

'What if...' everyman from Europe's margins made strategic planning?

A qualitative case study of geopolitical imaginations in Ceuta's border-region on the conditional relation to the European Union



Summary

This qualitative case-study was designed to make a contribution to the EU-borderscape project researching on EU-borders, among others to Northern Africa. Klaus Dodd's (2008) incentive for critical, counterfactual analysis in geopolitics was taken up to explore geopolitical imaginations about the conditional relation of Ceuta to the EU. Ceuta was chosen as a case, combining rather singular characteristics, as a small isolated Spanish enclave on the African continent bordering Morocco and as Mediterranean harbor city. The aim was to understand how the 'everyman'-borderpeople of the Ceuta-Tetouan border-region renegotiate and eventually tactically contest and resist geopolitical imaginations of powerful discourse-makers (elites and media).

'Geopolitical imaginations' (Mamadouh & Dijkink, 2006) is a concept deriving from traditional geopolitical understandings of strategically planning a place's relation to other places and the increasingly important dimension of economic relations to this planning (Sparke, 2002).

In the attempt to bring back the 'everyman' and his tactics into geopolitical research (Häkli, 1998; De Certeau, 1988), postcolonial theory has been considered appropriate to understand the process of Ceuta's repositioning in the EU. Through geopolitical processes of repositioning Ceuta responds to wider transformations in the border-region.

Post-colonial studies have shaped the concept 'conditionality' (Kramsch, 2010, 2011; Kuus, 2004). It refers to practices of obtaining a good status within the EU and respective privileged treatment (including funding), which is constrained by conditions: proving the willingness to economically develop to a 'core-European' standard, internalization of the 'core-European' cultural norms and functioning as a securitized bufferzone to the 'other' beyond the EU (Ferrer-Gallardo & Van Houtum, 2012) – manifesting in Ceuta by being the Spanish-Moroccan-European-African-border.

The border-situation though, alters the way conditionality manifests and is practiced: Ceuta has for long lived on cross-border interaction; daily encounters with people bearing 'other', 'non-European' cultural traits are common. Essentially Ceuta's economy is largely dependent on the relations to Morocco. It is a pivot in the strategic geopolitical deliberations about repositioning (Ferrer-Gallardo, 2009; Kolossov & Scott, 2012).

It was assumed that renegotiation of powerful discourse by 'everyman'-respondents from Ceuta and the Tetouan-region in Northern Morocco was context-specific and therefore influenced by the border-situation (Hall, 1997b; Gibson-Graham, 2000). Renegotiation was understood as spatio-temporally dependent individual meaning-making of wider discourse: interpretation of discourse is made by the individual every-day experience (De Certeau, 1998; Merrifield, 2011, p. 108), which for borderpeople is highly entangled with practices around the border.

With the help of several qualitative and ethnographic research instruments and operationalization of indicators geopolitical imaginations on conditionality and their renegotiation by the everyman-borderpeople were captured within six weeks of fieldwork and analyzed with qualitative coding throughout a period of almost five months.

Major findings of this research could be elaborated on identifying three major bundles of geopolitical imaginations about conditionality corresponding to three spatial units of Ceuta: imaginations about Ceuta's center, the spaces of

flow (the border-passage, the CETI and the harbor) and Ceuta's margins. Geopolitical imaginations of the conditional relation to the EU were fragmented because conditionality is imagined to manifest differently in each space. Per topic (space) different geopolitical imaginations and their renegotiations were selected.

Diverse actors (discourse-makers and everymen from both sides of the border) imagined a one-way conditional relation of the EU to Ceuta's center to work out well. In Ceuta's spaces of flow both, a working conditional relation as well as factors and practices weakening the relation, were imagined. Each aspect of conditionality simultaneously vitiated the relation – such as Ceuta being a buffer, the European border. While seeking to live up to the buffer function, Ceuta is imagined to absorb 'otherness' for the EU. In Ceuta's margins then working conditionality is imagined to be limited, as a series of manifestations and practices of 'otherness' coincide here (the proximity of the border, poverty, marginalization, Muslim populations, crime and a tendency for radicalization).

The renegotiation process investigated had several striking features. Everymen and powerful discourse-makers subjected to the final aim of Europeanization in the conditional relation – progress, prosperity, security, development (Kramsch, 2011, p. 200), civilization and modernity (Kuus, 2004, p. 482) are desired and imagined. But definitions of what that would mean and which strategy would serve to live up to the conditional relation varied.

The renegotiation of geopolitical imaginations of the powerful discourse-makers differed per everyman, given differences in experience and information, life-worlds and everyday practices. From the everyman's experience and pragmatic, everyday positions they prioritized a different focus of Europeanization. Their discursive involvement appeared to begin with concern. Thus, additionally, renegotiation often departed from the observable and neglected the abstract. Therefore the relation to and information about Ceuta's different spaces played a role. Commonalities in imaginations have been discovered in renegotiations by everymen residing in the same space (Ceuta's center, its margins or across the border in Morocco).

Moroccan everyman-respondents generally not residing in Ceuta tended to be least concerned and informed about Ceuta's spaces and reproduced powerful geopolitical imaginations as far as they were aware of them through their routine or contacts in Ceuta. Especially few Moroccan respondents renegotiated imaginations in relation to Ceuta's margins.

Imaginations of practices of Moroccan carriers at the border-passage and their experiences of struggles, as well of cross-border workers, narratives about the violence against and bad treatment of migrants reaffirmed respective powerful imaginations. They requested the EU to take responsibility at the border and in migrants' countries of origin.

Given that the respondents imagined the standard of living to be lower in Morocco, Ceuta appeared a modern place to them. The modernity was attributed to the city's European-ness, which some respondents resulted envious of. Positive connotations partly seemed to derive from Ceuta's (border-passage's) reputation in Morocco as a place of opportunity.

Instead, similarities across the border, the mixed culture of the border-region and interrelations were a dominant aspect of their geopolitical imaginations. At the same time they noticed the functional and identitarian-

socio-economic fragmentation of Ceuta into three spaces. The respondents, who interact most with Ceuta, scrutinized the socio-economic and cultural causes of crime in Ceuta's margins.

Moroccan everyman-participants were the group of respondents, who hesitated least in criticizing Europeanization (once they identified failures) and respective strategies for Ceuta. Most Moroccan respondents firmly supported the geopolitical claim of their country over Ceuta for a better future, also given the existing multiple relations (the flows of clients and the trade). Yet, their contestation of Ceuta's conditional relation manifested less in discourse than in their practices. Together with the Ceuti respondents from the margins they are the ones, who proved most 'borderthinking' and resistance.

Ceuti everyman-participants, like the Moroccans, used to lack information. Further findings highlight that lack of renegotiation of powerful imaginations has a meaning and can imply a form of silent resistance as simultaneously tactics are applied, which weaken conditionality. Most respondents reported to commit to responsibilities of EU citizenship and defend the culture in exchange for the earlier mentioned benefits connoted to European-ness. Thus they tend to justify Ceuta and reject criticism, presumably also justifying their own choice to stay in the city. To this end they employ diverse tactics, e.g. invisibilizing dependency on the EU (funding) and (economic) relations.

Several strategic imaginations appeared to be rooted in 'good-old-times'-experiences in comparison to more visionary plans of the powerful discourse-makers. Many desired additional support by the EU, and regret about the negative reputation of Ceuta's spaces of flow. A shift of responsibility of 'otherness' of crime in the margins to mafias involved in drug-business performed in powerful geopolitical imaginations is reproduced by different Ceuti participants. Further the renegotiations of Ceuti respondents were not homogeneous. Nonetheless, for many aspects one could differentiate renegotiations by groups of everymen from the center and the margins respectively.

Ceuti everyman-participants from Ceuta's center, especially, applied discursive tactics of invisibilization and sought to normalize the city, e.g. neglecting relations to Morocco which to them were connoted to (many features of) 'otherness'— socio-economically and culturally. Their imaginations revealed fears from migrants and Moroccans to individually different extents, a fear from infiltration of 'otherness'.

Concerning violent treatment of migrants and their suffering (at the border-passage and in general) some center participants asked for modernization of the passage: more control, organization or securitization, mostly legitimating the border. The carriers' fate seemed invisibilized instead. Also about Ceuta's margins they resulted generally conscious about features of 'otherness', but avoided renegotiating them. Many aspect of cultural struggle got wrapped up in the proud discourse about successful coexistence of cultures. Yet, even xenophobic imaginations about a 'Muslim other' could be traced. Especially those with most fear from the 'other' seemed to subject firmest to the conditional relation to the EU and were least in touch with the Moroccan side of the border.

Ceuti respondents from the margins (many of them unemployed) shared insights into their vulnerability and everyday struggle, the feeling of exclusion and wish for Europeanization. They desire more sustainable modernization strategies than implemented so far in their districts, participation in policy-making and commitment by the EU. They applied (collective) tactics to manage to get by. Nevertheless, they subject to conditionality, dreaming a

European dream of economic prosperity, like the powerful discourse-makers. Emotions of deprivation of privileges in the relation to the EU contained suspicion towards the powerful in the center. The Ceuti everyman-respondents from the margins accentuate the concentration of Europeanization in the center more than powerful discourse-makers. Several participants from the margins would wish Ceuti's protested and fought more for their rights.

The mix of cultures was appreciated and several respondents imagine being leading a 'bi-cultural' life. At the same time their renegotiations revealed failures of coexistence of cultures, ending up in experiences of colonial hierarchies of one-way cultural imposition of European, Christian culture – only weakened and resisted to by their own double-identities. Demands were put forward to seize criminality in and stigmatization of the margins. Several indicated to feel compassion for carriers' and migrants' fates. Still they subject to modernization and 'filter'-plans of the border-passage.

This group of respondents subjects to Europeanization as such, but contests the marginalization they imagine to manifest as side-effect of the powerful implementing strategies exclusively in the center.

The theoretical perspective served to understanding many facets of the renegotiation of powerful geopolitical imaginations by Ceuti and Moroccan everyman-respondents about conditionality in relation to the EU. Surprising or unexpected findings were encountered such as the high relevance of everyday routine and disinterest explaining for lack of renegotiation (Merrifield, 2011, p. 108). Also the way of relating to Ceuta's spaces strongly influenced imaginations (ibid.).

An overwhelming subjection to Europeanization, linear template modernization and progress-thinking (by all participants) – the European dream – hint at the appeal and imagined superiority of a modern society (Kramsch, 2011, p. 196; Sparke, 2002, p. 220; Kuus, 2004, p. 474; Mignolo, 2000, pp. 58-59).

The side-effect of Europeanization in Ceuta, spatial fragmentation (Hardt & Negri, 2000, p. 199; Gunder Franck, 1966, p. 20) or marginalization, through representation and distribution of investments has been a remarkable finding, a crucial feature of imaginations – including the mutual perpetuation of the processes (Gunder Franck, 1966, p. 20).

Among more such findings the failure of one-size-fits-all approaches (Kramsch, 2011, p. 200) of imagined core-European modern models of society to deal with contexts and 'otherness' is the most intriguing (Kramsch, 2011, p. 200). The EU was imagined partially blind to its own constituent parts (Mignolo, 2000, p. 60). EU-culture is contested by mixed identities, borderthinking and place-based habits (Mignolo, 2000).

The geopolitical imaginations of everyman (Häkli, 1998, p. 145) resulted worth investigating, revealing subaltern geopolitical insights, which cannot be discovered from traditional powerful, strategic geopolitical perspectives. The need for contextual strategies is highlighted in many imaginations (Kramsch, 2011, pp. 196-197).

All the findings and limitations of this research can be taken as incentives for future empiric or further theoretical elaborations. The study has managed to dive into the rich geopolitical, strategic imaginations of border-people and pieces of place-based knowledge, in spite of (methodological) limitations. Failures of the EU emerged imposing

models, but actually being blind, without understanding its citizens and thus itself. They point at alternative concepts of a union of 'everyman'.

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1. Introduction

To start with I would like to present the following quotation, which takes us into the struggle of Ceuta's powerful and border-people to position in the context of the European Union (EU) as a Spanish border-city in Africa. In a speech about Melilla (which is similar enough to Ceuta for the characteristics mentioned in the speech to project the insights on Ceuta) the Minister of Justice envisions the border-city in Africa as


"The heart and day-to-day of Europe we want (...) I came across the expression 'Austria is the heart of Europe', but the EU identity is not in only one country. There is social, political, racial, linguistic and religious diversity, which is desired and reconstructed in Melilla, which literally incorporates the EU's essence. As a border, it is the beginning of everything, not at all the end. The role-model function of Melilla proves that the EU is not far from Melilla"
(Perdiguero, 2014)

The most important message of the quotation is the role ascribed to Ceuta in EU context as 'role-model'. Spanish and Ceuta's leaders, both, engage in overcoming the imagination of the border-cities being marginal in the EU. Ironically, instead of highlighting what makes the cities 'European', they simply invert the discourse. What is typical of the border-cities becomes represented as intrinsically European. It is a discursive strategy of improving the border-cities status in the EU, a way of Europeanizing them. Why such strategies of representation are implemented by the powerful authorities and how they are carried on by the border-people of the border-region of Ceuta and Tetouan will be issue to investigation here – including understanding the very own ideas and imaginations of strategies where to go in the EU in future.

1.1 The aim and relevance of this research

The goal of this research is to understand the renegotiation of powerful geopolitical imaginations (Mamadouh & Dijkink, 2006, pp. 354-356, 362; Ferrer-Gallardo & Van Houtum, 2012, pp. 244, 248; Tuathail & Dalby, 1998, pp. 3, 12; Luke, 1998, p. 297) about the border-city Ceuta's conditional relation to the EU (Kuus, 2004; Kramsch, 2010) in the in (powerless) geopolitical imaginations of border-people. What we understand by the term "geopolitical imagination" could be defined as "strategic and tactical" (Häkli, 1998, p. 144) evaluation of the geographical and political relation of the own place to other places (Dijkink, 1996, p. 11) in the present and for the future.

More precisely the research aims to understand how the attribution of "European-ness" (Kuus, 2004) – European standards, good status and financial European support - to Ceuta is constrained by conditions, which are locally mediated by the border-situation to Africa and Morocco. The particular way conditionality affects Ceuta might be grounded directly in the presence of the border but also be created through its proximity and lack of official recognition as Spanish EU-external border by Morocco. The latter circumstances are often seen as shaping "singularity of Ceuta" (Aranda-Gallego, 2007, p. 351).



Such singularity manifests in the form of obstacles to economic development and additional dependence on Spanish national funding (X. Ferrer-Gallardo, personal communication, May 9th, 2013). Post-colonial theory on borders offers explanations on these issues: In comparison to more territorially based theories or cosmopolitan thinking they take into account processes of (de-) construction, discourse and meaning-making (Gibson-Graham, 2000, p. 97). The dynamic making of discourse and places here replaces static, territorial-based theories, which work with container-images of countries and do not capture the overlapping identities and influences – of Europe, Spain, Morocco, the city and its people- evolving in Ceuta (Balibar, 1998, pp. 223-224). The latter cosmopolitan critique though tends to partly disregard unequal power-relations, which are central to post-colonial, post-structural perspectives (Walters, 2002, p. 574; Mignolo, 2000, p. 67; Kuus, 2004, pp. 479-483).

In order to identify unequal power-relations in the case of Ceuta one has to e.g. think of key features of practices of conditionality in the relationship to the EU or of powerful discourse-makers in relation to the 'everyman'. Post-colonial theory here is especially enriching, because Ceuta has been colonized by Portugal and Spain during the beginnings of the first imperialist, capitalist expansion (from 1500) (Mirage, n.d.) as Mignolo defined them (2000, p. 53). Ceuta has moreover been a border to the colonized Spanish protectorate in Morocco for long (1912-1956) (Pennell, 2009, p. 138), rendering the nowadays border a formerly colonial one. Colonial history consequently plays a role even in Ceuta's present.

Post-colonial insights reveal how European cultural, normative arguments have become more dominant than other, less European ones (Stoler, 1997; Mignolo, 2000). They also explain the mutually constitutive functions of different identities, which are interdependent and cannot but exist through (binary) opposed categories (Said in Rygielk, 1998, p. 124). Accordingly and seen that Ceuta is in a process of redefining its position within the EU – in times of crisis and ongoing debates about the model to be followed in the future - these theories appeared adequate to work with. Scientific, theoretical aspects resulted interesting to focus on in this research, because the Spanish

enclaves in Morocco have served as frequent examples to illustrate why diverse theories are more or less adequate in understanding the EU-border. Additionally, ethnographic approaches and considerable attention for insights of border-people in relation to powerful imaginations could support exploration of new ways of investigating common issues in border studies. This is different from a traditional geopolitical focus on the national scale and power elites (Mamadouh & Dijkink, 2006, p. 355).

Critical perspectives, here a postcolonial one, cannot but help Europe to start listening to the people “out there”, in- and outside its borders (Kramsch & Brambilla, 2007, pp. 105, 113). Here the social relevance of this study comes in: Certain ways of relating to the EU (e.g. in official geo-economic-political imaginations) have implications felt in Ceuta’s daily life, the life of the “everyman” (Häkli, 1998, p. 147), or border-people. They are supported to different extent by and seen as advantageous for (diverse groups of) border-people. Establishment (institutionalization) of certain imaginations has produced winners and losers (Gibson-Graham, 2000, p. 104), who both have to carry the consequences (O.T. Kramsch, personal communication, March 5th, 2012). This process of establishment works through media and the individual borderpeople becoming bearers (Kramsch, 2010, p. 1011) of the powerful geopolitical imaginations.

Yet, as Häkli (1998, pp. 143-144) convincingly argues on the basis of Michel De Certeau’s insights: There are many tactics in everyday life to subvert, undermine, weaken, avoid and contest wider, superimposed strategies. Tactics and agency (Kuus, 2004, pp. 477-479; Kramsch, 2011, p. 206) can be both, discursively reproduced or lived in practice. Geopolitical, powerful strategies (reproduced by elites and media) are not identical with the ones border-people of Ceuta imagined (Dijkink, 1996, p. 143): Meaning-making and renegotiation are context-specific and based on the individual’s means (e.g. experiences of the individual) of interpretation and understanding (Hall, 1997a, p. 32) and the everyday practice (Merrifield, 2011, p. 108).

The basic assumption of this research thus was that geopolitical imaginations about conditionality in the relation of the EU and Ceuta as produced by powerful discourse-makers differ from geopolitical imaginations of border-people, to which extent was investigated here. As everyday practices take place in the borderland in various ways, ‘everyman’-border-people envisioned a partly different future (strategy) than depicted in powerful geopolitical imaginations.

1.2 Research question

The research question which ensues from these deliberations was:

How are the ‘geopolitical imaginations’ of powerful discourse-makers about conditionality in the relation of Ceuta to the EU renegotiated in ‘geopolitical imaginations’ of border-people-everymen of the Ceuta-Tetouan border-region?

An answer could be given by first focusing on the following sub-questions:

- 1) *How do powerful discourse-makers imagine Ceuta’s conditional relation to the EU (in future)?*
- 2) *How do ‘everyman’-participants imagine Ceuta’s conditional relation to the EU (in future)?*
- 3) *How and why do the everyman’s renegotiations differ from the powerful geopolitical imaginations?*

1.3 Approach to investigation and structure of the paper

The topic of the research performed is linked to the 'EUBorderscapes'- program, worked on (among others) at the department of geography of the Autonomous University of Barcelona, funded by the EU. In this ongoing research program debate about and investigation of European border landscapes are central. Grounded on documentation on the state of the debate and issues treated by different working packages in the program this case-study has been developed.

In order to answer the research question of this study, firstly, a profound overview over the theoretical perspective of this research (chapter 2) allows digging into phenomena investigated about here. The theoretical background on geopolitical imaginations, renegotiation and conditionality has also served as guideline for conceptualizing and operationalizing instruments of this research. In the method section (chapter 4) this operationalization process as basis for the gathering of data for the case-study is outlined. Further qualitative methods have been selected as instruments to gather data about and to scrutinize the case of Ceuta. Interviews, observations and informal talks in the field and extensive analysis of literature were the means of data-gathering. For the qualitative content analysis a manual explorative, ethnographic coding approach was implemented. The exact definition and background information on the border-region necessary to understand struggle of positioning in EU context, are provided in chapter 4, the regional background.

The three following chapters present the findings of Ceuta being imagined in a spatially fragmented way in this research. The topics, corresponding to imagined distinct spaces of Ceuta in the conditional relation with the EU, in each of the chapters emerged from the analysis of data. Chapter 5 is meant to present geopolitical imaginations about Ceuta's center in the conditional relation to the EU. The following two chapters respectively deal with the geopolitical imaginations about Ceuta's spaces of flow (chapter 6) and Ceuta's margins (chapter 7). In each of the result-presenting chapters differentiation of imaginations of the different groups – discourse-makers and everymen – is kept on, in order to answer the research question of this investigation. The final chapter (chapter 8) is a conclusion presenting the most striking pieces of findings of this research.

2. Theorizing geopolitical imaginations and strategies of conditionality in Ceuta

This part of the proposal outlines the main theoretic concepts and links among them. Good understanding of these is crucial for the framing of this research. An overview of the most important concepts used here from post-colonial theory, respective background information and the way the concepts are applied is given in table 1 below.

Postcolonial theory goes back to important thinkers such as Edward Said and Derek Gregory (in geography), who both worked on the mutual constitutive-ness of (post-) colonial identities (Rygielk, 1998, p. 124). In these insights about the binary, powerful distinction between the modern "Self" and the "Other", criticism is implicated as well:

“Yet the sense of confrontation between an often emotionally defined Arab world and an even more emotionally experienced Western world drowned out the fact that Orientalism was meant to be a study in critique, not an affirmation of warring and hopelessly antithetical identities.”

(Said, 1977, p. 340)

Their post-colonial scholars' work has inspired generations of authors in different parts of the world (O.T. Kramsch, personal communication, September 23rd, 2011). One of those scholars is Walter D. Mignolo, who seeks to push more radically away from binary oppositions as tools of postcolonial analysis. He recommends especially taking into account 'colonial difference' and 'coloniality' as a part of - as belonging to - modernity. Modernity *is* and acts on the basis of coloniality of power. It has always needed the 'Orient' in ways of economic 'dependency' to come up with its 'neoliberal', capitalistic ideals of progress and global designs for its 'civilizing mission' (Mignolo, 2000, pp. 53-54). The self-constituting effect of an Orient for the Occident concerns all spheres of identity-building. They manifest in relation to one another (Rygielk, 1998, p. 124). Hegemony of the Modern (Occident) is based on distinguishing some subaltern 'other' – an Orient – which can be regarded as steady condition to Occidentalism (Mignolo, 2000, pp. 58-59).

Yet, in modern imaginary there is inherent blindness to the colonial difference and other knowledges: Modernity renders other knowledges to become 'subaltern' to hegemonic, modern knowledge. This implies that a scale of degrees of sameness, here as non-European-ness (an “underside of modernity”, immaturity, laziness, cowardice etc.) (ibid., p. 60), is forced upon these knowledges. They are measured in terms of the modern, civilized, hegemonic planetary episteme (ibid., pp. 53-54) which is actually not capable of grasping (ibid., p. 67) what is actually peculiar, forgotten (ibid., p. 51), and thus simply particular– instead of a constitutive Other (ibid., p. 61). But as such knowledges have been equaled and sub-alternized as “Other” (ibid., p. 61) one has to search for where they are “persistent in memory” (ibid., p. 64) to make use of the possibility of overcoming the process of sub-alternization (ibid., p. 67). Standards of coloniality, modernity and rationality suppress transmodernity, doublecritique, creolization and 'other thinking' (ibid., pp. 59, 67-69).

Mignolo thus asks (postcolonial scholars) to apply border-thinking, making a double movement through double critique and thereby releasing subaltern knowledges (ibid. p. 67). Recognizing diversity and change are steps out of the dichotomy of Occident and Orient – enabling thinking from the border (ibid., p. 64). A chance to empower silenced, “subalternized knowledges” and to “listen to plurality” (ibid., p. 69) would be invoked. Postcolonial rediscovery of local histories (ibid., pp. 71-73) is very much in line with reintegrating the neglected individual, particular and local neglected in main-stream geo-political analysis (2.1).

After this brief introduction, 'geopolitical imaginations' (2.1) will be outlined. Next, it will be briefly explained, what is understood by 'renegotiation' and the 'everyman' here (2.2). The third paragraph explains the term 'conditionality' as used in recent post-colonial literature on Europe and the EU (2.3). In this context the role of being a border (-city) (2.3.1) will be discussed to illustrate what conditionality might be connoted to in political and individual imaginations about Ceuta. The last major theoretical aspect introduced here is 'spatial fragmentation' in the context of the

conditional relation between Ceuta and the EU (2.4). The last sub-section summarizes the main theoretical vision applied in this research (2.5).

Main concepts used	Explanations and elaborations
<p>“geopolitical imaginations” (2.1)</p> <p>(presumably theoretically relevant elaborations)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Explanation of traditional geopolitical approaches (focus classical nation-state scales, administrations, territorial relations, foreign policy) - Explanation of critical geopolitical approaches (open up ways to integrate popular geopolitics, other voices and analyses of diverse actors) - Continuation of criticism in critical approaches: Klaus Dodds counter-factual thinking on local and individual scale - Everyman by Merrifield, everyday practices, strategies and tactics by De Certeau
<p>“renegotiation of discourses” (2.2)</p> <p>(socially and theoretically relevant)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Theories about meaning-making, contextual influences on the individual meaning-making and interpretation, discourses and the individual (Hall, 1997a; Gibson-Graham 2000, Kramsch 2011; etc.)
<p>“conditionality” (2.3)</p> <p>(presumably socially relevant elaborations)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Explanation of postcolonial thinking and conditionality, applications on the European context (Kuus, 2004; Kramsch, 2011) - Explanation for Ceuta as a particular border-city <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - opportunities inherent in borders and the border in Ceuta, stress on economic aspects- Marxist insights also; barrier-functions, security aspects – biopolitical insights - Explanation of in how far fragmentation is part of the strategy of conditionality of governmentality of the EU (Foucault, 1991; Gutting, 2013; Hardt & Negri, 2000) - Explanation of how the conditional relation with the EU exacerbates spatial fragmentation

Table 1: overview of theoretical approaches and synthesis in this study

2.1 Political and individual geopolitical imaginations

In a lot of geographical literature border-people and their views (Mignolo, 2000, pp. 63-64; Kramsch, 2011, p. 196; Rumford, 2008, pp. 57-59; 61) have been ignored. Focus has often been given to the level of the (nation-) state, to central governmental strategies of security and national foreign policy – especially in traditional geopolitical literature. Consequently, certain groups have become the center of attention and others have been neglected: powerful elites, administrations, leaders, academics, journalists, professionals dealing with international relations, and those involved in foreign policy (Kolossoff & Scott, 2012, p. 14) have received most attention. Also media, business interests, political commentators and geopolitical experts belong to this ‘elite’ -category (Dodds, 2008, p. 79).

Traditionally, geopolitical writing refers to the topics of ‘territorial belonging’ (Bonura, 1998, pp. 94-96) and ‘power’ (the superiority in imposing a will) (Dodds, 2008, p. 78). This reference have also been applied for geopolitical insights on borders: The powerful “decide, construct and constitute borders”, “deconstruct”, “manage”, “close” and “open” them on local and national level (Kolossoff & Scott, 2012, p. 12). Power relations of actors and their discursive representations have only gradually become recognized by academics to be crucial to geopolitics (Mamadouh & Dijkink, 2006, p. 358).

A range of “world geopolitical visions” in the form of normative, mental and political maps of the world and regions (Dijkink in Kolossoff & Scott, 2012, p. 12) gradually joined the established units of analysis and subjects of

studies. Images of desired and demonized 'others', social divisions, communities and contexts were revealed by a critical school of thought e.g. the increasing wish for homogeneity and "(border-) control" (popular especially since Schengen in 1991) "in Europe" (Kolossoff & Scott, 2012, p. 27). On the basis of criticism of the traditional geopolitics with their limited scope of focus, critical geopolitical scholars have pushed forward terms such as "security identity", "strategic culture", "stress on security", "definitions of security" and "geopolitical imaginations" (Mamadouh & Dijkink, 2006, p. 354).

These scholars also started paying attention to non-traditional sources in media, popular culture, construction of visions, spatial practices and powerful physical geographical facts (ibid., p. 356; Luke, 1998, p. 296; Bonura, 1998, pp. 89-90). In the context of the European border the main issues addressed then were "international migration", "mass control technology" and (un-) "documented crossing" in relation to "inequality of North and South, rich and poor" (Kolossoff & Scott, 2012, p. 13). Such studies also unveiled how the emphasis of the "politicized function" (ibid., pp. 14-15), "historical togetherness, cohesion and purity" dominate the debate on the European project and stimulate islamophobia and refusal of immigration (Ferrer-Gallardo & Van Houtum, 2013, p. 244).

To go on with this critical reflection and adding postcolonial thought, here I argue that the term 'geopolitical imagination' (see 2.2) can be also applied in the context of the city Ceuta, as a particular place and to its 'geopolitical' situation as seen through the eyes of its border-people. The latter seems a challenging use of the attribute "geopolitical" as it apparently contradicts the traditional application (Tuathail & Dalby, 1998, p. 10; Mamadouh & Dijkink, 2006, p. 354) strongly. Yet, there are few arguments why "geopolitical imagination" would be a privilege of politicians, experts and intellectuals (Mamadouh & Dijkink, 2006, p. 356). Why should not everyone have an idea or imagination about geopolitical questions (Dijkink, 1996, p. 11)?

"Geopolitical" ought not necessarily to be linked to an officially recognized nation-state scale (ibid.). A proof for this claim is an analysis of geopolitical imaginations of the Basque country (Mamadouh & Dijkink, 2006, p. 359). Literature shows that the individual should not be neglected, because the individual *does* practice and contribute to an everyday (b)ordering process about socio-cultural boundaries, divisions, experiences and identity constituting categories (Kolossoff & Scott, 2012, p. 8). This process, a process of renegotiation, is highly impacted by socialization, family, local political culture, media and identification with the local culture (ibid., p. 4). It finds expression in everyday life and border practices such as shifting and contesting (divisions of) groups: individual subjects do border-work on daily basis through meaning-making, traditions, habits, emotions and their respective understanding of the local context (Kramsch & Brambilla, 2007, p. 103).

The physical border instead becomes a conditioner to local identity, routines, attitudes and narration of collective memories (Kolossoff & Scott, 2012, p. 34). Bottom-up approaches (developing grounded knowledge) researching on everyday life-worlds and perceptions of neighboring 'others' (ibid., p. 35; Ferrer-Gallardo & Van Houtum, 2013, p. 244) might thus add decisive insights to the field. Nonetheless, such approaches, centering on the daily and individual, have been mostly ignored in geopolitics, e.g. that "each human being yearns for some kind of world order" and perceives "threats to order" and "feelings of insecurity" as "severe disruptions of his or her personal social pathologies" (Dijkink, 1996, p. 15). Individual "standards" and expectations are thereby derived from the

individual's community and might be shared by members of "localized" groups (ibid., p. 16). To sum up these ideas: the individual has a relevant geopolitical imagination and role to play.

Significance of individual contexts should be also especially obvious in an era of globalization, in which the role of the state is being redefined and in which city-marketing in the framework of global competition between regions (Sparke, 2002, p. 215), including border-regions such as Ceuta, have become every-day routine. Decisions impacting Ceuta as a border-place are presumably congruent with the interest on each of overlapping institutional scales, on which they were taken (Kramsch, 2010, p. 1011; Rumford, 2008, p. 59). Yet, they are not necessarily coherent with imaginations at the local and individual level, where the impact of such decisions is felt and manifests.

Thus here I would like to follow Klaus Dodds's incentive and ask a "what if question" (Dodds, 2008, p. 74), making use of a form of "counter-factual reasoning": What if the individual border-people of Ceuta were in a position to determine a "geopolitical" strategy for Ceuta's future? Where would Ceuta go according to the "everyman" (Häkli, 1998, p. 147; see also 2.1.1) –border-people of Ceuta? Klaus Dodd's introduction of the 'counterfactual' offers the opportunity to rethink plans and outcomes in alternative ways, leading to different solutions. It reminds us that hegemonic methodology and knowledges in studies of geopolitics are just another strategic element lending power to the powerful (Dodds, 2008, p. 77; Kramsch & Brambilla, 2007, pp. 100-101).

Outsider's knowledges and ideas (outsider in the sense of lack of political power) are meant to challenge the dominant knowledges and ideas. For Ceuta it is not only Spanish foreign policy impacting processes, but also, and especially, EU foreign policy and neighborhood policy. Ceuta, in this sense, makes its own foreign policy as a (border-) city of the EU and as a Spanish city by positioning itself in the European context: Border-people involved in political decision-making (directly or indirectly), those, who steer and implement practices of conditionality in Ceuta are mediators between local particularities given the border-situation and higher scale politics. Their ways of expressing geopolitical imaginations will be regarded here as strategic (De Certeau, 1988, p. Xix) and powerful, not tactical.

But geopolitical imagination of Ceuta's powerful discourse-makers, experts, intellectuals (Mamadouh & Dijkink, 2006, pp. 350, 359), the leaders or elite, spread as discourse by diverse media (Dodds, 2008, p. 76) should not be regarded the only valid one. Border-people can also think of what strategies would be diligent and as Michel De Certeau (Häkli, J., 1998, p. 143) would suggest, they do in fact already contest the strategies through tactics (of resistance) and agency (Kramsch, 2011, p. 197; Mignolo, 2000, p. 63). Borderpeople are the "bearers of border differentiation" (Kramsch, 2010, p. 1011) which gives them important agency in contesting this role. The approach is profoundly in line with much of post-colonial thinking.

2.1.1 Merrifield's 'everybuddy-everyman' as indifferent and resistant geopolitical thinker and actor

Given the above considerations of border-people envisioning geopolitical strategies and contesting existing strategies by tactics (in the form of practice and meaning-making), next, we need to define who is a border-people-

individual. The question is: Who is 'everyman'? Who is the 'everyman' whom Häkli (1998, p. 147) suggests to reintroduce into geopolitics? By which characteristics could one identify this group of 'everymen'? Who are the ones lacking strategic power and those who have to work with tactics to survive (De Certeau, 1988, p. Xix)?

Consulting Andy Merrifield's reflections on "crowd politics" – "or here comes everybuddy" (2011) which are mostly based on insights by famous Henri Lefebvre and James Joyce some relevant hints can be found: Merrifield locates the everyman in the urban social environment, the place where "everybody is coming". Everybody is coming to urban environments nowadays, since "today most people live in cities" (Merrifield, 2011, p. 103). Here the 'everyman' will not be understood, however, as an urban figure only. Yet, Merrifield's insights are useful: His attention is attracted by the idea that there is some hidden, latent power of organizing among everybody – everyman - "without organization" as put forward by Shirky (Merrifield, 2011, p. 103).

Here we can see similarities to De Certeau's (1988, pp. XVII – XIX) conceptualization of latent power of tactics of the powerless – without strategic tools in the hands of the powerful discourse-makers. Although Merrifield dislikes the way Shirky develops his argument "artless"-ly, he does like the focus on new kinds of sociability (Merrifield, 2011, p. 103), where everybody gets together e.g. via social media offering opportunities to "de-professionalize select sectors" (Merrifield, 2011, p. 104). Reflecting on Shirky with the help of James Joyce's "everynight-man" and Ulysses "everyday-man" (Merrifield, 2011, p. 103) Merrifield identifies the 'everyman' as "ordinary non-specialist people" (Merrifield, 2011, p. 104). The 'everyman' then becomes a "universal dreaming figure", the "archetypal image" of people with "collective desiring", though "unconscious" of it, "constantly the same as and equal to himself well worthy of any and all such universalization" (Merrifield, 2011, p. 103).

The circumstances under which the everyman acts do matter as well: According to Merrifield's interpretation of Lefebvre's insights the world market dynamics have initiated a "vicious process of dispossession" (in the rural areas e.g. being taken over by powerful agro-business). Therefore people are forced and pushed into cities where gentrification of the centers pushes the "poor and vulnerable newcomers" simultaneously to the margins. The analysis of this "paradoxical dialectic", which Merrifield takes over from Lefebvre, allows stressing the self-destructive features of "planetary urbanization", "immanent in circuits of capital" (Merrifield, 2011, p. 105). Most importantly, Merrifield concludes that such changes bring along a transformation of the "notion of the citizen and city-dweller" ending up in lives of close "proximity without sociability" (Merrifield, 2011, p. 106). This thought then serves to explain why the city is an "empty head", which neutralizes radical ideas which formerly were bonding people (Merrifield, 2011, p. 107).

The everyman in urban life, the masses on Earth, tend towards "relative conformity", whether everyman is "unemployed, sub-employed and multi-employed". The new urbanization cuts off the everyman from the past, excludes him from the future and catches him in the "daily grind of hustling living" (Merrifield, 2011, p. 108). Thus the 'everyman' in Merrifield is strongly focused on and working for his own survival, everyday routine and practices – which reminds of De Certeau's (1988) understanding of tactical practices in everyday routine. To certain extent the everyman tends to live with a certain indifference to its wider social environment beyond the everyday.

Unconsciously though, through tactics of daily struggle for survival, he might contest or undermine the strategic power or discourse of the elite (see 2.2).

To mobilize and politicize the everyman's routines, topics must be "meaningful" to their everyday lives (Merrifield, 2011, p. 108). Here again Shirky's conceptualization of the role of social media comes in, as a means to mediate encounters, to "overcome the inertia of the mass" of the everyman, to empower the individual powerless everymen ('everymEn' will be used as the plural-form of 'everymAn' occasionally here). The experience of humiliation and exploitation might form the "mode" everyman relates to the world. This mode can be made use of to build solidarity, to "piece together common notions" e.g. to "universalize specific lived experience" (Merrifield, 2011, p. 108).

The everyman are ultimately "disparate people who are neither conscious of class nor motivated to act in its name". Their motivation to unite for building strategic power might be rooted in the "desire to act against the ruling class", "against an undemocratic system" which enables their encounter: becoming "collectively conscious of an enemy". The "modern working class" consists of those looking for work. Once they find it, they become "commodities exposed to competition" and the "fluctuations of the market". The decisive characteristic of these everymen is that they "sell labour in order to live" (Merrifield, 2011, p. 110) – which is what pretty much everyone – everyman - does nowadays.

This might sound like a rather Marxist understanding of what the everyman is. It fits well with the insights by Rosa Luxemburg and Mathew Sparke (see 2.3.1) observing how places compete and sell themselves in global competition. But the same thus applies to the everyman in a certain sense in the nowadays neoliberal world. Thus the need to find work is a basic common characteristic of everymen, even applying for those who might "never find work and know it". Those everymen act as a "non-class". They can only recognize their "latent political muscle" when they encounter and see that they share to be "pushed around", that they share "vulnerability" (Merrifield, 2011, p. 111). This requires giving up their 'everyman'-, individualized, singularized struggle, the everyman is used to. It implies rejecting the "habitual", the "accepted". Occupying streets, stopping the production might create the lacking awareness of them being the ones creating, maintaining the city and everyday life they are caught up with (Merrifield, 2011, p. 114). Under such conditions, Merrifield argues, everyman would become actively resistant.

What we learn from this characterization is that for Merrifield "everyman" can be anyone, man or woman, representing the masses of society, the flaneur in streets and roads. He or she is a testimony of modern transformation of the cityscape and in the world, he has been so from the middle ages until modernity (Olivier Kramtsch, personal communication, January 30th, 2014). This does not imply a proletarian belonging or that everyman is poor: Everyman is a border-flaneur between classes up and down, he or she can be part of the shadow spaces, often seems invisible and conforming, but he or she can see everything (Olivier Kramtsch, personal communication, January 30th, 2014).

At the same time it is a rather singularized figure struggling for his or her own survival in his or her everyday routine. Everyman start resisting when they develop the consciousness of being not the only one to be actively resistant. Selling his or her labor and thus actually keeping the world working the way it habitually works, he or she

might appear to certain extent indifferent. Yet, “the ingenious ways in which the weak make use of the strong, thus lend a political dimension to everyday practices” (De Certeau, 1988, p. Xvii).

2.2 Renegotiating geopolitical imaginations in Ceuta

“The production of new knowledge is a world-changing activity, repositioning other knowledges and validating new subjects, practices, policies and institutions” (Gibson-Graham, 2000, p. 101)

Following Hall’s description of the post-structural philosopher Michel Foucault’s famous concept of ‘discourse’, one can understand it as a group of statements giving a language to talk about, a representation of knowledge on a topic (Hall, 1997b, p. 44). Those diverse meanings and statements are subject to (re-)negotiation through social practices, which, again, entail meanings which shape what we do - our practices. In this sense all practices have discursive aspects. Discourse and practice shape each other mutually (ibid.) to varying extents.

The “concept of discourse” (Hall, 1997c , p. 55) is about *where* meaning comes from.

“Meaning is understood to be produced under specific social and intellectual conditions, and knowledge is not a ‘true reflection’ but a productive and constitutive force. Although knowledges cannot be differentiated according to their greater or lesser accuracy (their success or failure reflected in the world), they can be distinguished by their effects – the different subjects they empower, the institutions and practices they enable, and those they exclude or express” (Gibson-Graham, 2000, p. 97)

What Gibson-Graham hints at here is that there are always conditions and a context to meaning-making (ibid., p. 99; Hall, 1997a, p. 32; Kolossov & Scott, 2012; Dijkink, 1996, p. 35). Space and time thus play a crucial role. This leads us to a significant aspect related to what renegotiated geopolitical imaginations for border-people might be like: “‘taking the meaning’ must involve an active process of interpretation” (Hall, 1997a, p. 32) and [is] never exactly congruent with the speaker’s meanings” (ibid.). The ‘reader’ of meaning, in space and time, is consequently as important as the writer. Hall (ibid.) argues that only then meaning becomes meaningful. In this research the everyman-“border-people” (Driessen, 2010, p. 171) are thus bearers of Ceuta’s geopolitical discourse and strategies to which they subject - to individually differing extent. From their individual context, their everyday practice, they are supposed to renegotiate pieces of discursively produced geopolitical imaginations, adding their own interpretations and meaning-making.

Gibson-Graham (2000, p.101) adds to this thought that there is a “possibility of disruption and invention in cultural process” for the individual (consciously and unconsciously). It “opens a space for ‘agency’ and unpredictability” (ibid.). Although people might act within boundaries of a certain discourse, there is a degree of narrative freedom: they add their own meaning, their own, nuances. Alternatively, everyman-border-people might individually, simply neglect or reject to reproduce a certain discourse – which suits the earlier mentioned definition of the ‘indifferent everyman’ (2.1.1).

Yet, the decisive difference between expert imaginations and those of border-people is the power of the former to spread and institutionalize their discourses, the strategic instruments in the hands of powerful discourse-makers (De

Certeau, 1988, pp. Xvii – Xix). Power of discourses and meaning-making has also been referred to as “performativity”. Gibson-Graham (2000, p. 104) outlines that a discourse becomes effective and powerful through subjection by individuals (*ibid.*, p. 108). In post-structuralist tradition knowledge is consequently seen as “multiple, contradictory and powerful” (*ibid.*, p. 95) translating into practice (*ibid.*, p. 97). Meaning-making contributes to the construction of power relations as well as it is limited by those (Hall, 1997c, *ibid.*).

An underlying key-assumption has to do with the simultaneity of diverse levels of discourse (Gibson-Graham, 2000, p. 101; Hall, 1997a, p. 32): Häkli illustrates that there are “many contexts” to social life, and thus spheres of discourse (Häkli, 1998, p. 147). A mutual influence of these is another much discussed issue, such as for narratively strengthening local identities at the expense of the state or national identity (Kolossoff & Scott, 2012, p. 10) – nonetheless, the relation of such overlapping discourse does not necessarily manifest in mutually exclusive ways. Instead the overlap might manifest as such (Wallerstein, 1991, p. 187). The effect of such discourse is that certain social representations become empowered, and can therefore shape human environment (*ibid.*, p. 13; Tuathail & Dalby, 1998, p. 22). Simultaneity of such diverse levels is even an intrinsic part of the definition of ‘geopolitical imagination’ as “any perceived relation between one’s own place and other places” (Dijkink, 1996, p. 11). This is crucial to have in mind when analyzing the role of everyman-border-people’s geopolitical imaginations. Their representations might balance pieces of strategic discourse of the EU on local level.

Referring to Häkli working with De Certeau’s post-structuralist insights, making a distinction between strategies and tactics may serve to characterize the powerful “political” geopolitical imaginations and the “individual” renegotiation (see 2.1) (Häkli, 1998, p. 147). Both discursive representations are interdependent and unevenly influence each other in diverse ways: a government’s legitimacy is often achieved through popular appeal relying on everyman’s benefit assumptions (*ibid.*). On the other hand subtle, tactical resistance and manipulation of strategically imposed representations and duties from below (De Certeau, 1988), is what happens daily and subtly in localized, particular contexts (*ibid.*, pp. 143-144).

Resistance can be of unplanned nature, but it is worth noting that it is “not reducible to discourse” (*ibid.*, p. 144, Hall, 1997b, p. 44). It finds expression in everyday practices as well (e.g. acts of decision seizing opportunities, emotions, reproduction of regional identities and social power relations) (*ibid.*, p. 144). The terms “strategic” and “strategy” appear frequently in geopolitical studies (Dijkink, 1996, p. 11; Mamadouh & Dijkink, 2006, pp. 351-355). The power of tactical “popular geopolitics” (Tuathail & Dalby, 1998, p. 10) (e.g. in popular visual images, media representation etc.) has gradually become acknowledged, in studies of popular movements, street parlance to organized activities (Häkli, 1998, p. 147).

The “discursive economy of popular imaginations” determines in part political discussion of foreign policy (*ibid.*, p. 12) and media has eventually been acknowledged to have potential to alter power balances and give legitimacy to resistance. On the other hand strategic planning mostly seeks to anticipate popular imaginations, to prevent resistance: it has been argued that tactics eventually play minor roles in shaping the world by now, for power elites have learned to predict popular reactions and involve these calculations in their strategic planning (Dijkink,

1996, p. 144). Irrespective of these arguments diverse cases show that political strategies become openly opposed by the wider public.

These theoretical insights also describe, what happens in cross-border relations routinely, on the one hand through institutional, strategic planning and on the other hand, through parallel informal contacts (Kolossoff & Scott, 2012, p. 43). The dominant discourse about “European integration” heralds “post-national politics” and manifests as the Europeanization of cross-border cooperation (Kolossoff & Scott, 2012, p. 16) and the ENP. Whether people actually feel European-ness in their place is questionable (Dijkink, 1996, p. 10). Also in Ceuta everyman-border-people might renegotiate discourse based on own (border-) experience, everyday practices related to the border and individual means of interpretation. They might produce their own geopolitical imagination of Ceuta’s relation to the EU, its European-ness (Kuus, 2004, p. 473) which is investigated in this paper. They might also create images and practices of resistance to the relation with the EU as a manner of renegotiating such “narratives of regional change” (Gibson-Graham, 2000, p. 107).

2.3 Conditionality – a geopolitical strategy of Europeanization

In this part of the theoretical framework the presumably underlying conditionality in the border-city’s relation with the EU will be dealt with. It is about the question whether everyman can feel conditionality in Ceuta and what it consist of in their imagination. ‘Conditionality’, thereby is understood as one of many geopolitical imaginations, a strategy, which is (imagined to be) imposed by the EU on Ceuta and to which powerful discourse-makers and everyman-border-people subject to different different extent. But what might the vague term “conditionality” actually refer to? In order to understand this we have to firstly remember what postcolonial theory tells us about Europe. Mignolo’s (2002) insights presented in the beginning of this chapter have inspired more authors and were applied to the EU, among others by Kuus (2004) and Kramersch (2011; 2010). We also have to notice from the beginning that (imagination of) ‘conditionality’ is used as an open-ended concept as such and can refer to diverse dimensions (political, cultural, economic etc.). This fits the idea that conditionality is a certain geopolitical strategy, covering various aspects of life. Additionally, in this research, the concept is generally understood to refer to conditions designed by the powerful EU. These have to be lived up to by all its constituent parts. Those are in expectation of diverse kinds of benefits from doing so.

More specific definitions could be derived from the literature. Kuus (2004) has worked on discourses of European-ness after the Eastern enlargement of the EU: According to her insights post-coloniality is reflected in discourses about degrees of otherness in comparison to some loosely defined core-European identity in the EU. The “East” in this context is connoted to being “not yet”, “not fully” European, still learning and adopting dominant norms (Kuus, 2004, p. 483). The “East” – treated similar to the “Orient” in Mignolo - is thus in need of advice and follows the template of ‘core-Europe’, which core-Europe generously provides. The Eastern process of conformation is disciplined and controlled by the EU (ibid., p. 478). “Good behavior” (ibid., p. 474) according to criteria of European-ness, which e.g. includes showing the willingness to internalize European norms, means that more European-ness is

attributed to a place behaving well. Good behavior and willingness are a '*condition for being recognized as European*' (ibid., p. 484).

Variability in European-ness is thereby grounded on idealized core-values in Kuus – civilization, modernity, development, progress, Christian moral beliefs, belief in “linear transitology” - and distance from the core (ibid., p. 482; Kolossov & Scott, 2012, p. 18). Controversially, but fitting Mignolo’s reasoning, the “European core” *needs* othering for its self-image (Kuus, 2004, p. 474), to constitute its own “Western” identity. “Eastern Europe” thereby becomes a “bufferzone” (ibid., p. 477) to still ‘less European outsides’. It has the task to prevent spill-over of risks and threats to the EU and its identity (Kramsch, 2011, p. 201). This desire of protection is very visible in EU-frontier-zones such as at the Ukrainian border, but also at the highly militarized border-fence in Ceuta.

Securitization for the sake of a bigger whole often prevails over local economic interests (Kolossov & Scott, 2012, p. 21). Throughout Europe, thus, different degrees of European-ness are created, degrees of “western” normality and “eastern” otherness (Kuus, 2004, pp. 475, 479). The intriguing aspect of Kuus’ theorization is flexibility in the construction of this discourse: Through flexibility of the concept “East” several Europes and Easts are constructed, since the local discourse will always shift the boundary of the East even further eastwards (e.g. Whereas ‘East’ in a place in France is attributed to places in Germany and beyond, in Bratislava, the capital of Slovakia, ‘East’ is attributed to its own East and Ukraine). This way European-ness of the ‘Self’ is discursively reaffirmed (ibid., p. 479). Kuus (ibid., p. 480) calls this practice “nesting orientalism”. Consequently, power-relations and dichotomy of East and West are not clear-cut, for they are based on degrees of proximity and “likeness” (ibid., p. 484).

Moreover, “agency” is visible in the ways the superimposed, strategic recommendations (conditions) by the core are silently resisted (ibid., p. 477) in places - even though officially they appear to be implemented. Kuus (ibid., p. 484) therefore recommends to research from power-margins. The margin’s construction, she understands as a “mirror” of exclusion, division and the functioning of discursively established degrees of otherness (ibid.; Ferrer-Gallardo & Van Houtum, 2013, p. 248) in Europe.

In essence, what we learn about conditionality from Kuus, is that good relations between the margins and core-Europe, – are conditioned by showing (more than average) willingness to develop according to some discursive construct of European template development, values and degrees of likeliness to the core. In exchange improvement of status is granted to and subsidies are sent to places (Kuus, 2004), helping them Europeanize even more. Here I claim that a similar paradigm like for the East – core relation can be applied for Southern margins, such as Ceuta and Spain, and a Northern ‘more European’ core.

Kramsch (2011, p. 197) additionally stresses another aspect of conditionality in his work – more economic in kind. According to his insights increasing distance from core Europe parallels images about increasing underdevelopment on an “evolutionary timeline”, putting the more marginal places spatio-temporarily “into the past of the European present” (Kramsch, 2011, p. 196). Thus the degree of economic development as understood to be representative of core-Europe is used as a scale to determine the degree of European-ness of other places in the EU. Advanced economic development is thus another crucial condition for a high “European status” within the EU.

But Kramersch (ibid.), Ferrer-Gallardo and Van Houtum (2012, p. 248) criticize the EU for being blind to diversity, particularity with regard the EU's claim for universal legitimacy of the core-European model. At its border, the EU creates "hardening dividing lines" of conditionality implementing the ENP (European Neighborhood Policy) (Kramersch, 2011, p. 197). Morocco is one of the countries in the EU's neighborhood and therefore the Moroccan part of Ceuta's border-region and all of Ceuta's relation to Morocco are somehow concerned with the ENP. The ENP adjures the geostrategic "common" interest, of bringing "stability, prosperity and security" to the regions beyond the EU-borders (Kramersch, 2011, p. 200). Yet, the "positivist conditionality" is a "two way process" *just on paper*. It actually builds upon the neighbors', Morocco's, willingness to develop according to the "European" attributes in exchange for deeper relations. Conditionality actually results in the neighbors' "one way commitment to European values" for "mutual benefit" (Kramersch, 2011, pp. 200-201). The mechanism described here for the ENP is almost the same Kuus (2004) describes for inner-EU conditionality. To conclude with: postcolonial conditionality can be considered to be built on "inferiorizing otherness", through claiming EU values to be the only system to reach a global, common prosperity and through "eurocentric organization of knowledge" (Kramersch & Brambilla, 2007, p. 98).

What Stoler's work (1997) contributes here (even though she refers to the era of institutional imperialism the basic mechanisms of her ideas can be claimed to be applicable also for the postcolonial context) is the finding that conditionality of European-ness even reaches into the private sphere, the sphere of the everyman. It takes the form of psychological requirements to citizenship and a need to avoid cultural "contamination" of European-ness. The latter is pictured as fragile construct, which is easily neutralized through influence of less fragile, less civilized, cultural traits (Stoler, 1997, pp. 203, 213-214). Whereas the common consequence and tactic to avoid contamination might be isolation of groups (see 2.3.2), there are also discursive tactics of 'invisibilizing' otherness (Ferrer-Gallardo, Albet-Mas & Espineira, 2014).

The process of 'invisibilization' has been uncovered in Southern Spain, in Tarifa, a city just across the Straits of Gibraltar, not far from Ceuta, in a twofold way: Here it had a symbolic and a functional dimension. Firstly it consisted of neglecting and ignoring historical heritage which contests the symbolism of one Christian, European cultural heritage (conveying the long-standing presence of Islam in Tarifa, through manipulating street-names to be Christian and avoiding to give a place to the Arab Tarif in public memory) (Ferrer-Gallardo et al., ibid., p. 4). Instead the symbolism of the desired European cultural heritage is particularly emphasized in the city. Secondly, the practice of managing migration flows in the detention center in Tarifa is conveyed, e.g. not calling the center a place of 'detention' (ibid., p. 7).

Both practices of conveying are meant to neutralize otherness and 'exclusionary practices' manifesting regularly as consequence of respective border-management of the EU (ibid, p.1). Such invisibilization serves to discursively attribute European-ness to the 'Self', while conveying elements which could contaminate the European identity (Stoler, 1997, pp. 213-214).

Yet, all postcolonial theory reminds us also of the subaltern, marginal knowledges and ways in which silent resistance to conditionality is realized: selective re-narrating of EU experience, renegotiation of the geopolitical idea of Europe (Kramersch & Brambilla, 2007, p. 113) is what actually happens in all EU-ropean localities (Kuus, 2004, p.

478). The impact the border-situation does have in this European context of conditionality, will be elaborated upon in the following subsections.

2.3.1 Expectations of the geopolitical imaginations of conditionality in Ceuta, a border-city

How does the border-situation tighten and shape conditionality in the relation between Ceuta and the EU? There is, of course, no one correct answer to this question. In many answers surfaces the notion that conditionality in Ceuta's particular border-situation is designated by cultural and economic implications of the border as well as by the process of securitization. Beyond this concordance there are diverse opinions of which factor is prevailing (Kolossoff & Scott, 2012, pp. 21, 31) – but actually they often appear together and thus seem to be intermingled. Whereas “Europeanizing” and “nationalizing” discourses often occur as calls for closure of the border, “internationalizing” discourses promote “opening” and interaction, perceiving interdependence and complementarity across the border (Kolossoff & Scott, 2012, p. 50). It can be helpful to differentiate here how the border-situation impacts Ceuta's geopolitical situation and the life of the individual.

In geopolitical, official, powerful imaginations the economic intrinsic need of exploitation for capitalist accumulation (Luxemburg, 1972, p. 61) is a reason why the border-situation is an opportunity for economic survival. Going back to Marxist tradition and Rosa Luxemburg we understand that capitalism needs external opportunities for exploitation (ibid., p. 60). Potential of gains through purchase by independent sources outside commodity production (ibid., p. 57) causes competition for (economic) expansion to non-capitalist places - “colonies” (ibid., p. 61). This intrinsic economic mechanism of accumulation explains imperialism (ibid., p. 61), the world system's inherent inequalities and the function of borders perpetuating such inequalities (Kolossoff & O'Loughlin in Kolossoff & Scott, 2013, p. 25).

On this basis Matthew Sparke (2002, p. 214) outlines economic visions on strategic regionalism, a powerful discourse and practice: regions and places are put on the market for attraction of investment. They enter neoliberal competition. This is where city-marketing comes into play. Cross-border inequalities and cooperation advantages have to be exploited. Otherwise borders were irrational anachronisms to economy (Walters, 2002, p. 564). Thus economic development is a driving force behind mechanisms (Kolossoff & Scott, 2013, p. 43) of (in-) formal social network creation (Kramsch & Brambilla, 2007, p. 106) across borders, following a neoliberal approach to economic development (Sparke, 2002, p. 220). Diverse actors, especially the powerful, on national and local scale, play an active role in this process (ibid.).

In Ceuta economic needs have been the reason for establishing Schengen- and EU-Customs-exceptions, which Ceuta's economy is built on. As Kramsch (2010, p. 1003) remarks: possibilities are inherent in borders. Permeability and extending networks will persist in spite of ongoing reinforcement of boundary demarcation (Driessen, 2010, pp. 175-176). Boundary advantages consequently concern diverse aspects of economic life - work *and* leisure (Kolossoff & Scott, 2012, p. 36). Yet, other economic activities are hampered by the border, since the same competition among regions for attraction of investment renders borders unnecessary obstacles (Sparke, 2002).

They affect “all aspects of social life” in border-regions very directly, e.g. causing doubling of infrastructure and economic activity which adhere to each side’s national legislation. Networking and economic survival remain disturbed by the barrier-function of the border (Kolossoff & Scott, 2012, p. 8). Being cut in their radius border-regions use to be poorer than central regions and populated by ethnic, cultural minorities, who eventually also reside on the other side (Kolossoff & Scott, 2012, p. 33) of the border. The other sides e.g. of the EU external border in Morocco use to be similarly disadvantaged (ibid., p. 33).

Different sorts of informal cooperations are typical of border-areas, and especially of Ceuta (§ 2). TNC (transnational crime), smuggling (harmful) goods and immigration (or human trafficking-) networks (Axford, 2006, p. 170; Kolossoff & Scott, 2012, p. 17) make use of EU-borderland-situations. The “criminal”, informal activities can become mere locomotives to growth and innovation (ibid., pp. 31-32) – in the case of Ceuta this is exacerbated by Ceuta’s unique fiscal system serving informal cross-border trade (see chapter 4). The border-trade has become the only constant economic opportunity and the most important employee for many border-people from both sides.

In this sense Rumford (2008, p. 62) is right in stating, that “benefit” in border-regions arises from “bridging” a barrier. The particular situation of Ceuta, at a border, which is not officially recognized by Morocco, is not *only* obstacle to commercial relations (Ferrer-Gallardo, 2009, pp. 29, 32), which are tolerated by Morocco for the sake of profit and widely impact the economic structure on both sides (Aranda-Gallego, 2007, p. 348, Martinez Navarro, 2003, p. 3; Ferrer-Gallardo, 2009, p. 32).

The process of redefining the city’s position in the economic and political cross-border context shows that the Ceuta is struggling to fulfill its part of the conditional relation to the EU. Ceuta might live up to the standards of the development criterion of conditionality but always making use of the (economic) opportunities invoked by the border. The geopolitical imaginations concerning conditionality can be expected to be closely interlinked with the border for the economic dimension.

With regard to individual ‘everyman’-border-people conditionality is shaped by the border-situation as well. In the social and economic sphere of life, theories suggest, that (in-) direct effects of the barrier function limit people’s freedom of movement (Kolossoff & Scott, 2012, p. 36) and communication (ibid., p. 5). The boundary’s proximity conditions life and individual life-cycles: in a border-region like Ceuta and Northern Morocco life-cycles differ from the common model of concentric circles in space symbolizing contacts, which weaken at increasing distance from the center of the life-cycle. The border decisively cuts this potentially circular space for many border-people (ibid., p. 36). In spite of these dominant national and European discourses demarcating the external border in Ceuta, the individual border-people have found opportunities to resist - a possibility of “resistance to territorially institutionalized power” (Kramsch, 2010, p. 1012).

It is the border-people of both sides who cross or let cross the barrier frequently to make a living, even though for informal or even criminal activities. This could be regarded as agency and resistance to the conditionality imposed in the relation between Ceuta and the EU. For the border-people it is simply the field of daily practice and discourse though. The “*arena of local everyday life experience is the scale ‘where the meanings of (state-)*

boundaries are ultimately reproduced and contested'" (Newman et al. in Kramsch, 2010, p. 1009). The notion of *possibility* allows for recognition of the longstanding interaction and exchange among populations in border-territories, their border-thinking (in the style of Mignolo) and as well as their agency.

Still, separation and barrier-functions of the border are not only evident, but to some extent even desired, especially in the cultural realm: Ceuta's EU external Schengenborder is one of the "more important" borders in geopolitics, namely a "frontal", "global" one with strong barrier-functions. Economic wealth and status are still highly unequal (Kolossoff & Scott, 2012, p. 10) on the two sides. Power elites, mainly still in Ceuta, construct and constitute the border, being in a position of managing and controlling the border (ibid., p. 12). Separation of legal systems, cultures, politics, mentalities, religions and people are the border's purpose and function, but not necessarily its dominant effect.

Definitions of identities have always retained overlap, because e.g. European and national concerns are superimposed on possibly diverging local interests (Ferrer-Gallardo & Van Houtum, 2012, p. 244). Local interests might contradict and undermine legal barriers e.g. concerning access to labour markets, migration and respective legislation impacting on socio-economic mobility (Kolossoff & Scott, 2012, p. 31). For this potential incongruity borderlands lack some direct top-down control. Toleration of neglect of political measures common for core regions is provided, which renders such regions to be in a permanent state of exception - with special rules and community affairs becoming "grey zones" of state sovereignty, "unorthodox" spaces of local autonomy (ibid., p. 32). In terms of post-colonial theory these features of 'otherness' seem inherent as well as a certain resistance, potentially not fitting the compliance of requirements in relations of conditionality.

As shown in many post-colonial studies identity issues are grounded in the cultural conceptualization of European-ness (§2.2) based on Christian values, enlightenment, civilization etc. This conceptualization facilitates the demarcation of borders in the form of visa regimes, citizenship, residence rights and physical controls (at the EU's external frontiers). In this context creation of new, hybrid categories is perceived to have disturbing effects (Kolossoff & Scott, 2012, p. 18). They "compete rather strongly with more exclusive notions of European-ness" (ibid., p. 18), which is a "hot" issue in Ceuta, where diverse cultural groups meet, but where they are not physically separated by barriers (Ferrer-Gallardo, 2009, p. 31).

Another crucial insight is that "typically, a richer side is afraid of its poorer neighbour, inflow of economic refugees and cheap labour force" contesting elements of national identities (Kolossoff & Scott, 2012, p. 21) – in Ceuta there is fear of migration from many African countries. The kind of and ways criteria for European-ness are expressed by borders to protect purity mirror the conditionality implied in "being considered European" (Kramsch, 2011, p. 197). Racial, sexual, national, moral and legal discourses are the basis to European superiority involving spheres of public and private life in families (Stoler, 1997, p. 199). Management of categories and classification forms the basis of this construct (Kramsch & Brambilla, 2007, pp. 100, 115).

Asymmetry of a 'European fragile identity' to other, dangerously disturbing, 'more stable, less civilized kinds of identities' (Stoler, 1997, p. 215) is an implicit assumption here, causing the mentioned fears and driving the

management by categories. According to these insights one should expect political discourse in the culturally hybrid city Ceuta to perform “identitarian gerrymandering” (Ferrer-Gallardo & Van Houtum, 2013, p. 247). The official political geopolitical imaginations of culture expressed in Ceuta, its media, national media and the EU are thus expected to frame conditionality with the border imagined as a barrier. “Bordering” becomes basically politics of difference (Hardt & Negri, 2000, p. 199).

The identification of “cultural, social threats” (from the other side) has led to a “hardened conception of foreigners” (Kramersch, 2011, pp. 194, 205). Threats have become personified and racialized as “Islamic”, “non-white”, as they blur distinctions by contesting groups, rendering refugees dangerous figures to better be filtered at the border (Walters, 2002, p. 572; Ferrer-Gallardo & Van Houtum, 2013, p. 243). The desire for cultural homogeneity and stigmatization of ‘less European’ cultures gives legitimacy to reinforced security functions of borders over economic goals (Kolossoff & Scott, 2012, p. 21) and thus permits the establishment of “locked front lines” or “borders of fear” (ibid., p. 22).

In Ceuta supposed inefficiencies and weak spots in the border had to be confronted vigorously especially after Schengenization (Walters, 2005, p. 569). Spread of surveillance and the biopolitical, disciplinary nature of borders have become accepted (Walters, 2005, p. 573), even in the hinterlands of borders as “sites of production of knowledge about populations”: police forces can check papers of potential illegal migrants at any time and place, which gives a mobile character to borders (Urry, J. in Kolossoff & Scott, 2012, p. 26; Hardt & Negri, 2000, pp. 16-17). Border zones (one of which is Ceuta) are turned into “bufferzones” (Kuus, 2004, p. 477).

Being prone to infiltration of non-European influences, border-sites especially have to prove their willingness to internalize “the” European norms (ibid.). They engage in (securitizing) necessary borderwork for entire Europe, maintain “purity” (Walters, 2005, p. 574 ; Rumford, 2008, p. 57; Ferrer-Gallardo & Van Houtum, 2013, pp. 244-246) and prevent “cultural contamination” (Stoler, 1997, p. 213) in exchange for privileges in treatment, status, funding and even for being geographically included in the European community. Again privileges and inclusion result conditional for border-regions.

Culture-wise processes of ‘othering’ between Christians and Muslims - as mutually constitutive pieces of discourse though – have been part of daily-routine (also in Ceuta) and cross-border interaction for long (Ferrer-Gallardo, 2009, p. 31). Limits are set discursively and border-people to some extent adapt politically invoked “cultural, differentialist racism” and the “marking practice of social separation” (Hardt & Negri, 2000, p. 192). A hierarchy has been created between constructed categories of characteristics of competing cultures. “Degrees of deviance” of non-conforming traits with presumably “European” standards define ranks and degrees of inclusion of the individual in cultural groups (Hardt & Negri, 2000, p. 194). The criteria used in official discourse translate into cultural and “psychological requirements for citizenship”, “fear of infiltration”, “contamination” (Stoler, 1997, pp. 213-214) and are presumably endangered by “empowerment of deviant” standards.

Therefore border-people daily participate in border-work for themselves and the EU (Rumford, 2008, pp. 57-59). Ceuta’s border-people, living so close to the supposed “other” especially feel a need to reaffirm their own European-ness, bearing the impacts of “constant danger” from across the border and from within the hybrid

community. Conformation might be perceived as a one of the conditional tasks imposed on them for them being protected by the EU and their recognition as Europeans. In this sense they contribute to fulfillment of the condition of maintaining “European”-attributed culture in their city. Two rather useful discursive tactics with the aim of Europeanizing oneself are ‘shifting of otherness’ (Kuus, 2004, p. 479) or ‘invisibilization’ (Ferrer-Gallardo et al., 2014) of otherness.

Yet, in terms of culture the border-region remains a “hybrid” (Kolossoff & Scott, 2012, p. 32) zone of contact. The power of the powerless everymen, their tactics, can harden, soften and displace borders. They can contest them in their role as bearers of the border differentiations (Kramsch, 2010, p. 1011) in their “lived spatiality of borderlands” (Kramsch, 2010., p. 1012; Gibson-Graham, 2000, p. 101).

In Ceuta the dominant effect of the border is not separation, although definition of identities and discursive belonging are entangled with it. The border in fact reveals an overlap and simultaneity of these, being also permeable and continuous on the local scale (Ferrer-Gallardo, 2009, p. 30 ff; Balibar, 1998, p. 223). Ferrer-Gallardo (ibid.) observes how much interwoven are relations of Europe and Morocco, a former colony of Spain. The European-ness of Islam, the Islam-ness of Europe, the Christianity of Europe, European-ness of Christianity, African-ness of the European Union and coast all meet as “fabricated identities” and have formed the border-region in Ceuta (Ferrer-Gallardo, & Van Houtum, 2013, p. 246). Political boundaries simply “rarely match ethnic, linguistic and cultural boundaries” (Kolossoff & Scott, 2012, p. 21) in post-modern and post-colonial reality. Controversially, they are forced upon people through strategies of governmentality (see 2.3.2). But it is the people, who in their practices and discourses, tactics of neglect and resistance (Mignolo, 2000, p. 83; Häkli, 1998, pp. 143-144) contest and undermine clear-cut separation.

Close contact of different groups helps to decrease fear and reduce prejudice; it stimulates cross-border friendships and feelings of connectedness (Ferrer-Gallardo, 2009, p. 31). Positive encounters enable to forget previously held stereotypes (Kolossoff & Scott, 2013, pp. 30-31). Realms of agency – from the political, everyday economic, the social to family and cultural (ibid., p. 35) – exist in borderlands. They are sites, where one can observe Europe’s ability to actually live with the “other” best, which is more than and a constitutive part of it (Ferrer-Gallardo & Van Houtum, 2012, p. 247). Yet, it is Moroccan, Muslim border-people (from both sides) and migrants who are presumably bearers of the discourse of otherness. But some though, might feel more European (given daily contacts, their habits and practices –also those across the border) than they are meant to.

The controversial nature of conditionality in borderlands thus plays in diverse aspects of life in the region: Economic development is desired as part of living up to the European template, the European model of progress and modernity as condition to a good status within the Union. At the same time the potential hybridization of European culture has to be prevented. Otherness would lower the reputation of European-ness of the city. On the other hand funding has been claimed from Spanish and EU-institutions for being located at the border: the singularity of Ceuta rooted in the isolated position at the border (the sea cutting Ceuta off from Europe mainland, the border cutting it off from Africa) is also a source of ‘underdevelopment of Ceuta’, hampering economic development, investment by external actors,

causing high rates of unemployment in the city to be chronic (ibid., p. 31; Aranda, 2007, p. 2). Ceuta now struggles to obtain more funding as compensation for singularities and for relative underdevelopment. It had to enter a bizarre competition with new localities in the new member-states (after the enlargements in 2004/2007). They all try to present themselves as “sufficiently” underdeveloped to become receivers of cohesion funding (El pueblo de Ceuta, 2013).

To sum up: Conditionality is mediated by the border-situation in Ceuta in different ways, also for the individual. The border-space might be perceived as distinctive, yet, vital, vein of connection, a space of flows. It is thus both a functionally distinctive space and its vein of survival. As the city is concerned with fulfilling criteria of conditionality, to live up to European standards, so are the border-people in their private lives. They struggle for economic survival, cultural ideals of identities and private security. However, to some extent their practices are also related to the other side of the border and to border-people who carry attributes of otherness, that they resist the conditional demands, silently or openly.

2.3.2 Conditionality reinforcing Ceuta’s spatial fragmentation

Following basic insights by Michel Foucault concerning government (-ality) in modern Western society, conditionality can be put into the light of discipline, control and exercise of power. Foucault’s definition of government reveals the strategic character of government nowadays: Governing is seen as a practice of management, while using certain strategies as instruments (Foucault, 1991). Thereby knowledge plays a key-role – “The state is governed according to rational principles” (ibid., p. 97). The problems of population are at the center of government in modern society (ibid., p. 99). But it is ‘statistics’ becoming a major technical device to capture the problems of population and group the latter by features (ibid.).

The aim of government is the improvement of welfare and conditions of life of the population. In order to achieve this “government will act on population itself” e.g. through campaigns or without making the population aware of the directive role taken, managing flows of population (ibid., p. 100). It is a major objective and instrument of the government to possess “knowledge of all the processes related to population” (ibid.). Additionally, discipline is appreciated to manage a population, together with sovereignty (ibid., p. 102). This is where governmentality derives from.

We could imagine ‘conditionality’ in the context of governmentality as a major strategy to achieve the objectives of the EU government. It is a way power is implemented, to attribute even more power in more places to the EU.

Gutting (2013) illustrates that conditionality following Foucault can be seen to certain extent as a subtle, disciplinary function of control:

“the distinctive feature of modern power (disciplinary control) is its concern with what people have not done (nonobservance), with, that is, a person's failure to reach required standards. This concern illustrates the primary function of modern disciplinary systems: to correct deviant behavior. The goal is (...) reform, where, (...) reform means coming to live by society's standards or norms. Discipline through imposing precise norms (“normalization”) is quite different from the older system of judicial punishment, which merely judges each action as allowed by the law or not allowed by the law and does not say that those judged are “normal” or “abnormal”. This idea of normalization is

pervasive in our society: e.g., national standards for educational programs, for medical practice, for industrial processes and products” (Gutting, 2013).

The quotation illustrates how discipline works in modern society in times of governmentality. The correction of deviant behavior, the implementation of standards and norms reminds thoroughly of the working of conditionality as defined earlier (2.3) (Kuus, 2004; Kramsch, 2011, p. 197; Stoler, 1997, p. 199). Therefore, in Foucauldian terms, conditionality could be understood as just another strategy of disciplining and managing the European population, including the Ceutis.

Hardt & Negri (2000) have elaborated on mechanisms, which are implemented in order to discipline and manage populations, similar to the way conditionality can be applied. “Differentialist racism”, which centers on culturalist, not racist arguments (Hardt & Negri, 2000, p. 192), is a mechanism of conditional disciplining manifesting in Ceuta. Instead of race the role of culture now marks social separation. A strong hierarchy can be created on the basis of differences of identity (ibid.) and subordination according to the results of competition on the cultural market. The supreme scale and template of culture thereby, again, is the civilized European one. In comparison to this template degrees of deviance or non-conforming traits are identified (ibid., p. 193).

Racist exclusion, Hardt and Negri (2000, p. 194) argue, does not take place anymore. Society instead works through differentiated inclusion (p. 194) – the ‘liker’ an identity or cultural feature is to the European role model, the higher the status. All this is performed under an “umbrella of universal inclusion” (ibid., p. 199). Colonial power, Hardt and Negri (ibid.) conclude, works through fixing and separating identities as control functions (p. 199).

The mechanism is similar to how Kuus (2004) identifies conditionality working through degrees (of deviance) of European-ness. Governmentality manages through “stabilizing differences (...) [which] facilitate control” (Hardt & Negri, 2000, p. 200) of the population: Whereas certain places and segments of population are more alike to the template of ‘the European’ and are included, others (places of segments of population) are included according to the likeness to the standard they show and perform. Fragmentation of space and segments of population is thus inherent in relations of conditionality with the EU.

The latter might be exacerbated, since further inclusion serves the EU (according to the logic presented here) only, as long as some (places and groups). This might in part contradict the expanding logic of European modernity, but having a closer look, it actually does not: The conditional inclusion in its spatial logic might act as inclusionary for all territorially divided and governed entities in the EU (including all cities, such as Ceuta). Yet, within these sites inclusion might work through fragmentation, including those groups, spaces and activities which easily conform through living up to the conditions of European-ness. This process perpetuates lines of fragmentation in these places and between groups, since the deviance increases for those who performed ‘un-European behaviors’ – through lack of performance according to the conditions, conditional support is not offered either to these segments of population and their spaces.

Gunder Franck (1966) has managed to explain perpetuation of fragmentation of groups and spaces, through his insights developed as part of the ‘dependency theory’. This theoretical approach mainly focuses on economic

processes, the development of capitalism, which as described by Luxembourg (1972) is benefitting elites of the EU. But like much of post-colonial theory the dependency theory highlights the neglect of economic and other relations between the 'metropolis' – or here 'core-Europe' in terms of Kuus (2004) - and its economic colonies (including non-core European places) in the world capitalist system (Gunder Franck, 1966, p. 17). The processes in the economic sphere are understood here as examples of wider geopolitical processes of Europeanization in other spheres, the process reinforced by conditional relations of the EU to its places.

Underdevelopment is understood by Gunder Franck as a "historical product of past and continuing economic and other relations between the satellite underdeveloped and the now developed metropolitan" places, so that the relation between the margins of the EU and its core metropolitan sites is constitutive of underdevelopment – the underdevelopment of satellite sites is exacerbated by the economic development of the core, Gunder Franck (1966, p. 18) argues. Economic Europeanization of the EU's core might parallel the inverted process in the margins, the satellites. Gunder Franck (1966, p. 19) emphasizes an analogous relation between the different parts of the satellite (margins') society: capitalist development (according to the EU-template) produces both, the Europeanized economic development of the anyway progressive areas and the comparative underdevelopment of the backwards areas in such spaces – fragmentation of societies, even along spatial lines, is perpetuated through such economic Europeanization.

The diverting tendencies are reproduced in the local arena, if the process of economic Europeanization is subjected to (Gunder Franck, 1966, p. 20). This is why the marginalized develop suspicion about the ruling classes of local arenas to promote exclusively their own development and the 'prosperization' of their own class (Gunder Franck, 1966, p. 21). Gunder Franck's theory thus highlights that "underdevelopment [comparative backwardness in economic development in the EU] was and still is generated by the very same historical process, which also generated economic development: the development of capitalism itself" (Gunder Franck, 1966, p. 23). It fragments societies and territories.

2.4 Summing up the theoretical vision of this research – Ceuta and EU conditions

In the field of geopolitics the focus of research has for long and traditionally been given to the strategic, national scale. But researchers have started to recognize the value of other scales, units and subjects of research, which had consistently been neglected. Therefore the critical geopolitics, counterfactual thinking (Dodds, 2008) and investigation of non-national actor's discourses have opened a way to reintegrate the individual 'everyman' and his or her tactics into the debate, which is experimented with here.

Arguments why 'geopolitical imaginations' ought to be a privilege of politicians, experts and intellectuals (Mamadouh & Dijkink, 2006) are few and in very plain words one could ask: Does not everybody have an idea or imagination about geopolitical questions (Dijkink, 1996, p. 11)? The everyman's indifferent, conforming (to conditional requirements) and his or her resistant (contesting conditionality) tactics and practices are taken into account here, while investigating the strategic, geopolitical imaginations Ceuta's everyman-border-people would develop if they had power.

Yet, the individual scale of geopolitical imagination is not seen as binary opposition to wider, official discourses. Because border-people in Ceuta to some extent are expected to subject to discourse, the powerful geopolitical imaginations of powerful discourse- and decision-makers, we can only trace the everyman's imagination as a process of renegotiation of the dominant discourse. This allows unveiling also diverging ideas and agency (unconscious or conscious resistance). Further it has been argued that in addition to geopolitical, including cultural aspects, the economic dimension plays a major role in strategic planning in Ceuta, given the particular border-context in which the city is competing for status and funding. This economic component is investigated as an aspect of the geopolitical imaginations.

But all of that would still be too broad to investigate. Therefore, conditionality in the relation to the EU, which is seen as a kind of geopolitical imagination (including economic aspects), has become the main topic of research. Such conditionality is built upon the mentioned competitive sphere, a competition for attributing degrees of development and cultural standards of European-ness to places in the EU. The theoretical roots of this research, thus, lie in postcolonial theory explaining the way advantages of EU-membership have discursively been rendered privileges and are bound upon conditions. Conditions refer to a certain set of standards and subjection to fight degrees of deviance from those. Higher degrees of European-ness are acknowledged and rewarded.

The border-situation of Ceuta has a major impact on the way conditionality is imagined to manifest in Ceuta and to be affronted by geopolitical strategies. On the one hand, the border is imagined as a major trigger of employment and economic activity. Consequently, the criterion of progress and development in the conditional relation with the EU are entangled with the (economic) opportunities invoked by the border. That is to say that the conditional requirement to live up to European standards of development is responded to by using advantages of the border-situation. But the border is also a site of cultural encounter, where potential spill-over of 'contaminating threats' to European-ness take place. Securitization (discourses) and identitarian gerrymandering might emerge from powerful geopolitical imaginations, to sustain an official reputation of European-ness of the city and live up to the conditional expectations - inside the city among groups as well as to its outside.

The other way round e.g. EU-funding is given to Ceuta to compensate for 'economic underdevelopment' caused by the border and meant to stimulate achievement of typical, economic "European standards" (Kramsch & Brambilla, 2007, p. 112; Kramsch, 2011, pp. 196, 201). Funding is also given to the city to take the role as a buffer-zone (Kuus, 2004, p. 477) to the "Islamic Other" beyond the border and unwanted immigration (Ferrer-Gallardo & Van Houtum, 2013, p. 244).

Also in the lives of everyman-border-people, who struggle for survival, cross-border opportunities are an issue touched by conditionality. Their everyday practices are linked to the border and the hybrid culture in the borderland might endanger ideals of European-ness of the everyman-border-people: Living close to potential threats and criminal influences from the stigmatized Muslim -"other" they might feel a need to distinguish and reaffirm their own European-ness, e.g. avoiding contact with or invisibilizing otherness in the city. Conditionality thus might be perceived in terms of psychological and cultural requirements.

Yet, the contact and encounter are unavoidable in the region and intrinsically part of daily routine, practices and discourse. Certain ways of resisting or neglecting dominant European standards are inherent in the particular border-situation of people in Ceuta. Moroccans from the other side might be envisioned to bear more attributes of European-ness (being in steady contact with this identity) than powerful imaginations admit. In the end though, all the border-people in Ceuta and beyond might profit from economic support and political recognition of their border-region by the EU, which is possible through compliance with criteria of conditionality of the EU.

Geopolitical imaginations of Ceuta's relation to the EU are expected to reveal that the process of Europeanization is paralleled by and triggers a process of functional and spatial fragmentation of the city (Gunder Franck, 1966; Hardt & Negri, 2000, pp. 199-201) The border-space, a space characterized by the flows which penetrate and cross it, is imagined as a functionally distinctive space in Ceuta. Simultaneously, a fragmentation process might be imagined to be perpetuated through the implementation of Europeanization strategies – not only is fragmentation of groups of different 'degrees' of European-ness imagined and institutionalized, but it is also reinforced by the uneven manifestation and imaginations of European-ness across Ceuta's space – resulting in marginalization of groups and spaces.

Border-spaces- of-flow have different roles on different spatial scales for different stakeholders, including different advantages and disadvantages, which are often contradictory or complementary at the same time. Because there is a border in Ceuta, which determines practices and daily life in various ways (being obstacle and facilitator at the same time) conditionality in the relation with the EU manifests with a particular nature in Ceuta and might be resisted to. At the same time the conditionality imposed on Ceuta, including reward for adaptation to European standards by the EU (in the form of funding and improvement of status) could exacerbate fragmentation of the city. Whereas some parts (of population) benefit from rewards and become more alike to the European standards aimed at by conditional demands from the EU, others are bearers of otherness in the city and struggle to comply with the standards. The fragmentation of the population and functions in the city increases, so that in the end it would manifest in the city's spatial composition.

3. Methods

This section is dedicated to the methodological choices in this research. First the selection of the research strategy is outlined (3.1). After that the operationalization (3.2) on the basis of the theoretical framework of this research is presented. Operationalization was the basis to data-gathering and analysis presented (3.3). The last sub-section elaborates on methodological problems encountered throughout the investigation (3.4).

3.1 Choice for a qualitative case-study

This research has been realized in the framework of Euborderscapes, a program destined at the investigation of European borders. Within the latter the African-European border is a topic under screening. With this study a minor

contribution to the project was made, exploring ongoing processes at this kind of border. Support was provided by the border-research center in Nijmegen and by Xavier Ferrer-Gallardo, researcher at the Autonomous University of Barcelona, member of Euborderscapes.

The choice for a qualitative case-study-design was made to obtain new data and profound knowledge (Korzilius, 2008, p. 121). Understanding the particular case of the border-city Ceuta was a major aim of this study. Given the “how”- research question (Cresswell, 2000, p. 78) analysis was descriptive. As unit of analysis (Korzilius, 2008, p. 121) geopolitical imaginations were scrutinized.

Based on the theoretical lens in combination with postcolonial theory, powerful strategic discourse and “native point[s] of view” (Malinowski in Morris et al, 1999, p. 781) were interpreted (Geertz in Morris et al, 1999, p. 781) with adequate awareness of the role of the researcher – as a European, female student and with particular experience (Rohlen in Morris et al, 1999, p. 782) and provoking certain connotations, which influence data-gathering and analysis. The context of the research was vaguely familiar to me, especially the Moroccan side of the border (based on few impressions during previous research and through literature). The conceptualization, research and writing process resulted iterative, since e.g. improvisation during fieldwork required revisions. Yet, the leading postcolonial theories have resulted very useful to structure and guide the way of gathering data and analysis (Vennix, 2009, p. 264).

3.2 Operationalization and indicators for data gathering and analysis

The operationalization was directly derived from the theoretical framework and the sub-questions of this research. First of all operationalization of the term ‘geopolitical imagination’ and ‘conditionality’ were required. The differentiation by powerful discourse-makers and everyman-participants was taken into account, distinguishing strategic and tactical aspects in imaginations as well. Yet, for gathering data such distinctions resulted complicated to realize (e.g. during interviews) so a general interview structure built upon the most relevant aspects of the operationalization was established (see 3.3.1).

Generally, indicators were identified on the basis of the theory, before summarizing and rephrasing them. Ways of capturing future visions and imagination, a speculative realm of imagination, were sought to be included as well. For data-gathering much was transformed at the end into more open dimensions, to be more explorative and open a space for counter-factual thinking and alternative visions (Dodds, 2008). Below the way of operationalizing indicators has been depicted in a table for the two main dimensions (see table 2) – geopolitical imaginations and conditionality

Dimension	Sub-dimensions involved in definition	Differentiation by		Indicators from theory	Summary indicators
<i>Geopolitical imaginations</i>	“Strategic and tactical (Häkli, 1998, p. 144) evaluation of the	Everyman- imagination (strategic & tactical)	Geo-		
			Political		

	geographical-economic-political relation of the own place to other places (Dijkink, 1996, p. 11) in the present and possible changes for the future”	Powerful discourse-maker imagination (strategic)	Geo-		
			Political		
<i>Conditionality</i>	“Beneficial relations with a powerful institution in exchange for conformity to dominant values and norms” (Kuus, 2004; Kramsch, 2011)	Border making conditionality particular	Everymen level	What has been received by EU?	
				How does Ceuta adapt?	
				In how far does the conditional relation fail ?	
			Powerful discourse-maker level	What has been received by EU?	
				How does Ceuta adapt?	
				In how far does the conditional relation fail ?	

Table 2: Way of operationalizing indicators from theory

Through this structured operationalization categories of indicators were formed. This might appear controversial in a research, which so much relies on post-structuralist thought. Yet, these categories here are not taken as fixed or all-encompassing. They are rather overlapping and have fluid borders, being ordered in just one of many possible ways. The important aspect is that they helped to produce a wide range of indicators which enhanced data-gathering and analysis to produce differentiated data and results.

Only the ‘fittest’ indicators found were selected from many more suitable or doubles. The following lists of indicators presents possible indicative aspects which were operationalized from the theoretical chapter and summarized in the lists below (see Appendix for exact operationalization and theoretical sources). In spite of the separation of the lists per level of imagination (everyman vs discourse-makers) the final aim of this thesis is to understand the dialogue between expert view strategic as described by de Certeau and everyman imaginations (Olivier Kramsch, personal communication, January 30th, 2014), which is part of the analysis here (see 3.3.2):

Indicators for geopolitical imaginations on everyman-level:

- 1) Identification with collective and territory (feeling of belonging: where?)
- 2) Location of/ intermingling of local identity with others (also higher level)/ renegotiating identities

- of self and other (individually and groups)
- 3) Contextuality of emotions, social (power) relations, activities (perform in a way fitting the context)
- 4) Cultural/ visible expressions of local/ communities' relations (tradition/localized standards/knowledge)
- 5) Connoting groups with certain kinds of routines, traditions
- 6) Reasons to resist and express in popular movements, street parlance, organized activities or protest, cyber politics, visual images
- 7) Political discourse of media listened to, discussions about it, add own knowledge
- 8) Re-narration of a common history, memories
- 9) Perception of threats to order, feeling insecure because...
- 10) Need of order, structure, system to understand the world (explanation world system – how?)
- 11) Routines and habits everyday life
- 12) Making use of local (cross-border) opportunities (basis for decisions)
- 13) Resisting formal ways of economic practices through using opportunities

Indicators for geopolitical imaginations on discourse-maker-level:

- 1) Different levels/scales of putting oneself into relation with other places
- 2) (Mental) maps of foreign policy about relations (experts)
- 3) Stress on historical (national) togetherness
- 4) Physical symbols (of geographic inclusion)
- 5) Discourse about European integration
- 6) Media representation of diplomatic foreign policy of institutionally powerful groups
- 7) 'Othering' for legitimacy of (powerful) ideas
- 8) (Discursive) division of groups (categorization)
- 9) Emphasis homogeneity/purity and common characteristics within geographic entities
- 10) Security strategies about potential threats
- 11) Border control
- 12) Dealing with migration
- 13) Planning for economics, business interests and economic relations to other places
- 14) Cross-border disparities and cooperation
- 15) Neoliberal assumptions about free markets
- 16) Economic competition and comparison with other places
- 17) Placing the local in wider competitive context, need positioning in competitive context

Indicators for conditionality and agency on everyman-level:

- 1) Security (feeling secure, safe, prevention of crime, protection property and life) guaranteed
- 2) Prosperity, employment (increase standard of living, find a job)
- 3) Opportunities for leisure (shop, meet people, spend leisure on the other side) and work (at border, with border, on the other side)
- 4) Carry cultural differentialist racism (apply criteria of European-ness when meeting people and judging about quality of the contact and person)
- 5) Be a well-behaving European citizen
- 6) Commitment to European values
- 7) Preserving purity, avoiding contamination by hybrid other cultures (contact, relation, keep on European values, take euphemistic view, look down upon alternative cultural forms)
- 8) Export European values, dreams and moral standards (tell about advantages of living in Europe, "teach", give advice, present one's own good situation)
- 9) Carry on particularities, maintain cross-border/cultural contacts (hybrid culture)
- 10) Accepting limitations imposed on life-cycle (not crossing border, or undermine its authority by cross-border activity)

- 11) Subvert (border-) control; Doing what is not allowed; Informal, carrying illegally; goods, forbidden goods
- 12) Pretend to adopt while actually undermining principles/laws
- 13) Make use of cross-border relations for economic survival/private
- 14) Only selective renarrating European dream/model (telling about disadvantages of life, difficulties, stress local identity, particularities, appreciation of otherness, advantages across the border)
- 15) Enjoy possibility to be at the other side (leisure, encounters)

Indicators for conditionality and agency on discourse-maker-level:

- 1) Attribution of European-ness, normality, recognition of ability decision-making and problem-solving, status
- 2) Advice (recommendations how to affront problems) by the EU
- 3) Prosperity (rise standard of living on average, avoid divided social development into few rich and many poor)
- 4) Economic development (investment, growth GDP, diversification, creation of employment)
- 5) Learn from European model (consult problem-solving in places in North-Western Europe as examples)
- 6) Implement linear transitology (adapt strategies alike to those successfully used elsewhere; goal-setting modernization, progress)
- 7) Internalize Eurocentrism, superiority universal European knowledge (scientification, standards implemented, homogenize)
- 8) Discursively shift boundaries (attribute otherness to beyond the border)
- 9) Commitment/willingness to internalize European values (internalization, homogenization)
- 10) Stigmatize otherness, while becoming more alike to European core-model (apply stereotypes and seek for confirmation of these assumed images)
- 11) Avoid further hybridization (prevent immigration of non-Europeans, keep on European values, take euphemistic view, look down upon alternative cultural forms)
- 12) Instrumentalize fears, legitimize securitization of the borderland
- 13) Economic inequalities exploitation for accumulation, cross-border cooperation networks
- 14) Overcome underdevelopment (less unemployment, more economic activity)
- 15) Become buffer-zone against external threats (Provide/host security forces and help to prevent Infiltration of threats further into hinterlands)
- 16) Control by EU (monitoring how progress in development, advice)as incentive to progress
- 17) Security, stability (no cultural threats and less migration-related, Morocco no threatening neighbor)
- 18) Good relations with, better status in EU (recognition, support and confidence in decision making)
- 19) Financial compensation for securitization (revenues for (extra-) security forces, infrastructure)
- 20) Funding for lack of development (reception of cohesion funds (or similar) by EU additional to Spanish funding)
- 21) Possibility to compete for funding for under-development in EU (structural funds)
- 22) Only pretend to adapt, adapt selectively
- 23) Exploit intact disparities for economic activity and job-search
- 24) Pretend to adhere, but ignore recommendations
- 25) Continue informal cross-border relations

All these indicators were translated into guides for interviews and helped analyzing the results.

3.3 Data and analysis

Here a description of the process of data-gathering including fieldwork is provided (3.3.1). Secondly the qualitative analysis of data will be outlined (3.3.2).

3.3.1 Data-gathering

Data-gathering consisted of two (timely partly parallel) steps – fieldwork and literature study. This is already a hint at the use of triangulation, augmenting the reliability of the research process and results (Vennix, 2009, p. 267).

Practical fieldwork was as common with fieldwork partly issue to improvisation, as knowledge and familiarity increase throughout fieldwork (Vennix, 2009, p. 264):

Fieldwork of seven weeks (February and March, 2014) was based on realizing 40 in-depth structured interviews (recorded by a voice-recorder) – twelve with powerful discourse-makers, 13 with everyman-participants from the Moroccan part of the border-region and 15 interviews with everymen from different parts of Ceuta (for an overview, please view the appendix). The interviews were standardized, but open-ended types of interviews (Vennix, 2009, p. 254) leaving an opportunity to respondents to freely fill in their geopolitical imaginations. Only at the end of the interview questions became more explicit. It is important to notice that all participants, powerful discourse-makers and everyman-participants were asked the same questions in a rather fixed order, to provide for equal treatment, which is the basis to put imaginations of both group on the same level and to realize the counter-factual analysis.

Yet, spontaneous interaction or input by the interviewees was not excluded. The standardized form also had advantages for the non-native researcher to cope with linguistic difficulties, maintaining the flow of the interview. Additionally, the researcher could concentrate on the content of answers, the behavior of the interviewee and stimulate the interviewee to reveal more information about interesting ideas. As usual with interviews, “possible mistakes in the process of communication” were avoided and common rules for realizing interviews were followed (for more details see Vennix, 2009, p. 255).

In the beginning sampling of Ceuti every-respondents was a random procedure. At a later stage of the fieldwork a snow-ball method developed and involvement of more diverse respondents, e.g. different categories of age, women and non-center inhabitants was carefully thought of (the first few everyman-respondents were all male and from the center). In Morocco sampling went the same way, but here especially involvement of women became a challenge (see 3.4). Additionally the interviews with Moroccan participants were realized with the help of interpreters, in case the respondents did not command of Spanish or French.

Sampling the powerful discourse-makers worked through a snowball method. The processing of the interviews is little conservative here: As the choice was made to include all interviews in the results (although a time limit for the research process was tight), only few complete transcriptions have been made (see appendix). In order to save time most interviews were summarized and translated while listening to them. This way still several A4-pages of information could be obtained per interview – especially for long-lasting interviews of about one hour. Almost all meaningful sentences have been written down this way – yet the part of questions and less meaningful sentences (e.g. ‘well, you know’) could be skipped. The entire process took about two months of time.

The interviews, the main sources of data gathered during fieldwork were complemented by several observations and informal conversations (see appendix). Both complementary methods were applied to obtain additional information without intervention (ibid., p. 258) in true to social reality and verify facts, which the researcher

doubted about. Both were applied spontaneous and planned to understand circumstances, practices and interaction, symbols and relevant events. This background knowledge resulted enriching for interpreting other data (ibid., p. 259). Unfortunately, the researcher was not able to organize focus group discussions, due to the limited time of fieldwork and the lack of willingness of anonymous respondents to get involved.

Documents obtained during fieldwork were analyzed together with newspaper articles (first gathered from the two local journals 'El Faro digital de Ceuta', 'El Pueblo de Ceuta'- online and the national newspaper 'El País' from September 2013 to May 2014 on a daily basis; then sampled randomly for each newspaper every third day a couple of articles which seemed relevant), and similar literature in a qualitative analysis of contents. The tools used are common qualitative research methods. Problems and obstacles in the process are outlined in 3.4.

3.3.2 Qualitative analysis of contents

The whole process of research has been rather iterative (ibid., p. 253), which contributes to reliability (ibid., p. 268), especially analysis, interpretations and conclusions. After processing data, producing overviews of information per interviewee/piece of literature/observation / informal conversation data could be compared and grouped for similar contents. This way data was reduced and filtered (ibid., p. 253).

Qualitative analysis of literature and other processed data has been in the first place an explorative process. Qualitative coding (axial coding) as recommended by Cresswell (2007) was realized first, generating several tables used to order insights by filtering key-terms (Vennix, 2009, p. 265). On the basis of the first explorative findings – among others the spatial fragmentation of the city in imaginations - a structure had been established (along the spatial lines emerging from the imagined fragmentation). In combination with insights of the theoretical framework (conditionality, otherness, agency and resistance) the analysis became a theoretically guided process also relying on the operationalization (see 3.2) realized beforehand.

During the writing process data was further reduced and insights of different groups (powerful discourse-makers including media and everyman-respondents) were put into dialogue. Common standards of qualitative analysis of contents were taken into account (for more information see Vennix, 2009, p. 253). The discourse analysis (Walters, 2002, p. 561) here is not purely historicized. Instead thoughts on past, present and also future had to be understood.

3.4 Problems and limitations of data-gathering and analysis

The first 'problem' of this research is the subjective input through direct involvement of the researcher (in fieldwork *and* analysis) inherent in case studies. Triangulation and guidance by theory could contribute to reasonable reliability, reliability though. The researcher's worldviews will inevitably impact the study, since the researcher is his own major research instrument (ehow, n.d.). Awareness of this role is crucial. No universalizing conclusions (ibid.) can be drawn (but it is also not the aim of this research), because a case-study is specific, place-based and adheres to a certain temporal context. This makes replication impossible and results unique, limited (ibid.) to the case. The subjective input also applies for all choices made during the course of the research.

The second major problem for fieldwork and analysis was the language-barrier, as the researcher's mother tongue differs from the one of the interview partners. Communication therefore was not completely precise, and even less, when an interpreter had to be involved (for Moroccan Arabic). Communication was then interrupted by an additional step – which figured especially in combination with different cultural backgrounds.


During an interview with a Moroccan woman her husband joined the conversation. He then started answering the questions asked to his wife. The Moroccan interpreters did not understand the researcher's concern that the answers of the woman could be different from the answers of her husband. The different understanding of research and gender roles here generated a mixed interview of two respondents. The absence of analysis of newspaper articles from the Moroccan part of the border-region is a deficit of this research as well. This limit had to be condoned from the beginning given the absence of Arab-speaking and writing skills.

Interviews with two interviewees were realized in several cases (participant 11, 13 and 27) (also note remarks in the participant overview in the appendix). The choice to be made by the researcher was in all cases either to do an interview with the two interviewees at the same time together, or to renounce on the interview with carefully selected interview partners. Individual interviews with each of the two respondents, were not possible, because the situation and cultural norms required the double interview (11) or the respondents were scared, unwilling and were chosen representatives of a bigger group, the two of them (13, 27).

In strict ethnographic and scientific sense the interviews might not be 'correct', as it resulted impossible to figure the answers of the individuals afterwards. Dividing the information by the individuals, each interview remained incomplete. Additionally, one interviewee had influenced the connotations and imaginations of the other during the course of the interview. The decision was made that the interviews would be used as one single source of information (one interview) and treated like all the other interviews. The reasoning is that the information revealed about geopolitical imaginations still seemed relevant and considering the results as mixture of focus-group discussions and interviews they would still be reasonable data-sources.

Sensitivity of the topic of the border and political relations might have impeded participants from telling the researcher the most honest version of their thoughts. Also accessibility of the research group in Morocco (Moroccan everymen) was an issue: the topic of borders is considered sensitive. Gender-roles in Morocco impaired the possibility of the researcher meeting and talking to a woman in the streets (also given the language barrier) and even asking via a male interpreter resulted complex. Accordingly, among the Moroccan everyman-participants from Morocco there are more men than women. The women interviewed were mostly young and not married, none of them older than 35.

During the writing process and analysis choices had to be made. These choices could have been made in diverse ways. Here a crucial choice was to work with all interviews of all participants in order to establish a multi-perspective result sections. However, the entire process of analysis and writing could have been more to the point, faster, more efficient and selective if the researcher had chosen to drop a number of interviews and focus on a



selection of e.g. 20 participants. Another consequent limitation of this case-study is the absence of proper transcriptions (except five ones) for all the interviews – given the limited time-frame for finishing the research and the choice to involve all interviews, it was not possible to make standard transcriptions. The alternative way of preparing data was good enough to produce rich results – yet they are less complete.

4. Regional Background – Ceuta then and now

When talking about Ceuta and the border-region we have to define which territorial units are referred to: So we could identify the region where imaginations were gathered as the borderland between Ceuta and the Northern Moroccan city “Tetouan”, including the villages along the main connecting road. This definition here is based on the fact that most people interacting across the border (working with and at the border, and those spending freetime on the other side) live in this selected space (see figure 2 and figure 3). Through this interaction of Ceuta and the Moroccan part of the borderland the geopolitical imaginations about Ceuta gain in geopolitical relevance.



Figure 2. Ceuta and Melilla at the Northern Moroccan coastline. Retrieved on June 24, 2013, from: http://www.welt.de/multimedia/archive/00772/ceuta_karte_DW_Poli



Figure 3. Ceuta Peninsula, the border and Morocco. Retrieved on June 24, 2013 from: <http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/0/0f/Perejil-neutral.png/300px-Perejil-neutral.png>

Ceuta's former and recent development has been subject to "ongoing modification of relational power between Ceuta and Morocco" (Ferrer-Gallardo, 2009, p. 24). Particularities of Ceuta as a border-city thus have been grounded in and are still currently based on

- An isolated geographic position within the EU on the African continent
- Being the neighbor of an Islamic country (potential, stigmatized "additional" cultural differences)
- Being located at a border which is not officially recognized as such by Morocco claiming the territory to be Moroccan
- Being located at a border where high economic inequalities manifest
- "Penetration" by (im-)migrants from non-EU states seeing the landborder to the EU as a chance occurs
- An economically adverse situation and lack of perspectives of investment (reliance on services)
- High unemployment among others as a consequence of the former particularity
- An atypical trading system across the border based on an advantageous fiscal system and a 24-hour-Schengen-Visa exception for Moroccan border-people from the region
- Dependence on external funding by Spain and the EU

Ceuta as a border-city is located in the very North West of Africa, forming the remaining Spanish land area together with Melilla in the region after the end of the Spanish protectorate in Northern Morocco (Pennell, 2009, p. 158). The city is thus cut off from the European continent through the Straits of Gibraltar and cut off from the surrounding land areas by a Spanish and European border. What makes the situation more complicated is that the border is contested by Morocco: the country claims the territory of Ceuta to be Moroccan and Spain to be its occupier. Therefore Morocco has never officially recognized the border and the passage to Ceuta (Bechev et al, 2010, p. 35, 55). The city is an exceptional border place also because unlike many landborders of the EU, its neighboring country and population is to major extent Islamic. Islam in the context of the EU has become stigmatized and stands for 'very different' norms and values. Thus the border in Ceuta is also seen as a border to a supposedly "threatening", "suspect", different, cultural environment (Ferrer-Gallardo & Van Houtum, 2013, p. 244).

Another potential 'threat' is the penetration by (im-) migrants from and via Africa, especially since the Schengenization in 1991 (Driessen, 2010, p. 171). Those are mostly attempting to escape from war and poverty in their home-countries to seek a promised "paradise" in Europe (Rueda, 2009, p. 2) or at least a 'better life'. It is the 'European dream' attracting them. Ceuta is thus a border, marking high inequalities and economic disparities – not only between Morocco and Spain (Ferrer-Gallardo, 2009, p. 31), but more importantly between Europe and Africa.

In spite of the differences in standards of life between the two sides of the border economic activity in Ceuta is rather limited: Settling of industrial sectors and investment are hardly possible given the limited space and additional costs for transportation (Aranda-Gallego, 2007, pp. 333, 469; Martinez Navarro, 2003, p. 9).

These circumstances render agricultural activity impossible as well (Armuña, 2010b), so that only services (private and for a huge proportion public) have a chance for persistence in Ceuta. 92,15% of the GDP has been generated through services in 2010 (Armuña, 2010b).

Unemployment has always been high – concerning 20% (Aranda Gallego, 2007, p. 2) of the population able to work - but it has risen recently in the context of the crisis up to 38,5% (2012), which has been the highest rate in whole Spain (INE, 2013, p. 53). In the third semester of 2014 the rate was slightly lower at about 32%, according to

the national EPA study (Encuesta de Población Activa) – but after Canary Islands the rate is still the highest of Spain (Datosmacro, 2014).

The only additional economic resource is the border, which has lent itself to establish an “irregular” trading system to transport goods from Ceuta to Morocco (Ferrer-Gallardo, 2009, p. 28). The trade was especially stimulated by an advantageous (within the EU Customs Union an exceptional) fiscal system and a 24-hour Schengen-exception for Moroccan locals from the border-region of Tetouan, who come to transport the imported goods from Ceuta to their country (Hernandez et al., n.d) – including ‘illegally’ smuggling goods, humans (migrants) and drugs.

However, economic activity is not sufficient to establish a healthy equilibrium for socio-economic sustainability. Funding from Spain and by the EU has for long been directed to the city to compensate for higher costs of living, infrastructural needs and social redistributive measures. Additional financial support was given to Ceuta and even Morocco for the securitization measures to be taken at the technically highly sophisticated border, to protect the EU from “infiltration” of migrants and crime (Lahlou in Pickerill, 2009, p. 3; Ferrer-Gallardo, 2009, pp. 29-30).

Nonetheless, the border is more permeable than its outer appearance might suggest (Driessen, 2010, p. 171). The city has been also marked for centuries by its multicultural character - hybridity of people of different cultural backgrounds and religions (Ceuta digital, n.d.; Ferrer-Gallardo, 2009, p. 28). Daily contact with borderpeople from the Moroccan side is usual. Many Moroccans have found a job in Ceuta (some working without license in low-wage-labour- in the construction sector, gastronomy, domestic sector etc. see Ferrer-Gallardo, 2009, p. 31) and for leisure. Moroccans adhering to the Schengen-exception do shopping and spend their leisure time in Ceuta. Ceutís do the same on the Moroccan side (Ferrer-Gallardo, 2009, p. 31).

Modernization in Morocco and accessibility of the same mass-media bring people closer to each other. However, through securitization, through an increase in Muslim population in Ceuta and since Schengenization processes of cultural “othering” among the groups have simultaneously been reinforced (ibid., p. 28).

Recently major changes have occurred and are about to occur (ibid., p. 34), especially induced through shifts in the (power-) relations between Northern Morocco and Ceuta (Ferrer-Gallardo, 2009): The gradual disarmament of taxes on importation between Morocco and the EU has diminished the fiscal advantages of importation of products to Morocco via Ceuta– at least for some major branches (Aranda-Gallego, 2007), whereas investment in tourism and real estates on the Moroccan side has grown (Ferrer-Gallardo, 2009, p. 31).

This effect has been reinforced by strong liberalization measures and economic growth of the Moroccan economy throughout recent years (ibid., pp. 30-31). Yet, fragile bilateral relations between Morocco and Spain obscure the possibilities of cooperation on economic scale (ibid., p. 28), although in the framework of ENP relations with the EU are regarded to be good.

An additional obstacle arises from the enlargement of the EU, which brings along more regions into Europe, which for the calculation of distribution of cohesion funding will fall under the “least developed” category - supplanting Ceuta in the category of “developed regions in transition” (El pueblo de Ceuta, 2013). These receive decisively less cohesion-funding.

The European financial crisis, which has been especially grave in Spain and has led the Spanish government to apply dramatic cuts in their administrative spending corresponding to austerity-programmes, does not improve the city's revenue/budget balance. The crisis has had its impact on Ceuta e.g. in the public services employees had to be fired. Yet, the border and economic development of Morocco are supposed to have moderated the effect (Echarri, 2013). Urgency for responses to the general changes have been exacerbated by the crisis and are even connoted to increase of insecurity in Ceuta (Zumeta, 2013; Zumeta, 2012).

All in all, Ceuta as a municipality has been forced to respond to these diverse developments: the city is forced to restructure economic activity, political relations and its approach to being a border (Aranda-Gallego, 2007, p. 233; Ferrer-Gallardo, 2009, p. 35): decrease of unemployment has to be achieved; needs, requirements and demands of the inhabitants have to be satisfied again. Ceuta is thus seeking to reposition itself in the economic and political constellation of the EU, renegotiating among others financial support and its status, e.g. as an EU-external border site – a rather geopolitical maneuver.

The administration has decided to reform the fiscal system and introduce the common VAT (as in other parts of the EU Customs Union). This step is destined among others to facilitate the establishment of legal, official cooperation across the border with Northern Morocco – which, however, would be also conditioned by Moroccan acceptance of the border (Aranda-Gallego, 2007, p. 464; Ferrer-Gallardo, 2009, p. 28). A common vision imagines Ceuta to become a growth-pole of the cross-border region then (Wikiceuta, 2012; Aranda-Gallego, 2007, p. 348, Martinez Navarro, 2003, p. 3; Ferrer-Gallardo, 2009, p. 32).

Another idea is applying for recognition by the EU as an “ultra-peripheral region” in order to obtain special funding. So far attempts have failed (Crespo, 2013a), so that the only funding by the EU will be received for social compensations (funding for regions in transition) and the city has to start redefining its strategy and status within the EU again. **(MORE BACKGROUND IN BOXES)**

5. The center – Ceuta's model student of conditionality

The center of Ceuta is chosen to be analyzed as one of three distinct spaces of Ceuta: It is mostly associated with the main shopping area, its prevailing Christian and affluent population. It is also the center of decision-making, the place where most governing institutions are settled. It is thus the channel through which decisions are influenced from higher scale and through which local interests can reach higher scales of decision-making. It is here where power and the powerful concentrate.

This is especially relevant for the relation with the EU: A speaker of the governing conservative party puts it plainly - “80 % of decisions made in Brussels impact life in Ceuta directly” (Aznar, 2014c). Thereby he refers to modernization in diverse forms, funding, also manifesting in projects and programs as well as the cross-border relations and neighborhood-projects (ibid.) regarding Morocco.

Whereas some everyman-participants from the border-region agree with this analysis (participant 12), others are not informed about what the EU might mean for Ceuta (participant 9, 16, 28, 31) or have seen little positive impacts since Spain has joined the EU (participant 17).

But the center (here including its Eastern and Western foothills) is also the site, which is often connoted to the name of the city – so many imaginations presented in reference to Ceuta also apply for the general situation of the city.

The renegotiation of the official discourse about the center and about the relation with the EU seems to differ highly for different everymen. But official discourse has no unitary voice, either. In order to understand the way conditionality is envisioned in geopolitical imaginations by the powerful discourse-makers (media and elites) and how these become renegotiated in the everyday contexts a structured analysis follows here.

First the discourse with regard to development of conditionality in Ceuta's center will be analyzed (5.1). In the same sub-chapter the renegotiation by everyman-respondents are outlined per topic, always considering the specific contexts of renegotiation. Secondly, otherness, agency and resistance weakening the manifestation of conditionality are presented (5.2). At the end the relation of the two developments to another are evaluated in a summarizing section (5.3).

5.1 Conditionality in Ceuta's center

Here the working aspects of conditionality of the center of Ceuta in relation to the EU will be presented. The first sub-chapter created on the basis of analysis of results deals with the center's funding relation to the EU (5.1.1). Secondly the conditional relation in the political (5.1.2) realm will be discussed. Then geopolitical imaginations about the conditional relation regarding the urban physiognomic (5.1.3), economic (5.1.4) and cultural sphere (5.1.5) will be presented.

5.1.1 Ceuta's center, a virtuous circle of conditionality - Europeanization through subsidies

"Ceuta is a region receiving funding within the EU as is Andalusia: until this and that year you have 'x' funding from the EU - that is how they assign the funding" (G. Martínez Arcas, personal communication, February 6th, 2014). Since Spain has become an EU-member-state (since 1989) Ceuta has received in total about 390 million euro funding (Q.A., 2014a). This is one and a half times more than the municipality's highest budget ever.

These contributions have slowly been decreasing over time, as Martínez Arcas (coordinator at PROCESA, the municipal agency for economic technical consultancy) acknowledges. Now Ceuta only applies for the social criteria of the EU cohesion funding: Spain has not benefitted from regional economic cohesion funding anymore since the adhesion of Eastern European member-states. Through the adhesion of those countries with lower GDP, Spain's regions' GDP is above the funding level of 75% of the average regional GDP in the EU (F.E., 2014). The main contributions are thus 'ERPF'-subsidies destined for improvements in *social* affairs.

Given Ceuta's major singularities related to its geographic position, the financial contributions by the EU are still rather high and convenient, Martínez Arcas (personal communication, February 6th, 2014) puts the negative impression into perspective. From an informal conversation with another expert I learned that this implies a relation of 1 to 10 for European funding in comparison to subsidies provided by the Spanish state. Yet, the purpose of usage of

the two kinds of funding differs. The two sources of subsidies complement each other (J.R. Olmedo Izar Fuente, personal communication, February 26th, 2014).

Official documents as well as examples of investments with such subsidies mentioned by experts prove that, indeed, especially the Ceuta's central areas have benefitted from investments e.g. in the form of urban revitalization measures (5.1.3). From the above insights into different pieces of the powerful imaginations (governing elite and newspaper articles) we can conclude that Ceuta has been and will be supplied by important amounts of EU-funding – the EU's commitment in the form of financial reward for Europeanization in Ceuta as part of the conditional relation appears to work (Kuus, 2004, p. 484).

From across the border, some Moroccan every-man participants (those interacting less across the border especially) would not know about the topic, they have not heard about it or simply do not connote Ceuta's relations with the EU to economic benefits. Participant 9 states: "I have no idea what it means for Ceuta to be European. I am not sufficiently informed to say anything". Yet, it depends on the daily routine (Merrifield, 2011, p. 108; De Certeau, 1988) of participants, whether Moroccan participants were aware of the discourse, or not.

Actually, the powerful imaginations have spread across the border to those everymen interacting closely with people from Ceuta, as the example of participant 8 shows: "the North sends a lot of funding, but they will reduce that" (participant 8). Participant 7 considers the mutual support and solidarity among European countries expressed in funding a reason, why Europeanization has been beneficial for Ceuta. Yet, here this benefit for Ceuta is being identified in terms of ethics and community interaction – which is a rather distinct socially-oriented perspective.

In general, to everyman-respondents the projects, subsidies are invested in, form a more commented topic. It seems that they ask the question - "who benefits" - as they listen to the official discourse about funding which apparently obscures this aspect. It is part of the renegotiation of the everymen-people to ask such a question, because they seek to position the content of the discourse in relation to their own lives, livelihoods and daily routines (Merrifield, 2011, p. 108). 'What does it mean for me? Does it affect me?' – would be what everyman might ask.

This explains why any of the Moroccan participants has made a statement about this question – although the investments in Ceuta actually might affect their daily routine as well. They are not aware of this impact as their preoccupation and aspirations center on their own lives beyond the border in Morocco (ibid.). Also, they might feel powerless and without any right to claim European funding for their own benefits, subjecting to the national boundaries drawn in the region (Gibson-Graham, 2000, p. 108; Kramsch, 2010, p. 1012).

Most everyman-participants from Ceuta have are aware that subsidies from the EU are provided to Ceuta. Details, about which kind of funding is received and how much, are not renegotiated. Some Ceuti respondents assume that the decision-makers would try to invest the subsidies mostly in the areas, where they live themselves, the zones of the center: "The ones in power will help their own districts and only do something for ours if they are interested in getting something from them", participant 16 from the margins states.

Many Muslim everyman-respondents from Ceuta's margins (participant 16, 24, 27, 29) (see also 7) feel disadvantaged by the distribution of funding. They observe investments for modernization accumulating in the center.

For instance, participant 24 has noticed investments in new flower-decoration or statues frequently. Yet, also people from other districts and of non-Muslim background share this view: “We are a bit out of the center, it seems only the center is benefitting from reconstruction”.

Yet, participant (23) regards the accumulation to be ‘normal’, “happening in any place, country; the center has more flowers, the apartments are more expensive”. These different renegotiations, again, can be attributed to experiences the participants make in daily routine (Merrifield, 2011, p. 108). The renegotiations reflect the powerful geopolitical imaginations that funding has been largely invested in the center. With this help one part of the conditional relation seems to work out well for the center (Kuus, 2004, p. 484; Kramsch, 2011, p. 200)

5.1.2 Political adaption to criteria of conditionality in Ceuta’s center

EU-support in Ceuta’s geopolitical struggle

A major aspect of the manifestation of the conditional relation to the EU is Ceuta’s geopolitical struggle about the territorial claim from Morocco. Pieces of official, powerful geopolitical imagination reveal that the EU is imagined to reward Ceuta through reaffirming the city’s geopolitical positioning as part of the EU. The other way round, the city’s commitment is expressed in many European and Spanish flags decorating multiple places in the center and the border-zone (observation, February 27th, 2014; observation, December 8th and 15th, 2011) (see figure 4).



The local governmental institutions also prove to seek the support from Brussels as confirmation of the city's status of European-ness (J.L. Gomez Barceló, personal communication, February 5th, 2014). "Uncertainty" (J.A. Alarcón Caballero, personal communication, February 12th, 2014) due to the Moroccan territorial claim is not hidden. Instead, several of Ceuta's powerful express thankfulness for the generous support by the EU. The EU is imagined here as superior emitter of conditionality in relation to Ceuta (Kuus, 2004, p. 484) and as powerful geopolitical player (Mamadouh & Dijkink, 2006), more powerful than Spain.

One of the leaders of the local 'Caballas'-party, Juan Luis Aróstegui Ruiz (personal communication, February 26th, 2014), predicts that the EU would play a crucial role for Ceuta's future. He reminds that it is fundamental for Ceuta to insist on Spain doing what is necessary for defending Ceuta with the support of EU-institutions. According to these pieces of geopolitical imaginations by powerful discourse-makers the perception of the EU as additional support for Ceuta's territorial belonging is rooted in Spain's hesitation to officially demonstrate Ceuta's Spanish-ness (Cembrero, 2013b) – this hesitation is imagined to be grounded in geo-strategic, economic interests of Spain in relation to Morocco (Cembrero, 2013b).

Most everyman-respondents from Morocco reproduce the discourse about the EU's generosity: the impression is confirmed that the EU reinforces Ceuta's Spanish-ness. It is seen as a positive gesture for Ceuta, as the EU takes the risk of harming geopolitical interests between Morocco and Spain and the EU by this support (participant 6, 12).

The only different standpoint is taken by participant 7, who is convinced that the status of Ceuta being Spanish is impossible to question now and will never change – a thought many other Moroccan border-people everymen would not share.

Nonetheless, few Moroccan everymen connote the territorial claim over Ceuta to the relation between the city and the EU. Others do not feel informed. They are not concerned (Merrifield, 2011, p. 108). It is actually Ceutís, who experience fear of otherness (Stoler, 1997, pp. 213-214) through the claim. Thus Moroccan everyman-participants avoid speaking about the territorial question to Ceutís (Participant 7), because many actually do consider Ceuta Moroccan (participant 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8).

Many everyman-respondents in Ceuta seem to reproduce the powerful imaginations rather authentically (Gibson-Graham, 2000, p. 108). Being European is perceived as adding security to the lives of everymen and Ceuta (participant 14, 21, 22, 23, 26, 28, 31) as alluded to in the powerful discourse-makers' geopolitical imaginations. The everyman's perception fits in with official discourse – presumably because few events would destabilize their perception and it is no topic everymen renegotiate in everyday practices beyond the discourse (Merrifield, 2011, p. 108; De Certeau, 1988). Military protection by the EU has been observed to manifest (participants 21, 22).

Most everyman-participants arguing about the topic are Christians (mentioned above, except participant 28) from the center, who hardly visit the other side of the border or do not have positive ideas about it (participant 14, 21, 22, 31).

The (mostly Muslim, Arab-speaking) population from marginal areas, living closer to the potential threat, seem to interact more across the border, which apparently reduces the fear (Ferrer-Gallardo, 2009, p. 31) - the less

interaction across the border, the more likely everymen reproduce the official geopolitical imagination of a threat and reaffirm the conditional generous inclusion by the EU (Kuus, 2004, p. 484). The fear from the otherness across the border (Ferrer, 2011, p. 31; Walters, 2002, p. 572; Ferrer-Gallardo & Van Houtum, 2013, p. 243) leads to subjection to the conditional relation with the EU especially by inhabitants of the center.

Europeanizing Ceuta's political organization and structures

In order to achieve improvement of status in the EU, it is imagined that efforts have to be made by Ceuta to comply with organizational requirements concerning the political structures of the city, as the powerful discourse reveals. So far the EU has shown satisfaction about the work done by political leaders in Ceuta regarding the results of the management of subsidies (El Faro, 2014f). The EU-representative sent to check the completion of tasks (a condition bound up with receiving funding) was satisfied (Aznar, 2014b). That is to say that Ceuta's politicians and institutions are imagined to work according to an officially recognized European strategy (Kuus, 2004, p. 474).

This is mirrored in the organization of the city, which has been influenced by Europeanization (Kuus, 2004, p. 482): The most important role is with the decision-makers such as Ceuta's president. Minor agencies assist in technical consultation and make proposals for how to solve issues on the political agenda (projects are approved by Spanish Ministries or in Brussels occasionally) – management is based on knowledge (Foucault, 1991).

Newly, Ceuta has formed a committee for the management of funding involving various stakeholders as the EU requires: civil society, entrepreneurs and the local government are involved. Then creative work is build around thematic pillars EU- funding should be dedicated to (G. Martínez Arcas, personal communication, February 6th, 2014). Also actors like the representation of the entrepreneurs in Ceuta (A. Ramírez, personal communication, February 5th, 2014) participate.

Connections and qualifications are the keys to take a technical consultancy position, Olmedo Izar Fuente (personal communication, February 26th, 2014) explains. This implies that it is easier for people, who already form part of the elites in Ceuta (for educational, technical requirements and connections) to get into those positions - those mostly reside in the center. People with similar skills from different social strata or districts might be hampered by lack of connections. Among the influential actors in Ceuta collaboration works well, Ramírez Hurtado (personal communication, February 5th, 2014) explains, problems can be often solved informally via face-to-face consults. These slightly nepotistic practices, illustrate the fragmentation of the different parts of the city, with the center being the site of power and elites (Gunder Franck, 1966, p. 21).

Moroccan respondents agree with powerful imaginations in their renegotiation to have policy-making organized in Ceuta in a European, modern way: three participants suggest that political decisions should be based on investigation and information, as well as on proper organization (participant 2, 10, 12). This should involve statistical assessment e.g. in order to classify people with the help of categories (participant 2), enabling better organization (participant 2, 10, 12). Participant 12 suggest especially involving expertise of professionals. These thus Moroccans favor rather 'enlightened' means of making politics reproduce the appeal of European knowledge-making techniques (Foucault, 1991) and creation of categories of control (Stoler, 1997, p.199; Kramsch & Brambilla, 2007, pp. 100, 115).

The subjection illustrates the status such 'superior' knowledge has acquired beyond the EU's borders (Mignolo, 2000, p. 97) - the scientification, Europeanization of making politics. In this sense the respondents do reproduce pieces of the Europeanization discourse, which, however, have not been identified explicitly in the imaginations of powerful discourse-makers from Ceuta – presumably, because their practice of decision-making is almost naturally organized in the scientificated way. Therefore they would not mention it.

The Moroccan everymen do not expect politics to be organized in scientificated ways, maybe because they hardly agree with outcomes of policy (in Ceuta and, or their country) and cannot imagine that a reasonable assessment was the basis for decisions. Otherwise they would expect to benefit from positive outcomes in their daily routines (Merrifield, 2011, p. 108).

In spite of all that, the EU (as political institution) is not believed to be the level where most influential decisions are made for Ceuta. This function is attributed to the Spanish state by several participants (participant 3, 8, 10, 12). Some consider this power to derive from Spanish military presence (participant 12) and institutions, which are highly concentrated in Ceuta (participant 8). Those reflections only partly fit the powerful geopolitical imaginations, where the influence of the Spanish government is depicted as one of more scales across which competences are distributed.

The reason for Moroccan everymen to evaluate power-relations in such a different way could be as follows: they might project their understanding of the centralized political landscape they are used to in Morocco on the analysis of Ceuta's position in the political power-play e.g. also neglecting the role of economic actors. Contextual knowledge of everyman, experience and routine (Merrifield, 2011, p. 108; Hall, 1997a, p. 32) highly influence the geopolitical imagination of the everyman-respondents.

Yet, also many Ceutí participants attribute the political decision-making power mostly to the Spanish authorities and only partly to the EU or to the municipal government (participant 18, 23, 25, 29). Participant 18 explains: "Ceuta is Spanish. The future of Ceuta is in the hands of the national government (...) the local governments here have some competence, but they have to act conform with Spanish governments". The participant also believes that the future of Ceuta depends on the same institutions as does the future of other European countries – and he is convinced that this power is located in the economic sector, less in politics.

The participant thus locates the power in the nation-state construct, which has for long been a rather European interpretation of power (Mignolo, 2000, p. 50), but also among economic actors – which implies a recognition of the neoliberalization-tendency in EU-politics (Sparke, 2002, p. 220) paralleling globalization and Europeanization (Mignolo, 2000, p. 87). The EU envisioned here adheres to neoliberal strategies of economic development and expansion (Sparke, 2002, p. 220, Luxembourg, 1972, p. 61).

Other respondents among the Ceutís attribute most geopolitical power to parties on national and local level (participant 26, 31): there is a sense of acknowledgement for the good work done by local leaders (participant 26). Strikingly, most respondents, who expressed opinions about the organization of geostrategic power are from the center. The question of 'who actually influences', thus, seems to be asked prevalingly among the elites.

Others might feel far from such influence even locally and accordingly do not think about distribution of such power (participant 16, 27, 28). Again the fragmentation of the city is reflected in the renegotiation here (Gunder Frank, 1966, p.20) and again different Europes, of different levels of geostrategic power, are depicted (Kuus, 2004; Kramsch, 2011).

Gain in status through European membership and citizenship

In official geopolitical imagination the diplomatic relations with the EU are depicted by many experts as having positive effects for Ceuta, the status and rights of citizens: freedom of movement of the individual (A. Romero Aliaga, personal communication, February 25th, 2014), the democratic values and freedom (C. Pérez Marín, personal communication, February 24th, 2014) and mutual support of the member-states and fiscal (economic) advantages (J. Castillo Sempere, personal communication, February 20th, 2014) are considered positive impacts, which Ceuta can attribute to its name since having become European.

For Ceuta continuous support by Spanish and European authorities is important and the Ceutís, Martínez Arcas (personal communication, February 6th, 2014) states, are proud of being European for the associated democratic institutions, the humanist philosophy and human rights. Although some powerful discourse-makers do not fully share this perspective (A. Romero Aliaga, personal communication, February 25th, 2014; J.L. Aróstegui Ruiz, personal communication, February 26th, 2014), the reaffirmation of the values of democracy and freedom perceived as positive political outcomes for Ceuta implies a broad subjection (Gibson-Graham, 2000, p. 108) to the superiority of the geopolitical strategy of Europeanization (Kuus, 2004, p. 480) in Ceuta. Ceuta is represented as benefitting from the conditional expectations (Kuus, 2004, p. 484).

Moroccan everyman-participants enumerate advantages of European-ness manifesting in politics and citizenship, reproducing pieces of the powerful imagination (Hall, 1997b, p. 44): Having 'more rights' is regarded to be a European privilege (participant 3, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12 and 13) - and through this privilege they identify Ceuta's European-ness (Kuus, 2004, pp. 482-484).

Only two elderly participants, 1 and 2 (both have their sons living in difficult situations in Ceuta), disagree. Also young participants, like 4 and 5, do not perceive privileges in Ceuta. They have not experienced the center of Ceuta; participant 5 has not been in touch with Ceuta-Europeans, who might benefit from those privileges (Merrifield, 2011, p. 108; Gibson-Graham, 2000, p. 97).

Yet, some female Moroccan participants emphasize that the rights they experience in Ceuta have a less gendered dimension than in Morocco - their liberties are more obvious, so they even dare to go out at night. Participant 13 could imagine marrying a Ceuti-man to get a European passport. Most Moroccan everymen share participant 3's understanding that the first difference between Africans and Europeans are rights and dignity in life. He observes such privileges to manifest in Ceuta for men *and* women.

Moreover, participant 3 regards the EU to be a useful institution for mutual support among the countries. This widely shared perception illustrates that the Moroccan everyman-respondents subject to their 'otherness' in comparison to Ceuta evaluating the situation by European criteria (Kuus, 2004, p. 482; Stoler, 1997). Those each fit

the geopolitical imagination of Europe the individual everyman develops from his or her context (Hall, 1997b, p. 44). The Moroccan participants seem to have subjected to the imagination of European superiority (Kramsch & Brambilla, 2007, p. 98).

The Ceutí everyman-participants also rather agree with the powerful discourse about rights and advantages in and for political action. Many reproduce positive geopolitical imaginations of the EU as well as of the geopolitical strategy of Europeanization (ibid.; Kuus, 2004, p. 484): participant 15 (originally) from Morocco, who considers himself to be a Ceutí, but who has never received a residence permit, dreams of the rights and advantages European citizenship can bring along: participation in schooling, free mobility in order to pursue a career in different places and in a flexible way and democracy.

Also social security is envisioned as an attribute of European-ness (Participant 29). Democracy and freedom of movement are repeatedly mentioned aspects in the meaning-making, the geopolitical imagination of everyman-Ceutís (participant 16, 18, 26, 22, 28, 29) attributed to the EU and Ceuta. Others also mention the common market and collaboration between countries, when defining what is positive for Ceuta about the EU (Participant 14, 19, 22, 23, 25, 26, 27, 28). According to participant 16 and 28 the EU defends democratic decision-making and protects discriminated groups.

Participant 14 wants the EU to be seen as beautiful as it is also to the exterior world, as a model of responsibility and brotherhood for the world. "Europe is a union of countries fighting to improve the economic situation of people, the rights of men, women and children - for those who are in Europe" (participant 27). Participant 28 connotes the EU to great opportunities for the future: "it would be a total power".

Curiously, a number of participants also feel the need to justify Ceuta's European-ness (participant 18, 19, 25): "We live in Northern Africa, but we are not different from the others" (participant 18). Participant 19 imagines a Europe in which distance does not lessen European-ness (he seems to refer to a long geographical distance from Ceuta to some - for him- central European point). He reminds that Finland is a good example of a far away, European place which is anyway rather European. So this would not apply for Ceuta as well, he argues and thereby he reveals that he somehow he considers Finland to be more obviously European than Ceuta.

Participant 25 normalizes Ceutí Europeans in comparison to her imagined Europe: "although we are in the North of Africa we are normal persons with the same rights and obligations, the rights to live a good life and the obligation to respect the law and to be good".

European-ness seems to be an important aspect of political identity of Ceutí everymen. The reaffirmation also implies that Ceutí everymen *want* to be Europeanized and seem to be willing to adapt to and comply with the criteria of European citizenship (Stoler, 1997, p. 199).

5.1.3 European-template urban transformation in Ceuta's center

Funding destined at enhancing the Europeanization process received from the EU has been invested especially in Ceuta's center for urban revitalization measures (A. Ramírez Hurtado, personal communication, February 5th, 2014).

It is a rather obvious, tangible way of spending subsidies. But it is a part of the strategy of the local decision-makers to achieve revitalization of the center aiming at promoting the city's economic development.

Both, the EU and Ceuta's leaders seem to envision the EU plenty of sites, where buildings are renovated or substituted by new architecture, making streets look civilized (Stoler, 1997, p. 215; Kuus, 2004, p. 482) - prosperous, splendid, clean and proper. One of these sites would be the center of Ceuta, a Europeanized representative center.

In spite of rather diversified purposes of funding-related investments in Ceuta, walking in the center one perceives a strong tendency for accumulation of revitalization measures (construction works) here. Most were realized during the first 20 years of Spanish EU-membership (observation, February 27th 2014): the boulevards, the harbors, the leisure park "Parque Marítimo del Mediterráneo" and hotel 'Puerta de Africa', the design of the main square, the historical heritage of the ancient city-walls were modernized during the 1990s (Q.A., 2014b).

Carlos Pérez Marín (personal communication, February 24th, 2014) highlights the redesign of the Maritime Parks and the creation of respective economic opportunities. This project made Ceuta even become a popular consultant about reasonable spending of EU funding among local leaders in Spain – giving the city center the status of a role-model in displaying willingness to live up to EU-expectations and conditions (Kuus, 2004, p. 474).

Indeed, all around Ceuta one can find signs indicating that certain projects (construction works, restoration, establishment of business) have been funded to a certain extent by the EU, I was attended by José Ramos Aparicio (personal communication, February 12th, 2014)(see figure 5). In total 200 sites became targets of modernization (ibid.; A. Ramírez Hurtado, personal communication, February 5th, 2014). The center's modernization has been realized for 98% through EU funding (A. Ramírez Hurtado, personal communication, February 5th, 2014).

Local decision-makers praise the efforts: Olmedo Izar Fuente (personal communication, February 26th) is convinced that "we [Ceuta] need physical investments to guarantee the flow of people" to the city as consumers. In the 2014 'strategic plan' (Ciudad de Ceuta, 2014) the municipal government of Ceuta announces to update the general urban plan, the PGOU, and to progress in formerly initiated projects.

Several of them concentrate in the central areas of Ceuta, e.g. the modernization of the campus of the university (Presidencia de la Ciudad, 2014). Also the local news record modernization measures in Ceuta's physiognomy: modern shopping facilities in the center are results of recent investment (Saura, 2013a). In December 2013 the city launched a competition for new construction works of 4,5 millions euro for the Marina central-boulevard (Saura, 2013b). These measures are examples of projects benefitting mainly the central areas.

José Maria Campos Martínez (personal communication, February 19th, 2014) considers such spending of the EU funding to have highly relevant cultural and economic consequences. The head of the municipal archive explains "it [the EU-funding] might be lower than Spanish funding, but it is crucial, especially for infrastructures and the face of the city, its credibility" (J.L.Gómez Barceló, personal communication, February 7th, 2014). The center, "the face of the city", is what you first look at and where visitors pilgrimage to explore and participate in activities. All of these experts thus unanimously describe a process of modernization, which transformed the central zone of Ceuta, which has lived up to certain standards of the EU. With a modern 'face' to the outside world future economic benefits are expected.



Figure 5. Photos of signs indicating the funding relations with the EU in Ceuta. Many projects are subsidized to major or minor extent by the EU. Accordingly signs hint at the respective support, especially in the (touristic) zones of the center. Photos were taken between December 2013 and March 2014.

The benefits of EU subsidies and its effects are thus evaluated in terms of EU-template economic development (Kramsch, 2011, p. 196; Kuus, 2004, p. 482). Ceutís are proud of their center (A. Ramírez Hurtado, personal communication, February 5th, 2014), most likely, because in their geopolitical imagination Ceuta has made an important step to become more alike to other places in the Europeanized world (Kuus, 2004, p. 484).

Infrastructural upgrades are imagined as a future challenge of modernization (J. Ramos Aparicio, personal communication, February 12th, 2014). Several projects are announced and launched (El Pueblo, 2013e). The opposition parties hope that the projects would not exclusively result in physical modernizations in the form of skyscrapers, but also in functional enhancement (Carracao at observation, February 8th, 2014).

Opposition parties express disapproval of "distinterest by the government about implementing agenda 21" (Rincón, 2014a), a European environmental norm for functional changes in urbanization. The greens consider the reform pending since 2006. At that time 28 measures were agreed on according to the EU requirements, but promises have never transformed into action (Rincón, 2014a).

This piece of imagination shows that Europeanization is not always imagined and implemented with the same prioritization for different fields. It seems that the economic development has constantly been subject to modernization plans. Other fields are neglected by the central power-elites and have less priority in their strategy of Europeanization of Ceuta (Kuus, 2004, p. 482).

Among the everymen from Morocco participant 7 reproduces the imagination about a process of modernization in the physical environment in Ceuta, especially in the infrastructure, investments in enterprises and positive economic development (participant 7). Thus he is convinced that becoming European has been a clear advantage for Ceuta, Spain and all the member-states of the EU – the union is imagined as a modern prosperous economically mutually stimulating community (Kramsch, 2011, p. 196). This perspective reveals that participant 7 (who is a real border-crosser for leisure and constantly in touch with Spanish) evaluates the situation on the basis of modern, efficient and result-oriented criteria – rather Europeanized criteria in terms of (Kuus, 2004, p. 482).

Another respondent also stresses that Ceuta has a good relation with the EU and that it implies that "the others [countries] help Ceuta". Yet, in general Moroccan everyman-participants who are aware of Ceuta receiving subsidies from the EU, cannot tell what exactly they were used for. The geopolitical strategy of Ceuta, pursuing Europeanization and urban modernization, does not play any role in their daily routines and survival, so they result to be rather indifferent about the topic (Merrifield, 2011, p. 108).

Reflections by several Ceutí everyman-respondents highlight that infrastructure and physical features have been especially upgraded in the central areas: the renegotiation is close to the powerful imagination, as most respondents bring forward the same arguments (participant 14, 18, 21, 22). Yet, the unit of analysis is not always the urban environment. Some respondents identify manifestation of benefits from funding in reforms (participant 18, 22), employment creation (participant 22, 29), infrastructure upgrades (participant 22, 25), business start-ups (participant 25, 17) and the maintenance of the (historical) heritage and identity of the city (Participant 21, 31).

All of these participants could tell about the investments, because they were each involved in the fields they mentioned – which confirms the crucial role of every-day practices in the renegotiation process (De Certeau, 1988; Merrifield, 2011, p. 108).

Some though, like participant 29, see progress particularly manifesting in the physical transformation of the city-scape - “now the houses are clean, repaired; the squares cleaner, wider” (participant 29). Participants seem aware of that the funding, Ceuta has received, were important amounts in comparison to what other Spanish cities have received (participant 21). In this sense, thankfulness is expressed by Ceuti respondents, who appreciate solidarity and support by the EU (Participant 26) – the EU becomes envisioned in a paternal function, helping the development of Ceuta, like typical of conditional relations (Kuus, 2004, pp. 473-474).

On the other hand criticism evolves about the mentioned concentration of investments in the central areas, especially by respondents from non-central zones. They miss projects in other districts (participant 24, 28). “It is beautiful, but it depends on the part of Ceuta. In parts where there is just one community [the Christian one] there is a lot of decoration” (participant 28), which is less in other parts of the city. An employee from the tourist office describes that Ceuta’s affluent inhabitants reside especially at Ceuta’s outer Eastern edge, the Monte Hacho in proximity to the center, in some Western hilly zones and the city center. Those are the high-price living areas – where most measures of modernization have taken place so far.

During observations (February 17th, 2014) I noted a decrease in quality of renovation of buildings, the farther I moved away from the center. Again there is evidence in imaginations of a certain fragmentation. Europeanization is imagined to successfully involve the center, but less other parts of Ceuta (Gunder Frank, 1966, p. 20).

5.1.4 Economic template-modernization

Production

The industrial sector is taken into account in the geopolitical imaginations of the powerful, but not as major strategy of modernization for Ceuta. In the planning of the municipal government, “special support for established industry” (Ciudad de Ceuta, 2014, p. 16) is announced, as well as support for developing future potential. The objective is to increase the proportional relevance of the productive structure in the local GDP – especially to create employment (Ciudad de Ceuta, 2014, p. 3).

Revision of the rules of origin (Ceuta is currently treated like a third country when trading to the EU) is foreseen in order to eliminate import barriers to the EU Customs territory e.g. for animal-based products from Ceuta (fish). Such a step would mean to ‘Europeanize’ the rules of origin, adapting to the EU model (Kuus, 2004, p. 474).

Further, the industrial zones in the city are to be promoted, according to the document (Ciudad de Ceuta, 2014, p. 16). The need for such incentives had been identified 10 (and more) years ago by Campos Martínez (2005, p. 83): By that time the lawyer imagined technical consultancy for setting up industries to become *the* major service provided by the municipal government, including selection of appropriate physical spaces for settlement and seizing issues of the rules of origin (Campos Martínez, 2005, p. 83). In this sense, we can conclude, that there has been little progress in production in favor of economic development. The underlying imagination of the EU here is a zone of

prosperity (Kramsch & Brambilla, 2007, p. 98; Kramsch, 2011, p. 200): This should be based on diversified, dynamic economic sectors leading to welfare and modernity.

The Moroccan everyman-respondents do not renegotiate this piece of discourse, which is a logical consequence of hardly any of them seeing a need for further modernization in Ceuta. In comparison to the conditions in their life-worlds Ceuta matches much more the image of a prosperous EU (Kramsch, 2011, p. 200). They argue from their own life-worlds (Merrifield, 2011, p. 108; Kolosov & Scott, 2012, p. 13) which they measure on a scale of European-ness (Kuus, 2004, p. 475). Superior European-ness is subjected to and imagined as what life in Ceuta is like – perhaps because it is the (only) place in the EU they know (best).

Ceuti everymen, though, identify the lack of a well-functioning productive sector as a problem - The functioning of the sector is imagined as the most relevant basis for a positive development and modernization: “The only thing we need is more production sites, factories and so on” (participant 20), which is a vision shared by several Ceuti participants from different districts and of different backgrounds (participant 21, 22, 23, 24, 26, 28). Participant 26 explains that in the past factories in Ceuta processed fish, beer and ceramics, but then probably due to bureaucratic requirements, she assumes, they had to close down. The latter suspicion might be still based on her strenuous experience of setting up a business with her family.

Three respondents see a potential for factories in processing of fish (participant 24, 22, 28) and hope for investment in this field in future. As participant 28 puts it: “The material we have here is the sea. We could fish, it is a profitable sector”. The participants argue mostly on the basis of their memories of the “good old times”, when there was still fishing (Hall, 1997a, p. 32).

It is a conflicting geopolitical strategy they envision in comparison to objectives and strategies the decision-makers consider feasible. Given high transportation costs for delivering products from Ceuta (J.M. Mas Vallecón, personal communication, February 14th, 2014) they are hesitant about the potential. Such a view is not shared explicitly by any of the everymen, who put a lot of hope into the possibilities of developing industrial activities and respective employment opportunities. To them Europeanization and economic development through production (Kramsch, 2011, p. 196) also means improvements for the lives of everymen.

Service-sector

According to powerful discourse-makers instead, Ceuta’s potential for future economic growth lies mostly in the service sector. The latter term is used in the elite’s imagination sometimes as a rather broad and under-specified container-concept. Yet, the use of the term highlights that the EU is imagined as a union of service-based economic prosperity (Kramsch, 2011, p. 196).

In-depth analysis reveals that one main hope imagined by the powerful concentrates on consumption in the center by clients from across the border. The potential of development for Ceuta’s economy is estimated to increase by legalizing trading and service provision to Morocco. Ceuta would become the formal initiator of dynamic growth in the border-region (J.A. Alarcón Caballero, personal communication, February 12th, 2014). Studies are required to find long-term solutions.

The national administration official, Olmedo Izar Fuente (personal communication, February 26th, 2014), agrees with this vision of what 'European economy' is like. He supports the strategy to change Ceuta's economic model from dependence on smuggling activities (see chapter 6) to formal conditions for trading products and services across the border. This way enhancement of the kinds and quality of products passing could be achieved. In the politician's geopolitical imagination Ceuta is the most backward place in Spain for adopting the formal - 'European' - economic model. The vision of the EU as well regulated market union makes the politician depict Ceuta as a backward place, though, with ambition to Europeanize (Kuus, 2004, p.474).

From Ramírez Hurtado's perspective (personal communication, February 5th, 2014) Ceuta's center is rather modern and suggests prosperity – which for him are important criteria of European-ness. He and more powerful actors show sympathy to adopt a neoliberal strategy for economic Europeanization (Sparke, 2002, p. 220): arguments against plans resulting in over-regulation and increase of taxation in the gastronomic sector (A. Ramírez Hurtado, personal communication, February 5th, 2014; García, 2013b; A.J., 2013) are an example of the vision to achieve growth through economic flexibility (El Pueblo, 2013b) and generous regulation (Saura, 2013d).

Ramírez Hurtado (personal communication, February 5th, 2014) shows disapproval, though, of large construction projects prioritized by Ceuta's government. Many small enterprises could benefit from the same funding and investments in a more sustainable way for the future. Thus, while economic development as pillar of Europeanization (Kramsch, 2011, p. 196) seems to be embraced, negative consequences of certain imposed EU-norms are understood to hamper such development (Sparke, 2002, p. 216).

The debate about "growth" (observation, February 8th, 2014) as such illustrates a broad consensus by different emitters of powerful discourse that Ceuta's economy is *not yet* (Kuus, 2004, p. 483) readily developed. A European, neoliberal model solution should be applied to improve the situation for different economic actors especially from the center (February 8th, 2014, observation).

The rise in standards of living (A. Ramírez Hurtado, personal communication, February 5th, 2014) could be considered as manifestation of success of geopolitical strategies chosen – irrespective of inequalities in distribution also between the different parts of the city (Gunder Franck, 1966, p. 20). The continuation of the neoliberal growth strategy is committed to in the government's strategic plan: it lists a series of measures destined at increasing competitiveness, boosting the (local) demand and making the center more attractive for consumption in diverse sales areas and for multiple famous brands to settle (Ciudad de Ceuta, 2014, p. 10). Among others extension of opening-hours on Sundays, holidays and Saturday nights and improvements of the vocational and technical training for management skills for entrepreneurs (Ciudad de Ceuta, 2014, pp. 10-11) are programmed.

The key-insight from the experts' neoliberal geopolitical strategic imagination here is that economic modernization, Europeanization (Kuus, 2004, p. 482), has taken place in the center, but could be enhanced using EU subsidies for investment in modernization of service provision.

This vision concerning a service-based development cannot be found in the insights obtained from analyzing geopolitical imaginations of 'everymen'. For Moroccan participants, one should consider that in Morocco small

entrepreneurial culture is rather widespread (Merrifield, 2011, p. 108), so they would not notice any particularity about this sector. They would thus not consider it to a special potential of Ceuta (Gibson-Graham, 2000, p. 97).

Ceuti everyman-respondents are highly used to the entrepreneurial culture as well and do not necessarily compare this structural aspect, when leaving Ceuta, with other places in Europe (De Certeau, 1988). The 'service sector' as such is hardly mentioned in imaginations by Ceuti everyman-participants on either side of the border. It seems to be a too abstract concept summarizing groups of activities, which are mentioned individually (gastronomy, tourism, trade etc.) with reference to places in the life-worlds of people (De Certeau, 1988).

Yet, those branches do not seem to be features Ceuti and Moroccan participants prefer as a basis for modernization in future. Instead, they cherish more hope about the tangible production sector which seems promising to foster development, making a European site of Ceuta (Kramsch, 2011, p. 196). Most plans for measures of modernization of services in the center seem to pass un-noticed and un-renegotiated by the everyman-sample in this study. Being concerned with every-day routines, they might not have any energy left to inform about the abstract, strategic *future* plans of the powerful discourse-makers (Merrifield, 2011, p. 108).

Tourism

Different kinds of tourism are imagined as promising branch for economic growth by powerful discourse-makers. European tourists could be attracted by the harbor-city and transition point Ceuta, where a variety of cultures mix: multicultural is fashionable. Guillermo Martínez Arcas (personal communication, February 6th, 2014) imagines tourists in Ceuta to eat out at Hindu and Arab restaurants in the center. They could be offered excursions to have a Moroccan mint-tea in Benzú. There is a broad offer of sports-activities from canoeing to horse-riding, which the tourist office provides information about.

Ceuta attempts to follow regions, which have completed adaptation to European standards in this field, especially liberalization (Solana Bermejo, 2010). But the city is not yet (Kuus, 2004, p. 483) at this stage, the imaginations reveal. Conference tourism has development potentials, the 'strategic plan' resumes, e.g. celebrating an Expo in Ceuta (Ciudad de Ceuta, 2014, p. 12). Attraction of cruise ships, which in times of crisis rely on bigger ships with higher capacities in order to maintain price-levels, has become more difficult in Ceuta's small harbor. In order to adapt and avoid losing the gainful stays, construction works in the harbor have been initiated (El Faro, 2014b).

Skepticism is expressed by Olmedo Izar Fuente (personal communication, February 26th, 2014), an economic consultant for the delegation of the Spanish government in Ceuta, about tourism as a means to economic modernization and development. He fears that Ceuta cannot compete with the touristic potential of the surrounding areas. Instead Ceuta should make use of the EU-subsidies relying on services such as banking and entrepreneurial activity.

Behind all the debate about tourism lures the geopolitical ambition of Ceuta's decision-makers to catch up in economic development and prosperity with other places in the EU (Kuus, 2004, p. 479). Some imagine that Europeanization through tourism could be achieved by investing EU subsidies in city-marketing (Sparke, 2002, p.

215) to finally improve economic performance according to the (imagined) EU-expectations (Kuus, 2004, p. 2004; Kramersch, 2011, p. 200).

A special kind of tourism, which has established in Ceuta and is identified to have potential to contribute to the implementation of the strategy of Europeanization (Kuus, 2004, p. 484) is shopping-tourism from Morocco. Revitalization measures in the center are also designed to attract Moroccans to spend leisure in the center and to consume. The government proposes to facilitate the certification of temporary visa, which are now exclusively available for Moroccans from the Tetouan-region. Additional provision of information and advertisement, orientation towards respective target groups and guaranteeing indirect tax advantages for acquisitions by voyagers are programmed by the authorities (Ciudad de Ceuta, 2014, p. 4).

Each year, as economic development progresses in Morocco, more middle-class clients can be attracted to Ceuta by the offer of services and shopping (A. Romero Aliaga, personal communication, February 25th, 2014). Gomez Barceló (personal communication, February 7th, 2014) analyzes: “We are attractive for certain groups for certain reasons. We are a European city *and* we can offer everything like the rest of Morocco, Casablanca and so on. But still we are interesting for our neighbor. It is the curiosity which counts. Culturally, we can offer something distinct - consider the bourgeois families coming to visit Ceuta during the weekends for shopping-tourism or wanting their children to learn a foreign language. They can do things they cannot do back in their country, due to rules related to the religious confession. They eat things, like pork, they cannot eat there. (...) All things, which are marginal on the Moroccan market, have a potential of attraction for clients even from Rabat: You can be in Spain without taking a boat”.

Ramírez Hurtado (personal communication, February 5th, 2014) and Carracao (a local representative of the socialist party, at observation, February 8th, 2014) have similar ideas. Maintaining this image and offer with attributes of European-ness (suited to the image the average Moroccan has of the EU) can be used to attract clients with a “less-European” (Kuus, 2004, p. 475) cultural background, from a place with presumably (assumption in mind of Moroccan clients which is worked with) less “Europeanized” offers and market structures.

Ceuta thus aims at making use of its European attributes to benefit from “non-European” flows of clients or to put it differently, by exploiting its image as a place of curiosity –an exotic place to Moroccan clients. Although ‘otherness’ is inverted here (Ceuta as exotic other), in the end, Ceuta might be able to transform the profit of consumption into further measures of modernization and Europeanization (Kramersch, 2011, p. 200).

Many Moroccan everymen are aware of the relevance of sales to Moroccan clients in Ceuta’s center for the city’s economic development – less of other kinds of tourism flowing into Ceuta. Yet, participant 3 notices, that the acquisition of goods in Ceuta for the Moroccan market has rather negative side-effects on the Moroccan domestic economy. Consequently he appreciates the king’s efforts to prevent people from participating in the business across the border – e.g. creating alternative employment at the giant new harbor of Tanger (Tanger Med).

Participant 5 (like participant 3, she never has entered Ceuta and does not know the center) draws conclusions from what she observes in Tetouan: products from Ceuta are sold on in each part of the city, and she

knows several people, who live on this business. Participant 12, who has been working for long in Ceuta, has recognized the dependence of Ceuta on the demand by Moroccan clients buying for themselves or selling on. She identifies them as the target group for 'rebajas' (special offers) announced all around Ceuta's center.

Some Moroccan respondents (participant 4, 7, 10), who use to cross the border with appropriate visa confirm that Ceuta is a popular destination for shopping given the facilities and environment for this activity: "Ceuta for me is a place to go for a walk, for excursions with my family" (participant 4). "We are not working there, we use to go there for leisure. From all over Morocco people are coming to Ceuta for shopping etc., but they need a visa" (participant 7). Unlike in powerful imaginations the everyman-participants here do not pose any problems into this relation between Ceuta's center and the border-people from Morocco. As they are not concerned with the economic gains of the shops in the center, they stick to a consumer perspective. They do not renegotiate the discourse from the entrepreneur or decision-maker perspective (Merrifield, 2011, p. 108).

In some of the meaning-making by Moroccan everyman-participants one can discover the cultural appeal Ceuta has for Moroccans: participant 5 who has never been to Ceuta's center dreams of finally exploring the city. She was told that Ceuta was beautiful, that people were kind and she likes the clothes, which are sold there. Participant 7 and 8 tell that they use to go to the center of Ceuta, for having a drink, dinners and meeting friends. Participant 8 organizes visits on weekly basis, also getting in touch with Ceutís working in his field. He is rather satisfied about having Ceuta close, because this way some of his projects could be realized with 'European' means (considering that his professional field is a rather new branch in Morocco, as it has been growing only recently). Ceuta is complementary for his demand e.g. of books which he cannot get in Morocco. In this sense, Ceuta is framed as a market place for unsatisfied, 'European' demands from Morocco and a 'European' shopping and leisure environment (Kuus, 2004, p. 482) in the participants' imaginations. This fits the way powerful discourse-makers envision the appeal of Ceuta.

Participant 8, with many connections to cultural and political elites in Ceuta reproduces pieces of the powerful discourse (Hall, 1997b p. 44). Like the decision-makers, the cultural dimension is imagined as economic potential, making use of touristic and educational facilities e.g. in the form of a new university (participant 8). He regards the sector to have more future than plain commerce.

Participant 7 is convinced that Ceuta will have a good future, because it is European (Kuus, 2004, p. 482) and like more Moroccan respondents he thinks that there are sufficient companies, shops, goods for trade and employment. The EU imagined here is, again, an economically prosperous, well-working system of welfare (Kramsch, 2011, p. 200; Kuus, 2004, p. 482). This is attributed to and projected on Ceuta as well.

Except participants 22 and 31, none of the Ceutí everyman-respondents identify tourism with target groups from the EU as a potential growth sector. One could conclude that neither participants in Ceuta nor from Morocco do perceive this touristic flow as important economic pillar. The range of possibilities deliberated about for future development is less broad than in the powerful imaginations. Having geopolitical, strategic tools and responsibilities in their hands, the experts seem to feel forced to consider all alternatives at hand. They also seem more ambitious to live up to further Europeanization than the everymen Ceutís. This implies that the implemented Europeanization strategy is

supported mostly by the center of Ceuta, where the decision-makers live and operate – the city appears divided (Gunder Frank, 1966, p. 20).

It is striking that few Ceuti participants mention the Moroccan clients as central economic trigger to Ceuta's economy. Their representation of the commercial service sector in Ceuta's seems to be confined to their own supply (Merrifield, 2011, p. 108). But two Ceuti participants, participant 14 and 27, do not even attempt to describe the obvious strategy of shops in the center to appeal to Moroccan clients. Instead they somehow seemed to feel ashamed of the dependence on this group of clients. They search for an excuse for the involvement of non-European actors in Ceuta's economic development: "there is little production left by now, before there was a lot of production. We are Europeans, Spanish, but we need something to live on as well" (participant 14).

The targeting of Moroccan clients seems to be seen as a successful, effective strategy of economic modernization and Europeanization (Kramsch, 2011, p. 200). It is only obscured by the fact that it is not an intrinsic, endogenous demand. Instead the target group seemingly carries many attributes of otherness (Kuus, 2004, p. 483). The Ceuti everyman-participants do not seem to like to admit that a major pillar of their economy are Moroccan clients in the center and prefer to invisibilize this dependency (Ferrer-Gallardo et al., 2014).

Knowledge-economy

Ceuta's governing elite seem enthusiastic about incentivizing the construction of a knowledge- and technology sector in Ceuta. The strategic plan of the government emphasizes potentials in installing enterprises specialized in information science, electronic commerce, online games and services based on new technologies through fiscal incentives, a special regime for the creation of employment in the sector (Ciudad de Ceuta, 2014, p. 5).

Firstly, cooperation with the University for creating private education models and business-schools for the branch are planned. This way specialized training would be offered in Ceuta (Ciudad de Ceuta, 2014, p. 15). Ceuta's decision-makers thus take up the popular trend of geopolitical imagination in the EU to foster innovation and competitiveness in new technologies to develop economically.

Following other places examples, 'silicon-valley'-examples, the leaders subject to the imagination of effectiveness of neoliberal models of knowledge-economy (Sparke, 2002, p. 222). They imagine the EU as a (hegemonic) knowledge- and information-society (Mignolo, 2000, p. 85). Different policy-makers agree on such measures, presenting them as valid alternatives for Ceuta's economic future. Mas Vallecón (personal communication, February 14th, 2014) relates the potential to the African market on which high-tech services from Ceuta might be demanded. "It could be a solution and they [high-tech innovative enterprises in Ceuta] could benefit from the [Ceuta's distinct] fiscal system" (J.M. Mas Vallecón, personal communication, February 14th, 2014).

Beyond the enthusiasm of the powerful discourse-makers, it does not seem to be a strategy many everyman-respondents, on either side of the border, would envision for Ceuta. It is a little tangible vision, different from the potentials of the city everyman would focus on, such as production. IT is a hardly studied area in Ceuta, at least, among the generation of 35-plus years.

Any of the respondents, except participant 7 from Morocco, has worked in, for or with the IT branch. This might be another explanation, why everyman-participants did not consider the field as future economic alternative for

Ceuta – it lies beyond the everyday practices of the participants and might consequently remain un-renegotiated (De Certeau, 1988; Merrifield, 2011, p. 108). It seems a discourse designed in elitist geopolitical imagination, in the center. It is not shared in spaces beyond – another evidence of Ceuta’s spatial fragmentation (Gunder Franck, 1966, p. 20).

5.1.5 Europeanizing Ceuta, a cultural process

Ceuta’s center - a site where modern, European thinking and practice manifest

During a speech held in Barcelona by a Ceutí, working for a Ceutí NGO, he claims that Ceuta contributed to the cultural richness of the Catalan capital through the presence of the ‘regional house of Ceuta’. The latter is depicted as a symbol of “incorporation of our city [Ceuta] in the age of modernity”, with Ceuta having the chance to establish its “unquestionable modern image” and “illusions for the future” (Fortes in El Pueblo, 2013c).

This characterization of Ceuta’s modern culture suits the efforts made to modernize the city - it is obvious, that at least the power-elites think in terms of modernization and strive to link up with sites of modernity (Mignolo, 2000, p. 59). Ceuta’s elites often reaffirm that ‘Ceuta is European’, which is a sign that the process of Europeanization is still going on (Kuus, 2004, p. 483) – but also saying that Ceuta is European means Europeanizing the city discursively.

Many experts define European-ness and explain why these features are inherent to Ceuta: The historian and librarian Alarcón Caballero (personal communication, February 12th, 2014) describes European-ness as sharing the history of the Occident, civilization, development and the acceptance of the occidental culture. He is convinced that these aspect manifest in Ceuta as in other places of the EU. Ceuta is thus imagined to geopolitically belong to the EU.

Alejandro Romero Aliaga (personal communication, February 25th, 2014) regards Ceuta to be rather Occidentalized and although the city is in Northern Africa and could be expected to be Muslim, it is actually more similar to Cadiz, an Andalusian, Spanish city. Olmedo Izar Fuente (personal communication, February 26th, 2014) refers to the superiority of the Occidental culture, the privilege of being European, in Ceuta. The head of the municipal archive, Gomez Barceló (personal communication, February 7th, 2014) confirms that “being European is an identity, Europe has a culture and identity – which is essentially Hebrew and Christian.” In this culture, Gomez Barceló explains, one has freedom, rights and obligations. As a European one can be proud of this identity, as can the Ceutís. The enumerations of European attributes reminds of attributes mentioned in Kuus (2004) and Kramsch (2011).

“They [Ceutís] are Spanish and Ceuta feels totally European for the culture and way of life. For Ceuta it was important to join the EU, we are conscious about being a European city in Africa (...) the union means being stronger” (J.L. Gomez Barceló, personal communication, February 7th, 2014). Yet, he is also sure that the European identity allows for some variation, diversity and difference.

Also other powerful-discourse-creators feel proud of being European (G. Martínez Arcas, personal communication, February 6th, 2014) and think that a certain range of variety in features does not diminish their European-ness– this argument is, pointing to that Ceuta might have particularities, but emphasizes that this is normal within the Union. This way attribution of otherness, because of certain particularities, is defeated without even having

to mention them – a discursive way of invisibilizing otherness (Ferrer-Gallardo et al., 2014). But also the lawyer Campos Martínez (personal communication, February 19th, 2014) agrees that diversity must be allowed in the EU, also in economic contribution, because the Union is the first priority. It is certainly an argument to defeat complaints he has heard before in more affluent regions, which regard themselves subsidizing and sustaining poorer EU regions such as Ceuta. But in this statement a certain ‘inferior position’ and process of adaptation is revealed, which Ceuta has to undergo to become more European in future (Kuus, 2004, p. 473).

All these discursive affirmations of European-ness of Ceuta and the Europeanization strategy (Dijkink, 1996, p. 11) reveal that Ceuta subjects to the conditional relation with the EU as the inferior in this relation and tries to adapt, while benefitting from attributing European-ness to the city: in status, rights, legal guarantees, also for its citizens (Kuus, 2004).

In the geopolitical imaginations of Ceuta’s decision-makers profound appreciation of the EU-values (and thus cultural association with the EU) can be traced (Kuus, 2004, p. 482). Values expressed in ‘rights’, which are connoted to ‘being European’ are freedom of movement (J. Ramos Aparicio, personal communication, February 12th, 2014), human rights and democracy (J.M. Campos Martínez, personal communication, February 19th, 2014) as well as more liberty (J.A. García Inigo, personal communication, February 18th, 2014) in general. ‘Efficiency’ in work and process is considered an important feature of capitalist modernity (Luxembourg, 1972, p. 61; Mignolo, 2000, pp. 53-54). This value is becoming incorporated by power elites in Ceuta in their institutions, which currently undergo a process of rationalization for more efficiency. Additionally, it is part of the leaders’ jobs to overwork and to be available during weekends (J.R. Olmedo Izar Fuente, personal communication, February 26th, 2014; J. Castillo Sempere, personal communication, February 20th, 2014) to contribute to efficient treatment of tasks. The EU, imagined by the leaders, is one guided by such values.

Moroccan respondents hardly felt prepared to talk about contributions Ceuta and Ceutís make to the EU, most probably, because they are no Europeans and would not know about commitment to the EU on the different levels (decision-makers or everyman) (Merrifield, 2011, p. 108).

But in their meaning-making appreciation of EU values is clear. The appreciation mostly has as point of reference in Morocco – often in comparison to the situation imagined in Ceuta. This is different from Ceutí everymen’s and leaders’ positioning of the Ceutí situation in relation to other places in the EU. This way definitions of what European values are differ. In both cases though appreciation is often based on the perception that the own standards are inferior to the standards compared to (Kuus, 2004, p. 484).

This divergence is then attributed to the difference in value system: participant 9 is sure that “Ceuta has little in common with Morocco, so it must be European and Spanish”. This observation about lack of similarities between the two sides of the border, from the perspective of a Moroccan implies that culture is seen as a crucial distinction and the distinctiveness of culture in Ceuta is attributed to the city’s Spanish and European identity.

Thanks to the police-presence in the streets in the center, the controls, participant 10 feels rather safe being in the city. He and participant 11 find it a rather orderly and organized environment in comparison to their home-

country. This is evidence to them that the city is modern and European – the EU becomes envisioned as secure and orderly (Kramsch, 2011, p. 196).

Other Moroccan respondents resulted to be less explicit. They talk about Ceuta's center as a place for leisure and consumption, which is a more indirect characterization of Ceuta as a modern place – offering the luxury of a modern, capitalist site (Sparke, 2002). Participant 4, 7, 6, 8 and 10 tell about the different ways they use Ceuta as a destination for eating out and supplying themselves. For participant 4 it is a site for excursions with her family, participant 7 and 8 use to meet up with friends and participant 10 uses to go with friends about once per month or whenever there is a holiday.

The cultural appeal of Ceuta for leisure and shopping has been mentioned before, including admiration of the modern splendid city-center and the different, European products sold. Many features, which are perceived as positive and distinct in Ceuta, the Moroccans seem to attribute to Ceuta's European-ness. They connote prosperity to the EU and Ceuta (Kramsch, 2011, p. 196; Kuus, 2004, p. 482).

Participant 5 knows that people in Ceuta “have good lives, they go to different countries to spend holidays with their families”. Participant 13 (first respondent) has observed that the family the center, she works for, do not need to work a lot: they own a shop and are well off. The latter observation about prosperity of Ceutí everymen from the center proves that the center is imagined as rather privileged in Ceuta – thanks to properties, the family mentioned has a good life, while others in other parts of the city struggle for employment. Property and real estates might be held especially by people from the center, who have benefitted from stable work conditions for generations, recently through the Europeanization and funding by the EU (Gunder Frank, 1966, p. 20).

For those, who work in Ceuta and have also gotten in touch with people, Ceutís are “good” and “not all are racist” (participant 13). The latter illustrates that the Moroccans perceive Ceutí people eventually as racist, which fits the superiority claims towards Moroccans emerging from powerful imaginations (Ferrer-Gallardo & Van Houtum, 2013, p. 247).

Many everyman-respondents from Morocco connote European-ness to privileges, so they reproduce the official powerful imaginations. “I will be attended everywhere because of being European” (participant 6). European-ness is first of all connoted to rights for participant 10 and to Christianity – two characteristics which according to his perspective are typical also of Ceuta. Participant 7, 10 and 11 notice that the center of Ceuta is a rather safe place to be, they trust the European security forces.

Participant 12, however, who has been working in Ceuta for long, appreciates certain European values, but she is more critical about their manifestation in Ceuta. She is sure, that “Ceuta should focus on Spain in future, otherwise it will just be stuck and bust. I also saw [on television] that people in Europe use to dress up better than here [in Ceuta], more elegant. Some go out of their houses here in their sleep-dress, even to school they use to go like that. My mum taught me from the beginning that one should only sleep with that kind of clothes”. She suggests that Ceuta will need some modernization in future. Right now, it appears as a rather small city where “everyone knows each other”, like in rural areas or “villages” (participant 12). The participant's evaluation of the status of European civilization of Ceuta is rather critical – to her, certain aspects of the culture of the Ceuta are not yet modern, metropolitan or European (Kuus, 2004, p. 483) enough.

In contrast to that participant 8, being an intellectual himself, emphasizes another aspect of Ceuta's culture, the civilization and intellectuality (Kuus, 2004, p. 482). He suggests, however, to build and work on them in future, e.g. creating an own university in Ceuta, independent of the one in Granada, in order to attract people from other regions of Spain. He likes to think of Ceuta as a place of culture and would want these aspects to be emphasized more – in forms of cultural events or conferences, also in order to make Northern Africa and Morocco play a role in European culture (participant 8). In this sense he wants Ceuta to modernize, yet, making use of its own cultural potential, instead of implementing standardized model, with the aim of recognition in the EU. Again, this aim reveals the opinion that conformation to the EU-norms and expectations is a reasonable strategy for Ceuta, though in a contextual way (Kuus, 2004).

To sum it all Up: Most Moroccan participants subject to the geopolitical imagination underlying the conditional relations and regard European-ness as a privilege. To them it means being superior to others (Mignolo, 2000, p. 59). Some see potential for further modernization, but comparing it to Morocco, most of them seem to agree that the degree of European-ness of Ceuta's center is advanced (Kuus, 2004, p. 475). The connotation also depends on the way the individual border-people relate to Ceuta (Hall, 1997a, p. 32). Especially, the elderly participants, 1 and 2, did not renegotiate the discourse about cultural modernity of Ceuta. They do not seem to be concerned with the "European" attractions and cultural appeal Ceuta has for young, who connote it to shopping and leisure. The two participants have never been close friends with Ceutís or built connections to people from the center. The appeal of modernity seems to reach those who have a life to live before them, whereas aspirations or concern of the elderly remain indifferent (Merrifield, 2011, p. 108).

Some everyman-Ceutís connote European-ness to 'good life', a "good job, a good house, living in peace and satisfied, with dignity" (participant 27), as the Moroccans do. These positive connotations, which participant 28 describes in a similar way, prove that Ceutís in their meaning-making subject to the imagination of the EU as a zone of prosperity (Kramsch, 2011, p. 196). Participant 31 confirms that "being European I am included in the most ancient, most cultivated, civilized, advanced continent, where most of civilization comes from" – the appeal of European-ness seems to be connoted to modernity, progress and civilization in the Ceuti everyman-renegotiation as well (Kuus, 2004, p. 482).

More privileges identified as 'European' ones, have been mentioned before: the right to move around freely (participant 20), solidarity (participant 23), improving the chances for development (participant 23) and more. Being included in the union is seen as a privilege. This proves that the participants perceive the conditional inclusion as beneficial for the city (Kuus, 2004, p. 484).

A different explanation of the cultural identification with Europe is given by participant 28, a participant living near the border in Ceuta's margins: "It is a psychological effect" of living in a place where one can "see Morocco, but we also look at Europe". This explanation of proximity of non-European-ness and the border, causing strong identification with the EU (Kolossoff & Scott, 2012, p. 34) has to be understood, though, also in relation to the above mentioned arguments of the cultural appeal of 'being European'. Yet, whereas the participant from the margin dares to speak of the border having effects on the identification with the EU, the participants living in the center seem to

avoid to explain this factor to their gratitude for being included in the union– they invisibilize the proximity of an ‘oriental’ country (Ferrer-Gallardo et al., 2014; Kuus, 2004). Here the Ceuta’s fragmentation surfaces, the divergence between the groups manifesting across the space of the city (Hardt & Negri, 2000, pp. 200-201): the inhabitants of the center tend to invisibilize more.

On the other hand, some Ceutí everymen claim a lack of modernization in their city – which is an indication of that they would desire and appreciate such a process (Kuus, 2004, p. 474). Participant 19 would like an own university to be installed in Ceuta and participant 22 and 23 the decision-makers to make better, modern city-marketing for Ceuta. They are not satisfied about the rather negative image people from elsewhere have about Ceuta. The geopolitical strategies suggested by them all focus on renewal and improvement of Ceuta’s current situation or status.

The same underlying pattern of thinking, in terms of, progress and linear transitology (Kuus, 2004, p. 482), can be recognized also in observations about whether modernization has manifested in Ceuta since Spain has become a member-state of the EU: participant 18, who emigrated to Ceuta from France has noticed a process of modernization in Ceuta, he tells, because the cultural differences between other places in Europe before were wider.

Participant 29, with Moroccan background, appreciates the development he observes, the cleanliness and the difference to what Ceuta was like some years ago. Participant 28, from the margins has not benefitted from modernization himself, he thinks, while others have. Nonetheless he appreciates positive changes: “It is better if you have a stable life, a stable job, a house. Then your children can be stable (...) so if that is the case for many people in a part of a city, there is stability in that part of the city“, he concludes, referring to the central parts of Ceuta. Several Muslim Ceutí everymen, who are not from the center, give similar examples of the concentration of an affluent, modern lifestyle in Ceuta’s center.

All these quotations and comments are evidence that Ceuti everymen apply the criteria of modernity in order to evaluate and connote them to being European (Mignolo, 2000, pp. 58-59). According to th evaluations especially the center could live up to expectations: it has been modernized in the conditional relationship and benefitted from reward such as improvement in reputation and status (Gunder Franck, 1966, p. 20).

But Ceuta is also a Spanish, European city of a corresponding Spanish, European culture, according to the participants. In the geopolitical imagination of Ceutí everymen, Ceuta belongs to Europe. But it also seems that the participants attempt to Europeanize their city discursively by putting stress on this aspect (Kuus, 2004, p. 479). The image of Ceutí European culture produced in powerful discourse is appealing and the Ceutís subject to the discourse (Gibson-Graham, 200, p. 108).

“Ceuta is Spanish, Ceuta is European” (participant 15) is a rather common characterization. People connote a high quality of services to this European-ness, as for instance in hospitals or schools (participant 16). Participant 16 is aware of the “advantage” to be European, for which he thanks God. Participant 17 refuses to think of Ceuta not being European or Spanish: “I do not imagine, I do not like to imagine Ceuta not being Spanish or European”. In this same way participant 18 justifies that “we [the Ceutís] live in Northern Africa, but we are not different from the others“. Participant 19 confirms, that Ceuta is “like (...) any other city of Spain”. Ceuta not being Spanish or

European is an “absurd” idea to him. To participant 21 it does not matter that one has to cross the Straits to arrive to Ceuta, because Ceuta is “still Europe”. Participant 20 considers Ceuta’s European-ness to be in the first place ‘cultural’ in kind (Stoler, 1997, p. 215) and she is convinced that “we [other Europeans and Ceutís] have the same culture more or less”. Differences, according to her, have to do with distance and the “further you go” (Kuus, 2004, p. 484). Thus participants do have rather similar ideas of criteria to determine European-ness of a place like the powerful discourse-makers. They all consider Ceuta to be European and Europeanize it discursively (Kuus, 2004, p. 479).

Participant 22 thinks that European-ness can be felt, it is a feeling in daily life. Also participant 24 connotes a feeling to ‘being European and Spanish’: the feeling of pride to be part of the system, where there are “pensions”. There is thus a process of identification, a process of subjection to European superiority in comparison to other identities (Mignolo, 2000, p. 58; Stoler, 1997, p. 215), for the individual as for Ceuta as a place with the EU.

Participant 26, again reproduces the normalization discourse, stating that Ceutís “are normal persons” and thus they “are equal in Europe”, answering as if someone had casted a doubt about Ceuta’s European identity. All these statements show a defensive undertone, defending the EU-identity of Ceuta, proving the pride of geopolitical inclusion in the EU and the tactics of discursive normalization (Kuus, 2004, pp. 475, 479). Especially everymen from the center, who interact least across the border (see 6) (Ferrer-Gallardo, 2009, p. 31) eagerly attempt to attribute European-ness to Ceuta.

In their practices and everyday routine several participants adopted ‘European’ efficiency and are hard-working (participant 14, 17, 19, 21, 25), especially those with an own business (participant 17, 19, 21, 25). Participant 25 calls the routine in everyday-life of self-employed in Ceuta “pure and hard”. She admits that she is “very tired”. All these practices by people from the center (except participant 25 and 17) reflect tactics of adaptation to a neoliberal, capitalist economic system dominant in the EU with high stress on efficiency and competition (Sparke, 2002, p. 220).

Everyday practices have Europeanized (Stoler, 1997, p. 199) to certain extents. The Muslim participants 27 and 28, who are neither from the center nor do they have a job, affirm that they would do the same – adapt to the system and adapt to the European norms: “We are from here, so we follow the norms here” (participant 27), because they consider themselves as “working people” (participant 28) if they get the chance. This interpretation of what European behavior should be like is a rather Europeanized interpretation. It highlights diverse aspects of how Ceutís comply with the norms, subject to and contribute to the EU (Kuus, 2004, pp. 473-474).

Political culture of silence

In imaginations by powerful discourse-makers, the political culture in Ceuta is described as dominated by a lack of involvement and interest of citizens. Gomez Barceló (personal communication, February 7th, 2014) confirms, that generally “demonstrations in Ceuta are rare”. Aróstegui Ruiz (personal communication, February 26th, 2014) gives an explanation for why this culture has developed. He tells about the movement for autonomy, to become an autonomously governed city in Spain during the 1990s, which many passionate Ceutís took part in. Since then he has observed a “psychological exodus” in Ceuta’s citizens, left without energy and willingness to insist on their rights. Instead they dream and think of Spain mainland, many have left the city.

The geopolitical imagination here shows a city of a political culture of silence. And as a consequence silent, official subjection (not saying here that the Ceutís all agree and subject in their practices though!) manifests to the geopolitical strategy of Europeanization and the conditions bound up with it (Gibson-Graham, 2000, pp. 104, 108).

Moroccan participants mention that they have observed the Ceutís manifesting for diverse reasons (participant 7, 10, 11, 12). Yet, manifestations on the Moroccan side of the border-region seem rare (except for Tanger and unless parties organize protest paying the participants, as I was told during an informal conversation) as well. The Moroccans' perception of demonstrations taking place regularly in Ceuta has to be seen in this context.

Their renegotiation fits the official discourse. It confirms that demonstrations do take place. At the same time they do not disconfirm that the political culture is rather silent in Ceuta, either. It is striking that participants, who visit Ceuta little, have nothing to say about the topic – it seems to lie beyond their life-worlds (Merrifield, 2011, p. 108).

Through insights in the Ceutís' geopolitical imaginations about the political culture in Ceuta, the impression is confirmed as well. The political culture results to be dominated by lack of knowledge and indifference to problems (Merrifield, 2011, p. 108): participants 25 and 29, both, admit that they are not informed of what plans the government, locally and nationally, have developed for the city. Many respondents shook their heads denying, when they were asked.

This non-renegotiation of proposals and visions proposed by the government is first of all a common phenomenon, occurring in many places. On the other hand such forms of disinterest might be related to the expectation that anyway few things would change in future through interventions. The everymen are somehow caught in their everyday-routines and practices (De Certeau, 1988; Merrifield, 2011, p. 108), but they also seem to have doubts that geopolitical strategies can translate into real-world effects – including Europeanization and modernization measures.

This is obvious, because almost all the Ceutí respondents explain, that demonstrations or protests are unusual in the city, it is no common practice (participant 14, 17, 18, 19, 20, 22, 23, 27, 29, 31). In Ceuta the conservative party, the PP, has always taken absolute majorities (participant 17, 18). Most Ceutís support the party and seem to agree with the policy-making (participant 31) and thus do not have many reasons why to complain.

Participant 20 describes the situation: "We do not use to go out to demonstrate, but in Ceuta, we would have a lot of topics to demonstrate about. We are not used to protest". Several participants (14, 20, 23) are convinced that it is simply a feature of the culture or mentality that people do not participate but maybe support protests "a bit from behind, passively" (participant 14).

Participant 25 does not give anything for demonstrations; she is more concerned with her business. Participant 31 uses to take part in rather general demonstrations on national level e.g. anti-terrorism demonstrations, but she "never had a reason to demonstrate about the job or so". Multiple participants (especially from the center) appear suspicious of strategic change they would have to readapt their habitual tactical practice to. Such an attitude is shared by participants 14, 17, 18, 25, and 29. Ceutís seem to prefer relying on their every-day routine tactics (De Certeau, 1988).

Only participant 22 and 23 regret that “people are just too quiet” and explain that actually no one goes into the street, because in Ceuta “everyone is thankful to someone for something” (participant 23). Ceuta as a small place, where people know each other well is an environment where it is not easy to resist the powerful from whom many depend - less in times of uncertainty and crisis. Many subject to the strategies of the powerful, while contesting their power silently through tactics (De Certeau, 1988) (see 5.2). Like in many minor cities, it appears as if a culture of nepotism generated a culture of conformism.

The governing elite work out their geopolitical strategies of modernization and Europeanization for Ceuta on the basis of their understanding of the EU, without much interruption – the decision-makers from the center of Ceuta and on national government seem rather free to impose their visions (De Certeau, 1988). Yet, several Ceuti everyman-participants expect that the citizens take responsibility and show social-political commitment. Participant 18 is proud of that he is highly informed and involved: “I do feel responsible”, he explains. Yet, he regards such commitment as a general duty of citizens, not only in relation to the EU. His position could be identified as a rather model-citizen attitude in a society as envisioned by the power-elites of Ceuta.

A more explicit stance is taken by participant 19, who explains that feeling and complying with responsibilities as EU citizen means “to defend the EU, make it better than other countries, defend it with regard to whatever is against it”. “Solidarity” (participant 18) and helping “the poor, (...) those who really struggle to satisfy their needs” (participant 25) are seen as major European attributes by these everymen, who all three of them, commit to satisfying needs of others in their jobs and daily practice. Solidarity is an attribute of behavior, which has not emerged in the powerful discourse-makers’ geopolitical imaginations. It seems to derive from the contextual understanding of everymen, their experience and biographies (Hall, 1997a, p. 32; De Certeau, 1988; Merrifield, 2011, p. 111).

Actually, though, there are many creative suggestions by respondent for future improvement of policy-making in Ceuta. Participant 14, who is a student but struggles to find a proper job is of the opinion that involvement of more young people in institutions could foster a positive, modern development for Ceuta: young could “give a new image, a young change” to Ceuta. He is not satisfied about mostly older people leading the city, because he thinks that young people with their understanding of the problems of the young and next generations would help to modernize Ceuta like in a ‘young Europe’.

Content-wise several everymen suggest their own geopolitical strategies, such as replacing the economic diversification strategy focusing on more tangible branches, such as production (participant 18, 20) or enabling business start-ups (participant 23). Thereby they all base their strategy-suggestions on imaginations of what Ceuta and the EU should be like (Dijkink, 1996, p. 15; Mamadouh & Dijkink, 2006, p. 354), asking what is necessary to live up to the ideals and conditions they have internalized (Kuus, 2004, p. 473).

Participant 18 would install “easier and quicker” bureaucracy. Participant 27 criticizes lack of transparency and open communication about geostrategic plans, which prevents citizens from giving input and feeling involved. He would also like the local media (mostly inhabitants from the center work here) of Ceuta to be more true, not letting them be manipulated by politicians (also mostly from the center).

All of these suggestions of geopolitical strategies aim at modernizing Ceuta, yet, only some of them are reproductions of the the imaginations of the powerful. The EU they envision as template differs from the template the decision-makers have in mind (Dijkink, 1996, p. 15). The renegotiation by everymen combines individual biographies and every-day routines of the participants (Hall, 1997b, p. 44; De Certeau, 1988) with the ideals of European-ness they subject to.

5.2 Otherness, agency and resistance to the conditionality

Otherness, agency and resistance are imagined to weaken the conditional relation of places with the EU. These three main topics differ by the degree of activeness of resistance : otherness is attributed to certain distinct characteristics of Ceuta in comparison to the EU (5.2.1); agency is attributed to discursive resistance and practices in everyday life, which weaken the conditionality (5.2.2). The last aspect, protest (5.2.3), is regarded as the most active form of impeding manifestations of the conditionality.

5.2.1 Otherness in and of Ceuta

A special geographic position

The special geographic position of Ceuta is what Carlos Pérez Marín (personal communication, February 24th, 2014) mentions first about Ceuta's particularity. Due to the city's position, he argues, it is possible to tell the entire world history and even current events, by only telling Ceuta's history and presence – he reinforces the argument, enumerating archeological findings of different dynasties and findings in Ceuta's architecture. At present the “awkward situation in the North of Africa” at a border of the EU, with its people continuously reinventing the border-space (Gomez Barceló, personal communication, February 7th, 2014), determines the particularity (Kolossov & Scott, 2012).

On the other hand, Pérez Marín (personal communication, February 24th, 2014) perceives that through the Straits Ceutís might always keep on feeling separated from Europe, but actually not from the Mediterranean. It is clear in many geopolitical imaginations that the EU is the point of reference (Kuus, 2004, p. 475) to constitute that Ceuta is particular and isolated.

Moreover, Ceuta's particular geography also features because of the city's limited, small territory: “This is a small place” (J. Ramos Aparicio, personal communication, February 12th, 2014). This characteristic is appreciated by several experts who enjoy walking to their high-prestige jobs in the center where they live (A. Ramírez Hurtado, personal communication, February 5th, 2014; J.M. Campos Martínez, personal communication, February 19th, 2014).

The distance to the EU and its territories is expressed in pieces of discourse about ‘not feeling European’ and ‘identifying first of all and more with Ceuta’ - the “caballa”- identity (A. Ramírez Hurtado, personal communication February 19th, 2014; Castillo Sempere, personal communication, February 20th, 2014). “I feel caballa (..) I have appropriated the Ceutí feeling, the way of life” (J. Ramos Aparicio, personal communication, February 12th, 2014). Caballa is what the Ceutís have been called for long.



Martínez Arcas (personal communication, February 6th, 2014) nicely summarizes above mentioned features of otherness attributed to Ceuta's geographical location, which are obstacles to living up to the European norms of e.g. economic modernization (Kuus, 2004, p. 479) (think of transportation cross increasing production costs): "we are isolated, the territory is limited. There is a high density of population; we are the border of Europe. So there are some circumstances, which require acknowledgement of our singularity by the EU. Even if we are not ultra-peripheral for the distance to the mainland, but we do have different limitations" (see figure 6 and figure 7). Otherness is thus imagined as intrinsically linked to the geographic characteristics of Ceuta in the EU-context and seen as a factor hampering the compliance with certain aspects of the conditional relation.

In the renegotiation by the Moroccan everymen most of the features of otherness mentioned in the powerful discourse-makers' geopolitical imaginations can be traced as well. Ceuta's geographic position is identified as distinctive from the rest of Europe – they also take the EU as a point of reference (Kuus, 2004, pp. 475; 484) in geopolitical imagination: participant 8, 11, and 12 mention the distance to the Spanish mainland, which constitutes otherness in Ceuta's geography (Kuus, 2004, p. 479): "everything of that [Ceuta] is Africa" (participant 8) and "Ceuta is not like other cities in Spain mainland, it is a special situation", given the distance which one has to make to the mainland.



Participant 8 regards Ceuta to be a relatively small, provincial place, e.g. in comparison to major cities. Also participant 12 highlights that Ceuta is small in size. Like participant 8 she categorizes it as "rural". Many aspects, which the participants mention, seem to be reproductions of the imaginations of the powerful (Gibson-Graham, 2000,

p. 108). The two participants, who know Ceuta best and come often, reveal most detail about what they think of Ceuta (participant 12 and 8).

This implies two things: experience and routines play a role in the renegotiation of geopolitical imaginations (Merrifield, 2011, p. 108). And the participants being most in touch with Ceuta had the chance to catch more pieces of the official discourse (Hall, 1997a, p. 32). The provincial character of the city, though, is a piece of renegotiation the Moroccan border-people add through their meaning-making. This shows that being outsiders, they do not hesitate to attribute less positive aspects to the city. Comparing Ceuta to other parts of the EU they notice features of otherness (Kuus, 2004, p. 479).

The Ceutí everymen identify the same features of otherness which were identified in the powerful discourse and by the Moroccan everymen. “We are far from everything. It is true. We are far, so we just watch maybe” what is going on in the EU, participant 14 explains. In this context participant 16 assumes that for the EU “Ceuta means something exotic; (...) you would see Africa, not Europe”. Again Ceuta is being positioned in context of the EU. Again its marginal position in the imagination of Ceutis is revealed (Dijkink, 2006, p. 354). In all the statements there is a sense of the ‘otherness’ (Kuus, 2004, p. 484) like in the powerful discourse.

Some participants project the geographical distance on figurative distance: “We are very far. There are all around [European] flags, but that does not mean anything” (participant 16) (see figure 4). This statement refers to Ceuta’s margins, which the participant regards ‘farther’ than the center from European privileges. Again the fragmentation (Gunder Franck, 1966, p. 20) is pointed to also referring to the conditional relation to the EU: the center seems closest to the rest of the EU (Gunder Franck, 1988, pp. 18-21).

Some center-residents experience Ceuta’s limited territorial extensions as an advantage as the local power-elites do. This is different from the Moroccans, who connote modernity with metropolitan life and larger extensions of cities: “we have a quiet life here, we do not need any car, in two minutes you can get everywhere. It is a small city. The advantage is that you get everywhere quickly, but the disadvantage is that there are few opportunities” (participant 14) – this quotation, however, highlights a negative consequence of Ceuta being small, the lack of economic opportunities (see next chapters).

Participant 23 has struggled with the local administration and compares Ceuta in this context to a “small fiefdom”; participant 25 walks to her job in the center every day, although she is from one of the most distant districts. During observations I noticed that most people in buses seemed to know each other, greeting all the people in the bus and talking eagerly (observation, February 5th, 2014) – a proof, that the place is small enough to have people know each other – maybe Ceuta can easily be imagined as small or provincial.

I also noticed the ambiguous issue of identification, going by bus: many names of shops included either the terms “Africa...” or “Europe” (“European” or “African”). This stress of the location was unusual to me, since in non-border places few times the terms would be used to name shops (observation, February 17th, 2014). Most of the features outlined about geography in the powerful imaginations are reproduced by the Ceutí everyman-participants. They also add their pieces of meaning and every-day experiences (Gibson-Graham, 2000, p. 97).

Moroccan territorial claim

For the strategic position, history and the city's location in Africa, surrounded by Moroccan land, Ceuta's territory is claimed to be Moroccan. The geopolitical imaginations of Ceuta's leaders reflect that they are aware of the claim and that it is not a 'normal' (Kuus, 2004, p. 475) situation in the EU to have to deal with such a claim from another country. "Spanish-ness is stressed here more than in Spain because of the claims from Morocco" (J. Romero Aparicio, personal communication, February 12th, 2014) (see figure 4 and).



The local 'Caballas', left-winged, progressive party has ever since put particular stress on the singularity of Ceuta. They have split from the major Spanish socialist party for their demand for more radical political action (firmly insisting on the Spanish-ness of Ceuta before all actors) about the Moroccan claim. They understand the latter as a conditioner of the border and thus the entire city, from the economic system to the individual every-day routine (J.L. Aróstegui Ruiz, personal communication, February 26th, 2014) (Kolossoff & Scott, 2012). The leading politician in the party, Aróstegui Ruiz, wants the EU to take more responsibility, because of this singularity. He is worried about the "psychological exodus", the resignation by Ceuti people, who keep thinking about the mainland. The librarian Alarcón Caballero (personal communication, February 12th, 2014) explains why this could happen: "The more problems the city shows, the stronger the claim by Morocco".

These pieces of imagination reveal that a certain degree of rejection to acknowledge and affront the problem prevails, resulting in invisibilization when dealing with this 'otherness' (Ferrer Gallardo et al., 2014). All the pieces of discourse illustrate the relevance of the territorial claim in Ceuta's powerful's imaginations – the discourse is rejected and suppressed. The reason for doing so is that features of 'otherness' and respective impacts on the city are not

desired (Ferrer-Gallardo et al., 2014). The claim is imagined as another feature weakening Ceuta's Europeanization (Kuus, 2004, p. 475)

The territorial claim by Morocco is reaffirmed by many Moroccan everymen and they also justify the claim – which is partly a renegotiation of the official Moroccan discourse: “Ceuta is Moroccan. Who occupies its territory has to pay a rent”, participant 1 explains about the prize the “occupiers” should pay for taking the territory. Typical comments by the Moroccan respondents are: “I wish the future of Ceuta will be Moroccan” (participant 2) and “Ceuta, Tetouan and Melilla alike, they are Moroccan cities” (participant 3).

Participant 7 can imagine that “people in Ceuta might be more worried, because one day in future we would ask our land back, so if you live there, you have been born there, having your own business, a shop or so, you could be worried about the future”. Participant 7, who knows many Ceutís, thus tries to imagine what the consequences of realizing claim would be for Ceuta's citizens. Participant 8 regards the significant military presence in Ceuta to be a result of the claim. But he thinks that, in the end, there would be always be a diplomatic decision about the topic (participant 8).

It is obvious that in the Moroccan everyman's geopolitical imagination Ceuta is Moroccan. Yet, none of the Moroccan respondents actually relates the claim to consequences impacting on the economic system of the city. This implies that the geopolitical imaginations of Ceuta's powerful are only renegotiated as far as they are congruent with the Moroccan dominant discourse (Wallerstein, 1991, p. 187). They also do not explicitly call the claim a feature of otherness in the EU, although it is obvious that the case of Ceuta –except Gibraltar (participant 8) – is unique in Europe.

Ceuti everymen have a different geopolitical imagination than the Moroccans - more similar to the official version focusing on the EU-context: participants from the center might feel farther from Morocco, protected by a ring of peripheries along the border. But being little in touch with the neighboring country (even if they have vacation houses in Morocco or a Moroccan charwoman they do not necessarily have friends among the Moroccans), many of them, might be frightened of the ‘other’, Islamic culture (Ferrer & Houtum, 2013, p. 243). So they prefer not mentioning the claims. This is a similar avoiding or invisibilization strategy (Ferrer-Gallardo et al., 2014) as the one the local government has chosen – not mentioning whatever could reinforce or reproduce the claim.

Participant 15, who came to Ceuta more than ten years ago from Morocco, still supports the Moroccan geopolitical imagination. He is convinced that Ceuta should actually be Moroccan, as he had studied in school. The ‘otherness’ is identified in the territorial claim by another, Islamic country: participant 20 admits that it causes her preoccupation sometimes, although she trusts that severe events (real amendments or military interventions) would not occur, as nothing had happened for so long.

Participant 22 is aware of the geostrategic struggle and stresses that important amounts of Spanish officials are stationed in Ceuta– which she attributes among others to the claim from Morocco. Participant 23 strongly disagrees with the claim: “we are not a colony of Morocco, no occupied piece of land of them. The king of Morocco just once in a while makes a statement (...) in countries where there are many poor (...) it is always good to entertain them with a small campaign. But they actually do not insist”. Participant 23, thus, regards the claims to be strategic

political instruments of Moroccan internal politics. In the end those would not translate into real exterior political measures. She takes a rather defensive attitude, which, however, shows that she does not like the feature of 'otherness' and seeks to weaken the argument.

Participant 28 is convinced, however, that the claim from Morocco will persist for long, because Ceuta is a city on the African continent and giving up the claim would not fit Moroccan politics (participant 28). The Ceuti respondents seem to reproduce the imagination that Ceuta is Spanish and European, while trying to ignore the claim (Ferrer-Gallardo et al., 2014) in their lives (Merrfield, 2011, p. 108). Nonetheless, many are aware of the claim, including the 'otherness' it bears (Kuus, 2004, p. 484).

Fiscal and economic otherness

As the geopolitical powerful imaginations by Ceuta's elites show, the 'other' geographic position and the claim from Morocco impact on the economic system of Ceuta. The distinctiveness first of all made Ceuta adapt a different fiscal regime, which Ceuta had established independent of the EU in order to guarantee economic sustainability in the 1980s: Ceuta "has a special fiscal status at this moment, so (...) there are a couple of fiscal discounts, the taxes you pay are lower in certain fields also for social security for the entrepreneurs with the aim of attracting companies to settle here, to invest" (G. Martínez Arcas, personal communication, February 6th, 2014).

Ramírez Hurtado (personal communication, February 5th, 2014) underpins that there are "fiscal advantages here in comparison to rest of Spain, which Ceuta has been benefitting from. For example all the companies pay the business tax, but it is refunded for 50%, whereas on the mainland refunding is proportioned about 25% maximum". This particularity – a characteristic of 'otherness' (Kuus, 2004, p. 483) of Ceuta - has benefitted the city's economic growth. According to geopolitical imaginations of some discourse-makers Europeanization by adapting to fiscal conditions, the EU standards (joining the EU Customs Union) (Kuus, 2004, p. 474), is not likely to be realized in future: "The danger of changing the system (...), more integration into the EU, consists in losing these important advantages. So we have to calculate and evaluate well" (A. Ramírez Hurtado, personal communication, February 5th, 2014).

The often envisioned idea to follow the fiscal model of the Canary Islands (G. Martínez Arcas, personal communication, February 6th, 2014) also taking over the un-European features would re-institutionalize 'otherness' in the fiscal system. The possibility of taking such a step is additionally constrained, Martínez Arcas reminds, by Morocco claiming the territory of Ceuta and not acknowledging its border. This lack of acknowledgement would imply the rejection of the installation of an official customs checkpoint at the border. Thus becoming a part of the Customs Union of the EU would be impeded. Olmedo Izar Fuente (personal communication, February 26th, 2014) contributes to the discourse with almost the same ideas.

All together one can thus conclude that Ceuta's powerful discourse-makers are conscious of the fiscal 'otherness' of Ceuta affecting multiple others fields. The fiscal regime and consequent particularity become bearers of the 'otherness' and penetrate the everyday routine in Ceuta (Hall, 1997b, p. 44a). To certain extent the city is thus (voluntarily) excluded from the EU (Kuus, 2004, p. 483).

Moroccan everymen do not discuss the fiscal conditions as a feature of 'otherness' of Ceuta. They seem to be aware of other (consequent) features of Ceuta's economic system, which affect their lives in Morocco (Merrifield, 2011, p. 108) such as the trade across the border (see chapter 6). The fiscal system as a topic is rather abstract and thus far from the horizon of renegotiation of geopolitical imaginations in everyday concerns (Merrifield, 2011, p. 108).

Only one Ceutí participant (21), who due to his job is rather informed about politics, had a comment about the distinct fiscal system: "Europe has to consider that Ceuta is a bit special in this sense: we have the IPSI, no VAT, here. So if someone comes here to start a factory, he can benefit from the IPSI". He recognizes the particularity of the case of Ceuta, its otherness in EU context (Kuus, 2004, p. 483).

With regard to future reforms he affirms, that everyone in Ceuta is interested in joining the Customs Union, which is different from some experts' opinions. None of the other participants made an explicit statement on the topic. So it is not easy to know how the fiscal system is actually geopolitically imagined by Ceutís in relation to the EU. They do not seem to attribute otherness to Ceuta and its center, because of this distinctive feature – also for them the topic might seem abstract, beyond life-worlds and without chance to enter everyman's meaning-making (Merrifield, 2011, p. 108).

5.2.2 Agency: practices of otherness and discursive resistance

Economic practices of otherness

Concerning Ceuta's economics practices and discourses are depicted in imaginations, which do not fit the idea of regular economic activities in the EU. In a letter to the editor of the local daily *El Faro Olivencia* (2014a) comments on the rules of origin which should guarantee that no customs have to be paid for animal products made in and leaving from Ceuta for EU territory. The author insists on the relevance of sustaining Ceuta's fiscal exemptions. She is not satisfied about the Spanish government's pro-forma protests about the EU changing the exemption laws. She is convinced that more active and engaged resistance would have been possible to prevent such changes– she is resisting in this piece of discourse to the Europeanization of Ceuta's fiscal particularities (Kuus, 2004, p. 477; Kramsch, 2011, p. 197).

Also the socialist party (Vivancos, 2010) and more voices (Flores, 2010; Campos Martínez, personal communication, February 19th, 2014) are dissatisfied about the way of Ceuta's decision-makers deal with the topic (Caracena, 2010). The ideal of economic modernization is supported in this vision, yet, the Europeanization of Ceuta's exceptional status is seen as hampering the achievement of economic modernization (Kuus, 2004, p. 474). Those pieces of explicit opinion can be seen as contributions to the discourse of resistance (Kuus, 2004, p. 477) to a 'template-Europeanization' of Ceuta. Nonetheless the ideal of modernization and Europeanization are not questioned.

While the latter is a rather general criticism, Ramírez Hurtado (personal communication, February 5th, 2014) presents a more specific criticism: "On the local level I am not quite satisfied with the plans, which have recently been made. We [confederation of entrepreneurs] continue to criticize the local financial management. Now resources are mostly used to stabilize banks, but they were originally destined at giving credits to start up companies and similar

projects“. He is thus convinced that the measures taken on EU and national levels and their local implementation harm the Europeanization-process of Ceuta’s center, its economic development (Kramersch, 2011, p. 200).

A piece of imagination expressing resistance even to the ideal of Europeanization as the right geopolitical strategy is suggested by Pérez Marín (Kuus, 2011, p. 477): He argues that “the most natural thing would be to form and join a Maghreb Union (...) a geopolitical union similar to the Eu and then we could open the borders between both unions. That would be natural. But it depends on what would happen in a wider context of the world” (C. Pérez Marín, personal communication, February 24th, 2014).

Other critical remarks concern inappropriate usage of EU-funding in Ceuta. The president of the federation of associations of neighborhoods, José Ramos Aparicio (personal communication, February 12th, 2014) criticizes Ceuta’s politicians for relying too much on the citizens. He reminds the politicians that it is their task to serve the citizens diligently managing their fiscal returns. Like Ramos, the opposition party has criticized the municipal government, for making “shop-window politics” for the center instead of integral interventions in all the districts (El Pueblo, 2013a).

Such comments reveal that Ceuta’s space is imagined as fragmented, through a division of the center from other districts (Gunder Franck, 1966, p. 20). In relation to EU-funding there are critical voices as well: What is looming behind the financial rewarding, the beneficial relationship is understood by some as ‘dependency’.

Alejandro Romero Aliaga (personal communication, February 25th, 2014) regards Ceuta to be a “subsidized city” with “hardly any own resources”, except the harbor. The lack of industries and the presence of relatively large numbers of officials make the city dependent on funding from Spain and the EU. The lawyer, who is *not* originally from Ceuta, is not the only one framing the EU funding in a negative way. Other experts hint at strong repercussions every change in the national or European context can have in Ceuta, due to the special funding-relations (J.A. García Íñigo, personal communication, February 18th, 2014). Also José Ramos Aparicio (personal communication, February 12th, 2014) shares this view.

The argument of dependency might be part of the reason, why José Maria Campos Martínez (personal communication, February 19th, 2014) promotes to have an office in Brussels defending interests of Ceuta there. In this light of dependency the discourse about modernization and improvement of Ceuta’s image can be seen as induced from outside and suggests that Ceuta or its leading elites can be easily manipulated or conditioned from Brussels (Kuus, 2004, p. 473; Kramersch, 2011, p. 200). However, it is not a piece of imagination the decision-makers would want to disseminate – which might be an explanation of why a positive framing in official discourse prevails. Additionally, imposition of conditions is only possible as long as a place and people subject to the discourse of European superiority (Mignolo, 2000, pp. 58-59; Gibson-Graham, 2000, p. 108).

Moroccan participant 8 suggests: Ceuta should focus South in future. These deliberations imply the idea that Ceuta should resist further Europeanization of the economic practices and focus on Morocco, ‘Moroccanizing’ the city’s economic practice even more (Kuus, 2004, p. 477; Mignolo, 2000, p. 69). On the other hand, the underlying aim of economic modernization according to some EU template can be still identified in this imagination (Kramersch, 2011, p. 200).

Comparing Ceuta's situation and status of prosperity to Morocco participant 10 reminds that the relation of salaries and standards of life in each of the places should be taken into account – then standards in Ceuta seem similar to the situation in Morocco (participant 10). Such an analysis highlighting similarities of Morocco and Ceuta weakens the Europeanization discourse and the image of European-ness of Ceuta (Kuus, 2004, p. 483), the discourse which especially powerful and inhabitants of the center seek to generate. The framing of the relation between the EU and Ceuta as one of dependency does not pop up in Moroccan everyman-discourse. Again, their every-day practice, which is not (perceived to be) impacted or affected might impede them from digging into Ceuta's funding-relations with the EU (Merrifield, 2011, p. 108).

Economic dependence on Morocco results to be a more obvious, economic, distinctive feature of Ceuta in the geopolitical imaginations by everymen. The Moroccan participant 13 observes the flow of Moroccan clients into Ceuta's center, which she regards essential for the city's economic survival: "if you closed the border, if people did not come from Morocco, Ceuta would die (...) The special offer only serves to attract Moroccans".

Participants 8 and 3 reveal another dimension of economic dependency, yet, on Spain: being far away from Spain mainland, participant 8 analyzes, salaries in Ceuta must be higher in order to keep people in the city. They are additionally rewarded by the quality of life. The other way round Ceuta is believed to serve the EU through its otherness and particularities in geographic position (see 6.1): participant 3 is convinced that it is a geopolitical strategy of Spain to continue to subsidize the city, in order to control the territory of Ceuta and the Straits (participant 3). In this sense he makes a link between the geographic position and the city's dependency on other spaces. In this geopolitical imagination Ceuta has such a crucial role for Spain and the EU that huge investments are made (De Certeau, 1988; Kramsch, 2010, p. 1011).

The renegotiation illustrates that everymen develop their very own ideas and are influenced by various overlapping discourses at a time to which they can subject or not (Gibson-Graham, 2000, p. 97, 108). In this case the participants have resisted to subject to powerful geopolitical imaginations in Ceuta (Kuus, 2004, p. 477; Kramsch, 2011, p. 197)

Only few Ceutí everymen-respondents imagine or identify a downside to funding relations, the dependency created. Participant 15 from the Northern marginal zone of Benzú, who is generally skeptical about sustained EU supports in future (suiting his skepticism about his own insecure future without permanent residence permit) tells: There is a necessity of having funding come to Ceuta, because there are issues which have to be solved with that help. However, there is no guarantee of funding. This estimation reveals the one-way nature of the relationship of dependence and conditionality (Kramsch, 2011, p. 200).

A similar standpoint is shared by a participant (22) from the center, who analyzes a "lack of a lot of things" in Ceuta and problems. She then concludes that for the EU Ceuta "is a lost place". This analysis is no direct naming of dependency in the relationship, but it does stress the weakness of Ceuta's position in relation to the EU as a result of needs. Given those unsatisfied needs, Ceuta is imagined as *not yet* modern (Kuus, 2004, p. 483).

The other way round the EU, and other European places, are imagined to be modern and superior to Ceuta. Ceuta's 'otherness' weakens the city in living up to the conditional relation with the EU and become a self-sufficient,

more European place (Kuus, 2004, p. 474). Further the dependency seems a piece of geopolitical imagination, which is invisibilized (Ferrer-Gallardo et al., 2014, p. 4) by Ceuti everymen – reflected in lack of renegotiation by many interviewees.

Nonetheless, the conditional relation between Ceuta and the EU seems to be subjected to, in spite of various remarks about potential unsustainable dependency. Yet, not all measures taken for economic modernization are welcome and modernization is not considered intrinsically for the good: participant 26 presents regret about the waste of millions of euros for replacing the former military hospital by a new one. In her eyes the former was working perfectly. Thus alongside the approval and reproduction of the official strategy of modernization of the urban environment, there are also local critical renegotiations and geopolitical imaginations about Europeanizing Ceuta (Mignolo, 2000, pp. 71-73).

Criticism of (EU-) politics

Another major topic we can filter from official discourse is the resistance of the center's discourse-makers, their agency and resistance, in politics. In the first place this can consist of practices which subvert EU norms. A good example of a piece of discourse revealing the latter deals with members of the municipal assembly habitually over-exploiting the possibilities of receiving refunding for bills for up to 240 euros per day at work (El Pueblo, 2013m). This mal-abuse of the system for the politicians own good and luxury is not in favor of wider social welfare and prosperity. From such understanding of EU-norms, the progress and modernization of society is impeded by those practices (Kuus, 2004, p. 478).

Another case is the negligence by the municipal government to comply with the EU environmental norms imposed on the city via Agenda 21 (Rincón, 2014a). Ceuta's powerful elites from the center have only selectively adopted 'European' practices, so that 'Un-European' practices, un-fit the EU norms, continue to weaken the adaptation required in the conditional relation (Kuus, 2004, p. 478). Deception is expressed by citizens. One of the political parties' youth-leaders disapproves of the municipal local politicians not engaging sufficiently for the future of the young in Ceuta and of lack of support by the EU (El Pueblo, 2013j); local bus-drivers argue against efficiency measures in an attempt to prevent the reduction of salaries and austerity policies imposed by Spain on the EU (Saura, 2013e). Such measures and policies are manifestations of the neoliberal paradigm in the EU. In a letter to the editor the EU as geopolitical unit is doubted about in general (Adan Carmona, 2014) and Europeanization as a reasonable geopolitical strategy for Ceuta (Dijkink, 1996, p. 11) is questioned.

Those imaginations add to the impression that there is criticism about the EU by the powerful and media to the idealization of European-ness (Kuus, 2004, p. 482). Also the local Caballas-party envisions a different EU than the conservative governing party: a geopolitical union relying on alternative, green economic models aiming for sustainable development for a good quality of life of the EU citizens (González, 2014) to achieve Europeanization.

Criticism is also directed to the government about interrupting collaboration with Melilla in defending the singularities of Ceuta before the EU. Collaboration was considered as a better basis for Europeanizing the city in a suitable way. The leader of the Caballas-party, Juan Luis Aróstegui Ruiz (personal communication, February 26th, 2014) outlines that Europeanization and support by the EU are necessary, yet, he criticizes the residents of Ceuta's center (and beyond) of having forgotten how to fight for visions – such as Europeanization in a way which fits Ceuta.

Implicitly he is thus dissatisfied with the lacking commitment of the Ceuti leadership and residents to Europeanization of Ceuta, which he is in favor of (Kuus, 2004, p. 474). But he resists the short-term implementation of the dominant strategy (Mignolo, 2000, p. 63).

A rather cynical article caricatures the attempts to solve the problems of Ceuta with the help of exterior, physiognomic modernization measures aiming at attracting tourists via the new “brand Ceuta” (Abad, 2014b). The EU and strategy suggested in the article is about eliminating causes of economic struggle, instead of whitewashing surfaces.

All this critique contains a discursive kind of pro-European resistance produced by the central elites of Ceuta (Kuus, 2004, p. 478). Additionally, the leader of the local ‘Caballas’-party observes mal-understanding of Ceuta’s singular situation (Aróstegui Ruiz, personal communication, February 26th, 2014) across the Straits, especially, because the EU is not familiar with the city’s history and conditions – a postcolonial critique (Mignolo, 2000, pp. 69-73).

Similar criticism can be traced in the renegotiation by two Moroccan everymen: “they [the EU] do not look around to see the problems in the world, such as those in Africa. All the powerful countries in Europe know the problem in the Southern parts of Africa, but they do not do anything. They just watch from far, but (...) do not tackle things at their roots” (participant 7) – this statement is a general criticism of European politics and the union’s unwillingness to understand places (beyond the EU) (Mignolo, 2000, pp. 58-59). Although the participant here talks about places beyond the EU’s border, he seems to be convinced that ‘European’ means would be the right ones to solve problems in countries in Africa. Here the participant has a lot of trust that Europeanization is a reasonable geopolitical strategy (ibid.). On the other hand he criticizes the EU of not committing itself to the Europeanization project the way it should.

Another Moroccan everyman-renegotiation shows approval for a certain negligence of EU norms (ibid.; Kuus, 2004, p. 477), since it is just another institution, the city is dependent on in decision-making: “you have just another boss above you” (participant 6) and in the end “those suffering are just the same again, the powerless” (participant 6). These ideas express mistrust towards the EU as an institution and legitimate neglect of EU norms on local scale (Kuus, 2004, p. 477).

Participant 3 has been to France and from his experience he knows that many people in Morocco are wrong believing that being European means to be rich – he knows that going to the EU also implies to affront racism and hatred against Muslims. It is also difficult to find a job there. He appreciates the rights which Europeans have, but he cannot understand police beating up demonstrators then, as happening in Ceuta. He is convinced that you can best just go for a visit to the EU, not for living. This opinion is especially critical about the EU and a discrepancy between bad practices and norms (Kuus, 2004, p. 477). The participant observes such discrepancies in Ceuta but also elsewhere and his criticism is general.

Participant 4’s argument against the EU and Europeanization in Ceuta is based on the assumption that Ceuta is Moroccan. She is also convinced that the EU does not take care of the city and that it would be better, if Morocco took over the role of the governing supra-local institution: “The EU, they do not have a real interest in the city, just in the location and how to profit. The security and well-being of people is secondary to them. They use this

place like an object. They are not interested in the situation of people living there” (participant 4). This rather negative geopolitical imagination of the EU in relation to Ceuta bears resistance to EU-superiority (Mignolo, 2000, pp. 71-73). Yet, as most Moroccan participants do not live in Ceuta and their own life-worlds would not be impacted they do not renegotiate the topic a lot (Merrifield, 2011, p. 108).

Several Ceutí everymen are critical of the EU as well. Participant 14, who is a student, agrees with protests expressing the dissatisfaction of the young about the reforms in Spain after the crisis and the high unemployment of the young as a consequence of austerity. Participant 17 agrees with the doubts: “I do not like the idea of Europe so much. The EU is not correct, (...) the only ones benefitting were few.” Another participant (18) is especially suspicious of reforms of the educational system, which Spain is about to implement in order to privatize, rationalize and liberalize the system with the objective of modernization (Europeanizing) (Kuus, 2004, p. 474). Yet, these measures are what the participant fears and regards as the wrong way to go for a sustainable future of the educational system in Ceuta. Additionally he would like the EU to feel more responsible towards their citizens (participant 18).

From other participants we learn that they relate joblessness in Ceuta to the Europeanization of the currency in the early 2000's (introduction of the euro) (participant 20) and norms being imposed from above without being adequately contextualized (participant 23) – fitting postcolonial criticism of neglect of contextuality (Mignolo, 2000, pp. 58-59, 69-73). Thus Europeanization is not only imagined as exclusively positive for Ceuta - potential dangers to the local system are recognized and discursively resisted to (Kramsch, 2011, p. 197).

The feeling of identification with the EU is not naturally felt among all of the Ceutís (participant 24). Also suspicion about a corrupt powerful elite have been overheard (Gunder Franck, 1966, p. 21). In this imagination the center of Ceuta is the center of the satellite Ceuta, mal-abusing the means for Europeanization provided by the EU. Expressions of disappointment from the local elites and dissatisfaction with the EU can be traced here, although the EU is imagined by many to be a guarantee for, a spatial union standing for rights and equality (Kuus, 2004, p. 482).

Several participants (18, 20, 28) criticize the way Europeanization is pursued and think that it should happen in a different way, which implies that everymen do develop own, distinct geopolitical imaginations (Dodds, 2008; Dijkink, 1996, p. 15).

Participant 18 says: “I would want the EU to know that Ceuta is part of it, we are too often forgotten by them”. Other participants tell the same, but relate the neglect and ignorance to the distance of Ceuta to other parts of Europe (Kuus, 2004, p. 484). “We are still Europe, although in Europe they do not know what we are. Europe does not recognize the potential of Ceuta” (participant 21) and “we feel forgotten” (participant 22). The everymen border-people used to explain that Ceuta is perceived elsewhere as a place in Africa, where camels and elephants walk through the desert (participant 31, participant 27). This demonstrates that Ceutís feel collectively misperceived, exoticized and ignored (Mignolo, 2000, pp. 58-59) – elsewhere otherness is shifted on Ceuta (Kuus, 2004, p. 479).

5.2.3 Resistance - protest in and about the center

More active forms of resistance and agency taking place in Ceuta's center are protests. The buildings, where the local and national representatives govern, are in the center. So usually, if protests are organized, these are carried

out in front of and on the route between those buildings: different newspaper articles depict the center as a site of political struggle. Also during observations (February 27th, 2014), this impression could be confirmed.

In this sense, the center of Ceuta has become a site of protest of which protagonists largely are not from the center themselves – an indication of the contradictory fragmentation of Ceuta's space by functions and groups (Hardt & Negri, 2000, pp. 199-200). The claims vary between pro-modernization requests (better ferry-connection to the mainland, see chapter 6) and anti-modernization complaints (see anti-housing demolition protests by Benzú people, chapter 7).

Demonstrations have also been initiated by neoliberal thinkers, the entrepreneurs, showing objection to an increase of the local tax on terraces and waste treatment. Their preoccupation is that some business would have to close down as a consequence of these Europeanization measures (adapting to EU norms was the actual aim of the reform) (García, 2013a). The discontent addresses the local government's strategy of Europeanization. The actors request more liberal strategies of Europeanization, prioritizing small business, growth and consumption (Sparke, 2002, p. 220).

Besides newspapers powerful discourse-makers report about demonstrations as well: about migration issues (A. Romero Aliaga, personal communication, February 25th, 2014), unemployment (G. Martínez Arcas, personal communication, February 6th, 2014) and the consequences of the crisis (J. Castillo Sempere, personal communication, February 20th, 2014). However, actually, Olmedo Izar Fuente (personal communication, February 26th, 2014) notes: there are only individual protests. People are not used to go into the streets in Ceuta. Yet, protests are effective due to the way the media work in Ceuta. Olmedo Izar Fuente, in his position as an official of the government, seeks to emphasize that the discontent with the strategies of Europeanization chosen exists only among few people. He reaffirms the government's approach to Europeanization (Kuus, 2004, p. 474).

The resistance in and resistance to the EU or the local leaders seems to be largely unnoticed and hardly renegotiated by Moroccan respondents. They are little concerned in their routines (on the other side of the border) (Merrifield, 2011, p. 108; De Certeau, 1988) with such events. Few notice discontent in the center: participant 12, who spends much time in Ceuta, has observed many demonstrations in Ceuta. According to her information, the demonstrators "do not want the human rights to be violated" and "they demand for work" - this reflects rather well the information revealed in the powerful geopolitical imaginations. On the other hand, we have seen before that most Moroccans, especially those who just come for leisure, consider Ceuta to be a modern European place (Kuus, 2004, p. 475) and do not notice the resistance (Kuus, 2004, p. 477).

Few Ceutí respondents made explicit statements about demonstrations taking place in the center. Participant 26 from the margins, who is in favor of Europeanization in general (Kuus, 2004, p. 477; Stoler 1997, p. 197), would want people to follow the example of Ukraine also in other countries around the world: to protest for human rights, freedom etc. in the streets.

Participant 23 from marginal parts simply notices that demonstrations take place and she admits to participate for the good, once in a while. Participant 17 analyzes that it is in the hands of the politicians of Ceuta "to

worsen or improve the city". She clearly dislikes what the local leaders do, since "they leave the citizens on their own". She would want people to go more often into the street and regrets that most people still support the way of making politics and Europeanization the PP-government does: "here people do not go into the streets, they do not demonstrate, here everyone supports the one party, the PP. It always takes about the absolute majority of votes. (...) so, there are few against them. So, few would participate in demonstrations".

Resistance is thus desired by several Ceutís, both, in favor of and against the dominant Europeanization strategies (Kramsch, 2011, p. 197). Protest against the powerful leaders in the center seem to be expressions of discontent about strategies of Europeanization, particularly of those who do not live in the center – social and spatial fragmentation come to surface again (Hardt & Negri, 2000, pp. 199-200).

5.3 Summary about strong conditionality in Ceuta's center

Conditionality in the relation between Ceuta's center and the EU (Kuus, 2004; Kramsch, 2011) could be traced in the geopolitical imaginations of powerful actors and everyman-participants from both sides of the border. Traits of conditionality are imagined in different fields. Two main indications of the conditional relation emerge: the benefits of progressing on the imagined scale of European-ness (Kuus, 2004, p. 484) (which differs slightly by each person and group framing it) and the adaptation to standards (Kuus, 2004, p. 482):

Firstly the EU does support and reward Ceuta's center in the process of Europeanization via funding, which is invested for further modernization. In powerful imaginations much relevance is attributed to the relation between Ceuta and the EU for funding. Many benefits surface and manifest in the city according to the geopolitical imaginations. Those imaginations reaffirm the strategy of Europeanization chosen for the city. The continuation of funding relations is an explicit goal set in the central outline of priorities of Ceuta's municipal government, the strategic plan for economic development (2014). Many experts envision a "fierce development" according to the European model (J.A. Alarcón Caballero, personal communication, February 12th, 2014). Additionally, the status granted by the EU of 'being European' is perceived as protection against the Moroccan territorial claim and as sign of inclusion in the union. Also on the level of the citizen 'being European' is perceived as additional guarantee of rights and freedom.

Secondly, in order to hold up those benefits received through the inclusion in the EU Ceuta's leaders have taken a series of adaptation measures in the center: the political organization, the urban landscape and the economic orientation have been reformed to suit the modern European society, as imagined by the decision-makers. All those reforms aim at economic progress (Kramsch, 2011, p. 197). Focus is given to services, attracting shopping tourists especially from Morocco and creating a more knowledge-oriented entrepreneurial sector.

All in all, powerful discourse and everyman-participants agree that the policy-making of Ceuta ('s center) has been modernized and Europeanized in many ways (Kuus, 2004). However, Europeanization as a geopolitical strategy and living up to the conditional expectations of the EU is interpreted in different ways by different groups. Accordingly, the

context, experience and everyday routine (Merrifield, 2011) of everyman play a major role in the way Europeanization is imagined (to manifest) in Ceuta.

For instance, a debate has arisen about urban transformation through EU investments and whether to set priorities with aesthetic enhancement and hoping for consequent structural improvements; or whether to prioritize more functional, structural measures. Therefore, there is not only satisfaction about the way Ceuta is being modernized, especially, because the decision-makers are largely from the center and implement their strategies according to their life-worlds – mostly in the center, generating fragmentation of Ceuta's space (Gunder Franck, 1966, p. 20; Hardt & Negri, 2000, p. 199).

The culture of Ceuta is depicted as European and the citizens' commitment to the EU is highlighted. Additionally, discursive Europeanization and invisibilization are means employed to represent European-ness of Ceuta ('s center). A continuation of Europeanization is desired by almost all powerful leaders and everymen-respondents. Various strategies and tactics of Europeanization are employed (De Certeau, 1988).

On the other hand, otherness, agency and resistance are identified in geopolitical imaginations of the powerful discourse-makers, but also in the renegotiations of the everymen from both sides of the border. The powerful leaders of Ceuta attribute otherness to Ceuta due to its geographic particularities and the Moroccan territorial claim, which are unusual in the EU context.

Consequent adaptations in and of other sectors such as economic activities have carry respective particular attributes as well; whereas Moroccans agree on the territorial claim and geographic particularities, they are indifferent to the economic systemic particularities as these are hard to observe empirically for ordinary people; the same applies for Ceutí everymen, who additionally tend to reject attributing otherness to the (geographic) characteristics of their city. They discursively try to Europeanize it (Kuus, 2004, 479).

Beyond these passive features of otherness, there is a dimension of slightly more active agency in Ceuta: practices of otherness, such as the economically living on Spanish and EU-funding, are imagined to occur in the economic sector. It resulted to be noticed by everyman-participants as well. Also, discursively, discontent is expressed in powerful geopolitical imaginations about the implementation of the Europeanization strategy and even doubts about the strategy itself emerge. The skepticism is shared by Moroccan and Ceutí respondents – some of the former argue that Morocco would care better for Ceuta than the EU, some of the latter complain about lack of involvement and unequal distribution of benefits across the city's space (Gunder Franck, 1966, pp. 20-21; Hardt & Negri, 2000, p. 199). In this context, un-European, unfit behaviors are attributed to powerful discourse-makers in geopolitical imaginations by Ceutí respondents.

More active resistance in the form of protest is rare: such events usually are initiated by groups from beyond Ceuta's center where Europeanization manifests less, according to those groups. Often the objective of the demonstrations is to achieve more and different strategies of Europeanization. There is thus a temporal dimension to such protests, meaning that whereas temporally protest is actively implemented to resist the Europeanization-approaches chosen, in the long-run protesters often agree with Europeanization as a geopolitical strategy for a better

future of Ceuta. Curiously, although the protests are mostly organized by non-center inhabitants the center is the site of public resistance and protest, as local powerful institutions are settled here.

The EU's and Europeanization strategies envisioned differ among powerful discourse-makers the everyman-participants with certain characteristics: the powerful leader's visions vary by political, ideological orientation; for everyman-respondents it is decisive whether they live or not in Ceuta; and in case they do, in which part of the city. Agreement largely exists about the aim of becoming modern, affluent and more European, but definitions of what that means vary. Accordingly, the strategies imagined to suit best for positive development in Ceuta vary as well.

The differences in the renegotiation of the powerful discourse (geopolitical imaginations) are based on the different experiences in everyday routine, personal backgrounds and how everyman-people consequently relate to the city-center (Merrifield, 2011, p. 108; De Certeau, 1988; Hall, 1997a, p. 32; Gibson-Graham, 2000, p. 97). Thus, also the level of information of everyman-participants plays a role e.g. knowing about investments with the help of EU funding. Thus, the same everyman can present him- or herself with contradictory opinions about different topics, or have contradictory opinions even about one topic. Tendencies about how the different groups renegotiate the official geopolitical imaginations can be filtered here.

The Moroccan everyman-respondents interviewed tend to reproduce powerful geopolitical imaginations partly, for as far as they are aware of them and the topic: some topics are they are familiar with through their routine or contacts in relation to Ceuta (Merrifield, 2011, p. 108), e.g. modernization measures manifesting in Ceuta's center. Living in another nation-state (with a different dominant confession than the EU and a lower standard of living – to put it in a framework of 'European-ness') they tend to take different standards for granted, in their imaginations. Thus they generally consider Ceuta anyway a modern place and attribute its modernity to its European-ness.

The Moroccan respondents also tended to idealize modern, European political, technocratic processes of assessment based on knowledge (Foucault, 1991). Europeanization is mostly connoted to positive attributes, and several envy privileges, prosperity and superiority (Kuus, 2004, p. 484) which connoted to the process. These insights are often rooted in the way they experience Ceuta: most know Ceuta's center as a site of leisure.

Yet, they result to have little trust in politicians, in their competence and information. But some everymen would regard a future of Ceuta as part of the Moroccan state to be a better solution. And they highlight the strong interrelation with Morocco and dependency on the flow of clients from there without any hesitation – unlike Ceutís, who might consider such relations as 'otherness' and prefer to invisibilize this trait (Ferrer-Gallardo et al., 2014, p. 4).

Moroccan respondents are also straightforward in criticizing what they consider to go wrong in Ceuta since they are emotionally less attached than Ceutís, e.g. calling Ceuta 'provincial' or a bit 'backwards'. Their point of reference for comparison is mostly Morocco. But comparing Ceuta to other parts of the EU, they notice the lower degree of European-ness of the city. Evaluating in terms of backwardness they prove that they have internalized linear template thinking.

In their renegotiation often less detail can be found than in powerful geopolitical imaginations - their life-worlds, routine and understanding are still concentrated on their side of the border. Disinterest (Merrifield, 2011, p.

108) can be noticed as lack of reproduction or renegotiation for topics. Especially topics, which do not concern their lives and which are rather abstract or not tangible (such as Ceuta's fiscal particularities) remain un-renegotiated. Certain imaginations of Ceutis about European citizenship or critical insights about Moroccans would not be shared.

Ceuti everyman-participants' renegotiation differs from powerful geopolitical imaginations by tendency, because more often the concentration of manifestation of Europeanization in the city's center is highlighted - especially by everymen from outside of the center (Kuus, 2004, p. 479). Sometimes the everyman's experience and daily routines (Merrifield, 2011, p. 108) impede him from obtaining certain information – thus his renegotiations vary and are distinct from powerful geopolitical imaginations.

Pieces of imaginations revealing the relation between Ceuta and Morocco, often tend to be rejected or neglected through tactics of shifting otherness (Kuus, 2004, p. 479) or invisibilization (Ferrer-Gallardo et al., 2014). This way respondents reinforce European-ness of Ceuta discursively. For instance, several Ceutís from the center reject to think of tourism from Morocco and prefer to focus on flows from Spain. They do not like to have 'negative light' shed on their city. They feel attached to the place and feel the urge to prevent potential attribution of 'otherness' to their own identities (Stoler, 1997, pp. 213-214).

Generally, Ceutí respondents subject to the conditional relation and Europeanization (Gibson-Graham, 2000, p. 108) as they appreciate the privileges and benefits granted to them (Kuus, 2004, p. 484), although they still seem to attribute most influence on Ceuta's future to the Spanish state, less to the EU. Nonetheless they commit to European citizenship, respective imagined responsibilities and defend the culture. Both groups of everymen, those from the center and those from beyond, hardly renegotiate abstract pieces of imaginations such as the 'service sector' and have different priorities in mind for Europeanization than politicians. Yet, Ceutí everymen have several suggestions for strategic steps to be taken in future on a pragmatic, everyday level.

Dependency on the EU and Morocco are invisibilized by many respondents (Ferrer-Gallardo et al., 2014, p. 4). Yet, especially residents from marginal parts suspect the central elites of corrupt practices and utter doubts about certain aspects of the powerful Europeanization strategy and Europeanization in general. This tendency of clearer criticism from Ceuta's margins, fits the protests in the center, which are mostly organized by non-center Ceutís. Nonetheless those events in the center are rare. Several everymen from the margins would wish Ceutís to manifest more often, and fight for their rights. They reaffirm that Ceuta is dominated by a mentality of political silence.

Everymen respondent appeared to be caught up in the present, in their routines and hardly anticipate measures introduced by the decision-makers for the future (Merrifield, 2011, p. 108) – so they start getting involved once they experience the effects of the measures and visions. Additionally, it resulted that geopolitical visions of everymen are mostly based on empiric observation and perceptions of what is wrong around them. This is different from planners and decision-makers, who have sources of detailed (hidden) information at hand. Their strategic power can unfold (De Certeau, 1988; Foucault, 1991).

Lack of renegotiation of imaginations by everymen, however, can also be interpreted both, as a form of subjection to strategies and conditionality, or as silent resistance (Kuus, 2004, p. 477) while applying tactics (De Certeau, 1988) which weaken conditionality. What and why everyman- border-people do not know about issues, or

do not consider them as such, or do not talk about them has a meaning and is part of the renegotiation process as well (De Certeau, 1988).

The theoretical perspective of this paper has served to explain many aspects of the renegotiation of geopolitical imaginations about conditionality in relation to the EU in Ceuta: invisibilization (Ferrer-Gallardo et al., 2014), 'othering' and shifting 'otherness' (Kuus, 2004, p. 479) have explained different renegotiations and imaginations. Especially, the Ceuti everymen (from the center) and partly the city's powerful discourse-makers tend to implement such strategies.

Also subjection to conditionality in the form of othering, (neoliberal) template thinking, the dream of template development towards becoming a modern, affluent, service-oriented society of consumption (Kramsch, 2011, p. 196; Sparke, 2002, p. 220; Kuus, 2004, p. 474) and admiration for superior modernity and European-ness (Mignolo, 2000, pp. 58-59) have been uncovered in imaginations about Ceuta's center. The subjection manifests in Europeanization (adaptation) measures and the support by the EU (Kuus, 2004, pp. 484-484). The side-effect of spatial fragmentation (Hardt & Negri, 2000, p. 199; Gunder Franck, 1966, p. 20) through representation and distribution of investments has been alluded to as well.

The most important conclusion to be drawn here is that, according to much of the geopolitical imaginations by different actors, the one-way conditional relation to the EU results to work out well in Ceuta's center (Kuus, 2004; Kramsch, 2011, p. 200). Europeanization and living up to the conditional expectations is only imagined to be mediated by certain particular context-specific conditions (otherness and agency) (Gibson-Graham, 2000, p. 108) and little resistance (Kramsch, 2011, p. 197; Mignolo, 2000, p. 63). It is also clear that Ceuta is the weaker, inferior partner in the conditional relation with the EU, which is (imagined to be) imposing conditions for pieces of reward (Kramsch, 2011, p. 200).

6. Ceuta's spaces of flow

This chapter deals with Ceuta's 'spaces of flow'. The 'spaces of flow' of Ceuta are used as a term to describe the sites in Ceuta, which are the connections to the outside world where decisive flows to Ceuta's identity manifest. The spaces of flow are distinct from other spaces of Ceuta for their function. In other spaces of Ceuta isolation and stability manifest more dominantly (center, margins). In the 'isolated' city Ceuta – a city cut off through the sea and a European border from other places the spaces of flow are viable and fundamental for Ceuta and its conditional relation with the EU.

The flows considered relevant on the basis of the results obtained through qualitative analysis are those of people (migrants, porteadores, cross-borderworkers, passengers and travelers) and of goods (the goods arrive at the harbor of Ceuta from all over the world and are traded on across the border to Morocco, including the flow of undesired goods such as drugs from and to Morocco). Accordingly the most relevant sites of connection detected during analysis, the spaces of flow of Ceuta, are the harbor, the border-passage and the CETI, the center of accommodation where 'irregularly' arriving migrants stay in Ceuta, until they (have to) move on.

Firstly the geopolitical imaginations of Ceuta's powerful discourse-makers about the working conditionality in Ceuta's spaces of flow are presented (6.1). Then imaginations about otherness, agency and resistance weakening the conditional relation are highlighted (6.2). Generally, for each sub-topic first the geopolitical imaginations of the powerful discourse-making elites will be presented. Then the renegotiation by Moroccan everyman-participants and finally by Ceuti everymen will be described. To conclude the chapter a summary will give an overview about the most relevant findings about Ceuta's spaces of flow and conditionality (6.3).

6.1 Conditionality in Ceuta's space of flows

The conditional relation with the EU has to be investigated also for the spaces of flows in Ceuta. Again, first the indications of the conditional relation in the powerful geopolitical imaginations of the leaders will be discussed per section. Then their renegotiation in the geopolitical imaginations of everymen, from Morocco and Ceuta will be presented. First, the characteristics will be presented, which make Ceuta a space of flow, a space of transition in the EU (6.1.1). Next the economic flows through the border-passage Tarajal (6.1.2) will be outlined. Further the flow of migration at the border-passage and at the CETI (center where irregularly entering migrants stay in Ceuta) (6.1.4) will be described before the cultural impact of the flows on the city (6.1.5) will be outlined.

6.1.1 Ceuta, a Europeanizing transition point for the EU

Geographic strategies and the harbor site between two worlds

Another major topic in powerful geopolitical imaginations is the assumed strategic position Ceuta has in European geography. Pérez Marín (personal communication, February 24th, 2014) explains that "the Straits continue to be a strategic point for the whole world for all powers, not only Spain and Morocco (...) there is an international power play going on here". So much of Ceuta's future depends on "what would happen in the world", especially Europe's future in relation to the Arab states, and on the potential for alliances. Castillo Sempere (personal communication, February 20th, 2014) thinks that everything happening in Ceuta is crucial for the EU, as it is "the door", the entrance to the Union, "between two worlds".

Ceuta can play a role in diverse ways to reaffirm the EU and its role in the world (J.A. Alarcón Caballero, personal communication, February 12th, 2014) (Kuus, 2004, pp. 474, 477). The territorial claim by Morocco, Juan Luis Aróstegui Ruiz (personal communication, February 26th, 2014) outlines, is not based on economic but on geostrategic (Flores, 2014) interest. Yet, discourse-makers have doubts about whether the EU appreciates the European-ness of Ceuta: "The general relations between the two countries have priority" (Olmedo Izar Fuente, personal communication, February 26th, 2014). In fact, Morocco has become a "favorite ally of Spain" (Aróstegui, 2013). The local Caballas-party fears that one cannot be sure about how long Spain continues to support the ambiguous status of friendship and defending the two border-cities at the same time

It is clear though, that the city itself, in EU context, is envisioned as a space of flows, which plays a significant role in the EU's strategic and diplomatic play (Dijkink, 1996, p. 11), although the Union might not be conscious about it.

The harbor of Ceuta is considered a relevant space of flow in this context. It is a space of Ceuta, where flows of goods and people arrive or leave, the connection to Spain and to other places in the world, as we learn from powerful imaginatons (A. Romero Aliaga, personal communication, February 25th, 2014). Beyond its economic and strategic role in relation to Morocco the harbor is imagined as economically highly relevant to Ceuta. Observing the harbor, one notices that all day long goods are imported. Campos Martínez (personal communication, February 19th, 2014) stresses that the choice for the future orientation of the harbor is a rather strategic one, deciding about on which kind of flows (containers or people or both) it should specialize in.

Similar choices were made for the city before, the lawyer outlines. For some time, he tells, the harbor had converted into the “gas-station of the Straits”. The gas was cheaper in Ceuta because of the special tax on importation and many ships would make use of this opportunity (J.M. Campos Martínez, February 19th, 2014).

But, since the establishment of Tanger Med, a modern huge harbor only some 30 kilometers away in Morocco, e.g. for passenhgers it has become more economic to go from Spain to Tanger, (the old harbor now specialized in passengers only) and to consume in the Moroccan city. According to Campos Martínez statistics show that the flow of passengers to Ceuta has reduced by 50%. Another argument highlights repercussions of the working of the harbor in the city: “each euro earned in the harbor means three more earned in other sectors” (J.R. Olmedo Izar Fuente, personal communication, February 26th, 2014). Olmedo Izar Fuente and Campos Martínez agree that the choice for the harbor’s orientation actually implies to define the economic model for the city - its geopolitical strategy (Mamadouh & Dijkink, 2006, p. 351-355).

Ramírez Hurtado (personal communication, February 5th, 2014) puts forward that in spite of TangerMed it is still more rentable to import goods via Ceuta, thanks to the Ceutí IPSI-tax. The local newspaper El Pueblo presents statistical data which reaffirm the analysis by Ramírez Hurtado - container traffic has increased by 19% in 2013, which has translated in wider increase of economic activity in the city. Additional amounts of goods were sold. Larger ships are difficult to be hosted in Ceuta, since they need more space. Much of the harbor’s space is blocked right now for ship repair. However, construction works are undertaken in order to adapt to the needs of e.g. big cruiseships (El Faro, 2014b). In 2014 invitations were sent to multiple cruising-companies. Efforts have been also reinforced to attract mega-yachts, to spend days in the city (Saura, 2013g).

All the pieces of discourse highlight the economical relevance of the harbor in imaginations of Ceuta and for the city’s vitality – and thus, (economic) progress in the EU and improvement of status (Kuus, 2004, p. 474). Many ambitions for future development and modernization are projected and the harbor space of flows has thus become another means of Europeanizing the city (ibid.). EU institutions have recognized potential for modernization in transportation and provide funding for respective improvements (El Faro, 2010a), which Ceuta has effectively benefitted from EU-funding (Kuus, 2004, p. 484). Tourism and respective transport connections have been incentivized. “We depend on the transportation and we need economic support. If the EU would not have tolerated all that [singularities of Ceuta] we were not here” (J.L. Gomez Barceló, personal communication, February 7th, 2014).

In this quotation Gomez Barceló makes a relevant point about the EU in its role as generous “tolerator” of particularities of Ceuta, which is conditioned by Ceuta making efforts to live up to EU standards in different realms (Kuus, 2004, p. 474). The geopolitical situation of Ceuta is thus imagined in certain ways, with the powerful

discourse-makers subjecting to Europeanization (Gibson-Graham, 2000, p. 108). The EU has been able to impose the Union's imagination for Ceuta. But also local decision-makers have proved agency and added their visions (Kuus, 2004, p. 473).

Among the Moroccans one can notice a certain deception about Ceuta being Spanish. Participant 1 preferred the Franco period in which Ceuta and Melilla by an agreement were both considered Moroccan. Others recognize and identify Ceuta as European, a part of Spain (participant 8, 10).

The Moroccan border-people also confirm the discourse about Ceuta being a strategic point. Participant 3 outlines that Ceuta has a high relevance as a site because of the ships passing and because it has a bridging function between Africa and Europe. Participant 7 would mention also the important quantities of goods and products passing through the city, making it a strategically relevant site, as the door of the Mediterranean (participant 4). Participant 3, 4 and 5 also perceive the funding guaranteed to Ceuta as a proof, that the EU considers the spot strategically relevant.

Others call Ceuta a transition-point (participant 6, 7), one of the most important in the world given its geographical position (participant 7). According to participant 7 many powers in the world concentrate along the Straits and have been fighting about it for centuries, also due to the location at the sea, the entrance of the Mediterranean.

Yet, hardly any Moroccan everymen further renegotiated the topic of the harbor (Hall, 1997a, p. 32). It does not seem to concern the Moroccan everymen in their everyday practice (mostly in Morocco) (Merrifield, 2011, p. 108), how things work at the harbor and which kinds of flows Ceuta's harbor should focus on in future. To sum up: The renegotiation of the powerful imagination reflects different aspects rather authentically – Moroccan respondents share the imagination with powerful discourse-makers that Ceuta is a geopolitically relevant site for the EU (Kuus, 2004, p. 477). The Europeanization of Ceuta is being recognized (Kuus, 2004, p. 479), although partly criticized by Moroccan everymen.

Ceuti everymen reproduce many pieces of the powerful leaders' geopolitical imaginations. The strategic relevance of Ceuta's position for Europe is stressed, because the city is located at the Straits of Gibraltar in Africa (participant 31), because it is the European border, it is in the 'middle', a spot between one and another (participant 14), it is essential for (military) security of the EU (participant 21) and a 'key location' (participant 22). This way, Ceuta contributes to the union, although it is far and small (participant 14, 23).

In this sense, Ceuta is imagined as a guarantee for other places' European-ness (Kuus, 2004, p. 477) in the eyes of several Ceuti everyman-participants – "it could help to avoid worse things to happen, (...) if there was something on diplomatic level" (participant 14). Participant 21 thinks that the EU has understood the decisiveness of Ceuta, because there are international military troops stationed now. Participant 23 identifies the EU's interest in Ceuta as highly interlinked with the diplomatic relations with Morocco and the Sahara issues.

Other participants have the impression that the entire discourse about Ceuta's strategic value is an exaggeration (participant 18). The claim by Morocco is also discussed among everymen: some seem to be afraid of losing the protection by the EU or Spain in case recognition of Ceuta's importance as strategic point was lost

(participant 14). Another participant (26) is not worried, because it seems too obvious that no one among the Ceutís would ever prefer to be Moroccan. Again other everymen seem to categorically exclude the option to become Moroccan. The respondents reaffirm that to them Ceuta is simply Spanish and European and will be so in future (participant 16, 31). All these statements reaffirm the geopolitical imagination of Ceuta as a European city (Kuus, 2004, p. 475) and Europeanize Ceuta (Kuus, 2004, p. 475).

The reproduction of the powerful geopolitical imaginations traced here seems to be rarely related to individual experiences. The high convergence of the statements among everymen indicates that it is a topic widely thought and discussed about. The European-ness-discourse is subjected to across groups and districts (Gibson-Graham, 2000, p. 108). Europeanization as a strategy results desired (Kuus, 2004, p. 482; Kramsch, 2011, p. 200; Mignolo, 2000, pp. 58-59).

Many Ceutí participants seem to feel the need to define the role of Ceuta within the EU among the political powers and defend their home-place's relevance –justifying also their decision to live and stay in this point. Concerning the harbor's role, entrepreneurs such as participant 17 and 25 envision the harbor to work better in future. The flow of goods should be accelerated as well as the procedures of transfer in the harbor. A reduction of taxes for goods would also be appreciated by Ceuta's business community (participant 17) – both fitting their imagination of a European efficient and neoliberal economic model (Sparke, 2002, p. 220). They need to maintain their business (Merrifield, 2011, p. 108).

The respondents seem worried about obstructions of the potential for modernization and economic development. Participant 28 does not subject to the official discourse effectively neglecting fishing as a viable sector for Ceuta: He is convinced that once relations were better with Morocco and Ceutís were allowed to fish in Moroccan waters again, the sector could recover and create new flows into the harbor of Ceuta (participant 28). The responsibility of the decay of the sector is attributed to the local decision-makers by participant 28: they decreased the proportions of funding spent on fishing.

None of the participants, however, is aware of or mentions the funding the EU has provided. The imaginations about negative effects of high tariffs paid for passenger travels on the ferry seem to catch all their attention. The positive developments and restructuring of the harbor seem as if faded out in their perception. The measures are also less close to their everyday concerns (Merrifield, 2011, p. 108).

Participant 21 is convinced that Ceuta could make use much more of the potential of the harbor if the city joined the EU Customs Union. In the renegotiations of Ceutí everymen from different parts of the city further modernization of the harbor is desired, yet, in different ways than the power-elites suggest (Hall, 1997a, p. 32). But few details are presented. The current relevance and significance is only identified by entrepreneurs, who depend on the harbor (Merrifield, 2011, p. 108) and by others speculating on the arrival of tourists (participant 22) – yet much less than in the powerful discourse-makers' imaginations.

6.1.2 The border-passage Tarajal, trade and other cross-border activities

(Irregular) economic cross-border-relations promoting Ceuta's economic development

For what we can learn from the geopolitical imaginations of Ceuta's powerful leaders, there are many indications that the relations of flow with Morocco are and will be the main economic engine for Ceuta, guaranteeing progress and modernization (Kuus, 2004, p. 482).

The space which is most involved and characterized by the flow is the border-passage Tarajal (although the harbor is the place where goods arrive, the flow of carriers concentrates around the wholesales and passage at the border). In powerful geopolitical imaginations it is considered to be the economic vein of Ceuta. Thus Ceuta's spaces of flow which are imagined as highly related to Morocco are triggers of (economic) Europeanization of the city (Kramsch, 2011, p. 196).

The awareness of the relevance of economic relations with Morocco is acknowledged in multiple imaginations about the trade: trade to Morocco is often seen as the most important pillar of Ceuta's economy. García Iñigo (personal communication, February 18th, 2014) puts it brief: "the future of Ceuta is totally bound up with the development in Morocco. (...) we are a community of traders and merchants". This insight has been institutionalized in official documents of the government: looking through the strategic plan (Ciudad de Ceuta, 2014) we find the indication that "growth potentials of Ceuta are related to the potential of the demand in the neighbouring country for commerce, services and tourism" (ibid., p. 3). "For Ceuta the trading across the border is very important, most of all for the quantity of tax paid. (...) it has a huge weight for the economy, not only for the direct effects deriving from business at the wholesales at the Tarajal border-passage, but due to indirect effects on the local commerce. The traders depend on banking services, consultancy and so on" (A. Ramírez Hurtado, personal communication, February 5th, 2014).

Box 1 Background information

Carriers' bundles in Tetouan and their socio-economic effects

I have the impression that traffic in the city center has increased at all moments of the day. Also contamination can be felt more than two years ago. With urbanization it seems, the amount of cars and car owners has increased as well. On the other hand I am surprised that none of the big supermarkets has made it to occupy spaces closer to the center. In the center of Tetouan only small shops exist. Major chains have agglomerated at the outskirts of the city (Observations on several occasions at the beginning of March 2014). Products sold in shops in Tetouan (many obviously are those traded across the border) seem to exceed the local demand by far, in spite of the growing peripheries. I observed how bundles, still packed the way they are carried on the backs of women across the border, are charged on normal buses for passengers at the main bus-station of Tetouan. This way they can be transported onwards to Tanger and other places, I conclude: several men carried bundles from Ceuta to passenger buses. Then the men got paid by a more elegantly, well-dressed man (March 3rd, 2014, observation).

The practices of otherness around the flows from Ceuta reach far into Morocco and have effects far beyond the passage: In fact strong urbanization around Tetouan and other villages in the region takes place and many families make a living trading across the border. The goods are transported onwards into other regions of Morocco, many more people live on the business, more than the Ceutís and carriers. Their practices of otherness reach different areas across the border into Ceuta (Kuus, 2004, p. 484). All these aspects do not appear in official discourse, nor in the renegotiation by Ceutí everymen, as they are beyond their concern of everyday routine of the people in Ceuta (De Certeau, 1988; Merrifield, 2011, p. 108). In renegotiation Moroccan everymen hint at the effects of the trading across the border (participant 3, 4, and 7), but they mostly remain obscure, as if seen as too logical consequences of the trading than being worth mentioning. Except participant 3 and 7 none of my respondents uses to travel far into Morocco, so that they do not have much opportunity to follow the paths the goods make into Morocco.

In an article by Campos Martínez (2003) we can learn that the American Chamber of commerce in Morocco estimates the trade across the border to have a value of about 15.000 millions of dirhams a year, involving 45.000 people directly (75% women) and for each job there ten regular related jobs (e.g. taxidivers) – thus there are 450.000 jobs depending on the border trade. Additionally since 2003 the numbers of traders and volumes of goods have risen, because of additional constraints on trading along the Algerian border. More carriers were pushed to Ceuta and Melilla (Cembrero, 2013b). All these insights affirm that the economic development of Ceuta as part of its Europeanization (Kramsch, 2011, p. 196) highly depends on flows of commerce to Morocco. Thus, the commerce is understood to serve Ceuta catching up on EU standards (ibid.). Compliance with conditions imposed on the city by the EU is imagined to outweigh the ‘otherness’ (Kuus, 2004, p. 484) of the flow of ‘atypical’ trading across the European border.

Box 2 Background information

Excursion from Tetouan to Fnideq and thoughts on the border-region

On March 2nd, 2014, I realized an observation travelling from Tetouan to Fnideq by bus and walking on the market, where huge quantities of the goods traded across the border are sold. The bus travelling slowly was crowded and more and more people got on the closer we approached Fnideq. People on the bus seemed diverse. I saw few symbols of status (expensive watches, brand-clothing). I estimated that the people I was travelling with were neither very rich nor very poor. Also some Sub-Saharan joined us. It was a Sunday and as I have learnt, this is a popular day for organizing a family trip or excursion to the village (research 2011). Crowds of people were hanging out and shopping in the market halls and in the city center, which appeared converted into a huge market place. Sellers used loudspeakers to attract potential clients. Many shops sell the same goods, the diversity is limited to different kinds of products such as tissues, clothes, shoes, gold, electronic devices or equipment for construction. I also noticed that Fnideq, the small border village is transforming into and growing to be a city.

Also Tetouan and Mdiq (village on the road from Tetouan to Fnideq at the coast) seem to be expanding into the hills. I wonder whether the strong urbanization is the consequence of immigration into the region - which is likely since I have spoken to many Moroccans, who originally come from other parts of Morocco, such as participant 1, 3, 8, 9 or 11. High fertility exacerbates the process additionally. I can imagine that it is also a sign of a slight increase in standards of living and prosperity: Some children move away from their parents' house to invest their income in an own place (such as it was the case of my interpreters).

On the other hand urbanization is a strong trend in all parts of Morocco, modernizing and many families have given up subsistence economy in rural areas under the pressure of major multi-national players in agro-business (although agriculture is still a major pillar in Morocco's economy). I am also pondering about whether the infrastructure, such as physical facilities, schools or public transport, could keep up with the pace of urbanization. The king seems to keep on investing in the region which is reflected in the increase of numbers of asphalt-roads even in suburban areas and the creation of green spaces (Observation in Tetouan's surrounding). Also from informal conversations I learned that the king still continues to pursue an investment strategy in the North of Morocco.

As highlighted in Ramírez Hutado's geopolitical imaginations of the dependence of Ceuta's economy on flows to Morocco goes beyond trade and bears potential for the future in the service sector. The service sector is also envisaged as an economic alternative - Olmedo Izar Fuente (personal communication, February 26th, 2014) would like to replace dependence on the 'irregular' trade across the border by activities in the service sector, e.g. in finance, tourism and entrepreneurial consultancy. This way, he imagines rearranging the spatial concentration of activities in Ceuta, shifting them from the spaces of flow into the center of the city. From a newspaper article we can learn that several decision-makers depict Ceuta's future as becoming a 'service-pole' for Morocco.

Respective entrepreneurship should be incentivized through reduction of bureaucratic obligations, attracting investment in respective activities and offering virtual operations without having a seat in Ceuta (Saura, 2013f). Mas Vallecón (personal communication, February 14th, 2014) is positive about the quality and quantity of existing entrepreneurial cross-border relations and the automatic alignment of mentality in business in Morocco: offering “European services in Africa”, pointing to presumably higher standards which are connoted to European technology or knowledge (Mignolo, 2000, pp. 58-59). He also hopes that Spanish and Ceuti entrepreneurs could exploit such opportunities better than the French, who have dominated this field so far (- a suggestion also highly promoted by Pérez Marín, personal communication, February 24th, 2014). His fellow of the socialist party in Ceuta agrees that in this context Ceuta should regard its “geographical position as a strategy” (Carracao, observation February 8th, 2014) as recommended in the municipality’s strategic plan (Ciudad de Ceuta, 2014, p. 3).

Potential to develop in that direction is especially attributed to medicine and different consultancy services, the investment sector, joint activities in tourism and logistic platforms. “European know-how in entrepreneurialism, education, constructing a European university in Ceuta attractive for more students from Morocco” or becoming a second Monaco (G. Martínez Arcas, personal communication, February 7th, 2014) – all these options would complement the offer in Morocco to satisfy the demand of the Moroccan middle-class.

The cosmopolitan-thinker, the architect Carlos Pérez Marín (personal communication, February 24th, 2014), expresses incomprehension for some colleagues not being willing to orient toward the Moroccan market. According to his evaluation it is a question of mentality and openness, which should be much easier for people from Ceuta who have been living with different cultures ever since. Another suggestion of his is to install an international university in Ceuta, attracting students from Morocco to obtain European qualifications and diplomas.

Marín Pérez (personal communication, February 24th, 2014) imagines Ceuta as a part of a metropolitan region: in his life he combines jobs and projects in both countries, Spain and Morocco, usually within one week. Even for leisure events he does not regard the border to be an obstacle. In spite of this possibility of living in between two countries and several major cities, he says, many people in Ceuta would not even think of it – even politicians, who most of them hardly cross the border to Morocco.

In general, powerful discourse-makers advertise the service flows (more than trading) and cross-border-relations with Morocco (Kramsch, 2010, p. 1003; Walters, 2002, p. 564; Luxembourg, 1972, p. 60). There is hope to develop and Europeanize Ceuta’s economic situation (Kuus, 2014, p. 482) living up to the expected European economic standards (Kramsch, 2011, p. 196).

In the renegotiation and geopolitical imaginations of the Moroccan everymen the trade is a major topic. Many recognize the dependence of Ceuta on Morocco. Participant 11 states: “if there was no contrabando [smuggling or trafficking], Ceuta would be people-less. It would not work without it”.

Implications for Ceuta, its people and future decision-making, however, are hardly imagined. As long as there were no significant changes, the participants’ lives would not be affected - even if they worked in trade (Aranda-Gallego, 2007, p. 351). Such radical changes do not seem to be anticipated. As mentioned before, everymen do not use to renegotiate geopolitical imaginations for the future (Merrifield, 2011, p. 108). Renegotiation often refers to the

opportunities associated with trading: whereas Ceutí discourse-makers imagine trade concerning its structural economic impacts, the Moroccan everyman-people think of the fate on individual level in everyday practices and life (De Certeau, 1988) – they adopt the discourse to the context (Hall, 1997a, p. 32).

Participant 3 mentions that people in the Tetouan region have made a lot of money (e.g. constructing own houses) thanks to the economic opportunities in border-trade. Participant 11 tells about his work life and that he specialized in carrying blankets across the border. The story of participant 9, who came from the South of Morocco to work at the border, is revealing: He got the incentive to work at the border through narratives about the opportunities one could have as a 'porteur' (carrier) at the border - Ceuta was described as a place of opportunity. Even 500 kilometers South, near Casablanca, he got to know opportunities for buying and selling. So participant 9 migrated to Fnideq (the steadily growing village behind the border). He tried to trade, but due to problems (he avoided to describe in detail) he ran out of money. Now he is left without anything, he does not have a place to stay, just sleeping in the streets - for the first time in his life. But still he is full of optimism and trusts that there is an opportunity even for him around Ceuta.

Ceuta's fame and appeal in geopolitical imaginations of Moroccans as site of opportunities is obvious. It is because of European-ness, people attribute prosperity and opportunities to Ceuta (Kramsch, 2011, p. 197) - from the Moroccan 'everymen'- point of view Ceuta is a modern European place and people have a good life (participant 9, 5, 10). The geopolitical imaginations of participant 10 suggests that he would like his part of the border-region to benefit (more) from the economic dynamics in Ceuta, which he regards to be typical of the EU (Kramsch, 2011, p. 196): "it would be a good plan to create more work there. That would be fine for the Moroccans, if organized properly. We can exchange people from here to search work there and the Spanish come here".

A border-trader, who lives on trading across the border, does not share the enthusiasm (participant 11). Crossing the border is his daily routine and a "nightmare" (see chapter 6.2). Again, we can see the power of everyday practices, aspirations and experience influencing renegotiation (De Certeau, 1988; Merrifield, 2011, p. 108). Participant 7 is convinced that jobs at the border are rather profitable in comparison to other jobs in Morocco, for working only few hours a day. This is another explanation of the popularity of the border-jobs. All these imaginations represent the connotation of trade and Ceuta to opportunities (Walters, 2002, p. 564).

That does not mean that the trade is considered 'European', but it is clear that prosperity is attributed to the jobs at the border-passage and connoted to Ceuta (Kramsch, 2011, p. 200). The impact of the trade on Morocco is another part of the imaginations, for the economy and the lives of many families. Insights in the biography and the interview with participant 13 show the eventual cultural impact of working across the border: Women start being main providers of income (which I would interpret to have impacts on the structure and everyday practices of the families in Morocco) and might feel attracted to a 'Europeanized' life in Ceuta (Kuus, 2004, p. 482).

Few Moroccans explicitly renegotiate the specific and more abstract imaginations about service-based economic relations. Participant 2 tells about his former job working for a Spanish, Ceutí company in Morocco for 16 years. This work-relation illustrates that entrepreneurial relations across the border have existed for a while. A similar story is the one of Olmedo Izar Fuente (personal communication, February 26th, 2014), who has been working for several years in Tetouan realizing projects of a Ceutí company. Participant 8 has made use of for him job-related

services in Ceuta, which are not provided in this form in Morocco. In Ceuta pieces of his work have been presented several times. He has chosen a European-appearing artistic name, a marketing strategy. His education and entire career have been facilitated by his relations in Spain and Ceuta. A similar biography could be told about participant 7. Participant 8 shares Pérez Marín's and Martínez Arcas' visions to create a university offering education to students from across the border.

All of the stories show the interdependence of economic relations and compatibility of services across the border. They are stories of just some few people, but more Ceutí and Moroccan everymen live on and with some kind of service-relations across the border. The powerful imaginations thus already manifest in practices of everymen (Hall, 1997b, p. 44). The desired economic development (Kramsch, 2011, p. 196) in Ceuta is not renegotiated as such though.

The Ceutí everymen are aware of the trading and the corresponding economic benefits for the city – yet, they imagine the relative importance of trading in comparison to other activities to be lower than the powerful discourse-makers: "there is a lot of transition from Morocco, they just enter to sell or buy", participant 17 describes and participant 24 shows that she is aware of the significance of the flow: "economically, we live on the trade with Morocco, on the people, selling goods to Morocco". Both participants are from Ceuta's margins as is participant 25, stating that "we [the Ceutís] live a lot on Morocco, many people come from there. If Ceuta closed the border, Ceuta would be empty". Non-center inhabitant 28 thinks that "the trade across the border is important". Participant 24 and 26 indicate that the crisis might have hit Ceuta less than other places in Spain, because of the relations maintained with Africa.

Only two participants from the center, participant 21 and 31 talk about the significance of the commerce: "the trade with Morocco is the thing to live on" (participant 21) and "we depend on the trade with Morocco" (participant 31). And as if she had to justify this fact she adds: "... and there is nothing bad about that". From the latter quotation we can draw the conclusion that there is awareness in Ceuta that the trade is nothing to be proud of, due to the conditions of work for the carriers (see chapter 6.2.2). Ceutí everymen might feel the need to justify the legitimacy of Ceuta's economic system, before strangers – wanting to Europeanize their city discursively (Kuus, 2004, p. 479).

This is what participant 14 does: "there is little production by now, before there was a lot of production. But we could not keep it up, the commerce should be in two directions. We have relations across the border with Morocco, but also to Spain and other countries. We are Europeans, Spanish. But we need something to eat". An alternative way of dealing with the feeling of shame is avoiding, invisibilizing (Ferrer-Gallardo et al., 2014) the topic, a tactic (De Certeau) many people from the center appear to choose. They allude to the fact that economic relations with the South, with Morocco will be a basis for future economic development to avoid thinking about or mentioning the trade as such, mentally orienting to Spain.

Participant 19 tries to normalize (Kuus, 2004, p. 479) the relation across the border, comparing Ceuta to other cross-border trading sites at inner-European border-spaces (Driessen, 2010, pp. 175-176) even referring to before the EU was established. At this point we can remember the piece of powerful imaginations by Pérez Marín

(personal communication, February 24th, 2014): many Ceutís still do not want to turn to Africa and so they live with their backs to the South, facing hopefully North. On the other hand, the powerful imagination about the relevance of the trade result to be subjected to in practices, such as the trading (Hall, 1997b, 4).

Another explanation of not renegotiating is that analyses about the trade such as Aranda-Gallego's (2007), highlighting Ceuta's strong economic dependence on the trade to Morocco, have never been published. The analysis is prevented from being published by the government institutions of Ceuta - any arguments reaffirming the Moroccan claim are avoided (informal conversation).

The only Ceutís (participant 28, 26) talking of services for Morocco (beyond tourism or trade) imagine founding a new university for students from both sides of the border. The other way round, participant 26 would like to have Morocco become a supplier of agricultural products, which are of good quality there. Participant 28 sees a lot of potential in the Moroccan handicrafts and abilities of recycling e.g. for electronic goods – practices people apply a lot out of economic reasons in Morocco and in part out of habit (De Certeau, 1988).

Those imaginations of a mutual beneficial relationship in services differ from the Ceuti leaders' imaginations, in that the leaders think of Ceuta's economy first and thus envision a one-way relationship of profit (Luxembourg, 1972, p. 60). They ponder less about Morocco's destiny. As explained before, the term of services in general is too abstract to be further renegotiated by everyman-respondents, it seems: It is easier to imagine about observable features than something, which does not physically manifest yet (Merrifield, 2011, p. 108).

Additionally, the relation to Morocco is a topic Ceutís do not enjoy to imagine, because of the skepticism towards otherness and the desire to be more included in the EU (Kuus, 2004, 484; Ferrer-Gallardo & Van Houtum, 2013, p. 243). What is important though is that most powerful imaginations envision cross-border relations intensifying in future.

The border singularity and EU support

The debate about recognition of status of Ceuta by the EU centers on potential for improvement according to the (imagined and imposed) criteria of Europeanness (Kuus, 2004, p.484). At the same time renouncement on parallel recognition of Ceuta's singularities is refused. According to geopolitical imaginations by the powerful the recognition including the city's peculiarities is fundamental for Ceuta's relationship with the EU, so that Ceuta has its "singularities entirely recognized" (Campos Martínez, 1997, p. 103).

Already in 1997, Ceuta had a customs institution at the EU Southern border with Algeciras, but not at Ceuta's border with Morocco. The latter border-passage, though, has been highly frequented already then and huge quantities of goods were exported without paying any customs. Simultaneously, Ceuta also became a major attraction point for irregular migration (6.1.3). Both irregular flows created through the (unrecognized) border are seen as reasons, why Ceuta needs its singularities to be acknowledged and why 'normalization' of the border would be crucial in the future, Jose Maria Campos Martínez (1997, p. 107) wrote.

13 and 14 years after, the news of Ceuta still report that parties in Ceuta advertise themselves with the slogan "special treatment is necessary for Melilla and Ceuta, [...] without fighting for the latter and without the EU Ceuta awaits a bad future" (Suárez, 2010; O.J., 2014a). The status of the border seems to be a never-ending issue, which is reframed and taken up in a series of newspaper articles (El Faro, 2013a; Abad, 2014c). The "final objective

[of all the demanded, announced and realized negotiation efforts with the EU] is always the better treatment of Melilla and Ceuta, achieving respect their conditions of being far, non-continental, land-borders with Morocco, which restrain economic and social development in these cities” (Rober, 2010a).

All of these deliberations by the power-elite are reflected in the local government’s planning for the upcoming period (Ciudad de Ceuta, 2014, pp. 7-8). The vision for Ceuta’s future looming behind these considerations is a slightly modified version of membership in the EU Customs Union. Singularities (especially the border situation) would become recognized. To strengthen Ceuta’s position in negotiation for such a particular kind of status improvement and more certainties collaboration with Melilla has been identified as a useful strategy (ibid.). It has become a major expectation for the government and the president of Ceuta to make Ceuta’s voice be overheard in Brussels concerning the city’s status and to put issues on the table (J. Castillo Sempere, personal communication, February 20th, 2014).

The powerful discourse-making elite’s calls for reform of the fiscal system go beyond measures announced by the municipal government, such as Martínez Arcas (personal communication, February 6th, 2014) suggestion to create incentives for “investors, via the harbor [fiscal conditions related to the harbor]”. Pérez Marín (personal communication, February 24th, 2014) explains: “they [the political decision-makers] are afraid that Morocco might get angry, because normalizing the border would imply that Morocco has to recognize the Spanishness of the city”. But the expert is convinced that normalization ought to be possible for Ceuta, given that it has been possible for Melilla. He also reminds, that Morocco has an interest in the development of its Northern region. García Iñigo (personal communication, February 18th, 2014), Gomez Barceló (personal communication, February 7th, 2014), Campos Martínez (personal communication, February 19th, 2014) and Aróstegui Ruiz (personal communication, February 26th, 2014) all firmly agree with Pérez Marín.

The most supportive elite-discourse makers here are those, who are not part of any government institution, which might be caused by the invisibilization-strategy of the government. The latter avoid touching the topic of Morocco in many occasions (Ferrer-Gallardo et al., 2014). Gomez Barceló points out that the effect of finally having customs paid can be an important contribution to the budget and development of the city. He suggests that it should be the EU making the step to install an official customs institution and border, via negotiation with Morocco. Here is evidence of the rather circular conditional relation – Europeanization of Ceuta is dependent on efforts and generosity of the EU to give something back and contribute to the process (Kuus, 2004, p. 484).

The Ceuti elite wish that the EU would allow Ceuta to improve its status and to foster normalization (adapting to the EU standards). But still the interests of Europe and Spain to maintain good bilateral relations with Morocco have priority over Ceuta’s fate. Morocco can have much more influence in comparison to a small city as Ceuta is (G. Martínez Arcas, personal communication, February 6th, 2014). Also integration into the Customs Union of the EU is expected to have positive effects. It would also mean to Europeanize (adapting the EU standard) parts of the special fiscal regime in Ceuta (Kuus, 2004, p. 479). Several experts agree that implementing VAT instead of Ceuta’s local IPSI taxation - could be an advantage, as long as it would lead to converting the atypical commerce to Morocco into regular trade. It would have to be done carefully considering Ceuta’s singularities and a step-wise

process (J.M. Campos Martínez, personal communication, February 19th, 2014; J.A. Alarcón Caballero, personal communication, February 12th, 2014; G. Martínez Arcas, personal communication, February 6th, 2014).

Campos Martínez envisions Ceuta to become a 'deposit for Morocco' based on regular transportation of goods. The other way round the Ceutís could import fruit and vegetable which now usually make a detour via Spain mainland, if the border became a regular EU customs border with a commercial customs institution. The Moroccan market would be accessible (J.M. Campos Martínez, personal communication, February 19th, 2014), all together bringing along advantages for economic development (Kramsch, 2011, p. 196; Sparke, 2002, p. 215).

In fact support of entrepreneurial associations for maritime transportation of goods and customs clearance to improve Ceuta's competitiveness, are major priorities for the municipal government (Ciudad de Ceuta, 2014, p. 5). In the leaders' imaginations, we can summarize, Europeanization of the trade across the border is desired. Yet, the political authorities are hesitant with regard to this topic. They feel the urge to protect Ceuta's singularities and the relations to Morocco. With a 'normal' border-passage Ceuta would live up to some of the conditional expectations the EU (is imagined to) demand(s) (Kuus, 2004, p. 474).

The Moroccan participants' imaginations did not embrace the topic at all and few were informed. They would not mention singularities about Ceuta's fiscal status and could not enumerate dangers of losing recognition of status in the EU as imagined by the powerful. Again the argument holds: geopolitical imaginations about future plans remain highly unrenegotiated as long as they do not concern the lives of the everymen (Merrifield, 2011, p. 108).

Several Ceutí everyman-participants do want the EU to recognize a singularity, that Ceuta *is* its bordercity (see chapter 6.2.2). Yet, hardly any of the participants knew about the exact state of the debate, nor about (dis-) advantages which might be expected from further integration into the Customs Union. The debate about protecting Ceuta's singularities, while integrating into the EU, ongoing for more than 15 years, it seems, cannot draw the everyman's attention – maybe not anymore: the debate plays no role in everyman's life (Merrifield, 2011, p. 108).

Only in imaginations of Ceutí participant 23 a vision of modernization of the fiscal system emerges, but she does not refer to the customs at the border. Three respondents (participant 14, 21, 28) argue that a commercial customs institution would be a way to improve the trade and economic system of the city, without explaining details about their visions. Even after asking interviewees about the reforms concerning the Customs Union, few would discuss the topic.

Modernizing the border-passage

The border-passage is a target of EU-subsidies and securitization measures also because of the trade taking place across the border. "Chaos at the border" (García, 2013h) can be generated by the Moroccan 'porteadores' and other Moroccan employees working in Ceuta, who get into conflict with security forces (chapter 6.2.2). Those are present to control exactly this kind of situations. It is an event which occurs frequently resulting in tension, we learn from the newspaper article.

Police agents are accused of being violent and aggressive. NGOs join to observe the situation and help in case of emergency or injuries. Due to these conditions caused by lack of space, crowds and pressure the municipal

government is planning to invest in renovation of the main road leading from the center to the border-passage. But also the modernization of the passage itself is planned in order to allow for better organization and emergency measures for the 'Biutz' tunnel most 'porteadores' have to pass through (Crespo, 2013d) to get back to Morocco. Many of those measures to catch up with European standards as depicted in the present imaginations (Kuus, 2004, p. 482), will be realized with the help of European and Spanish funding.

Many articles document and praise the progress of the development of the plans (El Pueblo, 2014i; El Pueblo, 2014k; Aznar, 2014c). One article even reveals details about the amounts in millions of euros, which will be invested for certain measures, such as a parking and more lanes to pass (Aznar, 2014a). Thus the EU support, the reward and generous support of the superior one in the conditional relation (Kuus, 2004, p. 484), consists among others of funding for the spaces of flow. This way Ceuta is compensated for obstacles its economic survival created by the border. Also technical and police supply is increased. Additionally, the support seems to be based on a certain degree of acceptance of Ceuta's special features (Kuus, 2004, p. 484).

Information in media reveal the future plans for the Tarajal (the 'Montoro-plan'): the municipal government is programming an integral revitalization of the districts around the border-passage. However, the plans are not easy to realize. Dwellings have to be replaced and substituted, so doubts about the plan's feasibility are presented by opposition parties. On the other hand proposals from the opposition parties are integrated into the plan. Finance is provided by the Spanish state and the EU. The funding was originally destined for working on the migration issue, but the usage has been transformed for other purposes related to the border-passage (El Pueblo, 2014k) – this reveals the high priority modernization of the passage has in the imaginations of Ceuta in the EU (Kuus, 2004, p. 474).

The librarian Alarcón Caballero (personal communication, February 12th, 2014) regards it to be an economic necessity to improve the border-passage, transforming it into "a real effective border". This way Ceuta could give incentives for development also to Northern Morocco, having both sides of the border mutually stimulate each other's development, even if the trade continued to be atypical. A practical initiative has been started by the residents association of Ceuta, writing a guide about all the important norms regulating the border-transit. The guide aims at accelerating the transition across the border (El Pueblo, 2014g; Rincón, 2014b).

Alarcón Caballero in his imagination draws on the change, he has observed at the border-passage since the 1970s: recently, organization at the border has lost quality, due to a higher differential in standards of life across the border, he analyzes. It is more complicated to have an EU border and no longer just a passage. Many experts agree that modernization of the border-passage could help its functioning and thus Ceuta's economic development (G. Martínez Arcas, personal communication, February 6th, 2014; J. Castillo Sempere, personal communication, February 20th, 2014; J.M. Campos Martínez, personal communication, February 19th, 2014; A. Ramírez Hurtado, personal communication, February 5th, 2014) - and thus the modernization of Ceuta (Kramsch, 2011, p. 196; Kuus, 2004, p. 474). But their imaginations of how to achieve this aim vary.

Thus we can see that media and many powerful discourse-makers in Ceuta desire modernization of the passage for the sake of its functioning, efficiency and the city's reputation. An underlying objective is to catch up (economically) (Kramsch, 2011, p. 196) and improve Ceuta's status in European context (Kuus, 2004, p. 484).

Also Moroccan everyman-respondents have suggestions for improvement at the border-passage. Yet, only one of them, participant 2, who has known the border for long (given his advanced age), has observed changes at the border since Ceuta had become EU territory: changes have especially manifested in the level of control (Walters, 2002, p. 573), which has increased, and in accessibility, which has diminished. Europeanization of the border as implemented here newly meant economic and practical barriers (Kolossoff & Scott, 2012, p. 38), while, on the other hand, Ceuta was living up to its securitization responsibilities (Kuus, 2004, p. 477) – a rather contradictory process.

Participant 7 proposes to create “a separate entrance for the ‘porteadores’, the carriers, to make sure they can make their livings. In the end it is a question of survival”. The young participant 10 agrees with the suggested solutions in the short-run. He would like to introduce better organization and a wider passage. Participant 11, carrier himself, demands from the Spanish state to provide for good treatment at the border, reminding also of the crucial role the flow of carriers plays in Ceuta’s economy (Kolossoff & Scott, 2012, p. 31). He wishes more police around to organize the flow. Participant 12 would prefer men and women to pass separately, because she sees a danger in women getting squeezed in the crowd at the carriers’ passage called “El Biutz”.

The visions of the Moroccan everyman-participants about the passage are based on their experience in everyday life and refer to their practices, including tactics to deal with the system (De Certeau, 1988) they have to subject to in the space of flow. They adapt to and incorporate the conditional relation of Ceuta with the EU in their lives (Stoler, 1997, p. 199; Hardt & Negri, 2000, p. 200). Yet, most of them favor a normalization and regularization of the circumstances at the passage in an organized “European way” (Kuus, 2004, p. 482). Their renegotiation differs strongly from the powerful imagination: the participants renegotiate the tangible everyday-life related events, less the abstract economic or political ones. They are most concerned with their and their fellows’ livelihoods (Merrifield, 2011, p. 108).

The border-passage is an exhaustive topic in the imagination and meaning-making of Ceuti everyman participants. Almost all agree that the Tarajal needs improvement and change (participant 14, 15, 16, 17, 19, 20, 22, 23, 29, 27, 31). The analysis and proposal of participant 15 - “The border is a problem. There is a lot of traffic, (...) you have to make documents. We should organize the access to the border, the traffic, separating people by what they are going to do” - reflects the ideas about installing more categories of control (Kramsch & Brambilla, 2007, p. 100, 115) of other participants. Many ask for more security through control e.g. concerning drugs and human trafficking (participant 14). The demand for organization and categorization is dominant, which reveals a rather Europeanized understanding of how the border is imagined to work (Hardt & Negri, 2000, pp. 192-194).

Participant 22 is afraid of the “wrong” people entering and she would like to have a system filtering out people behaving bad and letting pass only those behaving well – well, in terms of European understanding of civilization (Stoler, 1997, p. 199). Especially the people from the center, who interact least across the border, result afraid of the ‘other’ (Ferrer-Gallardo, 2009, p. 31). The separation, especially of the ‘porteadores’ from other flows, is largely desired (participant 16, 17, 27, 31) with the objective of making the border more “flexible and flowing” (participant 19). It would be crucial to avoid congestion even beyond the passage (participant 19, 20).

Besides these mere organizational visions for change, participant 27 suggests physical modernization of facilities such as improving the presence of taxis on the Ceutí side of the border, sanitary facilities, indications and information about the different parts of the border, their respective functions and guidelines for the people passing. He regards the state of art at the border not to be representative of Europe and wants the European standards to be reflected also here (Kuus, 2004, p. 483) - many ideas seem reproductions of the leaders' imaginations (Gibson-Graham, 2000, p. 108).

Others would like to broaden the passage with the end to improve the flow (participant 16, 17). All these measures concern the functionality of the border, the trade and travel –efficiency is requested, a favorite concept in neo-liberal paradigms of modernity (Sparke, 2002, p. 220). It is being subjected to here and connoted to Europeanization (Kramersch, 2011, p. 200).

Several participants from Ceuta were concerned with the border trade. Participant 17, first of all, would like the Moroccan and Spanish authorities to cooperate better, since neglect of cooperation has negative effects on the relation of Ceuta and Spain with the EU in her geopolitical imagination (Kuus, 2004, p. 484). Good cooperation with Morocco about the border is imagined as a means to improve Ceuta's status in the relation. The geopolitical imagination of the Ceutí everyman-participants seems closer to the official imaginations, than to the everyday-based considerations of Moroccans, who are little worried about Ceuta's future (Merrifield, 2011, p. 108).

Remarkably, the Moroccan part of the border-passage has been changed since 2011, when I was in Ceuta first. This time, in 2014, e.g. separate pathways for pedestrians were provided, while before pedestrians walked on the lanes alongside the cars. Now passport control was more organized as well, concentrated in one office (with a longer queue though) directly at the entrance of the passage, instead of spread and hard to understand before. Construction works are going on now (observation, February 3rd). Modernization and progress in organization could be noticed here (Kuus, 2004, p. 482).

6.1.3 The CETI and the border-passage: migration flows

Schengen-norms in Ceuta

From geopolitical imaginations in media and those emitted by powerful discourse-makers most EU-norms which concern the spaces of flow in Ceuta have to do with the border-situation. Especially, the Schengen-rules are determinant at the border and make it first of all a subject to EU responsibility. Consequently, it is here, at the border, where migratory policies made by the EU have to be implemented - policies, which stand out through a rather restrictive nature (J.A. Alarcón Caballero, personal communication, February 12th, 2014).

The norms imposed by the EU (ideally are imagined to) have to be congruent with the union's values, history and legislation e.g. asylum policies. However, also the national administration plays a crucial role (A. Romero Aliaga, personal communication, February 25th, 2014). The national administration had to adjust the Spanish norms in 2007 to adapt new EU-norms, Romero Aliaga (personal communication, February 25th, 2014) tells. We can thus draw the conclusion that EU-imposed Schengen norms are implemented in the spaces of flow in Ceuta, as part of the conditional adaptation process of the city (Kuus, 2004, p. 474).

The Moroccan everyman-participants do not imagine the Schengen-norms, thinking of the EU border and migration. As they are not from Ceuta, nor have difficulties in crossing the border-passage, they are not concerned with the topic: for inhabitants of the border-region of Tetouan there is a 24 hours- Schengen-exception-visa, which allows them to cross Ceuta's border regularly – a typical greyzone of the EU border-policies (Kolossoff & Scott, 2012, pp. 31-32). In this sense the norms imposed by the EU do not play any role in their practices (De Certeau, 1988).

Several Ceutí everyman-respondents instead subjected to and renegotiated the imaginations about Schengen-norms. Three everymen from Ceuta agree that the EU should and has to play a role in the migration policy (participant 19, 28, 29) and that it is not Ceuta's responsibility to regulate this field. Those Ceutí everymen are well informed.

Yet, there is little renegotiation – the Ceutí everyman-respondents do not even seem to question that the responsibility is with the EU and it seems normal that consequently the supra-national institutions may impose norms. They subject to the institutionalization of EU-border- and migration policies (Gibson-Graham, 2000, p. 108; Kuus, 2004).

Ceuta – a subsidized 'buffer' and 'filter' for the EU

Official geopolitical imaginations about Ceuta's spaces of flow emphasize the support received from the EU in the form of funding and technology enabling Ceuta to live up to the task of border protection. Martínez Arcas (personal communication, February 6th, 2014) explains: "Ceuta is a region receiving funding, (...) [which] has been reduced now. But it is still comfortable, because Ceuta is a border-city with special features". Ceuta thus receives additional funding for the border-spaces of flow. Like Melilla, Ceuta has received 25 million additional funding for the period 2014-2020 for investments at border.

The border-passage and -fence have been maintained and established by the subsidies. Consequent investments might be dedicated to security. In security the EU plays a significant role for Ceuta, a border-site with significant disparities between the standards of life on both sides of the boundary (J.M. Mas Vallecón, personal communication, February 14th, 2014). Ramírez Hurtado also mentions the role of the border-control agency FRONTEX, to which the EU passes tasks of border-management to secure Ceuta's border (Walters, 2002, p. 569-573).

It is thus clear that the EU sends support in financial form to Ceuta for border-protection tasks (Kuus, 2004, pp. 484, 477) – with the need for protection especially identified in the migration topic. Migration is imagined as another threat to the EU as a whole (Kolossoff & Scott, 2012, p. 21; Kramsch, 2011, p. 201): "More than 100 immigrants have tried to pass through Tarajal II [the border-passage of Ceuta] (...) [the attempt] was impeded by military forces of Morocco" (García, 2013f). The article also indicates that a similar attempt had taken place some 15 days before, with 250 migrants participating. Thanks to the new camera technology the attempts remained without success, the author writes.

What we thus see is that technology provided by the EU serves to support Ceuta in the task to prevent migrants from reaching EU territory in Ceuta (Rumford, 2008, p. 57). Jiménez Gálvez (2014c) reports about the high-tech protection installed in Ceuta which is about to be reinforced by more fences, longer walls, more police and new

closed-meshed metal fences along the existing fences to protect the EU border. Anti-terrorism instruments are being employed at the border, as well as sprinklers with pepper water to prevent migrants from irregularly crossing to Ceuta and Melilla. Considerations of re-installing barbed wire rolls on top of the fence are being made. In Ceuta also deliberations can be overheard about prolonging walls into the sea in future (ibid.). Generally, intensification of surveillance seems to be an issue on the agenda (Ferrer-Gallardo & Van Houtum, 2012, pp. 244-246).

Romero Aliaga (personal communication, February 25th, 2014) illustrates that in case a migrant reaches Ceuta he or she will stay in good conditions at the CETI ('center for temporary stay'), with a bed, food, courses for alphabetization or Spanish offered, medicines, psychologists and lawyers at their service. In general the conditions in this space of flow are reasonable and the center is partly financed by the EU aid for refugees.

At my visit at the CETI I observed the presence of necessary basic facilities and other services, which were already mentioned, a separate family part, houses with (many) beds, a few freetime facilities, a department for basic supply e.g. clothing (observation, February 25th, 2014). The staff seemed to make efforts to make the migrants have a good time (as far as possible), with various NGOs working together to provide all services. Some funding arriving to Ceuta's spaces of flow is for a small proportion destined for the CETI (Kuus, 2004, p. 477).

There is hope that the EU will increase support for Ceuta with regard to border-management, Abad (2014c) writes on the basis of a speech by a leading politician, especially since the shocking events of 15 migrants dying in an attempt to cross from Morocco to Ceuta on February 6th, 2014. After the event the EU seemed to acknowledge that Ceuta is an EU-border and needs support in doing border-work the union benefits from (Kuus, 2004, p. 477).

Many times the border-passage space of flow is envisioned as some sort of filter, separating the desired or accepted flow from those who should not pass. This image emerges e.g. from a comment by Ramos Aparicio (personal communication, February 12th, 2013): "we are in a globalizing world, with 'yours' and 'mine' - if this is 'mine' you get in through a door. But if I do not give you my permission you cannot pass. (...) depending on your documentation. Ceuta being a border means that it is the door of a house, like a filter: Ceuta is a filter because you cannot pass without permission".

A similar understanding of the border is depicted by Romero Aliaga (personal communication, February 25th, 2014), who stresses that the Schengen-visa is "required again in Algeciras" and that passing without respective documentation means that a migrant stays in Spain without any rights. The underlying imagination of the EU is that different groups of migrants can be distinguished by their rights to access the EU and by their documentation. The space of flow at the border in Ceuta is imagined as a rather selective one, separating distinct kinds of flows (Ferrer-Gallardo & Van Houtum, 2013, p. 243). This is reaffirmed by Romero Aliaga (personal communication, February 25th, 2014) as well: "I would change the border: It would be advantageous to have an asylum-system immediately at the passage. If you do not ask for asylum, or you do not fit the process you can be sent back. With the system at the passage, those who need international protection can ask for it at the border. The CETI [the third space of flow, the flow of migrants] should be represented. Whenever someone qualifies for refugee-status he or she can be brought to the CETI. It would be a way to identify whether the migrants need protection or not, a direct application of the law".

Box 3 Background information

Observation at Benzú border in Ceuta – sensitivity of the topic

During an observation at the former second border-passage in the district of Benzú my attention was attracted by the fence and I started looking for a few seconds into the direction of where the fence is built into the water: I was approached by guards of the border-security immediately, just because they saw me walking with a camera. Their harsh command to put the camera into my bag was a different reaction than at other official institutions in Ceuta. Military institutions use to be sensitive topics, but at this point I realized that the police and border-institutions are a highly sensitive issue (observation, February 7th, 2014).

A normalization of the border (having Morocco acknowledge Ceuta to be Spanish), Aróstegui Ruiz (personal communication, February 26th, 2014) recognizes, would also help to solve the migration issue, since those, who have the right to enter, would reach European territory more easily. In all those insights about the border-passage in relation to migration, the filter-function for migrants, is emphasized, a job Ceuta does for the EU (Kuus, 2004, pp. 474, 477).

Simultaneously the border is imagined as a 'buffer' (Kuus, 2004, 477) against the lot of people, who presumably carry too much 'otherness' (Stoler, 1997, pp. 213-214; Ferrer-Gallardo & Van Houtum, 2012, p. 243) into the EU and presumably cannot be sustained. "I believe that it is convenient and inconvenient for the EU to have the border here [in Ceuta]. If the border was not here, something similar would happen to Algeciras or at another place along the [Spanish] coast. This is, I think, why the EU helps Ceuta and Spain" (J. Ramos

Aparicio, personal communication, February 12th, 2014). Ceuta thus has to conform to this role and work to live up to the respective obligations (Kuus, 2004, 474): "we have to keep the border in a good state, so these people [non-Schengen migrants] stay out" (J. Ramos Aparicio, personal communication, February 12th, 2014). In these imaginations the city receives the mentioned support by the EU, but it is conditional: It is bound upon the borderwork Ceuta has to realize for the union (Walters, 2002, pp. 569, 573): "it is work to control a border (...) It is impossible. As long as countries do not develop people continue to migrate. It is a question of mentality and the expectation that things will be much better in Europe" (C. Pérez Marín, personal communication, February 24th, 2014).

The conditional relation with the EU (Kuus, 2004, p. 477) concerning the border is alluded to also by Campos Martínez (personal communication, February 19th, 2014), Romero Aliaga (personal communication, February 25th, 2014), Castillo Sempere (personal communication, February 20th, 2014) and Olmedo Izar Fuente (personal communication, February 26th, 2014): "the influence of the problems on the reputation and image of Ceuta as well as the human aspect of people searching for a better life, (...) I am worried about that" – Castillo Sempere; "it is a city in Africa and at the moment there is pressure [from migrants]" – Olmedo Izar Fuente).

In those geopolitical imaginations the status of the city in the EU is affected by the reputation of the spaces of flow, which emerges among others in documents of the government: the remodeling and restructuring of the Tarajal border-passage is set as one of the priorities for the period 2014 -2020 (Presidencia de la Ciudad, 2014). The only way for Ceuta to disconfirm the reputation of infiltration of otherness (Stoler, 1997, p. 213) is by presenting itself simultaneously as a modern place to visitors – a strategy of shifting attention, thus invisibilizing e.g. issues about migration (Ferrer-Gallardo et al., 2014): the restructuring of the Tarajal seems a necessary measure for improving the city's status within the EU (Kuus, 2014, p. 479).

However, it is not only Ceuta doing borderwork for the EU: collaboration with Morocco for borderwork has been reinforced (Saura, 2013f) in order to prevent the flow of 'otherness' into the EU (Kramsch, 2011, p. 201). Morocco

also plans to construct another fence, Morocco's own wall, around the border-cities (Ramos, 2014) in order to comply more easily with the border-work tasks. It is thus also Morocco doing borderwork for the EU, entering a conditional relation with the union (Kramsch, 2011, p. 200) (conditional, because financial compensation and other support is provided in case the country assists the EU and behaves the way the union expects it).

This way, even massive assaults on the border by migrants, gathering in groups of more than 500 people, are being prevented. With the help of technological means allowing tracing the movement of groups of migrants the security forces can be alarmed (El Pueblo, 2014j). Since the tragedy of February 6th, when several migrants died at the Tarajal passage, stricter orders have been released by the Spanish state: now the defense of the border by shooting gummy balls or false munition is prohibited (ibid.). Yet, it is more frequently the Moroccan security forces, interrupting the flow of migrants into Ceuta (Rincón, 2013c).

The fundamental role of collaboration in the implementation of the borderwork to be realized is stressed in a lot of imaginations of powerful discourse-makers - sometimes because it is working out effectively, sometimes not. Coordination of collaboration can still be improved (J.M. Campos Martínez, personal communication, February 19th, 2014; Pérez, 2014).

Moroccan everyman-respondents hardly renegotiate the imaginations concerning funding for the securitization of the border. Generally, only few Moroccans connote modernization measures in Ceuta to funding and are aware of such benefits of being part of the EU. Those, who are most regularly in the Ceuta or in touch with Ceutís from the center, resulted to be most informed (Merrifield, 2011, p. 108). Thus, the general lack of renegotiation about the funding for securitization is not surprising.

Box 4 Background information

Migrants in Tetouan

In comparison to 2011 I noticed that more Sub-Saharan were in Tetouan's streets, several of them making a living as street-sellers. Their habit to involve in such occupation was confirmed by representations of some respondents. Whereas they might have been present in Tanger before, their presence is new to me in Tetouan. I wondered how many of them would want to stay in Morocco, how many were students in Morocco and how many were intending to cross the fences of Ceuta and join the flow into the EU (Observation, March 2nd, 2014).

Yet, Moroccan everymen might observe technological upgrades at the border-passage, such as installations of cameras or the reinforcement of the fence (participant 2, 11). On the other hand, both are of little concern to them, since they can cross the border with their special permissions through the passage - their lives and practices are hardly touched by the EU support for Ceuta's securitization of spaces of flows (De Certeau, 1988). Only participant 6, who is a Spanish living in Tetouan, knew Ceuta receives incentives to upgrade the border-passage (Kuus, 2004, p. 477).

In the renegotiation of the imaginations of the function of Ceuta for the EU Moroccan everyman-participants confirmed that Ceuta has as role to play. Yet, the filter- and buffer-function do not emerge from their imaginations explicitly. Participant 3, 7 and 12 describe the flow of migration to Ceuta and try to explain its causes. "There are many Africans [by 'Africans' Moroccans often refer to Sub-Saharan migrants, discursively shifting African-identity south] who live there [in Ceuta]. Many want to cross the border [from Morocco to Ceuta]" (participant 3). Participant 12 reminds that Ceuta is like a door for the EU, also for migrants, who come to Ceuta, because they wish to satisfy their basic needs and long for a better life, just like the Moroccan

workers. The comparison made here envisions Ceuta to be a superior, economically affluent place, where people from 'inferior', more 'backwards' economies - on the template scale of economic development (Kramersch, 2011, p. 196) - migrants and Moroccans - come to make a living.

Participant 7 explains the same. Thus, the Moroccan everyman-participants are aware of the migration flow to Ceuta, independent of whether they use to go to Ceuta (participant 7 and 12) or have never been to the city (participant 3). Participant 12 and 7 worry like Castillo Sempere that huge numbers of migrants cannot be sustained by Ceuta alone, and neither by a single country. Instead participant 12 affirms that the EU should take charge of the migrants' fates all together. Participant 1, 3 and 6 observe that once the migrants make it to the border, "Morocco always sends them back to their own places when they arrive to Fnideq" (participant 1).

The geopolitical imaginations of the everymen here illustrate the borderwork Ceuta and especially Morocco do for the EU (Kramersch, 2011, p. 200), preventing the EU from having otherness flow across the border, like a buffer (Kuus, 2004, p. 477). Participant 6 confirms the powerful discourse and explains that Ceuta as a transition point is also a point where controls are implemented (Walters, 2002, p. 574). On the other hand she is sure that such controls do not succeed in inhibiting migrants from arriving to Ceuta – which reaffirms the complexity of the task for Ceuta mentioned in the discourse-makers's imaginations.

Certain aspects of renegotiation by Moroccan participants are based on their daily routine (Merrifield, 2011, p. 108): due to the increase of migrant-arrivals to Ceuta throughout the last years, Ceuta's buffer function and securitization have been reinforced (Rumford, 2008, p. 57). This had negative impacts on the flow of traders and carriers. The controls became more severe for them as well, their business has become more complicated in comparison to 10 or 20 years ago (participant 1 and 11).

On a more abstract level e.g. Moroccans hardly presented themselves concerned about Ceuta's reputation and status in the EU for the migration flow, since they do not identify with the city and might also not be aware of the negative image of Ceuta presented in media. All in all the Moroccan everyman-participants do not explicitly identify the borderwork Ceuta and Morocco do for the EU (Kuus, 2004, p. 477): in their renegotiation and meaning-making they do identify the flows, causes, problems and effects, but they do not evaluate them in terms of gains for Ceuta and Morocco in the conditional relation (Kuus, 2004, p. 484).

Ceuti respondents, instead, result to be aware of the financial and material support by the EU. Participant 18 sometimes gets in touch with the border in his job. He is sure that the EU's contribution to securitization manifests most in the tasks FRONTEX, the border-management agency, solves for them (Ferrer-Gallardo & Van Houtum, 2012, pp. 244-246). The reasons for measures taken are all related to migration, in his imagination, since smuggling is a problem dealt with in Algeciras (participant 18). Participant 19 states that the funding given to Ceuta by the EU for being its border in Africa is an important and just investment, as the border-control tasks benefit the entire EU.

Beyond funding the support takes place in the form of additional corps of police, national, local forces and the Guardia Civil. These first two respondents thus observe the working of the conditional relation, with the EU giving subsidies for Ceuta's borderwork (Walters, 2002, p. 569). Participant 27 though admits that he is little informed about the security measures taken by the EU in Ceuta. The latter opinion might reflect imaginations of more Ceutis – there

seems to be a clear lack of exact information about the implication of the EU in the spaces of flow in Ceuta - it is little tangible or empirically observable in everyday practice for Ceuta's inhabitants (Merrifield, 2000, p. 108).

The borderwork expected from Ceuta is a process Ceuta's borderpeople-everymen do seem aware of, including the impacts on the city's status in the EU and Europeanization (Kuus, 2004, p. 484). Participant 23 describes the flow of "all the immigrants from different countries, Cameroon and Pakhistan (...) on a journey or forced to stay [in Ceuta]. (...) they do not want problems or conflicts. That would harm them as well. Their stay does not affect the peace or coexistence in Ceuta, it is no problem". Yet, she is convinced that, if there were more of them, the equilibrium of the city would be affected –reproducing arguments made in other places of the EU in order to justify the selective filtering and defense against migration (Stoler, 1997; Kramsch, 2011, p. 201.). She also dislikes to continuously see her city in the news in relation to the borderwork done and failing. It makes her feel ashamed and at the same time powerless - powerless, because she would want the media to report more completely, not only about the negative aspects of Ceuta – showing European-ness instead of exclusively 'un-European' features (Kuus, 2004, p. 479).

These insights reflect many aspects of the Europeanization-thinking revealed in powerful imaginations: the borderwork has to be done as it is imposed on Ceuta in the conditional relation (Kuus, 2004, p. 477), although it is a major struggle for the city and it harms its image in the EU and consequently economic development (in tourism or through settlement of companies) (Sparke, 2002, p. p. 215). Participant 18 highlights the conditional relation and lot of work done by Ceuta for the EU: "we serve as a cork for the EU" (participant 18) and "this way the EU can sleep with a 'culo tranquilo' ['quiet arse' –meaning that the EU and its citizens do not have to worry]" (participant 18). The participant explains that the preoccupations and worries about migration as a problem for the EU are being absorbed by Ceuta, working like a buffer (Kuus, 2004, p. 477), incorporating the problems and otherness in the city's spaces of flow.

The status of the city is regarded to be highly impacted also by the support the EU gives to Ceuta in financial and material means (participant 20, 23). It is regarded as reaffirmation of Ceuta's European-ness and the EU's commitment to guaranteeing this status to Ceuta in future. The bad reputation of Ceuta is something many participants regret about, but they reaffirm that Ceuta is better than its reputation (participant 22, 23, 26), deserving a good status in the EU and maybe more - the Ceutí everymen seek to Europeanize and normalize their city (Kuus, 2004, p. 475). Participant 15 is actually sure that the existence of the border is advantageous for security reasons and peace (participant 15) in the EU. He thus subjects to the border situation and reaffirms it discursively (Kramsch, 2011, p. 200; Kolossov & Scott, 2012, p. 8).

6.1.4 Border-passage: flows into Ceuta and the European culture

Ceuta's culture, Europeanization and flows

Being at a border, powerful discourse-makers explain, also impacts on the consciousness of belonging to one or another supra-local institution – in case of Ceuta, there is a wide-spread consciousness of belonging to Spain and the EU: a strong tendency of discursive Europeanization can be traced in geopolitical imaginations in Ceuta deriving from the perceived (potential and real) presence of otherness around and within Ceuta (Kuus, 2004, p. 479). The

frequent comparison with places, which in geopolitical imagination are less European can be seen as process of 'shifting' or 'nesting otherness' (Kuus, 2004, p. 479).

Ceuta's culture and the city are Europeanized, such as in an analysis by Olmedo Izar Fuente (personal communication, February 26th, 2014): "being European means having privileges, on a global level. The city [Ceuta] has changed a lot. We know what the standard of life is like in Asia, Africa, in South America. It is completely different". Several experts highlight that in Ceuta a culture of rejection of migrants and Moroccans is growing, defending the European-ness of the Ceutís and their city (Ferrer-Gallardo, 2009, p. 31; Stoler, 1997, pp. 213-214). "I am worried about the people in Ceuta being annoyed by migration and there are many racists. The insecurity discourse is wrong. The migrants here in CETI are no criminals; the migrants have not come to steal. Yet, it is true that there is a lot of trans-border crime with Morocco; The Moroccans have permissions to come to work or beg; others come and steal" (A. Romero Aliaga, personal communication, February 25th, 2014). The latter quotation illustrates that the two groups of flows are distinguished, the Moroccans allowed to cross the border to Ceuta and the (Sub-Saharan) migrants, who are not.

This imagination fits the idea of the filter-function of the border (Stoler, 1997, p. 199): the lawyer Romero Aliaga implies in his statement that there is a reason to be skeptical about the flow of Moroccans, but he rejects the common opinion that migrants perform criminal activities in Ceuta. Curiously, he considers the latter assumption to be "racist", whereas he does not for prejudices about Moroccan border-crossers. The distinction between the groups of flows into Ceuta implies that different degrees of European-ness are attributed to the groups by different people (Hardt & Negri, 2000, pp. 192-194), mirroring imaginations of European-ness (Kuus, 2004, p. 475).

The EU is imagined here as a union of likeness (Kuus, 2004), in which 'contamination' with otherness is seen as dangerous (Stoler, 1997, pp. 213-214). "The people here are xenophobic about the other side. They are afraid of the different. This is why Spanish-ness is stressed here more than in Spain, also because of the claims from Morocco. You can see Spanish flags everywhere" (A. Romero Aliaga, personal communication, February 25th, 2014). (see figure 4)

Romero Aliaga, however, is not the only one observing such a tendency: rejection often seems to surface as invisibilization-strategy (Ferrer-Gallardo et al., 2014). Not knowing or talking about the 'other' next door, even if the existence and features of 'the other' as imagined in Ceuta are not hated is a strategy of ignoring. Gomez Barceló (personal communication, February 7th, 2014) has a different explanation for disinterest: It is not only Ceuta, but also Europe, which does not see the change occurring in Morocco in different fields and how much more 'European' it has become. Europe always "just looks at Europe", but not beyond. In this sense, cynically, the ignorance and neglect by the Ceutí culture seems to be almost 'European' or intrinsic to it: the EU as perceived by Gomez Barceló marginalizes the other by invisibilization and disinterest (Ferrer-Gallardo et al., 2014) and discursively shifting it beyond its borders (Kuus, 2004, p. 479).

Also Pérez Marín (personal communication, February 24th, 2014) is critical of the culture of rejection and regrets that cosmopolitan thinking has not yet started to prevail in Ceuta. He regards the attitude of rejection to be a "colonial idea" – an old-fashioned idea - by Ceutís about Moroccans, since the rejection of otherness from the other side actually hampers the Europeanization and economic development of modernity and European-ness in Ceuta

(Kramsch, 2011, p. 196). Campos Martínez (personal communication, February 19th, 2014) confesses that indeed many people turn their backs to the South and respective flows, neglecting and invisibilizing the neighborhood with Morocco (Ferrer-Gallardo et al., 2014, p. 4).

“The syndrome of the border influences everything”, Campos Martínez comments, “although here in the center you do not realize that there is a fence separating Ceuta from Morocco. The city lives escapist” from its own reality. In this comment Campos Martínez (personal communication, February 19th, 2014) hints at that the border-situation of Ceuta is largely ignored, invisibilized, in policy-making and by people from the center (Ferrer-Gallardo et al., 2014). Nevertheless it is a determinant feature for all spheres of life in the city, even in its center, according to the expert’s geopolitical imagination (Kolossov & Scott, 2012, p. 34; Driessen, 2010, p. 175).

Several experts defend the rejection of migrants, partly legitimizing the rejection-culture in favor of European-ness (Kramsch, 2011, p. 201). The delegate of the government, Olmedo Izar Fuente (personal communication, February 26th, 2014) is first of all worried about the pressures, the flows, from the surrounding areas. In the local newspaper *El Faro*, additionally, essays have been published by readers, who reject the flow of migrants and the voices of those who defend their rights. Álvarez (2014b) argues that indeed migrants have proved to be criminal, since a proportionally very high percentage of prisoners in Spain are foreigners in comparison to the proportion of foreigners in the total population. He observes prostitutes, terrorist and mafias to be mostly foreign and warns from more immigration across Ceuta’s border. This xenophobic attitude published in the local news is part of the imagination of a purely ‘European’ EU (Ferrer-Gallardo & Van Houtum, 2012, pp. 244-246), free of crime and illicit activities – a proper place.

Such pieces of imagination contribute to the rejection of flows of otherness into Ceuta and reaffirm that the European-ness of Ceuta can be only maintained and protected by improving the borderwork done for the EU (Kuus, 2004, p. 477). All the comments and insights from the official imaginations thus confirm that there is a culture of rejection of the flows to Ceuta, considered to carry attributes of otherness, into the city (Stoler, 197, pp. 213-214). European-ness and the border are firmly defended in most powerful imaginations (Kuus, 2004, pp. 474, 477).

Moroccan everyman-participants, in contrast to the culture of rejection, highlight the Europeanization of their own culture through the flows into Ceuta and back across the border (see chapter 6.2.1) – they hardly renegotiate the imaginations about the culture of rejection.

Participant 12 and 13, who use to stay in Ceuta for entire weeks, have observed only “few” incidents of people showing racist attitudes to them. It is likely that Ceuti culture of rejection surfaces when meeting ‘European’ (-considered) people from other European places. Borderpeople then aim at Europeanizing the city and the ‘self’, shifting otherness beyond the border (Kuus, 2004, p. 479). Yet, consequently the prejudices and rejection do not manifest in everyday practices (Merrifield, 2011, p. 108).

Certain groups among the Ceuti everyman-respondents share attitudes of rejection of ‘otherness’ from beyond the border imagined by the local leaders and which accordingly seems to prevail. They are of the opinion that the flows culturally harm Ceuta and its European-ness (Kuus, 2004, p. 475) (especially people from the center without much

contact to the other side). Everyman-respondents, especially those with experience in interaction with Muslims and migrants, do not subject to this imagination (Ferrer-Gallardo, 2009, p. 31). Thus whereas the renegotiation and subjection to the imagined culture of rejection does not fit the daily routine of Moroccans, especially everymen from certain central areas (where Christian, Spanish dominate the population) (participants 14, 19, 21, 22, 31) are (partly) bearers of the rejection discourse (including in their practices, e.g. participant 22 has just once in her life been to Morocco and never wants to go again) (Gibson-Graham, 2000, p. 108).

Participant 14 stresses that he does not use to go to Morocco, as it seems far to him – which has to be, of course, interpreted in figurative ways. Participant 18 shifts otherness across the border: “Across the border there is also a cultural difference. In Europe [including Ceuta] the religion does not influence life, people are atheist or moderately Christian. But in Morocco the religion affects all the spheres of life of people”. Participant 22 puts it more simply: “If Ceuta was not Spanish or European, it would be bad. We would live like most of the Moroccans - dieing from hunger”. Participant 20 seems to share this point of view: “If Ceuta was not Spanish or European, it would be just another people of Africa. Just a bad people, it is difficult to imagine”.

The otherness across the border is thus attributed to behaviors and standards of living, religion, but also to lack of rights and freedom (no security, no human rights, the role of women is zero) (participant 21). Several seem to fear the ‘other’ they attribute to Morocco in their discourse and seek to attribute European-ness to themselves (Kuus, 2004, p. 479). Morocco is thus represented as inferior to Ceuta in various fields in the geopolitical imaginations of these participants.

Participant 26 explains why she thinks that also Muslim-Ceuti’s prefer Ceuta to be Spanish, not Moroccan: “they have a better time here with us [Europeans], the quality of life you have here you cannot have in Morocco, you do not have any medicine there. According to participant 31 there is a major difference between Ceuti’s and their superior culture and people, who come from the other side of the border: “people of low educational level, cultural low level, who do not know how to behave” (participant 31) come to Ceuta. Education and civilization are applied as criteria through which otherness can be shifted across the border.

A Moroccan Ceuti everyman-respondent has noted that some Ceuti’s make use of ‘othering tactics’ by presenting racist attitudes and calling the Moroccans “moros” in order to Europeanize themselves, although not all of them do so. Participant 28 adds that African people are very different and therefore he guesses that without belonging to the EU the situation in Ceuta “would be even worse” (participant 28). This quotation shows that although Ceuta might *not yet* be fully Europeanized and modern (Kuus, 2004, p. 483) in the imagination of many Ceuti’s, what is beyond the border is worse.

Participant 26 and 27 from Ceuta’s margins, however, locate otherness even on the Spanish mainland: “In Andalusia they do not know how to deal with the young dropping out of school, so people come here and they find work. At least they find a job here” (participant 26) and participant 27 is convinced that in Spain mainland “the marginality is 3 times as bad as in Ceuta, there is corruption and yihaddism”.

In summary then, otherness seems to be attributed in geopolitical imaginations to everything that is ‘African’ (except Ceuta, which is European although it is in Africa!). It is depicted as culturally inferior. And even places in

Spain are imagined inferior to Ceuta's European-ness – showing the 'othering' tactics applied (Kuus, 2004, p. 479) as well as a partial reproduction of the powerful imaginations (Gibson-Graham, 2000, p. 108).

6.2 Agency, otherness and resistance in the spaces of flow of Ceuta

Otherness, agency and resistance imagined as weakening the conditional relation between the EU and Ceuta's spaces of flow will be discussed in this section. The first aspects presented are various features of otherness (6.3.1). Agency in the spaces of flow will be presented as manifesting in (tactical) everyday practices in Ceuta and demands for change (6.3.2). The latter can transform into more active resistance, such as protests (6.3.3). It is crucial to note, that all the features of agency, otherness and resistance of the spaces of flow affect the relation to the EU, for both, the spaces of flow and consequently Ceuta as a whole.

6.2.1 The spaces of flow and their characteristics of otherness

Ceuta as a transition point, cross-border relations and mixture of cultures

Ceuta's spaces of flow are often imagined by the local powerful leaders to carry attributes of otherness, because they are points of transition impacting also on the city's identity. In Ceuta, Gomez Barceló (personal communication, February 7th, 2014) explains, one can encounter "problems like in any other Spanish city, and additionally the problems of a border-city". Campos Martínez agrees: "Life is influenced by the border here".

"It conditions the way you think and live. From Ceuta you have a more global view on things than from other places. Ceuta has always had international contacts, for the harbor, and the position. We have interacted internationally from when we are small, we are always simultaneously worried about the global situation, the international and the local one", Mas Vallecón (personal communication, February 14th, 2014) adds. What Mas Vallecón describes is 'thinking from the margins', thinking from a border or 'double thinking' - as theorized by Mignolo (2000). Thanks to the flows into the city and the spaces of interaction with others, at the border and the harbor, the citizens of Ceuta have learnt to think from the border – an important feature of otherness and agency not fitting simple subjection to the European-superiority discourse (Mignolo, 2000, pp. 63-64).

Further, official-discourse-makers from Ceuta, who have known the history of Ceuta and flow of migration into the city for long have a different understanding of borders. "Now in this century I have a Spanish passport, but three centuries ago I could have had a Moroccan, Egyptian or Syrian passport" (C. Pérez Marín, personal communication, February 24th, 2014). This border-thinking (Mignolo, 2000, pp. 63-64), which does not reproduce the division of "the European and the Other" is an alternative way of understanding. It contains a sense of resistance to the powerful binary discourse of conditionality (Mignolo, 2000, pp. 71-73).

Cultural adaptation and conformation to EU standards is thus mediated by Ceuta's border and manifests in and because of the border-passage space of flow. The culture in Ceuta, in a border-place, is much more influenced by the renegotiation of discourses of likeness than elsewhere (Kolossoff & Scott, 2012, p. 34). Thus, Pérez Marín (personal communication, February 24th, 2014) calls Ceuta a "bridge" between the EU and the Maghreb, implying that he sees the city as a space of flow and interaction with an 'un-European Other' (Ferrer-Gallardo et al., 2014).

The cross-border relations, across the border-space of flow, are part of the geopolitical imagination of Ceuta's powerful discourse-makers and are imagined to contribute to otherness in Ceuta: Most elite-experts interviewed have connections across the border. As EU citizens, Ceutís are allowed to cross the border to Morocco freely and stay for as long as they wish (up to three months in a row) in the neighboring country: Ceutí people use to cross the border for the weekend, to see friends (J. M. Mas Vallecón, personal communication, February 14th, 2014; Martínez Arcas, personal communication, February 6th, 2014).

Alarcón Caballero (personal communication, February 12th, 2014) has been working often in Morocco e.g. for collaboration with Spanish institutions and the Ceutí library, he manages. Thus he has built friendships across the border. He even bought a house in the country for weekends. Accordingly, he travels to Morocco almost every week, sometimes twice. He thus contributes to the flow of people to Morocco, through the borderpassage. Otherness in this context can be seen in frequent interaction with a so-considered 'non-European, Muslim culture' (Ferrer-Gallardo, 2009, p. 31). Gomez Barceló tells a similar story. He writes and works for a Moroccan Ministry, the Ministry of Art in Rabat. He enjoys travelling to Morocco, meeting friends or having them visit him in his private life (J.L. Gomez Barceló, personal communication, February 7th, 2014).

What is more, many Ceutís are originally from the other side of the border and have relatives on both sides (J.M. Mas Vallecón, personal communication, February 14th, 2014). Another example of crossborder-interaction has been mentioned before - the life of architect Pérez Marín consists of commuting between cities on the Spanish mainland and various sites in Morocco (C. Pérez Marín, personal communication, February 24th, 2014).

Many Ceutís have decided to officially or unofficially stay in Fnideq, the first Moroccan village behind the border: "That people go to live in Fnideq while working in Ceuta has been a common phenomenon for long. Christians and Muslims make use of these advantages (...), the rent is much lower. Some families from here also go to live in Morocco, also working there. Yet, they continue to receive the support for unemployment and their children still attend schools in Ceuta. Mas Vallecón (personal communication, February 14th, 2014) reasons very similar and explains that the national crisis has made the trend even more popular. Aróstegui Ruiz (personal communication, February 26th, 2014) agrees that such behaviors, however, are normal and use to occur in border-regions (Kolossov & Scott, 2012, p. 36). Yet, such relations, the imaginations of the powerful discourse-makers point out, weaken Ceuta's economic modernization and thus the city's Europeanization (Kramsch, 2011, p. 196).

Beyond business-relations across the border, actors, like NGOs, have founded a cross-border Euro-African researcher-network with the aim of raising consciousness about and intensifying the fight against detention of foreigners and migrant tragedies, guaranteeing respect and human rights, abolishing deportations (El Faro, 2014g). This interaction and the dependence on collaboration is a distinct feature of Ceuta, by some imagined as feature of otherness (dependence on the interaction with a Maghreb, Muslim state) related to the space of flows at the border, the Tarajal. It partially weakens the subjection to the EU and the conditional relation (Kuus, 2004, p. 473): Olmedo Izar Fuente (personal communication, February 26th, 2014) admits that the role of the border has become more important than he considers sustainable for the city, especially, in the commercial sector. Its repercussions can be felt in other aspects of life though, also in education, housing and social services. Olmedo Izar Fuente dislikes the irregular character of many activities, the otherness of the flows (Kuus, 2004, 484).

On the contrary Carlos Pérez Marín (personal communication, February 24th, 2014) identifies this attitude as a feature of otherness: “the border has become the best indication of incompetence [of local politicians], a major problem of the city” – a sign and symbol of otherness (Kramsch, 2011, p. 196): he criticizes backwards-oriented urban planning not taking into consideration new developments in Morocco across the border (Pérez Marín, 2013) – which in this context implies that he regards the local decision-makers to work in an old-fashioned, un-Europeanized manner (Kuus, 2004, p. 479).

But also Ceutí decision-makers are going to establish and institutionalize the ‘otherness’ of interdependence across the border as part of Ceuta - in the strategic plan (Ciudad de Ceuta, 2014) they emphasize the demand from the neighboring country in commerce and tourism which Ceuta could live and rely on (ibid., p. 4). It is part of the program of the government to facilitate Moroccans obtaining temporary visa, ensure good treatment and provide information and services.

In the imaginations of Ceuta’s powerful discourse-makers even a mixture of cultures has formed across the border. Romero Aliaga (personal communication, February 25th, 2014) observes that in Ceuta the Moroccan Arabic dialect is and has always been spoken, it is the second language of Ceuta. In this sense the flow of ‘otherness’ into Ceuta has found expression also in language (Kuus, 2004, p. 483), especially in the spaces where the flows manifest e.g. at the border-passage. Martínez Arcas (personal communication, February 6th, 2014) suggests that Ceuta should make use of the different flows into and from the city by advertising the mixture of cultures and respective activities or services – to promote economic development (Kramsch, 2011, p. 196; Luxembourg, 1972, p. 60).

Cross-border relations are also part of the imagination of Moroccan everymen. “Ceuta is different from other places because it is located next to Morocco - even the weather is like in Morocco” (participant 3). Also participant 11 stresses Ceuta’s function as a transition point, a “door to another world” and participant 8 reminds that there is a border. According to participant 1 Ceutis highly depend on the production of fruit, vegetable and bread in Morocco, which they use to buy in Fnideq – It is, of course, not true that there is no alternative in Ceuta to get these products, but the observation of the high level of demand by Ceutis is consistent (also confirmed by Ceutí participants and participant 12).

Participant 4 would prefer such cross-border relations to be interrupted, so that the North of Morocco would develop endogenously. At the same time Spanish migrants have started living in Morocco, like participant 6. This flow of migration is envisioned as incoherent with a sustainable European, modern development having qualified workforce stay in Spain. Nonetheless participant 6 describes the attraction of Morocco and the North with its cultural mixture highly influenced by Spanish. Working in Tetouan she contributes to the local economy and participates in many activities of the Spanish community as well as activities of Moroccan associations.

The flows across the border are not simple and one-way, but complex: for participant 6 Ceuta is a “space of transition”, a space of flow, “a city in Africa”. Saying this she attributes ‘otherness’ (Kuus, 2004, p. 483) to the city especially stressing Ceuta’s spaces of flow connecting Ceuta with the other side of the border. There are many cultural similarities between Ceuta and Tetouan, where a Spanish community lives in interaction and exchange with the Moroccans (observation, March 8th, 2014) (see figure 9).

Another proof of the flows of culture and the presence of Spanishness or European-ness in the North of Morocco is the story of participant 7. He went to study at a Spanish highschool in Tetouan and he used to accompany his father attending social events in the 'house of Spain' (the meeting point of the Spanish community of Tetouan). He is convinced that his mentality has been highly influenced through this experience. Generally, he explains, people in the North of Morocco are highly influenced by Spanish culture through the media of Spain such as television. Also through his studies in Granada and interacting with Spanish he feels that he lives with a double culture – combining and merging pieces of culture, which are supposed to be separate.

This insight discloses a sort of double-thinking from the border (Mignolo, 2000, pp. 67-69). Many people in the region know Spanish and could also teach the language to their children - participant 12 has learned Spanish from her father and participant 4 by watching Spanish television. The career and professional development of participant 8 have been based on relations with Spanish, Spain and Ceuta. At the same time he feels like a real "tetouani", very much at home in the culture of Northern Morocco and Spain. Nonetheless, being a student in Spain, he participated in a union of Moroccan students to fight for Moroccan independence and development. His story is thus one of a double culture (ibid.) as well.

Moroccans from the border-region are not necessarily 'un-European', and the case of participant 6 shows, that Spanish might be attracted by Morocco and a life beyond Europeanization. Flows between Ceuta and Tetouan have existed for long, so a clearcut separation of cultures by the border does not hold, in spite of constant discursive attribution of European-ness to Ceuta and otherness to Morocco (Ferrer-Gallardo & Van Houtum, 2010, p. 247; Kramsch, 2010, p. 1003).

Here thus the simple imposition of conditionality on Europe's margins fails as the realities and contexts are much more complex – neither can the Ceutis make a clear distinction between themselves and the 'others' from beyond the border to prove their European-ness (although discursively they try), nor can the EU simply impose norms and obligations on the city and its citizens, because these might not adhere in their daily routines (De Certeau, 1988; Mignolo, 2000, p. 83).



Figure 9. Andalusian-style architecture in Tetouan and Moroccan-style architecture in Ceuta. Photos taken in December, 2011.

Instead Moroccan everymen beyond the border might comply with (imagined) European criteria, showing a lack of top-down control (Kolossoff & Scott, 2012, pp. 31-32). Having a look at the individual life-stories and everyday-practices is fundamental to understand the renegotiation of imaginations (Häkli, 1998, p. 145). Participant 3 explains that interaction between Ceutís and Moroccan border-people must be positive, since the mentality on both sides of the border is similar, independent of the religious orientation of the individual. Coming from the French-speaking part of Morocco, he observes more differences in mentality between himself and the Northern Moroccans than between Ceutís and them.

Deception from interaction with Ceutís was reported to me by participant 2. He heard of several cases in which Ceutís hired Moroccans for construction works, but at the end they did not pay the price they promised to pay. When asked for the rest of the money, they would only give a short answer "manana, manana". The participant suspects the Ceutís of betraying and cheating the Moroccans for business, occasionally (Luxembourg, 1972, p. 60).

Unlike imaginations of the powerful discourse-makers everymen from Morocco imagine interaction mostly regarding personal relations. In official discourse the aspect of business and cooperation has been prevailing. The topic is taken up in the renegotiation but relocated within the individual everyman's everyday practices (Merrifield, 2011, p. 108; Hall, 1997a, p. 32). The otherness of the mixed culture is often attributed to the differences in religion (Ferrer-Gallardo & Van Houtum, 2012, p. 243), the Islam, the 'other' of the EU, infiltrating into the city – an indication of practices of otherness - or a lower standard of living, as indication of economic backwardness (Kramsch, 2011, p. 196). And such attributes of otherness are imagined (by Ceutí everyman-respondents and everymen) to weaken the conditional relation with the EU (Kuus, 2004, p. 474).

The crossborder relations are part of the imagination of several Ceutí everymen as features of 'otherness' as well. Participant 17, 21 and 14 simply admit (they do not invisibilize!) that Ceuta is a border-city, in Africa (participant 17) with a neighboring country different from Ceuta (participant 21, 14). People from the Northern region of Morocco benefit from and sustain Ceuta thanks to an exceptional visa exemption of the Schengen-regime. It allows for the vital flows of Moroccans to Ceuta. For this exception in the Schengen-norms Ceuta is (together with few other territories) distinct from the rest of the EU. The exception can be seen as a feature of otherness (Kolossoff & Scott, 2012, p. 18).

Yet, the flow of Moroccans to Ceuta even from beyond the visa-exemption region in Morocco is economically important for both sides, participant 22 explains. She regards it to be some kind of symbiosis, a "mutual support". The imagination here is framed in terms of mutuality. Participant 19's adds to this impression, by observing that the Straits are an obstacle, which requires measures such as the special economic system to survive adds to this information. Participant 18 agrees that the relationships with Morocco are relevant economic-wise more than diplomatically, because of the strong impacts on the entire population of Ceuta.

More everymen from Ceuta are conscious that the economic relationship across the border is shaped by a certain dependence (participant 21 and 31). They perceive it as inadequate to comply with criteria of the EU-model (Kramsch, 2011, p. 196). Similarly, participant 26 is rather critical about Ceutís living across their border and not paying their taxes. From her perspective, they benefit from inscriptions in Ceuta, pretend to be not working while

actually paying lower rents and being working – this kind of cross-border relation to her means exploitation of the honest, working Ceutís. She envisions this relation as non-European (Stoler, 1997, p. 199), reproducing the powerful discourse-makers' preoccupation about wider adverse economic effects.

The cross-border family relations imagined by Ceuta's powerful are confirmed to exist in the meaning-making of everyman-respondents, too: participant 15, who is originally from Morocco appreciates that he can visit his family during weekends across the border. Participant 28 is married with a Moroccan and they regularly visit her family on the other side. Participant 16 explains: "no one here has bad ideas about people on the other side; most of us have family there". In this sense we can deduce that at least the Arab-speaking community in Ceuta is highly related to Morocco in private life. The interaction is easier for the Ceutís who speak Darija (participant 27). "The border is just a separation for another country". In the imaginations of many Ceutís, participant 18 explains, the Moroccans are seen as the Ceutís' neighbors. There is a basis of historical relations and common cultural roots (participant 18).

In this sense also a Ceutís imagine a cross-border-culture, which blurs distinctions between 'them' and 'us' in the border-region, weakening any clear definitions of Ceuta's European-ness versus 'otherness' in Morocco (Stoler, 1997, pp. 213-214). Participant 24 does not want to think of differences. To her the people from the other side are just like Ceutís. It is striking that participant 24 is a Muslim Ceuti from a non-central area of Ceuta, often crossing the border. The difference in perception of the commonalities of culture across the border seems to vary among others according to the intensity of contact with the other side. The fragmentation along lines of degrees of interaction seems to fit religious and spatial lines of fragmentation between groups in Ceuta (Hardt & Negri, 2000, p. 200).

Appreciation of the interaction is a feature, which is special. It allows the flows of 'otherness' into Ceuta to continue (Stoler, 1997, pp. 213-214). Interaction can be even part of the routine: "we use to go to the other side, to eat, to travel to have a walk, (...) we also go to the mainland to eat and travel. (...) It depends on the necessities, sometimes I go everyday." Participant 28 outlines the dependence on the possibility of going to the other side of the border to buy food for favorable prices. In this sense 'otherness', from the neighboring Muslim country is flowing into Ceuta (Stoler, 1997, pp. 213-214). "I use to go almost every week, because it is cheaper. I buy vegetables and fish is also fresh there. The vegetables are good. Many vegetables in Ceuta come from Morocco originally, but they first go to the mainland" (participant 20). Additionally participant 20 tells about the beautiful beaches, landscapes and meeting friends.

All those descriptions are evidence of the cross-border practice of shopping. Negative effects derive from such behaviors, impeding consumption and economic modernization in Ceuta (Kramsch, 2011, p. 196). Participant 28 suggests turning the conditional relation (of the EU sharing superior knowledge with others) (Kuus, 2004, p. 473) the other way round: he recommends learning from Moroccans and Morocco about recycling. He has often noticed that people across the border are skilled in reusing seemingly un-usable things. He is convinced that more cooperation with Morocco would have positive effects. This image of the stigmatized 'Other' teaching the Europeanized West, as if being superior in knowledge completely relativizes the image of the EU as where

knowledge and modernity emit from and spread into the world – subaltern knowledge is imagined to be released (Mignolo, 2000, p. 59).

Also imaginations about Ceutís, some in precarious situations, residing across the border are confirmed: “Actually my life is here. I just go to Morocco to sleep. My son uses to go to school here, (...). It is just too expensive to live here with dignity and rights. As the standard of living is lower in Morocco (...) I have been unemployed again for a year, when we decided to go there. We have to stay inscribed here at the house of friends, otherwise schooling would be complicated for my son. (...) Now we live at five kilometers of distance and I first have to cross two borders”, participant 16 tells his story. Participant 27 knows many, who felt forced to move across the border, since they were unable to pay rents anymore. Those, who cross the border daily, I learn from an informal conversation, use to buy bundles like the carriers and take them across the border to make at least some money from the procedure. This cross-border-interaction is labelled by the powerful and everyman-participants, who are not concerned themselves, un-European. It puts additional strain on the municipal budget.

6.2.2 Agency and tactics - practices of otherness and discursive resistance in Ceuta’s spaces of flow

Cross-border-workers

Another flow which imaginations of powerful discourse-makers and borderpeople deal with are cross-border workers, commuters from Morocco, who work in Ceuta (see figure 10). The flow is considered to be un-European: Moroccans are often imagined as the ‘other’ (Kuus, 2004, p. 479). In the strategic plan of the government (Ciudad de Ceuta, 2014), however, also work-conditions of the ‘commuters’ are depicted as un-European. Usually the workers receive significantly lower salaries than the Ceutí average and they often work without contracts and insurances. The planning document does not give much detail. But it promises to improve this un-European practice of hiring Moroccan employees. The local government will make “efforts to (...) repress unfair practices and assure adherence to public order” (Ciudad de Ceuta, 2014, p. 11).

Romero Aliaga (personal communication, February 25th, 2014) outlines that migrants staying at the CETI struggle to find jobs in Ceuta even in the informal economy, e.g. in construction, since this niche is already taken by informally working Moroccans. A very common occupation for these workers is being charwomen in households of Ceutí families (A. Romero Aliaga, personal communication, February 25th, 2014; J.R. Olmedo Izar Fuente, personal communication, February 26th, 2014). The practices of the Ceutí employers do not fit the European expectation and standard of working (Kuus, 2004, p. 482) with a contract, insurance and for a certain minimum salary.

Monitoring of the implementation of proper employment conditions is central also regarding fiscal obligations. Clandestine workers should be searched for and regularized, as their presence inhibits a positive development on the labor market and of Ceuta’s economy. Successful social security inspections are requested by Ceuta’s labor union – with the final aim of contributing to the general economy in Ceuta (Armuña, 2010b). The normalization and standardization, conform to EU norms, demanded here, reflects that Europeanization has not yet achieved a ‘European’ level in this sector (Kuus, 2004, p. 483). But on the other hand, the demand for normalization is an indication of the selfish wish for economic modernization (Kramsch, 2011, p. 196; Luxembourg, 1972).

In the geopolitical imaginations of Moroccans the practice of otherness manifesting in a flow of often informally working Moroccans in Ceuta is renegotiated. Especially those, who actually work in Ceuta informally, have commented on the topic. Participant 12 tells about her job as housekeeper for a Ceuti family from the center. “Thousands of people do the same as I do in my job; many of them have a family. If I found something better in my country I would not come here. I am forced to do so. I go for a piece of bread in my mouth”. Nonetheless her salary is significantly lower than salaries of Spanish workforce.

She regrets that she did not have the chance to study and become a teacher as she intended to until her father had an accident and could not supply the family anymore. “For 5 years I have been without a contract with the elderly lady. (...) I see a black future for me in Ceuta. The uncertainty is overwhelming”. Participant 12 is thus one of many cross-border workers, who work under conditions, which make them vulnerable to arbitrary changes of their work-relations. She also depends on the arbitration of security forces at the border-passage to let her pass to get to her job. Therefore she avoids crossing every day and stays in Ceuta with the family she works for. This way she just has to join the flow across the border eventually during weekends.

Participant 13 (double interview, see appendix) uses to do the same: one of the girls works in housekeeping for a rich family from the center like participant 12; the second has been working in a cafeteria even with a contract and social security (“I could even go to see a medicine if necessary”) until few weeks before the interview, when it was closed down. Now she is searching for a new job, ideally with a contract, but it is not easy. She uses to join the cross-border flow like participant 12 once a week. The first girl prefers to return to Morocco only once per month, because of the security forces at the border. For passing a passport often is not sufficient anymore - often the cross-border workers have to prove that the employer pays social security (participant 13). Irregular job-relations are monitored now. One of them stresses that working without contract to her means being vulnerable, without rights and without influence on the conditions they encounter (participant 13).

The cases show that Moroccan everymen have tactically adapted their schedules, lives and the place to stay to the conditions at the border (De Certeau, 1988; Kolosov & Scott, 2012, pp. 33-34). We can learn from these stories that the vulnerability of cross-border workers is high, due to neglect of EU-norms by their employers (Kuus, 2004, p. 478). On the other hand indeed monitoring of regular employment relations is observed as well (ibid.). The geopolitical imaginations of the powerful discourse-makers are partly reproduced (Gibson-Graham, 2000, p. 108) but more detail and experience is added in the renegotiation (Merrifield, 2011, p. 108).

Also in renegotiations of everyman-participants from Ceuta the presence of the (informally working) cross-border workers is not always connoted to wider social or economic effects, since the everymen seem to analyze the situation from an everyday-practice and individual perspective (Merrifield, 2011, p. 108), less from the template developmental, general perspective of Ceuta’s powerful (Kramersch, 2011, p. 196). Participant 15, who is Moroccan of origin but has been living in Ceuta for 10 years has always worked without contract. Any of his employers offered him a contract, even those for whom he used to work for long. He found a way to ask a permit from the police to stay in Ceuta, but to obtain such a document one needs the respective contacts (participant 15). This corrupt practice of the police certainly does not suit the norms of the EU (Kuus, 2004, pp. 475, 477).

In spite of his vulnerability participant 15 is convinced to stay and fight until he would get an ordinary contract. Often, participant 29 tells, he works six days a week in order to not be replaced by someone working for an even lower salary. As he has made the decision to stay in Ceuta, he has to compete with Moroccan crossborder-workers for his job.

Participant 22 describes the flow of Moroccan workers: “it is a flow of people coming to work here. It is (...) economically important for them and for us. We mutually support each other”. This opinion indicates that many households in Ceuta benefit from having a charwoman, without problems to afford the service, given the low salaries Moroccans work for. Participant 22 tells about her housekeeper, assisting her every day. She and more families, whom the girl helps, however, share the costs of social security and a health insurance – they have created more ‘European’ employment conditions (Kuus, 2004, p. 482).

Participants 17 and 27 know that it is not only housekeepers working in precarious conditions, but the same applies for construction workers. Other respondents seem more aware that the savings for companies and households contribute to the lack of jobs for Ceuta’s unemployed (participant 14, 16, 27): participant 16 does not accuse the Moroccan workers (“I am not rejecting those poor ones, who come here to work to have a life. I am not against foreigners or so. The world is free, the border has been created by people, for their laws”) but he disagrees with the un-European practice of employees exploiting the Moroccans. He would want their jobs to be substituted by ordinary, European employment (Kuus, 2004, p. 475).



Figure 10. Cross-border-workers queuing for the bus in front of the border-passage. Many women work as housekeepers or charwoman for Ceuti families. Photo taken in December, 2011.

Also participant 27 is frustrated by the companies and others not complying with the EU standards of paying minimum salaries. Participant 24 depreciates the low salaries housekeepers are paid as well, for the same reason as participant 27 does so– she cannot compete to do a household every day for 150 euros a month. Participant 27 wishes the government would finally take charge of the issue and prevent exploitation. The participants’ concerns and demand to the EU and the local government might also be reinforced by their current experience of unemployment and the struggle to find a new job (Hall, 1997a, p. 32). Although the practice is exploitative and thus

un-European (ideal understanding) (Kuus, 2004, p. 475), the economy of Ceuta is partly dependent on the availability of cheap workforce (especially in construction) and might suffer from stronger regulation - at least in the beginning.

The workers' flow into Ceuta is not renegotiated in only one way; there are different connotations and reproductions (Gibson-Graham, 2000, p. 97). Yet, several everyman-participants who did not refer to the topic might not realize the harming economic effects and exploitative practice, as they do not feel concerned (Merrifield, 2000, p. 108).

Carriers' practices at Biutz and Tarajal

According to powerful imaginations of the border-passage-practices of the Moroccan carriers, who bring goods from Ceuta across the border into Morocco, carry attributes of otherness. This way the practices vitiate the conditional relation between Ceuta and the EU (Kuus, 2004, p. 483): Cembrero (2013b) imagines the border in Ceuta as "one of the most transited borders of Africa". He also describes the "chaos", which periodically increases e.g. due to restructuring on the Moroccan side of the passage. The practice of the carriers becomes consequently altered. Currently they have to pass through a different passage than before (Cembrero, 2013b).

The chaos and scene described by Cembrero suits the situation I could observe at the border: carriers receive big, heavy packages of goods from some entrepreneurs organizing the business across the border. The entrepreneurs bind the packages to the carriers' bodies. This way, the latter queue in a long line in front of the passage for carriers, the tunnel 'El Biutz', for hours. Here the Spanish security forces check the passports and the goods carried, which causes the queues in front of the tunnel and reaching far into the regular border-passage, the Tarajal. After passing the tunnel most carriers hand the packages back to assistant-entrepreneurs. Sometimes the carriers return after having passed one bundle, in order to do a second turn and earn more (observation, February 17th, 2014).

Moreover, other flows of traffic across the border add up to the pressure of carriers (even though they pass at another passage, these flows have to be controlled as well). Besides Moroccan tourists and people doing shopping in Ceuta Moroccan crossborder-workers e.g. sellers of drugs join the flow. The conditions at the passage, which develop under these circumstances, remind of a "zona de guerra" (war-zone) (Perdiguero, 2013). The description given by Perdiguero in the article published in *El Faro* nicely reflects the practices, which are imagined 'un-European' – because they are envisioned as unorganized, chaotic, irregular, criminal (drugs-trafficking) and disturbing for other activities at the border (Kuus, 2004, p. 482).

On the Moroccan side of the border procedures of control are lengthy. So here as well queues use to develop. Some decide to not return to Morocco over night to have advantages in queueing in the morning – those carriers now sleep on the ground at the Tarajal. Especially, elderly women among the carriers suffer (García, 2013h). The articles emphasize: there is no order, no organization, no efficiency and goods are transported illegally under inhuman conditions on the backs of people. It seems all the contrary of 'European' order and core values, organization, efficiency and respect of human rights (Kuus, 2004, p. 482).

The tension developing while waiting is now affronted only by a low number of badly equipped police agents, who struggle to get the masses ordered, getting nervous themselves: "All groups at the Tarajal suffer from the situation, reminding of third-world circumstance" (*El Faro*, 2014a) – this framing illustrates that backwardness on

the template scale of development (Kramersch, 2011, p. 196) is attributed to the circumstances around the carriers' work at the border. Consequently 'otherness' is connoted to the precarious conditions, which surround the practices of the carriers in the powerful discourse-makers' geopolitical imaginations (Kuus, 2004, p. 483).

The "porteadores are good for the trade in the city, they need more dignity in treatment, they should be treated like human beings (...) the city benefits so much from them" (A. Romero Aliaga, personal communication, February 25th, 2014). Elderly women charged with huge weights on their backs, in total about 25.000 people crossing per day without any sanitary installations around cannot be considered to be worthy conditions of work, but still the flow is the city's economic pillar number one (Andreu, 2014). But the situation and consequences are hazarded and tolerated for the sake of economic survival and modernization of Ceuta (Kramersch, 2011, p. 200). Yet, the conditional relation to the EU is considered disturbed by the practices in the border-passage-space of flows.

The efforts by Ceuta's public bodies to prevent publishing of data about the economic weight of the trade (informal conversation) impact the awareness about the need for change of the otherness of the practices and the 'un-European conditions' at the passage (different from 'ideal European standards of business') (Kuus, 2004, p. 483). Aróstegui Ruiz (personal communication, February 26th, 2014) in this context analyzes that little has changed about disorganization and chaos at the border-passage throughout the last decennia, "nothing is well organized here, it is a microcosm – rights get lost in the Straits, the entire life in Ceuta is conditioned by the border and Moroccans crossing". He underpins that otherness is intrinsic in irregular flow and that this practice of 'otherness' shapes Ceuta as a whole (Kolossoff & Scott, 2012, pp. 31-32).

Morocco's ambiguous strategy - denying the Custom rights to Ceuta, but allowing products to enter even though not legally imported - actually might negatively affect Morocco's Northern regions and beyond, as well (Chambre de commerce americaine au Maroc, 2002, p. 1). Gomez Barceló (personal communication, February 7th, 2014) doubts that it is sustainable to have porteadores carrying about 50-100 kilos on their backs each day to maintain the trade to Morocco. He imagines the practices as inappropriate or 'un-European' (Kuus, 2004, p. 483) and he does not consider them a long-term solution. He wants the border to become an official customs check point and the EU to invest and improve the existing infrastructures at the passage.

Mas Vallecón (personal communication, February 14th, 2014) suggests that recognition of Ceuta by Morocco and consequent installation of a commercial customs institution at the border would change the practice of the carriers: shifting transport of goods to cars and vehicles, having no 'carriers' lifting bundles on their backs anymore. The EU would have to commit to this improvement of the status, since regularization would be a step to Europeanize the border-flows and thus the city (Kuus, 2004, p. 474). Ceuta's decision-makers actually also commit in their program to improving the "working of the Biutz passage", the part of the Tarajal, where the carriers queue (Ciudad de Ceuta, 2014, pp. 11, 5.). This shows that they agree that the passage does not yet work well enough, not well enough to match the vision of Europeanization and economic development they have for Ceuta (Kuus, 2004, p. 483).

Moroccan everyman respondents renegotiate these imaginations about the carriers' practice and conditions at the border-passage adding their own pieces of meaning to the imaginations. Thereby they also include resistant

demands for 'un-Europeanization' (Kramsch, 2011, p. 197). Participant 3 shares the negative imagination about the carriers' practice at the border, arguing that Morocco should rely on its own production instead of importing irregularly from Ceuta. Participant 10 agrees that once the border trade is abolished people would be forced to create jobs and find jobs in Morocco. Participant 4 is less optimistic about such an automatism after abolishing the trade. First the mentality of people in Northern Morocco would have to change, she suggests, making them become entrepreneurs, who invest and help develop the economy for the good of the country instead of piling up money only for themselves. Closing the border from one moment to the other instead would end in a disaster.



Figure 11. Carriers at the Tarajal. Preparing to carry huge bundles across the border, waiting for their turn. Photos taken in December, 2011 and February 2014.

All three of the respondents arguing this way are young (less than 25 years) and have a whole life ahead. Respondents of other generations do not present such specific ideas, presumably because they have been involved in some everyday routine for long, which creates a certain disinterest for issues beyond the routine (Merrifield, 2011, p. 108). Only participant 8 presents similar ideas: he asks improvements by the Moroccan government. He regards it to be their responsibility, since many people migrate into the region from other parts of Morocco, uncontrolled, and worsen the situation. This could have rather negative consequences on Tetouan and surroundings, once the border-trade does cease to work having all those new settlers leaving again. Participant 8 is worried about his region becoming more and more dependent on the trade without any alternatives (participant 8). In case the anti-trade imaginations of the young would manifest, Ceuta might become more isolated and living up to the conditional expectations by the EU would be more difficult (Kuus, 2004, p. 474).

Practices of 'otherness' across the border are noted by participant 3. He is worried about the inflow of drugs and otherness from Ceuta into Morocco. He suggests installing cameras to control the border, to avoid such incidents. His idea is an inverted interpretation of 'otherness': Morocco is the Europeanized place, which has to protect against the inflow of 'otherness' from Ceuta – this statement

would probably be understood as discursive piece of resistance (Mignolo, 2000, p. 64) in many Ceutis' imaginations.

Since Ceuta has become European, participant 12 testified, that dignity in working conditions for carriers has decreased. More dependence on the police agents' good will and lower profits from trading have made the Tarajal an even less attractive site. Also the securitization process has created obstacles to trading (Walters, 2002, p. 569). From this point of view Europeanization of Ceuta has stimulated increase of 'otherness' of the passage (Kuus, 2004, 483).

Almost all Moroccan everyman-participants know carriers or have heard stories about the practices. Participant 10 suggests establishing a maximum weight to be carried per person per day to improve the organization. It would help to protect the carriers from having their goods taken away from them by corrupt security forces. Like participant 5 he does not want them to carry 100 kilos. These ideas about regulating the border in a human and just way, illustrate that Moroccan participants perceive the conditions and practices at the border as incoherent and 'un-European'. They express the desire of having the Tarajal Europeanized (Kuus, 2004, p. 474).

An important insight explaining for these developments might be observations by participant 7 and 8 that increasing numbers of people are attracted by the opportunities at the border, also due to the promising income some carriers earn. As standards of living have improved in Morocco the desire for getting a piece of the cake has been growing, participant 7 analyzes. On the other hand he accuses Ceuta of exploiting this situation for its own good, referring to the economic modernization, which is supported by the business across the border (Luxembourg, 1972, p. 60; Kramsch, 2010, p. 1003).

Clashes and conflicts around the borderpassage are mentioned by participant 10, who knows that the dissatisfaction about the long waiting times has been intense. In this context, participant 10 tells, a man burned himself as a sign of protest at the border recently. Participant 11, the carrier, tells about the business with blankets and how it is working. He confesses that it is physically hard work and that especially the lack of proper organization of business makes the job at the border stressful. The borderpeople's experience (Merrifield, 2011, p. 108; Hall, 1997a, p. 32) plays a major role in the renegotiation of powerful geopolitical imaginations and adds much detail about the everyday routines and consequences beyond the border in Morocco (Häkli, 1998, p. 145).

A few Ceutí everyman-participants have presented geopolitical imaginations, which reproduce Ceuta's powerful discourse-makers' visions. Many Ceutí everyman respondents seem to be aware of the trade across the border, but do not dig into how it works – maybe because their everyday practices do not mix up with it (Merrifield, 2011, p. 108).

Although there is concern about the well-being of the carriers, only participant 16, who daily crosses the border with the carriers, tells more about the practice: the carriers, he respectfully states, are hard working and exploited by their employers. Participant 17 is dissatisfied with the traffic jams at the passage and has ceased to cross. She and participant 28 suggest that making the border a commercial one like in Melilla and organizing it better could improve a lot (providing sanitary facilities, telephones and water sources for those who queue), although the irregular trade across the border might not disappear.

Participant 21 shares this desire for Europeanizing (regularizing, organizing and modernizing) (Kuus, 2004, p. 482) the border-passage, as does participant 27. The latter refers especially to the traffic jams developing as a consequence of the congestion. The respondents thus renegotiate several insights of the imaginations of the

powerful discourse-makers, but they also add their own imaginations of 'otherness' (Kuus, 2004, p. 483) of the passage and about necessary improvements.

The improvements the Ceutí respondents suggest are highly related to the tangible, observable problems at the border occurring in everyday life (De Certeau, 1988). Especially, women (participant 20, 24, 25, 26) were worried about the conditions for the carriers, some of them feeling sorry for elderly people being still 'porteadores' at their high age, just to make a living carrying huge weights on their backs. But they hardly connote possible improvements of conditions to EU policies about Ceuta.

Practices of and about migration

The CETI is an open camp for temporary stay of migrants, where migrants, who reach Ceuta, would be accommodated if they could not be expelled within 72 hours (El pueblo, 2013d). It is situated a bit isolated from the city, uphill in the North. On the one hand Ceuta is short of space, on the other hand it might have been a conscious choice to isolate the migrant accommodation out of the central areas – isolating what is different not fitting the image of European-ness (Kuus, 2004, p. 479), Ceuta tries to create.

Ceuta as a whole is the migrants' 'prison' – they cannot get to Spain mainland regularly without respective documents. Many articles in the local newspapers report on the arrival of migrants being transferred to the center, where capacities are often reached and more migrants stay than there are beds (Lacasa, 2014; Jiménez Gálvez, 2014a). In this space of flow, we can conclude, difficulties of managing the border-securitization-task properly manifest (Ferrer-Gallardo & Van Houtum, 2012). Also here European norms are only partly followed (Kuus, 2004, p. 478).

On the one hand the migrants are retained in Ceuta for a while, so they would not flow into the EU. On the other hand almost every migrant makes it to the EU territory of Spain from Ceuta (A. Romero Aliaga, personal communication, February 25th, 2014). The CETI is thus a space of flow. It is also a site though, where institutional practice imposed by the Ministry of the Interior can be traced and un-European attributes can be identified about it (Kuus, 2004, p. 483): before the change of law in 2009, when Spain started to apply the EU norms for migration procedures, many did ask for it in order to avoid being immediately deported, illegally sent away. The practice of making the migrants stay in Ceuta has evolved after 2009 and is actually "an illegal way of treating them, so we [CEAR, the organization Romero Aliaga works for] were at the court of Andalusia to claim the free circulation" (A. Romero Aliaga, personal communication, February 25th, 2014) of migrants in Spain.

The maximum duration to process requests for asylum should be 6 months; actually the Ministry takes much more than a year, which discourages the refugees from making use of their right of asylum. It is also a "violation of the international protection" (A. Romero Aliaga, personal communication, February 25th, 2014) which should be granted to refugees also according to EU law. But the Ministry continues the practice, subtly undermining European norms (Kuus, 2004, p. 478). As a consequence hardly any migrant reaching Ceuta requests asylum and changed tactics, lying about their backgrounds (A. Romero Aliaga, personal communication, February 25th, 2014).

This is where the subversive practices of migrants come in. Their tactics (De Certeau, 1988) are a way to cope with the Ministry purposefully taking a lot of time working on the asylum requests. From Ceuta “there are three ways to get to the mainland for them: the first is via documentation, asking for asylum. The second is humanitarian transfer with the help of NGOs, taking them to other centers on the mainland. Traditionally these privileged migrants are families with children, migrants with diseases, illnesses, trauma from migration and for a big part those who have been staying longest in Ceuta. (...) the third way of leaving is for other detention camps or being deported back by the state” (A. Romero Aliaga, personal communication, February 25th, 2014). Another fourth way Romero Aliaga (personal communication, February 25th, 2014) is human trafficking, hiding under trucks etc. Respective networks smuggle groups up to 200 migrants, e.g. hiding them for two weeks in a ship carrying waste (El País, 2013). The traffickers, circumventing the EU strategies (De Certeau, 1988), are punished if found (Abad, 2013a).

Box 5 Background information

A migrant's story in Ceuta

More information about the practices of migrants I could learn from a migrant who made it to Ceuta. He uses to work every day as a 'daledale' (that is the deprecatory term Ceutis call the parking assistants of migrant-background, who use to say 'dale, dale' to indicate that the driver is parking correctly) in the center. As the CETI where he stays is far and the bus expensive, he has to walk several kilometers to get back and forth. He was born in 1986 and fled from the war in Ivory Coast. Before reaching Ceuta he also tried the way through the border-passage, staying in the forests around Ceuta. Two years before that, he had been making a life in Rabat. The situation with the police was too tense, though. He reached Ceuta by Kayak with six more migrants, with the help of two Moroccans. They were paddling for three and a half hours from Tanger on the Straits of Gibraltar. Their group consisted of migrants from different countries. He remembers that he was happy the first day he made it to Ceuta.

But now he has been there (at the CETI) for four months already and he just hopes to leave soon. He dreams of finally meeting his brother in Madrid, who has a job there. The problem is that he does not have much money. His father died, but his mother still stays in his home-country. His plan is to stay in Ceuta only until the next wave of humanitarian transfer takes place - asking for asylum would take too long, he thinks. His story illustrates flows into Ceuta, which actually do not only manifest exclusively at the border-passage or around the harbor, but also along aparts of the city's coast.

When arriving to Spain all those without proper documentation (e.g. asylum requests) would encounter difficulties in obtaining regular status and finding jobs - they remain vulnerable to deportation: “They are condemned to marginality in Europe, working in precarious situations without contract” (A. Romero Aliaga, personal communication, February 25th, 2014).

Both practices, the slowing down of the procedure of asylum requests, capturing migrants in Ceuta, impairing their right on freedom of movement as well as migrants irregularly travelling on into other EU territories are practices vitiating the conditional relation with the EU (Kuus, 2004, p. 483) manifesting in the CETI, one of Ceuta's spaces of flow.

Another conditionality-vitiating practice of agency in Ceuta's space of flow at the borderpassage in relation to migration is the way Morocco makes use of the dependence of the EU on its support in borderwork (Walters, 2002, p. 569; Kuus, 2004, p. 477). With regard to the topic of 'warm return', which is a practice of

immediate return once migrants reach the border-city and which the Spanish government intends to intensify given the increasing numbers of migrants approaching the border-city, Morocco asks more subsidies. Continued efforts are presented by Morocco to reinforce human and material resources for land-, sea- and air-control, in order to fight against the human trafficking networks (Casqueiro, 2014).

“Morocco now receives a lot of European funding to help controlling immigration, so if Morocco has some request for Europe they just allow some migrants to pass. (...) It is a tactic of Morocco”, Pérez Marín (personal communication, February 24th, 2014) comments. Tactical agency is revealed (De Certeau, 1988) which Morocco

implements, exploiting the (imagination of) dependence of the EU. This inversion of the conditionality is an indication of 'otherness' in the relation of the EU and Ceuta, where it manifests (Kuus, 2004, p. 1983).

Descriptions of the flow of migrants and their tactics (De Certeau, 1988) to enter Ceuta illustrate how they circumvent the filter-function and border-tasks Ceuta is supposed to realize (J.A. García Inigo, personal communication, February 19th, 2014) for the EU (Kuus, 2004, p. 477): Crespo (2013b) reports about the city going through a climax of clandestine migration in 2013 doubling the numbers of migrants arriving to Ceuta in 2012. Gomez Barceló (personal communication, February 7th, 2014) identifies the migrants as one of three groups flowing into Ceuta (besides the tourists and Moroccan traders). Campos Martínez (personal communication, February 19th, 2014) agrees on the latter insight, since he knows that migrants long for transit to other EU territories and that they wait for leaving.

This piece of discourse is also taken up in a newspaper article of *El País* (2014d), describing the (emotionally and generally) precarious situation of the migrants in Ceuta dreaming of the mainland, while new waves of migrants arrive and have to be hosted in provisional camps. Ceuta is known for the flow of migrants in the national and international media, which often report on their presence in the space of flows, the CETI and the borderzone. This makes the public connote 'otherness' to these spaces (Kuus, 2004, p. 483): migrants are not desired in the EU because of the fear they could absorb the welfare and prosperity in the union and their different cultural backgrounds (Ferrer- Gallardo, 2009, p. 31).

But managing the migration has failed eventually. "Maybe we fail a lot and we commit errors. But imagine, one day you wake up and it is cold, therefore 12 immigrants have gathered in front of your door to find protection and sleep there. (...) It is different answering a question in theory and being confronted with it" Gomez Barceló (personal communication, February 7th, 2014) tells.

Presence of migrants is also imagined and discussed in terms of flow beyond Ceuta's borders, alluding to tenthsousands of migrants moving towards Morocco and staying in Morocco (Gómez & Abad, 2014c), especially in the mountains surrounding the border-cities in inhuman conditions (Mena, 2014). The borderwork done by Morocco for the EU in the North of Morocco, failures of causing migrants' deaths in conflicts or raids by the police (Cembrero, 2013c) are often connoted to the border-city in powerful imaginations – 'otherness' is attributed to Ceuta (Kuus, 2004, p. 483). "Ceuta's meaning for the EU is its border, the migration issue" (G. Martínez Arcas, personal communication, February 6th, 2014), which Campos Martínez calls the "syndrome of the border" (J.M. Campos Martínez, personal communication, February 19th, 2014).

The migrants' tactics to cross the border of Ceuta – and to subvert the border-function Ceuta has to fulfil for the EU (Kuus, 2004, p. 479) - change over time: The preferred method of entrance have become smaller boats and the way along the sea. But this transfer has become costly. So many try the tactic of group assaults on the border in Ceuta (Cembrero, 2013a).

The technique of crossing the border uses to be adapted to the circumstances the migrants encounter when passing: For migrants from Syria a network of human traffickers has established smuggling the migrants with fake-Moroccan passports into Ceuta, as the police discovered recently (Abad, 2014a). Staying in the mountains in Ceuta while waiting for an opportunity for crossing is considered the better-quality-stay in comparison to the

accommodation-options around Melilla. At least there is water in Ceuta's mountains. In case the police find the migrants though the caves they hide at are burnt. The migrants would be put on busses to be transferred back to the Algerian desert (Andreu, 2014).

In Ceuta the terrain obstructs the possibilities of climbing the border-fence, where migrants easily hurt from barbed wire etc. This is why the sea seems the easier way to reach Ceuta (Cembrero, 2013a). In an attempt of crossing in September 2013, many migrants tried to make use of old tyres of cars to swim to the other side of the border, yet, they were stopped by the Moroccan border-forces (Abad, 2013b). In other occasions also the massive assaults of the fences have produced successful crossings, which, however, often go in hand with violent incidents between the border guards and the migrants (Rincón, 2013b).

Newspapers and media report regularly about such attempts of crossing e.g. assaults by hundreds of them running towards the fences and trying to get the opportunity of making it to the other side, in the chaos they create through their assault. They also choose moments in which they consider the likelihood of crossing highest, such as during the high Moroccan festivity of sacrifice, Eid el Kbir, when surveillance might be more relaxed (Agencias, 2013). At another occasion 14 migrants crossed the border driving a car full speed across the border passage, even overriding agents (Abad, 2013a).

All the tactics (De Certeau, 1988) circumvent the border-regime strategies of Ceuta, but also the injuries and violence migrants experience do not suit the role of Ceuta as a buffer for the EU and less a buffer-site, where Human Rights are respected – the border-passage in relation to migrants is a site where 'otherness' manifests (Kuus, 2004, p. 483) and where the conditional relation with the EU fails to work. Romero Aliaga (personal communication, February 25th, 2014) explains that for the migrants it is just the last step to get to Ceuta and from there to the mainland in Spain, the last step of a long journey.

Alarcón Caballero (personal communication, February 12th, 2014) criticizes and discursively resists (Mignolo, 2000, p. 83; Kramersch, 2011, p. 197) little involvement by the EU and the union's migratory policies: "The problems do not result from implementing national policies, but from the implementing EU migration policies (...) [We have] focused so much on European interests, (...) we neglect and ignore, do not see the other countries" (J.A. Alarcón Caballero, personal communication, February 12th, 2014) – highlighting the Euro-centric perspective of Europeanization (Kramersch & Brambilla, 2007, p. 99).

More powerful decision-makers agree: "it is a tragedy seeing people escaping from misery and hunger; I think, that many people share the idea that we should help them in their countries" (J. Ramos Aparicio, personal communication, February 12th, 2014). The discourse presented by the experts places Ceuta in a more global context and identifies rather systemic causes for failures in his imagination. The systemic causes Alarcón would like to address are major elements of Europeanization (neoliberal capitalism, modernization of the EU, focus on the EU) (Sparke, 2002, p. 220; Mignolo, 2000, p. 53). Many experts agree that the EU could mitigate the problem of migrants in Ceuta (J.L. Gomez Barceló, personal communication, February 7th, 2014; J. Castillo Sempere, personal communication, February 20th, 2014).

García Iñigo (personal communication, February 19th, 2014) also imagines that the border is no solution against migration and that Ceuta could better get rid of it. He finds it hard to see that people die in the waters of Ceuta and lose their lives at the passage. He does not suggest alternatives, but he is clear about that the border (-fences) should be eradicated – an imagination which does not fit the securitization policies of the EU and respective visions by Ceuta's leaders (Ferrer-Gallardo & Van Houtum, 2012, pp. 244-246).

Many voices of NGOs and civil society ask for human methods of reducing the permeability of the border, guaranteeing respect of human rights for retention and completion with the EU legislation (El País, 2014c). But also the practice of the civil society, favoring the interests of the migrants once they have made it to the EU, can be seen as a practice, which weakens the border -control and -filter function of Ceuta in the conditional relation with the EU (Kuus, 2004, p. 477).

Whereas some experts dislike admitting such features of otherness, others take it as something inherent in the city and its nature for which there is no need of negligence (Ferrer-Gallardo et al., 2014, p. 4). Ramos Aparicio (personal communication, February 12th, 2014) wants the migrants to encounter better treatment at the border, which means Europeanizing the spaces of flow (the Tarajal and the CETI), for borderwork would be done the way European standards prescribe. Then the image and status of Ceuta might improve (Kuus, 2004, pp. 474, 484).

Geopolitical imaginations of the Moroccan everyman-participants attribute otherness to migration into Ceuta, but it is no frequent topic in their renegotiations. Only few everymen (participant 3, 5, 7, 8, 12 and 13) present detailed imaginations– it seems that although many migrants stay in the border-region, they hide away well from the police and interaction with the Moroccan border-people. More everyman-respondents have heard about the Sub-Saharan (participants 9, 10, 4, 5, 11, 12, 13) and seen them around on both sides of the border. They also know about the police trying to stop the flow to Ceuta (participant 4). The language barrier between Arabic, Berber, Spanish (border-people) in Morocco's North and French, English, and different ethnic languages (migrants) might contribute to the lack of interaction and a consequent scarce imaginations about the migrants.

The needs in daily routine and the ways of entering Ceuta of respectively Moroccans and migrants differ as well - they do not share the same situation, which could bring the groups closer (Merrifield, 2011, p. 111). Participant 3 reports that he met many migrants in different mosques of Morocco. They were often asking for financial support to pay their rents and food. Participant 3 shows a solidary attitude and understands the migrants' situation, putting himself into their place. Begging the migrants might intent to save money to cross the border with the help of a small boat or other relatively costly swimming device.

Participant 8 has also observed people from the border-cities sustaining migrants with food. Others help them during their stay in the mountains. He is also aware of the hardship the migrants have to pass during their journey through Algeria and other countries until they reach Morocco (participant 8). He thus attributes 'otherness' to the flow of migrants into Ceuta and recognizes that their way of surviving and entering Ceuta has nothing to do with European imaginations of affluent life (Kuus, 2004, p. 482). Participant 5 is aware that migrants regularly attempt to cross the border by different methods. Nonetheless, the fate of migrants in Ceuta and the exact practice of crossing remain obscure to the imagination of Moroccan everyman-participants.

Participant 7, who is closely in touch with Ceutís (Merrifield, 2011, p. 108), has a more detailed imagination and does not agree with the policies of the EU: to him the migrants are “voyagers travelling throughout the world. The first universal rule of this world is that we are free, to transit and circulate. These laws exist but nobody, no state adheres to them. The EU does not, either.” He shares the opinion that the migrants who escape from miserable conditions have a right to improve their lives.

Participant 8 (with similar contacts to Ceuta) suggests opening the border, like García Inigo (personal communication, February 19th, 2014). He thinks that it would be especially advantageous for Ceuta and believes in a world without borders or visa, where movement is free. “The Sub-Saharanans actually are no problem of entering or not, but it is a question of helping them in their countries, but without colonization. It is about helping them to build up something together, not like ‘I am the lord and you are the slave` but in constructive exchange. The future of the world is Africa, everything is possible there. (...) I would help them in their countries, give them agriculture, factories to work at and create treaties between countries” (participant 8).

Participants 7 and 8 imagine a world free for circulation with a chance for everybody to develop, with Africa as its center –their geopolitical imaginations thus contradict the idealization of the EU, criticize the unions policies and eurocentrism (rejecting otherness) (Kuus, 2004, p. 478; Kramsch, 2011, p. 197).

Only participant 3 identifies the borderwork Morocco is doing for the EU, which is “not good” for his country and the migrants suffer. The powerful imaginations are thus partly reproduced and criticized by Moroccan everyman-participants (Gibson-Graham, 2000, p. 108; Kramsch, 2011, p. 197).

In the geopolitical imaginations of Ceuti everymen ‘otherness’ through migrants in Ceuta’s spaces of flow plays a more dominant role than in the imaginations of the Moroccan respondents. Participant 18 calls the migration an “issue”, which impacts on Ceuta’s security (Walters, 2002, p. 574). Participant 24 and 31, similarly call the flow “a problem”. Participant 20 and 22 observe important quantities of migrants flowing into Ceuta. The terms used in descriptions seem partly taken over from powerful imaginations (Gibson-Graham, 2000, p. 108). “Problem” is a common way to refer to the topic.

The ‘otherness’ of the flow refers to the migrants’ different cultural background, their story and the fact that they enter without legal permission - which are reasons, why the flow is described as “issue”. “Large numbers” are regarded alarming by the Ceutís (Stoler, 1997, pp. 213- 214). The borderpassage, where on February 6th, 2014, fifteen Sub-Saharan migrants died is seen as a place marked by such sad incidents, which do not fit the imaginations of European-ness Ceutís would like to attribute to their city (Kuus, 2004, p. 482) – as participant 25 correctly observes: the occasions at the border have “a lot of repercussions” for and in Ceuta. The space of flows is marked by ‘otherness’ in the powerful imaginations as in the renegotiation by everymen from Ceuta: “at the border many people have been dying” (participant 27). The piece of discourse is only slightly altered by own experiences or thoughts (Hall, 1997a, p. 32).

People from the margins of Ceuta seem to be less concerned, presumably because in the marginal areas many problems such as unemployment (chapter 7) dominate the everyday routine of people anyways (Merrifield,

2011, p. 108). On the other hand people from the center might be more concerned about the reputation of their city, which appears begrimed by the migration issue.

Participant 22 is concerned about the migrants losing their lives at the border for a dream. She is convinced that they are provided with erroneous information about what to expect in the EU. She believes that the mafia structures (human traffickers) would have to be addressed if one would want the migrants to not die at the fences of Ceuta anymore, but Ceuta cannot manage this job alone, though.

Participant 23 shares the feeling of compassion, but she stresses that employment should be created in the places the migrants come from (participant 23). Referring to the 6th of February tragedy participant 25 says: “when people died at the border, in Spain there were a lot of repercussion, but here we are used to it, I am used to it. (...)The only problem is that this place is small. From the mainland they criticize a lot, but still I would help the migrants (...) they leave their countries for severe reasons. We should try to help them”. In this imagination migrants are understood to depend on help and support, the EU and Spain should provide. But in Ceuta, a small place, the participant imagines, there is not so much what could be done, but the higher scale institutions should take action – she envisions a solidary Europe (Kuus, 20004, p. 482).

Many details presented by the powerful are not reproduced by any of the Ceuti everymen as such, they tend to provide generalizations in their imagination, hardly considering the destiny of the individual. Also between Ceutis and migrants there might be a lack of interaction. Many wish the EU to support Ceuta more in the task of protecting the borders of the EU (Kuus, 2004, p. 484).

Few Ceutis comment on the CETI space of flows, probably due to the short, temporary stays of migrants and the spatial distance between many Ceutis and the migrants, in the CETI, rather isolated on a mountain at the edge of the city. Yet, in their routines they observe the migrants coming and making their way walking between the CETI and the center (Merrifield, 2011, p. 108).

Participant 27 outlines that the CETI “is a center to help the ones without documents, they help them in the center until they know how to go on. But it has a restricted capacity, so we have to avoid that masses of people enter [Ceuta]”. He also knows that the migrants are provided with food and clothes. He is supportive of the help provided. Participant 31 tells about her experience while working for the police. She used to interrogate migrants at the CETI about their origin. She is rather deprecatory about the migrants: “the problem is that they do not come here presenting themselves as medicines ready to work. (...) we have to sustain them and this is a problem. If there are not even enough jobs for Spanish, what shall we do with the immigrants?”, she envisions, reproducing populist anti-migrant arguments common in the EU (Ferrer-Gallardo & Van Houtum, 2012, p. 244-246). Two participants renegotiating the populist visions are from the center of Ceuta. Respondents with Muslim-Spanish bi-cultural experience, from Ceuta’s margins, did not reproduce such populist insights (Ferrer-Gallardo, 2011, p. 31).

The buffer-function of Ceuta, manifesting in securitization of the border (see figures 12 and 13), is discursively questioned by some Ceutis: participant 15 considers the treatment of migrants at Ceuta’s border “a crime”, since he is sure, that one should not shoot hard balls at someone swimming in the water (referring to the February 6th events). His request for more solidarity is also criticism of the EU’s migration policies (Kuus, 2004, p. 478). Participant 18

adds to this idea that differences between human beings from different places should not exist in the EU and the world he envisions. Actually, all human beings share the same needs. Accordingly, he considers borders to be redundant and artificial. He questions the main argument to justify classification of desired and undesired flows of people (Hardt & Negri, 2000, p. 192): He doubts that there is 'not enough' for everyone to share in the EU. He has ideas of resistance (Mignolo, 2000, p. 83) and would like people to think through a lens of solidarity, forgetting about the capitalist, interest-oriented, corrupt system of the EU of banks (Sparke, 2002, p. 220; Mignolo, 2000, p. 53).

All the participants (participant 15, 16, 18, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28) questioning the effectiveness of the border prove some border-thinking (Mignolo, 2000, p. 64). Most respondents who argue out of compassion and solidarity in favor of opening the border are women. Participant 18 meets migrants rather often in his daily routine at work (De Certeau, 1988). Some respondents from the Muslim dominated outskirts of the city (participant 15, 16, 17, 24, 27) and the part of the city where the CETI is located (participant 23, 26) (they can interact easily with migrants) ask for human treatment of migrants by the EU – Ceuta seems to be fragmented along lines of center and margins also in the concern about the migrants fate (Hardt & Negri, 2000, p. 199) (several experts from the center, but few everyone also formulated such ideas).

Participant 28 imagines that the border-management tasks could be realized without installing knives on the top of the fences and having the migrants taking bad injuries from their attempts to cross. Instead he would want to see the usage of cameras to become more efficient (Rumford, 2008, p. 57). The suggestions imply critique of the EU's migration policies and on Ceuta being burdened with the tasks of border-management (Kuus, 2004, p. 477).

Participant 14 does not have deprecatory opinions about migrants, but he is convinced that it is no solution to have migrants stay in Ceuta or at the CETI, because they do not have any future there. He suggests sending the migrants either back or to Spain, criticizing the current practice of making them stay in Ceuta. Participant 20 agrees and participant 27 is convinced that the current approach and higher fences are no solutions.

Participant 31 instead blames Morocco of not collaborating enough yet, shifting the responsibility and 'otherness' away (Kuus, 2004, p. 479): "we would need agreements with Morocco, but they do not really acknowledge and recognize the problem they have about the border". She asks to comply with the conditional relation with the EU and to live up to the expectations (Kuus, 2004, p. 474).

To sum up, many pieces of powerful imaginations are renegotiated partly or more completely by some Ceuti respondents. Some (three participants from the center with less personal multicultural backgrounds, participant 21, 31 and informal conversation) depreciate migrants' behaviours and their 'otherness'. They regard provision of help to them as sacrifice – applying tactics of differentialist racism (Hardt & Negri, 2000, p. 199). On the other hand many Ceuti respondents did not give detailed accounts on the topic, some, because their preoccupation centers around their own future (participant 25) (Merrifield, 2011, p. 108); others, because they do not like to attribute problems to Ceuta (participant 14, 19, 22) (Ferrer-Gallardo et al., 2014, p. 4).

Un-European practices by security forces in the spaces of flow

Proportionally a high number of security officials are employed in Ceuta, which is a consequence of Ceuta being an autonomous border-city: costs of employment in these fields double the highest figure for Spain mainland provinces (El Pueblo, 2014h). Besides the practices of otherness at the border, security officials' practices are imagined to

contribute to practices of 'otherness' (Kuus, 2004, p. 483), as media and local powerful discourse-makers of Ceuta affirm.

In Ceuta, I soon got the impression that the control practice at the border-points is meant to be hidden from media attention. An informal conversation with an expert, a frequent border-crosser, confirmed my suspicion: "there are always a lot of struggles and conflicts at the border between police officers and carriers. Officers sometimes beat up the carriers and all get violent with each other. It is not unusual." These impressions are alluded to in news (García, 2013h) - the tension uses to evolve due to the long waiting periods in the queue and some impatient carriers, who have to be stopped by security forces. The high pressure makes several carriers try to pass through the normal passage, the Tarajal, instead of joining the queue waiting at the 'Biutz'. This way the carriers block the Tarajal for other flows. The security forces get in rage and beat up carriers when the carriers start complaining about their non-perishable goods being confiscated (García, 2013h).

Moreover, the arbitration of security forces in letting pass carriers and cross-borderworkers (mentioned before) contributes to tensions. Crowds also develop through rigid controls of goods by the security forces (Rincón, 2013d) causing traffic jams. 'Porteadores' feel forced to sleep at the border-passage to be able to make enough turns the next day to earn their income. All together the articles represent the police-practice as an obstacle to the beneficial flows, promoting economic Europeanization of Ceuta (Kramsch, 2011, p. 197).

Yet, most pieces of powerful geopolitical imaginations center on incoherent practice towards migrants: after the fatal events on February 6th, 2014 different narratives spread about the course of the events. The narrative presented by the Ministry of the Interior differed decisively from what NGOs and the migrants told. The latter two groups stress that the migrants gathered in the mountains, with about 300 people in order to reach the 'Biutz'. After the attempt failed to cross 'El Biutz' (affronting the firm defense by Moroccan security forces) the migrants tried to cross the border through the sea next to the passage (see figure 12). Here they were shot by gummy balls. Migrants assure that at least 20 of them made it to Spanish waters, but they were repelled and returned immediately – which is a practice not conform the European law (Kuus, 2004, p. 478).

A migrant, who made it to Ceuta was forced to kneel on the ground and beaten up by gum-sticks before being sent back to Morocco. Others got injured in the water. The agents shot gummy balls on them, which might have made some faint away and drown. The crowd was pushing even into deeper water, until some ended up dead on the surface of the water. Out of despair and rage the remaining migrants on land started singing for their dignity and throwing stones across the border to the Spanish police agents. In the aftermath the agents stressed the violent attitude of the migrants (Jiménez Gálvez, 2014a).

In El Pueblo, the local newspaper, testimonies of the event are quoted describing how the migrants were directly shot on in the water "like chickens". Additionally, multiple NGOs announced to accuse the Spanish security forces of their violent, dangerous practice. Their request was that all video and audio-material registered during the events, would be published by the security forces and serious juridical investigations should be started (El Pueblo, 2014c).

All of the practices by security forces do not fit the Human Rights presumably applying in the EU or imaginations of the EU as union of freedom and rights – the practices are represented as un-European (Kuus, 2004,

p. 483). Several non-governmental stakeholders criticize the EU of tolerating 'warm return' and violating human rights (El Pueblo, 2013). The conservative party in Spain understands 'warm return' as a solution to the migration pressure (Jiménez Gálvez, 2014b; Barbulo, 2014), but diverse media of Spain and the EU criticize them, as well as the presence of knives on the border fences, endangering the migrants' survival.

Plans to reinforce the protection of the border, e.g. by knives (Saura, 2013f) get under pressure as many imaginations reveal criticism about such failures (García, 2014c; El Pueblo, 2014b) of Ceuta doing borderwork (Kuus, 2004, p. 478). Even the EU demands justification for the death of several migrants (El Pueblo, 2014e). Experts ask representatives of the local and national government to retire from their positions as response (Saura, 2014a; Duva, 2014; El Pueblo, 2013g).



The after-February 6th - response by security forces was defensive and avoiding: they justify their operation with the emergency of having to defend the border against waves of immigrants and to fight against mafias exploiting the migrants' desire to reach the EU (J.A.R., 2014) - shifting responsibility for their practices of otherness to mafias from beyond the EU (Kuus, 2004, p. 479). Consequences of such failures for Ceuta's image in the EU (Sastre, 2014; Echarri, 2014a) are frequently discussed. Thereby different authors defend Ceuta claiming the complexity of the tasks of being a border-city for the EU in Africa (El Pueblo, 2014d), while others ask for more human treatment of migrants (El País, 2014c; El País, 2014a). Resistance to the policies and accusations by the EU, as well as

complaints about Ceuta's implementation strategies are obvious in imaginations (Kramersch, 2011, p. 197). Often, the defensive attitude and criticism derive from a pro-European understanding, desiring improvement of Ceuta's situation and status (Kuus, 2004, p. 484).

Recognition by the Spanish government that the 'warm return' is already practiced in spite of the existing legal frameworks had been pursued by NGOs publishing evidence in the form of fotos and videos as proof of such deportation, or 'kidnapping' (Cembrero, 2014). The lawyer Romero Aliaga wants the EU to act and insist on the member-states complying with the procedures and human rights regarding 'warm return' (meaning that migrants are not even given a chance to be identified or to ask for asylum as the legislation prescribes): "The EU should be interested in the compliance of rights at its own entrance [Ceuta]" (A. Romero Aliaga, personal communication, February 25th, 2014). (Only) under the pressure of the incidents in February 2014 the EU and the Spanish government have expressed doubts about the methods of e.g. allowing Moroccan police entering Ceuta and Melilla to take the migrants back (Díez, 2014; El País, 2014b).

Also Moroccan agents are known for violent abuse of their powerful position, violating Human Rights (Salmi, 2014) (see figure 13). Most discourse-makers want the EU to take responsibility at Ceuta's border and prevent the violation of its own principles (Kuus, 2004, p. 484). All these arguments illustrate the practices of otherness (Kuus, 2004, p. 483) manifesting in Ceuta's spaces of flow, at the borderpassage - in the name of the EU. The discourse-makers also draw attention to the fact that other countries in Northern Europe benefit from the 'dirty borderwork' realized in the city (Kuus, 2004, p. 477) – implicitly asking the EU to have a look at its own borders (Gómez & Abad, 2014; Abad, 2013d). Violation of Human Rights of migrants should not be tolerated for the sake of securitization (Paone, 2010) (Walters, 2002, p. 574).


A different opinion questioning fundamental principles of the EU is presented by Álvarez (2014a), an author, who regularly defends European purity in the local news of Ceuta: He rejects the "new intolerant doctrine (...) called 'human rights'". He justifies neglect of the respective higher values of coexistence and social well-being. He suspects the concept to be used to legitimize dangerous invasions by migrants into Ceuta. His doubt about the Human Rights principles facilitating invasions of flows of 'otherness' into Ceuta, is based on a populist, rightwinged understanding of European-ness and xenophobia (Stoler, 1997, pp. 213-214) – he resists Europeanization (Human Rights application) discursively (Kuus, 2004, p. 478).

Generally, though, practices by security forces performed to implement the securitization task are imagined to be 'not yet European' enough (Kuus, 2004, p. 483) – even worse: under the pressure of expectation Ceuta is being forced to institutionalize un-European practices which are vastly criticized (warm return) and which shed a negative light on Ceuta, hampering its Europeanization in terms of status, image and consequently presumably as well its economic modernization (Kuus, 2004, p. 484; Kramersch, 2011, p. 196).

In the imagination of Moroccan everymen the worries about un-European practices by security forces at the border-passage towards migrants appear as well. "The Sub-Saharanans [migrants] here do not deserve the bad treatment they encounter now. They are human beings and need to be treated the same way as anyone else, (...)

like Europeans and Northern-Africans. (...) they are not doing well in their own countries“ (participant 4). In the renegotiation by

participant 4 we can see that critique of the existing institutionalized structures and the lack of European-ness (equality and human treatment as values here) (Kuus, 2004, p. 482) of treatment at the border-passage is based on compassion and solidarity, with migrants.



Participant 13 imagines the migrants' stories similarly, but she also highlights limited capacities of receiving: "The poor ones... The Sub-Saharanans want to enter Ceuta to have a better life. You should get them to the center [CETI] (...) But, (...) they also just encounter problems here. In this sense we can better not let them pass, they can better stay in Morocco and ask for help there" (participant 13). The quotation also reveals that the life of Sub-Saharanans does not necessarily improve once they reach Ceuta because of the lack of opportunities, which reflects deliberations of the powerful (Hall, 1997b, p. 44). It is easier for migrants, participant 13 thinks, to have a Europeanized life with opportunities (Kramsch, 2011, p. 200) in Morocco, which is another inversion of the superiority discourse normally attributed to the EU (Mignolo, 2000, pp. 58-59).

Participant 5 is of a more radical opinion and suggests bringing the migrants back to their countries of origin, which is actually already done via deportations. There the Moroccans ("if they really want to help") should support them to develop. In any case they should not let them die at the borderpassage. The participant thinks on the long-

term, wanting causes of migration to be seized, less the process, which the EU seeks to interrupt. She implicitly criticizes the short-term-thinking EU strategy (Dijkink, 1996, p. 11). The everyman participant finds it a moral, human duty to not letting the migrants run into death – which is a critique of the inhuman, un-European, methods of defending the border (Raumford, 2008, p. 57).

Participant 1 has observed the Moroccan security forces detaining migrants, whenever they find them in Fnideq and bringing them to cars. He supposes that the police bring them back to where they came from. Participant 3 confirms that the Moroccan security forces fight the migrants' crossing-attempts at the border and beat them before deportation. He also feels compassion for the migrants and is afraid that such practice could also shed bad light on Morocco involved in securitization (Kuus, 2004, p. 479).

In the imaginations of Moroccan everymen the exposition of the carriers and cross-borderworkers to the arbitration of the security forces at the border-passage is a more dominant topic though, even more dominant than in the imagination of Ceuta's powerful discourse-makers. Participant 5 knows that it is routine that the carriers are shouted at and beaten (participant 5).

Further, participant 2, 6 and 12 report about the security forces on both sides of the border, asking money for allowing the Moroccan border-crossers passing: "Paying two euros you can also pass without [passport], sometimes we also have to pay (...) the Spanish (...), this should not exist" (participant 12). Participant 2 is disappointed about the corrupt practice at the border and tells the story of a Moroccan police agent having his waistbelt drop to the ground. A lot of money taken from the border-crossers fell on the ground. Participant 6, who does not even cross the border often, has observed the cashing-up-habit as well. Those corrupt practices are not what Europeanized well-organized and standardized borders are supposed to tolerate. It is imagined as another practice of 'otherness' harming Ceuta's reputation as a European place and weakens Ceuta's Europeanization process (Kuus, 2004, p. 474).

Everyman-respondents, who are or were carriers, commented on the treatment they experience: "the treatment is not human, they just rub you goods. It means suffering. The Spanish like the Moroccans do it. The Spanish treat you worse than the Moroccans. I had 30 kilos which were taken by them. I have no idea what they do with the goods then - maybe they sell them on? The strong would win over the weak for what applies to feelings of security. I feel insecure especially in the Spanish part, but also the Moroccans treat us badly", participant 11 tells. But he has noted that police in the center treat him well, instead. This report by participant 11 illustrates the un-organized, tense situation at the border as well as the incoherent practices of police agents, not suiting the EU-model of security forces (Kuus, 2004, p. 483).

He is of the opinion that treatment at the border got more severe and passing more complicated since the 2004 attempts to cross the border by Sub-Saharan migrants. "Before it was okay, but because of their attempts to enter the porteadores are treated worse as well" (participant 11) –describing the process securitization of the border (Walters, 2002, p. 568). Several participants accuse the security forces of being violent (especially towards women, participant 3 highlights) (participant 3, 5, 6, 10, 12, 13) – it does not fit their understanding of how people should be treated in the 'civilized' EU-context (Kuus, 2004, p. 482). Participant 13 confesses that more likely smugglers and

carriers become victims, because they complain easily. The crossborder-workers' problem is only the queue. They do not carry heavy bundles.

Participant 12 adds that "many things happen in the border, hopefully, God will see this" - expressing her despair about the circumstances, which she thinks only God can help to improve. All together these renegotiations illustrate the bad, un-European practices (Kuus, 2004, p. 483) implemented towards carriers of which I have witnessed occasions as well: A police agent amended an elderly woman with his stick and raising his arms as if ready to hit her (observation, February 17th, 2014). At the same occasion an elderly woman was leaning to a wall, breathing heavily and shifting the weight she was carrying as much as possible to the building. While recovering there, a security agent approached her and indicated impatiently to move on, in spite of her obviously hardly managing to stand on her feet.

To sum up: the renegotiation of the powerful imaginations about abusive practices by border agents takes place on the level of daily routine (Merrifield, 2011, p. 108): it mostly concerns the observable and the suffering of people. In the powerful discourse-makers' imaginations the violence against carriers is hardly mentioned. Such practices might preferably be hidden and not mentioned officially (Ferrer-Gallardo et al., 2014, p. 4) – since they harm the reputation of Ceuta not living up to the expectations about border-management (Kuus, 2004, p. 477).

The Ceuti participants of this study reproduce imaginations of the powerful imaginations and have in common some insights with the Moroccan respondents. Some Ceuti respondents are aware of the "un-Europeanized" (Kuus, 2004, p. 483) methods to defend the border from immigration and they disapprove of it: "it is a crime", participant 15 confesses referring to the 6th of February events.

Participant 21 mentions the same event. Yet, he rejects the migrants' presence in the EU and supports the defense, since many come "to rub" and "thousands of them enter". He does not believe that the police forces shot at the migrants. He also explains that the treatment the migrants receive once they reach Ceuta is more than appropriate; they even have heating and televisions. He is disappointed about their criminal behaviours once they reach Spain and he is convinced that they do not want to adapt to the European norms - they do not have proper qualifications to work in Spain. In this imagination populist arguments of the powerful imaginations about migration and consequent rejection are reproduced (Gibson-Graham, 2000, p. 108) and fear from infiltration of otherness is celebrated (Stoler, 1997, pp. 213-214). The migrants are imagined to hamper the process of Europeanization in Ceuta and elsewhere – through their un-European behaviors (Hardt & negri, 2000, pp. 192-194). The practice of 'otherness' by security forces is embellished and invisibilized (Ferrer-Gallardo et al., 2014, p. 4). Also the sacrifices by Ceuta are stressed to help the migrants, neglecting the failures in realizing the border-tasks imposed by the EU (Kuus, 2004, p. 477).

Yet, the borderpassage is imagined as site, where 'otherness' manifests by more everymen: "I daily pass the border. It is a bad moment each time. (...) The treatment is bad. I have been crossing for three and a half years, but still they ask for my passport. They recognize me (...) It is a bad moment", participant 16, one of the Ceutis living in Fnideq (the Moroccan village right across the border), reports.

But it is not only those, who cross the border daily (with goods), who tell about arbitration: participant 24 is very disappointed about the lack of respect of Moroccan police agents for elderly carrier-women, and she proposes

education measures for police agents– imagining them to learn ‘civilized’, maybe ‘European’ behaviors (Stoler, 1997, p. 213). Participant 29 wants the EU to intervene and have its security forces stop hurting working human beings. All in all, the everymen seem to feel freer to talk about people being hurt by security forces than the powerful discourse-makers and they would tell about it, because they are emotionally touched by the injustice (Merrifield, 2011, p. 111).

It is striking also that most of the improvement requests about the conditions the carriers face, emit from everyman-participants, who are Muslims like the carriers and who live close to the borderpassage. It is probable that they are more in touch with the traders and know about their fates, because most of them often cross the border, they can interact in Moroccan Arabic with them in everyday life (Ferrer-Gallardo, 2011, p. 31; Merrifield, 2011, p. 108). The different levels of renegotiation of the different groups (formal in the center by powerful discourse-makers versus everyday-perspectives from the margins) illustrate the fragmentation of the city into center, spaces of flow and margins (Gunder Franck, 1966; Hardt & Negri, 2000, p. 199).

Other participants discuss the un-European practice of treatment at the border they experience even being Ceutí citizens: participant 23 finds the borderpassage intimidating, although less intimidating than 20 years ago. She is afraid to pass, because the Moroccan police would treat Ceutís deprecatorily and ask money to allow them to get back to Ceuta. She is disillusioned by the corrupt practices. During an informal conversation with a young from Ceuta I learned, that even her generation shares the fear of not being allowed to pass back to Ceuta without paying. She explains, that Ceutís are not treated much differently from the Moroccans with Schengen-exemption visa. Thus whether the Ceutí respondents cross the border regularly or not, they do not have positive opinions about the practices of security forces and are aware of the bad treatment Moroccans. They imagine the practice of the security forces as practices of ‘otherness’ (Kuus, 2004, p. 483).

Yet, they hardly mention the violence towards carriers. A reason for this might be, that even if they observe respective events, they prefer not to talk about it, avoiding attributing more otherness to Ceuta and the passage (Kuus, 2004, p. 483), using tactics of invisibilization (Ferrer-Gallardo et al., 2014). Others are possibly not aware of the practices, since they hardly interact with carriers (Ferrer-Gallardo, 2011, p. 31).

The Ceutí everyman-participants renegotiated most of all the pieces of powerful imaginations about the ‘otherness’ of the space of flows concerning cross-border-relations and interaction. This is different from the powerful imaginations emphasizing the migration topic and the Moroccan everyman-participants’ stress on the practice of the carriers. This difference in emphasis might be based on the fact that the thoughts of each participant about the spaces of flows mostly would be relate to their own experience, worries and ways the respondents are impaired. The topic of migration is frequently discussed in media in the EU, but it does not penetrate spheres of everyday life of many everymen (Merrifield, 2011, p. 108). At the border carriers mostly pass walking through the second passage, the Biutz, whereas Ceutís normally pass through the Tarajal passage, often driving a car. This reveals that the power of everyday practices (De Certeau, 1988) highly influences the focus of renegotiation of geopolitical imaginations (Mamadouh & Dijkink, 2006, p. 354).

6.2.3 Protests about Ceuta’s spaces of flow

Open protests, we have learnt is rare in Ceuta, yet, occasionally demonstrations do take place. In the imaginations of the powerful discourse-makers protests also address the spaces of flow as their central objective. However, generally the aim of the resistance (Mignolo, 2000, p. 83) can be continuation or intensification of the conditional relation with the EU (Kuus, 2004, p. 474). The act of protest then expresses criticism of the implementation of the Europeanization strategy chosen by the powerful.

Newspaper articles often describe migrants' protests. Migrants, who made it to Ceuta, use to gather in the main square to ask for transfer to Spain mainland and completion with the rights of asylum (Aznar, 2014d). Algerian and Syrian migrants attempted in 2013 to put pressure on the administration of Ceuta by organizing as a group in front of the delegation of the national government announcing a hunger strike in the square until they would be transferred (García & Saura, 2013; El Faro, 2013b; Abad, 2013c): they insisted on their right (granted by the EU) to move freely in the EU-memberstate. This way they also challenge protocols ratified by the Spanish government to have migrants e.g. leave through 'warm return' and deportation (El Faro, 2013b). The protest, an operation of agency (Kramsch, 2011, p. 197), has the final objective of having authorities live up to EU norms (Kuus, 2004, p. 474), they ask for Europeanization.

Ceuta is represented as just another prison. Migrants also complained about the bad conditions (especially the lack of space) they encounter at the CETI and they asked for separate stays with their family for reasons of safety (Abad, 2013c). This illustrates the mistrust among inhabitants of various backgrounds in the CETI and un-European conditions perceived in the center (Kuus, 2004, p. 483). Opposition parties and NGOs support several requests for Europeanization of the border-management tool (El País, 2014c), contradicting the imaginations, visions and practices of the governing institutions in Spain and Ceuta about the city's spaces of flow.

Also Morocco reminds the EU that the conditional relation to the country is not given, carefully rejecting the conditional relation (Mignolo, 2000, p. 83) regarding 'warm return' – except more financial support can be granted. Several demonstrations took place in Morocco against the way borderwork is realized by Moroccan security forces in Tanger: at a raid a 16-year old migrant fell out of a window and died immediately. The response, a demonstration in Tanger mostly joined by migrants, was a critique of the un-European measures and methods employed to treat the migrants in the name of the EU - which pays Morocco for securitization of its borders (Kramsch, 2011, p. 200). They also complain about the Moroccan guards catching migrants trying to cross the Straits before they can reach Spanish waters (Gómez & Moreno, 2014). The demonstrations about such practices are thus protests against the EU migration policy and the implementation of Moroccan interests for making the country participate in dirty borderwork in an un-European way (Kramsch, 2011).

Moroccan everyman-respondents hardly renegotiate the imaginations by powerful discourse-emitters about such protest. Only few reported about protests in Ceuta in general, yet, participant 3 tells that demonstrations use to take place at the border-passage, because of the violent treatment of carriers by the security forces of both countries – an aspect which does not appear in the powerful discourse-makers' imaginations. Probably the powerful do not differentiate about the chaos at the border and imagine it as a phenomenon as a whole, including demonstrations. Demonstrations about violent treatment might not be presented in their imaginations either in order to avoid the

attribution of un-European characteristics of the border-passage and practices of security forces to Ceuta (Ferrer-Gallardo et al., 2014, p. 4).

Participant 10, instead, heard of daily demonstrations at the border by carriers, especially in the Moroccan part. A few more Moroccan everyman-participants are informed about protest concerning migration – at the border-passage (participant 4) and in the center (participant 12). Both participants have learnt that the demonstrators (in the first case Moroccans and Subsaharans –participant 4; in the second case Ceutís – participant 12) were dissatisfied about the un-European violent treatment and border-defense techniques employed at the passage (Kuus, 2004, p. 483).

Participant 12, who stays in Ceuta, has often watched people demonstrating in Ceuta's center. The last protest she witnessed was about the migrants, who died at the borderpassage and against the dangerous practice of the Guardia Civil (the security forces at the passage).

Both kinds of demonstrations criticize the EU-border-management, which is a part of the conditional relation with Ceuta (Kuus, 2004, p. 477). Participant 13 would want to demonstrate for more rights for Moroccans working in informal conditions like she does. But being from the other side of the border she is afraid of the police finding her without official documents. She would be in trouble and brought to Morocco. But she would demand to Europeanize Ceuta for her fellows, make it a space of rights and freedom', like her ideal geopolitical imagination of being Europe (Kuus, 2004, p. 482). In her vulnerable situation the participant does not yet consider Ceuta sufficiently European (Kuus, 2004, p. 483).

The Ceutí everyman-participants, mentioning demonstrations concerning the space of flow at the border-passage, also refer to the protests about the migrants: participant 23 wonders how the violent behaviours implemented against the migrants could have ever evolved at all and why the state pays its servants, if they perform such incoherent, un-European, behaviours (Kuus, 2004, p. 483). She is the only participant from, who reports about having joined the manifestation about the migrants (participant 23).

Another protest mentioned by two Ceutí participants (which did not emerge from the imaginations of Ceuta's discourse-making elites either) is a demonstration about the tariffs of the ferry to Spain mainland, which should be adopted to market prices (participant 20, 23). The protesters desire more focus on the preoccupations of Ceutís themselves in their lifeworlds and the harbor space of flows. The demonstrations reveal the aim and desire of having a Europeanized transfer to Spain mainland, adhering to neoliberal ideologies and competition about prices in favor of the clients (Sparke, 2002, p. 220). All in all, we have understood that Ceutís use to protest little (which seems to be their mentaltity), which might explain the lack of further renegotiation of the topic (Merrifield, 2011, p. 108). But also invisibilization tactics might be applied to prevent further dissemination about e.g. the migration 'problem' (Ferrer-Gallardo et al., 2014).

6.3 Summary about weakened conditionality in Ceuta's spaces of flow

In Ceuta's spaces of flow the conditional relation between Ceuta and the EU does manifest according to both, the geopolitical imaginations of Ceuta's powerful discourse-makers and the renegotiations of the imaginations by everyman-participants from both sides of the border.

The analysis in this chapter illustrates that Ceuta is imagined as a relevant geopolitical site of transition in the EU. The position at the edge of a continent, at the sea and especially at the EU border impacts this imagination. Those particularities are seen as a reason why Ceutis identify firmly with the EU, being forced to negotiate their identity in relation to a world beyond the EU. The border and business at the Tarajal play major roles in the economic system and economic modernization of Ceuta: for trade and (potentially) services. But in order to provide for further economic development, in order to match the imagined and imposed EU standards in economy (Kramsch, 2011, p. 196), modernization of the border-passage is planned by Ceuta's decision-makers and imagined by everymen from both sides of the border.

The same applies for Ceuta's harbor which is identified as another economic engine for Ceuta. It is another connection allowing for relations to the world. The EU subsidizes respective projects, which proves a certain recognition of Ceuta's singularities and that the EU lives up to the conditional promises (Kuus, 2004, p. 484).

This is also true for the buffer- and filter-function the city struggles to perform (Kuus, 2004, p. 477). Many agree that the EU should support Ceuta more in this difficult task, "defending the EU from migrants". The buffer-function and subjection to the EU-Schengen-norms manifest in securitization at the border (Walters, 2002, p. 569) and have caused adaptation of practices also by Moroccan everyman-participants. Additionally, Ceutí everyman-participants and powerful leaders subject to European-ness (Kuus, 2004) in their renegotiation about flows of otherness (Ferrer-Gallardo, 2009, p. 31; Stoler, 1997, pp 213-214) to the city by invisibilizing the 'otherness' or rejecting Moroccans and migrants (Ferrer-Gallardo et al., 2014, p. 4). They also seek to discursively Europeanize their city and practices, shifting otherness beyond the border-passage (Kuus, 2004, p. 479).

As mentioned above, according to the geopolitical imaginations investigated, simultaneously 'otherness' manifests in the spaces of flow: it is intrinsic to a border-site like Ceuta that contact with 'otherness' occurs (Kolossoff & Scott, 2012, p. 34). Cross-border relations have for long existed in private and professional life (Driessen, 2010, pp. 175-176). So a mix of cultures could easily developed (Ferrer-Gallardo & Van Houtum, 2012, p. 247) in the region and institutionalize. Moroccan attributes and practices in Ceuta and Spanish attributes and practices in the Tetouan region are an appreciated part of the everyday routine (Merrifield, 2011, p. 108). The relations are even considered to bear potential of future economic development.

But, especially Ceutís, who least interact (mostly decision-makers and everymen from the center) attribute otherness to the relations in the European context. Yet, the simple imposition of European identity on one of Europe's margins fails. The context is more complex – drawing distinctions along the EU border (discursively) is contested (Newman et al. in Kramsch, 2010, p. 1012) and agency in the form of practices might weaken the imposition of norms in daily routines (Kramsch, 2011, p. 197; De Certeau, 1988).

The flows of cross-border workers, often vulnerable, because employed in informal conditions in Ceuta, the practices of 'smuggling' goods across the border by carriers working under inhuman conditions and the migrants'

tactics to subvert Schengen-rules, border-management and the inhuman struggles they have to fight, all emerge from the imaginations about Ceuta's spaces of flow. 'Otherness' is attributed to those 'un-European' (Kuus, 2004, p. 483) practices: on the one hand, invisibilization serves especially everyman-participants from Ceuta's center to hide the dependence of the carriers' suffering and the failure of border-work. On the other hand, compassion and solidarity are expressed (mostly by participants from the margins and some powerful discourse-makers) in combination with demands to the EU to take responsibility to normalize Ceuta's border, supporting the border-management and seizing causes of migration.

In a European context the convergence of the mentioned flows seems rather unique – and becomes a feature of 'otherness' (Kuus, 2004, p. 483). Whereas the Moroccan respondents criticize the EU and Ceuta in many ways arguing for more human conditions at the border, Ceuti participants were more hesitant – being torn between respect of Human rights, regularization and the struggle to live up to the conditions felt to be imposed by the EU (Kuus, 2004, p. 474). This seems also the reason why they partly close their eyes to the violent practices of security forces at the border-passage, who struggle to control the border and have developed corrupt and violent habits according to different imaginations. Violence to Moroccan cross-border-workers and carriers, however, is rendered irrelevant alongside the tragedies of migrants (Ferrer-Gallardo et al., 2014).

Protests occur only seldom in Ceuta, as chapter 5.2 has shown. Yet, migrants have organized hunger-strikes in order to have their rights granted by the EU and implemented in Ceuta. Other protests take place at the border-passage, evolving from the carriers struggle for better conditions for their work.

Ceuti's hardly demonstrate about the spaces of flow, if at all, for the insufficient transportation to the mainland. This demand reflects their desire of inclusion in the EU and their dependence on a reasonable, modern connection – a struggle, which concerns their routines (especially those from the center) (Merrifield, 2011, p. 108).

Fragmentation of functional space in the city, with the spaces of flows as veins of connection to the outside world, dominated by flows, in comparison to rather stable areas in the center and the margins is obvious. Additionally, a spatial fragmentation along lines of concern and degrees of interaction across cross-border relations can be traced (of course, it is a tendency, no fact) between Ceuti's from the margins (higher concern and more interaction) and the center-Ceuti's (more invisibilization and less interaction) (Ferrer-Gallardo, 2009, p. 31).

What applies to the renegotiation of powerful geopolitical imaginations certain patterns could be identified for different groups: the Moroccan everyman-respondents sometimes seem to base their renegotiations on the Moroccan national discourse and do not hesitate to criticize the EU, as they are no EU-citizens (Newman et al. in Kramsch, 2010, p. 1012). They do not seem to feel the urge to defend the union and European-ness (Stoler, 1997, p. 213). More than their renegotiation often their practices reveal what the powerful discourse-makers imagined (De Certeau, 1988; Hall, 1997b, p. 44). Yet, whenever imaginations touch an abstract level, such as future plans, which do not even concern their lives, Moroccan participants present themselves indifferent (Merrifield, 2011, p. 108). Generally everymen seem to live in the present and on that basis renegotiate imaginations as far as they seem tangible to them. They tend to contextualize imaginations on the basis of everyday life (Hall, 1997a, p. 32a) on their side of the border and in interaction with Ceuta.

Often they can observe changes described in powerful imaginations, but often they lack information or do not link it to institutions (the EU, Spain or Ceuta), which are responsible for transformations e.g. at the border-passage (e.g. the securitization measures to the EU). In everyday practice they meet Ceutis and experience only little rejection (Ferrer-Gallardo & Van Houtum, 2012, p. 244). Otherness which is attributed to them is not renegotiated (Merrifield, 2011, p. 108). The mix of cultures, instead, is strongly perceived, similarities across the border and interrelations are described with the help of many examples of everyday life. Some have incorporated the mixed culture in their biographies and practice, becoming borderthinkers (Mignolo, 2000, p. 64).

Some Moroccan everyman-participants argue from experience e.g. of the struggle about cross-border-work, feelings and consequences of the practices (Gibson-Graham, 2000, p. 97). The same applies to carriers. Ceuta's border-passage is famous in Morocco as a place of opportunity. The younger generation, though, presents anger about the economic relations to Ceuta and imagines better plans for the future relying on Morocco. There is a clear difference in the renegotiation of old (who seem to be caught in routine and resignation) and visionary young.

Given little interaction with migrants renegotiation about this flow is limited (Merrifield, 2011, p. 108). The Moroccan interviewees notice migrants' practices in Morocco and describe feelings of compassion, often based on images about devastating conditions driving migrants out of their countries for Ceuta. In their renegotiation they do not imagine what happens to migrants once they made it to Ceuta.

Yet, the majority of Moroccan participants prove borderthinking (Mignolo, 2000, p. 64) in desiring borders to be abolished. They are courageous to doubt about the EU border-policies and remind of the union's responsibility at the border, where migrants are known to be treated badly. Many participants renegotiate imaginations about the violence and bad treatment of Moroccan border-workers by security forces and the hardship of the carrier-job, especially for women and elderly. They are little aware of protests in Ceuta's center about the passage by e.g. migrants, but they are conscious about Moroccans protesting at the passage- aware of what happens to their fellows (Merrifield, 2011, p. 108). Many stress features of otherness *and* conditionality (Kuus, 2004, pp. 483, 484) of the spaces of flow like Ceuta's powerful.

In their renegotiations Ceuti everyman-participants often feel the urge to justify Ceuta, relativizing criticism emerging e.g. from powerful geopolitical imaginations. This way they legitimize their own choice to stay in Ceuta in spite of features and practices of otherness imagined about the city (Kuus, 2004, p. 483). They discursively seek to reaffirm European-ness as attribute of the city and themselves (Kuus, 2004, p. 479). Like for Moroccan respondents, the powerful discourse-makers' imaginations appear abstract or visionary to them (e.g. about cross-border-service relations).

Ceuti participants from the center tend to reject relations with and dependence on Morocco. Their visions often approve Europeanization e.g. of the border-passage. They start imagining own strategies from the present situation and add their own ideas, neglecting official future plans. Their renegotiation is more emotional and intermingles with fear, compassion and desires. In a certain way their strategic imaginations for Ceuta often seem more 'old-fashioned' e.g. putting hope for economic modernization (Kramsch, 2011, p. 196) in tangible production, while neglecting plans for services in order to move towards a European service-society model (Kramsch, 2011, p. 196). Everymen from all parts of Ceuta subject to Europeanization and would desire being respected in the EU

(Kuus, 2004, p. 484). They firmly believe that they deserve support by the EU, and regret about the negative reputation of 'otherness' of Ceuta's spaces of flow (Kuus, 2004, p. 484).

Especially Ceutís from the center agree with the presence of the border and defend it – which reveals their fears from migrants and Moroccans (Ferrer-Gallardo, 2009, p. 31; Stoler, 1997, p. 213; Kuus, 2004, p. 483). Some show 'Islam- and refugee'-phobia (Ferrer-Gallardo & Van Houtum, 2012, p. 244). The mix of culture is told about more by everymen from the margins and Muslims, who like their 'bi-cultural', cross-border practices (Mignolo, 2000, pp. 68-69). Everyman-respondents from the center avoided the topic (Ferrer-Gallardo et al., 2014).

Several Ceutís prevailingly from the margins showed compassion for carriers (Muslim Ceutís) and migrants; mostly female and non-center everymen put themselves into the vulnerable place of the carriers. Routinely trained gender roles seem to affect the renegotiations (Hall, 1997a, p. 32), as well. Yet, Ceutís also highlight the limited capacities of Ceuta to be a 'buffer' for the EU and want the union to take responsibility – showing certain discursive resistance (Kramsch, 2011, p. 197). T

here is also evidence in a few imaginations about corrupt practices by security forces (Kuus, 2004, p. 478). The CETI is hardly mentioned in their imaginations, perhaps, because it is spatially too isolated from the city and thus becomes isolated in imaginations. Although the center Ceutís know about the violent treatment of migrants and their suffering, they also legitimate the border and shift responsibility to mafias of human traffickers from beyond the border (Kuus, 2004, p. 479). The carriers' fate though is not mentioned much and seems to be invisibilized in imaginations of Ceutí respondents from the center (Ferrer-Gallardo et al., 2014). Ceutí respondents remain relatively indifferent to protests by migrants, but make a few remarks about their occasional own protest about e.g. the prices of the ferry (Merrifield, 2011, p. 108).

Finally, it is crucial to note that basically all aspects imagined as working in the conditional relation with the EU at the same time are imagined to have a 'downside', weakening the relation again e.g. thinking of the buffer-function of Ceuta: while living up to the EU expectations with the help of funding, inflow of migrants continues carrying attributes of 'otherness' into the EU, undermining the border-regime through tactics. In a similar way this holds for conditionality about economic development based on un-European trade and cross-border workers.

In the geopolitical imaginations of all groups (everymen and powerful) both processes, intensification of and vitiating Europeanization, are envisioned for Ceuta's spaces of flow and manifest. Working as European border is ambiguous in itself: whereas Ceuta's spaces of flow live up to EU expectations, they absorb otherness for the union, which undermines the Europeanization of the city. This is different from the center, where the conditional relation was envisioned as dominant for many aspects, with few weakening processes to them. Ceuta's spaces of flow are distinct from other spaces of the city for their function of connection, but also for the geopolitical imaginations about conditionality about them.

7. Ceuta's margins



Ceuta's margins can be defined here as the districts of the city, which are located in its North West (Benzú, Benitez area), in its South West (the Príncipe districts, Rosales) along the border with Morocco including several districts along the road connecting the center with the border-passage (Juan Carlos, Almadraba, El Moro) (see figure 14). These districts are imagined to have in common not only their non-central spatial positions, but their reputation of socio-economic marginality e.g. manifesting in comparatively low housing prices in comparison to the center. Precarious situations of many households in those districts are imagined as characteristic as well. The margins are imagined to correspond to the spatial units of Ceuta, where the proportion of Muslims is significantly higher.

Observations made me aware of the different conditions of life in Ceuta's margins, starting from the isolated locations, far from the center and central functions. Also the proximity of the margins to Morocco show quite plainly that the margins are far. Going by bus to Benzú, the Northern marginal district, from the center shows that it is rather isolated. The bus from the center just circulates once per hour and the bus-ride takes about 30 minutes (observation, February 7th, 2014). Going from the center to the Príncipe in the South the architecture gradually changes - closer to the border the 'Moroccan style of building' outweighs the 'Spanish': in Príncipe's narrow, steep, uphill streets cars hardly pass.

Life in the street is different as well. Shops can even consist of a linen sheet on the ground offering 10 tomatoes and 2 pieces of garlic – as it is common in Tetouan, where elderly women sell few pieces of vegetables on sheets. And like in Tetouan those women from the mountains dress up with the red-white typical, traditional dress

and hat with veil of the Tetouan-region (see figure 15)(Observation, February 13th, 2014). Also the implicit cultural affiliation to Morocco or Moroccan life-style – both are to certain extent features of otherness, negatively impacting economic and cultural Europeanization and impeding the margins to live up to the expectations imposed in the conditional relation with the EU (Kuus, 2004, p. 482). The margins seem culturally distinct, marginal and isolated for their spatial-relational position.



The analysis of geopolitical imaginations about Ceuta's margins has delivered an image with a strong tendency: Whereas in the two previous chapters aspects of the conditional relation to the EU emerged clearly and for some aspects rather distinct from the imaginations about weakening factors, for Ceuta's margins the 'otherness' was prevalent in the imaginations about all the relevant features. On the basis of such results here the choice was made to rely on a different structure for this chapter: the sub-chapters deal with the five most important topics simultaneously illustrating imaginations of otherness and strategies envisioned to mediate the otherness (Kuus, 2004, p. 483). First the fight against unemployment and abandonment (7.1) will be described. Then imaginations about urban (irregular) development (7.2), the multicultural mix-culture of the margins (7.3), criminal practices (7.4) and protests (7.5) will be outlined. The chapter concludes with a summary (7.6).

7.1 The fight against unemployment and abandonment

Unemployment and social problems

A major feature of otherness attributed to the margins of Ceuta in the powerful discourse-makers imaginations are socio-economic 'un-European' conditions (Kuus, 2004, p. 483). An indication by the tourist office in Ceuta illustrates, that socio-economically well positioned parts of the population do not seem to dwell at the Northern and Southern margins of Ceuta.

During a presentation by the PSOE (socialist party) (observation, February 8th, 2014) one of the speakers made the following argument: “everyday there is more inequality in Ceuta. (...) Life expectancy varies a lot by the part of the city you live in (making a difference of up to 10 years). (...)The phenomenon is passing from one generation to the next”. Olmedo Izar Fuente (personal communication, February 26th, 2014) additionally mentions the problem of unemployment, although it is hard to determine its structural nature (e.g. through structural lack of economic opportunities). “The tragedy of joblessness in Ceuta dangerously approaches a limit” (Aróstegui, 2014b), especially among young, where a proportion of almost 70 % is without a job. They are driven into informal economy, forced to consume in Morocco without much chance to integrate into the labor-market soon. This perpetuates the adverse effects on Ceuta’s economy. A distinct situation has established for employees of the public sector, with rather secure job-guarantees (Aróstegui, 2014b) – which is the case of many inhabitants of the center of Ceuta. In this context Aróstegui accuses the public leaders of egoism and lacking solidarity.

An article in the local newspaper *El Pueblo* bears evidence of the magnitude of the problem: Ceuta is the city with the highest unemployment rate in the EU, the article (*El Pueblo*, 2013h) quotes the party UPyD. Also Mas Vallecón (personal communication, February 20th, 2014) outlines that the “first problem is the unemployment; it is common and vast in Spain, but in Ceuta it has a different quality, (...)”. Within Europe we are the region with the highest unemployment rate”. He is convinced that it is an internal social problem of the city, given the spatial distribution and characteristics of the unemployed – an intrinsic feature of ‘otherness’ in his imagination (Kuus, 2004, p. 483) weakening the potentials of economic development in the margins and of Ceuta as a whole (Kramsch, 2011, p. 196).

In the wake of the crisis, the EU has released norms for the balance of budget of Spain, which translate into cost-cutting measures for the public sector (Olivencia, 2014b). Although many people in the margins are anyway unemployed, their chances to find employment, to improve their situation, are even more reduced through this rationalizing Europeanization strategy (Kuus, 2004, p. 474). Features of ‘otherness’ in Ceuta’s margins are imagined to be exacerbated by socio-economic impacts and the unusually high unemployment in the city (Kuus, 2004, p. 483). Rationalization strategies imposed by the EU might perpetuate the problem (Gunder, Franck, 1966, p. 20). All of this does not fit the European model of economic progress and modernization (Kramsch, 2011, p. 196).

Moroccan everyman-respondents do not renegotiate imaginations about this socio-economic feature of ‘otherness’ in the margins. Some are aware of struggles in the Príncipe area (participants 1, 2, 7, 8, 12, 13) but it is not a primary feature of the margins they would comment on. Most of the Moroccans, including those, who use to come to Ceuta, are not concerned with the struggle and even if they knew about it, it would not come to their mind first, when thinking of Ceuta (Merrifield, 2011, p. 108).

The participants, who do take note of the unemployment and do consider it a problem. Especially participants 12 and 13, stress their compassion for those being unemployed and suggest solutions. As they are cross-border workers, they can experience the struggle in their everyday routines (De Certeau, 1988) in the city. They are also among those, who hope to build a life in future in the city, and share worries about the future: participant 13

has noticed the decrease in job-opportunities over time. On the other hand, her story is symptomatic of how irregular occupations replace regular ones – a major cause of unemployment in the margins.

Participant 7 has listened to residents of the margins complaining about their precarious situations and concludes that there are economic problems, which should be overcome. The concern of the participants is derived from putting themselves into the place of the unemployed. Their reasoning is thus less rational, but emotional and close to every-day life considerations (Merrifield, 2011, p. 108). The imaginations of norms imposed by the EU worsening the situation in the marginal areas are not renegotiated by Moroccan everyman-participants (see chapter 5, 6 for renegotiation about impacts of EU policies).

It is striking, that almost all the imaginations presented about the unemployment and social problems were uttered by everymen residing in the margins. Especially respondents living in financially stable conditions do not express any concern about the unemployment in the margins – their everyday practices do not make them get in touch with the topic (Merrifield, 2011, p. 108). One of the respondents is even convinced that the situation in Ceuta is better than elsewhere in Spain, because “people come here and they find work” (participant 26). But we have learned before that participant 26, who is not from Ceuta, feels that she has to defend Ceuta (and thus her choice to stay in the city) from any criticism.

Participant 19 is aware of lack of employment, but he does not consider this problem to be worse than in other places of Spain. Participant 19 in general avoids admitting that Ceuta has particularities at all. It is probable that Ceutís, originally from Spain mainland (participant 19, 26) are used to people suspecting Ceuta of being different. But in participant 19’s routine in the center of Ceuta, he also hardly notices differences. Many might prefer to avoid the topic of the margins in general, because they dislike revealing problems of their city to a Northern European researcher. Many Ceutís regret about Ceuta’s negative reputation. They might want to improve the image mentioning the more positive aspects, while keeping silent about its otherness (Kuus, 2004, p. 483) – this tactic can be called ‘invisibilization’ (Ferrer-Gallardo et al., 2014).

Participant 14, residing in the center recognizes that there are few opportunities in Ceuta, and especially “not all kinds of jobs you would like to work at” – which implies that it is also difficult to find a job, matching one’s qualifications. It is a problem many young suffer from and a reason why they leave for Spain mainland. Participant 20 tells the story of her daughter who “is 28 and studies because she cannot find work. (...) she has done various courses. But there is no work.” Thus, some everymen from central districts and marginal districts do regard the unemployment as unusually concentrated in Ceuta and as a feature of ‘otherness’ (Kuus, 2004, p. 483).

Many everyman-respondents from the margins, on the contrary, enjoyed to shed light on what the ‘otherness’ implies for the lives in the margins, while charging responsibility on the powerful from the center. Participant 16 tells that once he became unemployed again (eventually he had short-termed occupations), he took the decision to move to Morocco: given the precarious economic situation of his family, he decided that they could better stay across the border and have a more decent life. Participant 17, as if confirming, states that she is worried about the unemployment in Ceuta, especially about lack of opportunities for young.

Participant 27 tells his story: he lives with his parents and on their small income (pension) with his children and wife. It is not possible for him to cover a rent including costs for water, light and additionally the costs of daily routine such as food or books for school. Sometimes there is no money left for having a breakfast, since there is hardly any financial support by the state. He is also aware that many families share the same precarious situation. He longs for an own place to stay with his family - "like a human being". Although he knows about the provision of financial unemployment support, called 'paro', and the social support, called 'ayuda', he does not appreciate the system, since the former has ended for him some time ago. Then he was left without any means and support for finding jobs. He rejects to leave his family to go to another country to work – for all the emotional ties. The disappointment about local decision-makers is obvious, especially because they had promised too often to help without making their promises come true. This, he says, only nurtures an atmosphere of mistrust.

But his disappointment also refers to the EU, which he does not feel to be part of, given the circumstances he lives in, in Ceuta's margins - he envisions an EU, which is the opposite of what he experiences in his city; the opposite of corruption and neglect, unemployment and lack of a roof above his head. Also participant 28 feels 'marginalized'. Participant 29, who knows many families complaining about unemployment, and ongoing demands to create jobs analyzes: "every year there is the same unemployment, each year there is the 'employment plan' to clean streets etc., but we need more jobs". In this statement he implies that there is a lack of reasonable alternatives, hinting at structural deficits of Ceuta's economy.

Participants 15, 21 and 25 describe this lack: "the only thing you can do in Ceuta is to have a business" (participant 15). Setting up a business is not easy in conditions, under which everyone struggles to find a niche. Self-employed can hardly take free time during normal weeks (participant 21, 25). Participant 27 reminds that there are no production sites in Ceuta, either. Many participants worry about the future of the next generation (participant 16, 17, 22, 23).

These worries are mostly related to e.g. family-members, who are young and qualified, but struggle. Some, who worry, have experienced unemployment themselves. Knowing what it is like they hope for a better future for others. The renegotiation of the powerful imaginations thus discloses experiences of the 'otherness' by everymen from Ceuta's margins (De Certeau, 1988). They attribute 'otherness' (Kuus, 2004, p. 483) to their districts and situations in comparison to other places in the EU or just Ceuta's center. Those sites suit better the socio-economic European standards they imagine (Kramsch, 2011, p. 200). Participant 28 is of the opinion that the center is a rather stable part of the city, where people live in comfortable situations due to the high level of employment – an imagination highlighting the fragmentation of the city (Gunder Franck, 1966, p. 20).

Strategies and tactics to fight unemployment in the margins

In official imaginations of the powerful discourse-makers Ceuta's margins adapt to European standards in economic development (Kramsch, 2011, p. 196). Most imaginations, however, deal with the eradication of unemployment – a major obstacle to EU-template-economic development. Imaginations and respective measures are thus decisively less ambitious for this part of the city (departing from even 'less' European conditions than in other parts of Ceuta).

This mirrors the spatial and social fragmentation of the city and the reinforcement of this process through the conditional relation with the EU (Gunder Franck, 1966, p. 20): Official government documents suggest several steps to approach the problem of unemployment. A first step proposes creating employment in construction, inserting unemployed labor force. This would have to parallel sanctioning bad practice such as informal employment of Moroccan labour. The margins' most vulnerable groups should be prioritized for the involvement in the programs (Ciudad de Ceuta, 2014, p. 8) instead of hiring applicants from elsewhere (A.J., 2014). Other measures would promote commercial zones in marginal areas (ibid., pp. 10-11), investment in the industrial zone around Loma Colmenar (ibid., p. 16) and restructuring the Almadra zone's economic activity (ibid., p. 17).

Additionally, the conditions for social support are to be restructured as well as the frameworks for reintegration into the labor market, e.g. the employment plan includes new programs, especially for young and women (ibid., pp. 69-74). By now new courses are offered in the school for construction involving about 120 students. The offer is broad, ranging from courses in classical construction to integral cleaning, furniture building and commercial sale – which might also fit the local economic structure and its demand (El Pueblo, 2013i). In multiple powerful geopolitical imaginations education and vocational training are represented as keys of the strategy to diminish unemployment.

Yet, for this reason e.g. the president of the labor union considers the rationalization-reform of the Spanish educational system imposed by the EU (Kuus, 2004, p. 482) as having especially destructive effects in Ceuta's margins, more than elsewhere (Rincón, 2013a). The labor Union of Ceuta wants the national administration to give special attention to Ceuta, being the city with the highest unemployment rate of entire Spain, e.g. in the form of an integrated plan. Regularization of employment relations in Ceuta is a major point for action and another important step, according to the imaginations of the representative, could be diversification of the economic system of Ceuta (thus, less reliance on the public sector) (Armuña, 2010a). This approach to modernizing Ceuta's economic structure reminds of the plans made to foster the service sector in Ceuta (5.1).

The socialist party members emphasize the necessity to help the young to create employment e.g. assisting them to set up new, small- and medium – size enterprises (P. Sánchez at observation, February 8th, 2014; J.M. Mas Vallecón, personal communication, February 14th, 2014) and providing them with additional EU-funding (Kuus, 2004, p. 484) for business start-ups. In the long-run, Mas Vallecón (personal communication, February 14th, 2014) would advise to treat the school drop outs, also the highest in Europe, to reform the 'employment plan' and to stimulate the private economy. He believes that general measures are needed, since various types of unemployment seem to coexist in Ceuta, e.g. among the groups with degree or without. With regard to the presence of cross-border labor force the number of informally working Moroccans declines – a positive development. Contracts are formalized, so chances on the labor market for Ceutís have improved again (J.M. Mas Vallecón, personal communication, February 14th).

The representative of the socialist party of Ceuta makes a rather neoliberal argument in favor of entrepreneurialism as solution to unemployment, fitting the general trend of neo-liberalization in the process of Europeanization (Mignolo, 2000, p. 53; Sparke, 2002, p. 220). Additionally, the suggestion to study the situation

profoundly and to obtain more knowledge, perfectly suits the idea of knowledge economy and European modernity – making decisions based on empirical information (Foucault, 1991).

Castillo Sempere (personal communication, February 20th, 2014), a high level official for social affairs explains that for those, who are unemployed, programs have existed to reintroduce them into the labor market, already now. They can apply for social support and should be incorporated in the employment plan. She is optimistic though, that with the help of the offers the municipal institutions provide, unemployment and social vulnerability can be fought successfully. Yet, she agrees, that through the border much work is absorbed by cross-border workers, given cheap labor and economic disparities between Ceuta and Morocco (Ferrer-Gallardo, 2009, p. 31). She admits that it is hard for the municipal institutions to intervene in such employment practices as they are organized in the private sector (J. Castillo Sempere, personal communication, February 20th, 2014).

The pieces of discourse added by the social affairs official here fit the plans and programs the municipal government announces to implement. Most measures strive for modernization in the margins (Kuus, 2004, p. 482). Less unemployment would, of course, help the template development of Ceuta's economy (Kramsch, 2011, p. 196).

Surprisingly, another vision for economic development of the marginal Príncipe district is seen in the field of tourism: Thanks to the new soap opera in one of the main Spanish television channels the district is becoming well known all over Spain. In the plot the district is depicted as dangerous Muslim, Mafia-dominated zone. Whether true or not (there are similarities with the situation in the district as described by some people from Ceuta) – it could be a good advertisement for the district, becoming an adventurous touristic site, Spanish would like to explore. Also the rest of Ceuta might benefit from a new flow of tourists into the city (Aureliano Martín, 2014) – positive effects on the economic modernization and Europeanization of the district and the city as a whole (Kramsch, 2011, p. 196) are likely. But, in general, the imaginations of Ceuta's leaders show that Ceuta is struggling to modernize its margins according to the EU-template. Still, subjection to the superiority of the EU model can be identified in the geopolitical imaginations (Mignolo, 2000, pp. 58-59; Gibson-Graham, 2000, p 108).

In response to the problem of unemployment, imaginations of several powerful discourse-makers translate into calls for more attention and dedication, commitment and involvement by the EU in Ceuta's margins. The European Spring movement highlights that (O.J., 2014b) Ceuta's dependence on the EU for its singularities – especially the socio-economic struggle in the margins - is not yet taken seriously: Ceuta does get a lot from the EU, but it is far from enough in this imagination (Kuus, 2004, p. 484). In the local newspaper *El Faro*, the discursive resistance by the Caballas party is presented, including the critique of the use of EU-subsidies so far. They do not agree with the modernization of the city center, because they imagine that all districts should have been included.

Especially in zones, where necessities are concentrated, such as the marginal areas with high unemployment, investments could have been useful. The party suggests developing an integral plan for e.g. the Príncipe area and surrounding districts for a profound improvement of quality of life – increasing employment rates, improving infrastructures including schools or residence for elderly (A.Q., 2014). Resistance to the national reform of the school-system, which is expected to have adverse effects in Ceuta's margins is an important piece of geopolitical imaginations. More flexibility would be needed in order to cope with the needs of students (*El Pueblo*, 2013b) of

Ceuta. The EU standard template development including rationalization is imagined to obstruct development. Instead a more contextual approach is favored (Mignolo, 2000, pp. 71-73).

Aróstegui Ruiz suggests approaching the issues on the long-term by making political, structural changes. In the short-run he seeks to appeal to the entrepreneurs of Ceuta to sacrifice some margins for creating employment, and to choose for less precarious employment conditions (Aróstegui, 2014b). In the appeals the fragmentation and likely perpetuation of the process are highlighted (Gunder Franck, 1966, p. 20). A practice, which was developed in response to political abandonment of the margins of Ceuta is an initiative by the associations of neighborhoods, providing the residents of the marginal districts with support for pupils (e.g. materials needed for school). Another voluntary effort is the offer of occupation in the green brigade's project –employment for 55 persons (J. Ramos Aparicio, personal communication, February 12th, 2014). The initiative can be interpreted as a sign of agency of the civil society and residents of Ceuta, working solidary against the abandonment of the margins.

The identification of the urgent needs in the margins by the association highlights the otherness imagined to concentrate there (Kuus, 2004, p. 483). But it is also a way to empower residents, who through Europeanization and mismanagement by political decision-makers have been deprived of trust in their power (Kramsch, 2011, p. 197).

In the renegotiation by Moroccan everyman-participants the topic of economic modernization of Ceuta's margins is almost neglected. Few Moroccan everyman-participants envision strategies of how to fight unemployment; anyway few have noticed the problem at all, mostly those, who regularly cross the border. Participant 7 and 13 wish that the unemployed would soon be given work to develop and survive. Participant 12 utters concern about the future of the young (participant 12): "my dream is to give a secure future to the young. I know what it means to give away your youth for nothing, I understand it (...). I would also consult people, who have studied, I would go to organizations and investigate the situation of the young" (participant 12) – this quotation is another proof of how much the own contextual, local experience influences the way official discourse is renegotiated (Gibson-Graham, 2000, p. 97).

At the same time the appeal of modern, technocratic policy-making (Foucault, 1991) can be traced. Participant 13 highlights that actually the Ceutí unemployed have the option to travel freely to find a job in Europe, which from a Moroccan perspective (Moroccans are highly restricted in free mobility through visa-requirements in many countries) is an EU-privilege (Kuus, 2004, p. 484). Participant 7 cannot understand why the EU, Spain and Ceuta still tolerate informal employment relations in Ceuta and fraud for requesting social security, given consequent negative economic and social effects in Ceuta's margins. But he is also suspicious of the residents of Ceuta's margins, blaming them of being lazy and not really wanting to work.

In his country, Morocco, he explains, all these practices would not be tolerated. Saying this he imagines that his country results to be more Europeanized and organized, on a higher level of Europeanization than Ceuta, inverting the relation of superiority (Mignolo, 2000, pp. 58-59), but still reaffirming the value of Europeanization and organization (Kuus, 2004, p. 482). This imagination is, of course, a challenge to the conditional relation between Ceuta and the EU (Kramsch, 2011, p. 197), since it points to Ceuta's incapacity to Europeanize and break through the vicious circle reinforcing 'otherness' in the margins (Gunder Franck, 1966, p. 20).

The housekeeper participant 12 is aware that many unemployed Muslims suffer from the competition with Moroccans like her, doing jobs the unemployed from Ceuta could have done. She fully understands their despair and complaints, but she is thankful herself that she can survive with the help of her job. This renegotiation is grounded a lot in her world of experience in Ceuta, the experiences she gathers in everyday routine (De Certeau, 1988): She encounters unemployed Ceutís as a Moroccan, who found a job in Ceuta. The demand for more control of employment relations she renegotiates as justified, a demand in favor of standardization or normalization suiting EU norms (Kuus, 2004, p. 482), revealing the current state of otherness (Kuus, 2004, p. 483).

The geopolitical imaginations for future strategies to fight unemployment are also mostly renegotiated by inhabitants of the marginal areas, especially by respondents from Príncipe. For participants from the center the strategies do not play any role in the daily routines (Merrifield, 2011, p. 108) and they do not have any reasons to go to Ceuta's margins (work, consumption and living take place in the center). Even the respondents' concern about spaces in the city seems rather fragmented, like the space of the city: while everyman-participants from the margins are concerned with all the three kinds of spaces discussed here (chapter 5-7), the everyman-participants from the center and Morocco care less about the modernization of the Ceuta's marginal spaces, where they do not come (Merrifield, 2011, p. 108).

A resident of Ceuta's margins, participant 24, has been involved in the 'employment plan' (a program offered to unemployed to be reintegrated into a labor market created on the basis of public subsidies). She has been benefitting from it periodically, but after, she was back to a vulnerable situation. She was also struggling with the employment conditions as she had to care for her children. But she knew, she would be fired once she could not make it to work. In this imagination the measures described by the experts and documents are renegotiated through the experience of the individual (Hall, 1997a, p. 32). The meaning-making of participant 24 reaffirms criticism presented about the lack of sustainability of the employment plan.

Instead participant 16 is aware that the 'employment plan' is a project initiated by the EU, which allows about 1000 people a year to be occupied. But for the individual, he complains, it is too irregular to be involved for half a year and then fall back into unemployment until being called again. According to the renegotiation by the everyman-participants from the margins the adaptation and Europeanization tasks are not yet properly lived up to in the margins in the conditional relation (Kuus, 2004, p. 483). The fragmentation of Ceuta's space is obvious in the imaginations of the everyman-participants from the margins.

Participant 24 would appreciate economic development for her district (Kramsch, 2011, p. 108) and wants the unemployment to be fought on the long-term. The same wish for modernization and improvement is presented by participants 16 and 28, including similar criticism about the organization. Generally, participant 16 expects that more equality of opportunities would have a positive influence on Ceuta's future, as well as the creation of employment with the help of EU funding (Kuus, 2004, p. 484).

Often though, participant 16 suspects, funding has been asked from the EU for modernizing the marginal areas, but then it was invested in the center of Ceuta. The support for unemployed mentioned in official discourse does not seem to be perceived as proper measure for improvement and it is not made use of. Participant 28

compares the center to a first world place, which does not share the EU-funding with the rest of the city, the margins resembling third-world country districts - areas, which are not even noticed by the EU (Mignolo, 2000, p. 60).

Participant 17 is of the opinion that joining the EU has had few positive effects on Ceuta in general. Although she appreciates increase in freedom of movement between countries, in her imagination, few subsidies have been provided to Ceuta or at least only few have benefitted the city in the end, also because of corrupt practice of local elites (Kuus, 2004, p. 478). She does not feel involved. Such an opinion is shared by participant 27, who feels cheated by political elites in Ceuta, but also other powerful decision-makers such as entrepreneurs or the media. He has never benefitted from being a European citizen on paper, because of the different socio-economic conditions in the margins. He invites politicians of the EU to Ceuta to see the problems with their own eyes, e.g. corruption and neglect. Additionally, participants who are unemployed, complain about the companies and government hiring workers and entrepreneurs from the mainland to realize major projects in Ceuta (participant 16, 27).

Participant 28 would want the EU to trust the citizens of Ceuta's margins more, because he believes they would manage to seize the problems with adequate means in their hands (Mignolo, 2000, p. 60). Participant 27 proposes that investments should finally help his district – a suggestion which shows that the modernization measures and unemployment programs have not changed the situation much, but that such modernization is desired (Kuus, 2004, p. 474). The optimistic geopolitical imaginations of Ceuta's leaders only partly match the everyday-routines of the everyman-respondents (Merrifield, 2011, p. 108). So their renegotiation is first of all critical, but also hints at solutions.

Several participants suggest how to overcome unemployment: participant 19 from the center, who does not consider Ceuta's situation to be different from the situation in other places, would make plans about the lack of employment for young people – “all the normal stuff, like in any other city of Spain” (participant 19). On the contrary, participant 28 from Príncipe outlines another idea to benefit the “marginalized districts”: “With all that money and funding for 13 years we have been receiving it, if I had been the one arranging things, I would have changed Ceuta completely (...) per person [unemployed] throughout the last years we had 15.000 euros, enough for 3 years per person for creating employment (...) First, 300 people could have established a company. Then within 10 years slowly people could jump on the train step by step”.

Other participants agree especially with the last idea, to start up business (participant 26) and to invite companies to settle (participant 27). In this sense they reproduce major parts of the official plans debated (Gibson-Graham, 2000, p. 108). Generally, Ceutí everyman-participants from the margins demonstrate agency in various ideas of how to improve the situation of socio-economic and cultural deprivation: participants 16, 24, 27 and 28 would like the EU to send funding to improve the situation, especially by creating equal employment opportunities for inhabitants of Ceuta's margins. But further they do not link many of their ideas to the EU taking responsibility.

Participant 23 suggests investing in education of people living in the outskirts, additionally. Participant 27 and 28 show disappointment about the EU and Spain not introducing finally measures against the informal employment of Moroccan cross-border workers, many Ceutís struggle to compete with on the labor market. In the Príncipe district unemployed Muslims have organized in an association to make their claims for fighting

unemployment. They seek support by public bodies for their initiative via dialogue. The resistance refers to both lack of reform (unemployment in the margins) and to certain reforms (Kramsch, 2011, p. 197). Both initiatives pledge for a more place-based, context-specific strategy for improvement of the situation.

The Europeanization strategy as pursued in Ceuta is resisted to in Ceuta's margins with the aim of implementing a, according to their imagination, more suiting strategy for modernization (Mignolo, 2000, p. 60). Often requests for more or better facilities are uttered. Participant 15 would want the municipality to install more schools and leisure facilities in the isolated margins, because the margins would deserve equal provision of services. This imagination is a criticism of the current distribution of political attention and the strategic focus on the center (Gunder Franck, 1966, p. 20).

Most complaints express deception about the neglect by the EU. The renegotiations of geopolitical here capture the disappointment and frustration traced in the imaginations of the margins' everymen. They show the everyday routine desires and struggles (Häkli, 1998, p. 145). Accordingly, the suggestions of strategies by everymen have an additional value to capture the failures of Europeanization in Ceuta's margins (Kuus, 2004, p. 483), representing also the fragmentation of the city (Gunder Franck, 1966, p. 20).

Tactics for survival used by those suffering from the adverse socio-economic conditions and unemployment, are imagined by many everymen from the margins. A tactic of survival translating into practice is being solidary with each other: "among the neighbors we help each other" (participant 15). Another practice is selling goods across the border to Morocco like the carriers and their bosses use to do (participant 16). Living with relatives, who are in better positions, sharing little space and food with several entire families (participant 27) is also common.


More practices of survival concern the ways people cope and spend their day being unemployed: the young, participant 16 describes, often meet in bars to play dominoes to be at least doing something and to avoid staying at home. The lack of opportunities is grave also, because the young feel deprived of chances to study – for there are hardly means in their families to afford to pay their training (participant 28).

All these tactics of survival and coping strategies are not what would be considered a normal template European life-style – there is little efficiency and productivity (Stoler, 1997, p. 199), little ambition and hope left in the practice of people. Instead, in spite of neoliberal, individualistic logics of the dominant European model (Sparke, 2002, p. 220), the everyman-participants from the margins illustrate that solidarity and reliance on one-another plays a major role (Merrifield, 2011, p. 111). Their renegotiation of imaginations of the adverse situation and dealing with it manifest in practices, which do not correspond to ideal lives of European template citizens as well as in resistant, contesting discourse (Merrifield, 2011, p. 111).

Social support for Ceuta's margins' families

According to Ceuta's powerful, influential the population of Ceuta's margins has benefitted and will benefit from financial means provided by the EU in the form of social support measures. Mas Vallecón (personal communication, February 14th, 2014) outlines the Spanish regulations for receiving contributory payments. Normally, he explains, it is just for a certain period of time, when you get unemployed, that these payments are provided. After that there are different kinds of payments leveled by age and other circumstances of about 200 to 400 euro. Additionally social

support options exist mostly provided on monthly basis. Criteria for such support are largely complied with for many people in Ceuta – many cases have accumulated in the margins.



Additionally, Mas Vallecón (personal communication, February 14th, 2014) stresses, that one can apply for occupation in the 'employment plan', involving about 1400 people receiving a reasonable salary. It is a provisional support. In general search for jobs is obligatory for the applicants of social support, but restricted to the territory of Ceuta. Mas Vallecón (personal communication, February 14th, 2014) emphasizes, that all the supportive initiatives are financed also by EU funding e.g. the FEDER funding or support for business-startups (bound to certain criteria to be complied by the entrepreneurs) for 4 years (J.M. Mas Vallecón, personal communication, February 14th, 2014). The information obtained from those geopolitical imaginations indicates that families in Ceuta's margins can benefit from social support. The EU is involved in most of the social support programs. The figure (figure16) shows that concentration of receivers of social support is high in the marginal districts of Ceuta. We can thus conclude that the EU funding is implemented to address social needs in marginal areas of Ceuta (although we do not have any indication about to which extent EU funding is invested here).

In the geopolitical imaginations presented the EU thus lives up to the conditional commitment promised to support provision of EU-standards of living in the margins of Ceuta (Kuus, 2004, p. 484). Nevertheless, geopolitical imaginations presented in a report of the municipal government of Ceuta show that social support services are not yet sufficiently known in less affluent households in comparison to average Ceutí households (Consejería de Asuntos Sociales, Ciudad Autónoma de Ceuta, 2013, p. 15). This lack of information explains (among others) why many less affluent households find themselves in precarious situations feel left alone in their daily struggle and excluded. It is a

communicational failure the local authorities would have to work on in order to match standards they regard as 'European' (Kuus, 2004, p. 482).

What is rather implicit in official discourse is debated more actively in the renegotiation by everymen, but not by Moroccan border-people. Moroccan everyman-participants might be aware of the option to receive social security in Ceuta. But they might not be aware, which financial resources are made use of in order to pay the monthly support – it is far from their daily routines (Merrifield, 2011, p. 108) empirically unobservable for them.

A similar reasoning can be applied for Ceuti everyman-participants from other areas of the city. Even if they are aware and follow the topic in the news, they might hardly research about what flows of money the social support provided in the marginal areas consists of e.g. whether EU funding is implemented to realize the contributory payments or the 'employment plan'. Some participants from the marginal areas do receive social support, but others do not even comply with the criteria. In case they receive support, they are still not completely aware of whether EU-funding is involved.

Participant 23 is convinced that many people in the marginal areas, especially the Muslims, benefit from Ceuta being European. Being part of Spain means that social security and support is provided, which would not be the case if Ceuta was not European or Spanish. The Muslims (from marginal areas), according to participant 23, have also many children and do thus depend on and benefit even more from such service provision.

On the contrary, participant 27 (Muslim and resident of Ceuta's margins) insists that he cannot feel the support and benefits of the EU, (he is not making use of or does not apply for any of the programs mentioned by Mas Vallecón). He insists that the large part of funding is invested in decoration and construction in the center. Participant 28 would desire something different from social support: a stable job. He would like the local administration to provide such opportunities to the Muslims in the marginal districts, also with the help of EU-funding (Kuus, 2004, p. 484). Participant 16 agrees with this suggestion, since he is convinced that EU subsidies could be used better for the creation of employment.

All together it results that the people from the marginal areas are not exactly aware of the social support options and less about the EU involvement in programs (Merrifield, 2011, p. 108). The only participant, who knew about the 'employment plan' being funded with EU subsidies, criticized the program for being too limited, not suiting his imagination of an ideal organization, a European one (Kuus, 2004, p. 482).

7.2 Urban (irregular) development

Irregular construction and dwelling

Geopolitical imaginations of Ceuta's powerful attribute otherness not only to features of the city's margins, but also to agency, practices and resistant meaning-making, in the margins of Ceuta. One kind of practice envisioned as weakening the conditional relation with the EU is irregular construction and dwelling. In Ceuta's margins the often mentioned illegally constructed houses (without license) and dwellings concentrate (García, 2013e; Álvarez, 2014c).

At the same time construction practice authorized by the local government has been an issue to media attention in the end of 2013; the demolition of stairs connecting the Príncipe district with the border-passage has

resulted in problems of accessibility between these two destinations, negatively affecting the accessibility of school for children and economic activity. The demolition provoked waves of criticism about the measure. Consequently, the municipal authorities were forced to think of a solution (García, 2013a). Their authorization and plans did not suit any European ideology of progress and modernization (Kuus, 2004, p. 482).

Both examples – illegal constructions and inefficient construction projects - show that European norms and standards do not yet always manifest in the margins of Ceuta (Kuus, 2004, p. 483) in urban planning. 250 signatures were gathered to ask for a substitute of the former stairs to come (García, 2013c). The planned demolition of illegal constructions in the margins of Ceuta (especially in Benzú) provoked rejection of normalization (Kuus, 2004, p. 479). Requests disseminated to stop demolition of such informal buildings. The local Caballas party had been accused by the conservative governing party of defending illegal causes, when supporting the resistance to the demolition (García, 2013d). But also the Green party had promised support of the cause of the platform created by the Benzú-citizens, who question the necessity of demolishing the housing of at least 15 families.

The demolition is promoted by the municipal government, officially, to comply with the law of coasts in the EU. Together with the Green party the platform presents similar cases of housing not being demolished elsewhere, either, although the construction contradict the law of coast e.g. in Tenerife (García, 2014a). Also the socialist party, the PSOE, supports the citizens' claim by searching for juridical solutions, also considering the individual destinies of the everyman-people having to abandon their houses (García, 2014b). The government agreed that offering alternative dwellings to the families is a priority. On the other hand the authorities re-emphasize the urge to comply with the norms for coasts, which is directed by the responsible national Ministry (El Pueblo, 2013k) – to live up to the EU expectations (Kuus, 2004, p. 474).

Caballas, in their support of the claims, analyze that the “remainders of social sensibility have disappeared in Ceuta”. So, local leaders behave “like cowards under national pressure” (Aróstegui, 2014a). The resistance to the demolition in accordance with EU norms illustrates that the norms, which are insensitive to the local context (Mignolo, 2000, p. 60), do not fit the Ceuta's margins. Such norms, if necessary, become subject to resistance (Mignolo, 2000, p. 83). Resistance here addresses measures of Europeanization, based on the imagination that implementing EU norms can be “un-European” as well (Kuus, 2004, p. 483). Such tactics of agency weaken the conditional relation between Ceuta and the EU (Kuus, 2004).

Moroccan everymen did not present any renegotiation of imaginations about irregular dwelling and construction practices in Ceuta's margins. The crucial reason for the lack of renegotiation might be the lack of concern in their everyday-routines – it does not matter to them, whether construction and dwelling in Ceuta's margins are regular or not (Merrifield, 2011, p. 108).

Another reason for the lack of renegotiation could be that culture-wise, we have seen before that Ceuta's margins are similar to Northern Moroccan villages. The architecture is similar to Moroccan style architecture as well. Illegal building practices might be a topic outsiders hardly hear of when visiting the center. As constructions in the margins look similar to constructions in Morocco, Moroccan everyman-respondents might not suspect them to be illegally built or might not think in the same European normative frame for construction permissions. They are not used to the norms (Hall, 1997a, p. 32).

Ceuti everymen respondents on the contrary are concerned, notably those, who are affected by regularization and demolition in their routines (Merrifield, 2011, p. 108), Ceutís from Ceuta’s margins. They have developed geopolitical imaginations manifesting e.g. in the movement of resistance in Benzú. The movement defends the interests of the residents of dwellings, which are subject to future demolition. During an observation (February 7th, 2014) in Benzú, graffiti displaying all around called my attention. The streetart represents arguments of the movement (see figure 17). The resistance formed against the imposition of the EU norms without involving the Benzú citizens is obvious as well as their deprivation (Kramersch, 2011, p. 197).

Everyman-participant 15, a resident of Benzú, reports about the situation. He tells about the fear of the residents to end up in the streets. They would like to stay in their houses, where they have lived for long (observation, February 7th, 2014). Their deception, according to participant 15’s imagination, is intense. They have been struggling with lack of employment opportunities, but now they feel endangered to be deprived even of the last certainties they have – their homes.



This approach of renegotiating is rather different from the imaginations of the powerful, in which the un-European-ness (Kuus, 2004, p. 483) of building practices in the area is highlighted. Yet, the contestation is grounded on the renegotiation of people from Benzú and their emotional response – it is grass-roots meaning-making which illustrates the importance of everyday routine to the renegotiation of wider geopolitical imaginations (Häkli, 1998, p. 145; De Certeau, 1988).

Modernization requests and strategies

According to official, powerful discourse Ceuta's margins do and will benefit from financial and infrastructural support provided by the EU. The president of the federation of associations of neighborhoods, Ramos Aparicio (personal communication, February 12th, 2014) assures that projects with EU funding are implemented in all the districts of Ceuta and that "no district can complain that nothing has been done for the inhabitants". The only area where projects especially for housing and dwelling still have to be realized are the Príncipe district and the surrounding areas.

From these statements we can conclude that the EU complies with the conditional commitment, and for the Príncipe, will provide for benefits (Kuus, 2004, p. 484). From the powerful geopolitical imaginations we can learn that in Ceuta's margins measures are taken to adapt to European standards in urban development (Kuus, 2004, p. 482), departing from still little European conditions (Kuus, 2004, p. 483). The most relevant modernization plan, the so called 'Montoro'- plan and similar projects are designed to address urban structural deficits in infrastructures and housing at the border-passage, in the surrounding districts and improve accessibility of both (Aznar, 2014a; El Pueblo, 2014k).

Part of the modernization will be creating appropriate telephone and electricity networks, extra housing and a better organization of lanes and traffic. Buildings will have to be modified in order to generate more space for lanes in the Príncipe. Around the border-passage and Príncipe area parking infrastructures will be provided (Aznar, 2014a). Moreover facilities like a kindergarten are to be created (Aznar, 2014a). According to an article in El Faro (Echarri, 2014c), the integral plan also considers remodeling the district Benzú. A total of 123 millions would be spent on the modernization. Additionally, plans promise to improve dwelling in various areas such as in Rosales or about promoting commercial and other service activities in the zones (Echarri, 2014c).

Although the Montoro plan is not directly based on EU-funding (it is funded by several Spanish Ministries of various responsibilities) it should be mentioned here, as a project benefits indirectly from EU-funding provided to the Ministries (Aznar, 2014a). Thanks to additional funding by the EU (23 million euros) also Almadra, another marginal district, can be involved in the modernization measures. The period for realizing the project is set from 2015 to 2018. Most of the measures are still in preparation, but there is a promise (in the forms of plans and governmental documents) for implementation. The Príncipe is a priority this time. But also urban revitalization in Benzú promises improvement of accessibility (Crespo, 2013d). Other marginal areas are mentioned, but without enumerating the exact measures planned. So the exact benefits remain conveyed.

Yet, the strategy is criticized since revitalization measures do not help the districts to catch up economically or on a structural level (El Pueblo, 2014k). An alternative plan for the margins about non-physical infrastructural investments has been proposed by the local Caballas party: investment of EU funding in security measures is proposed, in the form of an intervention unit for districts. The proposal aims at showing up an alternative, presenting social-equality oriented objectives (El Pueblo, 2013a). It also reveals the different imaginations about how modernization with EU funding should be strategically implemented (Dijkink, 1996, p. 11).

Another critical voice stresses that the construction process would add congestion to the existing traffic jams. There is also no guarantee, either, that the approach will lead to sustainable solutions and Europeanization of

the districts (El Faro, 2014c). Generally, in the powerful discourse-markers' imaginations there is consensus about the need to modernize and standardize the margins of Ceuta in a European way (Kuus, 2004, p. 474). Contestation refers only to the strategy how modernization can be achieved. The same seems to apply for the traffic jams and collapses in the districts surrounding the border-passage: the adverse economic effects (e.g. for taxi-drivers) are not welcome on Ceuta's way to become more 'European' (Kuus, 2004, p. 474) - the collapses cut off the margins from the city (Aznar, 2014c).

The Moroccan everyman-participants do not renegotiate the topic at all. In chapter 5.1 we have learnt that the only signs of Ceuta receiving EU funding observed by the Moroccans are attributed to modernization in the center, where some of them use to come – as it does not concern their own routine (Merrifield, 2011 p. 108), less what urban plans is invested in in Ceuta's margins. The Moroccan border people might also mostly interact with people in the center or at the border-passage, who are not necessarily people from marginal districts.

On the contrary Ceuti everyman-respondents do renegotiate pieces of the imaginations, but they are not informed about the new plans in detail, either. Few from the marginal districts might be informed about future plans, since future plans have to be read, learnt about or heard of (Hall, 1997b, p. 44). Additionally, in case they are aware of plans, such as the residents from Benzú, they might not fully agree with the modernization measures for the district (El Pueblo, 2014a). It is also striking that only respondents living in marginal areas have expressed opinions about marginal districts receiving EU funding - again the strong argument about concern being steered by everyday practices (Merrifield, 2011, p. 108) holds.

Participants from central districts care little about investments in the marginal areas. Participant 16, who is from the Príncipe district, is afraid that most of the funding arriving to Ceuta in general is anyway 'burnt'. Participant 24, 27 and 28 (24 formerly living in the Príncipe district, like 27 and 28) share this opinion: "I have no idea what the EU means for Ceuta, I have not heard of any help from Europe. Maybe you can hear about it, but you do not feel or see it. It just ends up in a void" (participant 24). Participant 24 has noticed e.g. improvements of decoration of the boulevards in the center, but she is afraid that no structural changes have been achieved. The funding does not get to the marginal areas (participant 27), it stays among the inhabitants of the center.

Consequently participant 27 feels that the EU is far: officially Príncipe is part of the EU, he imagines. "I do not feel the European Union here, although there is some funding. (...) it should be invested to treat most urgent necessities and for what it has been asked" (participant 27). Insights gathered during observations reaffirm the comparatively less modern standards in Ceuta's margins (Kuus, 2004, p. 483): the conditions on the street and the services encountered are very basic in marginal areas. The same applies for infrastructure, such as exterior electricity lines, which give away the lower level of modernization and progress in these areas. In the Príncipe district lanes are narrow and there is barely space for parking cars. So people often park on the lanes, disturbing the flow of traffic. The often quoted difference in 'decoration' between central and the marginal areas was obvious as well, as plants along the street are left wilder and hardly any decoration can be found (observation, February 11th, 2014).

The only everyman-participant (23) commenting on the topic, who is not from the Príncipe zone, but from another marginal part confirms: "we are a bit out of the center, it seems only the center is benefitting from

reconstruction etc., the rest is more abandoned”. She hopes that in future her part of the city would be taken care of as well.

Most everyman-participants result little informed about urban modernization. They do not reproduce the imaginations of the powerful, but seem to base their imaginations on every-day encounters (Hall, 1997a, p. 32). However, the deception by Príncipe inhabitants about lack of investment in marginal districts actually is in line with the official imaginations, which also affirm that the Príncipe has not yet benefitted from any subsidies. According to this renegotiation the everyman-respondents do not notice any conditional commitment by the EU or Europeanization to manifest in Ceuta’s margins (Kuus, 2004, p. 484). The transformations in marginal areas do not have any influence on their routine (Merrifield, 2011, p. 108).

Participant 16, originally from the marginal Príncipe area, first of all, would not take seriously any news until construction works really start, since plans had been announced to them often before (Aznar, 2014c). Through an informal conversation with a citizen from the Príncipe district I learn that hardly any urbanization measure had been taken throughout the last years, except the installation of the social center. Further, the everyman tells that he has the impression, that people of his district are left alone with their struggles (referring to facilities and urban planning here).

All of these imaginations about features, which could be modernized in the margins (Kuus, 2004, p. 483) indicate that modernization is wished and needed for living up to ‘European’ standards. Participant 16, instead of telling about urban planning of the government, complains about another phenomenon of revitalization: it seems that investors and private persons from the mainland buy or rent apartments and houses in Ceuta, which pushes the prices for rents. This has a rather negative effect on the people, who struggle to afford their monthly rent in Ceuta, even in the marginal areas. For those buying or renting from the mainland, Ceuta is a destination for vacation or a way to pay lower tax (given the favorable, special fiscal regime). This might be another case in which modernization of parts of the city might have positive economic effects for some (Luxembourg, 1972, p. 60), for those who are involved in real estate’s business.

But everymen in marginal areas are negatively affected, and might not agree with this kind of modernization (Kramsch, 2011, p. 197) – the fragmentation of Ceuta’s society along the spatial lines of districts becomes visible in those imaginations (Gunder Franck, 1966, p. 20). There is evidence that everyman-residents from marginal areas live with features they would like to Europeanize in their districts (Kuus, 2004, p. 474), but they are not convinced of all plans or they are not even aware of projects, either.

7.3 Ceuta’s margins’ multicultural, mixed culture

Mixture of culture is (un-) European

In a speech about Melilla (which is similar enough to Ceuta for the characteristics mentioned in the speech to project the insights on Ceuta) the Minister of Justice calls Melilla “the heart and day-to-day of Europe we want”. He outlines: “The role-model function of Melilla proves that the EU is not far from Melilla” (Perdiguerro, 2014). Here Ceuta and Melilla are discursively being Europeanized by emphasizing that the mixed culture, especially in Ceuta’s margins, which does not fit the traditional Christian, white European-ness (Kuus, 2004, p. 482) actually is what the EU should

stand for in the Minister's geopolitical imagination: generously embracing diversity – given the willingness to comply with 'European' norms.

Europeanization here is inverted - what is typical of Melilla is being identified as something intrinsically European, which makes Melilla seem a model-representative of European-ness. It is a discursive strategy to Europeanize Melilla via cultural discourse (Kuus, 2004, p. 479). The potential 'other' appears as something 'European' thinking through a double-perspective (Mignolo, 2000, pp. 67-69).

The argument is reproduced by a couple of important decision-makers and powerful discourse-emitters as well. Martínez Arcas (personal communication, February 6th, 2014), Campos Martínez (personal communication, February 19th, 2014) and Pérez Marín (personal communication, February 24th, 2014) agree that the European culture mixed up with Muslim culture makes Ceuta especially European, since everything still underlies European institutions (democracy, human rights, humanism) (Kuus, 2004, p. 474). Given the knowledge and understanding of how clash of civilizations is imagined to be overcome, Ceuta could be a model for modern Europe, Pérez Marín (personal communication, February 19th, 2014) suggests.

Box 6 Background information

Presence of Islam in Ceuta's history

According to the librarian (J.A. Alarcón Caballero, personal communication, February 12th, 2014) a major wave of immigration by Moroccan origin people to Ceuta had started from the 1930s, since the military had been installed in the city. Since the invasions in the 16th century few Muslims had been left before. But from the 1930s onwards more Muslims settled in Ceuta, some went back to Morocco later on with the independence. This is just one example of how much the history of Ceuta has always been related to Morocco. On the other hand it was especially during the first years of the Spanish Protectorate that the city started multiplying economically and in population. This demographic development, nowadays has resulted in what José Ramos Aparicio (personal communication, February 12th, 2014) considers to be a "place of many cultures".

Ceutís are proud of Ceuta being a meeting place of cultures and aware of the crucial role Ceuta has played for the EU in history for this reason (El Pueblo, 2013d). Having a look at the names of highly appreciated members of the Ceuta's society one can easily recognize the Arab-language origin of these. The high status of some Arab-origin families is expressed for instance in the construction of a monument for a medicine, who participated in voluntary charity services in a tolerant, solidary altruistic way for long. His name was "Abdelkrim" – which gives away the Arab origin of his ancestor (Saura, 2013c).

Gomez Barceló (personal communication, February 7th, 2014) explains that the EU is (often imagined to be) built among others on the pillar of the Hebrew- Christian culture and the relation with an 'Other', the Islam. This relation has created a problem of coexistence in many EU countries (Ferrer-Gallardo &

Van Houtum, 2012, p. 244). In Ceuta, Gomez Barceló continues, "we do have an experience, maybe not the best, but we have it". His conclusion is that "few cities can present a coexistence of so many religions. We are a real experiment with all our successes and many failures" (J.L. Gomez Barceló, personal communication, February 7th, 2014). The discourse about the four cultures and the potential for being a space of experiment is not only reproduced by the head of the municipal archive. It is shared by more elite-experts: "the European culture here mixed up with Muslim culture, (...) a mixture of Occident and Orient, Africa and Hinduism" (G. Martínez Arcas, personal communication, February 6th, 2014). He adds that "we [the Ceutís] are trying to live with four cultures all together, (...) it is not an absolute coexistence, but, there is no bad coexistence either: there is no tension or conflict between

people in the streets. In this sense we could be a model to be exported to other places in the world” (G. Martínez Arcas, personal communication, February 6th, 2014).

Ramos Aparicio (personal communication, February 12th, 2014) adds a real world example to these theoretical deliberations: “we get along well, we have friends of different religions, we participate in all the important holidays of all of us, I think we are an example. People from outside might not understand how it works well, we are different from Europe. Integration seems to fail elsewhere”.

Castillo Sempere (personal communication, February 20th, 2014) explains what kind of attitude one needs to create such a coexistence of cultures: “racism? I do not observe that, (...) me for myself I do not tolerate or accept racism at all. If there was, I would not share such ideas. (...) where so many different groups coexist, there are always people threatening, but this is not a vast proportion of the population. (...) I would totally reject it”. All those pieces of geopolitical imaginations about the ‘distinct, mixed culture’ of Ceuta hint at the role-model function of Ceuta in the EU – a feature, which Ceuta can contribute to the union (Kuus, 2004, p. 474), because the city is imagined as the best –the most European and advanced – in mixed-culture-coexistence.

Ramos Aparicio and Gomez Barceló (“living in a border-city is different from living in the interior of a country where you just see foreigners from far; it is also not the same seeing a Muslim on television than meeting him or her selling you the newspaper every day, being the charwoman in your own house. It is beautiful to be the defender of other religions, if you share everyday activities with the believers”) regard it as rather enriching. Ceuta seems a site in these imaginations with superior knowledge in the European context (Mignolo, 2000, pp. 58-59) – a knowledge, which one could compare to border-thinking (Mignolo, 2000, p. 64) – and which the EU should learn about.

Besides, Campos Martínez (2005, pp. 85 -87) sees the domination of Arabic language by the Muslims in Ceuta as an opportunity for development: international organizations and high quality employers often search staff knowing e.g. Arabic including Arabic culture. Although in Ceuta there are many opportunities to learn it, most Ceutís do not make use of them. Especially the Arabic-speaking Muslim community could have many opportunities - combining their knowledge with other minimum skills. For business with Morocco companies might search for people, who are familiar with the language and culture. Ceutís have also the advantage of easily travelling through Europe (without much paperwork).

He suggests opening a business school for international transactions, forming professionals for business with Maghreb states (Campos Martínez, 2005, p. 85). Additionally, he suggests, the approval of new rules of origin by the EU to push forward the opportunity for Arabic-speaking Ceutís to initiate business in the Maghreb. If transforming products made in Morocco a bit in Ceuta they could be exported with low taxation to the EU market (Campos Martínez, 2005, p. 86). Pérez Marín (personal communication, February 24th, 2014) thinks along the same lines: “Ceuta could be like an ambassador if you think of all the people in Ceuta speaking Arab, Spanish and English and who understand both cultures. They are searched for and we have them here”.

On the other hand the mixed culture is imagined as manifestation of otherness, since multicultural coexistence is frequently imagined in the entire EU as something suspicious and even dangerous to the EU identity and well-fare (Stoler, 1997, p. 213; Ferrer-Gallardo, 2009, p. 31); in some districts of Ceuta the Muslim population is the majority.

Gomez Barceló (personal communication, February 6th, 2014) calls Ceuta a “peculiar historical site” where the major Hebrew-Christian culture (basis to the EU identity) meets its “Other, the Islam”.

This encounter has often been presented as reason for problems of coexistence elsewhere in the EU (Ferrer-Gallardo & Van Houtum, 2012, p. 244). Pérez Marín (personal communication, February 24th, 2014) stresses that Islam in Ceuta has been present in the past, it is present and it will be so in future. The architect points to an important dimension here – the temporal dimension of the relation with the ‘Other’ in Ceuta is distinct from the temporal dimension manifesting elsewhere in the EU. There is not only rejection of a widely perceived ‘other’ in the EU (Ferrer-Gallardo et al., 2014) but historical understanding and a common future, which can be understood as ‘otherness’ of Ceuta and the mentality of Ceutís (Kuus, 2004, p. 483).

Through an informal conversation with an important, powerful actor of Ceuta I realized that Islam and Arab culture are seen by some (maybe few) powerful discourse-makers actually as inferior in comparison to European, Christian, Spanish culture– which is a highly deprecatory, racist, euro-centric attitude (Mignolo, 2000, pp. 58-59). All of these imaginations prove that the Ceutí powerful discourse-makers perceive a certain distinctiveness of Ceuta in Europe due to the mixture of cultures. In a certain sense they seek to Europeanize Ceuta by presenting it as role-model for the rest of Europe (Kuus, 2004, p.479), especially, discourse-makers who are not involved in the government. The imagination of fostering a mixed culture and purposefully involving the socio-economic disadvantaged groups does not suit the one-way imposition of a neoliberal, Christian value-system, the EU-template of progress and development, either (Kramsch, 2011, p. 200).

The important feature of the “mixed culture” is renegotiated by the Moroccan everymen: “Ceuta is an interesting place; a lot of cultures live there together. There are Jewish, Christians and Muslims”. The quotation of participant 7 is a good example of the renegotiation, without evaluation about the degree of ‘European-ness’ (Kuus, 2004, p. 484) of this feature. There are many subtle ways through which the imaginations of the powerful are subjected to (Hall, 1997b, p. 44) – remember participant 1 telling about his grandchild living in Ceuta and participant 10 advises to have a look at the clothing of Ceutís to see that different religions coexist.

Participant 8, like several powerful in Ceuta, finds it ‘European’, that there is a diversity of cultures, which mix up. Also in future the mixed culture might play an important role in Ceuta, if there was a “Union of Moroccans and Spanish, to find a solution together, across the border, helping each other mutually”, participant 7 proposes – a vision from the margins (Mignolo, 2000, p. 83), which can be understood to challenge eurocentristic ideas of the world (Kramsch & Brambilla, 2007, p. 99).

All in all, a few Moroccan border-people-everymen seem to reproduce the discourse explicitly, except those, who eventually use to go to Ceuta (Merrifield, 2011, p. 108). The mixture is interpreted by them as advantageous and special in Europe, but ‘European’ (Kuus, 2004, p. 482). But also the ‘Muslim Other’ (Ferrer-Gallardo, 2009, p. 31) is imagined by the few Moroccan everyman-respondents, who know Ceuta, well to influence the mix: “Ceuta is different from other places in the EU, because of the chaos. In other countries people are more methodological, more responsible (...) Ceuta is more Arab, more Mediterranean...we have our own organization and order” (participant 6).

Participant 8 agrees that Ceuta is “less civilized than big cities like Berlin or so”, connoting civilization to modernity and European-ness (Stoler, 1997, p. 199). Participant 7 continues about this idea: “Ceuta still has some features, which you cannot find in other places – they eat couscous and drink mint-tea and they could not be without it”. Both participants highlight the similarities in traditions in Ceuta to the Moroccan Arabic culture, which is different from their imagination of ‘European’ culture (Kuus, 2004, p. 482).

Many Ceuti everymen describe their experience and perceptions of living with several religions and cultures all together in one city (Participant 17, 18, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 26, 27, 28, 29): “I am Spanish, my family is from here. But I am of Muslim religion. I practice my belief with all my family - that is independent of your nationality. There are many like us, about 50% [of Ceuta’s population]”, participant 17 tells. She is also aware of the uniqueness of this feature within Europe: “I think no other city has half of one culture and half of another” (participant 17). Participant 21, 23 and 24 stress that four religions and cultures live in harmony (participant 24), which makes Ceuta singular (participant 21).

Participant 24, Muslim herself, tells that she enjoys the mixture, “the coexistence of cultures (...) on Fridays you listen to the Imam, on Saturdays it is the day of the Hindus, on Sunday the bells of the churches ring ... I like it!”. The coexistence is described also by Christians: “We have a good relation between all the four of us.” (participant 26). Participant 29, who is originally from Morocco feels like living in a big family among Christians and Muslims. Participant 28 has subjected to the European identity discourse (Stoler, 1997, p. 199): “we are children of Ceuta, my father is from here”. From Christian participant 22 we learn that people in Ceuta have grown up with the four cultures surrounding them and that they take it as a natural part of their environment. She also stresses that this is the way how she learned to simply accept difference and that she expects others to respect her culture and religion the same way.

Participant 18 confirms that children, who grow up in such a mixed culture, have valuable knowledge about all cultures and respect them – “which is enriching” (participant 18). During my observations in Ceuta I came across various indications of the coexistence. The easiest indication, I noticed indeed, is to observe the style of clothes: About half of the women in Ceuta’s center wear scarfs and jelabas (typical Moroccan dress, similar to a coat, often colorful and for women of silk)(observation, February 4th, 2014).

Ceuta’s mixed culture is considered an advantage and ‘European’ (Kuus, 2004, p. 482) – the respondents thus also invert the imagination of European-ness and take what is normal in Ceuta as European - especially those living in Ceuta’s margins: a Muslim respondent prefers living in Ceuta than elsewhere, because she feels more liberty in practicing her religion (participant 17) – more liberty, more European-ness (Kuus, 2004, p. 482). Participant 25 thinks that coexistence works and that Ceuta could be a positive example for other places in Europe, subjecting to the powerful imaginations (Gibson-Graham, 2000, p. 108). Participant 18 does not observe any segregation or separation by cultures. Instead he observes the mixing of cultures, each day more. Segregation, he argues, is only created through socio-economic disparities in the city, which is the same in Ceuta as in other places in the EU. This statement is an example of ‘discursive normalization’ and Europeanization (Kuus, 2004, p. 479) of the situation in Ceuta. Emphasizing that Ceuta is just normal with the additional advantage of having mixed cultures around means

to think from the margins (Mignolo, 2000, p. 64) and resist to imaginations of the EU as a zone of purity (Ferrer-Gallardo & Van Houtum, 2012, p. 246).

Fragmentation of the space of Ceuta is attributed exclusively to socio-economic structures, e.g. the neoliberal ideology driving the EU in its search for modernity (Sparke, 2002, p. 220). The renegotiation might be mediated and reinforced (Hall, 1997a, p. 32) by participant 18's everyday practice, through which he gets in touch with inhabitants of various districts of different cultural background (De Certeau, 1988). Participant 27 from a marginal zone, supports the discourse of coexistence as well. The dominant European culture is not questioned by any renegotiations here: they also imagine the mix of culture as enriching component of Ceuta, which the city contributes to the EU (Kuus, 2004, p. 474).

Yet, Participant 21 does not like to see so much "otherness" around, especially, because the Muslims to his taste "put too much stress on religion". Participant 25 observes a "conflict between the cultures" in Ceuta and stresses that it was "not that bad before". She is the first to call the relation a 'conflict' and thus contradicts powerful imaginations – a conflict implies attribution of more otherness to Ceuta in the imagined self-declared EU space of peace (Kramsch, 2011, p. 200). She does not simply imagine 'diversity' but a 'conflict of cultures'.

Participant 28 from the Principe district confirms that people from his district feel at home in Morocco, even his wife is Moroccan. He emphasizes that the community in the center and his district benefit from the EU to very different extents – especially regarding socio-economic conditions. This insight is confirmed by the fact that all Muslim respondents from the margins are unemployed (participant 16, 23, 24, 26, 27).

Also cultural differences are imagined to persist. Participant 28 describes that the Muslim population live a more social, collective life, whereas the Christians are more solitary. Participant 16 envisions a hierarchy of religious groups based on degrees of otherness (Hardt & Negri, 2000, pp. 192-194): for him, the Hindi, Jews and Christians from the center treat the Muslims from the margins, whom they call "moros" with colonial superiority – an argument explained also in postcolonial theory (Mignolo, 2000). In his imagination the city is thus spatially divided at least into the peripheral and central areas, corresponding to the religious division of groups (Gunder Franck, 1966, p. 20).

None-Muslim participant 23 is actually afraid of Muslims being "too religious", because she suspects them of being "driven more by faith than education and reason", referring to radicalization. She hopes that through modernization and economic growth differences would vanish soon, showing trust in progress (Kuus, 2004, p. 482). Her intolerance of 'Muslim otherness' is obvious (Ferrer-Gallardo, 2009, p. 31).

Participant 28 outlines that especially people from his district are bi-cultural, representing the mixture of cultures. They grow up with Muslim values in their families, but they attend Christian schools and institutions. This indicates that especially the non-Christian populations of the city think beyond binary divisions (Mignolo, 2000, p. 64), whereas the Christians and their districts largely stick to Spanish, Christian traditions in their daily routines (De Certeau, 1988). 'Otherness' is connoted in many ways to the margins of Ceuta (Kuus, 2004, p. 483) in the imaginations about the multicultural co-existence. The conditional relation with the EU is regarded as weakened through such otherness (Kuus, 2004, p. 483).

The distinctiveness of a 'Muslim-other' in the margins is even noticed by Muslims from the margins. "Europe, some laws I do not like, for example the rights for homosexuals to marry. I do not like that, it is against our religion. (...) It is not good, we would enter into crisis. There will be death and bad consequences because of that", participant 15 explains from his Muslim-belief-oriented imagination. The example he gives is useful to illustrate imaginations of incongruence of Muslim belief with European jurisdiction (Kuus, 2004, p. 474). The Muslim-respondent puts his Islam-based value-system above the one of the neoliberal European ideological template – this attitude is a sign of passive resistance to Europeanization (Kramsch & Brambilla, 2007, p. 115).

Support of EU values and European cultural domination in Ceuta's margins

The geopolitical imaginations of Ceuta's powerful discourse-makers indicate that inhabitants of Ceuta's margins culturally conform to the norms the discourse-makers understand to be typically European. The 'Muslim-Other'-culture, which exists in Ceuta's margins is thereby considered as adapting to the EU culture, in a one-way conditional relationship (Kramsch, 2011, p. 200; Stoler, 1997, p. 199). A two-way mixing of culture instead would be seen as a process of othering or 'contamination of the European culture' (Stoler, 1997, p. 213).

A first indication of cultural Europeanization and conformation in Ceuta's margins is the way presumable EU values are imagined to be supported: there is emphasis on the solidarity of all Ceutís, their belief in ethics and reasoning, appreciation and prioritization of democratic values and the rule of law (El Pueblo, 2014f). An article in *El Faro*, analyzes, why Ceuta and specifically the marginal districts might be (-come) an even more successful breeding place for jihadists. Simultaneously, the author of the article stresses: "yet, most Muslims in the border-cities have been born here, they are children of immigrants, who adapted to the Spanish lifestyle, including the language, and habits" (Pérez Ventura, 2014). The latter representation reaffirms the European-ness of the marginal areas and its residents – a sign that the conditional relation between Ceuta and the EU is (discursively) reproduced (Gibson-Graham, 2000, p. 108).

The strategy of hiding otherness, invisibilizing (Ferrer-Gallardo et al., 2014) the features not matching the standard-image of European-ness can be traced in more imaginations: Martínez Arcas (personal communication, February 6th, 2014) explains that a good cohesion of cultures exists and has to be maintained for the good of Ceuta. He mentions the "Muslims and the other cultural groups", as the lines, which might be the points of friction in case this cohesion is not maintained (Hardt & Negri, 2000, p. 199). He also stresses that the main task is to prevent that the Muslims would feel rejected. Instead they should be given the feeling of being equal and integrated (G. Martínez Arcas, personal communication, February 6th, 2014). It is clear from this imagination, that the expert fears that the desired, harmonic cohesion, especially with the Muslim groups, could be harmed, as they could feel disadvantaged or excluded. Although the given coexistence is depicted as positive and European (the Muslims live peacefully and integrated with us and our European norms) (Kuus, 2004, p. 479), fragmentation is seen as a danger (Hardt & Negri, 2000, p. 200), once the invisibilization-discourse (Ferrer-Gallardo et al., 2014) about the otherness and subjection to it do not hold anymore.

Campos Martínez (personal communication, February 19th, 2014) contributes to the invisibilization of 'otherness' in the margin: "it is not like this, they just live there, because in London also Spanish concentrate among Spanish. Spanish there work in high level professions, but all the minorities concentrate in certain districts." His

comparison finishes by concluding that in Ceuta groups concentrate in districts due to socio-economic features they have in common, not because of religion or culture. Whereas the socio-economic features the groups concentrating in the districts have in common might be a major cause of the concentration, it is striking that these characteristics largely coincide with religious and cultural features (Muslim versus other religious identities) (Gunder –Franck, 1966, p. 20).

The argument by Campos Martínez, like the one by Martínez Arcas, thus appear as belittlement, discursive invisibilization of 'otherness' (Ferrer-Gallardo et al., 2014, p. 4), of isolation of cultures instead of exchange and adaptation to European-ness by the 'other' (Kuus, 2004, p. 483). The powerful discourse-makers thus seem to Europeanize the situation in their imaginations (Kuus, 2004, p. 479). This culture of Europeanization among the experts – the wish to be 'European' – however, is a clear sign of European-ness in the culture of Ceuta (Kuus, 2004, p. 482).

But there is also resistance to the cultural domination of the Christian, modern value system imposed on Ceuta and its margins in the conditional relation with the EU: the vision of Ceuta becoming an Arab city in future (C. Pérez Marín, personal communication, February 24th, 2014) does not suit the imaginations of Ceuta, developing according to the EU template and achieving a higher status in the EU according to European criteria (Kuus, 2004, p. 482). Aróstegui Ruiz (personal communication, February 26th, 2014) criticizes the right-wing policy of Ceuta's decision-makers (Aróstegui, 2014a) with the apparent aim of only improving the privileges of those in power. Other segments of the population appear suppressed. Those segments often coincide with Muslim identity (in the marginal areas). He goes further and calls the underlying attitude of the elites "unconsciously racist" towards an unattended, forgotten part of the population (Aróstegui, 2014a).


Castillo Sempere (personal communication, February 20th, 2014) is aware that some Muslims from marginal districts feel discriminated against on the labor market due to their religious affiliation. Yet, she is convinced that it is only a question of perception, since her institution would treat all clients equally.

In a report published on the website of the municipal government the conditions of life of Ceuta's population (Consejería de Asuntos Sociales Ciudad Autónoma de Ceuta, 2013) are analyzed. In this report the socio-economic welfare and distribution of characteristics of the population, such as unemployment and religious identity are presented: The report illustrates that the spatial pattern of distribution of economic poverty of households is not even across Ceuta's space. There is a strong tendency of concentration in the periphery, especially, in the South (see figure 18). The districts in the South of Ceuta (e.g. the Príncipe area and more districts along the Southern coast) show the worst indications of poverty and social exclusion. Economic poverty reaches severe levels per household, involving between 37% and 71% of the total number of residents comparing to only 17% on average in other parts of the municipality (Consejería de Asuntos Sociales, Ciudad Autónoma de Ceuta, 2013, p. 5).

The population of Ceuta's margins is thus depicted as socio-economically poorest. Socio-economic welfare distribution spatially fragments Ceuta (Gunder Franck, 1966, p. 20) – a sign of 'otherness', weakening economic modernization (Kramersch, 2011, p. 196).

At the same time the marginal districts with a relatively large population with high risk of poverty largely coincide with districts with relatively large proportions of foreign population (Consejería, de Asuntos Sociales, Ciudad Autónoma de Ceuta, 2013, pp. 4-6) (see figure 19). 76% of families with a foreign inhabitant as their head live in poverty. For Spanish citizens, the risk of poverty is particularly high among Arab-Muslim origin households, since about 60% to 65% are affected (comparing to 13.5% to 14.5% among Christian households). In the margins of the city the proportion of households struggling to get by until the end of the month amounts to up to 50% or 60% (Consejería de Asuntos Sociales, Ciudad Autónoma de Ceuta, 2013, p. 8) (see figure 20). The report thus confirms that the margins of Ceuta bear 'otherness', because they host the poorest of Ceuta - large proportions of the Muslim-Arab or foreign origin populations, who are poor. Accordingly, many Europeanization criteria, and those to be met by Ceuta in the conditional relation with the EU, are not lived up to in the city's margins (Kuus, 2004, p. 482).

Even worse, the following imagination by González (2014a) proves that Europeanization reinforces the 'otherness' in marginal areas of Ceuta and consequently the fragmentation of the city (Gunder Franck, 1966, p. 20): González (2014a, p. 3) reproduces the ideas of the Ceutí sociologist Rontomé that no institution actually searches for solutions, although the EU is informed about the problems. Ceuta's social singularity appears too complicated to be understood from core-Europe, and more complicated, it seems to reduce marginalization (Mignolo, 2000, p. 60). It is difficult to understand also that Ceuta is the border with a Muslim country, that it needs special education measures






Figure 20. Map of districts indicating also proportions of households with difficulties to get by until the end of a month. In the circle diagrams the latter group is indicated by the part of the circle colored in 'red'. The 'blue' parts of the polygon indicate slight difficulties and even ease. The 'light green' parts of the circle indicate the proportion of households getting by until the end of the month easily. The proportions of household with a lot of difficulties are highest in the peripheral areas of the city (Consejería de Asuntos Sociales, Ciudad Autónoma de Ceuta, 2013, p. 8).




Figure 19. Map of distribution of proportions of foreign population per district. 'Dark red' polygons symbolize districts with high proportions of foreign population (7.5% and more). The polygons colored in the 'yellow' symbolize the districts with the lowest rates of foreign population (0.9% - 4.2%). Whereas the latter are concentrated in the central part of Ceuta, the former especially cluster in the South and West of the city (Consejería de Asuntos Sociales, Ciudad Autónoma de Ceuta, 2013, p. 4).

and social workers. The saving measures (for whole Spain) imposed by the EU and the border-closing policies do not seize the problems, but might make them worse in Ceuta (González, 2014a, p. 3).

The political class has allowed peripheral zones of Ceuta to reach a disastrous level of marginalization and devastating socio-economic conditions. Now these coincide with the origins of more jihadists heading to Syria than from entire Belgium (González, 2014a, p. 3) - Ceuta undergoes an Islamization-process (or at least its margins), a play with the feelings of young, who feel the urge to reaffirm their Muslim identity. This urge derives from growing up in a European – and even Europeanizing (Kuus, 2004, p. 482) – environment, which does not involve them.

According to the sociologist the mixture of marginalization and religious extremism in combination with well-working networks makes Ceuta's margins a favorable site for recruitment of jihadists (González, 2014b, pp. 2-3). Slowly, more radical perspectives have been infiltrating, reaffirming themselves in the context. They create ruptures between Muslim communities, fragmenting them in who are more or less Muslim. An instable intercultural balance has only been working in Ceuta, because some informal contract seems to be ratified that nothing may be moved or touched (González, 2014c, p. 3) in politics, Rontolomé concludes.

The critical voice of the sociologist summarizes the 'otherness' of Ceuta's margins (Kuus, 2004, p. 483): adverse, un-European socio-economic conditions without much perspectives for modernization (Kuus, 2004, p. 483) have enabled radical thought to spread creating new features of Muslim 'otherness' (Ferrer-Gallardo et al., 2014). The insights show that the EU imposes the EU-standard template (Kramsch, 2011, p. 196) on the city without understanding the peculiar situation (Mignolo, 2000, p. 60). Thereby, it exacerbates 'otherness' in the margins of the city – fragmentation of the city is reinforced through the conditional relation with the EU (Gunder Franck, 1966, p. 20).

The Moroccan everyman-respondents hardly renegotiate the imaginations about cultural Europeanization in the margins of Ceuta. Only participant 2 knows (his son lives in Ceuta) about the conflict between the groups (Christians and Muslims) and discrimination Muslims experience. For participant 4, similar insights are based on the mafia-story soap opera about the Príncipe district in television and on what people tell – she has never been to any marginal district of Ceuta.

This is the case also for participant 5, who grounds statements on narratives she heard from others. The fact that stories about the marginal areas make it to Morocco, however, shows that the margins are clearly distinguished from the center in the narratives by their characteristics– a sign of fragmentation in imaginations of the city (Gunder Franck, 1966, p. 20).

Participant 10 and 12 tell that they got in touch with people, who "are a bit racist", reaffirming the imaginations of Ceuta's powerful discourse-makers about the culture of rejection leading even to openly racist, discriminatory defense of the Christian culture (Kuus, 2004, p. 479). Generally, the Moroccan respondents do not renegotiate geopolitical imaginations about the coincidence of abandonment, socio-economic poverty with concentration of Muslim population. Most Moroccan respondents only imagine the center, which appears modern and European. They hardly present insights about the margins, less about socio-economic struggle (Kuus, 2004, p. 483).

The reproduction of powerful imaginations by some of the margins' Ceutí everyman-respondents illustrates that many seem to be highly attached to their European identity and the union. Some everyman-Ceutís from the marginal

districts and even Moroccans want to Europeanize more in future and link this to a claim for more support by the EU (Kuus, 2004, p. 484), matching their individual aspirations (Merrifield, 2011, p. 108).

Participant 23, who presents herself rather proud of Ceuta, attributes the future job-opportunities for her children - a change for the better and a feeling of security - to being part of the EU. Thus in this sense, the EU becomes imagined as a source of hope and a guarantee for progress (even on individual level) in the emotional meaning-making of the participant (Kuus, 2004, p. 482). The renegotiation by participant 28 is similar. He calls the relation to the EU “a way out for the future” and “salvation” – reflecting his discontent being unemployed and deprived of means to improve his current situation as well as his hope for a better future. Everyman-people from the margins of Ceuta connote a big portion of hope to the EU (Kuus, 2004, p. 482). Even a participant 2 from Morocco hopes that his son will have the freedom to move around in Europe to find work for a good future. Thus the hope and optimism about the future, the EU seems to transmit to the everyman-participants from the border-region, even those in the marginal districts, show that European-ness is perceived as desirable. Many subject to it (Gibson-Graham, 2000, p. 108) – especially, concerning individual economic prosperity (Kramsch, 2011, p. 200).

Participant 27 and participant 26, feel European. Participant 27 participates in the elections, he is from Ceuta and likes it; he and other Muslims follow the norms - the only difference to other Ceutis is the religion: “democracy, the way of thinking (...) we live with the same constitution, flag and ideology like other places in Europe” (participant 27).

With regard to suspicion about insecurity (lack of respect for EU norms) in Ceuta's margins, participant 24 claims that she does not feel insecure anywhere in Ceuta, least in the Príncipe district. There she would even walk on the street at 3 o'clock in the morning. Participant 25 and 26 reaffirm her argument. It is due to the bad image, media create, why people attribute insecurity to Ceuta. But once they see themselves they are impressed by the city's beauty (participant 26). Participant 27 is convinced that crime and corruption happen and jihadists live everywhere. Actually, he considers Ceutis a very solidary people who share and (...) feel responsibility as European citizens (participant 27).

All of these renegotiations added from the individual context, practices and experiences show that European-ness is discursively attributed to the everymen from Ceuta's margins and the districts (Kuus, 2004, p. 479) – partly invisibilizing and belittling ‘otherness’ (Ferrer-Gallardo et al., 2014). The participants shift ‘otherness’, attributing European-ness (Kuus, 2004, p. 474) to themselves and the margins of Ceuta discursively, to avoid contamination (Stoler, 1997, p. 213) of the image they want to present.

Yet, the experience of the Muslims in the margins is often one of discrimination against them. This experience and imagination hardly emerge in the imaginations of the powerful discourse-makers. The story of participant 16 is an example: he was one of the best students at school, but, nonetheless, he was not given the award and either offered the same opportunities as the others, who performed as good as or worse than him. In his imagination it is a simple example of the inequality of opportunities for citizens of Muslim religion in Ceuta.

Most Muslim participants from the marginal districts (participant 15, 24, 27, 28) were unemployed at the moment of the interview or working under precarious conditions. “We can imagine how it would be to not to be part of

Spain and Europe, we are experiencing this daily. That is our life. We see ourselves as inferior: we are Spanish, but we are inferior to Madrid's Spanish, we feel very marginalized. (...) do you think that this is democracy? (...) this is presumably a country of the European Union, (...) but would you like to be deprived of your voice? ", participant 27 explains his understanding of the relation between the EU and Ceuta's Muslim margins. "We have experienced discrimination - for being Muslim in Ceuta and Spain. We have grown up with this conflict, but we have to live with it peacefully. (...) we have had bad comments about being Muslims at work, but then we say that it is a private thing, nothing about work", participant 27 tells. It is rather obvious that the EU's conditional commitment in the conditional relation is denied to the "Muslim-margins" of Ceuta, in this imagination (Kuus, 2004, p. 484).

Also participant 28 has a strong perception of injustice with regard to the distribution of poverty across the religious groups: he compares the relations between Christians and Muslims in Ceuta with colonial relations between an Emperor and slaves, just in modern times. From his point of view the Christians from the center abuse the Muslims – asking funding for the Muslim districts from the EU, but using it for their own interests (participant 28). Also participant 16 perceives the treatment by the inhabitants of the center of Christian, Hindu and Jewish background as colonial (Gunder Franck, 1966, p. 20). The Muslim-being means that access to work in major institutions is blocked and that one is often treated as if having to learn something from the Christians (Stoler, 1997, p. 199) - although the other way round, Christians should be taught tolerance and anti-corruption strategies, another resident of the Príncipe tells.

All of those arguments identify a colonial hierarchy in Ceuta in relation to the EU-imperialists, with the Christian center Europeanizing, while oppressing the adaptation and Europeanization of the margins (Hardt & Negri, 2000, pp. 192-194). The one-way mixture of cultures (assimilative mixing, but orienting to and mixing approaching the EU and its values) is obviously the way many everyman-participants from the margins perceive the ongoing cultural process in Ceuta. There is evidence of segregation, which favors prevalence of European-ness of the city and helps avoiding 'contamination of the European-ness' (Stoler, 1997, p. 213).

Participant 16 argues: "they might tell you something about 'a meeting point of cultures' or 'here we live together rather well', but that is all lies. It is only the face to the outside. The real life is so different". Several respondents seek to stress that Muslims *do* have the same rights like everyone else in Ceuta (participant 17, 29, 24) as if the interviewer would anyway doubt about it. Another resident of Ceuta's margins points to the obstacles Muslims are likely to encounter, when e.g. starting up a business. Getting subsidies of the EU would not be allowed, even if a presented project was perfect. Besides, participant 16 is convinced that Muslims, who made it to live in the center could just make it by illegal business. He cannot imagine how to become a Muslim of the center, without illicit connections.

The role of Muslims, carrying attributes of 'otherness' is imagined as barrier to participate and Europeanize one's life (Kuus, 2004, p. 474). The Muslim Ceutís even observe a hierarchy, an imperial hierarchy when defining status in the EU between the groups (Christians over Muslims) and spatial areas (center over margins) in the city (Hall & Negri, 200, pp. 192-194), which is exacerbated through subjection to the conditional relation with the EU (Kuus, 2004, p. 474).

An everyman-participant, who is not from the margins of Ceuta, describes preoccupation about the compatibility of cultures and religions in Ceuta from a rather Muslim-critical perspective: "I am worried for the religion for the future of Ceuta. They [the Muslims] do not want to evolve and develop with us. So they have their part and we have ours, it is not compatible, so there is no future." (participant 21). This comment reproduces the imagination of fragmentation. The phrase "they do not want to evolve with us" (participant 21) shows that the process of development (economic and cultural modernization according to an EU-template)(Kramsch, 2011, p. 196), according to the participant, increases the disparities between the groups, because it increases the difference of the Christians in the center to the backwardness or 'otherness' of the Muslim Ceutis in the marginal areas (Gunder Franck, 1966, p. 20). It perpetuates fragmentation of the city into parts which comply with the one-way conditional relation and parts, which do not (Kramsch, 2011, p. 200).

Still, participant 21 insists: "I feel unsafe, because they are violent - on Sunday, a violent guy threw things on me. They are violent. I did not provoke him or so, they are just like that". This generalizing, xenophobic and rejecting comment about Muslims, does not reflect opinions of all the participants, of course. But it reveals that both sides – the Christians and Muslims –reproduce and reaffirm the cultural fragmentation of the city by degrees of 'otherness' (Kuus, 2004, p. 483).

Participant 25, who is from a marginal area, but not a Muslim, states: "the only problem we do have here is the conflict between the races. It is here. People are not racist? Yes, they are". She is worried about this attitude. Those stories explain frustration of many inhabitants of the margins. Behaviours and life-style of Muslims are questioned, while Christian practices and habits seem to be recommended. Binary stigmatization seems to institutionalize and impede a successful cohesion of the groups (Gibson-Graham, 2000, p. 104).The 'Muslim-other' is avoided or assimilated, Europeanized, if possible to fit the European character of Ceuta (Stoler, 1997; Ferrer-Gallardo et al., 2014).

The discursive tactics by some Christian respondents here are to distance themselves, by bordering and othering Europeanizing themselves (Kuus, 2004, p. 474). A two-way relationship of mutual giving and taking (see 7.1.5) in the relation between cultures in Ceuta in this sense does not fit the one-way conditional relation the EU imposes (Kramsch, 2011, p. 200) in these imaginations: although several participants (24, 28, 29) from Ceuta's margins say about themselves to have incorporated a double-identity, bi-cultural thinking and life (Mignolo, 2000, pp. 67-69), differences between the cultures are still highlighted by others, especially, in the context of Europeanization.

The concept of 'European core culture' (Kuus, 2004, p. 482) and assimilation of 'others' to a dominant culture in a one-way, conditional and imposing relationship – a 'colonial' one is subjected to in Ceuta (Gibson-Graham, 2000, p. 108), in spite of resistant opinions from the margins, (and) of those, who appreciate the 'border-crosser identity' (Mignolo, 2000, pp. 67-69). Marginalization in Ceuta's society is imagined as going along with a 'lower status of European-ness' (Hardt & Negri, 2000, pp. 192-194). Especially those not living in Ceuta's margins nest 'otherness' in those areas (Kuus, 2004, p. 479).

7.4 Criminal practices in Ceuta's margins

The report published by the municipal government for social affairs depicts more geopolitically relevant practices of 'otherness' in the margins: the presence of drug business and crime in the districts is described according to perception of families. Residents of Ceuta's margins report not to approve of the presence of prostitution, waste seekers, violence and rows in public, purposeful creation of car incidents and shooting. Especially Ceuta's peripheries result to be the scenery of those problems (Consejería de Asuntos Sociales, Ciudad Autónoma de Ceuta, 2013, p. 11) (Gunder Franck, 1966, p. 20).

Many pieces of discourse, especially newspaper articles, discuss crime and radical, Islamist tendencies (not suiting the Christian, orderly core-European-template of identity of districts in modern European cities: Islamism - *the other*, since the 'war on terror' has begun) in Ceuta's margins: the TV-series 'El Príncipe' is hotly debated about in local media. Preoccupations are expressed for the reputation of Ceuta, as the series might be little favorable city-marketing - the problems of drugs, struggle between groups, insecurity and jihadists become more firmly connoted to the city, 'an un-European site in Europe' (Kuus, 2004, p. 483). All of that does exist in the marginal areas of Ceuta, but it is over-emphasized in the series (El Faro, 2014d). Additionally, sentences used in the series like "at the end of the world' or 'what happens here does not occur anywhere else'" create a stigma, which is difficult to separate from the image of Ceuta – listened to in millions of living rooms all around Spain (El Faro, 2014d).

Alarcón Caballero (personal communication, February 12th, 2014) explains that the 'real' insecurity in the marginal areas is influenced by the border situation and the illicit trafficking. Mafia-structures have developed, but these do not use to affect the rest of the population, beyond the respective areas, e.g. the Príncipe. Romero Aliaga (personal communication, February 25th, 2014) puts it like in the article by González (2014, p. 3) - involvement in narco-trafficking is a consequence of the marginalization of the periphery, such as the Príncipe (Gunder Franck, 1966, p. 20).

In an article by El Faro (2014e) we can read that the journal is "tired of writing that the Príncipe needs the same security measures like the rest of the city", without seeing any improvement coming: the practices of shooting (of gangs) even during the day, as a consequence damage on houses, cars and sometimes death or injured victims is identified as the most unsuitable practice, the authorities ought to seize. The author of the article demands to increase the presence of police to make sure that the residents of the district can live without fear – leading a 'European' life (Kuus, 2004, p. 482). The events culminated in a 20-year old student being shot by mistake – the murderer thought him to be someone else and he became the target of murder (Angel, 2014b).

Discursive protest was published in the form of letters to the editor in El Faro, reminding that the Príncipe is a part of the city and that the health of Ceuta depends on the health of all its parts - fear, anger and pain are depicted as overwhelming; the author asks the mafia-groups to leave and to let the district with peace (Díez Nieto, 2014). Earlier incidents of shooting have been documented e.g. in December 2013 (García, 2013e) or in different forms e.g. as assaults on shops for money (García, 2013g).

Box 7 Background information

Insecurity in Príncipe district

I could witness violent practice the day I realized the observation in Príncipe district myself (observation, February 13th, 2014): I was invited into the house of a resident while people started yelling at each other outside on the street: A conflict between two boys and their mothers seemed to escalate. Neighbors standing near made attempts to calm down the conflicting parties. Ten minutes later we heard shooting from outside and saw the exchange of fire happening directly in front of the house, the two boys had entered in trouble again. Only after ten minutes a unit of the police approached the scene.

Angel (2014a), in another article, reminds that one should avoid criminalizing all the 12.000 inhabitants of the Príncipe district. But he also asks the citizens to collaborate well with the security forces to uncover the bunch of maybe 40 persons, who are involved in the mafia-activities. Otherwise the wish for peace is hard to realize. In order to pacify and modernize the district (Kuus, 2004, p. 482), for breaking through the vicious circle of marginalization (unemployment, school drop-out), he encourages, to direct claims to the municipal authorities.

Campos Martínez (personal communication, February 19th, 2014) acknowledges that political decision-makers have never found a solution to trigger the causes of the criminality. The lawyer criticizes the failure of politics to seize the marginalization, criticizing also their strategy of Europeanization (Dijkink, 1996, p. 11; Kuus, 2004, p. 474). Olmedo Izar Fuente (personal communication, February 26th, 2014), political decision-maker himself, would not want to blame the conditions of life in certain districts. In his eyes it is a problem of individual affiliations and preferences. Instead he blames the attraction of easy ways of making money through the business across the border, which have developed in the city. He is disappointed about the mentality to make use of such opportunities rather than avoiding them. He regards Ceuta's geographic position as strategic for illicit business such as trafficking drugs along "the trajectory from Africa to Europe" – he thus shifts responsibility beyond Ceuta (Kuus, 2004, p. 479).

Ramos Aparicio (personal communication, February 12th, 2014) supports the requests for more security forces in Ceuta's margins together with the associations of neighborhoods. "Walking, showing that they [police agents] are present, would intimidate criminals. Just seeing them, represses aggressions" (J. Ramos Aparicio, personal communication, February 12th, 2014).

Whereas the demands may aim for Europeanization – progress and welfare improvement in Ceuta's margins (Kuus, 2004, p. 474) - they might not suit the neoliberal stance in Europeanization going in hand with rationalization and reduction of public services, e.g. police presence (Sparke, 2002). The 'otherness' of crime concentrating in the margins also does not fit Europeanization (Kuus, 2004, p. 483). Many demands by citizens of Ceuta's margins have not been listened to when showing up alternative strategies to live up to EU conditions imposed (Mignolo, 2000, p. 60).

In the renegotiation by Moroccan everyman-respondents 'otherness' (Kuus, 2004, p. 483) is attributed to many aspects of criminal practices in the margins: participant 1 is convinced that the drug-business is the cause of other criminal activities, while participant 2 reports more details about Muslims (here he generalizes) 'fighting and killing' each other. The generalization and exaggeration might be based on the retelling narratives about the Príncipe in Morocco (a narrative is always more catchy if details are distended and made more exciting). But also the series 'El Príncipe', which even many Moroccans watch might contribute to the imagination (participant 4). Most of the respondents from Morocco have not even been to the district (participant 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 10), so they would know it from TV and connote it to the images.

Participant 12 has heard about the shooting and the gangs in Príncipe. Only participant 8 connotes the criminal activity to the precarious situation the residents of the district might go through, being unemployed. But he also knows about the arms, the business with drugs and conflicts among them.

All in all, the Moroccan everyman-participants seem rather aware of criminal activities, especially in Príncipe, and reproduce many aspects of the imaginations of Ceuta's powerful discourse-makers (Gibson-Graham, 2000, p. 108) They tend to boost the narratives and generalize. Again (lack of) renegotiation appears to depend on the individual – including his or her daily routines, practices, everyday life-worlds and experience (Merrifield, 2011, p. 108). But it is also clear, that the Moroccan respondents highlight 'otherness' of criminal practices in Ceuta's margins in the EU context.

A woman living in Príncipe only since recently told that she is originally from Tetouan. There, she used to feel rather safe. Since she has lived in Ceuta's marginal district, she does not have that feeling anymore. She avoids going into the streets (informal conversation). This feeling is analyzed by other Moroccan everyman-participants. Participant 4 outlines that she is worried about the security situation in the Ceuta's margins, for what she has learned from television. She feels, that there is injustice leaving such an important part of the population, the Muslims, deal with insecurity, since they should benefit from the same security levels people in the center benefit from. She criticizes that Ceuta's Muslims were forced by the local authorities to tell that they experienced good treatment, if they want to be safe from being arbitrarily expelled to Morocco. This shop-window-equality, participant 4, would like to be substituted by real equality in treatment, a European treatment (Kuus, 2004, p. 484) instead of suffering from corruption (Kuus, 2004, p. 478). The participants do not Europeanize the area discursively, they even suspect the political class blackmail Muslim everymen from the margins to join the strategy of invisibilization of 'otherness' (Ferrer-Gallardo et al., 2014).

Participant 7, like participant 1, is aware of the practice of trafficking drugs and imagines it to be the cause of most criminal activities. "Two bad districts", the two Príncipes, participant 7 imagines in Ceuta, stressing their 'otherness' in comparison to the rest of the city (Kuus, 2004, p. 483). Two districts - he strongly dissuades anyone from going there. He compares the situation in the marginal districts to peripheries of major cities, such as Paris. He regards the lack of cohesion with other parts of the city to be a failure of the EU as a total: in many places integration work fails in the EU, where migrants or minorities live. What the participant implies in his comment is, on the one hand, that Muslims in Ceuta's margins are marginalized and live a different, isolated and economically precarious life alongside the rest of the society (Gunder Franck, 1966, p. 20). This suits well with analysis by some powerful discourse-makers.

On the other hand, the participant regards such marginalization to be a problem not only of Ceuta, but of the EU and more places. On theoretical level this means that he thinks that Europeanization and the EU as conceptualized now marginalize its 'other' within the EU (Hardt & Negri, 2000, p. 199). Fragmentation of society seems a consequence, maybe even an intrinsic part of the process. The one-size-fits-all approach (Kramsch, 2011, p. 200) of European modern models of society is unable to deal with 'otherness' – so the EU's coping strategy is marginalization. Europeanization, which is open to plurality, learning and melting with others, would contradict the logic of the process and undermine itself (Kramsch, 2011, p. 200; Hardt & Negri, 2000, pp. 199-201).

The fact, that it is participant 7 identifying this intrinsic failure of Europeanization is not surprising: he is a real double-thinking border-crosser, living between societies (grown up in Tetouan, interacted with the Spanish community for his whole life, studied in Spain, spending leisure in Ceuta with Ceutí friends). His insight is based on

experience of cultures mixing up – it is a ‘border-crosser point of view’. One could call it simply ‘border-thinking’ (Mignolo, 2000, p. 68), what he performs.

Geopolitical imaginations about criminal practices in Ceuta’s margins are reflected in renegotiations by Ceuti everyman-respondents as well. From participant 21’s point of view the margins and the Muslims are highly involved in criminal activities such as smuggling and drug-business. Additionally he regards them to be violent, as mentioned before. This is not only based on the renegotiation of geopolitical imaginations of the powerful discourse but also on fear from Muslims and immigrants (Ferrer-Gallardo & Van Houtum, 2012, p. 243). Mutual stigmatization (he depicting Muslims as backwards and violent; Muslims depicting him as xenophobic), a vicious circle of ‘othering’, increases the fragmentation of the city into spaces of religious and cultural groups, into margins and centers, even more (Gunder Franck, 1966; Hardt & Negri, 2000, p. 199).

Participant 28 enumerates various occasions in which he had witnessed shooting, stealing or rubbing. Police interventions were sometimes on time in his district. The frequently exercised criminal practices clearly contrast the situation in other parts of the city. There, participant 17 and 20 (everyman-respondents from the margins as well) assure, such practices manifest much less (ibid.). Participant 17 admits that some zones are less secure than others. Insecurity is notably higher in Ceuta’s margins: “there is no police around here, this makes the place quite insecure. It is simply discrimination by the local government”, a desperate resident from the Príncipe district bemoans.

Participant 15 has observed that especially in the Southern margins some everymen use to rub, which is different from the peaceful Benzú marginal district – ‘otherness’ (Kuus, 2004, p. 483). Nonetheless, he is convinced that media often exaggerate and boost the news about crime even concerning the Southern districts. Participant 16 is rather skeptical about the reinforcement of security forces in Ceuta, since he suspects the police and gangs of collaboration – the police agents seem corrupt to him: “more police, more crime, it is the reverse effect”. Participant 28 supports the plan of Caballas, which he is well informed about. He would want a the local police to be more present in Príncipe, since funding-investments in security facilitates more equal opportunities and better quality of life in his district. He cannot understand why many districts of Ceuta have police agents present, whereas his district, with approximately 15.000 inhabitants cannot have a police station financed by EU funding (participant 28).

Participant 17 is convinced like participant 16 that crime rates are actually lower than they are presented: she suspects the local authorities to make use of respective statistics about the margins of Ceuta to obtain more EU-funding for mediation – which then is not necessarily invested for this purpose. The best example, she thinks is the discourse about Islamist terrorism, which is a minor problem, boosted by media and decision-makers.

Criminal ‘otherness’ weakening modernization of the city and the imposed template by the EU is imagined as distinguishing feature of the margins of Ceuta (Kuus, 2004, p. 483). Participant 23 from the margins herself is aware that criminal practice limits the freedom of movement of people, which in Ceuta often coincides in the areas where people are jobless – criminal practice become tactics of dealing with Europeanization sparing Ceuta’s margins (De Certeau, 1988; Gunder Franck, 1966, p. 20).

Some geopolitical imaginations of Ceuti everyman-participants shed light on another kind of un-European practice in the margins of Ceuta: certain operations by the local authorities are criticized as nepotist practice, e.g. the decision-makers providing employment to their peers while excluding the Muslim residents of Ceuta's margins (participant 16, 23).

Participant 28 criticizes the practice of security forces in the margins instead, as they seem to arbitrarily distribute fines without explanations. This is perceived as provocation by the inhabitants of Ceuta's margins. Distrust towards the decision-makers, security forces and media in Ceuta has consequently spread contributing to continuing fragmentation (Hardt & Negri, 2000, p. 199). The practice described by the everyman-participants does not fit the imaginations of European norms, which are used to evaluate the European-ness and compliance with the conditional relation with the EU – authorities should behave democratically, respectful and according to the law (Kuus, 2004, p. 474). This is not the case in Ceuta in those imaginations.

These pieces of renegotiation show a high degree of agency and distinct meaning-making by everyman-participants from the margins (Kramersch, 2011, p. 197), but also strategies of Ceuta's authorities to exploit the conditional relation with the EU for their own good (Kuus, 2004, p. 478).

7.5 Protest about Ceuta's margins

Some resistance in Ceuta's margins has developed into active protest, as geopolitical imaginations reveal. As seen in chapter 5 and 6 Ceutís do not tend to protest a lot. Yet, some groups "claim lack of employment and work" (Gomez Barceló, personal communication, February 7th, 2014). Others might complain about lack of incentives to improve the situation on the labor market or urban plans.

The latter was the case on February 27th, 2014, when I was walking in the street, I ran into a mass of people demonstrating against the demolition of houses in Benzú. I could observe about 150-200 people making a lot of noise, carrying posters, walking towards the main square of the center, where the delegation of the national government resides (observation, February 27th, 2014). The next day an article by Saura (2014b) appeared in *El Pueblo*: more than 300 people walked from the municipal government to the national delegation asking to stop the demolition of dwellings. The families, who are forced to move, would not give in to be displaced to different housing in another part of their district; they would not leave their houses to comply with some insignificant urban plans based on (Saura, 2014b) the EU regulations (Kuus, 2004, p. 474). The protest was also an expression of rejection to subject to EU norms (Kramersch, 2011, p. 197).

Another issue of protest Gomez Barceló (personal communication, February 7th, 2014) does not enumerate in his geopolitical imagination, is the insecurity in Ceuta's margins. Many inhabitants of the Príncipe area moved into the center after a young innocent fellow of their district was killed by accident in the streets. The demand for justice, the protestors formulated, implied the request to detain the murderers. Additionally, they asked more security measures in their part of the city, in order to reduce violence. The protest was realized without permission, additionally (Echarri, 2014b). The same occasion of death moved 2000 of Ceutís to take part in the memorial ceremony, asking to rethink policies about security in Ceuta's margins (Martín Segura, 2014).

Such protests by people from the margin reaffirm imaginations about the 'otherness' of their districts in relation to 'normal' European, safe, well-supplied, well-maintained, organized, proper, Christian dominated districts (Kuus, 2004, p. 483). Additionally, the protests are indications of agency and resistance to the way Europeanization excludes the margins of Ceuta (Mignolo, 2000, p. 83).

Another issue to protest is the discontent expressed by a group of unemployed, who for years have been gathering each day in front of the municipal assembly. In 2014 they entered the building to demonstratively turn their backs to the decision-makers of government and opposition parties during an ongoing debate. Their message was deception about the politicians' neglect to improve the situation of the unemployed and not taking seriously their requests (Rincón, 2014c). The group does not agree with the operations by the local government, but they agree with strategies of modernization, economic growth and employment creation (Kramsch, 2011, p. 196).

Moroccan everyman-respondents are hardly aware of protests in Ceuta. So it is not surprising that there is almost no renegotiation hinting at protests in or about Ceuta's margins. Yet, participant 11, who frequently works at the border and thus has the chance to observe protest in the marginal districts next door in his daily routine (Merrifield, 2011, p. 108), has noted that recently protest took place about the earlier mentioned demolition of stairs – the connection of the Tarajal passage and the district Príncipe. Ceutís, the participant tells, went into the street to demonstrate about the difficulties their children encounter now, walking to school and the danger involved in passing across the mountain without stairs. This protest observed clearly addresses the failing measures, failing geopolitical strategy of Europeanization in the margins (Kuus, 2004, p. 483), chosen by the municipal government.

From Ceuta only participants 15, 16 and 27 comment on respective protests. Participant 27 uses to join protests of unemployed. They gather in front of the local government on daily basis to remind the responsible decision-makers of the issue of unemployment in the city. They desire to "remind them [local decision-makers] that we [the unemployed] have a family and that there is no way to get a job. (...) that we have no means. (...) Ceuta is not only the officials and those in the government. There are also normal citizens".

The participant also explains why the group is disappointed about the local powerful elites: "the politicians, the representatives, the entrepreneurs, (...) you promise to give us work, but you are lying, all the time". Yet, the group soon realized that the local media was private and "corrupt" (participant 27), selecting and cutting from what the group wanted to tell. The choice to gather in front of the assembly, where politicians have to pass every day is thus grounded on disappointment from local politics and mistrust in local media: "Ceuta is not transparent to Europe, everything is a lie" (participant 27). All these explanations by one of the demonstrators imply that the group would like more reasonable and all-encompassing strategies of Europeanization to be implemented (Kuus, 2004, p. 474).

From an informal conversation I have learned about another example of demonstrations. Some time ago the Muslim-community attempted to have their Moroccan Arabic language recognized by the autonomous city of Ceuta as an official language, given that the command of the language is spread among half of the population of the city. The measure of regularization, standardization and normalization (a rather modern political process according to Foucault) was rejected by the rest of the population and the local authorities. The recognition of the language might

have reaffirmed 'otherness' of Ceuta (Kuus, 2004, p. 483). Controversially, protests took place in order to achieve the 'Europeanization' of the un-European language.

A reason, why Ceutis even those from the margins hardly demonstrate is presented by participant 16: "whatever like demonstrations, you start, they are not interested in it. They [local decision-makers and administrations] do not appreciate it; they ignore you, whatever you ask of them. You also need the document to organize it or so, but they would boycott it". Participant 15 adds an important argument, which applies for him, but many others, who live in Ceuta, as well. "I do not have rights without residence card, so I cannot join the protests" –

Both arguments highlight the obstacles everyman-participants have encountered in presenting their imaginations and resistance in the form of protest about the precarious situations they are in. The discourse about 'otherness' they want to present is not listened to – the decision-makers present themselves indifferent to the attributes of 'otherness', in their imaginations, and marginalize them by not attending them (Gunder Franck, 1966, p. 21). Participants from the center generally avoided mentioning protests and 'otherness' of the margins in Ceuta – in their tactics of invisibilization they would avoid talking about such events (Ferrer-Gallardo et al., 2014). Not surprisingly, those participants, who wish there were more movements and manifestations are not from the center. In this sense, the center of Ceuta has become a site for protest. But the protagonists are not from the center themselves.

7.6 Summary about weak conditionality in Ceuta's margins

In Ceuta's margins the conditional relation between Ceuta and the EU manifests weaker than in the spaces discussed before, according to the geopolitical imaginations of Ceuta's powerful discourse-makers and renegotiation by everyman-participants from both sides of the border. Results of the analysis highlight that the margins are imagined to be characterized by several features and practices of 'otherness', which vitiate manifestations of the conditional relation to the EU (Kuus, 2004, p. 483). Although attempts of discursive and practical Europeanization can be traced, most modernization measures only aim at soothing 'otherness' (Kuus, 2004, p. 474).

Unemployment is considered the major problem of the margins by powerful discourse-makers, less by Moroccan everymen. Thus, modernization strategies and tactics of dealing with the complex situation are imagined as counting also on EU support e.g. in strategic planning for integrating unemployed from the margins in the labor market. Many ideas are put forward about training, business start-ups, employment plans and the fight against informal employment of Moroccan cross-border workers. But the margins' Ceutis insist on the creation of opportunities, most of all, also with EU support, they have not yet benefitted from. In this context they give detailed descriptions of the precarious situations they are in and of the failures of measures implemented so far. They desire long-term stable solutions also for the young.

The other everyman-participants hardly renegotiate the topic. They are little concerned in their everyday practices (Merrifield, 2011, p. 108). This also applies for social support, which the powerful discourse-makers consider to be provided including contributions from EU funding (Kuus, 2004, p. 484). But reports show absence of awareness of such offers, especially in marginal areas, where dependence is highest. The only district where so far no investments of subsidies had been realized is the marginal district Principe. For the future, many plans are

presented to modernize the district's urban physiognomy and infrastructure also involving EU funding (Kuus, 2004, p. 484).

But criticism emerged about whether a more structural approach to solving marginal districts' problems would be more effective – tackling socio-economic struggles. The concern is shared by everyman-respondents from the margins. They obviously attribute 'otherness' (Kuus, 2004, p. 483) to the socio-economic abandonment of their district in comparison to the rest of Ceuta. They would rather seize unemployment by creating jobs.

Irregular construction in Ceuta's margins is also imagined as practice of 'otherness' (Kuus, 2004, p. 483). Failures of urban planning by authorities and habits of constructing arbitrarily, beyond the European norms are addressed. The margin's residents do not agree with the Europeanization strategy imposed here, least with plans for demolition of their housing (Kramsch, 2011, p. 197).

Further, Ceuta's margins are subject to imaginations concerning Ceuta's 'mixed culture': the mixture of cultures, however, is presented as 'European' in powerful imaginations, highlighting the role-model function Ceuta can have for coexistence of cultures in the EU. Ceuta hereby becomes discursively 'normalized' (Kuus, 2004, p. 479). Yet, currently, in Ceuta's margins socio-economic emergency coincides with a concentration of Muslim population. Especially Muslim everyman-participants from the margins identify with the multi-cultural coexistence and prove border-thinker abilities (Mignolo, 2000, p. 64). The knowledge of Arab-Muslim culture and language present in Ceuta's margins is even envisioned by some powerful discourse-makers as potential for economic development in future (Kramsch, 2011, p. 196).

Some imaginations, however, emphasize a one-way cultural adaptation process, in which EU values and the dominant Christian European culture are subjected to in the margins. The Muslim residents of Ceuta's margins are expected to adapt. Many non-Muslim everymen do not tolerate the Muslims' 'otherness' (Ferrer-Gallardo & Van Houtum, 2012, p. 244) and want them to assimilate. European Christian values are institutionalized. The Muslim inhabitants though tend to feel discriminated against by the powerful (Christian) elites from the center (Gunder Franck, 1966, pp. 20-21; Hardt & Negri, 2000, pp. 199-201).

The 'mixed-culture'-discourse also serves to invisibilize imagined traits of 'otherness' of Islam (Ferrer-Gallardo et al., 2014, p. 4). Even xenophobic fears about incompatibility of cultures are imagined by a few everymen from the center, attributing 'otherness' to the Muslims and the space of the city they occupy, the margins (Kuus, 2004, p. 483). The fragmentation of the space of the city and rejection by Christians, discrimination experienced by everymen from the margins culminate in the perception of a hierarchy of inclusion of cultures (Hardt & Negri, 2000, pp. 199-200) concerning socio-economic development, involvement and participation in political decision-making and in (cultural) institutions – resulting in (spatial) marginalization of Muslim everymen from the margins (Gunder Franck, 1966, p. 20).

Additionally criminal practices are attributed to the margins, where they coincide with mentioned features of marginalization and 'otherness' (Kuus, 2004, p. 483). Drug-business across the border and respective mafia structures are considered the major cause of the concentration of the practices in the margins. Geopolitically powerful discourse-makers and everyman-participants from the margins warn from stigmatization of the entire population of the districts.

In powerful geopolitical imaginations from the center also danger is identified in radicalization of Muslims leaving for jihad. Fear in the districts and about the districts of everymen is reinforced by the telenovela 'El Príncipe'. Yet, practices of 'otherness' (Kuus, 2004, p. 483) such as shooting, killing and rubbing are confirmed to take place in the districts in real life as well. Therefore the desire for more presence of security forces is expressed even via protests and by NGOs.

Moroccan everyman-participants instead do not link criminal practice or protests to the socio-economic and cultural marginalization described in other imaginations, or to xenophobic theories from everymen participants from the center, who firmly reject Muslim -'otherness'.

Many Ceutí respondents, especially from the center, worry about their city's reputation. Generally protests are imagined to be rare occasions about Ceuta's margins. Issues, which made everymen go into the street are the demolition of housing in Benzú, unemployment and abandonment. The conditional relation with the EU is (un-) consciously resisted to (Kuus, 2004, p. 478). But the practices and features of 'otherness' also highlight the intrinsic marginalization going along with Europeanization resulting in spatial fragmentation of Ceuta (Gunder Franck, 1966, p. 20).

Remarkable (patterns of) renegotiations could be featured from imaginations about Ceuta's margins by Moroccan and Ceutí everyman-respondents. Moroccan everymen tend to renegotiate often on the basis of everyday-life and emotions (Hall, 1997a, p. 32) - if they do renegotiate an aspect. Several respondents e.g. show compassion for the struggle and precarious situations unemployed go through. Instead only few renegotiate considerations about wider economic effects for Ceuta. Mostly those, who are in touch with Ceuta regularly presented imaginations, also thinking of solutions to unemployment and for modernization (Dijkink, 1996, p. 15). They do not hesitate to accuse the local authorities of failures of management and present alternative, often rather technocratic solutions (Foucault, 1991).

In some imaginations they invert superiority, inferiorizing the Europeanization strategy of Ceuta in comparison to strategies of their own country (e.g. regarding failing controls of informally cross-border workers) (Kuus, 2004, p. 484). Few renegotiations about EU funding investments in Ceuta were traced, so less about investments in the margins. Ceuta's margins appear to be beyond Moroccan everyman-participants' daily routines, in which they might pass through the center or the border-passage only. Also future plans revealing the geopolitical strategy imagined by the political decision-makers are not renegotiated – generally future plans are hardly issue to renegotiation by everymen (Merrifield, 2011, p. 108).

Moroccan respondents also do not perceive all features of 'otherness' mentioned in powerful imaginations e.g. the irregular construction. The coexistence of cultures is observed but hardly evaluated in degrees of 'European-ness' (Kuus, 2004, p. 475). Some simply notice that Ceuta is maybe a bit more Arab than other places in the EU, since many of its residents cannot be without tea or couscous. 'Otherness' of the margins, because of the presence of Muslims is identified by some in comparison to the rest of the city, especially, because of the spatial fragmentation (Gunder Franck, 1966). Based on the Príncipe tv-soap and many stories many respondents attribute 'otherness' to the margins (Kuus, 2004, p. 483): shooting, killing, drug business and mafia structures. Only those, who come to

Ceuta often, identify the parallel manifestation of socio-economic abandonment, socio-economic otherness (Kuus, 2004, p. 483; Gunder Franck, 1966).

The everyday routine and disinterest of everyman-respondents as long as they are not concerned in their everyday practices have a strong influence on the (lack of) renegotiation by this group of everymen here (Merrifield, 2011, p. 108).

Ceuti everyman-participants, especially those from the center, tend to be aware of features of 'otherness' (Kuus, 2004, p. 483) in the margins. But they avoid renegotiating them, employing tactics of invisibilization (Ferrer-Gallardo et al., 2014). Like the Moroccans few of them are concerned with unemployment in the margins (Merrifield, 2011, p. 108). Ceuti participants in stable jobs seemed least concerned and least renegotiated imaginations about the topic.

Respondents from the margins instead outline their vulnerability and everyday struggle, the feeling of exclusion and wish for Europeanization (Kuus, 2004, p. 474) – which they project first of all on employment. This renegotiation is highly based on the context, experience and everyday struggle (Hall, 1997a, p. 32). What is different in their renegotiation is suspicion towards the powerful in the center. They margin-respondents suspect them to abuse their strategic power for their own interests (Gunder Franck, 1966, p. 21). They identify it as a problem of nepotism. This interpretation partly derives from feelings of mistrust, abandonment and frustration residents of the margins of different religions experience in relation to the center (Gunder Franck, 1966, p. 21).

The margin's everyman-respondents also ask for long-term solutions, more effective ones than so far provided (Kuus, 2004, p. 482). It is them asking for creation of employment and more involvement in policy-making for their districts also by the EU (Kuus, 2004, p. 484; Mignolo, 2000, p. 60).

Some of their ideas differ from the EU template strategies. Additionally, their imaginations reveal that unemployed have developed tactics of coping, e.g. reliance on one another and the collective (Merrifield, 2011, p. 111). In spite of their struggle, they subject to the same aim of Europeanization, economic prosperity, as do the powerful leaders (Kramersch, 2011, p. 200). Outlining their adverse positions they often reproduce discourse about victimhood, highlighting the injustice of other districts benefitting more (e.g. in urban modernization) (Gunder Franck, 1966, p. 21).

Other topics regarding the margins, such as the powerfuls' preoccupation about irregular construction, resulted of little concern to the residents of central areas. Instead residents from the margins present grass-root, emotional, resistant perspectives about the same topic (Merrifield, 2011, p. 108). Eventually, their analysis of topics differs e.g. thinking of imaginations about coexistence of culture, which everyman-respondents from the margins connoted with a colonial hierarchy of one-way cultural imposition (Kramersch, 2011, p. 200; Stoler, 1997). The renegotiation about culture by participants from the center mostly invisibilizes the cultural 'otherness', but also xenophobic comments appear from imaginations about the mixture of cultures.

The Muslim residents of Ceuta's margins themselves put stress on their double-identities (Mignolo, 2000, pp. 67-69), but at the same time they accuse the powerful of Ceuta of exacerbating marginalization. The margins' everyman-respondents themselves might also be aware of certain incoherence of their Muslim belief-system with the

generally appreciated EU ideology. For respective aspects, they might resist to and label it inferior to Muslim belief – inverting the relation of superiority (Mignolo, 2000, pp. 60, 83).

The shift of responsibility of ‘otherness’ (Kuus, 2004, p. 483) of crime in the margins to mafias involved in drug-business, is reproduced by different Ceuti participants. But also demands for change (Ceuti’s from margins especially) are added, e.g. requesting presence of security forces and a police station. At the same time the residents of the margins seek to defend themselves and avoid attribution of more ‘otherness’ to them: they also disagree with the stigmatization of their districts, boosted by media and news. In spite of all their struggles open protest is not common, even about the margins.

Theory-wise, the insights about (resistance to) conditionality (Kramsch, 2011; Kuus, 2004) and ‘otherness’ of Islam (Ferrer-Gallardo & Van Houtum, 2012) resulted useful to understand the geopolitical imaginations of the powerful discourse-makers and their renegotiations by everymen. ‘Otherness’ and European-ness are often imagined in degrees of criteria as described by Kuus (2004, p. 475), e.g. Christian values, organization, civilization, prosperity etc. Especially, those, not living in Ceuta’s margins, nest attributes of ‘otherness’ in the margins, to Europeanize themselves (Kuus, 2004, p. 479).

The analysis of some imaginations revealed that the marginalization paralleling Europeanization might be an inherent problem of how Europeanization works even in other places of the EU - Europeanization of minorities fails, since the ‘other’ gets marginalized (Hardt & Negri, 2000). Fragmentation of society seems a paralleling phenomenon of Europeanization. The one-size-fits-all approach (Kramsch, 2011, p. 200) of imagined core- European modern models of society is unable to deal with ‘otherness’ – so it employs a strategy of marginalization (Dijkink, 1996, p. 11).

Even the concern of groups of everymen (center, margins, Moroccans) based on different every-day routines seemed fragmented along these lines. Resistance, subtle discursive and (little) active, practical manifestations, have emerged in and about Ceuta’s margins: the Europeanization excluding the margins of Ceuta is resisted to (Kramsch, 2011, p. 197; Mignolo, 200, p. 83).

But simple subjection to the domination of Christian dominated EU-culture is contested by mixed identities and place-based habits (Mignolo, 2000, pp. 67-69). Ceuta’s mixed culture is presented as a role-model for the EU, as ‘European’ for an EU as it is envisioned by border-people with border-crosser mentalities and those who seek to invisibilize ‘otherness’. Many of the Muslim everymen combine diverse identities in their imaginations of themselves and have a ‘border-crosser’ mentality (Mignolo, 2000, pp. 67-69).

Again the theories about the ‘everyman’ and the power of everyday practices (De Certeau, 1988) have proven valuable. The everyman’s geopolitical imaginations (Häkli, 1998, p. 145) are worth investigating and offer additional, subaltern insights. The EU results indeed blind to its own constituent parts, by imposing pre-figured categories of European-ness on places, which have developed an own identity for long (which they consider or not European) (Mignolo, 2000, p. 60). The need of contextual strategies is highlighted in many imaginations resisting the template Europeanization imposition of strategies (Kramsch, 2011, pp. 196-197). On the other hand, the dream, the

conditional relation with the EU promises to come true, is subjected to by Ceutís from Ceuta's margins. The EU is a source of hope for them (Kramersch, 2011; Kuus, 2004).

Aróstegui Ruiz (personal communication, February 26th, 2014) summarizes: features and practices of otherness which coincide in Ceuta's margins: the proximity of "the border, poverty, marginalization, the tendency for radicalization". The margins are generally imagined as 'un-European', featured by precarious socio-economic conditions without much perspectives for modernization (Kuus, 2004, p. 483).

8. Conclusion

Departing from Häkli's (1998, p. 145) incentive to bring back the 'everyman' into geopolitics and Klaus Dodds' (2008) suggestion to realize counterfactual analysis the question was asked, how geopolitical imaginations of powerful discourse-makers about conditionality in Ceuta's relation to the EU are renegotiated in geopolitical imaginations of everymen in the Ceuta-Moroccan border-region.

The aim of this qualitative case-study starting from this question was to understand the renegotiation of powerful geopolitical imaginations (Mamadouh & Dijkink, 2006, pp. 354-356, 362; Ferrer-Gallardo & Van Houtum, 2012, pp. 244, 248; Tuathail & Dalby, 1998, pp. 3, 12; Luke, 1998, p. 297) in geopolitical imaginations and practices of everymen (Merrifield, 2011; De Certeau, 1988). Thereby focus was given to geopolitical imaginations about a geopolitically relevant process of positioning, the conditionality in Ceuta's relation to the EU (Kuus, 2004) and the way it is discursively and practically mediated in the border-city.

Based on extensive qualitative data-gathering and analysis three major bundles of imaginations coherent with spatial units in Ceuta could be identified as highly relevant concerning the conditional relation to the EU: imaginations about Ceuta's center, the spaces of flow (the border-passage, the CETI and the harbor) and Ceuta's margins. The concentration of imaginations around those spaces of the city is already one of the most important findings of this research – geopolitical imaginations of the conditional relation to the EU are fragmented, because conditionality is imagined to manifest differently for and in each space.

Yet, it is important to note that the conclusion here cannot be that the space of Ceuta is fragmented into clear-cut pieces. It is the geopolitical imaginations of conditionality, which attribute certain distinguishing characteristics – for each person at least slightly different ones – to spaces considered as margins, center and spaces of flow. During the analysis a certain congruence of attributed characteristics to each space was noted across different discourse-emitters. Per space different aspects were selected, for which the imaginations about conditionality and renegotiation process seemed worth outlining. For each aspect the geopolitical imaginations of the powerful discourse-makers were presented first. Then they were compared to the geopolitical imaginations of Moroccan everyman-participants from the border-region of Tetouan. Finally, the same comparison was made for geopolitical imaginations of Ceuti everyman-respondents.

Firstly, results of the analysis shed light on conditionality regarding the center: according to many geopolitical imaginations by different actors, the one-way conditional relation to the EU is imagined to work out well in this space for multiple aspects (Kuus, 2004; Kramsch, 2011, p. 200). Contestation manifests eventually, but in weak forms, mostly through connections to beyond the center.

The conditionality is perceived to manifest differently in the functionally distinct spaces of flow, especially, because they represent both, Ceuta's isolation and the city's only, but particular, connections to spaces beyond itself. All aspects imagined as working in the conditional relations with the EU about the spaces of flow were imagined to simultaneously vitiate the relation - both groups (everymen and powerful) imagine both processes as if balancing each other, e.g. think of Ceuta, working as European border. The task is ambiguous, because while living up to the buffer function (Kuus, 2004, p. 477), Ceuta must absorb 'otherness' for the EU, which weakens the Europeanization of the city.

Conditionality is lived up to in Ceuta's margins only in a rather limited form, as remarkable, diverse contestations, manifestations of and practices of 'otherness, coincide in this space: the proximity of the border, poverty, marginalization, majorities of Muslim population, crime and a tendency for radicalization. All the features and practices enumerated here are imagined as 'un-European' (Kuus, 2004, p. 483) and strategies for Europeanization result less ambitious than in the other spaces. These impressions were filtered from both geopolitical imaginations of Ceuta's powerful discourse-makers and renegotiation by everyman-participants from both sides of the border. The EU's and Europeanization strategies envisioned by powerful discourse-makers tend to vary by political, ideological orientation and on whether and how they interact across the border to Morocco. Yet, all everymen and powerful discourse-makers subject to the final aims of Europeanization in the conditional relation – the goals imagined are progress, prosperity, security, stability, development (Kramsch, 2011, p. 200), civilization and modernity (Kuus, 2004, p. 482). But definitions of what that would mean and ideas, which strategy would lead to achieving the aim, varied. Nonetheless, the superiority of European-ness was subjected to (Gibson-Graham, 2000, p. 108; Kuus, 2004, p. 482; Kramsch, 2011, p. 200; Mignolo, 2000).

The renegotiation of geopolitical imaginations of the powerful discourse-makers by everymen differed per individual, given the differences in experience and information (Hall, 1997a, p. 32), life-worlds and everyday practices (Merrifield, 2011, p. 108). Powerful geopolitical imaginations were reproduced as far as respondents were aware of them through their routine or contacts in Ceuta (Merrifield, 2011, p. 108) and agreed with the strategic considerations. Disinterest (Merrifield, 2011, p. 108) can be noticed especially for abstract, little tangible topics e.g. future plans, not yet manifesting, or Ceuta's fiscal and economic particularities, which are hard to observe empirically. The observable consequences in everyday life are renegotiated though. Generally everymen seem to live in the present and on that basis renegotiate imaginations as far as they seem tangible to them in everyday life (Hall, 1997a, p. 32a), but less visions of others for the future. Strategic imaginations use to differ from powerful imaginations, because from the everyman's experience and pragmatic, everyday positions they prioritize a different focus for Europeanization. Involvement begins with concern (Merrifield, 2011, p. 108) and often departs from the observable.

Further findings highlight that lack of renegotiation of powerful imaginations has a meaning and can imply a form of silent resistance (Kuus, 2004, p. 477) while applying tactics (De Certeau, 1988) which weaken conditionality. Additionally, the relation to and information about Ceuta and the different spaces played a role. Accordingly, the same everyman eventually presented contradictory opinions about the same or different topics. Y

et, by tendency certain commonalities have been discovered in renegotiations by everymen residing in the same space (Ceuta's center, its margins or across the border in Morocco): their life-worlds and everyday practices in relation to Ceuta resulted similar in one space – including institutions and facilities.

Moroccan everyman-participants relate to Ceuta as 'the Moroccan-Spanish-European city behind the border-passage'. As they do not reside in Ceuta (except a few cross-border workers), they tended to be least concerned and informed about (coherence of what they observe and connote to) the spaces of Ceuta e.g. the coherence of investments in urban revitalization and EU funding and distribution of responsibilities of transformations e.g. at the border-passage (e.g. the securitization measures to the EU) across institutions (the EU, Spain or Ceuta).

Their renegotiation often carried less detail. Generally, few Moroccan respondents renegotiated topics in relation to Ceuta's margins, where Moroccan everymen do not come. Few resulted to renegotiate wider effects of problems they observe, such as economic consequences of the noticed high unemployment in Ceuta's margins. Instead those renegotiating respective imaginations showed compassion for the struggle and precarious situations of unemployed, they imagined from their daily-routine-perspective (De Certeau, 1988). A couple of them, who spend much time in Ceuta tried to think of solutions to unemployment (Dijkink, 1996, p. 15).

Most Moroccan participants seemed to have internalized the modern transitional template thinking of European superiority (Mignolo, 2000, pp. 58-59): given that they live in Morocco, where they imagine the standard of living to be lower in comparison to Ceuta, the latter appears a modern place, which they attribute to the city's European-ness. Some respondents resulted partly envious of privileges, prosperity and superiority (Kuus, 2004, p. 484), they connote to the European-ness – whereby the imagination of what the latter is was often influenced by what they knew about Ceuta (especially the center where many use to come for leisure). Moroccan respondents also tended to idealize modern, European political, technocratic processes of assessment based on knowledge (Foucault, 1991) e.g. for policy-making as their trust in politicians is not high. The positive connotations also seem based on Ceuta's (border-passage's) reputation in Morocco as a place of opportunity.

Moroccan everyman-respondents also contested imaginations about the conditional relation. They form the group of respondents, who hesitated least in criticizing Europeanization (once they identified failures) and respective strategies for Ceuta – but they contested Ceuta's conditional relation less discursively, contestation derived from their practices (Kramsch, 2010, p. 1003).

Some of their imaginations resulted influenced by Morocco claiming Ceuta's territory. Most respondents firmly supported this geopolitical imagination. In line with this some participants would expect Ceuta to have a better future joining Morocco given Ceuta's dependence on the relation with the country (the flows of clients and the trade). Whereas the older generation of Moroccans result caught in routine (or even resignation), visionary young Moroccan

respondents demand to interrupt the reliance on business relations of Morocco's North with Ceuta, fearing negative economic impacts on their country's economy.

In this context, Moroccan participants were straightforward in criticizing failures of geopolitical strategic planning in Ceuta even calling Ceuta a provincial, backward site. Unlike Ceutís, nor they are emotionally attached neither they feel the urge to highlight the city's European-ness. Eventually, especially concerning Ceuta's margins, they inverted superiority, inferiorizing the Europeanization strategy of Ceuta in comparison to Europeanization-strategies of their country (Kuus, 2004, p. 484; Newman et al. in Kramsch, 2010, p. 1003).

Some have noticed the migrants' presence and practices in the region and have developed compassion. They dared to request the EU to take responsibility at the border and in migrants' countries of origin. Additionally, experiences of struggles of cross-border workers are depicted in a real-world fashion (Gibson-Graham, 2000, p. 97). Imaginations about the violence against and bad treatment of migrants, Moroccan cross-border-workers and carriers reaffirm respective powerful imaginations.

But the Moroccan respondents also put stress on interaction with Ceutís and the mix of cultures. Most participants seem unaware of Ceutís rejecting Moroccans (Ferrer-Gallardo & Van Houtum, 2012, p. 244) – 'otherness' which is attributed to them is not renegotiated (Merrifield, 2011, p. 108). On the contrary, similarities across the border and interrelations, to be even retrieved as prevalent continua in several biographies and practices of Moroccan respondents, are described. The practices, biographies and imaginations explain how some participants became 'border-thinkers' (Mignolo, 2000, p. 64). Some respondents point to bits of 'Arab' culture in Ceuta and identify this presence as unusual in the EU and in comparison to the rest of the city, especially, because of the spatial fragmentation (Gunder Franck, 1966).

The respondents, who interact most with Ceuta, scrutinize the socio-economic and cultural causes of crime in the margins presented in powerful discourse. Together with the Ceutí respondents from the margins they are the ones, who proved most 'borderthinking' and resistance (Mignolo, 2000, p. 64).

Many Ceutí everyman-participants were aware of EU funding support, but few renegotiated details about consequent investment. Many imagined themselves to comit to responsibilities of citizenship and defend the EU-culture. Thus they tended to justify Ceuta and weaken criticism, presumably also justifying their own choice to stay in Ceuta (Kuus, 2004, p. 483). They discursively sought to Europeanize the city and themselves (Kuus, 2004, p. 479) via diverse tactics, e.g. invisibilizing dependency on the EU (funding) and (economic relations to Morocco) (Ferrer-Gallardo et al., 2014, p. 4).

Several strategic imaginations by Ceutí participants appear more 'old-fashioned', as if based on 'good-old-times'-experiences in comparison to more visionary plans of the powerful discourse-makers e.g. the vision of transforming Ceuta back into a site of industrial production versus transforming it into a 'Silicon-valley'- center of knowledge and IT.

Everymen from all parts of Ceuta firmly believed that they deserved support by the EU, and regretted about the negative reputation of otherness of Ceuta's spaces of flow (Kuus, 2004, p. 484). Many respondents hinted at the

limited capacities to live up to the 'buffer'-role and asked for more commitment by the EU – a piece of discursive resistance (Kramersch, 2011, p. 197) in their imaginations.

Aspects like the spatially isolated CETI are hardly mentioned in their imaginations (Merrifield, 2011, p. 108). Ceuti respondents remained relatively indifferent to protests by migrants, but made a few remarks about their own concerns occasionally transforming into protest e.g. the prices of the ferry (Merrifield, 2011, p. 108). The shift of responsibility of 'otherness' (Kuus, 2004, p. 483) of crime in the margins to mafias involved in drug-business, was reproduced by multiple Ceuti participants.

The renegotiations of Ceuti everyman-respondents were not as homogeneous, but for many aspects one can differentiate renegotiations by participants from the center and by respondents from the margins (also partly depending on religious affiliations).

Ceuti everyman-participants from Ceuta's center especially applied discursive tactics of invisibilization (Ferrer-Gallardo et al., 2014), sought to normalize or shift 'otherness' (Kuus, 2004, p. 479) as for them Morocco and relations to the country were connoted to (many features of) 'otherness' (Stoler, 1997, pp. 213-214) – socio-economically and culturally.

Their imaginations also reveal their fears from migrants and Moroccans (Ferrer-Gallardo, 2009, p. 31; Ferrer-Gallardo & Van Houtum, 2012, p. 244), fears from infiltration of 'otherness' (Stoler, 1997, p. 213). Along with the wish to Europeanize Ceuta this made them shift 'otherness' across the border (Kuus, 2004, p. 479). Center Ceuti respondents cannot avoid to know about violent treatment of migrants and their suffering (at the border-passage and in general). Some ask for modernization of the passage in the form of more control, organization or securitization (Ferrer-Gallardo & Van Houtum, 2012, pp. 244-246). But some also legitimate the border (Kuus, 2004, p. 479). The carriers' fate, though, is rarely mentioned and seems invisibilized in imaginations about the border (Ferrer-Gallardo et al., 2014). Yet, there is evidence of corrupt practices by security forces (Kuus, 2004, p. 478) in a few imaginations.

Ceuti everyman-participants from the center are generally conscious about features of 'otherness' (Kuus, 2004, p. 483) in the margins, but avoid renegotiating them as well. Like the Moroccans few of them were concerned with and thus hardly imagine struggles e.g. unemployment in the margins (Merrifield, 2011, p. 108), least Ceuti's with stable jobs. Most attributes of cultural 'otherness' are invisibilized by participants from the center or get wrapped up in the proud discourse about coexistence. Behind the invisibilization, Muslim belief and culture often resulted an imagined 'other' (Ferrer-Gallardo & Van Houtum, 2012, p. 244) even culminating in xenophobic ideas and visions.

This group of everyman-respondents subjected most to the conditional relation and defended it most firmly and their suggestions of geopolitical strategies revealed a focus on Spain and the EU.

(Unemployed) Ceuti respondents from the margins shared insights into their vulnerability and everyday struggle, the feeling of exclusion and wish for Europeanization (Kuus, 2004, p. 474), based on experience. Detailed descriptions of their adverse situations shed light on that they consider themselves victims, suffering from injustice – deprived of privileges in the relation to the EU (Gunder Franck, 1966, p. 21). It is a feature of their renegotiation which is different from the powerful imaginations – it contains suspicion towards the powerful in the center.

The latter are suspected of abusing their strategic power for their own (corrupt) interests (Gunder Franck, 1966, p. 21). The Ceuti everyman-respondents from the margins accentuate the concentration of Europeanization in the center more than the powerful discourse-makers.

The margins' respondents also tended to especially renegotiate imaginations which do or could affect them (Merrifield, 2011, p. 108) such as the competition on the labor market with informal cross-border workers. They desire more sustainable modernization strategies than implemented so far (Kuus, 2004, p. 482) in their districts, focusing on the creation of employment. Also more participation in policy-making and commitment by the EU (Kuus, 2004, p. 484; Mignolo, 2000, p. 60) are hoped for.

Beyond their slightly distinct ideas of EU template strategies (in comparison to the powerful discourse-makers) they apply (collective) coping tactics to manage to get by (Merrifield, 2011, p. 111). Nevertheless, they subject to conditionality, dreaming of economic prosperity (Kramsch, 2011, p. 200). Several everymen from the margins would wish Ceuti's to protest and fight more for their rights.

Some respondents from the margins indicated to feel compassion for carriers' and migrants' fates. Some respondents even suggested solving the migration issue back in the countries of origin (with the EU taking responsibility) but subject to modernization and 'filter'-plans of the border-passage. Yet, they are much more concerned about their own struggle within Ceuta, it appears.

The mix of cultures is vividly commented by residents of Ceuta's margins. They appreciate the mix and imagined to lead a 'bi-cultural' life themselves, interacting with Morocco through cross-border practices (Mignolo, 2000, pp. 68-69). At the same time their renegotiations reveal failures of coexistence of cultures in Ceuta, ending up in experiences of colonial hierarchies of one-way imposition (Kramsch, 2011, p. 200; Stoler, 1997) of European, Christian culture – only weakened and resisted to by their own double-identities (Mignolo, 2000, pp. 67-69). Discriminative treatment by Christians from the center is imagined to perpetuate marginalization. Incoherence of the Muslim belief-system with EU ideology is noticed by few, who inferiorize the latter to a superior Muslim belief, rendering European-ness subaltern (Mignolo, 2000, pp. 60, 83).

Demands have been put forward by everymen to affront criminality in the margins and stigmatization through attribution of more otherness to their districts is fought and shifted (to other districts and mafias from beyond the border). This group of respondents subject to Europeanization as such, but contest the marginalization they imagine to manifest as side-effect of the powerful implementing Europeanization strategies exclusively in the center (Kramsch, 2010, p. 1003).

All in all, the theoretical perspective of this paper emerged as rich enough to help understanding many facets of the renegotiation of powerful geopolitical imaginations by everyman-respondents about conditionality in relation to the EU. Firstly, the theories about discourse and renegotiation (Gibson-Graham, 2000; Hall, 1997a, b) were applied to understand the mechanism of partial reproduction of discourse from a context. Understanding the everyman (Merrifield, 2011) and his tactics weakening the strategies of the powerful (De Certeau, 1988) through everyday practice was facilitated by the theoretical framework as well. Further, the postcolonial theories especially about the conditional relation between the EU and its places (Kuus, 2004; Kramsch, 2010; 2011) including insights about the

imaginings of 'otherness', European likeness (ibid.; Stoler, 1997; Hardt & Negri, 2000; Mignolo, 2000; Ferrer-Gallardo, 2009; Ferrer-Gallardo et al., 2014; Ferrer-Gallardo & Van Houtum, 2012) and economic modernization (Sparke, 2002; Luxembourg, 1972) enriched the analysis here. And, finally, the insights about geopolitical imaginings (Mamadouh & Dijkink, 2006; Dijkink, 1996) about borders (Kolossoff & Scott, 2012) should be named.

Surprising and unexpected theoretical insights which have served to explain special, unexpected findings were encountered and applied as well. Insights about everyday routine and disinterest of everymen (as long as they are not concerned in their everyday practices) resulted to be rather relevant to explain lack of renegotiation (Merrifield, 2011, p. 108) by everymen. Such disinterest was encountered often, especially for Moroccan everyman-respondents. The way everymen (but even discourse-makers) related to Ceuta's spaces or used to spend time here strongly influenced imaginings (ibid.).

The overwhelming subjection to Europeanization, linear template modernization and progress-thinking (by all participants) – the European dream - was rather surprising (and not) as well. The appeal and imagined superiority of a modern, affluent, service-oriented society of consumption (Kramsch, 2011, p. 196; Sparke, 2002, p. 220; Kuus, 2004, p. 474; Mignolo, 2000, pp. 58-59) was reaffirmed. This does not mean that Europeanization was desired by each everymen and powerful discourse-maker for each aspect of life, but that none of them explicitly questioned it as a general model for society to strive for.

The side-effect, spatial fragmentation (Hardt & Negri, 2000, p. 199; Gunder Franck, 1966, p. 20) or marginalization, through representation and distribution of investments has been an unexpected finding in the beginning, which then developed to be a crucial feature of imaginings – including the perpetuation of the process through Europeanization of Ceuta (Gunder Franck, 1966, p. 20) and likely even Europeanization in other sites. Even the concern of the groups of everymen (center, margins, Moroccans) appeared fragmented.

The distinctive role of Ceuta's spaces of flow could be expected based on insights by many border-scholars, but it also clearly emerged from the imaginings under investigation.

'Otherness' and European-ness are often imagined, in fact, in degrees of criteria as described by Kuus (2004, p. 475), e.g. Christian values, organization, civilization, prosperity etc. Imaginings of 'otherness' of Islam and Muslim culture (Ferrer-Gallardo & Van Houtum, 2012) proved to be prevalent in relation to the spaces of flow and the margins. Findings also show that Ceuti everyman-participants and discourse-makers, who least interacted across the border attributed most 'otherness' to the relations to and flows from Morocco. Thus also Ferrer-Gallardo's (2009, p. 31) insights about contact reducing fear and rejection proved valuable.

The failure of one-size-fits-all approaches (Kramsch, 2011, p. 200) of imagined core-European modern models of society to deal with contexts and 'otherness' is an intriguing – yet not completely innovative - finding (Kramsch, 2011, p. 200). The EU resulted partially blind to its own constituent parts (Mignolo, 2000, p. 60). Subtle discursive, practical and active resistance to Europeanization weakening the manifestation of the process (was imagined to) occur (Kramsch, 2011, p. 197; Mignolo, 2000, p. 83). EU-culture is contested by mixed identities, borderthinking and place-based habits (Mignolo, 2000).

The geopolitical imaginations of everymen (Häkli, 1998, p. 145) resulted worth investigating, revealing subaltern geopolitical insights which cannot be discovered from traditional powerful, strategic geopolitical perspectives. The need of contextual strategies is highlighted in many imaginations (Kramsch, 2011, pp. 196-197). Finally, the counter-factual analysis, asking a 'what-if-question' as Dodds (2008, p. 74) suggests ('what if everymen of Ceuta would envision geopolitical strategies for their city?') emerged as enriching.

All those surprising findings, highlighted in the former paragraph, can be taken as incentives for further applied research and theoretical elaborations. But there are a series of problems and limitations to this research, of course. Already choosing for post-colonial theory and the topic of conditionality meant that the research was strongly guided into a certain direction. A different theoretical background might have led to different or partly even converse results.

In data analysis a more selective approach could have helped to reduce and simplify the analysis - a lengthy procedure. For a more in-depth, thorough approach the decision could have been made to work with individual life-stories – a narrative approach and leaving arguments of the individuals complete. Through deciding to work with a multi-perspective approach per topic, instead, certain details might have been lost: this way stress was put on comparison and dialogue.

Another limitation of the study is that during fieldwork the 'renegotiation'-aspect was not dealt with explicitly: the researcher could have asked the participants through which ways they use to obtain information, what kind of information they are interested in and where they find it. Answers to these questions would have added to understanding the process of renegotiation.

Doubling of data was allowed for, but highlighting different aspects each according to the structure of the paper. Additionally the fieldwork issues, mentioned in 3.4 reveal weak spots of the methodological conceptualization and investigation.

In a future study the here enumerated issues should be considered and preferably revised, to explore what different results can be obtained with a few (some more, some less fundamental) changes. It is recommended to investigate more of such specific cases of Europe's margins like Ceuta.

Most importantly, though, this study has managed to listen to a few everymen from Ceuta's border-region. It has proven that the everyman's geopolitical imaginations are enriching, place-based and able to highlight the failures of the EU imposing its prefabricated model. The EU emerged being blind, without understanding its citizens and thus itself in geopolitical imaginations here.

Perhaps, the EU could start exploring itself and become a union of 'everyman'.



Figure 21. Photo of a painting by an artist from Tetouan, Sidi Ahmed Amrani. His art has developed in the border-region, which he feels strongly attached to.

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Appendix

a) Operationalization- table (for methodology chapter 3)

Differentiation by	Indicators from theory	Summary indicators
Individual imagination (strategic & tactical) Geo-	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Territorial belonging (Bonura, 1998, pp. 94-96) - narration of collective memories (Kolossoff & Scott, 2012, p. 35; Ferrer-Gallardo & Van Houtum, 2013, p. 248) - have to position themselves in the context with neighbor (Kramsch, 2010, p. 1011; Rumford, 2008, p. 62). - Feeling European: own constructed, perceived local European-ness they consider as such (Kuus, 2004, p. 473) - emotions, reproduction of regional identities and social power relations) (Häkli, 1998, p. 145). - Informal contacts (Kolossoff & Scott, 2012, pp. 35, 43) - Importance of the context (Dijkink, 1996, p. 10) - spatial practices (Bonura, 1998, p. 87) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 14) Identification with collective and territory (feeling of belonging: where?) 15) locate and intermingle local identity with others (also higher level) 3) Contextual-ness of emotions, social (power) relations, activities (this way because in this context)
Economic-	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - (working/leisure) routines, attitudes concerning economic survival (Kramsch & Brambilla, 2007, p. 105) - cross-border cooperation of individuals (Kolossoff & Scott, 2012, p. 16) - in everyday life; acts of decision seizing opportunities (Häkli, 1998, p. 144) - informal contacts across border (Kolossoff & Scott, pp. 35, 43) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 4) routines and habits everyday life 5) making use of local (cross-border) opportunities (basis for decisions) 6) resisting formal, official ways of economic practices through using opportunities
Political	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Images desired/demonized others (Kolossoff & Scott, 2012, pp. 8-9) - popular culture (arts, music, etc.) (Tuathail & Dalby, 1998, p. 11) - everyday (b)ordering process about socio-cultural boundaries, divisions, experiences and identity constituting categories (Kolossoff & Scott, 2012, p. 8) - shifting and contesting (divisions of) groups: through meaning-making, traditions, habits emotions and respective understanding of the local context (Kramsch & Brambilla, 2007, p. 105). - local identity (Kolossoff & Scott, 2012, p. 35) - picture identity of neighboring other (Kolossoff & Scott, 2012, p. 35; Ferrer-Gallardo & Van Houtum, 2013, p. 247) - "many contexts" occasions for resistance, overlap (popular movements, street parlance, organized 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 7) Perception and renegotiating identities of self and other (individually and groups) 8) Cultural/ visible expressions of local/ communities' relations/tradition/localized standards/knowledge 9) Connoting groups with certain kinds of routines, traditions 10) Reasons to resist and express in popular movements, street parlance, organized activities or protest, cyber politics, visual images 11) political discourse of media listened to, discussions about it, add own knowledge 12) renarration of a common history, memories 13) perception of threats to order, feeling insecure by ... 14) need of order, structure, system to understand the world (explanation world system)

	<p>activities (Häkli, 1998, p. 147)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - political discourse in media or school; strengthening local identities and individualism (Kolossoff & Scott, 2012, p. 4) - "yearning for some kind of world order" (Dijkink, 1996, p. 15) - perceives "threats to order"/ "feelings of insecurity" as "severe disruptions of personal social pathologies" (Dijkink, 1996, p. 16) - Individual "standards" and expectations (derived from the individual's community and might be shared by members of "localized" groups (Dijkink, 1996, p. 16) - popular visual images, media representation, reminders and cyber geopolitics (Tuathail & Dalby, 1998, p. 12) - openly opposing political decision-making (Dijkink, 1996, p. 144) - Outsider knowledge and ideas (Mamadouh & Dijkink, 2006, p. 356) 	
<p>Political, official imagination (strategic) Geo-</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Foreign policy (agendas) (Dijkink in Kolossoff & Scott, 2012, p. 12) - Discourse by geopolitical experts (Dodds, 2008, p. 79) - Normative (mental) maps (Dijkink in Kolossoff & Scott, 2012, p. 12) - Border-control (Kolossoff & Scott, 2012, p. 27) - Migration and politics (Kolossoff & Scott, 2012, p.44) - refusal of immigration (Ferrer-Gallardo & Van Houtum, 2013, p. 244). - "historical togetherness" (Ferrer-Gallardo & Van Houtum, 2013, p. 244) - Powerful, physical geographical symbols (Mamadouh & Dijkink, 2006, p. 356) - Post-nationalism, European integration discourse (Kolossoff & Scott, 2012, p. 16) 	<p>18) (mental) maps of foreign policy about relations (experts)</p> <p>19) Border control</p> <p>20) Dealing with migration</p> <p>21) Stress historical (national) togetherness</p> <p>22) Physical symbols (of geographic inclusion)</p> <p>23) Discourse about European integration</p>
<p>Economic</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Foreign policy (agendas) (Kolossoff & Scott, 2012, p.12) - Discourse by business interest (Dodds, 2008, p.79) - Political-economic interest (Dodds, 2008, p. 80) - Inequalities, poor vs rich in world (Kolossoff & Scott, 2012, p. 13) - cross-border cooperation (Kolossoff & Scott, 2012, p. 16). - everyman's benefit assumptions (Häkli, 1998, p. 147) - city-marketing, competition between regions (Sparke, 2002, p. 215) in border-regions such as Ceuta has become every-day routine, need positioning (Kramsch, 2010, p. 1011; 	<p>24) Planning economic, business interest and relations to other places</p> <p>25) cross-border disparities and cooperation</p> <p>26) neoliberal assumptions about free markets</p> <p>27) economic competition and comparison with other places</p> <p>28) placing the local in wider competitive context, need positioning in competitive context</p>

		Rumford, 2008, pp. 53-54).	
Political		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - (national) security strategies (Kolossoff & Scott, 2012, p. 12) - Foreign policy (agendas) (Kolossoff & Scott, 2012, p. 12) - Discourse by powerful elites, administrations, leaders, academics, journalists, professionals (Kolossoff & Scott, 2012, p. 14), media, political commentators and geopolitical experts Dodds, 2008, p. 79) - powerfulness (Mamadouh & Dijkink, 2006, p. 356), manipulation - Images desired/demonized others (Kolossoff & Scott, 2012, pp. 8-9) - Social division: distinct groups sticking together (Kolossoff & Scott, 2012, p. 9) - Formation of communities (inclusion by what criteria, of whom?) (Kolossoff & Scott, 2012, pp. 26-27) - wish for increasingly "homogenous communities" and "(border) control" (Kolossoff & Scott, 2012, p. 10) - political decision rebordering (Kolossoff & Scott, 2012, p. 27) - seeking legitimization of politics (Mamadouh & Dijkink, 2006, p. 355) - "cohesion and purity" (Ferrer-Gallardo & Van Houtum, 2013, p. 244) - islamophobia (Ferrer-Gallardo & Van Houtum, 2013, p. 244). - Attentiveness to foreign policy in border-cities - national geopolitical strategies are reflected presumably more explicitly e.g. because of greater dependence on foreign policy with neighbours (Kramsch, 2010, p. 1011; Rumford, 2008, pp. 53-54). - European integration" discourse heralding "post-national politics" (Kolossoff & Scott, 2012, p. 16) - images and its instrumentalization by elites and heterogeneous support (Mamadouh & Dijkink, 2006, p. 361) - Them and US relation, national identity (Kolossoff & Scott, 2012, p. 11) - Spanish foreign policy EU foreign policy, neighborhood policy 	<p>29) Security strategies about potential threats</p> <p>30) Media representation of diplomatic foreign policy of institutionally powerful groups</p> <p>31) Othering for legitimacy (powerful) ideas</p> <p>32) (Discursive) division of groups (categorization)</p> <p>33) Emphasis homogeneity/purity and common characteristics within geographic entities</p> <p>34) Different levels/scales of putting oneself into relation with other places</p>
Border making conditionality particular Individual level	What receive by EU?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Security (Ferrer-Gallardo, 2009, p. 25) - Prosperity (Kramsch, 2011, p. 200) - Opportunities for leisure and work on the other side (Ferrer-Gallardo, 2009, p. 31) through existence of border (Kramsch, 2010, p. 1003; Rumford, 2008, p. 62) - <i>Ideally indirect profiting from benefits given to POLITICAL LEVEL</i> (Kolossoff & Scott, 2012, p. 36) 	<p>16) Security (feeling secure, safe, prevention of crime, protection property and life) guaranteed</p> <p>17) Prosperity, employment (increase standard of living, find a job)</p> <p>18) Opportunities for leisure (shop, meet people, spend freetime on the other side) and work (at border, with</p>

			border, on the other side)
	How to conform?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - follow European template "Good behavior" (Kuus, 2004, p. 474) - come up to psychological requirements to citizenship (Stoler, 1997, p. 203) - avoid cultural "contamination" (Stoler, 1997, pp. 213-214) - preserve purity (Ferrer-Gallardo & Van Houtum, 2013, p. 244) - be bearers of typical European cultural values (Kolossoff & Scott, 2012, p. 18) - Accepting the limitations imposed on life-cycle, communication etc. (Kolossoff & Scott, 2012, p. 36) - Subject to and carry on cultural differentialist racism (Hardt & Negri, 2000, p. 192) and fear of infiltration (Stoler, 1997, p. 220) - Promoting European model of citizen, values (Stoler, 1997, pp. 203, 213-214) - Exporting European dream via contacts and encounters to the non-European side of the border (Kuus, 2004, p. 475; Kramsch, 2011) 	<p>19) Be a well-behaving European citizen</p> <p>20) Commitment to European values</p> <p>21) Preserving purity, avoiding contamination by hybrid, other cultures (contact, relation, keep on European values, take euphemistic view, look down upon alternative cultural forms)</p> <p>22) Carry cultural differentialist racism (apply criteria of European-ness when meeting people and judging about quality of the contact and person)</p> <p>23) Accepting limitations imposed on life-cycle (not crossing border, or undermine its authority by cross-border activity)</p> <p>24) Export European values, dreams and moral standards (tell about advantages of living in Europe, "teach", give advice, present one's own good situation)</p>
	Agency?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Carry on particularities (Mignolo, 2000, p. 86) - Stick to subaltern knowledge (Mignolo, 2000, pp. 59, 67-69) - Pretending to adopt (Kuus, 2004, p. 478) - maintaining friendships to "others" and keeping on mixing up (Kolossoff & Scott, 2012, p. 31) - Support illegal immigration (Kolossoff & Scott, 2012, p. 31) - controls (Kolossoff & Scott, 2012, p. 31) - Subalternized knowledge used (Mignolo, 2000, pp. 59, 67-69) - Use atypical cross-border relations (trading) for income (Luxemburg, 1972, p. 62; Ferrer-Gallardo, 2009, p. 29) - selective re-narrating of EU experience, renegotiation geopolitical idea (Kramsch & Brambilla, 2007, p. 113) - smuggling goods, drugs, making a living (Axford, 2006, p. 170; Rumford, 2008, p. 57) - spend leisure time on the other side (Ferrer-Gallardo, 2009, p. 31) 	<p>25) Carry on particularities, maintain cross-border/cultural contacts (hybrid culture)</p> <p>26) Subvert (border-) controls Doing what is not allowed, Informal, carrying illegally goods, forbidden goods</p> <p>27) Pretend to adopt while actually undermining principles/laws</p> <p>28) make use of cross-border relations for economic survival/private</p> <p>29) only selective renarrating European dream/model (telling about disadvantages of life, difficulties, stress local identity, particularities, appreciation of otherness, advantages across the border)</p> <p>30) enjoy possibility to be at the other side (leisure, encounters)</p>
Political ,	What received by	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Attribution of European-ness (Kuus, 2004, pp. 480, 484) including related privileges of status 	26) Attribution of European-ness, normality, recognition

official level	EU?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - <i>condition for being recognized as European</i> (Kuus, 2004, p. 484) - <i>security, stability</i> (Kramersch, 2011, p. 200) - <i>status of normality</i> (Kuus, 2004, p. 475) - <i>disciplined and controlled by the EU</i> (Kuus, 2004, p. 478) - <i>good relations between the margins and core Europe</i> - <i>Being in „better“ condition/position after Europeanization</i> (Kramersch, 2011, p. 196) - <i>Financial compensations for securitization</i> (Ferrer-Gallardo, 2009, p. 25) - <i>funding for compensating the barrier effect repressing development of proper economic growth</i> (Ferrer-Gallardo, 2009, p. 25) - <i>adverse economic conditions through barrier-effect allow to compete with other regions in the EU for funding for under-developed regions</i> (El pueblo de Ceuta, 2013) - <i>advice</i> (Kuus, 2004, p. 474) according to what is considered European therefore means more attribution of European-ness, <i>condition for being recognized as European</i> (Kuus, 2004, p. 484). - <i>Prosperity</i> (Kramersch, 2011, p. 200) - <i>Economic development</i> - <i>Normal status, recognition as developed region</i> (Kuus, 2004, p. 475) 	<p>ability decision-making and problem-solving, status</p> <p>27) Security, stability (no cultural threats, less biopolitical – migration-related, Morocco no threatening neighbor)</p> <p>28) Good relations with, better status in EU (recognition, support and confidence in decision-making)</p> <p>29) Financial compensation for securitization (revenues for (extra-) security forces, infrastructure)</p> <p>30) Funding for lack of development (reception of cohesion funds (or similar) by EU additional to Spanish funding)</p> <p>31) Possibility to compete for funding for under-development in EU (structural funds)</p> <p>32) Advice (recommendations how to affront problems)</p> <p>33) Prosperity (rise standard of living on average, avoid divided social development into few rich and many poor)</p> <p>34) Economic development (investment, growth GDP, diversification, creation of employment)</p> <p>35) Control by EU (monitoring how progress in development, advice)as incentive to progress</p>
	How to conform?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - “not yet”, “not fully” European: learn and adopt dominant norms (Kuus, 2004, p. 483) - Take over Eurocentric views (Mignolo) - Accept superiority of European knowledge, science (Mignolo, 2000, p. 73) - Produce European universal knowledge and listen to it (Mignolo, 2000, p. 73) - Take bufferzone-role (Kuus, 2004, p. 477) prevent spill-over of risks and threats (Kramersch, 2011, p. 201) - Securitization, militarization (Kolossoff & Scott, 2012, pp. 21, 26-27; Walters, 2005, p. 571; Rumford, 2008, p. 55; Kramersch, 2011, p. 205) reinforce police checks, become a bufferzone (Kuus, 2004, p. 477) - Shift boundary discursively to South and East - Commit to values: civilization, modernity, development, progress, Christian moral beliefs, belief in “linear transitology” (Kuus, 2004, p. 482) - exclusion, division and the functioning of discursively established degrees of otherness (Kuus, 2004; Ferrer- 	<p>36) learn from European model (consult problem-solving in places in North-Western Europe as examples) ,implement linear transitology (adapt strategies alike to those successfully used elsewhere; goal-setting modernization, progress)</p> <p>37) internalize Eurocentrism, superiority universal European knowledge (scientification, standards implemented, homogenize)</p> <p>38) become bufferzone against</p>

		<p>Gallardo & Van Houtum, 2013, p. 248)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - exclusion, division and the functioning of discursively established degrees of otherness (Kuus, 2004, p. 479) - stigmatizing otherness behind the border for self-identification (Kuus, 2004, p. 474) - develop likeness to core-European model (Kuus, 2004, p. 484) - create hardened lines at border, reinforce it (Kramsch, 2011, p. 197) - avoid further hybridization of culture (Ferrer-Gallardo & Van Houtum, 2013, p. 244) - instrumentalize need of individual for personal safety, privatization tendency to legitimate reinforcement of border, securitization (Kolossov & Scott, 2012, pp. 26-27) - Willingness to progress (Mignolo, 2000, pp. 53-54) - and follow European template "Good behavior" (Kuus, 2004, p. 474) - realize economic strategies for development/ growth (Kramsch, 2011, p. 196; Ferrer-Gallardo, 2009, p. 35) - <i>Economic development : exploit inequalities across the border for accumulation (Luxemburg, 1972, pp. 60-62)</i> - overcome underdevelopment (Kramsch, 2011, p. 196) - willingness to change according to the "European" attributes (Kramsch, 2011, pp. 200-201) - making us of cross-border cooperation, strategic regionalism (Sparke, 2002, p. 214) - rely especially on powerful actors - networking across the border: actor networks (Kramsc & Brambilla, 2007, pp. 103-104; Axford, 2006, pp. 166-167) 	<p>external threats (Provide/host security forces and help to prevent infiltration of threats further into hinterlands)</p> <p>39) discursively shift boundaries (attribute otherness to beyond the border)</p> <p>40) commitment/willingness to internalize European values (internalization, homogenization)</p> <p>41) stigmatize otherness, while becoming more alike to European core-model (apply stereotypes and seek for confirmation of these assumed images)</p> <p>42) avoid further hybridization (prevent immigration of non-Europeans, keep on European values, take euphemistic view, look down upon alternative cultural forms)</p> <p>43) instrumentalize fears, foster privatization, to legitimize securitization of the borderland</p> <p>44) economic inequalities exploitation for accumulation, cross-border cooperation networks</p> <p>45) overcome underdevelopment (less unemployment, more economic activity)</p>
	Agency?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - pretended to adopt (Kuus, 2004, p. 478) - barrier helps to maintain disparities partly so that it can be exploited by individual borderpeople for economic activity and job-search on/with the other side (Luxemburg, 1972, pp. 60-62; Sparke, 2002) - pretending adaptation (Kuus, 2004, p. 478) of strategic recommendations by the EU- core, while silently ignoring, rejecting, resisting 	<p>21) only pretend to adopt</p> <p>22) exploit intact disparities for economic activity and job-search</p> <p>23) pretend to adhere, ignore recommendations</p> <p>24) continue informal cross-border relations</p>

b) Two tables created as overview of chapter 5 for 5.3 – Summary of chapter 5

Sphere of conditional relation	Powerful geopolitical imaginations	Geopolitical imaginations by Moroccan everymen	Geopolitical imaginations by Ceutí everymen
<i>Funding as reward and support</i>	-Funding is provided to Ceuta by the EU to support the Europeanization process to live up to the conditions European-ness is bound up with (Kuus, 2004, p.484).	-Only those Moroccan everymen resulted to be aware of this piece of discourse, who are in touch with Ceuti people from the center on a regular basis (Merrifield, 2011, p. 108).	-Ceutí everyman-respondents know about the support, but with regard to investments with the help of subsidies respondents, who are not from the center, have noticed a bias in favor of the center (Gunder Franck, 1966, p. 20).
<i>Conditionality in politics</i>	<p>-Ceutí elites also regard the lending of the status of European-ness as such as a way in which the EU generously protects the city from the Moroccan territorial claim.</p> <p>-Organizational adaptations in the political realm have been realized to live up to the conditional requirements by the EU, paralleling the reinforcement of nepotistic practices by the decision-makers from the center (Gunder Franck, 1966, p. 21).</p>	<p>-Also in everymen renegotiations from the two sides of the border the generosity of the EU granting Europeaness to Ceuta and the thankfulness of the Ceutis is highlighted.</p> <p>-Moroccan everymen participants hardly realize such changes, but idealize Europeanization in this organizational sphere, e.g. in the form of scientification (Foucault, 1991) of the political process.</p> <p>-In spite of the approval of Europeanization the Spanish state is regarded to be the most powerful political actor for Ceuta in everyman-imaginings. For Moroccans coming from a rather centralized political system this imagination is straightforward.</p> <p>-Generally both everymen groups reproduce the imagination that joining the EU is advantageous for Ceuta and its citizens, considering European-ness as additional guarantee of rights, democracy and freedom in official. Moroccans envy such rights and privileges of Ceutís, subjecting to the imagination of superiority of being European (Mignolo, 2000, pp. 58-59).</p>	<p>-Also in everymen renegotiations from Ceuta recognize generosity of the EU and their thankfulness is highlighted.</p> <p>-In spite of the approval of Europeanization the Spanish state is regarded to be the most powerful political actor for Ceuta in everyman-imaginings. Ceutí everymen imagined Ceuta to be too far from the EU to have it be most influential. Others recognized the power of the neoliberal ideology (Sparke, 2002, p. 220) in the EU resulting in important influence of economic actors.</p> <p>-Generally both everymen groups reproduce the imagination that joining the EU is advantageous for Ceuta and its citizens, considering European-ness as additional guarantee of rights, democracy and freedom in official. Ceutís do not compare the situation in Ceuta to Morocco, but they do subject to the positive connotation of geopolitical imaginations of the EU and the strategy of Europeanization (Kuus, 2004).</p>
<i>Urban transformation</i>	-Ceuta is coined by important efforts to imitate models of other well-maintained urban central areas in the EU, while receiving reward and funding for the same aim by the EU – only disagreement about priorities in such investments e.g. functional versus aesthetics can be traced. The aim behind the geopolitical strategy of such revitalization is economic growth through improving Ceuta´s attractiveness – to live up to (imagined) European (economic) standards (Kuus, 2004; Kramsch).	-Moroccan interviewees had little to say about the changes, although they do notice modernization in comparison to earlier moments – without connoting the modernization to funding by the EU.	-Ceutí everymen reproduce the imagination of the powerful in Ceuta. Yet, the non-center inhabitants are critical about the distribution of such measures across the city, that is to say, the concentration in the center (Gunder Franck, 1966, p. 20).
<i>Conditionality in economics</i>	-Investigating official geopolitical imaginations and their renegotiation,	-Moroccan respondents were rather indifferent on this aspect	-For Ceutí everymen measures to modernize and boost the production

	<p>we can conclude that Ceuta's center has lived up to many economic expectations and works on implementing others (Kuus, 2004, p.482): the production sector has less priority in the Europeanization strategy of Ceuta's leaders, although a few measures are planned, especially with regard to the rules of origin. The experts from Ceuta, though, are skeptical about the potentials of the sector because of the high transportation costs from and the city.</p> <p>-They give priority to services, imagining the EU as a prosperous service society according to economic modernization models (Rostow etc.) (Kramsch, 2011, p. 196). They recommend to make use of EU support to foster service provision, especially for Morocco in future. The revitalization of the center is envisioned to boost consumption and the local economy. Different geopolitical imaginations of powerful actors sometimes clash since some argue to implement economic norms of the EU while neoliberal thinkers criticize over-regulation – revealing contradictions of the EU-models imagined</p> <p>-In much of expert geopolitical imaginations Moroccan clients are the target group to be attracted for shopping tourism in Ceuta. The experts see huge potential for development here (Kramsch, 2011, p. 200) and work on facilitating entrance for all Moroccans, especially focusing on the growing middle-class.</p>	<p>(Merrifield, 2011, p. 108), since many consider Europeanization to be at an advanced stage anyway (kuus, 2004, p. 484) in Ceuta.</p> <p>-Curiously, everymen hardly renegotiate those imaginations. The term and topic of the wider 'service sector' result abstract.</p> <p>-Moroccan everymen have a strong awareness of the attraction strategy. Some worried about it; others tell how they themselves spend leisure in Ceuta and consume. Compatibility of markets is reaffirmed</p>	<p>sector belong prioritized geopolitical imagination for Ceuta's future, especially to tackle the employment issues.</p> <p>-Curiously, everymen hardly renegotiate those imaginations. The term and topic of the wider 'service sector' result abstract. From everyman-perspectives it is easier to build their imagination on observable activities of life, so that most hopes lie on production.</p> <p>-Ceuti interviewees instead do not consider tourism to have much potential in Ceuta. Only few hope for Spanish to be attracted to the city, some more recognize focus on Moroccan clients to be an alternative strategy.</p>
<p><i>Conditionality in culture</i></p>	<p>-According to the powerful geopolitical imagination Ceuta is European and modern (Kuus, 2004, p. 475). Nonetheless, discursive Europeanization is used to stress the features to which European-ness is attributed. The powerful elites subject to superiority of European culture (Kuus, 2004; Stoler, 1997).</p> <p>-Ceuta is seen as making cultural contributions to the EU, carrying its European features, being a part of it and defending the culture from the union's margin like a buffer (Kuus, 2004, p. 477). European citizenship is connoted with responsibility by powerful actors and Ceutis.</p> <p>- Yet, in general the political culture in Ceuta was depicted as one of silence. Subjection to the official geopolitical strategy and conditions seems to easily occur</p>	<p>-In geopolitical imagination by Moroccan everymen the point of reference is Morocco. Again, from that perspective using criteria of European-ness Ceuta's culture appears more European: traits of European-ness are observed in safety, prosperity, leisure and intellectuality (Kramsch, 2011).</p> <p>-Everymen from Morocco find it hard to imagine citizenship of the EU as such (Merrifield, 2011, p. 108).</p> <p>-Several Moroccans contradict, since from their perspective and given the context of few demonstrations in their country (Merrifield, 2011, p. 108), confirming that demonstrations take place.</p>	<p>-In Ceuta few everymen are critical of the cultural tendency to strive for progress, which illustrates the appreciation of modernization (Kuus, 2004).</p> <p>-European citizenship is connoted by everymen to responsibility, though not many renegotiate or reproduce the discourse.</p> <p>-Ceuti everymen instead reproduce the official geopolitical imagination about the silent political culture, however, some also make suggestions for politics in future, whereby those visions depend on the individual lifeworlds of the respondents. They talk especially about the status of citizenship and rights as reflection of European-ness in politics, because it impacts every-day routines and opportunities and</p>

			dreams for their future (Merrifield, 2011, p. 108)

Degree of activeness of resistance	Powerful geopolitical imaginations	Geopolitical imaginations by Moroccan everymen	Geopolitical imaginations by Ceutí everymen
<i>Otherness</i>	<p>-Otherness is imagined as intrinsically linked to the geographic characteristics (small place, separated from the EU, isolated, peninsular, a border) of Ceuta in the EU-context and seen as a factor hampering the compliance with certain aspects of the conditional relation (Kuus, 2004, pp. 484).</p> <p>-For the official, careful acknowledgement of the territorial claim by Morocco,</p> <p>-Economic otherness regarding the fiscal system is considered to suit the geographic isolation and is envisioned to be difficult to get rid of even in future by the leaders.</p>	<p>-The point of reference to determine otherness is the EU also for Moroccan everymen, who largely reproduce the official imagination about the geographic particularities. They add that Ceuta has a provincial character, a negative connotation which Moroccans tell about without hesitation since Ceuta is not their city: they might not feel the urge to present it only positively, unlike Ceutís.</p> <p>- Moroccan everymen reproduce and reaffirm the claim</p> <p>- Moroccan everymen do not renegotiate the abstract topic of fiscal particularities in relation to otherness either. They only observe real-world consequences of it, such as the border trade (chapter 7).</p>	<p>-Those reproduce the official imagination that Ceuta is small, which brings along some disadvantages. For other pieces of geopolitical imaginations about Ceuta's geographic position they hardly acknowledge 'otherness' of Ceuta.</p> <p>- Ceutí everymen react with rejection and neglect to the claim, using a strategy of invisibilization (Ferrer-Gallardo et al., 2014).</p> <p>- Ceutís hardly renegotiate the imagined otherness through the fiscal system for the same reason as Moroccans do not renegotiate it, although changes could have major impacts on the Ceutí economic system (Aranda-Gallego, 2007, p. 348, Martínez Navarro, 2003, p. 3) and thus on the everymen.</p>
<i>Agency (practices and discourse)</i>	<p>-Practices of otherness, a more active form of resistance or agency, are acknowledged by the elite, e.g. because of dependency on subsidies, which is a criticism of Europeanization, as such, at least for certain features of economic system. Negative effects on Ceuta are feared because of the city's singularity (otherness). Moroccan clients in Ceuta can be seen as otherness in its center. However, this otherness is desired, the commerce depends on them and will be reinforced with the end of modernizing and Europeanizing the center – boosting the economic development of the city (Kramsch, 2011, p. 196).</p> <p>-Doubts are expressed about the effectiveness of policies, the implementation of the Europeanization strategy and Europeanization as such. There is little agreement among powerful actors about how to implement Europeanization and critiques of the local government and the EU emerge.</p>	<p>- Moroccan respondents notice dependency on the Moroccan clients, but not the dependency on the EU (Merrifield, 2011, p. 108).</p> <p>-Also Moroccans do not all trust in Europeanization, especially, because they suspect the EU not to understand Ceuta. Few suggest that Ceuta could better be Moroccan since the EU actually does not have a real interest in Ceuta and the well-being of the people.</p>	<p>- Ceutí everymen are indifferent to both kinds of dependency or invisibilize them (Ferrer-Gallardo et al., 2014, p. 4). Bad practice of politicians and economic elite actors in Ceuta, corruption and fraud are identified as un-European in geopolitical imaginations as well.</p> <p>-Also Ceutí everymen, both from the center and peripheries, present themselves skeptical of imposing EU norms without contextualizing them. Ceutí everymen are dissatisfied with local leaders in power not serving citizens. The disappointment also refers to the EU not involving them and tolerating bad implementation, especially beyond the center</p> <p>-Most participants, arguing like this from Ceuta, do not live in the center, which indicates that they feel deprived of certain privileges—the concentration of benefits in the central zones of Ceuta is pointed out (Gunder Franck, 1966, pp. 20-21). It is an accuse of elites for nepotism Europeanizing only their own group.</p>
<i>Active</i>	- Protests often involve	-Moroccan everymen share the	-Ceutí everymen agree that protests

<i>resistance (protest)</i>	unemployed, entrepreneurs or simply mixed groups, but are regarded to be rare occasions. The events take place in the center where governing institutions are located. Most protesters are not from center, which highlights the spatial fragmentation of the city (Hardt & Negri, 2000, pp. 199-200). All those incidents of protest, however, can be seen as resistance to the local government and demands for pursuing Europeanization of otherness in a more consistent or different way also complying with the conditions imagined to be imposed on Ceuta with the support of the EU (Kuus, 2004; p. 477).	perception that protests occur in the center. But they are rare, also in Morocco (Merrifield, 2011, p. 108). Additionally, as they consider Ceuta a modern place, they do not see many reasons for protest from the perspective of their own routines (De Certeau, 1988)	are rare, few join them and renegotiate the discourse about them. Some are in favor of protests when necessary, so there could be more and more often.
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c) Two tables created as overview of chapter 6 for 6.3 – Summary of chapter 6

Degree of activeness of resistance	Powerful geopolitical imaginations	Geopolitical imaginations by Moroccan everymen	Geopolitical imaginations by Ceuti everymen
<i>Otherness</i>	<p>-Ceuta is different from other spaces because of the border and cross-border relations, the economic dependence and flows of people, bearing otherness, into the city. People live across the border without paying taxes in Ceuta but benefit from social support in Ceuta. Many have relatives and spend leisure in Morocco;</p> <p>-Mix of culture is imagined to occur in many lives of many Ceutis. It is depicted as positive potential and interaction. Some experts regret about the culture of rejection and would like to reinforce cross-border contact. Institutions of the other culture have existed since the protectorate; there has been interaction. Spanish have chosen to live in Morocco. Darija is spoken often in Ceuta, in Northern Morocco television is often watched in Spanish, in Tetouan there is a house of Spain, a vital Spanish community has for long lived in Tetouan, and there are cultural similarities. The leaders have an institutional vision, and there is no simple subjection to the discourse of otherness of Morocco: it is weakened by Moroccan relations in biographies, life-styles of</p>	<p>-Moroccans notice the the cross-border relations, but they would not call it a cultural flow of otherness because they would not call themselves 'other' – so they only partly renegotiate the imaginations;</p> <p>-Moroccans give many examples of most aspects of the mixed culture imagined by Ceuta's powerful based on everyday life;</p>	<p>-Few Ceutis admit the dependence as such, imagine it as mutual support instead. Otherness of Moroccan culture is reaffirmed and recognized as flow across the border. They tell about cross-border living without paying taxes, some spend leisure with pleasure across the border. Others depend on living in Morocco while sending their children to school in Ceuta- which all is identified to weaken the conditional relation;</p> <p>-Ceutis also notice similarities across the border and coexistence; yet, similarities are admitted especially by those who interact – more Muslims than center inhabitants, who are more hesitant. Some of the Muslims even propose to learn from Morocco – to turn around idea of knowledge superiority (Mignolo)</p>

	Ceuti families and their relations and borderthinking (Mignolo)		
<i>Agency (practices and discourse)</i>	<p>-Crossborder-workers practice is irregular and 'un-European' because of the illegal employment practice without contracts. It is not fit the rules in the EU and weakens economic prosperity because no tax are paid. It is common especially for employeing housekeepers;</p> <p>- The carriers' practice is connoted to the frequent chaos at the border, since their flow together with other flows block the passage. Conditions for carriers are consequently bad for the queues and the weight carried. Their practice also has not only positive but also adverse economic effects for Ceuta and Morocco in the long-run. Still, carriers would suffer, if the trade was interrupted. Many powerful ask for change, e.g. making the border an official border and the passage a customs site, yet recognition by Morocco is needed for that, the alternative for carriers is to pass goods in cars, but many female carriers without drivers license are vulnerable;</p> <p>-Migrants stay at the CETI where they live in no perfect conditions, it is crowded, Ministry is unlawfully hesitant for working on refugee requests, so migrants feel forced to find other ways to get to the EU and develop tactics. There are four ways of leaving Ceuta, without asylum or documentation many remain vulnerable in the system, when getting to Spain. Morocco does border-work for the EU and blackmails the union for more financial support. All of these tactics are practices of otherness. Also migrants have many tactics to circumvent the border-management, showing the failure of the conditional relation of Ceuta and the EU. Many tactics are dangerous and endanger the lives of migrants. They stay for long in, adverse conditions, but nonetheless numerous make it to the city; the EU is asked to take responsibility for the causes of migration and for the treatment in Ceuta – the union should take a role;</p> <p>-There is a high concentration of security forces in Ceuta for the</p>	<p>-Moroccans tell about vulnerability as crossborder-workers with informal work conditions, uncertainty about losing one's occupation, arbitration by security forces about who passes and who does not. They mostly tell about their own experiences, most work without contract. It is difficult to find a new job if one lost one. They tell more details, there is more experience in renegotiation. Those who comment on the topic are mostly cross-border workers or know some;</p> <p>-for carriers Moroccans depict the adverse conditions as well, the heavy weights. The worry about the carriers' health, tell that the situation has worsened since Ceuta has joined the EU with Spain. The younger want Morocco to stop the trade and develop differently in the North to become independent of Ceuta. Older participants seem more in the routine, less worried; they have resigned and accepted the situation. Protest by carriers themselves do develop when they cannot bear the conditions anymore the job is physically demanding;</p> <p>-Moroccans do not have many imaginations about migrants, the language barrier impairs interaction and migrants often hide away in the mountains, they only get in touch in Morocco eventually. In the mountains they are supplied with food by Moroccans sometime or they beg in mosques, this shows solidarity. The EU is seen as responsible and should open the borders Moroccans state. Everybody should be free to circulate in the world, not suffering. The change in politics in Morocco about migrants is commented, few observe them in Ceuta, many</p>	<p>- Ceutis are aware of the flow, some have housekeepers, some with(out) contract. Others, mostly unemployed or those struggling with not becoming unemployed, highlight negative effects on their own chances to find employment, at the competition. They ask for adequate salaries and regularization of the cross-border workers jobs – they want measures by the EU and local authorities to finish with the exploitative practice;</p> <p>-Ceutis worry about the destinies of carriers, women about the health of elderly. Also adverse effects are noted which the trade creates: traffic jams in the city are complained about. Some give the example of Melilla to suggest better organization, regular conditions, with facilities for basic needs at the border;</p> <p>-Ceutis reproduce almost every aspect of the official discourse, differences in perception and opinions about the migrants' presence exist, depending on interaction level: most non-center Ceutis and women understand the situation and feel solidary. Nonetheless most agree that it is no solution to have them stay in Ceuta, they consider it the EU's responsibility, many want the borders to be open (borderthinking). Often understanding has a binary basis – poor, hungry people from Africa need to come to rich Ceuta and Europe. Morocco's tactic for funding is clear to some, imaginations about the CETI Moroccans did not have but even for Ceutis not part of everyday. They might avoid</p>

	<p>incoherent border-situation, the forces perform un-European practice themselves though, they get violent in the struggle for organization of the flow across the border, conflicts with carriers evolve. Especially also cross-border workers are exposed to corruption and arbitration, the agents make use of violence (physical and verbal), however, the attention of the news is more concerned with the violation of migrants' human rights, the warm return not suiting the EU-laws which has become anyway a preferred method of dealing with the bordertask, the migrants often hurt and get hurt by agents at the border and passage, many stakeholder have doubts about the practice and the reinforcement of the fence etc. – especially those not actively involved in the government, all ask support and responsibility from the EU; on the other hand a single voice presents rejection of Human rights as European values and wants the migrants to be impeded from getting to Ceuta;</p> <p>-Criminal activity in Ceuta is connoted to the border for drugbusiness. Dealers use to be caught in Ceuta, discursive normalization by the leaders takes place: it is a normal phenomenon of cities at borders. Also shifting otherness discursively is used to avoid attribution of crime to Ceuta: drugs actually come from Morocco, Moroccans and Spanish work on this together, behaviors of Moroccans get questioned, they are suspected of stealing and considerations are made whether they can frow up to behavioural standards of civilization;</p> <p>-Insufficient transport connections for goods and people from and to Ceuta in comparison to other European places are criticized, transportation could be EU standard, if e.g. competition between shipping companies was created, the lack of transportation is considered to have negative effects on Ceuta's economy; also the Europeanization of Ceuta's border, making it an official border would enable better transportation from there;</p>	<p>understand them. Some are aware that Morocco does borderwork for the EU, but do not find it a good idea, they resist quite much the EU policies and discourse;</p> <p>-few are aware of un-European inhuman treatment by security forces at the border, especially women want migrants to be treated more human, female compassion. They suggest solving problems in the migrants' countries and bringing them back, which would be better than dying at Ceuta's passage, some have observed deportations and beating. They worry about bad light shed on Morocco assisting the practice. Carriers are also seen when beaten, there are a lot of comments on this topic. Violence against carriers and cross-border workers is common, corrupt practices have been observed and complaints about it are known and made. Many similar observations, many worry about women and elderly; they ask for more dignity and better treatment. The latter aspect is more renegotiated than in the powerful imaginations, where the bad treatment of carriers seems to be widely hidden away in comparison</p> <p>-As the Moroccans do not live in Ceuta they are less concerned with crime there. Two participants talk about drug flow and agree that it is induced by the border, but not blaming Morocco;</p> <p>-Moroccans are not concerned with insufficient transportation, so there is no renegotiation. They are also used to complicated transportation across the border. They might have different preoccupations themselves</p>	<p>talking about certain aspects of migration, avoid the attribution of otherness to Ceuta and prefer to invisibilize that aspect</p> <p>- Some few Ceutis find it a shame what happens to Sub-Saharanans, disagree with the bad treatment, others justify Ceuta and find that migrants would better not come to the EU. Bad treatment of Moroccan carriers is not talked about so much. Some mention the bad treatment, some corrupt practices (by Moroccan security forces here) and being asked for money also as Ceutis. They complain about the lack of respect for elderly. The Muslims from Ceuta's margins show much more compassion with carriers than citizens of the center – maybe because the Muslims interact more with the carriers and Morocco;</p> <p>-Ceuti like in official discourse criticize criminal behaviors of Moroccans which are eventually seen as less civilized by uneducated Moroccans; they attribute the causes of crime across the border and at the border. The border is regarded to be too permeable. They like the presence of the border to be protected;</p> <p>-Ceutis agree on lack of transportation, and find it un-European and not modern to stay so isolated in Ceuta. They want the ferry to work on lower tariffs and have more ships for the local economy. More flow into city could improve the economic performance, for entrepreneurs it would be positive, queues at the border-passage disturb the connection to Morocco and have similar negative economic effects,</p>
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<i>Active resistance (protest)</i>	- Protest takes place especially about migration and border policies and is organized mostly by migrants in the city center, they want their rights to be granted by the EU and see them implemented, they ask to be transferred to Spain mainland and wish better conditions at the CETI. Part of their protests are hungerstrikes. Ceutís demonstrate little. The migrants resist, with the aim of havgin Human rights,European norms, manifest	-Moroccans hardly know about the migrants protests in the center, Ceutís have been observed demonstrating about migration once after 6 th of February went on the street. They are more aware of protests at the border, organized by Moroccans, events not mentioned in the leaders´ imaginations maybe to avoid attribution of otherness to Ceuta	-Ceutí seldom demonstrate, few mention protests about the spaces of flow, one participant has joined protest against having migrants die in the February 6 th event, more protest concern the ferries and transport connections from Ceuta, another protest which does not emerge in the powerfuls´ imaginations

d) Table created as overview of chapter 7 for 7.5 – Summary of chapter 7

Sphere	Powerful geopolitical imaginations	Geopolitical imaginations by Moroccan everymen	Geopolitical imaginations by Ceutí everymen
<i>Fight against unemployment and abandonment</i>	<p>-Unemployment is a huge problem affecting many people and in comparison to the European context very high, not normal. Negative effects on the economic modernization go along with it. Some blame structural features, others blame the crisis. Additionally, the problem of youth unemployment is highlighted as well as the concentration in margins;</p> <p>-Measures to fight unemployment are taken. It is understood to help economic development in the margins, but it is a less ambitious vision than for other districts, given the complicate situation.. Disadvantage through cross-border workers competing for occupation and informal contracts are highlighted, struggle to reduce informal occupation. The employment plan is financed among others with EU-subsidies and is a measure to have people occupied. Commitment is projected to involve unemployed in various construction projects. Touristic potential of Principe can now be exploited, as the district is now known all over Spain, it has potential for general economic growth according to the EU template, efforts for mediation of unemployment are reinforced also for specific target groups such as young and women – provision vocational training, encouraging also business start ups with EU subsidies, Europeanization of conditions is aimed at. Discursive and tactical resistance to political</p>	<p>-Some Moroccans are aware of the problem and show compassion, but few are informed. Mostly those spending everyday routine time in Ceuta, understand the precarious situation;</p> <p>-Moroccan everymen only renegotiate the modernization measures, if they often come to Ceuta. Those who do express compassion for those who struggle and suspect failures of management and politics. They suggest working in a more technocratic way and are worried about the future of the young; Moroccans agree that policies in Ceuta go wrong about unemployment, the Europeanization or regularization of informal contracts should long be realized- at least in Morocco such a practice would not be tolerated so long – here the relation of European superiority is inverted, with Ceuta being less</p>	<p>-Ceutís, who are unemployed describe their precarious situation, consequences of not having enough food and not being able to pay a rent or the school of children. They describe their feeling of exclusion, express the wish for work and economic stability. They complain about privileges of people from the center and suspect them of incoherent practices. Not unemployed and everymen from the center might be aware but hardly renegotiate the topic as a problem, they are not concerned in their daily routine;</p> <p>- Several Ceutís from center notice modernization measures to fight unemployment in the margins and ask that the problem must be seized, many regret the situation, also many from the margins suggest solutions themselves. Most popular solutions are to create employment in different branches, some want this to happen in services, others in production. They highlight the failure so far of creating long-term solution, since e.g. the employment plan is highlighted as not sustainable enough. Many worries about the future of young in different parts of city are expressed; those with stable incomes and in good positions do not worry, no comments; Ceutís want a place-based understanding and respective measures, a more contextual approach to Europeanizing Ceuta´s margins, They ask more commitment and support for their own ideas, EU could have done more and have more trust in the everymen. The Europeanization strategy chosen by</p>

	<p>abandonment is spread especially among opposition parties and social stakeholders, wanting structural changes including NGOs or the association of neighborhoods, suggest resist one size fits all template EU norms and instead they wish to go for contextual solutions, EU imposed rationalization can have negative effects in Ceuta's margins general rationalization in socio-economic realms but also for education the imposition of EU norms could make things worse, the discourse-makers are suspected of egoistic operations;</p> <p>-Social support is provided, different options also, no one left without but there are different criteria for each option. Most of them are in some ways also supported by EU funding, although here no clear overview has been obtained. Few though might know about the EU funding involvement, because anyway few know about the programs offered, which is a problem</p>	<p>European and inferior, the otherness of Ceuta's margins is noticed;</p> <p>-Social support is hardly renegotiated, not mentioned, although some might be aware that it exists as an offer. In case they are they are not informed about the EU funding involvement</p>	<p>Ceuta's leaders does not work, but one-size-fits-all imposed by the EU either. Complaints can be overheard about the constant focus by decision-makers on modernization of the center criticized–deception. The margins' everymen want local problems to be solved with EU help; they have also developed various tactics of survival, helping each other, share even a house with entire families. Many families struggle to pay a training for the young, who remain unemployed, so they hang around in bars, play together as coping strategies, un-European life-style, not productive in margins not individualistic, but collective;</p> <p>-Social support only by marginal district residents renegotiated, for central everymen might not be very informed about it – few benefit from it in the center, they are also not so much concerned and would also hardly know about the role of EU funding in it, a non-Muslim marginal resident is convinced however that Muslims benefit a lot, all the unemployed, big families. Instead several Muslims are not aware, have not received it at any moment and are less aware about the involvement of EU funding. Some are, but they want stable jobs to be created instead of programs such as the unsustainable employment plan, they want the funding spent on the decoration for the center to be spent on the creation of jobs for everymen from the margins</p>
<p><i>Urban irregular development</i></p>	<p>-Investments for modernization of urban modification involve EU funding, all districts of Ceuta have benefitted, though not yet in Principe district. But plans are in preparation, also partly for other areas but most exact description of modernization measures e.g. infrastructural upgrades and facilities for Principe this time. The EU commitment is recognized. But also different adaptation strategies from different perspectives of the opposition parties are presented, highlighting the wish to modernize structural features above physical modernization, the existing plans would also benefit several areas around the border, fear is expressed that the construction process will make worse the traffic jams at the border;</p> <p>-cases of irregular construction and failures of planning have generated a lot of media attention: one case is the demolition of stairs in the Principe, which had functionally un-European consequences for the districts, economic disadvantage and problem for children to get to school, shows un-European urban planning in Ceuta. In Benzú the local authorities have been insisting on implementing EU norms,</p>	<p>-Moroccans do not renegotiate urban plans and failures in planning since it does not concern them in their everyday routine. They hardly get to the area, since they mostly come to the border or the center.</p> <p>-Moroccans do not renegotiate about irregular constructions, maybe because they are not concerned or do not hear about it in the center of Ceuta. But they might also just not think of the topic, because they are not used to EU normative frames of how to construct legally and they would hardly question the style of buildings concerned since the architectures is often similar to the Moroccan style of building</p>	<p>Ceuta's from the center are not concerned, no renegotiation of modernization plans. It does not have anything to do with their routine. Everymen from the margins especially those from Principe complain that the EU cannot to be felt, no benefit from right on equality. They want especially the unemployment to be seized, and are less interested in construction etc. They seem not to be informed about or not to trust the plans. Several everymen also non-Muslim confirm that margins of Ceuta are neglected in comparison to the center; Ceuta's from margins only are concerned, see the need, nothing has been done for long, difference observable also,</p> <p>Concerning the irregular construction there is renegotiation by Ceuta's from Benzú who highlight the emotional deprivation when having to abandon a house –people anyway do not have work and then even their houses are taken which means that the last certainty in life would be gone. The renegotiation takes place from a grass-roots perspective, also manifesting in the streets, in graffiti etc, for those from the center the crucial reason for the lack of renegotiation might be the lack of concern in their everyday-routines – it does not matter to them, whether construction and dwelling in Ceuta's</p>

	but were indifferent to the context of everymen people rejecting to move and abandon their houses, support by different parties, against strict compliance with EU norms, many opposition parties are involved;		margins are regular or not (Merrifield, De Certeau).
<i>Ceuta's margins' multicultural mixed culture</i>	<p>-Cultural conformation of Muslims is witnessed, jihadists are exceptions, Muslims of Ceuta are Europeanizing and like European culture, feel good in the EU; The domination of Christian culture is actually true, Muslims might feel disadvantaged, while Christians from the center are often unconsciously racist and show superiority of own value-system which is the dominant institutionalized Christian one, whereas the Muslim one is perceived as other</p> <p>-Mixture of culture makes Ceuta unique space of experience, distinct but positive experience of coexistence with 4 cultures, role model Ceuta for other places in the EU – the mix feature of otherness is discursively Europeanized invisibilizing problems some, also highlighting economic advantages – Arab-speakers, understanding language and culture while EU passport etc can be human capital in Maghreb relations, little used potential; Multiculturality is also represented as otherness, in spite of the rhetoric about role-model functions, used to hide that Islam is often perceived as other at the same time, only classical European Christian values are institutionalized in Ceuta. Rupture, fragmentation would be bad, temporality of living with other makes Ceuta distinct case, less clash but in EU context Ceuta simply still is a distinct case, otherness of Islam is perceived, economic deprivation in Ceuta parallels Muslim or foreign identity, concentration in margins, where most Muslims live and where they are the dominant population, coincidence of abandonment and religious group of Muslims has enabled religious radicalization additionally, jihadists and Islamism have developed in combination with abandonment, especially young are attracted, major point of departure jihad in Syria;</p>	<p>-Few Moroccans reaffirm cultural confirmation, not really renegotiating the discourse, because it is not their business they think, they know something about the relations of religions from television, and stories, the otherness of Muslim affiliation in Ceuta is recognized in the fragmentation of the city, on the basis of the Principe soap opera and few know that Muslims are seen as less European, they hardly explicitly renegotiate the topic</p> <p>-Moroccans notice that different cultures exist in Ceuta and that they are distinct in the EU for that. But they do not evaluate whether it is European or not, but do not doubt that not combinable; Moroccans admit that Ceuta is different from other European places, more Arab culture, imagined as opposed or different from European standard, Ceuta's margins even more than the rest;</p>	<p>-Ceutis from margins, especially Muslims explain how to combine being Muslim and feeling Spanish and European; they like the EU and live with respect for its norms, ideology. They subjecting to EU values, no one questions the European superiority. Nonetheless they had experience of discrimination also concerning opportunities, since they have grown up with negative comments about Muslim identity, privileges remain with Christians in the center -no equal chances. They even see the relation as a colonial hierarchy in treatment, the Christian center elite takes everything for themselves, and there is a one-way mixing of cultures, mix is a lie. They criticize corrupt practices of Christians towards others, and subject to a hierarchy with Muslims as carriers of otherness; Center Christian present themselves partly as xenophobic, accusing Muslims of backwardness and violence; a struggle and clash of cultures does exist. Any two-way relation fails for the identification of otherness of Muslims highlighted for Europeanizing the self by Christians, invisibilization is another popular tactic also hinting at the wish for Muslims to assimilate if at all; those with 'border crosser mentality' also about themselves exist, alongside, but otherness of Muslim is always highlighted</p> <p>-Ceutis stress that living in Ceuta in mix and coexistence, reproduce discourse about 4 cultures, although problems are also mentioned they stress that it is working well, that Ceuta can be an example for other places, where not working, not so much renegotiated, more fact that 4 different cultures together in city. But Ceutis also admit that the coexistence is connoted to otherness for the Islam and Muslims; they realize that these identities coincide in the margins with socio-economic adverse conditions, tendency for easy radicalization is identified plus fear from that by non-Muslims is expressed, sometimes the Muslim belief also results incoherent with EU ideologies and values (liberal vs against homosexuality), put belief system of Muslims as superior to European, want to change the European one</p>
<i>Criminal practices in Ceuta's margins</i>	-Crime and Islamist radicalization concentrate in Ceuta's margins, shooting, assaults, mostly triggered by drug-related mafia structures. Warning from stigmatization of all Ceutis from Principe, too easy, creating a wrong	-Moroccans highlight otherness in form of crime , based on Principe soap opera, they know about it; few have been to the districts, but also	-Ceutis see drug-business as cause (experience everyday impacts renegotiation) of crime in Principe and other margins, insecurity is perceived by margin-residents as injustice, not feeling safe, want to be provided with police

	image reinforced by tv soap opera El Príncipe. Jihadist development in combination with border Morocco proximity possible, radicalization through marginalization. Shooting has killed people and causes fear and damage, NGOs and opposition ask for increase of presence of security forces;	stories are told about killing each other, drugs as cause, those who are most in touch with Ceuta know most, not mentioning jihadists at all	forces, wish that marginalization as 'partner-process' will be seized, wish Europeanization, It seems intrinsic, a vicious circle in Príncipe; stigmatization follows the official discourse about dangerous Muslims, margin inhabitants stress that boosted discourse by media, safer than presented, few cases jihadists, stigmatization of the district, Benzú in the North is different and peaceful, Southern districts are sites of crime, occasions of robbing, killing stealing, shooting, but also practice of police incoherent –questioned, also fear of police involvement working together with gangs, local authorities also behave un-European– nepotism and arbitrary distribution of fines by police agents. Marginal residents also ask why no security e.g. a police station is located in such densely populated areas, as the margins
<i>Protest about Ceuta's margins</i>	- Protests in Ceuta are anyway rare, but recently about margins there were some concerning demolition of housing in Benzú, demonstrations, complaints resist imposition of EU norms, inhabitants refuse to be displaced elsewhere, not give up home; second issue for protest is the violence and crime, mafias create in the margins, the death of an innocent person made people go into the streets to protest against the neglect of the margins and ask security provision and dealing with violence, their criticism is about the strategic concept of Europeanization as designed by the powerful in Ceuta;	-Moroccans anyway hardly aware of any protests in Ceuta, less of those in margins, only the border-trader participant tells about protests about the demolition of stairs between the Tarajal and the Príncipe. He knows that there were complaints by parents about the insecurity of children walking to school there;	-constant protest of a group of unemployed is mentioned, protesting about their situation and reminding the local authorities of their duty to provide employment, but anyway few mention protests at all, only those from the margins do, there seems to be invisibilization by those from the center or disinterest about protests concerning Ceuta's margins. Anyway the center is often the site of protest for those, who are not from the center themselves. But also the movements of unemployed encounter obstacles of disinterest by government, not listened to (imagined), residents who stay without documents, would like to protest about their situation but cannot without being expelled

e) (Anonymous) overview of participants of the research

<i>participant</i>	<i>Side of the border</i>	<i>gender</i>	<i>age</i>	<i>origin</i>	<i>place of residence</i>	<i>profession/occupation</i>	<i>Relationship to the border and other side</i>
1	M	m	67	El Hoceima	Fnideq for almost 50 years	Retired	Has worked across and at the border before (contrabando), now not crossing anymore, elderly, still living in Fnideq the border village
2	M	m	46	Tetouan	malabaou district in Tetouan always has been living in Tetouan	retired, before working in metal factory/workings/craft	sometimes, son working in Ceuta, from last September not been there, grandchild in Ceuta, son can come to Tetouan in the weekends

3	M	m	22	Meknes	Tetouan, for 6 months	A-levels in meknes, 2 years of studies mechanic electrician, tried to work at mcdonalds, bad work, then in Casablancabut bad payment/conditions, through uncle job at Marjane, commercial assistant, advertising electronic equipment,	went to France for some weeks participating in exchange program, cannot go to Ceuta because no Tetouan ID card, but has been working with people, who told him about the other side, he went to the border, has come to the region as a tourist with his family in summer often before
4	M	f	18	Tetouan, family from Rif, mother from Tetouan, learned Spanish with the tv	Tetouan	student, going to get her A-levels this year, economic specialization, after go for studies, to Tanger, design but first management desires to build up an own business	aunt in Marbella, living there; go for excursion and walks with family to Ceuta, once or twice per month,
5	M	f	20	Tetouan	Tetouan, 8 brothers and sisters, youngest	finished studies at highscool, going to study international relations, in Martil University of Tetouan,	no meaning in her life Ceuta, she has never been there, wants to get a passport to go there, residence card is not enough, requesting passport this year, but maybe in future excursion shopping, friends, other people she knows work there
6	SM	f	25	Extremadura, Barajos, until 18 years old then off	Tetouan, for 6th months already, at least staying until the summer	working for a translator in Tetouan as internee, after translation studies in Granada, Arabic and English, lives with another Spanish	she is Spanish, has been living in Egypt, Tunisia for her studies, she has been to Tetouan with her parents that is when she decided to study Arabic, she likes Morocco, the North, finds it similar to Spain and people similar to Spanish, much more than in other Arabic speaking countries she has lived in, here she can combine both being Spanish and working with Arab, study local dialect here, Ceuta is just a place to do administrative stuff close to here, she has to pass there to go back and forth, she does not do so often, she normally does not like to go to Ceuta, because the reasons for which she goes are not very pleasant to her, in Tetouan she helps in the Spanish community
7	MS	m	43	Tetouan	Tetouan and Casablanca (5 years), commuting by weeks in between	studied IT in Granada for 4 years, self-employed, consulting	one of the Moroccans who has been growing up side by side with the Spanish community, friends of Spanish origins/parents, has been in touch with Spain for long, in-between-person, open minded, friendly, seems really Spanish when I talk to him, for his gestures, behaviours etc.
8	MS	m	72	Tetouan, Tetouani very much attached to city, no own family, quiet life	Tetouan and Martil, in between studied in Sevilla and Madrid, traveller between Spain, France and Morocco	self-employed	borderhopper, frequently travelling, work published in Ceuta, Ceuta as a facilitator for his projects, collaboration
9	M	m	34	Mohamed	Fnideq, just for a month so far	not working at the moment, before he did several things, driver, trader	heard of Ceuta as a place of opportunities, has put hope into it, to make a life here, has observed the border from the Moroccan side only

10	M	m	18	Family from Rif, born in Tanger, but almost always in Tetouan	Tetouan, whether going to stay in future depends on where he can find a job, if he cannot find anything in Teotuan he would leave	Highschool -student, 2 years to go before he will start university, wants to get his A-levels, then something more manual, practical, mechanics or so, two schools in Tetouan,	just as a Tetouan citizen, likes Ceuta, goes there for leisure
11 Double interview	M	mf	23	El hoceima, husband from Marrakech	Fnideq, many years in Fnideq, lika about 23 years,	porteadora across the border, selling goods then,	working as porteadora in contrabando, lives on the border, daily bread, suffering at same time, violence
12	MS	f	30	Fnideq	Ceuta and Fnideq, she is the oldest, a sister and a brother	housekeeper and nursing tasks caring for a Spanish elderly lady of 80 years, staying with her, experience working with elderly for 9 years	has to cross for work or being with her family, opportunity for work, earning money because of the border, at a certain point she was tired of the border, so from Monday to Friday she stay in Ceuta and goes back to Fnideq only for few days, being married this would not be possible, she would have to come and leave every day
13 Double interview	MS	f	23, 31	Tetouan	Ceuta and Tetouan	one working as waitress here and there, the other working in a household of a Spanish family, both have always been working in Ceuta, not in Morocco, for many years, since they were 15 and 19 years old	They have to cross the border for work, but as the police agents do not let them pass easily for their work - they do not have contracts - they avoid crossing and thus stay in Ceuta during the weeks, cut off from family or workplace, that is what the border does to them
14 Double interview	S	m	27, 18	Ceuta	Ceuta, center; one day it would be nice to leave Ceuta	Brothers: older working and studying history, younger studying chemistry, both in Ceuta, living with their family still	no real relationship with the border, just living in Ceuta
15	SM	m	36	Tetouan, born in the city, airport district, parents from the Rif	Ceuta, Benzú, for 14 years in Ceuta, last 5 years in Benzú before 9 years in Jadu, just came to Benzú for work	Job as a waiter in a small café	from the other side of the border, came to Ceuta to get residence permit, still struggling to get residence permit

16	SM	m	42	Ceuta, grandparents moved from Rif, grandfather was a soldier with France, father was one year old when moving to Ceuta	Fnideq, for moved to Morocco 3 years ago	working as a waiter in Ceuta, he has studied administration tasks and got a title, no financial means to go to the university, then he was unemployed for long,	has lived in Principe at the border, has been one of the marginalized Muslim Ceutis thus, now moved across the border, because rents/costs of living have gotten too high in Ceuta to live with a big family, so now they are daily border commuters and hate it, he wants his children to go to school in Ceuta, makes use of border advantage
17	SM	F	30	Ceuta	Ceuta, Murcia for 2 years, has travelled all over Europe and Arab countries, but never lived outside Europe	owner of a shop, self-employed, for 2 years, also continuing process	used to go to Morocco rather often, but since the queue has gotten very long she does not like to go so often, friends across the border, went for shopping, eating etc.
18	SF	M	51	From another EU country, at age of 8 years to Spain	Ceuta, before studies in Spanish university, came to Ceuta for work, feeling citizen of Ceuta, more than 20 years in Ceuta	Has recently changed jobs, now working in the social sector	Morocco's proximity and he border influence the daily life in Ceuta, are, go, way people live all around, in job very busy with migration issues
19	S	M	59	Another city in a distinct part of Spain	Ceuta, for 28 years, studied in Granada	Self-employed	sometimes uses to cross the border, likes to be neighbor with a beautiful country, feels that it is the European border in Africa
20	S	f	52	Ceuta	Ceuta margins of center, in between zone	Working in the administration, studied but found the job then before finishing her studies	uses to cross the border, likes it, just for shopping, spending leisure time there, escape, benefit from lower prices, nice people, friends, regular crossing, sees also advantages of border location for Ceuta
21	S	m	52	Ceuta	Ceuta, all life in Ceuta, hoping to die here, all family in Ceuta, living in center	With wife own business, no studies, secondary school	Does not like people crossing, does not like presence of another country, feeling very Spanish and insisting on Spanish identity of Ceuta and himself
22	S	f	51	Ceuta	Ceuta, parents are from here, grandparents migrated from the mainland when they were young	housewife, studied but wanted to care for children, n working when she was young, in an office	not going to Morocco a lot, housekeeper comes to clean the house, feels sorry for differences in standard of living, has crossed the border only once in her life

23	S	f	53	Ceuta, father from Malaga, feels 'caballa'	Ceuta, margins	teacher, trainer	lives in the border city, feels influenced by what living at the border means, has a more positive idea of the neighboring country and things which happen on the other side, people there by now, better than before, still wishes some more modernization there
24	SM	f	34	Ceuta, everyone of family, family in Morocco, meet them sometimes	Ceuta, Rosales, before Principe, margins	housewife, cannot find any job for the moment, sometimes in plan of employment, different jobs after, losing the first, now children, working in households,	I do not like to go out so much, I do not know what to do there, family friends do live across the border there
25	S	f	43	Ceuta	Ceuta, Jadu	technical study, now self-employed, among others thanks to European funding that she could get, before 12 years in same sector, then closed down the place she worked at, then had to do something	not caring so much about the border, caring most about own life, does not have much time to get to the other side, sometimes for shopping, no friends there, but multicultural friends here
26	S	f	62	Cadiz	Ceuta, for 40 years, feels like from Ceuta, came for husband,	specialized shop, her family husband and her, so before working a lot in selling, now less	does not usually go to Morocco, likes Ceuta a lot, but lives in a city at a border, which she tends to forget sometimes, at the same time very conscious of the mixed culture and being cut off by the Straits from the mainland
27 Double interview	SM	m	- (35?/30?)	Ceuta, born in Ceuta	Ceuta, grandparents from Melilla, others from Morocco; other man's mother is from Rif, father from area around Fes; feel citizens of Ceuta	unemployed both, have worked in multiple jobs, most jobs not enough to live on, insurances sometimes not paid, you can have a contract of 4 hours, but you work 12, taking many courses; first worked in Spain mainland from 2004-2007, supermarkets, private establishments etc, second man also stayed in Barcelona and Madrid doing jobs; Both came back to Ceuta for life attachment and ties	friends across the border, share language and religion, share nationality and etc with people in Ceuta, fate of Ceuta as border-city touches upon their destiny as being unemployed
28	SM	m	38	Ceuta, born there	Ceuta, wife from Tetouan, living in Principe; some time on mainland construction works, for a year, there was no work left, , back for health reasons, brother lives in Melilla	unemployed, fighting for a job at the moment, has formation to be electrician, office for knives, construction works experience in, public relations, water system some courses, did a lot of formations	wife from the other side of the border, uses to go there, visit, his wife is the daughter of his cousin actually

29	SM	m	27	Tetouan, born	Ceuta, 16 years in Spain, Ceuta, living at Loma Colmenar in Ceuta, Spanish nationality	working, having a job in a hotel, restaurant	he is from the other side of the border originally, but now moved to Ceuta, has found a job at and even obtained residence in Ceuta
31	S	f	44	Ceuta	Ceuta center, decided for Ceuta because of, family, friends, otherwise living elsewhere would be also nice	Official of municipality has studied in England and has studied in Granada 4 years	friends and vacation house tin Morocco before, girl from Morocco in household, now spending less time across the border
EXPERTS/POWERFUL DISCOURSE-MAKERS							
Jose Antonio Alarcón Caballero	S	m	54	Ceuta	Ceuta, has studied in Granada	Director of Ceuta's library, has studied contemporary history is what he studied, first working for the university for 4 years, then back in he became the director of the archive of the library in city	some friends in Morocco, house across the border, knows Morocco well, cultural collaboration is part of his job as well as studying relations between Morocco and Ceuta
Alejandro Romero Aliaga	S	m	- (36-45?)	Sevilla	Ceuta for CETI job, for 10 years, living in Ceuta with family, studied in Sevilla	the lawyer for CEAR organization in CETI, dealing with asylum requests, has known the topic for long, before during studies human rights specialization and volunteering for CEAR,	not long ago he crossed the border for leisure, shopping
Carlos Pérez Marín	SM	m	42	Ceuta	Ceuta, studied in Sevilla, then back Ceuta, then 8 years Lyon France before returning to Ceuta, sometimes for months in Morocco or Madrid for job	architect, teaching at universities, projects in Morocco	many friends across the border, often on the Moroccan side, appreciation, working there partly, regularly commuting, parts of his life in Morocco, different view on the cross-border advantages than others
Antonio García Iñigo	S	m	58	La Linea, studied there	Ceuta, still living in La Linea, but director of the El Pueblo journal, now living in Ceuta for 6 months, in total however 6-7 years	Director of El pueblo de Ceuta, journalist, editor, industrial chemistry studies, but from young on working in journalism, daily life in el pueblo	friends in Morocco, not originally Ceuti so not for whole life related, focus on life in Ceuta at the moment

José Luis Gomez Barceló	S	m	50	Ceuta, family from Ceuta, but actually cross-border, before ancestor also sometimes lived in Tetouan	Ceuta, technical achievement of profession, no studies but via internships, travelling a lot and also lived in other places, but Ceuta is his city	Director of municipal archive of Ceuta, working as official of administration, also dedicated to historical research about Ceuta, Morocco, Straits of Gibraltar	friends in and from Morocco, uses to cross the border for the weekend to stay there
Guillermo Martínez Arcas	S	m	39	Melilla, from 5 years in Ceuta	Ceuta, also lived in Madrid for studying, in Brussels, US	official of PROCESA, executing branch for European funding issues within the government, before politician himself, active in the parliament of Ceuta, coordinator of EU funding, EU community law studied,	not a lot of contact across the border, hardly going there, not been across for 5 years
José Maria Campos Martínez	S	m	'no one knows'	Ceuta	Ceuta, only when studying in Granada not living in Ceuta, or other stays for education	active author, with pension, before leading chamber of commerce of Ceuta, economic advisor, is a lawyer, has also studied sociology, entrepreneur once, politician once, many things, real estates, author, military official, journalist, lawyer essentially, retired now, still collaboration with media, consultant for enterprises, companies, 3 companies of his family, helping out, writing reports	often crossing the border, house on the other side for weekends, appreciates beauty and also cultural difference
José Ramos Aparicio	S	m	61	La Linea de la Concepción	Ceuta, for 40 years by now, studied here	president of Federation of association of neighborhoods, actually studied expert in gastronomy, working for Ministry of Interior, here not earning, voluntary, effort to help	not crossing the border very often, knowing well Morocco, sometimes shopping, some friends, little time though
Josefina Castillo Sempere	S	f	58	Ceuta	Ceuta, in Sevilla studies, always Spain, also lived in another city	head of social service administration in CEUTA, related to Ministry on local scale, social worker, studied in Sevilla, since '84 in the social services of Ceuta	crossing the border more before now little, topic impacting her work, worries of her as a person and official
José Maria Mas Vallecón	S	m	52	Ceuta, family for many generations here, only mother from Catalonia	Ceuta, Bachelor in Malaga, polytechnical in Madrid, also research qualification in Madrid, for the rest always in	has studied economics on mainland, specialized on juridical parts and companies, in Ceuta's parliament, politician for social party (PSOE), secretary of economics and financial politics	crossing seldom

					Ceuta		
José Ramon Olmedo Izar Fuente	S	m	52	from Bask-country	Ceuta, has studied in Madrid, 30 years in Ceuta, would consider himself Ceutí, cosmopolitan, family in Ceuta, life in Ceuta	important position at the delegation of the national government, has studied law and economics, first worked in local administration, now working for central	seldom crossing the border, before working for company, project in Tetouan, had to cross regularly
Juan Luis Aróstegui Ruiz	S	m	56	Ceuta/Granada from 0-1 year old, then his family moved on to Ceuta	Ceuta	Economist, teacher in secondary school, director of instituto Puertas del Campo in Ceuta, has studied in Madrid for 5 years, From 1985 head/leader/speaker of local political party Caballas – at that time still different name/group;	Does not cross a lot to Morocco, hardly leaving Ceuta at all
Alejandro Ramírez Hurtado	S	m	26	Ceuta, also parents and grandparents from Ceuta	Ceuta, studied in Ceuta first, then Granada for the Master's degree, half a year only in Granada	general secretary of association/federation of entrepreneurs of Ceuta, studied administration and management of companies	crossing seldom

e) Examples of interview-processing including 5 complete transcriptions

Example participant 3

Difficulties during the interview:

noisy everyone is talking, luckily the respondent speaks Spanish, although she has never explicitly learned it, she is able to express herself well, sometimes she gets unsure and feels to better switch to Arabic to make sure her message will be passed on correctly, so Ahmed translates, I can still guess what she says but I prefer to interact directly because I see the difference in efficacy of interviewing, she is a good respondent, she has very clear ideas about the whole situation, she does not have to think long before answering, she seems to have thought about similar problems, questions before, impressive at her young age

First impression:

young guy, probably younger than me, open-minded and interested, has travelled to France already, proud of being Moroccan, misses his hometown, but argues reasonably about why staying in Tetouan is useful to him, has grown up through such experiences of staying away, but also appreciates Meknes, his hometown even more.

Content:

I have learned Spanish with the tv, my family as well, my aunt lives in Marbella, not far from here, Ceuta, Sebtá, that is what it is, Ceuta for her is a place to go for a walk, excursion with her family, Ceuta has been, is and will be Moroccan, explaining to someone else: colonization, no one knows what happens there, only the citizens of that place know, whenever you go for a walk there, you still cannot really know what it is like, the secret. If you ask others they would tell you it is Spanish, but if you ask to the Moroccans of Ceuta, they would tell you that it is Moroccan, ours, one or two times a month I use to go to Ceuta, I like it, I like how people get happy walking in the streets, people respect/appreciate their city, but it is divided between the Christian part, and the Moroccan Ceutis, Ceuta consists of two parts, I am worried about future of Ceuta, we all have responsibility to know what will happen there because it is a part of our country, we should try to get it back, In the North of Morocco it is the opposite of what happens in the internal parts of Morocco, we are more worried about Ceuta's future because we are the closest to it, the people of the North also care for their children and the surroundings, they really care for their Northern zone, I watched a movie from Spain about the Principe in Ceuta, which shows what actually happens there. But I do not feel insecure when I go to Ceuta, because I usually do not go to the Principe. It depends on the district. I am not sure who can decide about the future of Ceuta, but if it was Morocco it would be fine: Ceuta would be in the hands of its own real people again, the people in the city could influence that, we cannot because we are outside, they choose if they want to be with Spain or us, with the crisis we will see, she heard that if GB would leave Gibraltar to Spain, Spain would hand back Ceuta and Melilla to Morocco, Never observed demonstrations in Ceuta, last year some people at the border just wanted to enter, they were not armed, but the police did not let them pass, the Africans, yes, Ceuta is a place which deserves the good for its future, if Spain takes care of it well it is fine, so if they have the power and means to do so fine, if Morocco one day has the same, it was better if they gave it back to Morocco, The Moroccans always have to say that they are being treated well there, otherwise they would be carried away, a good plan for Ceuta would be to install more equality, the police does not treat people equally, people who are marginalized in the part of Principe are treated worse than the others, in the center, a good future for Ceuta would also include correct, complete information about the past, not only the last centuries, but who has built and formed it, who/what it is now, the way she mentioned earlier on, being European, have the red passport? nowadays it means having rights, be able to go wherever you want in the world, find respect (from) all over the world, Ceuta is European but not completely, people inside do not all have the same rights, e.g. for what applies to security, Moroccans in Ceuta have the red passport, they are Spanish, but they do not have the right of security, there are people wearing guns in the street, the European Union has managed to gather under one flag, the European one, which we have not managed, in spite of differences, cultural barriers, citizens of Europe responsibility because one of the economic political leaders of the world, they can travel wherever they'd like to, so they ought to be happy about the situation they are in, because there are people who do not have all that, Ceuta is a bridge for the EU, which the EU can use whenever and for whatever they like, pass goods, it is the door of the Mediterranean sea, perfect geographic position, used as a bridge, make use of the city for its geographical position not because of the people who live there, they have in common with other places their red passport, but they do not benefit from the same rights, Christians and Jewish possess the passport and the rights, the Muslims are not granted all these rights, a Muslim woman living there cannot benefit from all the rights, The EU regards Ceuta as a door, but they do not have a real interest in the city,

just the location and how to profit, the security and wellbeing of people their is secondary, place used like an object, no interest in the situation of people living there, if it was not EU there, Ceuta would be like Tanger, Tetouan, any other city in the NOrth of MOrocco, in future Ceuta should focus on the South, because everything depends on the people entering Ceuta, buying, the border should not exists, when you enter Ceuta, it is the same soil and land, the same air, there is no difference, it should be abolished, so Morocco hopefully one day will have the power to take it back, every time you want to go to Ceuta you have to wait until you can get into your country, all the people working at the border because of it etc. remind you the existence of the border everyday even in Tetouan, there should not be such a difference between people, we should take the initiative to stop that discrimination, I also feel responsible when I see those women with all that weight on their backs, get there at 5 in the morning to be beaten up by some police agents, indeirectly we are all responsible and guilty of what happens there. many live on that trade, but there are many rich people in the NOrth in the mountains living on the trade of drugs, they should start investing the money they earn finally, so people would find better jobs in the NOrth, people in Ceuta are rich, they talk Moroccan and Spanish, their culture is different from other places, mixed culture also living with Christians, so you can easily distinguish between a MOroccan and a Moroccan from Ceuta, first I would like to change things in Morocco and then the border, she would change the way people think here in Morocco first, change mentality of people to not keep money home but to start investing, then everything gets going, projects, people would find jobs, the economy would develop, when Morocco reaches such economic stability, then we could close the border, closing directly would not work, people would be lost, subsaharians here do not deserve the bad treatment they are encountering now, they are human beings and need to be treated the same way, equally, as Europeans, North-Africans, they are forced to come here, because they are doing badly in their own countries, there are also people who cannot ieven leave their country, they do not have any choice, because of hunger, wars, so they have to leave

Example participant

Difficulties while interviewing:

he is confused by questions, difficulties in answering as he feels unfamiliar with the place yet, he is not a person of many words, darija, the place is not ideal for having an interview, ahmed and jamila talk a lot to him without really telling me, I feel like losing grip of the interview sometimes, afraid of them asking too suggestive questions,

First impression:

quiet person, thinks about wha he says, a bit confused by quesitons, you can see that he is on the streets not yet, still good jacket, etc, looks like a pirate, sea guy, like from where he comes, long beard, black, curly hear under his cap,

Content:

he came to work to Fnideq, Ceuta is anyway well known to be a place to buy and then sell things, so he just came to Fnideq, he has already tried to sell things, but then he had a problem and ran out of money, so no he is left without anything, he does not have a place to stay but he sleeps in the streets for now, he does not know anyone, not even a bit, so he is alone for now, coming to Ceuta, to the border for him means a period which you probably have to go

through, he was not so lucky for now, but it is something you have to go through, it is the first time that fate has hit him this badly, first time on the street, he came because he had a problem and he had to leave because of that, he had to escape, a problem while building up some sort of business, he does not know a lot about Ceuta as he has been here for a short period, he has heard that you can have at least a future here, there are opportunities, work, but so far he could never enter Ceuta, in future you can never know what would happen, but it does not affect him, what would happen in the region anyway, he has the intention to stay, here or in Tanger, he has heard of an agreement between Spain and Morocco, so in future there will be new opportunities, but for now it has not been confirmed, if he was in power he would guarantee everyone a chance to enter Ceuta, but not in an accessive way, there would be a law to control things, being European means more opportunities and more rights, but in the end it does not matter if you are European or not, most importantly you should be yourself, likes idea of EUropean Union, it is good for you as a migrant to go there but you would always stay a migrant, even with a passport you would not be European, maybe you just have more rights, no idea what it means for Ceuta to be European, not informed enough to say something about the meaning of Ceuta for Europe, he cannot imagine what is similar or different in Ceuta with regard to other places in Europe, because he has not been there, if Ceuta was not European there would not be a lot of business here, there would be a big effect, it would be a maroui city, Ceuta is not like Morocco it is Spain, it is a small part depending on the trade of the border with Moroccans especially, the trade should keep on working otherwise both, Spanish and Moroccans would suffer, he does not know so much about the border, but it is there where people get their daily bread, everyone can try to earn what he or she needs to survive, he does not have many friends here yet, so he cannot say what people actually tell about the Ceutis, he has heard about the Subsaharians but he is not very informed, no idea about what would happen in future, what to do with border

Example participant 14

Difficulties while interviewing:

they speak mothertongue I do not, so there might be some communication problems, the place is rather okay, they are two, so that I am not sure what the opinions are, how they might differ (even though they are brothers they might have different connotations of course), good interview, representing young and those who studied in Ceuta,

First impression:

one older than the other, has studied more, would be more courageous to answer, interested in the world, trying to think of questions he has not thought of before eagerly, very polite, his younger brother, seems more reserved but has clear opinions once he is asked

Content:

work and study in everyday life, not left a lot for doing more things, 6 days working then 3 off, we have anyway a quiet life here, we do not need any car, in two minutes you can get everywhere, it is a small city, the advantage is that you get everywhere quickly, but the disadvantage is that there are less opportunities, there are not all jobs you

would like to work at and there are not all the kinds of studies which you would like to do, as I work here, I cannot go to another place to study, so there is a study which I would like to do in the mainland, but here it is not, in Madrid you can study it, so I just chose the second best option to study here in the UNE, probably I could find a job in Madrid, but without a career finished it is hard, so I could not leave to study there, a beautiful place where a lot of cultures, people live together, there are few inhabitants, there are few problems, little problem about environment, all of family and friends here, in future for those who are young, well there is little change, many people in Ceuta got bored, they went to other countries, go to Spain mainland, more opportunities, jobs, academic also generally, here we depend on a ship, were are enclosed, if things turn out well you leave, otherwise you stay, one day it would be nice to leave Ceuta, for opportunities and to get to know new things, the world is big, feel both curiosity and forced to leave, on one side we feel forced, you can grow as a person elsewhere, in Madrid there are generally more possibilities and you can move around, here there is what there is, Ceuta and the neighboring country, Morocco, insecurity is all around, nowadays communication is fast, so with such media things seem bigger nowadays, before you would not know about something happening somewhere else, but you just have to have a look at famous facebook and you are up to date, you know when someone has been shut at where at what minute, so things seem bigger than they are, but insecurity is a very common phenomenon of course, or just orally passing on news, it is a small city so you know everything before, a young institution could have influence on Ceuta, give a new image, a young change, there are few young here, relatively few though, because the move away, so in the end only the elderly stay, so if there was a young institutions, there are youth organizations but not havin much influence, majority of friends somewhere in Andalucia, come back for visit, but see opportunities out there and start having roots there, little informed about plans for Ceuta, sometimes follow news, most about insecurity, not participated in demonstrations, teachers, students recently went on streets, dissatisfied about the change of system, we do not like to demonstrate, so we did not participate, support a bit from behind, passively, a young change would be good for future, opportunities for work, studies and leisure, and reduce distance of Straits, not literary but not pay so much, also for tourists, for coming and going it should be more accessible, being European is important for us and Ceuta, we are also at the border, a strategic point between one and other, we are a mix, European means a group a union helping each other, within the same continent more or less, citizen of European Union means elimination of borders, also currency is almost the same, some are not part of European Union, still you just need the ID to travel, we like Europe, not bad, it is easier, convenient, we feel some responsibility, we should do things well, European Union should be beautiful also to exterior, be like brothers but also within responsibility, a real Union has to be formed, we are far from everything that is true, the responsibilities are the same, maybe because of being far, a small place, we are maybe more passive for responsibility, there is less activism than in France, Spain or so, we are far, so we just watch maybe, relationship is good, there are advantages institutes, schools, courses, formation, it is a strategic point for the EU, as border with Morocco, Ceuta is in the middle because it is in the middle, it could help to avoid worse things to happen, so if there was something on diplomatic level, it would be a strategic point here, in security issue here, if there was something, the EU would support Ceuta, all countries, more than just Spain, I suppose, it should be like that, if Ceuta was not Spain, European, it would be Morocco probably, we should not imagine talk about that, but Morocco is close, like in Melilla, Morocco claims both cities, so they would achieve what they want, so we are a people fighting against them,

without Spain a small people against a whole country, on the level of the market we should orient both South and North, make use of advantages to be border city, there is few production by now, before there was a lot of production, but we could not keep up that, the commerce should be in two directions, have relations across the border with Morocco, but also to Spain and other countries, we are Europeans, Spanish but we need something for food, we do not cross the border, it is so far from the areas we know, everything can enter at the border and leave, the control is ridiculous, illegally everything can pass, legally, well, anyway no problem, it is a regulatory place theoretically, we do not use to go there for shopping or so, other people from here like it and use to go there, we have Arab friends, I like it, but I would rather go to other countries or to Spain mainland, there are various, multiple ideas of people here about Moroccans, although there is diversity and respect here, I do not think that people here generally like a lot, the Moroccans sometimes treat each other well, but cultures clash, many Moroccans come here, being in a Spanish, European city is a privilege, but people do not like it a lot, people come from outside for work, so there is a lot of clash, I do not go to Germany, I do not go, I would go there and try to integrate if I had, that is the key, we have quite a bunch of Moroccan friends though, not speak about racism, but..., opinions about immigrants, they just come for opportunities to make a life, they use to stay at the CETI; they help them with documents and generally, send them to Spain or back, if power to change border, more security, more active control, control for people entering, no human trafficking, avoid drugs, but also avoid mafia human trafficking, it should be stopped, the border should be better prepared, those who enter below a car, it is the life of a person, for the good of those who come, not for the city, I think there has always been a traffic jam around the Tarajal, Union Aduanera not very much known, back to mainland, pay IPSI, not about paying IVA; but also here in harbor UAC, also this is about stuff to get there to the mainland, pay IPSI, product, Aduana and UAC, that is what you pay!!!, effect on carriers and smugglers would have an effect if the fiscal system changed

Example participant 22

Difficulties while interviewing:

seems to be hesitating but actually does have many ideas, just asking through, she gives a lot of answers, loves her city so she defends things a lot, no noise disturbing, good tapes although divided into two, Spanish problem for me, another woman as interviewee for me

First impression:

seems a vulnerable, loving, friendly, whole hearted person, with good intentions and dreamer, worried about bad things in the world, wants people to be well all over, very nice and kind, still rather young, cares for her looks

Content:

I have my household to care for, I do a course of art, I enjoy reading a lot, I read a lot of everything, last time I read a novel, if I like a book I would read it at once in one night, I love Ceuta it is my country, the people are really nice, my parents were here, I have always been living in the center, in different places but always in this area, I had, I do have Muslim friends, we live here with 4 cultures, I have Hindu friends, Jewish, we were all together in school, the coexistence has always been good, I never had problems, others might have had sometimes, but with a bit of

respect, it works, everyone has another religion they respect mine I respect theirs, I have grown up in calle Real, a bit more above, middle class and proletariat, we are worried about the news about insecurity, it is a beautiful city with a lot of light and beautiful things and aspects, but they make advertisement, propaganda which is negative it is a maltratada city, in summer here it is beautiful two beaches, the Atlantic and the mediterranean coast, no problems, here from my point of view, I really feel sorry about all the negative and even wrong things, this is true there is a lot of unemployment, before many people came from the mainland to buy things for good prices, but they have reduced the boat trips so radically that people do not come anymore, the same goods are in the mainland for the same price the boat is expensive, people from here go to study there, so this is the fear we all have, but for living here you can have a good life, everything is so close, we have everything actually, insecurity news about shooting and mafia, actually it is a very quiet place, but where there is a border, you know, the permeability people enter also those who do not behave well, they commit crimes, whatever religion people have here, they use to be nice and peaceful people, I do not feel unsafe, first of all we are the ones to influence the future of Ceuta, the ones of the assembly the local one, then Spain, we are part of Spain, a key location at the Straits, they cannot permit to leave us, this has been Spanish for long, even if once there has been some Moroccan king, but now this is Spanish, plans for the city, in crisis there cannot be a lot of plans, mostly about investment, we are all doing badly even all Europe, the US, I would like to have more opportunities for the young around here, more work, the case of one of my cousins who has studied and everything, even of the University, he is almost 35 very ready to work, but he cannot find anything, so this is priority to create work for those, we are a people which is just to quiet, people do not go into the street, until there is not police agent around we are going out and complaining, you see, if I had the power to change something I would at least get the ship a bit cheaper, it is the only connection we have, it is too expensive for a family to spend vacations here, for them it is much more than for us, additionally create employment, also more for tourism, the problem are the Straits, build some factories, before we had something which does not really exist nowadays anymore, but, give another dynamic to this city, a new exit, there are many administrative officials, many officials, being European, there have been a lot of financial helps from the EU, we have done a lot with it, but we are a bit far, many people do not know Ceuta, but I am not negative about it, I think we are stronger with all that Union, all countries together to improve, this is positive, this is not bad, being European means we have the same interests, economically and socially, the connection between people, it can enrich people to get to know people from other places, the relations are positive, we are Spanish, so we are more open-minded, it is a different culture, but, in daily life I feel that I am European, sometimes not, if there is support I feel, but in the end we are still in the North of Africa, we feel forgotten, because actually this is an important border. the responsibility we have common plans and a common currency, I am not sure about such responsibility, relation with EU and Ceuta is positive, they use to invest here economically, but we lack a lot of things, infrastructure, also means to create employment, which is the biggest problem, Ceuta means for the EU to be a lost place, problems of border, many migrants enter, in common with other places we are Spanish, we feel also European, but we have a border passage which is the door to Europe, we have a bunch of problems, many people transit, like in all the border places, except the interior border places, being a borderplace with Morocco in that country there are big differences between rich and poor, many of them come here to work, it is a stream of people economically important for them and us, mutual support in the end, the EU in

security, I am not sure about that, I suppose there is some role to play for this, I think the forces are integrated, if Ceuta was not Spanish or European, it would be bad we would live like most of the Moroccans dieing from hunger, before there was a good fishing industry but the cheaper fishing in Morocco was more competitive so ours was ruined we even had a special market for fish, economically we should orient to both, we live on the people who come from Morocco, but also from mainland, we should really focus on those, the problem of the ship, the price inhibits them from coming, like canarias we should have organized things, we have not done well for this, I prefer Ceuta it is more beautiful than Canarias, so we could have made more of that, we could collaborate with this in Morocco, many people come from MOrocco, so they also help us now with the crisis, otherwise we would be worse, I have only been once to Morocco, I do not like to be treated in a different way, it is another culture, so I do not feel or know why to go there, other people use to do shopping and so on, go to see snow in the mountains, to the beaches, I do not like it, here I have many things to do as well, I also have that girl who comes for me every day we pay a social security, health insurance for her, we share it with three families, she has been coming from Castillejos for 10 years, she is a great person, so this is the contact across the border I have, so I know more about the other side, she maintains all the family with her salary here, so I know they are doing badly, the traffic jams, the weekends had to come early to my place, but they did not let her pass. so she cannot make it early anymore, we respect each other and treat each other well, I think I have to treat them well, this girl I feel is part of my family, I do not know why treat her badly, even if she did something bad, people coming here are good people, there are not so many things we have in common across the border, they have a very different culture, the food, many things, but you have to coexists with respect, I know you cannot eat certain things so I do not give it to you, the thing to change in the border would be a filter for people who come to do behave badly, commit crimes, the border part is a drama they should organize things there, the subsaharians is a really sad thing to lose their lives for change, noone should lose his life for a dream, I think they do not have the correct information, the mafia who brings them, I am incredibly sad about them, I am really sad about it, they come so many kilometers they hurt themselves jumping the fence

Example of participant 27

Difficulties during the interview:

difficult because two of them, have to treat them like one, because they did not answer all the questions both of them, sometimes they had different ideas, but the main ideas are similar, sometimes when disagreeing speaking simultaneously so difficult to hear on tape who is saying what and what exactly, language for them no problem. Sometimes trying to involve me and hear my opinion, but I had to make clear to them that it was about them talking and me only asking questions

First impression:

first one is rather concerned of having to supply a family, has still hope to achieve something by protests, other as well, but no family, better not have one if you have no job, but disappointed with life, feeling bad, clearly visible in him, little hope, although still fighting in the movement

Content:

we live on the support of our parents, other also lives with parents, we would like to live just with the necessary things, light, water, food, sometimes you pass days eating in a very unhealthy way, sometimes you do not have a

breakfast, all day long without food, my three children suffer as well, my wife and me are both unemployed and we do not receive any financial support, my wife has also worked in shops generally, but we are in the same situation, other is without family, but still has to pay things, would love to have an own place, family, would like to study, have clothes, live like a human being, in the street here, in front of the door of the local government we use to go to ask for employment, everyday, we try to be present and remind them that we have a family and that there is no way to get a job, that we have no means, the media of communication here hide the truth, reality away, they talk about public television, Ceuta is not only the officials and those in the government, there are also normal citizens who do not have any means, we do not have production sites, the little we have in Ceuta does not get to us, funding arriving to Ceuta, stays somewhere with them, here there is a financial support called paro and one called ayuda, the first ended, then I applied for the latter it has also finished, 4 years ago it was gone, once it is finished you are left without anything, no one helps us to find work, we leave them our CV all around here in Ceuta, but we do not have any agency to help you, in Spain it is like that, you have to organize yourself, Ceuta is part of Spain, but Ceuta should communicate more openly and transparently about the problems we encounter here, which does not happen at the moment, even not for the citizens, even not with Spain, we have been to the elections, we are from here, so we follow the norms here, we want to go to vote like all the other citizens, we are not different, just because we have another religion, we ask help from the Spanish government and the municipal one, we do not ask extraterrestrial things, it does not matter to us who will help us, the Spanish government or the local one, we do not want houses or cars, just a job to give food to our families, be able to pay light, water and the rent, that is what we ask day by day there in front of that door, we came back to Ceuta because we are from here, we have born here, our families are here, other says that also elsewhere there is the crisis, so it is difficult to find work, especially if you do not know a city very well, so I had to come back to Ceuta, I could not pay the rent there anymore, so I stay under the roof of my parents who pay gas, light, water, it is not about crisis, it is just about politics in the end, they just pretend there was a crisis, but the politicians just cheat us, the media are showing that, the crisis is invisible, but the realities of many families where the father has to leave to go to another country to find work and leave the family behind, emotional ties, people, family, you have grown up but you see how your city is going down, everything is beautiful, the nature, the flowers, but there are also people, without jobs you cannot survive, if you do not help, the politicians, the representatives, entrepreneurs, if you promise to give us work, you are lying, each time, so this would just nurture the atmosphere of mistrust, we cannot go on, we are worried about Ceuta's future, how about our future, which kind of future is awaiting us, our families, other says he would like to leave already, as I am single I can leave, but the other with family cannot leave, who would support the family, insecurity is in all places, what does it actually mean, all around the world you can find crime, in Spain mainland the marginality is 3 times as bad as in Ceuta, corruption, yihadism, this exists all around, all the world is getting worse, but we do not feel insecure here, the politicians should have influence about the future, they talk but make us wait, all politicians from above to the lowest level to the highest, the entrepreneurs, economic actors maybe less, they do not get the information that there are many people ready to work for them in front of the building of the municipal government, it is difficult to install an own business, the problem is that although here is unemployment they want companies from the mainland to come here, bringing their own staff from there, meanwhile we have everything, the companies are wrong, the politicians should understand, we all have

capacities, also officials are unemployed, we are not demonstrating but claiming, requesting, from teachers, to painters, officials, no women, they have rights to be there, we do not know why women are not with us, be with children someone has to be with them, here we all know each other, so one day we came together to discuss how we could manage to change things in the same street, with whom we could talk to make them listen to us and help, the media here is private, it is not true that they are public, so they are corrupt, they send a picture or a message, but they cut them, so it is incomplete, Ceuta is not transparent to Europe, everything is a lie, good plan for future, noone in unemployment, talk to companies, invite companies to install sites here, advertisement for Ceuta, you can make use a lot of the 4 cultures, traditions, we are coexisting in peace, taking the same bus, all together, we live together really well, so we should make use of it, catering, ceuta has a lot of potential, make people spend their leisure here, keep shops open during the weekend, open places, attract people to eat, drink different kinds of kitchen, so we should be more open for this, being EUropean, have a good job, a good house, live in peace and satisfied, dignity, nothing else, this is European, Ceuta is very far, it is not European, it does not even have the shade of color of it, very far, all around flags, but that does not mean anything, Ceuta is not yet that far, itstill needs something, but the people also should not kick it around and abuse it, people here cnanot speak openly, once we get rid of corruption we can talk about Europe, but this is really far here, the help and social support you mention about Germany we have not even dreamt of, we would like a real Europe to be seen here in Ceuta, but there is no one from Europe, Europe is a union of countries fighting to improve the economic situation of people, the rights of man, women, childre, for those who are in Europe, but I do not feel European here in Ceuta, we do not even have the basis of Europe, normally in Europe if someone has a aclaim he would be given a voice and listened to, but this is not the case here, I would invite everyone to Ceuta to come to understand what corruption means and is, I invite them to also see how we are, are you being treated badly here? are they amending you with weapons? do they rub you here? we are very solidary people, 100%, we divide the same bread and water, very solidary, we feel responsibility as European citizens, but as we said it does not get here, it is far Europe, responsibility, well there are fathers of families who cannot give food to their children, this is what I see, we should receive some support as we are officially, apparently EUropean, we should have the same rights as any other citizen of any other European state, especially in Ceuta we do not feel such a support, European funding, helping whom? We have not seen them, they have built parks and planted flowers, the border stinks as well, it is also a shame there, the funding should be given to everyone not for decoration, the funding, millions, where does it end up in whose hands, corruption, the media of communication hide everything, I do not feel the European Union here, although there is some funding, the funding should be used differently they should be invested in the most necessities and for whom have htey been asked, what meaning Ceuta can have for the EU that is what you, they decide, that is not our business, just imagining, we invite them to listen to the people, not just listen to some stories, like a place full of lions, elephants, africa, north of Africa, but we are not in the desert, we invite them here to listen to it and seeit, we are in it so we cannot imagine what else, other places in Europe are completely different, just the name is the same, we do not have work no decent houses, no production sites, EU in issues of security, we are not sure about that, we can imagine how it would be to not be part of Spain and Europe, we are experiencing this daily, that is our life, we see ourselves inferior, we are SPanish but we are inferior to Madrid Spanish, we feel very marginalized, if they shut down the means and media of

communication, do you think that this is democracy?, they do not consider us their citizens, additionally this is presumably a country of the European Union, but actually the helping one another, but would you like to be deprived of your voice being European, we are used to provocations, the only industrial thing working is the polygon at the border, the conditions at the Tarajal are not human, do you think that Europe would tolerate this to happen in front of the eyes of its citizens? we have to focus on the North, why should we focus on Morocco, we are Spanish citizens, if Morocco has a big demand, so it is logical that we have to sustain a business with them, but we are still European, Europe is a neighboring country, there is an economic potential of people coming here to buy, you have seen them entering all in the morning right, all of them, this could have an important role in the future of Ceuta, but the European Union should care for things, we need their permission to get a Customs Union, we all have the same rights to work, the border is just a separation for another country, we use to go to the other side, to eat, to travel to have a walk, as we have another country next door, like we also go to the mainland to eat and travel, to Morocco we use to go, it depends on the necessities, sometimes everyday, sometimes not, some people live in Fnideq, because they cannot pay rents here anymore, here rents are high at about 400 at least, they have their wives there, they had to leave for necessities, Spanish and people who know Darija, they pass the border daily, go back to sleep, additionally light and water, food, clothes, for the same money you can live perfectly even with more money than needed to live and stay in Morocco, people here say that the other there live better, everything is cheaper, you do not have to pay so much tax, and you can easily maintain a family there, you can buy a bread for 50 cents, people there are like we are, they are working hard, they are nice sympathetic people, like our neighbors, the problem is that if there is a company doing construction works here, they prefer to take Moroccans and pay them lower salaries than for which we could be working, this is the truth which has to be said here, also without social/health security, but we are in Europe, so they should stick to the law, this is illegal, in the end it is us suffering who are left unemployed and on the street, they do not pay the taxes, the government here is responsible, they do not fight corruption, but they exploit us, the citizens of this city, but those without documentation, for them it is fine as they live in Morocco they can work for 10 euros a day, we cannot do that, you have to ask why the companies do so? they just steal and save the money for their own pockets, to rub from us, each worker should have papers, 8 hours of work, a salary, insurance, that is what the EU says, theoretically the law should protect us everyone should work under these conditions, theoretically I am a Spanish that is what is in my ID; so if I ask for employment they do not want us because that would mean they had to pay everything, so we are back to the topic that we are not treated like European citizens with all their rights, the media is private not public, this should change, we would change the border, improve because it is really inconvenient to be in the border e.g. as a taxi driver, it is a stinking place, no sanitary services, you are a tourist, so if you need to have a toilet you have to go until the center, there is not information for the people who enter, so you never know which way you have to follow, the treatment is not human, so many things to improve, this is not normal, this is not the way to stay in a border, where so many people pass, in a border of Europe with the flag above, the door of Europe, it is not only about the porteadores, but you would have to push and pull even as a tourist, people have been dying there, sometimes you cannot get across because it is crowded, many people have been dying, police beats people up, the EU it is allowing these things to happen, but why?, I would go without car, we have to push and pull, sometimes they do not let you, what have people done there

to beat them up? carrying goods on their backs? why are you beating them up, to defend? but they are not defending, so tell the European Union that an official may not hurt a human being even with such a weight on her back, there is no reason to beat such a person up, instead they should let a person pass, you have to organize good ways of passing, adequately, do not use the stick to beat up people, subsaharians, with them we have to know something about their countries, how we could prevent them from coming, then understand why they come, other says we know the reasons, there is a lack of employment opportunities and they are hungry, like we are, I agree we need a border, security, to avoid others to invade illegally, we need information about them, normal people escaping from war, soldiers, we need to know whether they are bad or good, they do not come with arms, we have to solve it differently, maybe not a bigger fence, they are people, imagine you have to travel to Congo, because it is a country where it is like in paradise, all the way down there but when we arrive they kill us right at their border, we are hungry and just want to eat, the CETI is a center to help the ones without documents, they help them in the center until they know how to go on, but it has a restricted capacity, so we have to avoid that masses of people enter, to improve lives, it is to help those people, give them food, clothes, but there is a limit for not all of them, where do the funding go to maintain people? they should invest in another center, a bigger one, improve the border, if there is money here, they have to divide it better, the EU should take charge of them finally, so there would be money finally, send cars everything to get them there, but no money for us? why do they not help us as well? we have experienced discrimination for being Muslim in Ceuta and SPain, we have grown up with this conflict but we have to live with it peacefully, every religion has a sheppard leading them who has to give the right food to his sheep, that is it, we have had bad comments about being muslims at work, but then we say that it is a private thing, nothing about work, I am Muslim, but it does not change anything, I am SPanish I still have all rights, it is just our religion, in Spain and in Ceuta, it is just some few people who are not having good lives either, no one should be marginalized for the religion, we do the same things as anyone else, we are all humans, we are living well together, so there is no discrimination, different opinions exist, no discrimination, at the moment you discriminate you discriminate yourself, the religion does not change anything, the religions help us to find the good way in life, it does not matter which religion, they all help us, you can just follow them, also about the veil, it just covers your hair not her brain, they are just respecting their religion

Example of Alejandro Romero Aliaga
Interview ALEJANDRO ROMERO.

Interview-setting

- in CETI; interruption and a lot of noise and busy atmosphere around, me: feeling that he spends too much time with me given that he has a lot of other tasks to do

Difficulties during the interview

-difficult to be understood on tape, Andalusian accent is strong, meaning that letters get skipped; additionally using special terms for legal procedures, which can hardly be understood, even after understanding and translating their meaning remains vague because seeing them out of context without legal knowledge, tape is okay though broken in

two parts, I could have insisted on some points more to get whole story, but during interviewing already not easy to understand this accent and jurisprudential topics, interesting, enriching information from different perspective

First impression

-seems stressed and concerned about fate of immigrants, disappointed because of the asylum procedures he works with have lost their appeal for migrants, being also the way to get to Spain with most perspectives afterwards, busy and living for job, however not very personal, close relationship etc. with people in CETI either it seems, some reservation

Interview-transcription

J (00.01): Me puede repetir su nombre?

AR (00.08): Mi nombre, Alejandro romero, soy el abogado de la comisión española de ayuda a refugiados y atiendo el departamento jurídico del CETI desde el 1 de marzo del año 2004.

J (00.19): Muy bien y entonces ha estudiado como abogado aquí en Ceuta o...?

AR (00.27): No, yo soy de Sevilla, hice derecho en Sevilla y estoy colegiado en el colegio de abogados de Ceuta.

J (00.34): Y entonces ¿me puede contar un poco más sobre cómo ha terminado en Ceuta? ¿Qué papel tiene en su biografía?

AR (00.43): Pues mientras yo era estudiante de derecho era voluntario de la comisión española de ayuda a refugiados en Sevilla y el 1 de marzo dimitió el abogado que había en Ceuta y me ofrecieron a mí el puesto, y no me lo pensé.

J (00.58): Entonces ya desde el principio ha sido voluntario...

AR (01.02): No, yo cuando llegue aquí conocía bastante bien la situación de Ceuta porque en Sevilla me dedicaba a hacer informes de apoyo a los casos relevantes de asilo que pasaban por esta ciudad.

J (01.12): Y entonces ahora es ciudadano de Ceuta, usted es ciudadano de Ceuta...?

AR (01.22): Bueno si, yo me he instalado aquí.

J (01.25): Claro, entonces desde hace unos 10-15 años que vive aquí...

AR (01.28): Desde el 1 de marzo del año 2004, es decir hace ya casi 10 años.

J (01.32): Casi 10 años... , y entonces me puede contar un poco más de la vida de cada día aquí en CETI?

AR (01.42): Mira mi función principal es asistir a solicitantes de protección internacional, vale? En estos años ha cambiado mucho ese asunto porque antes en Ceuta todo el que entraba pedía asilo. Yo tengo la opinión que todo los que entraban pedían asilo para protegerse de una posible expulsión. Era una época en la que había muchas expulsiones ilegales y los inmigrantes solicitaban inmediatamente asilo porque una vez que manifestaban su voluntad de pedir asilo y eran visitado por la visita del extranjero para realizar la entrevista ya no los podían expulsar. Vamos legalmente no se le puede expulsar a alguien que ya está en España pero bueno por lo menos evitaba esa práctica ilegal de devolverlos ilegalmente a Marruecos.

J (02.35): Claro.

AR (02.37): Esa era la situación en 2004, entonces mi función principal era entrevistar al máximo número posible de personas para detectar verdaderas razón de refugiados. Una época donde casi todo el mundo decía, yo pido asilo porque se me ha muerto la cabra y me he quedado sin sustento, o yo pido asilo porque quiero trabajar en Europa. Y yo tenía que detectar pues, dependiendo de los países de origen, del conflicto que hubiera en cada país y de las razones de las personas quien era verdadero refugiado y ahí teníamos pues gente que huía de la guerra del Congo, gente que huía de la guerra de Costa de Marfil. En este momento veo también unas personas con perfil político de la zona bereber de Argelia cuando las revueltas etc. ... personas perseguidas en sus países de origen por su condición homosexual, como son países que castigan la homosexualidad, como Camerún, como Togo, Uganda..., y mi trabajo era detectar esos casos, asistirlos, la ley nos permita elaborar informes de apoyo a las solicitudes de estas personas y una vez que conseguían ser admitidos a tramites, eran documentados provisionalmente con una tarjeta provisional de asilo y van derivado en todo....para refugiados. El tema cambia radicalmente a partir del cambio legislativo de 2009 por España está obligada a entrar con varias directivas en la UE en materia de asilo y de ahí nace la ley del año 2009 de asilo, ¿qué es lo que ocurre?, que la ley de asilo cambia el procedimiento y desaparece como causa de inadmisión a trámite, desaparece la inverosimilitud de las alegaciones y el no alegar motivos de la conversión. Eso antes era muy común, que llegaba una persona pidiera asilo porque se ha peleado con un socio comercial, no es motivo de la conversión. Ahí no admitía el trámite, una persona que pide asilo diciendo que viene de Sudan y es de realmente Nigeriano y no tiene ni idea de donde esta Jartum, ni de datos súper básicos de Sudan, eso es una solicitud inverosímil de manera que manifiesta, eso en la antigua ley hubiera sido inadmitido el trámite. Que significa eso, que se quedan en Ceuta mientras que se les aplica, una vez que se le niega la solicitud de asilo se le admite el trámite el procedimiento de expulsión y posteriormente si son repatriables se repatrian y si no pues los derivan a la península y se quedan pues con un procedimiento de expulsión incubado pero en libertad. El cambio legislativo de 2009 tiene unas consecuencias muy importante para Ceuta y Melilla, desde el punto de vista de que en estas ciudades los inmigrantes no tienen libertad de circulación, porque en el momento que el inmigrante entra por el control fronterizo que hay entre Ceuta y Algeciras, al no tener la documentación Schengen que habilite el paso de frontera, se le impide pasar a la península. Eso vale para los marroquíes que tienen derecho de paso en Ceuta pero no para la península y vale para las personas que están en situación regular, pero un solicitante inadmitido, perdón un solicitante de asilo admitido a trámite y documentado provisionalmente no es una persona en situación irregular, esa persona si tiene derecho de pasar a la península. Ahora también la ley desaparece de causa de inadmisión a trámite la inverosimilitud manifiesta y el no alegar motivos de la convención, ¿qué significa eso?, que al 95% de las personas que pasan por Ceuta los vas a tener que admitir a trámite y lo vas a tener que documentar provisionalmente, ¿cuál es el temor que tiene el ministerio del interior?, que las personas que pidan asilo sin tener motivo, con la nueva ley al ser documentadas provisionalmente van a poder exigir su paso a la península y comienza a ver una vía de hecho. Una ley no escrita un actuación administrativa por la cual se impide el paso a la península a los solicitantes de asilo admitido a trámite y documentados provisionalmente. Nosotros consideramos que esa practica es ilegal, ese tema lo llevamos a los tribunales y finalmente según la instancia los harán, consideró el tribunal superior de justicia de Andalucía en varias sentencias que la delegación de gobierno en Ceuta, infringía derechos fundamentales de los solicitantes de asilo al no reconocer la libertad de circulación. Actualmente muy pocos piden asilo y la situación es que a pesar de la sentencia de que sea en contra, a pesar del informe del ¿? A pesar del informe del defensor del pueblo, a pesar del informe del relator de las Naciones Unidas contra las formas contra discriminación vía racismo, a pesar de eso, siguen infringiendo, delegación de gobierno y ministerio de interior, la legislación. Y siguen sin dejar ir a la península a los solicitantes de asilo admitidos a trámite. Ahora se da una situación que yo calificaría de grotesca. El que no es solicitante de asilo, se va a la península en tres o cuatro meses, no pasan más de tres o cuatro meses en Ceuta, bien a través de su internamiento en un CIE en estas que se pasan dos o tres días y son puestos en libertad, bien a través de la salida llamadas salidas humanitarias, que no son salidas humanitarias, lo que hacen es sacar a las personas que más tiempo llevan en Ceuta y que no hayan solicitado asilo.

J (09.41): Los llevan a la península

AR (09.44): De manera que los más antiguos que tenemos en el CETI son solicitantes de asilo, es decir se está perjudicando al inmigrante por solicitar protección internacional, eso es gravísimo, eso es gravísimo y esa es la situación que tenemos actualmente, ¿qué es lo que ha pasado?, que de 1500-2500 solicitudes de asilo que había en el año 2000 que digo, no eran razonables, claro es que actualmente buscaban protección frente a devoluciones ilegales. Ahora lo que nos encontramos es que nadie pide asilo, porque si pides asilo te castigan y te quedas en Ceuta encerrado. Y Ceuta es una ciudad sin posibilidades económicas para personas extranjeras, porque la mano de obra clandestina ilegal y barata está ocupada por trabajadores marroquíes que tienen derecho de paso los de la zona de Tetuán, derecho de paso a Ceuta pero no tienen derecho a pasar a la península, los ciudadanos que tenemos aquí ven Ceuta como el último, paso para llegar a Europa.

J (10.55): Claro, claro, pero ¿cuántos logran llegar a Europa, a la península, al final?

AR (11.05): Todos, hombre, hay que tener en cuenta que por nacionalidad y dependiendo de los tratados que estén en vigor en cada momento de repatriación con los países de origen hay algunos que irán al centro de entrenamiento y de ahí serán deportados a sus países, principalmente nigeriano y argelino, de ahí que sistemáticamente los nigerianos mientan acerca de su nacionalidad, algo que es una pena, porque ahora mismo en el norte del país hay una crisis muy grave por la actividad violenta de la guerrilla islámica de Boko Haram también es grave porque hay muchísimas mujeres sometidas a trata nigerianas - importante también porque el conflicto étnico entre jausa y yoruba y también porque la homosexualidad en Nigeria está muy perseguida y ese tipo de personas que llegan aquí ni piden asilo ni se identifican como nigerianos por temor a una deportación.

J (12.15): Claro, entonces dice que todos llegan al final a la península y entonces ¿a cuántos están ayudando aquí en el CEAR con la ayuda que pueden ofrecer - porque dice que, hay otros caminos?

AR (12.34): Nuestra ayuda es la que..., yo hago una jurídica entonces una vez que detecto un caso que yo considero que es un verdadero caso de refugiado, si me lo permite mi agenda voy a la oficina del extranjero y le asisto en la entrevista. Otra cosa que podemos hacer desde CEAR es recabar información probatorio tanto documental como pericial. Ya tengo la prisa de ver si uno tiene un tiro en un brazo, llevarlo al médico para que haga un informe para aportarlo como procedimiento por ejemplo, o si veo que uno tiene problemas psicológicos post traumático por ejemplo, que lo vea la psicóloga y le envíe un informe a la oficina de asilo y refugio y a su vez tengo la posibilidad de emitir informes en apoyo de cada solicitud. Ayer estuve haciendo uno de una muchacha siria, kurda, estudiante y con las pruebas que tenemos, y con la opinión ... de mi opinión jurídica y de información del país de origen he elaborado un informe recomendando a la oficina de asilo y refugio que se le reconozca el estatuto de refugiada en España.

J (13.51): Y entonces a cuántos ¿cada uno viene aquí en esta oficina, habla con usted y después se decide si puede ser un caso de asilo o refugiado?

AR (14.03): Bueno, yo no lo decido si es un caso de asilo. El que quiere pedir asilo lo pide, y yo no intervengo, de hecho a la mayoría de las personas que veo son personas que ya son solicitantes de asilo. En la oficina del extranjero les dan información de que yo estoy en el CETI para asistir a solicitantes de asilo. Y yo veo a los solicitantes de asilo del CETI y a los solicitantes de asilo que no están viviendo dentro del CETI también. Los entrevisto aquí, estudio cada caso y ya en atención en cada caso yo ya pienso si es conveniente que yo vaya a la entrevista de asilo con la oficina de extranjero, si me lo permite mi agenda como te lo he dicho y que material probatorio podemos buscar y que informe de apoyo puede ser conveniente que yo elabore...

J (14.50): Y ¿cuánto dura un proceso de pedir el status?

AR (14.55): La ley dice que el procedimiento debe durar un máximo de seis meses. Pero eso no se cumple.

J (15.01): Entonces ¿cuánto dura en realidad?

AR (15.04): Muchas veces yo creo que más de un año

J (15.06): más de un año. ¿Y entonces...?

AR (15.11): Ahí, hay un retraso muy grave de la oficina de asilo y refugio, pero el retraso es provocado por cuestiones de oportunidad política, de política migratoria, es decir a mí me parece gravísimo que con la crisis que hubo el año pasado en Mali ni un solicitante de asilo de Mali pidiera asilo. El único que ha pedido asilo ha terminado renunciando cansado de ver como se iban todos sus amigos y él se quedaba aquí, y cada vez que contactaba con la oficina de asilo y refugio, me decían los instructores que tenían la instrucción de sus superiores de dejar aparcados los casos de Mali hasta que cambiara la situación. Eso para mí es cargarse la protección internacional, porque si tienen una situación de crisis que hay que resolver y que hay que darle protección a las personas que vienen huyendo de esa situación de crisis, es patente que una situación de crisis esos casos hay que instruirlos y documentarlos cuando tu tengas la certeza de que es un verdadero refugiado, que un verdadero nacional del país que dice ser nacional que necesita protección. Lo que no puedo decir es lo dejo hasta que se calme la situación y eso lo hicieron con Costa de Marfil en el año 2011 y lo han hecho el año pasado con Mali. Lo han dejado los casos estancados y cuando ha habido un informe de las NU favorable en relación a estas personas argumentando que la situación de crisis ha finalizado o que ya no están y entonces resuelven argumentando que hay falta de vigencia actual de las alegaciones -ya no hay guerra, usted se puede marchar a su casa. Que yo llevo esperando dos años que usted me resuelva, cuando vio usted crisis no me resolvió, y yo debería estar protegido. Eso es grave en la península pero mucho más grave cuando tu estas en Ceuta y tú no puedes trabajar. Están viviendo en una habitación con muchas camas, con muchas personas, que a lo mismo huelen mal o a lo mismo son mal educados o les molesta.

J (17.32): Entonces ¿cuánta gente hay en este momento?

AR (18.12): 576

J (18.13): 576

AR (18.14): El centro tiene una capacidad máxima de 512 personas, por lo tanto esta sobrepasada la capacidad, la gente están viviendo en unas condiciones buenas. El comedor no hay problema cuando estamos así, se hacen dos turnos. Yo creo que a lo mejor no es ni necesario dos turnos. Habitaciones, pues, se habilitan aulas con cama. Entonces todos tienen cama, el que quiere atender clases de español puede dar clases de español, el que quiere atender clases de alfabetización puede dar clases de alfabetización, el que necesita un médico tiene un departamento sanitario, el que necesita hablar con un psicólogo lo tiene también. Entonces desde ese punto de vista, a pesar de que este sobreocupado el centro los servicios funcionan con normalidad y la gente está atendida.

J (19.12): Pero normalmente no son tantos ahora es un poco...

AR (19.16): Por etapas. Por etapas porque ha habido etapas en las que el centro ha tenido cerca de 700 personas, depende de la gente que trabaje en Ceuta y hay una etapa en las que no se traspasa los 350, los 400.

J (19.34): Entonces me puede contar un poco más del CEAR porque seguramente puede encontrar información también en internet, ya he visto algo pero me gustaría saber por ejemplo ¿cómo funciona la financiación, es el estado de España que paga algo?

AR (19.50): Si, bueno o sea tiene varios programas, como se llama, como subvenciones. Yo estoy metido en un programa que está financiado con los fondos de Europa para los refugiados.

J (20.03): ¿Entonces hay también unos fondos de gente privada o donaciones?

AR (20.11): Pues mira, es el grave problema económico que tiene Ceuta, que tiene pocos fondos privados, depende en una medida muy elevada de los fondos públicos

J (20.24): Claro, claro. Pero ¿cuantos años es que existe el CEAR?

AR (20.31): Pues desde el año 68, es decir una serie de abogados que cuando no había una ley de asilo en España trabajaron para poner en pie las primeras protección de asilo a las personas que huían de las dictaduras de Sudamérica, de Argentina, Uruguay, Chile, etcétera.

J (21.00): ¿Y la gente aquí cuando viene está dispuesta a hablar de sus historias y entienden que es importante?

AR (21.08): Si, yo veo que conmigo tienen confianza. Yo también trato de generar esa confianza, entonces es mucho, la anécdota, muchos alucinan cuando hablo con ellos y les doy la mano, dicen ¿esto qué?, porque eso lo hacen muy poca gente, entonces eso encaminado a generar confianza.

J (21.38): Entonces esta, usted conoce también bien, las situaciones en todos los países más o menos

AR (21.44): Bueno, pues lo que ocurre ...

J (21.49): Más o menos, y por ejemplo...

AR (21.52): Hoy en día es muy fácil documentarse, a través de internet y sabiendo tú de que fuente recorre la información...

J (21.58): ¿Y de dónde vienen los demás ...decía que de Nigeria del Congo todas esas regiones, pero me imagino que también de Senegal?

AR (22.08): Si claro, de Senegal. No dice ninguno que es de Senegal porque los pueden, los atraparían, entonces casi todos son congianos o malienses, no lo saben. Los nigerianos, hay muchos nigerianos son de Ghana, muchos nigerianos son sudaneses o son malíes entonces hubo un problema porque tenían aquí muchos nigerianos somalíes y nadie tenía ni idea de la problemática de Somalia y coincidió que llegó un grupito de somalíes. Agarro al somalí, y entonces destapan asustado -oye aquí hay nigerianos que nos están amenazando-

J (22.56): Claro, entiendo. Muy bien ahora entiendo un poco más de la situación aquí

AR (23.06): Mira acerca de la confianza siempre hay algo que realmente es difícil y es la problemática por la trata. Las mujeres sometidas a trata no quieren hablar, bien por temor a no conseguir la protección que ellas buscan o bien por temor a que sean descubiertas por la propia mafia entonces hace escasos meses una subsahariana pidió asilo de la República Centroafricana, que ya viniendo la RC tiene bastantes condiciones como para ser reconocida como refugiada. Ya me comento que estaba coaccionada en Ceuta por personas pertenecientes a la mafia que están conviviendo con ella, ese es un problema que tenemos aquí, que conviven tanto personas tratadas como personas de la mafia.

J (24.17): Es que no se puede saber...

AR (24.20): Entonces, ella me contó que estaba siendo coaccionada, pero cuando le propuse ir a la policía a denunciar me dijo que no, que tenía mucho miedo, que la iban a matar, que estaba embarazada, que quería tener al niño y la gente de la mafia la iban a obligar a abortar. Entonces finalmente no conseguimos que denunciara, también renunció a la solicitud de protección, pero eso fue porque veía que sus amigas se iban por no pedir asilo y que ella como pedía asilo no se iba. Eso es injusto y lo que sí consiguió es tener a su hijo, al menos.

J (25.08): Entonces ¿cómo es que se van - no sé si he entendido bien... porque puede ser por el español o algo que he escuchado otra vez - pero me puede explicar otra vez como se van si no van con un status de refugiado, van con la mafia, con la gente que está traficando?

AR (25.40): Como se van a la península. Aquí hay tres maneras de irte, una con documentación. La documentación que nosotros pensamos que es suficiente. La provisional de solicitante de asilo una vez que han tramitado así tu solicitud y así lo ha dicho el TCJ, con esa documentación la policía no la deja salir. Eso es ilegal. Pero de momento así está la cosa no lo dejan salir. Una segunda vía es a través de lo que se llaman salidas humanitarias.

J (26.20): Eso no entiendo

AR (26.21): Son personas que van a centros de acoyo y son gestionados por ONG `s.

J (26.29): Pero como funciona, no me puede...

AR (26.33): Mira tradicionalmente eso se debía cuando fueran personas con niños, familias homoparentales, también personas con algún tipo de enfermedad, personas con algún tipo de trauma migratorio. Y, eh cuando podían irse más personas dentro de este cupo se tenían también a los más antiguos, personas que llevan ya demasiado tiempo en Ceuta. En la situación actual están habiendo muchísimas salidas de personas por esta vía. ¿Qué pasa? ya prácticamente no quedan personas con una tipología de razones humanitaria como pa que se vayan. Dentro de las características, simplemente se cogen los más antiguos, los más antiguos es por donde hay salida, por ende de entrada a la ciudad, por ejemplo la semana pasada se fueron a un centro de acogidas gestionado por CEAR 30 personas. Pero las características de estas personas es decir te das cuenta, se van este orden numérico es el orden de entrada a Ceuta, son personas que entraron aquí en agosto en septiembre y todos ellos tienen una misma característica y es que no han pedido protección internaciona. Si uno de estos pide protección internacional no se va, acogida de protección humanitaria, se quedan en Ceuta, por eso ahora no quieren pedir asilo.

J (28.20): Y entonces en donde, en donde van, van a campos de ONGs o...

AR (28.27): A centros de acogidas de ONGs vale, y la tercera vía de salida legal es la de que van a centros de entrenamiento, entonces la ley española por ejemplo hace un máximo de entrenamiento de 60 días y si se les puede repatriar, España los repatria y si no se les puede repatriar pues antes de que venzan los 60 días se les deja en libertad, la situación de estas personas que se quedan en libertad después de pasar un centro de entrenamiento al igual que la situación de estas personas que se van por situación de vulnerabilidad, jurídicamente es la misma, tienen una orden de expulsión y una prohibición de entrada que les dificulta enormemente su regularización, no solo en España sino en toda Europa y no son deportables con lo cual son personas que van a vivir en España o en Europa en situación irregular y están condenados a la marginalidad, por ejemplo a prostituirse y a trabajar hombres y mujeres en unas condiciones laborales muy precarias sin contrato de trabajo y sin los derechos que tiene el trabajo legal.

J (29.55): Claro hablamos del tema...

AR (29.59): Perdona, hay otra vía de salida que es la cuarta vía, que es la vía clandestina, que son los que se meten en un barco en un camión de manera clandestina para cruzar de Ceuta a la península, esa vía funciona perfectamente para los argelinos, porque los argelinos se quitan todos de en medio y aparecen a las dos tres semanas en Algeciras en Málaga.

J (30.26): Entonces tienen los contactos para que...

AR (30.31): No sé si hay una red montada o es que se buscan los camiones y se meten debajo o como le hacen pero los argelinos se quitan de en medio por esa vía.

J (30.41): Y al final están perjudicando...

AR (30.44): Lo que hacen los argelinos, lo que hacen los argelinos es pedir protección internacional, con la documentación de asilo ganan tiempo porque no se les puede crear un procedimiento de expulsión, ahora lo que temen es que se les dé un procedimiento de expulsión y sean repatriado mediante su entrenamiento en un CIE por eso procuran pasar poco tiempo en Ceuta, piden asilo ganan tiempo y durante el tiempo que están documentados por asilo y no se les puede incubar un procedimiento de expulsión, durante ese tiempo buscan la manera de irse a la península.

J (31.21): Y ahí están también en situaciones marginalizadas porque no tienen documentación al final ¿no?

AR (31.29): Pero es un problema que tiene toda Europa

J (31.33): Si, claro, ¿pero ellos también, entonces el único modo para estar seguro de a ver, de tener más oportunidades al final es pedir asilo y obtener?

AR (31.48): Bueno, no tener la oportunidad... la ley española de extranjería creo un mecanismo para documentar a personas extranjeras, bastante inverosímil, es decir que tú estás en tu país de origen te cae un contrato de trabajo del cielo y te vas a la embajada española y te vienes a regularizar a España. Esa vía no funciona. La otra vía es la de la reagrupación familiar que también está bastante restringida porque tiene que acreditar que tiene unos medios económicos que no tiene ningún español, para que viva contigo tu familiar, reagruparle. La vía común para regularizar a personas extranjeras que ya están en España es la denominada arraigo y tampoco es fácil, tienes que acreditar que llevas más de tres años en España que tienes una oferta de empleo suficiente como para que te cubra económicamente tu estancia en España y además que no tenga en vigor una prohibición de entrada. Al margen de eso, perdón, la única posibilidad es la de la línea asilo, la gente en Ceuta no pide asilo bien porque no lo necesita, bien porque temen hacer castigados por ello. Porque en Ceuta es un obstáculo más para llegar a Europa como lo he dicho antes. Aquí la gente quiere estar el menos tiempo posible porque por encima de la documentación está el llegar a Europa y trabajar y a la gente siempre que tenga con quien trabajar no le importan las condiciones en las que lo pueda hacer, con tal de llegar.

J (33.33): Claro, vamos a hablar sobre los temas que tengo aquí porque la idea es tratar a todos los expertos un poco igual para ver las diferencias de las ideas que tienen también. Entonces ya dijo algo sobre Ceuta pero si tiene que definir Ceuta ¿qué es?

AR (33.56): ¿Desde qué punto de vista?. Desde el punto de vista de la inmigración, Ceuta es el último obstáculo después de que las personas han pasado por el desierto, han bebido su propia orina para no deshidratarse, han visto como han muerto compañeros, han llegado a marruecos y marruecos los ha repatriado al desierto con Argelia, bueno repatriado no, los ha devuelto a otro, a un tercer país. Después de todas esas penalidades consiguen entrar en Ceuta y en Ceuta todavía no están a salvo, eso está, es el último obstáculo para poner el pie en la península, una vez que llegan a la península pues muchos se establecen en España otros tienen en su proyecto migratorio el ir a Francia, Alemania, Bélgica etcétera

J (34.45): Claro, y entonces usted como ciudadano de Ceuta ¿está preocupado o interesado en que va a pasar en el futuro en Ceuta?

AR (34.59): Yo creo que desde el punto de vista migratorio, es fundamental una reforma de la ley de asilo. Para que se consiga que a través de la ley de asilo no se vulnere la legalidad de la ley de extranjería pero sí que se respeten los derechos de los solicitantes de protección internacional y sobre todo de los verdaderos refugiados, que pienso yo que debería haber. Lo prevé las directivas de asilo, se puede restringir la libertad de regulación si lo prevé la ley de asilo, la ley de asilo española no lo prevé pero las directivas si prevé que se puede poner una residencia obligatoria en un determinado lugar, entonces yo pienso que la ley española debería contemplar las antiguas causas de

inadmisión a trámite como motivo para imponer esa residencia obligatoria de manera que al que pide asilo y fraude de ley se le pueda notificar la residencia obligatoria en la ciudad de Ceuta en tanto que se le tramita la resolución y al que pide asilo es una solicitud verosímil y alega en la convención, no se le impida el paso a la península y su acogida en un centro de acogida de refugiado, un car, que es donde deberían estar los que piden asilo

J (36.39): Pero, ¿y entonces los demás que no piden asilo?

AR (36.46): Los que no piden asilo debería haber una vía más práctica para su regularización, que lo que no tiene sentido es tener una bolsa tan grande de inmigración irregular en un país que es foco de, bueno iba a decir foco de delincuencia. Pero ellos son las primeras víctimas, son focos de mano de obra ilegal, precaria, son personas que tienen el riesgo de ser explotados, de ser prostituidos y eso. No digo que se evitaría pero se alivianaría bastante esa situación como una vía creíble de regularización, entonces en el momento de que una persona, no es repatriable, no tiene sentido que se le castigue con la marginalidad

J (37.45): Está bien, volvemos a la pregunta porque me gustaría su opinión, su propia opinión, su propia idea si está preocupado por la situación de Ceuta en el futuro. De Ceuta como ciudad...

AR (38.02): Como ciudad, pero no sé de qué punto de vista estoy preocupado, a mi lo que, a mi lo que más me preocupa, es a corto plazo es que comenten es espigón que se avienta en el mar y provoque más muertes. Eso me preocupa porque levantando más metros la vallaa o poniéndolo mas alto no va a evitar que lleguen a Ceuta personas que huyen de situaciones terribles y de guerras. A mi lo que me preocupa es que los estados europeos no sean fieles a su, a su propia historia y a su propia legislación. Un sistema de asilo significa dar protección a las personas que los necesitan y también cooperar en el desarrollo de terceros países.

J (39.01): Entonces quiere decir que usted está más preocupado a nivel nacional y europeo que a nivel local de la ciudad.

AR (39.14): Hombre a mí me preocupa que las personas en Ceuta estén molestos con la inmigración y que haya muchas personas racistas, eso sí me preocupa.

J (39.25): Y entonces en la prensa de Ceuta muchas veces hay discusiones sobre la inseguridad que hay en la calle por ejemplo, ¿qué piensa de esto?

AR (39.38): Que se equivocan.

J (39.52): ¿Por qué?

AR (39.44): Los inmigrantes económicos o de asilo, bueno, perdona, voy a reformularlo, los inmigrantes subsaharianos y asiáticos que tenemos en el CETI no son delincuentes. Y no, no han venido aquí a robar ni a... sí que es verdad que hay mucha delincuencia transfronteriza, es decir hay muchas personas marroquíes que viven en unas situaciones económicas mucho más pobres que las que hay en España y que sí que vienen a robar. Yo trabajo de oficio y lo veo diariamente, pequeños grupos de personas que entran a Ceuta a robar, pero no son inmigrantes, son personas que viven en Marruecos y que tienen derecho de paso y al igual que hay una masa importante de personas que vienen a trabajar por nada, cobran poquísimo y trabajan muchísimo, también hay personas que vienen a mendigar y también hay algunos que vienen a robar.

J (40.53): Alguna gente dijo también que depende de barrio...

AR (40.56): Pero ya te digo, los subsaharianos y los asiáticos no.

J (40.57): Si, pero la gente en Ceuta dice que...

AR (40.58): Yo creo que son incluso los que mejor se portan.

J (41.00): Me imagino, me imagino.

AR (41.03): Hombre, hay, puede haber problemas de convivencia que se genera por el tiempo que pasan ellos en la ciudad, es decir, si tenemos una habitación viviendo ocho personas durante un año, muy raro es que no haya algún conflicto de convivencia.

J (41.23): Claro, claro pero la gente dice que depende del barrio en donde se vive, se sienten inseguro en la calle. Usted se siente inseguro en...

AR (41.32): No, en absoluto.

J (41.35): Pero hay unas barriadas en Ceuta en donde hay más inseguridad...

AR (41.42): Bueno hay barriadas marginales entonces hay muchas personas por ejemplo que no quieren ir al príncipe, yo he ido al príncipe, mi mujer ha trabajado por algunas temporadas en el príncipe y yo no lo considero o sea un barrio inseguro, que sea un barrio marginal y que haya tanto personas que se dedican principalmente al narcotráfico que vivan en ese barrio pues sí.

J (42.12): Y entonces ¿quién según usted podría tener una influencia sobre el futuro de Ceuta, que institución, que actores, que individuales?

AR (42.24): Yo creo que Europa debería de hacer algo, pero lo más práctico ahora mismo y la situación actual acerca de esto que te he comentado, yo creo que pasa por el gobierno de la nación, es necesario que respete la linealidad que no lo está haciendo y con un poco de miras más altas, hace falta también una reforma legislativa.

J (42.49): Y entonces aquí en Ceuta hay muchas manifestaciones o activismo, ¿ha participado una vez, ha visto gente en la calle que se queja?

AR (43.03): Bueno, de vez en cuando hay, alguna concentración, manifestación de cualquier, eh por cualquier motivo, lo propios inmigrantes también ha habido temporadas que se han manifestado frente a la delegación, yo considero que como en cualquier otra ciudad, por ejemplo, yo estuve en la. Esta semana, el jueves de la semana pasada en una concentración que hubo por unas muertes en la frontera y a mí me indigno que fuéramos tan poco, cuando han habido 15 muertos. A mí me indigna el comentario racista de muchas personas de que hay que pararlos como sea porque nos invaden, y yo creo que en ese discurso, son responsables los propios partidos políticos.

J (43.56): Está bien, y según usted como sería un buen plan para el futuro de Ceuta, si usted tuviese el poder para cambiar algo, ¿qué haría?

AR (44.07): Lo que te comente antes, yo reformaría la ley de asilo para facilitar que se le de protección al que la necesita y para evitar el fraude legislativo

J (44.19): Claro, ¿y en cuanto a la UE, vamos a este tema, qué significa para usted ser europeo, y qué significa para Ceuta?

AR (44.31): ¿Para Ceuta? No sé qué contestarte, para mí ser europeo significa que hay un concierto en Alemania que quiero ir y voy

J (44.48): Y entonces es la libertad de movimiento que tiene....

AR (44.54): La libertad de movimiento, que bueno por las informaciones que tenemos parece que se está poniendo en peligro esa libertad de movimiento, da la impresión de que se ha puesto por encima la libertad de movimiento de capitales que la libertad de movimiento de personas, porque ya hay muchos países y entre ellos esta Bélgica que

están empezando a tener un discurso contrario a esa libertad de movimiento, lo vimos con Francia cuando expulso a personas de Rumania

J (45.21): Claro, y ¿le gusta la idea de Europa?

AR (45.25): Si, pero me gusta la idea de, esto ya no es de inmigración ni un tema jurídico, es un tema puramente personal, yo pienso que Europa es una Europa del capital y Europa lo que necesita es una estructura para estatales, una democracia de verdad que las personas que votemos tengan capacidad de decisión sobre temas económicos, que Europa pueda intervenir en la economía, que Europa tenga una banca nacional.

J (46.07): Muy bien

AR (46.08): Y una democracia real.

J (46.09): Y usted ¿siente una responsabilidad como ciudadano de la UE?

AR (46.18): No lo entiendo, en qué sentido

J (46.23): Porque se supone que si usted es ciudadano, uno siente una responsabilidad y me interesa si esta responsabilidad usted la siente diferente para España por ejemplo, para Ceuta, que para la UE.

AR (46.39): Bueno, yo es que no entiendo la pregunta

J (46.45): Pero usted, ¿siente una responsabilidad como ciudadano en general, una, si al estado, por ejemplo una responsabilidad que usted tiene que comportarse?

AR (46.56): Hombre, mi responsabilidad es que mi padre este orgulloso de mi y que yo esté contento con mi propia consciencia.

J (47.05): Muy bien, entonces vamos a la próxima pregunta, ¿cómo es la relación entre Ceuta y la UE?

AR (47.25): Yo veo a Ceuta como una ciudad subvencionada, es una ciudad con escasos recursos propios, tiene poquísimo, la principal fuente de negocios.

J (47.42): Si, como es la relación entre Ceuta y la UE, usted decía que es una ciudad subvencionada.

AR (00.00): Bueno yo tengo una opinión muy particular, que yo que soy de afuera, de Sevilla, pero a esta ciudad como una ciudad subvencionada, hay pocos recursos propios, el más importante es el puerto hay muchísimo personal funcionario, pero hay poca industria y desde ese punto de vista la ciudad económicamente depende mucho del dinero que viene de España y de Europa.

J (00.37): Claro, pero usted entonces no ve Ceuta todavía como su ciudad, no es...

AR (00.44): Bueno, mi hija ha nacido en Ceuta, yo no veo Ceuta como mi ciudad, pero me planteo que va a ser el resto de mi vida laboral. Es mi ciudad, porque estoy establecido aquí con mi pareja y con mi hija, mi pareja es de Sevilla también nosotros nos vinimos juntos en el año 2004 y estoy bien porque bueno tengo amigos, de...ceutíes, con una asociación musical, del propio colegio de abogados. Ceuta es una ciudad pequeña y la gente se conoce en seguida, entonces desde ese punto de vista es fácil.

J (01.35): Claro, entonces ¿qué significado tiene Ceuta al revés para la UE?

AR (01.49): Económicamente, es un punto estratégico para las relaciones con Marruecos, y por el puerto, fundamentalmente yo creo que Ceuta es importante para Europa porque es una puerta de entrada de inmigración, entonces yo creo que Europa debería de tener interés por respeto de los derechos, y posibilitar que esta vía de

entrada no sea un obstáculo para proteger a las personas que huyen de sus países, por la guerra por persecución, por motivos étnicos, políticos, religiosos, sexuales, etcétera. Y es importante también desde el punto de vista de la inmigración económica.

J (02.47): ¿Y que tiene en común Ceuta con otros lugares de la UE y que es diferente?

AR (02.59): Bueno, Ceuta es una ciudad española, yo veo Ceuta como cualquier otra ciudad española. La única singularidad es que tiene barrios que son mayoritariamente musulmanes. En Ceuta se habla con mucha facilidad el árabe dariya. Eso no ocurre en ningún otro punto de España pero es lógico, es lógico porque Ceuta está rodeada por Marruecos y hay unos tratados de amistad con Marruecos que permite que los ciudadanos ceutís viajen a Marruecos sin mucha documentación y requisito al igual que los ciudadanos de marroquíes de la zona del norte, pueden entrar libremente a Ceuta. Eso es muy beneficioso para la economía de la ciudad, porque tienen como te he comentado antes, compradores que son personas de alto nivel marroquíes y también tienen esclavos - personas que trabajan por menos. Que bien, que siempre te van a decir aquí, que bueno es que la chacha que tengo en la casa que cobra 300 euros y la tengo durmiendo en mi casa, que es una currada lo poco que cobra para ella es un tesoro porque cobra más que un policía nacional marroquí, pero a mí eso no me va, si estamos en Europa tiene que tener un sueldo europeo y una protección similar a la que tiene cualquier otra persona en España.

J (04.35): Claro. ¿y qué papel tiene la UE en el tema de seguridad aquí?

AR (04.44): Yo creo que está vinculada a la inmigración y al igual que te he dicho antes que Europa, que Ceuta es la puerta de Europa. También podríamos decir que Ceuta y Marruecos son los gendarmes de Europa porque primero Marruecos y después Ceuta son una cortapista en inmigración irregular.

J (05.12): ¿Claro y podría imaginar cómo sería la situación si Ceuta no fuera europea o si no fuera española?

AR (05.26): No, no lo podría imaginar. Ten en cuenta que Ceuta es española desde hace muchísimo tiempo, desde antes que existiera marruecos. Y antes de ser española era portuguesa, entonces Ceuta es una ciudad bastante occidentalizada por ejemplo, Oran, Argel. Han sido ciudades españolas, pero son ciudades norteafricanas y musulmanas tanto culturalmente como demográficamente. Sin embargo Ceuta no, Ceuta se parece más a Tarifa, que a cualquier otra ciudad marroquí.

J (06.11): Y en cuanto a la ubicación de Ceuta yo pienso que es una ciudad muy particular porque está separada por un mar hacia el norte y por la frontera hacia el sur, como ya dijo que no tiene capacidades de producción agrícolas, nada. Entonces depende mucho del sector público y del sector de turismo más o menos y sobre todo de comercio hacia marruecos, los clientes marroquíes que vienen a comprar y en esta situación ¿hacia donde tiene que orientarse en el futuro esta ciudad, hacia el norte o hacia el sur?

AR (06.53): Hacia el sur.

J (06.55): ¿Por qué?

AR (06.58): Porque tenemos un país como Marruecos que con esfuerzo está intentando crearse una estructura democrática, es un país en vías de desarrollo y que cada año parece que progresa un poquito más, y que tenemos una clase media incipiente en Marruecos que son potenciales compradores y usuarios de bienes y servicios que se pueden ofrecer en Ceuta. Entonces ahora mismo ya estamos viendo como diariamente entran muchas personas marroquíes a comprar ropa, a comprar joyas, a comprar tecnología, etcétera.

J (07.54): Claro, vamos a las últimas preguntas sobre la frontera, ¿qué papel tiene la frontera en su vida cotidiana?

AR (08.03): En mi vida cotidiana, ninguna. Yo trabajo con solicitantes de asilo que son personas que ya están dentro, hombre. Yo estuve aquí por ejemplo en el 29 de septiembre de 2005, cuando entraron, no sé si fueron, un

intento de entrada de 500 personas y en lo personal me afecto ver como venían andando por su propio pie personas con los trozos de carne colgando por culpa de los daños de la concertina. Eso sí me afecta, pero en mi trabajo diario no...

J (08.46): ¿Y tampoco para el tráfico que hay en la frontera, todo eso no le afecta?

AR (08.53): Pues mira, no porque yo no he viajado a Marruecos, no viajo a Marruecos porque me quieren multar porque no renuevo un documento que tenía que renovar y además de una manera que yo considero que es discriminatoria, me dijeron, no como tú no eres ceutí no te tratamos como ceutí, te tratamos como a un español en vez de a un ceutí. Como tratamos a un español no tenemos en cuenta que no te haces de la vista gorda, como lo hace un ceutís como cuando se te caduca un papel para tu pasar un coche a marruecos, me querían multar digo hace, si yo digo que soy de Ceuta no me multan y si tu consideras que yo soy más Sevillano que de Ceuta si me multan, lo veía tan arbitrario que dijo, mira me doy la vuelta y no entro más a Marruecos, y no entro a Marruecos porque tengo, por eso que me multen o que me confisquen el coche o yo que sé. Y además una infracción puramente administrativa que era, no había renovado un documento.

J (09.58): Pero, ¿esta proximidad de la frontera causa una responsabilidad particular para los ciudadanos ceutís, como ciudadanos europeos?

AR (10.10): Una responsabilidad, no. Puede resultar molesto, puede en los meses claves de verano en la operación paso del techo puede que el transporte está colapsado porque hay mucho flujo entonces si normalmente un ceutí tarda 20 minutos en pasar la frontera para ir a marruecos, en esos días de máximo transito pues prefieren no ir, porque puede estar tres cuatro horas esperando, lo mismo para ir a Algeciras. Para ir a Algeciras si yo espero media hora en el embarque para entrar con mi coche en el barco e ir a Algeciras, los momentos de mucho tránsito ... en el puerto eso es una molestia.

J (10.58): ¿Que cuenta la gente aquí sobre la gente del otro lado?

AR (11.04): Que es muy racista.

J (11.08): ¿Sí? ¿que cuentan?

AR (11.10): No, es xenofobia y miedo al diferente. Tienen, están convencidos de que Marruecos se quiere anexionar a Ceuta y entonces quieren muchísima españolidad, porque te sacan enseguida la bandera de España.

J (11.28): Y entonces la gente lo dice aunque tengan a una chica en su casa que limpia...también las familias...

AR (11.40): No esas, con más razón.

J (11.42): ¿Y qué papel tiene la frontera con Marruecos en la relación a la UE?

AR (11.57): Bueno, desde el punto de vista migratorio es del que yo te puedo hablar, es un obstáculo a la inmigración.

J (12.03): Claro, y usted ¿qué haría con la frontera si tuviera, si tuviese el poder para cambiar algo?

AR (12.09): Pues mira, yo creo que podría funcionar el sistema de asilo en frontera. Ese asilo en frontera que se da en los aeropuertos, una vez que una persona no es admitida a trámite se le devuelve a su país de origen. Yo creo que eso podría funcionar, bueno claro, es imprescindible la colaboración de marruecos, de manera que el que necesite protección internacional tenga la posibilidad de pedir protección internacional en la frontera para eso tiene que tener unas dependencias habilitadas como podría ser el mismo CETI para albergar a estas personas en tanto que por un procedimiento urgentísimo se decida acerca de la admisión o inadmisión a trámite de la solicitud de asilo. En el momento que es admitido a trámite esta persona se le documenta debido a un centro de acogida para

refugiado. En el momento que haya admitido a trámite y siempre que no haya otro tipo de razones humanitarias, se posibilite la devolución a marroquíes. Eso creo, es un procedimiento que requiere de la asistencia letrada y de intérprete.

J (13.31): ¿Y en cuanto...?

AR (13.32): Un intérprete es importante porque muchas veces se practican procedimientos de devolución y de denegación de entrada sin la asistencia no solo de abogados si no de intérpretes.

J (13.48): En cuanto a los porteadores y los marroquíes que entran ¿que haría que hacer ahí?

AR (13.56): Yo creo que eso es bueno para el comercio de la ciudad, lo que habría que hacer, unos mecanismos de entrada más dignos, con las personas. Porque yo veo, bueno yo no trabajo ahí pero por con lo que yo puedo observar de los medios, pues a veces se les trata como animales de carga, como mulos y eso no es un trato digno a una persona, debería de haber una facilidad porque además son personas que están beneficiando a la economía de esta ciudad.

J (14.30): Claro, muy bien muchas gracias.

Example of Carlos Pérez Marín

Interview with CARLOS PEREZ MARIN

Interview-setting

-on street in bar, wind is strong, it is cold, noise around us,

First impression:

-creative person, serious, likes to listen to himself a bit, likes his own ideas, engaged person also for politics and resistance to straight discourses, arrangements for city, very much borderperson

Difficulties during the interview:

-good interview interesting insights only few times not very good tape because of wind rushing through, borderperson thinking in two worlds, double thinking incorporated, also in lifestyle, different perspectives also critical about Ceuta, sometimes I could have asked more through, too many ideas to be all captured in one interview

Interview-transcription

CP (00.01): Un porcentaje de gente que va a Marruecos pero no quiere saber nada del país. Es decir gente que va a comprar que vuelve o gente que tiene una casa en la playa y va en verano y vuelve pero no conoce, pero no conoce este lado, entonces porque no conoce Marruecos y porque no quieren conocer Marruecos. Entonces en función eso es una clasificación dentro de tres grupos digamos que puede dar una idea, los porcentajes de cuanta gente depende, también de la religión. Entre los musulmanes es más fácil que exista contacto con Marruecos porque pueden tener familia en Marruecos, o no, o sencillamente porque como ahí en Marruecos hay muchas veces un problema que también es el idioma. No todo el mundo habla español y aquí en Ceuta no todo el mundo habla el dariya y si lo hablan pueden ir a Tetuán y a Tánger pero si van más a abajo ya no se entiende. El dariya de Ceuta se diferencia del dariya de que habla en otros sitios, entonces también es un país que si la gente no domina el idioma y no conoce gente pues le tienen miedo, entonces de esos de los que van mucho a Marruecos hay muchos ... pero también hay españoles. Por ejemplo yo me considero en ese caso de porque tenemos muchas amistades o por cualquier otro tema. Ahora también está la circunstancia aparte de mucha gente que se ve obligada a ir a Marruecos

a trabajar ahí y ya no solamente gente de Ceuta sino gente de toda España o sea que en ese sentido si le preguntas a un grupo te va a decir unas cosas y si le preguntas a otro otra. Si por desgracia dentro de los grupos que yo digo, los regidores, es decir las personas que tienen responsabilidad política de una mayoría nunca van a Marruecos y no conoce Marruecos. El gobierno no conoce Marruecos y así eso genera muchos problemas en la frontera porque muchas de las cosas que están pasando ahora y no solamente el tema de la inmigración sino los problemas que ha habido con las colas. Ese es un problema de que no hay entendimiento porque también hay mucha gente en Ceuta que siguen teniendo una mentalidad de cuando España tenía el puerto al lado de Marruecos y eso me lo han dicho a mi policías de Marruecos cuando me han puesto una multa en la autopista y me pongo a hablar con ellos en francés. ¿de verdad que tú eres español y eres de Ceuta?. Yo mira, es la primera vez que alguien de Ceuta me habla si chillar me habla con respeto, y encima me habla en francés porque en Ceuta la gente si eres musulmán hablas dariya pero el español habla español y se acabó entonces le choca mucho ¿no? Pero bueno eso

J (02.54): Eso está bien, está muy bien. ¿Pero entonces me puede contar algo sobre usted, me puede repetir su nombre?

CP (03.00): Yo soy Carlos Pérez Marín.

J (03.04): ¿Cuantos años tiene?

CP (03.07): Estamos en el 2014, febrero. Tengo que hacer las cuentas. Cuarenta...cuarenta y dos.

J (03.17): Muy bien ¿y su profesión?

CP (03.25): Yo soy arquitecto.

J (03.29): Entonces ha estudiado arquitectura...

CP (03.31): He estudiado arquitectura en Sevilla.

J (03.35): ¿Pero es originalmente de Ceuta?

CP (03.36): Yo llegué a Ceuta cuando tenía tres meses con, con mi familia mi padre lo desterraron aquí y mi hermana pequeña si nació aquí en Ceuta.

J (03.47): Claro. ¿Entonces cuantos años más o menos ha vivido en Ceuta?

CP (03.51): Es complicado pues los 42.

J (03.55): Todo.

CP (03.56): Todo.

CP (03.57): Toda la vida, ha habido, es que depende si consideramos la época de estudiante pues estuve siete años estudiando en Sevilla, después volví aquí a Ceuta a empezar a trabajar después me fui a Lyon a Francia estuve 8 años viviendo ahí pero iba y venía porque seguía teniendo trabajo aquí en Ceuta. Seguía trabajando en Marruecos, es decir pasaba meses aquí, pasaba meses en Marruecos, pasaba meses en Madrid, pasaba meses en Lyon.

J (04.20): Como es esto de que me había comentado antes que usted viaja mucho a Marruecos. ¿Cómo ha sido posible esta relación?. ¿Qué hace en Marruecos?

CP (04.32): Pues la relación empezó, hablaba antes de que los políticos en Ceuta no quieren tener mucha relación con Marruecos sin embargo hay otro grupo de gente como puede ser el instituto ceutí, otros investigadores ,que si tienen bastante relación. Entonces una de las instituciones que de maneras anónimas han tenido una relación en

Ceuta con Marruecos han sido el museo. El museo se ha dedicado a hacer muchísimas posiciones sobre artistas marroquíes porque entre otras cosas la única escuela de bellas artes que hay en Marruecos es la escuela que había de Tetuán que fue fundada por un pintor español Mariaño Bertusi en 1940 y hay otra escuela en Casablanca, pero esa pertenece al ayuntamiento, no pertenece al ministerio de cultura entonces eso hace que tengamos contacto. En cuanto conoces a un pintor te presenta a otro, y a otro. Fue un momento clave también cuando yo me fui a Francia en el año 2003 tuve que aprender el francés y entonces cuando ya venía a Marruecos. Pues en Marruecos con la gente del Tánger, Tetuán siempre encuentras a muchos que pueden hablar el español, pero en cuanto te metes más hasta al sur o hablas francés o no te entiendes con nadie, entonces esa posibilidad de poder hablar el francés me abrió muchas puertas.

J (05.58): Pero usted habla también dariya...

CP (06.01): Yo estoy aprendiendo ahora el árabe estándar. El mal llamado clásico, que es el estándar.

J (06.02): Si, si.

CP (06.10): Entonces por eso la vez que tienes el idioma pues ya te puedes relacionar con mucha más gente y ya también profesional. Yo hasta el año pasado durante tres años he sido profesor en la escuela de arquitectura de Tetuán. Independientemente pues he colaborado bastante con algunos artistas marroquíes en exposiciones por ejemplo aquí en Ceuta, en Marruecos, en Qatar, en Madrid y...

J (06.43): Siempre en relación a la arquitectura, ¿o...?

CP (06.46): No, a veces al arte, especialmente con el arte, no. Pero después también con Marruecos es un país en el culturalmente que la cultura es minoritaria entonces es muy fácil conocer a gente de todos los ámbitos, conozco gente que hace teatro que hace cine gente que hace música, gente que hace sobre todo artes plásticas. Entonces ese es una de las ventajas que tenemos aquí en Ceuta, que parece que estamos completamente asilados. Pero depende de cómo te lo tomes en, porque si te apetece descubrir cosas tienes un mundo, tienes realmente una cultura al lado. Y eso la gente de Ceuta muchas veces no se da cuenta de esa, de eso de vivir a caballo entre dos continentes, porque hay muchos temas relacionados con cuestiones sociales que a nosotros nos parecen normales. Sin embargo fuera no, y cuando estoy diciendo fuera no solamente españoles sino que en Francia, yo que en Francia he tenido mucha experiencia de que ha pasado allí con la inmigración. Ahí había temas que ya están esperados y aquí todavía no.

J (07.58): Y España es un país en donde no había una inmigración tan fuerte, hace unos años.

CP (08.06): Ha sido ahora a otros países como Francia, Holanda lleva mucho más, más tiempo,

J (08.10): Claro pero entonces. Por ejemplo la profesora en Tetuán ¿esto significa que usted está enseñando en español?

J (08.20): ¿En francés?

CP (08.22): Estuve enseñando...

J (08.24): ¿Y los estudiantes ahí sabían el francés bien?

CP (08.29): Si, el francés no es el oficial pero está considerado una segunda lengua en Marruecos y de todas maneras la escuela de arquitectura solamente ahora mismo hay cuatro en Marruecos solamente y solamente entran los mejores. 150 alumnos al año y tengo alumnos....

J (08.45): ¿Y ahí es una condición saber francés?

CP (08.48): En la universidad hay ciertas carreras que tienes que saber francés porque las clases son todas en francés.

J (08.56): Yo conozco unas escuelas también españolas en Tetuán entonces esta gente saben bien el español estudian bien pero no, por ejemplo no tenían la posibilidad de entrar en una universidad o en una carrera. Es esto, muy bien. Entonces..

CP (09.22): De tal manera también te comentó o sea, yo iba, yo he terminado el año pasado termine ahora aquí montando un centro de investigación en el desierto en Zagora, pero por ejemplo yo cuando iba a clases en la universidad iba martes y jueves pero iba y venía, es decir que desde el punto de vista de las relaciones no sé si ese punto saldrá mas adelante, para mi yo vivo en, no en una ciudad como en Ceuta sino vivo en un área metropolitana, que es un concepto que por supuesto aquí en Ceuta ni lo piensan sobre todo los políticos y en Marruecos poco a poco, porque incluso no se terminan de entender entre Tánger y Tetuán no se terminan de entender por una serie de cuestiones históricas ¿no? Pero funciona ya el hecho de que a Ceuta venga gente de Marruecos a trabajar, gente de aquí de Ceuta que vaya más a Marruecos a trabajar y que se produzca mucho intercambio también comerciales, sociales, culturales, sobre todo la frontera para nosotros los de Ceuta como no necesitamos prácticamente sellar, tenemos el pasaporte y vamos mucho más rápido.

J (10.30): Si vamos a hablar de esto más adelante, pero me interesaría todavía entender cómo puede imaginar su vida de cada día, ¿normalmente está aquí en Ceuta o viaja casi todas las semanas?

CP (10.47): Hombre era más fácil contarlos hasta el año pasado porque el año pasado iba los martes por la mañana volvía por la noche, los miércoles me iba a Málaga a una obra que estaba dirigiendo y el jueves volvía, volvía el mismo miércoles a Ceuta y el jueves me iba otra vez a Tetuán y volvía y el lunes y el viernes trabajaba aquí en mi estudio y los fines de repente depende a veces aquí, a veces me iba a Marruecos.

J (11.14): Y ahora ya es diferente.

CP (11.16): Ahora suelo ir como mínimo una vez por semana a Tetuán a recibir clase de árabe y después ya todo pues digamos que no tengo un calendario fijo, entonces el sábado me fui a Rabat, di una conferencia en Casablanca, volví, mañana me voy a Marrakech porque está la vinal de artes ahí y aprovecho estoy en Marrakech para irme a Zagora y tener reuniones.

J (11.46): Yo digo que no hay una vida de cada día.

CP (11.48): Y después vuelvo y al día siguiente me voy a Madrid.

J (11.53): Ya está ya está.

CP (11.55): Es que también ten en cuenta que por ejemplo el tema de Tetuán y de Tánger. Tetuán yo en coche tardo desde la frontera tardo 25 minutos, a Tánger son 55 minutos, eso hace que si hay una actividad cultural o simplemente hay amigos que me llaman - Carlos te vienes a comer o te vienes a cenar - yo cojo el coche me voy a Tánger, ceno y cuando termino de cenar me vuelvo a mi casa

J (12.17): Claro, claro...vamos eh, ¿qué papel tiene Ceuta para usted en la vida y que significa Ceuta?. Si tiene que explicar a otra gente...

CP (12.35): Pues Ceuta es una ciudad testigo de la historia. En el sentido de que viniendo aquí a Ceuta prácticamente se puede contar toda la historia y no aspectos históricos puntuales sino temas bastantes importantes y todo es gracias o debido a su posición geográfica. Eso de hacer de frontera de un continente o de puerto de un continente o de puerto de un mar o de otro mar desde el punto de vista filosófico o de literatura puede sonar muy bien pero es que lo es, es un punto clave o sea. Hay poco puntos, lugares en el mundo como este ¿no?, el...y

además afortunadamente ha habido un grupo de gente historiadores, arqueólogos, otros arquitectos que han estado trabajando esto pese a que los políticos no le veían mucho interés, en la muralla real en donde está el foso antes de diez años descubrí con cuatro amigos una puerta del siglo decimo, la puerta califal que está dentro de la fortificación que hicieron los portugueses en el siglo XVI ahora están trabajando en ella están terminando las obras para poder entrar pero ahí se han encontrado restos prehistóricos, se han encontrado restos romanos, sean encontrados restos bizantinos, se han encontrado restos califales del siglo X a desde el XII, portuguesa del XV del XVI y después español del XVII y del XIX, es decir que en un, con un edificio cuentas toda la historia ¿no? Y que es muchísimo más compleja de lo que parece ¿no?, pero también eso hace el que todo ese pasado lo hemos tenido, al menos unas personas lo consideramos así ¿no?, es quizás lo que hace que las personas de Ceuta pueden ser un poco distintas a otros españoles, los que no han conocido, no han tenido esa, la oportunidad realmente de vivir y de sufrir todos los cambios que se han sucedido por aquí y que hoy en día incluso sigue siendo un lugar especial.

J (14.48): Y para usted ¿que significa, para usted personalmente Ceuta?

CP (14.59): Es difícil explicar .

J (15.03): ¿Es su casa?

CP (15.05): No, no, es el lugar donde está mi familia. Es mi lugar donde estoy yo y el lugar donde están mis amigos o sea es mí, mi ciudad ¿no? Que ¿por qué vivo en Ceuta? por ejemplo, es una pregunta que muchos me han hecho, que ¿por qué me volví de Lyon? una ciudad muy interesante o por qué teniendo trabajo en Madrid no me quedo en Madrid o porque no me voy a otro sitio. Porque Ceuta me da la oportunidad de estar entre dos mundos prácticamente y aprovecharme de uno y de otros no y eso no es fácil.

J (15.35): Y usted ¿está preocupado o interesado que va a pasar en el futuro de Ceuta?

CP (15.45): Eh, es difícil hacer un pronóstico, yo puedo contar lo que a mí me gustaría que pasara.

J (15.53): Si, sería una pregunta más adelante, pero si vamos

CP (16.02): Hay un, hay...Ceuta es un sitio muy pequeñito pero gracias al sitio, a donde está situada eso lo hace que tenga, que sea una ciudad muy sensible desde momento de que muchas de las cosas que ocurren a su alrededor tienen una implicación aquí, es decir, mañana ocurre, hay un problema en Israel y aquí hay repercusiones o en otros países.

J (16.35): Por ejemplo...

CP (16.37): Aquí hay una comunidad hebrea muy importante, yo tengo amigos hebreos ahora no, pero en su momento me decían que su hermano estaba combatiendo en contra la...bueno, los diversos problemas que tienen en Israel ¿no?

J (16.51): Claro.

CP (16.52): Entonces eso llega un momento dado cuanto las intifadas generan muchos problemas en Israel, aquí la relación entre hebreos y musulmanes pues está un poco más tensa, entonces eso es complejo, después también hace poco se ha visto que lo que ocurre en la frontera con los migrantes, no es un tema solamente de Ceuta, no es un tema solamente de España, es un tema de Europa ¿no? En un futuro y con el cambio que está habiendo global, Ceuta debiera ser realmente un puente ya no solamente entre España y Marruecos sino entre Europa y todo el Magreb. Cuando, porque también claro todo eso depende de Ceuta, de que es lo que ocurre con sus vecinos, una de las cosas que yo había escrito en ese artículo que te envié fue ¿qué pasaría o que va a pasar si mañana abren la frontera terrestre entre Argelia y Marruecos?, eso va a tener una, una consecuencia para Ceuta, económicas, sociales, culturales de de mucho tipo, y entonces eh, al menos como no se sabe cuándo va a ocurrir pero al menos

hay que estar preparados para ver qué pasa ¿no? Hay una pregunta que aquí la gente no se hace sobre el aspecto del futuro Ceuta sería una ciudad árabe o será una ciudad islámica, porque ese es otro factor a tener en cuenta, ¿qué va a ocurrir cuando los musulmanes sean mayoría en Ceuta? como ya ocurre en Melilla ¿no? Eso puede cambiar bastante la manera de relacionarse Ceuta como, sobre todo con Marruecos ¿no? Y ya no realmente con Marruecos sino también con otros países porque...

J (18.56): También con España?

CP (18.59): No, no, no, con España no, pero siempre se ha dicho en Ceuta que puede ser una ciudad fantástica para hacer de embajador de la gente de España de la UE en Marruecos, solamente algunos entre comillas cristianos pero solamente los musulmanes que han estudiado en Europa que son de Ceuta y que te hablan español, dariya, francés, inglés esos han tenido muchísimos trabajos ahora porque sobre todo las empresas de la UE venían buscando gentes así, gente que conociera el terreno y que pudiera comunicarse, eso lo tenemos los de Ceuta. El, ese choque de civilizaciones cristianas, musulmanas, para mí no lo es pero para alguien que viene de allí enfrente si, y entonces eso a la hora de hacer negocios de hecho hace poco leía ofertas de trabajo de empresas españolas para irse a trabajar a Arabia Saudita pero pedían sobre todo que conocieran la cultura musulmana, o sea para cualquiera de nosotros de Ceuta aunque no nos diéramos cuenta o sea es una oportunidad de trabajo.

J (20.09): Sí, sí. Pero entonces vamos adelante con esta pregunta, porque otra gente me comento de los problemas económicos que tiene Ceuta, del paro, del desempleo, de todas estas cosas y yo siempre he preguntado entonces en que sector Ceuta en el futuro tendría que enfocarse.

CP (20.35): Hay dos de ellos fundamentales, uno es el turismo y otro es el sector servicios.

J (20.44): ¿Pero el turismo desde la península, desde el norte?

CP (20.48): Desde Marruecos. Hace, eso está cambiando ahora, hace unos años, antes de que yo me fuera a Francia yo estaba haciendo, bueno, colaboraba con la ciudad y tuvimos una reunión en el que había una consultora de Barcelona que hacia una propuesta sobre ¿que había que hacer desde el punto de vista turístico con la ciudad? y siempre hablaban del turismo de la Costa del Sol, de Málaga de Marbella y cuando termino la reunión con el presidente con o sea con todos los políticos de ahí muy bien que íbamos a hacer, estaba todo mundo de acuerdo y yo no. -Hombre Carlos, ya me extrañaba que tu no quisieras decir algo-, y pues yo. Si, y ¿qué pasa con el turismo de Marruecos?, -no con el turismo de Marruecos nos han dicho que no se puede contar-. Aquí muchas veces a gente cree que el marroquí es solamente, esa persona que ven en la frontera con smuggling, con el contrabando y no les entra en la cabeza que en Marruecos pueden haber intelectuales que pueden haber gente de negocios, que, muchos mejor formados y con mucho más dinero que mucha de la gente que tienes aquí.

J (21.51): La clase media, se dice mucho de eso...

CP (21.55): Si, o no tan emergente pero que tienen una idea preconcebida del marroquí, y una idea de superioridad todavía como si estuviésemos en las colonias a enseñarles a los marroquíes y entonces eso ahora desde hace un par de años, sobre todo en veranos que hay tantísimo marroquí de Casablanca y de Rabat que vienen de vacaciones a la playa, vienen aquí de compras, entonces ahora ya están haciendo un esfuerzo pero son muy pocos los comerciantes que contratan gente que hable el árabe o el pi y/o el francés pero poco a poco y de hecho Ceuta no está con la crisis, aquí se habla se crisis, pero la crisis de aquí no es como la crisis que hay en el resto de España, o sea no tiene nada que ver, es mucho de mentalidad, no tiene nada que ver porque hay muchísimo funcionario...

J (22.42): Entonces para el turismo hay que enfocarse hacia el sur, pero para el sector de servicios que imagina usted....

CP (22.51): El sector de servicios pues mira, la inmensa mayoría de obras desde el punto, desde mi campo o sea todo el tema de la construcción están trabajando sobre todo empresas francesas y belgas en todo el norte de Marruecos, ahora están empezando algunas españolas. Yo, es una cosa que estoy haciendo pero yo soy creo que el único arquitecto de aquí de Ceuta, bueno hay otros porque hay musulmanes y porque la madre es de Tetuán y está en Tetuán, pero de los pocos que están trabajando o haciendo cosas en Marruecos, el resto no les interesa porque no les hace falta. Digo yo me voy a Tetuán dos días a la semana cuando tengo la obra dos minutos a pie de mi casa, no me voy y sin embargo, si se hubiesen abierto más pues ahora mismo podrían estar haciendo muchísimas cosas.

J (23.40): Si, aprovechar el conocimiento que aquí para invertir ahí en Marruecos, en el sector de servicios...

CP (23.51): En el sector de servicio o en lo que sea, digamos como asesores, como asesores de alguien que va a ser intermediario entre una mentalidad europea y una mentalidad marroquí.

J (24.02): En cuanto al contrabando...

CP (24.06): Perdona, hay otro sector que sería también importante como sería el de la educación. Hay una universidad que depende de la universidad de Granada y la universidad de Granada como ahora tienen un sitio un edificio nuevo, la universidad de Granada lo que le dijo a los de Ceuta es que ellos querían la universidad no para la gente de Ceuta sino para los de Marruecos, porque alguien de Tetuán si tiene medios económicos se puede ir a cualquier ciudad española, pero si no tiene muchos medios económicos, poder estudiar una universidad española sin tener que pagar un piso porque él va y viene un un taxi colectivo pues si sería posible, alguien también, cuando alguien de la ciudad tiene una idea como por ejemplo, montar una escuela de negocios con profesorado muy cualificado y prestigioso y sin embargo a la hora de decidir en qué idioma se da la clase, pues deciden que en español y automáticamente eliminan a un alto porcentaje, porque si eligen el inglés que es el lenguaje de los negocios en Ceuta no ha habido mucha gente, y entonces al final se ha convertido en una escuela de negocios que tenía un espíritu internacional pero que ahora mismo funciona de una manera local, y eso vuelve otra vez a la, al tema de la posición de Ceuta, o sea, había, tengo un amigo arquitecto que cuando vino aquí estuvo pensando que se puede hacer con la economía de la ciudad y el propuso la creación de un palacio de congresos. Perdón ¿pero un palacio de congreso, no tenemos aduana comercial con Marruecos? y dice, a ti te da igual, tu no vas a enviar la mercancía por Ceuta, tú vas a traer aquí al empresario del norte de Marruecos que no tiene visado para ir a la península, pero para Ceuta si, tú vas a cerrar los acuerdos aquí con él, firmas un papel, él se vuelve a su casa tú te vuelves a la tuya y ya la mercancía le llegara por Tánger o por donde sea, pero el negocio lo ha hecho aquí, eso de que hay muchas ciudades que están intentando convertirse en un centro de congreso y de feria y que aquí tendríamos la oportunidad. Málaga lo ha hecho, o sea Málaga el palacio de congreso que ha hecho es con vistas a Marruecos, pero está en Málaga y aqui pues son, son oportunidades que se van perdiendo.

J (26.23): Y entonces en cuanto al contrabando ¿qué haría en el futuro, piensa que tiene futuro o, los marroquíes que vienen aquí a limpiar las casas, a trabajar?

CP (26.37): No, eso no es contrabando, esos vienen legalmente, el contrabando es el que va a las naves industriales que hay al lado del polígono del Talajar, coge la mercancía y la lleva para allá. Eso cambiara en el momento en que haya una aduana comercial.

J (26.53): ¿Lo que usted querría o no?

CP (26.55): Si, una aduana comercial, ahora ya también por el tema de la crisis lo están solicitando a la ciudad, pasa que eso lo tiene que pedir a Madrid, Madrid que lo pida a Europa y creen que Marruecos se va a enfadar, porque dicen que Marruecos no está interesado porque es una manera de reconocer que Ceuta es española, es un argumento más....porque Melilla tiene aduana comercial. Porque Melilla si y Ceuta no, pues principalmente porque

aquí durante mucho tiempo nunca ha interesado aquí en cuanto había mucho contrabando, la ciudad todo mundo ganaba mucho dinero, de todos lados muchísimo dinero...

J (27.29): Pero el debate sobre la aduana comercial y la unión aduanera todo eso ya lleva diez años más, desde el 2000 más o menos...

CP (27.38): Si pero porque no lo han planteado todavía.

J (27.41): No pero dijo que no la han pensado todavía antes...

CP (27.46): En Madrid, no, no, les ha hecho falta. Ahora que cuando empiezan a tener problemas económicos es cuando empiezan a ver como lo podemos solventar pero no, no también el tema del contrabando porque la cosa es muy sencilla, si Marruecos no quiere contrabando, no hay contrabando, no deja pasar a la gente y ya está. Lo que ocurre también que en Marruecos durante muchísimo tiempo gracias al contrabando había muchísimas familias que han podido comer, si Marruecos no lo permite el problema lo va a tener Marruecos con todo el estadillo social y todos los problemas sociales derivados, es decir, y durante muchos años, prácticamente hasta hace diez o quince años que no empezaba a gobernar el rey actual Mohamed VI el norte estaba completamente abandonado por el padre, ahora con toda la infraestructura que hay y con todas las obras que hay en Marruecos, en el norte de Marruecos ya no hay tanto paro pero antes cuando no había todo eso, ha sido una salvación para la gente del norte de Marruecos.

J (28.48): El porte...las cosas, venir a limpiar aquí las casas....

CP (28.54): No pero sobre todo en el tema del contrabando.

J (28.57): Del contrabando, si claro.

CP (28.59): Porque aquí hay gente que viene, porque por ejemplo, el tema del paro el tema del paro es algo que hay que tenerlo, hay que mirarlo de otra manera porque yo estuve en el año 98, desde el 98 hasta el 2000 estuve trabajando en el ayuntamiento dirigiendo lo que se llama una escuela taller que se dedicaba a formar a jóvenes que eran expulsados del colegio, entonces era para darles una formación para poder trabajar como albañil, como carpintero, como electricista y normalmente se trabaja rehabilitando patrimonio, pues en ese momento en el 98 Ceuta era una ciudad con mayor índice de paro y que sin embargo ¿qué ocurría?, que cuando teníamos que sustituir a un alumno no encontrábamos a gente que quisiera y Ceuta tenía mucho paro y sin embargo había muchos trabajadores de la construcción que venían de Marruecos legalmente, legalmente, pero de Marruecos es decir la gente que estaban aquí de paro no querían trabajar de albañiles no querían trabajar de electricistas porque estaban mejor sin trabajar cobrando el subsidio, el paro y después haciendo algún trabajito por ahí.

J (30.04): Entonces es una cuestión de mentalidad también.

CP (30.07): Si.

J (30.10): Pero, entonces dice ¿qué hay que hacer con esta, estos trabajo transfronterizos en el futuro, tiene que persistir esto o como organizarlo en el futuro?

CP (30.27): Es que eso, hay mucha gente que va a intentar ganarse la vida de esa manera, y entonces en el momento en el que haya mercancía que pueda pasar o también que tenga un impuesto, o sea algo que sea más barato aquí que Marruecos la gente va a seguir viniendo aquí a por él, entonces porque por ejemplo Melilla tiene aduana comercial pero también tiene contrabando por culpa de los aranceles que tiene ¿no? Entonces no se puede predecir, lo que también es cierto es que quizás con la aduana comercial la cosa cambie, tengo que decir también que ahora también se está produciendo una cuestión muy interesante y es que ya no solamente hay mercancía que

entra de Marruecos, no que sale de Ceuta a Marruecos también la hay de Marruecos que entra a Ceuta, sobre todo productos chinos que viene por el puerto de Casablanca.

J (31.21): Aja, y ¿cómo lo traen para aquí, en las bolsas y se compran?

CP (31.26): Lo compran y lo traen en coche poco a poco o con las personas o...

J (31.37): Está bien, aquí tengo una pregunta de la que no hablamos, que no hemos hablado, en muchas discusiones sobre la inseguridad ¿qué dice de esto?.

CP (31.54): El tema de la inseguridad si se considera como porcentajes, o sea como números pues la policía dice que no hay tanto, tantos problemas, lo que ocurre es que aquí si en Ceuta matan a alguien por un ajuste de cuentas de las mafias, todo mundo lo sabe, aparece en todos sitios. En Marbella a lo mejor no te enteras, en Madrid tampoco te enteras, en Barcelona tampoco te enteras...

J (32.20): Y ¿porque aquí si se enteran?

CP (32.22): Porque es muy pequeña.

J (32.24): Marbella tampoco es muy grande ...

CP (32.26): No, no no, pero allí hay más muertos que aquí, y sin embargo la gente va Marbella creyéndose que aquello es seguro no?

J (32.32): Y ¿usted se siente inseguro aquí?

CP (32.34): No, yo me siento seguro.

J (32.37): Y ¿depende del barrio?

CP (32.40): Hombre, el barrio donde no vas con tanta facilidad es el Príncipe pero yo he trabajado años en el Príncipe.

J (32.50): ¿Y estaba bien...?

CP (32.51): Si estaba bien pero también porque yo tenía alumnos que eran de allí y sé que lo primero que le preguntaron cuando me veían, es si yo era policía, si yo era guardia civil y cuando le dijeron que no que era arquitecto y que me portaba bien con ellos, yo no tuve ningún problema.

J (33.05): Claro, hay mucha gente que me comentó que ya va a vivir en Marruecos y viajar a Ceuta todos los días porque no encuentran trabajo y entonces quieren que sus hijos vayan en colegio aquí y Ceuta y trabajo como los marroquíes que entran aquí pero originalmente son ceutís.

CP (33.35): Pero eso, eso desde hace ya tiempo hay no solamente musulmanes también cristianos que a lo mejor lo que hacen es que trabajan aquí en Ceuta en el ayuntamiento o donde sea pero viven en Marruecos porque le sale mucho más barato alquilar unas casas allí, y hay otro, y ahora hay familias que son de aquí de Ceuta pero también viven en Marruecos porque aquí están cobrando el paro, en Marruecos están trabajando en algo, les cuesta más barato la casa pero los niños los siguen trayendo al colegio.

J (34.06): Y que dice, ¿esto tiene futuro, hay que cambiarlo?

CP (34.12): No, eso, es curioso porque es el tipo, no de problemas sino de situaciones, se da en todos sitios donde hay frontera, yo tengo un amigo, yo estuve hace poco un amigo que vive en Constante y me contaba los problemas entre Constance y Kroninberg, y yo el Lyon, los amigos que eran de Ginebra me contaban los problemas que había

entre Ginebra y la ciudad más cercana francesa por el hecho de que la gente, los suizos se iban a Francia pero trabajaban aquí.

J (34.50): En si, no es un problema que se puede solucionar o tocar o....

CP (34.54): Se solucionara en el momento en el que el nivel de vida de ambos lados de la frontera sean parecidos, pero también el nivel entre Suiza y Alemania es muy parecido y sin embargo sigue habiéndolo eso es muy difícil yo creo es muy difícil de controlar.

J (35.10): Y vamos a hablar sobre la UE, ¿qué significa para usted ser europeo y que significa para Ceuta?

CP (35.20): Para mi ser europeo es lo más próximo que hay a un, a un estado democrático y libre, somos un artículo muy bueno de Orhan Pamuk el premio nobel turco que un artículo que escribió en el "The Guardian" hablando de que eran los o sea porque los intelectuales turcos querían entrar en la UE y era porque para ellos era un referentes en cuantos a libertades, con todos sus problemas pero que incluso eran mucho mejor que en EU, a nosotros por ejemplo en muchas ocasiones ha sido la UE los que nos han salvado de que Madrid o los gobernantes de Ceuta hubiesen hecho lo que hubiese dado la gana y en ese sentido Ceuta desde el punto, el momento que Ceuta ha sido o formado parte de la UE era también una especie de seguro para que cuando Marruecos reivindica algo ya no solamente está reivindicando algo a España, está reivindicando algo a Europa. Y entonces no es lo mismo cuando le das respuesta a un solo país que cuando das respuesta a todos, pero eso también lo hace, que sea una circunstancia que es aprovechable por ambos lados, el tema de los inmigrantes ahora Marruecos está recibiendo muchísimo dinero de la UE para que lo controle, cuando Marruecos quiere algo a cambio permite que los inmigrantes intenten saltar a Ceuta cuando aparece en la televisión se sientan a negociar y le piden más dinero.

J (36.56): Es una táctica estratégica de Marruecos...

CP (36.59): Claro, y cuando alguien de la UE de Francia o de España dice algo en contra de las ¿? y de Marruecos sobre el Sahara, automáticamente empieza a crear problemas en Ceuta o en Melilla o en las fronteras, también por eso también quizás también el problema del Sahara no se ha arreglado porque tanto a España como a Francia le interesa de que Marruecos tenga sus problemas allí y así nos deja tranquilos los de aquí, es todo muy complejo.

J (37.31): Si, si, lo veo, lo veo, pero entonces ¿usted siente una responsabilidad como ciudadano europeo?

CP (37.40): Una responsabilidad ¿desde qué punto de vista?

J (34.44): ¿Como interpreta usted?

CP (37.47): O sea, ¿si yo me siento europeo?

J (37.51): No, la respons...si se dice, se supone que los ciudadanos de un país, tienen responsables entonces yo pregunto si también al nivel europeo se siente una responsabilidad...

CP (38.04): Aquí hay una cosa curiosa lo que sucede en esta ciudad, porque al menos, eso poco a poco va cambiando la mentalidad de la gente ¿no?, nosotros somos africanos, yo soy un africano, lo que pasa es que desde el punto de vista administrativo soy español y por tanto soy europeo pero yo vivo en África.

J (38.23): ¿Y usted se siente más africano o más europeo?

CP (38.27): Esa es una pregunta que cada vez se va a diluir más en el sentido de lo que ocurra con los inmigrantes en Europa que son medio europeos pero como tienen las familias siguen teniendo vínculos o relaciones con sus países de origen pues siguen teniendo los dos, o sea yo tengo he, tengo un sentimiento de ser europeo, pero de un europeo en África y no como alguien que ha venido aquí sino alguien que se ha criado aquí y desde ese punto de vista, lo que también me siento responsable es en él, en las medidas de mis posibilidades, hacer que el ámbito

geográfico pueda desarrollarse, una de las razones por las que he estado dando clases en Marruecos no, para que, para formar a la gente o para enseñar a la gente a pensar de una manera determinada porque si esos estudiantes mañana llegan a ser ministros en Marruecos con esa mentalidad que algunos llegarán, podrán ver las cosas de otra manera, como es por ejemplo, se hablaba antes el tema de las relaciones con Argelia ¿no?. Y el tema de crear una unión del Magreb, no como no como lo que hay ahora que en teoría hay una pero que no funciona....

J (39.49): Entonces ¿cómo es la relación entre Ceuta y la UE?

CP (39.55): Aquí en Ceuta hay una muy buena consideración hacia la UE, sencillamente porque durante muchísimos años la UE ha invertido muchísimo dinero aquí, el parque marítimo, o sea una cantidad de obras todas pagadas por la UE y de hecho esos fondos europeos empezaron a ser gestionados por el presidente de la ciudad Juan Vivas y en alguna, y sobre todo el principio en Madrid se llevaba al presidente de la ciudad Juan Vivas y a otra persona más ¿??? que ahora mismo es el presidente de procesa a dar conferencias por toda España para explicar cómo había que ejecutar y gestionar los fondos europeos, es decir que durante muchos tiempo sea recibido mucho dinero no se han hecho muy mal las cosas y entonces siempre lo hemos considerado a la UE como algo que nos da, que da nos da, nos aporta una ayuda económica importante y veces también no solamente es económica sino también de defensa ante ciertas circunstancias de Marruecos, por ejemplo ahora con el tema de los inmigrantes claro decían que es un tema de la UE y que la UE es la que tiene que actuar no solamente invirtiendo sino que también manteniendo relaciones con otros países, los países tercer que hablan que de donde vienen estos inmigrantes.

J (41.16): Claro, y ¿qué significado tiene Ceuta para la UE?

CP (42.22): Yo creo que Ceuta, al igual que ocurre con Madrid Ceuta es una gran desconocida, Ceuta, muchos se creen, cuando digo muchos son españoles y el resto europeo que es una ciudad problemática, en donde simplemente hay siempre problemas con inmigrantes con temas de contrabando temas de drogas, temas de todo relacionado, todo negativo esa es la noticia que aparece después en la prensa europea o en las noticias europeas ¿no? Sin embargo todo aquel que ha pasado por aquí, puedes tú quizás hablar mejor sobre la sensación que has tenido antes de conocer Ceuta y después de conocer Ceuta, suele cambiar bastante. Suele cambiar bastante porque pues como ocurre como otros sitios, que normalmente si te fijas solamente por la información que aparecen en los medios de comunicación, normalmente vas a escuchar cosas negativas¿ no?

J (42.24): Claro. Está bien y ¿qué tiene Ceuta en común con otros lugares en la UE y que es diferente?

CP (42.36): Si hay lugares en la UE parecido a Ceuta, pues si mira, ahí hace algunos años iniciamos con Adolfo Hernán en la fuerte y otros amigos, iniciamos una serie de viajes para recorrer lugares que como Ceuta en algún momento habían sido límite entre Europa y occidente y entonces por ejemplo el primer viaje que se hizo fue a Malta, en Malta hay una ciudad que fue la capital que se llamaba Medina, pero de Medina que viene de Almádina o sea que viene del árabe y que estaba, sin embargo estaba, si había una población musulmana pero que estaba sobre todo construida con palacios de españoles y de italiano, y donde, y llegas a un sitio donde aunque la lengua oficial sea el inglés, el maltes sigue teniendo raíces pilar árabes aunque se escribe de otras maneras, es decir, es un sitio donde tú dices aquí hay una mezcla, como ocurre aquí en Ceuta que tu llegas y escuchas a españoles hablándose en árabe en dariya o en español, vistiendo de manera distinta, pensando de manera distinta, otro sitio parecido decir que fue por el mismo estilo, Sicilia, ahí fue exactamente lo mismo, eh Roda también, hasta llegar a Turquía, o sea son sitios donde al final uno, o sea, Líbano, yo hace poco en octubre estuve en el Líbano y había mucha similitud de como dos comunidades importantes convivían o malvivían juntos ¿no?, eh y esas son las cosas que hacen que cuando ciertos problemas que han sido superados aquí se reproducen en otros sitios donde no estaba acostumbrado se genera un problema muchísimo más grande y en alguna que otra ocasión se ha dicho que Ceuta debiera servir como laboratorio social, no solamente para experimentar cosas sino también para dar soluciones que se han dado en otros sitios.

J (44.42): Claro, y ¿que es diferente en Ceuta?

CP (44.47): Respecto a...

J (44.50): A otros lugares en la UE.

CP (44.54): Hay un factor que es fundamental que es el tema del islam, en por ejemplo en el sur de España en Andalucía todo lo que es relativo al islam, es una consecuencia del patrimonio, la Alhambra, de Granada, Sevilla, y para ellos el islam es algo que pertenece al pasado. Para nosotros el islam es el pasado, pero es el presente y es el futuro, con todo lo bueno y lo malo que eso conlleva. En otras ciudades europeas con una alta inmigración musulmana pues les está pasando lo mismo lo que pasa es que ellos no tienen pasados islámicos, es algo completamente nuevo, entonces el hecho de que tu tengas un pasado hace de que, de que la situación actual no sea tan, tan brusca, o sea no sea una confrontación de repente o instantánea sino que a lo que se ha ido digiriendo durante, con el paso de los años ¿no?

J (46.00): Y vamos al próximo tema, ¿qué papel tiene la UE en el tema de seguridad aquí en Ceuta?

CP (46.12): Por un lado nosotros no pertenecemos al espacio Schengen, nos dejaron fuera entre otras cosas para evitar que los inmigrante una vez que entrasen aquí ya tuviesen libertad, o sea utilizan la frontera natural del estrecho como límite, yo creo que incluso la UE si hubiese podido, Ceuta no sería una parte a la UE. El problema, porque al final también es una cuestión de seguridad, o sea, lleva una cuestión geopolítica, siempre cuando se entró, cuando España en el años 80 entro en la OTAN ya dijeron bueno Ceuta ya está protegida porque ya no hay una reivindicación contra España sino contra toda la OTAN porque si hay una agresión contra España es una agresión a la OTAN, lo mismo ocurre con la UE.

J (47.09): ¿Y puede imaginar cómo sería la situación si Ceuta no fuera europea y si no fuera española?

CP (47.20): Pues sería diferente y no sería diferente.

J (47.30): ¿Por qué no sería diferente?

CP (47.34): No, digo que en un aspecto sería diferente y en otro aspecto no sería diferente, hay una, siempre todo cambio según el punto de vista, la percepción que uno pueda tener sobre las cosas. Ceuta por el hecho de tener el estrecho de Gibraltar siempre pensamos que estamos separados de Europa entonces si vamos a una escala mucho mayor y observamos lo que ha ocurrido a lo largo de la historia y lo que ha ocurrido sobre todo con las migraciones con los movimientos sociales, o con los flujos de inmigración se dará cuenta de que al final el mediterráneo que es otra de las claves, no funcionan como una orilla norte y otra orilla sur, sino es como si fuera un lago en el que siempre las civilizaciones han ido dando vuelta siempre, entonces a mi amigos de Marruecos cuando me dicen Ceuta ponle mira, Ceuta yo hoy tengo pasaporte español, si hubiese nacido hace tres siglos tendría un pasaporte marroquí o sirio o egipcio no lo sé, dentro de unos años no se lo que va a ocurrir. O sea por ejemplo que es lo natural, lo natural sería que hubiese por un lado una unión del Magreb y que no hubiese frontera que fuera la UE, y el siguiente paso sería que tanto el Magreb como Europa sean un solo espacio también geopolítico, con lo cual la pregunta sería podemos seguir siendo una ciudad española pero sin frontera y al igual que ocurre entre la fronteras de los países europeos, eso podría cambiar mucho más las cosas. Y eso terminara sucediendo porque es lo natural, hace unos años, yo eso se lo he comentado un poco por el tema de aquí pero eso es ciencia ficción para ellos, el intentar no solamente que va a ocurrir con la ciudad sino que va a ocurrir con el mundo, cuando la UE hay algunos que están diciendo, por ejemplo fue Sarkozy cuando él era presidente de la republica que quería relanzar la unión por el mediterráneo es porque él era de los pocos que quería junto con algunos españoles de que había que reforzar, había que reforzar los lazos incluso eliminar fronteras y que el futuro de Europa estaba ligado al futuro de los países árabes, por tema de relaciones históricas y por tema de relaciones comerciales y sobre todo porque era el siguiente aliado natural desde el punto de vista geográfico, porque la UE se está empezando a dar cuenta, no

todos, de que o busca otros socios para ampliarse o sino no tiene nada que hacer con lo que están haciendo sobre todo los rusos, los chinos, los coreanos y los japoneses.

J (20.26): Claro. Pero entonces, hablamos sobre el papel que tiene la frontera en su vida cotidiana, dice que la cruza muchas veces pero, en sí ¿qué papel tiene emocionalmente?

CP (50.43): La frontera muchas veces aún, es una cuestión psicológica, ahora es una circunstancia un poco particular desde hace varias semanas, varios meses con las colas que se producen en la frontera yo por ejemplo yo te puedo decir que al menos el año pasado dependiendo de qué día y a qué hora cruce pasa como si fuese un peaje de una autopista. Y entonces cuando te tardas cinco minutos en pasarla, no tienes sensación de que estés pasando una frontera...

J (51.20): Pero cuando hay....

CP (51.21): Cuando hay atasco pues sí, pero es como cuando hay atasco con una autopista.

J (51.24): Claro, y ¿que cuenta la gente aquí sobre la gente del otro lado, que se cuenta?

CP (51.32): ¿Que se cuenta? Pues depende, aquellos que no tienen contacto con Marruecos no quieren saber absolutamente nada, y los que tenemos contacto pues siempre hablamos de cómo están cambiando las cosas en Marruecos, de cómo están evolucionando las ciudades, de cómo esta evolucionando la economía, de cómo está evolucionando la cultura.

J (51.57): Y ¿usted tiene muchos amigos también en el otro lado que son españoles o marroquíes?

CP (52.02): No, marroquíes.

J (52.05): Y, yo he encontrado un he hablado también con gente que está un poco, que tiene una actitud un poco racista, he percibido yo que dice

CP (53.20): Pues son gente que no conoce Marruecos

J (53.22): Que rechazan

CP (53.23): Que los rechazan, hay una el cuándo to comentaba antes de que si somos una ciudad árabes o islámicas, eh para no solamente para los ceutís sino para muchos europeos ser árabe es sinónimo de ser musulmán, y se olvidan de que hay países donde son, los cristianos son mayorías, pese a que, como Líbano o de otros países como Egipto o Iraq donde hay una población cristiana bastante importante, entonces muchas veces hay que hacer digamos, habría que hacer pedagogía de todos esos temas, de que nosotros seremos una ciudad árabe porque hay una mayoría que hable el árabe, independientemente que sean musulmanes que sean cristianos, hindúes o hebreos y eso no debe significar un problema, eso es la misma cuestiones que ocurren cuando los marroquíes reivindiquen a Ceuta, no es que durante siete siglos nosotros estuvimos allí, perdona vosotros no, o sea pasaron muchas dinastías por aquí por Ceuta y solamente podemos decir que los que dieron origen a lo que hoy en día es Marruecos que fueron las, fueron el dos siglos antes lo que estuvieron aquí porque los otros musulmanes que estuvieron aquí en Ceuta no eran marroquíes, eran sirios, eran tunecinos, eran egipcios, pero la gente tiende, digamos a equiparlo todo.

J (53.49): Y al final hablamos de la frontera y qué hacer con la frontera en el futuro en cuanto a los subsaharianos, en cuanto a los porteadores. Que, si usted tuviera el poder de cambiar algo en la frontera para los subsaharianos por ejemplo ¿qué haría?

CP (54.12): El problema no está aquí, el problema está en los países, una vez me encontré con un camerunés en Francia y empezamos a hablar sobre estos temas y él me decía, ponle, mira yo, me vine aquí un año a estudiar

legalmente ingeniería, termine la carrera y yo me pude volver a Camerún pero yo decidí quedarme aquí y decía, ¿y sabes que es lo que más me preocupa?, de que Camerún todo mundo piensa que es un país pobre sin embargo tenemos todo lo que hace falta, ¿pero qué ocurre?, como todo se lo llevan las empresas extranjeras, no queda nada en el país y como la situación está como esta todo aquel que tenga una mínima cualificación como yo si nos podemos quedar fuera nos quedamos fuera, por lo cual quien toma la decisión pues no tiene ningún tipo de estudio, ningún tipo de carrera y son fácilmente convencibles por parte de las grandes empresas para hacer los negocios como les interesa, entonces en ese sentido la UE habla mucho de que va a hacer mucho pero después van los países, Holanda, Francia, Inglaterra, con sus empresas de la mano y hacen sus negocios, y eso muchas veces lo que la gente no entiende, ¿por qué Francia entro en guerra con Mali? Por defender las minas de uranio que tiene al lado del Níger, sencillamente es el primer país productos de nucleares.

J (55.41): Entonces aquí en la frontera es menos es síntoma, es la....

CP (55.46): Es una consecuencia pero en, cuesta trabajo controlar una frontera, ¿cómo se va a controlar una frontera como la que hay entre Marruecos y Argelia?, dos países que no tienen relaciones entre ellos y con un desierto de por medio, ¿cómo se controla eso?, eso no se puede controlar, si los países africanos no se desarrollan, seguirá viniendo gente, yo he conocido a marroquíes que han cruzado en barco a España a Canarias. Hoy en día es uno de los jóvenes artistas más conocidos de Marruecos, y él, lo intento tres veces, a la tercera lo consiguió pero en Canaria lo detuvo la guardia civil, lo mandaron con un grupo de gente a Melilla y en Melilla otra vez a Casablanca y yo he estado en su casa en el sur en el desierto y conozco a su familia que se gana bien la vida, o sea que no son pobres, pero él me decía la mentalidad es que Europa va a ser mucho mejor..

J (56.46): Claro, es el 'paraíso'.

CP (56.50): Entonces, eso, eso, es un problema de conceptualización y después un problema que los países africanos se puedan desarrollar realmente.....

J (56.57): Y para los porteadores en la frontera ¿como cambiaría la situación ¿

CP (57.03): Cambiaría bastante con una aduana comercial y se quitaría muchísimos problemas, seguirá habiendo siempre cuando hay una frontera siempre hay y de hecho Ceuta ahí, ¿cómo se llama?, Eloy Corrales, hay otro investigador de Ceuta de la universidad de Barcelona, de la Pompeu Fibra me parece, Eloy Martín corral que es miembro del instituto de estudios ceutíes que tiene publicado varios libros sobre por ejemplo el comercio transfronterizo en el siglo XVIII y el comercio entre catalanes, en Barcelona y Marruecos en el siglo XVIII y ya te hablaban de que había una serie por ejemplo de Muley y Mail durante 27 años pero que seguir habiendo relaciones comerciales de contrabando entre locales de un sitio y de otros eso no, quitar eso no es tan fácil...

J (57.57): Está bien, muchas gracias por la entrevista

CP (58.00): ¿Ya está?

J (58.01): Ya está.

Example of Guillermo Martínez

Interview with GUILLERMO MARTINEZ

Interview setting

-in his office, silent place

First impression

-quiet, tired, stressed, disillusioned person it seems, low energy level reached but continuing, appreciating family but burdened with responsibility it seems, intelligent, good in his field, technical most of all

Difficulties during the interview

- important interview good information about EU funding, politicians way politicians of Ceuta work and think, could have asked more about the how not only about what, good tape, quite okay interview

Interview-transcription

J (00.00): Entonces, ¿su nombre es?

GM (00.06): Guillermo Martínez Arcas.

J (00.10): Está bien, encantada. Y ¿puedo saber su edad?

GM (00.14): 39.

J (00.16): 39 ¿Y su profesión?

GM (00.18): Yo soy funcionario del ayuntamiento de la ciudad autónoma.

J (00.21): Claro. ¿Y aquí en PROCESA?

GM (00.25): Soy el coordinador de fondos europeos.

J (00.28): Claro. ¿Y ha estudiado qué?

GM (00.30): Estudié derecho comunitario.

J (00.33): ¿Aquí en Ceuta?

GM (00.35): En Madrid, en la universidad complutense.

J (00.38): Claro, y ¿de dónde es originalmente?

GM (00.39): De Melilla.

J (00.41): De Melilla. Y ¿cuanto es que ha vivido por aquí?

GM (00.45): Bueno, si descontamos lo que estudié, desde los cinco años o sea que llevo 34 años en Ceuta

J (00.52): Claro. Entonces ...

GM (00.54): Pasa que yo estudié en Madrid, estuve viviendo en Bruselas, estuve viviendo en Estados Unidos y ya me vine para acá...

J (01.03): Y ¿quiere quedarse por aquí?

GM (01.04): Si, sí, tengo mi familia aquí.

J (01.06): Entonces se siente un ciudadano de Ceuta.

GM (01.07): Si totalmente y con ganas de quedarme.

J (01.10): Y a Melilla ya no quiere volver...

GM (01.15): Si, si voy de vez en cuando tengo familia allá

J (01.19): Claro, está bien. Y en su vida de cada día entonces ¿está aquí en la oficina y que más hace?

GM (01.24): Bueno el tiempo libre con la familia y con mis hijos.

J (01.29): Y ¿tiene que viajar a menudo?

GM (01.31): Si viajo. Esta semana estuve en Madrid el lunes y martes por temas de trabajo

J (01.36): Claro. Y ¿que más me puede contar de su biografía, y la historia y qué papel tiene Ceuta?

GM (01.48): Bueno yo he sido miembro del gobierno de la ciudad durante seis años, he sido consejero, consejero es el equivalente a consejero regional del gobierno, de medio ambiente, de fomento, de economía y hacienda, he sido portavoz del gobierno también durante dos años el chair man, y lo que pasa es que lo deje porque bueno ya no podía mas y pero bueno, evidentemente tengo mucha vinculación con la ciudad. He estado en política durante seis años he sido diputado y ahora pues he vuelto a mi puesto de técnico en la administración.

J (02.28): Claro. Y ha sido un representante de un partido...

GM (02.35): Si. Del partido Popular

J (02.38): ¿Entonces todavía es miembro del partido?

GM (02.41): Sigo siendo miembro del partido pero en un nivel, como un militante de base, no estoy ya en los comités ejecutivos ni en los comités de dirección.

J (02.52): Es más pasivo.

GM (02.53): Si, si, ya soy militante que apoya en las elecciones y aporta ideas pero desde un punto de vista anónimo, no desde un punto de vista activo de primera línea.

J (03.04): Claro, y antes de comenzar con las preguntas, además me gustaría aprender más sobre Procesa...

GM (03.11): Procesa es la entidad pública de la ciudad autónoma que se dedica en general al desarrollo socioeconómico, todo lo que sean proyectos que puedan tener que ver con el desarrollo económico de la región, se encauzan a través, se focalizan a través de Procesa, y en particular tiene la encomienda, tiene el encargo de gestionar los fondos europeos que proceden de la UE.

J (03.39): Entonces Procesa es más o menos como un ministerio....

GM (03.42): No, es dentro de la consejería de economía, como el ministerio de Ceuta dentro de la consejería de economía y hacienda hay un departamento que es procesa que se dedica al desarrollo económico y a los fondos europeos. Es un departamento no un...

J (03.57): Y los otros departamentos tienen otros...

GM (04.02): Si hay otros departamentos, está la intervención general para fiscalizar el gasto, está la contabilidad para controlar las cuentas, está tributo para el tema de los impuestos que se pagan.

J (04.12): ¿Pero cuanta autonomía tienen por aquí?

GM (04.15): Procesa, bueno procesa depende del gobierno, tiene un presidente del consejo de administración que es el consejero de economía y hacienda que era lo que yo hacía cuando estaba en política.

J (04.27): Pero en su condición puede hacer propuestas.

GM (04.31): Si de nivel técnico, lo que pasa que después ya la decisión política le corresponde al político como es lógico.

J (04.37): Claro, si pero su creatividad.

GM (04.42): Bueno mira, el organigrama nuestro, es así. Esto es el gobierno de Ceuta, tiene un presidente, ¿vale? Y después hay consejeros. Consejeros son como ministros, ¿vale? En el gobierno de España tiene el presidente y los ministros de economía, de asuntos exteriores, de educación. Pues aquí también claro, hay de economía y hacienda otro es de educación otro es de medio ambiente. Otro es de servicios sociales y así hay, ahora hay nueve. Entonces, dentro de economía y hacienda hay varias cosas, este tributo es para los ingresos, esta intervención, esta contabilidad, esta contratación, hay más ¿no? y una de ellas es procesa entonces, nosotros aquí, tenemos un director y después ya está el coordinador que soy yo y después ya hay técnicos, hay administrativos. Entonces las decisiones que desde aquí se hacen desde un punto de vista técnico. La decisión le corresponde al consejero o al gobierno en bloque.

J (05.54): Hace más o menos recomendaciones....

GM (00.57): Es técnico.

J (00.58): Es técnica.

GM (00.59): Si alguna decisión tomamos...

J (06.00): Porque...no me puedo imaginar que un presidente sabe todo.

GM (06.05): Claro, el nuestro es técnico de Procesa, nuestro presidente actualmente es técnico de Procesa, lo que pasa es que ahora está en política, pero el, él sabe de esto porque es técnico, él ha estado aquí.

J (06.19): Pero claramente una persona tiene siempre...

GM (06.23): Limitaciones.

J (06.24): Limitaciones es así entonces tiene que ...

GM (06.27): Delegar.

J (06.28): Apoyarse en otras personas...

GM (06.29): En cuestiones técnicas, claro.

J (06.30): Entonces en este centro tiene alguna autonomía en hacer propuestas.

GM (06.35): Ahora mismo yo lo que estoy haciendo es una propuesta de qué hacer con el programa operativo de empleo juvenil que la iniciativa de youth employment, no sé cómo se llama. Y estoy haciendo un borrador de

propuesta de programa que se llevara al consejero para que decidan si es o no es. Si les gusta o no les gusta y sobre esto ya se llevara a Bruselas.

J (07.04): Y para llevar estas propuestas usted ¿consulta otra gente?

GM (07.11): Si claro, somos un equipo aquí no estoy solo, claro hay más técnicos trabajando, expertos y después depende de cada iniciativa. Algunas si se consulta con un parte en área social. Los fondos europeos en general, no solamente en Ceuta sino en todos lados requieren que haya un comité de seguimiento, un comité en el que están los sindicatos, están los empresarios, está la sociedad civil, entonces muchas decisiones se toman consensuada con las centrales sindicales y con los empresarios.

J (07.48): Claro, y ¿cuánta gente trabaja en Procesa ms o menos?

GM (07.56): Ahora mismo, unas cincuenta personas.

J (08.00): Está bien. Si, entonces me puedo imaginar que los fondos europeos llegan aquí y ustedes los distribuyen, ¿o como?

GM (08.12): Si, bueno la asignación que le corresponde a Ceuta, Ceuta es una región dentro de la UE respecto de fondos europeos, como puede ser la baja Sajonia o como puede ser Andalucía. Exactamente igual y se nos asignan fondos europeos. Se nos dice para el periodo 2014-2020 tiene equis millones de euros, la cantidad, una cantidad concreta.

J (08.33): Que son mucho menos ahora que antes.

GM (08.36): Ahora son un poquito menos, no te creas que Ceuta ha salido muy mal en comparación del anterior periodo. Porque a Ceuta se le mantiene un status específico por nuestra situación fronteriza, entonces tiene una dotación especial.

J (08.49): Pero, entonces los fondos ya tienen la función no, cuando llegan aquí por ejemplo ...

GM (08.55): Bueno, los fondos europeos no sé si los conoces más o menos como van. Más o menos, hay varios tipos de fondos, básicamente hay cinco, fondo el FEDER que es el del desarrollo de infraestructura, el fondo social europeo que es para fomento de empleo, el fondo de cohesión que es para proyectos medio ambientales y de transporte. El CEADE que es para proyectos agrícolas. Y el IFO que es para proyectos de pesca. Nosotros aquí no tenemos CEADE porque no hay agricultura en Ceuta ni ganadería, queda descartado. No tenemos ya fondos de cohesión porque a España como país no le corresponden los fondos de cohesión. Ya estamos fuera de, por lo cual no tenemos y nos quedaría FEDER fondo social europeo y el de la pesca. Pero el de la pesca tenemos muy poca cantidad porque prácticamente tenemos muy poca pesca en realidad FEDER y fondo social, entonces nos dan una cantidad y nos marcan unos ejes entre que te los puedes gastar. Puedes gastártelo en una serie de proyectos, tú eliges dentro de esa batería de posibles proyectos en que te lo quieres gastar. Y así que cada uno. Te dicen -este dinero tienes y este dinero te puedes gastar- en una batería que pueden ser cien cosas distintas y tú eliges de esas cien que cinco quieres hacer o seis.

J (10.17): Y ¿qué papel entonces tiene la frontera porque obtienen fondos además?

GM (10.23): Adicionales, si, si, el consejo de Europa cuando hizo el reparto de fondos europeos entre las distintas regiones y países estados miembros de la UE específicamente aquel consejo de Europa donde están los primeros ministros, la señora Merkel, el señor Rajoy, el señor todos, en aquel consejo de Europa hicieron una disposición específica para Ceuta y Melilla que nos daban 25 millones de euros adicionales a los que nos correspondían. 25 a Ceuta y 25 a Melilla.

J (10.54): Y estos 25 millones son para eh...

GM (10.58): Para la frontera, ¿no?

J (10.59): Solo para la frontera.

GM (11.00): No, se pueden gastar en cualquier cuestión, nos lo dan porque estamos en la frontera. No es que nos lo gastemos en la frontera, sino porque somos frontera

J (11.10): Porque reconocen.

GM (11.11): El problema que supone ser frontera.

J (11.12): Claro, está bien.

GM (11.13): Pero eso está reconocido expresamente, eso lo puedes mirar si quieres en el consejo de Europa en el que se decidió el reparto de fondos que yo creo que fue, no sé si fue en febrero o marzo del año 2013 en el consejo de Europa. Uno de los acuerdos específicamente era Ceuta y Melilla.

J (11.31): Pero como, he entendido de la prensa, si, hace un año entonces, hasta este año, ya no obtienen estos fondos de cohesión...

GM (11.45): Si, España no le corresponde.

J (11.47): Pero antes si hasta el 2013 ¿no?

GM (11.52): Hasta el 2013 España como país recibía fondos de cohesión, a partir de 2014 ya no recibe fondos de cohesión, porque para recibir fondos de cohesión Janna, el país de los 27 estados miembros de la UE.

J (12.07): Tienen que tener menos, el setenta por ciento de

GM (12.09): Eso es, entonces España ya no es perceptora.

J (12.12): Pero significa que Ceuta tiene menos fondos en total ¿no?

GM (12.18): Pero no muchos menos.

J (12.20): ¿Cuanto menos?, más o menos...

GM (12.22): La comparación me parece que es de unos 10 millones de euros menos de lo que tuvo en el anterior periodo.

J (12.27): Porque antes no recibía estos 25 millones.

GM (12.30): Si los recibía, también los recibía.

J (12.34): Claro, entonces...

GM (12.35): Hay una reducción, pero la reducción que ha tenido Ceuta es menos que la que ha tenido conjunto de España.

J (12.41): Claro porque Ceuta también recibe muchos fondos para crear el empleo...

GM (12.49): Si, fondo social europeo. Recibe de FEDER y de fondo social Europeo

J (12.55): Claro, y que dice de la Unión Aduanera ¿qué es?

GM (13.03): Bueno Ceuta no forma parte de la UA común

J (13.07): Pero en la discusión...

GM (13.10): Si queremos estar o no queremos estar. Yo creo que sería positivo que Ceuta formara parte de la Unión Aduanera, sería positivo siempre y cuando se respetara el estatus especial que tiene Ceuta. Ceuta tiene reconocido un estatus fiscal especial, entonces en Ceuta hay una serie de bonificaciones y deducciones en determinados impuestos se paga menos impuestos o se paga menos en la seguridad social como incentivo para que las empresas vengan a Ceuta a invertir y se queden en Ceuta. Si ese estatus se pudiera ver afectado y no tenemos IVA, tenemos un impuesto sustitutivo que es el IPSI, si ese estado se pudiera haber modificado como consecuencia de entrar en la unión aduanera entonces creo que no sería interesante para Ceuta...

J (13.58): Entonces hay que, mantener el IPSI.

GM (14.02): Yo creo que hay que mantener el status específico, como por ejemplo Canarias. Canarias están dentro de la unión aduanera pero mantiene sus peculiaridades fiscales, tiene sus propios impuestos, tiene sus propios condicionantes y eso Europa lo ha reconocido

J (14.18): Porque son regiones ultra periféricas... claro, pero para Ceuta es más difícil porque no es una región ultraperiférica.

GM (14.26): No es una región ultraperiférica, pero en Ceuta concurren mucho los factores que hacen que, fundamenta la política regional, somos una región aislada, no tenemos, tenemos una escasa superficie, una alta densidad de población, somos frontera terrestre de Europa en África. En definitiva se dan una serie de condicionantes que entiendo requieren de la, de el reconocimiento de esa singularidad por parte de la UE. Aunque no seamos ultraperiféricos porque no tenemos los requisitos que establece el tratado de la UE, de distancia respecto al continente y de otra serie de condicionantes sí que tenemos otros problemas que no tiene Canarias, ya quisiera Ceuta tener el turismo que tiene Canarias.

J (15.11): Si claro, claro, pero al mismo tiempo entonces ¿hay una oportunidad o es probable que Europa va a reconocer estas singularidad en este modo?

GM (15.25): Yo opino y es una opinión personal, yo opino que no va a pasar porque el problema de la Unión Aduanera requiere también del reconocimiento del estatus de aduana comercial en la frontera con Marruecos y Marruecos no va a querer y los intereses de Europa en Marruecos son importantes con lo cual...y los de España ¿no? Los de España como país y los de la UE como unión y yo creo que la presión o la fuerza que pueda tener Marruecos frente a una ciudad pequeña como Ceuta y Melilla es mucha con lo cual creo que nunca habrá a priori un consentimiento de aduana comercial y una unión aduanera.

J (16.09): Claro, y entonces vamos a ver las preguntas más estándar. ¿Qué es Ceuta para usted?

GM (16.21): Para mí, bueno es mi región, es mi ciudad, es mí, ya un poco más poético, sería bueno, creo que es un referente a nivel nacional y a nivel mundial por la ubicación estratégica que tiene, geográfica, en el estrecho de Gibraltar, históricamente todos los pueblos han querido ocupar Ceuta porque es un punto de referencia de control del paso en el estrecho de Gibraltar y después también creo que es un referente porque lo ha podido comprobar ¿no? Aquí vive gente cristiana occidental, gente de origen hindú, gente de origen árabe, gente de origen hebreo y la relación no es que sea una convivencia absoluta pero no existe mala convivencia, no existe conflictividad entre unos y otros en la calle y yo creo que eso es un ejemplo que podría extrapolarse a otros sitio del mundo, por ejemplo a Israel y Palestina por ponerle un ejemplo.

J (17.33): Claro y entonces los problemas no son la primera cosa que vienen en mente pensando en Ceuta...

GM (17.45): A mí no, si no no viviría aquí y no tendría hijos ni me gustaría quedarme aquí, estaría pensando en irme.

J (17.53): Claro, claro, pero ¿está preocupado por el futuro de Ceuta?

GM (18.01): Si, si lógicamente estoy preocupado por el futuro de Ceuta, en general por el futuro de España pero en particular por el de Ceuta, yo creo que hay problemas consecuencia de la presión migratoria, hay problema porque el modelo económico en el que está basado Ceuta no está funcionando bien y hay mucho paro y después esta la presión histórica de Marruecos reclamando la soberanía de Ceuta y Melilla.

J (18.33): Claro, y hay muchas noticias y discusiones sobre la inseguridad en Ceuta, ¿cómo la percibe y cómo se comporta gente?

GM (18.49): Yo creo que Ceuta es una ciudad en general segura, los problemas de inseguridad en Ceuta están vinculados estadísticamente con nuestra condición fronteriza, es lógico que haya más tráfico de inmigrantes en Ceuta que en un punto del interior de Alemania o de un punto interior de España, es normal, la frontera está aquí no está allá, es normal que aquí haya más detenciones como consecuencia del tráfico de personas, también es cierto que en el ámbito del narcotráfico de la droga, Ceuta también está en un punto, para lo bueno y para lo malo estamos en un punto importante y aquí claro es paso de droga de África o de Marruecos hacia Europa y por eso también hay una mayor incidencia en el ámbito del narcotráfico pero lo que es la vida cotidiana, lo que es la delincuencia común, robos, asaltos, peleas, agresiones, eso es exactamente igual que en el resto de España, Ceuta no es más insegura que el resto de España en el tema de delincuencia común, de un robo de un hurto, es como el resto de España.

J (19.58): Claro, y entonces ¿quién o quiénes son las personas o las instituciones que pueden influenciar más sobre el futuro de Ceuta.?

GM (20.15): Indudablemente el gobierno de España y la UE. La posición de defensa del gobierno de España frente a la UE, la capacidad que tenga el gobierno de España de convencer al resto de socios de la UE al resto de países de que Ceuta es un punto estratégico que requiere un apoyo especial. La capacidad de influencia que pueda tener Rajoy y su gobierno de convencer a Merkel y a Zar...al francés, como se llama, a François Hollande y al resto de presidentes, de jefes de estado de que Ceuta requiere un estatus especial. Me pregunta si lo tiene, yo creo que ahora mismo la posición de España es débil en la UE por las circunstancias económicas, por las circunstancias de ahora mismo no es el que está marcando la pauta indudablemente, hubo otro tiempo en el que quizás si tuvo mayor influencia.

J (21.24): Pero en general hay un apoyo ...

GM (21.27): Pero la UE en general yo creo que sí, ya eso que te decía antes del reconocimiento específico hacia Ceuta y Melilla en el consejo de Europa es muestra de que todo los demás países conocen de la problemática de Ceuta y Melilla...

J (21.31): Claro y aquí en esta ciudad ¿hay manifestaciones, activismo, ocurre a veces?

GM (21.40): Si, a veces claro claro, hay manifestaciones fundamentalmente solicitando empleo por un lado, hay mucho paro. Ceuta es la ciudad española con más alta tasa de paro y eso hace que la gente en ocasiones está desesperada, y también estamos teniendo casi puntualmente manifestaciones de inmigrantes que están reclamando asilo, o que están reclamando poder pasar a la península.

J (22.11): Y si usted tuviera el poder para decidir ahora mismo que va a pasar con Ceuta en el futuro. ¿Qué haría?

GM (22.29): Te lo digo aquí, lo he tenido, ahora ya no lo tengo, no, pero eh ¿qué hacer con Ceuta en el futuro?, yo creo que el principal problema de Ceuta es, bueno tiene varias cuestiones. Una intentar que la cohesión social, la convivencia entre occidentales, europeos y musulmanes no se quiebre, no se rompa, es decir, hay que hacer un importante esfuerzo para que las zonas o las personas de origen musulmán no se sientan rechazadas e ignoradas sino que se sienta integradas, y que sean exactamente iguales unos que otros, que no exista una discriminación y eso es fundamental porque el día que se rompa esa convivencia entonces Ceuta no será posible, no será un sitio agradable donde vivir y evidentemente vendrá un problema grave, pues ese es el principal objetivo que tiene que tener todo el mundo, fomentar la igualdad, fomentar que haya una convivencia y que todos se sientan a gusto viviendo aquí. Desde el punto de vista, en segundo lugar seguir manteniendo el apoyo de la administración, tanto del gobierno de España como de Europa para que bueno aquí se sigan prestando servicios públicos y se siga bueno manteniendo la ciudad en condiciones. Y en tercer lugar intentar buscar incentivos para que la actividad privada, la actividad empresarial pueda bueno, mantenerse, sea por la vía de la Unión aduanera o sea por la vía de incentivos o el desarrollo del puerto o el desarrollo del turismo. Eso sería un poco...

J (24.09): Está bien. Entonces para hablar más de Europa, ¿qué significa para usted ser europeo y que significa para Ceuta?

GM (24.22): Yo me siento europeo y orgulloso de serlo, o sea me siento orgulloso de ser Ceutí, me siento orgulloso de ser español y me siento orgulloso de formar parte de Europa porque creo que es una unidad aunque hay cosas que evidentemente nos diferencian y que somos, bueno, cada uno aporta sus cosas, cada uno aporta sus costumbres su cultura, su tradición, su historia, pero el objetivo común, además creo que es positivo porque la unión hace la fuerza, es un dicho muy extendido y muy común pero es verdad, entonces yo creo que es más fuerte España dentro de Europa que España sola. Y es más fuerte Francia dentro de Europa que Francia solo, yo considero que existe, que es positivo y me siento contento de ser europeo. Aparte que creo que es útil el ser europeo.

J (25.13): Y siente alguna responsabilidad por ser ciudadano europeo

GM (25.19): Si yo siento una responsabilidad, bueno la misma que siento de ser español o de ser ceutí.

J (25.25): Claro y ¿lo siente más porque Ceuta está en la frontera?

GM (25.34): ¿Siento más que soy europeo y español porque estoy en la frontera? Quizás...quizás en Ceuta se sienta todos los días se está continuamente reivindicando que eres español y que eres europeo, eso no pasa en otros puntos de España o de Europa.

J (25.50): Porque uno lo ve más claro...

GM (25.52): Más normal, aquí evidentemente hay una presión al otro lado de la frontera. Marruecos reclama la soberanía de Ceuta y Melilla y eso hace que tú pues te afiances en tu posición de defensa, la muestra la tienes en que cuando vinieron los reyes en el año 2007 fue la primera visita de uno, del jefe de estado a Ceuta desde mil novecientos veintitantos

J (26.14): Había una crisis....

GM (26.15): Había una crisis con Marruecos pero salió muchísima gente a la calle más que en ningún sitio con las banderas españolas. Ahí tengo un libro sobre la visita real de. En 2007

J (26.32): Y entonces, como es la relación entre Ceuta y la UE ya lo ha dicho un poco pero...

GM (26.39): Bien, bien, yo creo que en general es positiva. Bueno Ceuta directamente con la UE no tiene relación o sea directamente con las instituciones europeas. O ¿te refieres con las instituciones o te refieres en general?

J (26.53): Depende de usted, como...

GM (27.06): Con las instituciones no hay una interrelación directa o sea a través del gobierno de España y es el gobierno de España que tiene que defender la posición de Ceuta en la UE y Ceuta con la UE desde el punto de vista de afuera de las instituciones. Yo creo que las relaciones son buena, los ceutís se sienten orgullosos.

GM (27.16): Y hay una ventaja.

GM (27.18): Si, si, indudablemente.

J (27.19): Y ¿qué significado tiene Ceuta para la UE?

GM (27.21): Yo creo que Ceuta, bueno en primer lugar es la frontera, es el primer tapón para la inmigración, yo creo que la inmigración lamentablemente es un fenómeno que cada vez está más expandido y que no solamente se pasa por la frontera de Ceuta, sino que te llega a través de Lampedusa se llega a través de, o lamentablemente cruzando el estrecho con un barco o una barca una patera pero a través de Malta o donde sea, pero es el primer, es la única frontera terrestre al igual que Melilla de Europa en África y también creo que es una oportunidad, porque es una oportunidad para como laboratorio, es decir para ver cómo aplicar políticas de contención o en su caso políticas de integración a las que ya estén, bueno pues qué hacer con ellos, como hacerlo y yo creo que es una buena, es una prueba de toque.

J (28.16): Está bien y ¿que tan común Ceuta con otros lugares en la UE y como es diferente?

GM (28.23): Bueno Melilla es evidente que tenemos prácticamente los mismos problemas y las mismas características. Y con el resto de la UE, claro si nos comparan con Finlandia poco tenemos que ver con ellos. Tiene en común, tiene en común pues la cultura europea en este caso mezclada con la cultura musulmana y con la cultura árabe pero bueno sigue siendo una institución, siguen siendo instituciones europeas democráticas y donde se aplica el humanismo y se aplican los derechos humanos y los derechos fundamentales como en el resto de Europa, ese toque con esa mezclanza que te comento. Y que tiene de diferente, pues eso precisamente que somos mediterráneos que estamos mezclados occidentales con, con personas procedentes de África o procedente de Asia como los indios, los hindúes y que bueno pues es una ciudad donde no existe la hegemonía absoluta de una etnia como en casi toda Europa.

J (29.29): Claro, y entonces ¿qué papel tiene la UE en el tema de seguridad en la vida cotidiana?

GM (29.38): Yo creo que es muy importante ¿no?. De hecho prácticamente todo el aspecto fronterizo de Ceuta está controlado, consiste además que sea financiado con algún fondo europeo a través de la administración general del estado, no por parte de la ciudad y después me consta, yo no soy ningún experto en temas de seguridad ni mucho menos pero me consta que cuerpos y fuerzas de seguridad de otros países y de la UE han venido a Ceuta para ver y analizar el control fronterizo, luego yo creo que es un punto importante estratégico del que todos están muy pendientes.

J (30.17): Y ¿puede imaginar cómo sería la situación sin UE, sin ser España?

GM (30.35): Sin ser España, sin ser España no me lo puedo imaginar, sin ser UE pues. Pero sin ser España no me lo puedo imaginar, Ceuta es España desde que se creó en el año 1400 bueno era portuguesa. ¿Conoce la historia de Ceuta?. Fue portuguesa hasta que se fusionaron las coronas de España y Portugal entonces paso a ser española y cuando se volvieron a separar siguió siendo española. Entonces bueno Ceuta es una ciudad que surge en el mundo occidental, surge con la llegada de los portugueses, no la considero evidentemente si no fuera española o no fuera de la UE sería como al otro lado de la frontera, sería como Tetuán o... sería como Tetuán.

J (31.12): Está bien y eh... en esta situación aislada del continente europeo por el mar, aislado de marruecos por la frontera sin grandes capacidades agrícolas, sin en producción más o menos hay algo pero no es mucho. ¿Hacia donde o en qué dirección Ceuta tendría que orientarse más?

GM (31.45): Bueno yo creo que Ceuta evidentemente tú lo has explicado muy bien es una ciudad de servicio, no es agrícola, no es industrial, luego solamente puede ser servicio y yo creo que debe intentar enfocarse en varias vías, por un lado el desarrollo del puerto, el puerto de Ceuta está ubicado en un sitio estratégico de transido de mercancías, de Europa con América y de Europa con África y en consecuencia es un sitio, deberíamos desarrollar la actividad portuaria como ocurre en Gibraltar o como ocurre en Algeciras por ejemplo, o el propio Tánger, el Tánger med no, entonces el puerto de Ceuta yo creo que tiene capacidad para, o debería tener capacidad para absorber parte del tráfico del estrecho y en consecuencia desarrollarse económicamente, por otro lado también creo que turísticamente Ceuta tiene algún recorrido, no mucho porque tenemos serios competidores cerca pero yo creo que puede ser atractivo para el europeo en el sentido de darle esa multiculturalidad que no tiene allí al otro lado del estrecho. Bueno, aquí te puedes ir a un restaurante árabe o puedes ir a un restaurante hindú o puedes ir a tomarte un té en Benzú, y eso es un atractivo que no tienes allí y simultáneamente también es un atractivo para el vecino de marruecos venir a Ceuta porque es venir a Europa y es venir a encontrarse cosas que no puedes hacer al otro lado de la frontera, desde tomarte una cerveza, que no puedes tomártela allí en un bar hasta bueno hasta hacer serie de cosas entonces eso puede también ser un objetivo de desarrollo y después yo creo que podría ser o puede ser un área que preste servicios a la zona norte de marruecos aprovechando el know how europeo en la gestión empresarial, en la gestión medio ambiental, en los servicios sociales en la educación, es decir la universidad europea que también está aquí en Ceuta pues podría servir para...

J (33.48): Pero hay también unas limitaciones de todo eso ¿no? porque en realidad solo la gente que tiene un pasaporte, una carta de identidad de Tetuán puede venir. Entonces no pueden entrar todos...

GM (34.05): Si pueden venir solo los que sean de la provincia de Tetuán y el resto puede venir si vienen con visado claro, pero pasa con visado

J (34.12): Pero entonces sería bien ampliar esto a todo Marruecos, ¿sería práctico para Ceuta?

GM (34.22): Si yo creo que, hombre hay intentar al menos buscar agilidad para permitir ese tránsito de ida y vuelta de día del personal que venga del vecino reino de Marruecos.

J (37.25): Si, y entonces ¿qué papel tiene la frontera en su vida cotidiana, como impacta?

GM (37.32): En la mía personal la verdad que poco, yo no soy una persona que vaya mucho a Marruecos.

J (37.41): Pero encuentra el tráfico en las calles...

GM (37.45): Vivo cerca del trabajo con lo cual vengo andando los niños tienen el colegio cerca de, de...no cojo el coche prácticamente, lo cojo los fines de semana para ir a jugar al fútbol con los niños y eso, pero desde el punto de vista personal mío....

J (38.02): No tiene grandes relaciones en el otro lado de la frontera.

GM (38.06): No, hace tiempo que no paso del otro lado de la frontera, hace cinco años que no voy a Marruecos.

J (38.12): Es tanto. Y ¿qué se cuenta sobre la gente al otro lado de la frontera. Hay algunos estereotipos, estereotipos sobre la gente del otro lado?

GM (38.29): Yo tengo relación con gente del otro lado, aunque yo no vaya no quiere decir que no tenga relación con marroquíes y si la tengo eh, y no sé qué imagen puedo tener, pues buenas personas, son personas que tienen un

problema, es un país donde no existen los mismos derechos humanos que existen aquí o las mismas garantías respecto a la educación, la sanidad y bueno pues son dignos de elogio pero yo creo que son personas, yo tengo un buen concepto de las personas que están al otro lado de la frontera. De las personas, otras cosas son las instituciones y los gobiernos pero del marroquí yo creo que es una buena persona que no tengo porque pensar nada negativo de él.

J (39.17): Claro y si esto ya hemos dicho más o menos, ¿qué haría con la frontera si tuviera el poder de cambiar algo en la frontera?

GM (39.39): Yo la modernizaría, intentaría que fuera más moderno, incrementaría el número de medios de personas. Ten en cuenta que por ahí pasan diariamente entre seis, siete, ocho mil personas todos los días, entonces intentaría humanizarlo intentaría que fuera más amplia, más cómoda, más confortable, incrementaría el número de policías que están ahí controlando el acceso, es decir, facilitaría desde ese punto de vista la cuestión manteniendo siempre la seguridad que debe ser un principio básico porque es frontera ¿no? Pero básicamente eso ampliaría la frontera, la haría más confortable y la incrementaría los medios e incluso si pudiera aplicaría medios tecnológicos para que quizás pudieran dinamizar aquellos, como ocurre en muchos otros sitios, tú vas a ver al Bayer de Múnich o al Real Madrid y ya cuando entras al estadio lo que hay son unos tornos magnéticos que tu pasas la entrada y automáticamente se abre la puerta. Pues a lo mejor algo así se podría intentar ingeniar con los pasaportes de manera que -puede pasar, no puede pasar-....

J (40.50): Al mismo tiempo crea empleo controlar los pasaportes...

GM (40.53): Bueno se tienen que ser policías, tenía que ser policías porque esa competencia nomás que le corresponde a la seguridad pública.

J (41.05): Claro entonces ya hemos terminado y fue un grande placer, muchas gracias.

GM (41.10): No gracias a ti, Janna, un placer.