Where *Lies* the *w*est?

Exploring Performances of the west *in Dutch Integration Practice*

Sem van Boxtel

Supervisors: Neta-Paulina Wagner, Henk van Houtum
2nd Reader: Olivier Kramsch

Faculteit der Managementwetenschappen,
Radboud University, Nijmegen.

Radboud University

Cover image generated by author via DALL-E.
Prompt: [show me] the most important cultural value of western civilization.

Abstract

Claims to 'the west' are omnipresent, but what do they mean? Starting from the presumption that there is no objective 'West Pole', this thesis analyses how constructions of 'the west' were performed in Dutch integration practice (2000 – 2009). It shows that the notions of 'the west' were pivotal to integration practices in the Netherland in their use to formulate a system of categorization, a benchmark to measure and evaluate the (socio-cultural) integration of migrants and a logic judging which people were 'normal' and which were 'problematic'. In the process, the thesis uncovers the governmental rationales and ideological presuppositions that explain the use of the notion in the setting of integration. Moreover, it takes into account performativity in order to address how the 'problematic' character of 'non-western' *allochtonen* is constantly 'proven' as real, which reifies these equivocal terms. In this way, the thesis rejects the implicit reductionism of existing works about 'the west' which leave invocations of the notion in the domain of integration firmly intact – instead, it attempts to deconstruct its neutrality and entertain a critical sensitivity towards the term's inherent contradictions.

Keywords: *West, Non-West, Imaginary Geography, Performativity, Occidentalism, Civilization, Integration.*

Acknowledgements

Completing a thesis after having spent countless hours of work on it is unnerving.
I am deeply indebted to many wonderful people who have supported me throughout the writing process. My supervisor Paulina, for helping me with the right advice at the right time. I am certain that this thesis would not have been the same without it. Henk, for giving me the opportunity to delve into the inspiring world of academic research. I have sincerely enjoyed our conservations about the absurdity of claims about the 'west' and 'non-west'. To the wonderful people of the Department of Geography, Planning and Environment at Radboud University for making me feel welcome and appreciated throughout my time in Nijmegen – especially Luuk, for inspiring discussions and much-appreciated advice. And last, but certainly not least, to my parents and Merel for bearing with me and believing in me.

Thank you all.

Sem van Boxtel, April 2023.

List of Abbreviations, Figures and Tables

CBS	Netherlands Statistics *Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek*
SCP	Netherlands Institute for Social Research *Sociaal en Cultureel Planbureau*
WRR	Netherlands Scientific Council for Government Policy *Wetenschappelijke Raad voor het Regeringsbeleid*
NIDI	Netherlands Institute for Interdisciplinary Demography *Nederlands Interdisciplinair Demografisch Instituut*
WODC	Research and Documentation Centre *Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek en Documentatiecentrum*

Word Count: 34871 (excl. preface, bibliography etc.).

Table of Contents

I turn this map around
for the world is all burned up:
East and West, a heap
of ash gathered
in the self-same grave.

Adonis, ‘West and East’.
Translated by Khaled Mattawa (2010).

Introduction

The notion of 'the West' is omnipresent. As Bonnett (2004) rightly notes, "it just trips off the tongue so very easily." (p. 1) But despite the casual tone that this citation suggests, the idea of 'the West' and the symbolic division between 'West' and 'non-Westerners' have become central to politically sensitive discourse(s). The debate surrounding integration practice in the Netherlands is a striking example of this (Mepschen *et al.* 2010; Balkenhol *et al.* 2016). It has been argued for over thirty years that 'the West' is existentially threatened by groups of non-western 'migrants' whose way of life is incommensurable with what 'the West' supposedly stands for (e.g. Bolkestein, 1989; Fortuyn, 1997). This suggests that the Dutch feel as if migration does not touch or challenge their Dutchness but, rather, their very 'West-ness' or 'Western-ness'.

In contrast to what these examples suggest, however, the term has not merely been used for polemical purposes. From 2000 to early 2022, Statistics Netherlands (Dutch: *Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek*, hereafter CBS) adopted the term as the standard means to classify people of foreign descent residing in the Netherlands. Specifically, it distinguished *westerse* and *niet-westerse* (western and non-western) *allochtonen*, whereby the former group was operationalized as a set of countries that were considered 'socio-economically' and 'socio-culturally' resembling of the Netherlands (Keij, 2000; see also Yanow & van der Haar 2011, 2013; Yanow *et al.* 2016). This practice cements the observation that the notion of 'the west' became an important way to think about (the integration of) immigrants in both official and popular discourse.

Such articulations of 'the West' might make intuitive sense as we have heard them so often, but they are actually far from self-evident. Taking the proposed distinction by the CBS (figure 1) as an example, we might ask ourselves questions like: why are ex-Soviet Republics considered 'Western' countries when the Soviet Union was declared the (ideological) archenemy of 'the West' during the 'Cold War'? Why is Indonesia considered a 'Western' country – and if so, why are the other former Dutch colonies then not considered 'Western'? Why is Japan the only 'developed' Asian state that is considered 'Western'? Moreover, what do 'socio-cultural' and 'socio-economic resemblance' mean exactly? Is it justified to take one country (the Netherlands) as a standard to designate what is 'Western' and what is not? Why are only nation-states taken into account – instead of, for example, regions?

Western	**Non-Western**
Europe (not Turkey)	Turkey
	Africa [Morocco]
North America	Latin America
Oceania	
Japan, Asian ex-Soviet Republics*	Asia
Indonesia (former Dutch East Indies)	[Suriname, Dutch Antilles/ Aruba]

Table 1: 'The West' as perceived through the gaze of Netherlands Statistics.
(Yanow & van der Haar, 2011, p. 168, based upon Keij, 2000). Bracketed names are mentioned explicitly by Keij (2000).
*Added on the basis of the specifications (Bovens *et al.*, 2016, p. 23).

An instinctive reaction to these questions might be to suggest that this operationalization is 'just' an inadequate or incorrect definition of 'the West'. This would, however, inevitably raise other, epistemological concerns: how do we establish valid definitions of 'the West'? What are the relationships between the different phenomena (institutions, values, spaces) that we invariably describe

as organic parts of one 'Western' whole (Appadurai, 2016)? We might even ask ourselves the radical question: does 'the West' even exist?

The apparent il-logic of the distinction between *westerse* and *niet-westerse allochtonen* illustrates just how conceptually *incoherent* and contingent articulations of 'the West' actually are (e.g. GoGwilt, 1995a, 1995b; Graeber, 2007). This incoherency casts doubt on the validity of any 'objective' definition of 'the West' and the related practice of sorting and dividing the cartographical surface between neatly demarcated 'Western' and 'non-Western' compartments, a routine that is foundational to our thinking about the world (Hall, 1992; Coronil, 1995; Federici, 1995). The suggestion that a 'West' can be pointed out on a map is, logically speaking, non-sensical: every point on the earth is East and West at the same time. However, there is a widespread presupposition that 'the West' is a clear object and an actually existing place in the world to which someone might validly refer – as if there would be a magnetic 'West Pole' that can be designated with absolute certainty (Jackson, 2006, 2007). It is for that reason that the arbitrariness of its definition is seldomly, if ever, critically questioned.

This 'illusion' of concreteness (Coronil, 1995) clearly informs the supposed descriptive usefulness of the term in domains like integration policy and the statistical classification of immigrants. Moreover, it seems that this illusion is intricately tied to the *durability* of 'the West' as an idea (Gilroy, 2009) or the omnipresence of it – which is indeed one of the most interesting characteristics of the notion (Jackson, 2009, p. 54; Meyer, 2022, p. 192). The notion seems to be reified continually: but how does this process work? This process of continual reification is also where the relevance of geography comes in. Geography, mainly using its prototypical technique of cartographic depiction, has actively facilitated the reification of imagined spaces by "grounding" such entities in soil, which subducts their historical contingency and silences the imagined nature of such notions (e.g. Gregory, 1994). This is absolutely true for 'the west' as well (Coronil, 1995). As Lazarus (2003) has argued, 'the West' is "an ideological category masquerading as a geographic one" (p. 44). I will continue to refer to 'the West' as 'the *w*est' without an uppercase letter[1], in order to highlight how the concept depends upon an illusionary sense of geographical facticity.

If the 'West Pole' does not exist, and the west is indeed a silenced imaginary geography, the fact of omnipresence turns into a set of questions (GoGwilt, 1995a, p. 38). In my opinion, two issues stand out. First and foremost, how does this seemingly incoherent and falsely concrete notion remain such a durable way to understand the world, and integration in particular? Secondly, what does it mean for the question of integration (and integration practice that it has been framed so starkly in exactly these terms – as something that is about 'the west' and 'non-west'? In other terms, what is at stake? (GoGwilt, 2022) I argue that these two questions are closely related. For, if the continuous articulation of the term does not produce any problematic effects, what is the point of critically analysing this continuity in the first place? Moreover, if 'the west' is actually incoherent term, that would imply that integration practice has been widely misguided. What does that 'misguiding' look like?

In line with these observations and objectives, this thesis conceptualizes the notion of 'the west' as a *performative* spatial imaginary that is distinctively *latent.* Stressing performativity[2] allows me to situate the articulation of 'the west' within assemblages of concrete practices, such as the poignant example of migrant categorization, which enact the concept as a descriptive term in largely uncritical

[1] Uppercase letters are usually used to refer to states and to apparently stable (concrete) and singular (unique) territorial entities. Sometimes, I write the *w* (in italics) to highlight it. In quotes, I will write 'the West' with an uppercase letter to remain true to the tone of the author. I also write the 'West Pole' with an uppercase letter to highlight its geographically fallacious nature.

[2] The Butlerian notion of performativity suggests that discursive phenomena are neither 'free-floating' entities but embedded in (non-discursive) practices within which such phenomena materialize, nor do they materialize in one singular act of 'invention,' however, they are rather constantly (re)articulated (Bialasiewicz et al. 2007, pp. 407-8). This is useful since 'the west' is quite an abstract notion that remains abstract whenever it is not *anchored* in specific practices in which the notion (performatively) plays a major role.

ways and which, over time, naturalize the concept. The element of latency stresses precisely this: the largely unarticulated, aura of objectivity that surrounds the notion. Repeating some of Said's (1978) comments, imaginary geographies might be considered true "for ontological reasons that no empirical matter can either dislodge or alter" (Said, 1978, p. 70). It is this specific quality, I argue, that needs to be fully understood. Stressing the performative nature of the concept thus allows me to frame the perpetuation of the latent 'west' – within the integration apparatus specifically – as a concrete and visible object of analysis.

This thesis thus aims to engage with these issues by analysing the following main question:

How were ideas of 'the west' performed in the integration practices of Dutch state institutions (2000-2009)?

This explorative question is divided into the following sub-questions:

(1) *Why* was 'the west' used to guide integration practice?

This sub-question aims to grasp *why* certain ideas of 'the west' (q. 2) were applied by certain government institutions to tackle integration issues. Both discursive and non-discursive contexts will be taken into account here.

(2) How was 'the west' conceptualized within integration practice?

This sub-question aims to describe the particular, contingent conceptions of 'the west' that were employed within integration practice. The difficulty lies in discerning the concrete elements that really guide the practical course of the practice, since the relation between idea and outcome is not clear-cut, as is often presumed in the field of discourse analysis, but unstable (Fearon & Laitin, 2000). It therefore requires careful theoretical deliberation.

(3) What does 'the west' do performatively?

This sub-question aims to interrogate how conceptions of 'the west' (q.2) are performatively 'made real' (Butler, 1990) through particular integration practices. The notion of performativity stresses the continual materialization of discursive notions and relates, therefore, to 'the west's reification. This section also stresses how certain conceptual elements materialize as concrete political *effects*.

The focus on state institutions is premised upon the fact that 'the west' was normalized as a descriptive term or 'sense-making instrument' (Jackson, 2017, p. 89) and applied by various Dutch state institutions in making sense of integration and integration practice. This provides the opportunity to study both (I) widely acclaimed discourses about what 'the west' supposedly 'is' – since state institutions are crucial players in formulating and verifying what constitutes as 'truth' – and (II) the (concrete) political effects of claims to 'the west', since the discourses of state institutions produces deep effects that generally affect society, and the lives of migrant individuals in particular.

Theoretical & Practical Relevance

This thesis contributes to scholarly research in three ways. In the first place, this thesis argues the necessity to rethink the notion of 'the west' in two ways.

Firstly, current research into the political implications of 'the west' covers only a limited range of issues, which ultimately perpetuates a reductionist idea of 'the west' *does*. Existing studies remain

indebted to debates regarding the continuation of the Transatlantic security community (a supranational entity acting strictly in the domain of foreign policy)[3] or the continuation of coloniality within the sphere of knowledge production, an approach known as 'Occidentalism' (Rath, 2017). The example of the articulation of 'the west' by CBS – and within Dutch integration practice more widely – illustrates that the term is operative in many more instances. There is no reasonable argument that invocations of 'the west' in such instances are not as complex and relevant as in the domain of Transatlanticism, outside the fact that they might be more normalized. The thesis argues for a reconceptualization in order to facilitate engagement with both the construction of 'the west' outside the reductive scope of existing work about 'the west' *and* the severely undertheorized issue of 'the west's' durability – which seems to be intricately related to the unquestioned validity of the term. The thesis theorizes of 'the west' a *latent, performative imaginary geography* specifically to tackle these (conceptual) issues.

In its discussion of integration practice, this thesis brings critical geography into dialogue with integration studies. Integration practice seems to have been systematically neglected by the discipline, which is unfortunate given that many geographical themes congregate in it, plus that integration studies itself could benefit from critical geographers' sensitivities concerning the processes through which spatial entities are thought (e.g. Gregory, 1994) – a sensitivity that is clearly lacking vis-à-vis the notion of 'the west' (e.g. Schinkel, 2017). Installing such an awareness is in line with the objective of this thesis as it wants to understand how notions of 'the west' affect the shape of integration practice.

On a societal level, this thesis questions the justifiability of integration practices and existing ways of categorizing immigrants that are informed by discourse on 'the west'. Here, not only social effects such as exclusion, but also psychological effects of being categorized as 'lesser' – which is implicated by notion of the 'non-west' (Hall, 1992) – need to be noted (e.g. Ramdas, 1992). This issue is also highly relevant given recent efforts of the WRR to replace the statistical distinction between 'western' and 'non-western' *allochtonen* with a taxonomy based on 'continents' (Bovens *et al.* 2021; CBS, 2022). Not only is the underlying information about *allochtonen* still 'ordered' by old definitions (Geerdink, 2022), the replacement-classification arguably also represents an identical exercise of spatial differentiation equally grounded on the false premise of topographical objectivity. Ongoing discussions about the discrimination of people conceived as 'different' are at the heart of this thesis.

Moreover, this thesis encourages readers to reconsiders the place of the notion of 'the west' within contemporary political vocabulary. In its current form, the notion of 'the west' is polemically articulated by politicians with diverging ideological backgrounds in order to justify contrasting courses of action (cf. Buchanan, 2001; Garton Ash, 2001). This is problematic, as Appadurai (2016) notes, since "[western] values represent choices to make, not tracks laid down by a western destiny." The question is thus not what 'the west' 'is' or 'is not' – since this impossible to empirically establish. The question is what claims to 'the west' *do,* which is consistently neglected in contemporary discussions of discrimination. GoGwilt (2022) recently argued that 25 years of research on 'the west' did "little to dislodge the idea of the west itself" (p. 227). The ultimate goal of this thesis is to denaturalize this notion by uncovering the subjective and political nature of every articulation[4] of the term.

Reading Guide

[3] Examples include Klein, 1990; Jackson, 2003; Ifversen, 2008; Lethi, 2009; Joenniemi, 2009; Weber, 2017; Schlag, 2017; Vuorelma, 2020.

[4] 'Articulation' implies that "the construction of discursive objects and relationships out of 'cultural raw materials' and 'linguistic resources' that already make sense within a particular society" (Weldes, 1999, p. 154 in Milliken, 1999, p. 239).

The argumentative structure of this thesis is as follows. Firstly, in the theoretical part, I attempt to provide a much-needed synthesis of the diffuse literature surrounding the notion to argue for a particular conception of 'the west', focusing on the applied 'use' of the term in guiding political actions and its possible inceptions in integration studies. Secondly, the methodology describes the exploratory ways in which I attempt to answer the research question. The third section provides the results with regards to the sub-question which the fourth section (discussion) evaluates.

1. Theoretical Lens: *W*estern Orderings

Preamble

The preface to Foucault's classic book *The Order of Things* (1994 [1971]) is indebted to a story by the Argentinian writer Jorge Luis Borges about "a certain Chinese encyclopaedia" that taxonomizes animals into strange categories such as "belonging to the Emperor," "embalmed," "tame," "stray dogs" and "having just broken the water pitcher." (1994, p. xv) It is the very strangeness, the "unthinkable" nature of such a classification that tickles Foucault's interest in the "order of things" and the creation of 'the self', a sane and normal self – although in a strictly European context (Gregory, 2004, pp. 2-3). Foucault asks:

> When we say that a cat and a dog resemble each other less than two greyhounds do, even if both are tame or embalmed […] what is the ground on which we are able to establish the validity of this classification with complete certainty? On what 'table', according to what grid of identities, similitudes, analogies, have we become accustomed to sort out so many different and similar things? (1994, p. xxi).

By asking this, Foucault points to the possibly arbitrary, deceptive, or even nonsensical nature of our most unquestioned classifications and generalizations (Dillon, 2013, p. 373). In the book *The Order of Things,* Foucault (1994) establishes the concept of 'discourse', which refers to an intersubjective system of written statements by which a certain object is thought and by which outcomes or solutions are enabled or constrained (Dittmer, 2010, p. 278). Hence, to Foucault, knowledge – such as the "Chinese" knowledge codified in Borges' classification – is never simply "there," it is construed through language by, and is often applied in the service of, power (Foucault, 1984). This argument has inspired many geographers to question the apparent neutrality of the spatial classifications that have so thoroughly shaped our thinking of the world (Gregory, 1994, 2004, among others).

The adoption of the term 'imaginary geography', explored here, must be seen in that light. As Gregory (2004) has rightly pointed out, however, it is axiomatic that Foucault's interest in the topic was not sparked by an actual encyclopaedia from the Orient but a fabrication of it. This fact illustrates that one of the most unquestioned "factual" imagined divisions or mappings is indeed the separation between a rational 'modernity' and a mysterious, bizarre 'non-modernity' (Gregory, 2004, pp. 3-4; Said, 1978). This is equally true for the notion of 'the west' which, not unlike 'modernity', is used as a standard model or tool to describe, compare and evaluate states and people (Hall, 1992; Coronil, 1995). Following the Foucauldian project leads to the following questions: how does these terms of 'west' and 'non-west' continue to take such a prominent place in our "order of things", the "ordering" of Dutch integration in particular? And what does that mean practically?

'The *w*est' as Imaginary Geography

Rather than pre-given entities that form the neutral "backdrop of social action", places can be understood as fundamentally man-made (Said, 1978; Frank, 2009, p. 66) – endowed with various (poetic) meanings (e.g. Bachelard, 1969) – and, in that faculty, shaping how one acts in the world. In the 'writing' of space, thus, power is located (Said, 1978; Ó'Tuathail, 1994, 1996). It is in such reflections about space, in line with the philosophical project described above, that the notion of 'imaginary geography' was developed by the postcolonial scholar Edward Said (1978) in his monumental work, *Orientalism*, which first evaluated the spatial categories through which our globe is ordered (Gregory, 1994; Coronil, 1995;

Kitchin & Kneale, 2001; Springer, 2011). The term is a powerful analytical mechanism to grasp the properties of the spatial classifications that are pivotal to our societies and their intricate connections to the exercise of power.

Said (1978) originally developed the concept of imaginary geography specifically to capture the practice by which European culture produced a sense of difference between an inferior 'Orient' and a superior 'Occident' – as a means to subjugate this 'Orient' (Ashcroft & Ahluwalia, 2003). Said called this 'Orientalism'. Orientalism constituted an all-encompassing and widely accepted "grid for filtering through the Orient into Western consciousness" (1978, p. 6). Imaginary geography, in turn, describes the general "practice of designating (demarcating) in one's mind a familiar space which is "ours" and an unfamiliar space beyond which is "theirs." Here, the former usually acquires a sense of intimacy and security, and the latter is often seen as 'barbaric' (Said, 1978, pp. 54-5). It is this foundational act of differentiation that aligns the notion with that of 'Othering' (Watkins, 2011).

Following Said, Gregory (1994) gives a more abstract and general description of imaginary geography that is useful here as it explicitly incorporates its social functions. Gregory (1994) describes it as the "rigorous" and "seductive" spatial generalizations that constitute a "world-as-exhibition" and shape "the ways in which we conceive of the connections and separations between [spatial categories]" (pp. 203-4). This description accurately captures how spatial notions aid people in 'understanding' how the world 'works,' it is a mechanism that allows the user to present himself as a mere spectator of the world, framing his gaze as an 'objective' 'view from nowhere,' allowing him to act upon the world (Gregory, 1994, p. 203). This resonates with Haraway's (1988) infamous "God's eye Trick" – in which a very particular view represents itself as an impartial, objective view that seems like a "view from above, from nowhere" (p. 589) which erases the particular position from which it is constructed.

Acting upon imaginary geographies is always, to an extent, fallacious since every geography has its characteristic "distinctive silences, blank spaces, and distortions" (Gregory, 1994, pp. 203-4). In this way, spatial imagination deliberately or inadvertently allows for virulent geopolitical practices – or what Gregory (2004) would refer to as 'architectures of enmity' – to gain validity (Springer, 2011).

A last important characteristic concerns the remarkable consistency of imaginary geographies. This is illustrated by Said's exploration of the Orient, which, in his own words, is

> a closed system in which objects are what they are because they are what they are, for once, for all time, for ontological reasons that no empirical matter can either dislodge or alter (Said, 1978, p. 70 in Carrier, 1992 p. 196).[5]

Though Said's (1978) conceptualization of 'the west' has been criticized as being overtly generalizing and fetishist (Lazarus, 2003, 2011, 2012), this thesis concurs with Coronil's (1995) notion that Said's project is a relevant starting point for this research object. The rigid but all-encompassing character of the "grid", which filters between 'intimate' and 'barbaric' places and, thus, enables knowledge about the world, resonate strongly with conceptions of 'the west' (Hall, 1992).

Framing 'the west' as a geographical concept and subject of critical-geographical research leads to the question to what extend it is justified to frame 'the west' in this way. For example, Gramsci (1985) argued that historical content became attached to the cardinal directions, so that "the expressions East and West have finished up indicating specific relations between different cultural complexes" (p. 447 in GoGwilt, 2022, pp. 224-5). This leads to the claim that 'east' and 'west' have definitive, historical meanings. Contemporary interpretations have refuted this claim, however. There is no empirically 'true' definition of 'the west' that can be validated objectively; every description is an interpretation (Federici, 1995; GoGwilt, 1995a; 1995b). In much the same way, it is theoretically fallacious to argue that 'the

[5] This point will be interrogated in more detail later.

west' has one definitive location (Lewis & Wigen, 1997) – this is exactly why the 'West Pole' is such a productive metaphor (Jackson, 2006; 2007). Importantly here, the idea that some historically discrete 'western culture' exists often hinges upon the idea that 'western culture' – seemingly easily and straightforwardly – localizable on a map, as if it were a geographical absolute (Bueno Lacy & van Houtum, 2015). This is encapsulated in Lazarus' (2003) argument that 'west' is "an ideological category masquerading as a geographic one" (p. 44). Indeed, the deceptive properties of imaginary geography and its primordial method of cartography (Harley, 1992) are at work here, endowing 'the west' with a sense of facticity that allows people to act upon it (Gregory, 1994). Imaginary geography is thus not only a constant parameter underlying other standards and definitions examined in this chapter (cf. Boletsi, 2013, p. 68), it is also a productive angle to engage with the theme of 'the west'.

Two more elements of imaginary geographies are relevant to the notion of 'the west'. Firstly, the role of (conceptual) boundaries. Geographers have consistently argued that the idea of a border – a practice of socio-spatial differentiation encapsulated by the symbol of a line – is crucial to imagining space (van Houtum & van Naerssen, 2002; van Houtum, Kramsch & Zierhofer, 2005) – and that this process might even precede the substance of the enclosed entities that follow from the drawing of that line (Jones, 2009, p. 180). Moreover, it is precisely these (categorical) boundaries that are "so easily fetishized as fixed and finalized despite the overwhelming evidence that they are partial and incomplete" (Jones, 2010, pp. 264-5). The apparent objectivity of certain spatial categories thus depends upon the process of erecting (material or conceptual) boundaries around that space. Analysing how 'the west' is bordered is imperative to understand its objective status and role in shaping concrete integration practice.

Secondly, the narrative element surrounding spatial imaginaries[6] is relevant. Geographers have made abundantly clear that the 'writing' of space does not involve the straightforward induction of empirical fact, but instead entails a subjective – maybe even emotional – practice of 'imagining' the world as "characterized by particular types of places, peoples and dramas" (Agnew & Ó'Tuáthail, 1992, p. 192; Ó'Tuathail, 1996, 2002). This is often informed by so-called geopolitical 'schemes of projection' (Balibar, 2009)– these are sets of rules that are assumed to inform the spatial functioning of world politics (Agnew, 2003). Similarly, 'the west' is surrounded by a range of narratives which firmly place 'the west' in a (existential) drama of global proportions (Bonnett, 2004, 2007). Each provides a different way or forecast to historically and geopolitically frame the notion: in 'clashes' with a vengeful other (Huntington, 1996), heroic triumph (e.g. Fukuyama, 1989), immanent decline (e.g. Spengler, 1923, see Jackson, 2009) or even death (e.g. Buchanan, 2001). The importance of such narratives in directing the (proposed) course of action is thus not to be underestimated.

The Performativity of Spatial Imaginaries

Geographers have argued that performativity is the more accurate theoretical assumption about the nature of spatial imaginaries and its place and function in the social world. Performativity eschews the notion of the naturally existing subject, but it also captures the non-textual, practical elements of such imaginaries as it does not ontologically separate the linguistic from the material (Gregson & Rose, 2000; Nash 2000; Puar, 2006; Bialasiewicz *et al*. 2007; Glass & Rose-Redwood, 2014; Watkins, 2015). Moreover, performativity entails that the spatial imaginaries do not precede the subject's (the individual or state) claims to be acting in the name of this category (Kuus, 2007). This idea of performativity stems from Judith Butler's (1993) work – more so than Goffman's interpretation of performance, which leans upon theatrical thinking or, quite literally, putting on a mask and performing a social role (Gregson & Rose, 2000).

[6] This thesis uses the notions 'spatial imaginary' and with 'imaginary geography' interchangeably.

Butler famously drew attention to how discourse on gender categorizations ontologically "produces the effect that it names" (1993, p. 2). Referencing the work of linguist J.L. Austin, who argued that (linguistic) statements can operationalize something through the utterance itself, she suggested that repeated actions *become* the expression. Acts are "performative in the sense that the essence or identity that they otherwise purport to express are fabrications manufactured and sustained through corporeal signs and other discursive means." (Butler, 1993, p. 136). In other words, discourses are stuck in an ongoing process of becoming. Throughout this process, the precise meaning of the discourse might be altered or redirected – which is also where the agency of subject is located – but it does keep some sort of robust stability. In Butler's (1988) terms, repetition is "the mundane and ritualized form of their legitimation" (p. 526). Repetition is thus a means of reproduction.

In the context of geographical imaginaries, performativity highlights that thinking on space is ontologically inseparable from the (geopolitical) interventions it inspires (Gregory, 2004; Bialasiewicz *et al*. 2007). This is most clearly visible within security discourses, in which subjects are made through their being subject to threat and protection (Bialasiewicz et al. 2007; De Goede, Simon & Hoijtink, 2014; Hiemstra, 2014, Herborth, 2017; Herborth & Hellmann, 2017). In Gregory's reading (2004) of Said's work, imaginary geographies of the Orient are not merely a fabricated archive of knowledge about the Orient, "sedimentations of successive histories", but rather *repertoires* of codes that solidified colonial practices in this 'Orient' (pp. 17-9). They consist of both representation and material interventions (Frank, 2009, p. 72). An interesting example is how US discourse enacted certain Middle Eastern (metropolitan) areas as "receiving points for the dropping of murderous ordnance" through a framing that enacted these places as little more than flat and empty "impact points of GPS-targeted munitions" (Bialasiewicz *et al.* 2007, p. 417).

Butler thus focused on the citational and reiterative nature (iterability) of Foucauldian discourse. This is relevant since 'the west' acquires its status as unquestioned, permanent spatial entities through their performative repetition (e.g. Jackson, 2006; 2009, Joukhi, 2016, Meyer, 2022). Meyer (2022) notes how

> the West is both an abstract term and one which assumes [through the use of the definite article] a previous reference and thus quotes earlier usages, activating a quotational function of the definite article in general. This fact is crucial to all arguments of Westernness, since the suggestion can be made that every reference to the West is also one to "the West," i.e. to an entity already referred to as such previously and quoted (p. 192).

Apart from this dynamic, in which claims to '*the* west' works through (or even 'quotes') previous references, through 'archives' of knowledge about 'the west', 'the west' (as an imagined community) is made real within references to it: Jackson (2009) notes that "if social actions are *oriented* towards 'the West' – that calls the community into existence." (p. 54). This also inspires interventions in 'the west' or against 'non-western' communities. Taken together, the notion of performativity accurately captures the social dynamics of social imaginaries and of 'the west' in particular.

Additionally, the Butlerian understanding of discourse as performative has three major specific conceptual advantages for this thesis. Firstly, as mentioned, the emphasis on iterability is a valuable point to address the omnipresence of 'the west'. Second, performativity counters mistaken assumptions about the role of agency. Discourse is often mistakenly presumed to be a "repressive code" that programs actions in a clear-cut way (Fearon & Laitin, 2000), within one singular act of 'invention' (Foucault, 1984). However, the idea that outcomes would have been different if only actors would have thought differently, volunteerism, is also incorrect (Watkins, 2015, p. 518, i.e. Bialasiewicz *et al*. 2007, pp. 407-

8). Thirdly, focusing on the performative enactment[7] of imaginaries emphasizes that the materialization of discourse is shaped through or within an assemblage of concrete (interrelated) practices (Bialasiewicz *et al*. 2007; Kaiser, 2014). For example, the concept has been employed to study the role of state bureaucracy in the performativity of security (Bialasiewicz *et al*. 2007, p. 419). This is relevant because the thesis focuses upon the (performative) enactment of 'the west' within integration practice which can be understand as a constellation of practices, policies and representational techniques that aid the state in dealing with the difference of a migrant other.

The Latency & Durability of 'the *w*est' as an Imaginary Geography

Even though this description suggests that imaginary geography has to be conceptualized as conscious or (textually) explicit practices of spatial differentiation, Said (1978) was aware that Orientalism did not only entail more or less explicit "distillations" of essential ideas about the Orient (p. 205). The discourse was upheld by "conceptual architecture" below the 'surface' level of explicit articulations (Chibber, 2018, p. 41; Chibber, 2020). It is this 'architecture' that endowed the term with unquestioned validity. In Said's (1978) own words, 'Oriental' information

> seemed to have an epistemological status equal to that of historical chronology or geographical location. In its most basic form, then, Oriental material could not really be violated by anyone's discoveries, nor did it seem ever to be revaluated completely (p. 205).

This "basic form" is what Said calls *latent* Orientalism. He distinguishes this from *manifest* Orientalism, which entails the explicitly "stated views" about the Orient (p. 206) – which can change specific views of the Orient but does not alter the sense of basic difference under Orientalism. This structure is very relevant to 'the west' because this term also suggests a basic difference between (civilized) self and (barbarian) other that has remained so consistent to our thinking (da Sousa Santos, 2007). The manifest 'surface' of discourse about 'the west' is contingent but the general sense of validity and suitability of the term remains unchanged. In the words of, Gilroy (2016)

> The reanimation of Christendom and the consolidation of a Clash of Civilization as a banal and potent common-sense idea capable of explaining almost any political event have *made the West* into a rather more dynamic and a rather more *durable entity* than the title for our conference ['former West', an art project – SvB] suggest. (emphasis added).

'The west' is thus accurately described as a *latent* imaginary geography.

Other authors have stressed this issue in different terms. The constant reproduction of 'the west' that makes it such a durable entity is also stressed by a small shard of research discussing 'banal Occidentalism' (Bozatzis, 2014; Joukhi, 2016, 2020). 'Banal Occidentalism' stresses how the sense of community associated with 'the west' is subliminally reified through textual references to the term. Calling things 'western' implies not only a belief in the (empirical) existence of the entity but can be also be understood as a "tiny ritual" that ultimately reinforces it (Joukhi, 2016, p. 41) Joukhi (2016) suggests that this has a rhetorical function, which fits Jackson's (2009) idea that 'the west' is articulated to resonate with a target audience: they are "moves in a process of contestation rather than falsifiable or verifiable claims about the essence of the West." (pp. 55-6). The quote suggests that not all references

[7] The notion of 'enactment' is critical to the vocabulary of performativity as – unlike the notion of (social) 'construction' – it highlights that material effects are not produced within the frame of a singular 'creational act' but throughout various practices (Ruppert, 2011, p. 223 in Scheel, 2020, p. 575; cf. Foucault, 1984).

to term make verifiable claims about it. Here, it is important to study what 'the west' *does* (Jackson, 2009).

The Merits of 'Occidentalism' and Decoloniality

Decolonial scholarship has accurately deconstructed the "basic form" of thinking about the 'west' or, in their own terms, 'Occident'. In this tradition, the notion 'Occidentalism' refers to the self-understanding of 'the Occident', which functioned as the condition of possibility for Orientalism – here, images of the Occidental 'self' serve as 'mirrors' for images of the Oriental 'other' and vice versa (Carrier, 1992; Coronil, 1995; Rath, 2017). These representations are widely accepted as 'knowledge' about the world and comes with sets of categories and classifications of thought which act as standards of comparison and evaluation (Hall, 1992; Coronil, 1995; Lazarus, 2003). As such, it has become the "norm of orientation on all cultural development" (Quijano, 2007 [1992], p. 24) – reinforcing the westerners' sense of superiority (Baker, 2012). The relation between knowledge and intersocietal power is encapsulated notion of coloniality.[8] The deconstruction of Occidentalism is indispensable for the purposes of this thesis.

'Occidentalism' goes beyond fetishist conception of 'the west' (Lazarus, 2003; 2011; 2012)[9] by providing a critical reading of 'Occidentalism' as an invented way of seeing (Coronil, 1995 p. 53), serving as a (false) "basis for the production of theoretical knowledge" (Lazarus, 2003, p. 56). It "separates and reifies the world's components into bounded units, disaggregating their relational histories, and incorporating differences into normative hierarchies – classifying and ranking them" (Coronil, 1995, p. 57 in Baker, 2012, p. 8). The latent socio-spatial separation could be substantiated or, in Said's terms, 'manifested' in diverging ways, like the binaries developed/un(der)developed, 'valuable' and 'disposable' lives and citizen/foreigner (Mbembe, 2003, pp. 11-16, 27; Mignolo, 2007, pp. 470-77; Baker, 2012; Boatcă, 2015; Rath, 2017). In other words, "Occidentalism is the overarching metaphor around which colonial differences have been articulated and rearticulated" (Mignolo, 2012, p. 13).

Moreover, decolonial scholars have convincingly discussed pervasive 'stories' about 'the west'. There is a myth of evolutionism; a one-directional development of humanity from the state of nature to 'modern' civilization – based upon a linear conception of time (Mignolo, 2002, p. 75; Boatcă, 2015, p. 84 in Rath, 2017). In this narrative, 'the west' is the natural heirs of the 'golden nugget' of history (Appadurai, 2016), which first emerged in Greco-Roman civilization and was passed down through the Renaissance to the Enlightenment (Dussel, 1993; 2000; Mignolo, 2007). 'Western' ideas are often thought to have emerged solely from endogenous processes detached from the non-west (Coronil, 1995). In a similar vein, the cardinal direction of 'the north' – but this is equally true for 'the west' – is presumed to be the primary locus of rationality (Gordon, 2011, 2022). This is called 'methodological internalism' (Leigh, 2021). This logic is fallacious to decolonial scholars. They argue that 'modernity' emerged through a foundational but unequal (colonial) 'interaction' with the west's 'outside' (Dussel, 1993; 2000, Abu-Lughod, 1991). The assumption, however, remains largely intact.

---

[8] Coloniality is ultimately about the politics of knowledge (Bhambra, 2014). The term notes how knowledge produced *in* the (self-proclaimed) 'west' became the only one accepted as valid knowledge and model (Quijano, 2007; Sousa Santos, 2007). Locally grounded epistemologies were pushed away or overwritten by an exported 'global design' which has tried to obscure the locality which produced it (Mignolo, 2002; 2012) in a God-eye-like trick (Harraway, 1988). Coloniality is often tied to 'modernity', stylized as modernity/coloniality – to communicate that the exclusionary subjugation of other knowledges is intrinsic to modernity.

[9] Even though the notion was useful to postcolonial scholarship as it could effectively – that is, metonymically – designate a set of socio-political agencies, the term had "no coherent or credible referent" (Lazarus, 2003, p. 44), an was deployed as an "alibi in the determinate absence of a plausible conceptualization of capitalism and imperialist social relations" (Lazarus, 2003, p. 57).

Even though these insights are invaluable, deeper engagement with decolonial scholarship is not relevant as it focuses on another *problematique*. To decolonial scholars' 'western representation' is only or primarily relevant in its (re)constitution and organization of hegemonic Occidental superiority (Rath, 2017) that is largely epistemic or epistemological in nature (Bhambra, 2014) and *worldwide* in scale (Hall, 1992, p. 187; Coronil, 1996, p. 57). This resonates with the original work of Said (1978), who believed that Orientalism is most accurately thought of as a "machinery of cultural domination" *over* the Orient (Ashcroft & Ahluwalia, 2000, p. 53), but is not ideal to the objectives of this thesis, which focuses on state knowledge on a national scale.

The Use of 'the west'

Many scholars have usefully highlighted how 'the west' is an inherently contingent and contested term (Bonnett, 2004; Browning & Lethi, 2009; Herborth & Hellmann, 2017), also qua spatial demarcation (Lewis & Wigen, 1997). This has inspired a shift in attention from what 'the west' *is* to what it *does*,[10] interrogating how conceptions of 'the west' have been used to justify specific political decisions (e.g. Bonnett, 2004; Jackson, 2006; 2009; Browning & Lethi, 2009; Herborth & Hellmann, 2017; Lethi & Pennanen, 2020). This thesis builds upon these insights, extending its arguments to the sphere of integration practice. In order to analyse the 'use' of 'the west' in integration practice, this section provides an overview of existing work in this field.

To distinguish diverging conceptions of 'the west' is a difficult task since it has "crystallised into a single over-riding conception" (Heller, 2007, p. 48). It is thus not clear what every day uses of the term refer to, and if they refer to the same thing (Joukhi, 2016). The notion might function as an empty signifier – or notions that defy any singular definition (Laclau, 1996). The purpose of the empty signifier is to give a particular demand a function of universal representation (Laclau, 1996, p. 57 in Bettiza, 2014b, p. 5).[11]

All references to 'the west' resemble one another to a certain extent. All invocations emphasize internal "continuity over dissonance" (Browning & Lethi, 2009, p. 20) and, thus, concur to an illusion of conceptual coherence (Graeber, 2007) in which internal differences are disregarded or "flatten[ed] out" (Lazarus, 2012, p. 122). All sense of meaningful difference is displaced and projected upon the border between 'the west' and its Other (van Houtum & van Naerssen, 2002; Jones, 2010). Here, it necessarily involves an eradication of national differences since 'west' always references supranational phenomena (Guzzini, 2017, p. 24). In other terms, the term 'works' where it does not exclude or compete with national imaginaries (Coker, 2009). The notion suggests a totalizing, singular identity (Sen, 1996; Said, 2000). Despite these similarities, however, the differences stand out. Almost all authors locate its nature (essence), purpose, goals and direction elsewhere, with implications for the analysis of 'the west' in action (Browning & Lethi, 2009, p. 21).

Literature has distinguished three basic conceptions of 'the west' (Browning & Lethi, 2009, pp. 20-2), which function as ideal types – mental models that systematically characterize reality, facilitating analysis. They are not completely separate but remain important to distinguish given that the various conceptions have served different political purposes (O'Hagan, 2002).

First, the 'political west' refers to the Transatlantic alliance (Browning & Lethi, 2009, p. 21; Jackson, 2003; Ifversen, 2008; Lethi, 2009; Joenniemi, 2009; Weber, 2017; Schlag, 2017; Vuorelma,

[10] Here, the focus will remain on conceptions of self-proclaimed 'westerners' – like the Dutch – instead of the (negative) visions of 'non-westerners', which is simply beyond the scope of this thesis (e.g. Buruma & Margalit, 2002).

[11] Whether this is the case for the 'west' is difficult to say from the outset, which is why this hypothesis will not be studies in more detail.

2020) both as informal and formal (Klein, 1990; Jackson, 2003) security community. These studies have usefully note "the futility of searching for closure around a sanitised, simplified and homogenised West" (Browning & Tonra, 2009, p. 162), stressing instead how the term has been 'used' 'in action,' (Herborth & Hellmann, 2017). However, these works remain firmly indebted to *problematiques* of International Relations, and the stability of the Transatlantic relations – since these have been argued to be instable, 'divorced' or even split between multiple 'wests' (Lethi, 2009; Joenniemi, 2009; Blokker & Delanty, 2009; Vuorelma, 2020) – in particular. Transatlanticism has been deemed the west's "main conceptual battlefield" (Ifversen, 2008, p. 248). This represents a gravely reductionist vision of what 'the west' *is* – as it is proto-typically contrasted to a Soviet political other (GoGwilt, 2022; Meyer, 2022; Penner, 2022) – and what it *does* – as it is suggested that it is relevant strictly within the domain of international diplomacy (Guzzini, 2017). Therefore, conceptual debate about 'the west' is secondary to debates to Transatlantic relations, which hinders broader critical scholarship it. This is clearly visible in this conclusion to Browing & Lethi's (2009) edited book:

> Rather than being a book specifically about Transatlantic relations, debates on Transatlantic relations since 2001 *also* pointed to a broader series of issues related to the nature of the West (p. 218, emphasis added).

More importantly for the subject of this thesis is the 'civilization' West. This definition is characterized by the assumption that 'the west' is a distinct and coherent macro-cultural, socio-historical unit distinguished from, and compared with, other such entities[12] (e.g. Spengler, 1923; Toynbee, 1929). This implies that civilizations are seen as having isolated, self-contained historical progressions that ought to be studied as "an intelligible field" (Toynbee, 1929) and is be judged by their own merits instead of universal criteria (GoGwilt, 1995a; O'Hagan, 2002).

Graeber (2007) describes two ways to understand 'civilizations.' The 'Great Books' definition or the "myth of an unquestioned Western canon" (Trouillot, 2003) sees 'western culture' as a literary-philosophical tradition with which 'westerners', but potentially 'non-westerners' too, are incrementally familiarized and engaged throughout their lives – for example, in "Western Civ"-courses (Federici, 1995; Segal, 2000). The anthropological definition, in contrast, sees 'the west' as some "embedded folk understanding" (Graeber, 2007, p. 8). Ones' 'westernness' is conceived as a type of habitus informing one's daily mannerisms and practices. This resonates with classical examples, like the one of Kidd (1894 in Bonnett, 2003, pp. 336-7), who argued that 'the west' is like a "spirit of consciousness", suggesting that 'western' ideas are also not easily 'absorbed' or 'imprinted' into 'non-western' minds.

The 'literary' definition is more inclusive or open than the 'anthropological' one. However, the former could be argued to form the basis of more explicit claims to superiority given that certain cherished values, most notably democracy, can be argued to have been present *in potentio* in 'western' canon for a long time, so that 'the west' is their natural habitat (Graeber, 2007, pp. 7-8). Here we have, in a distilled form, what GoGwilt (1995b) has termed the "underlying contradiction" behind claims to 'western civilization' – that is, "their universal applicability, on the one hand, and their "rootedness in particular languages, societies and cultures, on the other." (p. 40). It is obvious that this tension is crucial to understanding the political effects of claims to 'the west'.

This contradiction brings me to the distortive nature of the civilizationist definition. Referring to Huntington's list of "western concepts", Graeber (2007) argues that

[12] Civilizations are notoriously difficult to define. This definition subscribes to the idea of civilizations 'in-the-plural' (O'Hagan, 2002; Bettiza, 2014a). Where "civilizations" are seen as the sense of attainment of a singular unfolding socio-historical entity (Bettiza, 2014a), and where other such units are evaluated on the basis of this singular set of attainments, there is overlap between "civilization" and "modern" conceptions of 'the west' (Hall, 1992). Here, detailed scrutiny is needed.

> His list … seems particularly arbitrary. Any number of concepts were adrift in Western Europe over the years, and far more widely accepted. Why choose this list rather than some other? What are the criteria?" (p. 6).

The notion of 'civilizations' is employed to suggest a false sense of (macro-cultural) coherence to the notion of 'the west' that is questionable at the very least (Federici, 1995; Graeber, 2007; Coker, 2009). Graeber's (2007) argument that the notion of 'the west' is "founded on a constant blurring" between its literary and anthropological definition, making the term inconsistent (p. 9). Moreover, certain values conventionally listed as 'western' may range from cosmopolitan to communitarian ideas, making them internally inconsistent (Coker, 2009, pp. 75-6). The same dynamic is at play with 'procedural' and 'substantialist' registers of culture (Emirbayer, 2000). Compare, for example, the definitions of 'the west' as (substantially) democratic (as in Huntington, 1993) or definitions on the basis of its supposed (processual) ability to self-criticism (Kolakowski, 1990; Ramdas, 1992). This distinction is relevant not only as the shift in registers adds to the notion's conceptual incoherence, but also, since substantialist ontologies tend to conceive of (continually unfolding) relations as properties that are secondary to 'substances' rendered static and inert (Emirbayer, 2000, p. 289).

One last 'civilizational' element that needs considering is the fact that 'western' culture often sees itself as a universal non-culture. The liberal, 'western' subject "poses as having a unique capacity for tolerance – a capacity identified with civilization" – which is then contrasted with those designated as fundamentalist, which are "inherently intolerant" or "incapable of tolerance" (Brown, 2006 in Boletsi, 2013, p. 46; Karkov, 2011). This notion creates a (dichotomous) opposition between "those who are ruled by culture" and those who 'choose' or 'enter' to 'enjoy' it (Brown, 2006, p. 153; Zizek, 2009, p. 120 in Boletsi, 2013, p. 79). The capacity of enjoying tolerance, to Žižek (2009), depends on the innate ability of the 'western' "Cartesian subject" to step outside ones' cultural roots[13] (p. 120 in Boletsi, 2013, p. 79). This resonates with Nadel-Klein's (1995) observation that a 'truly western' person is "one [who] must think, live and act independently of local custom and kinship, free from the parochial constraints of any particular community" (p. 111 in Bonnett, 2003, p. 339). To Brown (2006), however, the existence of this Cartesian subject is fictious and neglects that 'western' liberalism is itself a cultural product which *owns* 'us' – that is, the 'western' self (pp. 150-1). The obvious political implications are nicely illustrated by the following quote:

> Because Western liberal democracy considers itself "cultureless" or "culturally neutral," Brown argues, its principles are considered "*universalizable*," "above" culture, and thus supposedly applicable to all cultures (Brown, 2006, p. 170 in Boletsi, 2013, p. 79).

The non-cultural 'west' might be seen as something neutral, which directly clashes with decolonial narratives of 'Occidentalism' framing certain knowledge as ethnocentric.

The universalizable nature of 'western' non-culture can be actively related to so-called 'modern' operationalization.[14] This is the third definition. Modern conceptions of 'the west' see 'the west' as unique in inhibiting sense of attainment of a singular unfolding socio-historical entity (Bettiza, 2014a) –where other such units are evaluated on the basis of this singular set of attainments (Hall, 1992). These attainments often include its (natural) resort to rationalism (Gordon, 2011; 2022), an unequivocal belief in progress (Browning & Lethi, 2009, Lethi & Pennanen, 2020), or might point to a broader "type of society" that is, for example, rich, urbanized and replete with certain types buildings and architecture (Hall, 1992, pp. 185-6).

[13] See also Stekeler-Weithofer's (2022) discussion on the notion of 'personhood' as a (universal) 'western' idea.
[14] To discuss 'modernity' in further detail is complex and beyond the scope of this thesis. Here, it is important to mention that this thesis takes into account decolonial critiques of the term, which uncover the term as a term with particular (colonial) effects. This is visible throughout this chapter.

All these discussions about the frequent contradictions in existing definitions of 'the west' and their political implications are neatly summarized by O'Hagan (2002 in Browning & Lethi, 2009, p. 19), who has argued that definitions of 'the west' usually differ on three axes. The west is viewed as either a (I) civilization in the singular (modern) or among multiple civilisations, (II) its pattern of civilisational history is either deterministic or open and (III) its character either universalist or self-contained (p.19). The last problem is especially important because this tension between universal inclusion and particularistic exclusion is a foundational issue (GoGwilt, 1995a, 1995b; Federici, 1995; Coronil, 1995 Bonnett, 2003, 2004) that is, in obvious ways, related to integration practice.

Narrating 'the west'

Politically relevant conceptions of 'the west' are often endowed with narratives that provide a coherent interpretation of people's place and relations in the world and, as such, guide their conduct (Ó'Tuathail & Agnew, 1992; Jackson, 2007b; Coker, 2009). Narrations frequently assume the form of different tropes or recurrent themes and (figurative) motifs (White, 1985 in Browning, 2009, p. 219). To be sure, the articulation of these tropes does not involve a process of dispassionate and deductive observation, but instead involves, to a certain extent, deliberate production by relating oneself to previous discourses (Jackson, 2016, pp. 88-9).

One important narrative about 'the west' is the idea of 'westernization' or the "dissolution of the Other by the Self", where the "opposition between western and non-western cultures is resolved by absorbing non-western peoples into an expanding and victorious west." (Coronil, 1995, p. 58). This idea of a superior and triumphant 'west' (Fukuyama, 1992) is rooted in the universalist philosophies of Hegel, in which some 'western' model represents the culmination of some universal history (Coronil, 1995). In Fukuyama's case (1992), for example, the Anglo-Saxon version of the (neoliberal) free-market democracy is offered as the – final or interim – culmination of the universal 'struggle of recognition' (Bonnett, 2004, pp. 138-9). This implies a belief in the superiority of the 'western' model as a standard (Hall, 1992) and thus fits 'modern' definitions of 'the west'.

These models might be argued to be generally inclusive, but this is questionable. The element of time is important in this regard. The 'west' is particularly open to *historical* narratives. To Coronil (1995), the territorialization of 'the west' has the effect of making the notion ahistorical, paving the way for the use of 'historical repertoires' (Bertossi *et al.* 2021)[15] that have political implications – a chrono-politics (Agnew, 1996; Klinke, 2013). Though modernity may be argued to be "incorporative" because it "creates a universal frame of reference able to accommodate all societies" (Fabian, 1984, p. 26), this sense of 'openness' is also false since it continues to separate, compare and classify people(s), by taking one particular type of society as universal frame of reference (Hall, 1992; Robinson, 2000). Specifically, discourse about 'modernity' denies 'coevalness'; it persists that the producer of discourse lives in another Time than the referent of such discourse (Fabian, 1984, pp. 27-31). Other societies or spaces are compared and labelled below the "idealized historical experience" (Agnew, 1996, p. 27) as subordinates to the "holder of Time" (Mignolo, 2002, p. 67). This 'allochronic' or chrono-political separation thus entrenches subjective qualifications of 'good' and 'bad' (Fabian, 1984; Agnew, 1996; Mignolo, 2002; Samiei, 2010).

The essentialization of 'the west' might be built upon chrono-political narratives. There is, for example, a thick sense of organic, trans-historical (or ahistorical) continuity surrounding the notion of

[15] To Bertossi *et al*. (2021), 'historical repertoires' are the "ways in which history is *used* to justify and evaluate the present", focusing especially on hierarchical distinctions between historically entrenched natives and (historically) dislocated non-natives, relevant to the issue of integration. This sociological reading of history diverges from historian's focus on *historia res gestae* (pp. 4161-2).

'western' civilization. This is what Appadurai (2016) has called the 'golden-nugget' story of western civilization. This story imagines 'the west' as an essence "which has been passed from hand to hand on its historic journey" – which becomes a political question of access (Appadurai, 2016). This invoking of a usually positive "continuity between a distant past and the present" is what Bertossi *et al.* (2021) term a "schema of perpetual grace" (p. 4162).

The 'Clash of Civilizations'-thesis (Huntington, 1993; 1996) is a persistent trope surrounding 'the west' (O'Hagan, 2002; Gilroy, 2016). It suggests that (contemporary) political conflicts are to be explained by the incommensurability of civilizations – defined as "the highest cultural grouping[s] of people and the broadest level of cultural identity" (Huntington, 1993 in Ó'Tuathail, 2003, p. 172). In its applied form, the thesis designates Islam as the major incompatible enemy to 'the west' (Said, 2001; Ó'Tuathail, 1996; 2000). Following this narrative, perceived friction observed in the lacking integration of (Muslim) immigrants' into 'western' 'societies' like the Netherlands, has been explained as an expression of the immanent 'Clash' (O'Tuáthail, 2003; Oudenampsen, 2018). Criticism of the thesis and its conceptual premises abide, but relevant here are criticisms that note that Huntington's 'west' is foundational but incoherent (Graeber, 2007) or even empty, not referring to one stable referent definition but "gesturing" to many (Ó'Tuathail, 2000, p. 172). This essentializes socio-spatial entities, which removes all spatial ambiguity and nuance from the map (Rubenstein & Crocker, 1996; Ó'Tuathail, 1996; 2000; 2003; Said, 2001; Sen, 2013).

The 'decline' or 'falling apart' of 'the west' is another persistent trope and is considered crucial to the (historical) constitution and self-reinforcing of the term (Jackson, 2017). It is often accompanied by the designation of both internal enemies (Bialasiewicz, 2006; Jackson, 2009) and external threats, and the willingness to defend 'the west'. The latter case if often seen as a crucial step in the performance of 'the west' as an interstate security community (Herborth *et al*. 2017; Herborth, 2017), but is also relevant in the context of the 'Clash' and 'War on Terror', in which the threatening Other was an arriving Muslim *allochtoon.* As Lethi & Pennanen (2020) note, crisis narratives can provide both a sense of anxiety or loss of previous acclaim, and self-esteem and ontological security – and could thus be used to legitimate diverging ideological impulses (pp. 70-81). In conclusion, these narratives are conceptually and politically relevant elements to 'the west' but require careful deliberation to understand how they are relevant.

Imaginary Geographies and Integration Practice

To grasp the relation between conceptions of 'the west' and integration practice, this section discusses potential intersections between imaginary geography and integration practices.

Meta-Geographical Means to Migrant Categorization

Categorization is often falsely seen as neutral. Even though they are often seen as objective, subjective perceptions shape the process. Moreover, since practitioners apply labels to support policymaking, the practice is inherently political, shaping the world which it sought to described – see also Foucault's evaluation of the Chinese encyclopaedia. In the context of migration, the articulation of labels like 'refugee' versus 'economic migrants' – among others – differentiates between the experiences of those on the move, but also dictates the terms on which society needs to engage with them (DeGenova, 2004; Moncrieffe, 2007, pp. 1-2; see also Yanow *et al*. 2016; Dahinden, 2016; Crawley & Skleparis, 2018; Robertson, 2019) – particularly in terms of (dis)entitlement to protection and (citizenship) rights (Crawley & Skleparis, 2018, p. 59). The notion of 'categorical fetishism' (Apostolova, 2015) refers to the fallaciously treatment of categories as "empty vessels into which people can be placed in some

neutral ordering process like a small child putting brick into a series of coloured buckets" (in Crawley & Skleparis, 2018, p. 49).

Categories are "deeply embedded within the infrastructure of social institutions" and the state in particular (Mügge & van der Haar, 2016, pp. 78-9). In this context, categorization is crucial to a bigger ensemble of (discursive and non-discursive) practices that 'make' a state population "calculable" and "legible" or 'organizable', which enables, and therefore subjectifies people to the exercise of state power – that is, the Foucauldian notion of governmentality[16] (Yanow *et al.* 2016, pp. 191-2). The notion of 'population' is not a thing in itself, waiting to be discovered, but a particular way, preferred by the state, to organize social relations (Ruppert, 2010, p. 159 in Scheel, 2020, p. 575). Categorization specifically makes a state population "governable" through the creating of 'subpopulations', the so-called 'speciation' of the population (Schinkel, 2017, pp. 81-3 quoting Koomen *et al*. 2013). Here, people are put into solid conceptual compartments that allow for their unambiguous "slotting" (Yanow & van der Haar, 2011; Yanow *et al.* 2016). Governmentality thus normalizes certain identities (e.g. Legg, 2006; Sokhi-Bulley, 2011).

For example, a policy brief that discusses alternatives to the 'west' and 'non-west', Bovens *et al.* (2021) proposed the use of a geographical difference as a basis for classification (pp. 17-8). After this recommendation, CBS (2022) published a new way of categorization on a supposed 'topographical' basis that uses "continents and the most frequent source countries" (figure 1). Given conceptions of areas as 'imaginary' and the critique of the meta-geographical constructions of continents (Lewis & Wigen, 1997), this seemingly objective taxonomy is falling into similar epistemological fallacies. This issue justifies the need for geographers to engage with such formulations.



Figure 1: New Mapping per Source Country (*Nieuwe Indeling Herkomstland*) (CBS, 2022)

[16] In short, governmentality refers to a set of processes – which, importantly, include certain knowledge such as stat-istics – that aid the government in its (dispersed) exercise of power over human behavior (Li, 2007; Ettlinger, 2011).

Integration as B/ordering

'Integration practice' is a fundamental notion in this research; what does it mean? The word 'integration' suggests a neutral social process in which clearly distinguishable 'newcomers' are absorbed by a host society. However, this view obscures the critical question *who* is incorporated into *what* (Schinkel, 2017; Favell, 2019). This comes down to a socio-spatial differentiation of the (abnormal) 'immigrant' in need of 'integration', and the (normal) 'citizen' for whom integration is not an issue. Integration – as a political need and object of monitoring and scientific study – arises from this differentiation (Schinkel, 2017). Integration consists of the "means to observe and to render a certain object observable" (Schinkel, 2017, p. 73). This thesis defines 'integration practice' as those state practices that seek to describe in order to (politically) deal with the difference between the subject of integration and the 'normal' citizen.

The logic behind this differentiation (the designation of the object) is usually one of the nation-state: 'migration' constitutes an exception, an anomaly to the neat logic of nation-states, in which citizens are (formal) residents of one state, belonging only to that nation-state (Malkki, 1995; Wimmer & Glick Schiller, 2002; Dahinden, 2016). Since integration implies the incorporation of certain 'others' by a national 'self', integration can be understood as a prism through which to understand the social construction of national 'society' – a permanently unmarked space (Schinkel, 2017). However, integration has 'sedentarist' (Malkki, 1995) or 'nativist' biases (Balkenhol, Mepschen & Duyvendak, 2016; Kešić & Duyvendak, 2019). This notion says something about the relationships between the (migrating) individuals and their culture. Nativism assumed that people belong strictly to one soil-bound culture and that, consequently, a privileged relation exists between the individual migrant and the place from which s/he emigrated.[17] In short, integration is no disinterested process, but an instrumental tool to the state.

The functions of integration practice are akin to those of the border. Since integration is a prism for the imagination of national societies, the notion is related to the inward-looking functions of b/ordering; the "constitution, sustaining and reproducing of a national 'self'" (van Houtum, 2010, p. 958). Moreover, since integration tries to attain a homogeneous 'population' by incorporates certain 'others' into the 'self', it is akin to the border in the sense that it protects the 'self' and strives towards the maintenance of national 'order' (van Houtum & van Naerssen, 2002; van Houtum, Kramsch & Zierhofer, 2005; Parker & Vaughn-Williams, 2012). This is also why Schinkel (2017) argues that the priorities of state have shifted "from controlling the formal borders of the nation-state to controlling the borders of the "national society" (Schinkel, 2017, p. 216) – which probably hints at the emergence of civic integration programs during the first decade of the 20th century (Joppke, 2004; 2008).[18] This overlap justifies the use of both border studies and integration studies in this thesis.

Geographical thinking complements integration studies. The use of the terms 'western' for states 'resembling' the Netherlands, and 'non-western' for those not 'resembling' the Netherlands (see Keij, 2000, p. 24) clearly shows how the line between 'self' and 'other' that integration creates, is not one, singular one that separating nationals and non-nationals, but is actually a layered line encompassing overlapping spatial imaginaries covering the entire world. This issue is neglected by integration scholars (except for Yanow & van der Haar 2011; 2013, Yanow *et al.* 2016; Mügge & van der Haar, 2016), which is clearly visible in the work of Schinkel (2017). Even though Schinkel (2017) accepts that it is

[17] This relation is also encapsulated by notions of 'allochthony' and 'autochthony' (Essed & Trienekens, 2008; Yanow & van der Haar, 2013). The notions are problematic but interrogating them is ultimately beyond the scope of this thesis.

[18] These statements each resonate with Balibar's (2002) infamous argument about the multiplication of borders in contemporary societies. Integration is, like the border, a site of control over the movement of subjects: when immigrants are fully 'integrated', the notion of 'return' or enforced expelling to a (former) 'homeland' becomes non-sensical.

always non-western migrants whose integration is monitored as it assumed to fall short (p. 77), he totally neglects the possibility that 'the west' is a powerful signifier of 'difference' in and by itself – as is encapsulated by CBS (Keij, 2000) – and, as such, a way to define subject of integration policy and to think about what their integration should entail. Instead, Schinkel (2017) argues that an appeal to 'the west' is just another form of culturally defining the national 'self' – the process which lies at the heart of his work. This is not wrong per se, but in this way, appeals to 'the west' automatically become rhetorical tools to nationalist discourse:

> National differences in similar forms of social imagination ensure the boundedness of each "society" by identifying it with a culturally defined "nation" – even when that identification takes the form of an appeal to "Western" … values. A "national society" becomes identified by "values" or "opinions" construed as "Western." (Schinkel, 2017, p. 83).

This presents a very limitative account of the politics 'the west' with regards to integration practice.

The distinction between 'western' and 'non-western' *allochtonen* (Keij, 2000), for example, implies that these groups of migrants have differential rights, especially with regards to Dutch citizenship. The notion of conditional belonging symbolic but exclusivist border between 'natural possessors' and 'conditional' earners of citizenship, whereby the latter have to show specific efforts or competences to be able to become Dutch (De Waal, 2020, pp. 239-40). This separation seems to be related to systems regulating differential access to 'western' places, since these are too based upon meta-geographical abstractions separating 'normal' from 'abnormal' migrants (Van Houtum & Pijpers, 2007; van Houtum, 2010; van Houtum & van Uden, 2021).

Even in the work of Schinkel, one of the Netherlands' most critical sociologists, constructions of 'the west' are rendered as mere placeholder of nationalist discourse. This quote therefore remains a poignant illustration of the theoretical lacunae that surrounds the notion of the 'west' in the social sciences generally. This must be complemented by an insertion of critical geographical work.

2. Methodological Lens

Understanding 'the west' as an imaginary geography, this thesis will employ discourse analysis in order to answer the main question. This chapter outlines this methodology.

Exploration as a Starting Point

The conceptualization of 'the west' as a (latent) performative imaginary geography in integration practice places the thesis uncomfortably between diverging disciplines, which presents methodological problems in the construction of one coherent research design. To summarize, it was difficult to establish *a priori* which received theories were relevant to explain uses of 'the west' in the domain of integration. For this reason, the research benefits from being framed as an exploratory research design. In short, exploratory research aims to engage with a relatively 'unknown' or 'partially known' phenomena to develop a (hypothetical) theory from primary data. The goal of exploratory research in social science is, according to Stebbins (2001), to

> generate new ideas and weave them together to form […] theory that emerges directly from data. These ideas are the *raison d'etre* of the enterprise, whereas everything else – study design, measurement techniques, received theory without an exploratory base – is subordinate to them (p. 8).

Because exploratory research starts and ends with the data itself (induction), the relevance of received theories of 'the west' was judged in close dialogue with the data (text) and the construction of one all-encompassing design before pursuing the analysis was not needed.

The biggest methodological challenges of exploratory research designs include issues with sampling, and the validity and generalizability of the results (Stebbins, 2001, pp. 48-9). Most of these issues are, however, solved naturally with concatenate research projects correcting its mistakes (Stebbins, 2001, pp. 49-50). The remaining methodological issues will be discussed in the discussion section.

Complications of Discourse Analysis

Discourse as a term is notoriously underdefined, often being applied to empirical materials in highly arbitrary ways (Milliken, 1999; Müller, 2008; Müller, 2011). My understanding is Foucauldian and sees discourse as an intersubjective system of written statements by which a certain object is thought and by which outcomes or solutions are enabled or constrained (Foucault, 1994 see also Müller, 2008; Dittmer, 2010, p. 278). This approach, which focuses on what we hold as 'true' about the world as mediated by language, might be contrasted to a linguistic definition stressing how specific textual phrasings and lexical techniques, such as style, tone and intonation, shape the world (Dittmer, 2010, p. 276). My definition emphasizes what Milliken (1999) calls discourse productivity, which denotes the quality that discourses make certain some ways of being in, and acting towards, the world intelligible, plausible or conceivable, while rendering other ways as inadequate, impracticable or even inconceivable (Milliken, 1999, p. 229; Jackson, 2007). This understanding resonates deeply with the term imaginary geography, since it stresses the types of discourse that allow the user to present himself as a mere spectator of the world, who can act objectively upon the world (Gregory, 1994).

This definition presents two conceptual problems. The first concerns the autonomy of the user of discourse. Many scholars of (geopolitical) discourse have stressed the malleability of discourse,

suggesting that they are purposefully created, definitive products of a single author or institution. This view contrasts with the Foucauldian concept (Crampton & Elden, 2007; Müller, 2008; 2011). As Müller (2008) notes, "Foucault sees subjects as products and not as producers of discourses" (p. 327). The agency of users or subjects is relative since their ability to speak and act meaningfully in the world hinges upon the intersubjective 'system' of signification that constitutes a discourse (Foucault, 1994; Milliken, 1999). This relates to the issue whether there is *one* unmalleable, hegemonic discourse 'the west' or not (cf. Larsen, 2018). Theory also provides mixed signals on this point, as the term could be argued to be both incoherent (Bonnett, 2004; Graeber, 2007) *and* coherent by following a basic form (Said, 1978; Coronil, 1995) – as it could also be considered simultaneously full (Heller, 2007) and empty (following Laclau, 2000). However, this theoretical dilemma is impossible to solve *a priori,* and should rather be induced from the data, in true exploratory fashion. This issue will be discussed in more detail in the discussion section.

The second question is whether the political stance of the author (researcher) is suitable or not, even problematic. Multiple authors have mentioned how political concerns motivate discourse analysis, an influence that is strong because the Foucauldian school is so acutely aware of the social impact or 'productivity' of discourse (Milliken, 1999; Müller, 2008; 2011). Here, (geopolitical) discourse analysis is used to challenge common sense understandings by excavating the system of presumptions operating behind it (e.g. Ó'Tuathail & Agnew, 1992; Ó'Tuathail, 1996; Dodds, 2000 in Müller, 2011). This is true for this thesis as well. However, the objective of this thesis is largely based upon verifiable theories about the term, which minimizes possible problems like the distortion of effects due to selective perceptions and personal biases and limitations (Müller, 2011). A self-critical stance remains necessary, however, meaning that the theme should be revisited in the discussion.

Data Collection

The process of data collection proves a challenging exercise. One criticism of discourse analysis is that it is 'just' interpretation instead of (scientific) analysis. To Fairclough (1996), however, it *is* analysis because it is a 'reasonably systematic application of reasonably well-defined procedures to a reasonably well-defined body of data' (Fairclough, 1996, p. 52). This suggests that methodology must explain why procedures of data selection and the analysis of that data make sense. The main criteria for data selection were that it presented a (I) politically significant texts written by (II) "people presumed to be authorized speakers/writers of a dominant discourse…" (Milliken, 1999, p. 233; see also Lundborg & Vaughan-Williams, 2015, p. 8).

In deciding which data corresponded with these criteria, I turned to introductory research about the Dutch integration debate (Luccassen & Luccassen, 2011; Schapendonk, 2023) and integration in the Netherlands (Scholten, 2008, 2011; Schinkel, 2013, 2017). The book *Imagined Societies: A Critique of Immigrant Integration in Western Europe* by Dutch sociologist Willem Schinkel (2017) was particularly relevant in this regard. The book, a detailed description of the so-called 'moral monitoring' of immigrants (pp. 68-111) and how the problematization of culture operates within this practice (pp. 112-155), was formative to this thesis' understanding of how integration practice operates. Schinkel's consistent focus upon certain organizations, which he calls the 'ocular centres' of society elsewhere (2013, p. 1143), and SCP in particular – which he deems the "prism of the measurement of integration" (2017, p. 86) – informed the decision to analyze three organizations (CBS, WRR, SCP). This influence is visible in table 2, which provides an overview of the analysed texts.

This thesis focuses particularly on the discourse of these institutions, which together have been termed the 'research-policy nexus' by Scholten (2008; 2011), in an attempt to grasp the production of knowledge (discourse) about 'the west' before the implementation of concrete policy (at the ministerial level). Other organizations within the 'research-policy nexus' that do not explicitly study integration –

such as NIDI, which studies demography, and WODC, which is interdisciplinary – are outside the scope of this thesis. It must be noted here that WRR is not an official state institution, but an independent advisory body that is a science-based council to the Dutch government. As such, it is a part of the research-policy nexus.

Actor	Function	Rationale	Sources
CBS	Enables the monitoring of 'population' (Schinkel, 2017, pp. 81-2).	Develops classification in terms of 'western' and 'non-western' migrants.	Keij, I., (2000), 'Standaarddefinitie allochtonen'. *Index*, 10 (november/december), pp. 24-25.
WRR	Provides "policy-relevant knowledge" but has no explicit role in integration practice (Scholten, 2011, pp. 104-9).	Gives meaning to distinction 'western' and 'non-western' people; applies notion of 'west' to measure socio-cultural integration.	Dagevos, J. (2001) *Perspectief op Integratie: over de sociaal-culturele en structurele integratie van etnische minderheden in Nederland*. WRR Werkdocumenten nr. W121, The Hague: WRR. WRR (2001) *Nederland als Immigratiesamenleving.* WRR Rapport, nr. 60. The Hague: SDU Uitgevers.
SCP	Represents the "prism" of the measuring integration and the problematic 'populations '(Schinkel, 2017, p. 86): providing (bi-) annual reports on the social position of migrants (Scholten, 2011, pp. 147-8).	Measures socio-cultural integration and develops comprehensive knowledge about the 'non-western' other.	Dagevos, J. Gijsberts, M. & Praag, C. van (2003) *Rapportage Minderheden 2003.* The Hague: Sociaal en Cultureel Planbureau.[19] Gijsberts, M. & Dagevos, J. (2009) *Jaarrapport Integratie 2009.* The Hague: Sociaal en Cultureel Planbureau.
Civil		Necessary to uncover the ideological assumption beyond the use and introduction of notion 'the west'.	Bolkestein, F. (1989) 'Einde Geschiedenis laat nog even op zich wachten' in: *De engel en het beest* (pp. 136-141) Amsterdam: Prometheus. Bolkestein, F. (1992) 'De Integratie van minderheden' in: *De woorden en hun betekenis* (pp. 181-188) Amsterdam: Prometheus. Fortuyn, P. (1997) *Tegen de islamisering van onze cultuur.* Utrecht: Bruna. Scheffer, P. (2000) 'Het multiculturele drama'. *NRC Handelsblad,* 29 January. Scheffer, P. (2007) *Het land van aankomst.* Amsterdam: de Bezige Bij.

Table 2: Schematic Overview of Data Collection Process (Own work).

It is worth stressing that the question whether discourse about 'the west' within Dutch integration practice is internally coherent or not is complicated by differences in terms of differences in the framing of integration per institution (Scholten, 2008). Whereas WRR is relatively 'transnationalist', regarding immigration as a social fact, SCP subscribed to a 'assimilationist frame' which regards immigration as a problem (Scholten, 2008, p. 218). SCP also saw it as its role to reflect changes in the political mood (SCP, 2005, p. 7 in Scholten, 2008, p. 225).

[19] The focus is on this 2003 report as it was the first to focus on socio-cultural integration of 'non-westerners'.

Rationale for Analysing Civil Contributions

One of the premises of the analysis is that claims to 'the west' are never 'objective'. The question – see sub-question #1 – is to what extent the articulation of 'the west' by state institutions were informed by subjective, or even ideological, concerns and how these ideological concerns are visible in constructions of 'the west' and its political implications. In order to answer this question, this thesis analyses relevant civil contributions that reflect the wider integration imaginary (2000-2009) to observe notions about 'western civilization' (and its other) which are central to 'culturalist' thinking.[20] In order to substantiate my analysis about the discourse and its relations to wider integration practice, I treat certain secondary sources about this discourse (Pels, 2004; Geschiere, 2009; Oudenampsen, 2018) as primary data.

Time Frame

The time-period 2000-2009 is a suitable timeframe. Firstly, the year 2000 can be considered a watershed moment in the use of the term 'the west' within integration practice because the distinction between 'west' and 'non-west' was introduced in that year (Keij, 2000). Moreover, both primary and secondary literature point to a shift in integration discourse around that year – the so-called 'culturalist' turn – which is related to a range of national and global events, like the attack on the World Trade Center in New York (September 2001) (e.g. Faist, 2006) and, on a national scale, the murder of Pim Fortuyn (May 2002) and journalist Theo van Gogh (November 2004), the 'west' was framed as being 'under attack' by a Muslim 'other' (Buruma, 2006).

The year 2009 was chosen on the basis of considerations regarding sampling. It has been argued that an analysis is complete or validated when the researcher's theorizing fits consistently with new texts so that the addition of new texts yields no new insights (Milliken, 1999, p. 234; Jackson, 2007). Moreover, the explorative and intensive nature of this research designs prescribe "a small number of case studies with the maximum amount of detail" with the aim of (full) immersion as a means to understand the structural nature underlying certain (observational) phenomena (Clifford *et al.* 2010, pp. 11-2). This justifies a relatively narrow time frame and set of data.

Discourse Analysis for Performative Imaginary Geographies

This thesis relies upon a Foucauldian-inspired discourse analysis that builds upon the work of Norman Fairclough's (2003) and methodological discussions within the field of critical geopolitics (Ó'Tuáthail, 2002; O'Loughlin *et al.* 2004; Dittmer, 2010; Müller, 2008; 2011).

Fairclough (2003) distinguishes various levels of analysis. There is the (direct) *text* and its linguistic features (micro-level). There is *discursive practices* and the analysis of how authors draw upon already existing discourses, or how receivers apply these discourses in interpretation of the text (meso-level). The last scale involves *social practice*, which encompasses both discursive and non-discursive elements (macro-level). This also included both proximate and distal context (Müller, 2008). This scale can also be seen as the social context of the discourse (Dittmer, 2010). These various levels are actually represented in our research questions. The thesis takes macro-level migration practices into account (sub-question 1) and looks into existing ideas of the west, mainly on the basis of secondary sources. This study focuses on meso-level discourse, which is suitable for understanding common sense understandings (O'Tuáthail, 2002, p. 606) like 'the west'.

[20] See the section on the 'culturalist' turn in chapter 3.

Discourse analysis is problem-oriented and has no blueprint-method (Fairclough, 2003). In order to study the ways in which 'the west' is articulated, this thesis relies upon what Milliken (1990) calls predicate analysis, a basic (formal) method for the studying of the discursive constitution of subjects through analyzing language practices in text (p. 231). Predication is the set of verbs, adverbs and adjectives that are attached to nouns. It is predication that "construct the named thing as a particular sort of thing, with features and capacities" and – importantly – with relations to other things (p. 232). Milliken argues that relational distinctions – which (arguably) "order the ensemble, serving as a frame (most often hierarchical) for defining certain subject identities" (p. 233) – can be made visible by analyzing the predication of given objects. In this process, empirical study and theoretical abstraction go together (p. 234) – which fits the exploratory fashion of this thesis. Even though this method makes visible these 'relational distinctions', it is also quite a crude tool. It should thus be substantiated with additional analysis.

In substantializing the analysis, the thesis borrows from Ó'Tuathail's (2002) article about the geopolitical construction of 'Bosnia'. This study can be understood as one of few attempts to explicitly operationalize geopolitical discourse (Müller, 2010). It also usefully takes the theoretical assumption of performativity into account. The study discusses storylines and scripts. Storylines are sense-making organizational devices or 'discursive software' that arise in "social process[es] of categorization and particularization". These storylines make up performative scripts; tacit sets of rules for action (Ó'Tuathail, 2002, pp. 617-20). Ó'Tuathail (2002) analyses the content of these scripts by asking where? what? who? why? and so what? These questions are arguably too broad for the purposes of these thesis. Therefore, theoretical insights will be employed throughout the analysis as a means to substantiate direct observations. These insights are called "analytical tools".

These analytical tools were selected through a reiterative process. There first was a preselection of useful insights on the basis of a first reading of the literature. Later, during an inductive first reading of the primary literature – and, to a lesser extent, during the formal analysis itself – it was evaluated which of these insights were relevant to the analysis. The process of doing the formal analysis itself was mainly deductive in nature as the data was actively framed and analysed with the use of the chosen "analytical tools". The coding process was, however, not affected by this procedure given the very broad coding scheme. The discussion refers back to the theory

The methodological implications of performativity also need scrutiny since the term's 'processual' ontology and focus on the material are seemingly difficult to conciliate with linguistic methodologies. However, this is not necessarily the case (Müller, 2008; Dittmer, 2010). It has been noted that textually oriented discourse analyses can uncover how "something is constituted as an object of knowledge formation and planning" (Richardson & Jensen, 2003, p. 17 in Dittmer, 2010, p. 285). Such studies should take into account the more complex schema of causation that performativity suggests, in which associated elements "fold, blend, emulsify and dissolve into each other" (Connolly, 2005, p. 870 in Bialasiewicz *et al*. 2007, p. 408). This thesis analyzes how 'western' and 'non-western' entities and, specifically, peoples are constituted as object of knowledge formation and policymaking in the domain of integration – and will in the process scrutinize how given associations about 'west' and 'non-west' "fold" into such objects and how, in the process, the objectification of 'west' and 'non-west' perpetuate these ideas.

Operationalization & Coding

Coding is "basically a way of evaluating and organizing data in an effort to understand meanings in a text" which aids the research in identifying categories and patterns (Cope, 2010, p. 441). The fact that the primary literature discussed in this thesis was formulated without specific reference to the subject

('the west') problematizes the coding process and requires a more inductive approach (Cope, 2010, p. 443), again fitting exploratory research. Since 'the west' has been conceptualized in diverging ways, the thesis eschews stricter codifications, such as the ideal-typical distinction between 'civilizational', 'political' and 'modern' wests. Avoiding such categories is also necessary because it is difficult to establish thresholds for such abstract notions as 'civilization' or 'modernity'. Avoiding such narrow codes makes sure that coding is more inclusive, allowing the identification of patterns of variability and consistency in the broadest sense (Gill, 2000, pp. 179-80).

Coding is done on the basis of the research's sub-questions. By codifying on the basis of looser, robust codes, the thesis attempts to let the text "speak for itself" (e.g. Cope, 2010, p. 444) and avoid the fallacy of projecting some set of pre-determined meanings onto the text (confirmation bias). In this way, moreover, this thesis also avoids the problem of decontextualizing micro-level discourse (text) when we shift to meso-level analysis (Dittmer, 2010). Asking broad questions seems suitable for the explorative nature of this analysis. It maintains a difference between articulation that say something about the west – what it is argued to *be* – and performances– that is, how it becomes real as a concrete subject that *does* something. However, the disadvantage of such a coding scheme is that it is very robust, mushing widely divergent conceptions and uses together. In order to solve this, the thesis will (as mentioned) employ various 'analytical tools.' The overall plan for operationalization is summarized in the following scheme (figure 4).

Code	**Rationale**	**Imaginary Geography**	**Effect**
Question	*Why* was 'the west' used? (I)	How is 'the west' conceptualized? (II)	What does 'the west' do (performatively)? (III)
Analytical Tools (see Theory)	Logic of Integration: - Creating and monitoring of difference - Integration discourse: 'culturalization' - Governmentality through statistical categorization.	Definitional Properties: - Ideal types in definition - Latent or manifest difference - B/Ordering and Territorialization. - Singular/multiple entities - Universality/particularity - Form of historical narrative. - Narration: tropes of decline, clash and (spatial) extension Silences and distortions: - Presumption of innate empirical existence (West Pole Fallacy) - False sense of conceptual coherence (essentialization) - False sense of topographical absoluteness	Logic of Integration: - Installation of civic integration Programs - Exclusionary conditional citizenship - Reification of difference (separation of 'west' and 'non-west').
Objective/ Issue	Understanding use of 'the west' as sense-making device in integration practice	Understanding articulations of 'the west', uncovering their distortive (il-logical) nature.	Uncovering political implications of constructions of 'the west' in integration practice Understanding the durability of 'the west'*

Table 3: Schematic overview of operationalization (Own work).

3. Understanding Claims to 'the west'

The results section begins with the observation that the distinction between 'western' and 'non-western' migrants (like the separation of *allochtoon* and *autochtoon*) as the standardized way to categorize immigrants in official statistical records, was introduced rather suddenly in 1999 (Keij, 2000; Bovens *et al.* 2016, p. 9), and without explicit substantiation. This decision chronologically prefigured articulations in a range of different contexts (WRR, 2001; Dagevos *et al.* 2003). By using the analytical tools – that is, the particular logics of integration and governmentality as underlying rationale or epistemology (Ettlinger, 2011) of integration practice, this chapter attempts to answer the first sub-question: *why* was 'the west' used to guide integration practice?

Legitimating 'the West' as Means to Categorize Migrants (CBS)

A significant methodological problem with regards to sudden introduction of 'west' and 'non-west' as means of categorization, is the total lack of reporting on *why* the CBS began to use 'the west' and 'non-west' as means of classification,[21] which complements the remarkable absence of specific criteria used for the designation of countries as 'western' and 'non-western' (Keij, 2000). To counter this limitation, this section approaches the sub-question indirectly, by interrogating precursors to the classificatory distinction between 'west' and 'non-west' and asking what changed about the governmental means of differentiation and what could explain this change.

The application of the distinction between 'western' and the 'non-western' stemmed from CBS' demographic forecasts (Keij, 2000). Specifically, it arose from a discussion emerging during the second half of the 1990s, concerning the question how to operationalize the notion of *allochtonen.* Before this standardization, the CBS used a 'wide' and a 'limited' definition to measure the amount of *allochtonen* in parallel settings (De Beer, 1995). In the former definition, someone is considered an *allochtoon* when the person *or* one of his/her parents were born abroad. In the latter definition, someone is an *allochtoon* if the person *and* one of his/her parents were born abroad. This operational interchangeability obviously led to widely fluctuating demographic estimations as to how many *allochtonen* resided in the Netherlands, which legitimated the need to set up clearer working definitions (Keij, 2000).

Before 1999, an alternative 'limited' definition of *allochtonen* is visible in the archive of the CBS, which was based upon a qualitative distinction between 'rich' and 'poor' source countries, defined on the basis of OECD membership (De Beer, 1995; Prins & Verhoef, 1998; see figure 6). In effect, this differentiation separates OECD-member state nationals and non-OECD member state nationals. This qualitative differentiation prefigures the division between 'western' and 'non-western' migrants in many ways (Papaikonomou, 2019). Not only were both taxonomies rendered "objective" by the CBS. Both systems were equally dichotomous and totalizing in character, signifying the presumed 'need' to specify or delimit the more general notion of *allochtonen.* On this basis, the preconditions for the use of the terms 'western' and 'non-western' (*allochtonen*) as statistical categories were already present in the CBS before their actual application in 2000 (Keij, 2000).

Firstly, the decision rests largely on logics of governmentality. This logic, which attempts to render subjects (of state) visible and 'regulable' dictates that statistical categories are both effective and 'objective' – that is, objective representation of available quantitative data (e.g. De Beer, 1995) – of the classification are the most important criteria. The crux here is that the differentiation based upon source countries is an 'objective' criterium to a certain extent, but it is by no means a *neutral* means of

[21] I have had contact with the CBS to verify this statement.

differentiation – an issue which the CBS seems to have been neglecting at that time.[22] According to the institution, the 'objective' representation of demographic data is its most important aim (CBS, 2022) and, hence, it also argued that it is 'objectivity' that gave rise to the distinction between 'rich' OECD members and 'poor' non-OECD member states (De Beer, 1995 pp. 11-2), even though the institute conceded that this distinction – or any operationalized definition of 'allochtony' for that matter – was "to an extent arbitrary" and should depend on the specific purpose of the distinction (De Beer, 1995, pp. 11-2). The question is then: what does 'objectivity' mean to CBS?

It seems that CBS deems categorization "objective" to the extent that it constitutes an unambiguous means to statistically slot and compartmentalize people[23] – which is critical to the effective exercise of governmentality – since migrants *have to* come from some country in the world, of course. It is thus that a distinction based upon source countries is able to cover all migrants and is able to "slot" these migrants in clear, unambiguous national containers. The implication of this means of classification is that the territorial trap (Agnew, 1994) of national spaces is used instrumentally by CBS, because of its usefulness as a means to classify. The 'objective' is, thus, that which artificially puts people in unambiguous compartments. In other words, differentiation on the basis of nationality (source countries) is rendered as an 'objective' criterium that is 'useful' for defining (the amount of) *allochtonen* in the Netherlands.

This notion of objectivity can also be found where CBS defines what it does *not* count as objective criteria. De Beer (1995) notes that its dedication to use objective criteria (for its demographic inquiries) was exactly the reason why the organization did *not* take into account phenomena such as "cultural differences, religion, skin colour, language, lifestyle, self-identification or socio-economic differentiation" (p. 9, 11). These concepts are, indeed, all that are notoriously slippery; non-solid in these sense that they are subject to change and vague in the sense that it seems difficult to establish clear compartments. They are, therefore, unstable bases for classification. For De Beer (1995), this means that a classification is not 'objective'. This is, however, not to say that the differentiation is politically neutral. However, it is almost impossible to keep politics out of statistical inquiry. This becomes apparent, for example, in the following quote:

> The second criterium is related to the source countries: are all non-Dutch persons counted as allochtonen or are only persons from countries like Turkey, Morocco and Suriname, which are usually counted as *ethnic minorities*, counted as such*?* (De Beer, p. 9, emphasis added).

The use of the term *ethnic minorities* is important here, because this notion was used to delimit the target subjects [*doelgroepen*] of the former integration policy paradigm. In this way, it also invokes this sense of problematization – even if this problematization is based upon the socio-economic position of the group.[24] Moreover, the reference to "Turkey, Morocco and Suriname" – later the focus was put on people from the Netherlands Antilles as well (Keij, 2000; Dagevos *et al.* 2003) – is not random, as these were the groups of people that were generally considered to be most problematic. They did not, for example, constitute the most sizable groups: the amount of *allochtonen* from Germany and Indonesia ('western' countries) residing in the Netherlands has consistently been higher. Moreover, in 2001, the

[22] Recent publications like the one by Bovens *et al.* (2016) break with this pattern. It has also been critically discussed by NIDI (Ham & van der Meer, 2012).
[23] Yanow & van der Haar (2011) speak of a "slotting" approach which – as opposed to the "prototype approach" – rests on a "highly structured" schemata with a hard "set of membership criteria in which every element that needs categorising has a clear place, and each is expected to fit into one and only one category." (pp. 232-3, see also Yanow *et al.* 2016, pp. 196-7).
[24] 'Ethnic minorities' were distinguished on the basis of the (supposed) socio-economic deprivation of the group.

group of 'non-western' people was more sizable than the 'western' group but only for the first time since statistical recording (CBS, 2002, p. 33). Pure size could not have been the issue.

This point relates to the second point. The subtle moral connotation of the distinction between 'west' (positive) and 'non-west' (negative) was already present in the distinction between 'autochthony' and 'allochthony'. It has been pointed out that 'allochtony' is no neutral designation, but that it signifies the 'problematic' character of the signified people(s) (Yanow & van der Haar, 2011; 2013). Therefore, this specific reference to "countries like Turkey, Morocco and Suriname" highlights the problematic connotation surrounding the notion of *allochtoon*. The problematic connotation of 'allochtony' also becomes apparent when De Beer (1995) asserts that the immigrants from 'rich' states, such as Belgium or the United States, were "usually not considered allochtones" (p. 11). When considering the fact that 'allochtony' was officially defined by the WRR (1989) to include all people that were not born in the Netherlands – that is, excluding its overseas area – this particular quote of the CBS makes clear that the notion of 'allochtony' had morphed into a normative statement. *Allochtonen* refers to 'problematic' immigrants which are rendered as 'anomalies' to the 'normal' fabric of society.

Thirdly, the use of spatial delimitation or the creation of binary *spaces* (amalgams of national spaces) as a means to mark particular types of (problematic) *allochtonen,* was already present before the separation between 'west' and 'non-west' (see also Yanow & van der Haar, 2011; 2013). The separation of the world on the basis of OECD-membership is indeed a very binary (1 or 0) form of b/ordering, which eradicates all nuance (van Houtum, Kramsch & Zierhofer, 2004). Instead, it links the likeliness of individual migrant's successful 'integration' into Dutch society to the question of whether the host country is a member of some international organization (the OECD), which is obviously a very far-fetched and artificial relation – even if one accepts OECD-membership as a proxy for the state's wealth. The distinction actively reduces individual migrants to the criterium of having simply been *born* in a territory that is ruled by (whatever) non-OECD member state.

This is a form of spatial fetishism, which can be defined as the assignment of causal force to space *per se* (Paasi, 2020, p. 19) – a phenomenon, which is perceived to render other social relations, which actually 'produce' space (LeFebvre, 1974; Soja, 1980), invisible. By 'objectively' filtering on the basis of origin countries, therefore, the CBS implicitly chooses to neglect other possible material variables that might indicate a higher probability for social 'problems' – if that is what the notion of 'autochthony' signifies – such as the individual's motivation for migration, his/her education, political views etc. These are social phenomena which all relate dynamically and dialectically to space (Soja, 1980). This is even so for the socio-economic status and cultural views of the individual migrant. The CBS report (implicitly) neglects such social complexity by replacing these indicators with one large spatially fetishist indicator for 'problem-ness', in this case OECD-membership.

In conclusion, the epistemological seeds for the qualitative differentiation of migrants – between 'western' and 'non-western' – were already present during the 1990s, a time in which CBS seems to have exploring ways to delimit a more restrained definition of the *allochtone* population which signified or marked the problematization of its entry into the Netherlands.

Figure 2: OECD-based Migrant Taxonomies, CBS (1995-1998)

1995*	1998*
Turkey Morocco Surinam Dutch Antilles + Aruba Rich OECD-countries Other Total Total excluding rich OECD-countries	Belgium Germany United Kingdom Other EU-countries + EFTA-countries Indonesia + former Dutch East Indies Morocco Dutch Antilles + Aruba Surinam Other (rich) OECD-countries Other (poor) countries
(De Beer, 1995, p. 11).	(Prins & Verhoef, 1998, p. 184).



Visual representation of OECD-based taxonomies (based upon De Beer, 1995).

*Typographical separation between the categories above and below are original.

Legitimating 'Modernity' as Benchmark to Measure Socio-Cultural Integration (WRR & SCP)

The WRR Working Document *Perspective on Integration* by Dagevos (2001) – which formed the basis for a comprehensive report that would be published in 2001 (WRR, 2001, p. 15; 166) – signifies the first substantive articulation of 'the west' by WRR. The report provides a theoretical justification for its socio-cultural sensitivity by suggesting that socio-cultural integration is undertheorized with regard to (I) empirical data questioning the assumption in which social differences were assumed to decline gradually over time and (II) the operationalization of 'socio-cultural integration' into indicators useful to quantitative measuring (Dagevos, 2001, pp. 11-2). This last rationale clearly reveals the logic of governmentality determining the scientific agenda. Building upon a short literature overview, the report argues that research on the topic of socio-cultural integration is generally argued to include two themes: the extent of informal social contacts and the distinctive character of the culture of *allochtone* groups. On this basis, Dagevos (2001) proposes the distinction between 'social' and 'cultural distance' (pp. 12-3). He also distinguishes 'objective' integration (the observable acculturation process) from 'subjective' identification with the own group (pp. 13-4). All these elements are separately operationalized and interrogated – their coherence is only analysed *a posteriori* (pp. 13-4).

Socio-cultural integration is conceptualized as "the extent to which a group approaches, or distinguishes itself from, the surrounding society in terms of contact, norms, values and language." (p. 7). It is operationalized on the basis of two elements: (I) social distance – that is, the number of contacts with autochthonous/ native Dutch – and (II) cultural integration – that is, the degree to which society's norms and values are shared by immigrants. The latter intrinsically depends upon some preconceived (*a priori*) view of what the culture of the "surrounding" host society 'is'. Dagevos (2001) argues that can be measured via "the extent in which the culture of an *allochtone* group 'deviates' from that of the receiving society or the extent to which the 'cultural adjustment' of an *allochtone* group to the culture of the receiving society." (p. 20). Even though Dagevos (2001) notes that it is unclear what indicator (of culture) should be determinative – given the unstable and heterogeneous nature of cultures – the notion of socio-cultural integration is structurally dependent on some stable definition of what this culture is.

The concept of 'the west' is then central to this particular characterization of socio-cultural integration. Dagevos (2001) argues that culture is operationalized as the process of *modernization* (p. 20). This is where the notion of 'the west' comes in, since 'the west' is rendered as the place in which modernity has enveloped. 'Modernity' is, then, cast as pivotal to what 'the west' is: it is described as "one of the most fundamental developments in Western society," having had a "deep" effect on individual "human life" and the collective "conceptions about that what is seen as valuable and appropriate [behaviour]" – all despite the fact that this 'worldview' is not endorsed to the same extent by every member (Ester, Halman & De Moor, 1993 in Dagevos, 2001, pp. 20-1). Modernity serves here as a particularly objective proxy – or even a metonym – for the culture (*a priori*) of the "surrounding" host society. It thus serves "as a *benchmark* for analysing the views of *allochtonen*". This suggest that modernity conceptualized here as particularly *objective* phenomenon, and therefore as a neutral notion to guide reflection on the integration of (non-western) 'Others'. The use of modernity as a technique to measure migrants' integration – in which modernity in effect becomes a proxy for the 'socio-cultural integration' of migrants – points to a practice which Schinkel (2013; 2017) calls 'moral monitoring'. This practice stems from the ambition to render visible the extent to which migrants are integrated socio-culturally into the Netherland and to render this group (of socio-culturally others) governable and regulable.

Dagevos (2001) seems to take note of the sensitive nature of this practice of measurement more generally, by saying that measuring cultural integration invokes aversion due to the suggestion that

'others' should be integrated into a particular cultural self' (p. 21) – which would imply ethnocentrism or a perceived sense of moral superiority, which are widely condemned. Dagevos (2001) counters this possibility of ethnocentrism through framing modernization as a sociological idealtype that

> serves as a *benchmark* for analysing the views of minorities and autochtonen. The process of modernization is perceived as an idealtype in the sociological meaning of the word, not a means of moral judgement. The reasoning is that certain norms, values and attitudes are related to the modernization of Western societies, central elements form the culture of these societies. This observation is the starting point of comparison (p. 21, emphasis added; i.e. Dagevos, *et al.* 2003, p. 323).

Though the ideal type is a deliberate simplification of reality and that it – in and of itself – does not have any moral connotations, it does have the effect of "selecting and accentuating certain elements" (Britannica, 2018). These particular idealtypes clearly accentuate the difference between societies in terms of their 'progression' along the teleological ladder of 'modernization'. The use of the term as a *benchmark* specifically cements the ideological nature of the term. As Hall (1992) has shown, 'the west' provides a criterium for evaluation which, due to its powerful associations ('west' = good, 'non-west' = bad), is associated with a hierarchy (p.186). In conclusion, this quote reflects a striking ignorance over the fact that the differentiation is not neutral.

The fact that the use of a benchmark is not problematized is strategically necessary given that the objective character surrounding the quantitative measurement of integration depends on it. As Schinkel (2017) has made clear, the "supposedly normative neutrality of the "yardstick" chosen can only be maintained because the *selection* of that "yardstick" is not problematized or even discussed." (p. 106). Given the function of the SCP, however, it is unsurprising that they took over this use of (western) modernity as a benchmark for the quantitative measurement of socio-cultural integration. This first happened in 2003 (Schinkel, 2017, p. 91). In the 2003 Report on Integration, SCP notes a version of the WRR's argument about modernity. This "hypothesis of cultural contrast" is formulated as follows:

> that the development of Western culture developed [sic] in this direction throughout a centuries-old process of modernization and that the norms and values of a large part of the population have been coloured [*gekleurd*, as in determined – SvB] by it to a significant extent. In other parts of the world, this process of modernization has only occurred to a lesser extent, and people think differently … (Dagevos *et al.* 2003, p. 9).

This provides an arbitrary list of what 'western culture' is (e.g. Graeber, 2007) and – consequently – of what 'non-western' other must become.

The 'Culturalist' Turn in the Immigrant Integration Imaginary

The turn of the century witnessed a shift in the framing of immigrant integration: from a focus on individual (neoliberal) socio-economic participation towards a focus on socio-cultural acculturation. New discourse problematized socio-cultural difference between (certain) migrants and the ('western') culture of the Netherlands.

This departed from the previous paradigm, which was built around the assumption that many immigrants were still in an "objective position of [socio-economic] deprivation" (WRR, 1989, p. 14, 62-3), and the principal objective of stimulating the socio-economic participation of immigrants (WRR, 1989, p. 20-22, 32, 38, 63). The report defined 'integration' as the "equal partaking [*deelname*] of immigrants in the most important societal sectors and institutions" like (national) media (WRR, 1989, p. 14; 51; 62-3). The paradigm also stressed – in true neoliberal fashion – the individual responsibility

of the migrant for his/her material partaking in society. With regard the socio-cultural difference, the need to honour the (legalized principle of) cultural diversity (p.10) and "defend" the means to intra-cultural "self-experience" and "transfer" (WRR, 1989, pp. 49-51), while refraining from all-too-direct involvement (WRR, 1989, p. 64). In the following years, VVD-leader Frits Bolkestein would ignite the first discussion about the (in)compatibility between Islam and 'western' culture and its effect on the process of integration – arguing socio-cultural differences were more pressing than material issues (especially in terms of their implications on social cohesion. This issue would not be high on the agenda until Fortuyn popularized the idea as author and politician (Entzinger, 2006, p. 5).

This shift has been termed the 'culturalization' of discourse (Mepschen, Duyvendak & Tonkens, 2010; Mepschen & Duyvendak, 2012; Slootman & Duyvendak, 2015; Duyvendak, Geschiere & Tonkens, 2016; van Meijl, 2019). The same shift has also been understood as 'New Realism' due to the rhetorical proclamation of 'realism' by proponents of this discourse (Prins, 2002; Prins & Saharso, 2010) and, by others, as a shift towards 'civic integrationism' (Joppke, 2007a, 2007b, 2008) or 'assimilationist' (Entzinger, 2006; Duyvendak & Scholten, 2011) given its focus on the forced acculturation of national values instead of the moral relativism and the institutionalization of cultural pluralism associated with the previous paradigm(s) (Entzinger, 2006; Duyvendak & Scholten, 2011; Scholten, 2011; Slootman & Duyvendak, 2015). The cultural values virulently defended by 'culturalists' were not simply conceived of as national, but civilizational – that is, effectively, 'western' (Brubaker, 2017). Consequently, the notion of 'the west' had also not played a role of importance within the debate on immigrant integration, which is illustrated by the fact that the 1989 WRR report mentions the term only 5 times. This shift hypothetically created opening for the notion of 'the west' to become more influential within thinking about integration, but the question remains to what extent 'culturalized' conceptions were taken over by state institutions.

Considering the gradual 'culturalization' of the integration debate during the 1990s and crystallization around the turn of the century – which is exactly the time that the means of categorization preferred by CBS morphed from the separation between 'rich' and 'poor' allochthones morphed into that between 'western' and 'non-western' migrants – it is safe to assume that CBS was affected by the increasing pronunciation and problematization of socio-cultural difference as a consequence of the culturalization. In a 2019 interview with one of the head researchers of CBS, Tanja Traag, noted that the problematization of cultural difference was a critical factor in choosing 'the west' and 'non-west' as benchmark for the categorization of migrants (Papaikonomou, 2019). Given that 'the west' and 'non-west' were the specific terms that CBS thought of to capture this problematic socio-cultural difference, it is reasonable to conclude that the culturalization of the immigrant integration discourse informed the decision of CBS to use these terms.

4. Exploring Conceptualizations of 'the west'

This section discusses the sub-question *how* was 'the west' rendered within integration practice? The chapter explores the various constructions of 'the west' emerging in CBS, WRR and SCP texts, in that order. It begins, however, with the work of Fortuyn and Scheffer, the most important proponents of this 'culturalist' discourse (Schapendonk, 2022). All constructions are integrally compared and evaluated in the discussion.

The Geo-Cultural Scripting of the 'Culturalist' Turn

The west's Muslim Other (Echoes of Huntington)

It has been pointed out by numerous authors before that Dutch 'culturalist' discourse and Fortuyn's in particular, strongly resonates with, or even copies Samuel Huntington's (1996) infamous Clash-thesis (Pels, 2004; Brubaker, 2017; Oudenampsen, 2018). In *Tegen de islamisering van onze cultuur*[25] (1997), Fortuyn argues that Islamic faith is an inherent "hindrance" (p. 39) or "obstacle" (p. 57, 72) to effective integration into Dutch society. Liberal variants were regarded "problematic" too (p. 108). Echoing the discourse of Huntington, Fortuyn (1997) argued that "these differences … are not only sharp and painful, but also unbridgeable." (p. 108). In other words, there is a "conflict between Western society and Islamic culture" (p. 45), which integration policy should take account of. This position uncovers specific assumption about the nature of culture: ones' culture is presumed to be largely determinative for his/her behaviour and the successfulness of his/her integration in particular. This implies an anthropological definition of 'the west' (Graeber, 2007, pp. 7-8).

Fortuyn's (1997) sense of incommensurability lies in the argument that 'Islam'[26] categorically disapproves the west's most basic norms, such as secularity (p. 36) and gender inequality (p. 70). "Even" secular Islamic nations like Egypt are argued to "have difficulties with parliamentary democracy, secular rule of law, freedom of expression, independent judiciary and press, the enforcement of human rights and intercourse with minorities." (p. 56). He suggests that wherever 'Islam' rules, "essential" values are "tread underfoot" (p. 39). The sense of danger is strengthened by posing Islamic fundamentalism as an indirect geopolitical threat. Islamist regimes of Sudan and Iran are argued to "export fundamentalism ideologically", initiating chaos through "Islamizing" the region – Egypt, Eritrea, Uganda and Kenia specifically – by militant means. (p. 35). He implicitly suggests that this process is visible in the Rushdie Affair and in Bosnia, which signifies that the geopolitical influence of political Islam stretches to the (elusive) frontiers of 'the west'.

Scheffer's analysis of this problem, in his 2000 article *het Multiculturele Drama* is more subtle or moderate. Even though 'the west' is not mentioned explicitly and the trope of the Clash is not referred to, Scheffer (2000) does argue that a set of social problems is caused largely by a supposed lack of cultural rapprochement between "culturally isolated" Muslims and others (see Geschiere, 2009, p. 136, 155). Noting that sharia prescribes legal consequences for apostasy (*afvalligheid*) that are (technically) incommensurable with Dutch law, he argues that Muslims' sense of norms is "at a remarkable distance" from the Dutch. In his 2007 book, he also frames this 'distance' as deep and important (p. 376). This insistence on culture is informed by the presumption that common points of reference (culture) inhibit

[25] All further references to Fortuyn in this thesis will refer to this book.
[26] Here, Fortuyn (1997) renders Islam as a singular, indivisible entity. Indeed, Fortuyn's discourse renders ambiguous realities are rendered as static entities; "undivided, indivisible, immutable" (Pels, 2004, p. 184, 205). The impression of centralized organization hardens the sense of threat (Oudenampsen, 2018, p. 167).

the power to bind together sociological entities (communities) and serve as a means to relieve the socio-economic problems of (non-western) *allochtonen.*

Fortuyn's Cultural 'west'

Consistently referring to 'the west' as a "Judeo-Christian Humanist culture", Fortuyn's description of 'the west' arises from its proposed dichotomous contrasting to "(fundamentalist) Islam" (pp. 7-8, p. 108). Through he also refers to 'the west', in some instances, as "the free" (p. 9, 10) and "developed" – as characterized by its "market economies, rule of law and parliamentary democracies." (p. 108) – Fortuyn (1997) work mainly stresses the moral character of 'western' societies.

Every core value of "our" identity gets its own chapter:

- Separation of Church and State (Chapter 2).

The separation of Church and State is judged to be "perhaps the most essential terrain in which the conflict between Western societies and Islamic culture asserts itself." (p. 45). To Fortuyn, this 'conflict' entails both a political-institutional difference between 'western' and 'Islamic' states and an individual normative difference in whether the principle is accepted or not.

- Gender Equality & Sexual Morality (Chapter 3).

Fortuyn renders the (completed) emancipation of women and homosexuals as an innate characteristic of Dutch or western culture. He argues that "women are today absolutely equal to men on a cultural and mental level." (pp. 68-9). Moreover, the emancipation of homosexuals is argued to have developed alongside the emancipation of women (p. 69), so that gender and sexual orientation are (now) conceived as "unrelated to one's performance in the public domain." (p. 70). Fortuyn juxtaposes the Dutch 'accomplishment' to the "completely subordinate" position of women in Islamic states generally (p. 70).

- Hierarchical-Authoritarian Family Structures (Chapter 4).

Fortuyn casts the hierarchical-authoritarian families of Muslim families as incommensurable with the egalitarian character of Dutch society. To Fortuyn, "it is impossible to think our culture and society without a certain degree of egalitarianism and independence of the child and juvenile". He calls the Dutch family a "household of negotiation" and juxtaposes it to hierarchical and patriarchal "households of command" of Muslim families, in which women are not permitted to the public domain (pp. 82-3). He argues that the 'foreigners' – that is, Turkish and Moroccan boys (p. 82) – are "unable to adapt" to this egalitarian society (p. 78, 82) and that the difference causes confusion and a range of social problems ranging from criminality to lacking socio-economic opportunities.

Two interesting observations about this list stress that the definition is a particularly incoherent one (Graeber, 2007). Firstly, (I) it is not explained how these ideals relate to one another and what is specifically 'western' about them, and (II) how it involves both political-institutional factors (chapter 2 and 4) and cultural norms/substances (3 and 4).

Scheffer's Liberal 'west'

In contrast to Fortuyn, who remains relatively close to Huntington in describing 'the west' as a particular civilization, Scheffer's definition of 'the west' is more universalist in nature. His work, most explicitly in *het Land van Aankomst* (2007) focuses on the 'mission of civility' (*beschavingsmissie*), an explicitly 'western' project of liberal universalism (pp. 305-7). Even though Scheffer rejects teleological readings

of history[27] built upon premise of 'the superiority of western civilization, stating that it is "of no use" to speak of hierarchy [*rangorde*] (p. 305). This passage can be interpreted as suggesting that certain ideas have the potential to be (truly) universal in having the potential to regard people of different cultures equally, as Cartesian subjects – these ideas are deemed 'western'. The suggestion that "universalism creates responsibility" (p. 308) proves that it is legitimate to stand for and protect the own non-culture and (even) to acculturate [sic] others into it.

Though Scheffer emphasizes that this 'mission' is not unambiguously positive – and should take account of the significant dark sides of its past, most importantly slavery (e.g. pp. 270-1) – he presumes that 'the west' has, at its core, a 'legitimate idea'. Scheffer refers to Buruma & Margalit (2002), who write: "the question, then, is how to protect the legitimate idea of the West, that is to say, the world's liberal democracies, against its enemies. And the West, in this sense, includes such fragile Asian democracies as Indonesia and the Philippines" (p. 145). Scheffer quotes British historian Garton Ash (2004) to connect this political project to a theory about 'the west'. Garton Ash argues that universalism emanates exclusively *in* one area 'the west' and is thus legitimately deemed a 'western' idea – even if 'western' identity is a socially constructed reality (Garton Ash, 2004, p. 7). If this 'western' concept spills out of this area, it ceases to be 'the west'. It changes into a "post-West":

> But can the term really be thus infinitely extended, with every state that becomes a liberal democracy, whatever its geography or history, immediately adopted as part of the West? Precisely if we do believe that the possibility and value of liberal democracy are not confined to one culture or region, isn't it better to accept that *the West*, in *going so far beyond its historic self*, also *ceases* in some important sense *to be the West*? (Garton Ash, 2004, p. 176, emphasis added).

This seems arbitrary: at what point did 'the west' go beyond its historic self – and why does 'the west' then cease to exist? Garton Ash's point seems to be that ideas must originate in a set place that is historically real ('the west') but that this idea applies to potentially everyone ('post-west'). The latter is inclusive, the former is not. In the notion of 'the post-west', the idea that liberal democracy has a natural habitat in 'the west' (Graeber, 2007) merges with the will to include 'non-western' others and to account for the 'fact' of 'westernization' or the spatial extension of 'western' ideas.

Fundamentalist Others and Non-Cultural Selves

Fortuyn (1997) argued that fundamentalism was the most characteristic property of Islam or "Islamic culture" generally (p. 7). It is a continuous thread throughout the work (pp. 11, 32-5, 37, 58, 70). Although Fortuyn concedes that Islam is not fundamentalist in its entirety (p. 36), he consistently frames diverging (historical) interpretations of the Qur'an as fundamentalist (p. 70). He defines fundamentalism as a type of political position which is fully determined by a societal or religious belief that is interpreted as an absolute value. It is "absolutist" in its strife to "eliminate" other cultural views from the public domain (p. 32) and "totalitarian" in the sense that the particular belief covers every aspect of life (p. 33). Moreover, seeing Islam as a "strongly experienced" culture (p. 7), Fortuyn implies that it is 'totalitarian' at an individual level: as religious belief seeps through everything, effectively determining one's opinion on every aspect of life (cf. p. 33). It seems that Fortuyn argues that some cultures ('fundamentalist' Islam) are just more foundational to individuals' political formation and collective ways of political organization than others – that is, 'the west'.

[27] Scheffer (2007) does use historical narrative to argue that "exactly because they [progressive Dutch values, author] are such recent inventions, they must be cherished against the repulsion of those who want to revert them." (p. 306).

This difference between 'fundamentalist' others and 'non-cultural' selves is crucial. It shines through at multiple levels, such as Fortuyn's distinction between 'western' "societies" and 'Islamic' "culture". While the notion of 'society' gestures towards the public sphere, which is theoretically a space of open intercourse between 'cultures' and, therefore, signifies an intrinsic value neutrality. This characterization of 'western' as neutral is visible in his note that "perhaps … the level of civilization" of a certain society is "most clearly visible in its intercourse with minorities" (p. 56). Elsewhere mentions how "mature" ("developed") societies 'leave room for diverging opinions' (p. 47). In contrast, the notion of 'culture' implies privately held, foundational and substantial ways of thinking. This implies that there is also an argument that 'the west' is inherently neutral as a non-culture, and therefore (intrinsically) tolerant towards others.

Though this description is an important sign of how Fortuyn evaluates the difference between 'west' an (Muslim) 'others', it is logically inconsistent with his 'list' of 'the west's' cultural substances. This is because it is suggested here that 'westernness' is located in procedures qua dealing with (migrant) 'otherness' instead of substantial ideas about how individuals' private life or society should be organized – which is "fundamentalist". The constant shifting between substantialist and procedural registers marks the incoherence of 'the west' (Graeber, 2007).

Scheffer maintains a similar distinction. For Scheffer (2000), 'the defence of an open society' is at stake, which means that there must be "set limits to plurality" in those instances where "tolerance must be defended against *gewetensdwang*" – signifying an 'religious coercion' as a political threat to 'civilized' tolerance. Furthermore, Scheffer suggests "an open society [the west, SvB] depends on the extent to which people can judge themselves critically" (p. 306) – which reiterates descriptions of 'the west' as a non-culture (Kolakowski, 1990). Despite his insistence that hierarchical visions on culture should be abandoned, Scheffer (2007) therefore seems to entertain a distinction between a 'traditional' and 'modern' society (Geschiere, 2009, p. 155; Oudenampsen, 2018, p. 346) – substantiated by the difference between the difference between parochial 'cultures' and the modern 'non-culture' in 'the west'.

Cultural Relativism as Weakness and Betrayal

Culturalists view 'cultural relativism' as the weakness or enemy inside. It is considered problematic in two ways. Firstly, 'cultural relativism' is argued to "weaken" "the own identity and [to] dismantle the core values of society." (Fortuyn, 1997, p. 42). Moreover, it is argued to hinder successful integration since it implies that no clear goal of (cultural) integration is formulated: a relativist society – that is, 'western societies' (p. 45) – are "decadent" and "indifferent" (pp. 45-6) and thereby "unable to deal with people who confront […] their own norms in an absolute sense" (p. 42) – which refers to the perceived need of 'western' culture to counterbalance its 'strong' (fundamentalist) 'Other'. Fortuyn suggests that fundamentalist represents the 'end of toleration' (p. 37). Here, self-definition and 'Othering' are treated as existential tasks: "the west has to […] show its strength, also in a cultural-mental sense, and show and feel that there are limits to what is acceptable to us." (p. 37).

This is also present in the work of Scheffer. In *de Multiculturele Samenleving* (2000) already, he argues that the *beschavingsmissie* has vanished due to "postmodern" philosophies of history in which every declaration of community is made "suspicious". Scheffer (2007) also speaks out against 'cultural relativism' and "(multicultural) aloofness (*afzijdigheid*)" and considers it incompatible with liberal universalism (pp. 305-6). He calls it the "moral vulnerability of an open society" (p. 414). "Universalism creates responsibility" (p. 308), he argues, framing liberal universalism as some sort of 'mission'. He also notes that "renouncing democratic impatience would be the *betrayal* of the Western tradition." (p. 307, emphasis added), casting relativism as an existential enemy of 'the west'.

The Chronopolitical Narrativization of 'western' Emancipation

Fortuyn (1997) renders 'the west' as 'Judeo-Christian-Humanist culture' (p.7) but does not explain how Judaism and Christianity relate to each other and to Humanism. This contradiction is also visible in Scheffer's work (2007), who suggests that in 'the west', secularity is a "secular religion" (p. 412).

The reference to the 'Judeo-Christian' culture points to the use of religion as a symbol for the 'self' which has often been considered a way to exclude the Muslim 'Other' from the western 'self'. Van der Hemel (2014) has shown how the link between Judaism and Christianity must be understood as a rhetorical mechanism to instrumentally forge a sense of kinship in opposition to a supposedly 'Other' – instead of a term that expresses any type of substantive anthropological affinity (van der Hemel, 2014, pp. 60-1; Brubaker, 2017, pp. 1200-2). One important observation in this regard is that the reference to religion also does not signify substantive Christianity – that is, explicit practices of worship at the state level in the present. Religious faith has been almost completely abandoned and can now be considered a "tacit leftover of the past" (Joppke, 2013, p. 598).

The reference to faith suggests a chronopolitical narrativization of 'western culture' (see Klinke, 2013). The tandem of 'Judeo-Christian-Humanism' suggests that secularism and political liberalism (associated with humanism, all evaluated as positive) are logical and natural corollaries from the 'west's' so-called 'Judeo-Christian past' (van der Hemel, 2014, p. 63). Joppke (2013) calls this "particular" or "triumphalist universalism" (p. 600, 610 respectively). This argument suggests that Judeo-Christianity is not a threat to the secular present because it *made* it. This 'neutralization' of Christianity is not only used as an argument to establishes Christianity's intrinsic superiority vis-à-vis other religions, but also implies a "very categorical and irremediable exclusion" of Islam (Joppke, 2013, p. 604). In effect, thus, this argument binds both phenomena together in one chronopolitical story of unilineal and teleological historical evolution, which totally exempts Islam[28] (Joppke, 2013; Oudenampsen, 2018).

The chrono-political construct stitches disparate elements – substantive Christianity in the past and the secular present – into one trans-historical or anti-historical entity. This is the paradox: certain norms are framed as unambiguously Dutch/western even though they are relatively recent phenomena. This last point is illustrated by Fortuyn's personal memoirs about a not-so-distant past characterized by lacking emancipation of homosexuals and static hierarchical and patriarchal family structures (pp. 77-8). Framing later resistance against the patriarchy (the father figures) as the "rearguard action of modern society" and arguing that the 'father's loss' as "*unavoidable*" (pp. 59-60, emphasis added) suggests that the ultimate realization of "western concepts" was always there *in potentio* (and only *there*), waiting to be realized (Graeber, 2007, p. 7). Such arguments are inevitably anti-historical.

Elsewhere, Fortuyn argues that the 'victories of feminism' have prompted an all-encompassing historical transformation, which "touched" and "changed" "every social class" (p. 68). He also literally argued that emancipation can be considered "completed" (p. 69). This narrative of history fits what Bertossi *et al*. (2021) call the schema of 'accomplished progress'. This is a narrative which is "predicated on acknowledging the nation's historical struggles" resulting in a self-congratulatory story, triumph over certain long-standing problems. This narrative, maybe paradoxically, also stresses a trans-historical continuity in the sense that it argues that a certain essence has only fully realized itself in the present (Bertossi et al. 2017, p. 4163). This also implies that the 'Other' of 'western' societies – that is, Islam – inhibits some sort of unwanted resetting-quality, which is visible too in Fortuyn's infamous quote "I refuse to start all over again with the emancipation of women and gays" (Fortuyn, 2002 in Mepschen, Duyvendak & Tonkens, 2010, pp. 965-8 and Brubaker, 2017, p. 1195).

[28] This is particularly visible where Fortuyn highlights that though the Netherlands may have been culturally diverse (*verzuild)*, groups still held "Dutch history as a collective object." (p. 55) This comment stresses the geo-historical 'alienness' of Islam in the Netherlands, constructing an opposition between 'natives' and 'aliens.'

The scheme of accomplished progress is closely related to O'Hagan's (2000) binaries. It is firstly an argument for the deterministic form of the civilizational history, since the scheme assumes that there is a linear progression to emancipation in 'the west' that has now finished. However, it is also an argument about the closed nature of 'western' civilization. Emancipation emanated from 'western history', framed spatially as a purely internal development (Graeber, 2007; Oudenampsen, 2018; Leigh, 2021). This development is still blocked by 'strong' cultures from the 'non-west'. This implies that people subscribing to such 'strong cultures' cannot belong to 'the west'.

Standardizing Definitions of the west & non-west (CBS)

In 2000, CBS introduced, defined and standardized a differentiation between 'western' and 'non-western' migrants (Keij, 2000; table 4). The official explanation for this categorization is the "difference in socio-economic and cultural position between western and non-western allochthones. If a group resembles the Dutch population in a socio-economic or cultural sense, it is counted as western allochthones." (Keij, 2000, p. 24). The CBS does not, however, explicate which socio-economic or cultural substances are precisely meant here. Moreover, using this standard operationalization, the CBS states that it is able to "distinguish the most important subjects" of Minorities Policy: "Turkish, Moroccan, Surinamese, Antilleans (including Arubans)." (Keij, 2000, p. 24). The focus on 'non-western' also implies that gypsies, caravan dwellers, and Moluccans – groups that were previously the target subject of the so-called Minority Policy – now "cease to exist as distinct subjects" since most of these people were born in the Netherlands and the former Dutch East Indies (Moluccans) (Keij, 2000, p. 25), which makes them 'western'.[29] This fact alone makes the taxonomic change a politically relevant, instead of a merely neutral change.

This operationalization of the CBS is pivotal since it has seeped through multiple institutions. However, not much is known about the rationale behind the introduction of the notion into the vocabulary, apart from the explicit concern with operationalizing the notion of 'allochthony' in order to clearly measuring the total amount of *allochtonen* in the Netherlands.[30] The obvious question that stems from this lack of justification is: why does this categorization make sense?

Western	**Non-western**
Europe (not Turkey)	Turkey
	Africa [Morocco]
North America	Latin America
Oceania	
Japan, Asian ex-Soviet Republics*	Asia
Indonesia (former Dutch East Indies)	[Suriname, Dutch Antilles/ Aruba]

Table 4: 'The west' as perceived through the gaze of Netherlands Statistics.
(Source: Yanow & van der Haar, 2011, p. 168, based upon Keij, 2000). Bracketed names are mentioned explicitly by Keij (2000).
*Added on the basis of the specifications (Bovens *et al.*, 2016, p. 23).

As is visible in table 4, CBS provides an overview of the countries that are considered 'western' or 'non-western'. Since CBS does not directly explain the logic behind the distinction – that is, why country X would 'resemble' the Netherlands in a socio-cultural and/or socio-economic sense –, the reader ought to induce it from the distinction itself. An important first observation is that the description of the 'non-west' is largely built upon continents: the report notes that "the non-western source countries are Turkey and all countries in Africa, Latin America and Asia (except for Japan and Indonesia)" (Keij, 2000, p. 24). This suggests that the distinction is topographically motivated, and would reflect the assumption that geography is, in one way or another, an accurate proxy for the notion of 'socio-cultural and socio-economic resemblance' to the Netherlands.

[29] Interestingly, 'Mediterranean' people – that is, Greek, Yugoslav, Portuguese and Spanish nationals – were also designated ethnic minorities in the former paradigm, but these groups. (WRR, 1979, p. vii, 94).
[30] I have had contact with the CBS to verify this statement.

However, the taxonomy does not seem to be topographically motivated since it is geographically inconsistent (Yanow & van der Haar, 2011; 2013; Yanow *et al.* 2016). The geographical inconsistency of the definition is exemplified by the fact that some, seemingly random Asian countries are cast as 'western' – which brings up the question what criteria makes these countries 'resemble' the Netherlands (Yanow & van der Haar, pp. 240-1). This is difficult to deduct. For example, a recent interview suggested that Japan's inclusion in 'the west' was informed by its OECD-membership (Papaikonomou, 2019), while Turkey ('non-western') is also a founding member of the OECD. The exclusion of Turkey from 'the west' is inconsistent considering the designation of other ethnically Turkic states (former-Soviet countries) like Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan as 'western'.[31] If GDP is a factor, then the inclusion of a country like Papua New-Guinea, and the exclusion of countries like South Korea and Qatar are contradictory. All these examples show that this definition of 'the west' is inconsistent, even arbitrary. The un-topographical nature of the distinction becomes apparent especially when comparing this classification to the regional one that used incidentally by the WRR in 1989 and was more strictly based upon the world's continents (table 4). The construction of continents also does not represent an objective enterprise, however (Lewis & Wigen, 1997).

The sheer lack of justification of why certain countries belong to 'the west' and 'non-west' suggests that the taxonomy is based upon an implicit, latent idea that 'western' and 'non-western' places and peoples are somehow innately and fundamentally different. There indeed was a "sense that the integration of Dutch people with a western migration background differed from the integration of Dutch people with a non-western migration background." (Papaikonomou, 2019; see also Groenendijk, 2007). If this logic is extended, it becomes clear that 'non-western' countries are simply those countries from which the people were assumed to be difficult to integrate into the Netherlands. This is the logic behind latent Occidentalism.



Figure 3: Map of the CBS Operationalization of 'west' and 'non-west' (Own work).
*French overseas areas (most notably French Guyana) are marked as unknown/contradictory since these areas are outside of 'Europe' topographically, though its citizens are regarded as French nationals in the EU. The same does not apply to British overseas areas.[32]

[31] This observation also marks the idea that the distinction is not consistently ethnic.
[32] These are the paradoxes of 'Europe otherwise' (Boatcă, 2021).

Even though the operationalization is far from topographically 'logical', the mapping of 'the west' and 'non-west' does suggest this – as it very clearly communicates that 'the west' is firmly grounded within a set of nation-states (figure 3). CBS uses the "misplaced geographic certainty" (Bueno Lacy & van Houtum, 2015, p. 487) surrounding the term to hide the conceptual incoherence of its definition. Since the notions of 'socio-cultural and -economic resemblance' are not operationalized and therefore conceptually fragile (cf. Bovens *et al.* 2021, p. 11), geography in effect becomes a reductive placeholder for this notion of 'resemblance' – as if the complex concept of socio-economic and socio-cultural resemblance could be thought in a binary fashion. Whereas in the distinction between OECD and non-OECD, the concrete institutions of the OECD provided stability – and therefore, objectivity – to the system of classification, the 'West Pole Fallacy' fulfils that role here.

Another distortion is that the strict distinction between 'western' and 'non-western' countries, the 'hard' spatial b/order between the two entities, emphasizes socio-cultural and -economic differences between 'westerners' and 'non-westerners' and obscures or denies every other axis of difference. The notion of 'socio-cultural and socio-economic resemblance' is artificially operationalized in binary terms: either one 'resembles' the Netherlands fully (1), or not (0), meaning that *allochtonen* are either fully 'western' – which implies that there are no obstacles to their integration whatsoever – or fully 'non-western' – which implies a full range of obstacles to successful integration. This "an act of purification" represents a grave reductionist essentialization of these identities (van Houtum & van Naerssen, 2001, p. 126). Though other 'western' nations might be different from the Dutch, the 'real' difference – the marked one, the one that informs the entire system – is that between 'the west' and 'non-west'.

The effect of this discourse is that 'the west' is construed as "normality" or the unmarked category, whereas the 'non-west' is, by being seen as 'un-resembling, rendered as "exceptional" and marked for it (Van der Haar & Yanow, 2011, p. 169)*,* Similarly, Groenendijk (2007) argues that the taxonomy is based mainly upon "the circumstance that one category is viewed as problematic, and the other is not" (Groenendijk, 2007, p. 104). As is often the case with separations between 'the west' and its 'other:' the distinction suggests a hierarchical ranking instead of an egalitarian juxtaposition of the two categories (Hall, 1992; Coronil, 1995, de Sousa Santos, 2007, see also Bovens *et al*. 2016, p. 14). The hierarchy implied in the difference is extra problematic since the nationality of the *allochtoon* decides how this person is categorized. Nationality is wrongly assumed to be an effective proxy for the individuals' 'problematic-ness' – which marks the fact that individuals are indeed discriminated on the basis of their nationality.

A last important observation is that the definition has a temporal element. The operationalization extends until the second generation so that children to direct migrants, people born in the Netherlands, are rendered as 'non-western'. This is a nativist practice (Balkenhol, Mepschen & Duyvendak, 2016; Kešić & Duyvendak, 2019) since the person (parent) carriers 'his' culture towards another place, and instills its otherness – basically automatically – into their child(ren). Here, culture is perceived in this 'anthropological' way, as a habitus (Graeber, 2007). When tied with the 'sedentarist bias,' the 'west' and 'non-west' become inherently soil-bound cultures to which people belong or not – by means of their birth, of being simply a (first or second generation) *allochtoon.* People become timeless carriers or representatives of 'western' or 'non-western' cultures, which are all soil-bound. This idea shows that the socio-economic and -cultural traits associated with 'westernness' are assumed to unambiguously reside in one, clearly demarcated space only – that these phenomena are not really spatially transposable. In terms of the contradiction between conceptual openness and closure (O'Hagan, 2002), the CBS notions of 'the west' and 'non-west' is thus rather static and closed-off.

Problematizing 'non-western' Immigration (WRR)

The 2001 WRR report *The Netherlands as Immigration Society*[33] is the first one to explicitly argue that 'non-western' migrants ought to become that 'non-western' migration specifically an object of (political) concern. The report mentions the notion of 'west' around 81 times.[34] The report notes that the "migration debate and the resulting policy efforts do not draw attention to persons/groups from the 'rich West'" (p. 17). The focus on the 'non-western' other is a thread throughout the publication. The definition of 'the West' is fleshed out in distinction from it.

The report notes the following reasons for its problematization of 'non-western' migration, which reveals parts of the logic behind this choice:

- "The 'experience' that the size of non-Western migration is (nearly) unpredictable and uncontrollable – determined more by exogeneous factors than active Dutch policy." (p. 18). This uncontrollable character marks its problematic-ness to governmentality, the logic through which the state attempts to render regulable ("controllable") its subjects.
- "The 'experience' that in the last twenty years, in comparison to before, there are hardly well-defined groups, in terms of cultural background, place of origin and education, anymore." (p. 18) This characteristic is also related to governmentality, in the sense that this logic compartmentalizes its population into neat containers – depending on the purpose – as a means to render them calculable and regulable.[35]
- "The rise of cultural diversity and the heterogenization of migration trajectories." (p. 18, 137) The logic behind this characteristic is equal to #2
- The 'expectation' that for (non-Western) migrants "the chance of deprivation, exclusion (segregation), deprivation and the propensity of conflict is the highest" (p. 18; 20; see also p. 22). This statement points relates to the aforementioned focus on, and problematization of, socio-cultural integration. Socio-cultural *difference* is assumed to have a significant negative effect upon socio-economic participation.
- The 'expectation' that these (non-Western) migrants' appeal to the services of the welfare state is disproportionately large due to insufficient education, language skills and (working) experience (p. 18). The logic behind this point is equal to #4.

The use of the term 'expectation' is interesting here: on what basis does the WRR expect such results? (there was no data about 'non-westerners' at that point). If these 'expectations' are not based upon data, they can only be based upon subjective perceptions of what 'the non-west' is. This observation neatly fits Groenendijk's (2007) observation that the results of subsequent research are already present in the very differentiation between 'non-western' and 'western' migrant.

Despite being formulated as 'expectations' and 'experiences,' this list thus effectively functions as a set of (objective) traits of 'non-western migrants.' The latter two elements or "expectations" are most significant in this regard, since it associates 'non-western migrants' with a concrete set of social issues: poverty, unemployment segregation and even "conflict". The list above thus firmly establishes that the specific figure of the 'non-western migrant' is conceived as the 'problematic,' unwanted migrant

[33] Throughout this paragraph, every reference, unless explicitly stated, is to this 2001 WRR report.
[34] Estimations on the basis of searching for "Weste". Compare this to the 1989 WRR report, in which it was mentioned 5 times, or Dagevos' 2001 report, in which it is mentioned 6 times.
[35] This is despite the fact that WRR (2001) accepts diversity or multiculturalism (and transnational communities) as a factual given and does not problematize this as such: it only "casts doubt over the expectation that 'they' become like 'us' (pp. 21-2).

– implying that 'western' migration is seen as 'wanted' or 'normal.' This discourse is used to justify why the 'non-western migrant' is seen as the subject of this (revised) integration policy.

Besides establishing that the 'non-western migrant' ought to become the object of concern, the report also re-establishes the difference between 'western' and 'non-western' countries and people. "Non-western countries" are described as "economically" and "socio-culturally" "fairly distant" [*ver verwijderd*]" (p. 17, 20, 23) from "the west" or "prevailing western norms and values" (p. 20, 23). This 'distance' is suggested to be inherent to the migration process (p. 20) but is perceived simultaneously as a significant obstacle[36] to the process of integration in itself, something which is argued to be irrespective of the particular policy design of the host society (p. 22). This is in contrast to immigration 'from the European Union and other western countries', who are argued to be "hardly the subject of discussion" since they are supposedly not dependent on governmental welfare policies (p. 17). All these descriptions also function to normalize 'western' culture while abnormalizing and problematizing the presence of 'non-western' culture.

Two specific characteristics of the distinction need to be analysed because these can be tied to particular functions. Firstly, the spatial character of the distinction, which firmly naturalizes the distinction. The spatial character of the distinction is clearly visible: the CBS already seemed to use space (schemes of countries) to substantiate an empty definition. In the WRR report, the spatial character is visible through the use of the *spatial* metaphor of 'distance' which is used to signify socio-cultural difference. Schinkel (2017) argues that "the spatial character of the metaphor of an "outside society" rhetorically strengthens the plausibility of the implied opposition" (p.107). Though Schinkel refers to the opposition between migrant and national society, here, it equally applies to the figure of the 'non-western' *allochtoon* and (quite simply) 'the rest'.

Once again, the distinction is never explicitly motivated, which (again) lays bare its character as a naturalized one. The natural, taken-for-granted character of 'the West' as an empirically existing *space,* legitimizes its application as a means to distinguish 'problematic' from 'non-problematic' migrants. The spatial character of the conception is therefore quite important here. Space has the effect of providing a false sense of certainty to something ('the west') that is actually free-floating and fairly unspecified – as is the definition of 'socio-cultural' and 'socio-economical resemblance'. In this sense, space literally provides a *ground,* a foundation, for the seemingly unfounded (latent) sense of difference. The reference to national states, which are often regarded as solid and unquestioned entities (Agnew, 1994) strengthens this *grounding* of difference (my emphasis). Indeed, this is a primary function of imaginary geography: it allows the user to adopt a gaze as an 'objective' 'view from nowhere,' which allows the user to act upon the world (Gregory, 2004, p. 203).

Secondly, the 'west' and 'non-west' are argued to reside both at the collective and the individual level. In other words, non/western cultures are not only the definitive characteristic of larger collectives (geo-cultural aggregates of countries), but they are also found within the individual, to whom these non/western cultures are equally foundational and definitive. This definitiveness is visible in the fact that *allochtonen* are labelled 'non-western' even if they are themselves not born in a 'non-western' country – formally up until 2nd generation (Keij, 2000). This fact leads to a range of further questions: at what point does a 'non-western' migrant become 'western', and how? What is the relative importance (individual) upbringing versus schooling in this regard?[37] Graeber's (2007) distinction between culture as an intellectual tradition and as an (embedded) folk-understanding is relevant in this regard, as is does

[36] For example, this distance is argued to "increase the risk of stubborn segregation, deprivation […] and bad (hopeless) jobs." (p. 20)

[37] The WRR report casually notes that there are international differences in terms of the socialisation of people – noting schooling and individual upbringing as relevant factors (p. 137). However, does this mean that youngsters are socialized to become unambiguously 'western' or 'non-western'. Such reflections shine light on how the WRR (2001) conceives of the one-sided link between the collective and individual.

not become clear how 'the west' must be understood. It is problematic that these questions remain unaddressed, as they are left open to the interpretation of the user – as if they are straight-forward things.

The paradoxical framing of viewing certain cultural signifiers as simultaneously individual and collective has a strategic advantage. It implies that social problems can be attributed to both specific individual behaviour *and* collectively held values that may be argued to be (primordially) incompatible to the 'self' (Schinkel, 2013, p. 1154, original emphasis). The individualist character of the definition makes it possible for government institutions to generally measure the (individual) extent of socio-cultural integration, an intrinsic part of moral monitoring. As such, this double framing is instrumental to the exercise of governmentality.

The Unambiguous Modernity of 'the west' (WRR & SCP)

The most important 'trait' of 'the west' and 'non-west' are their modern and unmodern character. 'Non-western' (marked) migrants are distinguished on the basis of their presumed dismissal of 'modern' values and their socio-cultural integration is measured through surveying/evaluating the extent to which migrants subscribe to the preconceived set of presumably 'modern' values. The question is how 'modernity' and the modernization process are conceptualized and what practical effects this has.

The 'west' is understood as a 'modernized' entity. This means that 'western' societies (like the Netherlands) are perceived as the culmination of modernization process – a notion that is conceptualized in classical sociological terms, as the linear transition from an agrarian society to an industrial and post-industrial society, which is accompanied by institutional transitions "in the direction of a modern, rational-bureaucratic, urbanized, secularized and individualized democratic nation-state" (Dagevos, 2001, p. 20 in WRR, 2001, p. 138). This process is suggested to be universal – that is, not culturally specific – process as it is projected upon a range of ethnic minorities (WRR, 2001, pp. 138-9). This socio-historical 'phase' of 'modernity' is argued to be "tightly connected" to a specific pattern of norms and values (WRR, 2001, p. 138), which is mainly due to the weakening role of religious prescriptions and group ties within (post) industrial societies (Dagevos, 2001, pp. 20-1).

The norms most closely associated with ('western') modernity are social and gender equality, the autonomy of young people, secularization and the democratization of power relations (Dagevos, 2001 in WRR, 2001, p. 138), along with individual emancipation (*ontplooiing*), which was added later (Dagevos *et al.* 2003, p. 9). Of all 'modern' conceptions, individualization, secularization and gender relations seem like the most pressing issues (Dagevos, 2001, p. 175). Besides these more formal characteristics, Dagevos (2001) suggests that 'modernization' is also informally associated with demographical phenomena, such as norms surrounding common types of relationship – contrast marriage to living together – the average number of children per family and the age at which (women) choose to give birth (Dagevos, 2001, pp. 46-50). Taken together, this is quite an arbitrary list of values (Graeber, 2007), whose specific connections to modernity as a socio-historical phenomenon remain unsubstantiated. Although it is suggested that 'modernity' is no absolute,[38] the notion *is* in effect treated as such in the sense that modernity is conceptualized as an internally coherent and consistent benchmark that is applied specifically to measure the integration of the non-western *allochtoon.*

It is furthermore suggested that 'modern' values were cemented in 'the west' through the gradual dismissal of "group prescriptions" (*voorschriften*) and incremental liberation of the individual

[38] Dagevos (2001) concurs that indicators of socio-cultural integration are unclear given the variation or heterogeneity (p. 138) so that something like *the* 'Dutch norm' does not exist (WRR, 2010, p. 20). Similarly, the SCP (2003) notes that 'western' values are not universally subscribed to within the 'western cultural sphere'. "At most, one can observe that Western culture … grew in this direction and that this process coloured, to a large extent, the norms and values of a large part of the population" (p. 9).

over the course of modernization (Dagevos *et al.* 2003, p. 323). This implies that other, 'un-modern' 'non-western' cultures group prescriptions indeed did and still do 'curtail' the individual. In this way, 'modernity' is understood as a culture that 'guides' individual autonomy instead of 'restricting' it – as such, it is essentially understood as a 'non-culture'. This difference seems to be the key difference between that 'western modernity,' which rendered positively, and 'non-western cultures. This is accurately summarized by Schinkel (2017), who argues that 'the west' is

> apart from "culture" in the plural, which determines action so to speak from the outside and thereby restricts autonomy, either by religion or by tradition […] Such normativity is neutralized and naturalized as not simply the next primordial particularism of regional proportions, but as "liberal" or "Enlightened," as the unconstrained historical appearance of reason itself, which seems to have stage fright in other global regions. (pp. 167-8).

Schinkel's reference to "the unconstrained historical appearance of reason" is reminding of the classical Occidentalism in Hegel's work, in which 'the west' is the absolute embodiment of the spirit of History (Coronil, 1995). This evaluation of 'modernity' as positive is related to it being seen as something forward (in a temporal sense). The 'non-west' thus stands for the incompleteness or the absence of 'modernization' – non-western countries are argued to lack behind the process. There is a clearly visible denial of coevalness, which suggests a hierarchical ordering on a pseudo-historical basis (Fabian, 1984; Agnew, 1996).

Moreover, this chronopolitical argument is important for the 'openness' of the term (O'Hagan, 2002). Of course, non-westerners can in principle integrate into the Netherlands and its 'western' values – that is a basic premise. However, the label of 'non-western' that is put on the *allochtoon* individual – *at least* until the 2nd generation – carries with it the presumption that the individual does, by means of its parents' nationality, not subscribe to certain positive 'modern' norms which are argued to be 'at home' in 'the modern west' only. The label of the 'westerner' is thus not as open or incorporative.

Listing, Surveying & Quantifying 'westernness' (SCP)

The conceptualization of modernity leads to the practical use of this notion as a benchmark for the 'moral monitoring' of integration (Schinkel, 2017). In the WRR's report (2001), modernity is essentially boiled down to a list (see table 5) of certain cultural norms: (1) equal relations between sexes; (2) individuality and (3) secularity or, perhaps, individual non-religiosity – which is itself effectively operationalized as (individual) non-religiosity (Schinkel, 2017, p. 97; e.g. Dagevos, 2001, p. 26). The SCP (2003) report subtly rephrases the latter two values, referring to them as the 'autonomy of children' (#2) and 'religious liberalism' (#3) (pp. 324-5, table 5). These lists of values are used by SCP within survey (among certain groups of non-western *allochtonen*) to quantitatively measure and map their socio-cultural character.

This application assumes that the meaning of 'modernity' is operationalizable as a clear set of attitudes that could function as a valid mechanism to distinguish non-integrated subjects from integrated ones. However, the subtle renaming – as this list of values trickled down from WRR to SCP – implies, paradoxically, that the operationalization of modernity is no straight-forward task, but an unstable and arbitrary exercise. In a quote that resonates with the work of Graeber (2007), Schinkel (2013) opposes the idea that such a task would be straight-forward and argues that this sort of use of the notion of modernity involves the reduction or fetishization of 'modernity' "as a specific socio-historical phase of western societies at large", to 'modern' attitudes or practice (p. 1153). This also brings the work of Coronil (1995) into mind that modernity often becomes fetishized, as "parts replace wholes" (p. 79). In other terms, this practice of boiling 'modernity' down embodies a powerful fetishization of modernity,

in which individual parts (a set of propositions) is taken to embody the entire (collective) *modernization* process – as a socio-historical phase assumed to be universal.

Moreover, this fetishization of modernity involves one extra step, in which these norms that are signified as 'modern' are translated to a limited set (4 to 10) of propositions. In the results and analysis of this data, these propositions are ordered per category or sub-dimension of modernity. The respondents have to answer to these very propositions – on the basis of a Likert scale, mostly 1-5 (but 1-6 in Dagevos, 2001). These answers together are then taken to be indicative of the extent to which respondents are 'modern' which, as mentioned before, functions as a proxy (benchmark) for the extent to which certain *allochtonen* are 'socio-culturally integrated' into Dutch society (table 6).

Operationalizing non-Modernity (for measuring socio-cultural integration)			
(Dagevos, 2001, pp. 22-3).		(Dagevos *et al.* 2003, pp. 324-5).	
Sex Relations	Men earn the money	**Sex Relations**	
	Women take care of the children		
	Women cook the food		
	Men handle finance		
	Men decide on sizable purchases		Decisions on sizable purchases are best taken by men
	Women are responsible for the household		Women better have the responsibility over the household
	Men are responsible for finance		Men better have the responsibility over finance
	Education is more important for boys than for girls		Education is more important for boys than for girls
	It is more important for boys than for girls to have income		It is more important for boys than for girls to have income
	Women stop working after giving birth		
	Women stay at home when the child is sick		
Individua-lization	Child (17y.) may not choose to quit school itself	**Children's Autonomy**	Children best stay home until marriage
	Child (17y.) may not choose how to spend earned money		If parents are old, they can live with their children
	Daughter (17y.) is allowed to live independently		Parents should take in children when they ask
	Son (17y.) is allowed to live independently		Older family should have more influence on other decisions (e.g. relocation)
			One should respect parents, even if their attitude or behaviour does not assert it*

Secular-ization	It is annoying when a daughter wants to marry someone of another faith	**Religious Liberalism**	It is annoying when a daughter wants to marry someone of another faith
	It is annoying when a son wants to marry someone of another faith		It is annoying when a son wants to marry someone of another faith
	Children should go to schools corresponding to parents' faith		Children should go to schools corresponding to parents' faith
			If someone does not have long to live, s/he may themselves decide to end his/her life*
			It is unfortunate that religion is becoming less important in Dutch day-to-day life*
			I go to Church often
Other	One should respect elders, even if their attitude or behaviour does not assert it	-	
	In the Netherlands, people may themselves decide to end their life		
	It is unfortunate that religion is becoming less important in Dutch day-to-day life		
	In the Netherlands, men and women engage too freely		
	In the Netherlands, people are too open about questions concerning sexuality		

Table 5: Propositions by which the 'modernity' of respondents is measured 9 (original formulations).
*Operationalized, possibly in another form, as 'other' in previous reporting.
**In most cases, the agreement with the statement is operationalized as 'non-westernness'. The colour orange represents the cases where agreement signifies 'westernness'.

This leads to figures such as the following (figure 9). Here, Turkish and Moroccan communities are conceived as having "low" modernity with a score of 3,3 or 3,4 (out of 6). Surinamese and Antillean communities are conceived as having "middle" or "medium" modernity with a score of 4,2 or 4,3 Interestingly enough, these Antillean "*allochtonen*" are indeed citizens of the Kingdom of the Netherlands and, as such, holders of a Dutch passport. 'Autochthonous' communities score a 4,8. In effect, this means that all 'non-western' 'others' that are surveyed are all *less* modern that the Dutch ('the west'). Figures like these firmly and unambiguously 'prove' – via quantitative measurement – the 'unmodern' character of the 'non-Western' people and, therefore, also *reify* the distinction between these two entities. In effect, as Schinkel (2017) notes, "the very ranking of such groups on a scale derived from a supposed status" means that "*all* other groups are put in one uniform category" (Dagevos *et al.* 2003, p. 200 in Schinkel, 2017, p. 99). It is this status of being different, that makes them a subject of monitoring and regulation.

More than that, however, is that this ranking signifies that to be modern, to be 'western', is the implicit but clear end goal or the (cultural) integration process.

	Turkish	**Moroccan**	**Surinamese**	**Antillean**	***Autochtonen***
Average score	3,4	3,3	4,2	4,3	4,8
%					
1 not modern	4	6	0	0	0
2	29	29	6	5	2
3	46	45	32	31	16
4	18	18	48	43	37
5	3	3	13	19	39
6 very modern	0	0	1	2	7

Table 6: Cultural Integration per Ethnic Group (Dagevos, 2001, p. 24).

5. Understanding Implications of 'the west'

This section analyses the third sub-question, *how were ideas of the west performatively used in integration practices?* It focuses on the collective implications of the enactment of 'the west' by state institutions discussed in this thesis, especially SCP, since this institution has been most directly involved in the monitoring and gathering of (statistical) information about 'non-western' populations.

Performativity: Filling in Problematic Categories

The empty signifier of the 'non-west' – the weird category of the 'non-self' – is engineered to mark the problematic 'Other'. This designation has multiple consequences. The introduction of the category of 'non-western' migrant within statistical research implies that this category will become the subject of future research. This research is important in the sense that 'the non-west' is in the CBS' conception (still) rendered as a relatively 'empty' term that is not actively 'filled,' described or understood, too much. As mentioned before, the 'non-west' is both vaguely and negatively defined by the CBS. Negatively, because the 'non-west' is literally defined by its supposed *lack* of certain traits (its non-traits) – specifically, its lack of resemblance to the Netherlands, and vaguely, because it is based upon a series of unspecified (non-)traits which are labelled 'socio-cultural' and 'socio-economic'. This invites further explanation and 'filling in' of this subject group.

After its introduction as the standard way to order demographical data (Keij, 2000), the research-policy nexus began to gather (calculable) data about this figure of the 'non-western' *allochtoon.* Consequently, it began to appear consistently within the annual reporting of SCP (2003-2009).[39] This can be interpreted as a deliberate attempt to *fill in* this empty container of 'the non-west', which ultimately had the effect of reifying and normalizing this notion and its counterpart ('the western' self). The SCP's yearly reports on integration have since 2003 consistently focused on the position of 'non-western' migrants and their offspring in particular (e.g. Gijsberts & Dagevos, 2009, p. 1). Out of this research, a very specific and concrete image arose. As the "raw data" behind this image, remains, this image might outlive the formal categorization of people in terms of their 'western' and 'non-western' heritage (Geerdink, 2022). Consider these subchapters – and their conclusions – from the introduction to the SCP's 2009 yearly report (Gijsberts & Dagevos, 2009):

- *Demography*. Even though it is noted that the rise in immigration is "*mainly* due to western migrants", only the size and composition of the non-western migrant population is noted (1,8 million people, 11% of the population). The number of children (compared to autochthonous populations), mixed marriages and dual nationalities are also discussed only for the non-Western migrant population (pp. 5-6, emphasis added).
- *Inburgering* (Civic integration). This chapter evaluates civic integration policy.
- *Education.* This chapter notes differences – for example, children with Chinese and Iranian backgrounds are noted to generally perform better than autochthonous children. Still, it notes that "despite the rise, the level of education of non-western amply lacks behind that of autochthonous Dutch" (p. 8).
- *Unemployment, Welfare and Labour*. This part notes the sensitivity of non-western migrants, even though their "welfare dependency" (*uitkeringsafhankelijkheid*) is observed to be decreasing. It remains high, however, among "refugee populations" – that is, Somali, Afghan and Iraqi-Dutch residents (p. 9).

[39] The yearly reports on integration were later published by CBS.

- *Housing and Neighbourhoods.* It notes the broad trend of segregation, the rise of non-western majority "concentration neighbourhoods" (*concentratiewijken*) and the "colouring" (*verkleuring*) of "mixed neighbourhoods" which – though attractive – are characterized by "poverty, nuisance and abandonment" (p. 10).
- *Safety and Criminality.* It concludes that "non-western migrants are still registered as suspects significantly more often than autochthonous Dutch." (p. 11)
- *Socio-cultural Position*. Proves the 'un-modernity' of 'non-western' immigrants.
- *The Living Conditions of Children and Youth with a non-western background*. Notes poorer health conditions (e.g. overweight) and problematic external behaviour (e.g. aggression) of non-western youth (pp. 14-5).
- *The Position of Women and Girls.* Notes a positive raise in participation, but also the "slowness" of economic independence (pp. 15-6).

Out of this summary, a concrete image arises of the 'non-western' other: un-modern, under-performing, poor and dependent on welfare, criminal, unhealthy, aggressive, etc. In this way, 'non-west' – which was initially defined through the absence of certain unspecified traits of resemblance – became 'filled' with information. This information, in turn, supported the assertion that these 'non-western' others are inherently 'other' and problematic (which one comes first?). Generally, this biggest problem associated with the 'non-western' population is their lack of integration into the country (van der Haar & Yanow, 2011, p. 172). The category of 'non-western' migrants performatively creates what it claims to represent: a group of problematic migrants which is subjected to an (ever-increasing) range of (integration) policies.

The relevance of this data about 'non-western' *allochtonen* and its performative qualities is not to be understated. Bovens *et al.* (2021) discuss the distinctions of the SCP/CBS are used in "numerous research and policies. Especially the ministries of SZW [Social Affairs & Enployment], VWS [Health, Welfare and Sport], BZK [Interior and Kingdom Relations], OCW [Education, Culture and Science] and J&V [Justice and Security] use the distinction in policy notes to describe inequality and deficits in labour market, health care, housing, education and security." (p. 4). It has also been used in the work of the Research and Documentation Centre (WODC), which publishes yearly 'maps' on Dutch migration (e.g. Jennissen, 2011).

Even though SCP attempted to develop a finer taxonomy, which would "distinguish" between "the four biggest origin groups," – that is, Turkish, Moroccan, Surinamese, Antillean – "refugee groups" – that is, Iranian, Iraqi, Somalian, Afghan nationals – and "individuals of Chinese heritage", practicalities make such an incursion impossible. In the Gijsberts & Dagevos' (2009) terms, "the available data does not always allow for a fine-grained distinction" (p. 18). We are thus 'left' with the notion of 'the non-west' and its tendency to essentialize social reality by putting things in the oversimplifying and reductive boxes of 'west' and 'non-west'. It is specifically reductive in two ways. Firstly, it often gives a fairly limited insight into the integration dynamic, as it neglects possible social issues among 'western' *allochtoon.* This is even argued by the SCP itself. For example, in the 2009 report, it is noted how the lack of information about the integration of migrants from Central and Eastern Europe (especially Poland) – which are indeed coded as 'western' and thus as less problematic – was "partly due to the emphasis on [particular] trends selected by us" (Gijsberts & Dagevos, 2003, p. 17).[40]

[40] Gijsberts & Dagevos (2009) note that concepts like '*allochtonen*' are/were "met with criticism" for their stigmatising connotation: "It is thus well-conceivable that the term 'non-western migrants' will be questioned." (p. 18). However, they do not push this further and, thus, does not take responsibility for possibly problematic connotations of the term.

Secondly, it is by no means self-evident that these "facts" or attributes are attached to a 'non-western' other. Of course, these 'problems' mentioned by SCP are researched and mentioned primarily to address and improve the material situation of this 'non-western' migrant group. This is however beside the point. The framing of statistical data in terms of 'the west' and 'non-west' is *premised upon*, and also *results in*, the constant reification of problematic, over-fixated categories which were premised upon the presumed problematic character of one of the two groups in the first place (Groenendijk, 2007; Papaikonomou, 2019). This is a type of thinking that lies deep in our thinking about the world (de Sousa Santos, 2007) and 'the west' in particular (Hall, 1992; Coronil, 1995).

At the other site of the spectrum, 'the west' becomes associated with the 'normal.' The discourse of the CBS establishes that 'the west' – that which is assumed to 'resemble' 'us' – is not the subject of integration policy. The distinction informs an invisible process whereby the "unmarked" set of resemblance traits is normalised (van der Haar & Yanow, 2011, p. 170). Taken together, the distinction exaggerates differences (Bovens *et al.* 2016). Given that the reader does not know on what specific level the 'other' does not 'resemble' the Netherlands, the distinction seems like a very foundational and general one. As such, it reinforces the latent sense of socio-spatial difference that (re)produces 'the west' as a category. This 'otherness' is politically problematic because it provides a sense of 'otherness' that might overshadow the socio-juridical status of the individual migrants (Bovens *et al*. 2016, pp. 52-3). As such, it provides a firm basis for discriminatory measures.

The Neutralization and Direction of Integration

The notion of 'the west' is used in a (strategical) attempt to neutralize particular integration practices. This attempt both builds upon and, in the process, perpetuates the 'West Pole Fallacy'.

The notion of 'the west' was used to devise a *neutral* standard for the (socio-cultural) integration of migrants. The reference to 'the west' attempts to neutralize in two ways. Firstly, to argue that 'the west' – or actually, modernity – is "set apart from "culture" in the plural", to borrow Schinkel's words (2017, p. 167), is to suggest that 'assimilation' into 'modernity' cannot legitimately be called 'assimilation', even though this would still amount to the adoption of a cultural substance that one is obliged to adopt as a prerequisite to joining 'society'. As such, this particular conceptualization of 'the west' and modernity presents a way to legitimize (forcible) acculturation or 'assimilation' into this culture. Secondly, because 'the west' is larger than the Netherlands, it is assumed that the application of 'western' modernity as a benchmark represents something qualitatively different than the (hypothetical) application of some particularistic idea of the national culture. This move also pre-emptively clears the SCP from any possible allegations of national chauvinism. In Schinkel's (2017) terms, the government attempts to "de-particularize" the dominant culture "through allusions to western-ness" by leaning upon the universalist connotations of 'the west' (p. 167). Taken these two issues together, the notion 'western modernity' has been used to neutralize a certain integration policy in which acculturation became more important.

Specifically, the separation between 'west' and 'non-west' has informed conditional belonging (De Waal, 2020). This notion refers to the situation in which the entitlement to citizenship is, for people with certain integration backgrounds, dependent upon certain competences, characteristics and efforts (Goodman, 2010; De Waal, 2020, pp. 239-40). It suggests a separation between 'natural possessors' and 'conditional earners' of citizenship status, whereby the former is assumed to have "cultural and historical access to citizenship and the (supposedly) correct interpretation of universal norms that underpin the state" (De Waal, 2020, pp. 240-2). Here, the notion of "correctly interpreted universal norms" can easily be replaced with 'western modernity' given the SCP's emphasis on the neutrality of 'Western modernity'. Since 'non-western' *allochtonen* are presumed to lack this, they are the 'conditional earners' of citizenship. Here, the state "solves" the specific difference of the 'non-westerner' by implementing

obligatory civic integration courses and tests, which evaluates whether migrants have internalized predefined 'liberal' norms (Joppke, 2007a). In contrast, 'western' migrants are exempt from such demands and the moral monitoring that accompanies it – probably because it is assumed that 'western' migrants do have access to modern values, simply by means of having been born in a certain place. This is what Schinkel (2017) calls 'dispensation of integration'.

This practice thus becomes concrete in setting of inequal integration requirements (De Waal, 2020, pp. 231-2). One example of this is the *Wet Inburgering Buitenland*, a law that prescribes certain *inburgeringstrajecten* that migrants from certain countries have to take before departure. Family migrants from 'western countries' were exempted from these tests (De Waal, 2020, p. 238). The law led to a substantial decimation of the immigration cap (SCP, 2009 p. 7). De Waal (2020) argues that such pre-departure integration tests are explicitly implemented to limit immigration from 'non-western' states which, in her own words, conveys that the naturalization of certain immigrants is unwanted and that there is an (almost) "impermissible social inequality between 'wanted' and 'unwanted' citizens" (p. 239). It is this point precisely that was criticized by the UN committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination in 2010 (CERD, 2010). The committee specifically expressed concern that "the application of the Act [Civic Integration (Preparation Abroad)] results in discrimination on the basis of nationality, particularly between so-called 'Western' and 'non-Western' state nationals" and recommended that the act be reviewed "with a view to abolishing the discriminatory application … to 'non-Western' state nationals." (p. 2) The 'west' and 'non-west' are important terms indeed.

The Enactment of Nativism

Discourse of 'the west' has traces of nativist discourse in three ways. There is already a sense of nativism encapsulated in the very notion of 'allochtony'. In the second way, CBS categorizes people as (non-) western for two generations long. This means that the set of socio-cultural resemblance traits – which could be those proposed by SCP (2003) – are, to an extent, are to be instilled 'automatically' into the minds of children born *in* the Netherlands to 'non-western' parents. People are thus presumed to have certain values by means of their being born somewhere else or being the offspring of people that were born somewhere else – their precise moral standpoints and schooling or socialization outside the context of the family notwithstanding.

In the second case of SCP, nativism finds its ground in the chrono-political construction of 'the west'. In the SCP's narrative, 'western' values are deemed to stem from the socio-historical process of modernization – which is theoretically universal but has, practically speaking, only occurred (yet) in the demarcated area called 'the west'. This simple but abstract presumption implies that the 'non-westerner', unlike 'westerners', would not naturally fit in Dutch society and must be subjected to monitoring and civic integration practices. Here, an idealized geo-historical experience of 'triumphalist universalism' becomes a criterion for continual comparison and, eventually, the legitimation for differential treatment (Joppke, 2013). Since 'non-western' *allochtonen* are judged to be 'foreign', not naturally 'assimilable', to Dutch culture on the basis of the assumed (irreconcilable) difference in terms of geo-historical experiences, this is a nativist practice (Kešić & Duyvendak, 2019; Duyvendak, 2021, p. 4216).

6. Discussion

Starting with the presumption that the 'West Pole' does not exist, this thesis asked what it means that 'the west' was applied as a (performative) sense-making device in integration practice: how were ideas of 'the west' performed in the integration practices of Dutch state institutions (2000-2009)? This section discusses the meaning of the results in relation to the main question and existing work on 'the west' and, broader, integration studies. It also reflects on the methodological limitations of its arguments.

The results show that constructions of 'the west' were articulated in various instances and for varying purposes. When regarded integrally, certain themes arise.

Incoherent but Consistent: 'the *w*est' as a Travelling Concept in Dutch Integration Practice

The results uncovered how 'west' and 'non-west' were performed by Netherlands Statistics (CBS) as means to categorize *allochtonen.* These terms were then appropriated by other Dutch state institutions (WRR and SCP) to serve different, governmental purposes. The 'distance' between 'western' and 'non-western' people was problematized (WRR) and the notion of 'western modernity' was used as benchmark to monitor, by measuring quantitively, the extent to which ('non-westerners') *allochtonen* were 'socio-culturally' integrated into the Netherlands (WRR and SCP). Moreover, after CBS, SCP gathered data about 'non-western' peoples as a discrete group, which consistently 'proved' the difference between 'western' and 'non-western' peoples and reproduced the framing of the integration debate in exactly these terms. As a result, therefore, the presence of 'non-western' *allochtonen* was rendered 'abnormal' and 'unwanted' as problematic in the discourse of these institutions.

This shows that there are important differences in how 'the west' is constructed by different state institutions. The operationalization of 'west' and 'non-west' in the categorization of *allochtonen* (CBS) was based upon a topographical illogical territorialization of 'west' and 'non-west' based upon the arbitrary criterion of 'socio-cultural and -economic resemblance to the Netherlands'. Other discourses – applying the term as benchmark to measure and evaluate the socio-cultural integration of 'non-western' *allochtonen* (WRR, SCP) – was informed by assumptions about the inherently modern character of 'western society' vis-à-vis unmodern, 'non-western' 'cultures.' Here, state institutions provided incoherent (Graeber, 2007) lists of 'western' values without theorizing their relations with the socio-historical modernization process assumed to have taken place in 'the west' only.

Though there is an obvious trend in the under-substantiated articulation of these terms, the results uncovered nuanced differences in conceptualization between the institutions – which are related to the specific (governmental) purposes to which these concepts are articulated. The double use for the word as a label for both certain country nationals (CBS) and a signifier for a set of supposedly 'modern' values (WRR, SCP) makes possible very contradictory things such as very 'western' 'non-western *allochtonen'* or the conclusion that a sizable amount of Dutch *autochtonen* – whose western-ness is never questioned since the definition of western-ness depends on socio-economic and -cultural Dutch-ness – is not 'western' at all. Such reflections point not only to how arbitrary the claim to 'westernness' has been, but also illustrates how easily the complexity of the term leads to contradictions.

A question emerging from the methodology is to what extent the discourse of state institutions is akin to 'culturalist' arguments about 'the west'. Firstly, the results show clearly that the introduction of the terms 'western' and 'non-western' was informed by a shifting discourse on immigrant integration which stressed how the 'socio-cultural otherness' of Muslims – the prototypical 'Other' of 'the west' in that discourse – presented a sizable barrier to their integration into the Netherlands, pressing the need for civic integration programs. The 'culturalist' argument about culture and the presumption about the

"strong" foundational nature of culture specifically, is mirrored in the contention that 'socio-cultural distance' between 'west' and 'non-west' ought to be taken into account (WRR) and the idea that this dichotomy functions as an effective method of categorization (CBS). This suggests that 'culturalist' discourse has broadly inspired the use of the words 'west' and 'non-west' in integration practice, setting the terms of the debate. This result most vividly shows the ideological motivations behind the use of 'the west' within (state) discourses.

Secondly, the results suggest but cannot prove definitively that there is considerable overlap between 'culturalist' and state discourse about 'the west'. The results point to general similarities in the construction of 'the west'. All institutions *a priori* problematized 'non-western' migration (e.g. WRR, 2001) and regarded 'western' culture (which was also Dutch) as the 'normal'. However, it is difficult to say whether these elements are traceable to 'culturalist' discourse, since they are inherent to Occidentalist thinking (Hall, 1992). Moreover, there is general overlap in the definition of 'the west' and 'non-west' as concrete socio-historical entities or civilizations in an anthropological way (Graeber, 2007). The results also show that the specific lists of values deemed 'western' (without any substantial justification as to why they are specifically 'western' or how they are related) that were used by SCP (Dagevos, 2001; Dagevos *et al.* 2003; see table 5) are remarkably similar to the one provided by Fortuyn (1997).

An important difference that the results attend to is the extent to which the notion is open conceptually. The 'culturalist' conception of 'the west' is more exclusive compared to SCP, since the latter – unlike the essentializing tendencies of the 'culturalist' idea – seems to attend to the (natural) adaptability of cultural phenomena and also takes note of internal differences within 'western' and 'non-western' populations – for example, compare Surinamese to Turkish (table 6).[41] Fortuyn's descriptions of 'the west' as a 'Judeo-Christian' entity is also relevant in this regard, since it naturally excludes Muslims from incorporation into 'the west'. Taken together, there is simply no consensus on what 'the west' is. There is only consensus on the idea that others should be acculturated into 'western values.'

Despite the lack of consensus of what 'the west' is, the results still show that there is a clear trajectory of how the notion 'travelled' chronologically through the state institutions discussed in this thesis. The introduction of the notions 'west' and 'non-west' by CBS (2000) can be understood as an implicit response to the culturalization of integration discourse. After this introduction, the term trickled down to WRR (2001) and SCP (2003-), which could both refer to 'non-western' people as a consistent entity. Moreover, a WRR report (Dagevos, 2001) about socio-cultural integration prefigured the idea, used by SCP (2003-), that the notion of 'western modernity' ought to be used as a 'neutral' benchmark to monitor the socio-cultural integration of 'non-western' other. Considering that these conceptions of 'the west' are related but not alike – not in the last place due to the different political purposes to which they were enacted – Dutch state discourse about 'the west' must be seen as a consistent but incoherent whole.

Themes in the Construction of 'the *w*est'

The results clearly show that certain conceptual elements of 'the west' are more relevant than others in the enactment of the concept in integration practice. This has major theoretical implications.

Firstly, the results suggest that the articulation of 'the west' (and 'non-west') was, in many cases, theoretically unsubstantiated and based upon unspoken assumptions about the (inherent) difference between the 'west' and 'non-west.' This is particularly visible in the territorialization of 'west' and 'non-west' by CBS, which is logically inconsistent, based more on the idea that the integration of 'westerners'

[41] This is not to say that their monitoring, their non-subscriptions to 'western' values, their non-belonging, is not assumed by their label (CBS) as innately 'non-western'.

is different from that of 'non-westerners' instead of operationalized criteria (Papaikonomou, 2019). In other cases, constructions of 'the west' are theoretically unreflexive statements about the relation between modernity, space and culture at the societal and individual level. This result affirms that *latency* (Said, 1978) is an important property of discourse on 'the west.' This thesis thus shows that abyssal thinking is not only visible in abstract registers of modern legal thinking and knowledge production (da Sousa Santos, 2000) – which are emphasized by decolonial scholars – it is plainly visible in how 'western' states, or the Netherlands at least, regard the world and, consequently, how they enact policies aiming to integrate certain ('non-western') 'others' into the self.

Moreover, the results show that in the deployment of 'west' and 'non-west' by state institutions, the territorialization of the 'west' and 'non-west' is of particular importance in at least two ways. Firstly, the territoriality of 'the west' and 'non-west' – more accurately, the resort to topographical logic when territorializing 'the west' and 'non-west' – gives stability to a set of referents ('west' and 'non-west') that are intrinsically instable. The territoriality of these terms makes them suitable for the purposes of governmentality. This argument affirms that the conceptual incoherence and historical nature of the terms is 'hidden' under a fallacious claim to geographical absoluteness (Coronil, 1995; Lazarus, 2003). In operationalizing 'the west' as a geographical absolute, claims to 'the west' make much of the same mistakes as in Agnew's (1994) infamous territorial trap. Given that CBS will, from 2022 onward, use 'continents' as a means of categorizing migrants (CBS, 2022), there seems to be an urgent need to stress (again) the conceptual problems of using such meta-geographical mappings (Lewis & Wigen, 1997). If using a capital letter "W" invokes this false territorialization, there is a theoretical argument to be made for referring to the spatial imaginary as 'the *west*'.

Secondly, the presumption that 'modernity' represents an insulated historical development that has taken place in 'western spaces' only (Leigh, 2021), strengthens the sense of (incommensurable) difference between 'western' and 'non-western' people. In 'culturalist' discourse, the emancipation of women, gay people and children is represented as an accomplished historical process that would be automatically reset by the presence of 'others' (Fortuyn, 1997), 'others' who are 'alien' to the grounded, Judeo-Christian past of 'the west' that gave us the golden fruits of 'western civilization' (Appadurai, 2016) and is the 'natural habitat' of these ideas (Graeber, 2007). This argument links to idea about nativism (Kešić & Duyvendak, 2019). In SCP discourse, 'western' ideals are also argued to stem from the socio-historical process of modernization that has grounded in 'the west' only. This is the motivation behind the moral monitoring of 'non-western' others. The supposed but questionable difference in geo-historical experiences between 'western' and 'non-western' people thus becomes a basic rationale for nativist separation.

Graeber's (2007) important but often overlooked diagnoses of 'the west' were thus proven right by the results in many respects. Graeber (2007) correctly pointed out that 'the west' is conceptualized as an incoherent amalgam of un(der)theorized values. However, whereas Graeber suggested that the west's sole claim to democracy must be questioned, this thesis points to the west's claim to rationality and neutrality, stemming from its claim to the full realization of individual emancipation. Moreover, Graeber's hypothesis that there is a continuous slippage between 'anthropological' (closed) and 'literary-philosophical' (open) definitions of 'the west' is relevant since this slippage both pays tribute to the inconsistency of claims to 'the west' *and* the contradictions of inclusion and exclusion that are at play when the term is evoked. In conclusion, Graeber's take on 'the west' is indeed as "far-reaching" as a very recent suggests (GoGwilt & Meyer, 2022, p. 6) – It productively uncovers important paradoxes at the heart to claims to the notion, especially in the context of integration.

Furthermore, the so-called 'neutral' nature of 'western' culture is important. 'The west' is not only assumed to be neutral as something that 'just' empirically exists (as a 'West Pole') and could be appropriated as a neutral benchmark for comparison (SCP), it is also argued to be intrinsically neutral as a cultural phenomenon. The description of 'western' culture as representing the full emancipation of

the individual and of 'non-western' cultures as parochial sets of group prescriptions curtailing the individual (SCP, 2003, p. 323) was particularly relevant as it established the neutrality of the term as a starting point for analysis. This definition, which I have referred to as 'non-cultural', has been critically analyzed in political philosophical inquiries into liberal democracy (Brown, 2006) and thus seems to be largely absent from debates about 'the west'. This is unjustifiable. Results like these push the need for more philosophically sophisticated studies of 'the west'.

Lastly, these results suggest that the question is not so much whether 'the west' is taken to be a 'political', 'civilizational' or 'modern' entity – which emerged from the literature as one of the foremost and effective ways to theorize 'the west' (Browning & Lethi, 2009). The issue is rather how the notion is constructed and made politically useful in terms of its conceptual openness/particularity, inclusion and exclusion. The results suggest that this axis is crucial in understanding the political implications of the term.

The Invisible Rationales of Claims to 'the west'

This section takes a step tack to analyze the rationales that explain the articulation of 'west' (and 'non-west') by Dutch institutions specifically. The results pertaining to the first sub-question show that the articulation of 'the west' by state institutions was informed by both the intrinsic logic of governmentality *and* the specific integration discourse (culturalization), which stressed the socio-cultural 'otherness' of the 'non-western' other. This last result is solidified by the observation that the decision to use 'west' and 'non-west' as standard tool to categorize *allochtonen* by CBS (Keij, 2000) represents a move away from a purely socio-economic differentiation – between OECD-member state and OECD non-member states – towards the increasing emphasizing and problematization of socio-cultural difference. Given the fact that integration discourse gradually culturalized around the time of the decision.

The notion of governmentality represents a sizable part of the rationale for the use of 'west' and 'non-west' as a means to categorize migrants (by CBS) for a few reasons. The topographic nature or operationalization of the terms 'west' and 'non-west' allows for the discrete "slotting" of *allochtonen* in either one category (Yanow & van der Haar, 2011). The use of an equally comprehensive and totalizing separation between OECD and non-OECD countries (1995-1998) illustrates this point. This result stresses that specifically the territorialization of 'west' and 'non-west' – into seemingly objective 'West Poles' – is by no means a neutral and autonomous practice. The state draws upon it in order to endow its statistics with a sense of neutrality. This sense of neutrality is, indeed, false, precisely due to the role of 'culturalization' in suggesting that the difference between the (cultural) 'west' and 'non-west' are a suitable sense-making device to understand the integration (as a process) of *allochtonen* (as a group) into the Netherlands.

Moreover, the recuperation of the terms 'west(ern)' – and 'non-west(ern)' – for the purposes of governmentality implies that the durability of 'the west' as a concept (Gilroy, 2016; Meyer, 2022) hinges upon the articulation of the term within specific practices – governmentality in this case. This argument fits existing work on the governmentality of statistics which argues that statistics make possible a knowledge of the population and its various elements, and therefore allow for the normalization of identities (Legg, 2006; Sokhi-Bulley, 2011). It also shows that 'banal Occidentalisms' (Bozatzis, 2014; Joukhi, 2016, 2020) do not only consist of mere popular references to the word 'west(ern),' but is rather premised upon a range of practices involved in the description, comparison and evaluation of the 'western' 'self' and 'other' that takes place at multiple sites, including official state institutions. An awareness of this issues should raise questions about the accountability of state actors for the appropriation of the value-laden meta-geographical terms like the 'west' and 'non-west'.

Here, it is productive to return to Leigh's (2021) critique of Jackson's (2009) conception of 'the west' as an "unintended rhetorical commonplace." Leigh (2021) suggests that meta-geographical ideas like Occidentalism "works in and through" racialized categorisations of differential development and are thus far from unintended, casual invocations (p. 194). Leigh (2021) is right in pointing out that there are traces of hierarchical conceptions of culture and materially real experiences of differential development within most – if not all, but that is difficult to judge here – references to 'the west', but he mistakes Jackson's use of the term "unintended" as an attitude of casualness with regards to these issues. Therefore, he seems to the larger point this thesis is making after Jackson (2009), which is that the problematic connotations of the term are both reified by the notion's omnipresence. The results show that this reification is clearly present in the Netherlands.

The Political Stakes of Claims to 'the *w*est'

The results shows that the notions of 'west' and 'non-west' were applied in order to serve multiple political purposes. The term was articulated firstly as a means of categorization (Keij, 2000). However, this 'objective' purpose neglects the terms' hierarchical connotations – that 'the west' is seen as unambiguously positive and the 'non-west' as negative or problematic (Hall, 1992; Coronil, 1995) – and reproduce these connotations in the process. This is because the taxonomy inaugurated quantitative research which further designated the discrete group 'non-westerners' as problematic and rationalized their subjecting to the surveillance apparatus of the state, and the application of civic integration schemes for the conditional citizenship of these citizens.

The results show, secondly, that the term was used as a benchmark to compare *allochtonen* and measure the extent of their 'socio-cultural integration' into the Netherlands (Dagevos, 2001; Dagevos *et al.* 2003) or, in other words, which individuals are assumed to belong to the normal, 'western' 'self' and who are not ('non-western *allochtonen*) – who should be subjected to integration programs and who do not ('western' *allochtonen,* who are dispensed of integration). This extent was constantly monitored by measuring non-westerners' adherence to so-called 'western' values. This practice validates Hall's (1992) valuable point that the notions constitute a knowledge that allows for comparison and evaluation. However, the way in which the terms allow for evaluation are integration-specific and, thus, do not fit Hall's description entirely. This brings up the question how the terms are appropriated in diverse context.

Thirdly, results show that the marking of 'non-western' *allochtonen* as problematic, 'abnormal' or 'outside' the national 'self' prompted the discriminatory treatment of this group (CERD, 2010). Though SCP discourse suggests that 'non-western' people can (eventually) belong to 'the west' if they 'prove' their adherence to 'western' values (De Waal, 2020) 'westernness' was often defined in an anthropological way, assuming that the adherence to certain values is intrinsically related to the geo-historical experiences of societies and individuals. This nativist argument about what 'westernness' *is* marks the observation that becoming a Dutch citizenship is natural, and therefore easier, for so-called 'western' people than for other, 'non-western' people. This exclusionary effect is one of the major stakes in discourse about 'the west' since it is intrinsic to discussions about what 'westernness' *is.*

The last political element that needs emphasis is the neutral connotation of the terms 'west' and 'non-west' and the effect of neutralization. The results have shown how 'the west' was seen as a 'non-culture' which prioritized individual freedom over forcible 'group prescriptions' (SCP, 2003), which allowed for its use as a benchmark for comparison. The results have also shown, however, that discourse about 'the west' in general was consistently framed as 'objective', and how descriptions of 'the west' was presented as a 'view from nowhere' (Haraway, 1988), which was used to endow politically dubious practices of categorization and moral monitoring with a sense of legitimation (Schinkel, 2017). Given the notion's conceptual fuzziness, moral connotations and far-reaching political implications, I argue

that this is simply unjustifiable. This is a crucial point, since it uncovers how inconsiderate everyday invocations of these notion – all of which lean upon the fallacious sense of objectivity surrounding the term – actually are.

This thesis has applied the term governmentality in an effort to describe the logic behind claims to 'the west' and answer sub-question #1 – in line with Ettlinger (2011). However, this use would be inconsistent given that the term is often used in order to stress the intrinsic link between power and knowledge, crucial to the Foucauldian project. Here, governmentality denotes how governmental knowledges aid the state's exercise of power over the population. This is important because of the following reason. As the results show that the choice to categorize migrants by distinguishing 'westerners' from 'non-westerners' was primarily informed by concerns of governmentality, this fact alone shows that this particular claim to 'the west' and 'non-west' is a subjective one. All these results therefore show that the articulation of 'the west' as a sense-making device – even in those instances in which the claim to 'the west' is deemed neutral (e.g. SCP, 2003) – this appropriation has political effects.

Durability and The Performative (Re)Production of Difference

The reification of the terms brings me (again) to the conceptual durability of the term, which the results show is related to the *performativity* of 'west' and 'non-west'. The results have shown that the theoretical presumption of performativity is accurate and particularly relevant in the case of integration practice. In short, the performativity of 'the west' lies in the fact that the classification of 'west' and 'non-west' as discrete groups (CBS) "makes real" these groups by subjecting them to entire systems of measurement (SCP) – and, eventually, integration programs. These (bio) political effects are all effectively produced by (textual) discourse about this term.

The results show, furthermore, that, at the end of the terms' 'travel' through the institutions, especially the 'other' group of 'non-western' *allochtonen* is made the primary subject of research (SCP), which inaugurates the gathering of all sorts of (quantitative) data about this problematized groups. This data then 'proves' the ultimate difference between 'westerners' – be it *allochtoon* or *autochtoon,* the label makes this distinction effectively irrelevant or, at least, less important than other distinctions –and 'non-western' *allochtonen* – hiding the conceptual incoherence of these terms under a thick layer of (statistical) 'objectivity' – which reifies these terms and their application to integration. In this sense, the non-belonging of 'non-western' *allochtonen* really is 'produced'. In other words, the performative articulation of 'the west' within statistical research not only reifies the terms 'west' and 'non-west' as seemingly dispassionate and neutral (because statistically 'objective') terms to understand integration, but it also reifies the exclusionary connotations of the terms.

This conclusion is also relevant for discussions on the notion of durability. The consistency in constructions of 'the west' among Dutch state institutions is a telling illustration of the viscous nature of the term: its inherent conceptual flexibility – its latent character – makes the term a suitable sense-making device in a range of settings (compare CBS, SCP) – and its appearance of in a range of settings, in turn, 'proves' its status as a suitable device. A perfectly circular argument. This conclusion could function as a first, preliminary step to a theory of 'the *w*est's' continuous reification.

Understood in this way, the measurement of socio-cultural integration is a tool that proves the foundational difference between 'western' people and 'non-western' *allochtonen*. Given the results that the 'non-western' *allochtoon* is designated via its supposed non-resemblance of the Netherlands (CBS) and that 'western' modernity was used as benchmark to measure the socio-cultural integration of 'non-western' *allochtonen*, a conclusion like "non-western *allochtonen* are not (yet) well-integrated into the Netherlands"[42] is a double pleonasm. Groenendijk (2007) was thus absolutely right to acknowledge that

[42] This is a hypothetical interpretation of the SCP yearly report (2003).

many results of (SCP) research were already present in the very premise of distinguishing between western and non-western people. The full integration of 'non-western' *allochtonen* is therefore almost impossible.

Methodological Limitations: Validity & Generalizability

This section discusses methodological weakness of the thesis, starting with the data collection process. The weakness here is that the results are invalid as they are based upon a small sample size. However, the resort to such a small sample size was informed by largely practical concerns. Few sources actually attempt to describe 'the west' an 'non-west' and many reports, especially SCP yearly reports, that attempt to describe 'western' and 'non-western' *allochtonen* do so in relatively consistent ways – for example, discussing similar themes (cf. SCP, 2003; 2010). The addition of sources thus did not yield additional insights into this topic. This fits arguments that research is 'complete' when the researcher's theorizing fits consistently with new texts so that the addition of new texts yields no new insights (Milliken, 1999, p. 234; Jackson, 2007). Moreover, since intensive research aims at immersion into a small number of case studies as a means to understand social phenomena, the analysis of a relatively small sample size is justified there (Clifford *et al.* 2010, pp. 11-2).

The validity of the analysis might also be questionable since the interpretation of the data relies upon the sensitivity of the researcher, which disables the reproducibility of this research. There are multiple ways in which this thesis has attempted to account for this problem. It has mainly attempted to do so via the use of "analytical tools" and via frequent references to secondary literature in the results section, which 'grounds' the analysis firmly in theory. However, this opens us questions about whether secondary literature framed the results instead of empirical data (confirmation bias). This limitation was countered by choosing suitable theoretical insights on the basis of a reiterative dialogue with inductive readings of primary source material, resulting in a multidisciplinary theory section that was relatively loosely applied. This provided depth to the results section and suited the research objective. However, the reliance on secondary literature remains. I have attempted to make up for this by spending a relatively sizable amount of time to accurately depict the academic debate and providing an extensive bibliography of secondary material,

Continuing on the problem of subjectivity in interpretation, the question is to what extent the positionality of the researcher affected the results. Here, it is important to see that the thesis criticized the theoretical justifiability of labelling certain ideas as 'western', while refraining from judgements about the contents of these ideas (labelled as 'western') themselves, since this is incommensurable with the epistemological position of this thesis (see preamble). I concur that this aim is political in the sense that it presumes that certain political claims to 'the west' are illegitimate. This illegitimacy is firmly in line with current theorizing about 'the west', but there is also a political argument to be made here. In line with decolonial scholarship, I argue that it would be beneficial to reconsider the unambiguously positive connotations of 'the west' which underlie diverging ideological claims. Insolvable, non-sensical debate about what *is* 'western' or not, and rhetorical claims to 'the west' (Jackson, 2009, pp. 55-6) muddle productive discussions about important questions like how to overcome otherness.

The third issue is whether descriptions about the imagined difference between a 'western' self and a 'non-western' other were not in fact derived from (subsidiaries of) differences between a national, 'autochthonous' self and non-national 'allochthonous' others – as scholars of integration have suggested (e.g. Schinkel, 2017). Fortuyn's (1997) discourse especially seems to reflect the idea that the difference is non-existent: "our" identity, he argues, is simultaneously Dutch and 'western' (p. 46). This does not mean that the two imaginaries should be equated on a theoretical level, however. The results show that claims to 'the west' serve a unique set of purposes which are simply not interchangeable with claims to

'Dutchness'. The 'neutral' character of 'the west' – in contrast to the negative connotations surrounding nationalism – is especially relevant in this regard. The following section (on geo-methodological traps) goes into this argument further.

Fourthly, there are issues of generalizability. Since this thesis analysed the operationalization of 'the west' by a very specific set of institutions, it is simply not representative for discourse about 'the west' in general. The choice to analyse this particular case was, however, consciously inspired by an interest in some misunderstood themes – that is, the false claim to 'objectivity', their political effects and performative reproduction). The discussion has highlighted how the results inspire rethinking in these critical directions. It is the task of further or concatenate research to study how these themes are dealt with in other contexts.

Lastly, I am aware of the problematic connotations of the terms '*allochtoon'* (Essed & Trienekens, 2008; Yanow & van der Haar, 2013; Bovens *et al.* 2016) and 'migrant' (Dahinden, 2016). Still, I decided to use them consistently throughout the text for a few reasons. First, since the separation between 'western' and 'non-western' *allochtonen* was devised as a means to quantify the amount of problematic 'others' residing in the Netherlands (Keij, 2000), I argue that 'allochtony' and 'non-westernness' are related – both genealogically and in their simultaneous applications as signifiers of problematic 'otherness'. In this way, I argue that is accurate to pair them together. I have used the term 'migrant' for as a (more neutral) synonym for 'allochtoon'. I agree with critiques that posit that this word naturalizes the difference between (national) 'citizens' and 'migrant' but I believe that this thesis also inspects the formulation of knowledge about the (national) 'self and (migrant) 'other' in ways that challenge the underlying paradigm (Dahinden, 2016).

Geo-Methodological Traps

This research runs the risk of falling into certain methodological traps. There is firstly the risk of methodological nationalism, a set of methodological fallacies in which a bounded nation-state is taken to be a natural, unproblematic object of scientific analysis (Wimmer & Glick-Schiller, 2002, pp. 304-6; Agnew, 1994; Taylor, 1994). Similarly, concepts like 'migrant'–opposed to some national 'self' – only acquire meaning within the logic of nation-states (Dahinden, 2016). Methodological nationalism is intrinsic to studying integration because, as mentioned before, the concept depends upon the assumption of the singularity of 'society' and the unity of the 'state' (Favell, 2001; Schinkel, 2017). This is not the only methodological trap, however. Since 'the west' is widely considered a supranational entity, recent publications analyzing uses of the term have mainly discussed its (performative) articulation at the level of transnational order (Lethi, Pennanen & Joukhi, 2019). This implicitly suggests that it is only relevant at that scale. This is problematic given its implicit neglect of the articulation of 'the west' at the scale of national policies, like integration practice (e.g. Bialasiewicz, 2012).

This thesis aimed to counter these 'geo-methodological' traps by emphasizing the imaginary nature of both 'the west' and the (Dutch) 'nation' as places, as well as the national 'society' as an object of analysis. The focus on a national integration practice is mostly pragmatic as it demarcates a workable and relatively coherent subject of research. Beyond this, however, this thesis has even added to the debate about methodological nationalism by uncovering how imaginary geographies of national (Dutch) and civilizational ('west') selves can be intersecting. Note, for example, that the benchmark of 'westernness' by the Dutch state institutions is explicitly based upon the own nation – on "resemblance *to the Netherlands"* (Keij, 2000, emphasis added). The intricate relation between imaginaries of Dutch and 'western' 'self' which is evident from the results has showed that national imaginaries often build upon supra-national ones.

Here, it is productive to revisit Schinkel's (2017) argument that the claims to the 'west' is actually a placeholder for claims about the national society: "A "national society" becomes identified by "values" or "opinions" construed as "Western." (Schinkel, 2017, p. 83). This argument neglects the fact – visible in the results – that there are clear lines separating 'western' and 'non-western' peoples, a line which separates those 'national possessors' of citizenship (De Waal, 2020), whose integration is dispensed (Schinkel, 2017) – from those who have to follow a set of integration requirements to be able to become part of the 'self' – a 'self' that is, thus, as much national as it is non-national – that is, geo-cultural, geo-historical and moral. Moreover, elsewhere, Schinkel (2017) noted the strategical properties of shifting between national and 'western' imaginaries (p. 167). It is misleading to reduce articulations of 'the west' as mere placeholders of jingoism. In much the same way, the line between national 'self' and 'others' – as constructed throughout integration practice – is not a simple line between a nation-state and its outside, it is a (spatially) layered phenomenon. This is how integration studies can benefit from theories of imaginary geographies.

Towards w*estern studies*: Recommendations for Further Research

With the eye on further research, the question is whether there are cases like Dutch integration practice in the Netherlands, cases in which 'the west' is a foundational sense-making device. I believe that there are such cases, since the results prove that it is plainly naïve to assume both that references to 'the west' are neutral. Studies of 'the west' should therefore be pushed beyond its current limits.

There are certainly some promising directions. In the case of the Netherlands, the research could be pushed further by analyzing how the separation seeped down to the level of policy within the various ministries using the terms and data about them (see Bovens *et al.* 2021, p. 4). On a supranational level, I suspect that studying the relation between the distinction (or even geo-cultural discourse in general) and concrete migration policies, such as visa policies – which have notoriously operated on the basis of 'good' and 'bad' lists overlapping with conceptions of 'the west' (van Houtum, 2010) – is likely productive. The turn to 'civilizationist' discourse arguing for the defence of 'civilizational' heritage against certain ostensible 'others' is an interesting trend in this regard (Brubaker, 2017). It would be productive to study how discourse on the 'west' and 'non-west' in various 'western' states intersects with their diverging national traditions of (race-ethnic) categorization (Simon, 2012; 2015). The broad question underlying such topics is how subjects' self-understanding as 'western' affects how they act within the world, especially when confronted with certain non-western (migrant) others – and how such operations inform the self-perpetuation of the term.

Given the important effects of claims to 'the west', it is important to study which places and peoples are often considered 'inside' or 'outside' of it (see the issue of inclusion and exclusive). Different people might conceptualize their place 'in' or 'out' of 'the west' in different ways (Boatcă, 2021). This highlights the fact that there is no 'West Pole'. The position of post-communist states in Eastern Europe and Central Asia, 'underdeveloped' rural areas within 'western' states (Nadel-Klein, 1995) and/or the overseas territories of European states (Boatcă, 2021) might be interesting openings to study this issue. All these examples highlight different elements. Since Dutch integration practice – and the CBS categorization of these terms in particular – is such an effective case to discuss conceptual issues of 'the west', this thesis shows that it a suitable vantage point from which to engage with the fallacies and contradictions surrounding the term.[43]

The answering of this question represents a sizable task. With the risk of sounding grotesque, this thesis argues that there is an urgent need for systematic studies of what 'the west' does – akin to

[43] I am currently working on a research article with Henk van Houtum, as part of my research internship, which pushes this further.

critical analyses of 'Europe' or even of the 'Balkan' or 'Caribbean' which all have specialized academic journals committed to them – since the current debate is relatively disparate. In other terms, it proposes some sort of interdisciplinary field of '*w*estern studies.' It should by now be obvious that studies should not regard 'western' history as an "intelligible field" (Toynbee, 1923) like in many works in classical sociology (Carrier, 1992) or "Western Civ"-courses (Federici, 1995; Segal, 2000). Rather, the field would evade the 'West Pole Fallacy' and uncover hidden paradoxes to the term.

'Western studies' have something to say about the new taxonomy developed by CBS, which puts migrants into continental boxes – like 'Europe' and 'Africa' (CBS, 2021). This practice makes much the same mistakes as CBD did even before mapping 'the west', by relying upon the fallacious objectivity of totalizing, meta-geographical abstractions (Lewis & Wigen, 1997) to build a so-called 'neutral' taxonomy, which is also easily reified and 'filled' with meaning and 'used' for discriminatory purposes. It is imaginary geography gone rogue, all over again (Gregory, 1994). In order to counter this, I insist, like Scholten (2020), on bringing complexity into the picture. This is a matter of doing justice to both integration, which depends on more than one's 'western' or 'non-western' background, *and* to the avoiding the overt simplification of knowledge about 'the west'. The WRR-report *Samenleven in verscheidenheid* (2020) takes diversity in terms of individual source countries, motif, juridical status and duration of stay into account (pp. 27-30, 37-40). Even if it does not fully do away with geo-based categorization[44] (WRR, 2001, p. 40), it does a step in the right direction.

The Racist Connotations of 'Westernness'

This thesis has not explicitly discussed the possibly racist connotations of the term(s) 'west' and 'non-west'. This might be considered problematic as there are clear signs that the term overlaps with racial lines, which is most plainly visible in the observation that the (CBS) designation of 'western' overlaps with 'white' states (Essed & Trienekens, 2008; Winddance Twine & Callagher, 2008; CERD, 2010; Schinkel, 2011; Yanow & van der Haar, 2013). Similar observations about the intrinsically racial nature of the term 'west' have been noted by scholars of 'the west' as well (Bonnett, 2003, 2004; Leigh, 2021). Since this thesis is not a study into Dutch racism, however, I have chosen not to evaluate whether the term is a sign of racism since such an evaluation would require careful deliberation of notions or racism – or, perhaps, the evasion of themes of race – in the Dutch cultural archive (Wekker, 2016), which I did not have the room for in this thesis. This is not to say, however, that racism should not be of crucial concern to *w*estern studies.

*W*estern studies share with critical race studies the concern with in- and exclusion. An interesting take is Bonnett's (2003) argument that debate about "westernness" represents a contradictory historical transformation of the notion of "whiteness" which simultaneously maintained and disposed of racial implications. For example, the glorified achievements of a civilization explicitly and strategically rendered as 'western' became a justification for colonial administration envisaged as 'white'. Simultaneously, however, the notion of 'the west' was potentially (conceptually) open since "whiteness can only be mimicked [while] "westernness" can be borrowed and adopted." (pp. 334-5). Because 'the west' was associated with the delineation and analysis of principles, it was amenable to self-critique (cf. Kolakowsi, 1990; Ramdas, 1992); something unthinkable in notions of whiteness (Bonnett, 2003, p. 335). This overlaps with the observation that "the racial connotations [of the CBS distinction of 'west' and 'non-west'] are not absolute" (Winddance Twine & Callagher, 2008, p. 16). As such, notions of 'westernness' have complex relations to race, which should be pushed further.

[44] It uses a "geo-linguistic" categorization separating, for example, Anglo-Saxon, German-speaking, Scandinavian, Latin-American, Sub-Saharan African, Central-Asian and South-East-Asian source countries. The place of former Dutch colonies in this taxonomy is dubious (WRR, 2001, p. 40).

Though this thesis has not centered on debates around race, I argue that race should be of central concern to studies of 'westernness,' since it is central to the contradictions of inclusion and exclusion that, as the thesis has shown, lie at the heart of constructions of 'the west'.

Conclusion

This thesis pursued an explorative discourse analysis aimed at answering the question *how* ideas of 'the west' were performed in the integration practices of Dutch state institutions (2000-2009). Starting from critical readings of 'the west,' which argue that an innate 'West Pole' does not exist, it found that 'the west' was pivotal to the discourse of several Dutch state institutions as a standard of categorization, a benchmark for comparison and a formulation of the ultimate intent of integration. It functioned, thus, as an all-encompassing logic about integration into the Netherlands – about whose presence in the country is 'normal' and whose is 'abnormal' and 'problematic', and why.

Though these discourses were all rendered as neutral and empirically valid understandings of the world in general, and of migrants and their integration in particular, this thesis uncovered their theoretically inconsistent and political equivocal character, or – in the terms of the title – their *lies.* The thesis showed in particular that definitions of 'the west' were largely based upon the latent presumption that the cultural disposition of the so-called 'non-western' *allochtoon* – was markedly different from that of the 'western' *allochtoon*, crucially affecting their integration process. This logic provided the basis for the normalization of 'westerners' and for the implementation of discriminatory measures and integration programs for the 'non-western' *allochtoon.* Practices like these are questionable at least.

The imaginary differentiation between 'western' and 'non-western' people was performatively made real by gathering various sorts of knowledge about 'western' and 'non-western' people as discrete groups, which 'proved' the difference between these groups and reinforced the pervasive status of the 'non-western' *allochtoon* as problematic and, therefore, as meaningful subject of integration programs. The political nature of the terms 'west' and 'non-west' turns the reification of these terms into an urgent theoretical and political issue, since the 'West Pole Fallacy' and its discriminatory tendencies are perpetuated throughout its use for the purposes of statistical knowledge-gathering.

These results show how constructions of 'the west' and 'non-west' are politically relevant in a wider range of domains than previously assumed since it is able to converge with the nationalist politics of integration. Studying the articulation of 'the west' in this context has opened up a range of theoretical issues on the politics of the discourse on 'the west' that stem from the notion's numerous conceptual contradictions and silences, which push debate on this matter further. Most of all, it proves that every neutral invocation of 'the west' should be questioned. There is an urgent and ongoing need for theoretical reflexivity and political sensitivity about this notion.

Bibliography

Abu-Lughod, J. (1991). *Before European Hegemony: the World System AD 1250-1350*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Adonis (2010) Selected Poems. Translated by K. Mattawa. Yale University Press. In: Parker, S. (2012, 3 February) The Weekend Poem: 'West and East' by Adonis. *The Huffington Post.* Retrieved from: https://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/2012/02/03/west-and-east-by-adonis_n_1252895.html

Agnew, J. (1994). The Territorial Trap: The Geographical Assumptions of International Relations Theory. *Review of International Political Economy*, *1*(1), 53-80.

----------. (1996). Time into Space: the 'Myth of Backward' Italy in Modern Europe. *Time & Society*, *5*(1), 27-45.

----------. (2003). *Geopolitics: Re-visioning World Politics* (2nd ed.). London: Routledge.

Apostolova, R. 2015. "Of Refugees and Migrants: Stigma, Politics, and Boundary Work at the Borders of Europe." American Sociological Association Newsletter, September 14. Retrieved from: https://www.asaculturesection.org/2015/09/14/of-refugees-and-migrants-stigma-politics-and-boundary-work- at-the-borders-of-europe/

Appadurai, A. (2016, 9 November). There is No Such Thing as Western Civilization. *The Guardian.* Retrieved from: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/nov/09/western-civilisation-appiah-reith-lecture

Ashcroft, B., & Ahluwalia, P. (2008). *Edward Said* (2nd ed.). New York: Routledge.

Bachelard, G. (1969). *The Poetics of Space*. Translated by M. Jolas. Boston: Beacon Press.

Baker, M. (2012). Modernity/coloniality and Eurocentric Education: Towards a Post-Occidental Self-Understanding of the Present. *Policy Futures in Education*, *10*(1), 4-22.

Balibar, E. (2009). Europe as Borderland. *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space*, *27*(2), 190-215.

Balkenhol, M., Mepschen, P., & Duyvendak, J. W. (2016). The Nativist Triangle: Sexuality, Race and Religion in the Netherlands. In: J.W. Duyvendak, P. Geschiere & E. Tonkens (eds.) *The Culturalization of Citizenship: Belonging and Polarization in a Globalizing World* (pp. 97-112). London: Palgrave Macmillan.

Bertossi, C., Duyvendak, J. W., & Foner, N. (2021). Past in the Present: Migration and the Uses of History in the Contemporary Era. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, *47*(18), 4155-4171.

Bettiza, G. (2014a). Civilizational Analysis in International Relations: Mapping the Field and Advancing a "Civilizational Politics" Line of Research. *International Studies Review*, *16*(1), 1-28.

----------. (2014b). Empty Signifier in Practice: Interrogating the 'Civilizations' of the United Nations Alliance of Civilizations. *Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies Research Paper No. RSCAS*, *95*.

Bhambra, G. K. (2014). Postcolonial and Decolonial Dialogues. *Postcolonial Studies*, *17*(2), 115-121.

Bialasiewicz, L. (2006). 'The Death of the West': Samuel Huntington, Oriana Fallaci and a New 'Moral' Geopolitics of Births and Bodies. *Geopolitics*, *11*(4), 701-724.

Bialasiewicz, L., Campbell, D., Elden, S., Graham, S., Jeffrey, A., & Williams, A. (2007). Performing Security: The Imaginative Geographies of Current US Strategy. *Political Geography*, *26*(4), 405-422.

Blokker, P., & Delanty, G. (2009). European Identity, post-Western Europe, and Complex Cultural Diversity. In: C. Browning & M. Lethi (eds.), *The Struggle for the West: A Divided and Contested Legacy* (pp. 117-134). New York: Routledge.

Boatcă, M. (2015). *Global Inequalities beyond Occidentalism*. Burlington: Ashgate Publishing.

----------. (2021). Thinking Europe Otherwise: Lessons from the Caribbean. *Current Sociology*, *69*(3), 389-414.
Boletsi, M. (2013). *Barbarism and its Discontents*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Bolkestein, F. (1989) 'Einde geschiedenis laat nog even op zich wachten' in: F. Bolkestein, *De Engel en het Beest* (pp. 137-141). Amsterdam: Prometheus. Retrieved from: https://www.dbnl.org/tekst/bolk008enge01_01/bolk008enge01_01_0012.php
----------. (1992) 'De Integratie van minderheden' in: F. Bolkestein, *De woorden en hun betekenis* (pp. 181-188) Amsterdam: Prometheus. Retrieved from: https://www.renevanmaarsseveen.nl/wp-content/uploads/overig5/De%20Integratie%20van%20Minderheden%20-%20Frits%20Bolkestein%201991.pdf
Bonnett, A. (2003). From White to Western: "Racial Decline" and the Idea of the West in Britain, 1890–1930. *Journal of Historical Sociology*, *16*(3), 320-348.
----------. (2004). *The Idea of the West: Culture, Politics and History*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
----------. (2005). Occidentalism and Plural Modernities: or how Fukuzawa and Tagore Invented the West. *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space*, *23*(4), 505-525.
----------. (2009). Asian Occidentalism and Rediscovered Modernities. In: In: C. Browning & M. Lethi (eds.) *The Struggle for the West. A Divided and Contested Legacy* (pp. 201-217). New York: Routledge.
Bovens, M., Bokhorst, M., Jennissen, R. & Engbersen, G. (2016) Migratie en classificatie: naar een meervoudig migratie-idioom. *WRR Verkenningen,* no. 34. The Hague: WRR.
Bovens, M., Jennissen, R., Bokhorst, M. & Engbersen, G. (2021) *Afscheid van westers en niet-westers. Naar meervoudige indelingen van herkomstgroepen.* WRR-Policy Brief 8. The Hague: WRR.
Bozatzis, N. (2016). Cultural Othering, Banal Occidentalism and the Discursive Construction of the 'Greek Crisis' in Global Media: A Case Study. *Suomen Antropologi: Journal of the Finnish Anthropological Society*, *41*(2), 47-71.
Encyclopaedia Brittanica (2018, October 10). Ideal type. Encyclopedia Britannica. Retrieved from: https://www.britannica.com/topic/ideal-type.
Brown, W. (2009). *Regulating Aversion: Tolerance in an Age of Identity and Empire*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Browning, C. (2009) Conclusion: The Resilient West? In: C. Browning & M. Lethi (eds.) *The Struggle for the West. A Divided and Contested Legacy* (pp. 218-229) New York: Routledge.
Browning, C., & Lehti, M. (2009). The West: Contested, Narrated and Clustered. In: C. Browning & M. Lethi (eds.) *The Struggle for the West. A Divided and Contested Legacy* (pp. 15-32). New York: Routledge.
Browning, C. S., & Tonra, B. (2009). Beyond the West and towards the Anglosphere? In C. Browning & M. Lethi (eds.) *The Struggle for the West* (pp. 161-181). New York: Routledge.
Brubaker, R. (2017). Between Nationalism and Civilizationism: The European Populist Moment in Comparative Perspective. *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, *40*(8), 1191-1226.
Buchanan, P. (2010). *The Death of the West: How Dying Populations and Immigrant Invasions Imperil our Country and Civilization*. New York: Thomas Dunne Books.
Bueno Lacy, R., & Van Houtum, H. (2015). Lies, Damned Lies & Maps: The EU's Cartopolitical Invention of Europe. *Journal of Contemporary European Studies*, *23*(4), 477-499.
Buruma, I. (2007). *Murder in Amsterdam: Liberal Europe, Islam, and the Limits of Tolerence*. London: Penguin.

Buruma, I., & Margalit, A. (2005). *Occidentalism: The West in the Eyes of its Enemies*. London: Penguin.

Butler, J. (2002). *Gender Trouble*. New York: Routledge.

Carrier, J. G. (1992). Occidentalism: The World Turned Upside-Down. *American Ethnologist*, *19*(2), 195-212.

Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek (2022, 16 Februari). 'Nieuwe indeling bevolking naar herkomst: Vervanging van indeling naar migratieachtergrond en westers/niet-westers. *Statistische Trends.* Retrieved from: https://www.cbs.nl/nl-nl/longread/statistische-trends/2022/nieuwe-indeling-bevolking-naar-herkomst

Beer, J. de (1995) Hoeveel allochtonen zijn er in Nederland? How Many People with a Foreign Background Live in the Netherlands. *Maandstatistiek van de bevolking,* no. 7 (July), 9-12 [Data file]. Retrieved from: https://historisch.cbs.nl/detail.php?nav_id=3-1&index=2&id=3361415

Prins, C. J. M., & Verhoef, R. (1998) Demografie van Nederland 1997 Population Trends 1997. *Maandstatistiek van de bevolking,* no. 12 (December) [Data file]. Retrieved from: https://historisch.cbs.nl/detail.php?nav_id=4-1&index=1&id=3363636

Prins, B. (2002). The Nerve to Break Taboos: New Realism in the Dutch Discourse on Multiculturalism. *Journal of International Migration and Integration/Revue de l'integration et de la migration internationale*, *3*, 363-379.

Prins, B., & Saharso, S. (2010). From Toleration to Repression: the Dutch Backlash against Multiculturalism. In S. Vertovec & S. Wessendorf (eds.) *The Multiculturalism Backlash* (pp. 82-101). New York: Routledge.

Chibber, V. (2018). The Dual Legacy of Orientalism. In: B. Abu-Manneh (eds.) *After Said: Postcolonial Literary Studies in the Twenty-First Century* (pp. 37-52). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

----------. (2020). Orientalism and its Afterlives. *Catalyst Journal*, *4*. https://catalyst-journal.com/2020/12/orientalism-and-its-afterlives

Clifford, N. J., French, S. & Valentine, G. (2010) Getting Started in Geographical Research: How this Book Can Help. In: Clifford, Clifford, N. J., Cope, M., Gillespie, T. W. & French, S. (eds.) *Key Methods in Geography* (pp. 1-12). London: Sage Publications.

Coker, C. (2009) Rebooting the West: can the Western alliance still engage in war? In C. Browning & M. Lehti (eds.) *The Struggle for the West: A Divided and Contested Legacy*. New York: Routledge.

Connolly, W. E. (2005). The Evangelical-Capitalist Resonance Machine. *Political Theory*, *33*(6), 869-886.

Cope, M. (2010). Coding Transcripts and Diaries. In: Clifford, Clifford, N. J., Cope, M., Gillespie, T. W. & French, S. (eds.) *Key Methods in Geography* (pp. 440-452). London: Sage Publications.

Coronil, F. (1996). Beyond Occidentalism: Toward Nonimperial Geohistorical Categories. *Cultural Anthropology*, *11*(1), 51-87.

Crawley, H., & Skleparis, D. (2018). Refugees, Migrants, Neither, both: Categorical Fetishism and the Politics of Bounding in Europe's 'Migration Crisis'. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, *44*(1), 48-64.

Dagevos, J. (2001) *Perspectief op Integratie: over de sociaal-culturele en structurele integratie van etnische minderheden in Nederland*. WRR Werkdocumenten nr. W121, The Hague: WRR.

Dagevos, J. Gijsberts, M. & Praag, C. van (2003) *Rapportage Minderheden 2003.* The Hague: Sociaal en Cultureel Planbureau.

Dahinden, J. (2016). A Plea for the 'de-Migranticization' of Research on Migration and Integration. *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, *39*(13), 2207-2225.

De Goede, M., Simon, S., & Hoijtink, M. (2014). Performing Preemption. *Security Dialogue*, *45*(5), 411-422.
De Sousa Santos, B. (2007). Beyond Abyssal Thinking: From Global Lines to Ecologies of Knowledges. *Review (Fernand Braudel Center)*, *30*(1), 45-89.
Dillon, M. (2020). *Introduction to Sociological Theory: Theorists, Concepts, and Their Applicability to the Twenty-First Century*. Hoboken: John Wiley & Sons.
Dittmer, J. (2010). Textual and Discourse Analysis. In D. DeLyser, S. Herbert, S. Aitken, M. Crang and L. McDowell (Eds.) *The SAGE Handbook of Qualitative Geography* (pp. 274-286). Los Angeles; London: Sage Publications.
Dussel, E. (1993). Eurocentrism and Modernity (Introduction to the Frankfurt Lectures). *boundary 2*, *20*(3), 65-76.
----------. (2000). World-System and "Trans"-Modernity. *Nepantla: Views from South, 3*(2), 221-244.
Duyvendak, J. W., Geschiere, P., & Tonkens, E. (Eds.). (2016). *The Culturalization of Citizenship: Belonging and Polarization in a Globalizing World*. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
Duyvendak, J. W. (2021). Nativist Understandings. The Presence of the Past in contemporary Dutch Debates on National Identity. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, *47*(18), 4209-4220.
Emirbayer, M. (1997). Manifesto for a Relational Sociology. *American Journal of Sociology*, *103*(2), 281-317.
Entzinger, H. (2006). Changing the Rules While the Game Is On: From Multiculturalism to Assimilation in the Netherlands. In: Y.M. Bodemann & G. Yurdakul (eds.) *Migration, Citizenship, Ethnos: Incorporation Regimes in Germany, Western Europe and North America* (pp. 121-144). New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Ettlinger, N. (2011). Governmentality as Epistemology. *Annals of the Association of American Geographers*, *101*(3), 537-560.
Essed, P. & Trienekens, S. (2008) "Who wants to Feel White?" Race, Dutch Culture and Contested Identities. *Ethnic and Racial Studies, 31*(1), 52-72.
Fabian, J. (1983). *Time and the Other: How Anthropology Makes its Object*. New York: Columbia University Press.
Fairclough, N. (1996). A Reply to Henry Widdowson's' Discourse Analysis: A Critical View'. *Language and Literature*, *5*(1), 49-56.
----------. (2003) *Analyzing Discourse: Textual Analysis for Social Research*. New York: Routledge.
Faist, T. (2006). The Migration-Security Nexus: International Migration and Security before and after 9/11. In Y. Bodemann & G. Yurdakul (Eds.) *Migration, Citizenship, Ethnos* (pp. 103-119). London: Palgrave Macmillan.
Favell, A. (2001). Integration Policy and Integration Research in Europe: A Review and Critique. *Citizenship Today: Global Perspectives and Practices*, *349*, 351-352.
Fearon, J. D., & Laitin, D.D. (2000). Violence and the Social Construction of Ethnic Identity. *International Organization*, *54*(4), 845-877.
Federici, S. (1995a) Introduction In: S. Federici (ed.) *Enduring Western Civilization: The Construction of the Concept of Western Civilization and its 'Other's* (pp. ix-xvi). Praeger.
----------. (1995b). The God that Never Failed: The Origins and Crises of Western Civilization. In: S. Federici (ed.) *Enduring Western Civilization: The Construction of the Concept of Western Civilization and its 'Other's* (pp. 63-90). Westport: Praeger.
Fortuyn, P. (1997). *Tegen de islamisering van onze cultuur. Nederlandse identiteit als fundament*. Utrecht: Bruna.
Foucault, M. (1994 [1971]). *The Order of Things.* New York: Random House.

Foucault, M. (1984 [1971]). Nietzsche, Genealogy, History. In: P. Rabinow (ed.) *The Foucault Reader* (pp. 76-100). New York: Pantheon Books. https://noehernandezcortez.files.wordpress.com/2011/04/nietzsche-genealogy-history.pdf
----------. (1991). In: G. Burchell, C. Gordon & P. Miller (eds.) *The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Frank, M. C. (2009). Imaginative Geography as a Travelling Concept: Foucault, Said and the spatial turn. *European Journal of English Studies*, *13*(1), 61-77.
Fukuyama, F. (1989). The End of History? *The National Interest*, (16), 3-18.
Garton Ash, T. (2004). *Free World: America, Europe, and the Surprising Future of the West*. London: Penguin.
Geerdink, F. (2022, 21 February). 'Westers' versus 'Niet-westers' was nooit een onschuldige indeling. *OneWorld.* Retrieved from: https://www.oneworld.nl/lezen/discriminatie/westers-versus-niet-westers-was-nooit-een-onschuldige-indeling/
Geschiere, P. (2009). *The Perils of Belonging: Autochthony, Citizenship, and Exclusion in Africa and Europe*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Ghorashi, H. (2014). Racism and "the Ungrateful Other" in the Netherlands. In: P. Essed & I. Hoving (eds.) *Dutch racism* (pp. 101-116). Amsterdam: Rodopi.
Gijsberts, M. & Dagevos, J. (2009) *Jaarrapport Integratie 2009.* The Hague: Sociaal en Cultureel Planbureau.
Gill, R. (2000) Discourse Analysis. In: M. Bauer & G. Gaskell (eds.) *Qualitative Researching with Text, Image and Sound: A Practical Handbook for Social Research* (pp. 172-190). London: Sage Publications.
Gilroy, P. (2009, November 5) *Postcolonial Critique and the End of the West* [Keynote Speech]. 1st Former West Conference. BAK basis voor actuele kunst, Utrecht. Retrieved from: https://formerwest.org/ResearchCongresses/1stFormerWestCongress/Video/PostcolonialCritiqueAndTheEndOfTheWest
GoGwilt, C. (1995a). *The Invention of the West: Joseph Conrad and the Double-Mapping of Europe and Empire*. Stanford University Press.
----------. (1995b). True West: The Changing Idea of the West from the 1880s to the 1920s. In S. Federici (ed.) *Enduring Western Civilization: The Construction of the Concept of Western Civilization and its 'Others'* (pp. 37-62). Westport: Praeger.
GoGwilt, C. & Meyer, H. (2022) Introduction. In: C. GoGwilt, H. Meyer & S. Sistiaga (eds.) *Westernness: Critical Reflections of the Spatio-Temporal Construction of the West* (pp. 1-8). Oldenbourg: De Gruyter.
GoGwilt, C. (2022) Reinventing the West: The Invention of the West 25 Years Later, In: C. GoGwilt, H. Meyer & S. Sistiaga (eds.) *Westernness: Critical Reflections of the Spatio-Temporal Construction of the West* (pp. 223-230). Oldenbourg: De Gruyter.
Gordon, L. R. (2011). Shifting the Geography of Reason in an Age of Disciplinary Decadence. *Transmodernity: Journal of Peripheral Cultural Production of the Luso-Hispanic World*, *1*(2).
----------. (2022) Spinoza Lectures: Shifting the Geography of Reason. University of Amsterdam, the Netherlands, 24 May.
Graeber, D. (2007) There Never Was a West. Or Democracy Emerges From the Spaces In Between. Retrieved from: https://mirror.anarhija.net/lib.anarhija.net/mirror/d/dg/david-graeber-there-never-was-a-west.c117.pdf
Gregory, D. (1994). *Geographical Imaginations*. Cambridge: Blackwell.
----------. (1995). Imaginative Geographies. *Progress in Human Geography*, *19*(4), 447-485.
----------. (2004). *The Colonial Present: Afghanistan, Palestine, Iraq.* Malden: Blackwell.

----------. (2018). Between the Book and the Lamp: Imaginative Geographies of Egypt, 1849–50. *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, 20*(1), 29-57.
Gregson, N., & Rose, G. (2000). Taking Butler elsewhere: Performativities, Spatialities and Subjectivities. *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space*, *18*(4), 433-452.
Groenendijk, K. (2007) Allochtonen of burgers: definitiemacht in debat en wetgeving over immigranten. In: J.W. Duyvendak, G. Engbersen, M. Teeuwen en I. Verhoeven (red.) *Macht en verantwoordelijkheid. Essays voor Kees Schuyt* (pp. 101-112) Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press.
Groenendijk, K. (2011). Pre-departure integration strategies in the European Union: Integration or Immigration Policy? *European Journal of Migration and Law*, *13*(1), 1-30.
Guzzini, S. (2016). Foreign Policy Identity Crises and Uses of 'the West'. In G. Hellmann & B. Herborth (Eds.), *Uses of 'the West': Security and the Politics of Order* (pp. 13-36). Cambridge: Cambridge University.
Haar, M. van der & Yanow, D. (2011). Allochtoon als metafoor en categorie. Over de handelingsimplicaties van beleidstaal. *Beleid en Maatschappij, 38*(2), 160-178.
Hall, S. (1992) The West and the Rest: Discourse and Power, In: S. Hall & B. Gieben (Eds.) *Formations of Modernity* (pp. 185-227). Cambridge: Polity Press. https://analepsis.files.wordpress.com/2013/08/hall-west-the-rest.pdf
Haraway, D. (1988). Situated Knowledges: The Science Question in Feminism and the Privilege of Partial Perspective. *Feminist Studies*, *14*(3), 575-599. Retrieved from: https://newmaterialism.eu/almanac/s/situated-knowledges.html
Harley, J. B. (1989). Deconstructing the Map. *Cartographica: The International Journal for Geographic Information and Geo-visualization*, *26*(2), 1-20.
Heller, K. M. (2007). *The Dawning of the West: on the Genesis of a Concept* [Dissertation]. Cincinnati: Union Institute & University. Retrieved from: https://www.proquest.com/openview/9fcef46b399ed6d344f9d54efcb3012f/1?pq-origsite=gscholar&cbl=18750
Hellmann, G. & Herborth, B. (Eds.) (2017) *Uses of 'the West': Security and the Politics of Order*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Hellmann, G., Herborth, B., Schlag, G., & Weber, C. (2017). The West: A Securitising Community? *Journal of International Relations and Development*, *20*(2), 301-330.
Hemel, E. van den (2014). (Pro)Claiming Tradition: The 'Judeo-Christian' Roots of Dutch Society and the Rise of Conservative Nationalism. In: R. Braidotti, B. Blaagaard, T. de Graauw & E. Midden (eds.) *Transformations of Religion and the Public Sphere: Postsecular Publics* (pp. 53-76). London: Palgrave Macmillan.
Herborth, B. (2017). Everyday Exceptions: The Paradox of a Perpetual State of Emergency. In G. Hellmann & B. Herborth (Eds.), *Uses of 'the West': Security and the Politics of Order* (pp. 136-155). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Hiemstra, N. (2014). Performing Homeland Security within the US Immigrant Detention System. *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space*, *32*(4), 571-588.
Houtum, H. van, Kramsch, O.T. & Zierhofer, W. (2005). *B/ordering Space*. London: Ashgate Publishing.
Houtum, H. van (2010). Human Blacklisting: The Global Apartheid of the EU's External Border Regime. *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space*, *28*(6), 957-976.
Houtum, H. van & Naerssen, T. van (2002). Bordering, Ordering and Othering. *Tijdschrift voor Economische en Sociale Geografie*, *93*(2), 125-136.
Houtum, H. van & Uden, A. van (2021). The Birth of the Paper Prison: The Global Inequality Trap of Visa Borders. *Environment and Planning C. Politics and Space, 40*(1), pp. 20-27.

Houtum, H. van, & Pijpers, R. (2007). The European Union as a Gated Community: The Two-Faced Border and Immigration Regime of the EU. *Antipode*, *39*(2), 291-309.
Huntington, S. (1993). The Clash of Civilizations? *Foreign Affairs* 72(3), 22-49.
Ifversen, J. (2008). Who are the Westerners? *International Politics*, *45*(3), 236-253.
Jackson, P. T. (2003). Defending the West: Occidentalism and the Formation of NATO. *Journal of Political Philosophy*, *11*(3), 223-252.
----------. (2006). *Civilizing the Enemy: German Reconstruction and the Invention of the West*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
----------. (2009). The Perpetual Decline of the West. In C. Browning & M. Lethi (Eds.), *The Struggle for the West: A Divided and Contested Legacy* (pp. 53-70). New York: Routledge.
----------. (2016). After 'the Clash': Uses of 'the West' after the Cold War. In G. Hellmann & B. Herborth (Eds.), *Uses of 'the West': Security and the Politics of Order* (pp. 83-108). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Jackson, R. (2007). An Analysis of EU Counterterrorism Discourse Post-September 11. *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, *20*(2), 233-247.
Jennissen, R. (2011). Internationale migratie naar en vanuit Nederland: Algemene trends. In: R. Jennissen (ed.) *De Nederlandse migratiekaart 2011.* Onderzoek en Beleid. Den Haag: WODC.
Joenniemi, P. (2009). Difference within Similarity: The Puzzle of Transatlantic Relations. In C. Browning & M. Lethi (Eds.), *The Struggle for the West: A Divided and Contested Legacy* (pp. 135-160). New York: Routledge.
Jones, R. (2009). Categories, Borders and Boundaries. *Progress in Human Geography*, *33*(2), 174-189.
----------. (2010). The Spatiality of Boundaries. *Progress in Human Geography*, *34*(2), 263-267.
Joppke, C. (2004). The Retreat of Multiculturalism in the Liberal State: Theory and Policy. *The British Journal of Sociology*, *55*(2), 237-257.
----------. (2007a). Beyond National Models: Civic Integration Policies for Immigrants in Western Europe. *West European Politics*, *30*(1), 1-22.
----------. (2007b). Transformation of Immigrant Integration: Civic Integration and Antidiscrimination in the Netherlands, France, and Germany. *World Politics*, *59*(2), 243-273.
----------. (2008). Immigration and the Identity of Citizenship: The Paradox of Universalism. *Citizenship studies*, *12*(6), 533-546.
----------. (2013). A Christian identity for the Liberal State? *The British Journal of Sociology*, *64*(4), 597-616.
Jouhki, J. (2016). Global Issues, Western Foci: Banal Occidentalism in a Finnish Newspaper. *Suomen Antropologi: Journal of the Finnish Anthropological Society*, *41*(2), 32-46.
----------. (2020). Balancing Between Narratives of the West and Hindu Nationalism in Emerging India. In: M. Lehti, H. Pennanen & J. Joukhi, (eds.) *Contestations of Liberal Order: The West in Crisis?* (pp. 343-371). London: Palgrave Macmillan.
Jouhki, J., & Pennanen, H. (2016). The Imagined West: Exploring Occidentalism. *Suomen Antropologi: Journal of the Finnish Anthropological Society*, *41*(2), 1-10.
Karkov, N. (2011). Balkan Ghosts, Western Specters, and the Politics of Location: The Case of Slavoj Žižek. *Psychoanalysis, Culture & Society*, *16*, 291-298.
Keij, I., (2000), 'Standaarddefinitie allochtonen'. *Index*, 10 (november/december), pp. 24-25.
Kešić, J., & Duyvendak, J. W. (2019). The Nation under Threat: Secularist, Racial and Populist Nativism in the Netherlands. *Patterns of Prejudice*, *53*(5), 441-463.
Kitchin, R., & Kneale, J. (2001). Science Fiction or Future Fact? Exploring Imaginative Geographies of the New Millennium. *Progress in Human Geography*, *25*(1), 19-35.

Klein, B. S. (1990). How the West was One: Representational Politics of NATO. *International Studies Quarterly*, *34*(3), 311-325.
Klinke, I. (2013). Chronopolitics: A Conceptual Matrix. *Progress in Human Geography*, *37*(5), 673-690.
Kolakowski, L. (1997). *Modernity on Endless Trial*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Kuus, M. (2007) Ubiquitous Identities and Elusive Subjects: Puzzles from Central Europe. *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers*, *32*(1), 90-101.
Laclau, E. (1996) *Emancipation(s).* New York: Verso.
Larsen, H. (2018). Discourse Analysis in the Study of European Foreign Policy. In B. Tonra & T. Christiansen (eds.) *Rethinking European Union Foreign Policy* (pp. 62-80). Manchester: Manchester University Press.
Lazarus, N. (2002). The Fetish of 'the West' in Postcolonial Theory. *Marxism, Modernity and Postcolonial Studies*, 43-64.
----------. (2011). What Postcolonial Theory Doesn't Say. *Race & Class*, *53*(1), 3-27.
----------. (2012). Spectres Haunting: Postcommunism and Postcolonialism. *Journal of Postcolonial Writing*, *48*(2), 117-129.
Legg, S. (2006). Governmentality, Congestion and Calculation in Colonial Delhi. *Social & Cultural Geography*, *7*(5), 709-729.
Lehti, M. (2009). American West vs European West: a Struggle for Ownership and Legitimacy. In C. Browning & M. Lethi (eds.) *The Struggle for the West* (pp. 90-114). New York: Routledge.
Lehti, M., & Pennanen, H. R. (2020). Crises of the West: Liberal Identities and Ontological (In) security. In: M. Lehti, H. Pennanen & J. Joukhi, (eds.) *Contestations of Liberal Order* (pp. 61-97). London: Palgrave Macmillan.
Lehti, M., Pennanen, H. & Joukhi, J. (eds.) (2020) *Contestations of Liberal Order: The West in Crisis?* London: Palgrave Macmillan.
Leigh, J. (2021). Geoculture and Unevenness: Occidentalism in the History of Uneven and Combined Development. In: J. Rosenberg, J. Brake, T. Pignon & L. de Oliveira Paes (eds.) *New Directions in Uneven and Combined Development* (pp. 45-65). New York: Routledge.
Lewis, M. W., & Wigen, K. (1997). *The Myth of Continents*: A Critique of Metageography. University of California Press.
Li, T. M. (2007). Governmentality. *Anthropologica*, *49*(2), 275-281.
Lucassen, L., & Lucassen, J. (2018). *Vijf Eeuwen Migratie: Een Verhaal van Winnaars en Verliezers*. Amsterdam: Atlas Contact.
Lundborg, T., & Vaughan-Williams, N. (2015). New Materialisms, Discourse Analysis, and International Relations: A Radical Intertextual Approach. *Review of International Studies*, *41*(1), 3-25.
Mayblin, L., Wake, M., & Kazemi, M. (2020). Necropolitics and the Slow Violence of the Everyday: Asylum Seeker Welfare in the Postcolonial Present. *Sociology*, *54*(1), 107-123.
Malkki, L. (1992). National Geographic: The Rooting of Peoples and the Territorialization of National Identity Among Scholars and Refugees. *Cultural Anthropology*, *7*(1), 24-44.
Mbembé, J. A., & Meintjes, L. (2003). Necropolitics. *Public Culture*, *15*(1), 11-40.
Mepschen, P. (2017). A Post-Progressive Nation: Homophobia, Islam, and the New Social Question in the Netherlands. In: A. Rohde, C. von Braun & S. Schüler-Springorum (eds.) *National Politics and Sexuality in Transregional Perspective* (pp. 19-38). New York: Routledge.
Mepschen, P., & Duyvendak, J. W. (2012). European Sexual Nationalisms: The Culturalization of Citizenship and the Sexual Politics of Belonging and Exclusion. *Perspectives on Europe*, *42*(1), 70-76.

Mepschen, P., Duyvendak, J. W., & Tonkens, E. H. (2010). Sexual Politics, Orientalism and Multicultural Citizenship in the Netherlands. *Sociology*, *44*(5), 962-979.
Meyer, H. (2022). Russian Orthodoxy as Constitutive of Westernness in The Americans. In: C. GoGwilt, H. Meyer & S. Sistiaga (Eds.) *Westernness: Critical Reflections on the Spatio-Temporal Construction of the West* (pp. 179-202). Oldenbourg: De Gruyter.
Mignolo, Walter D. (2002). "Geopolitics of Knowledge and the Colonial Difference". *The South Atlantic Quarterly*, *101*(1). Retrieved from: http://www.unice.fr/crookall-cours/iup_geopoli/docs/Geopolitics.pdf
----------. (2007). Delinking: The Rhetoric of Modernity, the Logic of Coloniality and the Grammar of De-Coloniality. *Cultural Studies*, *21*(2-3), 449-514.
----------. (2012). *Local Histories/global Designs: Coloniality, Subaltern Knowledges, and Border Thinking*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Milliken, J. (1999). The Study of Discourse in International Relations: A Critique of Research and Methods. *European Journal of International Relations*, *5*(2), 225-254.
Moncrieffe, J. (2013). Introduction. Labelling, Power and Accountability: How and Why 'our' Categories Matter. In J. Moncrieffe & R. Eyben (eds.) *The Power of Labelling: How People are Categorized and Why it Matters* (pp. 11-26). New York: Routledge.
Mügge, L., & van der Haar, M. (2016). Who is an Immigrant and Who Requires Integration? Categorizing in European Policies. B. Garcés-Mascareñas & R. Penninx (eds.) *Integration Processes and Policies in Europe: Contexts, Levels and Actors* (pp. 77-90).
Müller, M. (2008). Reconsidering the Concept of Discourse for the Field of Critical Geopolitics: Towards Discourse as Language and Practice. *Political Geography*, *27*(3), 322-338.
----------. (2011). Doing Discourse analysis in Critical Geopolitics. *L'Espace Politique. Revue en Ligne de Géographie Politique et de Géopolitique*, (12). Online, via: https://journals.openedition.org/espacepolitique/1743
Nadel-Klein, J. (1995). Occidentalism as a Cottage Industry: Representing the Autochthonous 'Other' in British and Irish Rural Studies. In: J. Carrier (ed.) *Occidentalism: Images of the West* (pp. 109-134). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Nash, C. (2000). Performativity in Practice: Some Recent Work in Cultural Geography. *Progress in Human Geography*, *24*(4), 653-664.
O'Hagan, J. (2002). *Conceptualizing the West in International Relations Thought: from Spengler to Said*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
----------. (2007). Discourses of Civilizational Identity. In: M. Hall & P.T. Jackson (eds.) *Civilizational Identity: The Production and Reproduction of "Civilizations" in International Relations* (pp. 15-31). New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Oudenampsen, M. (2018). *De conservatieve revolte: Een ideeëngeschiedenis van de Fortuyn-opstand*. Nijmegen: Uitgeverij Vantilt.
Papaikonomou, Z. (2019, 22 March) Tanja Traag van CBS: "Begrippen 'westers' en 'niet-westers' staan ter discussie" NieuwWij. Retrieved from: https://www.nieuwwij.nl/interview/tanja-traag-cbs-begrippen-westers-en-niet-westers-staan-ter-discussie/
Parker, N., & Vaughan-Williams, N. (2012). Critical Border Studies: Broadening and Deepening the 'Lines in the Sand' Agenda. *Geopolitics*, *17*(4), 727-733.
Pels, D. (2004). *De geest van Pim: Het gedachtegoed van een politieke dandy*. AmboAnthos.
Penner, Y. (2022). Western Reflections: The Mirrored Real and the Imaginary in The Americans. In: C. GoGwilt, H. Meyer & S. Sistiaga (eds.) *Westernness: Critical Reflections of the Spatio-Temporal Construction of the West* (pp. 203-221). Oldenbourg: De Gruyter.
Puar, J. K. (2006). Mapping US homonormativities. *Gender, Place & Culture*, *13*(1), 67-88.
Quijano, A. (2007). Coloniality and Modernity/rationality. *Cultural Studies*, *21*(2-3), 168-178.

Ramdas, A. (1992). *De papegaai, de stier en de klimmende bougainvillea*. Amsterdam: de Bezige Bij.
Robertson, S. (2019). Status-making: Rethinking migrant categorization. *Journal of Sociology*, *55*(2), 219-233.
Rose-Redwood, R., & Glass, M. R. (2014). Introduction: Geographies of Performativity. In: M.R. Glass & R. Rose-Redwood (eds.) *Performativity, Politics, and the Production of Social Space* (pp. 1-34). New York: Routledge.
Rubenstein, R. E., & Crocker, J. (1994). Challenging Huntington. *Foreign Policy*, (96), 113-128.
Said, E. (1978) *Orientalism*. New York: Vintage.
----------. (2001, 22 October) The Myth of Ignorance. *The Nation.* Online, via: https://www.thenation.com/article/archive/clash-ignorance/
Samiei, M. (2010). Neo-Orientalism? The Relationship between the West and Islam in our Globalised World. *Third World Quarterly*, *31*(7), 1145-1160.
Schapendonk, J. (2022) 'Question Thesis Migration' Email to S.J.C. van Boxtel, 3 May.
Scheel, S. (2020). Biopolitical Bordering: Enacting Populations as Intelligible Objects of Government. *European Journal of Social Theory*, *23*(4), 571-590.
Scheffer, P. (2000, January 29) 'Het multiculturele drama'. *NRC Handelsblad.*
----------. (2007) *Het land van aankomst.* Amsterdam: de Bezige Bij.
Schinkel, W. (2011). The Nationalization of Desire: Transnational Marriage in Dutch Culturist Integration Discourse. *Focaal*, *2011*(59), 99-106.
----------. (2014) The Imagination of 'Society' in Measurements of Immigrant Integration. In: M. Schrover & W. Schinkel (eds.) *The Language of Inclusion and Exclusion in Immigration and Integration.* London: Routledge.
----------. (2017). *Imagined Societies: A Critique of Immigrant Integration in Western Europe*. New York: Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Schinkel, W. & Boersma, S. (2015) Imagining Society: Logics of Visualization in Images of Immigrant Integration. *Environment and Planning D, 33*(6): 1043-1062.
Schlag, G. (2016). Re-constituting NATO: Foundational Narratives of Transatlantic Security Cooperation in the 1950s and 1990s. In G. Hellmann & B. Herborth (eds.), *Uses of 'the West': Security and the Politics of Order* (pp. 156-178). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Scholten, P. (2008) *Constructing Immigrant Policies. Research-policy relations and immigrant integration in the Netherlands* 1974-2004). Dissertation. Retrieved from: https://research.utwente.nl/en/publications/constructing-immigrant-policies-research-policy-relations-and-imm-2
----------. (2011). *Framing Immigrant Integration: Dutch Research-Policy Dialogues in Comparative Perspective*. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press.
----------. (2020). Mainstreaming versus Alienation: Conceptualising the Role of Complexity in Migration and Diversity Policymaking. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, *46*(1), 108-126.
Segal, D. A. (2000). "Western Civ" and the Staging of History in American Higher Education. *The American Historical Review*, *105*(3), 770-805.
Sen, A. (2006) *Identity and Violence; The Illusion of Destiny*. London: Penguin.
Simon, P. (2012). Collecting Ethnic Statistics in Europe: A Review. *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, *35*(8), 1366-1391.
----------. (2015). The Choice of Ignorance: The Debate on Ethnic and Racial Statistics in France. In P. Simon, V. Piché & A. Gagnon (Eds.) *Social Statistics and Ethnic Diversity* (pp. 65-87). Cham: Springer.
Slootman, M., & Duyvendak, J. W. (2015). Feeling Dutch: the Culturalization and Emotionalization of Citizenship and Second-Generation Belonging in the Netherlands. In: N. Foner & P. Simon

(eds.) *Fear, Anxiety, and National Identity: Immigration and Belonging in North America and Western Europe* (pp. 147-68). New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
Sokhi-Bulley, B. (2011). Governing (through) Rights: Statistics as Technologies of Governmentality. *Social & Legal Studies*, *20*(2), 139-155.
Springer, S. (2011). Violence Sits in Places? Cultural Practice, Neoliberal Rationalism, and Virulent Imaginative Geographies. *Political Geography*, *30*(2), 90-98.
Stebbins, R. A. (2001). What is Exploration? In: R. A. Stebbins (2001) *Exploratory Research in the Social Sciences* (pp. 2-17). London: Sage Publications.
Stekeler-Weithofer, P. (2022). On the Universal Notion of a Person. How a Man without Qualities can Shed Light on Globalized Western Culture. In: C. GoGwilt, H. Meyer & S. Sistiaga (eds.) *Westernness: Critical Reflections of the Spatio-Temporal Construction of the West* (pp. 67-87). Oldenbourg: De Gruyter.
Taylor, P. J. (1994). The State as Container: Territoriality in the Modern World-System. *Progress in Human Geography*, *18*(2), 151-162.
Tonkens, E., & Duyvendak, J. W. (2016). Introduction: The Culturalization of Citizenship. In: J.W. Duyvendak, P. Geschiere & E. Tonkens (eds.). (2016). *The Culturalization of Citizenship: Belonging and Polarization in a Globalizing World* (pp. 1-20). London: Palgrave Macmillan.
Trouillot, M. R. (2003). *Anthropology and the Savage Slot: The Poetics and Politics of Otherness* (pp. 7-28). London: Palgrave Macmillan.
Tuathail, G. Ó & Agnew, J. (1992) Geopolitics and Discourse: Practical Geopolitical Reasoning in American Foreign Policy. *Political Geography, 11*(2), 190-204.
Tuathaill, G. Ó (1996). *Critical Geopolitics: The Politics of Writing Global Space.* Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
----------. (1999). A Strategic Sign: The Geopolitical Significance of 'Bosnia' in US Foreign Policy. *Environment and planning D: Society and Space*, *17*(5), 515-533.
----------. (2002). Theorizing Practical Geopolitical Reasoning: the case of the United States' Response to the War in Bosnia. *Political Geography*, *21*(5), 601-628.
United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination CERD (2010). Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, the Netherlands. United Nations doc. CERD/C/NLD/17-18, para. 5. Retrieved from: https://platformslavernijmonument.nl/wp-content/uploads/2010/03/ResultatenCERDSession_metdeNederlandseRegering.pdf
Vuorelma, J. (2020). From Identification to Division: Contesting the Unity of the West from Within. In M. Lehti, H. Pennanen & J. Joukhi (eds.) *Contestations of Liberal Order* (pp. 99-121). London: Palgrave Macmillan.
Waal, De T. (2020). Conditional belonging: Evaluating Integration Requirements From a Social Equality Perspective. *Journal of Intercultural Studies*, *41*(2), 231-247.
Watkins, J. (2015). Spatial Imaginaries Research in Geography: Synergies, Tensions, and New Directions. *Geography Compass*, *9*(9), 508-522.
Weber, C. (2017). Transatlantic Policies towards China and Russia. In G. Hellmann & B. Herborth (Eds.), *Uses of the West: Security and the Politics of Order* (pp. 179-203). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Wekker, G. (2016). *White Innocence: Paradoxes of Colonialism and Race.* Duke University Press.
Winddance Twine, F. & Gallagher, C. (2008). The Future of Whiteness: A Map of the 'Third Wave'. *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, *31*(1), 4-24.
Wimmer, A., & Glick Schiller, N. (2002). Methodological Nationalism and Beyond: Nation–state Building, Migration and the Social Sciences. *Global Networks*, *2*(4), 301-334.

WRR (2001) *Nederland als immigratiesamenleving.* WRR Rapport, nr. 60. The Hague: SDU Uitgevers.

Yanow, D. (2015). Making Sense of Policy Practices: Interpretation and Meaning. In F. Fischer, D. Torgerson, A. Durnová and M. Orsini (Eds.) *Handbook of Critical Policy Studies*. (pp. 401-421). Northampton: Edward Elgar Publishing.

Yanow, D., & Van der Haar, M. (2013). People out of Place: Allochthony and Autochthony in the Netherlands' Identity Discourse – Metaphors and Categories in Action. *Journal of International Relations and Development*, *16*(2), 227-261.

Yanow, D., Van der Haar, M., & Völke, K. (2016). Troubled Taxonomies and the Calculating State: Everyday Categorizing and "Race-Ethnicity" – The Netherlands Case. *Journal of Race, Ethnicity, and Politics*, *1*(2), 187-226.