

Decolonising Europe: Towards a redefinition of European identity

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Executive Summary

The purpose of this thesis is to explore the historical bases of European identity, focusing on the cultural-religious component of it. This choice was motivated by the current tensions between European national cultures and Muslims, despite the presence of this group in European soil for centuries. The main methods used in this thesis were desk research and policy analysis. After extensive research, it was found that there is no historical basis to European identity, mainly because there was no cohesion nor unity among EU nations before the signing of the Treaty of Rome, in 1957. However, according to the latest results of the Eurobarometer, most EU citizens now identify themselves as European, which hints at the presence of a latent European identity. This concept has been present in EU official documents and policies since at least 1973, in the Copenhagen Declaration, and has evolved from a defence-related, to a political, to a now cultural notion. Therefore, this thesis suggests that European identity can once again transform to properly reflect the EU's current cultural landscape. Thus, European identity should not be a racialised identity, but rather a citizenship based one. It is also proposed to strengthen the already existing political identity and anchor the cultural one to EU values and positive aspects of EU citizenship, without forgetting Europe's turbulent past.

Table of contents

CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION	5
1.1 THE EU AND EUROPEAN IDENTITY: AN INTRODUCTION	5
1.2 RESEARCH OBJECTIVE	5
1.3 RESEARCH QUESTIONS	6
1.4 SOCIETAL RELEVANCE	6
1.5 SCIENTIFIC RELEVANCE	7
1.6 THESIS STRUCTURE	8
CHAPTER 2. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK/LITERATURE REVIEW	9
2.1 LITERATURE REVIEW	9
2.2 CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK	12
2.2.1 <i>Definition of the concepts</i>	12
CHAPTER 3. RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODS	14
CHAPTER 4. RESULTS	16
4.1 PAST – FROM RELIGIOUS HARMONY TO IDEOLOGICAL DIVIDE	16
4.2 PRESENT – EU IDENTITY & “THE JUDEO-CHRISTIAN TRADITION”	18
<i>Case study: The rape of Europa as a symbol of political unity</i>	23
4.3 – EU POLICIES AND SPEECH ACTS ON EUROPEAN IDENTITY	29
4.3.1 <i>The Copenhagen Declaration (1973)</i>	29
4.3.2 <i>European Council Meeting at Fontainebleau 1984</i>	30
4.3.3 <i>Václav Havel and European identity</i>	30
4.3.4 <i>Treaty on European Union</i>	31
4.3.5 <i>EU policy for cultural heritage</i>	31
4.4 FUTURE – TOWARDS A MORE INCLUSIVE EU?	32
<i>European identity and the Eurobarometer</i>	32
CHAPTER 5. CONCLUSIONS	37
5.1 DISCUSSION	37
5.2 REFLECTION	41
5.3 RECOMMENDATIONS	41
LIST OF REFERENCES	42
APPENDICES	46
APPENDIX 1. THE RAPE OF EUROPA: THE EU’S POLITIZATION OF A GREEK MYTH	46
APPENDIX 2. FEELINGS OF CITIZEN ATTACHMENT TO EUROPE	50

Chapter 1. Introduction

1.1 The EU and European Identity: an introduction

European identity has been a concept present in EU documents since at least 1973, first appearing in the Copenhagen Declaration. At that moment, European identity was considered necessary to distinguish and position the EU in the worldwide political landscape. The concept was already hinted at in the Schuman Declaration before its institutionalisation in symbols such as the European anthem, the flag, and the institutions. However, as shown in the 2011 Eurobarometer on “New Europeans”, both the Euro and democratic values were the two most important components of European identity for most of the respondents (European Commission, 2011a), whereas the cultural aspect was left in the background. However, this concept is certainly not only used by the EU. Authors such as Gerard Delanty and Zygmunt Bauman referenced European identity in their works. I will come back to the central ideas in the literature review section.

Therefore, I will focus on the historico-cultural aspect of the concept, looking into the Judeo-Christian – Islamic divide which seems to be an important discussion point when talking about European identity. In other words, I aim to explore the claim of “the Judeo-Christian tradition” as central to the understanding of Europe, from a historical perspective, to investigate the origins of this divide in seemingly religious terms. The discourse surrounding European identity must shift to better reflect the richness of cultures and peoples that have shaped the continent. In short, I want to show that Europe is a multicultural continent, and that this fact should be the base of European identity as a concept, rather than limiting it to those who have a certain phenotype or hold a European passport.

As mentioned before, the Judeo-Christian tradition of Europe is often discussed when talking about European identity. Thus, I want to trace the origins of the idea of Europe and those ideas, attitudes, and places that are thought of as inherently European. After all, no one knows what Europe is, or where it exactly is located. And yet, there are images that its name evokes. That is the idea, the myth, that I want to bring into question. Furthermore, the division of the continent along religious lines has brought new challenges to European integration, an issue that highlights the importance of researching the religious chasm present in EU discourse surrounding identity.

1.2 Research objective

Through this research, I would like to call into question the current paradigm regarding European identity, and propose an alternative to it, where cultural heritage coming from the Arab world is also taken into account. I will be focusing on the Islam-Judeo-Christian divide, using it as the red thread for the historical analysis. Ideally, I would also like this research to contribute to new ways of thinking

about Europe and its treatment of history, so that history is (ideally) no longer tailored to fit a particular narrative, and that it shows that there is also greatness in multiculturalism, rather than considering the isolation and, to a certain extent, the “purity”, of the continent as an ideal. There is so much more to learn from ourselves, as a people, by acknowledging history as told from both (and all) sides, than to maintain a highly curated image of what we think Europe is.

This research will present a summary of the evolution of the concept of EU identity. This summary will be supplemented by the analysis of EU identity policies, in order to find out the reasoning behind the current othering practices aimed, mostly, at people of Middle Eastern origin or descent, within the framework of identity building in the EU.

1.3 Research questions

Thus, I propose the following main question and sub-questions:

How is EU identity policy influenced by the cultural-religious notion of Judeo-Christian heritage?

- What are the historical bases of the current definition of EU identity, as stated in official documents?
- What is the academic stance on EU identity?
- What is the current EU policy on EU identity?
- What would be viable alternatives to shaping EU identity?

1.4 Societal relevance

The rise of Islamophobia since 2001 and the popularisation of nationalist parties in the EU attest to the existence of a society divided along religious lines. The current displays of Islamic extremism do not help change the negative image that the religion has, such as the events in France, where a professor was executed for showing an image of the Prophet in his class while discussing freedom of expression. Instances like this only present the population with a seemingly valid reason to further discriminate against Muslims. However, these tensions also present an opportunity to show an alternative way to look at this “clash of civilisations”, to put it in Huntington’s terms. Thus, a paradigm shift could strengthen Europe by making it evolve from an elitist project into one where everyone feels included and heard. Moreover, Europe is not only present in this continental shelf, but also in territories overseas (Bueno Lacy & van Houtum, 2015), which, in my opinion, shows the need for a redefinition of EU identity.

I want to contribute to the discussion by analysing the current EU identity policies and highlighting how their wording perpetuates othering practices that predate the EU, and that show traces of colonialism, a practice that most of the current EU members profited and continue to profit from.

Neither Europe nor the EU have ever been isolated, and therefore cannot be explained or understood without examining them through the lens of others, such as the Arab world or the Americas (Bueno Lacy & van Houtum, 2015; Quijano, 2000). As a person born in the latter, I expect my input to help improve the current treatment that the others receive through identity policies.

1.5 Scientific relevance

I believe that researching European identity from this perspective and calling into question its foundations would help bridge the gap between the institutional understanding of Europe and its historical counterpart. It would be interesting to look at European identity from a historical and legal perspective, focusing on the mutability of the region across space and time. It would open up the possibility to use academic research and history in a more dynamic way. Also, I think it would be novel to redefine identity as a concept focused on inclusion, rather than exclusion, even though these terms are very closely related (van Houtum & van Naerssen, 2002). In my research, I think that coloniality of power could be useful to use, but applied to Europe itself, and how it has reflected the policies and societal changes that were first adopted in the Americas, as Quijano (2000) explains. This concept is relevant because it challenges the idea that Europe has always been the first to embrace modernity, as I believe it is also implied by the construction of Europe by the EU.

El-Tayeb (2011) states that “there is still little awareness of the actual ethnic diversity representing not only contemporary, but also historical Europe (...) ‘White and Christian’ seems to be the smallest denominator to which the debates on European identity are reduced, and anyone not fitting this description remains an eternal newcomer not entitled to the rights of those who truly belong”. This excerpt points out at the racialisation of the continent, as well as the conflation of nationality and race, which are issues that I hope to address in this thesis.

I am not the first one to consider that European identity, as a concept, needs to also take into account the Arab and Muslim heritage present throughout European history. Richard Bulliet proposes the term “Islam-Christian civilisation” as a possible substitution to the idea of “the Judeo-Christian tradition”, which is often present in debates around European identity. I will delve deeper into this concept in the literature review section of this thesis.

According to Passerini (2012) “new directions of research indicate an enlargement of the European public sphere, understood as a space characterized not by exclusion, but by inclusion, opening the way to a wide European sense of belonging”. Therefore, by looking into the past, I expect to encounter

information that can help reshape European identity, or rather, the thought of Europe, into a more inclusive way, looking at the way forward.

In sum, the main debate surrounding European identity revolves around how inclusive or exclusive it should be. I want to contribute to the debate by aligning myself with the idea of inclusivity, through historical research that helps uncover the inherent bias and selective erasure of European history that has taken place since the concept of European identity first emerged.

1.6 Thesis structure

The present thesis is divided in five chapters. The first chapter presents a brief introduction of the research topic, followed by the presentation of the research question and sub-questions, and scientific and societal relevance. Chapter 2 focuses on the conceptual framework and literature review, outlining the current academic debates surrounding the ideas presented in the conceptual framework. The following chapter is dedicated to the methods and research design. Chapter 4, the most extensive, deals with the results. This is, in turn, divided in four parts. The “past” section provides an introduction to the tensions of Abrahamic religions and their overall interactions. The “present” focuses on the usage of “Judeo-Christian tradition” as a tenet of European identity. The following section analyses EU policies and actors that are relevant to the concept of European identity. Finally, the “future” section presents the results of all Eurobarometer reports regarding attachment to Europe and belongingness and proposes some alternatives to the current understanding of European identity. The concluding chapter includes the discussion, where the aforementioned solutions are discussed in greater detail. This thesis closes with a brief reflection and some recommendations for future research on this topic.

Chapter 2. Conceptual framework/Literature review

2.1 Literature review

In “Coloniality of power and Eurocentrism in Latin America”, Quijano (2000) states that modernity and rationality, as concepts, are European products, and that Europe, at the same time, is a product of the Americas. Further, he argues that racialization and socio historical identity of the Americas made way for the hierarchization of new societies. Thus, Quijano seems to suggest that “Europe” did not exist before the arrival to the Americas (a quintessential postcolonial belief), and that, therefore, there was no othering before 1492 in what we now know as “Europe”. This could have been true at the time history was being made. However, the current understanding of the formation of the “traditionally European” territories, such as France or Italy, shows an othering process, for example, in the Crusades. Thus, I do not agree with Quijano on the origins of Europe. However, I do agree that the (re)conceptualization of Europe in terms of race started in the Americas, as the division was, until then, according to faith, as shown through the expulsion of Sephardic Jews from what is now Spain, also in 1492.

In his book, “The case for Islamo-Christian Civilization”, Bulliet (2004) questions one of the foundational paradigms of “the West”, that of the Judeo-Christian tradition. This term is also often used when discussing the origins of the EU. Therefore, he presents a revised version of European history, where he argues that the antagonization of Islam in the contemporary “West” has no reason to be, as Europe, or rather the EU, is the product of the interaction between these two civilisations, which should be seen more as two sides of the same coin. For Bulliet (2004) the main issue in Islam and Christian divide comes from a lack of communication; and, for him, the solution is to strengthen diplomacy and to invest in cultural campaigns that dispel common misconceptions about the West in Arab countries. Thus, Bulliet already acknowledges the arbitrary construct of EU origins and discourse. Following this reasoning, we can find Balibar (2004), who thinks of Europe as a process, rather than a place. In his words, “the question then should not be one of tracing the contours of a European identity, but rather that of ‘recognising Europe wherever it occurs’” (Balibar, 2004). Although it is not very clear in his text what he means with “Europe”, this sentence, I believe, is still applicable to the EU, since it is a political union.

Thus, if we conceive of Europe as a process, we can talk of the “promise of Europe”. Bialasiewicz (2012) talks of the “promise of Europe” as an alternative to the stifling notion of a single European identity. For her, this idea appeals more to the responsibility and role of Europe as protector and safeguard of the “other”. Moreover, Bialasiewicz (2012) also argues that Europe's Other is differentiated in time rather than in space, which strengthens the case for Islamo-Christian civilization.

Moreover, Bialasiewicz remarks are also applicable in the context of EU identity, as its components draw heavily from European history at large.

Peter Frankopan, in “The Silk Roads”, narrates the interaction between the Abrahamic religions, Christianity, Judaism, and Islam. According to him, in the beginning, these three religions not only tolerated, but also encouraged each other, which played an important role in the Islamic expansion (Frankopan, 2016, p. 87). Further, he states that “some Christian scholars thought Islam's teachings were not so much those of a new faith as a divergent interpretation of Christianity” (Frankopan, 2016, p. 90). However, the events of the 7th century seem to have been crucial for the future of the coexistence of these religions. He explains that it was then that “Islam focused on proselytism, evangelizing, and converting local populations to Islam. They also became more hostile towards Christianity and any other religions. It was also in this century that the Qur’an was written, as an attempt to unify and standardize the message of the Prophet Mohammed” (Frankopan, 2016, pp. 88-89). However, this statement still does not fully account for the drastic change in attitude. Especially, considering that Islam and Judaism were thought to be compatible, and that “the support of Jews in the Middle East was vital for the propagation and spread of the word of Muhammad” (Frankopan, 2016, p. 79).

If we take into account the interconnectedness of peoples in the globe since the beginning of time, a “clash of civilisations”, to put it in Huntington’s terms, is not only avoidable, but nonsensical. For example, Huntington mentions Arab and European civilisations as clearly distinct from each other, but Europe’s own history attests to the falsehood of this statement. Notable examples are the califate of Al-Andalus, which corresponds to modern-day Andalucía, or the Austro-Hungarian empire, which extended beyond present-day Poland and Hungary.

Moreover, if we follow Huntington’s reasoning, either there is only one civilization on Earth, or civilisations, as defined by him, do not exist. He defines civilisations as “differentiated from each other by history, language, culture, tradition and, most important, religion” (Huntington, 1993). However, even if we were to ignore the Arab, and Islamic, influence in the territory, Europe has never had a single religion. Historically, there have been Jews, Christians, and Muslims in the continent. Thus, if we look at history, how do we separate civilisations? After all, every civilization listed by Huntington shares history, language, culture, traditions, or religion, with others, thanks to their numerous interactions over time.


Luisa Passerini, in “Europe and its Others: Is there a European Identity?”, sustains that “an implicit Europeanness did frequently become conscious [...] only through the experience of migration or travel to other continents” (Passerini, 2012). Moreover, she touches on the debate on European identity, declaring that “the insistence on European values has largely substituted the effort to indicate contents

of identity, sometimes adding new values suggested by our times (Passerini, 2012). Passerini also suggests alternative nomenclature to that of European identity, favouring “less loaded terms like pluriculturalism [...] as long as they indicate an approach that could one day make the EU into a political space in which the paradoxes of democracy are negotiated” (Passerini, 2012). Furthermore, she is cautious to make a distinction between identity and citizenship. This, she argues, “acquires meaning when territory is envisioned not along national lines, but rather as multidimensional and plastic” (Passerini, 2012). It is worth noting that Passerini (2012) also relies on postcolonial theory to explain the Othering processes present in Europe across time.

Focusing on the aspect of European identity *per se*, we can find Gerard Delanty. In “Inventing Europe: Idea, Identity, Reality”, he states that “without a social dimension the European idea will fall into the hands of the nationalists and bureaucrats” Delanty (1995), thus suggesting that there is a need to go beyond the EU’s political identity that is more widely accepted by EU citizens. However, he also thinks that “the European idea has been a product of conflict more than of consensus” and warns that “it is not possible to see European history as the progressive embodiment of a great unifying idea since ideas are themselves products of history” (Delanty, 1995). Taking his statements into account, we are made aware of the inherent absurdness of marketing the past of Europe, as a continent, not only as a polity, as the beacon of peace, solidarity and progress that seems to permeate EU identity discourse. This will be expanded upon in the following chapters.

Delanty and Rumford (2005) discuss the components of identity, before delving into European identity itself. They are concerned with pinning down the kind of identity that Europe has. They thus categorise European identity as a collective identity, being “part of many national identities”, and which is in constant change, thanks to its intrinsic relation to the countries that form the continent. In the case of EU identity, this amalgamation of national identities is sometimes seen as a challenge, as identity policies tend to try to establish a common cultural ground, which is called into question through the continent’s violent history.

2.2 Conceptual framework



2.2.1 Definition of the concepts

Identity

Due to its complexity, this is a difficult concept to define, as its meaning is highly debated and greatly varies across the disciplines that employ it. However, I will stick to the definition provided by Stryker and Burke (2000) who explain it as “parts of a self composed of the meanings that persons attach to the multiple roles they typically play in highly differentiated contemporary societies”. This definition will also come in handy when proposing a new way of looking at identity because it takes into account the possibility of having several identities, without them having to necessarily compete against each other.

Religion

Defined as a belief system. For the purposes of this research, I will only focus on Judeo-Christianity and Islam. There will be no distinctions made, for example, between Orthodox Christians and Catholics, or between Muslim Sunnis and Shiites, for the sake of practicality.

Culture

Defined for the purposes of this research project as a combination of shared history, beliefs, social practices, etc. that bind a group together. I have purposefully not combined it with religion because they are not comparable. For example, a Muslim, or Christian, does not have the same culture all over the world. Although there are points of comparison (based on a shared religion, or a shared community), their cultures are bound to differ depending on the place they live.

Othering

“A set of dynamics, processes, and structures that engender marginality and persistent inequality across any of the full range of human differences based on group identities” (powell & Menendian, n.d.).

Islamo-Christian civilisation

The proposed foundation for the reformation of European identity, by revising the shared history between Islam and Christians in the Eurasian territory across centuries. The concept is borrowed from Bulliet (2004). This idea is also suggested as an alternative to the usage of “Judeo-Christian civilisation”. It is worth noting that this alternative does not aim to erase the Jewish legacy present in Europe. It simply attempts to question the current paradigm.

Judeo-Christian tradition

This concept connects to the constant referencing that is made to the Judeo-Christian tradition as an essential pillar to the myth of the EU. It is also used here in contraposition to the proposed alternative, that of the Islamo-Christian civilisation, explained before.

Chapter 3. Research design and methods

The main purpose of this research is to investigate the connection between EU identity policies and the concept of Judeo-Christian tradition. Therefore, the first step in researching the topic is to investigate the interaction of Abrahamic religions (Judaism, Christianity, and Islam) in EU nations. This will be added as a brief introduction to the body of this thesis. The introduction will be followed by a historical account of EU identity policies and speech acts stemming from Brussels, from the beginning of the EU to today. The third section will deal with policy analysis and will attempt to exemplify how these reinforce harmful attitudes towards those perceived as cultural others.

Data will be collected through desk research only, since the main documents to consult are policies and speech acts. Therefore, I am aiming to find either secondary or tertiary data. Since there will be historical context provided, there is a potential issue with comparing European territories with their modern counterparts. To limit the potential false equivalence in attitudes and political composition, I will make use of clear language that alerts the reader to keep in mind the everchanging nature of political borders in what is now the EU. Furthermore, I am aware of the issues with feasibility regarding the study of such a long period of time. Therefore, this research will focus on identity policies and will only reference historical events that are relevant for the contextualisation of said policies. In doing so, the topic will become more manageable, and will simplify attempting to explain the complexity of current policy acts and how the influence, directly or indirectly, the attitude of EU citizens towards certain minorities.

For the section on EU identity policies, I will start my search on the website of the European Commission, to find the appropriate policy documents on EU identity, and any other historical documents of importance to the topic of identity (such as the Schuman Declaration), that could help me trace the EU discourse since its establishment. The policy research will be enriched by looking into the attitudes towards European identity, as measured via the Eurobarometer.

Concept measurement & assessment

As can be seen in the conceptual map, I will try to describe EU identity as a combination of religion and culture. The employment of these two dimensions will allow me to focus on the religious divide between Christianity and Islam. As this research heavily relies on a revision of (accounts of) history, I am including concepts as othering and Islamo-Christian civilisation.

To assess these concepts, I am recurring to historical research and policy analysis. I will be reviewing academic articles, books, and other scientific sources to research these concepts from a historical perspective. I will also look into EU policy documents, statements, directives, etc. that can help me

elucidate the current discourse that the EU holds towards others, and thus, find out how the EU positions itself in the world. Therefore, I will make use of news articles, EU policies, and personal accounts, to investigate the contemporary aspect of this phenomenon. This research will also look into all editions of the Eurobarometer, to evaluate and compare the levels of self-identification with Europe and the EU.

Overall, I will keep a separate Word document to make notes on the research materials, and, if necessary, to summarise them, to make the workload more feasible, as well as to facilitate the recognition of connections across sources, authors, and themes. ATLAS.ti will also be used for these purposes. The abovementioned practical choices for data collection will allow my research to be independent from the current travel restrictions, and overall reduced mobility, set in place because of the covid-19 pandemic.

Data analysis

To analyse the data collected, I am planning to use critical discourse analysis. I have chosen this method because it involves the concept of power in the relationship between text and social practices (Wagenaar, 2015). To employ this theory, I am using the definition used by Fairclough, who defines it as “language as social practice determined by social structures” (Fairclough, 2001). In addition, I chose to use critical discourse analysis because I believe that it will help me uncover the underlying ideology, or ideologies, present in the concept of European identity, as well as in the policy documents that I plan to analyse. This method will allow me to investigate the validity of the theoretical part of this research. However, I need to conduct further research on methods that would fit my research question and goals, especially with regards to the handling of historical data and other secondary sources that I may encounter. It is paramount for the quality of this research project that I am able to accurately contextualise any historical processes that are mentioned in the final product.

Chapter 4. Results

4.1 Past – From religious harmony to ideological divide

In the past, Judaism, Christianity, and Islam coexisted peacefully in what we now know as the Middle East. Frankopan (2016) states that, despite their current situation, these three religions encouraged each other into their respective expansions. In fact, Islam and Judaism were even thought to be “mutually compatible”. So much so, that the support of Judaism in the Middle East was pivotal to the spread of Islam in the region (Frankopan, 2016). Or that, for some Christian scholars, Islam was another interpretation of Christianity, instead of a separate religion (Frankopan, 2016).

This symbiotic relationship between Abrahamic religions continued onto around the 7th century, when Islam’s attitude towards Christianity changed. According to Frankopan (2016), it was around this time that Islam focused on proselytism, evangelizing, and converting local populations. They also became more hostile towards Christianity and any other religions. It was in this century that the Qur’an was written, as an attempt to unify and standardize the message of the Prophet Mohammed, after his death.

According to some, this chasm was produced by a lack of communication and disagreement on the minutiae of their ideologies. Bulliet (2004) thus proposes that the solution is to educate the Arab countries on misconceptions about the west through cultural campaigns and diplomacy. However, this proposition could further exacerbate the othering processes that will be discussed in the next section.

It is important to stress that differences and disagreement within religions is a common occurrence. For example, within Christianity there are significant differences between the Russian and the Greek Orthodox Churches, each having their own Patriarch. This also happens within Islam, as elaborated upon by Bulliet (2004), who provides a thorough explanation on the characteristics that distinguish different currents of Islam, and how they started after the death of the Prophet. Hall (1991) elaborates on this, stating that “Islam [...] is an immensely diverse set of peoples, beliefs, traditions, and practices. What it shares with Christianity is more extensive than between any other world religion”. In short, the three religions mentioned throughout this paper, despite being different, have many things in common, which have historically linked them together, and which should not be overlooked when discussing them.

Moreover, Muslims have been present in Europe for centuries. Moosavi (2012) they have been active in countries such as Italy, France, Portugal, and Spain for more than 750 years, producing and transmitting knowledge wherever they went. The importance of Islam’s contact with other cultures can be found in the Qur’ān, which contains many words from Greek, Aramaic, Syriac, Hebrew, and Persian (Frankopan, 2016).

Muslims in Medieval Spain had a peculiar history, which is explained in length in “The Conversos and Moriscos in Late Medieval Spain and Beyond”, edited by Ingram (2009). At the beginning, Castille, and Aragón, the two Catholic kingdoms that ruled over modern Spain, had a generally tolerant stance towards other religions. However, this changed when the Inquisition was established, and both Sephardic Jews and Muslims were forced into conversion. The forceful conversions led to some new Christians to engage in “crypto-Judaism” or “crypto-Islam”. Meaning that they would continue practicing their rites and costumes in the safety of their homes, while attending mass and following Christian tradition outside. The Inquisition fiercely prosecuted these practices, although believers of Islam were prosecuted less severely than Sephardic Jews because they were not considered as wealthy or influential (Ingram, 2009).

Thus, the experience of Conversos in Inquisitorial Spain can be extrapolated to that of present-day minorities in Europe, as they constantly had to prove their religious identity, and thus their allegiance, to authorities. In the contemporary case, we see religious groups, particularly Muslims, constantly needing to prove that their beliefs and lifestyles are compatible with those of European “liberal” societies.

The practice of forgery at this time had a highly practical purpose. Forgers reinterpreted the history of their own cities for political reasons and went on to reinterpreting proto-Christianity to be similar to Islam. Thus, the situation in Medieval Spain seemed to be a constant power struggle to prove the legitimacy and good nature of the marginalised groups to the dominant society, composed of Old-Christians. The dominant culture, however, was eventually hybridised through its interactions with the Others, despite continuing to call itself “Christian”. In other words, the way Christianity was practiced was also influenced by the new converts and their cultures and produced a new way of being Christian. Thus, despite the fall of the Granada, and despite Isabella and Ferdinand’s royal decree to abandon Mudejarism, the Arab and Muslim influence in the Iberic Peninsula did not disappear, but rather became hybrid, with Moorish culture surviving the expulsions of 1492.

It is therefore in the Middle Ages where the Othering of different races, cultures, and religions started. This is also the period in which modern Europe was born, “by competing and exchanging ideas and commodities with its Eastern (and predominantly Islamic) neighbours” (Brotton, 2002). Thus, Europe developed in ideological proximity with these nations, instead of seeing them as antagonistic, a position they now have in European discourse. These exchanges, according to Brotton (2002), were mainly motivated by trade. He gives the example of Fibonacci, who brought the Hindu-Arabic numbers to Europe, which substituted the Roman numerals and thus made transactions quicker.

Therefore, we cannot talk of a “single” European Renaissance, as the developments in the North seemed to almost be contrary to those in the South. Moreover, “every generation creates a version of the European Renaissance in its own image” (Brotton, 2002). Thus, history is used as a political tool across time. Its political usage was most salient when European powers used it to justify colonialism and world domination, as validation of their *mission civilisatrice*. However, viewing Europe as opposite to the East erases the presence and input of people and cultures without which the spirit of the Renaissance could have never been realised.

4.2 Present – EU identity & “the Judeo-Christian tradition”

The Judeo-Christian tradition is often quoted as an essential element of EU identity, as attested to in speech acts and official EU documents. Although, at first glance, this may seem as a purely religious component, it also carries racial connotations that, whether intentionally or not, systematically minimise and silence those Europeans who do not fit within this binary.

Contrary to the statements made in some EU documents, such as the 1973 Copenhagen Declaration, Europe is not (entirely) Judeo-Christian. Believing so denies the existence of the Caliphate of Al-Andalus up until the 15th century, which took place in modern day Spain. Even if we were to disqualify this Caliphate from Europe, it is impossible to erase its very tangible consequences to not only Spanish history, but also to European history as a whole. For example, Spanish would have never expanded its linguistic richness, and some of Spain’s most iconic historical buildings, such as the Alhambra, would have never been built. Thus, disregarding the Arabic presence and influence in Europe would be as absurd as denying Europe’s role in the shaping of the Americas.

It can be argued that these historical events pre-date the existence of the European Community and are thus irrelevant for the construction of an EU identity. However, the efforts to shape an EU identity have been largely pushed forward similarly to the way national identities are constructed (Delanty and Rumford, 2005). Therefore, EU identity also attempts to anchor itself in prominent historical moments of its member states, supplementing its own milestones, such as the introduction of the Euro or the consolidation of the single market.

Furthermore, Europe has never existed in a vacuum. In fact, it can be argued that the notion of Europe did not start until the European powers started venturing overseas, and the need arose to assert their dominance and secure their position vis-a-vis their new territories. Regardless of when Europe came to be, the reality is that a great part of its consolidation as a world power across space and time was thanks to its dealings with “Others”. Yet, who are these “Others”? It is important to remember that the search for a common European cultural identity has partially entailed a retelling of the history of European nations to produce a cohesive story that shows that Europe has always existed as a distinct and unified

cultural and political bloc. However, this retelling runs into the danger of disregarding that most European nations lived in a state of constant war until recent times.

In other words, I distinguish two challenges to the modern understanding of (cultural) EU identity. First, how to reinterpret the constant tensions among modern EU nations in the past? Creating a unified, cohesive version of European history that proves that Europe, and the EU, have always acted as a single bloc with common interests would be challenging. Doing so would entail an enormous revision of history, and a possible danger of turning history into propaganda. Second, how to explain Europe (and the EU) without the rest of the world?

Identity and race

According to Hall (1991), “identity is always an open, complex and unfinished game – always ‘under construction’ (in Europe as much as in the Middle East, Africa or the Caribbean).” Thus, if identity is ever-changing, and bound to evolve at any time, then the following criticism of the current understanding of European identity can be used to reshape it and produce a more inclusive definition of the term.

Identity construction is also not an isolated process; it depends on external factors, such as culture or race. Yet, in modern EU identity building, there seems to be a conflation of race with culture. El-Tayeb (2011) states that this is particularly common in debates surrounding migration and minorities. This false equivalent is more noticeable when talking about EU identity and its “Judeo-Christian tradition”. Here, religion is also equated to race, effectively blurring the lines between these three separate concepts. Although race, culture, and religion are important aspects of identity construction, and often closely related, it is important to distinguish them from each other. Failing to do so results in issues such as the racialisation of religion, the most salient example of it being the conflation of Arab nations and Islam.

Moreover, as mentioned in the introduction of this thesis, there is a vast Arabic, as well as Islamic, heritage in European history. Yet, there seems to be a rejection in historical accounts to credit those who did not fit the phenotypes of Leonardo or Rembrandt for their artistic and scientific contributions. This historical erasure of the racialized other gives way to the false idea that Europe is a raceless continent. Not talking about race, however, does not mean that racism does not exist, but that it is difficult, if not impossible, to discuss it (El-Tayeb, 2011). Viewing Europe, or more specifically, the EU, as raceless, runs into the danger of ignoring the existence of those Europeans who are not of Judeo-Christian origin, or white.

Race is another highly contentious issue in the discussion of EU identity. According to El-Tayeb (2011) there is no acknowledgment of the history of other races in the continent. This idea of racelessness makes that “those perceived as non-Europeans constantly have to prove that their presence is legitimate, for there is no space within the limits of Europe that they can claim as their own, in which their status of belonging is undisputed” (El-Tayeb, 2011). The erasure of other races also perpetuates the idea that those who have a different belief system or skin colour are nothing but undesirable, as they do not contribute to the prosperity of Europe. The issue is that these perceived “Others” are part of European societies and should be considered as European as their white counterparts. In other words, these narratives about racialized others that are commonly used in migration discussions also “remind racialized minorities that being in Europe for several generations does not translate into the acquisition of permanent rights, not to mention full legitimacy as ‘European’” (El-Tayeb, 2011). Bhavnani (1993) concurs, declaring that “it is this European internationalism which is a racialised nationalism, in the sense that ‘black/Third World’ people are always defined as immigrants, and therefore not citizens, and therefore not Europeans, and therefore not desirable”.

Considering not only the important contributions of those considered as minorities, but their constant presence in European territories for centuries, solely referring to the “Judeo-Christian tradition” is both inaccurate and dangerous. Indeed, there are several problems with using this specific term as a defining element of identity. The term itself conflates two of the biggest religions in the world. Hyphenating Christianity and Judaism is a problem because it implies that they are not distinct from each other, although there are vast differences between the two. They have different sacred texts, different dogmas, and different leaders. It is not suggested that they should not be amicable with each other, but they should not be written off as a compound whose bundle of experiences makes up the cultural landscape of the EU. In the words of Hall (1991), “the ‘barbarians’ are already inside the gate; and face-to-face with them, European cosmopolitanism does not stand up well to the test”.

Another issue, as addressed by Frankopan (2016), is that seeing Rome and Greece as the progenitors of Western Europe overlooks the fact that they consistently looked to and in many ways were shaped by influences from the East. For Bauman (2004), the main issue is that “classical antiquity and Christianity” have been considered key factors for the establishment of the principles of freedom, justice, and democracy.

Moreover, using the term “Judeo-Christian tradition” to refer to the set of experiences shared by the citizens of the EU, from the start of the continent to today, implicitly erases the lived and shared experiences of those EU citizens who do not belong to either of these faiths. Especially, it denies the presence and influence of Islam throughout European history, and their importance in what we consider to be quintessentially European moments, such as the Renaissance. The erasure of Islam in the religious

heritage of the continent can be contested the presence of Bosniaks (Bosnian Muslims), whose very existence calls into question the notion of a strictly Judeo-Christian Europe. This may be one of the reasons why second-generation Muslims are seen as cultural Others, considered to be migrants despite being born and raised in Europe.

However, the situation does not have to be as bleak as it seems. El-Tayeb (2011) believes that this invisibility gives the 'others' the possibility to create new forms of identity, which serve the purpose of unifying those that are marginalised. In other words, identity can be redefined to be inclusive of multiple groups, finding a common ground on their very marginalisation. While this seems to be a sensible first step, the end goal should be to incorporate those that are perceived as culturally different into the main society. Not only because they also deserve rights and recognition, but also because of historical motives.

Othering

Indeed, EU history does not seem to acknowledge the vast history of other cultures in its territory. According to Moosavi (2012), Muslims have lived in European soil for centuries, and have been present in countries such as Italy, France, Portugal and Spain for more than 750 years. However, their history in European lands is rarely acknowledged (El-Tayeb, 2011). This adds to the previous point on erasure and contributes to the pressure felt by those who do not look "European" to prove that they deserve to be here.

In these othering practices there seems to be also the case of racialisation of religion. In support of this claim, El-Tayeb (2011) declares that "culture [...] has replaced race in discourses directed at migrants and minorities". The false equivalent between race and culture creates a type of othering that is highly problematic. A prominent example of this is the assertion that Muslims and Arabs are the same; a statement that is used by some political orientations and that exoticizes and segregates Europeans who profess this religion, creating a hostile environment for them in society. Thus, contrary to what certain politicians ascertain, they are not new to EU countries, nor do their cultures pose a threat to the "European society".

Bauman (2004) sustains that what makes European history cohesive is that it has a spirit of constant renovation and reinvention. Although this statement seems reasonable, it does not explain what makes European history so different from others. After all, is he implying that other continents are not in an endless pursuit of renovation and reinvention? His comment could be used to perpetuate Eurocentrism, which implicitly considers Europe to happen in a vacuum.

Certainly, Europe has never been isolated. Most of its historical prosperity stemmed from its interactions with others, whether through slavery, colonisation, or simply trade. Europe's othering process is peculiar. According to Bialasiewicz (2012) Europe's Other is differentiated in time rather than in space. Thus, there is no single Other for Europe, as these have changed across time, as was exemplified in the previous section. In other words, this way of Othering allows Europe to also distance itself from its past actions. This, however, makes it more difficult for a single European cultural identity to be established, as it is easy to deny past mistakes or atrocities by blaming these actions on its predecessors rather than on Europe as a whole. Therefore, as mentioned in the literature review, it is better to follow Balibar (2004), who suggests that "the question then should not be one of tracing the contours of a European identity, but rather that of 'recognising Europe wherever it occurs'". Viewing Europe as a phenomenon, rather than as a physical entity, liberates the concept of European identity from geography. Its alternatives will be expanded upon in the next sections.

"Secularised Christianity"

In "European Others", El-Tayeb (2011) mentions the notion of "secularized Christianity", a paradigm that prevails in the EU. This concept refers to the self-identification of the EU, and Europe at large, as heirs to Christianity (and Judaism), under the guise of the protection of European values such as freedom of speech, rule of law, and democracy. However, it also indirectly affects Muslims because it puts their culture and religion at odds with the majority of members of EU societies. Circling back to the ideas of Bialasiewicz (2012), Europe, or rather the EU's, current other is Islam. Thus, 'Muslim culture' is seen as the opposite of 'European culture'. El-Tayeb (2011) concurs, adding that it is not the Christian majority that is at odds with the Muslim minority, but rather "European humanism" against a "hostile, intolerant, foreign culture". "Secularized Christianity" will become more evident in speech acts and EU policies, touched upon in the upcoming sections.

Yet, there seems to be a paradigm shift in some EU outlets. The website of the Museum van Europa refers to European identity as "not exclusive but inclusive. It doesn't replace other identities; it is added on top of them". However, the museum also declares that it "creates Europe through a streamlined memory whose binary structure demands the dialectic construction of an Other that can only do its work on the inside, while being forever discursively placed on (and as) the outside of Europe". In other words, the museum acknowledges that the existence of an Other is necessary for telling the story of Europe, and the EU.

Case study: The rape of Europa as a symbol of political unity

Introduction

Nowadays, Princess Europa is a common sight in the EU. From adorning the front of the European Council to being depicted in the Greek two-euro coin, the princess has almost become an unofficial face of the pan-European political project. However, Europa, and the bull that always is depicted with her, have a longer history in European territory.

The myth of Europa first surfaced in Ancient Greece, specifically in the island of Crete. The legend served the purpose of justifying the divinity of King Minos, who, according to the story, was the product of Jupiter and Europa's entanglement. The myth was included in Ovid's *Metamorphoses*, helping its popularization across Western Europe.

This paper will focus on the EU's appropriation of the myth of the rape of Europa, exploring its political relevance across history through art, followed by a discussion of the historical implications and potential modern consequences of using this myth as a foundational story of the EU. The search for a foundational myth is common practice in national identity-building. However, the need for a common identity for a supranational authority is not agreed upon (Delanty & Rumford, 2005). Regardless of the debates, the existence of EU initiatives aimed at promoting a pan-European identity is undeniable. Examples of these are the European Capital of Culture programme or the Erasmus programme, which aim, through different means, to create a sense of belongingness for the peoples of Europe. Part of these efforts is the usage of imagery, such as the myth of Europa, to establish a departure point for European unity.

Thus, it is interesting to delve into the journey of the myth of Europa and the bull, and investigate how their story evolved from a local myth to an unofficial EU symbol. In order to do so, this paper will discuss the myth of the rape of Europa, the evolution of its depictions and meaning, culminating in its modern adjudication by the EU. The political usage of this myth dates to at least five centuries ago and had hegemonic connotations to it. Thus, it is necessary to explore if its current use by the EU resembles that of the past. To do so, six artworks, belonging to different historical times, which have the myth as their subject, will be presented and contextualised. Afterwards, an iconographic analysis will be conducted, where common elements across the artworks will be investigated and parallels between them will be drawn.

The rape of Europa: Beginnings and popularisation

Europa and Jupiter were first mentioned in the *Iliad*, written around the 8th century BCE. This is however an indirect mention, as it occurs in the context of Jupiter enumerating his many lovers. Thus, according to Charles FitzRoy (2015), Ovid's *Metamorphoses*, which relayed the Cretan myth in a light-hearted fashion, were the source of most pictorial depictions of Europa and the white bull. This version

was much more detailed, explaining that Europa did not instantly fall for Jupiter's tricks, but that this happened gradually, culminating on her sitting on the white bull's back. This version also juxtaposes the myth with its rationalisation. In the rationalised version, Europa was most likely kidnapped by Jupiter Asterius, after hearing of the beauty of the princess, as it was custom in those times, according to Herodotus (Ovid, 8 AD). It is further suggested that the image of the bull comes from the figurehead of Asterius's ship. Another explanation provided by Ovid is related to a misinterpretation of two Greek words.

Europa and the bull were not only present in literary works.; they were also a popular subject for painters. They have been found painted on several Greek vases, and even in a fresco in Pompeii, and continued to be reproduced across time, most notably by artists like Titian and Rembrandt. They are nowadays immortalised in Greek €2 coins and in sculptures across Europe. These examples can be found in the appendix and will be discussed in the following sections. The myth was first represented as an Arcadian idyll (FitzRoy, 2015), an idealised version of rural life, similar to the painting made by Titian (Fig. 2). Yet, most artists after Titian were influenced by Paolo Veronese's rendition of the myth (Fig. 3), who portrayed Europa as "an almost childlike figure, playfully picking flowers, while the beautiful, white bull is a creature from a fairy tale. She has tamed the bull with her flowers, and rides off to her fate full of optimism and, sometimes, even triumphant" (FitzRoy, 2015).

The myth of Europa in art

In the images presented in this paper, Europa's expression and stance towards her own abduction varies from artist to artist. Titian's painting was commissioned by King Philip II of Spain, as part of a collection of six works depicting Greek myths, the *Poesies* (FitzRoy, 2015). These works became a prized possession for the Habsburgs. FitzRoy (2015) further elaborates that Philip II went as far as likening himself to Jupiter. This self-identification reflects the association between the myth and hegemonic power at that time. In FitzRoy (2015)'s words: "As King of the Gods, [Jupiter] was associated with imperial propaganda surrounding the king, dispensing justice and punishing those who threatened his authority". In other words, aligning oneself with the myth of Europa showed that one was as powerful as the white bull, who saw what it wanted, and seized it.

Titian painted the Phoenician princess with an ambiguous expression when realising that the bull has crossed the water with her on his back. Indeed, the meaning behind the facial expression of Europa in Titian's painting is disputed to this day (FitzRoy, 2015). This painting also presents the question of absolutist eroticism, equally present in Rubens's *Rape of the Daughters of Leucippus* (Carroll, 1989). (It must be noted that Titian's *Rape of Europa* was reproduced by Rubens, and it is the version that currently hangs at the Prado Museum). Europa's expression can be interpreted as one of extasy, which would explain why the Habsburgs allegedly kept it private. This was to preserve their reputation as

strictly Catholic monarchs (Marks, 2015). In other words, Titian's painting, which presents a semi-nude Europa as its main subject, was kept in secrecy by its owner to preserve his reputation. Yet, the painting also served as a reminder of the power held by King Philip II, thanks to his self-identification with the bull. Thus, the ambiguity of the myth's interpretation was also present in its artistic reproductions.

Despite the various artistic interpretations of the Greek myth, perhaps the most central theme is violence. Most notably, in Titian's representation of the rape of Europa. In this version, we observe a dichotomy between the innocence of Europa, which led her to be tricked by the bull, and her seemingly sensual stance. Europa's figure is at the fore, and yet she seems to be a passive character in the story told through the painting. Furthermore, despite the openness of her body language, the scene alludes to a turbulent future, both through its chaotic composition and through the grey clouds appearing on the right side of the painting, where Jupiter is heading to. In this version, as in that of Veronese (Fig. 3), Europa is placed at the fore of the artwork, thus becoming the central character in the composition.

In contrast, Rembrandt's version (Fig. 1) does not put Europa front and centre of the scene. Rather, his painting encompasses the entirety of the characters present in the myth, as narrated in Ovid's *Metamorphoses*. This painting also presents Europa's companions in the same plane as Europa herself, thus giving them equal standing in the storytelling. Yet the most striking component in Rembrandt's rendition is the fashion. Europa was a Phoenician princess, and, in this painting, she is wearing clothes that seem contemporary to Rembrandt's time rather than to that of Ancient Greece. It is possible that the fashion choice was an attempt to make the observer feel more identified with the story, kidnapping Europa from her original context.

The EU's iconographic translation of the abduction of Europa

More recent renditions of the myth, produced *after* the establishment of the EU (figs. 4-6) suggest a change of stance in the figure of Europa, compared to artworks produced before. There are some theories explaining why the myth of Europa has become an unofficial symbol of the EU. According to Dejaegher (2011), Europa "provides the reassurance of continuity". In other words, the figure of Europa represents a 'familiar face' in the new Europe, a recognisable symbol that dates back to Antiquity.

This new Europa represents and embodies the EU, thus her triumphant posture. In these artistic retellings, the bull does not seem to be a foe, but rather the vehicle towards Europa's glorious destiny. Fig. 6 presents this significance more overtly, with a Europa that holds a 12-star crown in her hand, while riding the bull, in a composition that is more resemblant of an equestrian sculpture, than of the original myth. This change can be explained by Dejaegher's (2011) suggestion that the EU has taken the figure of Europa (and the bull) as symbols, separating them from their own myth. However, separating the actors from their myth voids Europa of any meaning, other than being a namesake of the

continent. FitzRoy (2015) interprets the EU's adoption of the myth as a way of telling a story about "peace and unity triumphing over hardship, with the bull seen as a dangerous animal, undermining this concept of peace and unity, or as a liberator, freeing Europa by taking her across the sea from Sidon/Asia to Crete/Europe." Thus, Europa is expected to be a representation of the EU, and the bull signifies the violence that has been conquered by the princess and her message of peace and prosperity. The bull, however, could also represent the forceful aspects of the European project, which are a necessary evil to maintain and advance the EU's goals.

A vivid example of this change of meaning in the iconography of Europa and the bull is found in the sculpture of Léon de Pas, located in front of the European Council's headquarters in Brussels (Fig. 5). The depiction of Europa in this artwork is of a woman who is, quite literally, taking the bull by the horns. This image is similar to that of the Greek €2 coin. Both images present us with a new Europe, one that seems to have made peace with her predicament and is in charge of her own future. Although this reinterpretation could be inspiring, the transformation of the myth's significance is also telling of the way European identity has been constructed. The story of Europa is, ironically, abducted from its context, and inserted in a foreign narrative that aims to cleanse it from any potentially ill meaning. In other words, a myth that involves abduction and rape is transformed into the (unofficial) origin myth of a political entity that claims to stand for justice, peace, rule of law, etc.

The EU's willing association with the myth of Europa is not surprising. After all, the name of the continent stems from Greece. Either from the Phoenician princess or from the name that Ancient Greeks gave to the regions West and North from their land (Dejaegher, 2011). Yet, the EU's alignment to the myth is also not innocent. The rape of Europa has been historically linked to (hegemonic) power, as mentioned before. Furthermore, the central theme of the myth is gender-based violence, which is in contravention of the values and laws that are set in place EU-wide. Thus, having the myth as a symbol indirectly undermines the image of upholder of human rights that the EU has worked to achieve.

Using this myth as a foundational story for the EU implies that it too can act as Jupiter, without facing any consequences. With this added connotation, the story also resembles Europe's colonising and hegemonic past. If it were to be taken more literally, it also presents a beginning for Europe's interest in the Middle East. In this regard, it reminisces the underlying intentions of the British administrators of Egypt, as detailed in Said's *Orientalism*. In Said's (1978) words, "there are Westerners, and there are Orientals. The former dominates; the latter must be dominated, which usually means having their land occupied, their internal affairs rigidly controlled, their blood and treasure put at the disposal of one or another Western power." Comparing this quote to the myth of Europa shows a distinct similarity: the East (Europa), with its "blood and treasure", is kidnapped by the West (Jupiter), who feels the need

to dominate. In other words, the predecessors of most modern EU states, like the bull, saw the beauty of the Orient, seized it, and appropriated it.

These themes are not a thing of the past. The exoticisation of the East, orientalism, and othering are very much present in modern Europe. There are several examples, such as the religious othering of its own population. Drawing from the myth, we see Jupiter (the EU) kidnapping Europa (the East), time and time again, through foreign policy that enforces EU-approved reforms in exchange for aid, or in the treatment of migrants of cultural backgrounds considered “exotic” for the majority population of the Union.

Conclusion

Europa and the bull have been the subject of many artworks across time. Both their story and its numerous depictions present an uncertain role for both characters. The painting that most effectively represents this ambiguity is *The Rape of Europa* by Titian. Since the myth is open to interpretation, it is in danger of being misused and re-told by anyone in power, at their discretion. Furthermore, using the rape of Europe as a foundational myth has historical connotations that the EU should not have, and which cannot afford. After all, those who associated with it in the past used it to imply that they possessed the same power and prowess that Jupiter exhibited when kidnapping Europa.

Using the myth of Europa also has geopolitical connotations, especially with regards to the East, and the rest of the world in general. The Phoenician princess can also be interpreted to be the Other, who is destined to be overpowered and subdued by powerful Jupiter, which could represent the West, or former colonising nations. Even Herodotus rationalised the Cretan myth as a story where the Greeks kidnapped Europa in retaliation for the kidnapping of one of their own, adding an overt tone of violence to the original story.

A political and economic project, which has been active since 1957, should not have a Phoenician princess that was abducted by a Greek god as a symbol. If the EU stands for the values of rule of law, freedom, democracy, etc, it would perhaps be in its best interest to not adopt a myth that was used in the past as a representation of hegemonic power, and that represents a violent act. Moreover, the original purpose of the myth was to explain the lineage of the rulers of Crete. Using a local myth from Greece to justify the antiquity of Europe as a unified bloc does a disservice to rest of the peoples of the EU and reinforces the (mistaken) idea that Greece is the cradle of (Western) civilisation. Further, the EU is an economic and political project, and as such, should not have the need to cement nor justify its existence in antiquity, in the same way national identities do.

Rather than holding onto such a myth, it would be more beneficial to the construction of a distinct political and cultural identity to create new myths, drawing from the various EU member states and their local stories. Separating Europa from the EU would also allow for the exploration of new forms of constructing an identity, and perhaps help advance the debates surrounding European identity.

It is difficult to propose an alternative to the usage of this myth as the centre of EU iconography. Yet, it is vital to do so, as studying and reimagining the effigies that evoke the EU could lead to a better understanding of what the EU is and what it is expected to be. An interesting option would be to use other stories and myths from other EU countries alongside this myth. It seems unfair that only a Greek myth is represented, just because of the word that the Greeks used to call the territories north of them stuck around.

4.3 – EU policies and speech acts on European identity

Before starting this section, it is important to keep in mind that these policies and speech acts refer only to European identity. Thus, the concept used does not make a distinction between the identity that is being crafted for EU citizens from what it is expected from other territories and peoples that are not part of the EU but are still seen as heirs to “European culture”.

4.3.1 The Copenhagen Declaration (1973)

The first EU-led definition of European identity was made at the Copenhagen European Summit of 14 and 15 December 1973, attended by the Heads of State of Government of the (then) nine European Community members. The purpose of defining the concept was “to achieve a better definition of their relations with other countries and of their responsibilities and the place which they occupy in world affairs” (European Union, 1973).

The document is divided in three sections, “I. The Unity of the Nine Member Countries of the Community”, “II. The European Identity in Relation to the World”, and “III. The Dynamic Nature of the Construction of a United Europe”. Section I expresses that, despite past conflict among the European Community (EC) members, they “have decided that unity is a basic European necessity to ensure the survival of the civilization which they have in common” (European Union, 1973). The document also highlights the importance of upholding the values they share, emphasizing representative democracy, rule of law, social justice, and human rights. These, according to the Declaration, are “fundamental elements of the European Identity”. This section also presents their goal to establish the European Union before the end of the 70s.

The Copenhagen Declaration also considers that European Identity is dynamic, because it is constituted by a varied group of cultures that share a “common European civilization”, with similar interests, values, and goals. Thus, this European Identity also welcomes other European nations who want to partake in it. Another reason for extending this invitation is the acknowledgment that the European nations are stronger, both politically and economically, if they unite.

Sections II and III of the Declaration state that a European Identity is needed to consolidate the EC Members as a united bloc in world affairs. These sections lay out the relationships that the MS expect to have with various nations, such as the United States, Japan, and Canada. There is also mention of peacekeeping as a task for the European nations, emphasizing the importance of the Atlantic Alliance and the military protection that the US provides to the nine EC members. The document concludes by stating that European Identity is a steppingstone towards a unified European foreign policy.

Therefore, it follows that European identity was not conceived as a purely cultural identity, but rather an economic one, whose by-product was a strengthened cultural identity. However, there is another issue with this. The Copenhagen Declaration talks about cultural and economic unity among the EU9. Thus, the values and cultural pointers mentioned in the text are not valid for the current configuration of the EU. For one, because the EU has now expanded to the East and to the South, incorporating nations that were, at the time, thought of as different or even opposite to the EU9.

4.3.2 European Council Meeting at Fontainebleau 1984

In this meeting, the European Council addressed administrative issues such as budgetary imbalance and future projects, as well as other institutional affairs. However, European identity was also discussed at the table. In section 6 of the document containing the Conclusions of the Presidency, named “A People’s Europe”, the council proposes measures “to strengthen and promote its identity and its image both for its citizens and for the rest of the world.” These were the drafting of a single document for the movement of goods, the abolition of customs, and the harmonisation of university diplomas (European Council, 1984). Thus, laying the basis for what is now the single market. Among issues that required further consideration, the Council mentioned the creation of pan-European symbols, such as a flag and an anthem.

4.3.3 Václav Havel and European identity

Václav Havel was the last President of Czechoslovakia and the first democratically elected president of the Czech Republic. In his youth, he also participated in the movements from 1968, commonly known as the Prague Spring. Throughout his life, he advocated for human rights in his homeland, an activity that costed multiple arrests and, eventually, four years in prison (Encyclopedia Britannica, 2014). His interest in human rights was also shown in his speeches before the European Parliament, where he stressed the importance of Europeanism and shared what it meant for him and his people.

In 1994, Václav Havel, then president of the Czech Republic, addressed the European Parliament. In his speech, he mentioned the Christian tradition and roots in antiquity that were unique to the EU, and that vested it with its own spirit. The points President Havel made regarding the construction and consolidation of European identity seem to have been adopted by the EU. He proposed the creation of symbols and asked the Parliament to explicitly state the EU’s “historical mission and momentum”, as well as reflect on what European identity would mean not only for Europe, but also for the rest of the world.

President Havel closed his speech by proposing the creation of a Charter of European Identity. Although the idea for the Charter was not adopted by the EU, it was co-opted by a German citizens initiative, Europa-Union Deutschland, in 1995.

President Havel addressed the European Parliament in 2000, where he touched upon the concept of Europeanism, stating that “to reflect on Europeanism is to ask what the ideals or principles are that the notion of Europe evokes or is characteristic of Europe” (Havel, 2000). In this address, he also acknowledged the EU’s troubled past, but was optimistic about the possibilities of further and deeper EU integration, specially to avoid further conflict, as had just transpired in the Balkans a few years prior to his speech.

4.3.4 Treaty on European Union

The current consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union, one of the core EU texts, explicitly states in its preamble that the provisions laid down in Article 42 (hereafter Art 42 TEU) reinforce “the European identity and its independence to promote peace, security and progress in Europe and in the world” (Treaty on European Union, 2020). Art 42 TEU, however, refers to Common Security and Defence Policy, and outlines the role of the EU and its Member States in military operations, including its role in NATO.

Neither the Treaty on European Union nor the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, the two core treaties, make a clear-cut reference to European identity.

4.3.5 EU policy for cultural heritage

Cultural heritage is defined by the Directorate-General for Education, Youth, Sport and Culture, a subsection of the European Commission, as “a common good passed from previous generations as a legacy for those to come”(Commission et al., 2019). The European Framework for Action on Cultural Heritage states that inclusion is one of its pillars. Namely, pillar 1: Cultural Heritage for an Inclusive Europe. This pillar states that it “has the potential to contribute positively to people’s lives and to European societies as a whole”(Commission et al., 2019). Yet, the Expert Group on Cultural Heritage does not include stakeholders from minority groups (European Commission, n.d.). Although the Framework acknowledges the positive impact that inclusion in cultural heritage can have in the psychological and social wellbeing of the citizens of the EU, the participatory approach used to push forward cultural policies does not represent every EU citizen. Notably, minority groups such as the Roma are not part of the Expert Group.

The Framework also highlights the need to protect Europe’s cultural heritage. And yet, this heritage is not defined. The only overt mention to what this heritage entails are two pilot projects on focused on the rescuing of Jewish heritage.

The next section will present some alternatives to the policy-making and institutional efforts presented in this chapter, by asking a group of Europeans about their ideas to open up the definition of European identity presented thus far.

4.4 Future – Towards a more inclusive EU?

Before delving into the new ways in which European identity can be conjured, some authors have declared what the new options should achieve. Bhavnani (1993), for example, states that “the possibilities for constructing a multicultural Europe have to permit the free development of each inhabitant as the condition for the free development of all”. El-Tayeb (2011) adds the exclusions produced by the idea of racelessness force those at the margins to create new paths for themselves, so that they can be heard by the mainstream society. Indeed, the whitewashing of European history is detrimental to everyone involved, as it creates racial conflict in a territory that has historically benefited from the confluence of multiple cultures.

Another productive way of transcending the cultural and religious divide that seems to permeate European discourses across time is to not reduce the continent’s identity to its cultural component. Rather, as Delanty and Rumford (2005) propose, it is better to think of European identity as “a socio-cognitive form consisting of repertoires of evaluation, discursive practices, and identity projects which could be characterised in terms of dialogic rationality”. Paradoxically, the constant search for finding its definitive identity is a quintessential part of European identity itself.

European identity and the Eurobarometer

The question on affinity to the European Union was not always explicitly asked in the Eurobarometer. At first, Europeans were rather asked if they felt that their country was benefiting from being a member to the European Communities. This changed in the Eurobarometer 17, published in June 1982, where the question of “Do you ever think of yourself as a citizen of Europe? Often, sometimes or never?” was asked for the first time. The results at the time were mixed. The average for respondents who felt often attached to the Communities was of 16%, and those who sometimes felt attached to it amounted to 37%. 43% of those interviewed stated that they never felt as a citizen of Europe, and 4% did not reply. In sum, 53% of the respondents felt attached to the Communities. This section of the Eurobarometer also stated that, in this survey, there was “a generally weak link between national pride and the feeling of being a citizen of Europe” (European Commission, 1982). This question would not show up again until 1985, in the 24th edition of the Eurobarometer. This publication reported that 19% of Europeans often felt as citizens of Europe, with small fluctuations in the results among member states. The Eurobarometer 26 confirmed that the responses stayed stable, but added that “46% of the Danes, 58% of the Irish, and 67% of the British did not yet feel as part of the Communities.

The 27th edition of the Eurobarometer reformulated the question of belongingness to the Community. Now, Europeans were asked “Do you think of yourself not only as (nationality) citizen but also as a citizen of Europe? Often, sometimes, never, don’t know”. The results again provided a divided panorama. 48% of respondents felt European at some point, while 49% of the interviewed claimed that they never felt European. The Eurobarometer expanded on the question by asking in what ways the respondents felt European. The top two responses were “putting past rivalries behind us and living in peace with the people of neighbouring countries”, accounting for 52% of the respondents, and “the ability to travel without difficulties or too many regulations at least in Western Europe”, following with a 43% (European Commission, 1987).

The Eurobarometer 29 conducted an in-depth evaluation of European unity and national identity. The respondents were presented with two texts. One painted national identity and European unity as incompatible, while the other proposed that they were complementary. Afterwards, the interviewed were asked to classify these in a scale. The results showed that “the ‘complementary’ side has slightly weakened, the ‘contradictory’ side slightly strengthened” (European Commission, 1988). Eurobarometer 31 asked what was the most obvious way in which citizens saw the Community. Most respondents (around 50%) said that it was the lack of borders, and 20% considered the exchange programmes as a “European measure”. Other highlighted effects were the recognition of professional qualifications, and the abolition of customs.


The Eurobarometer 35 registered an increase of 7 percentual points in self-identification with Europeanness, while the number of those who never identified as European decreased 7%. In addition, the Eurobarometer states that the Gulf War acted as a catalyst for this rise in feelings of Europeanness. Interestingly, most member states also identified primarily as European, followed by their nationality (European Commission, 1991). In 1992, EC citizens were asked if they identified not only with their nationality, but also with Europe. 46% of respondents agreed with this statement, while 51% stated that they never felt this way. When the question was reformulated to substitute identity with citizenship, the results remained largely unchanged (European Commission, 1992a).

By December of 1992, in the Eurobarometer 38, public opinion became more positive of the prospect of a possible European identity. 62% of respondents believed that their national identities and a European identity would be compatible (European Commission, 1992b). By 1993, a total of 56% of respondents identified as European to some degree (European Commission, 1993). This number further increased by 1994, with 63% of EU citizens identifying themselves as European, either now or in the near future (European Commission, 1994). However, this number dropped to 51% by the spring of 1997 (European Commission, 1997). This statistic went back to the levels it had in 1993 until 1999, when 56% of the interviewed declared that they felt attached to Europe (European Commission, 1999). The

Eurobarometer 49 compared the results of the question regarding feeling European from 1992 to 1998. The 62nd edition provided another comparison, from 1994 to 2004. Both tables are shown below.

FEELING EUROPEAN - TRENDS FROM 1992 TO 1998 - EC12/EU15 ¹¹							
	EB 37 Spring 1992	EB 40 Autumn 1993	EB 42 Autumn 1994	EB 44 Autumn 1995	EB 46 Spring 1996	EB 47 Spring 1997	EB 49 Spring 1998
Nationality only	38	40	33	40	46	45	44
Nationality & European	48	45	46	46	40	40	41
European & nationality	7	7	10	6	6	6	6
European only	4	4	7	5	5	5	5

Source: (European Commission, 1998a)



Source: (European Commission, 2004)

On average, 58% of the respondents felt European to a degree by 2000 (European Commission, 2000a), raising to 60% by the next edition of the Eurobarometer (European Commission, 2000b). In 2001, there seemed to be a turn to nationalism, acknowledged and validated by the Eurobarometer results. In this year, the amount of people who identified as European dropped to 53% (European Commission, 2001). Yet, it raised again to 59% by the end of 2002 (European Commission, 2002). The Eurobarometer 59, published in 2003, reported a drop of 2 percentual points, with 57% of the interviewed identifying as

European (European Commission, 2003). By 2006, this number shrunk to 54% (European Commission, 2006b)

The biggest leap in public opinion regarding Europeanness came in the 2000s. By the beginning of 2009, 74% of respondents stated that they identified as European (European Commission, 2009), compared to the 71% reported in the previous year. By 2011, this number decreased to 62%, according to the Eurobarometer 75 (European Commission, 2011b). The number of those who identify as Europeans further dropped to 60% by 2012 (European Commission, 2012), going back to 62% by the following year. The sense of belongingness to Europe fell to 59% by the 80th edition of the Eurobarometer, published in the autumn of 2013 (European Commission, 2013). Interestingly, this number significantly increased by the next edition of the Eurobarometer, presenting a 65% of respondents who identified as Europeans (European Commission, 2014). The Eurobarometer 83 reported a 67% of people identifying as European, by spring of 2015 (European Commission, 2015).

After some back and forth in the amount of people identifying as European, the Eurobarometer 88 reported a total of 70% of respondents who viewed themselves as European (European Commission, 2017). 71% of those interviewed called themselves European by autumn 2018. Furthermore, the amount of people who completely felt like EU citizens reached a peak (30%), not seen since spring 2010 (European Commission, 2018). By spring of 2019, this statistic reached its all-time high in the decade, with 73% of respondents seeing themselves as EU citizens. This number would decrease by 3 percentage points by the beginning of the covid-19 pandemic, and following Brexit (European Commission, 2020a). However, by the next edition of the Eurobarometer, more people than ever saw themselves as European, with 74% of respondents identifying as such (European Commission, 2020b). The latest Eurobarometer registered that 58% of people felt attached to the EU, compared to a 67% that felt attached to Europe (European Commission, 2022).

The 50th edition of the Eurobarometer introduced a new question regarding national identity. Concretely, respondents were asked if there was a common cultural identity among all Europeans. The results showed that, on average, only 38% of those interviewed agreed to some extent, while 49% were in a level of disagreement (European Commission, 1998b).

Later editions of the Eurobarometer focused on the citizenship aspect of European identity and started asking the population about their levels of identification with symbols such as the European flag, as seen on the Eurobarometer 65 and 67 (European Commission, 2006a, 2007). The Eurobarometer has also expanded on feelings of attachment to Europe, the EU, a region, a country, and the world.

The compiled results of the answers to the question of citizen attachment to Europe can be found on appendix 2.

Chapter 5. Conclusions

5.1 Discussion

The Framework for Cultural Heritage attempts to protect Europe's cultural past. However, the institution never defined what Europe's cultural heritage constitutes. Therefore, it is difficult to protect something that seems intangible. Although the Framework's efforts are noble, its work seems limited because, as mentioned in a previous section, the Expert Group that helps the European Commission protect cultural heritage does not include minority groups, such as Roma and Muslims (European Commission, n.d.). Moreover, the Commission's current projects regarding cultural heritage are only focused on the rescuing of Jewish heritage. This is commendable, but, in my opinion, not sufficient to truly reflect the multiculturalism that has always been part of the European territory. Thus, I propose to expand the competencies of the European Framework for Action on Cultural Heritage to focus on all vestiges of the territories past, regardless of religion, rather than just working on projects that preserve post-war history. I think that the framework would also benefit from detaching itself from EU narratives, and rather working on preserving European cultural heritage at large.

There should be a shift of focus to define European identity, where emphasis is put on shared values rather than on cultural pointers. European identity can be divided into two dimensions, one cultural and one political. European political identity is solid and largely undisputed. It encompasses the institutions, the single market, the abolition of internal borders, etc. However, European cultural identity is more difficult to pinpoint. As seen in previous section of this thesis, numerous researchers and European institutions alike have tried to define this identity. The difficulty lies in the fact that Europe and the EU are not the same thing, and that both have changed their borders with time. Yet, I would like to rescue Bauman (2004)'s idea that there is a driving force that ties the EU together, something that the EU seems to agree with, via the promotion of its values and commonalities among its peoples. Therefore, a European cultural identity should include everyone and be less tied to race and more connected to citizenship and personal feelings of belonging.

There are no concrete historical bases to EU identity. The only mention in official EU documents is the need to differentiate the EU from other strong political powers, a need made more prominent during the Cold War. The first mention of the concept of European identity, made in the Copenhagen Declaration of 1973, highlighted that its definition answered a need to position the European Communities as a world actor. The Declaration also emphasizes the importance of common values such as rule of law and representative democracy as a "fundamental part of European identity" (European Union, 1973). Later documents focused more on the development of what came to be the single market as a point of unity among Europeans, and a selling point for European identity. I personally think that the most effective way for European identity to be successful would be to focus on the cultural,

economic, and political aspects of it, so that the citizens of Europe could see the benefits of belonging to Europe and to the EU.

The Eurobarometer (EB) makes a distinction between Europe and the EU in its polls, as shown from the EB 60 onwards. It also sees European identity as citizenship based. This was a surprising finding, given that most EU documents consulted for this thesis used both terms interchangeably. Moreover, it was refreshing to see the Eurobarometer, which answers to an EU institution, ask about belongingness to Europe and to the EU from a citizenship perspective. This is an alternative to thinking of European identity, since it would strip away the cultural connotations that it still has. Although they have become almost imperceptible, the recent conflict between Russia and Ukraine has shown that religion still plays a part in the feelings of unity of some Europeans. Something that is brought to the spotlight when it comes to providing humanitarian aid.

Although the reason to call Europe “Judeo-Christian” could have seemed justified at the beginning of the European project, the course of European integration has made it an obsolete description, especially with the addition of Eastern European countries. I mention Eastern Europe specifically because of its richness of cultures and ethnicities, such as the Roma or Eastern European Muslims, who have been present in these territories for centuries. Furthermore, the Judeo-Christian argument is similar to the earlier mentions of European identity, where one of the commonalities mentioned was Western civilisation. In this case, too, the expansion of the European Union towards the East has rendered such an argument moot. Thus, pinpointing European identity as an ethnic or religious identity would mean excluding many that have been citizens of Europe since before the EU was established.

Regardless of a common cultural identity, the EU has a very distinct and strong political identity. It is not only recognised by the world, but also acknowledged by 7 out of 10 of its own citizens, as shown in the latest edition of the Eurobarometer (Eurobarometer 96, 2022). The efforts to establish a strong European identity could benefit from focusing more on its political aspect, at least for the time being. Institutions are easily recognisable, and the benefits they bring to the citizens are also more noticeable in everyday life, contrary to cultural aspects. With this I am not saying that culture should be ignored or no longer prioritised, but I realise that more abstract aspects of identity can be difficult to grasp for those outside of this field.

This gap is also noticeable in the way European identity is discussed in academia, compared to the way this identity seems to be understood by those interviewed in the Eurobarometer. In my opinion, academia tends to paint a bleak future for European identity, or entertain itself with aspects that, although interesting to investigate, produce more theories than actionable plans to strengthen a cultural identity. The Eurobarometer, on the contrary, shows that the majority of EU citizens identify as

European to some degree. However, the question of “What exactly is European identity?” remains largely unanswered. A solution for this, I think, would be for academics to engage more with Europeans, in order to come closer to an answer.

Another solution for the current impasse regarding European identity would be to recognise not only the EU, but also Europe, as a multi-ethnic, multicultural territory. Therefore, it should be respectful of its diversity, freeing itself from religious denominations. Although there are already policies and mechanisms in place for the protection of cultural and ethnic minorities, the problem is that there is still segregation in day-to-day life. There could be more programmes in place to promote respect and visibility of these vulnerable groups, especially of European Muslims. I mention this group as it has been othered and targeted by national policies, such as the hijab ban in France, but also becomes an easy scapegoat for nationalists, such as Marine Le Pen, Nigel Farage, or Geert Wilders. They have also been considered a cultural other since the Middle Ages in European soil, even though they have inhabited these lands since before those times.

Bulliet’s Islamo-Christian civilisation could be good first step towards overcoming cultural segregation. However, European identity should aim to go beyond this concept, towards a complete detachment from religious connotations, but maintaining its respect and protection towards religious expression. As mentioned before, vulnerable groups should be made more visible. Yet, if the EU expects to be a polity that truly represents everyone, it should also move past the idea of a “Judeo-Christian” community. This may have worked in the 70s, but it is no longer a reflection of the cultural richness that the EU has acquired. I would even argue that the Judeo-Christian denomination did not even work back then, because Muslims and other religions and cultures have been part of this community since colonialism started.

Furthermore, it is absurd to market Europe’s past as a peaceful, solidary, and progressive polity, something that seems to permeate EU identity discourse. The natural state of European history used to be conflict; the last war in the continent ended less than 100 years ago. Therefore, I do not think it wise to attempt to rewrite history to reflect a unity that simply did not exist. However, what is commendable is that European nations came together at the end of WWII, put their differences aside for the sake of economic stability and peace, and this project keeps on growing to this day. At the risk of sounding like propaganda, this is the history that should kept in mind when discussing European identity. Perhaps there is no need to find an ancient, underlying unity among national histories of modern European nations. After all, the traditional way of building identity at a national level does not work for a political union that encompasses several national identities. Rather, the focus should be on warring nations that put their differences aside to grow stronger.

As mentioned in a previous section, there are two points of contention in the current understanding of European cultural identity. First, how can past tensions be reinterpreted to show a coherent story that reflects an underlying unity? Second, how can Europe (and the EU) be explained without the rest of the world? In my opinion, past tensions, as stated in the previous paragraph, do not need to be reinterpreted. After all, these past international struggles were what became a catalyst to the signing of the Treaty of Rome. Thus, I consider that the underlying unity, and eventual self-identification with Europe, started developing from 1957 onwards, and that there is no need to trace this unity further back. There is an extra dimension that must be added in this discussion, namely, Europe in relation to the rest of the world. As stated several times in the course of this thesis, Europe has never been isolated, and therefore, in my opinion, constricting European identity to an ethnic identity would make a disservice to the past of those who were oppressed by former hegemonic powers. European identity can be cultural and political, but not ethnic, as it would continue to oppress and suppress those that have always existed at the margins of society, a struggle mentioned by Bhavnani, El-Tayeb, and Said, to name a few.

Neither the Treaty on the European Union (TEU) nor the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), the two core treaties of the EU, make a clear-cut reference to, nor define, European identity. I do not think that this is a bad thing, as the treaties do not have a responsibility to provide definitions. However, there seem to be some goals set for European identity. The preamble of the consolidated version of the TEU mentions that the role of European identity is “to promote peace, security and progress in Europe and the world” (European Union, 2008). From this statement it can thus be inferred that European identity’s importance lies more in the defence aspect of the EU rather than in the promotion of its culture. The consolidated version of the TFEU does not mention European identity.

European identity thus needs to evolve too, from a concept born from a need to distinguish itself as a new-born political bloc, into one that reflects and respects the plurality and cultural richness of its peoples, regardless of its turbulent past. As seen in previous sections, the notion of European identity has already gone through changes in the past. It started as a means to position the budding European Community in the world’s political landscape. Then, it focused on the defence and preservation of European values. In the 80s and 90s, there was emphasis put in the shared values that were being promoted by EU institutions. Nowadays, the focus seems to be on the cultural aspect of European identity, as evidenced in the topic of this thesis itself. Sometimes it can seem, at least to me, that European identity is a doomed idea, destined to fail and crumble because of political crises. However, as mentioned before, its malleable nature gives us all an opportunity to redefine it as we see fit, without it disappearing or changing history. After all, European identity has been present in the EU imaginary for at least 50 years. Academic debates and EU discourse will not change that, but the interaction between these two, together with those that consider themselves European, could provide the way

forward. European identity can, and must, be reshaped to truly reflect the EU's and Europe's current reality.

5.2 Reflection

This research is written from a postcolonial approach, as probably evidenced by the choice of authors present in the literature review and the opinions expressed in the discussion, which could be seen as a bias. There were some limitations to this research. For one, the usage of interviews or surveys had to be scraped due to time constraints and travel restrictions at the time this research was initiated. This produced a thesis that, although thorough in its research of EU documents and Eurobarometer surveys, was not able to tailor its practical section based on its theoretical one.

The research process was exhausting at times, but after completing this thesis, I am more confident that there is a lot more to investigate regarding European identity. There are so many research options that the topic remains attractive to me, despite the limitations and constraints that I have encountered in this process. Since European identity can also become an abstract concept quite easily, I cannot say that this thesis has definite conclusions. However, I can say that I have done my best to summarise and visibilise an issue that I think should be brought to the fore more often: the discrimination that some EU citizens have suffered, and continue to, because of their race and/or religion.

Furthermore, the results of this thesis made me hopeful about the future of European identity. Looking through EU documents and speech acts I learned that there is no official definition for the concept. I also was surprised to find that most EU citizens feel identified with either the EU or Europe at large, and that the achievements of this Union are also largely acknowledged. Therefore, I think that the EU institutions and academics are going in the right direction by pushing forward to keep discussing European identity. Yet, I also recognise that extremist movements that continue to go on the rise might pose a threat to this idea of unity and cooperation that is already present, largely irrespective of the phenotype of EU citizens.

5.3 Recommendations

It is recommended that further research on the topic of European identity makes use of tools that produce primary data, such as interviews, focus groups, or surveys. This would enrich the results and open the floor to European citizens of all races and creeds and could potentially create actionable plans that improve the EU's current politico-cultural landscape.

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Appendices

Appendix 1. The rape of Europa: The EU's politization of a Greek myth



Fig. 1. The Abduction of Europa, Rembrandt. J. Paul Getty Museum..



Fig. 2. *The rape of Europe*, Titian. Isabella Stewart Gardner Museum.



Fig. 3. *The Rape of Europa*, Paolo Veronese. The National Gallery.



Fig. 4. Greek €2 coin



Fig. 5. "Europa riding the bull", Léon de Pas. Entrance to the European Council, Brussels.



Fig. 6. Zeus (Jupiter) and Europa, Torremolinos, Málaga, Spain

Appendix 2. Feelings of citizen attachment to Europe

