

Master Thesis

**Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Master in
Political Science (MSc)**

Title: *Political Culture in Post-Authoritarian Hybrid Regimes. How Does It Affect the Success of
Opposition Parties in Elections?*

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Abstract

The research attempts to answer how the political culture of an electorate affects incumbent turnover via elections in post-authoritarian competitive authoritarianism. The study hypothesizes that the undemocratic political culture of an electorate is negatively and significantly related to incumbent turnover through elections in post-authoritarian competitive authoritarianism. To test the hypothesis, a sample of 45 national elections is drawn. The relationship between the political culture and incumbent turnover is analyzed employing binary logistic regression. The analysis generates two main conclusions. First, the research fails to provide enough support for the argument that the political culture of an electorate in post-authoritarian competitive authoritarianism is a significant predictor of incumbent turnover via elections. Second, the analysis finds that it is rather two other factors that best determine incumbent turnover through elections. These are the freedom and fairness of elections, as well as regime capacity. The latter is best understood as the government's capacity to abuse democratic practices in the pursuit of greater dominance vis-à-vis the opposition.

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List of Abbreviations and Acronyms

- CSO: Civil Society Organization
- HOG: Head of Government
- HOS: Head of State
- N: Sample Size
- p: Statistical Significance
- SD: Standard Deviation
- VIF: Variance Inflation Factor
- -2LL: -2 Log Likelihood

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Chapter One: Introduction

This thesis examines the political culture of electorates in post-authoritarian *competitive authoritarianism*. *Competitive authoritarian regimes* are political regimes which comprise both democratic and authoritarian features (Diamond, 2002). As such, these mixed regimes are considered nondemocratic political regimes (Schedler, 2013). While elections in *competitive authoritarianism* are highly tilted in favor of incumbents, they nevertheless remain competitive (Levitsky & Way, 2010). In that respect, the study of incumbent turnover through elections in *competitive authoritarianism* has been dominated by the structuralist and rationalist approaches. Structuralists have focused on the freedom and fairness of elections (Levitsky & Way, 2010; Schedler, 2013), incumbents' capacity for repressive measures (Bieber, 2018; Levitsky & Way, 2010, 2012; McFaul, 2005; Robertson, 2009; Turovsky, 2014; Van Ham & Seim, 2017; Wintrobe, 2000) and ties to the West (Bieber, 2018; Levitsky & Way, 2010, 2014; Way, 2008; Wolchik, 2012) in explaining incumbent turnover via elections. On the other hand, rationalists have concentrated on opposition capacity and the strategic choices made by opposition leaders (Bunce & Wolchik, 2010, 2011; Howard & Roessler, 2006; McFaul, 2005; Wolchik, 2012).

However, the culturalist perspective has been explored the least. The culturalist explanation has focused on the political culture of electorates (Bratton & Logan, 2006; Bratton et al., 2005; Colton & McFaul, 2003; Ekman, 2009; Furman, 2007; Pipes, 2004). In that regard, political culture is understood as a set of political attitudes, sentiments and values that govern behavior in the political process (Pye & Verba, 1965). In relation to post-authoritarian *competitive authoritarianism*, the culturalist explanation has focused on undemocratic attitudes shaped by the

lack or absence of previous experience of democracy. Specifically, such attitudes include acceptance of strongman rule (Bratton & Logan, 2006; Bratton et al., 2005; Colton & McFaul, 2003; Ekman, 2009; Furman, 2007; Pipes, 2004) and preferences for stability over democracy (Ekman, 2009; Furman, 2007; Pipes, 2004). To illustrate, 63 percent of Tanzanians have agreed that their ‘government should be able to ban any organization that goes against its policies’ (as cited in Ekman, 2009, p. 17). Of the Russian electorate, only 11 percent have expressed they would be ‘unwilling to surrender their freedoms of speech, press, or movement in exchange for stability’ (as cited in Pipes, 2004, p. 11). Despite all the evidence of undemocratic attitudes from surveys in post-authoritarian *competitive authoritarian regimes*, the explanatory power of political culture remains underexplored. Most of the research on the political culture of electorates as a determinant of incumbent turnover via elections in post-authoritarian *competitive authoritarianism* represents qualitative analyses. The explanatory power of political culture has not been statistically confirmed in any comprehensive large-N analysis. Furthermore, it is unclear if the political culture of an electorate maintains its explanatory power when controlling for all other factors. In other words, there is a knowledge gap present. It is concerned with whether the political culture of an electorate is a significant determinant of incumbent turnover via elections in post-authoritarian *competitive authoritarianism*.

Thus, the objective of this thesis is to answer the following research question: *how does the political culture of an electorate affect incumbent turnover via elections in post-authoritarian competitive authoritarianism?* The study hypothesizes that the undemocratic political culture of electorates in post-authoritarian *competitive authoritarianism* is negatively and significantly related to incumbent turnover through elections. Most crucially, the research is strictly concerned with incumbent turnover only. It is not concerned with democratization. The new government

could replace the old incumbents but the newcomers could continue carrying out the old menu of repression (Donno, 2013; Levitsky & Way, 2010; Van Ham & Seim, 2017). In such scenarios the new regime does not democratize the state and the country continues to be regarded as a *competitive authoritarian regime* (Donno, 2013; Levitsky & Way, 2010; Van Ham & Seim, 2017). To test the hypothesis, a sample of 45 national elections across post-authoritarian *competitive authoritarian regimes* is drawn (see *Appendix A: Sample Details*). The relationship between political culture and incumbent turnover is analyzed employing binary logistic regression.

Crucially, the study represents the first comprehensive large-N statistical analysis of the political culture of electorates in explaining incumbent turnover via elections in post-authoritarian *competitive authoritarianism*. Moreover, the research juxtaposes the explanatory power of political culture to that of other factors emphasized by structuralists and rationalists. This way, the explanatory power of political culture can be compared to other determinants of incumbent turnover through elections. Additionally, if the findings demonstrate that the undemocratic political culture of electorates is a significant predictor, there could be important societal implications. In that case, the West and other democratizing forces should focus on fostering democratic attitudes among electorates in post-authoritarian *competitive authoritarian regimes*. This is because incumbent turnover represents a necessary step for *competitive authoritarian regimes* to democratize.

The following chapter discusses the theory behind *competitive authoritarianism*, political culture and incumbent turnover. Afterwards, the thesis outlines the empirical strategy. Following that, the empirical results are analyzed and interpreted. Lastly, the thesis ends with a discussion of the main findings.

Chapter Two: Theorizing Incumbent Turnover via Elections

Literature Review


This section aims to provide an overview of what the academic literature says regarding *competitive authoritarianism*. Specifically, it focuses on what *competitive authoritarianism* is in essence; what types and subtypes of *competitive authoritarianism* there are; how it differs from other regime types on the democratic-nondemocratic spectrum; and what determines incumbent turnover¹ through elections in post-authoritarian *competitive authoritarianism*.

Defining competitive authoritarianism:

Competitive authoritarianism represents only one subcategory of *hybrid regimes*. A *hybrid regime* is a political regime that comprises both democratic and authoritarian features (Diamond, 2002). The term *hybrid regime* has been substituted for a number of other terms in the literature. Such alternative terms include ‘*electoral authoritarianism*’ (Diamond, 2002), ‘*defective democracy*’ (Croissant, 2004), ‘*semi-democracy*’ (Gasiorowski, 1996; Mainwaring, Brinks & Pérez-Liñán, 2007), ‘*partly free*’ regime (Freedom House), ‘*imitation democracy*’ (Furman, 2007), ‘*managed democracy*’ (Colton & McFaul, 2003) or ‘*illiberal democracy*’ (Zakaria, 1997).

¹ The phrases ‘incumbent turnover’ and ‘alternation in power’ are used interchangeably throughout this paper. Both expressions are used to convey a change in government through elections. Such a shift implies a new government consisting of officials who are not affiliated with the ruling party or coalition they replace. Importantly, the phrases above solely express a change of government. This new government need not bring about democratization.

Figure 1. Democratic-nondemocratic spectrum.



Note: the sizes of categories and subcategories do not reflect the actual distribution of political regimes in the world.

In order to understand *hybrid regimes*, one has to look closer at the democratic-nondemocratic spectrum along which political regimes can be located. The spectrum is divided into two poles: democratic and nondemocratic. It includes three main categories. These are *democracies*, *hybrid regimes* and *closed authoritarian regimes*. The democratic pole of the spectrum includes the category of *democracies*. In turn, *democracies* can be broken down into two main subcategories. These are *electoral democracies* and *liberal democracies* (Diamond, 2002; Schedler, 2002). *Electoral democracy* is generally considered a regime that complies with

Dahl's (1971) concept of polyarchy. Dahl's 'procedural minimum' requires that citizens have unimpaired opportunities to formulate preferences; to signal their preferences; to have their preferences weighted equally in the conduct of government; to oppose the government; to compete for government; and that all citizens are entitled to these aforementioned rights. Besides, citizens being able to formulate and signal preferences requires that they are granted basic civil liberties. (Dahl, 1971). These include freedom of speech, freedom of the press and freedom of association (Dahl, 1971). Nonetheless, scholars usually add one more criterium to the definition of *electoral democracy* (Levitsky & Way, 2010). It refers to there being an absence of nonelected 'tutelary' authorities that constrain the effective power to govern of elected officials (Levitsky & Way, 2010). Examples of such 'tutelary' powers include monarchic, religious and military authorities (Levitsky & Way, 2010).

Next, *liberal democracies* comply with all the requirements for *electoral democracies* and further build on them. *Liberal democracies* demand more extensive civil liberties and protection of the rule of law than those required for *electoral democracies*². Therefore, *liberal democracies* are found further ahead in the direction of democracy on the democratic-nondemocratic spectrum (Diamond, 2002; Schedler, 2002). In other words, *liberal democracies* are considered a level more democratic than *electoral democracies* (Diamond, 2002; Schedler, 2002).

On the other hand, the nondemocratic pole of the spectrum includes the other two categories: *hybrid regimes* and *closed authoritarian regimes*. *Closed authoritarianism* represents full authoritarianism. In *closed authoritarianism* there is a complete absence of political pluralism (Diamond, 2002; Schedler, 2002). Elections either do not take place, or if they do, they

² Generally, extensive civil liberties include broader minority rights, private property rights, privacy rights, political transparency, etc.

are not multiparty (Diamond, 2002; Schedler, 2002). Parties different than the ruling one are banned (Diamond, 2002; Schedler, 2002). In short, no democratic channels exist through which citizens can oppose the government (Diamond, 2002; Schedler, 2002). Hence, *closed authoritarianism* is found at the end of the spectrum, representing the most undemocratic category (Diamond, 2002; Schedler, 2002).

Moving on, the category of *hybrid regimes* is situated between *democracies* and *closed authoritarianism* (Diamond, 2002; Donno, 2013; Levitsky & Way, 2002, 2010; Schedler, 2002). *Hybrid regimes* can be broken down into two subcategories (Donno, 2013; Schedler, 2002). In academia, they are most commonly divided between hegemonic and competitive *hybrid regimes* (Diamond, 2002; Donno, 2013; Levitsky & Way, 2002, 2010; Schedler, 2002). The former is better known as *hegemonic electoral authoritarianism* (Schedler, 2002) or simply *hegemonic authoritarianism* (Donno, 2013). It refers to *hybrid regimes* in which democratic mechanisms do exist de jure but where political competition is virtually nonexistent in practice (Diamond, 2002; Donno, 2013; Schedler, 2002). In such regimes elections do take place (Diamond, 2002; Donno, 2013; Schedler, 2002). Democratic channels and institutions via which one can oppose or run for government do exist de jure (Diamond, 2002; Donno, 2013; Schedler, 2002). Nonetheless, in hegemonic *hybrid regimes* political competition is almost completely eliminated (Diamond, 2002; Donno, 2013; Schedler, 2002). Most parties different than the ruling one are banned; elections are marred by excessive fraud; and freedom of speech, the press, and association are extremely constrained (Levitsky & Way, 2010; Schedler, 2002). In other words, elections in *hegemonic electoral authoritarianism* constitute nothing more than ‘façade elections’ (Diamond, 2002) or ‘theatrical settings’ (Schedler, 2002). When it comes to elections, the regime is in Schedler’s (2002) words ‘invincible’. Thus, the only difference between *hegemonic*

authoritarianism and *closed authoritarianism* is that the former does hold de jure multiparty elections (Diamond, 2002; Levitsky & Way, 2002, 2010; Schedler, 2002). It is for this reason that Levitsky and Way (2010) do not differentiate between *hegemonic electoral authoritarianism* and *closed authoritarianism*. The authors subsume both of these regime types under full authoritarianism.

Nevertheless, it is worth discussing some of the research that analyzes turnover through elections in *hegemonic authoritarianism*. Some of these authors include Donno (2013) and Schedler (2013). These works find that turnover as a result of elections in *hegemonic electoral authoritarianism* is possible. However, it is crucial to understand what leads to turnover. Donno and Schedler prove that a significant predictor for turnover in *hegemonic authoritarianism* is regime capacity. That is, it is the erosion or decline of regime dominance that causes incumbent turnover via elections. However, this begs the question of whether these regimes should be considered hegemonic in the first place. This is because a defining feature which separates hegemonic regimes from competitive regimes is the incumbents' unbeatable dominance (Diamond, 2002). In other words, turnover via elections in *hegemonic authoritarianism* is possible only when the hegemonic regime ceases to be hegemonic and becomes competitive. It all comes down to the issue of how research determines which regimes qualify as *hegemonic authoritarianism*. Donno considers hegemonic those *hybrid regimes* in which the incumbents either received 75% or more of the votes in the first round of the previous presidential election; or in which the incumbents hold 75% or more of the seats in the national legislature. Similarly, Schedler considers hegemonic those *hybrid regimes* in which the incumbents have a two-thirds majority in the lower or only house; and have been *hybrid regimes* for at least 10 years. Therefore, to qualify as *hegemonic authoritarianism* Donno and Schedler consider the regime's

dominance based on factors different than the regime's dominance at the election in question. That is, these works do not consider incumbents' level of hegemony when it has already diminished at the election of interest. Hence, a misspecification like that could lead to a misunderstanding of whether incumbent turnover can take place in *hegemonic authoritarianism* via elections. For this reason, this chapter uses *hegemonic authoritarianism* to refer to those *hybrid regimes* where no viable channels of contestation exist.

Next, the second subcategory of *hybrid regimes* is the one which includes all competitive *hybrid regimes*. It comprises all competitive regime types which do not qualify for *democracy*. Therefore, this subcategory is situated between *electoral democracy* and *hegemonic authoritarianism* on the spectrum. Nevertheless, scholars have different ways of classifying competitive *hybrid regimes*. For instance, Levitsky and Way (2010) argue that the subcategory of competitive *hybrid regimes* can be broken down into four different regime forms³⁴. It is only the first form which they call *competitive authoritarianism*. Accordingly, *competitive authoritarianism* is distinguished from *electoral democracy* in that in the former incumbents violate at least one of three specific requirements (Levitsky & Way, 2010). These three criteria are fair elections; basic civil liberties⁵; and a reasonably level playing field (Levitsky & Way, 2010, pp. 5-12). Level playing field refers to the regime and the opposition having relatively equal access to resources, the law and the media⁶ (Levitsky & Way, 2010). Hence, these

³ Not to be confused, 'category' refers to *hybrid regimes* as a whole. Within it 'subcategories' are 'competitive *hybrid regimes*' and 'hegemonic *hybrid regimes*'. Within the subcategory of 'competitive *hybrid regimes*' different 'forms' of such regimes can be found.

⁴ Levitsky and Way's (2010) fourfold classification of competitive *hybrid regimes* has later been adopted by Schedler (2013) as well.

⁵ Again, basic civil liberties refer to freedom of the press, speech and association (Levitsky & Way, 2010).

⁶ Indeed, Levitsky and Way (2010) acknowledge that this requirement overlaps with the other two requirements. However, the scholars justify its inclusion by arguing that it brings about analytical convenience. Additionally, the authors argue that it allows for the researcher to uncover dynamics which are not strictly confined to the campaign period.

requirements represent a different formulation of Dahl's (1971) criteria for polyarchy, as they are directly linked. Nonetheless, state abuse of these criteria cannot be too extensive that it renders political contestation uncompetitive (Levitsky & Way, 2010). Levitsky and Way argue that the vast majority of competitive *hybrid regimes* fall within this regime form⁷.

On the other hand, other scholars employ a more straightforward classification of competitive *hybrid regimes*. Diamond (2002) seemingly breaks down the competitive subcategory into two regime forms. These are *competitive authoritarian regimes* and *ambiguous regimes* (Diamond, 2002). The latter refers to those regimes which 'fall on the blurry border between *electoral democracy* and *competitive authoritarianism*' (Diamond, 2002). In other words, in this regime form Diamond includes the most competitive among *competitive authoritarian regimes*. However, the author claims that the distinction between the forms is rather superficial. The scholar argues that 'virtually all' *ambiguous regimes* should be regarded as *competitive authoritarian regimes*. Essentially, Diamond does not differentiate between different forms of competitive *hybrid regimes*. The scholar regards all regime forms that fall in the subcategory of competitive *hybrid regimes* as *competitive authoritarianism*. Similarly, Donno (2013) too does not differentiate between different regime forms of competitive *hybrid regimes*. The author examines all regimes that are situated in the subcategory of competitive *hybrid regimes* as a single form. Likewise, Donno refers to all competitive *hybrid regimes* using the term *competitive authoritarianism* as well.

⁷ The second regime form identified by Levitsky and Way (2010) is *exclusive republics*. *Exclusive republics* differ from *electoral democracies* in that a major part of the electorate is deprived of suffrage (Levitsky & Way, 2010). The third form of competitive *hybrid regimes*, according to the authors, is *restrictive republics*. What distinguishes them from *electoral democracies* is that there is a major party which has been banned (Levitsky & Way, 2010). Finally, the fourth regime form within competitive *hybrid regimes* is *tutelary regimes* (Levitsky & Way, 2010). *Tutelary regimes* differ from *electoral democracies* in that the power of elected government is effectively constrained by nonelected authorities (Levitsky & Way, 2010). Such nonelected powers include monarchic, military and religious authorities.

Nevertheless, as to be discussed below, scholars appear to provide very similar accounts regarding the dynamics within competitive *hybrid regimes*. This is in spite of the disagreement concerning the inclusiveness of *competitive authoritarianism* as a term. As discussed above, competitive *hybrid regimes* can differ among each other based on the different areas of regime abuse. However, as Diamond (2002) argues, all regimes that fall in the subcategory of competitive *hybrid regimes* are mixed to some extent. They only differ in the extent to which each area is abused by the incumbents (Diamond, 2002). This is one of the reasons why the scholar does not differentiate between different regime forms. Diamond's claim presents a strong argument for the adoption of an inclusive understanding of competitive *hybrid regimes*. For this reason, this research employs such an inclusive understanding of competitive *hybrid regimes*. In other words, the research does not differentiate between different forms in the subcategory of competitive hybrid regimes. That is, while differences among *competitive authoritarian regimes* are acknowledged, these regimes are studied as a single regime form. The dynamics to be discussed below may not apply to every single *competitive authoritarian regime*. This is because not all regimes abuse every or all areas of governance. Instead, it aims to account for how *competitive authoritarianism* positions itself between *electoral democracy* and *hegemonic authoritarianism* in different areas.

In that respect, elections in *competitive authoritarianism* are best defined as competitive, yet highly tilted in favor of incumbents (Diamond, 2002; Donno, 2013; Levitsky & Way, 2002, 2010; Schedler, 2002, 2013). Elections are often marred with a number of irregularities and fraud (Diamond, 2002; Donno, 2013; Levitsky & Way, 2002, 2010; Schedler, 2002). Such malpractices include manipulation of voter registries, ballot-box stuffing, vote buying, voter suppression, falsification of final results, etc. (Levitsky & Way, 2010). In the most extreme

cases, some parties may be banned or some minorities may de facto be denied suffrage (Schedler, 2002). However, despite all the malpractices, they are not enough to render elections completely uncompetitive (Diamond, 2002; Donno, 2013; Levitsky & Way, 2002, 2010; Schedler, 2002). Elections remain viable arenas of contestation, which is why incumbents ‘take them seriously’ (Levitsky & Way, 2010). In contrast, in *electoral democracy* misconduct is minimal and it does not contribute to significant result advantage for either side (Levitsky & Way, 2010). On the other hand, elections in *hegemonic authoritarianism* do not represent viable arenas of contestation (Schedler, 2002). In *hegemonic authoritarianism*, there is no observable relationship between election results and voter preferences (Levitsky & Way, 2010).

Other common dynamics found in *competitive authoritarianism* is the vast disparity between incumbents and the opposition in their levels of competitiveness (Diamond, 2002; Donno, 2013; Levitsky & Way, 2002, 2010; Schedler, 2002). The ruling party enjoys far greater resources and media coverage (Levitsky & Way, 2010; Schedler, 2002). Large disparities in resources are not limited to just financial means (Levitsky & Way, 2010). Additional resources crucial for attracting voters include personnel, buildings, vehicles, infrastructure, venues, equipment needed for organizing events, etc. (Levitsky & Way, 2010). In *competitive authoritarianism* state resources are often employed for the needs of the ruling party in attracting voters (Donno, 2013; Levitsky & Way, 2010). Next, media coverage is often heavily biased in favor of the government (Levitsky & Way, 2010). In *competitive authoritarianism* freedom of speech and of the press are protected by law. However, in practice these freedoms are often infringed upon (Levitsky & Way, 2010). Opposition journalists are often harassed, threatened, attacked or detained. Although independent media exist and they operate ‘above ground’, they manage to reach only a small part of the population (Levitsky & Way, 2010). By contrast, in *electoral democracies* the

disparity between incumbents and the opposition in their levels of competitiveness is not as great (Diamond, 2002; Donno, 2013; Levitsky & Way, 2002, 2010; Schedler, 2002). Incumbents may also utilize some state resources for their own needs (Levitsky & Way, 2010; Schedler, 2002). However, such utilization remains very limited and democratic norms are respected (Levitsky & Way, 2010; Schedler, 2002). The ruling party may also benefit from somewhat biased media coverage (Levitsky & Way, 2010; Schedler, 2002). Nonetheless, that is achieved through the favorable coverage by state media, not through a systemic harassment of independent journalists (Levitsky & Way, 2010). On the other hand, in *hegemonic authoritarianism* the disparity between incumbents and the opposition in their levels of competitiveness could be far greater (Levitsky & Way, 2010; Schedler, 2002). Resource disparities may be so profound that the opposition is rendered completely uncompetitive (Levitsky & Way, 2010; Schedler, 2002). Freedom of speech and of the press may be protected de jure (Levitsky & Way, 2010; Schedler, 2002). However, in *hegemonic authoritarianism* media outlets that criticize the government or offer favorable coverage for the opposition may be closed down (Levitsky & Way, 2010).

Paths to competitive authoritarianism:

Next, it is crucial to understand what paths have led states to becoming *competitive authoritarian regimes*. *Competitive authoritarian regimes* are by no means a recent phenomenon (Diamond, 2002; Levitsky & Way, 2002). Nonetheless, *competitive authoritarianism* has clearly proliferated after 1990 (Diamond, 2002; Levitsky & Way, 2002). The most influential account of

the different paths of proliferation has been provided by Levitsky and Way (2002). According to the scholars, there are three such paths.

The first path is concerned with the decay of *closed authoritarianism* or *hegemonic authoritarianism* (Levitsky & Way, 2002). In such cases, authoritarian regimes have been pressured to either introduce democratic procedures or to adhere seriously to what had previously been ‘façade’ democratic mechanisms (Levitsky & Way, 2002). Such compulsion has often resulted from a combination of international and domestic pressure (Levitsky & Way, 2002). This path is best associated with transitions in sub-Saharan Africa (Levitsky & Way, 2002).

The second path is related to the collapse and fall of *closed authoritarianism* or *hegemonic authoritarianism* (Levitsky & Way, 2002). In these cases, full authoritarianism has been replaced with *competitive authoritarianism*. Even though newly elected governments have had the opportunity to govern like their predecessors in the face of weak democratic institutions, incumbents have not had the capacity to consolidate their rule (Levitsky & Way, 2002). Examples of this path include Russia⁸, Ukraine, Serbia, Armenia, Romania⁹, Croatia¹⁰ and Haiti (Levitsky & Way, 2002). On the other hand, post-democratic *competitive authoritarianism* has resulted from a single path only.

Finally, the third path is concerned with of the decay of *democracy* (Levitsky & Way, 2002). It refers to the well-known phenomenon of ‘democratic backsliding’. In such cases, democratically elected governments have violated constitutional constraints and have

⁸ Currently rated as ‘not free’ by the Freedom House.

⁹ Currently rated as ‘free’ by the Freedom House.

¹⁰ Currently rated as ‘free’ by the Freedom House.

undermined democratic institutions (Levitsky & Way, 2002). This third path is best associated with Venezuela¹¹, Peru¹², Turkey¹³, Hungary and India.

In turn, based on these paths one can differentiate between two separate types of *competitive authoritarianism*. These are post-authoritarian and post-democratic *competitive authoritarian regimes*. The post-authoritarian type has resulted from the first and second paths. On the other hand, post-democratic *competitive authoritarianism* has resulted from the third path.

Explaining incumbent turnover via elections in post-authoritarian competitive authoritarianism:

Moving on, it is essential to understand what factors determine alternation in power through elections in post-authoritarian *competitive authoritarianism*. In that regard, predictors can be grouped into five main categories. These are freedom and fairness of elections, regime capacity, opposition capacity, ties to the West and political culture. The conduct of elections is perhaps the most powerful determinant across all *competitive authoritarian regimes*. Free and fair elections are directly and positively related to incumbent turnover (Schedler, 2002, 2013). Earlier, this section discussed how *competitive authoritarianism* positions itself between *electoral democracy* and hegemonic *hybrid regimes* in that regard. Therefore, there is no need for further elaboration


¹¹ Currently rated as 'not free' by the Freedom House.

¹² Currently rated as 'free' by the Freedom House.

¹³ Currently rated as 'not free' by the Freedom House.

on this determinant of incumbent turnover. The discussion to follow focusses on the remaining predictors.

Figure 2. Predictors of incumbent turnover via elections in post-authoritarian competitive authoritarianism as outlined by the literature review.



In that respect, the structuralist perspective represents the most widely shared approach to explaining incumbent turnover via elections. Apart from the freedom and fairness of elections, structuralists have focused on two other groups of predictors. These pertain to regime capacity and ties to the West. Accordingly, regime capacity has a negative effect on incumbent turnover via elections in *competitive authoritarianism*. (Bieber, 2018; Levitsky & Way, 2010, 2012; McFaul, 2005; Robertson, 2009; Turovsky, 2014; Van Ham & Seim, 2017; Wintrobe, 2000). Regime capacity refers to incumbents' capacity to abuse democratic practices in pursuit of greater dominance vis-à-vis the opposition. The literature points to five interrelated factors that account for regime capacity. These include elite unity, party institutionalization, capacity for repressive measures against opposition parties, control over the entry and exit of civil society organizations (CSOs) and media control.

First, elite unity determines whether there are defectors among the ruling elite (Levitsky & Way, 2012; McFaul, 2005). 'Splits among the guys with the guns' (McFaul, 2005) can have serious consequences for the availability of all other resources associated with regime capacity (Levitsky & Way, 2012). Where cohesion is strong, local officials and allied legislators cooperate with the government (Levitsky & Way, 2012). On the other hand, incumbents regularly confront rebellion and insubordination where unity is weak (Levitsky & Way, 2012). In turn, this decreases incumbents' chances of winning in elections (Levitsky & Way, 2012; McFaul, 2005).

Second, party institutionalization represents a key aspect of regime capacity (Bieber, 2018; Levitsky & Way, 2010, 2012; Turovsky, 2014; Van Ham & Seim, 2017; Wintrobe, 2000). It refers to the penetration of the state administration by party members (Bieber, 2018). Party institutionalization is essential for several reasons. Firstly, it allows for cooptation (Van Ham &

Seim, 2017). Cooptation of the ruling elite can serve to secure support and loyalty for the incumbents. This is done by providing party members with the opportunity to access the spoils and advance their careers (Levitsky & Way, 2012). Additionally, cooptation is crucial for the formation of patron-client relationships (Wintrobe, 2000). Incumbents achieve electoral victory in part by offering supporters more rents than they can expect from an alternative regime (Wintrobe, 2000). Moreover, cooptation can serve to dissuade opposition activists by offering them high-ranking administrative positions (Turovsky, 2014). Secondly, party institutionalization is essential for achieving control over the security apparatus (Van Ham & Seim, 2017). Such control allows for the use of coercion against opposition activists (Van Ham & Seim, 2017). Thirdly, party institutionalization is essential for achieving ‘informality’ (Bieber, 2018). ‘Informality’ refers to the exercise of power by bypassing formal or legal mechanisms (Bieber, 2018). Incumbents ‘may systematically deploy the machinery of the state’ in their own favor (Levitsky & Way, 2010). Such informal practices may include the use of state resources or administrative favors in support of the incumbents’ election campaigns (Levitsky & Way, 2010). In other words, the lower party institutionalization is, the higher the chances of incumbent turnover taking place are (Bieber, 2018; Levitsky & Way, 2010, 2012; Turovsky, 2014; Van Ham & Seim, 2017; Wintrobe, 2000).

Third, the capacity for repressive measures against opposition parties is another crucial facet of regime capacity (Levitsky & Way, 2010). It implies different types of barriers to parties. These can include barriers to forming a party and barriers to competing in elections (Levitsky & Way, 2010). In turn, these barriers can be of financial, procedural or legal nature (Levitsky & Way, 2010). Examples include high administrative fees; long waiting periods; high requirements associated with the collection of signatures; excessive bureaucratic red tape; and a high threshold

for parties being represented in legislative bodies (Levitsky & Way, 2010). In short, higher barriers to parties decrease the probability of incumbent turnover occurring (Levitsky & Way, 2010).

Fourth, control over the entry and exit of CSOs represents another important dimension of regime capacity (Robertson, 2009). It is what Robertson (2009) refers to as the ‘licensing of civil society activity’. According to the author, the optimal way of achieving this is by creating a legal framework that can be employed selectively. This way, most CSOs will not have any trouble operating unless they start causing inconveniences for the authorities (Robertson, 2009). Controlling which CSOs are allowed to operate benefits incumbents in two ways. Firstly, the regime can prevent activities by anti-government CSOs (Robertson, 2009). Preventing a protest represents a far more superior tactic than suppressing a protest (Robertson, 2009). This is because the latter may lead to the regime being viewed as repressive (Robertson, 2009). In turn, this may have a negative electoral impact for the incumbents (Robertson, 2009). Secondly, control over the entry and exit of CSOs allows for the formation of sham social movements in support of the government (Robertson, 2009). According to Robertson, filling up the social space with such organizations creates the impression of wide support for the regime. Moreover, such sham social movements can be called upon to counter any opposition activity (Robertson, 2009). In turn, this may undermine the intended impact of the opposition event (Robertson, 2009). In short, strict control over the entry and exit of CSOs renders incumbent turnover less likely (Robertson, 2009).

Fifth, media control is the final aspect associated with regime capacity (Levitsky & Way, 2010). Control over the media ensures that the opposition receives disproportionately less coverage (Levitsky & Way, 2010). Furthermore, it allows for incumbents to increase their

popularity by shaping public opinion in their own favor (Levitsky & Way, 2010). That is, the less free media is, the more biased towards incumbents it is likely to be (Levitsky & Way, 2010). In other words, media control decreases the chances of incumbent turnover occurring (Levitsky & Way, 2010).

Following that, the last group of predictors that structuralists have focused on in explaining incumbent turnover via elections pertains to ties to the West. Respectively, there is a positive relationship between ties to the West and incumbent turnover (Bieber, 2018; Levitsky & Way, 2010, 2014; Way, 2008; Wolchik, 2012). In that regard, the main predictor associated with it is the intensity of linkages to the West. It is defined as the intensity of financial, economic, diplomatic, political, organizational, technocratic and social linkages to the Western world (Levitsky & Way, 2010, 2014). What scholars have referred to as the Western world has been the US, the EU, NATO, the IMF, the World Bank and other international bodies influenced by the West (Bieber, 2018). Nonetheless, this relationship is mostly an indirect one (Bieber, 2018; Levitsky & Way, 2010, 2014; Way, 2008; Wolchik, 2012). This is because the effect of the intensity of linkages to the West is mediated by three other determinants of incumbent turnover. Namely, freedom and fairness of elections, regime capacity and opposition capacity (Bieber, 2018; Levitsky & Way, 2010, 2014; Way, 2008; Wolchik, 2012).

First, the relationship between intensity of linkages to the West and freedom and fairness of elections is positive (Bieber, 2018; Levitsky & Way, 2010, 2014; Way, 2008; Wolchik, 2012). The high intensity of such linkages tends to heighten ‘the international reverberations caused by even minor abuses of power, turning small news items into international scandals’ (Levitsky & Way, 2014, p. 152). Where intensity is high, incumbents may fear triggering isolation or punitive action by the West if an election is perceived as excessively fraudulent (Levitsky & Way, 2014).

Furthermore, receiving economic aid by Western governments or international institutions is often conditioned on the conduct of free and fair elections (Levitsky & Way, 2010). In some cases, the prospect of EU membership has played a major role in curtailing electoral malpractice (Way, 2008). This is because serious manipulation would have threatened the country's road to prosperity, which would have increased popular opposition to the regime (Way, 2008). In short, high intensity of linkages to the West leads to increased chances of incumbent turnover occurring by increasing the freedom and fairness of elections (Bieber, 2018; Levitsky & Way, 2010, 2014; Way, 2008; Wolchik, 2012).

Second, the effect of intensity of linkages to the West on regime capacity is negative (Bieber, 2018; Levitsky & Way, 2010, 2014; Way, 2008; Wolchik, 2012). Similarly, high intensity of linkages to the West leads to fewer violations of all other democratic norms (Bieber, 2018; Levitsky & Way, 2010, 2014; Way, 2008; Wolchik, 2012). Where the intensity of linkages is high, perceived government repression may have similar ramifications as to those of perceived electoral manipulation. Thus, where the intensity is high, incumbents may be less likely to violate democratic norms that could trigger sanctions by the West or international isolation (Levitsky & Way, 2014). That is, high intensity of linkages to the West leads to increased chances of incumbent turnover occurring through elections by restricting regime capacity (Bieber, 2018; Levitsky & Way, 2010, 2014; Way, 2008; Wolchik, 2012).

Third, the relationship between intensity of linkages to the West and opposition capacity is positive (Bieber, 2018; Levitsky & Way, 2010, 2014; Way, 2008; Wolchik, 2012). High intensity of linkages to the West benefits democratically oriented opposition parties in multiple ways. These include providing financial support; providing training in how to run election campaigns; lending expert assistance in exit polling and parallel vote tabulations; Western

political figures visiting opposition rallies; etc. (Wolchik, 2012). Besides, high intensity of such linkages provides ‘external legitimacy’ to opposition parties (Bieber, 2018). This is because opposition parties receive political support by the West for being carriers of democratic change (Bieber, 2018). That is especially the case for opposition parties which advocate for an EU or NATO membership (Bieber, 2018; Wolchik, 2012). In other words, high intensity of linkages to the West leads to increased chances of incumbent turnover occurring via elections by increasing opposition capacity (Bieber, 2018; Levitsky & Way, 2010, 2014; Way, 2008; Wolchik, 2012).

Nevertheless, many scholars (e.g., Nodia, 2014; Tolstrup, 2014) have questioned the explanatory power of intensity of linkages to the West. This is because its effect has proven rather inconsistent in practice (Nodia, 2014; Tolstrup, 2014). There are instances in which a *competitive authoritarian regime* seemingly has intense linkages to the Western world, yet no incumbent turnover has occurred. For this reason, Levitsky and Way (2010, 2014) have included another factor in their model explaining incumbent turnover via elections. It refers to Western leverage. The authors conceptualize Western leverage as the government’s vulnerability to Western pressure. It is best determined by the state’s dependence on the West (Levitsky & Way, 2010, 2014). In that respect, Levitsky and Way consider a state to be low in Western leverage as long as it meets one of three criteria. These include having a large economy¹⁴, being a major oil producer¹⁵ or having the capacity to use nuclear weapons (Levitsky & Way, 2010). Crucially, Western leverage represents a moderator to the intensity of linkages to the West (Levitsky & Way, 2010, 2014). That is, Western leverage has a moderating effect on the relationship between intensity of linkages to the West and incumbent turnover through elections (Levitsky & Way,

¹⁴ With total GDP over \$100 billion (Levitsky & Way, 2010).

¹⁵ With annual production of over a million crude oil barrels per day (Levitsky & Way, 2010).

2010, 2014). Levitsky and Way argue that the effect of the intensity of linkages to the West alone tends to be inconsistent. Hence, their theorized model aims to resolve this issue. According to them, where Western leverage is high, intensity of linkages to the West has a negative and significant effect. In such cases, states lack bargaining power vis-à-vis the West and are heavily affected by Western punitive action (Levitsky & Way, 2010). On the other hand, where Western leverage is low, the effect of intensity of linkages to the West is not significant (Levitsky & Way, 2010, 2014). In such cases, sanctions or isolation by the West do not present serious repercussions for incumbents (Levitsky & Way, 2010, 2014). Respectively, high intensity of linkages to the West does not lead to an improvement in the freedom and fairness of elections or to the curtailing of regime capacity¹⁶ (Levitsky & Way, 2010, 2014). In short, high Western leverage results in the intensity of linkages to the West having a negative and significant effect on incumbent turnover via elections (Levitsky & Way, 2010, 2014).

Moving forward, the rationalist approach to explaining incumbent turnover through elections has focused on opposition capacity. Accordingly, opposition capacity has a positive effect on incumbent turnover (Bunce & Wolchik, 2010, 2011; Howard & Roessler, 2006; McFaul, 2005; Wolchik, 2012). Most rationalists acknowledge the significance of structural conditions, such as freedom and fairness of elections, regime capacity and ties to the West (Bunce & Wolchik, 2010, 2011; Howard & Roessler, 2006; McFaul, 2005; Wolchik, 2012).

¹⁶ Importantly, Western leverage refers to incumbents' vulnerability to democratizing pressure (Levitsky & Way, 2010, 2014). Therefore, Western leverage is a moderator in the relationship between intensity of linkages to the West and free and fair elections, as well as the relationship between intensity of linkages to the West and regime capacity (Levitsky & Way, 2010, 2014). As elaborated earlier, there are three intervening factors in the indirect relationship between intensity of linkages to the West and incumbent turnover. These are free and fair elections, regime capacity and opposition capacity (Levitsky & Way, 2010, 2014). However, Western leverage is not a moderator in the relationship between intensity of linkages to the West and opposition capacity (Levitsky & Way, 2010). This is because Western leverage is concerned with incumbents' vulnerability to democratizing pressure only.

Nevertheless, they argue that the power of structural factors has been overestimated in the context of *competitive authoritarianism* (Bunce & Wolchik, 2010). Instead, rationalists have based their argument on the strategic choices made by opposition leaders (Bunce & Wolchik, 2010; Howard & Roessler, 2006; McFaul, 2005; Wolchik, 2012). In that regard, many *competitive authoritarian* incumbents are ‘deeply unpopular’ (Howard & Roessler, 2006, p. 371). However, they manage to remain in power often due to the inability of the opposition to effectively challenge them (Howard & Roessler, 2006). According to Bunce and Wolchik (2010), opposition parties in *competitive authoritarianism* are often perceived as ‘incompetent and compromised’ (p. 74). For this reason, the authors argue that many of the citizens who oppose the government do not even go to the ballot box. This is because voting for the opposition is in many cases viewed as a waste of time (Bunce & Wolchik, 2010, 2011). Hence, for rationalists incumbent turnover is a matter of overcoming the collective action problem of mobilizing citizens to vote for the opposition (Bunce & Wolchik, 2010; Howard & Roessler, 2006; Wolchik, 2012). In other words, it is about convincing citizens that change is possible and that their vote will count (Bunce & Wolchik, 2010; Howard & Roessler, 2006). In turn, this is achieved by increasing opposition capacity (Bunce & Wolchik, 2010; Howard & Roessler, 2006; McFaul, 2005; Wolchik, 2012). Moreover, strong opposition capacity can increase the perceived costs and risks of repression against opposition members (Howard & Roessler, 2006). Where the opposition poses a credible challenge, the security apparatus and bureaucrats may be less inclined to carry out illicit practices that benefit incumbents (Howard & Roessler, 2006). This is because they may fear facing recriminations if incumbent turnover takes place (Howard & Roessler, 2006). In that respect, there are multiple factors associated with opposition capacity.

First, opposition unity represents the most crucial aspect of opposition capacity (Bunce & Wolchik, 2010, 2011; Howard & Roessler, 2006; McFaul, 2005; Wolchik, 2012). It refers to the size of the strategic coalition in support of a single candidate; or the size of the strategic pre-electoral coalition in legislative elections (Bunce & Wolchik, 2010). Wide opposition coalitions pose a greater challenge and foster the perception that change is possible (Howard & Roessler, 2006). Furthermore, ample coalitions channel votes to a single candidate or pre-election coalition, which increases their chances of winning (Howard & Roessler, 2006). In other words, the stronger opposition unity is, the more likely it is for incumbent turnover to occur via elections (Bunce & Wolchik, 2010, 2011; Howard & Roessler, 2006; McFaul, 2005; Wolchik, 2012).

Next, collaboration between civil society organizations (CSOs) and opposition parties is another factor pertaining to opposition capacity (Bunce & Wolchik, 2010, 2011; Howard & Roessler, 2006; Wolchik, 2012). Wide collaboration between opposition CSOs and parties entails greater availability of finances, motivated personnel, expert knowledge and equipment (Bunce & Wolchik, 2010, 2011). In turn, this may render the opposition a lot more capable of bringing down the incumbent (Bunce & Wolchik, 2010). Hence, strong collaboration between CSOs and opposition parties makes incumbent turnover through elections more likely (Bunce & Wolchik, 2010, 2011; Howard & Roessler, 2006; Wolchik, 2012).

Following that, the presence of election monitors, exit polls and parallel vote tabulation represents another crucial aspect of opposition capacity (Bunce & Wolchik, 2010, 2011; Howard & Roessler, 2006; McFaul, 2005; Wolchik, 2012). The presence of independent observers, exit polls or parallel vote tabulation increases the trust that an election will not be rigged (Bunce & Wolchik, 2010; Howard & Roessler, 2006). In turn, citizens who oppose the regime may be

much more inclined to cast a vote (Bunce & Wolchik, 2010; Howard & Roessler, 2006). This is because such citizens would be more prone to believing that their vote would count and that change is feasible (Bunce & Wolchik, 2010). In short, the chances of incumbent turnover occurring via elections increase with the presence of election monitors, exit polls and parallel vote tabulation (Bunce & Wolchik, 2010, 2011; Howard & Roessler, 2006; McFaul, 2005; Wolchik, 2012).

Lastly, Bunce and Wolchik (2010, 2011), and Wolchik (2012) argue that certain novel and sophisticated tactics can further boost opposition capacity. The scholars point to energetic voter registration drives and voter turnout drives; public opinion polls; and threatening incumbents with mass demonstrations if election results were manipulated, or if they lost but refused to vacate office. According to the authors, these tactics can create a widespread sense that incumbent turnover is possible. As a result, anti-government oriented citizens are much more inclined to cast a ballot (Bunce & Wolchik, 2010; Wolchik, 2012). In other words, employing these novel and sophisticated tactics may increase the chances of incumbent turnover occurring through elections (Bunce & Wolchik, 2010, 2011; Wolchik, 2012).

Moving on, the culturalist perspective has been examined the least in explaining incumbent turnover via elections in post-authoritarian *competitive authoritarianism*. Moreover, most of the literature discussed below represents qualitative research. That is, the explanations have not been statistically confirmed in any comprehensive large-N study. In that regard, the culturalist approach has focused on the political culture of electorates. In particular, culturalists have focused on two types of political attitudes. These include acceptance of strongman rule (Bratton & Logan, 2006; Bratton et al., 2005; Colton & McFaul, 2003; Ekman, 2009; Furman, 2007; Pipes, 2004) and preferences for stability over democracy (Ekman, 2009; Furman, 2007; Pipes,

2004). Both acceptance of strongman rule and preferences for stability over democracy have negative effects on incumbent turnover via elections in post-authoritarian *competitive authoritarianism* (Bratton & Logan, 2006; Bratton et al., 2005; Colton & McFaul, 2003; Ekman, 2009; Furman, 2007; Pipes, 2004). Crucially, scholars argue that these two types of attitudes play a role in post-authoritarian *competitive authoritarian regimes* only (Bratton & Logan, 2006; Bratton et al., 2005; Colton & McFaul, 2003; Ekman, 2009; Furman, 2007; Pipes, 2004). That is, they are not determinants of incumbent turnover through elections in post-democratic *competitive authoritarian regimes*. While all other predictors discussed so far apply to both types, these two sets of attitudes determine incumbent turnover in the post-authoritarian type only. According to Ekman (2009), incumbent turnover through elections in the post-democratic type may be explained by a different set of attitudes. Nonetheless, post-democratic *competitive authoritarian regimes* lie outside the scope of this research. For this reason, the discussion below centers on acceptance of strongman rule and preferences for stability over democracy.

In that respect, there is arguably a negative relationship between acceptance of strongman rule and incumbent turnover through elections (Bratton & Logan, 2006; Bratton et al., 2005; Colton & McFaul, 2003; Ekman, 2009; Furman, 2007; Pipes, 2004). This relationship is said to hold across all post-authoritarian *competitive authoritarian regimes* (Ekman, 2009). Acceptance of strongman rule may imply two things, both being the two sides of the same coin. These are tolerance towards a strong leader, as well as lack of tolerance towards political pluralism and competition (Bratton et al., 2005; Ekman, 2009). Where the mean acceptance of strongman rule is high, the electorate may share distinct skepticism towards freedom of expression and pluralism (Bratton et al., 2005; Ekman, 2009). For instance, 53 percent of Tanzanians have agreed that ‘the government has the right to silence newspapers’ (as cited in Ekman, 2009, p. 17). Also, 44

percent of the same electorate have agreed that ‘government should not allow the expression of political views that are fundamentally different from the views of the majority’ (as cited in Ekman, 2009, p. 17). Another example includes that 63 percent have agreed that ‘government should be able to ban any organization that goes against its policies’ (as cited in Ekman, 2009, p. 17). Looking into the Russian electorate, 79 percent have agreed that ‘the president should have the right to suspend parliament and introduce presidential rule by decree’ if the president considers it necessary (as cited in Ekman, 2009, p. 20). Moreover, as many as 52 percent of Russians have considered that ‘multiparty elections do more harm than good’ (as cited in Ekman, 2009, p. 20).

In that regard, culturalists have argued that acceptance of strongman rule reflects the consciousness of an electorate in post-authoritarian *competitive authoritarianism* (Furman, 2007). This set of attitudes is deeply rooted in cultural and historical factors associated with past authoritarian traditions (Furman, 2007). Authoritarian leaders often justify censorship of the opposing view and repression over the opposition based on protecting the majority from minority interests (Bratton et al., 2005; Ekman, 2009). As a result, electorates in full authoritarianism may form mass values that are inherently anti-pluralist and majority-centered (Bratton et al., 2005; Ekman, 2009). That is, electorates in full authoritarianism may start perceiving silencing of the opposing view as essential for protecting the view of the majority (Bratton et al., 2005; Ekman, 2009). In turn, this implies giving more power to authoritarian leaders (Bratton et al., 2005; Ekman, 2009). However, culturalists contend that mass values formed under strong authoritarian traditions may persist in the consciousness of an electorate even once the state transitions into *competitive authoritarianism* (Bratton & Logan, 2006; Bratton et al., 2005; Colton & McFaul, 2003; Ekman, 2009; Furman, 2007; Pipes, 2004).

Crucially, scholars claim that acceptance of strongman rule could affect incumbent turnover through elections in two ways (Bratton & Logan, 2006; Bratton et al., 2005; Ekman, 2009). First, acceptance of strongman rule could affect incumbent turnover via elections in a direct way (Colton & McFaul, 2003; Ekman, 2009). An electorate may choose a leader whose rhetoric and policies best resonate with them (Colton & McFaul, 2003; Ekman, 2009). That is, where the mean acceptance of strongman rule is high, a big part of the electorate may vote for the incumbent party if it shares majority-centered and anti-pluralist ideology (Colton & McFaul, 2003; Ekman, 2009). According to Colton and McFaul's (2003) micro-level statistical analyses, attitudes towards having a strong leader have had a significant effect on the voter's choice. Their analyses have been based on the 2000 presidential election in Russia. Nevertheless, the findings are rather inconclusive. In that regard, the authors find that the median voter who had preferences for a strong ruler 'was perceptibly more inclined to vote for Putin¹⁷ than others' (p. 219). However, they also find that those with the strongest preferences for a strongman voted for opposition candidates who were proposing the revival of the Soviet Union.

Second, the relationship between acceptance of strongman rule and incumbent turnover via elections could also be an indirect one (Bratton & Logan, 2006; Bratton et al., 2005; Ekman, 2009). That is, the relationship could be mediated by regime capacity (Bratton & Logan, 2006; Bratton et al., 2005; Ekman, 2009). This can best be understood with reference to Schedler's (2013) explanation of incumbents' calculations in *competitive authoritarianism*¹⁸. According to the scholar, incumbents may not expand their capacity for repressive measures to a point where it becomes counterproductive. As the author argues, if the regime becomes too repressive,

¹⁷ At the time representing the incumbent party.

¹⁸ Schedler's (2013) explanation may not pertain to culturalism. However, it serves to clarify the argument posed by the culturalist approach.

incumbents may face a decline in popularity or even a popular revolt. In other words, the critical point of maximum expansion is determined by how much repression the electorate is willing to tolerate. Therefore, where the mean acceptance of strongman rule is high, the regime can expand its capacity more compared to where the mean tolerance is low (Bratton & Logan, 2006; Bratton et al., 2005; Ekman, 2009). This is because the mean tolerance to repression against entities that are not aligned with the government is higher (Bratton & Logan, 2006; Bratton et al., 2005; Ekman, 2009). As elaborated earlier, stronger regime capacity reduces the likelihood of incumbent turnover occurring via elections.

Following that, preferences for stability over democracy arguably have a negative effect on incumbent turnover through elections as well (Colton & McFaul, 2003; Ekman, 2009; Furman, 2007; Pipes, 2004). This set of attitudes refers to preferences for social order and economic stability over civil liberties and democratic rights (Ekman, 2009). Interestingly, it implies preferences for stability and order at the expense of democratic freedoms (Ekman, 2009). That is, preferences for stability over democracy imply a choice between two supposedly incompatible things (Pipes, 2004, 2007). In other words, this set of attitudes is characterized by the perception of democracy as being inherently chaotic and unpredictable (Pipes, 2004, 2007). In a sense, preferences for stability over democracy imply a lack of support for democracy (Ekman, 2009). Where many citizens share this perception of democracy, the electorate is more likely to passively give up its democratic rights (Ekman, 2009; Pipes, 2004). This is because such an electorate perceives politics a choice between chaos or stability, the latter clearly being more valued (Ekman, 2009; Furman, 2007; Pipes, 2004). To illustrate, when asked if it is possible for there to be both democracy and economic well-being at the same time, as few as 63 percent of respondents in Russia have answered with 'we can have both' (Colton & McFaul, 2003, p. 223).

Within the same survey, when asked which of the two is more important, 55 percent have chosen economic well-being; only two percent have picked democracy; and 38 percent have answered with ‘equally important’ (Colton & McFaul, 2003, p. 223). In another study, when asked to choose between freedom and order, 88 percent of Russian respondents have expressed preference for order (as cited in Pipes, 2004). Of the same respondents, only 11 percent have expressed they would be ‘unwilling to surrender their freedoms of speech, press, or movement in exchange for stability’ (as cited in Pipes, 2004, p. 11).

Crucially, the relationship between preferences for stability over democracy and incumbent turnover via elections is not said to hold across all post-authoritarian *competitive authoritarian regimes* (Ekman, 2009; Furman, 2007; Pipes, 2004). Instead, the literature argues that the effect of preferences for stability over democracy should be significant across post-communist cases only (Ekman, 2009; Furman, 2007; Pipes, 2004). In other words, the relationship should be significant only across the post-communist subtype of post-authoritarian *competitive authoritarianism* (Ekman, 2009; Furman, 2007; Pipes, 2004). This is because the relationship should be generalizable only across those countries that have experienced the rapid transition away from communism as a result of the end of the Cold War (Ekman, 2009; Furman, 2007; Pipes, 2004). A distinct feature of this abrupt transition was the introduction of the open market. Nevertheless, the opening of the market led to social chaos and economic instability all over the newly transitioned post-communist states (Ekman, 2009; Furman, 2007; Pipes, 2004). In fact, the introduction of the free-market economy coincided with the attempt at introducing democracy. Consequently, many citizens associated the attempt at democracy building with the instability and lawlessness during that time (Ekman, 2009; Furman, 2007; Pipes, 2004). According to Furman (2007, p. 15), the experiences of despair and panic created a ‘fertile psychological soil’

for the repudiation of democracy. Where instability and chaos were experienced severely, more citizens formed preferences for stability over democracy (Ekman, 2009; Furman, 2007; Pipes, 2004). Crucially, the lack or absence of prior democratic experience has played an important role (Furman, 2007; Pipes, 2004). Most post-communist countries had had little to none past experience with democracy (Furman, 2007; Pipes, 2004). That is, electorates had nothing to compare the attempted liberalization at the time with (Furman, 2007; Pipes, 2004). As a result, many have conflated democracy with instability, chaos and lawlessness (Pipes, 2004).

In that regard, it is argued that preferences for stability over democracy could influence incumbent turnover via elections in two ways (Ekman, 2009; Furman, 2007; Pipes, 2004). Just as with acceptance of strongman rule, the effect of preferences for stability over democracy can be both a direct and an indirect one as well (Ekman, 2009; Furman, 2007; Pipes, 2004). In fact, both sets of attitudes are very similar in that respect. Regarding the direct path, an electorate may choose a leader based on salient issue dimensions. Where a big part of an electorate share preferences for stability over democracy, order and stability may be much more prominent. On the other hand, democratic rights and freedoms may be much lower on the list of prominence. In such cases the electorate may be willing to support the *competitive authoritarian* incumbents as long as they are perceived as to offer stability (Ekman, 2009; Furman, 2007; Pipes, 2004). This is in spite of incumbents infringing upon civil liberties, as considerations pertaining to the quality of democracy may not be as prominent in such electorates (Ekman, 2009; Furman, 2007; Pipes, 2004). Regarding the indirect path, preferences for stability over democracy could affect incumbent turnover through regime capacity (Ekman, 2009; Furman, 2007; Pipes, 2004). Just as with acceptance of strongman rule, electorates may be more tolerant of incumbent repression where many citizens share preferences for stability over democracy (Ekman, 2009; Furman,

2007; Pipes, 2004). Hence, where many citizens share these attitudes, the regime can expand its capacity a lot more (Ekman, 2009; Furman, 2007; Pipes, 2004). As discussed earlier, strong regime capacity renders incumbent turnover through elections less likely.

Nonetheless, it should be noted that most of the literature analyzed pertaining to culturalism represents qualitative research. Additionally, much of what has been discussed has been based on opinion surveys. It becomes clear that most questions have employed binary scales, such as ‘Yes/No’ or ‘Agree/Disagree’. Instead, they would be reported far more accurately if one considers multiple levels of acceptance of strongman rule and preferences for stability over democracy. Furthermore, these explanations have not been tested in any comprehensive large-N statistical analysis. As elaborated above, both sets of attitudes influence incumbent turnover in two ways, both directly and indirectly. The literature analyzed has argued that the effects in the indirect path are mediated by regime capacity. However, that would render these political attitudes confounders in the relationship between regime capacity and incumbent turnover. Hence, it is suggested that the effect of regime capacity may be partly endogenous. If true, it would mean that the explanatory power of regime capacity has been overestimated by not controlling for acceptance of strongman rule and preferences for stability over democracy.

Bottom line:

The literature review concludes three main points. First, *competitive authoritarianism* is considered a nondemocratic type of regime. Second, the discussion below identifies a number of factors that predict incumbent turnover via elections in post-authoritarian *competitive*

authoritarianism. These predictors pertain to the quality of elections, regime capacity, opposition capacity, ties to the West and political culture. Third, further research based on the culturalist perspective is needed. Of the aforementioned determinants, political culture has been examined the least. The explanatory power of political culture in predicting alternation in power via elections in post-authoritarian *competitive authoritarianism* has not been statistically confirmed in any comprehensive large-N analysis. It is unclear if the political culture of an electorate maintains its explanatory power when controlling for all other factors.

Hypothesis Generation

This section aims to formulate a hypothesis which will serve to answer the research question. As the literature review suggests, certain political attitudes among the electorate may predict incumbent turnover via elections in post-authoritarian *competitive authoritarianism* (Bratton & Logan, 2006; Bratton et al., 2005; Ekman, 2009; Furman, 2007; Pipes, 2004). Scholars arguing so implicitly or explicitly refer to the political culture of an electorate. The perspective of political culture has long been applied in studying democratic rule. The political culture approach¹⁹ holds that mass attitudes play a crucial role in developing and maintaining democratic rule (Inglehart, 1988, 1990; Inglehart & Welzel, 2003, 2019). Pye and Verba (1965) argue that the political culture of an electorate results from the collective history of the polity as well as from the past experiences of its current citizens. The authors define political culture as a ‘set of attitudes, beliefs and sentiments that give order and meaning to a political process and which provide the underlying assumptions and rules that govern behavior in the political system’

¹⁹ Also known as the ‘civic culture’ approach.

(p. 34). Almond and Verba (1963) more narrowly define political culture as ‘patterns of orientation’ to the political process. In this sense, ‘orientations’ represent concrete predispositions to political behavior (Almond & Verba, 1963). Furthermore, Booth and Seligson (1993), and Dahl (1971) have theorized a way for distinguishing between democratic and undemocratic political culture. Dahl holds that there are two features that define democratic political culture. First, democratic political culture is characterized by positive attitudes towards and support for democratic institutions (Dahl, 1971). In other words, an electorate is considered to have a democratic political culture when there is widespread approval and support for democracy (Booth & Seligson, 1993; Dahl, 1971). In such electorates citizens are positively inclined towards taking part in democratic channels of citizen participation (Booth & Seligson, 1993; Dahl, 1971). Booth and Seligson refer to this feature of democratic political culture as ‘extensiveness’. Second, democratic political culture is characterized by support for political pluralism (Dahl, 1971). The political culture of an electorate is considered democratic when there are high levels of tolerance for political dissent and pluralism (Booth & Seligson, 1993; Dahl, 1971). In such electorates citizens have high tolerance towards the opposing view, demonstrations and protests (Booth & Seligson, 1993; Dahl, 1971). This quality of democratic political culture is referred to as ‘inclusiveness’ by Booth and Seligson. In order for the political culture of an electorate to be considered democratic, it must be both ‘extensive’ and ‘inclusive’ (Booth & Seligson, 1993; Dahl, 1971). Therefore, in an undemocratic political culture one or both of these features are missing (Booth & Seligson, 1993; Dahl, 1971).

This distinction between democratic and undemocratic political culture offered by Booth and Seligson (1993), and Dahl (1971) offers a neat methodology for categorizing political culture in *competitive authoritarianism*. Following this typology, the political culture of electorates in

post-authoritarian *competitive authoritarianism* which share wide acceptance of strongman rule or preferences for stability over democracy should be regarded as undemocratic. Thus, this study formulates the following hypothesis:

H1: The undemocratic political culture of electorates across post-authoritarian competitive authoritarian regimes is negatively and significantly related to incumbent turnover via elections.

In that respect, the political culture of an electorate which shares wide acceptance of strongman rule should be considered non-inclusive. Therefore, the following is elaborated:

H1a: The non-inclusive political culture of electorates across post-authoritarian competitive authoritarian regimes is negatively and significantly related to incumbent turnover via elections.

Next, the political culture of electorates which share strong preferences for stability over democracy should be considered non-extensive. As discussed in the literature review, preferences for stability over democracy may have a significant effect on incumbent turnover in the post-communist subtype only. Hence, the following is articulated:

H1b: The non-extensive political culture of electorates across post-communist competitive authoritarian regimes is negatively and significantly related to incumbent turnover via elections.

In short, the study hypothesizes that anti-pluralist attitudes affect incumbent turnover across all post-authoritarian *competitive authoritarian regimes*. However, it is hypothesized that the relationship between preferences for stability over democracy and incumbent turnover holds across the post-communist subtype only. In other words, the study expects this relationship to be significant among the post-communist cases only.

Chapter Three: Data and Methods

Research Sample and Dataset

This section aims to lay out the sample selection process. The research employs a sample of 45 cases. Each case represents a national election. Hence, the unit of analysis is the national election. In turn, these 45 cases come from 25 different states. The most essential information concerning each case can be found in *Appendix A: Sample Details*.

Before elaborating on the sample, it is crucial to first consider the target population. This study targets the population of elections in post-authoritarian *competitive authoritarian regimes*. Thus, the research targets elections within only one subcategory of *hybrid regimes*. Namely, the subcategory of competitive *hybrid regimes*. Furthermore, the target population is confined to the post-authoritarian type only. That is, elections across the post-democratic type lie outside the scope of the study. Lastly, the target population does not reach back earlier than 1990. In other words, no elections prior to 1990 are considered. This is because all the literature analyzed so far has been on *competitive authoritarianism* since 1990. The works discussed in the literature review have focused on the proliferation of *competitive authoritarianism* since 1990. Hence, it remains uncertain whether all the inferences drawn may hold for *competitive authoritarianism* prior to 1990 as well.

Following that, the sample selection process can be broken down into five main steps. The first step is concerned with creating the initial pool of potential cases. For this, the V-Dem dataset (Coppedge et al., 2022a) is used. This choice of dataset is justified by a couple of

reasons. The V-Dem dataset represents a very comprehensive source on political regimes. It encompasses a very wide range of time periods and countries. Additionally, the dataset should represent a very reliable source²⁰. In that regard, the first step requires three separate actions. First, the dataset is confined to observations within the period of 1990-2019. As elaborated above, the target population reaches back to 1990. On the other hand, the sample does not include any cases after 2019. This is done on the grounds of reliability. The COVID-19 pandemic led to severe individual restrictions and government intervention all around the globe. These consequences were most noticeably felt during the period of 2020-2021. Thus, pandemic related measures would perhaps be reflected in any indicators of regime capacity, opposition capacity or the freedom and fairness of an election. In other words, the estimates of these variables during that period are most likely not going to be reliable.

Second, observations²¹ that do not feature a national election are discarded. It is with this action where dataset observations become potential cases. This is because it becomes certain that each observation in the dataset features a national election. However, it is important to consider why the research is confined to national elections only. This is due to data availability. Data at the local or federal level is not as abundant.

Third, the dataset is then confined to *competitive authoritarian regimes* only. This is done by setting a specific range on the *Electoral democracy index*²² found in the same dataset. The *Electoral democracy index* represents a very adequate choice for the job. As elaborated in the literature review, *competitive authoritarianism* is found in the middle between *electoral*

²⁰ The V-Dem dataset (Coppedge et al., 2022b) is made up of expert data coded by country experts. In part, it also contains researcher coded data.

²¹ An observation in the V-Dem dataset (Coppedge et al., 2022b) represents a state in a specific year.

²² The *Electoral democracy index* can be found in the V-Dem dataset (Coppedge et al., 2022b). It measures to what extent the ideal of electoral democracy is fulfilled. The variable has a scale '0-1'.

democracies and hegemonic *hybrid regimes*. Crucially, it is one criterium that differentiates these three subcategories from one another. Namely, to what extent a state conforms to the ideal of *electoral democracy*. Accordingly, the *Electoral democracy index* measures exactly that. Moreover, the index is taken from the V-Dem dataset (Coppedge et al., 2022b). Hence, it should be a reliable indicator of the respective criterium. Following that, the range encompassing *competitive authoritarianism* is set to ‘0.25-0.54’²³. The reasoning behind the particular span is as follows. As discussed earlier, Levitsky and Way’s (2010) book represents a seminal guide in *competitive authoritarianism*. In their book, the authors examine a sample of 35 cases. If the range above was to be applied to their sample of 35 cases, it would encompass 28 of them²⁴. Nevertheless, Levitsky and Way do not apply any quantitative cutoff criteria in deriving their sample. As such, their sample may not be perfectly representative. That is, some of their cases may perhaps be considered either *electoral democracies* or hegemonic *hybrid regimes*. In that regard, if this research wanted to make sure the range would encompass all 35 cases, then the sample would be contaminated with both *electoral democracies* and hegemonic *hybrid regimes*. If the lower bound of the range was to be brought lower, it would include present-day Belarus and Kazakhstan. However, few would agree that these two countries are *competitive authoritarian regimes* as of today. Instead, they are most frequently considered hegemonic *hybrid regimes*²⁵. On the other hand, if the upper bound was to be moved higher, the sample would include several EU democracies different than Hungary and Poland. Apart from Hungary

²³ The exact range used in the study is ‘0.245-0.544’. This is done for maximum inclusion of cases.

²⁴ The authors consider all 35 cases to have been *competitive authoritarian regimes* during the period of 1990-1995. To estimate this overlap, the following has been done. First, a mean score for the period of 1990-1995 is produced for each of the 35 cases. Second, the mean score of each country is then checked if it conforms to the range of ‘0.25-0.54’. It becomes evident that 28 of these scores fall within that range.

²⁵ Both are currently rated as ‘not free’ by the Freedom House.

or Poland, few would argue that there are other *competitive authoritarian regimes* within the EU as of today.

Moving on, the second step is concerned with making sure that each case can reliably be considered an election in a *competitive authoritarian regime*. For that, this research sets a criterium. It must be fulfilled for a case to be considered a reliable representation of an election in *competitive authoritarianism*. Namely, the state from which a case is derived must score as a *competitive authoritarian regime* in at least two consecutive years for the period of 1990-2019. It is crucial to note that the key phrase of that requirement is ‘at least two consecutive years’. To illustrate it in practice, consider two situations. Firstly, consider the pool includes only a single case of a particular country. If that case represents the only year in which the score of the respective state falls within the ‘0.25-0.54’ range, then it is discarded²⁶. For instance, consider a country has always scored as an *electoral democracy* with the exception for one year. However, for whatever reason in one year the country slips into the *competitive authoritarian* range. Then, the case is not considered a reliable *competitive authoritarian regime*. Hence, that case is discarded from the dataset. Secondly, consider a state scores as a *competitive authoritarian regime* in two nonconsecutive years. For example, consider the two years are ten years apart from each other. No matter if both or only one of the years represent a case²⁷, they are discarded. In other words, such a situation does not render a case a reliable representation of an election in *competitive authoritarianism*.

Next, the third step is about confining the dataset to only those cases which there is available data for. Data concerning the political culture of an electorate is not derived from the same

²⁶ Here, it is meant any year during the period of 1990-2019. That is, no matter whether there was a national election or not that year.

²⁷ That is, whether a national election took place in both or only one of the years.

dataset, the V-Dem dataset (Coppedge et al., 2022a). Instead, it is obtained from the WVS time-series dataset (Inglehart et al., 2020a)²⁸. Hence, the pool is confined to cases which the WVS time-series dataset contains data for. With regard to political culture, the study includes data anywhere from the same year of the election up to three years prior to the election²⁹.

Nevertheless, this step implies that the final sample cannot be considered a randomly drawn sample. In turn, this may raise concerns regarding the representativeness of the final sample. A nonrepresentative sample may cast doubt on the validity of the statistical results. Indeed, such concerns may be justified to an extent. Unfortunately, there is no viable way of solving this issue. As to be elaborated later, the WVS time-series dataset is the only source that can make possible the statistical analysis of the respective attitudes at the electorate-level. That is, a statistical analysis at the electorate-level necessitates this third step of the process.

Following that, the fourth step is about weeding out elections in post-democratic *competitive authoritarianism*. As discussed earlier, the post-democratic type remains outside the scope of the research. To differentiate between the two types, this research estimates a ‘past score’. A ‘past score’ is calculated for each of the countries which a case comes from. In essence, the score indicates whether a state is a post-authoritarian or post-democratic *competitive authoritarian regime*. In other words, it signifies whether the country was below or above the range of ‘0.25-0.54’ before becoming a *competitive authoritarian regime*. If it was below that range, the state is considered a post-authoritarian type. On the other hand, the country is considered to be of the post-democratic type if was above that range. Hence, cases that represent elections in the post-

²⁸ The section *Indicators* elaborates more on this topic.

²⁹ The WVS time-series dataset (Inglehart et al., 2020b) is an individual-level dataset. That is, each observation in the dataset represents a respondent from a particular country in a particular year. However, I aggregate the data to the electorate-level. More is elaborated in the following section, *Indicators*. What is meant here is that only those cases are taken for which the WVS time-series dataset includes respondents from the same country and an adequate year. An adequate year implies anywhere from zero up to three years prior to the respective election.

democratic type are discarded³⁰. In that regard, a ‘past score’ is derived in a fairly straightforward way. It represents the mean score on the range of the latest ten years in which the state was not a *competitive authoritarian regime*. That is, the mean score for the period of ten years before slipping into the ‘0.25-0.54’ range.

Nonetheless, there are two occasions that beg further elaboration. Firstly, an issue arises where the values during these ten years are divided into both values above that range and values below that range. This is because the mean score of these ten years would signal that the state is still a *competitive authoritarian regime*. That is, the ‘past score’ would fall within the ‘0.25-0.54’ range. As such, the estimated score would not be of any use. This is because the value would not indicate whether the country is of the post-democratic or post-authoritarian type. To resolve this problem, the research calculates the mean score of the period that comes later in time only. For instance, if values below the range are followed by values above the range, the state is considered a post-democratic type. Hence, it is discarded. If values above the range are followed by values below the range, the country is considered to be of the post-authoritarian type.

Secondly, a state can simultaneously represent both a post-authoritarian and a post-democratic *competitive authoritarian regime*. In other words, there are countries that can be regarded as either type depending on the period. For example, Turkey scored below the ‘0.25-0.54’ range before becoming a *competitive authoritarian regime* for the first time. Thus, in this first occasion Turkey is considered a post-authoritarian *competitive authoritarian regime*. This period was then followed by a long period in which the country scored above the ‘0.25-0.54’ range. However, since 2012 Turkey has scored within the competitive authoritarian range again.

³⁰ At this stage, this step leads to the weeding out of two cases only. Besides, both cases come from Turkey. These include the 2014 and 2018 Turkish elections.

That is, in this second occasion the country is considered a post-democratic *competitive authoritarian regime*. To resolve the issue, this study considers a country to represent both types simultaneously if the two periods in which it scored within the ‘0.25-0.54’ range are separated by at least ten years apart. In this scenario, cases that represent elections in the post-democratic period of a state are discarded³¹.

Moving on, the fifth step consists of the comprehensive screening of cases. It requires the close inspection of each election one by one. Crucially, this step is carried out with the help of the sources featured in *Appendix A: Sample Details*. In turn, the screening process can be broken down into five separate actions. Importantly, the first and second actions are closely related. They are both concerned with making sure the sample is devoid of elections affecting purely ceremonial positions. This study does not include elections for offices that do not offer significant powers. In other words, elections affecting rather ceremonial positions are discarded. This is done for reliability reasons. It could be argued that elections for ceremonial offices are a lot less likely to witness political contestation. Ceremonial positions can have little executive impact over how a state is governed. In that regard, one could argue that opposition parties are more likely to preserve their efforts and resources for more significant elections. In the context of the research, such ceremonial offices refer to the head of state (HOS) in parliamentary systems.

The final sample includes elections in four types of political systems. These include parliamentary systems, presidential systems, semi-presidential systems and parliamentary constitutional monarchies. Regarding parliamentary systems, the study includes elections

³¹ At this stage of the process, Turkey appears to be the only country that can be considered in two separate periods. The WVS time-series dataset (Inglehart et al., 2020a) includes data about the 2014 and 2018 elections. However, both elections have taken place during the post-democratic period. Therefore, both cases are discarded. In other words, the final sample does not include any countries which can be considered to have had two separate periods of being *competitive authoritarian regimes*.

affecting the position of the head of government (HOG) only. These refer to legislative elections. More specifically, they can either be elections for unicameral parliaments or lower chamber elections in bicameral parliaments³². When it comes to presidential systems, elections affecting the position of the HOS and the HOG are included. These include presidential elections only. In this type of system, the president serves as both the HOS and the HOG at the same time. Thus, the single office is simultaneously reflected by both titles of the HOS and the HOG. In terms of semi-presidential systems, elections affecting the position of the HOS and elections affecting the position of the HOG are included. Therefore, the research includes two different types of elections. The first type refers to presidential elections affecting the office of the HOS. The second one refers to legislative elections affecting the position of the HOG. Again, these can be elections for unicameral parliaments or lower chamber elections in bicameral parliaments. Regarding parliamentary constitutional monarchies, the research includes elections affecting the position of the head of government (HOG) only. These include legislative elections. Once more, they can be elections for unicameral parliaments or lower chamber elections in bicameral parliaments.

In that respect, the first and second actions are as follows. First, the study determines the type of political system at the time of election. As mentioned earlier, the sample includes elections in parliamentary systems, presidential systems, semi-presidential systems and parliamentary constitutional monarchies. This action requires the careful examination of constitutional amendments. This is because incumbents in *competitive authoritarian regimes* tend to resort to such amendments. Constitutional amendments can represent a very powerful

³² Elections for upper chambers are discarded. This is because they do not affect the office of the HOG.

way of concentrating power in the government. Second, the research determines whether the election affects any the respective offices of interest, as elaborated above.

Third, the research determines whether the election led to incumbent turnover in the respective office. Essentially, this step is about constructing the dependent variable. More elaboration on how it was set up can be found in the section *Indicators*. This step is necessitated by the fact that there is no readily available indicator³³.

Fourth, the study determines whether the V-Dem dataset (Coppedge et al., 2022a) indicates multiple elections in the same year. As to be elaborated later, several variables in the analyses have been derived from the V-Dem dataset. These include the indicators for opposition capacity, regime capacity, and the freedom and fairness of an election³⁴. Thus, one must be certain that each variable reflects the values for the respective elections of interest. Nevertheless, the V-Dem dataset has trouble accommodating multiple national elections in the same year. For instance, consider there have been both a presidential election and a parliamentary election in the same year in a parliamentary system. As discussed earlier, the research is not interested in presidential

³³ Both the NELDA dataset (Hyde & Marinov, 2021b) and the V-Dem dataset (Coppedge et al., 2022b) include indicators for incumbent turnover. The one found in the NELDA dataset is named *NELDA39*. While the one found in the V-Dem dataset is called *Election executive turnover ordinal*. Nevertheless, none of them can readily serve the purpose of dependent variable. Regarding the NELDA dataset, the variable may not be reliable enough. The dataset is characterized with a lot of coding errors. Given the small sample, it is crucial that all values are coded correctly. On the other hand, the variable found in the V-Dem dataset features a flaw. *Election executive turnover ordinal* assigns ‘0’ on two entirely separate occasions. The first one is when the incumbent retains their position as a result of the respective election. That is, in this occasion ‘0’ indicates that there has not been incumbent turnover. However, the second occasion is when there has been an election, yet it does not affect the respective office. The variable will assign ‘0’ if the election has not been determining for the respective office at all. Hence, the values of ‘0’ can mean two entirely different things. It is unclear whether the incumbent has retained their office as a result of the election or that the election has had nothing to do with the respective position. To resolve this issue, one could suggest weeding out all irrelevant elections. This way, the research would know for sure that the value of ‘0’ indicates the incumbent has retained their office as result of the election. Indeed, the V-Dem dataset includes a set of dichotomous variables that indicate the type of election. This set of indicators is named *Election type*. Nonetheless, not all dichotomous variables have been coded yet. Thus, making sure that all irrelevant elections have been weeded out remains impossible.

³⁴ For further details, see section *Indicators*.

elections in parliamentary systems. Therefore, it would only focus on the parliamentary election that year. However, the indicator for the freedom and fairness of an election³⁵ would include only a single value for that year. Furthermore, that value would reflect the freedom and fairness of a single election only. That is, the value would not represent the mean freedom and fairness of elections that year. Instead, the value would be the reflection of a single national election. Hence, it would be unclear which particular election the variable reflects. The exact same situation would apply to the indicators for opposition capacity and regime capacity. To resolve the issue, the research examines the set of dichotomous variables named *Election type*, which is found in the V-Dem dataset (Coppedge et al., 2022b). Following the example above, if *Election type* indicates the dataset only accounts for the presidential election that year, the case is discarded. If it indicates that it accounts for the parliamentary election only, the case is kept. However, if *Election type* indicates the dataset accounts for both elections, the case is discarded. This is because it remains uncertain which particular election the other variables reflect. If the case was to be kept, then the variables might be reflecting the presidential election. This would cast doubt over the validity of the statistical results. Nonetheless, if both elections took place on the same day, the case is kept. This is because both elections can be viewed to have taken place under the same circumstances. Thus, the values on the variables are most likely going to be the same for both elections.

Fifth, the research determines whether the election took place under any form of provisional government. Such forms include interim, caretaker and military governments. No election under

³⁵ As to be elaborated in the section *Indicators*, this indicator has been derived from the *Election free and fair* variable, which can be found in the V-Dem dataset (Coppedge et al., 2022b).

any form of provisional government is included in the final sample³⁶. This is done on the grounds of reliability. In such situations it may not always be clear who the incumbents are.

Indicators

This section outlines all the indicators used in the analyses. A summary of each variable and descriptive statistics related to it can be found in *Appendix B: Variables*. Additionally, a correlation matrix of all predictor variables can be found in *Appendix C: Correlation Matrix*.

Dependent variable:

The dependent variable is given the name *Incumbent Turnover*. It represents a dichotomous variable with a scale '0/1'. A case is coded '0' in either one of two occasions. The first one being that the national election of interest does not result in turnover in the respective office. In that case the incumbent remains in office as either the HOG or the HOS respectively. In the second occasion the national election results in turnover, yet the new successor comes from the same ruling party or coalition as the individual they replace. Thus, this study does not consider incumbent turnover to have occurred when the successor shares the same party or coalition affiliation as the holder they replace. This is because such a shift does not usually bring about a

³⁶ The only exceptions in this study represent three elections that took place in Pakistan. These are the 1997, 2013 and 2018 Pakistani elections. This is because the constitution of Pakistan mandates that there is a caretaker government prior to a national election. However, such a provisional government is chosen with a majority in parliament. In other words, incumbents themselves are in control of the composition of the caretaker government. Hence, such a provisional government may be considered a continuation of the incumbents.

significant change in the way of governing. In other words, the individual changes, yet the regime remains in power. Putin ‘passing the baton’ to Medvedev as the presidential candidate in 2008 serves as an illustration. On the other hand, a case is coded ‘1’ as long as two conditions hold. First, the national election of interest must result in the incumbent being replaced by a different individual in the respective office of the HOG or the HOS. Second, the new holder must not come from the same party or coalition as the person they replace.

As discussed earlier, the dependent variable has been manually put together. This has been done with help of all the sources featured in *Appendix A: Sample Details*. The binary distribution of cases within the variable can be found in *Appendix D: Dichotomous Distribution of Incumbent Turnover*. Incumbent turnover has taken place in 22 percent of the cases.

Independent variables:

To capture anti-pluralist attitudes and sentiments towards having a strongman leader, *Strongman Acceptance* has been created. It constitutes a continuous variable with a scale ‘0-3’. Accordingly, ‘0’ signifies the lowest level while ‘3’ indicates the highest level of acceptance of strongman rule. In other words, *Strongman Acceptance* ranges from democratic attitudes to undemocratic attitudes. This variable represents aggregated mean values of individual responses from the WVS time-series dataset (Inglehart et al., 2020b)³⁷. The individual survey asks respondents to rate different ways of governing of their country. The original question asks

³⁷ The original variable measured at the individual level by the WVS time-series dataset (Inglehart et al., 2020b) is named *E114*.

respondents to rate a political system that is characterized by a strong leader. More specifically, rate the way of governing where there is a strong leader who does not have to ‘bother with parliament or elections’³⁸.

As mentioned earlier, *Strongman Acceptance* could reflect the values of an electorate anywhere from the same year of the election up to three years prior to the election³⁹. Nevertheless, this raises two distinct concerns. Yet, both can be provided the same response. The first concern is about the reliability of the variable. Namely, whether *Strongman Acceptance* consistently measures what it is supposed to measure at all times. One could argue that attitudes could significantly change in two or three years. Certainly, concerns of that nature may be justified to some extent. However, *Strongman Acceptance* may serve as a good proxy. If only cases measured in the same year of the election were included, no statistical analysis would be feasible. This is because the sample would be too small for a large-N analysis. Unfortunately, no dataset offers an applicable substitute. This is because no dataset apart from the WVS time-series dataset (Inglehart et al., 2022a) contains data that is wide enough in terms of time and space. No other suitable source expands into as many years back or as many states. Moreover, there is no suitable substitute within the WVS time-series dataset itself. That is, there is no other question

³⁸ In the individual survey respondents rate this way of governing on an ordinal scale ‘1-4’. In that scale ‘1’ indicates ‘Very good’; ‘2’ indicates ‘Fairly good’; ‘3’ indicates ‘Bad’; and ‘4’ indicates ‘Very bad’. That is, the original survey scale ranges from undemocratic sentiments to democratic sentiments. To produce *Strongman Acceptance*, two steps have been taken. First, the original scale has been recoded into ‘0-3’ instead. Moreover, the direction of the scale has been reversed as well. That is, the recoded scale ranges from ‘Very bad’ to ‘Very good’ instead. In other words, the new ‘0-3’ scale ranges from democratic attitudes to undemocratic attitudes. This has been done for ease of interpretation. Second, individual responses have been aggregated into mean values based on every case from the sample. Put another way, the individual-level variable has been transformed into an electorate-level variable. This way *Strongman Acceptance* reflects the mean sentiments of a specific electorate at a particular year.

³⁹ Information regarding how many years prior to the election each case is measured at can be found in *Appendix A: Sample Details*.

within the survey that could serve as a good proxy for attitudes towards having a strongman leader.

Next, the second concern that begs additional consideration is of theoretical nature. For some cases *Strongman Acceptance* reflects the sentiments of the respective electorates in the same year of the election. Regarding these cases, it is possible that some of the respondents have been surveyed after the election had taken place. However, this would violate a fundamental requirement for inferring a causal relationship. It is the requirement that treatment must precede outcome. That is, one cannot infer causality if the treatment took place after the outcome had occurred. Yet again, the response is that *Strongman Acceptance* may serve as a good proxy. In other words, if for a particular case the variable reflects sentiments that were measured after the election, these values may serve as a good proxy for the true sentiments prior to the election. Unfortunately, the WVS time-series dataset (Inglehart et al., 2020b) does not allow for the researcher to resolve this issue with certainty. The researcher cannot make sure that no post-election respondents are included. A graph presenting the distribution of *Strongman Acceptance* can be found in *Appendix E: Distribution of Strongman Acceptance*.

Moving on, to measure values towards having stability and order vis-à-vis democracy, *Stability-Over-Democracy Preference* has been created. It represents a continuous variable with a scale '0-100'. The variable reflects the percentage of an electorate who consider stability and order more important than democratic freedoms. Therefore, *Stability-Over-Democracy Preference* ranges from democratic attitudes to undemocratic attitudes. Specifically, it reflects the percentage of those who consider either 'maintaining order in the nation' or 'fighting rising prices' as the most important goal their government should focus on. These two options represent only two out of four possible answers. The other two are related to liberal rights. These

are ‘giving people more say in important government decisions’ and ‘protecting freedom of speech’. Thus, the variable reflects a choice between stability and order on one hand and democracy on the other. *Stability-Over-Democracy Preference* represents a recoded and aggregated version of a question from the WVS time-series dataset (Inglehart et al., 2020b)⁴⁰.

As with *Strongman Acceptance*, *Stability-Over-Democracy Preference* too could reflect the values of an electorate anywhere from the same year of the election up to three years prior to the election⁴². Hence, the two concerns considered in depth regarding *Strongman Acceptance* also apply to *Stability-Over-Democracy Preference*. The response to both concerns remains the same. That is, *Stability-Over-Democracy Preference* may serve as a good proxy. Furthermore, the variable represents a somewhat clear choice between stability and order on one side and democracy on the other. This makes it a suitable indicator as that is exactly what this study attempts to test. Namely, whether strong preferences for stability and order over democratic rule lead to an absence of incumbent turnover. Besides, no other question within the WVS time-series dataset (Inglehart et al., 2020b) represents a suitable proxy. A graph presenting the distribution of *Stability-Over-Democracy Preference* can be found in *Appendix F: Distribution of Stability-Over-Democracy Preference*.

⁴⁰ The original variable measured at the individual level by the WVS time-series dataset (Inglehart et al., 2020b) is named *E003*.

⁴¹ The original survey question asks respondents to pick one out of four possible answers (Inglehart et al., 2020b). Accordingly, the answer should indicate what the respondent values as the top priority for their country. As mentioned above, these include ‘maintaining order in the nation’, ‘fighting rising prices’, ‘giving people more say in important government decisions’ and ‘protecting freedom of speech’. In creating *Stability-Over-Democracy Preference*, two steps have been taken. First, the options of ‘maintaining order in the nation’ and ‘fighting rising prices’ have been coded as ‘1’. On the other hand, the answers of ‘giving people more say in important government decisions’ and ‘protecting freedom of speech’ have been given ‘0’. Second, a new electorate-level variable is created. This new variable reflects the percentage of all answers that have been coded as ‘1’. That is, what is the percentage of all respondents from a particular electorate that have provided an answer coded as ‘1’.

⁴² Information regarding how many years prior to the election each case is measured at can be found in *Appendix A: Sample Details*.

Following that, to test the effect of *Stability-Over-Democracy Preference* among the post-communist subtype, a moderation effect is needed. Thus, an additional variable is required that indicates whether a case is considered post-communist. For this reason, *Post-Communist Subtype* has been created. The indicator constitutes a dichotomous variable with a scale '0/1'. Cases that are not considered post-communist are coded as '0'. On the other hand, post-communist cases are given '1'. The criterium applied in differentiating between post-communist cases and not post-communist cases is whether the state has been part of the Warsaw Pact or Yugoslavia. Hence, a state is coded '1' as long as it has been part of either.

This criterium is justified on two grounds. First, it is justified on pragmatic grounds. No other requirement could ensure that all cases labeled as post-communist are objectively such. This is because any other criterium would rather be more subjective in nature. For example, an alternative would be labeling post-communist those cases in which any former ruling party had considered itself communist. This would require content analysis of party manifestos for instance. However, a government labeling itself communist does not necessarily equate to communist policies. Likewise, a government that is characterized by Marxist policies may not acknowledge Marxism or communism as its ideology. Hence, the subjective nature of the criterium. On the other hand, one could apply a policy-based approach. That is, come up with a set of policies that define communist rule. Nonetheless, this alternative too would prove to be rather subjective. This is because there are multiple facets to communist rule⁴³. Thus, such a criterium would be unlikely to unite all researchers. Next, the criterium used for *Post-Communist Subtype* is also justified on theoretical grounds. The works discussed in the literature review

⁴³ For instance, planned economy, lack of private property, state-owned enterprises, ample state intervention and nomenklatura. Different scholars may disagree regarding what features are defining of communism. Moreover, the line separating communism on one side and socialism on the other may not be clear-cut.

regarding preferences for stability over democracy have focused on the post-Soviet and European post-communist states. After all, the fall of the Berlin wall and the collapse of the Soviet Union were experienced most considerably in these states. As a result, the transition from communism to open economy was abrupt in most of these countries. Therefore, it is in these states where the effect of preferences for stability over democracy is most likely to have played a significant role. *Post-Communist Subtype* has been manually put together. The binary distribution of cases within *Post-Communist Subtype* can be found in *Appendix G: Dichotomous Distribution of Post-Communist Subtype*.

Control variables:

To control for the level of opposition capacity, *Opposition Capacity* has been created. It represents a continuous variable with a scale '0-3'. In that respect, '0' indicates the lowest level of opposition capacity, while '3' indicates the highest level of opposition capacity. In other words, the scale ranges from low to high opposition capacity. Besides, *Opposition Capacity* constitutes a composite variable. Given the relatively small sample, the option of a single composite indicator represents the more favorable choice. This is because a composite variable brings about parsimony. In essence, *Opposition Capacity* reflects the sum of three separate dichotomous variables. All three have been obtained from the V-Dem dataset (Coppedge et al., 2022b). These include an indicator for whether domestic monitors were present at the election⁴⁴,

⁴⁴ The original variable found in the V-Dem dataset (Coppedge et al., 2022b) is named *Election domestic election monitors*. It indicates whether independent monitors and monitors from all parties were allowed to monitor the vote. The variable has a scale '0/1'. The absence of monitors from all parties and independent monitors is indicated by '0', while their presence is indicated by '1'.

an indicator for whether international monitors were present at the election⁴⁵, and an indicator for whether any international monitors were denied from overseeing the election^{46,47}. Unfortunately, these indicators fail to encompass all the aspects related to opposition capacity. As outlined in the literature review, additional aspects include opposition unity, collaboration between civil society organizations (CSOs) and opposition parties, presence of exit polls and parallel vote tabulation, energetic voter registration drives and voter turnout drives, presence of public opinion polls, and threatening incumbents with mass demonstrations if election results were manipulated. Nonetheless, no suitable proxy for any of these aspects has been found. Hence, due to the lack of available data the composite variable perhaps fails to reflect the full range of opposition capacity. In turn, this raises concerns regarding the reliability of *Opposition Capacity*. That is, whether the variable consistently measures opposition capacity at all times. Unfortunately, the lack of data availability does not leave the researcher with a lot of options. Including the variable as it is would be better than not controlling for opposition capacity at all. Moreover, the three indicators used for constructing *Opposition Capacity* come from a reliable source.

Following that, *Regime Capacity* has been created to account for the level of regime capacity. *Regime Capacity* constitutes a continuous indicator with a scale ‘0-16’. Accordingly, ‘0’ signifies the highest level of regime capacity, while ‘16’ signifies the lowest level of regime

⁴⁵ The original variable found in the V-Dem dataset (Coppedge et al., 2022b) is named *Election international monitors*. It indicates whether international monitors were present at an election. The variable has a scale ‘0/1’. The absence of international monitors is indicated by ‘0’, while their presence is indicated by ‘1’.

⁴⁶ The original variable found in the V-Dem dataset (Coppedge et al., 2022b) is named *Election international monitors denied*. It indicates whether any international monitors were denied the opportunity to monitor the vote. The variable has a scale ‘0/1’. The absence of such a denial is indicated by ‘0’, while the presence of such a denial is indicated by ‘1’.

⁴⁷ To construct *Opposition Capacity*, two steps have been taken. First, the indicator for whether any international monitors were denied access, *Election international monitors denied*, has been recoded. Its scale has been reversed. According to the recoded scale, ‘0’ indicates international monitors were denied access, while ‘1’ indicates no international monitors were denied access. This way, the recoded indicator has been realigned with the scales of the other two indicators. In other words, according to all three, ‘0’ signifies low opposition capacity, while ‘1’ signifies high opposition capacity. Second, a new variable is created that reflects the sum of all three indicators together.

capacity. That is, the scale is counterintuitive as it ranges from high to low regime capacity. Furthermore, *Regime Capacity* represents a composite variable. Again, this is done on the grounds of parsimony. As such, it reflects the sum of four separate indicators. All four variables can be found in the V-Dem dataset (Coppedge et al., 2022b). These include an indicator for party institutionalization⁴⁸, an indicator for incumbents' capacity for repressive measures against opposition parties⁴⁹, an indicator for incumbents' control over the entry and exit of CSOs⁵⁰, and an indicator for incumbents' control of the media⁵¹. Nevertheless, there is one aspect of regime capacity which this composite variable does not incorporate. The only aspect that is outlined in the literature review but has not been accounted for is elite unity. Unfortunately, no suitable proxy for elite unity has been found. Apart from that, *Regime Capacity* should serve as a reliable indicator of regime capacity. All four constitutive variables have been derived from a reliable source.

Lastly, to control for the freedom and fairness of an election, *Free and Fair Election* is used. *Free and Fair Election* is an ordinal variable with a scale '0-4'. In that respect, '0' indicates the election has been neither free nor fair at all, while '4' indicates the election has been almost perfectly free and perfectly fair. The variable takes into account numerous aspects of the campaign period, election day and post-election processes. *Free and Fair Election* has been

⁴⁸ The original variable found in the V-Dem dataset (Coppedge et al., 2022b) is named *Access to state jobs by political group*. It measures to what extent state jobs are equally open to qualified individuals regardless of their association with a political party. The variable has a scale '0-4'.

⁴⁹ The original variable found in the V-Dem dataset (Coppedge et al., 2022b) is named *Barriers to parties*. It measures how restrictive barriers to parties are. The variable accounts for financial barriers, legal barriers, as well as harassment by the regime. The variable has a scale '0-4'.

⁵⁰ The original variable found in the V-Dem dataset (Coppedge et al., 2022b) is named *CSO entry and exit*. It measures the extent to which the regime controls the entry and exit of civil society organizations into public life. The variable has a scale '0-4'.

⁵¹ The original variable found in the V-Dem dataset (Coppedge et al., 2022b) is named *Media bias*. It measures the extent of media bias against opposition parties and candidates. The variable has a scale '0-4'.

derived from the V-Dem dataset (Coppedge et al., 2022b)⁵². As such, the variable should serve as very reliable indicator. This is because it originates from a reliable source.

Research Method

This section is intended to outline the research strategy. The analyses set off with descriptive statistics. Descriptive figures can be very useful in deriving insights about the likelihood of the hypotheses being confirmed. That is, descriptive statistics can offer preliminary results.

Additionally, descriptive figures can serve as an introduction to the regression models. In that regard, the results chapter analyzes four separate figures. First, a histogram presenting the mean values of *Strongman Acceptance* based on the outcome of the dependent variable is analyzed.

The histogram can provide preliminary results regarding *H1a*. Accordingly, this study expects for the mean value of turnover cases on *Strongman Acceptance* to be lower than that of cases where turnover has not occurred. Second, a histogram presenting the mean values of *Strongman Acceptance* based on *Post-Communist Subtype* and *Incumbent Turnover* is inspected. This figure can offer a further examination of the dynamics of *Strongman Acceptance*. Importantly, *H1a* applies to all post-authoritarian *competitive authoritarian regimes*. In other words, it applies to both post-communist cases and cases that are not post-communist. Therefore, the study expects the dynamics between post-communist cases and not post-communist cases to be the same regarding *Strongman Acceptance*. Third, a histogram presenting the mean values of *Stability-Over-Democracy Preference* based on the outcome of the dependent variable is examined. This

⁵² *Free and Fair Election* represents a renamed version of the original variable from the V-Dem dataset (Coppedge et al., 2022b). The original variable is named *Election free and fair*. Other than providing a different name, the variable has not been altered.

histogram can offer an additional illustration of the dynamics of *Stability-Over-Democracy Preference*. *H1b* is concerned with the effect of the variable across post-communist cases only. In other words, the hypothesis is not concerned with the effect across all post-authoritarian cases as a whole. Regarding post-communist cases, *H1b* expects turnover cases to have on average lower values compared to cases that have not experienced turnover. Given that, it can be expected that across post-authoritarian cases as a whole the mean value of turnover cases would still be lower than that of cases that have not experienced it. Fourth, a histogram presenting the mean values of *Stability-Over-Democracy Preference* based on *Post-Communist Subtype* and *Incumbent Turnover* is studied. It is this figure that can provide preliminary results regarding *H1b*. In that respect, the research expects the mean value of turnover cases to be higher than that of cases that have not experienced turnover across the post-communist subtype.

Moving on, this study turns to regression analyses. It is the regression results that are considered definitive in answering the research question. In that regard, this research employs binary logistic regression. This type of regression is necessitated by the dichotomous dependent variable. However, there is an issue that begs further consideration. As elaborated earlier, the 45 cases come from 25 different states. Thus, some states are represented in the sample with more than one case. This means that there are 25 clusters present. Nonetheless, this repeated observation of states over multiple years violates a fundamental requirement of regression analysis. It is the requirement of independence of errors. The violation of this requirement may lead to unreliable estimates of standard errors. In that respect, standard errors usually tend to be downwardly biased. In turn, biased standard errors may lead to unreliable p-values. In other words, inferences about the significance of relationships may be inaccurate. Nevertheless, to correct for this, the analyses estimate clustered standard errors. Therefore, the results are adjusted

for the 25 clusters. This way, the analyses should produce reliable estimates of both standard errors and p-values.

Next, there are three clarifications that need to be made. This paper attempts to answer the research question by testing *H1a* and *H1b*. Hence, the effects of *Strongman Acceptance* and *Stability-Over-Democracy Preference* remain the focus of the study. First, as discussed in the literature review, the relationship between *Strongman Acceptance* and *Incumbent Turnover* should be both direct and indirect. In the indirect path, the relationship should be mediated by *Regime Capacity*. However, this paper is not concerned with testing for the exact path of causation. This is because the exact path is not specified in *H1a*. Thus, testing for mediation lies outside the scope of this research.

Second, the analyses focus on the effect of *Stability-Over-Democracy Preference* across post-communist cases only. In other words, the analyses do not focus on the effect across post-authoritarian *competitive authoritarian regimes* as a whole. As the literature review puts it forward, the effect of strong preferences for stability over democracy may only apply to the post-communist subtype. Accordingly, *H1b* is concerned with the effect across post-communist cases only.

Third, the analyses do not account for all potential predictors of *Incumbent Turnover*. There are two potential factors that are outlined in the literature review but are not included. Both of these have to do with ties to the West. Namely, intensity of linkages to the West and Western leverage. In that regard, there are two reasons for not including them. The first one has to do with the path of causation. As discussed in the literature review, ties to the West should have an indirect effect only. That is, the effect of ties to the West should be mediated by three other predictors. These include freedom and fairness of elections, regime capacity and opposition

capacity. Therefore, any variation in ties to the West should respectively be reflected by variation in these three predictors. These mediators are controlled for in the face of *Free and Fair Election, Regime Capacity* and *Opposition Capacity*. Thus, including intensity of linkages to the West and Western leverage may not be necessary. Next, the second reason for not including these predictors has to do with parsimony. It is important to note that this research is based on a relatively small sample. As such, parsimony should be an especially crucial goal. There are many different rules of thumb when it comes to the ratio of cases to variables. The most minimalist one holds that there should be at least five cases per single variable. Hence, given the 45 cases, a regression model shall not include more than nine variables. Even in the most comprehensive models, this study does include more than eight variables. Nonetheless, if proxies for intensity of linkages to the West and Western leverage were to be included, that rule would be violated. This is because the number of variables would rise to 11.

Furthermore, it is crucial to know if any of the predictor variables are too highly correlated with each other. In other words, it is essential to check for potential multicollinearity⁵³. An issue with multicollinearity would imply that not all predictor variables can be included in the same model at the same time. Relatively strong correlations are not a definitive sign of multicollinearity. However, strong correlations could be a good indicator for a potential problem⁵⁴. In that regard, a correlation matrix of all predictor variables is presented in *Appendix C: Correlation Matrix*. The table shows that there are no grounds for concern. No correlation

⁵³ That is, when two or more predictors predict one another to a high extent. If there is multicollinearity, the model has a hard time distinguishing how much of the variation in the dependent variable is predicted by each predictor alone. Hence, multicollinearity may lead to unreliable coefficient estimates.

⁵⁴ More comprehensive collinearity diagnostics are presented later in the research.

exceeds 0.8 or goes below -0.8. That is, no two predictors correlate too highly with each other. Therefore, there is no reason to exclude any variable at this point⁵⁵.

Moving on, the research analyzes 12 different regression models. Crucially, each model name ends with a suffix. That suffix can either be 'A' or 'B'. Models ending with the letter 'A' encompass the whole sample of 45 cases. On the other hand, those ending in 'B' include only 31 cases. Among these 31 cases are only those in which the two political culture variables reflect values from either the same year of the election or one year prior to the election. That is, *Strongman Acceptance* and *Stability-Over-Democracy Preference* reflect the attitudes of an electorate either the same year of the election or one year prior to the election. For example, the only difference between Model 1A and Model 1B is the sample size. Both models test the effect of the exact same independent variable. However, while Model 1A employs all 45 cases, Model 1B is based on those 31 cases only. Importantly, this is done on the grounds of robustness. Running each concept model with the two different samples represents a good robustness check. As discussed earlier, the two political culture variables could reflect the values of an electorate anywhere from the same year of the election up to three years prior to the election. Thus, there might be concerns regarding the reliability of these variables. However, these concerns should be resolved to a large extent with the introduction of the smaller 'B' sample. This is because the attitudes of an electorate are far less likely to change significantly in one year. Therefore, there should be less noise in each respective 'B' version. In that regard, each 'B' model may serve to reaffirm the results from its respective 'A' version. In other words, if both 'A' and 'B' versions

⁵⁵ One may understandably be concerned that *Regime Capacity* and *Free and Fair Election* could be multicollinear. After all, both predictors are related to how incumbents manipulate rules and procedures in their favor. Nevertheless, the correlation matrix in *Appendix C: Correlation Matrix* shows that the correlation between them is not too high. The table presents a positive and significant correlation of 0.454. The correlation is positive due to the counterintuitive scale of *Regime Capacity*. That is, its scale ranges from high to low regime capacity. Additional collinearity diagnostics are included later in the study.

of the same concept model show very similar results, then these results are more likely to be robust. Nonetheless, if the ‘A’ version presents a significant relationship, while the ‘B’ version shows it is not significant, then the results of the ‘A’ model are less likely to be robust. In this occasion, the results of the ‘A’ version should be interpreted with a degree of caution.

Following that, the models are analyzed in a hierarchical manner. First, Models 1A and 1B include only the constant and *Strongman Acceptance*. Second, Models 2A and 2B include only the constant and *Stability-Over-Democracy Preference*. Third, Models 3A and 3B include the constant, *Stability-Over-Democracy Preference*, *Post-Communist Subtype* and the interaction term between *Stability-Over-Democracy Preference* and *Post-Communist Subtype*. Fourth, Models 4A and 4B include the constant, *Strongman Acceptance* and *Stability-Over-Democracy Preference*. Fifth, Models 5A and 5B include the constant, *Strongman Acceptance*, *Stability-Over-Democracy Preference*, *Post-Communist Subtype* and the interaction between *Stability-Over-Democracy Preference* and *Post-Communist Subtype*. Sixth, Models 6A and 6B account for all the control variables. The models include the constant, *Strongman Acceptance*, *Stability-Over-Democracy Preference*, *Post-Communist Subtype*, the interaction between *Stability-Over-Democracy Preference* and *Post-Communist Subtype*, *Opposition Capacity*, *Regime Capacity* and *Free and Fair Election*.

Accordingly, the research expects *Strongman Acceptance* to have a negative and significant effect on *Incumbent Turnover*. Then, the relationship between *Stability-Over-Democracy Preference* and the dependent variable across the post-communist subtype is expected to be negative and significant. Next, the effects of *Opposition Capacity*, *Regime Capacity* and *Free and Fair Election* are all expected to be positive. This also applies to *Regime Capacity* due to its counterintuitive scale. Again, the variable ranges from high to low regime capacity.

Lastly, the research includes a variety of diagnostics. Inspecting each model would be too labor intensive. For this reason, only Model 6A is examined closer. In other words, it is only one of the two most comprehensive models that undergoes diagnostics. However, Model 6B, the other most comprehensive model, does not undergo closer inspection. This is because it has a sample of 31 cases only. That is, the model violates the minimalist cases-to-variables ratio. In other words, the model does not conform to the rule of five cases per single variable. It includes a lot more variables than allowed by the requirement. Crucially, the purpose of each ‘B’ version is to reaffirm the results of its respective ‘A’ counterpart. Hence, each ‘B’ model primarily serves as a robustness check. For that reason, Model 6B does not undergo diagnostics. On the other hand, Model 6A undergoes four main types of inspection.

First, the model is inspected for outliers. This is done by examining the normalized residuals⁵⁶. Second, Model 6A is examined for influential cases. This is done by inspecting leverage values as well as DFBeta values for all predictors that appear significant⁵⁷. Third, the model is inspected for multicollinearity. This is done by analyzing both Tolerance values and Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) values. Finally, Model 6A is examined for linearity of the logit⁵⁸. This is accomplished by employing the Box-Tidwell transformation⁵⁹.

⁵⁶ Also referred to as ‘standardized residuals’. Both terms are used to refer to the z-scores of residuals.

⁵⁷ To run the regression models, I use STATA. Unfortunately, running a regression with clustered standard errors in STATA leaves the researcher with limited options. To my knowledge, STATA currently does not allow for the computation of Cook’s Distance when you employ clustered standard errors. Nor does it allow for the computation of DFBeta value for the constant. However, estimating these parameters using basic standard errors is not a viable option. This is because Cook’s Distance and DFBeta values are computed in relation to the type of standard errors. These estimates would be different based on the type of standard errors.

⁵⁸ That is, testing for potential misspecification in the model. Nonlinearity may indicate incorrect judgements concerning the nature of the relationship between the predictors and the dependent variable.


⁵⁹ That is, including an interaction term between each continuous predictor and the log of itself. To infer linearity of the logit, these interactions must be nonsignificant.

Chapter Four: Results

This chapter aims to answer the research question by testing *H1a* and *H1b*. This is done by analyzing the regression results.

Descriptive statistics:

Figure 3. Histogram presenting the mean values of *Strongman Acceptance* based on the outcome of *Incumbent Turnover*.




Note: $N = 45$.

Descriptive statistics are examined as a means of introduction to the regression results. In that regard, descriptive results can be very useful in deriving insights about the likelihood of the hypotheses being confirmed. As such, descriptive statistics should only be used in deriving preliminary results. That is, descriptive results do not represent definitive results. Instead, it is the results of the regression models that are considered definitive by this study.

When it comes to *Strongman Acceptance*, expectations dictate that turnover cases would have lower values on average compared to cases that have not experienced turnover. However, the results do not seem to align with what was hypothesized. That is, the descriptive results are


Figure 4. Histogram presenting the mean values of *Strongman Acceptance* based on *Post-Communist Subtype* and *Incumbent Turnover*.



Note: $N = 45$.

not in accordance with *H1a*. This becomes evident in [Figure 3](#). This is because the mean value of turnover cases is slightly higher. Moving on, it is important to note that *H1a* applies to all post-authoritarian *competitive authoritarian regimes*. That is, it applies to both post-communist cases and cases that are not post-communist. Thus, it is expected that the dynamics between post-communist cases and not post-communist cases should be the same regarding the variable. In this respect, [Figure 4](#) presents favorable results. [Figure 4](#) presents very similar dynamics between the two groups of cases. Among both groups the mean value of turnover cases remains slightly higher. Additionally, the difference in mean values between turnover cases and cases that have

Figure 5. Histogram presenting the mean values of *Stability-Over-Democracy Preference* based on the outcome of *Incumbent Turnover*.




Note: $N = 45$.

not experienced turnover remains relatively similar.

Next, *H1b* is concerned with the effect of *Stability-Over-Democracy Preference* across the post-communist subtype only. That is, the hypothesis is not concerned with the effect across cases that are not post-communist or post-authoritarian cases as a whole. Regarding the post-communist subtype, expectations dictate that turnover cases would have lower values on average compared to cases that have not experienced turnover. Given that expectation, one would also assume that across post-authoritarian cases as a whole the mean value of turnover cases would still be lower than that of cases that have not experienced it. Indeed, [Figure 5](#) presents exactly

Figure 6. Histogram presenting the mean values of *Stability-Over-Democracy Preference* based on *Post-Communist Subtype* and *Incumbent Turnover*.



Note: $N = 45$.

that. However, to obtain preliminary results regarding *H1b* one needs to inspect [Figure 6](#). In this respect, the results in [Figure 6](#) do not provide support for *H1b*. This is because across the post-communist subtype the mean value of turnover cases is higher than that of cases that have not experienced turnover.

The effect of acceptance of strongman rule on incumbent turnover:

Table 1. Logistic regression analysis predicting incumbent turnover via elections in post-authoritarian *competitive authoritarianism* (Part One).

	Model 1A	Model 1B
(Constant)	-3.456 [†] (1.767)	-4.308* (2.025)
Strongman Acceptance	1.508 (1.177)	2.167 [†] (1.294)
-2LL	45.035	31.187
Nagelkerke R ²	0.087	0.187
N	45	31

Note: binary logistic regression coefficients with robust standard errors in brackets. Robust standard errors are based on country clusters.

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$, [†] $p < 0.1$

Nevertheless, it is the results of the different regression models that are definitive in confirming or disconfirming the hypotheses. In that regard, [Table 1](#) provides data relevant to *H1a*. However, the results appear to be contrary to what was hypothesized. In other words, the results are not in line with the hypothesis that anti-pluralist attitudes have a negative and

significant effect on incumbent turnover. This is because in both models *Strongman Acceptance* has a positive effect on *Incumbent Turnover*. This relationship is not statistically significant in Model 1A. On the other hand, in Model 1B the effect is significant, yet only at the 10% level. The coefficient for *Strongman Acceptance* in the latter model is equal to an odds ratio of 8.732. If one was to consider the effect significant, it would mean that for every one-unit increase (on the scale of '0-3') in the mean acceptance of strongman rule of an electorate, the odds of incumbent turnover occurring increase by 773.2%. Contrary to expectations, this represents a strong positive relationship.

Next, the value of Nagelkerke R^2 in Model 1B is higher than that in Model 1A. What this means is that Model 1B fits the data better than Model 1A. This goes with what is expected. This is because the 'B' version includes only those cases where *Strongman Acceptance* reflects the values of an electorate either the same year of the election or one year prior to the election. The results expectedly show that there is less noise in the 'B' model compared to the 'A' version.

The effect of preferences for stability over democracy on incumbent turnover:

Moving on, Table 2 contains data that is pertinent to *H1b*⁶⁰. Nonetheless, the empirical results are at odds with the respective hypothesis. That is, the results are not in accordance with the hypothesis that lack of support for democratic rule is negatively and significantly related to incumbent turnover across the post-communist subtype. In fact, the relationship across post-

⁶⁰ Above and beyond, Table 2 shows that a case being considered post-communist may be negatively related to incumbent turnover. Both Model 3A and Model 3B present a negative coefficient for *Post-Communist Subtype*. Nevertheless, the binary variable does not reach significance in either of the models.

Table 2. Logistic regression analysis predicting incumbent turnover via elections in post-authoritarian *competitive authoritarianism* (Part Two).

	Model 2A	Model 2B	Model 3A	Model 3B
(Constant)	0.667 (3.748)	0.981 (4.137)	6.763 (4.483)	4.749 (4.231)
Stability-Over-Democracy Preference	-0.026 (0.050)	-0.028 (0.057)	-0.117 [†] (0.069)	-0.083 (0.065)
Post-Communist Subtype (Ref. = not post-communist)			-13.751 (8.565)	-20.690 (19.585)
Stability-Over-Democracy Preference * Post-Communist Subtype			0.188 [†] (0.112)	0.262 (0.240)
-2LL	47.264	34.993	44.464	32.553
Nagelkerke R ²	0.014	0.019	0.105	0.129
N	45	31	45	31

Note: binary logistic regression coefficients with robust standard errors in brackets. Robust standard errors are based on country clusters.

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$, [†] $p < 0.1$

communist cases appears to be positive in both Model 3A⁶¹ and Model 3B⁶². However, *Stability-Over-Democracy Preference* and the interaction term *Stability-Over-Democracy Preference* * *Post-Communist Subtype* reach significance only in Model 3A and just at the 10% level. The effect of *Stability-Over-Democracy Preference* on the dependent variable across post-communist cases in Model 3A is represented by an odds ratio of 1.073. If the relationship was viewed as

⁶¹ The coefficient for the effect of *Stability-Over-Democracy Preference* on *Incumbent Turnover* across the post-communist subtype in Model 3A is $b = 0.071$.

⁶² The coefficient for the effect of *Stability-Over-Democracy Preference* on *Incumbent Turnover* across the post-communist subtype in Model 3B is $b = 0.179$.

significant, it would mean that for every one percent increase⁶³ of those who place their preference for stability or order rather than democracy in post-communist electorates, the odds of incumbent turnover occurring increase by 7.3%⁶⁴.

Moving on, each 'B' version of every model has a higher Nagelkerke R² value compared to its respective 'A' version. In other words, each 'B' version fits the data better compared to its respective 'A' counterpart. Again, this is all expected. This is because each 'B' version should contain a relatively smaller error term. This is due to each 'B' model including only those cases where *Stability-Over-Democracy Preference* reflects the attitudes of an electorate either the same year of the election or one year prior to the election.

The effect of acceptance of strongman rule and preferences for stability over democracy on incumbent turnover:

Next, Table 3 contains empirical evidence regarding both *H1a* and *H1b*⁶⁵. Nevertheless, the results are not in line with either of the hypotheses. Firstly, the evidence above is not in

⁶³ Since *Stability-Over-Democracy* reflects a percentage ('0-100' Scale).

⁶⁴ On the other hand, the effect of *Stability-Over-Democracy Preference* across cases that are not post-communist is negative in both Model 3A and Model 3B. In Model 3A, the effect is reflected by an odds ratio of 0.889. Thus, for every one percent increase of those who place their preference for stability or order rather than democracy in electorates that are not post-communist, the odds of incumbent turnover occurring decrease by 11.1%. However, *H1b* is concerned with the effect across post-communist cases only. Nonetheless, Model 3A and Model 3B show that the direction of the relationship is different based on whether a case is considered post-communist or not.

⁶⁵ However, if the effect of *Stability-Over-Democracy Preference* was to be generalized across all post-authoritarian *competitive authoritarian regimes*, then it would be negative. This is evident from Model 2A and Model 2B.

⁶⁶ Additionally, Table 3 shows that a case being considered post-communist may be negatively related to incumbent turnover. Both Model 5A and Model 5B present a negative coefficient for *Post-Communist Subtype*. Nonetheless, the binary variable does not reach significance in either of the models.

Table 3. Logistic regression analysis predicting incumbent turnover via elections in post-authoritarian *competitive authoritarianism* (Part Three).

	Model 4A	Model 4B	Model 5A	Model 5B
(Constant)	-0.335 (4.226)	0.091 (5.263)	5.372 (5.486)	2.959 (6.266)
Strongman Acceptance	1.847 (1.307)	3.028* (1.309)	1.798 (1.387)	3.032* (1.325)
Stability-Over-Democracy Preference	-0.048 (0.058)	-0.078 (0.074)	-0.133 (0.081)	-0.120 (0.092)
Post-Communist Subtype (Ref. = not post-communist)			-14.674 (10.622)	-30.753 (28.205)
Stability-Over-Democracy Preference * Post-Communist Subtype			0.198 (0.135)	0.380 (0.340)
-2LL	43.840	29.009	41.449	26.560
Nagelkerke R ²	0.125	0.274	0.198	0.365
N	45	31	45	31

Note: binary logistic regression coefficients with robust standard errors in brackets. Robust standard errors are based on country clusters.

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$, † $p < 0.1$

accordance with the hypothesis that anti-pluralist sentiments have a negative and significant effect on incumbent turnover. Contrary to expectations, *Strongman Acceptance* has a positive effect on *Incumbent Turnover*. This relationship holds across all four models presented above. However, it appears statistically significant only in Model 4B and Model 5B. In Model 4B, the coefficient equals an odds ratio of 20.656. This means that for every one-unit increase (on the scale of ‘0-3’) in the mean acceptance of strongman rule of an electorate, the odds of incumbent turnover occurring increase by 1965.6%. Of course, this effect appears extremely strong, which

means it is not likely to be true in reality. The subsequent models will show whether this relationship holds. On the other hand, the odds ratio reflected in Model 5B is equal to 20.747. In other words, for every one-unit increase (on the scale of '0-3') in the mean acceptance of strongman rule of the electorate, the odds of incumbent turnover occurring increase by 1974.7%. Again, this effect appears extremely strong. The subsequent models to come will show whether this effect holds.

Furthermore, the results are also not in line with the hypothesis that lack of support for democratic rule is negatively and significantly related to incumbent turnover across the post-communist subtype. This is because the relationship between *Stability-Over-Democracy Preference* and the dependent variable is positive across post-communist cases⁶⁷. This is evident in both Model 5A⁶⁸ and Model 5B⁶⁹. Nonetheless, neither *Stability-Over-Democracy Preference* nor the interaction term reach significance in either of the models. Thus, the relationship between *Stability-Over-Democracy Preference* and *Incumbent Turnover* is not significantly different between post-communist regimes and all other post-authoritarian regimes⁷⁰.

Following that, each 'B' version above has a higher Nagelkerke R² value compared to its respective 'A' version. What this means is that each 'B' model fits the data better compared to its respective 'A' version. Yet again, this goes with what is expected. This is because the 'B' versions include only those cases where *Strongman Acceptance* and *Stability-Over-Democracy*

⁶⁷ On the other hand, the effect of *Stability-Over-Democracy Preference* across cases that are not post-communist is negative in both Model 5A and Model 5B.

⁶⁸ The coefficient for the effect of *Stability-Over-Democracy Preference* on *Incumbent Turnover* across the post-communist subtype in Model 5A is $b = 0.065$.

⁶⁹ The coefficient for the effect of *Stability-Over-Democracy Preference* on *Incumbent Turnover* across the post-communist subtype in Model 5B is $b = 0.260$.

⁷⁰ The effect of *Stability-Over-Democracy Preference* across all post-authoritarian *competitive authoritarian regimes* appears negative. This is evident from Model 4A and Model 4B. However, this negative relationship does not reach statistical significance.

Preference reflect the sentiments of an electorate either the same year of the election or one year prior to the election. The results expectedly show that there is less noise in the ‘B’ versions compared to the respective ‘A’ versions.

Models with controls:

Table 4. Logistic regression analysis predicting incumbent turnover via elections in post-authoritarian *competitive authoritarianism* (Part Four).

	Model 6A	Model 6B
(Constant)	-26.689*	-25.471*
	(12.924)	(11.520)
Strongman Acceptance	1.401	2.190
	(1.439)	(2.255)
Stability-Over-Democracy Preference	0.041	0.081
	(0.072)	(0.080)
Post-Communist Subtype (Ref. = not post-communist)	5.293	-9.137
	(9.807)	(35.598)
Stability-Over-Democracy Preference * Post-Communist Subtype	-0.083	0.075
	(0.124)	(0.431)
Opposition Capacity	2.094	-0.209
	(1.912)	(0.704)
Regime Capacity	0.807*	1.069*
	(0.348)	(0.516)
Free and Fair Election	2.320**	1.905*
	(0.811)	(0.947)
-2LL	26.519	18.114
Nagelkerke R ²	0.574	0.628
N	45	31

Note: binary logistic regression coefficients with robust standard errors in brackets. Robust standard errors are based on country clusters.

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$, † $p < 0.1$

Moving on, Table 4 is concerned with answering both *H1a* and *H1b*⁷¹. The two models above represent the two most comprehensive ones as they include all the control variables. However, the empirical results do not appear to provide support for either of the hypotheses. To start with, the results are not in line with the hypothesis that anti-pluralist attitudes are negatively and significantly related to incumbent turnover. In fact, the effect of *Strongman Acceptance* appears positive in both Model 6A and Model 6B. Nevertheless, neither of the models assigns significance to the predictor variable.

Next, the results are also not in accordance with the hypothesis that lack of support for democratic rule is negatively and significantly related to incumbent turnover across the post-communist subtype. Firstly, the relationship across post-communist cases appears negative only in Model 6A⁷². That is, the effect of *Stability-Over-Democracy Preference* across post-communist cases is positive in Model 6B⁷³. Moreover, neither *Stability-Over-Democracy Preference* nor the interaction term appear significant in the models above. Therefore, the relationship between *Stability-Over-Democracy Preference* and the dependent variable does not differ significantly between the post-communist subtype and all other post-authoritarian cases.

Following that, Model 6A and Model 6B provide evidence for additional inferences. Two out of the three controls included reach statistical significance. These are *Regime Capacity* and

⁷¹ Additionally, Table 4 provides a suggestion regarding the influence of a case being considered post-communist. In that regard, it is an ambiguous suggestion. While *Post-Communist Subtype* may have a positive effect in Model 6A, the effect in Model 6B is negative. Nonetheless, the relationship does not reach statistical significance in either of the models.

⁷² The coefficient for the effect of *Stability-Over-Democracy Preference* on *Incumbent Turnover* across the post-communist subtype in Model 6A is $b = -0.042$.

⁷³ The coefficient for the effect of *Stability-Over-Democracy Preference* on *Incumbent Turnover* across the post-communist subtype in Model 6B is $b = 0.156$.

⁷⁴ Interestingly, the effect of *Stability-Over-Democracy Preference* across cases that are not post-communist is positive in Model 6A and Model 6B. By contrast, this relationship appears negative in all earlier models. Nonetheless, the effect is not significant in neither Model 6A nor Model 6B.

Free and Fair Election. Besides, both relationships are in the expected direction. Regarding *Regime Capacity*, its effect on *Incumbent Turnover* appears positive. The relationship is positive due to the counterintuitive scaling of *Regime Capacity*. That is, the scale ranges from high capacity to low capacity. In that regard, the coefficient in Model 6A translates into an odds ratio of 2.241. This means that for every one-unit increase (on the scale of ‘0-16’) in the variable of *Regime Capacity*, the odds of incumbent turnover occurring increase by 124.1%. On the other hand, the coefficient in Model 6B equals an odds ratio of 2.914. Accordingly, for every one-unit increase (on the scale of ‘0-16’) in the variable of *Regime Capacity*, the odds of incumbent turnover occurring increase by 191.4%. Hence, regime capacity appears to have a relatively strong effect over alternation of power via elections across post-authoritarian *competitive authoritarian regimes*.

Moving forward, the effect of *Free and Fair Election* on *Incumbent Turnover* appears positive as well. The effect of the predictor in Model 6A is equal to an odds ratio of 10.179. This means that for every one-unit increase (on the ordinal scale of ‘0-4’) in how free and fair elections are, the odds of incumbent turnover occurring increase by 917.9%. On the other hand, the coefficient in Model 6B translates to an odds ratio of 6.720. Respectively, for every one-unit increase (on the ordinal scale of ‘0-4’) in how free and fair an election is, the odds of incumbent turnover occurring increase by 572%. Both models assign fairly strong, yet not necessarily implausible, influence to *Free and Fair Election*. In short, the effect of the freedom and fairness of an election on incumbent turnover in post-authoritarian *competitive authoritarian regimes* appears overwhelming.

Lastly, Model 6B has a higher Nagelkerke R^2 value compared to Model 6A. In other words, Model 6B fits the data better compared to Model 6A. Again, this goes with what is expected.

This is because the 'B' version includes only those cases where *Strongman Acceptance* and *Stability-Over-Democracy Preference* reflect the attitudes of an electorate either the same year of the election or one year prior to the election. The results expectedly show that the error term in Model 6B is relatively smaller compared to that in Model 6A.

Diagnostics:

It is Model 6A which this chapter inspects closer. It is done with the help of several methods of diagnostics. First, the model is inspected for outliers. A normalized residuals⁷⁵ plot of Model 6A is presented in *Appendix H: Residuals Diagnostics for Model 6A*. The plot reveals that there are no cases which exceed 1.96 or go below -1.96. Based on these results, it means that there are no extreme cases which the model cannot account for well. There are no cases for which the model is not a good fit. So far, this is good news regarding the sample.

Next, Model 6A is inspected for influential cases. This is done by examining both leverage values as well as DFBeta values for predictor variables. Firstly, a leverage values plot can be found in *Appendix I: Leverage Values for Model 6A*. It reveals that there are three cases which can be regarded as too influential⁷⁶. These include Jordan 2010⁷⁷, Pakistan 2013⁷⁸ and Philippines 2004⁷⁹. In other words, these three cases are considered to exert undue influence over

⁷⁵ Also known as 'standardized residuals'. Both terms are used to refer to the z-scores of residuals.

⁷⁶ Based on the formula of $3*(k+1/N)$, these cases exceed the respective threshold of 0.533. However, if the formula of $2*(k+1/N)$ was to be applied, cases which exceed the respective threshold of 0.356 amount to seven.

⁷⁷ With the value of 0.545.

⁷⁸ With the value of 0.635.

⁷⁹ With the value of 0.813.

the model. Secondly, the DFBeta values for *Regime Capacity* and *Free and Fair Election*⁸⁰ are presented in *Appendix J: DFBeta Values for Regime Capacity in Model 6A* and *Appendix K: DFBeta Values for Free and Fair Election in Model 6A*, respectively. Based on the values for *Regime Capacity*, influential cases can be considered Pakistan 2013 and Philippines 2004. In other words, these two cases exert too much influence over the b-coefficient of *Regime Capacity*. Next, according to the values for *Free and Fair Election*, influential cases include (North) Macedonia 1998, Pakistan 1997, Pakistan 2013, Pakistan 2018 and Philippines 2004. Again, it means that these five cases exert undue influence over the b-coefficient of *Free and Fair Election*. Thus, based on the inspection of leverage and DFBeta values, there are six cases in total that can be regarded as too influential. These are Jordan 2010, (North) Macedonia 1998, Pakistan 1997, Pakistan 2013, Pakistan 2018 and Philippines 2004. Therefore, it could be considered that Model 6A is susceptible to significant changes if either one of the six cases was to be excluded. These six cases are then studied closer one more time. Nonetheless, all six have been coded correctly. Moreover, there is no reason found to exclude any of them⁸¹. Therefore, there is no ground for rerunning Model 6A without the six cases⁸². However, the issue with influential cases implies that the sample may lack representativeness.

Moving on, Model 6A is inspected for multicollinearity. *Appendix L: Collinearity Diagnostics for Model 6A* contains the Tolerance and VIF values. Regarding the former, there are no values lower than 0.2. Regarding the latter, there are no values greater than 10.

Additionally, all the values are below the value of 2. This means that the average VIF value is

⁸⁰ *Regime Capacity* and *Free and Fair Election* are the only two significant predictors in Model 6A. For this reason, the DFBeta values of only these two variables are inspected.

⁸¹ Perhaps, it could be argued that the three Pakistan elections stand out in that they are the only ones which were held under caretaker governments. However, by excluding them, it does not rectify the issue with influential cases. This is because there appear to be other influential cases in the new analysis.

⁸² Even when all six cases are removed, there appear to be other influential cases in the new analysis.

not substantially greater than 1. Therefore, it means that there is no issue with too high collinearity. In other words, the estimates of the b-coefficients in Model 6A should be reliable.

Lastly, Model 6A is inspected for linearity of the logit. The model is rerun applying the Box-Tidwell transformation for testing linearity of the logit. That is, Model 6A is rerun including the interaction terms between each continuous variable and the log transformation of itself. The results can be found in *Appendix M: Linearity of the Logit Diagnostics*. None of the interactions is statistically significant. Thus, it can be concluded that there is no issue with linearity of the logit in Model 6A. In other words, there should be no misspecifications in the model. It means that all the judgements concerning the nature of the relationship between the predictors and the dependent variable are correct.

Bottom line:

The results fail to provide enough support for the argument that the undemocratic political culture of an electorate predicts absence of alternation in power via elections. In that regard, the results fail to provide enough evidence to uphold the claim that political culture is a significant predictor of incumbent turnover. The statistical analyses offer mixed results regarding the significance and direction of the relationship between political culture and incumbent turnover.

Contrary to expectations, it appears that *Strongman Acceptance* is positively associated with *Incumbent Turnover*. The relationship is positive across all the models. Nevertheless, this positive relationship is statistically significant only in three of the models. These include Model 1B, Model 4B and Model 5B. Nevertheless, the relationship in Model 1B appears significant

only at the 10% level. Besides, none of the three models includes any control variables. Therefore, the results are not in line with the claim that the non-inclusive political culture of electorates has a significant effect on incumbent turnover via elections in post-authoritarian *competitive authoritarianism*. In other words, no evidence is found in support of *H1a*.

On the other hand, the effect of *Stability-Over-Democracy Preference* across post-communist cases appears ambiguous. Depending on the model, the relationship can be either positive or negative. The effect is positive across all the models with the exception of Model 6A. Nonetheless, *Stability-Over-Democracy Preference* and the interaction term appear significant only in Model 3A. Moreover, the positive relationship in Model 3A is significant only at the 10% level. Hence, there is not enough evidence to confirm the claim that the non-extensive political culture of electorates significantly affects incumbent turnover via elections in post-communist *competitive authoritarianism*. That is, not enough support is found to confirm *H1b*.

Nevertheless, Model 6A and Model 6B provide evidence for another conclusion. These models represent the two most comprehensive ones as they account for all the controls. Accordingly, both *Regime Capacity* and *Free and Fair Election* appear to be positive and significant predictors of *Incumbent Turnover*. The evidence appears in line with earlier expectations. This is because the scale of *Regime Capacity* ranges from high capacity to low capacity. On the other hand, the scale of *Free and Fair Election* ranges from less freedom and fairness to more freedom and fairness. Therefore, based on Model 6A and Model 6B one can infer the following. First, regime capacity is negatively and significantly related to incumbent turnover through elections in post-authoritarian *competitive authoritarianism*. Second, the freedom and fairness of elections are positively and significantly related to incumbent turnover via elections in post-authoritarian *competitive authoritarian regimes*.

Lastly, the closer inspection of Model 6A reveals that there are six cases that may be regarded as too influential. In other words, Model 6A is susceptible to significant changes if either one of these cases was to be removed. In turn, this might be a sign that the sample lacks representativeness. If a different sample was to be used, Model 6A could produce different results. Therefore, the results of the regression models should be taken with a degree of caution.

Chapter Five: Conclusion and Discussion

This chapter aims to summarize and discuss the main findings. The objective of this research has been to answer how the political culture of an electorate affects incumbent turnover through elections in post-authoritarian *competitive authoritarianism*. The study hypothesized that the undemocratic political culture of electorates in the post-authoritarian *competitive authoritarian regimes* is negatively and significantly related to alternation in power via elections. In that regard, the thesis generates two main conclusions. First, the research has failed to provide enough support for the argument that the political culture of an electorate in post-authoritarian *competitive authoritarianism* is a significant predictor of incumbent turnover through elections. Second, the analysis proves that it is rather two other factors that best determine incumbent turnover via elections. These are the freedom and fairness of elections, and regime capacity. The latter is best understood as incumbents' capacity to abuse democratic practices in pursuit of greater dominance vis-à-vis the opposition.

Nonetheless, it is important to reflect on the main strengths and limitations of this research. In terms of the former, the study has accounted for all immediate predictors of incumbent turnover through elections. Although not exhaustively capturing all aspects of some of them due to data availability, the research has controlled for the freedom and fairness of elections, regime capacity and opposition capacity. In turn, this has allowed for the juxtaposition of predictors against each other in relation to their explanatory power. Nevertheless, there are three main shortcomings that need to be considered. First, the sample has not been generated in a random manner. This means that the sample could lack representativeness. Indeed, the diagnostics results

show that this may be the case. There appears to be an issue with influential cases. In other words, the regression results may be susceptible to significant changes by the exclusion of single cases. Thus, the findings of this research should be taken with a degree of caution. Second, there could be an issue of mutual causality. One could argue that incumbent turnover can also influence the political culture of electorates, at least in an indirect way. Indeed, if there is mutual causality, then there would be serious concerns regarding the robustness of the regression results. Therefore, there is another reason to take these results with caution. Finally, the two political culture variables could reflect the attitudes of an electorate anywhere from the same year of the election up to three years prior to the election. Hence, this raises concerns about the reliability of these variables. Yet again, there is another reason to take the results with a degree of caution.

Moving on, there are several scientific implications that follow from this research. First, a new overarching survey project is required for capturing political attitudes. There is the need for a project which surveys attitudes consistently across regions and time. Currently, the absence of such an overarching project compels the researcher to limit their scope or sample. As demonstrated, sample composition can be very challenging. Second, the study has analyzed the effects of political culture on incumbent turnover only. Perhaps, future research needs to examine how the political culture of electorates affects democratization once incumbent turnover has occurred. Third, future research needs to comprehensively analyze how acceptance of strongman rule and preferences for stability over democracy influence voters' choices at the individual-level. This research has examined the effect of these attitudes at the electorate-level. Therefore, all the inferences hold at the electorate-level only. Extrapolating these findings to the individual-level would imply committing an ecological fallacy. Hence, to find out how these attitudes influence the voter's choice, individual-level analysis is required.

Next, had the results provided support for the argument that political culture is a significant predictor of incumbent turnover, there would be a crucial societal implication. It would mean that the West and international bodies championing democratization should focus on fostering democratic attitudes among electorates in post-authoritarian *competitive authoritarian regimes*. This is because incumbent turnover represents a necessary step for the democratization of *competitive authoritarian regimes*. Nonetheless, such efforts may not be needed as of now. As a societal implication, it shall be argued that the West and other democratizing forces need to concentrate their efforts in two other areas. These include curtailing electoral malpractice and restricting regime capacity. This is because the research demonstrates that these factors remain the most important immediate predictors of incumbent turnover via elections.

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Appendix A: Sample Details

Table 5. Sample details.

Case	System Type at Time of Election	National Election Type	Post-Communist Subtype	Years Prior Political Culture Variables Reflect	Election Outcome
Albania 2001	Parliamentary	Parliamentary → HOG & HOS	Yes	3	Absence of Turnover
Albania 2005	Parliamentary	Parliamentary → HOG & HOS	Yes	3	Turnover
Algeria 2002	Semi-presidential	Parliamentary → HOG	No	0	Absence of Turnover
Algeria 2004	Semi-presidential	Presidential → HOS	No	2	Absence of Turnover
Algeria 2014	Semi-presidential	Presidential → HOS	No	0	Absence of Turnover
Algeria 2017	Semi-presidential	Parliamentary → HOG	No	3	Absence of Turnover
Armenia 1999	Parliamentary	Parliamentary → HOG	Yes	2	Absence of Turnover
Armenia 2012	Parliamentary	Parliamentary → HOG	Yes	1	Absence of Turnover
Azerbaijan 1998	Semi-presidential	Presidential → HOS	Yes	1	Absence of Turnover
Bangladesh 2018	Parliamentary	Parliamentary → HOG	No	0	Absence of Turnover
Croatia 1997	Semi-presidential	Presidential → HOS	Yes	1	Absence of Turnover

Case	System Type at Time of Election	National Election Type	Post-Communist Subtype	Years Prior Political Culture Variables Reflect	Election Outcome
Dominican Republic 1996	Presidential	Presidential → HOG & HOS	No	0	Turnover
El Salvador 1999	Presidential	Presidential → HOG & HOS	No	0	Absence of Turnover
FR Yugoslavia 1996	Parliamentary	Parliamentary → HOG	Yes	0	Absence of Turnover
Georgia 2012	Parliamentary	Parliamentary → HOG	Yes	3	Turnover
Iraq 2014	Parliamentary	Parliamentary → HOG & HOS	No	1	Absence of Turnover
Iraq 2018	Parliamentary	Parliamentary → HOG & HOS	No	0	Absence of Turnover
Jordan 2010	Parliamentary constitutional monarchy	Parliamentary → HOG	No	3	Absence of Turnover
Lebanon 2018	Parliamentary	Parliamentary → HOG	No	0	Absence of Turnover
Malaysia 2008	Parliamentary constitutional monarchy	Parliamentary → HOG	No	2	Absence of Turnover
Malaysia 2013	Parliamentary constitutional monarchy	Parliamentary → HOG	No	1	Absence of Turnover
Malaysia 2018	Parliamentary constitutional monarchy	Parliamentary → HOG	No	0	Turnover
Moldova 2005	Parliamentary	Parliamentary → HOG & HOS	Yes	3	Absence of Turnover

Case	System Type at Time of Election	National Election Type	Post-Communist Subtype	Years Prior Political Culture Variables Reflect	Election Outcome
Montenegro 1998	Parliamentary	Parliamentary → HOG	Yes	2	Absence of Turnover
Montenegro 2001	Parliamentary	Parliamentary → HOG	Yes	0	Absence of Turnover
Nigeria 2019	Presidential	Presidential → HOG & HOS	No	1	Absence of Turnover
(North) Macedonia 1998	Parliamentary	Parliamentary → HOG	Yes	0	Turnover
(North) Macedonia 2002	Parliamentary	Parliamentary → HOG	Yes	1	Turnover
Pakistan 1997	Parliamentary	Parliamentary → HOG	No	0	Turnover
Pakistan 2013	Parliamentary	Parliamentary → HOG	No	1	Turnover
Pakistan 2018	Parliamentary	Parliamentary → HOG	No	0	Turnover
Philippines 2004	Presidential	Presidential → HOG & HOS	No	3	Absence of Turnover
Russia 1995	Semi-presidential	Parliamentary → HOG	Yes	0	Absence of Turnover
Russia 1996	Semi-presidential	Presidential → HOS	Yes	1	Absence of Turnover
Russia 2007	Semi-presidential	Parliamentary → HOG	Yes	1	Absence of Turnover
Russia 2008	Semi-presidential	Presidential → HOS	Yes	2	Absence of Turnover

Case	System Type at Time of Election	National Election Type	Post-Communist Subtype	Years Prior Political Culture Variables Reflect	Election Outcome
Russia 2011	Semi-presidential	Parliamentary → HOG	Yes	0	Absence of Turnover
Russia 2012	Semi-presidential	Presidential → HOS	Yes	1	Absence of Turnover
Russia 2018	Semi-presidential	Presidential → HOS	Yes	1	Absence of Turnover
Singapore 2015	Parliamentary	Parliamentary → HOG	No	3	Absence of Turnover
Ukraine 1998	Parliamentary	Parliamentary → HOG	Yes	2	Absence of Turnover
Ukraine 2012	Parliamentary	Parliamentary → HOG	Yes	1	Turnover
Zambia 2008	Presidential	Presidential → HOG & HOS	No	1	Absence of Turnover
Zimbabwe 2002	Presidential	Presidential → HOG & HOS	No	1	Absence of Turnover
Zimbabwe 2013	Presidential	Presidential → HOG & HOS	No	1	Absence of Turnover

Note: N = 45. Sources used in compiling this table include BBC Country Profiles, Countries of the World, IFES Election Guide, The World Factbook, NELDA dataset (Hyde & Marinov, 2021a), V-Dem dataset (Coppedge et al., 2022a), and WVS time-series dataset (Inglehart et al., 2020a).

Appendix B: Variables

Table 6. Descriptive statistics and variable scales.

Variable	Mean	SD	Scale
Incumbent Turnover	-	-	Dichotomous, '0/1' ('0': absence of turnover; '1': turnover).
Strongman Acceptance	1.390	0.422	Continuous, '0-3' (aggregated mean; where '0' signifies the lowest level of acceptance, and '3' signifies the highest level of strongman acceptance).
Stability-Over-Democracy Preference	75.647	8.945	Continuous, percentage (indicates the percentage of respondents who consider stability and order more important than democracy).
Post-Communist Subtype	-	-	Dichotomous, '0/1' ('0' is set as the reference category in all models; '0': not post-communist; '1': post-communist).
Opposition Capacity	2.580	0.583	Continuous, '0-3' (composite variable; where '0' signifies the lowest level, and '3' signifies the highest level of opposition capacity).
Regime Capacity	10.440	2.190	Continuous, '0-16' (composite variable; where '0' signifies the highest level, and '16' signifies the lowest level of regime capacity).
Free and Fair Election	2.180	0.834	Ordinal, '0-4' (where '0' signifies the lowest level, and '4' signifies the highest level of freedom and fairness of an election).

Note: N = 45 for all variables. There are no missing cases for any of the variables in this table.

Appendix C: Correlation Matrix

Table 7. Correlation matrix of predictor variables.


Variable	1	2	3	4	5	6
1. Strongman Acceptance	-	.200	.194	-.023	.308*	.273
2. Stability-Over-Democracy Preference	.200	-	.602**	-.025	-.086	-.144
3. Post-Communist Subtype	.194	.602**	-	.022	.025	.113
4. Opposition Capacity	-.023	-.025	.022	-	.452**	.298*
5. Regime Capacity	.308*	-.086	.025	.452**	-	.454**
6. Free and Fair Election	.273	-.144	.113	.298*	.454**	-

Note: N = 45. Statistical significance is determined based on two-tailed tests.

**** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$*

Appendix D: Dichotomous Distribution of Incumbent Turnover


Figure 7. Pie chart presenting the dichotomous distribution of *Incumbent Turnover*.



Note: $N = 45$.

Appendix E: Distribution of Strongman Acceptance


Figure 8. Simple bar chart presenting the distribution of *Strongman Acceptance*.



Note: $N = 45$.

Appendix F: Distribution of Stability-Over-Democracy Preference


Figure 9. Simple bar chart presenting the distribution of *Stability-Over-Democracy Preference*.



Note: $N = 45$.

Appendix G: Dichotomous Distribution of Post-Communist Subtype


Figure 10. Pie chart presenting the dichotomous distribution of *Post-Communist Subtype*.



Note: $N = 45$.

Appendix H: Residuals Diagnostics for Model 6A


Figure 11. Simple dot plot presenting the normalized residuals for Model 6A.



Note: $N = 45$.

Appendix I: Leverage Values for Model 6A

Figure 12. Simple dot plot presenting the leverage values for Model 6A.




Note: $N = 45$. Values account for country clusters as reflected in Model 6A.

Appendix J: DFBeta Values for *Regime Capacity* in Model

6A

Figure 13. Simple dot plot presenting the DFBeta values for *Regime Capacity* in Model 6A.




Note: $N = 45$. Values account for country clusters as reflected in Model 6A.

Appendix K: DFBeta Values for *Free and Fair Election*

Model 6A

Figure 14. Simple dot plot presenting the DFBeta values for *Free and Fair Election* in Model 6A.



Note: $N = 45$. Values account for country clusters as reflected in Model 6A.

Appendix L: Collinearity Diagnostics for Model 6A

Table 8. Collinearity statistics for Model 6A.

Variable	Tolerance	VIF
Strongman Acceptance	0.778	1.285
Stability-Over-Democracy Preference	0.566	1.768
Post-Communist Subtype	0.597	1.676
Opposition Capacity	0.742	1.348
Regime Capacity	0.622	1.606
Free and Fair Election	0.696	1.437

Note: N = 45. Dependent variable is the dichotomous Incumbent Turnover.

Appendix M: Linearity of the Logit Diagnostics

Table 9. Logistic regression analysis testing linearity of the logit.

	Model 7
(Constant)	-96.472 (176.694)
Strongman Acceptance	-42.306 (25.339)
Stability-Over-Democracy Preference	-0.086 (7.198)
Post-Communist Subtype (Ref. = not post-communist)	-16.532 (43.039)
Stability-Over-Democracy Preference * Post-Communist Subtype	0.160 (0.502)
Opposition Capacity	-4.511 (54.679)
Regime Capacity	37.767 (52.049)
Free and Fair Election	-13.662 (16.622)
LnStrongman Acceptance * Strongman Acceptance	34.687 (20.175)
LnStability-Over-Democracy Preference * Stability-Over-Democracy Preference	0.013 (1.366)
LnOpposition Capacity * Opposition Capacity	4.717 (30.901)
LnRegime Capacity * Regime Capacity	-10.118 (14.365)
LnFree and Fair Election * Free and Fair Election	9.050 (10.195)
-2LL	19.994
Nagelkerke R ²	0.703
N	45

Note: binary logistic regression coefficients with robust standard errors in brackets. Robust standard errors are based on country clusters. Analysis is run applying the Box-Tidwell transformation for testing linearity of the logit.

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$