ended. History shows that about every ten years a government-initiated incident took place causing the number of Greeks in Istanbul to gradually decline. Although the reoccurrence of incidents does not provide enough support for the idea of an eradication plan by the Turkish government, it is, however, understandable that these incidents caused fear towards the Greek minority living in Istanbul. This fear was then interpreted as a pressure to integrate in order to become prosperous so that possible future incidents would hopefully not be leading to the complete ruination of lives. It can therefore be argued that the influence and the impact of the Turkish government on the Greek level of integration are substantial and undeniable.

In the previous chapter the tensed relationship between the Turkish states and its ethnic minorities was illustrated by referring to the discussion initiated by the Human Rights Advisory Commission, wherein it was suggested to replace the word 'Türk' (ethnic Turk) for the word 'Türkiyeli' (being from Turkey). After having learned the results from the survey, it can be said that the non-assimilated Greeks of Istanbul can best be described as 'Türkiyeli'.

# Chapter 6 – Conclusion

Chapter 1 opened by stating that recently several European politicians such as Angela Merkel, Nicolas Sarkozy and David Cameron all condemned the multicultural society as an utter failure (DailyMail, 2011; see Modood, 2007; see Nye, 2007). The reason to condemn the multicultural society as an utter failure comes forth from the idea that the several ethnic minority groups within respectively France, Germany and the United Kingdom, did not participate in the much-desired process of integration but instead coexist within their own ethnic communities side by side rather than living together with the majority population. From this societal discussion on the multicultural society, the academic discussion on the relationship between ethnic segregation and integration can be distilled: seemingly the several European politicians consider ethnic segregation and integration as two opposites, whereby ethnic segregation is seen as undesirable since it hampers the integration of the ethnic minorities.

## 6.1 The contact hypothesis and the conflict hypothesis

The academic discussion on the relationship between the concept of ethnic segregation and the concept of integration was central in this research. It was explained in Chapter 1 that in general two views can be distinguished on this relationship. In the first view on this relationship between the two concepts, ethnic segregation and integration are seen as two opposites, whereby ethnic segregation hampers integration and whereby both cannot be present at the same time. As it was explained in Chapter 2, those who support this view find their ideas embodied in the contact hypothesis, as introduced by Allport (1954). In this hypothesis spatial proximity of and extensive contact between the minority population and the (native) majority population are encouraged so that cultural elements (such as language or values) as well as socio-economic opportunities are shared and thus integration is achieved. In that sense ethnic segregation is perceived negatively since it is limiting the desired and required contact between the minority population and the (native) majority population and thus obstructs integration.

The second view on the relationship between the concepts of ethnic segregation and integration does not consider these two concepts as being opposites. Instead, in this view it is stated that ethnic segregation and integration are able to be present at the same time and this thought is to certain extent embodied in the conflict hypothesis, as was also explained in Chapter 2. Instead of promoting extensive contacts between the minority and the majority population, the conflict hypothesis argues that these extensive contacts should be avoided in order to reduce conflicts. More importantly, in the conflict hypothesis the positive effects of ethnic segregation are emphasized and it is argued that residing ethnically segregated eventually also leads to integration into mainstream society (Bolt et al., 2010). This latter point is important to emphasize on since it implies that something else other than ethnic segregation can determine the level of integration.

## 6.2 The city of Istanbul as the location of the research

This research was conducted in order to bring more clarity with respect to the academic discussion on the relationship between ethnic segregation and integration. In that context the city of Istanbul proofed to be the perfect location for this research. In several chapters it was frequently mentioned that both Pinarcioğlu and Işik (2009) as well as Ayata (2008) concluded that ethnic segregation in Istanbul does not exist. Following the contact hypothesis, wherein it is claimed that ethnic segregation hampers integration, it could then be argued that ethnic minorities in Istanbul are properly integrated into society. It then, however, remains unknown

whether the level of integration can be explained merely by the absence of ethnic segregation or if the level of integration should be sought in an other intervening variable, for example, the role of the government.

As it was shown in both Chapter 1 and in Chapter 4, a tensed relationship between the Turkish state and its ethnic minorities exists, whereby this was clearly illustrated in the discussion initiated by the Human Rights Advisory Commission on the replacement of the word 'Türk' for the word 'Türkiyeli' (see Bouwman, 2008; see Oran, 2011; see Grigoriadis, 2007). In that respect three major ethnic groups can be distinguished within Turkey: the Kurdish minority group, the Armenian minority group and the Greek minority group. Considering the restrictions regarding data but particularly regarding time, in this research it was decided to focus on the Greek minority group in Istanbul, because it was the Greek minority group that could be studied the best within these restrictions. Keeping in mind the absence of ethnic segregation in Istanbul, the focus on the Greek minority of Istanbul combined with the academic discussion on the relationship between ethnic segregation and integration eventually resulted in the following central research question:

*To what extent can the Greek minority of Istanbul be considered as integrated into society, and what does this mean for the relationship between ethnic segregation and integration in general?*

### 6.3 The concept of integration and the method of research

The statement made by Pinarcioğlu and Işik (2009) and Ayata (2008) that ethnic segregation in Istanbul is absent was taken as a starting point for this research. With respect to the central research question this then implied that it was merely the concept of integration (i.e. the Greek level of integration in Istanbul) that needed to be measured in this research and this was done by means of a survey (Appendix 1). It was thus necessary and valuable to elaborate on this concept of integration and therefore attention was given to the 'spheres of integration' as introduced by Engbersen and Gabriëls (1995). These authors argue that integration takes place in seven societal spheres: labour, education, housing, politics, religion, law and culture. All these seven spheres are closely related to either the socio-economic dimension of integration or the ethnic-cultural dimension of integration, which are the two dimension of integration as distinguished by Veenman (1994). Although Engbersen and Gabriëls (1995) state that all societal spheres should be taken into consideration, in general the emphasis is limited to merely four spheres. For the socio-economic dimension of integration the spheres of labour, education and housing are considered to be the most important (Musterd & Ostendorf, 2009; Odé & Veenman, 2003). Socio-economic integration therefore should be perceived in the light of the equal attainment by ethnic minorities in these three spheres (Poulsen, 2009). For the ethnic-cultural dimension of integration the sphere of culture is regarded as the most important. In order to determine whether an ethnic minority group can be considered as integrated in ethnical-cultural terms, one needs to identify cultural traits that are preserved (such as language and religion), while an awareness and orientation towards the mainstream society still exists. In case it appears that a minority group is completely oriented towards the mainstream society and no cultural traits are preserved, it can be argued that the assimilation of an ethnic minority group took place. The difference in ethnic cultural adjustment by an ethnic minority group thus distinguishes integration from assimilation, an important notion in the common misunderstanding that integration and assimilation can be considered as synonyms.

As was said earlier, since the level of ethnic segregation in Istanbul was already known, it was merely the Greek level of integration in Istanbul that needed to be measured before statements could be made about the relationship between ethnic segregation and integration in general. As mentioned earlier also, the process of measuring the Greek level of integration in Istanbul was completed by means of a survey (Appendix 1). The questions in this survey were derived from the *Jaarrapport Integratie 2009*, a report wherein integration is measured in a rather comprehensive way by including more spheres of integration than was done in this research. For example, the socio-economic dimension of integration in this research was measured by merely incorporating the spheres of education and labour, by asking the Greek respondents about their educational level, their employment, their sector of employment and their level of income. Although housing is also considered to be one of the important spheres within the socio-economic dimension of integration, it was due to restrictions of data not possible to incorporate this dimension in this research. The ethnic-cultural dimension of integration in this research was measured by incorporating the sphere of culture by asking the Greek respondents about their orientation towards Greece and Turkey, their identity and their informal contacts with the Greek population of Istanbul as well as with the Turkish majority population.

**6.4 The results of the survey**
The results of the survey were clear and presented in Chapter 5. While paying attention to the socio-economic dimension of integration, it becomes evident that the Greeks of Istanbul are doing rather well. It was statistically shown that, compared to the Turkish majority population, the Greeks of Istanbul are higher educated, less unemployed, more often employed as a white-collar worker and earning a higher income. It can therefore be concluded that the Greek minority of Istanbul is socio-economically integrated. Also for the ethnic-cultural dimension of integration it can be argued that the Greeks of Istanbul are integrated. With respect to this latter dimension, the results generated by the survey provide reasons to believe that the Greeks in Istanbul developed feelings of belongings towards Turkey. It was illustrated that the Greeks of Istanbul prefer to live in Turkey rather than in Greece and it was also shown that all respondents in this research are able to speak Turkish. Apart from these orientations towards the mainstream society, the members of the Greek minority of Istanbul feel Greek and are also seen as such by the Turkish majority population. Moreover, all members of the Greek presence in Istanbul are able to speak Greek and a vast majority of this group consider themselves as Eastern Orthodox. In addition to that also the frequency of informal inter-Greek contact on the level of the neighbourhood prevails over informal contact with the Turkish majority population. All of these indicate that the Greek minority of Istanbul holds on to their own cultural traits. These cultural traits in combination with the orientation towards the mainstream society excludes the option of assimilation and instead confirms that the Greek minority of Istanbul is also integrated in the ethnic-cultural dimension of integration. In short, the ethnic-cultural integration of the Greek minority of Istanbul is perfectly grasped by Alexandris, who concludes that

> the great majority of the Constantinopolitan Greeks remained faithful to their religious, ethnic and linguistic traditions. Despite their readiness to fulfill loyally their duties as Turkish citizens, the Greek minority strongly opposed assimilation and clung to their traditional urban culture. As a result, although they were for all intents and purposes fully bilingual, the Greeks successfully resisted the inroads of Kemalist nationalism and secularism, maintaining a distinctly Greek/cosmopolitan character. (Alexandris, 1992, p.316)

## 6.5 The importance of the Turkish history

Whereas the socio-economic dimension of integration can be expressed perfectly in a quantitative way, this is slightly more difficult for the ethnic-cultural dimension of integration. Although the ethnic-cultural integration was also grasped in a quantitative way by means of the survey, it was nevertheless decided to describe the Greek level of integration in particularly the ethnic-cultural dimension in a more comprehensive way by holding brief conversations with those who filled out the survey. From these brief conversations it was learned that the history of the Greek minority of Istanbul is vital to comprehend the current Greek situation in Istanbul, including the current level of integration. It was for that reason that Chapter 4 modestly provided an overview on the Greek presence in Turkey and Istanbul in particular. It was thoroughly explained that with the conquest of Constantinople by the Ottomans in 1453 an intense cultural symbioses was inaugurated by means of the Millet system, wherein a high degree of autonomy was granted to various religious categories. The religious category to which the Greek minority of Istanbul within the Ottoman Empire belonged to was named the 'Millet-I Rum' or 'Rum Milleti' and apart from the Greek Orthodox also Orthodox groups from the Balkans, several parts of Asia and some Arab provinces belonged to this millet. While still ultimately subject to the authority of the Ottoman state, there seemed, however, to be a form of equality within the Ottoman society, especially since this seemed to be official Ottoman policy. The Greeks of Istanbul benefited from this policy by gaining a powerful economic position within the Ottoman Empire and as such they were the second most important ethnic group in the rich cosmopolitan Ottoman society (Alexandris, 1992). However, this situation changed completely after 1923 with the fall of the Ottoman Empire, the subsequent Greco-Turkish War and the eventual establishment of the Turkish state. From a cosmopolitan society during Ottoman times in which ethnic heterogeneity was tolerated, the Turkish state now set ethnic homogeneity as the standard by means of the policy of 'Turkification'. The first step on the path towards this ethnic homogeneity was agreed upon in the Treaty of Lausanne through the massive population exchange between Greece and Turkey in 1923. This measure aimed to solve the ethno-religious animus that the Greco-Turkish War had exacerbated but has been criticized fiercely, for example by describing the event itself as 'ethnic cleansing' and its consequences as a 'human tragedy' (Kayali, 2008; Koufa & Svolopoulos, 1991; Mak, 2007).

An other important element of the Treaty of Lausanne were the minority clauses (Appendix 2), which were designed in order to regulate the legal status and guarantee the equality of those ethnic minorities who were excluded from the obligatory population exchange (Alexandris, 1992; Kurban & Hatemi, 2009; Kurban & Tsitselikis, 2010; Soner, 2005; Tekin, 2010). However, as explained in Chapter 4, during the negotiations in Lausanne it already became clear that the newly established Turkish government was not supporting these minority clauses. Instead, the Turkish government demanded the complete expulsion of Greeks from the whole of Turkey, including the Greeks of Istanbul. Due to diplomatic pressure by the League of Nations, however, the Turkish government eventually did agree with the minority clauses in the Treaty of Lausanne and as such the Greeks in Istanbul were allowed to stay, their legal status was acknowledged and their safety was officially guaranteed.

## 6.6 The influence of the Turkish government on the Greek level of integration

Chapter 4 concluded with the statement that what was demanded by the Turkish government in Lausanne – the complete expulsion of the Greeks of Istanbul – was eventually almost achieved decades later. Although the safety of the Greeks in Istanbul should have been guaranteed by the minority clauses in the Treaty of Lausanne, the Turkish government

violated these clauses frequently and systematically (Alexandris, 1992). History shows that from 1936 onwards about every ten years a government-initiated incident took place resulting in a gradually declining number of Greeks in Istanbul and eventually causing the Greek element in Istanbul to almost disappear (Tekin, 2010). In that respect the property confiscation, the Varlık Tax, the Istanbul Pogrom, the Cyprus conflict and the Turkish invasion in Cyprus were all explained. Moreover, all of these events caused a certain fear among the Greeks of Istanbul towards the Turkish state. In fact, from the brief conversations held with the respondents in this research, it was learned that all these events made many of the respondents state that among the Greeks of Istanbul there is the deep-rooted idea that the Turkish state planned the systematic eradication of Greeks in Turkey ever since the Lausanne Treaty was signed in 1923. In short, it can be said that the Turkish government had substantial influence on the lives of and causing fear among the Greeks of Istanbul. Alexandris in that respect mentions the following:

> The story of the Constantinopolitan Greek minority is perhaps the best example of the abortive attempts to assimilate the  non-Muslim elements in republican Turkey. The Turkish constitution and the law accorded complete  equality to all citizens. Yet the republic's principles of secularism and formal legal protection of all its citizens has only nominally superseded past attitudes and prejudices. Notwithstanding the political status of the Constantinopolitan Greeks as Turkish citizens, both government and public opinion in Turkey looked upon this community as an alien element. As a result, Ankara felt no compunction in using the Greek minority as a lever against Greece whenever relations between the two countries became tense. One important conclusion of the Constantinopolitan Greek experience is that minorities can only exist within neighbouring nationalist states if general relations are friendly. Thus, during such intervals (1930-40, 1947-54, 1959-64 and 1968-71) the Greek minority was able to enjoy a certain sense of security and belonging. As soon as relations between the two neighbours began to deteriorate there was an immediate backlash against them. Under these circumstances, and as the Turks applied official and psychological pressure, the fortunes of the Greek minority were adversely affected. It is not coincidental that the four principal waves of Greek exodus from Istanbul (1922-29, 1955-59, 1964-67 and 1972-75) took place during such periods of strained Greek-Turkish relations. (Alexandris, 1992, p.316)

It was stated repeatedly by the respondents during the many brief conversations that it was particularly the fear caused by the Turkish government that made the Greeks of Istanbul feel a certain pressure to integrate, especially and particularly in socio-economic terms. After all, if one is prosperous it becomes easier to recover from a measure such as the Varlık Tax and an incident such as the Istanbul Pogrom.

**6.7 Concluding remarks on the relationship between ethnic segregation and integration**
It was illustrated in Chapter 5 and repeated in this chapter that the Greeks of Istanbul can be considered as integrated in the socio-economic dimension as well as the ethnic-cultural dimension of integration. Following the contact hypothesis, wherein the concepts of ethnic segregation and integration are considered as opposites, the obvious conclusion would then be that the absence of ethnic segregation caused the Greek minority of Istanbul to integrate into society. During the brief conversations held with the respondents, however, it was learned that not the absence of ethnic segregation but that instead the fear caused by the Turkish government should be seen as the reason for the high level of Greek integration. As a consequence of this finding, ethnic segregation and integration should not be seen as two opposites. In fact, from a historical point of view, it was learned from the article by Anastassiadou (2009) that in the past the Greeks of Istanbul used to reside within close proximity of each other in neighbourhoods such as Cibali, Galata, Üsküdar and especially Pera (Beyoğlu). It can therefore be argued that ethnic segregation was present in Istanbul. At the same time this ethnic minority group rapidly integrated in Istanbul due to the element of education in schools and the element of social ties created by charity and philanthropy

eventually leading to the awareness of a proper Istanbul identity. In short, ethnic segregation and integration can be present at the same time and should thus not be considered as two opposites.

The fact that in the past ethnic segregation and integration were present at the same time combined with the fact that the current level of Greek integration can be explained by the influence of the Turkish government instead of the absence of ethnic segregation, provides ample support for the rejection of the contact hypothesis. In short, based on the findings of this research the concepts of ethnic segregation and integration do not have to be perceived as two extremes, whereby this conclusion to certain extent corresponds with the conflict hypothesis. It should be stressed, however, that the rejection of the contact hypothesis does not necessarily lead to an immediate acceptance of the conflict hypothesis. Instead, merely a few elements of the conflict hypothesis can be supported through the results of this research. The most significant element that is accepted from the conflict hypothesis is the idea that the concepts of ethnic segregation and integration do not have to be considered as two extremes. An other element of the conflict hypothesis that can be accepted is the idea that something else other than the level of ethnic segregation can explain the level of integration. However, the assumption of the conflict hypothesis that ethnic groups should reside separately in order to avoid conflict was not focused on, therefore no statements can be made on it and thus the conflict hypothesis cannot be fully accepted at this point.

European politicians such as Angela Merkel, Nicolas Sarkozy and David Cameron, who have all condemned the multicultural society as an utter failure, based their ideas on the assumption that ethnic segregation and integration are two extremes, whereby ethnic segregation is supposed to hamper the integration of ethnic minorities. From the findings of this research, however, it becomes clear that ethnic segregation and integration should not be seen as two opposites. It is not the level of ethnic segregation that determines the level of integration. Instead, it is the role of the government that should not be underestimated while explaining the level of integration. The failure of the multicultural society should therefore not be seen in the light of ethnic segregation but perhaps in the light of failing governments.

## 6.8 Minor errors and recommendations for further research
Despite the best intentions to conduct this research in the most appropriate way, two minor errors were unfortunately made. These two errors were unconsciously made, one while constructing the survey and one while conducting the survey and both were discovered afterwards. The latter error, for example, was made while posing the third question of the survey to the Greek respondents. In this question the respondents were asked about the branch of their (former) economic activity, whereby merely the employed part of the respondents as well as the currently retired respondents were asked to answer this question. The unemployed part of the Greek respondents were, however, falsely left out. Just as the retired part of the respondents, the unemployed part of the respondents could have been economically active as well and as such the third question of the survey could have been posed to this group also. Although it could be argued that the answers of the unemployed respondents would not have made a significant difference for the eventual outcome, it nevertheless remains regretful that the unemployed part of the respondents were excluded to answer the third question of the survey.

The other error was made while formulating the fourth question of the survey. In this question the Greek respondents were asked about their level of income, whereby the question was designed in such a way that the respondents could choose from six predefined categories. In

retrospect, however, the question should have been designed in such a way that respondents could have provided an exact number instead of asking them to choose from the predefined categories. In case an exact number would have been asked, it would have been possible to apply a hypothesis test of proportions and by doing so a more comprehensive statistical statement could have been made with respect to the differences in the level of income. Although the eventual outcome of this question is still rather clear, it nevertheless remains regretful here as well that the respondents were not asked about their exact income and a hypothesis test of proportions could not be applied.

Whenever one would find the need to repeat this research, it would be advisable to keep in mind the errors that were unfortunately made in this research. However, as said, the impact of the errors were negligible and it can thus be expected that the eventual outcome of the research remains the same. For future research it is perhaps therefore more interesting to focus on related topics that can be derived from the findings of this research. This research has, for example, focused on the Greek minority of Istanbul particularly in relation to the concept of integration but for future research it is perhaps interesting to focus on the Greek minority of Istanbul in relation to the concept of assimilation. It was shown in this research that the Greeks of Istanbul held on to their own identity by remaining faithful to their own religious, ethnic and linguistic traditions. By doing so, they rejected Turkish assimilation and it is for future research interesting to question how this minority group was able to do so, especially when keeping in mind the frequent attempts of the Turkish government by means of the policy of Turkification.

The Greek minority of Istanbul became a distinct and acknowledged minority group after the signing of the Treaty of Lausanne. Future research could perhaps focus on the other ethnic minority group as defined by the Treaty of Lausanne, which are the ethnic Turks of Western Thrace in Greece, who were also excluded from the obligatory population exchange between Greece and Turkey. Although this research focused on the Greek minority of Istanbul and emphasized the (violent) role of the Turkish government, it should be stressed that it was not merely the Turkish government who consistently violated the minority clauses of the Treaty of Lausanne. Apart from the Turkish violations of the treaty, it was namely also the Greek government who's role can be questioned. For example,

> In 1955, the parliament in Athens introduced the Greek Code of Nationality. Article 19 of the Code stipulated that a person of non-Greek ethnic origin leaving Greece without the intention of returning may be declared as having lost Greek nationality. Until its repeal in 1998, Article 19 had served as the legal basis for the removal of Greek citizenship from approximately 60,000 citizens, the vast majority of whom were the members of the Western Thrace minority. It was explicitly discriminatory, as it had not applied to citizens of Greek descent. [….]. Violations have continued in the form of denial of self-identification, economic and educational marginalization, appointment of muftis by the state, limitations on political representation, restrictions on freedom of movement and closure of minority associations, all in contradiction with the obligations of Lausanne. (Tekin, 2010, p.85)

Based on what is said in the latter quote, it can be argued that the ethnic Turks in Western Thrace more or less experienced a similar influence of the Greek government as the Greek minority of Istanbul experienced from the Turkish government. For future research related to the topic of this research, depending on the level of ethnic segregation, it could be interesting to focus on the level of integration of the ethnic Turks of Western Thrace. By focusing on the ethnic Turks in Western Thrace and while keeping in mind the questionable role played by the Greek government, the possible outcome of future research could indicate if and to what extent the findings of this research can be supported and eventually a more comprehensive understanding of the relationship between ethnic segregation and integration can be attained.

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## Appendix 1
## Survey
## The integration of the Greek minority in Istanbul

This survey is designed to measure your level of integration into the Turkish society. In this survey you can remain anonymous and the answers provided by you will be processed in a discrete way. No other person than the researcher will see these answers and the answers will be used for his research only.

This survey consists of three parts. The first part will ask questions about your formal participation in society, which are questions about education and labor. The second part will deal with your orientation towards Greece, your perceived identity and the informal contacts with the people in your neighborhood. Lastly, the third part will ask for some background information.

**Part 1 – Formal participation in society**
1. What is the highest level of education you have completed?
□ Primary education         □ Secondary education         □ Higher education

2. Do you have a job?         □ Yes         □ No         □ Retired

3. In which branch of economic activity do you work?
□ Agriculture, foresting and fishing               □ Mining and quarrying
□ Community, social and personal services          □ Manufacturing
□ Wholesale and retail trade, restaurants and hotels    □ Construction
□ Finance, insurance, real estate and business service   □ Electricity, gas and water supply
□ Other, namely ……………………

4. What is in your household the average income per month in Turkish Liras?
□ < 4345              □ 11453 – 16706
□ 4345 – 7908         □ 16706 – 35093
□ 7908 – 11453        □ > 35093

**Part 2 – Informal participation in society and orientation**
5. Would you rather prefer to live in Greece or in Turkey?

    Greece      ○      ○      ○      ○      ○      Turkey

6. Do you speak the Greek language?         □ Yes         □ No

7. Do you speak the Turkish language?         □ Yes         □ No

8. To what extent do you consider yourself as Eastern Orthodox?

    Not at all      ○      ○      ○      ○      ○      Completely

9. I feel…

    Greek      ○      ○      ○      ○      ○      Turkish

10. The Turkish majority population considers me as…

     Greek     o     o     o     o     o     Turkish

11. What percentage of your neighborhood can be considered as Greek?

□ < 20 %     □ 20% - 40%     □40% - 60%     □ 60% - 80%     □ > 80%

12. How often do you have informal contact with the Greek people in your neighborhood?

□ Never     □ 1 or 2 times a week     □ 3 or 4 times a week     □ Every day

13.What percentage of your neighborhood can be considered as Turkish?

□ < 20 %     □ 20% - 40%     □40% - 60%     □ 60% - 80%     □ > 80%

14. How often do you have informal contact with the Turkish people in your neighborhood?

□ Never     □ 1 or 2 times a week     □ 3 or 4 times a week     □ Every day

**Part 3 – Background information**
15. What is your age?□ …..

16. What is your sex?□ Male     □ Female

17. For how long have you been living in Turkey?  □ ….. years

18. For how long have you been living in Istanbul? □ ….. years

**This is the end of the survey. As already mentioned in the beginning, the answers provided by you will be processed discretely, meaning that no third party will have access to these answers. Thank you for your time and cooperation.**

## Appendix 2
## Minority clauses in the Treaty of Lausanne
(Source: Alexandris, 1992; Kurban & Hatemi, 2009; Kurban & Tsitselikis, 2010)

### Article 37
Turkey undertakes that the stipulations contained in Articles 38 to 44 shall be recognised as fundamental laws, and that no law, no regulation, nor official action shall conflict or interfere with these stipulations, nor shall any law, regulation, nor official action prevail over them.

### Article 38
The Turkish government undertakes to assure full and complete protection of life and liberty to all inhabitants of Turkey without distinction of birth, nationality, language, race or religion.

All inhabitants of Turkey shall be entitled to free exercise, whether in public or private, of any creed, religion or belief, the observance of which shall not be incompatible with public order and good morals.

Non-Muslim minorities will enjoy full freedom of movement and of emigration, subject to the measures applied, on the whole or on the part of the territory, to all Turkish nationals, and which may be taken by the Turkish Government for national defence, or for the maintenance of public order.

### Article 39
Turkish subjects belonging to non-Muslim minorities will enjoy the same civil and political rights as Muslims.

All the inhabitants of Turkey, without distinction of religion, shall be equal before the law.

Differences of religion, creed or confession shall not prejudice any Turkish national in matters relating to the enjoyment of civil and political rights, as, for instance, admission to public employments, functions and honours, or the exercise of professions and industries.

No restrictions shall be imposed on the free use by any Turkish national of any language in private intercourse, in commerce, religion, in the press, or in publications of any kind or public meetings.

Notwithstanding the existence of the official language, adequate facilities shall be given to Turkish nationals of non-Turkish speech for the oral use of their own language before the Courts.

### Article 40
Turkish nationals belonging to non-Muslim minorities shall enjoy the same treatment and security in law and in fact as other Turkish nationals. In particular, they shall have an equal right to establish, manage and control at their own expense, any charitable, religious and social institutions, any schools and other establishments for instruction and education, with the right to use their own language and to exercise their own religion freely therein.

## Article 41

As regards public institution, the Turkish Government will grant in those towns and districts, where a considerable proportion of non-Muslim nationals are resident, adequate facilities for ensuring that in the primary schools the instruction shall be given to the children of such Turkish nationals through the medium of their own language. This provision shall not prevent the Turkish Government from making the teaching of the Turkish language obligatory in the said schools.

In towns and districts where there is a considerable proportion of Turkish nationals belonging to non-Muslim minorities, these minorities shall be assured an equitable share in the enjoyment and application of these sums which may be provided out of public funds under the State, municipal or other budgets for educational, religious, or charitable purposes.

The sums in question shall be paid to the qualified representatives of the establishments and institutions concerned.

## Article 42

The Turkish Government undertakes, as regards non-Muslim minorities, in so far as concerns their family law or personal status, measures permitting the settlement of these questions in accordance with the customs of those minorities.

These measures will be elaborated by special Commissions composed of representatives of the Turkish Government and of representatives of each of the minorities concerned in equal number. In case of divergence, the Turkish Government and the Council of the League of Nations will appoint in agreement an umpire chosen from amongst European lawyers.

The Turkish Government undertakes to grant full protection to the churches, synagogues, cemeteries, and other religious establishments of the above-mentioned minorities. All facilities and authorisation will be granted to the pious foundations, and to the religious and charitable institutions of the said minorities at present existing in Turkey, and the Turkish Government will not refuse, for the formation of new religious and charitable institutions, any of the necessary facilities which are guaranteed to other private institutions of that nature.

## Article 43

Turkish nationals belonging to non-Muslim minorities shall not be compelled to perform any act which constitutes a violation of their faith or religious observances, and shall not be placed under any disability by reason of their refusal to attend Courts of Law or to perform any legal business on their weekly day of rest.

This provision, however, shall not exempt such Turkish nationals from such obligations as shall be imposed upon all other Turkish nationals for the preservation of public order.

## Article 44

Turkey agrees that, in so far as the preceding Articles of this Section affect non-Muslim nationals of Turkey, these provisions constitute obligations of international concern and shall be placed under the guarantee of the League of Nations. They shall not be modified without the assent of the majority of the Council of the League of Nations. The British Empire,

France, Italy and Japan hereby agree not to withhold their assent to any modification in these Articles which is in due form assented to by a majority of the Council of the League of Nations.

Turkey agrees that any Member of the Council of the League of Nations shall have the right to bring to the attention of the Council any infraction or danger of infraction of any of these obligations, and that the Council may thereupon take such action and give such directions as it may deem proper and effective in the circumstances.

Turkey further agrees that any difference of opinion as to questions of law or of fact arising out of these Articles between the Turkish government and any one of the Signatory Powers or any other Power, a member of the Council of the League of Nations, shall be held to be a dispute of an international character under Article 14 of the Covenant of the League of Nations. The Turkish Government hereby consents that any such dispute shall, if the other party thereto demands, be referred to the Permanent Court of International Justice. The decision of the Permanent Court shall be final and shall have the same force and effect as an award under Article 13 of the Covenant.

**Article 45**

The rights conferred by the provisions of the present Section on the non-Muslim minorities of Turkey will similarly conferred by Greece on the Muslim minority in her territory.