A Better World for All?

The transforming field of development cooperation in the Netherlands

The influence of notions of security on the way the migration-development nexus is reconceived by a transforming Dutch development cooperation field

Lysanne Knobbout

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

A Better World for All? The transforming field of development cooperation in the Netherlands

The influence of notions of security on the way the migration-development nexus is reconceived by a transforming Dutch development cooperation field

Master's Thesis

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Preface

Honestly, I am thrilled to compose these first few words you are reading now, as they are finally the last ones I will write here. During this past academic year, I have written a Master's thesis on topics that have my great interest and of which I believe knowledge is extremely valuable for everyone in our globalising world: development cooperation, migration, and notions of security. The last few days have shown the importance of migration in our Dutch society as well; while I was putting the finishing touches to this thesis, the Dutch cabinet *Rutte IV* fell over 'irreconcilable differences' in coalition outlooks on asylum policy decisions. It seems to be indicative of the political space in which this research finds itself, something that will emerge more when discussing discourses on topics of this thesis.

But before we start putting all the pieces of this research puzzle together, I would like to express my gratitude. I namely owe much to many people. First of all, this research would not be finished here today without my interview respondents. I am enormously grateful for their contribution, which included so many interesting and valuable insights, and for the time they took in their busy schedules to have conversations with me. Without their honesty and openness, this research could not have existed.

I owe special thanks to my Master's thesis supervisor, Lothar Smith, for providing me with many valuable comments and discussions during this research process. His insights guided me towards this finalized product, which would have looked completely different without this input.

Furthermore, I would like to thank all my friends for listening to my many stories and struggles, for endlessly discussing all my ideas and doubts, and for providing me with distraction when it was so much needed. In particular, I want to thank Hanna and Céline – their support was beyond description and indispensable. I don't know what I would have done without our daily talks, so thank you. And, to my fellow Human Geography students: thank you for the countless amount of coffee breaks over the past few months, they really kept me going.

Finally, I am so grateful for the support of my parents. Their love is unconditional and I am blessed to receive their enormous amount of support. I don't know how I would have done this without them.

And now, with great joy, the time has come for me to say: Happy reading!

Lysanne Knobbout

Nijmegen, 15th of July 2023

Summary

The traditional landscape of development cooperation makes way for a more diverse and complex field, one that includes new actors and approaches; a phenomenon that also occurs in the Netherlands. Looking at this nation-state specifically, migration is becoming an important part of the pillars of the Dutch development agenda. Therefore, taking into account that the policy domains of migration and development tend to increasingly intertwine and the migration-development nexus is becoming politicized within the European Union, this research studies the transforming development cooperation field of the Netherlands and how notions of security affect the way in which the migration-development nexus is conceived in it. The thesis specifically focuses on the Dutch development sector that entails practitioners and projects concerning the subject of migration and border security. However, to support the move away from methodological nationalism and the sedentary bias that has shaped migration and development studies, the research uses the Netherlands as a starting point but is not bound by its borders, thus taking a transnational perspective.

In this research inquiry, a single case study design is used to study one issue (the influence of notions of security on the conception of the migration-development nexus) in one single site (the development cooperation field of the Netherlands). The case is considered to be a political space in which development organisations exist and act. Based on a postmodern interpretive framework, this qualitative research studies and deconstructs texts to discover concealed discourses residing in the development cooperation field. To fulfil the research aim, firstly, the primary ways in which the field has transformed were investigated by using the time frames of Jan Pronk (the 1980s), the MDGs (2000-2015), and the SDGs (2016-2030). This also provided the opportunity to investigate the social practice the studied issue resides in, which is specifically relevant to the discourse analysis this thesis used. To continue, nine semi-structured interviews were conducted with practitioners of the Dutch development cooperation field regarding migration and border security, to uncover discourses that exist in the field. The interview texts were coded and analysed in ATLAS.ti by using the three layers of Fairclough's Critical Discourse Analysis, including the linguistic, discursive, and social practice.

The results show that the Dutch development cooperation field transformed in many ways. In the conversations with the practitioners, the theme of localisation stood out and led to the determination of an uncovered discourse. There is, namely, an overall understanding that the voice of local actors should become central to development cooperation. However, it appears to be doubtful if localisation can or will be implemented to its fullest extent, since various circumstances, such as assumed risks of financial investors, complicate the transformation.

Furthermore, the findings regarding the migration-development nexus can be summarized into the understanding that some characteristics of the link were acknowledged and considered valuable, such as the value of financial and social remittances, as well as the idea that not only individual migrants but also migrant diasporas become development agents. Yet, the idea that there is a direct link between

bringing development and stopping migration is a train of thought that the development practitioners do not engage in, as it is considered to be simplistic. However, there is an understanding that the migration-development nexus can be used as an 'idée-fixe' by the Dutch government: to instrumentalize development cooperation as a way to halt migration and thereby limit security threats that are considered to be caused by international migration. This can be linked to notions of security, which were perceived to have a permeating role in the political space this research and the development organisations are residing in. Notions of security were experienced by the practitioners on the local, national and global level, and the discourse regarding this theme uncovered two perceived paradoxes.

All in all, the research concluded that it is important to acknowledge the so-called 'sake of self-interest' of a nation-state's government in development cooperation because it can offer the opportunity to not abandon the migration-development nexus altogether, but to acknowledge the complex political, economic, and social context in which it finds itself, and to look from there at what it can contribute to the development field. The thesis ends with the limitations of the research, of which the decision to focus on Dutch development practitioners has been mentioned as a prominent one. Including the voices of other actors, such as governmental ones or those of 'southern' partners, could have led to different perspectives on the themes discussed. Finally, the limitations are followed by recommendations for further research that could shine more light on the complexity of the transforming development cooperation field.

Table of Contents

List of Figures

List of Tables

List of Abbreviations

CDA	Critical Discourse Analysis
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
ENP	European Neighbourhood Policy
EU	European Union
EUTF	EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa
FTE	Full-time equivalent
IDGs	International Development Goals
IDP	Internally displaced person
ILO	International Labour Organisation
IMF	International Monetary Fund
INGO	International non-governmental organisation
IOB	*Directie Internationaal Onderzoek en Beleidsevaluatie* (Policy and Operations Evaluation Department)
MDGs	Millennium Development Goals
NGDO	Non-governmental development organisation
NGO	Non-governmental organisation
ODA	Official development assistance
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
PDIs	Private Development Initiatives
REMPLOD	Reintegration of Emigrant Manpower Promotion of Local Opportunities for Development
SDGs	Sustainable Development Goals
UN	United Nations
UNDESA	United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
WTO	World Trade Organization

1. Introduction

1.1 Introduction of the topic

Development cooperation is transforming into a more diverse and complex field of different actors and characteristics than it has been before (Gore, 2013). For the past decades, development cooperation was often understood as, and oriented on, official development assistance (ODA). At the global level, three institutions were leading in the regulation of development cooperation practices between recipients and donors: the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the OECD – the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (Gore, 2013). Furthermore, United Nations (UN) organisations characterize the landscape by, for example, fostering dialogue and formulating goals such as the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) for a global development agenda. Even though these supranational institutions obviously still exist and their influence should not be denied, the traditional landscape makes way for a more diverse and complex development cooperation field, one that includes new actors and approaches (Gore, 2013), a phenomenon that also occurs in the Netherlands (Kinsbergen & Schulpen, 2013). As Develtere, Huyse and Van Ongevalle (2021) put this, the development cooperation sector is becoming a complex web of an increasing number of actors that do not abide by the ins and outs of the development aid specialists and is no longer characterized by only Global North to Global South interactions but also increasingly consists of more South-South relations. On top of that, actors from all over the world express the desire *"to act 'without borders'"* (Develtere et al., 2021, p. 23).

While it can be stated that there is a proliferation – or sprawl, as Develtere et al. even calls it – of diverse actors that assign themselves to the development cooperation field, this is not the only change the sector is experiencing. The diversification of financing development, the regulation and coherence of policies, and the importance of knowledge are considered other important dimensions that are part of the changing landscape of development cooperation (Janus, Klingebiel & Paulo, 2015). Furthermore, the idea that development cooperation solely aims to reduce poverty has made way for a new context in which development actors have to decide whether they do or do not want their objectives to become related to policy objectives that consider, for example, global, national, or local problem areas such as climate change or security (Janus et al., 2015). Taking this into consideration, it can be argued that studying the transformation of the development cooperation field is valuable at this particular moment, as these ongoing changes will influence processes of the development cooperation sector in the future – if it is to remain a 'sector' at all.

More than twenty years ago, a report called '2000: A Better World for All: Progress towards the international development goals' was published by the IMF, OECD, UN, and World Bank to provide a framework for policies and programmes in the fight against poverty worldwide (IMF et al., 2000). The

report *"provided legitimacy to the IDGs although there was still some concern that donor countries were over-influencing the agenda"* (Hulme, 2009, as cited in McGregor, 2020, p. 285). Thus, there was already a concern back then that the donor countries were over-influencing the agenda, and these organisations felt the need to provide legitimacy to the International Development Goals (IDGs), which are mirrored in the MDGs (McGregor, 2020). So, are development goals and initiatives really there to create *A Better World for All*? Or just for some? Is there an ulterior motive, not necessarily originating from the initiatives themselves (and their executors, the development cooperation actors) but seeped through by a discourse residing in the development policy arena? This thesis studies a piece of the puzzle by focusing on the field of development cooperation in the Netherlands, a country that is one of these referred to donor countries.

However, it should be noted that development has been – and still is – perceived as a territorialized phenomenon that could be measured by indicators that reflect changes in one single place (Nijenhuis & Leung, 2017). The field of development is being investigated in an archaic and sedentary manner, and this bias results in the ignorance of translocal aspects of development in policies or agendas such as the SDGs and their predecessor (Nijenhuis & Leung, 2017). Furthermore, the conceptualization of development, focussing on achieving better living conditions in 'places of origin', includes the train of thought that migration is, actually, a failure in development. This, in turn, stimulates the sedentary perspective of development (Nijenhuis & Leung, 2017), which fails to understand the intersectional and interconnectedness of mobility and development (Smith & Schapendonk, 2018). Plus, development cooperation has not only been organized by representative organisations of nation-states for quite a long time. Especially when looking at transnational networks of migrants, development is not limited to one nationality or organised via the traditional institutional frameworks one might assume. Therefore, this thesis takes the research opportunity to focus on the transforming development cooperation field of the Netherlands, while using a transnational lens. To clarify, it studies actors in the field of development of the Netherlands but takes this as a starting point, and is thus not bound by the nation-state in its results. This perspective of transnationalism offers an opportunity to counterbalance the sedentary bias in research regarding development.

To delineate the boundaries of this research a bit more, one sector of the development cooperation field is studied more thoroughly. While there are various other important sectors like education and employment, health, food security and sustainable agriculture, human rights, or humanitarian aid, one sector is particularly on the rise: development regarding migration and border security. As the migration-development debate has shown, development, migration and security are integrally linked (Nyberg-Sørensen, 2012). One aspect is the attempt of several development agencies to, based on government decisions, enhance the linkages between the aid they provide and migration (and/or refugee) policies (Nyberg-Sørensen, 2012, p. 65), even though the relationship between migration and development is far from simple (Nyberg-Sørensen, 2016). Whether the nexus is perceived positively or negatively, it is increasingly used in formulating migration-development policies, as the

increase in migration is seen as a challenge for social cohesion (Nyberg-Sørensen, 2014). Furthermore, the policy domains of migration and development tend to increasingly intertwine, and the migration-development nexus is becoming increasingly politicized within the European Union (EU), including the Netherlands (Lauwers, Orbie & Delputte, 2021). And, like Van Reisen, Schoenmaeckers and Van Dillen (2019) state in their research on migration and development in the Netherlands, migration is an important part of pillars in the Dutch development agenda. During economic crises or when many refugees are arriving at the borders of the European Union, changes in the development policies of the nation-state can be identified (Van Reisen, Schoenmaeckers & Van Dillen, 2019). Therefore, taking into consideration the rising importance of migration within the development field, since development cooperation and policies have been framed as a tool to tackle irregular 'migratory pressure' (Kadysheva et al., 2019, p. 9) or used to make migration 'work' for development practices (Nyberg-Sørensen, 2016), this thesis focuses on the development sector that entails practitioners and projects concerning the subject of migration and border security.

Lastly, as said, Lauwers et al. (2021) established that the migration-development nexus has been politicized in the EU, but they also conclude that there is a significant difference among political parties and countries in the extent to which this politicization occurred. Furthermore, they argue that the conception of the migration-development nexus is very complex, not straightforward and can differ per country, and that more research is needed to understand the conception of the link. The authors focused on political debates on the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa (EUTF) – or better phrased as the Migration Trust Fund, as they argue – in eight EU parliaments and propose that further research should look into one nation-state more extensively or be centred around a more agency-centric perspective, looking at political parties and their conceptions and responses more in-depth (Lauwers et al., 2021, p. 87). I have heard that call but have decided to move away from this political party focus and orient myself towards the actual implementers of development cooperation policy: the practitioners within the Dutch field of development cooperation. I namely believe that their voices and experiences should be heard too, and how they conceive the migration-development nexus is closer to 'the source', the operations of the development cooperation field, than when politicians were studied. On top of that, their thoughts could reveal undisclosed discourses or power relations that would not emerge when interview-trained politicians were questioned. Taking this all as a starting point, this study highlights the transforming Dutch development cooperation field regarding migration and border security, looking into its actors and the way the migration-development nexus is conceived. So, without further ado, let's move on to the next section, which examines the relevance of this study in more detail.

1.2 Relevance

Following on from the prior discussion, in this section, I explicitly turn to both the societal and scientific relevance of this thesis.

1.2.1 Societal relevance

This thesis focuses on the transformation of the Dutch development cooperation field related to migration and border security. Development has been a topic that concerns and connects people all across the world and the Millennium Development Goals have, for example, formulated the worldwide development challenge as *"a shared problem, borne by all of humanity"* (Chandy & Kharas, 2011, p. 741). Tackling the problems we are facing today, such as climate change or conflicts, surpasses the nation-state level and can only be handled through international cooperation (Chandy & Kharas, 2011). The global perspective and (attempt of) global governance of the development cooperation arena are important, yet the changes within the field on a local and regional level are also highly relevant. A transformation of development cooperation, which can include the involvement of actors that have different purposes than before (e.g., commercial organizations versus non-commercial ones), could have an impact on the development processes, and therefore also on the communities and societies they are engaged in. Likewise, changing goals, aims, or participation within the development field could also shape the impacts on society. Furthermore, ideas on how migration is affecting development and social transformations in countries and societies are also changing (De Haas, Castles & Miller, 2020). It is therefore important to create more insight into the transformation and the way the migration-development nexus is conceived.

To continue, development cooperation tends to bear the understanding that areas that are 'underdeveloped' need the support of those that have been fully 'developed'. Development initiatives are often presented to have one single dominant aim, poverty reduction, leaving mixed objectives of policy instruments unspoken and resulting in the reporting of other impacts as 'unintended effects' (Keijzer & Lundsgaarde, 2018). It is important to reveal existing discourses, as these 'unintended effects' may not be as unintended as they appear at first or can be resulting from an undisclosed mutual benefit perspective. Arguing that these effects are actually 'undisclosed intended effects', Keijzer and Lundsgaarde (2018) state there is an *"urgency for development researchers and evaluators not to fall behind the curve in terms of continuing to represent development cooperation as pursuing a single dominant aim"* (Keijzer & Lundsgaarde, 2018, p. 216). I take this urgency as a research opportunity to study underlying discourses in development cooperation regarding migration and border security. By vetting current influences and listening to the experiences of practitioners of the development field in the Netherlands, discourses can be uncovered and 'unintended effects' can become visible. This makes the research relevant for society as well as for the actors in the development cooperation field, as these effects may not be caused by their own intentions but by, for example, the aims of the Dutch government. However, it should be noted that in this search for underlying discourses, including the actors' experiences on the 'receiving' or implementing side of development would have been very – perhaps even more – socially relevant. Why my research does not include these actors is elaborated on in the scientific relevance section (Section 1.2.2).

As part of the Human Geography Master's programme at Radboud University, I conducted a six-month internship in the second semester of the 2021-2022 academic year at Bureau Wijland. Bureau Wijland is a consultancy and project agency located in Nijmegen that strives to make sustainable and inclusive connections between people and within society. Their projects evolve around the inclusivity of citizens with diverse nationalities and ethnicities, mainly with a migration background. For example, they organize meetings with new Dutch citizens to sign 'participation statements' and work with governments, companies, and civil society organisations. Next to this, their programme and course *Kleurrijk Groen* (translation: Colourful Green) was founded to train participants to act as a bridge between their migrant networks and the themes of nature and sustainability.

Furthermore, and this was the focus of my internship, Bureau Wijland is the executor of the Shelter City Programme in Nijmegen. In this project, founded by Justice & Peace Netherlands, human rights defenders from across the globe find rest and protection in one of the Shelter Cities, while being empowered to continue their important work back at home after their stay has ended. I was the mentor of a Venezuelan human rights defender that stayed in Nijmegen for three months. Since 2014, 5.6 million Venezuelans have left their country due to the deteriorating social-economic and political situation (UNHCR, 2022). In 2022, this accounted for 17 per cent of the global total of refugees and other people in need of international protection (UNHCR, 2022). Through transformative programmes, the non-profit and non-governmental organization of this Shelter City guest tries to empower people that still reside in the communities of the Latin-American country.

The internship at Bureau Wijland, including the experience with the Shelter City project and the work the human rights defender was involved in, has offered me a context in which this Master's thesis could be created. As mentioned, Bureau Wijland advises companies in sustainable and inclusive matters and has multiple projects concerning the integration of migrants in the Netherlands, especially in Nijmegen and Arnhem. This thesis investigates the transforming development cooperation field of the Netherlands and looks at development regarding migration and border security specifically, in which Bureau Wijland can actually be distinguished as one of the actors within the field. They may not be the traditional NGO we initially think of, especially because their programmes are conducted in the Netherlands, but they can also be distinguished as part of the 'new category' of development actors as described by Develtere et al. (2021) – which will be elaborated on in the second chapter of this thesis – and they involve themselves in migration-development related matters since they actively try to stimulate participants to form a bridge between their social (transnational) networks and knowledge learned in the programmes. This context increased my interest and raised questions: why is this sharing of knowledge considered so important? What moves a municipality to provide subsidies for projects that stimulate the creation of change-makers, involving people with a migration background and those

included in their social networks? And why would a Venezuelan organisation receive funding from the European Union to enhance empowerment in the communities that are 'left behind'?[1]

Taking this all into consideration, the internship organisation brought indispensable added value in terms of setting the scene for writing this Master's thesis. The organisation's involvement in the development cooperation field is being recognized and, therefore, they were interviewed as one of the respondents. This thesis' results are thus relevant for them too, as uncovered perspectives evolving around issues and questions that they concern themselves with can contribute to an increase in understanding of their field of operation.

1.2.2 Scientific relevance

This Master's thesis aims to deliver one piece to the puzzle that consists of research concerning development cooperation and its relation to migration and border security. As Develtere et al. (2021) argue, there is a lack of knowledge and debate on development cooperation, while the field is a maze and includes thousands of (non-)governmental organizations and institutions across the globe. Trying to fill up a small part of this gap would make the research project scientifically relevant.

However, even though this study will focus on the changes regarding the Dutch development cooperation field, it should be noted that studying the same field of the Global South, or even South-to-South development relations, would have been highly relevant to investigate since development-related research is dominantly focused on the involvement of actors from the Global North (Develtere et al., 2021). Unfortunately, when this thesis' research proposal was written, the COVID-19 pandemic threw a spanner in the works and made doing research abroad uncertain. In addition, and perhaps more importantly, it was also ethically questionable to travel and conduct research in areas in which a significant part of society was not vaccinated yet. The fact that the imbalance of geopolitical power between Global North and Global South countries had contributed to this (Nhamo et al., 2021), made me wonder if doing fieldwork in these areas was the appropriate thing to do. Therefore, I decided to take the Netherlands as a starting point in this research, while acknowledging the importance of Global South-driven research.

Taking this aside, it can be stated that focusing on the development cooperation field of a high-income country such as the Netherlands is an important and understudied issue too. Namely, many studies tend to focus on the EU as a whole, especially when looking at the linkages between development and migration policies and the politicization of the debate (Lauwers et al., 2021). Yet, doing a contemporary analysis of one particular nation-state can provide more in-depth knowledge on the

[1] This funding was mentioned in a conversation with the human rights defender but will not be discussed more extensively, as exposing funding could harm the safety conditions of the organisation and its employees. It was merely used as a spur for this Master's thesis to investigate the underlying goals of development cooperation with its policies and objectives.

transformation of the development cooperation field within that specific context. To clarify, as was mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, even though the Netherlands will be used as the starting point, this research will not be bound by its nation-state borders. Migration and development studies have namely been shaped by and have suffered from a sedentary bias, which turned a blind eye to the possible importance of ties between people and places in these research areas (Nyberg-Sørensen, 2012). Methodological nationalism, meaning *"the assumption that the nation/state/society is the natural social and political form of the modern world"* (Wimmer & Glick Schiller, 2002, p. 302), has influenced social sciences, migration research and discourses related to immigration and integration (Wimmer & Glick Schiller, 2002). Holding on to this methodological nationalist approach would contribute to the assumption that the difference between migrants and native citizens is a challenge to stability and social cohesion in the nation-states in which migrants settle (Glick Schiller, 2009). Taking a transnational perspective acknowledges that migration and development processes are not defined by singular movements but by a continuation of mobility, including the crossing of state borders, which takes sedentary assumptions away and contradicts the belief that the nation-state is the 'natural' form of how our world is constructed. However, it should be noted that the value of this transnational perspective is not to discover something 'new' but merely to support the move away from methodological nationalism (Wimmer & Glick Schiller, 2002). Nevertheless, while looking beyond the border, a transnational perspective does not assume the demise of the nation-state (Faist & Fauser, 2011).

Furthermore, the fact that the migration-development nexus is becoming increasingly politicized within the European Union, including the Netherlands (Lauwers et al., 2021), makes this research not only relevant to society but also to the academic world. Lauwers et al. (2021) namely argue that there are various understandings of how the nexus is conceived and that these require a better investigation, as the understandings are complex and differ among EU states. Focusing on the way the migration-development nexus is conceived in one of these member states, the Netherlands, fills a small part of this research gap. It can make space for reflexivity, which is needed for both scientific and societal debate, as migration becomes more and more important in development debates.

Lastly, if it could be determined how the development cooperation field has transformed, then this could also shine a light on future changes, as some transformations may continue to persist and evolve. The fulfilment of the SDGs in 2030 is on the horizon, so established changes in the development cooperation field could create new recommendations for further research in which will be uncovered how the SDGs should be adapted (before or after 2030) so that the goals will fit into the new development cooperation arena.

1.3 Research objective and research questions

This research aims to gain knowledge on the transforming development cooperation field of the Netherlands and how the migration-development nexus is conceived in it. Taking the increasing

importance of migration within policies and the development domain into consideration, the development that concerns migration and border security is focused on specifically, as the total development cooperation field is too extensive to study. Therefore, the Master's thesis makes use of the following main research question:

> ***How do notions of security affect the way in which the migration-development nexus is conceived in the transforming Dutch development cooperation field regarding migration and border security?***

To answer the main research question, the following sub-questions have been created:

1) *In what primary ways has the Dutch development cooperation field regarding migration and border security transformed?*

The main research question implies that the development cooperation field of the Netherlands is transforming. Therefore, this sub-question will be used to study in what key ways the development cooperation field has transformed over the years. To define the boundaries of the thesis, it is necessary to set up a time frame. When looking at the Netherlands, the time frames of Jan Pronk (the 1980s), the MDGs (2000-2015), and the SDGs (2016-2030) are distinguished, as these times can be described as significant for changes.

2) *How do actors of the Dutch development cooperation field regarding migration and border security perceive the influence of the migration-development nexus and notions of security?*

The second sub-question focuses on the perspectives of the actors in the development cooperation field. It aims to grasp how actors perceive the supposed changes and influences of the migration-development nexus and notions of security within their field of operation. This question could uncover whether the actors experience this influence as negative or an issue, or if it is not perceived at all.

3) *To what extent do government policies regarding migration and security prevail in the Dutch development cooperation field regarding migration and border security?*

The third and last sub-question aims to provide information on to what extent government aims have an influence on the development actors and their processes. The aim of the Dutch government is to be able to control migration (Rijksoverheid, 2022), as this is often linked to security threats and irregular migration. Besides, migration must be in line with 'the capacity and needs of Dutch society' (Rijksoverheid, 2022). However, it should be noted that the idea of 'controlling migration' is described vaguely, as it is unclearly stated which form of mobility they want to control (e.g., immigration or emigration), or what this 'control' entails exactly. Investigating the prevalence of government policies

regarding migration in the Dutch development cooperation field is therefore important, as this indicates the link between the two domains.

These sub-questions have been formulated in such a way that together they can provide an answer to the main research question. To start, the first sub-question fulfils two purposes. Firstly, as mentioned, it answers the implied statement in the main research question that the development cooperation field of the Netherlands has transformed. Secondly, it provides the opportunity to explain the social practice the studied issue is residing in, which is part of the methodological approach applied in this thesis (Chapter 3). To clarify, this research makes use of a discourse analysis, in which the social context is specifically relevant. The first sub-question, explaining the transformation of the Dutch development cooperation field, thus sets the scene for the remainder of the study.

To continue, the second sub-question answers the 'main part' of this research; namely how notions of security and the migration-development nexus are conceived by the actors in the Dutch field of development cooperation regarding migration and border security. The third sub-question is connected to this and serves as a somewhat critical control mechanism for what is being concluded in sub-question two. Namely, it could be the case that the actors in the field of development do not necessarily perceive an influence of notions of security on the migration-development nexus. Yet, if they mention that government policies are clearly present or followed by the organisations, this could indicate that notions of security could still have an impact, as the migration-development nexus is becoming increasingly politicized in the Netherlands and linkages between aid and migration in government procedures exist. Taking this all together, the synergy between these three sub-questions resolves the main research question that is being studied.

1.4 Reading guide

By exploring the development cooperation field of the Netherlands, *Chapter 1* has introduced the topic and research inquiry. Now that the societal and scientific relevance, as well as the research aim and questions, have been discussed, I will walk through the following chapters of this Master's thesis.

Chapter 2 portrays the theoretical framework that I have created whilst writing this thesis. It elaborates on the existing literature regarding development cooperation, the migration-development nexus, and notions of security. To explain the complex context that development cooperation is residing in, the framework includes theories on migration, transnational development, government policies and the neo-liberal agenda. To visualize the discussed concepts, the conceptual model displays the graphical representation of this research.

Chapter 3 discusses the backbone of this research inquiry; the methodology. After touching upon the philosophical background, I guide the reader through all methodological choices, including the data collection, analysis, and reflections and limitations of the decisions that were made.

Chapter 4 is the first empirical chapter of this thesis and starts with the key ways in which the Dutch development cooperation field has transformed by using the time frames of Jan Pronk (the 1980s), the MDGs (2000-2015), and the SDGs (2016-2030), to set the scene for the context in which the research resides. This is continued by the transformations the practitioners in the development field perceived themselves, including a discovered discourse regarding localisation.

Chapter 5 builds on Chapter 4 by discussing two themes that have become increasingly prevalent in policies and debates on development cooperation regarding migration and border security: the migration-development nexus and notions of security. I examine these two themes by explaining the way in which they are conceived by the practitioners of the development cooperation field of the Netherlands. This is followed by insights into the dynamics at play between the Dutch government and its policies and the two mentioned themes.

Chapter 6 brings all the foregoing chapters together by connecting the findings to the discussed theories of the theoretical framework, followed by a conclusion of this research inquiry. Lastly, I reflect on the process and limitations of this Master's thesis, which leads to recommendations for further research.

2. Theoretical Framework

This second chapter elaborates on the existing literature regarding the development cooperation field, the migration-development nexus and notions of security. The main concepts of the thesis are operationalised, followed by an explanation of how they relate to each other. The graphical representation of this explanation can be found in the conceptual model.

2.1 Development cooperation

Defining development cooperation seems to be rather difficult, as there are many variations and perspectives regarding the subject. Develtere et al. (2021, p. 32) even argue that a scientific definition of the concept is non-existing and that no definition is being recognized by all key actors in the development field. As they state, it is a wide-ranging term and anybody can claim that they are engaging in development cooperation. However, many others do make an attempt at establishing a definition. For example, Janus et al. (2015) describe that *"the fundamental aim of development cooperation is to improve living conditions in poorer countries"* (p. 156). The Development Assistance Committee of the OECD determines official development assistance (ODA) is the distinguishing factor between development and other types of cooperation. Yet, development cooperation is far more complex and embedded in a mix of financing, motivations, interests, and goals (Janus et al., 2015). Looking at a policy brief commissioned by the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UNDESA) for the Development Cooperation Forum, Alonso and Glennie (2015) define development cooperation as an activity that meets the following four criteria: *"1) aims explicitly to support national or international development priorities, 2) is not driven by profit, 3) discriminates in favour of developing countries, and 4) is based on cooperative relationships that seek to enhance developing country ownership"* (Alonso & Glennie, 2015, pp. 1-2). However, as the authors already state, there are some grey areas within these criteria. For example, while the second criterium states the activity should not be driven by profit, Alonso and Glennie mention that an activity that is accepting a lower profit than the market would offer, thus still agreeing to some profit, could still be distinguished as development cooperation.

As these descriptions are just the tip of the scientific iceberg, it can be concluded that defining the concept of development cooperation is difficult. However, since this thesis is all about development cooperation and its transformation, it has been decided to use the following definition: *"Activity that aims explicitly to support national or international development priorities, is not driven by profit, discriminates in favour of developing countries, and is based on cooperative relationships that seek to enhance developing country ownership"* (Alonso & Glennie, 2015, p. 4). The reason for this is that it includes international development, underscores the non-profitable approach, and focuses on 'developing' countries' progress and ownership. Furthermore, it also fits the third and fourth pillars of

development actors as discussed in the following paragraph. And, on top of that, I discovered that Chaturvedi et al. (2021) also refer to this specific definition in their handbook on development cooperation, which makes me feel empowered to stick to this definition. However, it should be noted that the authors are also critical of the definition – actually of all definitions they discussed – as development cooperation is hard to define because it consists of many different types of cooperation and measurability and comparability across these types is a challenge (Chaturvedi et al., 2021). Only the financial components of development can be measured precisely, which is too restrictive (Chaturvedi et al., 2021) and also inapplicable to the focus of this thesis.

To categorize the many institutions and organisations that are acting and arising within the field, Develtere et al. (2021) have, by using an institutional lens to look at the changes, distinguished three 'pillars' of development cooperation: the official 'bilateral' development cooperation, international institutions and NGDOs (non-governmental development organisations). Furthermore, the authors suggest using a fourth pillar that consists of newcomers to the development field; organisations and institutions that were not created in the post-war 'North-South relations' context but as a response to globalisation (Develtere et al., 2021, p. 27). The fourth pillar is a category of development actors that exists and operates alongside the three traditional pillars. The actors enclosed by the category are new and unconventional, and their initiatives and characteristics are heterogeneous too. In this fourth pillar of the Netherlands, one can also see the increase of alternative development actors that are recognized as Private Development Initiatives (PDIs), which are organisations that are self-funded and voluntary (Kinsbergen, Schulpen & Ruben, 2017).

The agenda that concerns the novel development actors is being influenced by globalisation and topics that are different from the continuous inequalities between the Global North and South, such as sustainable development, health concerning issues such as epidemics, and migration and displaced people (Develtere et al., 2021). It is this last 'concern' that this research would like to focus on and leads us to the concept that will be defined in Section 2.2: migration.

Besides the diversification of actors and accompanying agenda changes, the characteristics and assessment of development cooperation are also shifting. In current debates, themes such as inclusion, transparency, and participation often come forward. According to De Bruyn (2013), the characteristics and possible effects on outcomes and impact level of (new) development actors are relatively understudied. For example, new kinds of partnerships, development techniques, relations, and knowledge are arising as characteristics that little is known of (De Bruyn, 2013). Holzapfel (2014) adds to this that in the past ten years, there has been a push for development cooperation to strengthen results and increase the effectiveness of development aid (Holzapfel, 2014). Agencies, as well as governments, are receiving more and more critical questions about their budget spending and whether their practices are achieving any global development goals (Holzapfel, 2014). Therefore, how the effects of

development practices are measured or assessed can gain insights into the transformation of the cooperation field, as well as the influence the migration-development nexus has on it.

2.1.1 Government policies

Controlling migration has always been a challenge for nation-states (De Haas et al., 2020). The difficulty for states is that on one hand, there is often a wish for migrants for economic development and labour demands. On the other hand, there is a rising request to regulate and govern incoming migrants, as their arrival is often seen as a threat. While governments have a high desire to control migration, this does not necessarily mean that it is preventing all mobility. It rather involves monitoring and accepting 'favourable' people, while at the same time, it will hinder 'unfavourable' entries (De Haas et al., 2020).

One could review this so-called 'struggle' to control migration not just on a national level, but on different levels as well. Namely, while mobility often crosses state borders, international or global migration governance seems to have many obstacles that governments are, in general, unwilling to fully surrender to, as they fear losing national sovereignty to supra-national bodies in controlling migration (De Haas et al., 2020). Furthermore, in some countries, regional governments also have a say in controlling the in- and outward of migrants, and local governments can be involved in integration processes quite extensively. What is more, not only administrative bodies are included in this process of governing migration, but also private actors (e.g., employment agencies or security companies) and humanitarian organisations can play a significant role in this (De Haas et al., 2020).

And with all these attempts to govern, this is where policy comes in. What should be noted, is the difference between migration policies and non-migration policies. As De Haas et al. namely state, is that migration policies are "*laws, regulations and measures that states enact and implement with the explicit objective of affecting the volume, origin, direction and internal composition (or selection) of migration*" (De Haas & Vezzoli, 2011, as cited in De Haas et al., 2020, p. 248). While multiple 'non-migration policies', for example, foreign policies or labour market regulations, may affect migration as well, they are not primarily designed to influence and regulate migration.

What can be seen, is that the objectives of migration and non-migration policies are becoming increasingly intertwined, maybe more than the definition above suggests. In the last few years, there has been an increase in interest among policymakers to use development aid as an instrument to reduce international migration (Gamso & Yuldashev, 2018). The theory behind this is that the development would decrease the desire to migrate. This approach would be more effective than stopping migrants at the border, as it would be a tool that tackles the 'root causes' of international migration, like political oppression or poverty (Gamso & Yuldashev, 2018; Nijenhuis & Leung, 2017). This concept is considered attractive for governments, as a decrease in 'unwanted' migrants would be favourable for their countries, it could create goodwill at border countries, and it would seem like a humane and do-gooder approach (Gamso & Yuldashev, 2018). However, scholars do not agree if this approach is

effective or not. For example, De Haas et al. (2020) argue that this 'tool' would actually stimulate migration. On the contrary, Czaika and Godin (2022) argue that there is insufficient scientific evidence that can confirm whether development policies could influence international migration. They state that, while positive connections between economic development and outward mobility for low- and middle-income countries have been acknowledged, this does not reveal whether or not other interactive drivers could have contributed to this correlation (Czaika & Godin, 2022). Furthermore, Gamso and Yuldashev (2018) state that any migration effects induced by development aid can also be influenced by the geographic focus of development projects. The impacts can be different in, for example, urban or rural areas, and should therefore be taken into consideration.

Taking the effectiveness of these policies aside, when looking at the Dutch government and its policies on development cooperation, its goals and intentions are defined quite clearly for the public eye. The central government namely seeks to accomplish three goals in 'developing' countries through its development cooperation policy: 1) to prevent conflicts and instability, 2) to reduce poverty and social inequality, and 3) to promote climate action and sustainable growth worldwide[2]. The national government explains the need for development as follows: *"The government believes that development cooperation is still needed because there are more conflicts, refugees and migrants than ever before"* (Government of the Netherlands, n.d.). As the governmental website states, since 2018, the Netherlands has mainly been giving aid to unstable regions near Europe. This aid is used in the aim to diminish terrorism and conflicts and to prevent migration to Europe (Government of the Netherlands, n.d.).

To continue, Adepoju, Van Noorloos and Zoomers (2010) have studied treaties the EU and individual member states have reshaped and created to optimize the link between migration and development in Global South countries to their liking. By explaining the shift these bilateral and multilateral migration agreements of the EU with Global South countries have experienced, the authors point out how development aid has been incorporated into these treaties recently.

At first, the focus of agreements was on controlling irregular migration, readmission, and repatriation. Not just the EU but also individual member states have pressed countries, especially migrant transit countries and countries of origin in the African continent, into agreements that obligated them into cooperating in the repatriation and readmission of irregular migrants. This externalisation of border control has not only led to many human rights violations but also to violations of the 'non-refoulement' principle (Adepoju, Van Noorloos & Zoomers, 2010). This was made possible by the often informal and flexible nature of these agreements, creating a lack of transparency and controllability.

And while most bilateral agreements between countries of origin and the EU still stress irregular migration control, there has been a shift towards cooperation that includes the boosting of economies,

[2] https://www.government.nl/topics/development-cooperation/the-development-policy-of-the-netherlands. Accessed October 26th, 2022.

increase of regular migration options to the EU and encouragement of circular migration, rather than just applying repressive measures (Adepoju et al., 2010). Looking at the circular migration stimulation, Adepoju et al. (2010) point out that there are, to some extent, economic development and job opportunities needed in the countries of origin. Otherwise, as opposed to the often 'promised' brain gain, the development impact of circular migration will not be maximized and internal economic growth will not be complemented. Furthermore, bilateral agreements and multilateral schemes introduced by the EU often have labour migration arrangements, for example in the form of (conditional) labour quotas, to not only help reduce irregular migration but also to satisfy their own labour market needs.

Connecting these bi- and multilateral migration agreements to development more specifically, recently, the focus has moved towards the incorporation of development aid and so-called 'co-development' in these treaties. Bluntly said, it is not rare for the EU and its member states to give development aid in return for migration control cooperation, thereby clearly showing the increasing interconnectedness of migration policies and development aid (Adepoju et al., 2010). Even though the stimulation of development can be considered positive if an increase in funds would lead to poverty reduction, one aspect is, however, of major importance and should be highlighted: *"Benefits of these agreements with the southern partners, such as increased levels of development aid seldom reflect a fundamental interest to eradicate poverty, but rather serve to legitimise the implementation of policy measures that constrain migration."* (Adepoju et al., 2010, p. 67). On top of that, the increased development-migration policy link can also cause damaging long-term effects. For example, if assistance in migration control is becoming a requirement for receiving funding, some countries (migrant transit and departure countries) will be able to receive extra funds, while other countries that are not en route towards Europe are being excluded from this development aid. This would in turn lead to even greater development gaps between countries. Secondly, another harmful effect is that general refugee funds (e.g., UNHCR) are securing less funding, as EU countries are already fulfilling their refugee protection 'obligations' by financing protection programmes of countries individually, leading to a decrease in the effectiveness of refugee protection and increase of competition for Global South countries that want to receive the development aid (Adepoju et al., 2010).

Even though the bi- and multilateral agreements between the EU (states) and Global South countries have shifted in their focus, the preceding paragraphs have already hinted at the unequal power relations that play a significant role in the imbalance of interests reflected in these treaties. The goal of the EU to control migration is still dominating and lots must be done to reach 'win-win situations' or 'fair multilateralism' for all parties involved (Adepoju et al., 2010). It would be favourable for Global South countries to, just like the EU, cooperate on a regional and multilateral level and create migration policies for themselves, so that they could enhance negotiating power towards the Union and migration issues would no longer be a condition to receive development aid or to create labour migration possibilities (Adepoju et al., 2010).

Linking this directly to this thesis, it is important to see if this far-reaching desire to govern and control migration is visible in the transforming development cooperation field of the Netherlands since these government aims do not necessarily have to appear in the goals of other actors in development. And, as Nyberg-Sørensen (2012) states, policies and their (un)intended impacts are essential as a reference point when one tries to understand the presence of nexuses, in this research the migration-development nexus, in policy discourses on e.g., national or global scale (p. 70). Furthermore, it could be the case that actors in the field of development are receiving funding from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and that their procedures are (consciously or unconsciously) affected by policy intentions. But, before diving deeper into the specific context of this matter, let's first turn to two concepts that will repeatedly appear in this thesis: migration and transnational development.

2.2 Migration and transnational development

Since the terms migration and transnational development appear repeatedly in this Master's thesis, this section will briefly address these concepts. Migration can be defined as the *"change of habitual residency across administrative borders (e.g., municipalities, provinces, departments, federal or national states"* (De Haas et al., 2020, p. 377). As this definition already indicates, migration occurs within the boundaries of nation-states. While internal migration, consisting of often rural-urban, but also urban-rural and rural-rural movements within national borders, represents a large share of all migrants worldwide (about 80 per cent), the focus of migration-related debates is often on international migration and its impact (De Haas et al., 2020). Even though international migration has been relatively stable for the last fifty years, namely around 3 per cent of the total world population, migration has become highly politicized. This is because migration has become directly linked to national identity and security issues (De Haas et al., 2020), which will be elaborated on in Section 2.4.

There are plenty of theories that try to determine why and how people migrate. What, however, seems to be the key theoretical issue, is that every explanation could be different in every context. This makes an overall theory of migration impossible, as drivers of migration can be varying among individuals or groups of people, as well as being influenced by time and space (Samers & Collyer, 2017). When looking at international migration, two main 'types' of theories can be distinguished: determinist and integrative theories. Yet, the approaches vary in, for example, approaches, groups or units of focus and levels of analysis. While connections and distinctions between the theories can be made, uniting them into one overarching explanation is problematic and unfeasible (Samers & Collyer, 2017).

New technologies in communication and travel have made it easier for migrants to move over large distances, while at the same time staying connected to their communities back home. Through the phenomenon of transnationalism, which refers to *"multiple ties and interactions linking people or institutions across the borders of nation-states"* (Vertovec, 1999, p. 447), migrants can maintain multiple and transnational identities. This, on the one hand, has led to the intensifying of debates

regarding threatening national identities and integration (De Haas et al., 2020). On the other hand, migration is often seen as valuable rather than a threat when linking it to development. As Faist (2008) describes, migrants and collective actors linked to migration have been designated as significant transnational development agents. Transnational migration networks are becoming part of optimistic visions for development policies to control migration. They are considered to contribute positively to development due to 1) the sending of financial remittances that would lead to the increase of local investments and poverty reduction, 2) the mobility of human capital and social remittances would have beneficiary outcomes such as brain gain, gender equity and democracy, and 3) temporary labour migration would lead to even higher (financial) remittances which would lead to a higher development stimulus than permanent migration would create (Faist, 2008).

This renewed interest in the link between development and migration was stimulated by the increasing attention to transnational migration in the transnational turn in the 1990s. Especially the interest of NGOs was sparked, since they were looking for different ways to operate, outside of the bilateral aid channels (Grillo & Mazzucato, 2008). It resulted in initiatives including migrants (and associations) focusing on transnational development. However, these initiatives are not often subjected to critical observation and assessment, as the evaluation of practices is regularly based on the reports created by the NGOs or local/ethnic associations involved, resulting in optimistic reports of the transnational activities (Grillo & Mazzucato, 2008). It is thus important to continue research on development initiatives of migrant associations based in migrant-receiving countries, to investigate if they actually 'work', and if so: for whom?

Finally, to continue, Grillo and Mazzucato (2008) emphasize the 'double engagement' that migrants experience, which is embodied in the many transnational linkages that not only create flows of people, money, goods, and ideas but also result in the creation of new institutions that cross the borders of nation-states. As their lives are actually 'multi-sited' and thus exist both 'here' and 'there', transnational migrants have to balance the 'here' and 'there' continuously, which tends to be a difficulty (Grillo & Mazzucato, 2008). How this challenge of 'double engagement' is handled by migrants is key in their future trajectory in the place they are residing.

2.2.1 Migration, development, and the neo-liberal agenda

Migration and the understanding of it is inherently political (De Haas et al., 2020). Therefore, this section will shortly address the way in which the neo-liberal agenda has influenced how migration and its outcomes are defined.

How migration has been perceived by governments and society has shifted over time. For developing industrializing societies, concerns mainly existed around rural-urban migration and emigration, while immigrants were often recognized as economic and political assets (e.g., by contributing to labour opportunities). In industrialized nations, in which a large part of the population

already resided in cities, the focus of fear was redirected towards the arrival of international migrants, as they would be the cause of problems such as lack of housing, unemployment or overcrowding (De Haas et al., 2020). These scenarios deriving from the securitization of migration, that international migrants are a threat to societies' security or the cause of the before-mentioned problems, can be used in arguments by both left- or right-wing parties and are not backed by evidence. They are often used to support calls for 'immediate action', of which the increase in development aid can be used as one (De Haas et al., 2020).

Yet, the urge of governments to control migration does not necessarily equal the aim of complete prevention of mobility. The control is rather focused on surveillance and regulation of movements by (often nation-state) governments (De Haas et al., 2020). This hints towards the paradox liberal democracies find themselves in, which can be explained in two-fold (of which the first part will also be elaborated on in Section 2.4). Firstly, liberal democracies strive for competitive advantage and therefore open borders for flows of not just goods and investments, but also of people (enabling e.g., labour migration). While this openness of borders for trade is favoured, the mobility of people, as this is considered to be part of increasing political risks, is often not as much appreciated. Or at least, not the mobility of *all* people. The overall aim is namely to keep people in their place, except for the selected chosen few: the 'good' migrant, the expat, the agent that stimulates development, versus the 'undesirable migrant'. To continue, the second part of the paradox consists of the fact that ideology and compliance with various liberal values, such as notions of human rights, are important to liberal states. Liberal 'developed' countries have signed human rights laws, such as the United Nations Refugee Convention, and these rights are held in high esteem. However, establishing these rights for migrants and refugees has led to the strengthening of states to prevent the arrival of these people, as they do not want to be held accountable for (not) fully complying with these treaties (De Haas et al, 2020).

Thus, it should be noted that while the money that migrants generate and transmit transnationally is considered positive for the impact on development by governments in the Global North and South, the migrants themselves are actually experiencing increasingly more barriers, often created by the same governments (Smith & Schapendonk, 2018). So even though migrants are, in the vein of development, recognized as the enablers for better livelihoods through transnational linkages, they are still hindered in their attempts to be mobile and leave their places of origin (Smith & Schapendonk, 2018).

Furthermore, it is important to realize the role of the SDGs therein and how these interpret the role of migration in development. The predecessor of the SDGs, the MDGs, namely did not include migration in their goals explicitly (McGregor, 2020). While migrants and their families were mentioned in one specific paragraph, focused on the commitment to ensure and protect the human rights of this group, it was only until the formulation of the post-2015 Agenda that the inclusion of migration in the development goals was actively advocated for (McGregor, 2020). The 2030 Development Agenda, consisting of 17 sustainable development goals, included only 7 goals (Nijenhuis & Leung, 2017) and 27 targets (McGregor, 2020) with references to migration and migrants. These references did not take

away the fact that there is still a sedentary bias represented in the SDGs since development is still focused on single-place or territorial-bound achievements, therefore implying that migration is a sign of failure of development (Nijenhuis & Leung, 2017). The translocal and dynamic character of development is thus not being recognized in these goals (Nijenhuis & Leung, 2017).

Moreover, it should be noted that, as McGregor (2020) states, there is a dominant narrative in which migration is included in the SDGs, consisting of the idea that migrants are *"a distinct social group at risk of being excluded from development"* (McGregor, 2020, p. 289). This stands out since this is in contrast with how migration was conceptualised and existed in the narrative before they were adopted in the SDGs, namely as an *"enabler of development"* (McGregor, 2020, p. 289). Still, the social and economic contribution of remittances remains to be a central aspect of the development and migration debate in the 2030 Agenda (Nijenhuis & Leung, 2017). It is the focus on economic and societal development, stimulated through social and financial transfers, that has led to the acceptance of migration as a global policy issue, and the fact that migration is being framed as a development problem has been used to bring migration into the United Nations and its agenda (McGregor, 2020).

2.3 Migration-development nexus

When looking into development cooperation and migration, it is crucial to understand how the interlinkages of these concepts are reviewed by researchers and society. According to Nyberg-Sørensen (2012), two nexuses between migration, development and security become increasingly apparent in current migration debates. On the one hand, the migration-development nexus argues that migration leads to development (often particularly meaning development in the Global South). After the transnational turn, migration became 'developmentalized'. This led to the idea that migrants would transfer remittances (both financial and social), knowledge and experience, which in turn would lead to the stimulation of the development of the South. Eventually, this could result in a reduction of continued migration movements, leaving development as an instrument for migration policies (Nyberg-Sørensen, 2012).

On the other hand, the securitization of migrants has created the migration-security nexus. Even though a significantly larger percentage of migrants and refugees is residing in the Global South, the idea exists that international migration is disturbing the security of nation-states (Nyberg-Sørensen, 2012). This could be done two-fold: by creating a security threat to territorial and political integrity, or by threatening the social coherence and cultural identity of the state. Paradoxically, the liberal ideas of many Global North countries prefer open boundaries and mobility to stimulate economic processes, while at the same time, these 'security risks' called migrants increase the demand for more restrictions and closed borders (Nyberg-Sørensen, 2012).

Zooming in on the migration-development nexus, it appears much has been written on the link between the two concepts. The nexus was explored by Nyberg-Sørensen, Van Hear and Engberg-

Pedersen (2002), stating that up until that moment, development and migration had been forming separate policy fields. What characterizes this nexus, is that it is residing in a highly politicized arena in which it is difficult to come to a consensus and collaboration, both nationally and internationally, since differing policy approaches are hindering it (Nyberg-Sørensen et al., 2002).

The idea that the increasing transference of financial and social remittances (the latter term coined by Levitt, 1998) stimulates the development of low-income countries to which they are transmitted becomes increasingly popular, as the influence is being acknowledged by internationally recognized reputable organizations such as the World Bank. Instead of being a problem (e.g., causing brain drain), migration is seen as a solution for development (Glick Schiller & Faist, 2009). Yet, the way in which migration is perceived as an engine for development uncovers the domination of economic factors in the conceptualisation of development (Dannecker & Piper, 2021; Nyberg-Sørensen, 2012). This can be seen in the so-called 'mantras' of the migration-development nexus; a list of aspects that characterize the link between the two concepts. Glick Schiller and Faist (2009) summarize these ideas, often considered beneficial, as follows: 1) migration leads to the transfer of financial and social remittances; 2) brain gain will eventually replace brain drain; 3) temporary and circular migration stimulate development; 4) not only individual migrants but also migrant diasporas become development agents; and, lastly, 5) while economic development first increases 'short' and 'middle term' migration, in the end it will reduce migration (Glick Schiller & Faist, 2009, p. 6). One could, however, disapprove of the generalization in this considered beneficial link, as the impact of migration is specific to its context. For example, the reception of remittances by a low-income country could lead to an increase in financial benefits. Whether it decreases income inequality is, however, not clear (Glick Schiller & Faist, 2009). Therefore, when talking about development, it is often unclear 'whose' and 'what' development one is talking about, as well as 'how' it is being achieved specifically (Bakewell, 2008; Dannecker & Piper, 2021).

To continue, Czaika and Godin (2022) are also taking a critical stance towards empirical evidence that tries to pinpoint the drivers of the migration-development nexus. They believe that this is because research concerning this subject is often making use of methods that have conceptual and methodological limitations, which can also not handle the complex relations between development and migration (Czaika & Godin, 2022). Furthermore, the fact that both development and migration are multi-layered processes themselves and have yet also mutual interdependencies, makes the nexus and conclusions related to it even more intricate. However, the authors do mention that there can be three conceptual elements established that form the political rhetoric of the migration-development nexus, which have shaped multiple of the European Union and its member states' policies relating to migration 'issues' in the last few years. Firstly, policies try to get to grips with the 'root causes' of migration that are considered unwanted. Yet, it should be mentioned here that the idea of root causes of migration is questionable, as it is again a multi-layered process that consists of a combination of causations which can include, for example, political, economic, social, or cultural factors. Secondly, the focus of the

policies is all about attracting and singling out the favoured international labour migrants. The third and last political objective is to make migration a stimulus for development in countries of the Global South (Czaika & Godin, 2022).

Furthermore, Geiger and Pécoud (2013) point out the distinction between migrants that is made in so-called 'Western' immigration policies that are also being acknowledged by Czaika and Godin (2022); the 'bad/unwanted' versus the 'good/desirable' migrant. However, they state that this is not just something that appears in the policy arena but is also permeated, more implicitly, in the migration-development nexus itself, as well as in the migrant-sending countries' efforts of trying to advertise (often international) migration as a type of development strategy (Geiger & Pécoud, 2013). The latter is actually a two-way process; the migrant has not only been granted the 'development agent' status from higher-up by institutions or governments but can also self-assign this designated 'hero' status in an aspiration to ensure development in their country or community.

Another distinction between migrants can be found in two UN papers: the Global Compact on Migration, officially called the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration (United Nations, 2018a), and the Global Compact on Refugees (United Nations, 2018b). Following the New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants, these intergovernmental compacts offer a framework for international cooperation on migration. However, the compacts are 'blueprints' and legally non-binding, otherwise, they would not have been accepted (Ferris & Martin, 2019). The distinction between refugees and migrants leads to a difference in rights, the former having more than the latter, which can be seen in, for example, approaches to detention (Ferris & Martin, 2019). Migrants and refugees are namely in different legal frameworks, and only refugees are specifically internationally protected by international refugee law (Guild, Basaran & Allinson, 2019). And while scholars argue that making a distinction between voluntary and forced migration is difficult and not clear-cut, the two compacts try to make a separation for the global agenda. Otherwise, there would have been one compact – a Compact on Global Mobility (Ferris & Martin, 2019). Linking the compacts to development, both agreements refer to the SDGs with the aim to connect migration to development (Guild et al., 2019; Ferris & Martin, 2019). However, as Section 2.2.1 also addressed, the SDGs just mostly focus on labour migration and the social and economic contribution of migrants through remittances. In this, refugees are not explicitly mentioned but are just included in the context of 'leaving no one behind' (Ferris & Martin, 2019, p.11). The Global Compact on Refugees now adds to this that development actors' engagement should be intensified to increase the involvement of refugees in development, mentioning the role the UN Development Program (UNDP) and the International Labour Organisation (ILO) can play. Yet, various difficulties for coordination exist, as the compacts are again non-binding and respect the sovereignty of states (Ferris & Martin, 2019).

While researching or discussing the migration-development nexus, three key points can be distinguished that should be kept in mind (Geiger & Pécoud, 2013). Firstly, the thinking on development and migration

is being influenced by and permeated with a bias that is existing in the Global North, consisting of the securitization of migration and the distinction of desirable and undesirable migrants. However, Geiger and Pécoud state that if this bias in agendas and policies would be taken seriously, then that would already uncover that other objectives, such as to make migration 'work' for development, are subordinate to the objectives of security (Geiger & Pécoud, 2013). Secondly, it should be taken into account that attempts to influence both migration and development collectively are inherently linked to the context in which they take place. Migrant-receiving countries often intervene in migrant-sending and transit countries, in an endeavour to limit migration and to further stimulate development. However, the (often historically grounded) power relationship between these countries is often not taken into consideration. Strategies for controlling migration turn out to be influenced mostly by migrant-receiving (generally high-income or Global North) countries, which leaves little space for the migrant-sending countries to adapt the strategies to their liking (Geiger & Pécoud, 2013). Looking from this perspective, development could be used as a 'convenient umbrella' that helps the more 'developed' countries interfere in the migrant-sending (or 'less-developed') countries and their political strategies, including migration, trade, and economic policies. The 'cooperation' part of development can thus be characterized by very diverging interests of the participating nation-states (Geiger & Pécoud, 2013). Thirdly, it should be noted that the migration-development nexus creates a framework in which state cooperation can exist by constructing migration issues in a specific way. As discussed, the nexus implies that migration and development can influence one another. This could shape the beliefs, expectations, and knowledge production of all the actors involved, such as governments, NGOs, and development agencies. Plus, not to forget: academia. Taking this all into consideration, Geiger and Pécoud argue, therefore, that the biases that exist in the migration-development nexus should be uncovered, as its outcomes also influence the way in which development and migration are governed and thought of (Geiger & Pécoud, 2013). This is especially relevant for this Master's thesis, as any consequences of this bias in the migration-development nexus could have influenced the transformations in the development cooperation field.

The migration-development nexus, as well as the migration-security nexus, reveals that there is a need for analysing practises and consequences of actors and policies on both the migration-development and migration-security level. Nyberg-Sørensen (2012) states that *"Placing the migration-development-security nexus debate within the analytical framework of the migration industry and markets for migration control may prove helpful in this undertaking"* (Nyberg-Sørensen, 2012, p. 67). By 'this undertaking', it is meant that the focus from the migrant needs redirection. The structures of the migration-development-security field need a view that connects perspectives 'from below' to those 'from above'. Therefore, Nyberg-Sørensen focuses on the migration industry, which consists of both legal and irregular actors that facilitate and control migration, and the markets for migration management, including governmental and private functions concerning migration management. In this Master's thesis, this debate is not placed within the migration industry and the markets for migration

control but rather in the development 'industry' or development cooperation field as discussed earlier in this literature chapter. While these actors may be, in some cases, considered to be part of both, the point of departure is to focus on actors of the transforming development cooperation field.

2.4 Notions of security

When exploring the link between development and security, one would stumble upon the naming of migration quite quickly. International migration is supposedly affecting the national security of countries in two ways. Firstly, and this is often considered the somewhat 'traditional' security threat, migration between countries is threatening the sovereignty of states by challenging territorial integrity, political independence, and peace (the last one being risked by the possible entry of terrorists). Secondly, international migration is leading to an increase in diversity in citizenships, ethnicities, languages, cultures and so on. This growing diversity is sparking – or rather fuelling – the debate on national identity and integration. International migrants are thus posing a threat to the nation-states' cultural identity and social coherence and stability (De Haas et al., 2020; Nyberg-Sørensen, 2012).

Since these threats can be considered quite clear-cut, one could wonder why state governments do not decide to simply close their borders. However, globalisation has led to an increasing intertwinement of responsibilities and concerns of states (Estevens, 2018). Their focus is not just on the traditional defence of their territories, it is also about ensuring, for example, economic development and social stability. Globalisation has made it impossible to create strategies regarding these matters that are bound by nation-state borders (Estevens, 2018). This also reveals the 'liberal paradox' countries find themselves in; the *"inherent tension between the need for liberal states to remain open to trade, investments and (labour) migration and protect the rights of its citizens"* (Hollifield, 1992, as cited in De Haas et al., 2020, p. 377). In other words, liberal ideas strive for free markets and individual rights for all, which makes it hard for liberal democracies to limit and control migration, as this openness of markets is not limited by the trade of goods and investments but includes the mobility of people too. Globalisation has, therefore, enabled international economic forces to encourage greater openness of trade, investments and thus migration, while states and their domestic political forces actually seek more closure (Nyberg-Sørensen, 2012).

And while security is often linked to international migration, it can also be connected to development. Nyberg-Sørensen (2012) briefly discusses this nexus that includes the idea that development and security are inseparably linked and frequently emerging in complex policy issues in nation-states that are experiencing (often violent) conflicts. Stern and Öjendal (2010) argue that the security-development nexus has indeed become familiar in policymaking, both nationally and globally. Security and development can be used as tools or concepts to prescribe processes and determine outcomes. Security policies, for example, those of the EU, namely entail explicit references to poverty

reductions and development in the fight against terrorism (Stern & Öjendal, 2010). Furthermore, the idea that people migrate because of a lack of development stimulates the urge to develop migrant-sending and transit countries. This could, eventually, neutralise the aforementioned security threats. The intent of international development is to reform political, economic, and social practices, and aid is often conditional; whether success based on geopolitical priorities has been achieved or not (Crane, 2020). Various scholars argue that development can be seen as part of the externalisation of migration and border control (Crane, 2020). I return to this in more detail in Chapter 5.

While many Global North countries, such as Australia, are considered to partake in this externalisation of migration management (Lee, 2022), in light of this Master's thesis, the European Union and its member states also seem to be taking extensive efforts to 'secure the external' (Bialasiewicz, 2012; Crane, 2020). A frequently used example in explaining this matter is the EU's European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). Yet, other initiatives regarding development have been concerning security issues too, for example, the earlier mentioned EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa (EUTF). The EUTF was initiated by the EU in 2015, the starting point of the Union's 'refugee crisis', to use development aid to reduce irregular migration. This was done two-fold: development for tackling the 'root causes' of migration, and by stimulating the development of border control and management in the migrant-sending countries in Africa (Szent-Ivanyi, 2021). NGDOs have expressed criticism of the fund and labelled it as a political tool. Nevertheless, many of the organisations, including one of Dutch origin, have been engaged in projects paid for by the EUTF, generally without drawing public attention to it. Furthermore, NGDOs were avoiding the projects that were directed at the EU's migration agenda and tried to focus on aspects that matched their morals, such as strengthening the resilience of communities (Szent-Ivanyi, 2021).

As irregular migration can be considered a security threat for migrant-receiving countries, seeing it as an undermining of (border) control systems of the nation-state (Nyberg-Sørensen, 2012), countries make large investments in border management. Taking the European Union again as an example since the Netherlands is a member state, Lemberg-Pedersen (2018) describes the self-reinforcing cycle that exists in the prevention of irregular migration towards the Union. The increase in controls leads to more irregular routes, which leads to advancing control technologies and ends up in migrants taking new irregular ways, and so on (Lemberg-Pedersen, 2018). What should be noted, is that the outcome of this process seems to be contradictory to the goals high-income countries have in the migration-development nexus. Increasing border control has made irregular migration more expensive, as, for example, higher fees are asked by smugglers, which leads to an increase in South-North remittance flows (Nyberg-Sørensen, 2012). While remittance flows can, obviously, be multi-directional (e.g., South-North but also South-South), these rising costs and the fact that many irregular migrants do not even reach their country of destination is influencing the migration-development 'potential' that is desired (Nyberg-Sørensen, 2012).

To be more specific and make this security concept usable for this research, it is important to set some boundaries. Firstly, as the research questions have already shown, I refer to security as 'notions of security', as this concept is empirically investigated by analysing the practitioners' statements in interviews. The concept is thus addressed as something they perceive in a certain way, and whether or not it is actually 'secure' or 'threatening' is based on someone's perspective and experiences. In this way, I am still able to study it for its influences. Secondly, while I try to move past methodological nationalism, security can exist on various scalar levels, as the Dutch government makes graphically clear (Government of the Netherlands, n.d.). In its migration policy, the Dutch government explains to have a comprehensive approach to ensure migration is well-managed and safe. The six-pillar agenda shows that migration management starts already 'in the region', referring to the prevention of people migrating starting outside of the EU; the externalisation of migration and border control as described by Crane (2020). Moving towards the local level, the final pillar ends in the encouragement of the integration of migrants. Taking this scalarity into account, notions of security relating to migration can thus be experienced on and discussed for the global (including the supranational Union and 'the region'), national and local level. In the empirical output, these various scalar levels will be taken into consideration. However, before diving deeper into the specific context of this inquiry, let's first turn to the graphical representation of the aforementioned topics: the conceptual model.

2.5 Conceptual model

The foregoing sections have discussed the main concepts and theories related to this Master's thesis, of which a visual representation can be seen in Figure 1. The subject under investigation is the transforming development cooperation of the Netherlands. In this thesis, I study how the actors in this field conceive the migration-development nexus.



Figure 1: Conceptual model (The Author, 2023)

On the left side, the two bubbles ‘notions of security relating to migration’ and ‘Dutch development cooperation policies’ can be seen. These are considered to be ‘domains’ that influence and are related to the transforming development cooperation field of the Netherlands. The development cooperation field namely has to follow the development cooperation policies of the nation-state, and the domain also represents the political space the research is residing in. Furthermore, as explained in the research objective and Section 2.4, the notions of security relating to migration can be linked to the development cooperation policies domain and the field of development cooperation, as the Dutch government aims to ‘control migration’. Development cooperation can play a role in fulfilling this aim.

To continue, the square with bubbles on the right represents the concepts under investigation. The perception of the migration-development nexus is central to this study. It is connected to transnational development, which will be studied for its transformations by looking at the changes in partners, objectives and impact assessments of development organisations, as experienced by the development cooperation practitioners. It can be stated that in this research, I am studying how these actors in the development cooperation field conceive the links that are envisioned in this conceptual model.

In my assumptions, I would say that there must be some sort of overlap in the aims that are posed by the Dutch government and its development cooperation policies and the work of development actors. So, how is the migration-development nexus conceived, and how do notions of security influence this? Are the wishes to ‘control migration’ of the Dutch government prevalent? The following Methodology chapter will elaborate on how I empirically investigate this matter.

3. Methodology

This research aims to study how notions of security affect the way the migration-development nexus is conceived by the transforming Dutch development cooperation field regarding migration and border security. The thesis follows an inductive design, meaning that it moves from a particular situation, in this case, the transforming development cooperation field of the Netherlands, to more general ideas and theories.

As Creswell and Poth (2018) describe, qualitative research tries to study phenomena in their natural settings. A researcher then tries to understand things or problems in terms of the meaning people give to them. By conducting explorative and qualitative research, this thesis tries to create a better understanding of the primary ways in which the development cooperation field is transforming by using the Netherlands as a location. I use qualitative research in this attempt, as it enables me to study the collected material (interviews, conversations, documents) and try to understand them in relation to the meaning people bring to them (Cresswell & Poth, 2018). Furthermore, the inquiry also aims to grasp how the migration-development nexus, which can be seen as a connection with a meaning ascribed to it, is conceived and how this may be influenced by notions of security, looking at different scalar levels. The meaning ascribed to the migration-development nexus can differ among participants, who are various practitioners in the development field (see Section 3.2.2), and this could hopefully provide new insights and a better understanding of the situation. Next to this, I am very curious if there is an interweaving of themes and if what actors explain what they perceive is also corresponding to what is proclaimed by the organisations. But before we get to that, let's first delve into the specifics of this research.

3.1 Methodological approach

How a researcher sees and understands the world influences qualitative research. Our assumptions namely affect how we, for example, look for information, draw up research questions and evaluate issues (Creswell & Poth, 2018). Therefore, this paragraph discusses the methodological choices that were made for this Master's thesis. This explanation is divided into two parts. Firstly, the philosophical backdrop, better known as the philosophical assumptions and interpretive framework are discussed. This is followed by an elaboration on the research approach, including the data collection and analysis.

3.1.1 Philosophical backdrop

Philosophical assumptions about ontology, epistemology, axiology, and methodology impact the characteristics of this qualitative research inquiry (Creswell & Poth, 2018). While I would not necessarily describe myself as an *"armchair radical"* (Thomas, 1993, as cited in Creswell & Poth, 2018,

p. 26), this thesis makes use of a postmodern interpretive framework. Postmodern researchers challenge the idea of objectivity and believe that knowledge is influenced by our own interpretations. Language plays an important role in this, as the meaning we ascribe to words is shaped by, for example, our culture and the conditions of the world we live in. By studying and deconstructing texts, postmodernists try to reveal discourses in which power and hierarchies are hidden (Creswell & Poth, 2018).

As Clarke (2006) points out, postmodernity is about being aware and trying to understand that within what is presented, there is something unrepresented. The researcher tries to be open for the 'other'; for that what is not represented. To continue, Clarke clarifies that postmodernism is not an oppression of modernity, it is just a – as he argues – confusing state of mind in which one tries to destruct appearances (Clarke, 2006). To connect it to this research, this Master's thesis tries to discover how notions of security have an influence on the way the migration-development nexus is conceived; another idea with a certain meaning ascribed to it. Studying what the actors express and say could uncover the discourses present in the development field of the Netherlands.

3.1.2 Case study

While the field of Human Geography allows us to use many interesting quantitative and qualitative research approaches, a qualitative case study approach is used for this Master's thesis. While not all researchers consider it a methodology, but rather a decision in what is to be studied or a product of the research, it can also be defined as a methodology (Cresswell, 2007). As Cresswell (2007) states, it is *"*[…] *a methodology, a type of design in qualitative research, or an object of study, as well as a product of the inquiry"* (Creswell, 2007, p. 73). It is a qualitative research approach in which the researcher investigates and explores an issue in a bounded system (or multiple ones) over time, and in which an in-depth data collection is used that includes various information sources. These information sources can include, for example, interviews, documents, reports, and observations (Creswell, 2007).

Three types of case studies can be distinguished: the single instrumental case study, the collective (or multiple) case study, and the intrinsic case study (Creswell, 2007). This research intended to study one issue (the influence of notions of security on the conception of the migration-development nexus) in one single site (the development cooperation field of the Netherlands). Therefore, this thesis has used the single case study design, as one issue in a bounded case is in need of a better and more in-depth understanding. Multiple sources of information can be used to create this insight (Creswell & Poth, 2018).

To clarify, as Yin (2018) also emphasizes, defining what 'the case' actually is, seems to be rather difficult for researchers. When talking about a single case, this does not have to mean an individual, it can also concern families, programmes, a process, social movements, or even non-profit organisations (Yin, 2018). In this inquiry, the case can be considered a political space in which organisations exist and act. Here 'political' is added, as these organisations are bound by rules and regulations of institutions

from a nation-state; the Netherlands. Identifying a specific locale is namely important when defining a case, according to Yin (2018). The actors of the development cooperation field of the Netherlands operate, of course, outside these nation-state boundaries, but their operations are bound by Dutch government policies. Yet, as this is a Master's research, I am limited to a certain amount of time and thus not able to investigate the political space in all its respects. The scope of the data collection had, therefore, to be limited. In the following sections, I elaborate on this thought process and the decisions that were made.

3.2 Data collection

Following on from the methodological approach, in this section, I turn to the data collection of this research inquiry. This thesis made use of an extensive literature review and semi-structured interviews. Why these variations of data were chosen and how they were collected will be elaborated on in the following paragraphs.

3.2.1 Literature review

The thesis made use of many different existing literature sources as secondary data. To create a stable and grounded base of theories and concepts, peer-reviewed articles, books, and academic journals were consulted. Furthermore, study books were used to gather information on development cooperation and the different theories linking it to migration, as well as to create a better understanding of doing research as a Master's student. For the latter, books by, for example, Creswell (Creswell, 2007; Creswell & Poth, 2018) and Clifford et al. (2016) were used.

Moreover, even though the semi-structured interviews with practitioners of the development cooperation field regarding migration and border security form the primary source of empirical data in this Master's thesis (which will be elaborated on in Section 3.2.2), I have employed much 'grey' literature to fully dive into the (context of) the development cooperation field and the organisations. For every interview, I reviewed information about the interviewee's organisation, such as newspaper articles, policy papers, programme reports, social media messages, and other resources available online. Creswell and Poth (2018) confirm that case research (by using documents, records, and physical artefacts) is a suitable form of data to collect in case studies. Screening documentation can be indicated as a valuable tool to gain in-depth knowledge of the case concerned and can display the uncovered themes. Next to this, it can also help in creating a better understanding of, for example, relevant policies or the 'public face' that is presented by an organisation (Clifford et al., 2016). In this research inquiry, I have mostly used this information and 'grey' literature to let interviewees reflect on information relating to their work and to discuss themes that could stimulate the conversations and reveal discourses in the field as perceived by the practitioners.

3.2.2 Semi-structured interviews with respondents

As this research is interested in the conception of the migration-development nexus by actors in the field of development, semi-structured interviews were used as a way to obtain primary data, a commonly used data collection method for case studies (Clifford et al., 2016). Interviews can provide a lot of information and perspectives from respondents, and especially semi-structured interviews allow the researcher to ask follow-up questions that were not stated in the interview guide, which could generate more in-depth insights into the cases. These new insights can, in turn, be incorporated into the interview guide for the next respondent and the guide itself is also a point of support during the conduction of interviews.

The main aim was to interview actors in the Dutch development cooperation field regarding migration and border security. These actors were approached independently, and the extensive network of the director of Bureau Wijland, the organisation in which I conducted my internship, had also provided valuable contacts, of which one also forwarded me to a colleague. This process created the opportunity to talk to people that would, probably, not have accepted the interview invitation otherwise, as they explained to receive many more of these requests by students or even journalists. To be fully prepared, I created an interview guide for every respondent, adapted it to their circumstances and included a few specified questions. I was aware that some respondents were used to being interviewed, even by journalists from national broadcasters. Therefore, I knew that asking them prompt questions that do not beat around the bush could be handled quite well, while others might need some more context or time to clarify themselves. One or the other is not any 'better' but it points out why the interviews and guides needed some extra attention, also to meet the time frames that the respondents agreed to. To give an idea of what the interview guides look like, I have included a 'basic form' of an interview guide in the Appendices (Appendix 1). It shows the themes of interview questions that I followed during the interviews. However, please note that the actual interviews also included more specific questions related to the interviewees and that the conversations covered all themes, but not all questions.

Yet, to study one specific development area within the cooperation field, it had to be clear which actors are involved in development cooperation regarding migration and border security. One way to do this could have been by making a list of development organisations that are receiving funding from the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs[3] and that concern specifically migration cooperation. However, there are also organisations part of the cooperation field that might not receive funding, or that are engaged in transnational migration and border development issues in a more consultative role. It is exactly this diversity within the cooperation field that Develtere et al. (2021) described that makes it difficult to pinpoint what development cooperation even *is*. Therefore, this thesis makes use of their distinguished pillars and focuses on the third and fourth ones: NGDOs and newcomers to the development field.

[3] https://www.nlontwikkelingssamenwerking.nl/en/#/results/themes/prospects-for-refugees-and-migration-cooperation



Figure 2: Data sample matrix (The Author, 2023)

To ensure a good diversity of these actors in the development cooperation field regarding migration and border security, a matrix was used to cluster and select actors – or rather: practitioners – that were important to interview (Figure 2). Three dependent variables were chosen to create this variety: commercial premise, size, and country basis (multinational basis or only based in the Netherlands). This last variable was chosen to contribute to the transnational perspective this research seeks. In addition, 'size' was defined by the number of employees and no other members involved in the organisation such as volunteers, as this would be too difficult to determine. For six organisations, the number of employees was established by the amount of FTEs as reported in the organisations' annual reports of 2021 (annual reports for 2022 had not yet been published by the time the data collection took place). For the remaining three organisations, the number of employees was listed on the website.

To obtain validity and credibility in the research, it was preferred to interview respondents from all four clusters. Unfortunately, no actors from organisations with commercial premises were interviewed. I used this gap to make the two remaining clusters (non-commercial and NL base only; non-commercial and multinational base) stronger by interviewing one extra respondent per cluster more than proposed. Yet, of course, this does influence the external validity of the findings, meaning a generalization of this thesis' findings does not apply to actors in the field of development that have a commercial premise. To continue, it is important to realize that this research thus focuses on NGDOs and newcomers to the development field, and not includes *all* types of actors in the Dutch development cooperation field regarding migration and border security – a boundary and considered limitation to which I also refer in Chapter 6.

Finally, on the next page, Table 1 displays the practitioners of the development cooperation field that were interviewed, including their corresponding organisation, occupation, and interview date. The order is determined by the interview dates, and the interview durations varied from 30 minutes to two hours. I sent the respondents the transcript of the interview afterwards, to allow for reading and reflecting

on what they had said. Development cooperation and migration namely tend to be (politically) sensitive topics in the Netherlands, so therefore, I wanted to ensure they agreed to this way of participating. With the first three participants, I even made the agreement to send the draft version of this thesis, an agreement that turned out to be too time-consuming. Of course, I kept my promise and sent them the draft, as well as the transcript.

ID	***Name***	***Organisation***	***Occupation***	***Interview date***
R1	Jan Ruyssenaars	Oxfam Novib, Amnesty	Former senior policy advisor and lobbyist, volunteer	05-01-2023
R2	Mark Kirkels	War Child	Senior advisor	12-01-2023
R3	Qadar Shafiq	Bureau Wijland	Director	19-01-2023
R4	Max Koffi	Africa in Motion	Director	22-03-2023
R5	Paul van den Berg	Cordaid	Political advisor	28-03-2023
R6	Eduard Nazarski	PAX for Peace, Amnesty, VluchtelingenWerk	Chair of supervisory board, former director	29-03-2023
R7	Respondent 7	Oxfam Novib	Employee	31-03-2023
R8	Respondent 8	Non-governmental organisation 8	Employee	06-04-2023
R9	Tineke Ceelen	Stichting Vluchteling	Director	21-04-2023

Table 1: Interview respondents

Almost all respondents have agreed to referral by name and organisation. The reason for using actual names and organisations instead of anonymising the data is that it contributes to the credibility of the research. More importantly, it allowed me to also connect what was said during the interviews to documents and reports of the organisations. For example, multiple respondents referred to newspaper articles or letters sent to the House of Representatives. If I had to anonymize the interviews, I would not have been able to make a connection with these documents, as anonymity could no longer be guaranteed afterwards. But, as Table 1 shows, two names and one organisation have been anonymized. Respondent 7 decided that, after reading the transcript, they did not want their name to be associated with it but using the organisation's name was agreed upon. The other interviewee, Respondent 8, pointed out at the very end of the interview that the organisation did not see itself as an actor in the field of development, even after discussing the transforming development cooperation field and changing variety of actors in it. Since I still believed the conversation was of relevance for this research, I decided to anonymize this respondent's data, to avoid any unwanted associations. The respondent was informed of this.

Lastly, it should be noted that besides interviews and document reviews, observation is also considered a suitable and frequently used way to obtain data in case study research (Clifford et al., 2016; Creswell & Poth, 2018). As Clifford et al. (2016) point out, a case study is contemporary to a researcher and, therefore, observations provide the opportunity to immerse in the case and to comprehend it fully. While I have considered this method, it turned out to be impracticable. Participating in an interview in which experiences of working for an organisation are shared, while at the same time being involved in it, appeared to be quite sensitive already. Executing observations tended to encounter an awful lot of (ethical) implications. The fact that I have shared all transcripts with my respondents beforehand, shows the sensitive manner in which the data had to be handled – or at least, the way in which I felt was ethical. Not to mention, even if I had been accepted to be an observant in one of the offices, joining meetings and spending time at the workplace, it would have been doubtful if the gathered information was really 'truthful' or insightful to how these organisations operate. Therefore, the decision was made to focus on the semi-structured interviews, which were most important to analyse and uncover discourses that reside in the development field, as experienced by the practitioners. I elaborate on this analysis in the following section.

3.3 Data analysis

After collecting all the data, it was time to move on to the data analysis. To be able to do this, all conducted interviews had to be transcribed first, for which all interviews were voice-recorded. Naturally, all respondents were asked for permission to do this. During the interviews, I would sometimes take notes or write down details that I believed could be specifically interesting to keep in mind.

The transcribing of interviews was started from the beginning, as this makes one more familiar with the research and can gain insights for the upcoming interviews (Clifford et al., 2016). Yet, when the interviews were scheduled relatively close to one another, this was not always possible. Furthermore, details such as pauses, laughs or other expressions of feelings were also included in the transcripts, as these details could provide valuable information for the analysis of the data. When all the interviews were transcribed, the data was uploaded into ATLAS.ti. ATLAS.ti is a programme that allows users to combine different files (interview transcripts, policy reports, visuals, and so on) into one project bundle available for analysis, contributing to the efficiency of analysing and comparing data.

To be able to evaluate the generated documents and to identify and understand meanings, all data was coded. Coding enables categories and patterns to be revealed, such as differences, similarities, and relationships. Moreover, it helps to develop themes that are more connected to the conceptual framework of the research (Clifford et al., 2016). To determine the coding and analysis approach of one's qualitative data, it is important to look at the epistemology and interpretive strategy of the researcher and thesis (Clifford et al., 2016); in this case a postmodern interpretive framework. For this research, a discourse analysis was applied, an interpretative strategy that is also often used by social

constructionists (often described as interpretivism (Creswell & Poth, 2018)) and other critical scholars (Clifford et al., 2016, p. 657). As Clifford et al. (2016) state, discourse analysis is especially suitable for studies that, for example, look into social changes or policy changes and public response. The discourses create 'what is known' and influence what is actually being said and what is not. Discourses do not only stimulate other ones, but they also have actual impacts. It is therefore relevant to discover these concealed discourses of the development cooperation field, as these could affect the field and its practices.

Looking into discourse analysis more specifically, the Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) of Fairclough (1989) was used. According to Fairclough, this includes *"analysing the relationship between texts, processes, and social conditions, both the immediate conditions of the situational context and the more remote conditions of institutions and social structures"* (Fairclough, 1989, p. 26, as cited in Flowerdew & Richardson, 2018, p. 5). Context thus plays a significant role in this analysis. Fairclough has distinguished a framework with three levels: linguistic practice (micro-level), discursive practice (meso-level) and social practice (macro-level) (Flowerdew & Richardson, 2018). The linguistic practice focuses on text analysis, studying the actual words and sentences used. The discursive practice concentrates on the production, distribution and consumption of the analysed texts. Lastly, the social practice involves the social conditions in which the text is constrained, which does not only include the social circumstances but also, for example, the political or economic context. These levels, also referred to as the first, second and third dimension, as I prefer, are interactive and continuously interrelated, and include relations embedded in the social context in which the text originates. The coding process of the interviews was executed in these three layers.

3.4 Methodological reflections and limitations

Every research has its limitations, and so does this Master's thesis. Therefore, this section reflects on the methodological choices that were made. Being critical and thinking twice about every step you take when doing research is necessary, but it can be paralyzing too. However, it is important to continuously reflect on research and its construction, which is also a great learning experience for conducting research in the future. That being said, without further ado, let's reflect on the methodology as discussed earlier.

3.4.1 Methodological limitations

It is important to discuss the quality of one's research, as this determines the worth of the process and outcomes. As Clifford et al. (2016) explain, the way in which this quality is evaluated can differ among researchers, especially those that are doing case study research. While some prefer Lincoln and Guba's idea of 'trustworthiness' based on the credibility, transferability, dependability, and confirmability of

the research (Lincoln & Guba, 1985), I have decided to stick with examining the validity and reliability, which is also supported in case study research as described by Yin (2018).

Validity can be divided into three parts: construct validity, internal validity, and external validity (Yin, 2018). Constructing validity had already started when the proposal of this research was made; it was clear that multiple sources were needed to be able to answer the research questions and it was necessary to focus on one 'sector' of the development cooperation field to set boundaries for the case. Looking at the internal validity, which can be hard to obtain in explorative research, it is important to realize that there can be many things that have influenced the answers of respondents in the interviews. For example, I have tried to make a representative sample by choosing dependent variables for selecting respondents. However, people answer questions based on their personal experiences. Due to the fact that they may have years of experience in the development cooperation field and can be involved in (projects with) multiple organisations at the same time, they can share thoughts or experiences that may have occurred outside of or before working for this specific organisation. This influences the internal validity of the research, but so do the decisions I made as a researcher. I decided to contact these specific organisations; selecting and approaching others could have resulted in different answers. Plus, the chosen dependent variables can also be considered biased in themselves. Lastly, the external validity of one's research concerns the extent to which it is possible to make generalizations. This appears to be quite difficult for case studies, as the case has been bound by characteristics and locale (Clifford et al., 2016). Therefore, it is important to be careful in stating that the findings apply to cases outside of this case study. If one were to study the same research question for the development cooperation field of a different country (or political space) or in a different social practice, outcomes could possibly vary.

Furthermore, reliability is determined by the consistency of the research; are the outcomes reproducible if it is done again under the same circumstances (Clifford et al., 2016)? By trying to code and analyse the data systematically, I tried to ensure the reliability of this study. But, as critical discourse analysis argues, our knowledge is based on interpretation and social practice. Therefore, it is hard for me firmly state that this research is executable exactly the same by another researcher, as my interpretations and positionality must have influenced the findings and how they are reported. However, taking this all into consideration, I would like to mention that I believe this study does answer the research question in a valid way and its outcomes can be considered valuable. Qualitative research is difficult to generalize as positionality and interpretations of respondents and the researcher simply have an influence, but if you are aware of that, the research is extremely valuable and creates a better understanding of the studied issue.

Besides reflecting on the validity and reliability of this research, I want to quickly address two other methodological characteristics that may have influenced this research. Firstly, all interviews were in Dutch, so quotes had to be translated. This was done after the analysis, as in discourse analyses linguistics play a key role and I thus wanted to analyse the data in its 'raw' or original form. I would

like to believe my proficiency in English did not hinder the process and I have tried to translate the quotes as accurately as possible. Still, it is important to mention and, thus, for the sake of completeness, all quotes can be found in their original Dutch form with the accompanying English translation in the Appendices (Appendix 2).

Secondly, the data collection of semi-structured interviews was done after the COVID-19 pandemic; a period in which the world became very familiar with online meetings. In this research, five interviews were done in person, where we would meet in a coffee place, office, or home. Four interviews were conducted online, via Zoom or Teams. And while interviews are often conducted in person, using online video meeting tools to collect this data has increased and offers opportunities as well (Gray et al., 2020). Namely, from a participant's perspective, an online interview can be time efficient and offer the opportunity to participate in the research if the geographical location does not allow it otherwise (Gray et al., 2020). Thus, the online meeting tools provided accessibility to these four participants (as they preferred the online interview over the in-person one), and were cost and time effective, since both the respondent and researcher were able to do the interview from home. Even though participants can be more comfortable in online interviews as they are in their familiar environments, which can be less intimidating, in-person interviews have the advantage to see body language and small talk, which can provide valuable information too (Grey et al., 2020). In the four online interviews, information derived from body language is thus lacking, yet facial expressions were noticed. Furthermore, two out of four online interviews involved quite a lot of small talk, as the interviewees mentioned being interested in the conversation and had some extra time for this. Still, it is important to take this difference of in-person versus online interactions into consideration.

3.4.2 Ethics

It is of great importance to consider the ethical issues one can encounter when doing qualitative research (Creswell & Poth, 2018). As researchers, we should think about possible vulnerabilities and risks for participants. Development cooperation is a field of operation that concerns sensitive subjects, and I was highly aware that the respondents were sharing personal and professional stories. In no way I wanted that their contribution to my research would negatively influence their lives or professional careers. Therefore, as mentioned earlier in this chapter, I took the precaution to let the respondents evaluate and approve the transcript, since they accepted to be referred by name and organisation. While most accepted the transcript immediately, I still think this was the right decision. For example, some participants had told me information 'off the record' or specifically mentioned, after receiving the transcript, that they did not want something included in the research. It is crucial to listen carefully to this and, of course, this information has not been enclosed. Making this visible to the respondents could build trust between the researcher and the respondent. Plus, it makes you wonder and curious why someone wanted to change something, which was stimulating for the research process.

On the other hand, one could say using names and not anonymizing the information could lead to respondents being more reserved or less open, thus possibly influencing the outcomes. However, the respondents seemed rather outspoken and not concerned at all. Besides, it offered the opportunity to look into documents of their organisations, to which many actually referred themselves. So even though, for this study, the advantages of name references were outweighing, it is important to take these downsides into account.

3.4.3 Positionality of the researcher

Last but not least, I would like to elaborate on my positionality as a researcher, since this influences the way I see the world and thus also the things I investigate. I am female, white, and have been brought up in the northern part of the Netherlands. During and after my Bachelor's, I have lived for half a year in Port Alfred, South Africa, and about one year in Australia. Yet, I never received the label 'migrant' and with my Dutch passport visa applications were granted quite easily. In my life, I have not experienced any form of poverty and I am a real 'six-ticks' person, for those who have read the interesting book of Joris Luyendijk.

Reading about development cooperation and talking to (indigenous) people in my time abroad have made me critical – maybe sometimes even sceptical – about development cooperation. Not necessarily about people's sincere way of wanting to do good by people, but more in the way 'the system' is constructed. As an interviewee also mentioned in one of the conversations: *"We do not point our criticism towards individuals or organisations. It's just all about: how do we, as 'The Netherlands BV', deal with the rest of the world and the system?"*. Please be aware, as am I, that this positionality influences this Master's thesis.

4. Diving into the Dutch development cooperation field

As was started with at the beginning of this thesis, development cooperation is transforming into a more diverse and complex field of different actors and characteristics than it has ever been before (Gore, 2013). The policy domains of migration and development tend to increasingly intertwine, and the migration-development nexus is becoming to an increasing extent politicized within the EU, especially in the case of the Netherlands (Lauwers et al., 2021). Therefore, this chapter takes the opportunity to dive into the context of the development cooperation field and to discover: in what primary ways has the Dutch development cooperation field actually transformed? The field will be explored while using the three before-mentioned time frames of Jan Pronk (the 1980s), the MDGs (2000-2015), and the SDGs (2016-2030), and this sets the scene for the social practice in which this research resides. This includes an explanation of how the Dutch government has changed its policies regarding development cooperation in these years, continued by touching upon the transformations the interviewed practitioners of the development field perceived themselves. Finally, the last section of this chapter lays out one of the discourses that were discovered in the data analysis.

4.1 The context of the Netherlands

4.1.1 Time frame: Jan Pronk (1980s-1990s)

> *She said: "Hey, I just came from Jan Pronk and I have a lot of money for research in Tanzania, Kenya, Uganda… If you do Tanzania, you are good at that, then I will do Kenya and they will do Uganda." Amazing. (…) At that time, Jan Pronk was the Minister of Development Cooperation. She had come up with a project and she had sold it, and Jan Pronk was willing to subsidize it. And then she wanted me there, you know? That's how it went.*
>
> (Interview with J. Ruyssenaars, January 5, 2023)

Development cooperation of the Netherlands has emerged from the solidarity of the Dutch society towards people worldwide (Schulpen, Verwer & Ruben, 2014). When looking at important time periods of the Dutch development cooperation field, Schulpen et al. (2014) explicitly mention the appointment of Jan Pronk as Minister for Development Cooperation as a key moment, which was during 1973-1977 and 1989-1998. This was because of the strong increase in government funds available for development cooperation (Schulpen et al., 2014). Dutch newspaper *De Volkskrant* even stated at that time that one cannot think of Dutch development cooperation without even mentioning Pronk (Nicolasen, 1998). His approach was different from his predecessors, and his vision was to follow institutions like the World Bank and IMF less blindly (Nicolasen, 1998).

Van Gastel and Nuijten (2005) explain in more detail the influence Pronk has had on the Dutch Ministry of Development Cooperation and its processes and policies, and that this historical context

seeps through development policy discourses. Basically, in his first term at the Ministry, Pronk had declared two points of focus: 1) the analyses and models that were used for policies within the Ministry were unsuitable, as they did not take into consideration the power relations of countries, both within and between nation-states; 2) the focus of new policies should be on the establishment of 'self-reliance' by increasing socio-economic circumstances of countries, which in turn would lead to their 'true freedom' (Van Gastel & Nuijten, 2005). However, in this case, this 'self-reliance' did not mean that development aid would be phased out. Namely, first, an intensification was needed to transcend the situation of poverty, after which autonomy could be achieved. The policies for development cooperation had to be changed for that. For example, Pronk believed that public investments had to be favoured above commercial private ones, and gifts would make way for loans (Van Gastel & Nuijten, 2005). The 'self-reliance' actually meant that a country could decide for itself which political system it had, as long as it allowed for structural changes that would be positive for its society as a whole. In Pronk's opinion, 'donorship' could exist and be combined with the 'self-reliance' (Van Gastel & Nuijten, 2005).

A specific project created in Pronk's first time at the Ministry of Development Cooperation that concerns development regarding migration is REMPLOD (Reintegration of Emigrant Manpower Promotion of Local Opportunities for Development); a project that made a connection between 'guest workers', referring to migrant workers coming to the Netherlands, and stimulation of development in their countries of origin (Gommers, 2016). It is an example of how the Ministry explored how development aid could help migrants' incentive of economic development in their countries of origin (Smith, 2007). This research project was, actually, one of the first that studied the relationship between development and migration, and it was predicted that the provided support would reduce migration (Smith, 2007). However, it turned out that returned migrants invested in their own, small projects in urban areas rather than in large projects in rural areas, which the Dutch government considered inconsistent with sustainable development. Thereby, REMPLOD's research concluded that sustainable economic development in the countries of origin was not led by migration; a conclusion that did not recognize the economic as well as social impact the investments had in local economies (Smith, 2007). Policies like REMPLOD, focussing on so-called 'productive investments' with remittances, failed to understand the other important transnational exchanges made that can also influence and improve local livelihoods (Smith, 2007).

To continue, in his second period at the Ministry (1989-1998), Pronk had, again, quite the influence. He implemented changes under the guise that a new period of time had started; he namely stated that 1990 meant the end of decolonisation as well as the Cold War and that the 'era of globalisation' had started (Van Gastel & Nuijten, 2005). This was accompanied by a change in policy that concerned a focus on democracy, human rights, and individuals, meaning that development should focus on the participation of people. The nation-states participating in (or rather receiving) development cooperation should have this focus on democratisation and participation, instead of having the before-mentioned right to choose the political system for themselves. This went hand in hand with the ideas of

‘good governance’ and ‘ownership’; the former thus focusing on human rights, the individual and democratic system participation, the latter promising that the wishes of people in development-receiving countries should be central, as opposed to the donor’s (Van Gastel & Nuijten, 2005).

Of course, after the Pronk era, new ministers came to the field. With only one outcast up until 2017, these ministers actually all came from (some arising from) the Christian Democratic Party or Labour Party, of which the latter Pronk was also a member (Schulpen et al., 2014). What Van Gastel and Nuijten (2005) underscore, is that the policy agenda on development cooperation of the Netherlands has been influenced quite strongly by Pronk’s personal (view on) life. Plus, policies regarding ‘good governance’ and ‘ownership’ may be portrayed as new agenda items, but they actually stem from policies of that time, that also strived for democracy, independency, and the before-mentioned ‘self-reliance’. The fact that terms like good governance are multi-interpretable serves even as an opportunity to gain new political support (Van Gastel & Nuijten, 2005). Re-inventing the wheel is thus not an exception for the development cooperation sector, since people are labelling things again and again (Van Gastel & Nuijten, 2005). It is exactly this statement that interviewee M. Kirkels also mentioned in his interview (Section 4.2.1). But before we move on to the interview output, let’s first have a more detailed look at the other two time frames.

4.1.2 Time frame: the MDGs (2000-2015)

> *And there [in Afghanistan] was actually a lot of... also policy-wise, attempts were made there to combine peace, security and development. That's also called the 'comprehensive approach' or '3D', so: development, diplomacy, and defence. It is actually an attempt to tie these different domains together, to connect them, and to also bring the different stakeholders there into contact with each other as much as possible. (...) So in that respect, Afghanistan has really been a kind of learning experience or a, yes, experiment, but has not necessarily succeeded. But you do see that thinking about that coherent policy on peace, security and development is still quite dominant, also in the way the Netherlands works in the Sahel or in countries like Mali, Niger, the Horn of Africa... Nowadays it's called the Triple Nexus.*
>
> (Interview with P. van den Berg, March 28, 2023)

The creation of the MDGs by the UN has been another moment that has been significantly important for Dutch development cooperation and the way it has been received by Dutch society (Schulpen et al., 2014). The goals have been mentioned several times in this thesis, and it has become clear that they did not include migration in their goals explicitly, since migrants and their families were only mentioned in a paragraph relating to ensuring human rights protection for this group (McGregor, 2020). While this research focuses on that sector of the field: development regarding migration and border security, one could question the importance of discussing the goals in the first place. However, the creation of the goals marked a time of globalisation and economic growth for low-income countries, as well as the quest for a global development agenda (Engel & Knoll, 2014). The latter encountered a lot of resistance

and neo-liberal initiatives of institutions such as the World Bank, IMF, and World Trade Organisation (WTO) received much criticism (Schulpen et al., 2014). Engel and Knoll (2014) conclude that the creation of the goals had contributed to the increase of welfare for some, but point out that changes may appear positively on a global level, while the results on a national level can be very disappointing. Furthermore, inclusivity was a real thorny issue, as input from 'developing countries' was not taken seriously.

Besides the multi-lateral development cooperation initiatives of the MDGs, Hoebink (2006) explains changes in bilateral policies for development cooperation of the Netherlands. He states that while the Netherlands was often admired and praised for its contribution to the field, there are multiple burning issues that continue to exist in the cooperations it is involved in, also in this time frame. Examples of these issues are the role of trade in programmes, the selection process of countries included in programmes, and responses to emergency assistance (Hoebink, 2006). Furthermore, after 2000, a 're-ideology' of development cooperation policy initiated by the Dutch Liberal Party *VVD* led to gradual and eventually radical changes in policies, in which development cooperation was preferably limited to the most necessary and obligatory (Hoebink, 2014). This has led to cuts in public funds.

Furthermore, it appeared that development cooperation was not considered highly important in the Dutch House of Representatives, as debates were dominated by the Liberal Party, and few oral and written parliamentary questions were submitted (Hoebink, 2014). Parliamentary questions can be used to draw attention to a subject, gather information, hold a minister accountable or get publicity. Given that this was done very little compared to other subjects, shows that development cooperation took a subordinate position in importance in the House of Representatives. The debate about development cooperation was conducted by so-called 'backbenchers', i.e. members of parliament who do not fulfil a considered important role like a ministerial position (Hoebink, 2014). And, as a side note, most questions (about 81 per cent) were based on media reports, but never on a report of the IOB (*Inspectie Ontwikkelingssamenwerking en Beleidsevalutatie*, nowadays called the *Directie Internationaal Onderzoek en Beleidsevaluatie*, referring to the independent Policy and Operations Evaluations Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that researches the efficiency and efficacy of Dutch foreign policy). Plus, in this time frame, most questions were asked by politicians of the nativist party *PVV*, which were formulated more as a call to stop development cooperation (Hoebink, 2014).

There are two events that occurred in this time frame that are worth mentioning, as they have had an influence on the social practice this research and its interviews are residing in and can be explicitly linked to notions of security. Firstly, the attacks of 9/11 have played a significant role in the increase of the global security agenda, accompanied by an increase in development interest (De Haan, 2011). Looking at the case of the Netherlands, the triple-D or '3D' approach concerning diplomacy, defence, and development, can be seen as an example of how the urge of fighting (potential) sources of instability and conflict have been combined with development objectives (De Haan, 2011). Secondly, from the 2000s on, the Netherlands appeared to experience a "pessimistic turn" in the migration debate

of the nation-state. Not just because of 9/11, but also due to the murder of Dutch politician Pim Fortuyn in 2002, the murder of Dutch filmmaker Theo van Gogh in 2004, and the rise of the nativist party *PVV* of Geert Wilders (Lucassen & Lucassen, 2015). It resulted in a polarized political context in which mostly Islamic people, left-wing parties, and so-called 'political elites' were targeted. This played a role in the creation of a context in which anti-immigration politics could thrive in the country (Lucassen & Lucassen, 2015).

4.1.3 Time frame: the SDGs (2016-2030)

> *The difference between the MDGs and SDGs was that the SDGs are much better operationalized. There are KPIs and targets attached to it, and all sorts of things are attached to it. Other organisations will undoubtedly take this seriously because that is what they want themselves, that is also what they want to convey to the public.*
>
> (Interview with M. Kirkels, January 12, 2023)

Naturally, after discussing the MDGs time frame, we arrive at the Sustainable Development Goals. As mentioned earlier, the interpretation of the role of migration in development in these goals has a sedentary bias and thus implies that migration is a failure of development, rather than an enabler (McGregor, 2020; Nijenhuis & Leung, 2017). Development has a territorial and single-place focus, and the dynamic plus translocal character is not recognized in the goals (Nijenhuis & Leung, 2017). Zooming out from development cooperation related to migration but looking at the SGDs as a whole, Engel and Knoll (2014) state that the goals, unlike their predecessors, are trying to break away from the 'developed' and 'developing' countries narrative. Differences between states are supposed to be based on their approach towards fulfilling the goals and taking responsibility. The formulation of the goals should, ambitiously, transcend the traditional train of thought between the 'Global North' versus the 'Global South' (Engel & Knoll, 2014). The Dutch contribution to the formulation of these goals specifically included a request to focus on climate change, gender- and income inequality, and human rights (Engel & Knoll, 2014).

And while the Ministry at the time stated in its letter to the House of Representatives that they would implement the goals on various scales (Ploumen, 2016), namely on a global scale (sharing knowledge and working together with multilateral organizations such as the UN and OECD), the state level (in policy at other ministries), and the provincial and municipal level (making a distinction between rural and urban municipalities), researchers have distinguished some other important changes in development cooperation policies in this time period. It should be noted that Section 2.1.1 on government policies covers a fair share of information for this time period. But, to continue on this, De Jong and Vijge (2021) state that the Dutch development policies have experienced a change in the conceptualisation of relations between countries. Namely, while at first the development relation was described as aid-giving and aid-receiving, this now has transformed towards a partnership. In the first

place, the increase of economic circumstances and stimulation of trade remain central in this partnership. Afterwards, this is followed by, next to poverty reduction, a focus on environmental sustainability (De Jong & Vijge, 2021). Furthermore, Yunita et al. (2022) describe that the Netherlands has been acknowledged by other OECD countries as a leader or even frontrunner in coherent development policies, also because of its success in combining development aid, investments, and trade (Yunita et al., 2022). To continue, the Dutch government appears to combine approaches to global issues well with its own national interests (Yunita et al., 2022). In this vein, De Jonge and Vijge point out that development cooperation and international trade have been merged into one combined ministry for over a decade (De Jonge & Vijge, 2021).

Besides trade being an important theme in development policy, there are also events that have significant meaning for development cooperation policies in this time frame. Partly due to the ongoing conflicts in Afghanistan, Syria and Iraq, many people arrived at the borders of the EU in 2015. This 'migration crisis' marked the beginning of a time in which the Netherlands and other EU member states would intensify their migration and asylum policy strategies. The European Council even dedicated a whole website to this, including a timeline and approaches per migration route and migrant category[4]. As a result, when looking at bilateral development aid, the Dutch development strategies have integrated migration perspectives (Kiratli, 2021).

And even though Hoebink concluded in 2014 that in the foregoing 65 years, development cooperation never truly had been in the spotlight in the House of Representatives (Hoebink, 2014, p. 113), in the year 2023 the tables seem to have turned. Politicians are namely not just concerned about the circumstances regarding asylum seekers' centres in the Netherlands, they are also worried about the cutback of 3.4 billion Euros from the development budget (NOS Nieuws, 2023). The numbers on the reception of asylum seekers have been systematically underestimated by the Dutch government for 21 years (Algemene Rekenkamer, 2023). The funding for this reception in the country is taken from the budget for development cooperation, which is troubling and improper according to development organisations (Partos, 2023).

Lastly, Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine should be mentioned in this time frame as well. While information and reliable sources are still limited as the war started by mid-2022, Ahmad and Carey (2022) report for the OECD an increase of ODA towards Ukraine. While the 'migration crisis' led to the intensification of migration policies and development cooperation was used as the externalization for border control, there now appeared to be a context in which the Dutch society was very welcoming to the many Ukrainian refugees. These differences were also noticed by the development actors.

[4] https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/eu-migration-policy/migration-timeline/

4.2 An ever-changing field of operation

> *Yes, there are discourses in the sector, in the development sector in the Netherlands, and they are about decolonisation, localisation, diversity, inclusiveness, integrity… So yes, those things do change the landscape. They change the way organisations work.*
>
> (Interview with M. Kirkels, January 12, 2023)

Reading about the Dutch development cooperation field with its changes in government policies and context made me very curious about what shifts the practitioners actually noticed in their field of operation. Therefore, often at the beginning of the interview, I would start the conversation with questions regarding changes in the field. And, before moving on to these discussed changes, it should be noted that this study used a critical discourse analysis since discourses create 'what is known' and influence what is actually being said and what is not. Uncovering the discourses shines a light on the way the migration-development nexus and notions of security are conceived by the actors. However, in this empirical chapter, the transformations respondents mention are not necessarily disclosed, as they literally answer a specific question. The linguistic practice, so the actual words being used, fit what they are saying. Next to this, the discursive practice, so how language is used in relation to when it is produced, is also corresponding, as the interviewees talk in an informative but informal way due to the interview. Thus, there are changes that I would not necessarily call a discovery of discourses: they are said in response to the questions. Nevertheless, I believe they are valuable to mention since there were themes that came forward in multiple conversations. Yet, there is one theme that stands out to which a subsection has been devoted: localisation (4.2.1). Throughout the interviews, it became clear that organisations are actively evaluating the positions they hold within development cooperation, and understand that local 'Southern' partners should become central within the cooperations. However, whether localisation will be implemented to its fullest extent appears to be doubtful. But before we go into much more detail, we first take a look at the other four themes.

Firstly, it has become clear that, as Paul van den Berg also nicely summarizes, climate change has come to play a major role in the field and has now become a part of many organisations:

> *Climate has now, well, actually become a very important issue in all organisations, and that does touch on the regions where we operate. Whether it's the Sahel or Yemen, I mean, we simply see the impact of climate change on a daily basis. Yes, that is a reason to, in terms of policy advocacy, do much more in that area. So that is really a new subject, so to speak, for many development organisations.*
>
> (Interview with P. van den Berg, March 28, 2023)

However, while respondents mention the increasing importance of climate change within their organisations, it is not necessarily becoming the focus or main objective of their operations. The rise is

mostly visible in their lobby and advocacy, or it is something they come across – the consequences of climate change – in their projects, like working in areas in which no rain has fallen for over three years[5]. The organisation that already has a focus on climate and sustainability in its programmes with people with a migration background, Bureau Wijland, emphasize that they are trying to make their voices heard, also on a global level:

> *But then we use the moment to send a message to Minister Jetten, from [the Ministry of] Climate and Energy, who is representing the Netherlands in Sharm-el-Sheikh. (...) "Don't forget Africa. So, the Netherlands, a wealthy country; great. But remember that there are also poor countries that directly experience the consequences of our consumption behaviour."*
>
> (Interview with Q. Shafiq, January 19, 2023)

Secondly, the changing governance of organisations came to the fore. People talked about the merges of Dutch organisations like ICCO and Cordaid[6] and the fact that they work together with other organisations in projects, but also in forming a united front when advocating ideas, for example towards politics. More specifically, Mark Kirkels explained that within War Child, there is a call to create a more global organisation that includes the voices of 'the South' more, and so that not every organisation has its own programme department, its own advocacy department, and so on.

> *At one point, we had three offices in the same town in northern Uganda: War Child England, War Child Netherlands, War Child Canada. Well, you don't want that, you don't want that at all. You just want one War Child. So, we are in the midst of that transition from a Dutch organisation to a global organisation, and so we have to merge those country structures from England and the Netherlands.*
>
> (Interview with M. Kirkels, January 12, 2023)

This internationalisation of the organisation is going with some difficulty, given that the organisations would like to remain independent. However, this theme did not appear in conversations with people from organisations with a Dutch base only, since they, of course, encounter other organisations and work with them, but these are not 'from their own team'.

Thirdly, changes in development cooperation policy and politics have been mentioned throughout the conversations extensively. Of course, we arrived at this topic since these organisations have to abide by the rules set by the Dutch government and we were about to discuss their field of operation in combination with the migration-development nexus, a concept that has been politicized in the Netherlands and EU (Lauwers et al., 2021). But, there was some sort of 'obviousness' in the way politics played a role in the conversations. Probably naïve, but before I conducted the interviews, I had the idea

[5] Interview with Respondent 7 (March 31, 2023)
[6] Interview with E. Nazarski (March 29, 2023)

that organisations would (portray to) execute their projects no matter what. And yes, to a certain extent, this is still true, their goals and objectives are central and also much criticism has been levelled at the government. But I was just surprised by the sort of ease politics came into play when discussing the transformations of the field. An example of this can be seen in the conversation with Paul van den Berg:

> *Yes and no. A lot has changed, absolutely, because the development sector really is in constant dynamics, so to speak. That also has to do with politics and certain choices made by the government and funding that may or may not become available. But there is also a lot of continuity like in... Well, development cooperation is a long-term process, so you don't do different things every year as an organisation. We do try to work on certain topics and certain countries on a long-term basis to really make a difference.*
>
> (Interview with P. van den Berg, March 28, 2023)

In conjunction with these changes in politics and its subsidies, which will also be elaborated on in the following empirical chapter, a transformation regarding assessments of impact has also come to the fore. The interviewed practitioners mentioned that, over time, it has become increasingly important to be able to prove what kind of impact your organisation's work will have[7], also for when things go South (pun not intended). An increase in evaluations, audits, and controls is experienced to prove the matter, also to show how the organisation is not just cooperating with coalitions here in the Netherlands, but also with organisations 'on the ground', meaning the 'partner' or local organisations[8].

> *Yes, the tone [of the debate] has changed, the policies have changed and what is specific to development cooperation is also... well, the cooperation has a somewhat different character, because the government is increasingly, well, clarifying its policy a little further, but also increasingly asking you to demonstrate what impact you think you can have. And that gets more attention from everyone; more attention to impact as well.*
>
> (Interview with E. Nazarski, March 29, 2023)

Fourthly, after talking about the changes in policy and the increase in assessments, a link can be made to the change of tone of the debate in the Netherlands. The contextual information of Section 4.1 shone already light on the polarized political circumstances in the nation-state, especially regarding migration-related matters. Multiple practitioners refer to this matter; that society and politics in the Netherlands tend to become harsher, notably when it concerns migration, and development relating to migration[9]. Eduard Nazarski makes an explicit statement, which can be connected to the social and political context of the Netherlands:

[7] Interview with E. Nazarski (March 29, 2023); Interview with J. Ruyssenaars (January 5, 2023); Interview with M. Koffi (March 22, 2023); Interview with T. Ceelen (April 21, 2023)
[8] Interview with E. Nazarski (March 29, 2023)
[9] Interview with E. Nazarski (March 29, 2023); Interview with J. Ruyssenaars (January 5, 2023); Interview with Q. Shafiq (January 19, 2023); Interview with Respondent 7 (March 31, 2023); Interview with Respondent 8 (April 6, 2023); Interview with T. Ceelen (April 21, 2023)

> *That interplay between criticism in society and politicians that say: "We are going to sort this out" by in fact, yes, you are allowed to write it down too, but in fact they just say: "Less, less, less". While others got reprimanded for it. Well, and this interaction is very strong at the moment. And the people who want it changed, they are either too little, or too modest, or too timid. Or just not alert enough. Because when I look at how fast certain xenophobic things are spread in social media and I look at how fast things I do agree with are being spread, then yes, we are really much slower.*
>
> (Interview with E. Nazarski, March 29, 2023)

The interviewee is referring to a very well-known controversial event of 2014, in which *PVV* party leader Geert Wilders asks his followers if they want more or less Moroccan people in their city and the Netherlands. The crowd replied by shouting "less, less, less", after which Wilders states "Then we will sort that out". The situation has been discussed for a long time in society, as well as in court. After 6500 declarations of discrimination and a six-year trial, the court convicted Wilders for group insult, yet without penalization (Openbaar Ministerie, 2021). In this comment, Nazarski portrayed a harshened society and transformation of accepted political circumstances that the development cooperation organisations thus also have to deal with. The fact that Nazarski explicitly mentions that I am allowed to write this down, thus implying that this is actually something that could also have been told off the record, stresses the sensitivity of the matter.

4.2.1 Discourse: localisation

Fifthly and lastly, one theme has been standing out when talking about transformations of the development cooperation field and in the conversations in general: localisation. And, as Mark Kirkels already described, it is a concept that has been used for a while but has received a new label:

> *[Talking about the Triple-Nexus] So that collaboration in such contexts between all kinds of agencies that... yes, that has been going on for decades and new things have always been invented for it and Triple-Nexus is just the last word. For localisation, I think so too. For decades we have been talking about society-building, civil society building, and to me, localisation actually comes across a bit like a new term for an existing concept[10]. (...) That is not entirely true, it has been modernised somewhat.*
>
> (Interview with M. Kirkels, January 12, 2023)

As mentioned before, the changes in and multi-interpretability of terminology can serve as an opportunity to gain support when (political) contexts are changing, therefore making re-labelling in the development cooperation sector not an exception (Van Gastel & Nuijten, 2005). In the discussions around localisation, organisations are evaluating their positions within development cooperation and

[10] *"Nieuwe vlag op een oude schuit"* is a Dutch saying literally translated as "a new flag on an old barge", referring to a new term used for something already existing.

acknowledge that local partners want to and should play a more leading role in the programmes. Kirkels even explained that if you really dare to have a deep discussion about this, you can ask yourself whether you should continue to exist as a development organisation.

This was very helpful in reading between the lines in other interviews and, more importantly, it led to the determination of an uncovered discourse. While some respondents can imagine the landscape looking completely different years from now[11], others seem to be wondering if that would really be the case. It can be stated that development practitioners believe that the voice of 'the South' should become central within development cooperation, as this is considered very important, but whether localisation will be executed to its fullest appears to be doubtful. This may not be due to a lack of benevolence, but rather that 'the system' or circumstances complicate it. In the conversation with Respondent 7, I asked whether they, as a large international NGO, were not afraid to completely efface themselves at some point. To which was replied:

> *The same [fear of eliminating yourself as an INGO] also applies, of course, doesn't it? Naturally, it is... but yes, in principle... Ultimately, you have to make yourself redundant. That's what we all want, isn't it? So eventually, development cooperation should be redundant, should no longer be needed. Well, that is a utopia, I think, but that's actually a goal you should have. In principle, let's just say, support or aid should really just be temporary.*
>
> (Interview with Respondent 7, March 31, 2023)

So, even though there might be concerns about organisations making themselves redundant, there is an understanding that this is actually also what should happen in the end. Still, there seems to be an understanding that it will not happen anyways, as the circumstances will not allow it. I will elaborate on this discourse by using the three layers of Fairclough.

Linguistic practice

In the example mentioned above, the word 'utopia' is, in fact, all-encompassing. It is an imagined desired reality in which everything is perfect, yet it is not existing. Furthermore, when looking at the linguistic dimension in all interviews, words such as 'decolonisation', 'inclusiveness', and 'local partners' point towards the 'upside' of localisation; working together with community-based partners instead of having a top-down approach. On the contrary, words like 'assumption [of mismanagement]', 'scary to invest' and 'losing control' point towards the disadvantages that exist in the social context. Next to this, usage of 'the involvement of local partners' or 'implementing partners' shows that the intent is not from the partners, but rather that they are included after the project has been set up.

[11] Interview with M. Kirkels (January 12, 2023); Interview with M. Koffi (March 22, 2023)

Discursive practice

Within the discursive practice, it can be clearly seen that the text is created in an interview setting with a student since the language throughout the texts is quite informal. I believe that if the respondents were interviewed by for example journalists, as some of them have experience with, the answers would be much more formal. Furthermore, they formulate their sentences in a way that looks for confirmation (from me, the interviewer) by using words like 'you know?', 'right?', 'isn't it?', maybe to check if I understood them correctly too. This will not be found in a speech or annual report. Lastly, phrases were often interrupted with words like 'of course' or 'obviously', in an attempt to emphasize that they believe localisation and strategic local partnerships are the just way of operating.

Social practice

In the discourse of localisation came forward that investors or donors find it hard to finance local projects directly, as this is assumed to be a 'risk'. Having an international NGO as an 'intermediary' can provide more certainty for them[12]. This was also mentioned when talking about investing in diaspora-organised projects (though one can argue if that is part of localisation, as diaspora sometimes are considered as 'outsiders' of the community). Financial resources are thus often allocated to larger INGOs. That being said, another considered downside of localisation is that it leads to fragmentation of projects, which in turn could lead to inefficiency in achieving goals[13]. Finally, looking at the organisational context: if the financial flows and execution of all programs passed you by as an organisation, the business model of your organisation would no longer exist, thus leading to the cessation of the organisation's existence. While it may be the ultimate goal, it can be considered scary or even unfavourable for now. These examples make clear that when looking at the social practice as distinguished by Fairclough, the political, economic, and organisational context play a role in the slow transformation towards localisation that the respondents perceive.

It should be noted that it would have been relevant for this research to address the question: what happens beyond localisation? The last used time frame of the SDGs is up to 2030, so what transformations do actors expect in the years to come? Localisation can be considered a transformation that is happening within organisations; organisations and their practices are rethought and restructured in a way that includes local voices. But how does this translate into changes for development cooperation as a whole?

As stated earlier, some respondents can imagine the landscape looking completely different years from now. They believe that if organisations want to include voices of 'the South', themes like decolonisation and depaternalism are important. And, therefore, some respondents acknowledged the overarching issue: how relevant is Dutch development cooperation still? This relevance is up for

[12] Interview with M. Koffi (March 22, 2023); Interview with Respondent 7 (March 31, 2023)
[13] Interview with E. Nazarski (March 29, 2023)

discussion when it comes to the role Dutch cooperation should play in the implementation of development programmes[14]. But how the future of development cooperation is envisioned and what approaches or roles organisations will play in this specifically remained underexposed in the interviews.

Therefore, looking back at the interviews, discussions about the idea 'beyond localisation' were limited, which can be considered a limitation to this research (which I come back to in my recommendations, see Section 6.3). A first explanation for this is that I have not asked the right questions for this discussion to arise in the semi-structured interviews. Secondly, there is a possibility that the visionary part of the interviews is limited because people were not open to that kind of discussion. However, the respondents were very open and honest in the conversations we had, so my assumption is that unwillingness did not play a major role in this limitation. Third and lastly, the uncovered discourse of localisation holds the thought that implementing localisation to its fullest potential is hard (and perhaps even a 'utopia'). What happens beyond localisation can thus perhaps be difficult to envision.

However, there have been conversations that included expected (and wished for) changes for the field of development cooperation, not necessarily linked to the idea 'beyond localisation', that I would still like to mention here. An example of what is considered that needs change is the 'global systems' that maintain inequalities to persist, such as trade agreements[15]. Furthermore, by focusing on the individuals rather than the global system as a whole, Bureau Wijland tries to affect people with diverse cultural and migration backgrounds in their quest for a more sustainable world. They hold all citizens accountable for their responsibilities on themes such as nature, the environment, and sustainability[16], which could be considered a part of the idea of Global Citizenship. Finally, two other specific examples of desired changes in the future were 1) combating injustices by creating a humane migration and refugee policy[17], and 2) increasing the distribution of information to counter negative trends in the way migration is perceived by society[18]. For the latter, an even more specific example was the idea of Eduard Nazarski, in which he suggested creating a positive 'cyber army', to counter xenophobic things regarding migration on the internet in a positive way.

4.3 Summary

Many insights have been discussed in the foregoing pages of this chapter. Therefore, before moving on to the second empirical chapter, I will briefly summarise the findings of this 'dive into the Dutch development cooperation field'. Three time frames were used to review the primary ways in which the

[14] Interview with M. Kirkels (January 12, 2023); Interview with M. Koffi (March 22, 2023); Q. Shafiq (January 19, 2023)
[15] Interview with M. Koffi (March 22, 2023); Interview with Respondent 7 (March 31, 2023)
[16] Q. Shafiq (January 19, 2023)
[17] Interview with E. Nazarski (March 29, 2023); Interview with T. Ceelen (April 21, 2023)
[18] Interview with E. Nazarski (March 29, 2023); Interview with Respondent 7 (March 31, 2023); Interview with T. Ceelen (April 21, 2023)

field has transformed. Firstly, the 'Pronk era' (1980s-1990s) marked a time in which government funds available for development cooperation strongly increased. In his first term at the Ministry, Pronk declared that policies should consider the power relations of countries, and a focus on 'self-reliance' by increasing socio-economic circumstances would help countries in obtaining independency. In his second term, the policy agenda received a focus on democracy, human rights and individual participation; agenda items that would also be used in the years to come. Secondly, the time frame of the MDGs (2000-2015) marked a time of globalisation and the quest for a global development agenda, in which inclusivity and input from 'developing countries' were not taken seriously. For the Netherlands, bilateral policies for development cooperation were 're-ideologized', which resulted in public funds cuts and limitations to the most necessary development obligations. Furthermore, events like 9/11 played a role in the increase of the global security agenda, leading to the urge of fighting (potential) sources of instability and combine this with development objectives. And, from the 2000s on, the Netherlands experienced a 'pessimistic' turn in the migration debate. Thirdly, the SDGs (2016-2030) tried to break away from the 'developed' and 'developing' countries narrative, but still see migration as a failure of development, rather than an enabler. Dutch government development relations in this time have transformed into forms of partnerships, but trade and own national interests have been well combined within these agreements. Moreover, the 'migration crisis' of 2015 marked the beginning of a time in which the Netherlands and other EU member states intensified migration policies, and development strategies have integrated migration perspectives.

The interviewed development practitioners also noticed many changes in their field of operation. In the conversations, four themes came to the fore: 1) the increasing importance of climate change within organisations, mostly in lobby and advocacy; 2) the changing governance of development organisations; 3) the changes in development policies of the Dutch government, in which impact assessment plays a more significant role; and 4) the change of tone of the debate in the Netherlands, especially regarding migration and development relating to migration. Lastly, the theme of localisation included the determination of an uncovered discourse. There is, namely, an overall understanding that the voice of local actors should become central to development cooperation. However, it appears to be doubtful if localisation can or will be implemented to its fullest extent, since various circumstances, such as assumed risks of financial investors, complicate the transformation. What happens beyond localisation remained underexposed in the interviews, but some interviewees believe that the Dutch development cooperation field will look completely different years from now.

5. The conception of the M-D nexus and notions of security

In this fifth chapter, I move away from the prior discussion on transformations and localisation and shine a light on the migration-development nexus and notions of security; two other important themes that need to be examined. I start with the discourse on the migration-development nexus, followed by an explanation of how notions of security on various scalar levels are conceived. The third section puts the dynamics between the Dutch government policies and these two themes in the spotlight.

5.1 Discourse: the migration-development nexus

> *Yes, those are root causes, aren't they? That's a frame that Schreinemacher's predecessors also used. It is actually the instrumentalisation of development cooperation, development resources, for the sake of self-interest, you could say. It is also a frame that really suits the VVD. Because well, you know, it was of course quite a remarkable choice for a VVD Minister to be put forward, and they simply don't have much interest in development cooperation. But if they can somehow sell development cooperation to their own supporters, like: "Yes, but we're also doing this because it's good for the Netherlands, you know? Because you are also against migration. Well, we use a bit of taxpayers' money then. And that helps them a bit in the countries of origin, but it's also good for the Netherlands and the EU." That's kind of the frame Schreinemacher has used, but so did the predecessors, you see. But the question is to what extent this is correct. (...) So this is mainly also a frame to, well, soften up critics of development cooperation, let me put it this way.*
>
> (Interview with P. van den Berg, March 28, 2023)

On the website of the Dutch government, current Minister of Foreign Trade and Development Cooperation Liesje Schreinemacher states that development and trade go hand-in-hand. Besides strengthening the Netherlands' position in the global economy, she mentions: *"At the same time, through development cooperation, we will continue to look out for people in the world's most vulnerable regions, and tackle the root causes of poverty, climate change, terrorism and migration"* (Government of the Netherlands, 2023, para. 1). In this way, as posed by the Ministry, development tries to get a grip on the 'root causes' of migration. When the circumstances allowed it, I presented the respondents with this quote during the interview, to continue the conversation about the migration-development nexus and see how they would react to this statement. Discussing the quote led to interesting conversations and important insights, just like the one above.

The connections made here are much more complex and every problem has various dimensions, and the question is to what extent the Dutch government itself plays a role in these[19]. For example, when thinking about tackling climate change or terrorism, it was mentioned that one should also think about ending subsidies on fossil fuels or contributions to the arms trade. But coming back to the link between

[19] Interview with M. Koffi (March 22, 2023); Interview with P. van den Berg (March 28, 2023); Q. Shafiq (January 19, 2023); Interview with T. Ceelen (April 21, 2023)

development and migration, in the interviews it became clear that the discourse on the migration-development nexus is considered simplistic and outdated. At the end of this section, I elaborate on this discourse by using the three layers of Fairclough. But first, even though the link itself was thus considered obsolete, some characteristics of the migration-development nexus as described by Glick Schiller and Faist (2009) were acknowledged or discussed by the interviewed practitioners in the field of development cooperation. I address them in the following paragraphs.

To briefly reiterate, it is important to note here that, as the Methodology chapter explained, I interviewed the actors of the third and fourth pillars of the development cooperation field as defined by Develtere et al. (2021): NGOs and newcomers to the development field. The empirical results thus echo the perspective of the practitioners, in particular the NGOs and INGOs. The development cooperation field regarding migration and border security yet also includes many more actors, such as actors on the implementing side, or governmental actors like the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Justice and Security. These voices are not included in the findings and their answers could entail different perspectives to the themes discussed. Therefore, please note that I discuss findings related to the perspective of the practitioners and not *all* actors of the Dutch development cooperation field regarding migration and border security. I will refer to this limitation – or rather: set boundary – in Section 6.3.

Firstly, coming back to the characteristics of the migration-development nexus, it came to the fore that remittances, both social and financial, were being acknowledged and considered important by the practitioners. The fact that financial remittances are, in aggregate, much greater in value than ODA, appeared to be common knowledge. The importance of social remittances was recognized too, yet a bit more disclosed, and a few projects of the organisations even take these remittances into account. For example, Qader Shafiq explains that one of the programmes of Bureau Wijland actively tries to share knowledge via the transnational networks of its participants:

> *Colourful Green is creating co-ownership here and actually focuses on sustainable choices, consumption behaviour, nature and the environment, considering education. And we know: so if people make choices here to eat less meat, or organic, or understand what consequences, for example, the increase of plastic has on the world, or the endless use of fossil fuel, what misery that brings in a lot of countries in the Middle East (...). If that awareness is there, because people are connected transnationally, they also have an impact on the consumption behaviour of people there. (...) We believe that the effect, the scope, by involving people from migrant backgrounds in nature and sustainability here, the effect is much greater. So not only here, but also there.*
>
> (Interview with Q. Shafiq, January 19, 2023)

Furthermore, the value of social remittances was also clearly seen in the projects of Africa in Motion. In various projects, connections are made between knowledge institutions, businesses and migrants, in

which acquired knowledge is actively shared with people in Africa by supporting the start-up of small businesses or improving agricultural practices[20].

Secondly, the idea that not only individual migrants but also migrant diasporas become development agents was discussed, which can also be seen in the programmes mentioned above. However, some respondents mentioned that this idea of diaspora as enablers or agents for development can be seen as an opportunity that is not fully seized[21]. Namely, while the diaspora can be considered valuable for development, as they both know the Netherlands as well as the country the development projects would take place, the diaspora is not involved in the projects properly or at all. That the diaspora is not valued for its worth leads to disappointments, and even in a submitted motion in the House of Representatives to recognize the diaspora as a serious interlocutor in development[22]. Even more specifically, Max Koffi mentioned that in his attempts to organize diaspora-led development cooperation projects, he experienced quite a lot of resistance:

> *And, even worse, I've often heard that too, directly and indirectly: the Dutch government, Dutch officials, they don't trust the diaspora. Because they say, "Yes, what is the agenda behind it?" (...) "Yes, why, Max, do you want to do this? What is the plan? Are we unwittingly going to support that and one day they say, 'yeah, we supported that guy. Look what he's doing in Africa now'." Do you get it? It's also the underlying reasons, which are not voiced. And then you can have 100,000 interviews with them. Then they will come up with reasons of, 'yes, the diaspora is not organised, and the diaspora has no capacity, are not that professional'. And that, that's where it lingers and so that's how it works. There are things that are in the country's interest, but you don't get it done, because you don't have that much capacity anyway.*
>
> (Interview with M. Koffi, March 22, 2023)

In this statement, Koffi mentions that there are things 'in the country's interest' to which he is now unable to contribute. It is referring to my question regarding one of their diaspora projects that stood out to me. Namely, one of the listed advantages of the project is that it will reduce immigration, due to the creation of new companies in African countries. It was a surprising goal to me, but it sounded like a potentially good match for Dutch government objectives that 'developmentalized' migration or consider development as a 'tool' to halt migration. However, several applications had not resulted in any subsidies, which for Koffi was confirmation that the diaspora is being questioned twice, as well as underestimated, compared to other development organisations.

Nevertheless, other characteristics of the migration-development nexus were underexposed or considered irrelevant. I would like to bring three characteristics as described by Glick Schiller and Faist

[20] Interview with M. Koffi (March 22, 2023)
[21] Interview with M. Koffi (March 22, 2023); Q. Shafiq (January 19, 2023); Interview with Respondent 7 (March 31, 2023)
[22] Interview with M. Koffi (March 22, 2023)

(2009) to the fore. Firstly, the notion that 'brain gain will eventually replace brain drain' remained underexposed in the interviews. There were two referrals to projects that support 'Southern' students to come to the Netherlands, obtain a (Master's) degree, increase their knowledge in agriculture, and use this knowledge after returning to the country of origin, but these projects were executed by universities and not by the organisations themselves[23]. Secondly, the described characteristic of the nexus that 'temporary and circular migration development stimulate development' was considered irrelevant by the interviewed practitioners, mostly because the organisations did not focus on temporary or circular migration and the interviews did not expand on this matter further. Third and lastly, the characteristic of the migration-development nexus that 'economic development first increases short and middle term migration, but in the end it will reduce migration' led to discussions with the interviewed practitioners, as the notion that development could be used to stop migration was perceived as simplistic and outdated.

To clarify, the interviewed practitioners do not consider development cooperation to be a panacea for reducing migration. But, it is necessary to acknowledge the concept of the 'migration hump' existing in theories that discuss whether development could ultimately reduce migration. Namely, as is also described by De Haas et al. (2020), (economic) development can lead to 'migration humps', meaning an increase in short- to medium-term emigration from the country experiencing the development changes. With a capital increase, people can look for alternative living environments and thus become mobile. Yet, ultimately, if the economic differences between two areas or countries decrease and flatten, migration can be reduced, as people decide to stay put in their country of origin. However, as also pointed out by De Haas et al. (2020), the 'danger' of following theories on the migration hump blindly, is that one could believe that development automatically leads to certain migration outcomes, while situations can vary and are highly context-dependent.

The direct link that is sometimes made between development and reducing migration – like in Schreinemacher's statement – is also addressed by Paul van den Berg, whose quote will be used to describe the discourse on how the migration-development nexus is conceived overall by the interviewed practitioners of the development cooperation field regarding migration and border security:

> *Well, I think this is quite a controversial idea and a lot of literature actually suggests the opposite. That investing in development, at least for the short term, could also lead to more migration because people would then also have opportunities to pack their bags and seek refuge elsewhere. But it is a kind of idée-fixe of the international community and also of the Dutch government, that they think: yes, we can use development with the prospects; we can keep them there. We don't go along with that ourselves. We think migration is a human right. I mean, you have the right to migrate. And if you choose to do that, then yes, of course, you're going to end up in a procedure and then it's ultimately up to the EU or the Netherlands to investigate whether people, well, have legitimate reasons to apply for asylum. But we do not engage in the notion that there is some kind of direct link between bringing development and stopping migration.*
>
> (Interview with P. van den Berg, March 28, 2023)

[23] Interview with M. Kirkels (January 12, 2023); Interview with Respondent 7 (March 31, 2023)

So, while I am using a critical discourse analysis to find out what, in addition to what is said, is not expressed, the quote of the respondent above described and summarized the discourse regarding the migration-development nexus well. As mentioned, some described beneficial characteristics of the link are perceived as valuable, but the train of thought that the nexus could directly reduce migration was conceived as simplistic and outdated[24]. However, respondents acknowledge the political context that is playing a part in using this nexus in a development strategy as expressed by the Dutch government. I will elaborate on this conception by using the three layers of Fairclough.

Linguistic practice

Just like with the discourse on localisation, there seems to be one word here that is all-encompassing for the discourse on the migration-development nexus: 'idée-fixe'. Deriving from French, the concept refers to a delusional idea; it is not existing but dwells in someone's mind. In this case, the idea that development could reduce migration is seen as an all-in-one solution by the international community and the Dutch government, yet it is deceptive. Furthermore, when looking at the linguistic dimension of other interviews, words such as 'keep on dreaming' and 'migration is part of humanity, accept that' point towards the conclusion that the link is unsound and used simplistically.

Discursive practice

Fairclough's three layers are interrelated – something that is visible in my research. The discursive practice is strongly connected to the linguistic practice in my analysis, since the texts are created in an interview setting with a student and that results in rather informal language use. It can be seen in the 'keep on dreaming' phrase: it is direct and maybe even bold, showing that the conversation is open and without too many formal restrictions.

Social practice

The social practice was important in this discourse, and especially the political context appeared to play a major role. While the characteristics of the nexus sometimes can be considered valuable (such as remittances) there seemed to be an understanding among the practitioners that the link can be used as a 'strategy' by governments to stop migration. Plus, portraying to use this link can help to put the critics of development cooperation at ease[25]. Both strategies were considered to be improper. However, it should be noted that sometimes, after talking about the nexus, it was mentioned that it could be nice if it (development reducing migration) was true, because then migrants and refugees would not have to experience the miserable circumstances, maintained by the political circumstances, that they now have

[24] Interview with E. Nazarski (March 29, 2023); Interview with J. Ruyssenaars (January 5, 2023); Interview with P. van den Berg (March 28, 2023); Interview with Respondent 7 (March 31, 2023); Interview with Respondent 8 (April 6, 2023); Interview with T. Ceelen (April 21, 2023)
[25] Interview with P. van den Berg (March 28, 2023)

to. Yet, one can question here whether, if not the practitioners of development cooperation but other actors such as those of the Dutch government were interviewed, different perspectives regarding the social practice would have come to the fore. Still, it is the political context of the social practice that brings us to the next topic and section: notions of security.

5.2 Discourse: notions of security

> *When I once started this work, then we had quite, in the eyes of fellow human beings here in the Netherlands, quite admittedly goat's wool socks*[26] *but still exciting, thrilling, admirable, good work we were doing, weren't we? And now today we are worn down as some sort of wackos*[27] *who, and especially if you look at the refugee work, we are rather seen as half criminals bringing refugees to the Netherlands or at least encouraging people from the region to come this way while we already have so many problems here in the Netherlands. This is just boldly summarized what... and of course, there are great nuances in it, because we still have a very serious and growing following. And, of course, that also indicates great support, but at the same time, the wind is getting a lot bleaker*[28]*. And, you see that in politics as well.*
>
> (Interview with T. Ceelen, April 21, 2023)

Literature has shown us that international migration is considered to affect the national security of countries in two ways. Firstly, and this is the somewhat 'traditional' security threat: migration between countries is threatening the sovereignty of states by challenging territorial integrity, political independence, and peace (jeopardized by the possible entry of terrorists). Secondly, international migration is leading to an increase in diversity in ethnicities, cultures, languages and so on. This growing diversity sparks the debate on national identity and integration, leading to the idea that international migrants are thus posing a threat to nation-states' cultural identity, social coherence and stability (De Haas et al., 2020; Nyberg-Sørensen, 2012). But how are these concerns for security encountered by the practitioners of Dutch development cooperation regarding migration and border security? Tineke Ceelen's example above provides an insight into how changes in the perception of their work were experienced: going from tree-hugger to being some sort of wacko. However, there is a lot to unpack here – which is why the following paragraphs discuss the influence of notions of security, discussed per scalar level as distinguished in Section 2.4: the local, national, and global level.

Firstly, notions of security relating to migration are considered to be felt on a local level. The change of tone of the debate in the Netherlands becomes harsher, which was elaborated on in Section 4.2, especially when it concerns migration, and development relating to migration. The practitioners described that, when looking at the local level, there is an increasing train of popular thought that

[26] *"Geitenwollen sokken"*, Dutch saying referring to a 'tree-hugger' reputation.
[27] *"Wappies"*, a Dutch term originating from the corona pandemic, referring to people believing in conspiracy theories relating to unconventional ideas (originally of COVID-19; 'covidiots').
[28] *"De wind wordt ook wel heel veel guurder"*, Dutch phrasing meaning that the debate is getting harsh and mean.

migrants and refugees are causing problems or would be threatening people's security[29], an image that is portrayed by Tineke Ceelen. With a wry comment, she elaborates on the observed intensity (or perceived absurdity) of the phenomenon:

> *Refugees are increasingly seen as a threat to our security on a small level, aren't they? From the HEMA where things get nicked, that is of course all to blame on refugees, to the safety in Ter Apel, from the bus driver to on a larger level that refugees could commit terrorist attacks; that terrorists are among them. And by now we also know that that's true, but that… then it is the one individual who has a very big negative effect on the whole group. Yes, that is very risky.*
>
> (Interview with T. Ceelen, April 21, 2023)

The local debate is considered to be taking a turn that includes many racist and xenophobic thoughts[30], such as 'there are too many of them' and 'our women, our bikes, our shops are suffering from them'. These thoughts and assumptions have a major influence on the people involved in the work of the interviewed development practitioners: migrants and refugees. These are the people that experience the negative impact of it the most[31].

Furthermore, the perceived negative line of thought is not only present in the local debate but interacts with the political debate, leading us to the national level. Practitioners shared that the polarizing public debate regarding migration is 'spiralling downwards'. This is considered to be increasingly taken over by politicians, or at least in a way that certain political parties are, nowadays, less openly or actively opposing the polarizing public debate regarding migration.

To continue, the influence of notions of security can be seen in the development organisations in three-fold. Firstly, it has an impact on the practices of organisations[32]: it can make organisations combative to prevent injustices and engage in conversations with people who feel threatened by migrants, or it can result in participation in projects in asylum seekers centres in the Netherlands or so-called fragile contexts because help is needed. Secondly, as touched upon in Section 4.2, there are more and more impact assessments and evaluations in the development field. This not only increases the organisation's workload but also points to the fact that, due to the tone of the debate and criticism, some organisations continuously audit all their practices to make sure nothing goes wrong and to be able to prove it was investigated properly in case it does[33]. Thirdly, the notions of security can have an impact on the employees of development organisations, because people can be less willing to do the work, as

[29] Interview with E. Nazarski (March 29, 2023); Interview with Q. Shafiq (January 19, 2023); Interview with Respondent 7 (March 31, 2023); Interview with Respondent 8 (April 6, 2023); Interview with T. Ceelen (April 21, 2023)
[30] Interview with E. Nazarski (March 29, 2023); Interview with Respondent 7 (March 31, 2023)
[31] Interview with Respondent 7 (March 31, 2023); Interview with Respondent 8 (April 6, 2023); Interview with T. Ceelen (April 21, 2023)
[32] Interview with P. van den Berg (March 28, 2023); Interview with Q. Shafiq (January 19, 2023); Interview with Respondent 7 (March 31, 2023)
[33] Interview with T. Ceelen (April 21, 2023)

their personal lives get affected by it. A specific example of this is the criminalisation of people helping migrants at sea. Tineke Ceelen mentioned another example of notions of security that had a direct influence on organisations' employees: the anti-terrorism legalisation of the Netherlands. These laws stipulated that if you had been in an area under the control of terrorist movements, you could be prosecuted by the Dutch government. While the law was set up to prevent the entrance of terrorists, all people visiting these states were 'targeted', including journalists and people working on development projects. However, while these regulations hinder their work greatly, she mentioned that *"Americans are worse"* – given that their post-9/11 restrictions for working in these areas are even more excessive[34].

The tone of the debate in politics and society came to the fore in many conversations, which can also be linked to the global level. The efforts of the European Union and its member states to 'secure the external' are considered to go very far and many respondents have indicated that they, and the development cooperation field as a whole, criticize the Dutch government for accepting the harrowing practices that are taking place, not just at the border but also in areas in which migrants and refugees (have to) reside. According to the practitioners of development regarding migration, the Dutch government should adopt an openly active and disapproving position in the debate, which is currently lacking[35]. Moreover, the discussions on notions of security relating to migration led to the determination of an uncovered discourse including two paradoxes, which can be linked to both the global and national level, as it includes both Dutch and EU policies that have an impact worldwide. I will first explain the two paradoxes, and then discuss them by using again the three layers of Fairclough.

As Schreinemacher's quote at the beginning of this chapter illustrated, through development cooperation, the Ministry wants to tackle the root causes of poverty, climate change, terrorism and migration. While my initial purpose for discussing this quote was to address the link made between migration and development, some respondents pointed out the paradoxical connection regarding terrorism made here, which is part of the notions of security relating to migration (namely the threat of peace disturbance and possible entry of terrorist). Eduard Nazarski described it as follows:

> *Well, if terror... If I were to talk to her [Minister Schreinemacher] about that, I would say: "If you don't do anything about that protracted refugee situation, then that will just pose terrorism". Because the endless humiliation in those camps, an academic in Senegal once said to me: "That is a paradise for Jihadi recruiters". Well, I mean, how... When you have to spend 15, 15 years in such demeaning conditions and you know it takes two finger snaps from wealthy rich countries to get you out and they just don't do it. And then someone comes along and says, "Shall we teach those people a lesson?" Well that... that must lead to huge resentment, right?*
>
> (Interview with E. Nazarski, March 29, 2023)

[34] Interview with T. Ceelen (April 21, 2023)
[35] Interview with E. Nazarski (March 29, 2023); Interview with P. van den Berg (March 28, 2023); Interview with Q. Shafiq (January 19, 2023); Interview with Respondent 7 (March 31, 2023); Interview with T. Ceelen (April 21, 2023)

The paradox can thus be seen in that, due to the Dutch government's own policies (which are also related to EU policy) with regard to the refugee situation[36] and the structural underfunding of development cooperation projects aimed at poverty reduction[37], the exact opposite is being achieved: it creates an environment in which terrorism can thrive, rather than decline. In addition, the earlier mentioned systemic underestimation of numbers on the reception of asylum seekers by the Dutch government for 21 years (Algemene Rekenkamer, 2023) has led to high costs for emergency reception facilities in the Netherlands, which is taken out of the budget for development cooperation. This, in turn, does not benefit the development cooperation programmes, which were already not receiving the budgeted required resources. It appears to be a reinforcing process.

The second paradox may be to a lesser extent related to notions of security, but it does involve practices of controlling migration and border security, which can be seen as a part of 'securing the external'. Namely, human rights are central to the policies of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Development Cooperation. Chapter 4 showed that since the 'Pronk era', there was already a change in policies that now received a focus on – among other things – human rights. Interviewed practitioners pointed out that this focus is not adhered to in every situation, referring to the human rights violations against migrants and asylum seekers in Europe[38]:

> *I mean (...), human rights is a big priority for [the Ministry of] Foreign Affairs, isn't it? It's also really, yes, an important part of Dutch foreign policy, but then just also look closer to home. Look, I don't hear anything from [the Ministry of] Foreign Affairs, from the Minister of Foreign Affairs, what is happening at the external borders.*
>
> (Interview with Respondent 7, March 31, 2023)

So, what is being described here is that, although human rights are central to Dutch foreign policy, this does not seem to apply to situations 'closer to home', referring to human rights violations against migrants and asylum seekers in Europe. These violations can be seen in, for example, Ter Apel in the Netherlands, as well as the at the external borders of the European Union. The continuation of this paradox was linked to the financial and political context, namely entering into (new) migration deals that are known to accommodate human rights violations, and the structural underfunding of reception 'in the region', leading to inhumane situations, which is, in turn, contrary to the standards of policies of the Netherlands and international agreements. In their lobby and advocacy, development organisations

[36] Interview with E. Nazarski (March 29, 2023); Interview with Respondent 7 (March 31, 2023); Interview with T. Ceelen (April 21, 2023)
[37] Interview with M. Koffi (March 22, 2023); Interview with Respondent 7 (March 31, 2023); Interview with T. Ceelen (April 21, 2023)
[38] Interview with E. Nazarski (March 29, 2023); Interview with P. van den Berg (March 28, 2023); Interview with Respondent 7 (March 31, 2023); Interview with T. Ceelen (April 21, 2023)

explained to fight these situations at different governance levels: in the Hague (the Netherlands), Brussels (the EU), and New York (the UN).

Taking this all into account, it can be stated that the notions of security on the local, national, and global level are recognized by practitioners in the development cooperation field regarding migration and border security. The uncovered discourse can be linked to the political space the organisations reside in, in the sense that they have to operate in the circumstances that these notions of security have an influence on (e.g., a decrease in public development funds, suddenly fall under anti-terrorism legislation, or personally experience the downsides of the harshening debate in society). I elaborate on this discourse through the used three-layer analysis of Fairclough.

Linguistic practice

The words used in this discourse were quite clear-cut; people made bold statements and did not beat around the bush. This can already be seen in the opening quote of this section: the changing perception of doing 'tree-hugger'-like work to being a wacko. Therefore, the words used in explaining these notions of security relating to migration were rather negative, and explicit statements were made. Examples of this are: 'it is madness', 'I think it [what is being said in politics] is so dangerous', or 'that is a paradise for Jihadi recruiters'.

Discursive practice

The fact that the analysed texts were created in an interview setting was, maybe even more than in the other discovered discourses, clearly visible. Notions of security can be a sensitive topic to discuss; we were namely talking about the criminalization of migrants and the accompanying change of tone in the public and political debate. Some respondents told me about the threats or racist comments read (and received) on social media like Twitter, so that's no small thing. The terms and phrases used in these explanations were, though, somewhat 'lightly' expressed sometimes. Respondents used many proverbs and sayings, as well as 'simple' examples to portray the situations. It made the xenophobic and racist thoughts in these statements of others clear, but I also considered it to be a way in which it was easier or more light-hearted to tell. Or, it could be a way to try to let me, the interviewer, understand the situation better. To give an example, one respondent referred to online comments that people who help migrants receive. At first, this was referred to as 'rather hateful language', while later in the conversation, it turned out that these comments included sentences like *'ik hoop dat jij gestrekt afgevoerd wordt'* (literally translated as: 'I hope you will be taken away stretched out', referring to laying on a stretcher or gurney), which is a Dutch way of saying you wish the other person to die. These are, of course, incredibly hurtful comments, yet at first, described as 'rather hateful'. This could be seen as an example of turning down the 'heaviness' of discussing the criminalization of (people helping) migrants so that it is a bit more easy to talk about.

Social practice

The foregoing paragraphs have made it clear that the social practice was very important in this discourse, since the social and political context played a major role, on all scalar levels. The public and social debate is taking a turn, which is felt in the context the organisations are residing in. In explaining this situation, many practitioners referred to political parties and government policies of the EU and the Netherlands. Furthermore, the financial or economic context also played a role in the discussion, as it repeatedly came to the fore that development cooperation is being cut in its budget, which exacerbates the conditions again. To avoid repetition, as we have already started discussing this in the foregoing paragraphs, I now turn to the next section which includes the dynamics between the Dutch government, notions of security, and development cooperation.

5.3 The dynamics of the Dutch government and development cooperation

> *Yes, just influencing people, right? Yes, conflicts and human rights are marketable. Yes, painful, but still, it is. So that was kind of the story.*
>
> (Interview with J. Ruyssenaars, January 5, 2023)

In my very first interview, Jan Ruyssenaars told me about his experiences as a lobbyist for human rights and armed conflicts in Brussels, mainly for the European Parliament, and The Hague. It offered a valuable first insight into the political dynamics at play in the development cooperation field. The foregoing sections have also shone a light on the interconnectedness of subjects and political, financial, and social contexts, and many interviewed practitioners have levelled criticism towards the role the Dutch government has and should play in development and migration-related matters. Some expressed the criticism more strongly than others, of which an example can be seen in the following conversation:

> *That [the misery that migration brings] is unfortunately, again, a consequence of a nevertheless new colonialist attitude of the rich countries. Which, then I do repeat, also use development cooperation as an instrument of the new colonial system. Because the aid is going to countries where our interests are.*
>
> (Interview with Q. Shafiq, January 19, 2023)

But if criticism is voiced, it also leads to a reply that questions whether the government then influences the operations of development organisations themselves or not, or to what extent organisations are guided by the policies posed by the Dutch government. However, answers regarding this matter have not resulted in one overarching uncovered discourse. Obviously, development cooperation organisations have to abide by the rules and laws posed by the Dutch government, since they all reside in the same political space and it would be impossible to operate otherwise. Besides this framework of legislation, it was often stated that organisations do not really take government policy into account in their operations. But when I asked in what other way government policies are then taken into consideration,

the main subject discussed was subsidies. The answers regarding this matter were varying, but some practitioners indicated that organisations are independent, yet receiving subsidies can influence the projects they involve themselves in[39]. Eduard Nazarski summarized this as follows:

> *You receive money from the government, but that doesn't mean you have to follow the government in everything. Only when they say, 'you get money to do this here, a certain project, and with those and those things', you don't suddenly start doing something completely different, with that money. So you have to use that money for that, but all those organisations have also filed lawsuits against the government. [So they remain] independent, yes. That's a good thing, right?*
>
> (Interview with E. Nazarski, March 29, 2023)

Organisations are considered to be independent, but if they partake in a project or partnership in which subsidies are granted, then the set goals must be adhered to. Other projects and programmes are financed with other, self-collected resources, and are thus considered to be detached from imposed goals of the Dutch government.

Next to this, it should also be mentioned that the relationship between the Dutch government and development organisations was often described as a 'critical partnership', in which a critical stance towards the government can exist – and therefore lawsuits are filed, or organisations express themselves (jointly) critically in the media, such as the Partos statement – but in which the parties can also still work well together[40]. Furthermore, some organisations can see the Dutch government and Ministry of Foreign Affairs, due to the key role they play in the UN and EU, as an 'ally' in particular situations, yet not regarding migration and refugees[41]. Nonetheless, some respondents think being fully independent and critical while also receiving subsidies would be ideal, yet impossible if organisations depend on the funding too much. In my last interview, Tineke Ceelen explained it as follows:

> *And you also see it, that with a number of organisations that have become way too dependent on government funding, that they are forced to, if the Dutch government says 'jump', then the whole group has to jump. While you actually think that they shouldn't do that at all. So it... I think our policy is very sound, a maximum of a fourth [depending on government funding], leaving you with the freedom to say: 'Well, we'll forgo government funding'. That's possible.*
>
> (Interview with T. Ceelen, April 21, 2023)

All in all, discussing to what extent Dutch government policies influence development organisations' practices did not result in one uncovered discourse. However, a different kind of – and to me, surprising

[39] Interview with E. Nazarski (March 29, 2023); Interview with J. Ruyssenaars (January 5, 2023); Interview with M. Kirkels (January 12, 2023); Interview with P. van den Berg (March 28, 2023); Interview with Respondent 7 (March 31, 2023)
[40] Interview with E. Nazarski (March 29, 2023); Interview with P. van den Berg (March 28, 2023); Interview with Respondent 7 (March 31, 2023)
[41] Interview with Respondent 7 (March 31, 2023)

– dynamic emerged in three conversations that is relevant for the political space this case study is residing in. So, therefore, I will briefly illustrate this matter in Section 5.3.1.

5.3.1 Discourse: Dutch ministers and the exercise of power

> *Well, that's the ideal reality. Look, and it has been like that for years, right? Only you see that the government is increasingly articulating its views in policy and it is starting to impose conditions for funding. So this is nicely made up, probably by (*), but reality doesn't match that. The reality...*
>
> (Interview with T. Ceelen, April 21, 2023)

Even though opinions on the prevalence of Dutch government policies in the development cooperation field were varying, the influence of the nation-state's administrative bodies turned out to be present in a different way. The 'ideal reality' above refers to a comment of mine, in which I explained that someone mentioned it is possible to receive funding and still be unaffected by government influences since that is possible in 'a democracy like ours'. The reality appeared to be, however, that three respondents disclosed that they had received a direct message (personally or in a letter) from a minister that, if they did not change their practices, their funding was at risk[42].

Firstly, Max Koffi explained that Minister Lilianne Ploumen, Minister for Foreign Trade and Development Cooperation (2012-2017), told him directly that she did not want to meet him anymore (I have not asked for which reason exactly), and the organisation would not receive any funding. Together with the Socialist Party *SP*, the organisation submitted an amendment to the House of Representatives, after which a subsidy of one million euros was forced to be made available by the Minister.

Secondly, Eduard Nazarski mentioned that, in his time as director of *VluchtelingenWerk*, he received a letter from Rita Verdonk, Minister for Immigration and Integration (2003-2006), which stated that if Nazarski continued to finance a project regarding asylum seekers facing deportation, he would risk losing the subsidies for the asylum centres in the Netherlands. Nazarski declined Verdonk's request of stopping the support and went to the Dutch newspaper *De Volkskrant*. In the article, it is explained that the Minister wrote that she *"would appreciate it if, in the future, in your decision-making on funding such projects, you weigh up the desire to continue the funding relationship on the one hand and your organisation's position of independency on the other"* (Kruijt, 2005, para. 3). In our conversation, Nazarski referred to his public reply, stating: 'if Verdonk can't take criticism, that's her problem, not mine'. Yet, he is unsure whether it is still possible to make such public replies nowadays since he believes 'that atmosphere is changing'.

[42] Interview with E. Nazarski (March 29, 2023); Interview with M. Koffi (March 22, 2023); Interview with T. Ceelen (April 21, 2023)

Third and lastly, Tineke Ceelen disclosed that her organisation received a letter from Agnes van Ardenne in her time as State Secretary or Minister for Development Cooperation (2002-2003; 2003-2007), that the organisation was not supposed to support initiatives that go against government policy. The director informed the administrative bodies that the organisation will continue to go its own way and if that is not appreciated by the government, they will rather return the money than change their practices.

Taking this all into consideration, it can be stated that the political dynamics at play in the development cooperation field (try to) influence people individually, or, at least, in these three cases. I had not asked about direct influences from ministers in these conversations, it was something brought up by the respondents themselves. Remarkably, the examples concern three different development organisations, three different Ministers (or one State Secretary), and three different time periods. Although all three persons openly or even publicly shared that they were not obeying the orders, it can be considered an important phenomenon for the political space the Dutch development cooperations are residing in. One can namely wonder how many of these messages were exerted in total, and what happened to the objectives of organisations that could not afford to risk their funding. There is still much to investigate here, which is also highly relevant for society. Therefore, I refer to this research opportunity in Chapter 6.

However, there are always two sides of the coin. It is also important to note that this power dynamic did not seem to be carried out by the ministers alone: in many conversations, respondents referred to contacting appointed ministers. Throughout the nine interviews, besides discussing Schreinemacher's quote, various referrals to contact with ministers were made. Assumed reasons for mentioning this can be that contacting a minister shows that the organisation is in close connection with administrative bodies. Or, it could be the only way that organisations see an opportunity to influence politics or policies. In any case, it is remarkable, yet research is needed to confirm this.

5.4 Summary

Recapitulating what this fifth chapter enclosed is hard, as it does not quite fit the complexity and nuances of the story I am trying to convey in this thesis. Still, the findings regarding the migration-development nexus can be summarized into the understanding that some characteristics of the link as described by Glick Schiller and Faist (2009) were acknowledged and considered valuable, such as the value of financial and social remittances, as well as the idea that not only individual migrants but also migrant diasporas become development agents. Yet, the idea that diaspora are enablers or agents for development is considered to be an opportunity that is not fully seized. Furthermore, the other characteristics of the migration-development nexus regarding brain gain and circular migration were underexposed, and the notion that development could be used to stop migration was perceived as simplistic. However, interviewed practitioners explained that the migration-development nexus can be used as an 'idée-fixe'

and for the sake of self-interest by the Dutch government: to instrumentalize development cooperation as a way to halt migration, and to put critics regarding development cooperation at ease.

These understandings can be linked to notions of security regarding international migration, which appeared to play a role on the local, national and global level. On a local level, the tone in the debate about migration and development regarding migration is experienced to be changing, by which migrants and refugees are negatively impacted the most. At the national level, the polarizing public and political debate is 'spiralling downwards', which can also have impacts on the practices of development organisations. Moreover, notions of security on a national and global level included the uncovering of a discourse including two paradoxes. Firstly, a paradox could be seen in the fact that, due to the Dutch government's own policies with regard to the refugee situation and the structural underfunding of development cooperation projects aimed at poverty reduction, an environment in which terrorism can thrive is stimulated, rather than tackled. Secondly, a paradox was recognized in the obedience of the Dutch government to its own set standards regarding human rights in foreign policy, referring to the human rights violations against migrants and asylum seekers at the EU border and in its member states.

But if criticism is voiced, it also leads to a reply that questions whether the Dutch government then influences the operations of development organisations themselves or not. The findings regarding the influence of Dutch government policies remained divided among the practitioners. Organisations are considered to be independent or in a 'critical partnership' with the Dutch government, yet discussing public funds led to the discovery of the dynamics at play in the Dutch development cooperation field and its political context since three interviewees disclosed they received a direct message from a minister that, due to their practices, their funding was at risk. How these findings can lead to opportunities for further research will be discussed in the following chapter, together with a discussion and conclusion of this thesis.

6. Discussion, Conclusion, and Recommendations

In this sixth and concluding chapter, I bring all the foregoing chapters together. It starts by connecting the theories of the theoretical framework to the results of Chapters 4 and 5 in the discussion and is followed by the conclusion of this research inquiry. Lastly, I reflect on the process and limitations of the study, which leads to recommendations for further research.

6.1 Discussion

This Master's thesis has provided insights into the ever-changing field of Dutch development cooperation regarding migration and border security, and the foregoing chapters have shown us that the landscape has, as was stated by Gore (2013) at the very beginning of this thesis, transformed into a more diverse and complex field than it has been before. This research aimed to gain knowledge on not just the primary ways in which the field has transformed, but also on how notions of security affect the way in which the migration-development nexus is conceived in the Dutch development cooperation field regarding migration and border security. To fulfil this objective, I dove into the context of this case study and interviewed practitioners to uncover discourses that exist in the sector. The findings of this research are connected to and build on theories as discussed in the theoretical framework, which I will elaborate on in the following paragraphs.

First of all, when looking at the transformations of the development cooperation field, four themes came to the fore in the interviews: 1) the increasing importance of climate change within organisations, mostly in lobby and advocacy; 2) the changing governance of development organisations; 3) the changes in development policies of the Dutch government, in which impact assessment plays a more significant role; and 4) the change of tone of the debate in the Netherlands, especially regarding migration and development relating to migration. Theories on development cooperation acknowledged the diversification of actors and agenda changes, in which themes like inclusion, transparency and participation often came forward. More specifically, Holzapfel (2014) stated that there has been a push for development cooperation to strengthen the results and effectiveness of practices, as well as that increasingly more critical questions regarding budget spending and goal achievements are asked. This meets the third discovered theme of transformations experienced by the practitioners in the development cooperation field regarding migration and border security, as they mentioned to increasingly have to complete impact assessments and evaluations, also to prove something was correctly investigated in case something goes wrong.

In addition, the findings related to transformations included determining an uncovered discourse: localisation, yet with a remark to it. There is, namely, an overall understanding that the voice of local actors should become central to development cooperation. However, it seemed doubtful whether localisation can or will be implemented to its fullest extent, since various circumstances, such as

assumed risks expressed by financial investors, complicate the transformation. As Alonso and Glennie (2015) stated, however, development cooperation aims to be based on relationships that seek to enhance ownership for the countries that are being 'developed'. So, while localisation at its core consists of this ownership enhancement, it was yet perceived to be doubtful whether that can be fully achieved. This perceived phenomenon seems to be at odds with the defined essence of development cooperation.

Furthermore, the findings on how the migration-development nexus is conceived expressed that certain beneficial characteristics of the link were recognized by the practitioners, while other characteristics appeared to be irrelevant. In these results, which I have actually already reported based on the characteristics as summarized by Glick Schiller and Faist (2009), it became clear that the value of financial and social remittances was acknowledged and considered valuable, as well as the idea that not only individual migrants but also migrant diasporas can become development agents. Yet, the idea that diaspora are enablers or agents for development is considered to be an opportunity that is not fully seized. The other characteristics of the migration-development nexus regarding brain gain and circular migration were underexposed, but the notion that development could directly reduce migration was perceived as simplistic and outdated.

The discourse echoes the statements regarding the theory as made by Czaika and Godin (2022), who express that the link between migration and development is way more complex than the nexus suggests, as both development and migration are multi-layered processes and have yet also mutual interdependencies. To continue, Czaika and Godin (2022) established three conceptual elements that form the political rhetoric of the migration-development nexus, and two of these elements have been visible throughout the empirical chapters. Namely, policies try to get grips with the 'root causes' of migration that is considered unwanted (Czaika & Godin, 2022), which was already voiced quite literally by the discussed quote of Minister Schreinemacher, and the political objective to make migration a stimulus for development in countries of the 'South' have been seen in the goals as posed by the Dutch government, which was discussed in the time frame of the SDGs. This revealed that, when looking at bilateral development aid, the Dutch development strategies have integrated migration perspectives (Kiratli, 2021).

Furthermore, two of the key points that should be kept in mind when researching the migration-development nexus of Geiger and Pécoud (2013) are also important in this discussion on how the link is conceived. Firstly, Geiger and Pécoud (2013) mentioned that the 'cooperation' part of development can be characterized by very diverging interests of the participating nation-states, including interference in political strategies, including migration, trade, and economic policies. The dive into the context of the Netherlands has shown us that, indeed, the Dutch government has appeared to combine approaches to global issues well with its own national interests (Yunita et al., 2022), and the nation-state has been considered to be a frontrunner in coherent development policies, also because of its success in combing development aid, investments, and trade (Yunita et al., 2022). Secondly, Geiger and Pécoud (2013) argue that thinking on development and migration is permeated with a bias that is existing in the Global

North, consisting of the securitization of migration and the distinction between desirable and undesirable migrants. As the authors state: if this bias in agendas and policies would be taken seriously, then that would already uncover that other objectives, such as to make migration 'work' for development, are subordinate to the objectives of security (Geiger & Pécoud, 2013). It is this exact statement that was uncovered while discussing the nexus with the practitioners of the development cooperation field: while the development practitioners do not engage in the notion that there is a direct link between bringing development and stopping migration, the migration-development nexus can yet be used as an 'idée-fixe' and for the sake of self-interest by the Dutch government: to instrumentalize development cooperation as a way to halt migration and to put critics regarding development cooperation at ease.

International migration is supposedly affecting national security in two ways: by threatening the sovereignty of states by challenging territorial integrity, political independence, and peace; and by posing a threat to the nation-states' cultural identity, social coherence and stability (De Haas et al., 2020; Nyberg-Sørensen, 2012). The outcomes have shown that these notions of security relating to migration are experienced on the local, national, and global level. The tone in the debate about migration and development regarding migration is changing, and includes many racist and xenophobic thoughts, by which migrants and refugees are negatively impacted. Plus, the public and political debate are considered to be 'spiralling downwards', which can also affect the practices of development organisations by, for example, making them more combative to fight injustices, or lead to the opposite, as the criminalization of helping migrants in certain situations can make people less willing to do the work. Furthermore, it became clear that the efforts of the European Union and its member states – thus the Netherlands – to 'secure the external' were considered to go very far, to which many respondents have indicated that they, and the development cooperation field as a whole, criticize the Dutch government for accepting the inhumane practices that are taking place, not just at the border but also in areas in which migrants and refugees (have to) reside.

These perceived circumstances can be linked to theories on notions of security since literature has shown the existence of the 'liberal paradox' in which countries find themselves (Hollifield, 1992, as cited in De Haas et al., 2020): liberal ideas strive for free markets and individual rights for all, what makes it hard for liberal democracies to limit and control migration, as this openness of markets is not limited by the trade of goods and investments but includes the mobility of people too. In the findings, this paradox is, in a sense, extended. Namely, the second established paradox concerned the obedience of the Dutch government to its own set standards regarding human rights in foreign policy, referring to the human rights violations against migrants and asylum seekers at the EU border and in its member states. So while liberal ideas encourage (human) rights for all, foreign policy is perceived to fall short of this.

To continue, Stern and Öjendal (2010) argued that the link between security and development has become familiar in policymaking on both the national and global level since the idea that people

migrate because of a lack of development stimulates the urge to develop migrant-sending and transit countries. This could then, eventually, neutralise security threats like terrorism (Stern & Öjendal, 2010). And, while tackling this security threat is indeed named in one of the Dutch government's development cooperation policy aims, the findings seem to suggest that the Dutch government's own policies concerning the refugee situation and the structural underfunding of development cooperation projects aimed at poverty reduction can achieve the exact opposite: it can stimulate an environment in which terrorism can thrive, rather than decline.

Lastly, one final note can be made regarding the transnational perspective this thesis ought to seek and accompanying theories regarding transnational development. By taking a transnational perspective, migration and development processes are acknowledged not to be defined by singular movements but by a continuation of mobility, including the crossing of state borders, which takes sedentary assumptions away and contradicts the belief that the nation-state is the 'natural' form of how our world is constructed (Wimmer & Glick Schiller, 2002). The value of this transnational perspective was not to discover something 'new' but merely to support the move away from methodological nationalism (Wimmer & Glick Schiller, 2002). Development namely has been – and still is – perceived as a territorialized phenomenon that could be measured by indicators that reflect changes in one single place, and this bias results in the ignorance of translocal aspects of development in policies or agendas such as the SDGs (Nijenhuis & Leung, 2017). However, as the discovered discourse on notions of security has shown us, the assumed security threats that accompany the existence of nation-state borders have a lot of implications for development cooperation. So, while the perspective of transnationalism thus tries to contradict the belief that the nation-state is the 'natural' form in which our world is divided, and offers an opportunity to counterbalance the sedentary bias in research regarding development, major implications due to these security threats are experienced in development cooperation regarding migration, by both migrants and the development cooperation practitioners. Transnational development theories seemed to have underexposed these notions of security.

6.2 Conclusion

In conclusion, it can be easily stated that the Dutch development cooperation field has transformed in many ways. By using the three time frames of Jan Pronk (the 1980s-1990s), the MDGs (2000-2015), and the SDGs (2016-2030), this Master's thesis dove into the Dutch development cooperation field to study the primary ways in which it has changed. Looking at the transformations as perceived by the practitioners of development cooperation regarding migration and border security, one theme stood out in particular: localisation, but with a remark to it. In the interviews, it came to the fore that there is an understanding in the field that the voice of 'the South' should become central within development cooperation, as this is considered to be very important. Yet, whether localisation can or will be executed fully appears to be doubtful. This is not deriving from concerns about organisations making themselves

redundant, but rather from the idea that the circumstances, such as the financial and political context, would prevent localisation to be executed to its fullest potential. It was mentioned that, for example, investors or donors can find it hard to finance local projects directly, as this is assumed to be a 'risk'. In analysing the theme of localisation, the word 'utopia' appeared to be all-encompassing for the discourse.

So, to uncover discourses that reside in this transforming field, a critical discourse analysis was used to study what the development practitioners expressed in conversations, and, more specifically, it revealed how notions of security have an influence on the way the migration-development nexus is conceived by practitioners of development cooperation regarding migration and border security. The findings regarding the migration-development nexus can be summarized into the understanding that some characteristics of the link were acknowledged and considered valuable, such as the value of financial and social remittances, as well as the idea that not only individual migrants but also migrant diasporas become development agents. Yet, the idea that there is a direct link between bringing development and stopping migration is a train of thought that the development practitioners do not engage in, as it is considered to be simplistic. However, there is an understanding that the migration-development nexus can be used as an 'idée-fixe' by the Dutch government: to instrumentalize development cooperation as a way to halt migration and to put critics regarding development cooperation at ease.

This all can be connected to notions of security, which were perceived to have a permeating role in the political space this research and the development organisations are residing in. The uncovered discourse regarding notions of security revealed that the tone of the debate on migration and development regarding migration becomes harsher in the Netherlands, a phenomenon that was mentioned by both the interviewed development practitioners and the literature of the 'dive into the Dutch cooperation field'. Linking security and development has become familiar in policymaking on both the national and global level since the idea that people migrate because of a lack of development stimulates the urge to develop migrant-sending and transit countries. This could then, eventually, lead to the neutralization of alleged security threats caused by international migration, like terrorism. And, while tackling this security threat is indeed named in one of the Dutch government's development cooperation policy aims, the reported findings seem to suggest that the nation-state's government policies with regard to the inhumane refugee situation and the structural underfunding of development cooperation projects aimed at poverty reduction can lead to achieving the exact opposite: it can stimulate an environment in which terrorism can thrive, rather than decline.

Finally, coming back to the uncovered discourse that the migration-development nexus can be used as an 'idée-fixe' to instrumentalize development cooperation as a way to halt migration and thus limit posed security threats, it is important to acknowledge this so-called 'sake of self-interest' of a nation-state's government in development cooperation. It can, namely, offer the opportunity to not abandon the migration-development nexus altogether, but to acknowledge the complex political, economic, and social context in which it finds itself, and to look from there at what it could yield and

contribute to international society. Then, hopefully, a future Master's thesis entitled 'A Better World for All' can end with an exclamation mark instead of a question mark.

6.3 Reflection and Recommendations for further research

Considering myself to be a very critical human geographer, it is now time to reflect on the research process and address the limitations of this research. Hopefully, since this thesis has come to an end, it has become clear that I have studied concepts that are very interesting and important, yet complex and highly dependent on context: migration, development, and security. Throughout this study, I have tried to be as comprehensive as possible, as the subjects include many different layers, aspects, and nuances. Things can, simply, not be expressed for one simple reason. Trying to convey relations in all their complexity can be a strength (and necessary), yet it can also be a weakness. In retrospect, I would say I possibly made the research too broad. Two specific aspects that are part of this reflection are addressed in the following paragraphs, followed by other research limitations.

Firstly, the controversial words 'Global South' and 'Global North' pass by every now and then: terms that are vague and have a certain disclosed post-colonial power hierarchy. While I have tried to stay away from these terms, much literature regarding transnational development has used these concepts, and I did not feel free to use other terms instead – since changing concepts in a theory could change its essence, as it was not initially written that way. Also in the semi-structured interviews, many respondents referred to 'southern' partners. In these conversations, I went along with this, instead of asking for clarification. On the other hand, one could argue that using terms like 'Global North' and 'Global South' also offers an opportunity to discuss differences that do exist in the world and to set these differences on the development- and research agenda, after which one can continue to define areas or regions more specifically. Still, I believe it is important to reflect on the usage of these terms here.

Secondly, while this thesis focused on the Dutch development cooperation field regarding migration and border security, in the data collection, the terminology regarding migration was taken too broadly. It basically concerned the mobility of people rather than 'just' migration, since examples of migrants, refugees, internally displaced persons (IDPs), asylum seekers, etcetera are constantly mentioned interchangeably in the interviews. This can be considered a major limitation and should have been taken more into account. However, it should be mentioned that when talking about notions of security, the changing and polarizing tone of the public and political debate is often central, as migrants are often framed as a threat to 'our' security. In these debates, it is also often not clear which 'type' of mobile person is seen as a threat. In fact, in the security discourse residing in society as described and perceived by the practitioners, refugees and migrants are all often mentioned in the same breath. So, this security framing is actually mirrored in the uncovered discourse on notions of security regarding migration.

To continue, another limitation of this research concerns the transnational perspective I tried to abide by. Since the research contained a case study concerning a political space in which development cooperation actors act and perform, it was hard for me to not keep coming back to the nation-state borders, as their existence just has a lot of implications for migrant-related development and notions of security play a key role in this. Yet, as was also stated in the introduction, the value of this perspective is not to discover something 'new', but simply to support moving away from methodological nationalism. In this research inquiry, I tried to contribute to that.

Furthermore, as Clifford et al. (2016) explained, generalisation is hard in case-study research. In this Master's thesis, I have written a lot on development cooperation and the context of the Netherlands, yet I have interviewed nine respondents. Since it is thus already difficult to generalize, it would have been good to interview more respondents, to create a more representative sample. Plus, as was mentioned throughout this thesis, the findings echo the perspective of the practitioners of the development cooperation field regarding migration and border security, in particular the NGOs and INGOs. The field yet consists of many more actors whose voices are not included in this research, such as actors on the implementing side of development or governmental actors like the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Justice and Security, as well as diaspora organisations (which were included but can be considered underrepresented in the sample). Including their answers could lead to different perspectives on the themes discussed, thus resulting in other uncovered discourses. However, it should be taken into consideration that CDA is an intensive analysis strategy, so a research set-up including all actors would be quite time-consuming.

Lastly, in this same vein, the focus on the Dutch development cooperation practitioners reveals the lack of focus on the people who are influenced by development cooperation, like people in the 'Global South' or 'Southern' actors that are involved in and implementing the programmes. Including the voices of people who are affected by development cooperation could shine a light on perhaps totally different relations with, and perspectives on, the development cooperation of the Netherlands. Postcolonial discourses have led to, for example, changes in terminology, goals, and relations (e.g., equal partnerships instead of a donor-receiver relation) in the international development cooperation field. However, these discourses on postcoloniality have been addressed a few times in this thesis, but it is safe to say it should have been included much more, also in the analysis – thus leading to another limitation of this research.

When reviewing the limitations of this research, there are a few recommendations for further research that I would like to make, as I believe they could be important and relevant. It should be noted that I have also considered formulating recommendations for government policies, but I concluded that my analysis is unsuitable for this. Namely, although this thesis was policy-oriented, it did not include a full analysis of Dutch development cooperation policies; the research was focused on the perspective of practitioners that had to react to these policies since they are operating in this political space. Because I

believe this base would be insufficient to support policy recommendations, as it is an indirect link to policies, I have decided to focus only on recommendations for further research, which are mentioned in these last paragraphs.

Firstly, as was explained in Section 4.2, what happens beyond localisation remained underexposed in the research. The visionary discussion was limited, so it is recommended that in new research, this would be taken into account. The fulfilment of the SDGs in 2030 is on the horizon, so ideas on what happens beyond localisation, if it would be implemented fully, could shine a light on how future goals should be adapted, so that they will fit into the new development cooperation arena – if it still exists like the way it is now.

Secondly, another research recommendation would be to include more literature related to discourses on postcoloniality and to focus on the voices of actors on the implementing or 'receiving' side of development cooperation, as these voices should be heard. Like the scientific relevance of this study already exposed: development-related research is dominantly focused on the involvement of actors from the Global North (Develtere et al., 2021). This thesis has contributed to this dominant focus, so I would recommend others to do it differently.

Third and lastly, for me, as a starting researcher, Section 5.3.1 concerning the Dutch ministers and their exercise of power was the moment when I thought: this is it, this is what needs to be investigated further. While the power dynamics at play can be considered striking, they are relevant to society and should be studied more in-depth. The dive into the context of the Dutch development cooperation field had already explained that visions of ministers, like the one of Jan Pronk, can be significant for changes in Dutch development cooperation policies. Yet, this is different to receiving direct threats from government officials that subsidies are risked if organisational practices are inconsistent with government policy. A large-scale research that studies how many development cooperations in the Netherlands have received direct orders from ministers to stop particular practices could reveal the power dynamics that reside in the political space of the Dutch development cooperation field. I must add to this that, as mentioned earlier, Hoebink (2014) established that about 81 per cent of the parliamentary questions submitted to the Dutch House of Representatives between 2004 and 2014 were based on media reports, yet never on a research report of the IOB. Although I have not been able to find any recent statistics regarding this matter, if we assume that this situation has continued to a fairly constant extent, then it is obvious that if one wants to make any relevant findings regarding this proposed research – or regarding development cooperation at all – to be heard in this political space, they should be expressed through the media.

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Appendices

Appendix 1: Interview guide (basic form with question themes)

Details interview:
Date and time:
Place:
Setting:

Details of interviewee:
Name:
Occupation:
Organisation:

<u>Opening statement:</u>

Introduction interview: Heel erg bedankt dat je mee wilt doen aan het interview. Ik ben student aan de Radboud Universiteit en volg de master Sociale Geografie. Voor mijn masterscriptie interview ik mensen die werken in het ontwikkelingssamenwerkingsveld van Nederland, om te kijken hoe ontwikkelingssamenwerking is veranderd en hoe migratie en overheidsbeleid hier een rol in zouden kunnen spelen. Hiervoor houd ik interviews met verschillende mensen uit ontwikkelingsorganisaties. Ik ben in dit gesprek vooral geïnteresseerd in jouw eigen ervaringen en hoe jij naar het werk kijkt, er zijn dus geen foute antwoorden; alles is van waarde.

Audio recording: Het gesprek zal ongeveer 30 minuten duren. Ik zou graag een audio-opname van het interview willen maken, zodat ik naderhand het gesprek kan beluisteren en kan inzien of ik de antwoorden goed heb begrepen. De audio-opname wordt vertrouwelijk behandeld en alleen ik (en de Examencommissie van de RU) hebben hier toegang tot. Ga je hiermee akkoord?
→ *start recording*

Privacy consent: Het gesprek kan op ieder moment gepauzeerd of gestopt worden. Het is natuurlijk ook mogelijk dat je een vraag niet wilt beantwoorden, dit kan altijd.
Heb je toevallig al nagedacht over of ik je naam en organisatie mag benoemen in mijn scriptie?

1) *<u>Met naam en toenaam:</u>* je naam en organisatie worden gebruikt wanneer ik refereer naar iets wat je hebt gezegd. Ik zal een transcript van het gesprek maken en stuur deze naar je toe, dan heb je de mogelijkheid om hierop te reageren.
2) *<u>Anoniem:</u>* jouw naam en organisatie zullen niet genoemd worden, ik zorg ervoor dat alle informatie geanonimiseerd wordt.

Heb je tot nu toe vragen of is alles duidelijk? Als je er klaar voor bent, dan kunnen we nu met het interview beginnen.

<u>Interview questions:</u>

Theme 1: Transformations in the development cooperation field
Veranderingen in ontwikkelingssamenwerking/ werkzaamheden van de organisatie

Mijn scriptieonderzoek gaat over het veranderende ontwikkelingssamenwerkingslandschap van Nederland, en ik kijk hierbij expliciet naar organisaties die zich bezighouden met onderwerpen die gerelateerd zijn aan migratie. Hierbij richt ik me niet alleen op organisaties die je vroeger niet per se bij

'ontwikkelingswerk' zou bedenken (bijv. Cordaid, Oxfam Novib), maar die ook de ontwikkeling van mensen stimuleren (bijv. diaspora organisaties of transnationale projecten).

- *Zou je wat kunnen vertellen over het werk dat de organisatie doet? (Warming-up)*
    - Specifieke projecten van de organisatie
- *Je bent al X jaar werkzaam bij de organisatie. Zijn er, in deze tijd, je dingen opgevallen die veranderd zijn in ontwikkelingssamenwerking?*

- Partners: Diversificatie van actoren in ontwikkelingssamenwerking
    - *Wie zijn jullie partners; met wie werken jullie voornamelijk samen?* (Denk bijvoorbeeld aan de overheid, lokale partijen).
    - *Zijn er nieuwe partners met wie jullie bijv. 5 of 10 jaar geleden nog niet samenwerkten?*
- Objectives: Veranderingen in doelen en motivatie
    - *Welke doelen staan er centraal in het werk van jullie organisatie?*
    - *Waarom zijn die doelen belangrijk; is dat ooit anders geweest? Stonden er eerder andere doelen centraal?*
- Impact assessment: Veranderingen in evaluaties en assessments
    - *Hoe gaat het evalueren van jullie projecten in zijn werk? Is dat veranderd in de afgelopen jaren?*
    - *Wanneer is een project 'geslaagd'?*

- MDGs/SDGs: De Verenigde Naties heeft in 2000 de millenniumdoelstellingen (MDGs) en in 2016 de duurzame ontwikkelingsdoelstellingen (SDGs) vastgesteld.
    - *Hoe positioneert jullie organisatie zich tegenover deze doelen?*
    - *Houdt de organisatie rekening met deze doelen in het werk? En hoe?*

Theme 2: Migration-Development nexus

In de literatuur wordt aangegeven dat migratie kan leiden tot ontwikkeling van gebieden. De gedachtegang bestaat onder andere uit dat migranten in een land zoals Nederland bijvoorbeeld kennis opdoen en die kennis delen met familie, of dit gebruiken wanneer ze terugkeren naar hun 'thuisland'. Of dat ze wanneer geld verdienen en dit maandelijks terug sturen naar familie, wat daar ontwikkelingen zou kunnen stimuleren (en dat ontwikkeling in een gebied uiteindelijk zou leiden tot het verminderen van migratie).

- *Ken je deze gedachtegang?*
- *Komt deze gedachtegang naar voren komt in het werk van jullie organisatie?*
- *Op welke manieren probeert de organisatie migranten te helpen?*
    - *Wat zijn de doelen van deze projecten? (Ook lange termijn of toekomstgericht)*

Theme 3: Government policies

Het volgende onderdeel van dit interview gaat over ontwikkelingssamenwerking, het beleid dat daarin gehanteerd wordt en de connectie met de overheid. De Nederlandse overheid maakt ook beleid rondom ontwikkelingssamenwerking.

- *Hoe of op welke manier houdt de organisatie rekening met het beleid van de Nederlandse overheid?*
- *Wanneer jullie programma's maken, op welke manier wordt er dan rekening gehouden met het beleid van de Nederlandse overheid?*

Uit vooronderzoek blijkt dan men soms denkt dat doelen van organisaties kunnen worden beïnvloed door beleid van de overheid (wanneer ze bijvoorbeeld subsidie ontvangen, dat hun doelstellingen zouden veranderen).

- *Hoe kijk jij daar tegenaan?*
- *Hoe gaat jullie organisatie hiermee om?*

Quote: Volgens de Rijksoverheid (pagina van minister Liesje Schreinemacher) wil Nederland:

"Via ontwikkelingssamenwerking hebben we tegelijkertijd oog voor mensen in de meest kwetsbare gebieden in de wereld, en pakken we oorzaken van armoede, klimaatverandering, terreur en migratie aan." Liesje Schreinemacher | Rijksoverheid.nl

(Quote source: Government of the Netherlands, 2023, para. 1).

- *Hoe kijk jij naar deze quote over ontwikkelingssamenwerking?*
- *Worden oorzaken van migratie (of terreur) aangepakt met het werk van jullie organisatie?*

Theme 4: Notions of security

Om dit interview ook te linken aan de actualiteit: op dit moment zijn situaties rondom migranten en vluchtelingen veel in het nieuws. Zo heb je bijvoorbeeld de crisis bij Ter Apel, waar gevluchte ouders en kinderen buiten moesten slapen. Of de rechtszaak op Lesbos tegen vrijwilligers die migranten op zee hielpen. Migranten en vluchtelingen worden soms gezien als een 'probleem' of een 'bedreiging voor de veiligheid'.

- *Hebben, naar jouw idee, dit soort situaties van framing of berichtgevingen invloed op het werk van jullie organisatie?*
- *Of op ontwikkelingssamenwerking in het algemeen?*
    - *Worden doelen aangepast/beïnvloed door deze situatie?*

Cooling down:

Specific link to the work of the interviewee with a final question.

Closing statement:

Dit waren alle vragen. Heel erg bedankt voor je bijdrage. Heb je vragen?
Ik zal nog meer interviews houden en alle gegevens worden in de komende maanden samen verwerkt en bestudeerd. Het transcript van dit interview zal ik naar je opsturen, dan kan je hier eventueel nog op reageren. Ik wil mijn scriptie in juni leveren.

Other respondents:

Ik ben nog opzoek naar andere respondenten; mensen die werken in het ontwikkelingssamenwerkingsveld (van Nederland, migratie gerelateerd). Weet je nog iemand die ook open zou staan voor een interview? → Een diaspora organisatie?

Appendix 2: Quotes in Dutch

Die zei "hé, ik kom net van Jan Pronk vandaan en ik heb een heleboel geld voor onderzoek in Tanzania, Kenia, Oeganda... Als jij nou Tanzania doet, dat kan je goed, dan doe ik Kenia en die en die doet Oeganda." Geweldig. (…). Jan Pronk was toen minister van Ontwikkelingssamenwerking. Ze had een project bedacht en dat had ze verkocht en Jan Pronk wilde dat wel subsidiëren. En toen wilde ze mij er wel bij hebben, snap je? Zo ging dat.

> *She said: "Hey, I just came from Jan Pronk and I have a lot of money for research in Tanzania, Kenya, Uganda… If you do Tanzania, you are good at that, then I will do Kenya and they will do Uganda." Amazing. (…) At that time, Jan Pronk was the Minister of Development Cooperation. She had come up with a project and she had sold it, and Jan Pronk was willing to subsidize it. And then she wanted me there, you know? That's how it went.*
>
> (Interview with J. Ruyssenaars, January 5, 2023)

En daar was eigenlijk veel... ook beleidsmatig, pogingen werden daar gedaan om vrede, veiligheid en ontwikkeling te combineren. Dat heet ook wel de '*comprehensive approach*' of 3D, dus: *development, diplomacy*, en *defense*. Het is eigenlijk een poging om die verschillende terreinen in elkaar te knopen, met elkaar te verbinden, en ook daar de verschillende stakeholders zoveel mogelijk met elkaar in contact te brengen. (...) Dus Afghanistan is wat dat betreft wel echt een soort van leerschool geweest of een, ja, experiment, maar is niet per se gelukt. Maar je ziet wel dat het denken over dat samenhangende beleid op vrede, veiligheid, ontwikkeling nog steeds wel vrij dominant is, ook de manier waarop Nederland in de Sahel werkt of in landen als Mali, Niger, de Hoorn van Afrika… Tegenwoordig heet het de Triple Nexus.

> *And there [in Afghanistan] was actually a lot of... also policy-wise, attempts were made there to combine peace, security and development. That's also called the 'comprehensive approach' or '3D', so: development, diplomacy, and defence. It is actually an attempt to tie these different domains together, to connect them, and to also bring the different stakeholders there into contact with each other as much as possible. (...) So in that respect, Afghanistan has really been a kind of learning experience or a, yes, experiment, but has not necessarily succeeded. But you do see that thinking about that coherent policy on peace, security and development is still quite dominant, also in the way the Netherlands works in the Sahel or in countries like Mali, Niger, the Horn of Africa... Nowadays it's called the Triple Nexus.*
>
> (Interview with P. van den Berg, March 28, 2023)

Het verschil tussen die MDGs en die SDGs was dat de SDGs zijn veel beter geoperationaliseerd. Er hangen KPIs aan en targets, en er hangt van alles aan. Andere organisaties zullen ongetwijfeld dat serieus nemen, want dat willen ze ook zelf, dat willen ze ook naar het publiek toe uitdragen.

> *The difference between the MDGs and SDGs was that the SDGs are much better operationalized. There are KPIs and targets attached to it, and all sorts of things are attached to it. Other organisations will undoubtedly take this seriously because that is what they want themselves, that is also what they want to convey to the public.*
>
> (Interview with M. Kirkels, January 12, 2023)

Ja, er zijn discoursen in de sector, in de ontwikkelingssector in Nederland, en die gaan over dekolonisatie, dekolonialisering, lokalisatie, diversiteit, inclusiviteit, integriteit, dus ja die dingen veranderen wel het landschap. Ze veranderen de manier van werken van de organisaties.

Yes, there are discourses in the sector, in the development sector in the Netherlands, and they are about decolonisation, localisation, diversity, inclusiveness, integrity… So yes, those things do change the landscape. They change the way organisations work.

(Interview with M. Kirkels, January 12, 2023)

Klimaat is nu, ja, eigenlijk bij alle organisaties een heel belangrijk onderwerp geworden en dat raakt ook wel weer aan de regio's waar wij actief zijn. Of het nu de Sahel is of Jemen, ik bedoel, we zien gewoon dagelijks de impact van klimaatverandering. Ja, dat is dan wel een reden om daar dan ook, qua beleidsbeïnvloeding, veel meer op te gaan doen. Dus dat is wel echt een nieuw onderwerp, zeg maar, voor veel ontwikkelingsorganisaties.

Climate has now, well, actually become a very important issue in all organisations, and that does touch on the regions where we operate. Whether it's the Sahel or Yemen, I mean, we simply see the impact of climate change on a daily basis. Yes, that is a reason to, in terms of policy advocacy, do much more in that area. So that is really a new subject, so to speak, for many development organisations.

(Interview with P. van den Berg, March 28, 2023)

Maar dan gebruiken we het moment om een boodschap te sturen naar minister Jetten, van Klimaat en Energie, die Nederland vertegenwoordigt in Sharm-el-Sheikh. (…) Vergeet Afrika niet. Dus ook he, Nederland, rijk land, mooi, maar denk eraan dat ook arme landen zijn die direct de gevolgen van ons consumptiegedrag ervaren.

But then we use the moment to send a message to Minister Jetten, from [the Ministry of] Climate and Energy, who is representing the Netherlands in Sharm-el-Sheikh. (...) "Don't forget Africa. So, the Netherlands, a wealthy country; great. But remember that there are also poor countries that directly experience the consequences of our consumption behaviour."

(Interview with Q. Shafiq, January 19, 2023)

We zaten op een gegeven moment met 3 kantoren in hetzelfde stadje in Noord-Oeganda: War Child Engeland, War Child Nederland, War Child Canada. Ja, dat wil je niet, dat wil je helemaal niet. Je wilt gewoon één War Child. Dus we zitten midden in die transitie van een Nederlandse organisatie naar een globale organisatie, en we houden, we moeten dus die landenstructuren samenvoegen van Engeland en Nederland.

At one point, we had three offices in the same town in northern Uganda: War Child England, War Child Netherlands, War Child Canada. Well, you don't want that, you don't want that at all. You just want one War Child. So, we are in the midst of that transition from a Dutch organisation to a global organisation, and so we have to merge those country structures from England and the Netherlands.

(Interview with M. Kirkels, January 12, 2023)

Ja en nee. Er is veel veranderd, absoluut, want de ontwikkelingssector is echt wel in constante dynamiek, zeg maar. Dat heeft ook wel te maken met de politiek en bepaalde keuzes die worden gemaakt door de overheid en financiering die al dan niet beschikbaar komt. Maar er is ook wel veel continuïteit als in... Ja, ontwikkelingssamenwerking zijn lange termijn processen, dus je gaat ook niet als organisatie elk jaar andere dingen doen of zo. We proberen wel bepaalde onderwerpen en bepaalde landen langjarig er te werken om ook echt een verschil te kunnen maken.

> *Yes and no. A lot has changed, absolutely, because the development sector really is in constant dynamics, so to speak. That also has to do with politics and certain choices made by the government and funding that may or may not become available. But there is also a lot of continuity like in... Well, development cooperation is a long-term process, so you don't do different things every year as an organisation. We do try to work on certain topics and certain countries on a long-term basis to really make a difference.*
>
> (Interview with P. van den Berg, March 28, 2023)

Ja, de toon is veranderd, het beleid is veranderd en het specifieke voor ontwikkelingssamenwerking is toch ook wel… ja, de samenwerking heeft toch ook een wat ander karakter, omdat de overheid steeds, ja, het beleid ietsje verder verduidelijkt, maar ook steeds meer vraagt om en aan te tonen welke impact je denkt te kunnen hebben. En dat krijgt meer aandacht bij iedereen; ook meer aandacht voor impact.

> *Yes, the tone [of the debate] has changed, the policies have changed and what is specific to development cooperation is also... well, the cooperation has a somewhat different character, because the government is increasingly, well, clarifying its policy a little further, but also increasingly asking you to demonstrate what impact you think you can have. And that gets more attention from everyone; more attention to impact as well.*
>
> (Interview with E. Nazarski, March 29, 2023)

Die wisselwerking tussen kritiek in de samenleving en politici die zeggen: 'wij gaan dit wel even regelen' door in feite, ja, mag je best opschrijven ook, maar in feite zeggen ze gewoon: 'minder, minder, minder'. Waar anderen het voor op hun kop kregen. Nou ja, en die wisselwerking is heel erg sterk op het moment. En de mensen die het anders willen, die zijn: of te weinig, of te bescheiden, of te bedeesd. Of gewoon niet alert genoeg. Want als ik kijk hoe snel bepaalde xenofobe dingen verspreid worden in social media en ik kijk hoe snel dingen waar ik het wel mee eens ben verspreid worden, ja, dan zijn wij echt veel langzamer.

> *That interplay between criticism in society and politicians that say: "We are going to sort this out" by in fact, yes, you are allowed to write it down too, but in fact they just say: "Less, less, less". While others got reprimanded for it. Well, and this interaction is very strong at the moment. And the people who want it changed, they are either too little, or too modest, or too timid. Or just not alert enough. Because when I look at how fast certain xenophobic things are spread in social media and I look at how fast things I do agree with are being spread, then yes, we are really much slower.*
>
> (Interview with E. Nazarski, March 29, 2023)

Dus die samenwerking in zulke contexten tussen allerlei agencies die, ja dat speelt al tientallen jaren en er zijn altijd weer nieuwe dingen voor bedacht en triple-nexus is gewoon het laatste woord. Voor lokalisatie denk ik dat ook. We hebben tientallen jaren hebben we het gehad over maatschappij-opbouw, civil society building, en op mij komt lokalisatie eigenlijk een beetje over als een nieuwe vlag op een oude schuit. (…) Niet helemaal waar, het is wel iets gemoderniseerd.

> *[Talking about the Triple-Nexus] So that collaboration in such contexts between all kinds of agencies that... yes, that has been going on for decades and new things have always been invented for it and Triple-Nexus is just the last word. For localisation, I think so too. For decades we have been talking about society-building, civil society building, and to me, localisation actually comes across a bit like a new term for an existing concept. (...) That is not entirely true, it has been modernised somewhat.*
>
> (Interview with M. Kirkels, January 12, 2023)

Datzelfde geldt natuurlijk ook, hè? Het is natuurlijk, maar ja, in principe... Uiteindelijk moet je jezelf overbodig maken. Dat is toch wat we allemaal willen, hè? Dus uiteindelijk moet ontwikkelingssamenwerking overbodig zijn, moet het niet meer nodig zijn. Nou, dat is een utopie, denk ik, maar dat is wel eigenlijk een doelstelling wat je moet hebben. In principe moet, laat maar zeggen, ondersteunen of hulp moet eigenlijk gewoon tijdelijk zijn.

> *The same [fear of eliminating yourself as an INGO] also applies, of course, doesn't it? Naturally, it is... but yes, in principle... Ultimately, you have to make yourself redundant. That's what we all want, isn't it? So eventually, development cooperation should be redundant, should no longer be needed. Well, that is a utopia, I think, but that's actually a goal you should have. In principle, let's just say, support or aid should really just be temporary.*
>
> (Interview with Respondent 7, March 31, 2023)

Ja, dat zijn die root causes, hè? Dus de grondoorzaken. Dat is een frame wat ook de voorgangers van Schreinemacher hebben gebruikt. Het is feitelijk wel het instrumentaliseren van ontwikkelingssamenwerking, ontwikkelingsmiddelen, voor het welbegrepen eigenbelang, zou je kunnen zeggen. Het is ook wel echt een frame wat past bij de VVD. Want ja, weet je, het was natuurlijk best wel een opvallende keuze dat een VVD minister naar voren werd geschoven en die hebben gewoon niet zoveel op met ontwikkelingssamenwerking. Maar als ze op de één of andere manier ontwikkelingssamenwerking kunnen verkopen aan hun eigen achterban, zo van: “ja, maar we doen dit ook omdat het goed is voor Nederland. Weet je wel? Want jullie zijn ook tegen jullie zijn ook tegen migratie. Nou, we gebruiken dan een beetje belastinggeld. En dat helpt hen een beetje in de landen van herkomst, maar het is ook goed voor Nederland en de EU.” Dat is een beetje het frame wat Schreinemacher heeft gebruikt, maar ook de voorgangers al, hoor. Maar de vraag is in hoeverre dit correct is. (…) Dus dit is vooral ook een frame om, ja, criticasters van ontwikkelingssamenwerking een beetje milder te stemmen, laat ik het zo zeggen.

> *Yes, those are root causes, aren't they? That's a frame that Schreinemacher's predecessors also used. It is actually the instrumentalisation of development cooperation, development resources, for the sake of self-interest, you could say. It is also a frame that really suits the VVD. Because well, you know, it was of course quite a remarkable choice for a VVD Minister to be put forward, and they simply don't have much interest in development cooperation. But if they can somehow sell development cooperation to their own supporters, like: "Yes, but we're also doing this because it's good for the Netherlands, you know? Because you are also against migration. Well, we use a bit of taxpayers' money then. And that helps them a bit in the countries of origin, but it's also good for the Netherlands and the EU." That's kind of the frame Schreinemacher has*

used, but so did the predecessors, you see. But the question is to what extent this is correct. (...) So this is mainly also a frame to, well, soften up critics of development cooperation, let me put it this way.

(Interview with P. van den Berg, March 28, 2023)

Kleurrijk Groen is mede-eigenaarschap creëren hier en richt zich eigenlijk op duurzame keuzes, consumptiegedrag, op natuur en milieu, rekening houdend met educatie. En wij weten, dus als mensen hier keuzes maken om minder vlees eten, of biologisch, of de gevolgen begrijpen wat voor gevolgen bijvoorbeeld de toename van plastic heeft voor de wereld, of de eindeloos gebruik van fossiele brandstof, wat voor ellende brengt dat in heel veel landen in het Midden-Oosten (…). Als dat besef er is dan, omdat ze mensen verbonden zijn transnationaal of... die hebben ook invloed op consumptiegedrag van de mensen daar. (…) Wij geloven dat het effect, het bereik door mensen met een migrantachtergrond te betrekken bij natuur en duurzaamheid hier, is het effect veel groter. Dus niet alleen hier, maar ook daar.

Colourful Green is creating co-ownership here and actually focuses on sustainable choices, consumption behaviour, nature and the environment, considering education. And we know: so if people make choices here to eat less meat, or organic, or understand what consequences, for example, the increase of plastic has on the world, or the endless use of fossil fuel, what misery that brings in a lot of countries in the Middle East (...). If that awareness is there, because people are connected transnationally, they also have an impact on the consumption behaviour of people there. (...) We believe that the effect, the scope, by involving people from migrant backgrounds in nature and sustainability here, the effect is much greater. So not only here, but also there.

(Interview with Q. Shafiq, January 19, 2023)

En, nog erger, dat heb ik ook vaak gehoord, direct en indirect: de Nederlandse overheid, Nederlandse ambtenaren, zij vertrouwen de diaspora niet. Want ze zeggen van: 'ja, wat is er de agenda achter?' (…) “Ja, waarom, Max, wil je dit doen? Wat is het plan? Gaan we dat onbewust ondersteunen en op een dag zeggen ze: 'ja, wij hebben die man ondersteund. Kijk wat hij nu doet in Afrika'.” Snap je? Het zijn ook onderliggende redenen, die niet uitgesproken worden. En dan kan je 100.000 keer interviews met ze voeren. Dan komen ze met redenen van: 'ja, de diaspora is niet georganiseerd, en de diaspora heeft geen capaciteit, zijn niet zo professioneel'. En dat, daar blijft het dan hangen en dus zo werkt dat. Er zijn dingen die in het belang van het land zijn, maar je krijgt het niet voor elkaar, want jij hebt sowieso niet zoveel capaciteit.

And, even worse, I've often heard that too, directly and indirectly: the Dutch government, Dutch officials, they don't trust the diaspora. Because they say, "Yes, what is the agenda behind it?" (...) "Yes, why, Max, do you want to do this? What is the plan? Are we unwittingly going to support that and one day they say, 'yeah, we supported that guy. Look what he's doing in Africa now'." Do you get it? It's also the underlying reasons, which are not voiced. And then you can have 100,000 interviews with them. Then they will come up with reasons of, 'yes, the diaspora is not organised, and the diaspora has no capacity, are not that professional'. And that, that's where it lingers and so that's how it works. There are things that are in the country's interest, but you don't get it done, because you don't have that much capacity anyway.

(Interview with M. Koffi, March 22, 2023)

Nou, volgens mij is dit best wel een controversiële gedachte en wijst juist ook veel literatuur op het tegendeel. Dat investeren in ontwikkeling, in ieder geval op de korte termijn, ook zou kunnen leiden tot meer migratie, omdat mensen dan juist ook mogelijkheden krijgen om hun biezen te pakken en hun heil elders te zoeken. Maar het is wel een soort van idée-fixe van de internationale gemeenschap en ook van de Nederlandse overheid, dat ze denken dat: ja, we kunnen met het ontwikkeling met perspectieven geven; kunnen we ze daar houden. Wij gaan daar zelf niet in mee. Wij vinden migratie een mensenrecht. Ik bedoel, je hebt het recht op migratie. En als je daarvoor kiest, ja, dan ga je natuurlijk wel in een procedure terechtkomen en dan is het uiteindelijk aan de EU of aan Nederland om te onderzoeken of mensen, ja, legitieme redenen hebben om een asiel aanvraag te doen. Maar we gaan niet mee in de gedachte dat er een soort van directe link is tussen het brengen van ontwikkeling en het tegengaan van migratie.

> *Well, I think this is quite a controversial idea and a lot of literature actually suggests the opposite. That investing in development, at least for the short term, could also lead to more migration because people would then also have opportunities to pack their bags and seek refuge elsewhere. But it is a kind of idée-fixe of the international community and also of the Dutch government, that they think: yes, we can use development with the prospects; we can keep them there. We don't go along with that ourselves. We think migration is a human right. I mean, you have the right to migrate. And if you choose to do that, then yes, of course, you're going to end up in a procedure and then it's ultimately up to the EU or the Netherlands to investigate whether people, well, have legitimate reasons to apply for asylum. But we do not engage in the notion that there is some kind of direct link between bringing development and stopping migration.*
>
> (Interview with P. van den Berg, March 28, 2023)

Toen ik ooit aan dit werk begon, toen hadden wij vrij, in de ogen van de medemens hier in Nederland, vrij weliswaar geitenwollen sokken maar toch spannend, opwindend, bewonderenswaardig, goed werk deden wij, hè? En nu vandaag de dag worden we versleten als een soort wappies die, en zeker als je kijkt naar het vluchtelingenwerk, dan worden we eerder gezien als halve criminelen die vluchtelingen naar Nederland halen of in ieder geval mensen uit de regio aan moedigen om deze kant op te komen terwijl wij hier in Nederland al zoveel problemen hebben. Dit is even boud samengevat wat... en natuurlijk zijn er grote nuances in, want we hebben nog steeds een hele serieuze en groeiende achterban. En dat wijst natuurlijk ook op grote steun, maar tegelijkertijd wordt de wind ook wel heel veel guurder. En, dat zie je ook terug in de politiek.

> *When I once started this work, then we had quite, in the eyes of fellow human beings here in the Netherlands, quite admittedly goat's wool socks but still exciting, thrilling, admirable, good work we were doing, weren't we? And now today we are worn down as some sort of wackos who, and especially if you look at the refugee work, we are rather seen as half criminals bringing refugees to the Netherlands or at least encouraging people from the region to come this way while we already have so many problems here in the Netherlands. This is just boldly summarized what... and of course, there are great nuances in it, because we still have a very serious and growing following. And, of course, that also indicates great support, but at the same time, the wind is getting a lot bleaker. And, you see that in politics as well.*
>
> (Interview with T. Ceelen, April 21, 2023)

Vluchtelingen worden steeds meer gezien als een bedreiging voor onze veiligheid op klein niveau, hè? Van de HEMA waar dingen gejat worden, dat is natuurlijk allemaal de schuld van vluchtelingen. Tot en met de veiligheid in Ter Apel, van de buschauffeur tot en met op een groter niveau dat vluchtelingen aanslagen zouden kunnen plegen, dat zich terroristen onder die vluchtelingen begeven. En ondertussen weten we ook dat dat ook zo is, maar dat… dan is het de enkeling die een heel groot negatief effect heeft op de hele groep. Ja, dat is heel riskant.

> *Refugees are increasingly seen as a threat to our security on a small level, aren't they? From the HEMA where things get nicked, that is of course all to blame on refugees, to the safety in Ter Apel, from the bus driver to on a larger level that refugees could commit terrorist attacks; that terrorists are among them. And by now we also know that that's true, but that… then it is the one individual who has a very big negative effect on the whole group. Yes, that is very risky.*
>
> (Interview with T. Ceelen, April 21, 2023)

Ja, of terreur... Als ik daar met haar over zou praten, dan zou ik zeggen: 'als je niks doet aan die langdurige vluchtelingensituatie stelt dat nog pas terreur aan'. Want de eindeloze vernedering in die kampen, dat heeft ooit een academicus in Senegal tegen me gezegd: 'that is a paradise for Jihadi recruiters'. Nou ja, ik bedoel, hoe... Als je 15, 15 jaar in zo'n vernederende omstandigheden moet blijven en je weet dat het twee vingers knippen kost aan welvarende rijke landen om je eruit te halen en ze doen het gewoon niet. En dan komt iemand voorbij die zegt: 'zullen wij die lui eens een lesje leren?' Ja die... dat moet toch tot enorme wrok leiden?

> *Well, if terror... If I were to talk to her [Minister Schreinemacher] about that, I would say: "If you don't do anything about that protracted refugee situation, then that will just pose terrorism". Because the endless humiliation in those camps, an academic in Senegal once said to me: "That is a paradise for Jihadi recruiters". Well, I mean, how... When you have to spend 15, 15 years in such demeaning conditions and you know it takes two finger snaps from wealthy rich countries to get you out and they just don't do it. And then someone comes along and says, "Shall we teach those people a lesson?" Well that... that must lead to huge resentment, right?*
>
> (Interview with E. Nazarski, March 29, 2023)

Ik bedoel (…), mensenrechten is een grote prioriteit voor Buitenlandse Zaken, hè? Het is ook echt, ja, een belangrijk deel van het Nederlands buitenlandbeleid, maar kijk dan ook gewoon dichter bij huis. Kijk, ik hoor niks van Buitenlandse Zaken, van de minister van Buitenlandse Zaken, wat er gebeurt bij de buitengrenzen.

> *I mean (...), human rights is a big priority for [the Ministry of] Foreign Affairs, isn't it? It's also really, yes, an important part of Dutch foreign policy, but then just also look closer to home. Look, I don't hear anything from [the Ministry of] Foreign Affairs, from the Minister of Foreign Affairs, what is happening at the external borders.*
>
> (Interview with Respondent 7, March 31, 2023)

Ja. Gewoon mensen beïnvloeden, he? Ja, conflicten en mensenrechten zijn verkoopbaar. Ja, pijnlijk, maar toch, het is wel zo. Dus dat was een beetje het verhaal.

> *Yes, just influencing people, right? Yes, conflicts and human rights are marketable. Yes, painful, but still, it is. So that was kind of the story.*
>
> (Interview with J. Ruyssenaars, January 5, 2023)

Dat is helaas een, nogmaals, een gevolg van een toch nieuwe kolonialistische houding van de rijke landen. Die, dan herhaal ik wel, die ook ontwikkelingssamenwerking als instrument van het nieuwe koloniale systeem inzetten. Want de hulp wordt gaat naar landen waar onze belangen zitten.

> *That [the misery that migration brings] is unfortunately, again, a consequence of a nevertheless new colonialist attitude of the rich countries. Which, then I do repeat, also use development cooperation as an instrument of the new colonial system. Because the aid is going to countries where our interests are.*
>
> (Interview with Q. Shafiq, January 19, 2023)

Je krijgt geld van de overheid, maar dat betekent niet dat je de overheid in alles moet volgen. Alleen als ze zeggen: 'je krijgt geld om dit hier te doen, een bepaald project, en met die en die dingen', dan ga je niet ineens iets heel anders doen, van dat geld. Dus dat geld moet je daar voor gebruiken, maar al die organisaties hebben ook rechtszaken tegen de overheid aangespannen. Onafhankelijk, ja. Dat is maar goed ook, toch?

> *You receive money from the government, but that doesn't mean you have to follow the government in everything. Only when they say, 'you get money to do this here, a certain project, and with those and those things', you don't suddenly start doing something completely different, with that money. So you have to use that money for that, but all those organisations have also filed lawsuits against the government. [So they remain] independent, yes. That's a good thing, right?*
>
> (Interview with E. Nazarski, March 29, 2023)

En je ziet het ook, dat bij een aantal organisaties die veel te afhankelijk geworden zijn van overheidsfinanciering, dat zij gedwongen worden om, als de Nederlandse overheid zegt 'spring', dan moet de hele groep springen. Terwijl je daar eigenlijk helemaal vindt dat dat niet moet. Dus het... ik vind dat ons beleid heel gezond is, maximaal een kwart, waardoor je de vrijheid behoudt om te zeggen: 'nou, we zien af van overheidssubsidie'. Dat kan.

> *And you also see it, that with a number of organisations that have become way too dependent on government funding, that they are forced to, if the Dutch government says 'jump', then the whole group has to jump. While you actually think that they shouldn't do that at all. So it... I think our policy is very sound, a maximum of a fourth [depending on government funding], leaving you with the freedom to say: 'Well, we'll forgo government funding'. That's possible.*
>
> (Interview with T. Ceelen, April 21, 2023)

Nou, dat is de ideale werkelijkheid. Kijk en dat is jarenlang ook zo geweest, hè? Alleen zie je dat de overheid steeds meer in het beleid z'n mening verwoord en dat het voorwaarden gaat stellen voor de financiering. Dus dit is leuk verzonnen, hè waarschijnlijk van (*), maar de realiteit matcht daar niet mee. De realiteit...

> *Well, that's the ideal reality. Look, and it has been like that for years, right? Only you see that the government is increasingly articulating its views in policy and it is starting to impose conditions for funding. So this is nicely made up, probably by (*), but reality doesn't match that. The reality...*
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> (Interview with T. Ceelen, April 21, 2023)