

UEFA's Europe

AN ANALYSIS OF UEFA'S NARRATIVES USED TO BORDER EUROPE



Bola de Futebol / Football ball by Marcio Cabral de Moura

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Summary

This bachelor's thesis will deal with UEFA's bordering of Europe and the narratives it uses to support the borders created. Different perceptions of what exactly entails Europe exist. For some, Europe is one of the seven continents on earth, being separated from the other continents by different bodies of water, like the Atlantic Ocean and the Mediterranean Sea, and mountain ranges, such as the Ural Mountains and the Caucasus. For others, the concept of Europe aligns with the European Union, a political and economic union formed by countries located on set continent. However, in the past, Europe used to be present all around the world, as the 'European' countries controlled territories spanning the entire planet through the existence of colonies. With these three different perceptions of what Europe entails come different borders. The first example provided borders of Europe by making use of physical elements of nature. The second example used the membership to the European Union as its border of Europe, while the third example shows that Europe can be found all around the world, with European borders existing almost everywhere you go. Pinning down these European borders is not only a challenge for the general population, but also provides for scientific debates and research regarding European borders. Nowadays, this research focusses mostly on European Union, its borders of Europe and the challenges these borders have to deal with. However, as shown by the introductory examples, different perceptions of European borders exist, based on different factors. In this research project, the European borders of the Union of European Football Associations [UEFA] have been studied. UEFA is the primary governing body of the biggest sport in Europe, but is not often associated with bordering Europe. Yet, since its establishment, this organisation has constituted its own borders of Europe which differ from many other perceptions. The following research question has been formulated to understand UEFA's role: *Does the UEFA play a role in redefining the external borders of Europe by creating their own narrative of Europe?* In support of the main question, three sub questions have been developed to dig deeper into the narratives UEFA uses to support its borders, as well as the inconsistencies and lessons that can be learned from these narratives regarding inclusive and just borders of Europe.

Using a combination of Eder's (2006) theory on soft and hard borders and Delanty's (2006) theory explaining the difference between open and closed borders, UEFA's borders of Europe have been studied. Eder's theory (2006) shows that hard, political, legal borders require the existence of soft borders in order to be respected. Soft borders are based on socio-cultural elements and are generally more fluent. Through creating narratives that claim a shared sense of identity, soft borders can be used to garner support for, and uphold, hard borders. Delanty adds onto this distinction between hard and soft borders a continuum of open and closed borders (2006). With this continuum, Delanty shows that all borders have a basis that allows for easy crossing of set border or not. Crossing a border in this sense does not relate to the physical exercise, but instead to institutional ease with which one can navigate a border.

In order to answer the questions formulated, a qualitative research approach has been employed in which open-access UEFA publications were gathered and analysed. Through desk research, already existing policy documents, circular letters and media releases could be retrieved, forming the backbone of the analyses. Additionally, existing scientific literature has been used in support of the analyses. This was also the case for a variety of news articles from UEFA itself or from other sources. The UEFA publications were then transferred into the qualitative research software Atlas.ti, in which

the documents were analysed and coded. This research has made use of both inductive and deductive coding, meaning that some thematic codes were established beforehand, but codes were also derived directly from the texts.

During this analysis, six main narratives were retrieved which UEFA uses to support its own and unique version of the European borders. Since its inception in 1954, UEFA has always functioned as a union that represents its European member associations at the Fédération Internationale de Football Association, FIFA. Under pressure of football associations from all around the world, the European football associations feared they would lose the power they had to control football matters. Through the establishment of UEFA, the European associations could unite their efforts to protect their own powerful position. However, the fear of the European football associations was not very well-funded. Even though UEFA's member associations would lose some of its governing powers, they would still remain by far the most powerful actor. It seems as if the forerunners of UEFA exaggerated the threats, knowing it would lead to unity among the European associations. UEFA's powerful position at international level has remained until today. This power can be understood to be used in an almost colonial way by UEFA, shaping football around the world in the best interests of its own European members.

The second narrative that could be traced is UEFA's competitions for national teams and clubs. Soon after UEFA's establishment it started organising football tournaments for the national teams of its member associations and for club teams. These competitions have been reformed over the past 68 years, but still are some of the most prestigious football competitions around the world. UEFA claims the competitions allow all member associations to join in continental matches, but this is not completely the case. The competitions are dominated by the 'Western' European associations, whereas the 'Eastern' and smaller associations are only playing a marginal role. However, some recent developments, such as the UEFA Nations League allow for fairer competition for all members of UEFA. On top of this, the UEFA Regions' Cup allows for a different representation of the member associations, fielding amateur teams drafted from the strongest region of every association.

The third narrative of UEFA in support of its borders is the membership to the union. In contrast to the previous two narratives, this narrative is relates more to the hard borders of UEFA. Since its inception, UEFA's membership numbers have grown from 25 to 55. These members include some non-nation states, like England, the Faroe Islands and Gibraltar, but also some countries that are not commonly regarded as being European, such as Israel, Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan. However, the ability for new football associations to join UEFA has been changed lately, only allowing new associations to join when they are directly related to a UN-recognised nation state. On top of that, new members should also be located on the European continent, though UEFA does not define what this vague concept exactly entails.

The fourth narrative that could be retrieved during analysis is that of UEFA as a uniting force in Europe during the Cold War. This narrative shows UEFA as being one of the few organisations that is successful in connecting the East and the West. Throughout the Cold War, member associations from both sides continued their efforts, playing against each other in competitions and protecting the common interests internationally. Nevertheless, power relations within UEFA were not equal at all during this time and afterwards. UEFA has always been dominated by the Western associations, that

provided representatives for the most important positions, organised and won most tournaments and hosted the most Congresses. In the light of this narrative, UEFA's actions against the Football Union of Russia following the Russian invasion of Ukraine are extremely interesting and might lead to adjustments of the narrative in the future.

The last two narratives are closely related to each other and have only emerged recently. The fifth narrative of UEFA has to do with its efforts of progressing European football. In the wake of the end of the Cold War, UEFA started investing in the development of its member associations, both on and off the field. This eventually led to the establishment of the HatTrick programme, that redirects UEFA earnings to all of the member associations, allowing them to improve their organisation and promote football. The sixth narrative goes hand-in-hand with the fifth by focussing on UEFA's social responsibility. UEFA has started using football as a means to improve the human rights conditions in the territory of the member associations, limit the existence of racism and discrimination in and outside the game, improve the position of women and support sustainability.

Together, these six narratives form the basis of UEFA's borders of Europe. Whereas the narrative of membership relates more directly to the hard borders of UEFA, the other five narratives support the soft borders of UEFA, allowing for the creation of a sense of unity that results in the European football community with the European game as its core. This unity is then used to support the hard borders of Europe UEFA has created, as those outside of these borders do not share the same values the European football community cherishes. However, inconsistencies exist in UEFA's narratives, leading to claims of injustice and a lack of inclusivity from for example the Eastern associations of UEFA or non-nation state associations that are denied membership. At the same time, UEFA shows some novel perspectives to increase inclusivity and justice of European borders, such as the UEFA Regions' Cup that allows regions to come to the forefront and the recent efforts to increase representation of women and minorities.

1. Introduction

1.1 Introduction

In January of 2022, at a meeting of the Council of Europe, Gianni Infantino, president of the Fédération Internationale de Football Association [FIFA], stated that a biennial World Cup and better access for non-European players to European competitions could save the lives of many African migrants drowning in the Mediterranean Sea (MacInnes, 2022). The speech provoked outrage, criticising Infantino for instrumentalising death and misery for FIFA's own commercial good, after which Infantino apologised for his statements. Whereas most media focus was aimed at Infantino's migrant statement, the rest of the content of his address might just have been as interesting, but for completely different reasons. Infantino proposed that access to European football competitions was too limited for non-European players, and that relaxing the rules for non-European players to play in Europe would benefit the development of the non-European regions of departure positively (MacInnes, 2022).

However, Infantino does not mention what he understands by European competitions, or Europe more broadly. FIFA has made its own division of the world, dividing the world among different continental associations (FIFA, n.d.b). The Union of European Football Associations [UEFA], is the primary European governing body for football, organising international competitions both for national teams and clubs (UEFA, 2022b). On top of this, all national football associations in 'Europe' are member of the UEFA. This list of members, though, is not in line with the members of the Council of Europe. Whereas the UEFA has a total of 55 national associations which they represent on continental level (UEFA, 2022b), the Council of Europe only consists of 47 members (Council of Europe, n.d.). Kazakhstan, Israel, Gibraltar and Belarus, among others, are a member of the UEFA, but not of the Council of Europe. Both organisations claim to represent Europe, but their versions of 'Europe' do not exactly overlap. In Infantino's speech, it is unclear to which of these versions he is referring, to FIFA's or the Council of Europe's interpretation.

The question could then be raised what exactly constitutes Europe. As the example of FIFA and the Council of Europe already showed, many different answers on this seemingly obvious question circulate. The most common answer would probably revolve around the classical map of Europe we know from education and most atlases. These maps often depict Europe as the geographical area on the northern hemisphere, bounded by the Atlantic Ocean on the west, the Arctic Ocean on the north and a set of more complex and vague boundaries on the east and south, consisting of the Ural Mountains, the Black Sea, the Bosphorus and the Mediterranean. However, this conception of Europe is far from perfect. Many other perceptions on what Europe is and where it is located exist and have existed throughout history (Kockel, 2010; Leontidu, 2004). Increasingly dominant nowadays is the coincidence of the idea of Europe with the territory of the European Union [EU]. Europeaness and the location of Europe has more and more been claimed by the EU and its member states (Boatcă, 2020; Eder, 2006; Leontidu, 2004). Those states that are members of the EU would carry on the ideas and values of Europe, defending what they believe to be the European identity (Kockel, 2010). Yet again, this image is also not perfect and without criticism. By claiming Europeaness to its members, the EU excludes states from Europeaness that are not a member of the EU (Kockel, 2010). Prohibiting those who are not a member of the EU from claiming to have a European identity is

highly doubtful, as can be illustrated by Brexit. The United Kingdom leaving the EU would mean that they are no longer European, along with Switzerland and Norway. At the same time, the EU includes territories that are not located on the geographic continent of Europe. These territories, most of which are former colonies or oversea areas of member states, are part of the EU, but mostly excluded and neglected by the image the EU tries to create of the location of Europe and its boundaries (Boatcă, 2018; Boatcă, 2020; Kockel, 2010; Kramsch, 2016).

1.2 Problem definition

As the examples of different ‘Europes’ above show, many different organisations, institutions and other actors all form their own idea of what constitutes Europe, its borders and what it means to belong to this idea. Infantino’s speech makes for an interesting observation: it is not only political organisations that interact with the formulation and creation of European borders, but also non-political actors who attempt to participate in this process. This leads to the following main question of this thesis:

Does the UEFA play a role in redefining the external borders of Europe by creating their own narrative of Europe?

In order to successfully be able to answer this question, the main question will be divided into a number of sub questions. By answering these sub questions, an answer to the main question will be formulated. The following sub questions have been formulated:

- *How has the UEFA defined European borders throughout its history by creating their own narrative(s) of Europe?*
- *What inconsistencies can be traced in UEFA's narratives for their version of the European borders?*
- *What can be learned from UEFA's borders of Europe to work towards more inclusive and just European borders?*

1.3 Objective

The objective of this research and thesis is to uncover what narratives UEFA employs to create their own idea and borders of Europe. Through studying UEFA policies and actions regarding the conceptualisation of Europe and its borders, both in the past and the present, there is the potential for finding a new projection of Europe. By closely examining UEFA’s ideas of Europe, valuable new insights might be found that can help defining what Europe constitutes in a just and inclusive manner.

1.4 Reading Guide

After this introductory chapter, this report will continue with addressing the relevance of the research conducted. In Chapter 2, both the relevance of this research for the wider society as well as the scientific relevance will be stated. Continuing on, Chapter 3 will set out the theoretical framework that has been used in this research. On top of this, a conceptual model will be revealed, bringing the theories of Eder and Delanty together. Chapter 4 will deal with the methods that have been applied, both in data collection and data analysis. After this, in Chapter 5, the results of the research will be presented along the lines of the most important narratives that have been found

during the analysis. These results will allow for answers on both the sub questions and main question in the conclusion in Chapter 6. Finally, in Chapter 7, the discussion will highlight some of the main research findings and use them to reflect on the research as a whole.

2. Relevance

2.1 Societal Relevance

As portrayed by the example of FIFA's perception of Europe and Infantino's speech before the Council of Europe, bordering Europe from the rest of the world happens differently by a multitude of organisations (Green, 2013). Even though they all make use of different borderlines, they do claim to represent the same Europe. This has the possibility to create confusion among the general population of different states that are both included in a certain delineation of Europe, but also to those outside of it. Through analysing and comparing the different notions that organisations, states and institutions have of Europe, a more complete and coherent view of Europe can be created, offering the public more clarity on what is meant by Europe when a certain organisation claims to be dealing or representing it. This research will specifically focus on the European borders according to UEFA, respected authorities when it comes down to football, but not often regarded as influential in the wider public debate regarding the borders of Europe. By outlining what this non-political organisations' perceptions are, a different perspective will be presented to the wider public, showing that such organisations actually are involved in the creation of narratives regarding the borders of Europe. Moreover, this study also aims to present new perspectives to a more just and inclusive Europe, by attempting to change the narratives that are currently dominant when bordering Europe with the lessons that can be learned from UEFA.

2.2 Scientific Relevance

As the borders of Europe are fluid, changeable and up for different interpretations, a common idea of Europe's outer borders has not been established by scientists either. As Van Houtum (2005) shows in his analysis of two 'classics', research into the European external borders has been an ongoing project throughout history. What has been considered Europe has changed from the Ancient Greek Mediterranean Europe to a dominance of Europe nowadays (Delanty, 2006; Leontidou, 2004). This focus on Europe as being demarcated by European Union membership has, however, shifted research interest of many researchers towards the challenges the outer borders of the EU face, most notably migration from Middle Eastern and African regions (Bialasiewicz, 2012; De Genova, 2017; Van Houtum & Bueno Lacy, 2020; Walters, 2009). Others criticise this approach in European border studies and instead focus on European external borders elsewhere on the world (Boatcă, 2018; Boatcă, 2020; Kramsch, 2016). Post-colonialism, inspired by the works of Aimé Césaire (2001) and Edward Said (1978), is a way of studying the European borders arguing that a broader perspective is necessary when studying European borders all over the world, also taking into consideration power discrepancies, stereotyping and discrimination (Said, 2014). European borders are not limited to the European continent, but appear all over the world. They argue that more attention is needed for these far-away, 'colonial' European borders in order to overcome the unequal power relations these regions have suffered from. This research will side with these critics and look to find better and more just European borders, as argued for by Van Houtum (2005), by investigating the borders UEFA applies to what they consider Europe. Through analysing the borders of a primarily non-political actor, this study aims to contribute to creation of a more inclusive, ethic and complete bordering of Europe.

Of secondary importance to this is the aim of this research project to increase the body of research that has been conducted regarding UEFA and its activities. Several studies have been conducted already, studying UEFA's history and establishment (Nunes & Valério, 2020; Vonnard, 2014; Vonnard & Quin, 2016), focusing on player health in UEFA-organised competitions (Di Salvo et al., 2010; Ekstrand, Hägglund & Waldén, 2011; Eckstrand, Speco, Windt & Khan, 2020), investigating corruption (Pouliopoulos & Georgiadis, 2021) or examining financial fair play measures of UEFA (Dimitropoulos & Scafarto, 2019; Müller, Lammert & Hovemann, 2012). This study will build on the existing literature, most notably on the historic insights, and add a new dimension to this by showing UEFA's activities and policies regarding the bordering of Europe.

3. Theoretical Framework

3.1 Soft vs. Hard borders

Borders as we know them are not a given fact, but a social construction (Delanty, 2006). In his own analysis of the borders of Europe, Eder (2006) makes a useful theoretical proposal on how to analyse the creation of borders. Eder establishes a distinction between hard and soft borders. Hard borders refer to the institutionalised, legal borders that are established in law and drawn on maps as thick lines between two territories. Soft borders, or boundaries as they are labelled, are based on the images people have of a certain territory, in this case Europe, which can be found in pre-institutional accounts. These writings then show where people actually believe the lines on the map should be, based on what they envision as being included and excluded. These borders are more socio-culturally based than political or institutional (Delanty, 2006). However, Eder argues that (hard) borders and (soft) boundaries do not exist outside of each other (2006). Instead, he argues that the two are interrelated. Boundaries can be used to attribute meaning to legal, institutionalised borders between different territories. Soft borders have symbolic power that can be used to naturalize hard borders. Because boundaries are already present in the mind of people, the borders that are legalised on the basis of these imaginaries are more easily taken for granted and accepted by the public. It can work the other way around as well, as boundaries can mark 'we-group', functioning to delineate identity (Delanty, 2006).

3.2 Open vs. Closed borders

Delanty (2006) adds to Eder's formulation of hard and soft borders a set of two opposing characteristics borders can have. In order to properly explain the functioning of border, Delanty (2006) argues that borders can be put somewhere along a continuum between being fully open and being fully closed, with different positions in between those extremes. Open borders are those boundaries between two territories that are easy to trespass, while in the case of closed borders, this is way harder to do. However, this should not be based on an analysis at microlevel, testing whether you are able to cross a border yourselves, but rather be based on policies and regulations allowing or disallowing one to cross a border. The example of the EU functions well in describing closed vs. open borders: the outer borders of the EU are more closed, as passports are necessary to cross from outside the EU to its internal territory, but once in the EU, the internal borders are open, because no policies or regulations are in place that prevent people from moving from one member state to the other.

3.3 Narratives

The symbolic power boundaries enjoy, does not appear out of nowhere. Rather, boundaries are created out of different narratives used to construct a collective identity (Eder, 2006). A collective European identity, according to Eder, is formed out of different elements that have to do with Europeanness. These different elements can be ordered and sequenced, so that a narrative comes into existence, pre-scribing what Europeanness is. With this narrative, a distinction can be made between the collective European identity, and that of those who do not fit in the narrative, the 'other'. The construction of a narrative of Europeanness is continual process, in which not just strategic, normative and historical conflicts are fought to change Europeanness for the 'better' in the view of some actor. For these narratives to work and create a common European identity, they do

need to be able to build on a shared symbol that can be used as a referent (Eder, 2006). Different nationalities need to be brought together, for which some commonality is needed. Eder defines three different transnational ideas that can be used to be at the basis of any narrative that creates European identity: shared cultural roots, shared social view and shared legal delimitation of citizenship (2006). Only when some, even minimal commonality is used in a narrative, can a collective European identity be formed. Once a European identity is accepted by the population, beyond being forced on them by elites, Eder argues that boundaries can be strategically formed to support a border of Europe (2006).

3.4 Conceptual Model

The figure below shows the conceptual model that can be created when the theories of Eder and Delanty are merged. Figure 1, displayed below, shows a visual form of the conceptual model. The conceptual model assumes UEFA to have a certain European identity, as it is the European confederation at FIFA. This identity, which mostly has to do with football, is used to create certain narratives. UEFA's narratives are necessary to defend and substantiate the borders UEFA uses to separate themselves from the rest of the world. Through these narratives, different borders can be formed by UEFA to separate themselves from the rest of the world and the other FIFA confederations. The different borders can be plotted on a graph developed by Delanty (2006), which takes into consideration the 'openness' and 'hardness' of a border. However, it is not pre-given that this border fits everyone's own imaginations. Lack of inclusivity or injustice of a border, as perceived by regions, people or other entities, either included or excluded by the borders created by UEFA, can lead to the non-acceptance of a border, meaning that a new or altered narrative is needed for UEFA to substantiate their vision of the European identity and support the borders it uses.




Figure 1: Conceptual Model

4. Methodology

This chapter will discuss the different methods that have been used during the research, both in collecting data and analysing the data that was gathered. Some adjustments have been made during the research in comparison to the initial plans before conducting the research.

4.1 Data Collection

In order to analyse FIFA and UEFA's vision of Europe and the narrative they have constructed, a qualitative approach of research has been used. The choice for qualitative research has been made due to the nature of the problem that is being studied and the goal that is associated to this. A qualitative approach suits a detailed and complex analysis of UEFA's bordering better than a quantitative approach, which is unable to uncover the narratives properly (Creswell & Poth, 2016). On top of this, a qualitative approach better allows for understanding the context UEFA's decisions and narratives fit in (Creswell & Poth, 2016). More specifically, desk research was conducted, making use of UEFA published material as the primary focus. This method has as its great advantage that it allows for the use of already existing data that can be accessed in large quantities online, without being reliant on people of institutions cooperating directly (Verschuren & Doorewaard, 2013). Different official documents from UEFA have gathered, as well as some official UEFA news publications. The decision to only use official UEFA writings as a primary source was made for the sake of construct validity. As the different narratives UEFA uses were the primary focus of the analysis, official UEFA sources are most reliable as these publications are used to spread the narrative. The precautionary measure of not including second-hand material prevents interpretations, ideas or reflections made by non-UEFA publishers from being interpreted as an official UEFA standpoint. However, this does not mean no secondary sources were used. Some publications by researchers who studied UEFA, most notably in its early stages, have been used as secondary sources to fill knowledge gaps that remained after analysing UEFA's own publications or as additional and useful insights to strengthen the argumentation. This form of desk research does have its disadvantages, though. First of all, the UEFA publications that are studied, have not been produced with this objective in mind, meaning that gathering data that are relevant can be more difficult (Verschuren & Doorewaard, 2013). Secondly, during research, the intention or implied meaning of the publications can not directly be uncovered by the researcher, because there is no contact between the publisher and the researcher (Verschuren & Doorewaard, 2013). This means that the analysis is dependent on the interpretations of the researcher, lowering the validity and reliability. However, due to the relative inaccessibility of the higher ranks of UEFA, doing interviews to circumvent this was not possible.

Primary data was gathered through UEFA's open library that can be found on UEFA's own website, UEFA.com. Due to the open access of this library, many different thematic documents and other publications were easily accessible. Before being earmarked and downloaded for analysis, documents, news articles, speeches and other material were scanned for relevant themes, making it so that all documents gathered before analysis would actually be worth analysing. Different types of documents were gathered, with the most important categories being 'Policy Documents', 'Circular Letters' and 'Regulations' and 'Media Releases'. Policy Documents are documents made by UEFA to express its practices, future strategies or results of past plans and programmes. Circular Letters are official UEFA announcements, made for its member associations, that keep UEFA's member

associations up-to-date with UEFA projects, notifies member associations of the ability to enrol for different tournaments and funding programs and communicates decisions made by the Executive Committee of UEFA. Many of the Circular Letters include not only the communicational message to the member associations, but also one or more enclosures. These enclosures have also been used as data, as they sometimes provide even more information than the Circular Letter itself. However, not all enclosures proved useful, so a selection has been, meaning only those enclosures that comprise important or valuable data were added. Regulations consist of different regulatory documents, setting out the rules of specific UEFA competitions, processes and programmes, such as bidding for the organisation of UEFA tournaments and competing in continental competitions. The last major category of data collected is 'Media Releases', consisting of documents made by UEFA to be released for the wider public, either via the news section of the website or in the official UEFA periodical called UEFA*direct. A complete overview of all data gathered and analysed, including the way of referring to them in this thesis, can be found in Appendix 1.

Even though UEFA has an open library, not all documents are accessible. Circular Letters are only retrievable for just over a year, whereas the accessible UEFA*direct editions only go back to 2008. Concretely, this means that no Circular Letters were accessible from before March 2021. On top of that, in the case of annually or periodically published documents, such as annual reports, updates on certain projects or newer versions of certain regulations, only the most recent version of the document was used for analysis, unless other documents provided interesting or differing viewpoints.

4.2 Data Analysis

The gathered data from the UEFA website and open library have been analysed using a discourse analytical view, meaning that the documents have investigated to retrieve a narrative used by UEFA in the creation of its European borders, as well as to find how this narrative is continued until today (Carta & Wodak, 2015). On top of this, analysis has focussed on the inconsistencies, unclarities and injustices present in UEFA narratives, as well as potential lessons that can be learned from UEFA's narratives. Before analysis was started, all data was imported into a qualitative software program, Atlas.ti. After having uploaded all data, documents were assigned different groups, as mentioned in the previous segment and as can be seen in Appendix 1. When this was done, coding of the data could start. Coding has been done both inductively as well as deductively. This means that codes were derived from content of the data itself (inductive coding) as well as from some predefined themes and categories (deductive coding) (Fereday & Muir-Cochrane, 2006). The predefined themes consisted of codes dealing with the different expected narratives that emerged during the data gathering, codes highlighting the relations UEFA has with other entities and codes regarding UEFA's definition of Europe. Through this hybrid approach to coding, the narrative behind the construction of European borders could best be analysed on its internal coherence and logic as well as on its relation to other existing narratives belonging to different views of European borders.

During coding, however, inductive coding meant that many new codes were added. To resolve a crowding of codes, code groups were made per theme and thanks to the software were ascribed a colour. Moreover, codes have been merged during the process of coding and some codes have later been deleted, as they proved irrelevant. In Appendix 2 the full and final codebook can be found, showing all codes, divided over groups, and a short explanation of set code. Due to the differences in

length and content, not all documents were ascribed as many codes as others. On top of this, some documents consisted of only a very small piece of valuable data, while the rest was of little interest to the research. Only those sections that were of use to the research have been coded and analysed, leaving the rest uncoded.

5. Results

In this chapter, the results of the analysis conducted in Atlas.ti of the UEFA documents will be presented. The analysis has taken place with the sub questions formulated in section 1.2 in the back of the mind. The chapter has been structured along the 6 most important narratives that were retrieved during the analysis. Each of the narratives has been used by UEFA in the past and is still being used today to back their borders of Europe. These narratives do not exist on themselves, but are linked to one another. Every narrative has been granted its own section, in which the origins of the narrative will be discussed, as well as the way the narrative has been developed by UEFA. The narratives will be discussed in rough chronological order of emergence. Secondly, inconsistencies and unclarities of each narrative will be mentioned. Lastly, each section will contain potential lessons that can be learned from UEFA's narratives and the way they support UEFA's vision of Europe, so that the borders of Europe can become more just and inclusive.

5.1 Common Position at FIFA

The first narrative that will be discussed is UEFA's aim to represent all European national associations at an international level, meaning before FIFA. First, the origins of this narrative will be discussed, after which a reflection will follow of the shortcomings of this narrative, as well as what can be learned regarding a more just and inclusive idea of Europe.

5.1.1 Origins of UEFA

In 1954, just before the FIFA world cup and the FIFA Congress took place in Switzerland, representatives of a number of national football associations from countries across Europe met in Basel to officially sign a motion that stated the following: *"the European football associations decide definitively on the constitution of a group of the said associations, under a form to be determined"* (UEFA 60 Years, p.13). Although the draft statutes were not yet approved, and the organisational form in which this group was to be organised was unclear, this moment has since been considered the origin of UEFA. Besides, it took until October of the same year before this new group got its name: Union of European Football Associations, in short UEFA (Vonnard & Quin, 2016). However, a continental group of national associations had been in the works for much longer. Ever since the end of the Second World War, the national football associations had been frustrated with the development of FIFA (UEFA 60 Years). Founded in 1904 by the national associations of seven European countries, FIFA had grown tremendously in just under 50 years to a total of 85 international members. With only 31 European members among those 85, the European national associations felt as if they were losing grip over an institution, they themselves had founded. They were far outnumbered in terms of membership, something which was only expected to worsen in the future. In order to protect European football's interests, the founding figures of UEFA figured that unity was to be brought among the European national associations. Even though *"not all European national football association officials saw the need to establish a European grouping within FIFA"* (UEFA 60 years, p.9), as it could potentially threaten the sovereignty of the national associations, an example was set by some of the South American associations. Already in 1916, the four South American countries Argentina, Chile, Brazil and Uruguay formed CONMEBOL (Vonnard & Quin, 2016). The stance of some of the national associations in Europe started to change: *"the benefits of such a process were becoming increasingly clear to the European associations, whose individual views sometimes differed too much for them to effectively defend their common interests"*

(UEFA 60 years, p.12). This made it possible to start exploring options for a European continental group at FIFA, which eventually led to the Basel conference and the UEFA, the Union of European Football Associations.

As mentioned before, the main reason for founding the UEFA was the fear of losing power at international level, at FIFA. This can be identified as the first of many narratives UEFA used to border Europe from the rest of the world. When UEFA was founded, UEFA considered all the European national associations that were member of FIFA to be its member. In total, in 1954, this meant that UEFA would have 31 members: the 25 founding members, physically present at the Basel meeting, consisting of Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, England, Federal Republic of Germany, Finland, France, German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Northern Ireland, Norway, Portugal, Republic of Ireland, Saarland, Scotland, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, USSR and Yugoslavia, and the six remaining national associations in Europe, consisting of Albania, Greece, Iceland, Poland, Romania and Wales. One potential member was missing, though. Türkiye was involved in setting up UEFA and willing to join the union, as they considered themselves to be European, but its accession was blocked by FIFA, who considered Türkiye to be a Middle Eastern country (60 years). As a result, they became an unofficial member of UEFA, joining in competitions organised by UEFA, until FIFA allowed the Turkish Football Federation to join UEFA in 1962 (Senyuva & Tunç, 2015).

The national associations of the founding members would from now on work together at FIFA to protect the interest of European football. Aided by statutory changes made by FIFA in 1953, *“allowing the continents to elect their own representatives to the FIFA Executive Committee”* (UEFA 60 years, p.16), the most important aspect of this collaboration was operationalised in the election of the European representatives at FIFA: *“The European members of the FIFA Executive Committee were elected by the UEFA general assembly/Congress from 1954 onwards”* (UEFA 60 years, p.16). UEFA did not want to prevent themselves from being governed by FIFA's wishes, so *“in order to preserve the independence of its own Executive Committee, members of the latter could not also be members of the FIFA Executive Committee”* (UEFA 60 years, p.17). This did, however, have the effect of giving the UEFA representatives at FIFA a little too much power, meaning *“they did not necessarily defend the positions adopted by UEFA”* (UEFA 60 years, p.17). In order to solve this, UEFA has since made sure to let their FIFA representatives attend Executive Committee meetings to strengthen the cohesion between the two. The narrative of a common position at FIFA is not only traceable in the act of electing the European representatives but is also firmly anchored in the statutes of the Union. Article 2 of the statutes, listing the multifold objectives of the UEFA. Different sections of Article 2 state that the objectives of the UEFA shall be to: *“promote unity among Member Associations in matters relating to European and world football”* (i), *“act as a representative voice for the European football family as a whole”* (l) and *“ensure that its representatives within FIFA loyally represent the views of UEFA and act in the spirit of European solidarity”* (n).

5.1.2 Reality of Europe's Position at FIFA

Even though the forerunners of UEFA employed the narrative of a united European representation at FIFA as their main *raison d'être* of UEFA in its beginning years, questions can be asked whether European football was really at danger of being overwhelmed by the non-European members of

FIFA. Gustav Wiederkehr, the former Swiss president of the UEFA from 1962 till 1972, went as far as to state the following:

“If, however, the voting power of the Associations of Europe, where football is played in almost every larger village, and which presumably still represents the majority of all football clubs in the world, is reduced to 25 per cent, this can, in the long run, only have derogatory effects on the position of the FIFA. This fact cannot be denied” (UEFA 60 years, p.56).

Wiederkehr strongly believed that UEFA and European football was being threatened, even attempting to reform FIFA's one association-one vote principle in favour of a one confederation-one vote regulation. However, Wiederkehr, and others with him, might, however, have underestimated the influence and power the UEFA held at international level. Especially in last century, the European associations still were considered the most powerful at FIFA, only being rivalled by the South American associations, united in CONMEBOL. Up until the 20s of last century, FIFA was completely controlled by the European associations, who provided all the members of the Executive Committee and the President (Vonnard & Quin, 2016). However, from the 30s onwards, pressure from mainly South American associations started to rise to reform FIFA in such a way that it would be international not only in its name, but also in the organisation itself (Vonnard & Quin, 2016). After the Second World War, this process continued. Whereas the European national associations had to rebuild, the South American associations saw its chance to increase its influence. In their efforts to make FIFA more international, and thus restrict the immense power the Europeans had occupied, the South Americans were supported by the Asian, African and Central American associations, struggling for their own recognition within the organisation (Dietschy, 2013). While all these efforts might have feared the European associations, in the early 50s, FIFA was still *“a federation charged with the task of governing world football, but which was dominated by Europeans”* (Jacqueus Ferran, in: UEFA 60 years, p.9). Most of the members of the Executive Committee were Europeans, the President was European and the rules and values of the game it promoted were those of the Europeans (Dietschy, 2013). However, many European associations either were not comforted by these facts or were successfully convinced that European football was at risk, as UEFA eventually was founded.

Up until this date, UEFA dominance of FIFA has continued. Every FIFA President, with the exception of João Havelange, a Brazilian, have been European (FIFA, 2021). His rise to power in 1974 marked the only break with true European domination of the international governor of football and paved the way for a more equal distribution of power to the different confederations of FIFA (Sugden & Tomlinson, 1997). However, the momentum reverted back to the European side in 1998, when Havelange was succeeded by Sepp Blatter. The strong linkage between UEFA's narrative of wanting to form a common position at FIFA, being afraid of domination by others, is perfectly visible in the current President as well, being Gianni Infantino. Infantino, who also gave the speech referred to in the introduction, fulfilled the role of General Secretary at UEFA before being elected as FIFA President in 2016 (UEFA 60 Years).

5.1.3 Colonial UEFA

Even though UEFA has had to give up some of its power at FIFA, in the form of permanent membership of the FIFA Council for different federations (FIFA, 2022), it still is a European-

dominated federation. Whether this is a result of UEFA's efforts to protect European football's interests can not be checked, but in a sense one can say that the narrative has worked. This European dominancy might be favourable for the UEFA and its member associations, but it has also shaped UEFA's 'external policy' in a way that might not be as favourable. UEFA is a strong advocate of the European sports model, a model based on an open system of promotion and relegation, with solidarity between different levels of play and a firm position for fans (Future of Football; Nafziger, 2008). Over the past 68 years, UEFA has started different development programmes to not only develop football in Europe, but also beyond. They have used their dominancy to tempt fellow FIFA members, but also complete confederations to adopt this system and model football to the way it is played in Europe. UEFA has tried to use its influence to retain their strong position, making other associations and confederations dependent on UEFA support, both monetary, but also in knowledge and services. At this point in time, UEFA still runs 121 development programmes, part of the UEFA Assist development programme (Annual Report). Through this, UEFA claims to use *"Football's power to connect the world"* (Annual Report, p52). Nevertheless, a sceptic could just as easily understand this as 'UEFA's power to develop football as it suits its interests best'. It almost has a colonial sense to it, with UEFA getting into contact with the underdeveloped member associations, helping them to develop and keep to the proper model and rules of football. The exert of the Annual Report below shows examples of these projects UEFA runs. To strengthen the ties with the CAF, Čeferin even specifically mentioned during the Congress in 2021, that *"Europe hasn't forgotten how much it owes to African football – you can count on us; we will work closely together"* (CL42('21)_encl1).

Whereas it might be understandable that UEFA wants to protect its position and undertakes certain actions, a moment of reflection might be necessary to rethink whether it is all being done in the right way. It seems as if the European associations are uneasy with losing a little of their power, thinking that their way of playing and operating the game will directly suffer from it. However, the chances of this happening are not all that high. The European associations, and with UEFA, still hold the strongest leagues, clubs and national teams around the world. At the last World Cup, in 2018, 6 of the final 8 teams remaining at the quarter finals represented a UEFA member association (Future of Football), while the FIFA Club World Cup has only rarely been won by a non-European team (FIFA, n.d.a). It might be time for UEFA to reform their developmental programmes in such a way that evolution of associations world-wide continues, but without the implied power relations that go it nowadays. A possibility to achieve this would be to start a funding programme not initiated by FIFA, that allows for the sharing of knowledge between confederations, allowing them to learn from each other, as well as having the budget to finance developmental projects from FIFA member associations. Remarkably enough, UEFA's HatTrick programme, which will be discussed more thoroughly in section 5.5.2, would be a perfect starting point, from which an international programme could be build. UEFA's HatTrick regulations might need adaptations to fit them to the wishes and state of international football, but the incentive and investment funding might just work fine internationally to improve football globally without the possible sentiments of colonialism by UEFA

5.2 Competition

However, protecting the interests of European football was not the only reason for the advocates of UEFA to start a European confederation. European football, since its inception, had always focussed on domestic competitions, with some minor competitions between specific states or regions being

organised on the side. At the same time, the FIFA World Cup provided the only opportunity to play at a true international level, with national teams. This section will unravel a second narrative that emerged during the establishment of UEFA: the ambition to organise European competitions. The focus will be both on the competitions initially started for national teams and club teams, before shedding light on the inequalities that emerge out of this narrative and potential solutions for this.

5.2.1 Competition for National Teams

Just like FIFA and the CONMEBOL, some voices within UEFA wanted to start organising a European Championship for national teams (Vonnard, 2014). While the focus might have been on the representation of Europe at FIFA, the first statutes of UEFA did include an article designed for exactly this: *“the arrangement when appropriate and at least every four years of a European Championship Series, the UEFA being the sole body competent to fix the regulations and conditions thereof”* (UEFA 60 years, p.19). With this, UEFA claimed the sole responsibility, but also rights on organising continental football tournaments in Europe. In doing so, Henri Delaunay, the first general secretary of the UEFA, stated UEFA *“has become a grouping in the legal sense but not yet in sporting terms. And yet I’d say that this sporting aspect is as essential to it as a national competition is to an association”* (Henry Delaunay in: UEFA 60 years, p.19). And so, the second narrative behind the founding of UEFA and its early borders was born: UEFA had the ‘obligation’ to organise football competitions.

However, not everyone was as enthusiastic about the ideas of some of the UEFA personnel. One of these opposing movements was FIFA. When it discovered the initial ideas for the set-up of the new-to-organise tournament, taking place over a span of multiple years, but in the same year as a FIFA World Cup, it resisted the efforts. After all, the organisation of a major football tournament in the same year as a World Cup, was *“against the vital interests”* of the FIFA (UEFA 60 Years, p.20). FIFA wanted to prevent national associations from being involved in extra tournaments or non-relevant matches, so that the World Cup would be the highlight of the year with the best players and nations represented. UEFA organising its own competition for national teams in the same year could potentially limit the number of national associations willing to take part in the World Cup. Secondly, the new UEFA competition had the potential to threaten the income of the FIFA World Cup. The income of the World Cup was fundamental to FIFA, so the new UEFA tournament had to assure the FIFA that its *“financial situation be neither altered nor undermined and that its previous resources remain guaranteed”* (Karl Gassmann in: UEFA 60 years, p.20).

But it was not only the FIFA that criticised the early ideas of a European national team competition. Among the member associations of UEFA, there was little eagerness to prevail with the initial ideas. At the 1955 UEFA congress, the UEFA working group responsible for creating a draft for the European Nations’ Cup, presented their ideas. These ideas, however, were not accepted in a vote by the member associations of UEFA, who considered them to be too premature. This meant that the working group had to go back to the drawing board and make amendments to their plans. A year later, though, enthusiasm had not grown. At the 1956 congress, again, the project was postponed. In 1957, in Copenhagen, it seemed as if the same was going to happen. Even though 15 national associations voted in favour of the plans, which provided a majority, the oppositional forces were not planning on quitting their efforts to cut short the European Nations’ Cup. For the time being, a delay was inescapable, but the vote provided a momentum for the advocates of the European Nations’

Cup. In 1958, in Stockholm, they therefore decided not to wait around yet again, after votes presented the same result as the year prior. Instead, they went on the aggression and declared that the vote for the first edition of the Nations' Cup would be taking place a few days later. This proved to be the right decision. 17 Member associations joined in this drawl, and preliminary rounds started in September of the same year. In 1960, when the final knockout stage was played in France, the USSR went on to beat Yugoslavia 2-1 in the final (UEFA, n.d.b). For the next edition, 29 of the then 33 members of the UEFA showed interest in competing. The UEFA Nations' Cup was born. Since, the name has been changed from UEFA Nations' Cup to UEFA European Championship and even later EURO with the addition of the year in which it is being held. The tournament has been held every four years, until 2020, when it had to be postponed to 2021 (Annual Report).

5.2.2 Competition for Club Teams

This was, however, not the only competition the UEFA set out to organise. The UEFA is a union for the national football associations of Europe, but the first championship the UEFA organised was not the European championship for national teams. Instead, a competition for the best professional football clubs of Europe was the first tournament to be organised by UEFA. This might seem incoherent with the function of UEFA and the scope of the organisation, as it has no direct control over the clubs. Yet, it was not the UEFA who gave rise to the idea of a continental competition for club teams. It was a group of journalists from French sports newspaper *l'Équipe*, who in 1954 came up with the idea for it. Up till that point, no true European or worldwide best football club could be decided upon, as international competition was unregulated and based mostly on friendly matches. Teams from 16 countries in Europe would be *"chosen by the organisers on basis of prestige"*, competing *"in home and away knockout ties to be played within fixed periods"*. Clubs *"were very keen to participate, although most were reluctant to commit without their national association's permission"* (all: UEFA 60 Years, p. 26). This is where UEFA comes in. As it were clubs from UEFA's member associations, they had to respond to the effort of the journalists from *l'Équipe*. UEFA was willing to co-operate, but had to ask FIFA for permission. On top of this, UEFA Emergency Committee, tasked with handling the efforts, also *"asked that the label 'Europe' be reserved exclusively for UEFA"* (UEFA 60 years, p. 27). FIFA allowed the to-be-created competition, as long as national associations of the clubs involved granted permission to set clubs and the word 'Europe' would not be used in the name. UEFA took over the organisation of the competition, Europeanising it and allowing all of its member associations to join in, instead of only the clubs *l'Équipe* invited (Vonnard, 2014). The new competition was named European Champion Clubs' Cup, in an effort of UEFA to involve clubs not on the basis of prestige but on the basis of national championships, while at the same time avoiding the word 'Europe' in the name. At this time, no one could have expected the worldwide success and lucrativeness of the competition. The first cup designed for the winner of the competition is also the only link UEFA has ever made to the origin of the word 'Europe' and European Mediterranean history. As 'Europe' was a prominent figure in old mythology (Leontidu, 2004), the designer of the first trophy incorporated a Greek artefact with the depiction of a ball in the cup (UEFA 60 Years).

UEFA did not stop here, though. Spurred on by the success of the European Champion Clubs' Cup, voices raised the idea of organising European championship for national cup winners as well. Although the first ideas were presented at the UEFA congress of 1956, it took until 1960 for the project to gain enough traction among members to start. Supported by the UEFA statutes, claiming that UEFA is the only institution to organise European continental competitions, the initiators of the

Cup winner's Cup took over the Mitropa Cup, a regional championship in the European Mediterranean (UEFA 60 years). They invited all the winners of domestic cup competitions of UEFA's members associations that had such a tournament, and officially started the European Cup Winner's Cup. This was not the last competition to be integrated into UEFA. In 1971, the Inter-Cities Fairs Cup, a competition between cities in Europe who had trade fair, was incorporated into UEFA, in order to create better coordination between different competitions and allow for more teams to participate in continental competition. The UEFA Cup, as it was to be called, consisted of teams from clubs who performed well domestically, but not good enough to ensure a spot at the Champions Cup or Club Winner's Cup (UEFA 60 Years).

The competitions organised by UEFA continued to flourish, partly because of the developments of modern technology, like television. Whereas UEFA feared the potential negative impact broadcasts of football matches could have on the attendance in stadiums and with it the profit that could be made, it soon changed its perspective on the issue when it turned out that the two could work complementary. In 1960, a deal was made with the European Broadcast Union to control the broadcasting of matches and skim profits more easily (Mittag, 2015). However, clubs still experienced too little financial security to their liking. On their initiative, UEFA reorganised its three continental club competitions in the 1990s. The Champions League was the successor of the Champions' Club Cup, while the UEFA Cup and the Cup Winners' Cup were merged a few years later to form the UEFA Cup, and later the Europa League. Both competitions no longer consisted of just knockout matches. A group stage was added to provide for more European matches, meaning more revenue, both for the clubs and UEFA (UEFA 60 years). On top of that, losers of preliminaries and third placed teams from the four-team group stage of the Champions League entered the Europa League. In 2018, UEFA announced the return of a third continental club competition, which was later to be called the Conference League (UEFA, 2018). The past season, the 21-22 season, marked the first edition of the Conference League, won by AS Roma.

5.2.3 Restricted Access to Competitions

Whereas the competitions themselves might flourish, the question can be asked whether the narrative of competition is successful in keeping UEFA together and creating unity. The tournaments and championships organised by UEFA are influenced by a hierarchy that exists in European football. UEFA's eagerness to organise championships has caused a situation wherein UEFA organises a multitude of tournaments for both national teams and club teams. Over the years, enthusiasm for these tournaments has grown, both continentally as well as on an international level. However, not all associations are represented as well at those tournaments. It is mostly clubs from national associations in the Western part of Europe that have dominated the club competitions. In fact, since the major reforms of the club competitions in the 90s of last century, with the Champions League replacing the Champions' Club Cup and merger of the UEFA Cup and the Cup Winners' Cup, almost every single club that won either of those competitions came from England, Spain, France, Germany or Italy. Figure 2, which can be seen below, shows the highest result ever achieved by any club coming from every single national association of UEFA in its premier club competition, being either the Champions' Club Cup or the Champions League.

As figure 2 shows, only a few associations have been able to have one of their clubs win a premier tournament, with many other associations reaching to the knockout stage at some point in the




Figure 2: Achievements of UEFA members in premier club competition until 2016

Source: Dtran080, reddit.com

existence of the European Champions' Club Cup or the Champions League. At the same time, there are also national associations who have never had a club that managed to qualify for the main stage of a tournament, as they were knocked out in one of the preliminary rounds. This mainly has to do with the development European club football has gone through. European football has commercialised extremely over the past 70 years. At the very beginning of UEFA, professional football was still in its infancy, with only a few players being paid for their efforts all over Europe. This number soon started rising, as prosperity grew (UEFA 60 years). The process was even accelerated even further by the invention of television (UEFA 60 years). Television allowed for people to watch their favourite teams playing. With the broadcasting rights of these matches, UEFA could make huge sums of money, which allowed for enabled UEFA to increase prize money. However, television did not only impact the continental competitions, but also the national competitions. With smart marketing, the highest national divisions were able to gather enormous amounts of money as well. Some leagues profited more from this process than others, which has led to a discrepancy in financial power of leagues and clubs that still exists today. The head start some of most famous clubs and leagues have had in the 80s and 90s is hard to catch up to without having to invest absurd amounts of money. The status some clubs and leagues accrued was then used by them to claim more permanent and qualifying spots for the European club competitions (UEFA 60 years). The clubs successfully managed to convince the UEFA that allowing more than one club per association in every competition was a benefit for UEFA, as it would bring in more money and better entertainment. With the revamping of European continental club football in the 90s, the UEFA therefor chose to use a coefficient system, which ranks the national leagues, that determines how many teams each league gets to send in. The leagues with worse performances of their clubs in the Champions League have always needed to have their teams qualify, as the national associations joined after the reform and the leagues did not accumulate enough coefficients to allow for direct placement. Combining this with the fact that domestic support (in money, fans, potential players, etc.) for many of the leagues

in the countries with worse performance is smaller, explains much of the difference. They simply had too much of a gap to bridge.

With the reappearance of a third European club tournament, the Conference League, UEFA hopes to turn the tides, allowing for all of its member associations to have representative teams participating in the main stage (UEFA, 2018). Even though last season marked the first iteration of the Conference League, there is little evidence that the Conference League will succeed in doing this. Many of the associations with little coefficient points, claiming a lower spot in the ranking, are still granted only access to the qualifying rounds, not directly to the group stage. This means that many associations still fail to be present in the European club competitions. UEFA might claim that it is a platform for competition for all its members, but it is a select group of associations that profits most from these competitions, while others have little chance of competing and showing themselves to the rest of Europe and the world.

5.2.4 UEFA Nations League

For competition between national teams, UEFA came up with a new tournament that attempts to tackle the differences in level and ranking of the different national teams. Before the start of the UEFA Nations League in 2018, the weaker national teams of the UEFA member associations never really played a role in European football. Due to the number of members, qualifiers have been necessary for many of the main national team tournaments, like the European Championship and the FIFA World Cup. Because of the limited access to the main stages of these tournaments, reaching for these prestigious tournaments has been near impossible for a large share of the associations. Their national teams played in the qualifying campaigns without much success and were left with some friendly matches that had no real stakes. UEFA might be very proud of the performance and success of European teams at the World Cups or the huge viewing numbers of the European Championships, for many, these stages are unreachable. In order to get rid of the many friendlies, UEFA announced they would be starting the Nations League. Before the first edition of this biennial tournament in 2018, UEFA grouped all association in three leagues, A to D, with A being the highest, based on the ranking of the national teams (UEFA, 2020b). National teams in each league were divided into smaller groups, in which they would battle for the first spot in the group. At the end of the tournament, when the group matches were over, all numbers 1 of each group would claim promotion to a higher league, while the last placed teams faced relegation to a lower league (2020b). A Nations League final would be played between the four winners of the groups in the A-league, to determine a final winner. Whereas the Nations League has successfully managed to replace the insignificant friendlies, the fact that it allows for all member associations to have a significant goal to play for might be of more importance. Not only the associations in leagues A and B, who normally battle for spots at the major tournaments, also the associations in leagues C and D have something to play for, being promotion to a higher division. It allows all national teams to play teams of their own level, letting them accumulate ranking points and developing football in a meaningful way.

The three images on the next page show the division of the national associations over the four leagues for the three iterations of the Nations League. After the first iteration of the tournament, some adjustments were made to size of the leagues and groups, meaning that leagues A, B and C have increased in size, while league D has decreased in size a little. However, comparison of the maps still shows the progression some of the associations have made. For example, the Hungary

Football Federation has managed to claim consecutive promotions, now playing in the A league, while some of the minor associations have managed to climb to a new level by finally winning matches with their national teams, like Gibraltar, the Faroe Islands and Luxembourg. It would be interesting to see what club competition would look like if a similar format would be applied. However, due to the power the top-tier clubs and professional leagues have accumulated over the years, starting their own interest groups and unions, the European Club Association [ECA] and European Leagues [EL]. Both the ECA and the EL have forced UEFA to accept them as legitimate stakeholders, resulting in two ECA representatives and a single EL representative in the UEFA Executive Committee (Batardiere, 2018; ECA, n.d.; Organs and Bodies).




Figure 3: Composition of maps showing performance in UEFA Nations League

5.2.5 Regions’ Cup

Another tournament that UEFA successfully organises and can serve as an example of how to adjust the narrative of competition to be more inclusive and just is the Regions’ Cup. The UEFA Regions’ Cup is a football competition for amateur teams from all UEFA member associations who want to participate. Although tournaments were organised by UEFA for amateur football players before, UEFA launched the Amateur Football Committee in 1996 with the mandate to explore the options for a new continental competition for amateur teams. UEFA had always been focussing mostly on the professional side of football, organising competitions for professional clubs and national teams. However, amateur and grassroots football form the largest share of players and provide the foundations for “excellence at the highest level of the game” (UEFA 60 years, p.147). In 1999, this project resulted in the start of the first edition of the biennial Nation's Cup. In the Nations’ Cup, every

member association of UEFA is allowed to be represented by one team, consisting only of amateur players, who have never played professional football or in the top national league of an association (Regulations Regions' Cup, art. 36). As can be derived from the name, though, the competition is not played by national amateur teams, but by amateur teams representing a region. UEFA has divided the territory of every national association into regions. Depending on the size of this territory, an association can consist of just a single region, for example Malta, Cyprus, Gibraltar and Andorra (CL60('21)), or of multiple different regions. In UEFA's 'Competition Structure Document', which unfortunately is publicly un retrievable, the regions of each national association are defined. National associations with multiple regions are forced to organise some sort of competition, to the associations liking, to determine which region will represent the association (CL60('21)).

Since the first edition, in which 32 out of the possible 51 national associations competed, participation among national associations has grown to approximately 70% (CL60('21)_encl5), meaning 39 amateur teams challenge for the title. In order to structure the tournament properly, some associations are directly qualified, while others have to play a pre-liminary mini tournament for the final spots (Regulations Regions' Cup, Art. 12). To determine which national associations qualify directly and which do not, UEFA has composed a coefficient system, comparable to the one it uses to rate national teams, clubs and leagues, ranking the national associations. The coefficient system takes into consideration the performance of the national associations over the past few Regions' Cups, but not the performance of singular regions (CL60('21)_encl3). If you would compare the ranking for the upcoming edition of the Regions' Cup, 2022-2023, in Appendix 3 with the UEFA rankings of the national teams of these associations, something very interesting can be seen. The national associations that dominate national team football for professionals are not the best performing associations in the Regions' Cup at the moment. Even though some of them can be found at the top half of the table, these associations have been unable to perform according to their overall status. On the other hand, some of the worst classified national associations on the FIFA ranking, such as those from San Marino and Lithuania, manage to score way above their weight in the Regions' Cup

UEFA's Regions' Cup can be seen as a successful attempt at both stimulating amateur and grassroots football in the territory of its member associations, but at the same time allowing for a different perspective on inclusivity of UEFA. UEFA is often associated with professional football, whereas amateur football is considered more of a task to national associations themselves. By creating an opportunity for amateur players to compete beyond the boundaries of their domestic competitions, UEFA shows that it values amateur football and that the European football community (Future of Football) so often mentioned by UEFA consists not only of the elites, but everyone competing under the umbrella of a national association that is member of UEFA. Beyond the attention for amateur football, the Regions' Cup allows for more equal and fairer competition. The difference in size between the numerous member associations is very wide. Whereas the smallest national association manages everything football for just under 34.000 people (Gibraltar Football Association)(Countrymeters, 2022a), the largest national association does so for a population of over 146 million (Russian Football Union)(Countrymeters, 2022b). The Regions' Cup, although not nullifying these differences, does reduce it significantly. For a union that values integrity of its competitions highly, also for the Regions' Cup (Regulations Regions' Cup, Art. 8), reducing this

discrepancy should be valued highly. Regions get the opportunity to show themselves to a wider world a rid themselves of the cloak of the national association they are otherwise covered up by.

It is, however, unfortunate and a missed opportunity for UEFA and its member associations to keep the separations of regions limited to the territories of the national associations. There are many regions throughout the territory UEFA covers through its members that cross the borders of national associations, of which the Basque Country (Royal Spanish Football Federation and French Football Federation), the Campine (Royal Dutch Football Association and Royal Belgian Football Association) and Tirol (Austrian Football Association and Italian Football Federation) are just a few examples. Though it might be understandable from an organisational perspective, the Regions' Cup would be a perfect opportunity to acknowledge cross-border regions. Through recognising these regions, a more just and inclusive imagination of Europe could be created, go beyond the nation state-system used so often. UEFA has the opportunity to do so, as it is not a union of political entities like the EU but is a union of football associations that do not always coincide with nation states.

5.3 UEFA Membership

The most obvious narrative that describes what UEFA interprets as the borders of Europe, is the membership to the union. This third narrative is as old as UEFA is itself. From the very beginning, UEFA wanted to represent its member associations at FIFA and wanted to organise tournaments for them. However, till this point, the way membership of UEFA is structured, provided to new members or withdrawn in extreme cases has not yet been discussed. This section will deal with the way UEFA membership is officially structured, through taking a close look at the statutes. Besides that, the consequences of the membership regulations will be discussed, showing inconsistencies and things to be learned for UEFA themselves as well as for other entities bordering Europe.

5.3.1 Development of Membership to UEFA

As illustrated before, under the heading 'origins of UEFA' (5.1.1), the union exists as a group of national football associations, who are member of UEFA. This membership can be interpreted as the most factual narrative of UEFA to demonstrate what Europe contains. In the statutes, this is explained as follows:

"Membership of UEFA is open to national football associations situated in the continent of Europe, based in a country which is recognised as an independent state by the majority of members of the United Nations, and which are responsible for the organisation and implementation of football-related matters in the territory of their country"
(Statutes, art. 5,1).

As can be recounted from the earlier explanation of UEFA's early years, the union started with 31 members in 1954. Today, UEFA consists of a total of 55 members (Direct 158). This means that the union has grown during its 68 years of existence. Expansion of the union has always been depended on national associations, wanting to join UEFA themselves, meeting UEFA regulations and passing the admission procedure in place. The admission procedure and criteria are broadly stated in article 6 of the statutes, while being explained more detailed in article 1 of the 'Regulations governing the implementation of the UEFA statutes'. National associations who want to become UEFA member association, need to *"submit a written application to the UEFA Administration"* (Statutes, Regulations

governing the implementation of the UEFA statutes, art. 1), after which the Executive Committee will study the completeness and criteria of application. If the application endures this initial check, the Executive Committee has the ability to “*provisionally admit a national football association into membership*” (Statutes, Regulations governing the implementation of the UEFA statutes, art. 2), which lasts until a vote among the members associations at the annual Congress will decide “*whether to admit or not as a Member Association a national football association that has been admitted provisionally*” (Statutes, Regulations governing the implementation of the UEFA statutes, art. 3). The first national association to apply for membership after the establishment of UEFA was Türkiye, which, as mentioned before, was not allowed to become an official member of UEFA due to FIFA's veto. To solve this issue, the Turkish national association was granted affiliation to UEFA (UEFA 60 years), meaning it could compete in UEFA competitions and attend Congress, but had no voting rights. The first new UEFA member to successfully complete the full procedure was the Malta Football Association. After having joined FIFA in 1959, it was granted full UEFA membership at the UEFA Congress in Rome in 1960 (UEFA 60 Years). In 1962, the stalemate between UEFA and FIFA around the status of the Turkey Football Federation was resolved, and it finally became a full-fledged UEFA member (UEFA 60 years). The Cyprus Football Association, struggling with the same Europe-Asia problem as its Turkish counterpart, followed soon after, being granted full membership in the same year (UEFA 60 years). Lichtenstein, San Marino and Faroe Islands where the next to have their national associations join UEFA, in 1974, 1988 and 1990 respectively (UEFA 60 Years). By the time the Faroe Islands joined UEFA, the Cold War had ended, leading to the disintegration of the USSR. Because of this, the Football Federation of the USSR was reinvigorated as the Russian Football Union, while a lot of the former Soviet states created their own football associations. This caused the number of UEFA member to rise with 18 between 1992 and 1998 (UEFA 60 years). However, one of the national associations joining in this era was an exception to this, being the Israel Football Association, joining UEFA in 1994. Ever since 1956, Israel had been a part of the Asian Football Federation, but it was expelled in 1974 due to political difficulties (UEFA, 2020a). It had attempted a few times to join the UEFA since, but took advantage of the political situation in Eastern Europe and successfully acquired full UEFA membership in 1994 (Mittag, 2015; UEFA 60 years). Growth of the UEFA would continue after the turn of the century, with the associations of Kazakhstan, Montenegro and Gibraltar joining in 2002, 2007 and 2013 respectively (UEFA 60 years). The last national association to have joined up to today, 2022, has been the Football Federation of Kosovo (Direct 158). At the UEFA Congress in Bucharest, in 2016, a majority of the member associations voted in favour of the admittance (Direct 158). A full overview of all current member associations of UEFA can be found in Appendix 4.

Those who would have counted the number of members joining UEFA in the previous paragraph, would have noticed that UEFA should be having 57 members instead of the 55 it actually has today. This has to do with the disbanding and following merger of two of the founding members of UEFA, Saarland Football Association and Deutscher Fussball Verband der DDR. In 1956, after the previous protectorate voted to join the Federal Republic of Germany, the Saarland Football Association ceased to exist in its international form, instead transferring those activities to the football association of the Federal Republic of Germany (UEFA 60 years). The Deutscher Fussball Verband der DDR would suffer the same fate in 1990, merging and forming the Deutsche Fussball-Bund, the German Football Association (UEFA 60 years). The UEFA statutes include different articles regarding withdrawal, exclusion or suspension of membership of the union (Statutes, art. 8+9). A member association is

free to withdraw its membership, as long as UEFA is informed in time (Statutes, art 8, par.1). Exclusion is possible when certain criteria set out are met. However, UEFA Congress has the final decision through a vote, as the exclusion *“must be supported by three-quarters or more of the Congress, and at least half of the total number of Member Associations must be present”* (Statutes, art. 8, par 3). A similar process is established for suspensions, where the Executive Committee takes an initial decision, but Congress decides *“whether or not the Member Association should be excluded, or the suspension lifted or continued”* (Statutes, art. 9, par2).

5.3.2 The European Continent

In the preceding chapter, Article 5.1 was cited. This article might seem well thought out, with concrete rules to which potential new members need to satisfy. However, when studied in more detail, some striking features appear that might not be all that strict and conceivable in only one way. For ease of reading, the full Article 5 is being shown once again in figure 4 below.

Membership	
Article 5	
Members	¹ Membership of UEFA is open to national football associations situated in the continent of Europe, based in a country which is recognised as an independent state by the majority of members of the United Nations, and which are responsible for the organisation and implementation of football-related matters in the territory of their country.
Exceptions	² In exceptional circumstances, a national football association that is situated in another continent may be admitted to membership, provided that it is not a member of the Confederation of that continent, or of any other Confederation, and that FIFA approves its membership of UEFA.

Figure 4: Article 5 UEFA Statutes

Article 5 starts with addressing that UEFA is open to national football associations, located in the continent of Europe. The fact that only football associations can enter UEFA is logical. After all, UEFA is a union of football associations. The reason as to why they need to be European is also obvious, as UEFA is a European association. In article 5.1, UEFA defines Europeanness as being situated in the continent of Europe. However, it does not define what the continent of Europe actually entails. Multiple interpretations of ‘the continent of Europe’ can be thought of. Quite possibly to most logical is related to what is referred to in the introduction as the geographical, educational idea of Europe. This perception of Europe, often shown on maps, has Europe as one of the seven continents of the world, bordered by the Atlantic Ocean, the Mediterranean Sea, the Bosphorus, Ural Mountains and the Arctic Ocean. This means that countries such as Türkiye and Russia are cut in half. Another option would concern a more geological view of the European continent. Through this lens, the tectonic plates would be taken as a starting point, meaning that the continent of Europe would be a part of the Eurasian plate that stretches all the way to the western edges of the Pacific Ocean. Following this logic would mean, though, that some parts of what is considered European in the geographical sense, would not be part of Europe, as they are located on other, smaller tectonic plates. This would concern for example Italy, Iceland and Greece, whose countries are located on multiple tectonic plates (McKenzie, 1970). A last version of ‘the continent of Europe’ can be found mostly in Great Britain and Ireland. Here it used to refer to the European mainland to separate themselves from their influences.

Out of the three, it appears as if UEFA is remaining closest to the common geographic perception of the continent of Europe. Its logo is a great example of this. The current version of the UEFA logo, with

its blue and red colours, shows a vague image made of dashed lines of something that should represent the continent of Europe. The image created by UEFA seems to closely resemble the map of Europe as bordered by the Mediterranean Sea, Arctic and Atlantic Ocean, Bosphorus, Black Sea and Ural. However, some of the national associations are not present, or only in parts, on the UEFA logo, like Kazakhstan, Israel, Cyprus, Iceland, Faroe Islands, Azerbaijan, Russia, Türkiye, Georgia and Armenia. On top of that, parts of some national associations are not occurring either: The Azores, belonging to the Portuguese Football Federation, the Canary Islands, incorporated in the Royal Spanish Football Federation and all of the French overseas departments or collectives are part of the French Football Federation.



Figure 5: UEFA logo at UEFA Headquarters Source: Paddy Murphy

5.3.3 Nation States

In addition to potential unclarities revolving around 'the continent of Europe', article 5.1 contains another part that can be questioned. The second section of article 5.1 states that new member associations need to be *“based in a country that is recognised as an independent state by the majority of the United Nations”* (Statutes, art. 5.1). Indirect involvement of the United Nations [UN] in the membership procedure of UEFA is questionable. This has two reasons. Firstly, UEFA is not forced to make use of the UN list of nation states and their rate of recognition by other member states, but instead itself elected to do this. UEFA is not a political entity related to the nation state-system, and never has been. It has had numerous member associations that do not directly relate to a nation-state, like the English FA, the Football Association of Wales, the Faroe Islands Football Association and the Gibraltar Football Association. These national associations would not be able to successfully become a member of UEFA under its current statutes, as none of them are nation states. Requiring new member associations to be nation states is therefor questionable. This also means that, after the Gibraltar Football Association became a UEFA member in 2013, amendments have been made to the statutes. However, no public source of information could be found relating this change to a UEFA Congress or decision of the Executive Committee.

In 2015, the Jersey Football Association solicited for UEFA membership, but its application was rejected by the Executive Committee before a vote at Congress was held, because it deemed the application not to be in accordance with the earlier mentioned article 5 (Statutes). However, the Jersey Football Association appealed at the Court of Arbitration for Sport [CAS], who ruled that UEFA needs to take a serious look at the application and allow a vote to take place, even though the application does not accord with the statutes (Keane, 2019). At the 42nd Congress, the Jersey Football Association was allowed to plea in favour of its application, but the member associations rejected the bid (UEFA direct 176). By some, the Football Association of Greenland is also expected to apply for UEFA membership in the coming years, but it remains to be seen whether their potential application would succeed (Homewood, 2015). On top of that, there are a number of regions which are disputed or do not have an official status within another nation state, like Jersey and Greenland, which also have their own football associations. Some of these regions have affiliated themselves with an alternative international football federation, called the Confederation of Independent Football Associations [ConIFA]. Although these associations, such as that of Abkhazia, Northern Cyprus, Sicily and Yorkshire, do not aspire to become members of UEFA, they would also be blocked under the current regulations (ConIFA, 2022).

For all these regions, it feels incredibly unjust that UEFA has a number of members that, just like them, are not a nation state, but they are not allowed to join this group. The example of Gibraltar joining UEFA is a good example of the potential UEFA offered football associations in the past to overcome colonial power struggles (Kaya, 2016). Ever since the early 2000s, the Gibraltar Football Association had been attempting to become a member of UEFA. In its effort, it faced heavy opposition from Spain and its national association, as it does not recognize Gibraltar as a territory belonging to the United Kingdom, just like Jersey or England (Kaya, 2016). Instead, it believes that Gibraltar actually belongs to Spain, as it was illegally captured by the United Kingdom during the War of the Spanish Succession. However, Gibraltar's football association eventually managed to overcome these objections, becoming a full UEFA member in 2013.

A second reason why requiring a new member association to come from a nation state recognised by the majority of the UN is questionable, is that it indirectly involves non-European nation states in UEFA membership procedure. More concretely, it means that a new national association has to be denied membership when it originates in a nation state that is recognised by all European nation states, but not by the rest of the world. The votes of the European nation states would then be outnumbered by those from the rest of the world, meaning that the nation state is not recognised by the UN. In this example, which would probably never happen this extremely, the rest of the world would prohibit a football association of joining a continental confederation. Since every UEFA member still has a vote at the annual Congress before a provisional member gains full membership, using the UN and its recognition of nation states as a factor for membership could turn out to be frustrating. On top of those two arguments, using the requirement for a national association to be from a country that is considered a nation state, also means that at this moment, the UEFA will not be growing, unless national association appeal to article 5.2. Using UEFA's perspective of the continent of Europe, there are currently no nation states that are not already a member of UEFA. Of course, this always has the potential to change in the future.

5.4 Uniting Europe internally

The fourth narrative that can be traced in the documents of UEFA, is that of a uniter of Europe. Closely related to the first narrative, UEFA attempts to bring together all regions of what it believes to be Europe, going beyond divisions of Europe on the basis of politics or religion. This was, ironically, put into words excellently by the Pope Paul IV, who stated the following at the UEFA congress in 1968 in Rome:

“Your Union ... helps to bring together the sons of our old and still young Europe, whether from the east, the centre or the west, thereby fostering human contact that sometimes leads to true friendships between players and administrators from different countries. It also gives, not only to the players, but also to the countless spectators who watch these matches, a vision of people and things that goes beyond the limited horizon imposed on the sons of the same civilisation, of the same continent, by barriers that are often artificially erected between different peoples” (UEFA 60 Years, p. 54-55).

This section will delve into the origins of this narrative, situated in the political separation of Europe at the time UEFA was established. Furthermore, it will show the lack of results in terms of unifying Europe that the narrative has actually brought. Lastly, the ongoing invasion of Russia into Ukraine will be studied in the perspective of this narrative, studying the measures UEFA has taken since the outbreak of violence.

5.4.1 Cold War

During the time UEFA was founded, relations between the different football associations that were to become members of UEFA were directed by the politics of that time. Europe was divided into a Western and Eastern part after the Second World War, with relations between the two sides getting more and more difficult. This division was most notable on the political and economic dimensions, and around these disparities, different organisations were formed in the years after the Second World War, such as NATO vs Warschaw Pact, OEEC vs COMECON (Nunes & Valério, 2020). Most countries in what was believed to be Europe, joined one of the organisations on either side, leading to a clear East-West division and a lack of direct communication between the two. The only time the two sides met, was at international level, at the United Nations or one of its affiliated organisations. On continental level, a platform where both parties were actively involved, was non-existent, until the inception of UEFA. From its very beginning, UEFA involved both sides, including Spain and Finland, and managed to create a functioning organisation where cooperation on topics like the state of European football and successful competitions were dominant over the political and economic divides (Mittag & Vonnard, 2017). Even the German Democratic Republic was a member of UEFA from the start, even though it was not recognised by many other sports organisations around the world, most notably the International Olympic Committee (Mittag, 2015).

UEFA achieved uniting both sides of the Iron Curtain by appealing to the common spirit of the football community in Europe (Mittag & Vonnard, 2017). This is one of the goals of UEFA, as stated in its statutes: *“promote unity among Member Associations in matters relating to European and world football”* (Statutes, art. 2i). By doing so, a common ground could be reached between antagonistic forces, as both sides had an apparent love for the game. Football, already in the 1950s, was the biggest sport on both sides, with millions of players and fans (Mittag & Vonnard, 2017). On top of

this, UEFA started organising competitions in which both Eastern and Western club or national teams played against each other. In doing so, it managed to bring together fans, players and associations that before had no official relation (UEFA 60 Years). One of the first matches ever played in any UEFA organised competition serves as a beautiful example, wherein Real Madrid faced off against Partizan Belgrade (UEFA 60 Years). While there was some doubt whether all would go well beforehand, the matches turned out to be a great success, both for the large share of fans watching, as well as for the diplomats who had an opportunity to meet and talk with one another (Mittag & Vonnard, 2017). The matches, but also the annual congress and the multi-national nature of UEFA's bodies, allowed for the construction of networks that bridged the East-West divide (UEFA 60 Years, Mittag, 2015)

However, UEFA could not overcome politics completely, as it was still reliant on national politics of the different member associations in some cases. Especially in the early years, visa issues and boycotts were attempted by different member associations, but these associations were targeted directly and harshly by UEFA repercussions. Spain refused to grant visas to the Soviet national team to play in the first iteration of the European Championship, because of political tensions between the regime of Franco and that of the Soviets (UEFA 60 years). UEFA responded by expelling Spain from the tournament. A youth tournament organised in Portugal the next year led to boycotts from Yugoslavia, Hungary and the German Democratic Republic (UEFA 60 years). UEFA worked to better this situation, though, by strengthening the ties with the associations. From this time on, boycotts and exclusions only happened incidentally, with the most well-known instance being the 1992 European Championship, where Denmark replaced excluded Yugoslavia and went on to win the tournament (Chowdhury, 2012).

5.4.2 Unequal Representation

UEFA's Europe is partly based on unifying the different parts of Europe, as it has always done from its inception onward. Especially in the early ages of UEFA, when Europe was divided into a Western and an Eastern part, with outcasts like dictatorial Spain and Finland that is afraid of choosing between either side. On top of that, UEFA has always functioned as a democratic organisation, where every national association has an equal vote (Statutes, art. 17). Already in the early decisions taken by UEFA, like the establishment of a European Nations' Cup, all national associations were asked to vote during consecutive Congresses (UEFA 60 Years). Until this day, democratic principles have always been highly valued. UEFA's different organs and bodies are all elected democratically by Congress from candidates representing their own association (Statutes, art. 7a/c/d). Furthermore, every national association itself is required to have a democratic procedure for electing an executive body and has to guarantee that external influence in these democratic procedures is impossible (Statutes, art. 7bis.2). Breaching these democratic principles can lead to suspension or even expulsion of a member association from UEFA (Statutes, art 8.3 and 9.4).

All these democratic principles upheld by UEFA and the pursuit of European unity in football might lead one to believe that the East and the West were actually of equal importance in UEFA, having equal powers. However, this is not really the case. From the inception of FIFA, the Western European national associations have always dominated the Eastern ones. The idea of UEFA was of Western European origin, with high-ranking officials of the national associations of Italy, France and Belgium leading the way. However, at FIFA level, Europe had always been a confederation of both the West and the East, meaning that those national associations also had to be joined in UEFA (Mittag &

Vonnard, 2017). When UEFA was founded, though, the Eastern associations were far outnumbered by the Western associations, as the USSR still was one association, not yet split up as we know now. If one adds up the dominance in terms of membership of the Western associations and the work some of them had been putting into shaping UEFA according to their ideas and visions, it should come to no surprise that equality between the East and the West was far to be found. The election of the first President and Executive Committee show this perfectly. The first UEFA president was Ebbe Schwartz, a Dane, who was supported by Vice-president Gerö from Austria and Executive members Sebes, Delaunay, Graham, Crahay, Bouwens, Constantaras and Frey, of whom only Sebes was of an Eastern association, being the Hungarian Football Federation (UEFA 60 years). Of the nine most important UEFA officials in its beginning days, only one originated from the Eastern side of the Iron Curtain. Whereas UEFA was dominated in terms of members by the West, this 1 to 8 ratio definitely did not reflect this discrepancy. Out of the 25 founding members of UEFA, 17 were from the West, 6 from the East, with Spain and Finland not really part of either, but probably closer related to the West than the East.

Even though the Iron Curtain no longer exists, and Europe is not separated anymore, Western dominance in UEFA is still very much present. Throughout UEFA's history, numerous members of the Executive Committee represented their national association from Eastern Europe, some even making it to the position of Vice-President, like Sebes, Barcs, Jira, Ryashentsev and Surkis, but they would never claim the highest position (UEFA 60 Years). It would take until the election of the current President Aleksander Čeferin in 2016 for UEFA to be chaired someone from the (former) east of Europe (Chaplain, 2016). On top of that, the Executive Committee still holds more representatives from the Western European associations than the Eastern associations (Organs and Bodies). The same goes for the chairing of the multitude of bodies and organs UEFA has formed over the years. Out of the 26 UEFA bodies that are not led by President Čeferin, 18 are chaired by a representative of a national association from the former Western bloc, whereas only 8 organs are presided by a representative from a former Eastern national association (Organs and bodies). The UEFA Club Financial Control Body might have one of the most skewed representations, with only 2 'Eastern' members of the 13, and a chair who originates from the United States of America (CL19('22)). Not only the composition of UEFA's organisation is skewed, the locations of some of UEFA's premier events, such as its Congress and (finals of) tournaments is not divided equally and justly. Most Congresses have taken place in cities belonging to the Western national associations, as can be seen in Appendix 5, while only 2 of the European Championships for national teams have been played solely on the territory of Eastern national associations (UEFA, n.d.a). These examples show that, in terms of equal representation of all of Europe, there is still ground to gain for UEFA and that the democratic principles it upholds might not be suitable to obtain this.

5.4.3 Russian Invasion of Ukraine

On the 24th of February 2022, Russian armed forces invaded the Eastern territories of Ukraine and started a large scale bombing campaign targeting cities throughout the country (Zinets & Vasovic, 2022). This marked the first time since the armed conflicts in the Balkans of the 1990s that UEFA became involved directly in armed fighting between member associations. UEFA responded quickly to the Russian act of aggression, when, on the 25th of February, they released a statement with two main, initial decisions: *“To move the venue of the 2022 UEFA Champions League final scheduled in St. Petersburg on 28 May 2022 to Stade de France – St Denis (France)”* and *“No UEFA competition match*

shall be played on the territories of either Russia or Ukraine until further notice” (Both CL08('21), p2). Whereas UEFA might have hoped for a quick resolution and end of the war, the opposite happened as the war kept on raging. Because UEFA was now no longer capable of meeting objectives of its own statutes. Articles 2.1d, UEFA’s objective to “Promote Football in Europe in a spirit of peace, understanding and fair play, without any discrimination on account of politics, gender, religion, race or any other reason” and article 2.1d, UEFA’s objective to “organise and conduct international football competitions and tournaments at European level for every type of football whilst respecting the players’ health” were no longer achievable. For this reason, UEFA decided to suspend teams representing Russia at competitions for club and national teams (CL10('22)). As Belarus got increasingly involved in the fighting as well, helping Russia attack key cities of Ukraine, the Football Federation of Belarus was suspended of hosting any UEFA organised match on its territories (CL12('22)). These punishments, taken shortly after the start of the war, have since been prolonged by the Executive Committee, meaning that Russia-representing teams are not allowed to take part in any UEFA organised competition (CL21('22)). On top of that, the Executive Committee also rejected the Football Union of Russia’s bid to organise EURO2028 or EURO2032. In line with the Bid Regulations of UEFA, the Football Union of Russia declared their interest to organise one of these tournaments. However, the Executive Committee decided that this application violates Article 16.2 of the Bid Regulations, stating:

“Each bidder shall ensure that it does not act in a manner that could bring UEFA, the UEFA final or UEFA final phase, any other bidder (or any employee, officer or representative of any of the foregoing), the bidding procedure or European football into disrepute” (Bid Regulations, art. 16.2)

The line of events painted by the different Circular Letters shows the actions taken by UEFA. Even though the war has not showed any sign of stopping as of yet, some initial remarks can be made about UEFA’s decision. From the Circular Letters it seems as if UEFA has not chosen to suspend or withdraw membership of the Football Union of Russia itself. Until this point, only the professional clubs who represented Russia in the different club competitions and the different national teams representing Russia in competitions for national teams, have been targeted. This is remarkable, as it could be argued that the Football Union of Russia violated UEFA’s Statutes, meaning that their membership can be withdrawn or suspended by the Executive Committee (Statutes, art. 8 and 9). However, when closely examining UEFA’s Statutes, there is no article present that prevents national associations associated with war-causing states to be a member of UEFA. This could mean either one of two things: UEFA was not properly prepared for a war between states that are associated with member associations of UEFA, or UEFA tries to distance itself from politics, arguing that national associations are not responsible for the horrendous acts. Whereas the first reason makes it seem as if UEFA is straight up oblivious of what happens in the world, it can somewhat be understood, as the Cold War never turned openly violent either. The second reason, though, is even more remarkable. It may be understandable that UEFA does not want to interfere in politics, but open aggression at the scale Russia used it against Ukraine demands condemnation, as has been shown by civilians and UEFA’s member associations throughout Europe (CL10('22); CL12('22)).

5.5 Progressing European Football

The fifth narrative that can be discovered in UEFA's publications is the progressing European football and protecting the game from non-European influences. This narrative has been slowly developing during UEFA's lifespan, but has become increasingly dominant in recent years. This section will deal with the development of UEFA interference in the development of European football, eventually leading to the HatTrick funding programme. After this, the HatTrick programme will be explained more thoroughly, dealing with the way it is set up and the consequences this has for the member associations of UEFA.

5.5.1 Origins of HatTrick

Ever since its inception, UEFA has not stood still. The organisation has developed from a union directed by volunteers from the member associations into an institution with worldwide recognition, its own headquarters in Nyon, Switzerland (60 years), and a permanent staff of 549, working solely for UEFA (Lange, 2022). Over the past 68 years, UEFA has slowly but steadily professionalised and increased the number of matters it is involved in (60 years). These changes have mostly been for the better, but they have also impacted the focus of UEFA. The *raison d'être* of UEFA when it was founded was very clear: uniting the European national associations and represent them at international level. Soon thereafter, UEFA's purpose was enlarged, when it started organising football competitions. For a long time, these two aims have been the dominant determinants shaping UEFA's policies and the narratives they used for bordering Europe. However, in more recent times, UEFA has started focussing on other issues as well, allowing those to climb the hierarchy and influence policy. This rise in priority can be seen best regarding the attention UEFA gives to football as a tool of development. UEFA, in this narrative, is believed to be not only a representative union that organises tournaments, but also a platform for progression of football in Europe.

UEFA has always seen a role for themselves when it comes to improving the game of football. Already in the 1960s did UEFA start developing training programmes for football coaches and referees. In the 1990s this eventually led to a licensing system for both professions that has since been used by FIFA in football all around the world, both at professional and amateur level (UEFA 60 Years). However, pursuits related to the development of football received little attention and was of minor interest in comparison to the overall business of UEFA. During the nineties of last century, though, this changed drastically, when UEFA experienced a huge influx of new member associations. As one might recount from the previous segment, this had to do with the collapse of the USSR and the emergence of new national associations as a result. These national associations were admitted to UEFA, but *"almost all the new members lacked both experience and the necessary structures"* (UEFA 60 Years, p.101) to function as a properly. According to Lennart Johansson, president of UEFA at the time, it was up to UEFA *"to provide the correct structures to guarantee a swift and complete integration of these new member associations"* (UEFA 60 Years, p.102). To do this, a special committee was set up, called the 'Ad-hoc Committee for Technical and Administrative Assistance to Eastern European Associations', whose task it was to guide integration of the new members and properly execute the East European Assistance Bureau, an assistance programme put in place. However, smaller member associations who were not from Eastern Europe, were unhappy with the limited access they had to funding for modernisation, even though they were struggling themselves as well. For that reason, UEFA decided to completely revamp the systems that were in place. In 2003, the renovation of UEFA's funding of member associations was marked by the first iteration of the

HatTrick programme. Article 1.1 of the HatTrick regulations neatly describe the goal of the programme: *“The UEFA HatTrick programme was established to provide financial support to the UEFA member associations in their efforts to develop and foster football at all levels within their territories”* (Regulations HatTrick). The programme has been extremely successful according to UEFA and is currently in its 5th four-year cycle. By the end of the current cycle, in 2024, a total of 2.6 billion euros will have been invested into HatTrick since its initiation (Annual Report).

5.5.2 HatTrick Funding

Funding for HatTrick is acquired by UEFA, through income of the competitions it organises. The EUROs are the main contributor towards UEFA's HatTrick budget. On a yearly basis, every national association that is a member of UEFA can apply for funding. For all member associations, a maximum sum of funding is settled at the beginning of a HatTrick cycle, being 6.9 million for the current iteration. This number is equal for all associations, no matter its size or location. The funding is divided into *“HatTrick investment funding and HatTrick incentive funding”* (Regulations HatTrick, art 4.1). The amount of funding a national association obtains from incentive funding is based on implementation of certain conventions and participation in UEFA competitions (Regulations HatTrick, art 4.2b), while the amount of funding from the investment funding is relative to the plans that are submitted by the association itself. National associations are stimulated to submit their projects, as long as they *“help develop football within the territory of UEFA, be of strict common interest to the football community and have a clear sporting, functional and educational purpose.”* (Regulations HatTrick, art. 10.1). There are different levels that each association must check of, using the HatTrick investment funding. These levels are created so that associations in different stages of development, use the funding according to UEFA's priorities (Regulations HatTrick, art 10.2). A list of examples of different projects that would be fit for funding, spanning the different development stages, would include: realization of an own headquarters and stadium for the national association, creation of football pitches, educational programmes for referees or sports medicine, development of futsal or women's football, ICT training and acquisition of sports equipment (Regulations HatTrick, art 10.2).

Whereas the HatTrick programme might seem to be very inclusive and suitable for UEFA's goal of improving football throughout its member associations, some remarks should be made about it. Firstly, it can be questioned whether the principle of equal funding for all member associations is completely fair and justified. Not all member associations contain as big of an organisation and domestic populace it needs to support. Potentially, the German Football Association can be granted the same amount of funding as Liechtenstein's national association, but the German Football Association is way bigger in all senses of the word. At the same time, in order to meet the requirements set up by UEFA, the German Football Association has to invest more time and money with a dedicated FSR-manager to deal with HatTrick funding than the Liechtenstein Football Association is (CL46('21)_encl2/3). This can all be conceived in two ways. Either one believes this is just and equal, as UEFA shows solidarity towards the smaller, less wealthy associations in helping them improve the status of football in their territory, or one believes that of there is no equality in HatTrick at all, as the associations who indirectly bringing in the most money, by owning the best national and club teams that generate the most revenue, are being awarded the same maximum of funding, but they have to do more to conform the regulations. Overall, though, there is no real tension to be found in the UEFA documents that were studied, between different member associations regarding the potential inequality of HatTrick funding.

5.6 Social Responsibility

Closely related to the previous narrative is UEFA's recent attention issues regarding social responsibility of the organisation. This forms the sixth and last narrative UEFA uses to support its borders. Increasingly, UEFA regards itself as having the responsibility to not only improve football, but use football as a tool to better society. This section will deal with the rise of UEFA attention for human rights and protection against discrimination during the late 90s of last century. Since the position of women and minorities within UEFA is related to this, it will also be discussed. Lastly, the recent spike of recognition climate change and the need to include the issue of sustainability in its policies.

5.6.1 Human Rights and Discrimination

Because of the previously mentioned reforms of European club team competitions, which proved to be extremely lucrative, UEFA all of a sudden had enough money to not only finance competitions and development programs related to football itself, but also take up its social responsibility. This *“new-found prosperity”* was used *“in particular in the fight against racism and other forms of discrimination, aid for charitable work and support of integration”* (UEFA 60 Years, p.99). UEFA's focus no longer was on only trying to improve the game but aimed at a more far-reaching impact for its developmental budgets: to improve society by using football and allowing everybody to compete. A politician from Switzerland articulated UEFA's vision perfectly in his opening speech of the 45th Congress: *“football contributed to the development of a better world as long as it stayed true to its values and remained the sport of the people, accessible to everyone, allowing everyone to dream big”* (CL42('21)_encl1).

Even though funds were available to invest in UEFA's social responsibility from the late 90s, it would take until Michel Platini's presidency of UEFA, which started in 2007, before action really got under way. A series of significant events took place at two consecutive Congresses in 2013 and 2014. In 2013, all member associations unanimously adopted a resolution in which racism and discrimination was condemned fiercely (Chaplin & Harrold, 2013). The resolution outlines *“a zero-tolerance approach towards racism”*, respect as a key principle and stricter sanctions *“for any form of racist behaviour affecting the game of the game”* (Resolution Racism). On top of this, it calls for awareness and educational programmes to improve the knowledge and recognition of racism and discrimination (Resolution Racism). The resolution has been the starting point of UEFA's 'No to Racism' campaign, wherein notable (former) football players make their stance on the topic clear. This campaign has since transformed to the Respect Campaign, focussing not only on racism, but on human rights actions and policies in the broader sense (CL80('21)), represented by the Blue Respect logo (CL80('21)_encl3). UEFA envisions football *“as a platform to promote human rights throughout the game”* (CL80('21)_encl1). A year later, at the Congress in Astana, Kazakhstan, the member associations voted in favour of amending the statutes, leading to the addition of the following paragraph, stating that combatting racism and discrimination is an obligation of the member associations of UEFA:

“Member Associations shall implement an effective policy aimed at eradicating racism and any other forms of discrimination from football and apply a regulatory framework providing that any such behaviour is strictly sanctioned, including, in particular, by means of serious

suspensions for players and officials, as well as partial and full stadium closures if supporters engage in racist behaviour” (Statutes, art 7bis.7).

The amendments to the statutes have not impacted the status of the resolution adopted at the London Congress, as it is still in place.

Playing football has also been used by UEFA to *“to help refugees, asylum seekers and internally displaced people remain physically and mentally healthy and become part of their host community”* (CL03('22)). In 2017, UEFA launched a grant scheme for national associations that allows them to organise football related activities for refugees and the host community (UEFA, 2021). These activities should focus on improvement of integration of the displaced people, while at the same time allowing for exchange of perspectives. The pinnacle of the UEFA Football and Refugees grant scheme is an annual tournament, held at UEFA's office in Nyon, where teams consisting of both refugees and non-refugees from all over Europe compete for a trophy (CL03('22)). UEFA organises this tournament, and its grant scheme, in collaboration with the United Nations Refugee Agency [UNHCR]. In 2021, both organisations signed a joined Cooperation Protocol, outlining their collaboration (UEFA, 2021). Such collaborations, with international, but also continental multi-national organisations, have increased steadily the last few years, especially in the domain of UEFA's social responsibility.

5.6.2 Women's Representation

That representation at UEFA is far from perfect, has been explained in section 5.4.2 already. Nevertheless, it can also be found in the underrepresentation of women in the organisational bodies and organs (Organs & Bodies). Football is being played at both elite and amateur levels by men and women, yet little women are present in UEFA's structure. Contrary to the inaction when it comes to underrepresentation of certain regions, though, UEFA has been improving its efforts to close the gender gap in its organisation. With the rise of awareness of human rights, discrimination and racism, many different measures have been taken by UEFA in the past ten years to better the position of women in UEFA, both in terms of support for women's football as well as female representation. In 2016, at the Congress in Budapest, an amendment of the statutes was passed that established that at least one of the 16 members of UEFA Executive Committee is to be a woman (Statutes; Collett, 2016). This led to Florence Hardouin being elected as the first ever female member of the Executive Committee, a role she still fulfils (Organs & Bodies). Besides this landmark change, UEFA also launched the 2019-24 women's football strategy, alongside the strategic vision for UEFA as a whole, containing goals to increase participation in the game, boosting visibility and further developing the competitions (Future of Football). The annual report of the 2020/21 season shows some promising progress, seeing an increase of participation of girls and women, growing support from national associations for women's football and higher commercial value of the game. Another milestone in the equal treatment of women in football has been the emergence of female referees at the highest level of the game, in male competitions. In September of 2017, the German Bibiana Steinhaus became the first ever female referee in the highest domestic competition of any UEFA member association (Hazlehurst, 2017). Stéphanie Frappart, a French female referee followed in Steinhaus' tracks and became the first match official to lead a Champions League match in 2020 (BBC, 2020). Ever since, a few female referees have followed in their footsteps (CL85('21)_encl3). The efforts from UEFA have also positively influenced the representation of women in the structures of the national

associations (UEFA, 2022a). This is key, as UEFA requires all its members of different bodies to uphold a function at their own national association. UEFA, thus, is reliant on the cooperation of the national associations, who also determine candidacy for open functions at UEFA. For this reason, UEFA *“strongly encourages”* member associations *“to propose female candidates and representatives of ethnic minorities whenever possible”* (CL13('21)). All these efforts of UEFA over the past few years show promising prospects, but it is still to be seen how much energy UEFA will be willing to spend to keep this up.

5.6.3 Sustainability

The last few years, a new topic has arisen on UEFA's agenda to complement the efforts already made in relation to human rights: sustainability. Increasingly, fans and individual players have been raising attention for the impact football has on climate change and the relation football historically has with the fossil fuel industry (Mabon, 2022). Over the past years, UEFA has progressively taken more and more steps regarding sustainability. In November 2021, UEFA wrote all their efforts down in its Environmental Commitment that *“will serve as a basis for the development of policies, action plans and targets”* (CL80('21)). In the commitment, UEFA outlines that football should function *“as a vehicle for environmental protection, engaging society and governments on key topics and providing information and education to raise awareness”* (CL80('21)_encl2). Since European football has gathered an audience of millions over the years, it can take up a key position in helping to raise awareness and catalyse action. Besides boosting the attention climate change and sustainability gets, UEFA also wants to focus on circular economy, sustainability of the events they organise, being mostly tournaments, and infrastructure sustainability (CL80('21)_en2). Like with the 'No to Racism' and 'Respect' campaign focussed on human rights, UEFA has created a flag, the Green Respect flag (CL80('21)_encl3), that is to be used in different UEFA tournaments and other activities related to sustainability (CL15('22)).

In their strategic vision for the future, called Together for the Future of Football, UEFA has recently added a new pillar, that of responsibility. This pillar consists of *“policies that are aligned with the United Nations Sustainability Development Goals will help protect the fundamentals of the game for future generations”* (Future of Football, p13), basically joining the two narratives discussed together. Priority in this pillar is awarded to guaranteeing *“all our activities and events are founded on the values of respect and sustainability, leading by example for the benefit of current generations and ensuring a positive legacy for the future”* (Future of Football, p.15). It includes policies that focus on complete compensation of carbon dioxide produced by UEFA, players and fans in relation to the tournaments they organise, as well as promotion of circular economy, equal access to the game and anti-discrimination. Even though the relation with the EU and its predecessors has long been turbulent and difficult, UEFA has improved its ties with the EU and other political entities since the 90s of last century, looking to work together to tackle societal issues, while protecting European football and its privileges (60 years; Annual Report, CL78, CL78_en1, CL80_en2, Future of Football).

6. Conclusion

In the previous chapter, the results of the analysis of the selected UEFA documents were presented. With these results, answers can be formulated to the three sub question and eventually the main question. The first sub question formulated in Chapter 1 was the following: *How has the UEFA defined European borders throughout its history by creating their own narrative(s) of Europe?* In UEFA's documents, a total of six important narratives could be traced that have been used by UEFA in the past, but are also still used today. In line with Eder's (2006) theory presented in the theoretical framework, these narratives are used by UEFA to support the borders of Europe they wish to use. The hardest bordering narrative used by UEFA is that of membership. Membership forms the backbone of UEFA and is used as the administrative, political border of UEFA to separate itself from the other football confederations in the world (Eder, 2006). The borders that are formed using the membership narrative imply that all member associations of UEFA are European, and therefore located in Europe, while those territories of national associations who are not a member of UEFA, are not European, since they are a member of another continental confederation. This also means that regions are considered to be within the borders of Europe according to UEFA, while they might not be considered European by other institutions that have their own borders of Europe, such as the EU. Following Delanty's theory (2006), the membership narrative also provides the most closed border of UEFA's Europe. There are strict regulations for admission into the union that are not easily negated. Without being a member of UEFA, becoming part of UEFA's Europe and pushing the boundaries it has created is very hard.

However, UEFA uses 5 more narratives to define their own borders of Europe. These narratives, being the representation of European football at international level, creating competitions, uniting Europe internally, progressing European football and taking care of its social responsibilities. All these narratives are representing more soft borders used by UEFA. As described by Eder (2006), soft borders are necessary to create sufficient support among the general public to support a hard border. The same goes for UEFA as well. Its hard border, formed out of its membership policy, needs support from more socio-culturally inspired narratives before the national associations will accept UEFA's borders. A form of unity needs to be created that supports membership to UEFA. The establishment of UEFA already showed this, when the narrative of representation of Europe was needed before the national associations backed the plans to border Europe from the rest of the world in footballing sense. Unity was formed around the perceived fear of being marginalised by the rest of the world, something that had never happened before to the European football associations. Soon, though, it proved that more was needed for UEFA to increase its influence and become a respected organisation. In order to maintain this support, new narratives were formed that all helped to form a common football identity among UEFA's member associations. It started organising competitions that were successfully received by the population in the member associations. On top of that, it managed to keep Europe together during a tough time, by appealing for a united European community of football. Lately, UEFA has shown that it continues to listen to its members, increasing their efforts to improve the game throughout Europe as a form of solidarity, as well as taking serious the social responsibility it has to improve wider society in its members associations. The narratives used to create soft borders of Europe were also more open than the very closed off and hard membership border of UEFA. Though slight differences in openness exist between the five, relatively speaking, the soft borders created can easily be crossed. Football associations that are not members

of UEFA can adopt UEFA's social responsibility measures to improve society in their own association, or they can use the narrative of a harmonious football community to join UEFA's uniting forces. There are no rules or regulations in place on the side of UEFA preventing others from joining these initiatives that are used to border Europe, causing these soft borders to be more open than the hard and closed membership border (Delanty, 2006).

The second sub question allowed for studying the inconsistencies and unclarity in UEFA's bordering practices: *What inconsistencies can be traced in UEFA's narratives for their version of the European borders?* In the analysis of the different narratives, a few important inconsistencies could be traced. These inconsistencies in UEFA's borders of Europe and the narratives used, have the ability to negatively impact the unity that is to be created by the narratives in support of the borders, as they can spark feelings of injustice and limited inclusivity for members associations of UEFA and potential new members (Eder, 2006). Firstly, UEFA's membership regulations have been changed, allowing only new football associations representing UN recognised nation states to join UEFA. This is confusing, as a fair share of the member associations UEFA consists of themselves are not associated directly to a recognised nation state. Whereas Gibraltar was able to join UEFA as a non-nation state, Jersey has been rejected membership because of the new regulations. This leads to a sentiment of injustice for the Jersey football association and other non-recognised football association. According to those associations, UEFA's borders of Europe are not inclusive, but instead repress the minor regions that are not a nation state themselves. Secondly, UEFA is unable to represent all of its member associations equally. Most prominent positions have been occupied by the dominant, West-European member associations, while the smaller and newer member associations from the East are rewarded with little representation. The same goes for the organisation of prominent UEFA events and the participation in UEFA's competitions: the Western, more established and on a sporting level more successful associations dominate the Eastern, newer and developing associations. The same, almost colonial dominancy can also be traced in UEFA's international policy, trying to keep all confederations in check and make them govern football according to UEFA's wishes. This Western dominancy has the potential to seriously harm the unity among member associations UEFA is looking for to support its borders, as well as the international recognition of UEFA's delineation of European borders.

However, it is not all doom and gloom. The third sub question formulated in Chapter 1 allowed for investigating the positive aspects of UEFA's bordering: *What can be learned from UEFA's borders of Europe to work towards more inclusive and just European borders?* UEFA's borders also show some recent developments that can be used to make work of more inclusive and just borders. The first lesson that can be learned by other actors that border Europe, has to do with the way UEFA has shaped some of its more recent tournaments. The UEFA Regions' Cup allows UEFA to improve unity among its members and the domestic populace by celebrating amateur football and creating competition for the non-elite players. By doing making use of regions, UEFA recognizes the importance of the smaller scale on which football is played by most players as well as giving a stage to regions to represent themselves and battle for their own interests. The UEFA Nations League is another relatively new UEFA tournament, wherein UEFA has successfully created a structure in which each member association can compete on its own level. By providing different levels of competition, UEFA gives every member association a chance to feel represented and have something to play for. The most recent narratives of UEFA also provide some lessons on inclusivity and justice regarding

European borders. UEFA attempts to create a sense of togetherness by fighting racism, promoting human rights, improving the position of women and other minorities and supporting a more sustainable society. On top of this, through the HatTrick programme, all member associations are provided with funding to increase the state of football in their association. By improving the unity, UEFA will ensure themselves of broader support for the narratives it uses to support its borders of Europe.

After having answered the three sub questions, the main question of this research project can be answered. The main question was formulated as follows in Chapter 1: *Does the UEFA play a role in redefining the external borders of Europe by creating their own narrative of Europe?* This question can be answered positively. UEFA indeed attempts to redefine the external borders of Europe. Throughout its history, UEFA has created and adapted different narratives that it uses to support the borders it has created of Europe. The hard, and different soft borders UEFA has used during its existence have resulted in a version of Europe that is very much different from many other versions that already exist. UEFA's hard and closed membership border crosses the Ural and Caucasus Mountains, by reaching all the way to Kazakhstan, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia and even as far as Israel. On top of that, it includes regions recognized by UEFA as the sovereign governors of football in a certain territory, even though the member association itself is not directly related to a UN-recognised nation state. In order to support this unusual representation of Europe, UEFA makes use of more open and soft borders to garner support from its member associations and the population within their territories. By creating narratives that align with important values in European football, such as solidarity among clubs, leagues and associations and the principle of promotion and relegation, as well as creating unity by forming a European football community, with room for everyone, no matter political background, gender, race or religion, UEFA attempts to retain the sense that its borders are just and inclusive to everyone who belongs or wants to. Even though improvements could definitely be made to UEFA's borders and the narratives it uses, it provides a unique vision of what UEFA's Europe entails.

7. Discussion

7.1 Reflection on relevance

This research project might have shown the role UEFA attempts to play in bordering Europe. Besides that, some of the consequences of UEFA's bordering narratives have been mentioned, just like some lessons that can be learned from UEFA's vision on Europe and the borders of this idea. By doing this, hopefully a contribution will be made to both the perspective of society, as well as that of the scientific community, with regards to the role non-political actors can play in defining the borders of a geographical unit, in this case Europe. On top of that, UEFA's bordering of Europe provides a unique perspective on what an inclusive and just Europe would entail. Through the Regions' Cup, in which regions are represented at European level, UEFA manages to give rise to a geographical scale that is otherwise often overlooked. UEFA's membership policies have long been doing the same, by rejecting the nation state system as the dominant way of classifying the world, allowing national football associations not directly related to a nation state, such as the English Football Association or the Faroe Islands Football Association, to join UEFA. For this reason, it is unfortunate to see that aforementioned amendments have been made to the statutes, no longer enabling this. Many regions, states or other entities might long for UEFA membership and the recognition that comes with it. In terms of inclusion, the efforts UEFA has made in recent years regarding the improved representation of women and other minorities, as well as its ongoing campaigns against racism and discrimination, show that it has the ambition to represent Europe in a more inclusive and just manner, one where other bordering actors might be able to learn from.

7.2 Recommendations for future research

However, as research into the bordering of Europe is still continuing, recommendations can be made for future research into European borders, more specifically regarding the bordering done by non-state and non-political actors. UEFA is just one of the existing organisations that employs a different version of Europe in their policies and membership. This research project has shown the unique perspective that such an organisation can bring to the table when discussing more just and inclusive borders. Nevertheless, there will probably be organisations, both in sports and outside of it, that have a different and unique perspective that will be more helpful and provide more interesting narratives with regards to bordering Europe. A prominent example, just to name one, from the entertainment industry would be the European Broadcast Union, renowned for its responsibility of organising the Eurovision song contest. Studying these other organisations will only help improving the different versions of Europe that exist to become more inclusive and just.

Some more recommendations that can be made regarding future research, has to do with the methodological set-up of this research project. This research project made use of a qualitative, discourse analytical view to uncover the narratives UEFA is trying to convey in its official publications. Whereas this approach might be suitable to create a first, in-depth understanding of the narratives of UEFA, this method is not sufficient for evaluating the extent to which UEFA succeeds in convincing its member associations of its borders, let alone to study the general opinion on this topic. Future research could focus more on this issue, by adopting a different method. For this, a qualitative approach involving interviews or focus groups could work to study the position of some of the member association of UEFA, while a quantitative approach might be more suitable to investigate the extent to which the general public accepts UEFA's narrative and borders (Clifford, Cope, French &

Gillespie, 2016). Another methodological adaptation that could be made in future research is inclusion of non-UEFA data. Because this research project focussed on the narrative as UEFA wants to tell it, only official UEFA data was used as a primary source. However, there might very well be perfect analyses or publications made not by UEFA, but by a different institution or author, that would be worth studying as well. These sources can provide new insights and different perspectives on UEFA’s bordering that might not be included in this research project.

7.3 Reflection on Conceptual Model

Now that we know that UEFA plays a role in the bordering of Europe, it could also prove interesting to look back at the conceptual model. The model, first presented in figure 1, was made after joining Eder’s (2006) theory regarding the difference between hard and soft borders with and Delanty’s (2006) theory of the ‘openness’ or ‘closedness’ of borders. In it, a diagram was shown that has been derived from Delanty’s work, which he uses to position different borders and boundaries that exist in the world. After the analysis, UEFA’s borders can also be awarded a position in this graph. Figure 5, shown below, shows the conceptual model, but this with UEFA’s European borders being situated in Delanty’s diagram, as marked by the red dot. As you can see, UEFA’s Europe has been situated in the lower left side of the diagram, indicating that the borders it uses are open and soft. This can be explained as follows: UEFA uses one hard border, its membership, to delineate what they consider to be European territory. This border is relatively closed, as access to ‘pass through’ it can only be granted in the way of membership to UEFA. On top of this, though, UEFA equips some soft borders, such as its social responsibility, its work to progress football and its ambition to organise tournaments. It is way easier pass through these borders. In the past, non-UEFA members have joined UEFA tournaments, while clubs and national teams play against its non-UEFA constantly in friendlies. Moreover, non-UEFA members can free to maim UEFA’s social responsibility programme and funding for the development of football. In doing so, these non-members essentially become members of the soft borders of UEFA. When all these borders are added up, UEFA’s position will probably be somewhere along the lines it has been placed in the figure below.




Figure 6: Conceptual Model with UEFA's Europe

Source: Own work

7.4 Closing Remarks

Lastly, it should be mentioned that UEFA’s narratives as presented in this thesis are not a finished project. During UEFA’s lifespan, the narratives have continually been altered to best support the borders UEFA has created of Europe. This process has not been stopped because someone decided

to study UEFA's bordering and write down the narratives that UEFA uses for this. In the future, UEFA will undoubtedly make adjustments to its narratives to make them fit better with the goals it has in that period of time. UEFA's borders might just be pushed even further out, or shrink because member associations decide to withdraw from the union. In this regard, it is interesting to see how UEFA's position towards the Football Union of Russia will be. At this moment in time, no signals point towards an end of the war. With the narrative of striving for unity in Europe and UEFA's success during the Cold War in the back of the mind, it remains to be seen what decisions UEFA will take in the future and what role it will attempt to play, or not, in ending the war.

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Appendices

Appendix 1: Analysed Documents

On the next page, a table can be found including all documents that have been gathered from the UEFA Library and UEFA.com. The table shows the official title of the document as it assigned by UEFA, the way it is referred to in the text of this thesis, the date of publication of the data as well as the day on which it was retrieved on, the source a document was retrieved from the ID it has been described in Atlas.ti, the qualitative software program, and the document group(s) a document was ascribed to. The table has been structured by the date of retrieval of the document. On top of that, alternating colours have been used to indicate documents that belong together, mostly being Circular Letters and their enclosures.

Title	Reference in text	Date of publishing	Date of retrieval	Source	Atlas ID	Document Group
UEFA: 60 years at the heart of football	UEFA 60 Years	19-03-2015	05-04-2022	UEFA Library; Organisation	D1	Media Release; Research Report
UEFA Statutes	Statutes	20-04-2021	05-04-2022	UEFA Library; Organisation	D2	Policy Document
Annual Report 20/21	Annual Report	11-04-2022	26-04-2022	UEFA Library; Circular Letters	D7	Policy Document; Speech
UEFA Circular Letter No19: 46 th Ordinary UEFA Congress, Vienna, Austria, Wednesday 11 May 2022	CL19('22)	11-04-2022	26-04-2022	UEFA Library; Circular Letters	D40	Circular Letter; UEFA Congress
Enclosure 2: 46 th Ordinary UEFA Congress, Vienna 11 May: Program	CL19('22)-encl2	11-04-2022	26-04-2022	UEFA Library; Circular Letters	D41	Circular Letter; UEFA Congress
UEFA Circular Letter No 15: UEFA Respect Protocol Flags	CL15('22)	14-03-2022	26-04-2022	UEFA Library; Circular Letters	D38	Circular Letter
Enclosure 1: Protocol Flags be used per competition	CL15('22)-encl1	14-03-2022	26-04-2022	UEFA Library; Circular Letters	D39	Circular Letter
UEFA Circular Letter No13: UEFA Committees and Expert Panels 2019-2023 – Annual option to update membership 2022	CL13('22)	07-03-2022	26-04-2022	UEFA Library; Circular Letters	D37	Circular Letter
UEFA Circular Letter No12: Decision of the UEFA Executive Committee related to Belarus	CL12('22)	03-03-2022	26-04-2022	UEFA Library; Circular Letters	D44	Circular Letter; War Ukraine-Russia
UEFA Circular Letter No10: Decision of the UEFA Executive Committee to Russia	CL10('22)	28-02-2022	26-04-2022	UEFA Library; Circular Letters	D36	Circular Letter; War Ukraine-Russia
UEFA Circular Letter No8: Russia and Ukraine: Decision of the UEFA Executive Committee	CL08('22)	25-02-2022	26-04-2022	UEFA Library; Circular Letters	D35	Circular Letter; War Ukraine-Russia
UEFA Circular Letter No3: 2021/22 UEFA Football and Refugees grant scheme –call for applications – UEFA/UNHCR refugees' tournament, 29 June 2022, Nyon	CL03('22)	25-01-2022	26-04-2022	UEFA Library; Circular Letters	D33	Circular Letter
Enclosure 1: Application form 2021-2022 UEFA Football and Refugees Grant Scheme	CL03('22)-encl3	25-01-2022	26-04-2022	UEFA Library; Circular Letters	D34	Circular Letter
Composition of the UEFA Organs and Bodies 19-23	Organs & Bodies	03-02-2022	26-04-2022	UEFA Library; Miscellaneous	D3	Policy Document
UEFA Circular Letter No93: Video campaign to encourage COVID-19 vaccination	CL93('21)	20-12-2021	28-04-2022	UEFA Library; Circular Letters	D32	Circular Letter

Bid Regulations UEFA Finals and Final Phases	Bid Regulations	16-12-2021	28-04-2022	UEFA Documents; Regulations	D4	Regulations
UEFA Circular Letter No85: Revision of referee categories for the second half of the 2021/22 season	CL85('21)	17-12-2021	28-04-2022	UEFA Library; Circular Letters	D28	Circular Letter
Enclosure 2: Women – All Categories – 2 nd half of 21/22	CL85('21)-encl2	17-12-2021	28-04-2022	UEFA Library; Circular Letters	D30	Circular Letter; Ranking
Enclosure 3: Men – All Categories – 2 nd half of 21/22	CL85('21)-encl3	17-12-2021	28-04-2022	UEFA Library; Circular Letters	D31	Circular Letter; Ranking
UEFA Circular Letter No80: UEFA's Human Rights Commitment; UEFA's Environmental Commitment	CL80('21)	29-11-2021	28-04-2022	UEFA Library; Circular Letters	D25	Circular Letter
Enclosure 1: UEFA Human Rights Commitment	CL80('21)-encl1	29-11-2021	28-04-2022	UEFA Library; Circular Letters	D26	Circular Letter
Enclosure 2: UEFA Environment Commitment	CL80('21)-encl2	29-11-2021	28-04-2022	UEFA Library; Circular Letters	D27	Circular Letter
UEFA Circular Letter No78: Executive Master in Global Sport Governance (MESGO): seventh edition	CL78('21)	15-11-2021	28-04-2022	UEFA Library; Circular Letters	D23	Circular Letter
Enclosure 1: MESGO VII Brochure	CL78('21)-encl1	15-11-2021	28-04-2022	UEFA Library; Circular Letters	D24	Circular Letter
UEFA Circular Letter No60: 12th UEFA Regions' Cup, 2022/23 – Entries	CL60('21)	06-08-2021	28-04-2022	UEFA Library; Circular Letters	D19	Circular Letter
Enclosure 3: Coefficients 2022-23 Provisional	CL60('21)-encl3	06-08-2021	28-04-2022	UEFA Library; Circular Letters	D20	Circular Letter; Ranking
Enclosure 5: General Statistics RCUP	CL60('21)-encl5	06-08-2021	28-04-2022	UEFA Library; Circular Letters	D21	Circular Letter
Enclosure 6: 2021-22 Categorisation of UEFA MSs for MT Financing	CL60('21)-encl6	06-08-2021	28-04-2022	UEFA Library; Circular Letters	D22	Circular Letter
Regulations of the UEFA Regions' Cup	Regulations Regions' Cup	01-03-2018	28-04-2022	UEFA Documents; Regulations	D5	Regulations
UEFA Circular Letter No46: UEFA HatTrick V Regulations (Edition 2021)	CL46('21)	14-07-2021	28-04-2022	UEFA Library; Circular Letters	D12	Circular Letter
Enclosure 2: FSR Officer Job Description	CL46('21)-encl2	14-047-2021	28-04-2022	UEFA Library; Circular Letters	D13	Circular Letter
Enclosure 3: FSR Officer Season 2022/23 Employment Rate	CL46('21)-encl3	14-07-2021	28-04-2022	UEFA Library; Circular Letters	D14	Circular Letter

UEFA HatTrick V Regulations	Regulations HatTrick	11-07-2021	28-04-2022	UEFA Documents; Regulations	D6	Regulations
UEFA Circular Letter No42: 45th Ordinary UEFA Congress, Montreux, 20 April 2021 – Minutes	CL42('21)	23-06-2021	28-04-2022	UEFA Library; Circular Letters	D10	Circular Letter; UEFA Congress
Enclosure 1: UEFA Congress Montreux 2021	CL42('21)-encl1	23-06-2021	28-04-2022	UEFA Library; Circular Letters	D11	Circular Letter; Speech; UEFA Congress
UEFA Circular Letter No22: Ratification of the ECA and EL representatives on the UEFA Executive Committee	CL22('21)	12-04-2021	28-04-2022	UEFA Library; Circular Letters	D9	Circular Letter
UEFA Circular Letter No21: UEFA Executive Committee decisions on the impact and consequences resulting from the ongoing suspension of Russian representative teams and clubs in UEFA competitions and other matters	CL21('22)	02-05-2022	04-05-2022	UEFA Library; Circular Letters	D43	Circular Letter; War Ukraine-Russia
UEFA Circular Letter No28: 2022/23 UEFA Regions' Cup Regulations	CL28('21)	16-05-2022	17-05-2022	UEFA Library; Circular Letters	D45	Circular Letter
UEFA Direct #158	Direct 158	08-06-2016	17-05-2022	UEFA Library; Periodicals	D47	Media Release
UEFA Direct #195	Direct 195	20-10-2021	17-05-2022	UEFA Library; Periodicals	D46	Media Release; Speech
Together for the Future of Football: UEFA Strategy 2019-2024	Future of Football	Unknown	17-05-2022	UEFA.com; News	D48	Policy Document; Speech
UEFA Direct #129	Direct 129	05-06-2013	17-05-2022	UEFA Library; Periodicals	D49	Media Release
UEFA Direct #176	Direct 176	14-03-2018	17-05-2022	UEFA Library; Periodicals	D52	Media Release
2013 XXXVII UEFA Ordinary Congress resolution European Football united against racism	Resolution Racism	24-05-2013	02-06-2022	UEFA.com; News	D50	Policy Document; UEFA Congress

Source: Author

Appendix 2: Codebook

The table below shows the codebook used during coding in Atlas.ti. The table contains all codes, all of which are grouped in a code group. Every code in the table contains an explanation of the code as well. Table is structured alphabetically, meaning that first the code groups are listed alphabetically, then for the codes the same has been done. To improve readability and linkage to the Atlas.ti file, colour-coding has been added to code groups identical to the colours used for the groups in Atlas.ti.

Code Group	Code	Explanation
Amateur Football	Attention	UEFA publications specifically mentions the importance of amateur/grassroots football
	Development	UEFA publication mentions actions or policies to develop amateur/grassroots football
	Difference with professional football	A specific difference between amateur and professional football is stated
	Equal rules/regulations as professional	Amateur and professional football are similar in terms of rules and regulations regarding the game
	Regions' Cup	The amateur football competition UEFA Regions' Cup is mentioned in general sense
	Regions' Cup – eligibility	Eligibility to compete in UEFA Regions' Cup explained
	Regions' Cup – format	The format of the UEFA Regions' Cup is explained
	Regions' Cup – lucrative	The extend to which the UEFA Regions' Cup is lucrative is mentioned
	Regions' Cup – ranking	A ranking of the UEFA Regions' Cup is shown or referred to
Defining Europe	Beyond nation-state system	UEFA goes beyond nation state system and uses different entities to define Europe
	Bordering by UEFA	UEFA's publication specifically mentions bordering acts by UEFA
	Claiming 'Europe' as brand	UEFA claims the term 'Europe' and uses it as a brand for their own organisation and tournaments
	Colonial?	UEFA's policies and actions can be interpreted as colonial towards others
	Nation-state system	UEFA uses the nation state system to define the borders of Europe
	Non-European element in UEFA	UEFA allows for commonly non-European elements in UEFA
Development UEFA	Achievements	Achievements of UEFA's development as an organisation are mentioned
	Decrease of power	UEFA experiences a decrease of power, can be on 'European' scale or international
	Growth pains	Small problems and stumbling blocks during UEFA's history are referred to
	Increase in power	UEFA experiences an increase of the power they can exert, both in 'Europe' or internationally
	Increase in tasks	UEFA widens the pool of tasks they involve themselves in
	Increase in members	UEFA welcomes new member associations to the union
	Outsourcing	UEFA directs tasks to different organisations
	Politically undermined	UEFA is politically undermined by another actor
	Professionalisation	UEFA as an organisation becomes more professional
	Relocation	UEFA's headquarters and other aspects are relocated to a different location
Establishment UEFA	Founding members	The founding members of UEFA are mentioned
	goal	The goals of UEFA at its establishment are mentioned
	Historic setting	The setting in which the establishment of UEFA took place, is mentioned
	Important people	Important people in UEFA's history are referred to
	Little attention	The lack of attention to UEFA's establishment is mentioned
	Potential dangers	Potential dangers of the establishment of UEFA are mentioned
	Predecessor	The different predecessors of UEFA are mentioned

	Process	The process of establishment of UEFA is explained
	Success	The success of UEFA as an organisation is explained or referred to
European Club Competitions	Enthusiasm	The enthusiasm of clubs for competitions is explained
	Expansion	The expansion of club competitions is mentioned or explained
	Format	The format in which the club competitions are played, is explained or mentioned
	Lack of enthusiasm	A lack of enthusiasm from stakeholder in the club competitions is mentioned
	Lucrative	The extent to which the club competitions are lucrative is explained
	Negatives	Negative aspects of European club competitions are mentioned
	Origin	The origin of the European club competitions are explained or mentioned
	Success	The success of the club competitions is explained
European National Competitions	Development	The development of the national competitions is explained or referred to
	Format	The format in which the national competitions are played, is explained or mentioned
	Initial ideas	Initial ideas for national competitions are mentioned
	Initial resentment	Initial resentment against competition for national teams is explained
	Lucrative	The extent to which the national competitions are lucrative, is explained
	Negatives	Negative aspects of European national competitions are mentioned
	Rivalling FIFA World Cup	Sentiments that the European national competitions would rival the FIFA World Cup are mentioned
	Success	The success of the national competitions is explained
Future UEFA	Ambition	Ambitions for future policy or visions of UEFA are mentioned or explained
	Concrete plans	Concrete plans on different themes for the future of UEFA are mentioned or explained
	Developing the sport	UEFA publications mention the necessity to develop the sport in the future
	Social responsibility	UEFA publications mention the necessity to improve social responsibility in the future
	Sustainability	UEFA publications mention the necessity to improve the sustainability in the future
	Narrative	Common position at FIFA
Competition		Contribution is made to the importance UEFA sees in competitions for clubs and national teams
Mediterranean history		Mediterranean history is mentioned as a narrative for the borders of UEFA
Platform for progression of football		Contribution is made to the narrative of UEFA being a force of progression of the game of football
Political problem solver		Contribution is made to the narrative that UEFA is an actor that partakes in solving problems between members associations in Europe
Protection against outside		Contribution is made to the narrative that UEFA is an organisation that must protect European football from external, dangerous and threatening influences
Uniting Europe internally		Contribution is made to the narrative that UEFA is an organisation that unites the different regions of Europe within its own borders
Social Responsibility		Contribution is made to the narrative that UEFA is to improve its social responsibility, improving society through football

Organisation	Democratic institution	The democratic values UEFA upholds for itself and its member associations is mentioned
	Procedures	Official organisational procedures of UEFA are mentioned or explained
	Set-up	The organisational set-up of UEFA is mentioned or explained
Relation UEFA	Clubs (ECA)	The relation between UEFA and 'European' football clubs is disclosed
	European Politics (EEC/EU/CoE)	The relation between UEFA and European Politics is referred to
	Fans	The relation between UEFA and fans of national teams and club football is disclosed
	FIFA	The relation between UEFA and FIFA is explained or mentioned
	International football federations	The relation between UEFA and other football confederations around the world is revealed
	International (non-governmental) organisations	The relation between UEFA and non-football related international (non-governmental) organisations is referred to
	National associations	The relation between UEFA and national associations (that are possibly member associations) is disclosed
	National leagues (EL)	The relation between UEFA and the national football leagues of UEFA's member associations is mentioned
	Other sports organisations	The relation between UEFA and other sports organisations is revealed
	Religious institutions	The relation between UEFA and religious institutions is disclosed
Representation	Equal	Equalities in representation at UEFA are mentioned or explained
	Unequal	Inequalities of representation of different entities at UEFA are mentioned or explained
Women's football	Attention	UEFA publications specifically mentions the importance of women's football, at amateur or professional level
	Development	UEFA publications mention policies or actions undertaken to improve the state of women's football, both at amateur and professional level
	Good Quotations	Code awarded to a citation that could prove valuable in research paper for its symbolic value or the condensed way of highlighting UEFA's positions
	Russia-Ukraine Decisions	The situation of the war between Russia and Ukraine is mentioned, as well as the decisions UEFA has taken regarding the situation

Appendix 3: Ranking of National Associations

The table below shows the position of all the member associations of UEFA on the FIFA Men's ranking of national teams, as well as their position on the UEFA Regions' Cup Ranking. Coefficients and ranks for the ranking of the male national teams were derived from FIFA.com on 10-06-2022. The UEFA Regions' Cup ranking originate from CL60('21)_encl3. UEFA rank displayed in the table is based on the order the national associations have been ranked in based on their FIFA rank. As not all national associations participate in the UEFA Regions' Cup, not all member associations have received a UEFA Regions' Cup rank.

UEFA Rank	National Association	FIFA Rank	Coefficient Points	UEFA Regions' Cup Rank	Coefficient Points
1	Royal Belgian Football Association	2	1828.45	-	-
2	French Football Federation	3	1759.85	9	10.667
3	English Football Association	5	1761.71	20	6.667
4	Italian Football Federation	6	1723.31	13	9.000
5	Royal Spanish Football Federation	7	1709.19	7	12.000
6	Portuguese Football Federation	8	1674.78	10	10.333
7	Royal Dutch Football Association	10	1658.66	-	-
8	Danish Football Association	11	1653.60	-	-
9	German Football Association	12	1650.53	5	12.333
10	Swiss Football Association	14	1635.32	18	7.667
11	Croatian Football Federation	16	1621.11	2	14.000
12	Football Association of Wales	18	1588.08	25	5.000
13	Swedish Football Association	19	1584.77	33	4.000
14	Football Association of Serbia	25	1547.53	19	7.667
15	Polish Football Association	26	1544.20	4	12.333
16	Ukrainian Association of Football	27	1535.08	11	10.000
17	Football Association of the Czech Republic	33	1500.62	6	12.333
18	Austrian Football Association	34	1500.37	-	-
19	Football Union of Russia	36	1493.42	8	11.667
20	Scottish Football Association	39	1472.66	32	4.000
21	Hungarian Football Federation	40	1466.08	12	9.333
22	Norwegian Football Federation	41	1463.50	-	-
23	Turkish Football Federation	43	1461.81	1	14.333
24	Slovak Football Association	45	1454.98	14	8.667
25	Football Association of Ireland	47	1449.48	3	12.667
26	Romanian Football Federation	48	1446.54	24	5.000
27	Irish Football Association	54	1423.55	16	8.000
28	Hellenic Football Federation	55	1421.43	34	4.000
29	Football Association of Finland	57	1406.87	26	5.000
30	Football Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina	59	1388.63	17	8.000
31	Football Federation of North Macedonia	62	1381.07	31	4.167
32	Football Association of Iceland	63	1380.85	-	-
33	Football Association of Slovenia	65	1378.23	28	4.333
34	Football Association of Albania	66	1371.86	-	-

35	Football Association of Montenegro	70	1342.79	-	-
36	Bulgarian Football Union	73	1338.78	15	8.000
37	Israel Football Association	76	1305.92	22	5.833
38	Georgian Football Federation	85	1276.31	39	0.333
39	Football Federation of Armenia	92	1245.13	-	-
40	Football Federation of Belarus	93	1243.20	35	3.333
41	Luxembourg Football Federation	94	1229.60	-	-
42	Cyprus Football Association	105	1186.09	-	-
43	Football Federation of Kosovo	107	1173.90	-	-
44	Estonian Football Association	110	1169.06	38	1.000
45	Faroe Islands Football Association	124	1137.40		
46	Kazakhstan Football Federation	125	1134.77	37	2.000
47	Association of Football Federations of Azerbaijan	129	1127.05	36	3.000
48	Latvian Football Federation	135	1105.02	23	5.333
49	Lithuanian Football Federation	138	1092.04	21	5.833
50	Andorran Football Association	153	1040.13	-	-
51	Malta Football Association	169	971.56	30	4.333
52	Moldovan Football Federation	180	932.79	29	4.333
53	Liechtenstein Football Association	192	895.08	-	-
54	Gibraltar Football Association	203	587.20	-	-
55	San Marino Football Federation	211	776.97	27	4.667

Source: FIFA.com and CL60('21)_encl3

Appendix 4: List of Member Associations

The table below displays all the current member associations of UEFA, ordered alphabetically, according to their names in English. All native names of the associations and abbreviations of set member associations have been Romanised if necessary.

English name National Association	Native name National Association	Abbreviation	Year of accession to UEFA
Football Association of Albania	Federata Shqiptare e Futbollit	FShF	1954
Andorran Football Association	Federació Andorrana de Futbol	FAF	1996
Football Federation of Armenia	Hayastani Futboli Federatsia	FFA	1992
Austrian Football Association	Österreichischer Fußball-Bund	ÖFB	1954
Association of Football Federations of Azerbaijan	Azərbaycan Futbol Federasiyaları Assosiasiyası	AFFA	1994
Football Federation of Belarus	Belorusskaja Federacija Futbola	ABFF	1993
Royal Belgian Football Association	Koninklijke Belgische Voetbalbond	RBFA	1954
Football Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina	Nogometni/Fudbalski Savez Bosne i Hercegovine	NSBiH	1998
Bulgarian Football Union	Bulgarski Foetbolen S'joez	BFU	1954
Croatian Football Federation	Hrvatski nogometni savez	HNS	1993
Cyprus Football Association	Kypriakí Omospondía Podosfaírou	KOP/CFA	1962
Football Association of the Czech Republic	Fotbalová asociace České republiky	FAČR	1954
Danish Football Association	Dansk Boldspil-Union	DBU	1954
English Football Association	Football Association	FA	1954
Estonian Football Association	Eesti Jalgpalli Liit	EJL	1992
Faroe Islands Football Association	Fótbóltssamband Føroya	FSF	1990
Football Association of Finland	Suomen Palloliitto	SPL	1954
French Football Federation	Fédération Française de Football	FFF	1954
Georgian Football Federation	sakartvelos pekhburtis pederatsia	SFF	1992
German Football Association	Deutscher Fußball-Bund	DFB	1954
Gibraltar Football Association	Gibraltar Football Association	GFA	2013
Hellenic Football Federation	Ellinikí Podosferikí Omospondía	EPO	1954
Hungarian Football Federation	Magyar Labdarúgó Szövetség	MLSZ	1954
Football Association of Iceland	Knattspyrnusamband Íslands	KSI	1954
Israel Football Association	HaHit'ahdut leKaduregel belsrael	IFA	1994
Italian Football Federation	Federazione Italiana Giuoco Calcio	FIGC	1954
Kazakhstan Football Federation	Qazaqstan Ùlttyq Futbol qūramasy	KFF	2002
Football Federation of Kosovo	Federata e Futbollit e Kosovës	FFK	2016
Latvian Football Federation	Latvijas Futbola Federācija	LFF	1992
Liechtenstein Football Association	Liechtensteiner Fussballverband	LFV	1974

Lithuanian Football Federation	Lietuvos futbolo federacija	LFF	1992
Luxembourg Football Federation	Fédération Luxembourgeoise de Football	FLF	1954
Malta Football Association	Assoċjazzjoni tal-Futbol ta' Malta	MFA	1960
Moldovan Football Federation	Federația Moldovenească de Fotbal	FMF	1993
Football Association of Montenegro	Fudbalski savez Crne Gore	FSCG	2007
Royal Dutch Football Association	Koninklijke Nederlandse Voetbalbond	KNVB	1954
Football Federation of North Macedonia	Foedbalska Federatsija na Makedonija	FFM	1994
Irish Football Association	Irish Football Association	IFA	1954
Norwegian Football Federation	Norges Fotballforbund	NFF	1954
Polish Football Association	Polski Związek Piłki Nożnej	PZPN	1954
Portuguese Football Federation	Federação Portuguesa de Futebol	FPF	1954
Football Association of Ireland	Cumann Peile na hÉireann	FAI	1954
Romanian Football Federation	Federația Română de Fotbal	FRF	1954
Football Union of Russia	Rossiyskiy Futbolnyy Soyuz	FUR	1954
San Marino Football Federation	Federazione Sammarinese Giuoco Calcio	FSGC	1988
Scottish Football Association	Comann Ball-coise na h-Alba	SFA	1954
Football Association of Serbia	Fudbalski Savez Srbije	FSS	1954
Slovak Football Association	Slovenský futbalový zväz	SFZ	1993
Football Association of Slovenia	Nogometna zveza Slovenije	NZS	1992
Royal Spanish Football Federation	Real Federación Española de Fútbol	RFEF	1954
Swedish Football Association	Svenska Fotbollförbundet	SvFF	1954
Swiss Football Association	Association Suisse de Football/ Associazione Svizzera di Football/ Schweizerischer Fussballverband	ASF-SFV	1954
Turkish Football Federation	Türkiye Futbol Federasyonu	TFF	1962
Ukrainian Association of Football	Ukraynska Asotsiatsiya Futbolu	UAF	1992
Football Association of Wales	Cymdeithas Bêl-droed Cymru	FAW	1954

Source: UEFA.com

Appendix 5: List of Congresses

The table below shows all Ordinary Congresses held by UEFA since its inception, including the location and the date of every Congress. In the first years of UEFA, this Ordinary Congress took place annually, but in 1958 the decision was made to hold a Congress every two years. At the beginning of the 21st century, this change was reverted back. The table is structured according to the number of every Congress.

Number	City	Date(s)
1 (I)	Vienna	2 March 1955
2 (II)	Lisbon	8 June 1956
3 (III)	Copenhagen	28 June 1957
4 (IV)	Stockholm	4 June 1958
5 (V)	Rome	21 August 1960
6 (VI)	Sofia	17 April 1962
7 (VII)	Madrid	17 June 1964
8 (VIII)	London	6 July 1966
9 (IX)	Rome	7 June 1968
10 (X)	Dubrovnik	8 May 1970
11 (XI)	Vienna	7 June 1972
12 (XII)	Edinburgh	22 May 1974
13 (XIII)	Stockholm	15 June 1976
14 (XIV)	Istanbul	22 April 1978
15 (XV)	Rome	21 June 1980
16 (XVI)	Dresden	28 April 1982
17 (XVII)	Paris	26 June 1984
18 (XVIII)	Cascais	24 April 1986
19 (XIX)	Munich	24 June 1988
20 (XX)	St. Julian's	19 April 1990
21 (XXI)	Gothenburg	25 June 1992
22 (XXII)	Vienna	28 April 1994
23 (XXIII)	London	29 June 1996
24 (XXIV)	Dublin	30 April 1998
25 (XXV)	Luxembourg City	30 June – 1 July 2000
26 (XXVI)	Stockholm	25 April 2002
27 (XXVII)	Rome	27 March 2003
28 (XXVIII)	Limassol	22–23 April 2004
29 (XXIX)	Tallinn	21 April 2005
30 (XXX)	Budapest	23 March 2006
31 (XXXI)	Düsseldorf	25–26 January 2007
32 (XXXII)	Zagreb	31 January 2008
33 (XXXIII)	Copenhagen	25–26 March 2009
34 (XXXIV)	Tel Aviv	25 March 2010
35 (XXXV)	Paris	22 March 2011
36 (XXXVI)	Istanbul	22 March 2012
37 (XXXVII)	London	24 May 2013
38 (XXXVIII)	Astana	27 March 2014
39 (XXXIX)	Vienna	24 March 2015
40 (XL)	Budapest	3 May 2016

41 (XLI)	Helsinki	5 April 2017
42 (XLII)	Bratislava	26 February 2018
43 (XLIII)	Rome	7 February 2019
44 (XLIV)	Amsterdam	3 March 2020
45 (XLV)	Montreux	20 April 2021
46 (XLVI)	Vienna	11 May 2022
47 (XLVII)	Lisbon	5 April 2023

Source: UEFA.com