United Nations Security Council Resolution 1820:
Why sexual violence became framed as a threat to international security

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The front page image originates from the cover of the documentary film *The Greatest Silence: Rape in the Congo* (2007) directed by Lisa F. Jackson and concerned with the survivors of rape in the regions affected by ongoing conflict after the Second Congo War.

Abstract

Women have been victims of sexual violence during and in the aftermath of armed conflict through time. Through history, sexual violence has been framed in several ways until it eventually became framed by the United Nations Security Council in June 2008 'as a threat to international security'. It was at this particular moment that the United Nations Security Council unanimously adopted United Nations Security Council *Women, Peace and Security* Resolution 1820. The status of sexual violence during and in the aftermath of armed conflict suddenly was a matter of international peace and security, whereas it first, was not (framed as such). This thesis investigates *why* sexual violence now did became framed as a threat to international security, a matter of international security and therefore insecurity. To give this thought a closer look, securitization theory is elaborated upon as the most logical explanation. However, it seems that although securitization can bring us to the understanding *that* security frames change, it does not shed light on *why* or at least *how* security frames change. This is where Finnemore & Sikkink's theory on normative change steps in. It is claimed that because normative change theory gives insights in *how* security frames might change, it therefore can illuminate also *why* security frames change. Finnemore & Sikkink's addition to securitization theory provides insight in *how* and *why* sexual violence became framed as a matter of international security in June 2008. The findings, nevertheless, suggest that the United Nations Security Council was not as much inspired to sign the draft resolution of UNSCR 1820 because of altruistic normative values, but seem to have been much more driven by the prominence of events in the DRC and the legitimation of the United Nations (Security Council) that thereafter was at stake.

Keywords: United Nations, United Nations Security Council, United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325, United Nations Security Council Resolution 1820, sexual violence in conflict, international peace and security.

Preface

The thesis lying in front of you is made as a completion of the master's program International Relations of Political Science at the Radboud University Nijmegen, Nijmegen. The topic under investigation in this thesis is a representative accumulation of my 6 years being enrolled as a student and 5 years of actual studying. During my bachelor education Cultural Anthropology & Development studies at Nijmegen I have always found myself choosing my paper topics and the like around issues relating to gender and/or Sexual and Reproductive Health and Rights (SRHR) and/or HIV/AIDS. After my bachelor degree I wanted to do some more elective and interdisciplinary courses but eventually ended up doing an internship at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in The Hague on SRHR and HIV/AIDS. So when I had to choose my master thesis topic, it was very clear to me that it had to deal with gender issues, SRHR and/or HIV/AIDS. Hence, this thesis is the result of academics, an internship and personal interests.

In December 2012, Dr. Anna van der Vleuten invited Reint-Jan Groot Nuelend, Ivo Roodbergen, Jaap Steenkamer and myself for the first time to what would become our 'thesiswerkplaats'. From that moment on, we would gather every 2, 3 or sometimes 4 weeks. During those meetings we, the students, would take turns in commenting on each others' documents. Dr. Anna van der Vleuten would provide guidance during these discussions and would provide us with written comments as well. As a result, not only our supervisor would function as a sounding-board but we became each other's as well. Any time I felt like sprucing I could throw my issues, concerns, interesting facts or whatever in our group. So, thank you Reint-Jan, thank you Ivo and thank you Jaap. I really much appreciated your input and the like and of course your moral support during the long days in the University Library.

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Further on I would like to thank my parents, Geert Stabel and Anneke van Til, for having given me the opportunity to study and for your emotional support during all those years. Also thank you Nander Stabel, for making fun of me and having put my concerns and stress into perspective during my six years of academic studying and also prior to that.

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Thank you also to my other fellow master students, dear friends and (other) family with whom I shared my university adventures.

And lastly, thank you reader, for reading my latest and probably last academic piece of work.

Table of content

Abbreviations

CEDAW	Convention on the Elimination of All forms of Discrimination against Women
DFS	Department of Field Support
DPKO	Department of Peacekeeping Operations
DRC	Democratic Republic of the Congo
ECOSOC	Economic and Social Council
ICTR	International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
ICTY	International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
INGO(s)	International Non-Governmental Organization(s)
IR	International Relations
MONUC	United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
NGO(s)	Non-Governmental Organization(s)
UK	United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNGA	United Nations General Assembly
UNIFEM	United Nations Development Fund for Women
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
UNSCR	United Nations Security Council Resolution
UNSG	United Nations Secretary-General
US	United States of America
WILPF	Women's International League for Peace and Freedom

List of figures

Chapter 1. Setting the stage: Sexual violence as a threat to international security

> 'As many here are aware, for years there has been a debate about whether or not sexual violence against women is a security issue for this body [United Nations Security Council] to address. I am proud today we can respond to that lingering question with a resounding 'yes'. This world body now acknowledges that sexual violence in conflict zones is, indeed, a security concern'.
>
> <div align="right">Condoleezza Rice (UNSC, 2008c)</div>

With these words, then Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice opened the caps day-long ministerial-level debate on *Women, Peace and Security: sexual violence in situations of armed conflict* on the 19th of June 2008. The session resulted in the Security Council defining sexual violence as a threat to international security in the unanimously adopted United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1820. According to some the resolution signed by the Security Council is historic since sexual violence is now recognized as a weapon, recognized as a substantial threat and, punishable.[1] Civilians had been the major share of the victims in armed conflict and especially women and girls were victims of sexual violence as a means of war to humiliate, dominate, frighten and to drive back the locals and their families. A lot of this kind of violence continued in post-conflict times hindering a lot of women to (re)participate in public life which could have its setback on peace on the long(er) term. UNSCR 1820 especially addresses the sexual violence committed by men on the bodies of women and girls and is the first follow-up resolution after United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 on *Women, Peace and Security* in 2000.[2] The United Nations Security Council acknowledged through the adoption of UNSCR 1325 the changing nature of warfare, especially affecting civilians and women to be (still) excluded from peace (re)building processes. It addressed the impact of war on women and the key role of women in conflict management, conflict resolution and sustainable peace. UNSCR 1325 was already seen as a landmark Security Council Resolution in the international legal framework addressing the need of the participation of women in conflict management. Resolutions related to security and women after UNSCR 1325 (UNSC, 2000a) are said to be part of the six Women, Peace, and Security Resolutions and comprise Resolution 1325 and its follow-up resolutions UNSCR 1820 (UNSC, 2008a), UNSCR 1888 (UNSC, 2009a), UNSCR 1889 (UNSC, 2009b), UNSCR 1960 (UNSC, 2010) and UNSCR 2106 (UNSC, 2013).[3] Together, the *Women, Peace and Security* resolutions are seen as a critical framework aimed at to improve the situation of women in conflict-affected countries.[4] UNSCR 1820 was the first Security Council Resolution to be adopted as a response to the weak sections concerning sexual violence prevention within UNSCR 1325. UNSCR 1820 was hence the first Security Council Resolution recognizing conflict related sexual violence as a matter of international peace and security and therefore the need for a specific security response to protect women and girls during and after armed conflict.

The course of events in 2008 makes clear that sexual violence was not seen anymore as an inconvenient side-effect of war similar to the destruction of roads and houses. The framing in UNSCR 1820 changed sexual violence from war-related collateral damage into a vicious war crime and made

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[1] See: http://www.ohchr.org/en/newsevents/pages/rapeweaponwar.aspx

[2] According to :
http://www.usip.org/gender_peacebuilding/about_UNSCR_1325#What_are_the_other_resolutions_related_to_security_and_women

[3] See note 2 and:
http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=45253&Cr=sexual+violence&Cr1=conflict#.UcisxPLCTui

[4] See: http://www.unwomen.org/about-us/guiding-documents/

an end to impunity since it was now framed by the United Nations Security Council "as a threat to international peace and security". One can say, something had changed.

The Member States of the United Nations Security Council *ante* the signing of UNSCR 1820 obviously felt that they had to pick up the issue of sexual violence during and in the aftermath of armed conflict since, given their mandate, it poses a threat to the international security. But why did the Security Council decide at <u>this particular time and place</u> to securitize <u>the specific framing of sexual violence</u> as a <u>threat to international security</u>. And how did change come about since the reality of sexual violence during and in the aftermath of violent conflict is not thought of as being a new phenomenon. Since it was acknowledged that women and girls had been victims of these kind of practices throughout time, why did the matter only now become seen as a matter for the Security Council and of international security and even become Resolution-worth while first it was conceived as an inconvenient side-effect of conflict? These questions suggest that the perception and therefore framing of what accounts as a security issue had changed - in contrast to reality of violent conflicts since wartime related sexual violence has not been a new phenomenon for ages. Notwithstanding, the Security Council decided at the 19th of June 2008 to sign UNSCR 1820 which officially framed sexual violence as a threat to security.

1.1. Security as a malleable concept

In the traditional security paradigm within International Relations theory, security was primarily defined in terms of the security of the state. Since the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648 states were seen as the most powerful actors in the international system. There was no higher authority than the state and hence states held the political legitimacy within its territory. Therefore, security was a matter of states as well and hence an inter-state affair. States guaranteed their own security in a world that was insecure; a self-help system. Hence, security from the Treaty of Westphalia onwards was seen as a matter of national security. The international system was a political arena in which states sought their own security at the expense of other states. Permanent peace was unlikely since one state's security was automatically another state's insecurity. Famous scholars within this 'realist' field of thought were for example Edward H. Carr (1946) and Hans Morgenthau (1948 and 1960) in the years after the end of the Second World War. Later on, still sharing this view of *insecurity* within international relations, 'neo-realist' writers such as Kenneth Waltz (1979) and John Mearsheimer (1990) saw security and insecurity as subject to the structure of the international system. Security thus was state-centred and rather an issue of *insecurity* rather than security (Baylis, 1997, p. 256-257).

Another approach was shared by scholars in the 1980s. In general one can state that notions of security from more traditional state-centred *insecurity* origins changed towards newer perspectives on what now became state-centred *security*. The idea rose that the characteristic of self-help in international relations not necessarily means that states always engage in war. The idea of 'relative gains' was introduced as opposed to 'maximum gains' and total destruction (and hence insecurity). Hence, international relations theory now became more focused on the idea and possibility of balancing rather than the necessity of mass destruction. And more radical, there were some opportunities for cooperation between states as well. Communal international institutions could even play part in war prevention. Institutionalized cooperation within international relations could achieve a greater sense of security since cooperation opened up unprecedented opportunities. Robert Keohane, as a neoliberal institutionalist, already in 1984 emphasised the need for international institutions since through these institutions states could gather information on each other which makes each others' behaviour more predictable and hence the states more reliable as potential partners (Baylis, 1997, p.

262). The issue of *insecurity* now had become a possibility in terms of *security*; theories were still state-centred but saw a special role for international institutions.

The end of the Cold War again brought about changes in the way of thinking about the nature of security. The 'global turn' marks the period between 1989 and 1991 and led many scholars to develop new security theories. For example, 'social constructivists' think of international politics in terms of social rather than material aspects. Since they rather sought to 'understand' than to 'explain' (realist objective) they argued that how is thought about international relations can bring about greater international security. Whereas for example neo-realists thought of the international political community of material capabilities social constructivists claim that social structures create social relationships that define through framing understandings, expectations and knowledge about international politics. This led social constructivist Alexander Wendt to his famous *Anarchy is what states make of it* (1992) (Baylis, 1997, p. 265-266). Security now both became to be understood to go beyond traditional approaches of insecurity and security but also beyond the state-centred approaches. Security moved to both wider and deeper frames of understanding and both within and beyond the borders of states. Frames of security were subject to change.

Security as securitization

The most vibrant debate within the field of security since the end of the Cold War has been the one of Securitization Theory. "..."Securitization" is one of the most significant conceptual innovations to emerge out of debates over the nature of security of recent decades" (Peoples & Vaughan-Williams, 2010, p. 85). Whereas Barry Buzan already in 1983 added political, economic, societal and environmental aspects to military aspects of security, Weaver's idea of securitization dates from 1995. The most important contribution to the new security discourse was the work of the Copenhagen School. In 1998 Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver and Jaap de Wilde published their book *Security: A new Framework for Analysis* with which they aimed to set up a new framework for security studies. They mention the traditionalist perception of security in which a military-focused and state-centric approach prevails, the narrow debate about security studies and a new(er) one of the '*wideners*', the wide debate within security studies; a broader notion of what security is (1998, p. 1). In the traditional notion, according to the authors, security is about state survival. However, when discussing the wider notion of security, one does not deal anymore with universal standards concerning just states in an anarchic system because threats now only exist in relation to the referent object, hence time and place and (inter)subjectivity (1998, p. 21). Security according to securitization theory can then indeed concern more than military security and can have different notions in terms of politics. Latent non-political issues can then become highly political topics (1998, p. 23). They understand securitization as issues becoming politically important to a high degree, whereas they prior were not, and even can become securitized. Important to note is that reality does not necessarily has to change in order to bring about other framings of that same reality. As a matter of fact, it is more likely that frames of reality change than reality itself is likely to change. Securitization theory, according to Buzan, Wæver & De Wilde "... aims to gain an increasingly precise understanding of who securitizes, on what issues (threats), for whom (referent objects), why, with what results, and, not least, under what conditions (i.e., what explains when securitization is successful)" (1998, p. 32).

Although they aim to understand the *who*, *what*, *whom*, *why*, *what results* and *what conditions* of securitization, they were highly criticized on predominantly the *why*-question. Where Buzan et al. may be authorities within the new security paradigm, they seem solely concerned with the fact *that* an issue can become a security issue but they do not reveal the process of change and interests prior to the securitization itself; e.g. the normative dynamics of securitization (Charrett, 2009). Here, Charrett links the idea of security frames as norms and therefore securitization in the light of normative change.

It thus seems legitimate to state that changing security frames is about changes in normative frames on security. However, Charrett also states that securitization theory is not concerned with how the securitization process takes place and how a particular frame of security is (re)produced. The power of the securitizing actor and motivations should for example be examined (Charrett, 2010, p. 11).

Therefore, it is suggested that securitization theory might be able to understand the fact *that* change in normative frames concerning change within security and in terms of facilitating conditions, but not in terms of the process of change prior to securitization. In short, securitization theory seems to be able to get a grip on the fact *that* issues change into issues of security, become securitized, when certain conditions have been met. Therefore *what is* and *what is not* seen as security; what security frames are. However, *that* security frames change does not give insight in the process of change at the base of frames changing; *how* change comes about and therefore the deeper layer of *why* something has changed. Hence, Buzan et al.'s theory does for now not seem able to tackle the *how* and *why* of changing frames of security.

Security as normative change

Although securitization theory holds a prominent place within security studies, its main concern seems to be to understand *that* issues can become securitized and hence are subject to change, but not *how* change comes about and therefore *why* frames change.

In the same year that Buzan, Wæver and De Wilde published their book, Finnemore & Sikkink published their article called *International Norm Dynamics and Political Change.* As the name might suggest, Finnemore & Sikkink too wrote about change but whereas Buzan et al. focused on changing security frames, Finnemore & Sikkink sought to explain more in general politics at change in the light of changing international norms. They claim that a lot of thinking on norms was rather concerned with stability and did not focus on change. "Claims that actors conform to "logics of appropriateness" say little about how standards of appropriateness might change" (1998, p. 888). The idea of Finnemore & Sikkink on normative change was one of the most innovative ideas on (political) change within IR (constructivist) theory. Hence, Finnemore & Sikkink are concerned with ideational change; e.g. *why* change took place at all; and *how* we can understand change? The central idea is that frames of what reality is and looks like, Finnemore & Sikkink call these 'logics of appropriateness', change whereas reality does not necessarily change. They claim, as constructivists, that the international structure is constructed through internationally distributed ideas: "Shared ideas, expectations, and beliefs about appropriate behavior are what give the world structure, order, and stability" (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998, p. 894). Therefore, change comes about through shifts in the framing of shared ideas of appropriate behavior. Important to emphasize is the fact that reality does not necessarily have to change in order to bring about normative change. Normative change suggests that the way in which is thought about reality changes brings about normative changes; *how* normative change comes about. Finnemore & Sikkink provide in their article on *International Norm Dynamics and Political Change* a theoretical framework on normative change which they call the 'Norm Life Cycle'. They seek to understand *how* normative change comes about by elaborating on the process prior to – and in order to understand - *why* normative change comes about.

Perhaps Finnemore & Sikkink are able to get to *how* frames change and therefore *how* the process of normative change works in order to understand *why* (security) frames are subject to change instead of recognizing solely the fact *that* security frames are subject to change by understanding the process towards the change of frames; e.g. securitization of issues. Hence, securitization seems to be a 'static' theory of changes in (security) frames whereas Finnemore & Sikkink try to understand the *process* of change and *how* that change takes place in order to understand *why* the changing of frames occurs.

1.2. Research question

Having introduced the adoption of UNSCR 1820 and having elaborated on the change of frames of security within IR theory it seems that - although being important within security studies – Buzan et al. cannot explain the changing of normative frames of security but do provide insights in the fact *that* security frames change. It therefore was suggested that the authorities within normative change thinking, Finnemore & Sikkink, might be able to understand *how* security frames change when thought of as change of normative frames and therefore *why* change in frames comes about. Chapter 2 will elaborate on these theories in depth and will formulate theoretically based hypotheses, which eventually will serve as the base of the operational hypotheses which will be formulated in Chapter 3.

The statement of the research problem is therefore twofold. Seen from an empirical angle, sexual violence framed as a security threat challenges prior notions of security frames and therefore concerns the problem of changing security frames whereas sexual violence in and in the aftermath of violent conflict is not a new phenomenon. Empirically, insight in changing security frames in general might prove useful for diverse actors involved wanting a certain issue getting framed as a security issue. The process of normative change and the specific characteristics and power relations involved might provide stakeholders with information on whom to target and when in order to get an issue on the security agenda; knowledge is power. From a theoretical angle it seems that the theory predominantly concerned with security issues and the framing of security, securitization theory, is not fit to explain the process of change of frames of security. Therefore, theoretically, this thesis aims to extend securitization theory with the more general IR theory on normative change of Finnemore & Sikkink.

From the above stated research problems follows that this thesis is concerned with changing security frames and focuses on the particular case of the adoption of UNSCR 1820 framing sexual violence as a threat to international security. In general, this thesis aims at understanding the process prior to changing security frames. For the particular case of UNSCR 1820, this thesis aims to understand the process prior to the adoption of UNSCR 1820; and sexual violence becoming framed as a threat to international security. Therefore, the research question this thesis will tackle is:

Why did sexual violence become framed as a threat to international security?

1.3. Plan of action

The next chapter contains this thesis' theoretical framework building on securitization theory by Buzan et al. (1998) and Finnemore & Sikkink's theory of normative change (1998) in order to later be able to explain normative change on frames of threats to security on sexual violence. The merits of the theory will be outlined and constructed as a framework to structure sexual violence's normative change into a security issue. The advantages and disadvantages of the theory will be elaborated upon and expectations will be formulated in the form of testable hypotheses.

Chapter 3 contains the methods and operationalizations used in this thesis. Based on the theoretical framework, concepts will be clarified and defined and the theoretical hypotheses will be transformed into operationalized hypotheses. Also the way in which data will be collected will be elaborated and justified here on which later the analysis will be based and conclusions will be drawn.

In Chapter 4 changed frames of sexual violence will be presented in the light of the developing Women, Peace and Security agenda. The emergence of women, peace and security related issues will be elaborated upon and the emergence of the issue of sexual violence on the international agenda will be dealt with. UNSCR 1325 will be introduced as the first ever Security Council Resolution tackling the issue of women and sexual violence in war and UNSCR 1820 will be introduced as the first follow-up *Women, Peace and Security* United Nations Security Council Resolution after UNSCR

1325 and the first UNSC resolution framing sexual violence as a threat to international security. Both changes between the two UNSC *Women, Peace and Security* resolutions and the main characteristics of UNSCR 1325 and UNSCR 1820 will be exposed. The chapter aims to provide insight in changing frames of the Women, Peace and Security agenda and (sexual) violence in general and at the United Nations and the United Nations Security Council specifically. By providing background information on the issue and on the specific *Women, Peace and Security* United Nations Security Council resolutions, this chapter's overview serves as the base of the empirical analysis of Chapter 5.

The analysis therefore can be found in Chapter 5 in which the data used as selected by the criteria elaborated in Chapter 3 will present the development of the United Nations Security Council's *Women, Peace and Security* agenda between the adoption of UNSCR 1325 and UNSCR 1820.

The findings will be interpreted and discussed in the light of the theoretical and operationalized hypotheses and alternative interpretations may be considered in the final chapter and last, but not least, Chapter 6 will provide the conclusions and implications found on the answer to the question *why* sexual violence became framed as a threat to international security. Moreover, the wider implications of this research will be discussed.

Chapter 2. Theoretical framework

In the previous chapter the case of UNSCR 1820 was introduced and the stage was set on understanding changing security frames. Both securitization theory and the theory of normative change were shortly discussed. Whereas securitization theory was one of the first and most innovative theories on changing frames of security and aims at understanding *why* an issue becomes securitized and therefore a matter of security, it seems not to be able to elaborate upon *how* an issue gets securitized and therefore a matter of security. The theory of normative change of Finnemore & Sikkink (1998) covers the issue of international normative and political change and seems applicable to unravel *how* and therefore also *why* an issue that was not framed as a matter of international security could have been framed as a security issue.

This chapter aims at getting grip on the prerequisites of successful normative change. Both theories, securitization and normative change, will be closely assessed to see how they come to understand changing normative frames (of security).

2.1. Understanding *that* frames change: securitization theory

As touched upon in the previous chapter, securitization theory investigates the fact *that* issues (can) become framed as security issue; become framed as a threat to security. According to Peoples & Vaughan-Williams, issues can move along the spectrum of securitization (2010, p.77). Hence, issues can be nonpoliticized, politicized and securitized (see Figure 2.1.).

Figure 2.1. The securitization 'spectrum':

nonpoliticized ----------> politicized ----------> **Securitized**

Peoples & Vaughan-Williams (2010, p. 77)

Hence, issues that were not framed as security can become framed as security according to securitization theory. Buzan et al. opened up the debate of security being understood as solely military-focused and state-centric. Securitization is therefore described as the intersubjective and socially constructed process by which a threat to a particular referent object is acknowledged and deemed worth protecting; "a discursive exchange between a securitizing actor and an audience in relation to an object, the referent, and that which threatens it" (Charrett, 2009, p. 13). One can say that securitization holds a special kind of politics, or even above it. So, according to Buzan, Wæver & De Wilde issues can be that uninteresting to the general public that they are not and will not become an issue of political debate. These issues are thus framed as non-politicized issues. But when an issue becomes an issue of public policy that requires special attention or even communal governance; these topics can become politicized. When moving further up the spectrum of political importance again it means that the issue is perceived as a real threat, in need of intervention beyond normal political procedures; securitized topics. However, the issue can move both directions and the degree of securitization can differ per context. Of major importance is the constructivist character. What an issue exactly means is thus dependent of the context it is issued in. The way an issue is framed, e.g. as a threat to international security, determines its importance. The particular issue is portrayed as a threat and holds that this particular fact already implies that it was perceived as a more existential threat than other issues. This leaves aside the question whether the issue is *indeed* the most important issue threatening security; it is a self-referential practice which allows it to differ over time and place (1998, p. 24). "Thus, the exact definition and criteria of securitization is constituted by the intersubjective establishment of an existential threat with a saliency sufficient to have substantial political effects. (...) The way to study securitization is to study discourse and political constellations" (1998, p. 25). But a

particular discourse presenting an issue as an existential threat to security is not immediately securitized; this is a securitizing move. When the issue is presented as such that the (wider) audience indeed accepts the issue as an existential threat, one can say the issue is securitized. So, there is a distinction between an attempt to securitize an issue, securitizing move, and successful securitization. The degree of significance is important in addressing an issue as a threat to security. One can discern issues according to their impact in order to determine the importance and success of it as a securitizing move. According to Buzan et al., in order for an issue to be successfully securitized it needs to be perceived as an existential threat, followed by emergency action and to have effects in terms of changing relations. So, securitization is understanding "... the processes of constructing a shared understanding of what is to be considered and collectively responded to as a threat" (1998, p. 26). Hence, security is intersubjective. What is and what is not a threat to security and peace is constructed through interaction and shared meanings (1998, p. 30). As such, the relationship between subjects and power performed on one another determines the success of the securitizing move. Some actors may have very convincing capabilities, but this can never solely guarantee the success of securitization. Therefore, to analyze securitization, one should focus on the securitization practice, not predominantly at the actors involved because that may not necessarily lead to the exact centre of analysis. Whether a securitizing move is successful depends thus on different aspects. Buzan et al. also speak of securitizing moves as *speech acts*. Since *"we are socialized into [social language] and in the process we do not simply learn words but how to act in the world- what it means to promise, threaten, and lie, the types of context in which these speech acts are appropriate or meaningful, or even what it means to formulate a hypothesis, vote or deploy a missile"* (Fierke, 2010, p. 188). Buzan et al. distinguish between the internal and external conditions of a speech act. Internally, it is important to frame an issue as to portray an existential threat to security by linking it to existing security notions. Externally, the actor presenting the issue as a security issue has to be in some sort of position of authority concerning the issue and the extent to which the issue is naturally associated with threats (1998, p. 32-33; Stritzel, 2007, p. 364). One, however, has to be careful that not everything is simply securitization. Using the word security is not necessarily portraying an issue as an existential threat to security but is about the creation and constitution of an issue as a security issue. Thereby, the issue has to be politicized to the degree that it indeed has become securitized. The logic of an issue requiring action and the acceptance of this issue requiring action is crucial. The action following upon the securitizing move can be either ad hoc or institutionalized. The latter is more likely to happen when a threat is persistent or recurrent in the way it is framed (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 27-28).

According to the theory of Buzan, Wæver & De Wilde, securitization occurs through the presence of three prerequisites. First, one has the *referent object*s, which are the perceived existential threats to a notion of security. Second come the *securitizing actors*, who securitize the referent objects. Last come the *functional actors*. They constitute the audience of the securitizing actors and their referent objects. Hence, securitizing actors issue referent objects to functional actors and hold a certain authority in order to get the issue securitized. Whereas traditional notions of security took the state as the referent object and hence states took other states as referent objects, now a wide spectrum of actors can be (made) referent object (1998, p. 36).

Essential in security analysis in according Buzan, Wæver & De Wilde is the answer to the question "... who can "do" in the name of what?". The theory given by them offers more types of units besides states (1998, p. 45). Hence securitizing actors can be multiple, even so functional actors as well as referent object. Therefore, the new possible security agenda is much broader than just the traditional military and political sector frames. That being said, frames can also be synthesized and concern a combination of several sectors as a threat to security. The theory however does not exclude traditional

notions of security. Buzan et al. blame traditional notions of not thinking on what security actually holds. Therefore, the authors add environmental, economic and societal sectors to the traditional military and political sectors of security. They transform security's monosectoral agenda ('narrow') in a multisectoral one ('wide') (1998, p. 195, 207). The securitization theory of Buzan, Wæver & De Wilde therefore provides a tool for a broader security analysis.

Since securitization theory came about in the field of IR and security studies, it has had a significant impact on the way security has been studied. Vaughan-Williams claims that what Buzan et al. have tried to do is to develop an analytical framework to determine what is and what is not a security issue beyond traditional military issues; through a securitizing actor, act and audience and with certain other prerequisite conditions, securitization can take place. "Based on a clear idea of the nature of security, securitization studies aims to gain an increasingly precise understanding of who securitizes, on what issues (threats), for whom (referent objects), why, with what results and, not least, under what conditions (what explains when securitization is successful)" (Buzan et al 1998: 32). Securitization therefore is established "... through which an intersubjective understanding is constructed within a political community to treat something as an existential threat to a valued referent object, and to enable a call for urgent and exceptional measures to deal with the threat" (Buzan & Wæver, 2003, p. 491). The main argument is that securitization theory is that security is established through a (illocutionary) act of speech, a so-called 'speech act'. This argument holds that when something is held as an issue of security, it therefore is an issue of security. Therefore, when a securitizing actor states that a referent object is threatened in its existence and therefore stresses the need for extraordinary measures to ensure the survival of the referent object, the referent object moves out of the sphere of normal politics in order for it to be dealt with according to its graveness. This suggests that security is not pre-given but can be anything; is a social and intersubjective construction of what security is. Therefore, security can be everything. Buzan et al. wanted to prevent that everything could become an issue of security, a successful securitization needs certain prerequisites. These are: the identification of the existential threat; the emergency action and the effects of the inter-unit relation by breaking free of rules (1998, p. 6). Hence, the first step in securitization is the securitizing move. Theoretically, a securitizing move can be anything an actor has do to convince an audience (which constitutes the inter-unit relation between the securitizing actor and the audience) of a legitimate need to go beyond regulating measures (which constitute the emergency mode) is a case of securitization. Therefore, the legitimate articulation of the problem is crucial in communicating it to a wider audience, functional actors, as security issue. Stritzel states: "The articulation of "security" entails the claim that something is held to pose a threat to a valued referent object that is so existential that it is legitimate to move the issue beyond the established games of 'normal' politics to deal with it by exceptional, i.e. security, methods" (2007, p. 360). From this follows that, in practice, not every actor can be a securitizing actor. This has to do with the power and capabilities of the securitizing actor and therefore by whom and how the issue is constructed as a threat.

Expectations

Having elaborated upon the securitization theory of Buzan, Wæver and De Wilde the theoretical framework can now be set up in terms of what has to be understood (explanandum; *y)* in terms of how this can be understood (explanans; *x)*. This leads to the following theoretical hypothesis:

Hypothesis 1. Securitization:

> *If* a) *a securitizing actor claims* b) *that a referent object is threatened in its existence   by   a certain 'threat'[5] and* c) *stress the need for extraordinary measures to ensure the survival of* the   *referent object* d) *to an audience of functional actors* (x)*, the 'threat'   to the referent object   gets securitized* (y)*.*

Hence, an issue is framed as security when a securitizing actor (that is seen as legitimate) frames an issue as threatened by a particular perceived threat to an audience. From this hypothesis becomes clear that securitization theory is rather about facilitating conditions than about the process of normative change; the more critical concern with *how* the securitization process takes place (Charrett, 2009, p. 11). It does not become clear *who* these securitizing actors exactly are, *where* they derive their legitimacy from and *how* they frame the issue and *what* motivations they have to do so. Subsequently, it does not become clear from securitization theory *who* the functional actors are and *how* the issue becomes widespread and for *what* reasons these actors adopt the framing of the issue as a security issue; securitizing the issue.

2.2. Understanding *how* and *why* frames change: normative change theory

Having elaborated on securitization theory, it is now time to discuss the theory of normative change of Finnemore & Sikkink to assess what can be expected in terms of understanding *how* frames change and therefore to understand why frames change.

Normative (political) change is a process that, according to Finnemore & Sikkink (1998), consists of three stages (see Figure 2.2.) that take place in an iterative movement; the Norm Life Cycle (see Figure 2.3.).

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[5] 'Threat' is place between brackets here because until securitization has occurred, the 'threat' is not been acknowledged as a threat to the referent object yet.

Figure 2.2. Stages of normative change:

	Stage 1 *Norm emergence*	Stage 2 *Norm cascade*	Stage 3 *Internalization*
Actors	Norm entrepreneurs with organizational platforms	States, international organizations, networks	Law, professions, bureaucracy
Motives	Altruism, empathy, ideational, commitment	Legitimacy, reputation, esteem	Conformity
Dominant mechanisms	Persuasion	Socialization, institutionalization, demonstration	Habit, institutionalization

Finnemore & Sikkink (1998, p. 898)

Figure 2.3. Free interpretation of the (iterative) Norm Life Cycle:

Finnemore & Sikkink (1998, p. 896)

First in the norm's life cycle comes the 'norm's emergence'. At a specific tipping point threshold the norm's dynamics tips from the first into the second stage when the norm gets adopted by a critical mass of relevant (state) actors, the 'norm cascade' and the normative frame becomes socialized in for example treaties, rule of law or resolutions. Finally, the norm can get fully 'internalized' by the mass and becomes fully internalized as the new logic of appropriateness.

In the following section Finnemore & Sikkink's theory concerning the 'norm-life-cycle' will be amplified by elaborating on the diverse processes at stake during normative change; e.g. stages. So, the first stage of the 'norm emergence', the tipping point between the first and second stage and the second stage of the norm's cascade. The internalization of the norm is not within the scope of this thesis since this thesis' aim is to unravel the process of changing normative frames and not to take into account to which extent states have conformed and internalized themselves to the new norm because

of habit and institutionalization.[6] Subsequently, the stages' associated actors, motives and dominant mechanisms will be elaborated upon all in order to get clarity *how* normative change (change of logics of appropriateness) comes about, forming the theoretical base for this thesis.

Stage 1: Norm emergence

Two elements appear to be important in the successful creation of new norms. These are norm entrepreneurs and organizational platforms from which entrepreneurs act. A norm entrepreneur is seen as someone who is interested in changing the current norm. Norm entrepreneurs might arise randomly but do have the frame that something has to be changed. According to Finnemore & Sikkink, these norm entrepreneurs are driven by altruism, empathy and ideational commitment. Norm entrepreneurs are needed because norms have to be created since they are not just 'out there'. Norms are built by the norm entrepreneur around ideas about what she or he holds to be appropriate or desirable behavior. Norm entrepreneurs are thus crucial for the formation of norms because they "... call attention to issues or even "create" issues by using language that names, interprets, and dramatizes them"; e.g. speech acts (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998, p. 897).The construction of frames in which norms (appear) 'fit' to 'reality' determines at the same time the 'language' that adheres to the norm. When new norms are to be installed, and thus former norms become contested, there exists a new notion of what is appropriate and apparently, in the eyes of the norm entrepreneur, the former norm is not suitable anymore hence needs to be altered/substituted; the logic of appropriateness that prevailed before, are now thought of as not appropriate *anymore*. This is exactly the point where Finnemore & Sikkink extend constructivist theory. While constructivist theory was able to explain behavior in terms of a logic of appropriateness, Finnemore & Sikkink try to explain *changing* behavior in terms of logics of appropriateness; prior norms become contested with new norms. Hence it is of importance to look at how notions are framed, since notions can have (slightly or radical) different meanings and implications as soon as they have become framed in a different manner. The authors pose an ostensible paradox since constructivist's way of explaining behavior; according to the logic of appropriateness, is exactly what is being contested at the emergent stage of a norm. Norm entrepreneurs therefore might perform inappropriate behavior according to the norm they are challenging. Going against the dominant norm can be powerful in framing a new norm on the dominant norm. Since constructivists seek to explain behavior, the dominant norm cannot explain why norm entrepreneurs go against the norm: "… invoking a logic of appropriateness to explain behavior is complicated by the fact that standards of appropriateness are precisely what is being contested" (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998, p. 897-898). However, the main concern of Finnemore & Sikkink is change of logics rather than the logics themselves. As becomes clear from Figure 2.1., norm entrepreneurs need motives in order to challenge the at that moment still dominant norm.

Then comes how norms from norm entrepreneurs agenda become (more) widespread and this takes us to the second aspect and concerns the organizational platforms from which entrepreneurs act. Some of these platforms are designed to promote a particular norm (these are often NGOs and transnational advocacy networks) and others are existing international organizations. The latter have their own agenda's and these agenda's might (and hence are not necessarily concerned with contesting norms in the way norm entrepreneurs are) (co-) shape the new norm. The authors note that in the case of for instance the UN, norms are influenced by the structural focus of the UN on decolonization, sovereignty, and humanitarian relief (1998, p. 899). Platforms are of major importance in the stage of

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[6] This last stage is not of concern here since this thesis is concerned with the question how and why normative change comes about, not whether that norm is fully internalized as the new logic of appropriateness. It is argued that the fact that the Resolution was adopted is enough ground for internalization to occur. Whether the norm indeed has been internalized is up to further research.

norm emergence for the norm entrepreneurs because they provide expertise and information to change behavior of thirds. Now, the norm has to be spread and the dominant mechanism for the stage of norm emergence is persuasion. Big international organizations such as the UN may have more leverage than others in issuing the new norm and have more negotiation-power than NGOs or INGOs. The norm spreads and the former norm becomes contested. The norm entrepreneur(s), from their organizational platform(s), thus have to make sure that the new norm gets institutionalized in specific sets of rules and organizations at the international level. One can think of institutionalization in (inter)national law, multilateral organizations and for instance bilateral agreements. When a new norm gets institutionalized in these ways, it becomes clear what the norms exactly holds and what kind of practices might violate what the norms stands for and sanctions for norm-breaking behavior might be installed. Hence, when a norm gets institutionalized in several countries and these states and/or NGOs issue the concern to the international agenda. Them, when the norm passes the critical tipping point threshold the norm is issued on the international agenda and gains momentum, the norm reaches the start of the norm cascade stage. However, institutionalization is not a prerequisite to reach the stage of norm cascade as long as several countries adhere (without the norm being institutionalized) to the norm (enough to reach the critical tipping point threshold). Then, institutionalization is more likely to appear at a later stage (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998, p. 900).

Critical tipping point threshold

At the point of the critical tipping point threshold the norm entrepreneurs have successfully issued their concern in order to persuade other states in the international community to become norm leaders and adopt the new norm. The norm now reaches the tipping point towards the norm cascade (see Figure 2.1.). Finnemore & Sikkink pose that there is no exact absolute or exact elative amount of states that have to adhere to the norm in order to tip over the threshold. They propose two tentative hypotheses about what constitutes the critical mass when the tipping of stage 1 into 2 can be expected. Although it is hard to predict the exact amount of states that counts as a critical mass because states are not equal in their normative weight, some empirical studies suggest that norm tipping rarely takes place before one-third of the states in the system have become norm followers. Next to that, it matters which states adopt the norm, exactly because of their normative weight (1998, p. 901).

Stage 2: Norm cascade

After the norm has passed the threshold, the norm gains in momentum and gets adopted more easily. Even without domestic pressure, states now primarily adopt norms in response to international pressure (see Figure 2.1.). States become socialized through a process in which they become stimulated to become norm followers; 'contaged' with the norm. Through sanctions and incentives offered by others states (their institutions in which the norm already has become institutionalized), states are praised or censured; become socialized to a new logic of appropriateness. International norms at this moment can become more important than domestic pressures for normative change. 'Contagion' however is too passive a metaphor to describe what happens during a norm's cascade. Norm cascade is an active process by which states that do not adhere to the norm (yet) (norm-breakers) are stimulated to become norm-followers through international socialization. Hence, the dominant mechanism of the second stage is socialization. Socialization occurs through the emulation of heroes, the praising for behavior that conforms to the norm and the ridiculing for deviation. States adhere to the new norm because it is in line with their identity as a member of the international community; they can become praised or censured through material bilateral or multilateral sanctions or incentives. States comply to the norm because they adhere to the appeal the international society has on them for they themselves regard themselves as member of that international society. As such, it

seems to be of importance that state identity shapes states their behavior and vice versa state identity is shaped by the cultural-institutional context of the international community; mutually constitutive. When states indeed regard themselves as member of the international community, they feel more pressured to stay a member of the international community and to adhere to the norm in order not to be left out and thus feel peer-pressured by other states in the international community. Finnemore & Sikkink see three motives for states why they live up to the (peer-) pressure to adhere to a new norm; it has to do with legitimacy, reputation and esteem. International legitimacy is of importance to states, according to Finnemore & Sikkink, because it can contribute to domestic legitimacy. Hence, domestic legitimacy refers to states' citizens' belief in and obedience to the dominant political institutions. States' citizens are more and more involved in judging one's own government and comparing it to others'. International legitimation is as such of importance since it reflects domestic legitimacy and a government's ability to stay in power (in a legitimate manner). Conformity and esteem have to do with the international, instead of domestic, realm. Conformity appeals to the urges of the states to be and stay part of the 'group'; the international community to which its identity adheres. Conformity or reputation has to do with being part of a group and acting conform the rules of that group to fulfill the need of indeed being part of that particular group. Esteem has to do with legitimacy and conformity. When a leader wants to defend his/hers/country's pride, this can result in norm following because he or she wants others to think of him or her well. State leaders might want to avoid disapproval and adhere to the norm in order to enhance national- and self-esteem. As such, it might be very useful for norm entrepreneurs to address individual state leaders' esteem (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998, p. 902-904).

Norms that matter

Buzan, Wæver & De Wilde's securitization theory gives insights in *that* issues can become security issues; become securitized. Finnemore & Sikkink have their own theory as to why some norms matter and why some do not, since not every idea can, just like that, become a new norm. So, how can one predict which norm has the potential to become the dominant one? Finnemore & Sikkink (1998) elaborate on a few hypotheses they thought were relevant. These hypotheses concerned legitimation, prominence and the intrinsic characteristics of the norm. Legitimation implies that international norms will be adopted when domestically (politically) elites are in need of ways to enhance their reputation or esteem and hence their legitimacy. Second, prominence. It holds that some domestic norms are more suitable to become international accepted norms than others. Norms that are perceived legitimate by others are more likely to be adopted. Finnemore & Sikkink come up with this hypothesis because they think this is happening with Western norms. Since the Western democratic model is desired by many, the norms of 'the West' will become more easily internationalized norms in non-Western spheres. There are different hypotheses to derive from this stance. One concerns the formulation of the norm and the other concerns the content of the norm. Moreover, norms that are clearly formulated will become adopted much more easily than norms that seem to be complex. Besides, norms that hold a kind of *universality for all* are also more likely to be successful. Appealing ideas for a norm to be of universal 'human' importance - has the possibility to concern every (innocent) human being in the world- are for instance universalism, individualism, voluntaristic authority, rational progress and world citizenship (Boli & Thomas, 1998). More specifically, Keck & Sikkink claim that when norms involve "... bodily integrity and prevention of bodily harm for vulnerable or "innocent" groups, especially when a short causal chain exists between cause and effect; (...) legal equality of opportunity are particularly effective transnationally and cross-culturally" (Keck & Sikkink, 1998). This argument holds that when the possibility is present that every single person in the world can be negatively affected by a particular practice and the new norm contests the possibility of one being victimized by

the practice, the new norm is more likely to contest the prior one. So, when a norm is considered to be universal to all, the norm has the potential to become successful. Concerning the content of the norm, Finnemore & Sikkink state that some norms may be considered 'historically efficient'. However, they state that the functional argument of norms does not necessarily hold (1998, p. 908). Since chemical weapons are just as awful and destructive as any other weapon, it seems not to explain why one gets prohibited and the other did not. Price's work on land mines however showed that the prohibition on land mines was successful because the norm entrepreneurs made the norm resonate with pre-established norms in humanitarian law. Norms can thus have an advantage within norm development when they are framed within the realm of already dominant norms. Price calls these mechanisms the grafting or nesting of a norm (1998).

But, also the relationship a new norm holds to a prior successful norm determines the success of the new norm. This might suggest that norms appear in adjacency-families. However, this adjacency is often not natural but has to be manipulated, i.e. framed, by the norm entrepreneurs. Also the timing of the norm matters. For instance wars and depressions can make norms urgent. And "The expansion of international organizations (especially with the UN) is contributing to this acceleration process by providing more opportunities to address and negotiate on a broad range of normative issues" (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998, p. 909). Hence, the organizational platforms available to the norm entrepreneurs are also international and even supranational organizational platforms. When a norm emerges at this level, norms are more likely to be successful since they already emerge at a high(er) level.

Expectations

From the above follows that Finnemore & Sikkink seem able to understand *how* normative change comes about. Normative change consists of different stages; each marked by different dominant actors, motives and dominant mechanisms, and separated by a critical tipping point threshold. They therefore seem better able to understand under which conditions normative change takes place; and therefore also processes of securitization.

Summarizing, from Finnemore & Sikkink's theory follows that norms are manifested in logics of appropriateness or what is called in this thesis: frames. However, as also elaborated upon, frames are subject to change. This is what Finnemore & Sikkink call normative change. Normative change, the life cycle of a norm, is expected to occur in three stages. First, the norm emerges. Norm entrepreneurs arise with the frame that the dominant norm or logic of appropriateness must be changed in a better fitting norm that is believed to be framed in such a way that it fits reality (better) (whereas reality does not necessarily has to change as well). These norm entrepreneurs with their normative frame often use existing organizational platforms from which they frame their issue to reach a broader audience of states in order for them to become norm followers. States do become norm followers often for domestic politically motivated reasons. When a critical amount of states or (a) critical state(s) within the first stage have become norm followers because of the persuasion of the norm entrepreneurs, the critical tipping point threshold will be reached and the norm enters the second stage of norm cascade. In this stage, states adopt norms in response to international pressure. They even adopt the norm when there are no domestic actors pressing them for the adoption of the norm. Now, states adopt the norm because of other reasons than domestic political reasons according to Finnemore & Sikkink.

Having elaborated upon the theory of Finnemore & Sikkink, the theoretical framework can now be set up in terms of *what* has to be understood (explanandum; *y*) in terms of *how* this can be understood (explanans; *x*). This leads to the following theoretical hypotheses:

> *If (a) norm entrepreneur(s) persuade(s)(a) state(s) of a normative frame (x), amongst those states (a) critical state(s) put(s) that normative frame on the international community's agenda (y).*

H3. Norm Cascade:

> *If (a) critical state(s) put(s) that normative frame on the international community's agenda (x), other states become socialized to the normative frame as well (y).*

Recapitulating, Finnemore & Sikkink have developed an analytical framework by which normative change can be understood in terms of the norm-life-cycle. They give insights in how a norm emerges in competition with a prior framing of how reality is perceived and spills over in a bottom-up way and becomes accepted as the new logic of appropriateness. The contestation of the new norm spills over from the more local to the international and moves along several stages which are characterized each by different dominant actors, motives and dominant mechanisms. Securitization theory of Buzan et al. and the normative change theory of Finnemore & Sikkink show several similarities but the pith of the matter is different. Both theories are based on specific actors who bring about the change of normative frames. Whereas Buzan et al. think of them in terms of securitizing actors, Finnemore & Sikkink call them norm entrepreneurs. They think of norm entrepreneurs as specific kind of actors who have organizational platforms and have specific motivations to challenge the then still dominant normative frame but also the dominant mechanism they employ to spread the norm to their audience. Where Buzan et al. discuss their audience as functional actors, Finnemore & Sikkink elaborate on the audience of the norm entrepreneurs as states and international organizations and networks and the motivations of these functional actors to adopt the framing of an issue as framed by the norm entrepreneurs and what dominant mechanisms are at play in order for the norm to become socialized. Buzan et al. on the other hand claim that securitization occurs because of the framing of an issue as a security threat (securitizing act) of a securitizing actor to a wider audience. It does not elaborate on *how* change comes about (through stages) and *why* it occurs (because of motives and dominant mechanisms). This is where Finnemore & Sikkink thus seem able to extend the understanding of securitization theory in not only *that* change of frames – normative change – comes about but also *how* and *why* change normative change of (security) frames come about.

This chapter has sought to understand how normative change and more in particular changing security frames should be understand. It has become clear that securitization theory, although focusing on the matter of changing security, cannot get to the core of the process of changing normative security frames. It is suggested that Finnemore & Sikkink's theory of normative change is able to step in here in order to understand the process of change according to stages with characteristic actors, motives and mechanisms.

Hence, the theoretical framework discussed here says something about changing normative frames within the international system. Where securitization theory was predominantly concerned with changes within security, Finnemore and Sikkink are more concerned with normative changes in general. The adoption of UNSCR 1820 and therefore the framing of sexual violence as a threat to international security is seen as a change of the normative frame.

Chapter 3. Methodology and Operationalization

This chapter contains the operationalization and methods of this research. The methodological choices will be elaborated upon to justify which data will be analyzed and how this will be done. Later on in this chapter, the concepts used, based on the set theoretical framework, will be defined and clarified to set the stage for the analysis done in Chapter 5.

3.1. Methodology

Since this thesis is designed as a single case-study research, this choice has methodological consequences. Case studies are thought of as having the advantage for allowing for the exploration of solutions of complex issues and generates new knowledge by going qualitatively 'deep' (instead of more 'broad' quantitative results). As such, case study researches are good sources for hypotheses and provide in-depth information since (unusual) cases can shed light on situations or problems that are unethical or impractical to study in other ways. However, case study research might also carry the disadvantage of missing vital information in order to interpret the case in a wider population (of cases); being representative for the whole population. Doing case study research has also methodological consequences since case study research (in this case the adoption of UNSCR 1820) tries to get grip on a complex reality by going in-depth into a specific event or case. The method of process-tracing is of use for the internal validity of the case study since it usually involves long causal chains in which multiple types of evidence are employed to verify a single inference (Gerring, 2007, p. 173). Since this thesis tests the Norm Life Cycle of Finnemore & Sikkink's causal inferences for the case of the adoption of Resolution 1820, process-tracing hence is of excellent use for tracing down the process between the sexual violence as threat to international peace and security norm's emergence to the point Resolution 1820 was signed.

Process-tracing

The Norm Life Cycle theory of Finnemore & Sikkink (1998) provides a framework which can be traced down from how a norm has emerged, tipped, cascaded and in the end has been internalized (however the scope of this thesis reaches to the point of norm cascading resulting in the adoption of UNSCR 1820). This thesis aims to trace this causal process down, hence process-trace down *how* and *why* this has happened. According to Gerring case study research relies heavily on its contextual evidence and deductive logic to reconstruct the causality within a single case research design. Since it involves long causal chains (of which also the Norm Life Cycle consists), multiple types of evidence are allowed to put together the bits and pieces of evidence in order to reconstruct the causal narrative of the construction of sexual violence as a threat to international peace and security (2007, p. 172-173). Process-tracing allows for the validity of research in clarifying the arguments and to verify each stage of the model. Although the evidence found is often difficult to verify since it is non-experimental and cannot be analyzed in a sample-based format.

Process-tracing is concerned with contextual assumptions and assumptions about how the world works; hence is constructed. Case study research relies on contextual inferences while trying to reconstruct causality within a single case. Because one relies on a single case (study) one does not compare cases but gazes within the particular case. What hence is a distinctive feature of process-tracing styles of research is, according to Gerring (2007, p. 178), investigating non-comparable bits and pieces of adjacent evidence in order to trace down the causal track within the case. This means that all pieces are evident in the whole causal chain but are not necessarily comparable to each other. Therefore, process tracing is said to have a "… complex logic, one analogous to detective work, legal briefs, journalism, and traditional historical accounts. The analyst seeks to make sense of a congeries

of disparate evidence, each of which sheds light on a single outcome or set of relates outcomes" (Gerring, 2007, p. 178). Because process-tracing uses different 'bits and pieces' to make congruent causal case, process-tracing evidence may be qualitative and quantitative. And especially this non-comparability of adjacent observations differentiates the process-tracing method from other research designs. Thirdly, since every bit and/or piece might be different but still contributing to telling the story of the causality within the case, the amount of observations is often indeterminate since they are, again, non-comparable. Gerring calls 'bits and pieces'; 'apples and oranges'. They cannot be compared on the same account, but do contribute to the case. A final characteristic of process-tracing holds that it leans on general assumption about the world. That is, according to Gerring (2007, p. 180) nomothetic laws (theoretical) or common sense (pre-theoretical). So, process-tracing needs to be embedded in a comprehensible universe of causal relations; that is, can be 'narrativized'. This argument is particularly set against the ideal-typical experiment. When one controls for all aspects possible within an experiment, the less 'real world' remains. The less one controls for, the closer one moves to the 'real world' complexity. That is, you need to rely more heavily on theoretical background assumptions about what the 'real world' is about. Gerring does not state that in other types of research one does not need or lacks general background knowledge but is said to be more on the surface within case study research.

For so far the general characteristics discerning case-study process tracing from other research designs have been elaborated. Now, the usefulness of process-tracing will be elaborated upon after which will be made clear why process-tracing is indeed practical for this particular case study research. The utility of process tracing comes in multiple steps. Gerring states that when a causal link can be narrated, it can be put in a causal diagram. Hence, it can be put in a logical figural inference. Second, the causal narrative, as such, can be broken down in single steps which lay within the same single case's causal chain. What comes next within case study research according to Gerring is that these multiple links within the same case cannot be tested in an experimental manner, as has become clear. That is why in case study research Counterfactual Comparison is common; hence it makes process tracing deductive of nature. At last Gerring states that the researcher rightly should "… focus her attention on those links in the causal chain that are (a) weakest and (b) most crucial for the overall argument" (2007, p.184). The validity of the process tracing research concerns the clarification of the central argument and the verification of each stage of the model under investigation. This is a challenge since the evidence is often non-experimental and cannot be analyzed in a sample-based format. Some think of process tracing as a cross-check or a methodological triangulation. However, employing process tracing can offer an enormous treasury of important evidence. Besides, and moreover, process tracing is based on contextual assumption of the 'real world'. And although some may think that research employing process tracing's analysis are highly disputable, when one documents the 'apples and oranges' evidence, results are still highly reliable (2007, p.185).

Beach & Pedersen distinguish three kinds of process-tracing research. The first they discern is theory-testing process tracing. This concerns a deductive kind of method to find out whether a hypothesized causal mechanism exists in a single case (2011, p. 7, 16). Second, they identify theory-building process tracing. This kind starts with empirical material and uses analysis to induce a plausible hypothetical causal mechanism (2011, p. 16). Last, they present the most common kind of process tracing which is the explaining outcome kind of process tracing. The goal of this kind of process tracing is to explain a particular historical outcome but is still predominantly doing theory-guided empirical research (2011, p. 22). One can both follow the deductive path and the inductive path in outcome process tracing. The deductive path follows the logic of theory-testing process tracing; the testing of an existing mechanism to see whether it can explain the outcome of the case. The inductive path follows the logic of theory building process tracing and is often employed for phenomena not

much known about (2011, p. 24-25). Explaining outcome process tracing is distinctly different from theory testing process tracing and theory building process tracing since the latter two aim to produce nomothetic outcomes that go beyond the specific studied case study whereas outcome process tracing is more interested in explaining the course of events for a particular case. What an outcome process trace study next should do is to point to potentialities within the particular case study process tracing research that can function as the basis of further research that perhaps can build further generalizable causal mechanisms providing external validity (2011, p. 27-28).

For this research, it can be argued that both the theory-testing process tracing and the outcome based process tracing area applicable. The empirical and primary focus of this thesis lays on the adoption of UNSCR 1820, hence the outcome kind of process tracing. However, at the same time, this research will prove whether Finnemore & Sikkink's theory is indeed able to unravel and understand how and why sexual violence became framed as a threat to international security. So, this research tests the outcome of UNSCR 1820 for the theory of Finnemore & Sikkink, hence follows the deductive path described above by going back in time. At the same time, and following the same deductive path as the theory-testing kind of process tracing, this thesis aims at outcome-explaining. Both the empirical and theoretical puzzle therefore require the deductive process tracing method. Whereas the puzzle is two-fold, the single method serves them both. Beach & Pedersen emphasize that while one conducts process tracing one should continue with re-building the causal mechanism through the 'bits and pieces' until a sufficient explanation has been found (2011, p. 25). Since focusing on the particular historical outcome of the signing of Resolution 1820 but testing for a particular theory, this research is a theory-guided empirical research focusing on Finnemore & Sikkink's theoretical framework and therefore deductive outcome focused process tracing. When both of the hypotheses (since they follow on one another in time) can be verified, Finnemore & Sikkink's theory is able to explain this particular case, but when both of the hypotheses will be rejected then this has implications for the theory of Finnemore & Sikkink; the theory is not capable to explain the framing of sexual violence as a threat to international security.

Data gathering

Having explored the method that will be used in order to be able to analyze the data, this paragraph now has to make clear which choice of data gathering will be maintained. Primarily texts prior to the adoption of Resolution 1820 addressing sexual violence in and in the aftermath of armed conflict as a threat to international peace and security, will be studied in order to reconstruct the course of events and hence the Norm's Life Cycle according to the way the hypotheses are set up and. Below will be specified which data will be used in order to be able to verify or falsify the hypotheses and in the end, the research question.

The main source of data analyzed in order to test the Norm's Life Cycle for the case of UNSCR 1820 concern primary sources. As has become clear from the paragraph dealing with the methodology of process-tracing, analyzing starts with UNSCR 1820 and works its way back in time. Therefore, data analysis starts with the official UNSCR 1820 and the meeting record of this particular UNSC official meeting on *Women, Peace and Security*; meeting 5916 of the United Nations Security Council. Hereafter, each meeting record of an official meeting of the Security Council on *Women, Peace and Security* prior to this meeting, going further and further back in time according to the method of process-tracing, will function as a guideline in finding the bits and pieces of evidence until the evidence is sufficient to answer the research question. The analysis however will be presented in chronological order. From these meeting record documents on, data gathering will evolve around these documents and the documents and actors referred to in them according to the method of process-

tracing mentioned earlier.

Besides these traced-down documents; bits and pieces of evidence, the Annual Reports of the United Nations Security Council will be analyzed as well to see what is going on in them according to the United Nations Security Council itself. These Annual Reports cover questions considered by the Security Council and matters brought to its attention as well as the work of the Security Council's subsidiary bodies during the reporting period of 1 August-31 July. Furthermore, these reports contain annexes relating, *inter alia*, to the membership of the Security Council, the representatives accredited to it, Presidents in the reporting period as well as meetings held and actions taken by the Security Council and its subsidiary bodies. So, in all of these Reports references are made regarding to the meetings, actions, letters send and received, etcetera that the Security Council concerned. All of those issues referenced to in the Reports concerning *Women, Peace and Security* UNSCR 1325 and after will be consulted in order to find out how sexual violence became a threat to international peace and security. Again, documents referred to in the context of the *Women, Peace and Security* agenda of the Security Council will be analyzed more closely and also the documents referred to in these documents.

Next to the start-document of UNSCR 1820 and meeting 5916 itself in which UNSCR 1820 was adopted, the Security Council Annual Reports and the documents referred to in it (which thus also can be other UN, non Security Council related documents) the meeting reports of Arria-formula meetings[7] concerning *Women, Peace and Security,* academic literature on this particular matter; and reports and documents of NGOs on the matter will be analyzed. The *NGO Working Group on Women, Peace and Security*, was actually established in 2000 to lobby for a Security Council resolution on *Women, Peace and Security* and has after that predominantly focused on the implementation of all *Women, Peace and Security* UNSCRs by serving as a bridge between women's human rights defenders working in and in the aftermath of conflict and the policy-makers at the United Nations Headquarters (www.peacewomen.org). It claims a degree of authority since this particular Resolution was indeed adopted.[8] The *NGO Working Group on Women, Peace and Security* has distributed its own UNSCR 1325 Annual Report and its speeches held and letters send to the Security Council are archived on its website. Through the whole process of writing this thesis and gathering data, several emails were sent to several of the NGOs of the *NGO Working Group on Women, Peace and Security*, especially to WILPF and to the *NGO Working Group on Women, Peace and Security* self. Unfortunately none of these emails was answered. Emails sent to Kristen A. Cordell, who was involved in the advocacy and passage of UNSCR 1820, however, provided me with useful information. Also Assistant Professor Soumita Basu from India replied to my email and provided me with insights in Security Council dynamics concerning its *Women, Peace and Security* agenda.

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[7] Arria-formula Meetings were initiated in 1992 by Ambassador Diego Arria, the representative of Venezuela on the Security Council (1992-1993). They are not envisaged in the United Nations Charter but under Article 30 of the Charter is stated that the Security Council is the master of its own procedures. The Arria-formula meetings are therefore very informal and are confidential gatherings of Security Council Member States that which to "… have a frank and private exchange of views, within a flexible procedural framework, with persons whom the inviting member of members of the Council (who also act as the facilitators or conveners) believe it would be beneficial to hear and/or to whom they may wish to convey a message. They provide interested Council members an opportunity to engage in a direct dialogue with high representatives of Governments and international organizations – often at the latter's request – as well as non-State parties, on matters which they are concerned and fall within the purview of responsibility of the Security Council."
See: http://www.un.org/en/sc/about/methods/bgarriaformula.shtml

[8] At the time, *NGO Working Group on Women, Peace and Security* existed of the following organizations: *Amnesty International*, *Boston Consortium on Gender*, *Security and Human Rights*, *Femmes Africa Solidarité*, *Global Action to Prevent War*, *Global Justice Center*, *Human Rights Watch*, *International Action Network on Small Arms* (IANSA), *International Alert*, *International Women's Tribune Center*, *Women's Action for New Directions* and also the *Women's International League for Peace and Freedom* (WILPF).

Moreover I had a very pleasant encounter with advocacy and research officer Julie McBride of *War Child* (www.warchild.nl). Although engaged in a different agenda than the *Women, Peace and Security* she shed some light on the process of NGO advocacy directed at the UN(SC). Anne-Marije van de Staaij, policy advisor on UNSCR 1325 at the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Stabilization and Humanitarian Aid Department, told me how the Dutch Government advocates for the implementation and development of the UNSCR 1325 Women, Peace and Security agenda. She also redirected me to Anne Sophie Kesselaar, policy advisor of *WO=MEN* (*women equals men*), a Dutch Gender Platform and part of the Dutch 1325 NAP[9] Partnership (www.wo-men.nl).

Since both the United Nations Security Council and the NGO Working Group for *Women, Peace and Security* claimed some kind of authority over Resolution 1325 (Shepherd, 2008, p. 6) documents obtained through these channels will be analyzed and complemented with the E-News of the WILPF since it reports on all kinds of issues related to the *Women, Peace and Security* agenda and is a member of the *NGO Working Group for Women, Peace and Security* and with secondary data which aims to understand UNSCR 1820. All of these documents together, bits and pieces, should make it possible to trace down the first actor, hence norm entrepreneur, that has framed sexual violence as a threat to international peace and security and the critical state putting it on the agenda for the 19th of June and subsequently therefore, what kind of dynamics were at play between this critical tipping point threshold and the adoption of Resolution 1820, acknowledging sexual violence as a threat to international security. Since WILPF is just one organization, although member of the *NGO Working Group on Women, Peace and Security*, and the *NGO Working Group on Women, Peace and Security* is already an existing network of NGOs relating to the Women, Peace and Security agenda; it is aimed for to trace down – through the several aimed documents – the actual norm entrepreneur within or outside this network.

For the analysis of all of these documents holds that June 19th 2008 is the starting point for the analysis but hence endpoint seen from the causal mechanism under investigation. From this point on, going back in time and constantly evaluating whether a found explanation is sufficient and is of importance in order to test the hypotheses in order to eventually answer the research question (Beach & Pedersen, 2011, p. 25).

3.2. Operationalization

Norms and normative change or frames and frames of reality are not that easy to 'see'. Buzan et al. and Finnemore & Sikkink have provided the theoretical framework for this thesis; these theoretical statements now have to be translated in measurable concepts. First, the theoretical hypotheses will be repeated and based on these theoretical informed hypotheses, a operationalized translation of the theoretical concepts will be made where after operationalized hypotheses will be set up focusing on the specific case of UNSCR 1820 in order to be able to organize Chapter 5: Analysis and to eventually falsify or verify the hypotheses according to the findings.

First, the hypothesis following securitization theory will be elaborated upon through operationalization. Since securitization theory is not explicit on what counts as a securitizing actor, referent object or audience, this particular hypothesis is theoretically informed with additions based on Finnemore & Sikkink's normative change theory. After the theoretical hypothesis based on securitization theory has been translated into an operational hypothesis, the two hypotheses based on the theoretical framework of Finnemore & Sikkink's normative change theory will be translated as well into operational hypotheses.

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[9] National Action Plan

<u>Theoretical H1. Securitization:</u>

> *If* a) *a securitizing actor claims* b) *that a referent object is threatened in its existence   by   a certain 'threat'[10] and* c) *stress the need for extraordinary measures to ensure the survival of the referent object* d) *to an audience of functional actors* (x)*, the 'threat'   to the referent object gets securitized* (y)*.*

<u>Securitizing actor:</u> A securitizing actor is thought of in this particular case as a norm entrepreneur in terms of how Finnemore & Sikkink think of norm entrepreneurs. Therefore, the same operational concept is thought of to be in place here.[11]

<u>Claim:</u> The claim of the securitizing actor to secure the existence of the referent object from the threat is thought of by Buzan et al. in terms of 'speech acts'. Here, the speech act is thought of as a statement made by the securitizing actor stating that sexual violence poses a threat to international security. Hence, the 'speech act' performed by the securitizing actor and involves the direct link between sexual violence and the maintenance of international security.

<u>Referent object:</u> International peace is thought of by the securitizing actor to be threatened by sexual violence in armed conflict.

<u>Stress the need for extraordinary measures to ensure the survival of the referent object:</u> Not only should the securitizing actor claim that sexual violence is a threat to international peace and security, the securitizing actor should also address the audience of functional actors with the need for extraordinary measures to ensure the survival of international peace, further claiming that sexual violence is an international security issue. Therefore, the securitizing actor should state that sexual violence is not a only a threat to international security but also that the way sexual violence was addressed and tackled before, is not adequate enough to maintain international security and new approaches should be developed in order to secure sexual violence in armed violence. Hence, extraordinary measures go beyond politics as usual.

<u>Audience of functional actors:</u> The United Nations Security Council is thought of as the audience of functional actors to whom the securitizing actor speaks its claims concerning the perceived threat to the referent object. Hence, the securitizing actor made a 'speech act' targeting the United Nations Security Council in order for the threat to the referent object to become securitized.

<u>Threat:</u> Sexual violence in armed conflict as a threat to international security holds that sexual violence in armed conflict may be used deliberately as a part of widespread and/or systemic attack targeting civilians which can significantly exacerbate situations of armed conflict and may impede the restoration of international peace and security.

<u>Securitization to become a security issue:</u> Sexual violence is thought of to have become a security issue – has become securitized – with the adoption of UNSCR 1820 in which was stated that sexual violence is a matter of international peace and security.

From the above, the operationalization of the elements of the theoretical hypothesis on securitization, the following operational hypothesis on the securitization of sexual violence as a security issue can be formulated:

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[10] See note 5.
[11] See 'norm entrepreneur' below.

Operational H1. Securitization:

> *If **a)** (a) representative(s) of (a) NGO(s) concerned with women affected by sexual violence in war claims **b)** that international security is threatened by sexual violence and **c)** call for extraordinary measures to maintain international security **d)** to the United Nations Security Council (**x**), sexual violence gets securitized (**y**).*

Again, this theory seems to reveal the fact *that* sexual violence could have become a threat to international security can be tested as a case of securitization. The following operational hypotheses based on the theoretical framework of Finnemore & Sikkink are expected to make testable *how* and *why* sexual violence became a threat to international security.

Theoretical H2. Norm Emergence:

> *If (a) norm entrepreneur(s) persuade(s) (a) state(s) of a normative frame (x), (a) critical state(s) amongst those states put(s) that normative frame on the international community's agenda (y).*

Norm entrepreneur: Since norms are actively built, norms need agents that have a clear view about appropriate behavior. When an agent feels that dominant attitudes and/or behavior – the dominant norm – do not fit his or her perception of how reality ultimately works, this agent may feel the need to contest the dominant form in order for the norm to change into what he or she feels like is the admired attitude and behavior to reality. Therefore, norm entrepreneurs are highly critical for the emergence of norms since '*they call attention to issues or even "create" issues by using language that names, interprets, and dramatizes them*' (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998, p. 897). Norm entrepreneurs are therefore likely to be the first to contest the dominant norm and may appear controversial or harsh in their statements. They explicitly frame the current logic of appropriateness – the dominant norm – as inappropriate to reality and frame the issue in a way they think is appropriate to reality. Reinterpretation and reframing is often thought of as the process of 'framing'. Framing is about the creation of a new norm on the base of what is thought of as inappropriate of a norm in the same realm; in this case this is thought of to be the dominant normative frame on sexual violence within the United Nations Security Council's Women, Peace and Security Agenda. Hence, a norm entrepreneur in this case should be the first within the context of the United Nations Security Council – at an official meeting, Arria-formula Meeting, United Nations Security Council related gathering with a United Nations Security Council Member State – to state that the then current logic is unjust and make a statement on sexual violence in armed conflict and directly link it to international security; frame sexual violence as a threat to international security.   Secondly, in order to contest the dominant norm, norm entrepreneurs need to have an organizational platform through which they promote their norms. These platforms may be existing platforms or may have been constructed for the purpose of the promotion of the specific norm. These organizations can be NGOs and/or larger transnational advocacy networks constructed by and of related NGOs. Since norm entrepreneurs try to persuade states of their normative frame, and since normative change for this matter is manifested at the United Nations Security Council level, for this research the norm entrepreneur of the normative frame that sexual violence poses a threat to international security must address the Members of the United Nations Security Council from his or her NGO or network of NGOs within the paradigm of *Women, Peace and Security*. Moreover, this NGO or this network of NGOs should have affiliations with the UN's *Women, Peace and Security* agenda and more specifically with sexual violence in armed conflict. There are several NGOs and networks of NGOs that lobby at UN-level on *Women, Peace and Security* related issues since persuasion has to do also with the framing of a new norm. NGOs

therefore having access to the Security Council Member States are thought of to have persuaded these states. The most important NGO lobbying on the *Women, Peace and Security* agenda at UN Security Council level is actually a network of NGOs and is called *NGO Working Group on Women, Peace and Security*. Its mission states:

> "The *NGO Working Group on Women, Peace and Security* for the equal and full participation of women in all efforts to create and maintain international peace and security. Formed in 2000 to call for a Security Council resolution on Women, Peace and Security, the *NGO Working Group on Women, Peace and Security* now focuses on implementation of all Security Council resolutions that address this issue. The *NGO Working Group on Women, Peace and Security* serves as a bridge between women's human rights defenders working in conflict-affected situations and policy-makers at UN headquarters."

<div align="right">

www.womenpeacesecurity.org

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Since this network of NGOs was especially established to address the Security Council for a resolution on *Women, Peace and Security* which indeed was signed in 2000, it seems likely that the *NGO Working Group on Women, Peace and Security* also pushed for the adoption of a resolution related to sexual violence in armed conflict. Moreover, since they are a network of NGOs the *NGO Working Group on Women, Peace and Security* seems a legitimate bridge between NGOs affiliated with women's human rights defenders and the UN and therefore the NGO most likely to have the intention to address the UN and to be taken seriously by the UN as well. Hence, the norm entrepreneur should be the first to address sexual violence as a threat to international security at the United Nations Security Council and needs an organizational platform to address the United Nations Security Council. The norm entrepreneur therefore is most likely a representative of the *NGO Working Group on Women, Peace and Security* or a representative of one of the NGOs at that time affiliated with the *NGO Working Group on Women, Peace and Security* and concerned with women's rights. Therefore, and related to this prerequisite of an actor in order to be a norm entrepreneur, the norm entrepreneur should have access, through their organizational platform, to the Member States of the Security Council. Later on, the norm entrepreneur can perhaps be traced back to one of the NGOs of the *NGO Working Group on Women, Peace and Security*. Thirdly, a norm entrepreneur is characterized by particular motivations to address a dominant norm seeking to contest and replace it with a new normative frame on a certain matter. This is since norm entrepreneurs contest a then still dominant norm and what they do is thus actually inappropriate behavior according to the to-be-replaced norm; the one they are exactly contesting. Therefore, norm entrepreneurs are said to be motivated by empathy, altruism, and ideational commitment according to Finnemore & Sikkink. "Ideational commitment is the main motivation when norm entrepreneurs promote norms or ideas because they believe in the ideals and values embodied in the norms, even though the pursuit of the norms may have no effect on their well-being" (1998, p. 898). Ideational commitment therefore is seen as the belief in the ideals and values embodied in the new norm as opposed to the prior one. A norm entrepreneur is ideational committed when he or she takes a definite position as opposed to the current state of sexual violence in conflict and states that sexual violence in armed conflict is to be seen in the context of international security. Second, norm entrepreneurs can be suffragists, but not many are. Therefore, a norm entrepreneur exhibits empathy when he or she addresses the Security Council Member States while expressing the need (for the Security Council) to take care for a certain (sub) group of people and portray a certain desire to help this (sub) group themselves as well; the norm entrepreneur and his or her organizational platform should therefore aim at improving the well-being of a larger group besides their own personal well-being and the NGOs direct interests. A norm entrepreneur expresses their altruistic affiliations when they do not mention the possible advantages

for himself or herself or for the NGO or network of NGOs they work for. It might be that the norm entrepreneur is a woman from a war torn country but preferably they do not mention their own background for this case.

Persuasion: Persuasion is thought of to be the main dominant mechanism for norm entrepreneurs to get states to share their normative frame. Persuasion is a difficult to measure mechanism, because when can one say to have persuaded someone. Finnemore & Sikkink state that norm entrepreneurs and their organizational platforms need "… the support of state actors to endorse their norms and make norm socialization a part of their agenda…" (1998, p. 900). Since some states are very powerful states, NGOs and/or networks of NGOs need quite some leverage in order to persuade a state. A norm entrepreneurs main deal is to reframe "… what is seen as natural or appropriate and convert it into something perceived as wrong or inappropriate" since "… the ultimate goals is not to challenge the "truth" of something, but to challenge whether it is good, appropriate, and deserving of praise" (1998, p. 900). Norm entrepreneurs often use strong language, might even name and shame states in order for them to be persuaded into norm-following. In this case the audience of the norm entrepreneur and his or her organizational platform concern the Member States of the United Nations Security Council. The norm entrepreneur might refer to the current state of sexual violence in armed conflict and 'frame' that sexual violence is not addressed correctly by the Member States of the United Nations Security Council. Persuasion and framing is therefore a moral appeal performed at the address of the United Nations Security Council Members. The norm entrepreneur should have held the United Nations Security Council Member States accountable for the inappropriate status quo of war-related sexual violence. Security Council Member States are thought of to have become norm-followers and therefore persuaded by the norm entrepreneur when they have welcomed the statement of the norm entrepreneur on the issue of sexual violence posing a threat to international security and preferably have repeated the statement themselves too; thus having adopted the normative frame by stating themselves that sexual violence in their opinion poses a threat to international security.

State(s): States that norm entrepreneurs should have persuaded are thought of as United Nations Security Council Member States. Other Member States of the United Nations are allowed to be present at the United Nations Security Council-meetings but are not entitled to vote during these meetings. United Nations Security Council Member States are entitled to vote and therefore it is thought of that United Nations Security Council Member States are the primary states that norm entrepreneurs should convince of their normative frame that sexual violence poses a threat to international security since it is thought of that persuading these states is critical for the norm to spread within the international community. When an issue gets acknowledged and/or adopted as a UNSC resolution, then the norm is more likely to cascade and eventually internalized (as said, the last is not of concern for this thesis). The main addressees of the norm entrepreneurs are therefore the United Nations Security Council Member States since they, being one of the most constructive bodies of the United Nations, have the most decisive power in order for a normative frame to be successful. Hence, norm entrepreneurs try to convince the United Nations Security Council Member States. These can be Permanent and Non-Permanent Security Council Member States. Since the composition of the Security Council changes every calendar-year, persuaded states of interest here are the states that were both present during the norm's emergence and its cascade.

Normative frame: In this case the normative frame holds the framing of sexual violence posing a threat to international security. Therefore, the norm entrepreneur should have been the first at a meeting of the United Nations Security Council on *Women, Peace and Security* to *1)* claim that the current state of affairs concerning sexual violence in armed conflict is not appropriate (anymore) and *2)* directly state at that particular Security Council related meeting that sexual violence poses a threat to

international security and that *(3)* new strategies should be developed in order to tackle the matter of sexual violence posing a threat to international security).

Critical state(s): (a) Critical State(s) are thought of as states with normative power. Within the context of the United Nations Security Council Member States, it is thought that the Permanent Security Council Member States – the so-called P5 – holds more normative power than the Non-Permanent Security Council Member States. According to Finnemore & Sikkink "... critical states are those without which the achievement of the substantive norm goal is compromised" (1998, p. 901). As said, the Permanent Members of the United Nations Security Council are the People's Republic of China, the French Republic, the Russian Federation, the UK and the US. These five Security Council Permanent Member States have more power in the Security Council since they are entitled more rights according to the UN Charter (UN, 1945, Chapter 4). The adoption or the draft of a Security Council Resolution is voted by the Security Council Member States. According to Article 27 of the UN Charter (UN, 1945, Chapter 4), a draft resolution is adopted when nine or more of the fifteen Security Council Member States vote in favor of the resolution. However, it only takes one veto of one or more of the United Nations Permanent Security Council Members to get the issue off the table. According to Base (2012), the P5 dominates the Security Council because of their privileged status in spite of major changes in international politics, for example the end of the Cold War. However, the most important reason seems to be the fact that the Permanent Five *is* permanent. The P5 are thought of as *being* the memory of the Security Council and have are inclined to have informal closed-door meetings amongst themselves before engaging themselves into sessions with the other Security Council Member States. Hence, each of these P5 states holds a specific legitimacy in the beholder eyes of the Non-Permanent Security Council Member States. Hence, the P5 is decisive when it comes down to the rejection of draft resolutions. But getting issues on the United Nations Security Council's agenda is something else. According to the Charter of the United Nations, several types of actors have the right to bring issues to the Security Council's Agenda: non-Council Members and non-UN Members (UN, 1945, Chapter 6), the Secretary-General (UN, 1945, Chapter 15) and other UN organs (e.g. the General Assembly) (UN, 1945, Chapter 4). But, every item on the agenda of the Security Council needs to be prepared by the Secretary-General according to the Provisional Rule of Procedure of the Security Council (Rule 6 of the Provisional Rules of Procedure of the Security Council). The Secretary-General then lists the issues that the Security Council should handle through communications with UN Security Council Member States and other UN entities. The President of the Security Council then approves or disapproves it. When the President approves the document with issues, it is now called the Provisional Agenda (Rule 7). The Security Council President then provides the provisional agenda to the other Security Council Members and when they adopt the agenda as well, the Security Council Member States can discuss the items at a particular meeting. Permanent Members therefore have no agenda-setting privileges when it comes down to the agenda of the United Nations Security Council. Several scholars think that the Council's agenda and resolutions reflect the interests of the P5 and that therefore the Security Council is still dominated by the P5. Non-Permanent Security Council Members therefore tend to avoid bringing issues to the table that may trigger a veto of one of the P5-states. Reasoned the other way around, issues may perhaps more easily reach the Security Council's Agenda when a P5 member, since having more agenda-setting power, has brought the issue forth to the to be adopted provisional agenda (Iwanami, 2011, p. 4).

International community's agenda: The procedure of the setting of the topic on the official agenda of the United Nations Security Council has been elaborated upon in the above. Subsequently, the United Nations Security Council Members can decide whether they will hold a formal meeting or informal consultations on the matter. Formal meetings are held in public and are used to consult on issues at

stake, exchange information, and decisions made whether the Security Council should take up further actions. Of these meetings verbatim records are issued. Informal consultations are private gathering where Security Council Members decide whether they should hold a formal meeting on the matter and/or approve a provisional agenda for that meeting. In the case of this particular framing and therefore UNSCR 1820, the operationalization of the international community's agenda is thought of the scheduling of the United Nations Security Council meeting on *Women, Peace and Security*: *Sexual violence in situations of armed conflict* agenda-item then to be held on the 19th of June 2008. This scheduled agenda item on the international community's agenda is chosen since this day seems decisive for the draft resolution to be adopted in a UNSC resolution. The ultimate success of the draft resolution marked the moment of the norm's cascade since sexual violence officially was then adopted into an international security threat with the signing of UNSCR 1820.

Following from the above, the operationalization of the elements of the theoretical hypothesis on norm emergence, the following operational hypothesis on the emergence of the new sexual violence norm can be set up:

Operational H2. Norm Emergence:

> *If (a) representative(s)of (a) NGO(s) concerned with women affected by sexual violence in war persuade(s) Member States of the United Nations Security Council of their normative frame that sexual violence poses a threat to international security (x), (a) Permanent Member(s) of the Security Council will put the normative frame that sexual violence poses a threat to international security on the agenda of the United Nations Security Council for the 19th of June 2008 (y).*

Theoretical H3. Norm Cascade:

> *If (a) critical state(s) put(s) a normative frame on the international community's agenda (x), other states become socialized to the normative frame as well (y).*

Other states: By other states the other Permanent and Non-Permanent Security Council Member States besides the critical state(s) are meant. The Permanent Security Council Member States are China, France, Russia, the UK and the US. Non-Permanent Security Council Member States in 2008 during the adoption of UNSCR 1820 were Burkina Faso, Libya, South Africa, Vietnam, Indonesia, Costa Rica, Panama, Belgium, Italy and Croatia.

Socialization: Socialization is the dominant mechanism of a norm cascade. It concerns the mechanism through which norm leaders persuade other to adhere to the normative frame as well. States are thought of to actually adopt the norm because of motivations related to their identity as a member of an international community. State identity is said to shape state behavior and state identity is again shaped by the context which the states find themselves in. States that consider themselves as a member of a particular group will subsequently behave as a member of that particular group according to what is thought of as desired behavior. Finnemore & Sikkink think of this mechanism as 'contagion' (1998, p. 902), just because states think of themselves as part of a particular group. Socialization in this case hence is thought of to occur within the context of the group of other states (see above) making up the United Nations Security Council. Socialization in this case is expected to occur prior to and during the 5916th meeting of the Security Council on June 19th 2008. Therefore socialization among the other states, due to the agenda-setting of the critical state(s) is thought of to happen at the following states: Burkina Faso, Libya, South Africa, Vietnam, Indonesia, Costa Rica, Panama, Belgium, Italy, Croatia and at least four out of five Permanent Security Council Member States: People's Republic of China

and/or the French Republic and/or the Russian Federation and/or the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and/or the US. As said, socialization works through identity and 'contagion' and therefore 'peer pressure'. States may have according to Finnemore & Sikkink three motivations for responding to this 'peer pressure' in order to become 'contaged' with the normative frame. These are: legitimation, reputation and esteem.

Legitimation, reputation and esteem: Legitimation is important for states since it has to do with the reputation, trust and credibility states enjoy in a specific international community. Legitimation not only has to do with external legitimacy in the international community but also relates to national legitimacy. Conformity and esteem also involve the reflections that go on intra-state. Therefore, conformity and esteem – as does legitimation – refer to the belonging of a particular state to that specific international community; the United Nations Security Council. Hence, here it is of importance for the states involved what they think others think of them. At the same time, they want others to (continue) to think well of them and not become a social pariah. Identity has therefore to do with what states think of themselves and what they think others think of them. Main concern for states is to belong to the international community; the United Nations Security Council. Therefore it is thought that although 'other states' do not value the normative frame of sexual violence as a threat to international peace and security for the norm itself as the reason to have signed UNSCR 1820, but because they felt they had to because of reasons of legitimation, reputation and esteem; they were socialized to the normative frame because of these motivations.

Hence, socialization is thought of to have occurred when the 'other states' have specifically expressed that the adoption of UNSCR 1820 and therefore the acknowledgement of sexual violence posing a threat to international security is the responsibility of the United Nations Security Council and therefore for the international community to address. The states should make special references to their own identity and belonging to this particular international community in order for the issue of sexual violence posing a threat to international security to be tackled.

From the above, the operationalization of the elements of the theoretical hypothesis on norm cascade, the following operational hypothesis on the cascade of the new sexual violence norm can be formulated:

Operational H3. Norm Cascade:

> *If (a) Permanent Member(s) of the United Nations Security Council put(s) the normative frame that sexual violence poses a threat to international security on the agenda of the United Nations Security Council (x), the other Security Council Member States will socialize to the normative frame that sexual violence poses a threat to international security and adopt UNSCR 1820 (y).*

In order to test the first hypothesis concerning the securitization of sexual violence into a threat to international security it is necessary to distinguish the operationalized prerequisites for securitization. Those prerequisites being: the securitizing actor, the referent object being threatened in its existence by a certain threat, the call for the need for extraordinary measures to ensure the survival of the referent object and the audience of functional actors. Therefore, the norm entrepreneur should have addressed the United Nations Security Council Member States during a Security Council Women, Peace and Security related meeting with the claim that international security is being threatened in its existence and that therefore extraordinary measures (beyond politics as usual) should be employed in order to maintain international security.

Therefore, when all of above four mentioned prerequisites are to be found through inductive

process-tracing, *H1. Securitization* is verified. Subsequently, if not all of the four above mentioned prerequisites are to be found through inductive process-tracing, *H1. Securitization* is falsified.

In order to test the second hypothesis concerning sexual violence as a threat to international security as an emerging norm it is necessary to find the norm entrepreneur who during the Security Council meetings on Women, Peace and Security has been explicit in her or his language about the threat sexual violence poses to international peace and security as contradictory to the contested normative frame, was not directly to benefit from this normative frame, had a organizational platform and did an appeal to the Security Council for change. This call for change and call for action should have taken place between 2000 and the planning of the then to be held meeting on 19th June 2008.

Therefore, when above mentioned elements are to be found through inductive process-tracing, *H2. Norm Emergence* is verified. Subsequently, when the above mentioned elements are not to be found through inductive process-tracing, *H2. Norm Emergence* is falsified.

In order to test the third hypothesis concerning the passing of and the critical tipping point threshold itself into norm cascade the point in time after the emergence until 19 June 2008 is investigated. Starting point again will be the meeting records of the Security Council Meeting of June 19 and will go further back in time and take into account documents and events referred to here and moreover, the Meeting records of that day will be analyzed as well in order to perhaps see the dynamics of legitimization, esteem and reputation which are ought to explain why all Security Council members felt the need to socialize, institutionalize and demonstrate the normative frame in the Norm Cascade of the adoption of Resolution 1820. Again secondary literature on the issue might as well shed interesting light on the case.

Therefore, when above mentioned elements are to be found through inductive process-tracing, *H3. Norm Cascade* is verified. Subsequently, when the above mentioned elements are not to be found through inductive process-tracing, *H3. Norm Cascade* is falsified.

Having elaborated on methodological choices and data gathering and subsequently having made operational choices, this thesis now has an operational framework. The methods paragraph has made clear how analysis will be conducted. Hence, the analysis in Chapter 5 will regard the analytical review of the data in a historical narrative way. The operationalization paragraph has made clear how the empirics can be tested for in Chapter 6. But before the analysis will be conducted, the next chapter, Chapter 4, will focus more in depth on frames of the Women, Peace and Security agenda and the issue of (sexual) violence through times; Chapter 4 functions as an introduction to and works upon setting the stage on the Women, Peace and Security agenda and sexual violence through time after which the reader has enough background and has been introduced to the matter in order to place Chapter 5: Analysis.

Chapter 4. Frames

Sexual violence in war is not a new phenomenon. With the adoption of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1820 sexual violence nevertheless has become recognized as a threat to international security; which is a new frame. This chapter introduces the reader to the development of the women, peace and security[12] agenda, and subsequently the shift towards and emergence of sexual violence in it. First a global overview of the development of the women, peace and security agenda will be given. Then follows the shift towards and the several frames of sexual violence within the Women, Peace and Security agenda. The timeline will end at the adoption of UNSCR 1325 in 2000 since the matter under the investigation concerns the becoming of sexual violence in a security issue and it is suggested that since sexual violence did not have that frame in UNSCR 1325, it became after 2000. Therefore, UNSCR 1325 and UNSCR1820 will be compared on their main characteristics in order to get clear what the latter added to the former. Hence, what frames we are dealing with. Therefore, this chapter is designed to set the stage for Chapter 5: Analysis. This chapter will introduce the reader to the course of events prior to UNSCR 1325. Chapter 5 will thereafter deal with the course of events that happened after the adoption of UNSCR 1325 in 2000 towards the adoption of UNSCR 1820 in 2008; sexual violence becoming framed as a threat to international security.

4.1. Framing sexual violence

Although sexual violence in war does not seem to be a new phenomenon, sexual violence nevertheless has been ignored and was largely accepted as an inevitable part of armed conflict (Barrow, 2010; Fitzpatrick, 2012). For a long time, sexual violence was not seen as a violation of humanitarian law. It was not being contested and seen as inevitable aspect of war, even reinforced its occurrence and re-established its acceptance as inevitable part of war. From antiquity, the Middle Ages to the European colonial era, World War I and World War II and in more modern times, sexual violence has been conducted as a tool of warfare. However, the acknowledgment of sexual violence during armed conflict within law and thereafter prosecution of perpetrators of sexual violence through war crime tribunals has been a more recent phenomenon. Whereas sexual violence in armed conflict was not to be addressed throughout most of history, sexual violence was also not prosecuted as a war crime. For instance the Nuremberg Trials after World War II failed to prosecute Nazi perpetrators of sexual violence (Askin, 1997). Hence, although women have been the victims of war related sexual violence throughout history, also laws aimed at the protection of civilians in armed conflict have until recently not recognized the special threat of sexual violence directed against women in armed conflict. Even where laws of war mentioned sexual violence, perpetrators were often not prosecuted (Thomas & Ralph, 1994).

However, it has become clear that frames are subject to change. The following paragraph will give a chronological overview of changing frames.

From 1945 onwards

Since normative change manifests itself at the agenda of the international community according to this thesis' theoretical and methodological framework; and the international community is operationalized as the United Nations Security Council agenda, the chronological overview will be assessed by the precursors of the women, peace and security agenda and (sexual) violence agenda at the international community level; in this case the UN level. From the establishment of the UN in 1945 onwards a

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[12] Here women, peace and security agenda does not (yet) refer to the establishment of the UNSC thematic agenda issue *Women, Peace and Security* since that was only to be established in 2000.

steady increase in global attention and more comprehensive approaches towards a certain women, peace and security and (sexual) violence agenda can be traced down.

Table 4.1. Timeline frames[13]:

June 1945	***United Nations Charter*** *Preamble*: "We the Peoples of the United Nations determined to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom to unite our strength to maintain international peace and security and to ensure that armed force shall not be used, save in the common interest to maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace."[14]
December 1948	***The Universal Declaration of Human Rights General Assembly Resolution 217A (III) 10*** *Article 3*: "Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person."[15]
1949	***The 1949 Fourth Geneva Convention on the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War*** *Article 27*: "Women shall be especially protected against any attack on their honor, in particular against rape, enforced prostitution, or any other form of indecent assault."[16]
1974	***The 1974 Declaration on the Protection of Women and Children in Emergency and Armed Conflict, adopted by the General Assembly*** Article 3: "All efforts shall be made by States involved in armed conflicts, military operations in foreign territories or military operations in territories still under colonial domination to spare women and children from the ravages of war. All the necessary steps shall be taken to ensure the prohibition of measures such as persecution, torture, punitive measures, degrading treatment and violence, particularly against that part of the civilian population that consists of women and children."[17]
1975	***UN World Conference on Women; Declaration of Mexico on the Equality of Women and Their Contribution to Development and Peace.*** *Article 27:* "Women all over the world should unite to eliminate violations of human rights committed against women and girls such as: rape, prostitution, physical assault, mental cruelty, child marriage, forced marriage and marriage as a commercial transaction."[18]
1975(-1985)	*Kick-off of the UN Decade for Women.[19]*
1977	***Second Geneva Protocol*** *Article 4.2:* "Without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing, the following acts against the persons referred to in paragraph I are and shall remain prohibited at any time and in any place whatsoever: e) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment, rape, enforced prostitution and any form or indecent assault."[20]
December 1979	***Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) General Assembly Resolution 34/180*** *Article 6:* "States Parties shall take all appropriate measures, including legislation, to suppress all forms of traffic in women and exploitation of prostitution of women".[21]

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[13] After the example of http://www.unis.unvienna.org/pdf/women_peace_security_backgrounder_Oct08_e.pdf and http://www.peacewomen.org/pages/about-1325/history-and-background-documents

[14] Retrieved from: http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/preamble.shtml

[15] Retrieved from: http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/human/univers_dec.html

[16] Retrieved from: http://www.unis.unvienna.org/pdf/women_peace_security_backgrounder_Oct08_e.pdf & http://unispal.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/0/F9AA4E95F285ED49852563680059609A

[17] Retrieved from: http://www.unis.unvienna.org/pdf/women_peace_security_backgrounder_Oct08_e.pdf & http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/e3dpwcea.htm

[18] Retrieved from: http://www.un-documents.net/mex-dec.htm

[19] Retrieved from: http://www.un.org/en/globalissues/women/

[20] Retrieved from: http://www.unis.unvienna.org/pdf/women_peace_security_backgrounder_Oct08_e.pdf & http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/7c4d08d9b287a42141256739003e636b/d67c3971bcff1c10c125641e0052b545

[21] Retrieved from: http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/ProfessionalInterest/cedaw.pdf

14 to 30 July 1980	*Report of the World Conference of the United Nations Decade for Women: Equality, Development and Peace (A/CONF.94/35)* *Paragraph 33*: "In accordance with their obligations under the Charter to maintain peace and security and to achieve international cooperation in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, bearing in mind, in this respect, the right to live in peace, States should help women to participate in promoting international cooperation for the sake of the preparation of societies for a life in peace."[22]
10 December 1984	*Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Being Subjected to Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Resolution 3452 (XXX), annex. Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhumane or Degrading Treatment or Punishment General Assembly Resolution 39/46* "No exceptional circumstances whatsoever, whether a state of war or a threat of war, internal political instability or any other public emergency, may be invoked as a justification of torture".[23] *However no specific mentioning of women.*
15 to 26 July 1985	*The Nairobi Forward-looking Strategies for the Advancement of Women from the World Conference to Review and Appraise the Achievements of the United Nations Decade for Women: Equality, Development and Peace (A/Conf.116/28/Rev.1,1986)* *Paragraph 232*: "The threat to peace resulting from continuing international tension and violations of the United Nations Charter, resulting in the unabated arms race as well as wars, armed conflicts, external domination, foreign occupation, acquisition of land by force, aggression, imperialism, colonialism, neo-colonialism, racism, apartheid, gross violation of human rights, terrorism, repression, the disappearance of persons and discrimination on the basis of sex are major obstacles to human progress, specifically to the advancement of women".[24]
22 November 1989	*Report of the Secretary-General to the CSW on the first review and appraisal of the implementation of the Nairobi Forward-looking Strategies E/Cn.6/1990/5* 'It is significant that, although women have been disproportionately the victims of violence, whether international, national or domestic, they have seldom been involved in the decision-making on combating it. That situation has not changed substantially since 1985'.[25]
18 December 1992	*"Security Council declared the 'massive, organized and systematic detention and rape of women, in particular Muslim women, in Bosnia and Herzegovina' an international crime that must be addressed".[26]*
12 July 1993	*World Conference on Human Rights, Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, A/CONF.157.23* *Article 38*: "In particular, the World Conference on Human Rights stresses the importance of working towards the elimination of violence against women in public and private life, the elimination of all forms of sexual harassment, exploitation and trafficking in women, the elimination of gender bias in the administration of justice and the eradication of any conflicts which may arise between the rights of women and the harmful effects of certain traditional or customary practices, cultural prejudices and religious extremism. The World Conference on Human Rights calls upon the General Assembly to adopt the draft declaration on violence against women and urges States to combat violence against women in accordance with its provisions. Violations of the human rights of women in situations of armed conflict are violations of the fundamental principles of international human rights and humanitarian law. All violations of this kind, including in particular murder, systematic rape, sexual slavery, and forced pregnancy, require a particularly effective response."[27]

[22] Retrieved from:
http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/beijing/otherconferences/Copenhagen/Copenhagen%20Full%20Optimized.pdf
[23] Retrieved from: http://www.peacewomen.org/pages/about-1325/history-and-background-documents &
http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/39/a39r046.htm
[24] Retrieved from: http://www.un-documents.net/nfl-intr.htm
[25] Retrieved from: http://www.peacewomen.org/pages/about-1325/history-and-background-documents
[26] Retrieved from: http://www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/rwanda/about/bgsexualviolence.shtml &
http://www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/rwanda/about/bgsexualviolence.shtml
[27] Retrieved from: http://www.unhchr.ch/huridocda/huridoca.nsf/(symbol)/a.conf.157.23.en

20 December 1993	*Declaration on Elimination of Violence Against Women General Assembly Resolution 48/104* "The 1993 General Assembly Declaration on the elimination of violence against women condemns all violence against women including sexual violence".[28]
20 December 1993	*Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women, United Nations General Assembly Resolution 48/104* *Article 1*: "For the purposes of this Declaration, the term "violence against women" means any act of gender-based violence that results in, or is likely to result in, physical, sexual or psychological harm or suffering to women, including threats of such acts, coercion or arbitrary deprivation of liberty, whether occurring in public or in private life."[29]
1993	"The Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia included rape as a crime against humanity, alongside other crimes such as torture and extermination, when committed in armed conflict and directed against a civilian population."[30]
1994	"The United Nations Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR) appointed a Special Rapporteur on violence against women, who seeks and receives information on violence against women, its causes and consequences and recommends measures, ways and means for its elimination."[31]
1994	"The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda declared rape to be a war crime and a crime against humanity."[32]
18 October 1994	*Programme of Action of the United Nations International Conference on Population and Development Chapter IV: Gender Equality, Equity and Empowerment of Women, A/CONF.171/13* *4.10*: "Countries are urged to identify and condemn the systematic practice of rape and other forms of inhuman and degrading treatment of women as a deliberate instrument of war and ethnic cleansing and take steps to assure that full assistance is provided to the victims of such abuse for their physical and mental rehabilitation."[33]
17 October 1995	*Report of the Fourth World Conference on Women, Beijing 4 to 15 September 1995 A/CONF.177/20* "The use of rape as a weapon of war and an instrument of "ethnic cleansing" is as depraved as it is reprehensible. The unfolding of this saga in different parts of the world, including Jammu and Kashmir and Bosnia and Herzegovina has shaken the conscience of the entire international community."[34]
2-13 March 1998	*The Commission on the Status of Women, Agreed Outcomes on Women and Armed Conflict: Report on the forty-second session, Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) Official Records, 1998, Supplement No. 7* "Ensure that where crimes of sexual violence are committed in situations of conflict, all perpetrators, including those among United Nations and international peacekeeping and humanitarian personnel, are prosecuted." *Article 5a:* "Respectfully international human rights law and international humanitarian law applicable to the rights and protection of women and girls and take special measures to protect women and girls from gender-based violence, particularly rape and all other forms of sexual violence during armed conflict, and end impunity and prosecute those responsible for genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes, including those relating to sexual and other gender-based violence against women and girls".[35]
1998	"In 1998, the ICTR became the first international court to find an accused person guilty of rape as a crime of genocide (used to perpetrate genocide). The judgment against a former mayor,

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[28] Retrieved from: http://www.unis.unvienna.org/pdf/women_peace_security_backgrounder_Oct08_e.pdf & http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/48/a48r104.htm

[29] Retrieved from: http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/48/a48r104.htm

[30] Retrieved from: http://www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/rwanda/about/bgsexualviolence.shtml

[31] Retrieved from: http://www.unis.unvienna.org/pdf/women_peace_security_backgrounder_Oct08_e.pdf

[32] Retrieved from: http://www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/rwanda/about/bgsexualviolence.shtml

[33] Retrieved from: http://www.un.org/popin/icpd/conference/offeng/poa.html

[34] Retrieved from: http://www.un.org/documents/ga/conf177/aconf177-20add1en.htm

[35] Retrieved from: http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/public/agreedconclusions/Agreed-Conclusions-English.pdf

	Jean-Paul Akayesu, held that rape and sexual assault constituted acts of genocide insofar as they were committed with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, the Tutsi ethnic group."[36]
17 September 1999	***Security Council Resolution on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, S/RES/1265*** "Recognizing the direct and particular impact of armed conflict on women as referred to in paragraph 18 of the report of the Secretary-General and, in this regard, welcoming the ongoing work within the United Nations system on the implementation of a gender perspective in humanitarian assistance and on violence against women".[37]
10 November 1998 and 12 July 1999	***Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court*** "The 1998 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court categorizes systematic rape as a war crime and a crime against humanity and, in certain circumstances, even as an act of genocide. In 1993 and 1994, rape and sexual violence were specifically codified for the first time as a recognizable and independent crime within the statutes of the International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and for Rwanda (ICTR). These two historic international instruments are now the foundation upon which crimes of rape and sexual violence are punished".[38]
31 May 2000	***Windhoek Declaration General Assembly, Fifty-fifth session, A/55/138ÕS/2000/693, Items 87, 109 and 155 of the provisional agenda*** *Article 6:* "UN troops should have obligatory inducted training with regard to gender issues including on Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women; and Sexual harassment and sexual assault. *Article 7*: "Standard Operating Procedures applying to all components of missions should be developed on the issues of sexual assault and sexual harassment."[39]
October 2000	***Adoption of Women, Peace and Security UNSCR 1325***

Table 4.1. shows the most important developments concerning the women, peace and security agenda taking in consideration developments targeting women and developments aimed at targeting (sexual) violence linked to security. The timeline table shows that the establishment of the United Nations (1945) and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) portrayed a gender or perhaps gender indifferent agenda towards security and peace. In 1949 women and rape were mentioned in the 1949 Fourth Geneva Convention. Rape and the like were framed as an issue of honor. After 1949 it was silence for a while until the UN General Assembly adopted the 1974 Declaration on the Protection of Women and Children in Emergency and Armed Conflict. Here we witness a shift in attention. Now it became clear that women and children were affected by armed conflict differently than men. However, acts of sexual violence are not specifically mentioned here. Then in 1975 the first UN World Conference on Women took place in Mexico. Here, a special role of women was emphasized in their contribution to peace and rape was framed as a violation of human rights. This event coincided with the UN kick-off of the UN Decade for Women. The Second Geneva Protocol framed rape as outrages on personal dignity. CEDAW of the UN General Assembly in 1979 abandoned all forms of discrimination against women. The report of the World Conference of the UN decade for Women in 1980 women became a matter of peace and security linked to human rights and fundamental freedoms. Although the *1984Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Being Subjected to Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment* did not mention women specifically, it is still seen as a step forward in the elimination of acts threatening human security[40]. In 1985, peace was thought of as obstructed by, inter alia, sex' discrimination. These obstructions to peace were framed as major. In 1989 was stated that women are often victims of violence but have never been

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[36] Retrieved from: http://www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/rwanda/about/bgsexualviolence.shtml
[37] Retrieved from: http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Civilians%20SRES1265.pdf
[38] Retrieved from: http://www.unis.unvienna.org/pdf/women_peace_security_backgrounder_Oct08_e.pdf
[39] Retrieved from: http://www.un.org/womenwatch/osagi/wps/windhoek_declaration.pdf
[40] See note 10.

involved in combating it. Hence, women were now seen as (possible) actors instead of victims. Then came the atrocities in former Yugoslavia in 1992 and the Security Council declared systematic rape an international crime. A year later, the UN General Assembly condemned all violence against women including sexual violence. Now, rape was to be extended into sexual violence. In 1993, the UN General Assembly worked on a declaration eliminating all kinds of violence against women. Also in 1993, the Statute of the ICTY included rape as a crime against humanity. In 1994, the atrocities in Rwanda erupted and led to rape becoming framed as a war crime and a crime against humanity. Later that same year rape was also framed as an instrument of war and ethnic cleansing. In 1995 in Beijing, rape again was framed as a weapon of war and an instrument of ethnic cleansing. In 1998, steps were made to end impunity and prosecute perpetrators of sexual violence. That year, the ICTY accused the first person guilty of rape as a crime of genocide. Later on, more steps were taken by UN entities to implement a gender perspective in the UN's humanitarian assistance and on violence against women. In 1998 and 1999 the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court framed systematic rape as a war crime and a crime against humanity. Rape now became officially punishable. The Windhoek Declaration in 2000 set the stage for the adoption of the first *Women, Peace and Security* UNSCR 1325 in October 2000 and focused on the mandates of the UN peace missions dealing with sexual harassment and sexual assault. Hence, until the adoption of the first Women, Peace and Security UNSCR 1325 in 2000, issues related to women, peace and security and therefore of (sexual) violence have been framed since the establishment of the United Nations in 1945 as a matter of honor, a violation of human rights, dignity, as an obstacle to human progress and in particular the advancement of women, international crime, violations of the human rights women in armed conflict, violation of the fundamental principle of international human rights and humanitarian law, crime against humanity, war crime and genocide. Attention to the matter of women, peace and security became more urgent over the years and stronger language was used in its framing.

This paragraph aimed at giving the reader an idea of change frames on women, peace and security and (sexual) violence through the past 6-7 decennia. Since the 1990s witnessed a lot of attention and new frames on sexual violence, this decade will be elaborated upon more in depth.

1990s: Rwanda and Yugoslavia

Frames of sexual violence began to change more rapidly and more strongly in the 1990s. In this decade, the public, media and NGOs responded to the widespread and systematic rape that had occurred in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda and therefore the issue became much more widespread. Eventually, progressive judgments at the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) and the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) have had impact on the way sexual violence in armed conflict was dealt with and even led to additions on the standing Geneva Conventions by extending the provisions on gender-based violence (Anderson, 2010; Fitzpatrick, 2012; Pilch, 2010). Askin wrote in 2003: '... *ten years ago there was debate as to whether rape was even a war crime. Since that time, the Tribunals* [ICTY and ICTR] *have developed immensely the jurisprudence of war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide'* (p. 346). Anderson (2010) claims that mentalities drastically changed through the course of events in Rwanda and Yugoslavia and that the ICTR and ICTY were decisive for the further framing of sexual violence.

Hence, judgments at the ICTY and ICTR have caused for the scope of definitions on sexual violence and rape in armed conflict to have widened; new frames of sexual violence in armed conflict became deployed (Barrow, 2010, p. 221).

Therefore, it was not until 1998 that sexual violence became framed as a crime against humanity. In that year Jean-Paul Akayesu was convicted by the ICTY in Arusha, Tanzania, for rape crimes against

humanity (Pilch, 2010, p. 90). The *Akayesu* judgment by the ICTR framed rape as a crime against humanity, as well as a 'form of aggression', potentially an act of genocide referring to an 'act committed with intent to destroy in whole or part a national, ethnical, racial or religious group', and a weapon of war referring to the deliberate '[imposition of] *measures intended to prevent births within the group'* (Barrow, 2010, p. 226). This particular judgment framed rape as a crime causing bodily and mental harm to women whereas it was first framed as a moral crime against women's honor. Later, within the Rome Statute of the International Criminal (ICC) provisions were adopted by which rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization, or any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity were recognized as a crime against humanity. Moreover, sexual mutilation could now fall under the provision, when resulting in long-term health implications that could impede the ability to reproduced, of genocide (Barrow, 2010, p. 227).   Later,   in   2001, Dragoljub Kunarac was found guilty by the ICTY. His case was the first case at the ICTY in which the accused was convicted for the rape of crime as a crime against humanity and therefore not only as a violation of law and customs of war.[41] Through this judgment, sexual enslavement was also recognized as a crime against humanity under Article 27 of the Fourth Geneva Convention. The definition of rape was moreover expanded stating that rape occurs in all situations where consent is not given voluntarily. The ICTY thus added to the Geneva Conventions, violations of the laws and customs of war, genocide and crimes against humanity (Barrow, 2010, p. 226)

Hence, attitudes towards sexual violence in war began to change in the first years of the 1990s since rape in war was now thought of *'as a weapon, a targeted act of terror, rather than merely as a by-product of the violence surrounding war'* (Goertz & Anderson, 2008). Hence, attitudes and values concerning rape and sexual violence in conflict began to change. During these years, the international attitude changed, and NGOs were heard more clearly. The institution of state sovereignty was not that self-evident anymore. The notion of a responsibility to protect was much more at the base of the argument to intervene. The cases of international law of the ICTY and the ICTR were the base of a felt state obligation to disallow impunity for perpetrators of rape in war; and international legal obligations instead of restrictions were emphasized (Fitzpatrick, 2012).

4.2. Women, Peace and Security and the United Nations Security Council

Having elaborated upon women, peace and security and sexual violence over the years, the issues will now be elaborated upon within the framework of the United Nations Security Council. First, the first Women, Peace and Security UNSCR 1325 will be introduced, and then UNSCR 1820 and later on the two UNSCRs will be compared to see where UNSCR 1820 shifted in frames as compared to UNSCR 1325.

The first *Women, Peace and Security* UNSCR 1325

In 2000, the first United Nations Security Council on Women, Peace and Security was adopted. It was the first systematic and broad approach towards confronting tactical rape and sexual violence since it tackled women's vulnerability in war and communal attitudes to women failing to recognize women's rights. It was argued that since women were in general more vulnerable and victims of discriminations and abuse in peace, conflict would only exacerbate these vulnerabilities. The adoption of UNSCR 1325 marked the beginning of the United Nations Security Council taking action and accepting its responsibility on rape and sexual violence in war (Fitzpatrick, 2012).

United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 called for both the participation and incorporation of women according to the so-called '3-P'-approach: *Participation* in conflict

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[41] See: http://www.haguejusticeportal.net/index.php?id=6082

prevention, peace-building and reconstruction; *Protection* of women and girls' human rights during conflict; and finally the *Prevention* of gender-based violence (UNSC, 2000a). Summarizing, Resolution 1325 called upon all its member countries to increase the representation for women at all levels, and upon then Secretary-General Kofi Annan to increase the participation of women, for himself to appoint more women as special envoys of the UN itself and subsequently to deploy them and expand their roles within peacekeeping and peace building operations. This part of the Resolution tried to envision the United Nations own willingness to expand its gender agenda and give the right signal to others. The United Nations Security Council called upon all parties involved in the negotiation of peace and subsequently the implementation of peace agreements to take into account the special needs of women and girls in conflict. Furthermore, the Security Council emphasized the need to support women-led peace initiatives and the implementation of international humanitarian and human rights law especially taking into consideration women's and girls' rights. Moreover, parties to conflict were urged to protect women and girls against acts of gender-based violence including rape. Also, refugee camps and the like should reflect the special needs of women and girls. Through Resolution 1325, all countries were called upon in order to prosecute the ones committing crimes against women and girls. In all aspects of conflict, the special needs of women and girls both as civilians and as combatant should be taken into account. In the end, Kofi Annan was also asked to conduct a study on the impact of armed conflict on women and girls and on actions concerning gender mainstreaming within the United Nations itself.

UNSCR 1820: Linking sexual violence as a tactic of war with the maintenance of international security

UNSCR 1820 was the second United Nations Security Council Resolution on Women, Peace and Security and was the first UNSC Resolution to tackle explicitly sexual violence; it explicitly linked sexual violence as a tactic of war with the maintenance of international peace and security since it recognised sexual violence as security issue and therefore justified a security response. The UN Security Council from then on would have a clear mandate to intervene, including through sanctions and empowering field staff (UNSC, 2008). Summarising, UN Security Council Resolution 1820 demands parties to end sexual violence, including training troops, enforcing military discipline, upholding command responsibility and vetting pas perpetrators. Moreover, the Resolution asserts the importance of women's participation in all processes related to ending sexual violence in conflict, including peace talks. Other elements of UN Security Council Resolution concern the affirmation of the legal status of sexual violence as a war crime, crime against humanity and constituent act of genocide in certain circumstances, calls for effective guidelines to help peacekeepers respond, requires exclusion of sexual violence from any amnesties reached at the end of conflict and hence states must prosecute or extradite alleged offenders, calls for states to strengthen their judicial and health-care systems to better support survivors and provide capacity-building for sustainable assistance, calls the Secretary-General to strengthen his efforts to implement a 'zero-tolerance' policy on sexual exploitation and abuse, include protection of women and girls in country-specific reports and increase the percentage of women peacekeepers. Moreover, the Secretary-General and other UN agencies should develop protection mechanisms in and around camps and the Peace building Commission should include strategies for addressing sexual violence in advice and recommendations (UNSC, 2008). UN Security Council Resolution 1820 aimed to end the debate whether sexual violence is within the remit of the world's paramount security institution; resounding to the recognition that peace cannot be built on women's silent suffering (UNSC, 2008). Security would remain elusive as long as girls and women would live under this threat. By raising the political, military and economic costs of sexual violence crimes, sexual violence is aimed to be removed as a tactic of war. Whereas sexual

violence was a cheap, easy and effective weapon of war, it would not be from that moment on. UN Security Council Resolution 1820 is therefore seen as an essential supporting element for the full implementation of UNSCR 1325. From 2008 onwards, sexual violence in conflict could not be dismissed as an inevitable aspect of war anymore but was seen as actually in itself posing a threat to international peace and security. Sexual violence from then on was seen as preventable through effective military and/or police tactics and efforts ending impunity. The acknowledgement that women's physical security is a right in itself and pre-requisite to the realisation of all other rights was groundbreaking. Moreover, the prevention of sexual violence is seen inseparable from the empowerment of women. Women must be consulted and closely involved in all measures taken on their behalf (UNSC, 2008).

UNSCR 1325 versus UNSCR 1820

UNSCR 1820 (UNSC, 2008) hence was the first follow-up resolution to UNSCR 1325 (UNSC, 2000a). Having elaborated upon both and their main characteristics, this paragraph will comparatively set out the differences between UNSCR 1820 to UNSCR 1325, and therefore UNSCR 1820s additions to UNSCR 1325 to see what exactly changed between 2000 and 2008.[42]

Whereas UNSCR1325 was the first UN Security Council Resolution to link women to the peace and security agenda, UNSCR 1820 was the first UN Security Council Resolution to recognize sexual violence as a self-standing security issue, linked with reconciliation and durable peace [OP 1]. Where UNSCR 1325 aimed to avoid amnesty 'where feasible' [OP 11], UNSCR1820 excluded sexual violence crimes from amnesty provisions [OP 4]. UNSCR1325 stressed training on protection rights and needs of women [OP 6] and UNSCR1820 on specific training of troops on categorical prohibition of sexual violence [OP 3, 6, 7]. UNSCR1325 stressed the need to maintain the civilian character of refugee and IDP (Internally Displace Person) camps and the need to design these camps in a way that helped prevent sexual violence [12] whereas UNSCR 1820 developed mechanisms for protecting girls and women in and around UN-managed camps [OP 10]. In UNSCR1325 no references were made to sanctions for perpetrators but does mentions the impact of sanction on women [OP 14] and UNSCR1820 regarded sexual violence relevant to country-specific sanctions regimes [OP 5]. In UNSCR 1325, there was no strategy for improving the information-flow towards the UN Security Council whereas in UNSCR1820 a Global Report should had been due on the 30th of June 2009 [OP 15]. UNSCR 1325 mentioned "special measures" to protect girls and women for Sexual Gender Based Violence (SGBV) [10]; UNSCR 1820 itemizes measures that can concretely improve protection and assistance [OP 13]. UNSCR 1325 does not mention coordination where UNSCR1820 welcomes coordination efforts of the *UN Action Against Sexual Violence in Conflict*. Furthermore, UNSCR 1325 does not make any reference to the root causes of war-time rape or to Peacebuilding Commission while UNSCR 1820 has a scope for addressing root causes and asks the Peacebuilding Commission to advice on ways to address sexual violence [OP 3].

So it seems that sexual violence has gained in interest of the international community and has undergone change in its framing over the years. Moreover, also the *Women, Peace and Security* agenda itself of the United Nations Security Council is subject to change since Resolution 1325 was adopted. The comparative oversight of UNSCR 1325 and UNSCR 1820 on their main characteristics and/or differences has made this clear. This chapter has shown *that* frames of sexual violence are subject to change within the international system and therefore thus also have changed. The next

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[42] See Appendix A for the comparison

chapter, Chapter 5: Analysis, will tell the story of what happened between the adoption of UNSCR 1325 and the adoption of UNSCR 1820; framing sexual violence as a threat to international security.

Chapter 5. Analysis

UNSCR 1325 in 2000 was the start of something new; the establishment of the thematic issue of *Women, Peace and Security* at the Security Council's agenda. It is suggested that since sexual violence in 2000 was not framed as a matter of international peace and security, the development of it becoming a matter of international security happened later on. Although UNSCR 1325 has already been discussed in the previous chapter, the year 2000 will also be included in this chapter, now focused on the particular Security Council dynamics concerning the what then still had to become the United Nations Security Council *Women, Peace and Security* agenda.

After the events of what happened between 2000 and June 2008 concerning the Security Council's *Women, Peace and Security* agenda have been elaborated upon, this chapter will end with concluding remarks on the most important events during this particular Security Council focused time-span.

2000

As has become clear in the previous chapter, the adoption of UNSCR 1325 is thought of to have been established because of the broader Security Council agenda. Since in the year prior to the adoption of UNSCR 1325, the Security Council had adopted resolutions on the protection of civilians in armed conflict and the peacekeeping failures in Somalia, Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia also kept the Security Council occupied. Especially from the examination of the atrocities committed in Rwanda and Bosnia became clear that it was important for the Security Council to tackle in the near future the way was dealt with "the planning and execution of all aspects of conflict prevention, peace processes, peacekeeping operations and post-conflict recovery on the assumption that women had a critically important contribution to make regarding how peace could be achieved and maintained. Put simply, by involving and taking into account the views of half of society a negotiated peace was more likely to be able to be implemented by that society" (Security Council Report, 2010).

Bangladesh pressed for but did not succeed in getting support from the majority of the Security Council during its Security Council's Presidency in March for a resolution or presidential statement in March 2000. The Security Council however began to incorporate more and more women, peace and security related elements in its work, resulting in two Presidential Statements (UNSC, 2000b: UNSC, 2000c) which focused on the role of peacekeeping personnel taking into account the special needs of women and children. Non-Permanent Security Council Members Canada, Mali, Jamaica and Namibia were the main supporters of Bangladesh' initiatives (Security Council Report, 2010, p. 4).

In April 2000, Canada held Presidency over the Security Council and invited the then Assistant Secretary-General and Special Adviser on Gender Issues and the Advancement of Women to an official Security Council debate on Afghan women and children under the Taliban. This was the first time that the impact of conflict on women in a particular country was addressed by the Security Council (Security Council Report, 2010, p. 4). In May 2000, the *NGO Working Group on Women, Peace and Security* was formed. Its goal was to lobby the Security Council in to adopting a special UNSCR on Women, Peace and Security (Security Council Report, 2010, p. 5).

Under the Presidency of Jamaica in July 2000 the role of women was emphasized during an open debate on the prevention of armed conflict. It emphasized the importance of increased participation of women in all stages of conflict prevention and peace building Security Council Report, 2010, p. 4-5).

Namibia held Presidency over the Security Council in October 2000. It organized an Arria-formula Meeting for Security Council Member States to meet relevant NGOs. It is said that the increasingly multidimensional nature of peacekeeping operations conducted by the UN in the 1980s

and 1990s now cumulated and had led to insights and the felt need to promote more comprehensive mandates as to the failures of UN peacekeeping missions in the 1990s in thus for example Somalia, Rwanda and Bosnia. Hence the efforts of the UN system to address gender in peace operations had been established in cooperation with Namibia by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) (Security Council Report, 2010, p. 5).

UNSCR 1325 was eventually adopted anonymously at the end of the October 2000 open Security Council meeting under the Security Council Presidency of Namibia.

In December 2000, the United Nations General Assembly adopted a resolution called: *Elimination of all forms of violence, including crimes against women* (UNGA, 2000).

2001

After October 2000 – the adoption of UNSCR 1325 - in March 2001, the Members of the Security Council recalled the first statement ever made by the Council on 8 March 2000 on the occasion of *International Women's Day* which highlighted the plight of women and girls in conflict situations and the role played by women in the prevention and resolution of conflicts as well as peacekeeping, peace-building, reconciliation and reconstruction (UNGA, 2001, p. 545).

On 31 October 2001 the Security Council met on the occasion of the first anniversary of the Council's adoption of Resolution 1325 under the Security Council Presidency of Ireland. Normally, UNSCRs do not have anniversaries; however, UNSCR 1325 was thought of to be something different since it was the first UNSC resolution to provide a political framework for women's suffering at the UNSC. Prior to the meeting, a representative of the *NGO Working Group on Women, Peace and Security* made a statement during the Arria-formula meeting of the UN Security Council on *Role of Women in Achieving and Maintaining International Security* on the invitation of Jamaica and Ireland and urged for the Security Council to make their words and concerns as captured in Resolution 1325 reality. The Arria-formula Meeting was held between Security Council delegations and Women's NGOs. It was not to be found which NGOs and which states had attended the Meeting. Women from East Timor, Afghanistan and Kosovo/Federal Republic of Yugoslavia are said to have met the Security Council delegations present during the meeting to describe their experiences with war.[43]

The official UNSC thematic meeting held that same day lasted 5 minutes, a Presidential statement reiterated the UNSC's commitment to Resolution 1325 but no further actions were undertaken by the Security Council (UNSC, 2001a;UNSC, 2001b).

2002

In 2002, the Secretary-General's study *"Women, peace and security"* documented the collective experience of the UN system and analyzed the impact of armed conflict on women and the relevant international legal framework. It also reviewed gender perspectives in peace processes, peace operations, humanitarian operations and reconstruction and rehabilitation.[44]   In October 2002 the Security Council held two meetings on *Women, Peace and Security* under the Security Council Presidency of Cameroon (UNSC, 2002a; UNSC, 2002b). After the second meeting, on the occasion of the second anniversary of Resolution 1325, a Presidential Statement was released (UNSC, 2002c) in which the Security Council reaffirmed its dedication to the matter, its intention to study the recommendations in the Report of the Secretary-General on *Women, Peace and Security* (UNSG, 2002) and to remain actively seized on the matter (UNSC, 2002c).

In December 2002, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the resolution called

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[43] Retrieved from: http://womenpeacesecurity.org/media/pdf-statement_muna_01.pdf &
http://www.peacewomen.org/security_council_monitor/debate-watch/arria-formula-meetings/8/arria-formula-meeting-celebrating-the-first-anniversary-of-security-council-resolution-1325
[44] Retrieved from: http://www.unis.unvienna.org/pdf/women_peace_security_backgrounder_Oct08_e.pdf;
http://www.peacewomen.org/security_council_monitor/report-watch

Elimination of all forms of violence against women, including crimes identified in the outcome document of the twenty-third special session of the General Assembly, titled *Women 2000: gender equality, development and peace for the twenty-first century* (UNGA, 2002).

2003

The Security Council gathered around the issue in October 2003 under the Security Council Presidency of the US on the occasion of the third anniversary of UNSCR 1325 (UNSC, 2003) after which no action was undertaken.

In December 2003, the United Nations General Assembly conducted an in-depth study on all forms of violence against women (UNGA, 2003).

2004

In October 2004, the Security Council held an open debate to mark the fourth anniversary of the adoption of UNSCR 1325 under the presidency of the UK (UNSC S/PV.5066) of whom is said that it had done efforts to highlight Resolution 1325 during its presidency. Prior to the official meeting, the Permanent Mission of Benin to the United Nations organized an Arria-formula Meeting with a representative of the *NGO Working Group on Women, Peace and Security* in which the NGO called the Security Council to make its commitments reality.[45] The official open debate focused on strengthening the United Nations' response to gender-based violence in conflict and post conflict situations after which a Presidential Statement was made in which the Security Council again reaffirmed its commitment to UNSCR 1325 and its intention to study the recommendations made in the Report of the Secretary-General on *Women, Peace and Security* but also in which it condemned all violations of the human rights of women and girls in situations of armed conflict and the use of sexual exploitation, violence and abuse (UNSC, 2004a).This thematic open debate was nevertheless remarkable since during this meeting, for the first time on this topic, NGOs were allowed and even invited to speak to the Members of the Security Council during an official meeting. Ms. Agathe Rwankuba was invited under the presidency of the UK to address the Security Council. She was a lawyer at the *Bakavu Court of Appeals* in South Kivu in the DRC and a member of the NGO Women's Network for the Protection of Human Rights and Peace (*Réseau des femmes pour la défense des droits et la paix*). She spoke about the situation in her country and asked the Security Council to help the women in the conflict. This was the first time that civil society was invited on the topic during an official Security Council meeting on *Women, Peace and Security* (UNSC, 2004b).[46]

In December 2004, again, the United Nations General Assembly adopted a resolution on the *Elimination of all forms of violence against women, including crimes identified in the outcome document of the twenty-third special session of the General Assembly, entitled "Women 2000: gender equality, development and space for the twenty-first century"* (UNGA, 2004). In the same month of the same year the General Assembly adopted an in-depth study of all forms of violence against women and the Secretary-General published an in-depth study of all forms of violence against women, including crimes identified in the outcome document of the twenty-third special session of the General Assembly (UNGA, 2004.

2005

In July 2005 the Security Council made security for children a matter of international peace and security by adopting UNSCR 1612 (UNSC, 2005a). Rape and other sexual abuse of children constitute important elements of this list. The emphasis of UNSCR 1612 is on monitoring, reporting and

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[45] Retrieved from: http://womenpeacesecurity.org/media/pdf-statement_arria_formula_true-frost_04.pdf
[46] Retrieved from: http://womenpeacesecurity.org/media/pdfagathe_rwankuba_speech_2004.pdf

sanctioning of rights violators.[47]

Prior to the official *Women, Peace and Security* meeting, an Arria-formula meeting was held with a representative of *the NGO Working Group on Women, Peace and Security* in which she requested the Security Council to take accurate measures for the implementation of Resolution 1325.[48] The day after this Arria-formula meeting, another Arria-formula meeting on *Women's Participation in Peace Processes* was held with a presentation by Dushirehamwe on the Implementation of UNSCR 1325 in Burundi. Also a representative and Co-founder and elected President of Women's alliance for a Democratic Iraq was enabled to address the Security Council during this Security Council Arria-formula Meeting.[49]

To mark the fifth anniversary of UNSCR 1325 the Security Council held an open debate in October 2005 on Women, Peace and Security under the presidency of Romania. During this official UNSC meeting, the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations gave examples of progress in the protection of women and their involvement in peacekeeping (UNSC, 2005b) after which a Presidential Statement was released in which the Security Council reaffirmed its commitment to UNSCR 1325 and urged Member States, regional and sub regional organizations and the further United Nations system to enhance the role of women in decision-making with regard to all peace processes, post-conflict reconstruction and the rebuilding of societies (UNSC, 2005c). Referred was to the Reports of the Secretary-General (UNSG, 2005) in response to the Security Council's Presidential Statement in 2004 (UNSC, 2004a). Again, civil society was invited. This time Ms. Sweeta Noori and Ms. Hélène Dandi; respectively Country Director for *Afghanistan of Women*, for *Women International*[50] and the Regional Adviser for West Africa of the *Network of African Women for Peace* to ask for the attention of the Security Council on Afghanistan and Côte d'Ivoire (UNSC, 2005d).[51]

2006

In 2006, the Secretary- General submitted an in-depth study on all forms of violence against women to the General Assembly (UNSG, 2006a).[52]

Prior to the annual official UNSC anniversary thematic meeting on Women, Peace and Security in 2006, the Security Council held an Arria-formula meeting. Ms. Barbara Thaimu-Bangura, National Coordinator *Grassroots Empowerment for Self Reliance* presented *The Sierra Leone Experience –'The Role of Women in the Consolidation of Peace'*.[53] The same day and meeting, Bineta Diop, the Executive Director of *Femme Africa Solidarité* on behalf of Safaa Elagib Adam– Secretary-General and Gender Advisor of the *Community Development Association* and *Women's Sudanese Civil Society Organizations* – drew attention to the situation in Darfur and to the lack of effective implementation of UNSCR 1325.[54]

Later on in October 2006, the Security Council held an open debate on *Women, Peace and Security* to mark the sixth anniversary of Resolution 1325 under the presidency of Japan at which the *Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on Gender Issues and Advancement of Women*, Rachel Mayanja, presented the most recent report of the Secretary-General on the issue (UNSG, 2006b; UNSC, 2006a). At the end of the meeting, the United Nations Security Council adopted a Presidential

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[47] Retrieved from: http://www.unis.unvienna.org/pdf/women_peace_security_backgrounder_Oct08_e.pdf

[48] Retrieved from: http://womenpeacesecurity.org/media/pdf-statement_nadjibulla_05.pdf

[49] Retrieved from: http://womenpeacesecurity.org/media/pdf-statement_fahkri_05.pdf

[50] Retrieved from: http://womenpeacesecurity.org/media/pdfStatement_SC_Open_Debate_Noori_2005.pdf

[51] Retrieved from: http://womenpeacesecurity.org/media/pdfHelene_Dandi_Statement_SC_Open_Debate_05.pdf

[52] Retrieved from: http://www.unis.unvienna.org/pdf/women_peace_security_backgrounder_Oct08_e.pdf

[53] Retrieved from: http://womenpeacesecurity.org/media/pdfBarbara_Bangura_Arria_Statement_October2006.pdf

[54] Retrieved from: http://womenpeacesecurity.org/media/pdf-safaa_elagib_adam_speech_06.pdf

Statement in which it conveyed the view that it is essential to promote the equal and full participation of women in rebuilding societies emerging from conflict by protecting and empowering women, and strongly condemned all acts of sexual misconduct by United Nations peacekeepers. Also this time, civil society was invited to join the Security Council meeting. Ms. Christine Miturumbwe, Coordinator of the *Dushirehamwe Association* from Burundi and Ms. Maria Dias, President of the *Rede Feto* from East-Timor were presented the opportunity to address their country's situation to the Security Council (which a college of Ms. Miturumbwe already did in 2005 during the Arria-formula meeting on *Women's Participation in Peace Process* (UNSC, 2006b).[55]

2007

In January 2007, the United Nations General Assembly adopted a resolution on the *Intensification of efforts to eliminate all forms of violence against women* (UNGA, 2007).

In April 2007, 12 UN entities united to form the first UN-wide Organization *UN Action against Sexual Violence in Conflict* (www.stoprapenow.org). The UN Action supported amongst others the design and implementation of the first *Comprehensive Strategy on Combating Sexual Violence* in the DRC. UN Action also keeps track of best peacekeeping practices in addressing conflict-related sexual violence.[56]

In October 2007 the Security Council held an open debate on *Women, Peace and Security* under the presidency of Ghana. During this meeting, Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping operations presented an update on progress in the contribution of women to the prevention and resolution of conflicts and peace building. The Security Council was also briefed by the *Special Adviser on Gender Issues and Advancement of Women*, again Rachel Mayanja, on the Secretary-General's latest report (UNSG, 2007; UNSC, 2007a; UNSC, 2007b). The focus within briefings and delegation statements was focused on sexual violence. Russia and China took a different stance than the other Member States and Russia stated that an artificial connection between gender related questions and questions exclusively addressed for the Security Council would be troublesome for the effectively implementation of UNSCR 1325. It thereafter stated that issues concerning 'the responsibility to protect' were a matter for the General Assembly and so was sexual violence. It added that UNSCR 1325 should not be limited to a matter of sexual violence. Also Russia did not want, although this was the recommendation of the Secretary-General's Report, to install new mechanisms within the Security Council since it would duplicate other UN entities work. Both Russia and China did not want to include specific measures to be included in the Presidential Statement.[57] During this annual anniversary meeting on *Women Peace and Security* in October 2007, the *NGO Working Group on Women, Peace and Security* was invited to the meeting for the official meeting for the first time. Contrary to the other occasions (past three anniversary meetings on *Women, Peace and Security*), the representative of the *NGO Working Group Women, Peace and Security* did not address the Security Council on behalf of a conflict-torn country but on behalf of the NGO itself and the specific matter itself and actually urged for greater accountability by addressing the Security Council. During this meeting, Ms. Gina Torry was the only NGO representative present; she was there in her job as Coordinator of the *NGO Working Group on Women, Peace and Security*. She was allowed to speak as the first non-UN representative in the debate. After she had thanked the Security Council for inviting her to the meeting she sort of recapitulated the seven years that had gone past the adoption of UNSCR 1325. She asked herself and the Security Council the question what the implementation of UNSCR 1325 had brought the women and girls in Sierra Leone, the DRC, Liberia, Burundi, Côte d'Ivoire, Afghanistan, Haiti, Timor-Leste and all of the other situations of the agenda of the Security Council.

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[55] Retrieved from: http://womenpeacesecurity.org/media/pdf-statement_nadjibulla_05.pdf
[56] Retrieved from: http://www.unis.unvienna.org/pdf/women_peace_security_backgrounder_Oct08_e.pdf
[57] Retrieved from: http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/update-report/lookup-c-glKWLeMTIsG-b-4197161.php

She answers her own question by stating that: "Seven years later, women and girls in situations of armed conflict continue to be subjected to widespread and systematic sexual violence. This is a matter of international peace and security". She continued: "Seven years later, women remain largely excluded from the very structures that make the decisions to sustain peace or to engage in conflict. They are still marginalized in peacemaking and peace building processes. This is a matter of international peace and security". She claims that the integration of UNSCR 1325 in the work of the Security Council has been highly inconsistent. She mentioned that sexual violence still is unabated with impunity and that greater efforts should be undertaken to end this impunity and to punish the perpetrators. Furthermore, she states that "Seven years later, there are still no monitoring or accountability mechanism to ensure the coherent and effective implementation of Resolution 1325 (2000). This is matter of international peace and security". Although progress had been made Ms. Torry focused on the role that the Security Council could fulfill in driving the progress in the implementation of UNSCR 1325. She again mentions the adoption of Resolution 1706 (UNSC, 2006c) by which the mandate for UNMIS in Sudan conducted useful gender-specific language and remarks that in her opinion, UNSCRs need to contain that kind of language since too often gender in UN peacekeeping mandates is not proper addressed. Some mandates, thus, do include monitoring and reporting on violations against human rights but specific language on sexual violence still lacked. Then she continued by "*respectfully*" urging the Security Council to take more specific measures. She concluded with a quotation from Ms. Barbara Bangura of Sierra Leone, who spoke in an Arria-formula meeting in October 2006: "… As such, the onus is on you here in New York to cast your light on the path that we follow. Our failure is your failure; our successes, your successes".[58] Panama, Qatar, France, South Africa, Italy and Iceland welcomed the speech of Ms. Gina Torry during this meeting (UNSC, 2007a; UNSC, 2007b).

After the meeting, the Security Council adopted a Presidential Statement in which it reaffirmed the importance of the equal role of women in the prevention and resolution of conflicts and in peace building, and urged again its Member States, regional and sub regional organizations and the United Nations system to enhance the role of women in decision-making with regard to all peace processes and post conflict reconstruction and rebuilding of societies. Further on, it called on its Member States to fully and effectively implement UNSCR 1325 through the development and strengthening of national efforts and capacity, and emphasized the importance of cooperation among Member States, United Nations entities and regional organizations to that end. Moreover, the Security Council stated to condemn all violations of international law committed against women and girls, the Security Council called on all parties to armed conflict to fully respect international law applicable to the rights and protection of women and girls. Also in the statement, the Secretary-General was asked for the next Report due in October 2008 to include information of measures taken by Member States implementing UNSCR 1325. This was seen as a small but necessary step since till that point the Reports had particularly focused on the UN. Moreover, the Secretary-General too was asked to include situations of armed conflict to see the progress on gender mainstreaming in peace building and peacekeeping missions, further data and measures taken to protect women from violence since the Secretary-General had until then included other forms of violence of women in his rapport and not focused primarily on sexual violence (UNSC, 2007c).[59]

In December 2007 the Security Council adopted UNSCR 1794 (UNSC, 2007d). In this

[58] Retrieved from: http://womenpeacesecurity.org/media/pdf-Barbara_Bangura_Arria_Statement_October2006.pdf; http://womenpeacesecurity.org/media/pdf-NGOWG_2007_Security_Council_Statement.pdf
[59] Retrieved from: http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/update-report/lookup-c-glKWLeMTIsG-b-4197161.php

UNSCR the Security Council requested the UN peacekeeping mission in the DRC (MONUC) to pursue a strategy aimed to prevent and respond to sexual violence.[60]

2008

On February 7th a resolution was adopted by the UN General Assembly calling for *Eliminating rape and other forms of sexual violence in all their manifestations, including in conflict and related situations* (UNGA, 2008).

In March 2008, the Secretary-General launched a multi-year global campaign to end violence against women, including sexual violence in armed conflict. "Achieving this requires national authorities to take the lead in developing and carrying out a comprehensive strategy to address the causes, kinds and consequences of sexual and gender-based violence in conflict" he said.[61] The campaign was called *UNiTE to End Violence against Women*. It aimed to prevent and eliminate violence against women and girls in both conflict and in times of peace.[62]

Further on in the spring of 2008, Security Council Report claims that key ambassadors of the Permanent Missions to the Security Council (although not mentioned which) were persuaded (and it is not mentioned by whom) to view the documentary film *The Greatest Silence – Rape in the Congo.* The documentary dealt with victims of sexual violence perpetrated by foreign militias and the Congolese army (2010, p. 6).

From 27-29 May the Wilton Park Conference was held. This conference was titled *Women Targeted or Affected by Armed Conflict: What Role for Military Peacekeepers?* and was organized by the United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM), Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and the Department of Field Support (DFS) on behalf of the *UN Action Against Sexual Violence in Conflict* with the assistance of the Governments of Canada and the UK. The purpose of the conference was to review current peacekeeping practice in the prevention of widespread and systematic sexual violence in conflict and post-conflict contexts. A view to identify existing efforts to prevent the targeting of women and children for sexual violence within current peacekeeping was approached for civilian protection and the building of a policy consensus on sexual violence as a security issue backed by mandates, means, training and incentives for effective response. There were around 70 participants 27 of which came from military establishments such as former Force Commanders, army personnel and staff of Defense Ministries. Others were four Members of Parliament, five Permanent Representatives of the Permanent Mission to the United Nations (Ghana, Democratic Republic of the Congo, the US, Canada and the UK), seven DPKO staff members, other UN-related personnel, peace activists, academics and former Commander of the United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo Major-General Patrick Cammaert. The latter stated that "It is more dangerous to be a woman than to be a soldier right now in Eastern DRC" (Goertz & Anderson, 2008). Participants emphasized during this conference that although peacekeepers already do address the threats and effects of sexual violence, the way they respond is still on an *ad hoc* basis. Kathleen Cravero, Director of UNDP's *Bureau for Conflict Prevention and Recovery* said that the UN should establish sexual violence as a security issue, clarifying the circumstances under which sexual violence is a national and international security threat. She also stated that this concern should be reflected in mandates for peacekeeping missions. Other issues that passed the agenda were the challenge of data collection and how to bring data to the attention of force commanders and to the Security Council in order to reduce gender inequality, impunity and the effect of amnesty and the role of the International Criminal Court, sexual violence as a method of warfare, peacekeeping mandates leaving room for interpretation , the training of peacekeepers and the role of sanctions against

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[60] Retrieved from: http://www.unis.unvienna.org/pdf/women_peace_security_backgrounder_Oct08_e.pdf
[61] Retrieved from: http://www.unis.unvienna.org/pdf/women_peace_security_backgrounder_Oct08_e.pdf
[62] Retrieved from: http://www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/rwanda/about/bgsexualviolence.shtml

perpetrators.[63] The seminar concluded with the acknowledgment that practical gaps are rooted in failing policy. Therefore, the conference stressed the need for the Security Council to explicitly recognize that in some situations the widespread use of targeted, systematic sexual violence may constitute a threat to international peace and security. The US decided, in co ordinance with the UK and France, to bring a resolution to the Security Council condemning sexual violence in situations of armed conflict since the Security Council is currently outpaced by peacekeepers themselves who already treat sexual violence as warranting a security response (UNSC, 2008b).

On June 4th 2008 the Permanent Representative of the United States of America addressed a concept paper letter to the Secretary-General for the Security Council debate on *Women, Peace and Security: Sexual violence in situations of armed conflict* by then still to be held on 19 June 2008. The paper calls the progress towards the goals of UNSCR 1325 slow and uneven and reminds the international community of its task within the field of *Women, Peace and Security*. It recognizes that the problem of widespread and systematic rape has become more severe since the first references to rape defined as a war crime in international humanitarian law were made (see Chapter 4). However, impunity still existed. It moreover called the international community to act to the reporting of women's faiths in for example the DRC and called for action.[64] Especially the situation in the DRC had become pressing during those days since estimates by then suggested that the war of 1998-2003 and the humanitarian catastrophe since had already killed 5.4 million people, making it the deadliest conflict since WO II. Not only had the situation in the DRC become more severe for the Congolese population but also for the UN itself. Two weeks earlier, on May 14th 2008, the spokesman for the UN Mission in Congo (MONUC) reported that an investigation had been launched by the *UN Office of Internal Oversight Services* (OIOS) since Indian UN peacekeepers had been accused of paying for sex with young Congolese girls. MONUC had also had been negatively been in the news because of a report of Human Rights Watch in which also UN troops had been alleged to have been involved in arms and gold smuggling.[65]

The first round of negotiations concerning the draft resolution as formulated by the US was already discussed on 6 June 2008. The majority of the Security Council member were already in favor of the draft resolution. During these negotiations on the draft, China and Russia are said to have argued that a Security Council Presidential Statement would be sufficient (as opposed to an UNSC resolution) since they had their reservations concerning the establishment of yet another UNSC mechanism. Indonesia and Vietnam shared this opinion. At this moment, European and Latin American Security Council Member States were in favor and wanted the language on impunity to be strengthened in the draft with referencing to the role for the ICC and wanted the Security Council too to adopt a more severe stance towards the sanctioning against perpetrators. It was here that the US held back; together with Libya.[66]

The UK held an Arria-Formula meeting on June 11 on the role of peacekeepers in addressing sexual violence, to see where practical measures could be taken by the Security Council. This meeting followed the Wilton Park Conference held from 27-29 May. At that meeting a number of non-governmental organizations emphasized the need for systematic quality and comprehensive data collection on sexual violence, the need to ensure accountability, and to link the issue of sexual violence with women's participation at all levels of peace efforts. Also as part of the United States of America led initiative to bring more attention to the problem of sexual violence, the UK chaired the Arria- meeting bringing together the Security Council, NGO representatives and UN officials "as part

[63] Retrieved from: http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/update-report/lookup-c-glKWLeMTIsG-b-4197161.php
[64] Retrieved from: http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/update-report/lookup-c-glKWLeMTIsG-b-4197161.php
[65] Retrieved from: http://www.reuters.com/article/2008/05/14/us-congo-democratic-un-idUSL146206820080514
& http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/update-report/lookup-c-glKWLeMTIsG-b-4197161.php
[66] Retrieved from: http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/update-report/lookup-c-glKWLeMTIsG-b-4197161.php

of a US-led initiative to bring more attention to the problem of sexual violence in armed conflict".[67] As was mentioned during the Wilton Park Conference, the need to fill the gap between policy created in New York and the realities on the ground at UN missions was outlined. Lieutenant General Lidder, former force commander of UNMIS from India, recommended that the zero-tolerance policy be respected and accountability be insured for all violations. Ms. Lusenge of *SOFEPADI-RDC* of the Democratic Republic of Congo emphasized sexual violence is a matter of security and therefore is an issue upon which the Security Council must act. Ms. Holt of the Stimson Center that Security Council mandates to be more explicit in their definitions of civilian protection to avoid free interpretation. Then several actors from civil society took the floor. *CARE* expressed that current resources to fight sexual violence were inadequate. *Amnesty International* commented that attention must be given to the accountability as there can be no peace without justice and recommended to the Security Council that their reports to be more extensive and analytical on sexual violence. The *Women's International League for Peace and Freedom* emphasized women's participation in order to fight sexual violence. The *International Crisis Group* encouraged the Security Council to use more forceful language in their statements. Then came the Security Council Member States to the floor. France expressed that sexual violence comes under the mandate of the Security Council since it poses a clear threat to international peace and security. Also France stressed the role of the Security Council in providing peacekeepers with more guidance. Costa Rica joined Ms. Holt in her statement. Burkina Faso emphasized the need for gender training to peacekeepers. The United States of America closed off by expressing that the link between sexual violence and the maintenance of international peace and security is at the heart of the discussion about what the Security Council can do. It is not clear whether other (Permanent) Member States of the Security Council were present and what their statements were since Arria-formula Meetings are not open to the public through meeting records but usually are reported upon (see chapter 3).[68]

On June 12 that same year, 71 women's groups from the DRC addressed the Security Council with a letter stating "…while we applaud your recent condemnation of the sexual violence we suffer, and your actions in that regard, we remind you that we have suffered for decades without any notable action on your part. You must ensure that this situation will never repeat itself in Congo or elsewhere. The Security Council cannot keep silent while thousands of women suffer indescribable sexual violence."[69]

Also more and more media attention rose on the issue the days prior to the Security Council meeting scheduled for June 19. For example the New York Times mentions, dated June 15, the failure of reform in Sudan, where the government had turned Darfur into a rape camp according to the author. This particular online article even suggests that South Africa, China, Libya and Indonesia support the pro-rape foreign policy of Sudan in Darfur by supporting Sudan's position in Darfur. When mentioning "rape capital of the world eastern Congo" the author links to former UN force commander Patrick Cammaert. The article concludes by stating: "Painfully slowly, the United Nations and its member states seem to be recognizing the fact that systematic mass rape is at least as much an international outrage as, say, pirated DVDs. Yet China and Russia are resisting any new reporting mechanism for sexual violence, seeing such rapes as tragic but simply a criminal matter." [70]

The Security Council President received a letter dated 16 June 2008 from the *Chargé d'affaires*, Karen Pierce Ambassador and Deputy Permanent Representative of the Permanent Mission of the UK to the United Nations (UNSC, 2008d). The latter contained the summary report of the

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[67] Retrieved from: http://www.cablegatesearch.net/cable.php?id=08USUNNEWYORK541

[68] Retrieved from: http://www.cablegatesearch.net/cable.php?id=08USUNNEWYORK541 & http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/update-report/lookup-c-glKWLeMTIsG-b-4197161.php

[69] Retrieved from: http://www.stoprapenow.org/uploads/advocacyresources/1282164625.pdf

[70] Retrieved from: http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/15/opinion/15kristof.html?_r=0

Wilton Park conference that was held 27-29 May 2008 on the theme *Women targeted or affected by armed conflict: what role for military peacekeepers?*

June 18 2008, the Security Council held an official meeting on the Security Council mission to Africa. During this meeting was emphasized that mandates to the region should be more robust and that, i.a. sexual violence kept continuing and that impunity remained the rule. Moreover, several of the Africa mission mandates would end in the months after this meeting and the Security Council formulated that these missions needed more robust mandates, i.a. on sexual violence (UNSC, 2008c).[71]

On June 19 2008, the Security Council held the thematic debate on *Women, Peace and Security: Sexual Violence in Situations of Armed Conflict* which was organized by the American Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice. The President of the General Assembly, Srgjan Kerim; the Chairperson of the Peace building Commission, Ambassador Yukio Takasu of Japan and; Major-General Patrick Cammaert, former Commander of the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC) were all invited to the meeting. The Secretary-General and the Deputy Secretary-General briefed the Security Council on the efforts United Nations bodies had made to address all forms of violence against women and girls, including sexual violence in armed conflict. The Secretary-General expressed his eagerness to deploy more women as police, military and civilian personnel, and also at the highest levels of mission leadership, and reaffirmed the United Nations zero-tolerance policy against sexual exploitation abused by United Nations personnel (UNSC, 2008d). Security Council President and then US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice opened the meeting by stating that *'As many here are aware, for years there has been a debate about whether or not sexual violence against women is a security issue for this* [United Nations Security Council] *to address. I am proud that today we can respond to that lingering question with a resounding 'yes'. This world body now acknowledges that sexual violence in conflict zones is, indeed, a security concern'* (UNSC, 2008d). Further on during that day there was some resistance to sexual violence becoming a singular aspect resolution whereas UNSCR 1325 was more broadly focused on *Women, Peace and Security* (Security Council Report, 2010, p. 34; Basu, 2012, p. 303). During the meeting all states were supportive towards the draft resolution. There were a few states that were not as out-spoken on the matter as the others. For example, Russia emphasized that women face more risks in conflict than just sexual violence (UNSC, 2008d, p. 26) and China emphasized that the issue was rather one for national authorities (UNSC, 2008d, p. 19-20). Moreover, Russia, China, Indonesia and Vietnam were not supportive of a similar working group as the one that had been established on children and armed conflict and showed together with Libya also other reservations to the draft Resolution mainly directed at the framing of sexual violence as a matter of international security as already had become clear during the first round of negotiations on the 6th of June. (Security Council Report, 2010, p. 34; Womensphere, 2008).

China was the first non co-sponsor Security Council Member State given the floor by the US Security Council President after Liberia, Croatia, South Africa, Burkina Faso, UK, Belgium, France and Italy during the official meeting June 19 2008. China had sent a Special Envoy of the Minister for Foreign Affairs to the meeting. China made the following point during its time given by the President of the Security Council. It emphasized that sexual violence should be addressed through a comprehensive approach in the context of peace process and political situation. Since the Security Council's main responsibility is the maintenance of international peace and security, sexual violence should therefore not be treated as a stand-alone issue. The issue of sexual violence should be handled by other UN bodies. Moreover, national Governments bear the main responsibility for the protection of women, therefore it is, again, not the responsibility for the United Nations Security Council. Third, China thought that more efforts should be undertaken for women's rights during peace and conflict

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[71] Retrieved from: http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/PV.5915

and especially the enhancement of positive measures taken by the UN Secretariat to increase the ratio of women in senior positions and the UN staff in general during peacekeeping missions. Fourth, China encouraged the work done by NGOs and their communication with UN entities. The representative of China closed off with stating that China '…is ready to work with the rest of the international community in a joint effort to reduce sexual violence in every corner of the world and achieve all targets related to the issue of women and peace and security' (UNSC, 2008d, p.20).

The representative of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya was next to take the floor and said to appreciate the presence of the Secretary of State Rice and thank the US representative on her?initiative for the open debate. He stated that heinous crimes of sexual violence are perpetrated by three kinds of people: personnel States involved in conflict, UN personnel and non-State actors. He further emphasized the need to focus on the religious aspects of war in order to protect women. Training for peacekeeping forces was mentioned as well as impunity. He stressed that the Security Council can play a vital role in order to protect women from sexual violence. He closed his statement by welcoming the draft resolution which Libya supported (UNSC, 2008d). After Libya, Vietnam was given the floor. Also the Permanent Representative of Vietnam welcomed the initiative of the USA and Secretary of State Rice's opening speech. Vietnam stated that the empowerment of women and girls is of importance and stressed the need for coordination between the Security Council and other UN entities. Vietnam emphasized that States bear the main responsibility to protect women and girls against violence, including sexual violence. Vietnam especially emphasized the need for UN personnel to prevent them from perpetrating and to recognize and respond in a better way to sexual violence. Vietnam closed off with stating that their last argument and the argument of empowerment are the most effective ways of tackling sexual violence (UNSC, 2008d).

After Vietnam, Costa Rica got the floor, after which Indonesia followed. Also Indonesia welcomed the initiative of the USA and the presence of Secretary of State Rice. The Permanent Representative of Indonesia emphasized the importance of that day's meeting to end impunity. Thereafter, they stated that 'we, the international community' (UNSC, 2008d, p. 24) should tackle the issue of sexual violence in armed conflict. Sexual violence is referred to as a crime under international humanitarian law and that UN personnel deployed in armed conflict situations should be strengthened in their capabilities to protect women and girls through their mandates. He ends his statement while emphasizing that the protection of women in armed conflict should be further strengthened and that the aim of the Security Council was the prevention of conflict and the maintenance of international peace and security. No direct link was made between sexual violence and it posing a threat to international security however. Also, Indonesia did not make clear in its statement whether it supported the draft resolution nor whether it saw itself as a direct member of the international community (UNSC, 2008d). The Permanent Representative of Russia spoke of sexual violence as a detestable crime in need for condemnation and strict sanctioning and the unacceptability of UN personnel committing these crimes. Russia did not want the issue of women and peace and security to be reduced to that of sexual violence alone especially because it thought that UN entities duplicated work done on this issue (UNSC, 2008d).

After the Security Council's open debate, the Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1820 (UNSC, 2008a) that had been drafted by the US and was co-sponsored by 51 UN Member States (UNSC, 2008e).[72]

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[72] *Armenia, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Canada, Chile, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Latvia, Lichtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Panama, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Romania, San*

Summarizing the 2000-2008 dynamics:

So, since the adoption of UNSCR 1325 in 2000, the Security Council gathered around each of UNSCR 1325-anniversary. These meetings usually were followed by a Presidential Statement that primarily reaffirmed the Security Council's commitment to the matter. Other attention than during those annual anniversary meetings was hardly given to the matter. However, sometimes attention was also given to the *Women, Peace and Security* agenda outside of the anniversary meetings. Under the UK Security Council Presidency for example, the Security Council held a debate on the topic of conflict, peacekeeping and gender. Years later, in March 2008, under the Security Council Presidency of South Africa, the Security Council released a Presidential Statement on the occasion of *International Women's Day* for the first time since March 2000.

However, dynamics – or rather the lack of any dynamic - seem to have changed from the beginning of January 2007. Then, the United Nations General Assembly adopted a resolution on the *Intensification of efforts to eliminate all forms of sexual violence against women*. In April the first UN-wide Organization *UN Action against Sexual Violence in Conflict* was established which, *inter alia*, supported the design and implementation of the first Comprehensive Strategy on Combating Sexual Violence in the DRC. Until October 2007 the focus of the Security Council on the *Women, Peace and Security* agenda however had more or less been limited to the anniversary meetings and two additional statements. For the occasion of the annual meeting on *Women, Peace and Security* in October 2007, the *NGO Working Group on Women, Peace and Security* which had pressured the Security Council in 2000 for the adoption of a Women, Peace and Security resolution which eventually happened in October 2000 with the adoption of UNSCR 1325, was for the first time invited to attend an official Security Council meeting on Women, Peace and Security instead of Arria-formula Meetings. Ms. Gina Torry, representative of the *NGO Working Group on Women, Peace and Security*, took advantage of this opportunity and 'named and shamed' the Security Council for, although having an Women, Peace and Security agenda, not having implemented it thoroughly and mentioning that a lot of women in armed conflict still have to deal with sexual violence. She explicitly framed sexual violence as a threat to international peace and security during that meeting. After this meeting, the Security Council adopted UNSCR 1794 (UNSC, 2007d), by which MONUC was requested to pursue a strategy aimed to prevent and respond to sexual violence.

In 2008 dynamics eventually really speeded up. In February 2008 the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution called for *Eliminating rape and other forms of sexual violence in all their manifestations, including in conflict and related situations.* A month later UN entities set up *UNiTE to End Violence against Women* to eliminate violence against women and girls in conflict and in times of peace. Somewhere during spring that same year, key ambassadors where persuaded into watching a documentary on rape in the DRC. In May 2008, the UN Security Council started an investigation on the alleged sexual exploitation of children in the DRC by UN Peacekeepers and at the end of May 2008 UNIFEM, DPKO and DFS on behalf of the *UN Action Against Sexual Violence in Conflict* and with the assistance of the Governments of Canada and the UK organized the Wilton Park Conference *Women Targeted or Affected by Armed Conflict: What role for Military Peacekeepers?* During this meeting France, the UK and the US decided that the US would bring the issue of sexual violence to the official meeting agenda on *Women, Peace and Security*. The moment that the US picked up the issue and put it on the Security Council's agenda for June 19 2008 would become the first time since the establishment of the United Nations Security Council's *Women, Peace and Security* agenda in 2000 that a *Women, Peace and Security* official Security Council meeting was to be held on another

occasion than UNSCR 1325's anniversary meetings held in October. The day after the Security Council met on the occasion of the Security Council mission in Africa, the Security Council unanimously adopted the US-initiated draft of UNSCR 1820 on June 19 2008 by which sexual violence became framed as a threat to international security and impunity of perpetrators of sexual violence was denounced.

Chapter 6. Conclusions and Implications

In this chapter, the final one of this thesis, all previous chapters will come together. Finally, an answer will be given to the lingering question: [but] *Why did sexual violence become framed as a threat to international security?*

The chapter proceeds as follows. First, a short summary will be provided concerning the previous chapters, recapitulating this thesis' argument. Secondly, the expectations will be elaborated upon and tested for what has been found in Chapter 5. The hypotheses will be rejected or accepted. Thirdly, answer will be given to this thesis' research question. Fourthly, the theoretical implications of this thesis' outcomes will be discussed. Fifthly, the societal relevance will be discussed. Lastly, the limitations to this research will be set out and recommendations for further research will be suggested.

6.1. Conclusion

This thesis started off with the impressive speech held by former Secretary of State of the US, Condoleezza Rice during the United Nations Security Council's 5916th Meeting, June 19 2008. She stated that for years there had been a debate on whether or not sexual violence against women in armed conflict was a security issue for the United Nations Security Council to address. She stated a resounding "yes", and with the unanimous adoption of the draft of UNSCR 1820 at the end of that particular Security Council meeting, the Security Council acknowledged that sexual violence in armed conflict is indeed a threat to international security.

However, how come that although sexual violence has been practiced as a tool of warfare through ages, only now it became framed as a matter of international security? The reader has been introduced in security thinking and has been shown that the notion of security within IR theory has been a malleable concept through times. Whereas security was seen since the Treaty of Westphalia as *interstate insecurity*, the end of the Cold War brought about the 'global turn'. The global turn since the 1990s brought *interstate insecurity* towards a notion of security that can be considered as *human security*. Hence, frames of security seemed to have been subject to change. Thereafter, the most vibrant debate within the field of security since the end of the Cold War was introduced; securitization theory. Securitization theory understands that security can be more than military security. According to Buzan et al., issues beyond the traditional frame of security can move on the spectrum of *nonpoliticized-politicized-securitized*. However, it was suggested that securitization theory's prerequisites could not illuminate *why* sexual violence became framed as a threat to international security, since it could only provide insights in the fact *that* it had become framed as a threat to international security. Therefore, the theory on normative change of Finnemore & Sikkink was introduced. Their theory concerns the Norm-Life-Cycle and states that political change is a matter of changing norms. Hence, normative change is thought of to occur through several stages of the Norm-Life-Cycle, each characterized by different actors and motivations. In fact, their theory aims to understand *how* normative change comes about. Therefore was thought that illuminating *how* sexual violence had become framed as a threat to international security would also bring understanding in *why* sexual violence became framed as a threat to international security.

But before coming to the testing of the theoretical and operational frameworks of this thesis, the reader was introduced into the world of women, peace and security and sexual violence in Chapter 4. It has introduced what happened before the adoption of UNSCR 1820 and its predecessor UNSCR 1325; the latter being the first *Women, Peace and Security* UNSC resolution and the former being its first follow-up UNSC resolution. A chronological timeline has introduced and illuminated the development of, what became in 2000, the United Nations Security Council's *Women, Peace and Security* agenda. Since the establishment of the United Nations in 1945, issues relating to women,

peace and security gained increased attention of the international community but it was not until the atrocities of sexual violence in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda in the 1990s that the attention of the international community eventually was drawn to sexual violence.

Since the 1990s, also the frames of sexual violence in armed conflict have changed. It was suggested that although *Women, Peace and Security* became a stand-alone issue on the United Nations Security Council's agenda in 2000 with the adoption of UNSCR 1325, sexual violence was not (yet) framed as a matter of international security. Therefore, the additions of UNSCR 1820 to UNSCR 1325 were elaborated upon in a comparative manner to show which frames were used.

The analysis of United Nations Security Council and related data through the method of process-tracing showed that since the establishment of the *Women, Peace and Security* agenda through UNSCR 1325 in 2000, for years, nothing alarmingly happened on the matter. On each anniversary of UNSCR 1325 around October the Security Council held an official meeting on *Women, Peace and Security* and an occasional additional statement was released. However, the dynamics changed from the beginning of 2007. During 2007's first few months the United Nations General Assembly adopted a Resolution on the *Intensification of efforts to eliminate all forms of violence against women* and the UN-wide Organization *UN Action against Sexual Violence in Conflict* was formed by 12 UN entities. During the official anniversary Security Council meeting on *Women, Peace and Security* the *NGO Working Group on Women, Peace and Security* was invited by the Security Council. The NGO stated that for more than seven years, since the adoption of UNSCR 1325, nothing had changed. She summarized those seven years by stating that women and girls in armed conflict continued to be subjected to sexual violence and that constituted as a matter of international security. Thereafter Ms. Gina Torry urged the Security Council to take specific measures on sexual violence in armed conflict since the failure of states to secure those women from sexual violence in armed conflict, was eventually the failure of the Security Council to maintain international peace and security. A few months later, the Security Council seem to have taken measures already by urging the UN peacekeeping mission in the DRC, MONUC, to pursue a strategy to prevent and respond to sexual violence. Then came 2008 and the UN General Assembly adopted the resolution called *Eliminating rape and other forms of sexual violence in all their manifestation, including in conflict and related situations* In the same year the Secretary-General launched *UNiTE to End Violence against* Women. Moreover, key ambassadors of the Permanent Missions to the United Nations Security Council saw the documentary film *The Greatest Silence – Rape in the Congo*. In May 2008 became clear that Indian UN peacekeepers in the DRC had been accused of sexual exploitation and an investigation was started by the *UN Office of Internal Oversight Service.* In the end of May UNIFEM, DPKO, DFS (on behalf of the *UN Action Against Violence in Conflict*), Canada and the UK organized the Wilton Park Conference *Women Targeted or Affected by Armed Conflict: What Role for Military Peacekeepers?* after which the US set the agenda of the Security Council for its Presidency over the Security Council in June, for June 19th 2008. It was during this meeting that the adoption of UNSCR 1820 officially framed sexual violence as a threat to international security.

6.2. Expectations

This paragraph will test whether the hypotheses formulated in Chapter 3, can answer the question *why* sexual violence became a threat to international security. Hence, can the expectation *that* security frames change and expectations concerning *how* security frames change, understand *why* security frames change? Hence, can the hypotheses be falsified or verified; and therefore bring *that* and *how* us to understanding *why* sexual violence became framed as a threat to international security?

In Chapter 3 it was expected that the case of sexual violence would be framed as a threat to international security:

H1. Securitization:

> **If a)** *(a) representative(s) of (a) NGO(s) concerned with women affected by sexual violence in war claims* **b)** *that international security is threatened by sexual violence and* **c)** *call for extraordinary measures to maintain international security* **d)** *to the United Nations Security Council (***x***), sexual violence gets securitized (***y***).*

From the beginning of this research, securitization was thought of not being able to come to the understanding of *why* security frames change but solely to the fact *that* security frames change.

> *(a)* Ms. Gina Torry, representative of the *NGO Working Group on Women, Peace and Security* claimed during the anniversary of UNSCR 1325 in October 2007 *(b)* that international security was threatened by continued sexual violence and *(c+d)* urged the Security Council to take special measures (x). Eventually, the Security Council securitized sexual violence by adopting UNSCR 1820 (y).

Above mentioned events all took place (x), but they do not arrive at the understanding of *why* sexual violence became framed as a threat to international security (y). Since, all prerequisites of securitization theory were present *H1. Securitization* can be <u>verified</u>. It nevertheless thus does not, as also was expected, illuminate *why* sexual violence became framed as a threat to international security. As was suggested before, there still seems to be a gap between *x* and *y* since it is not ruled out that *x* is the one and only explanation of *y*. This argument is strengthened by the analysis of Chapter 5.

H2. Norm Emergence:

> **If** *(a) representative(s)of (a) NGO(s) concerned with women affected by sexual violence in war persuade(s) Member States of the United Nations Security Council of their normative frame that sexual violence poses a threat to international security (***x***), (a) Permanent Member(s) of the Security Council will put the normative frame that sexual violence poses a threat to international security on the agenda of the United Nations Security Council for the 19th of June 2008 (***y***).*

From the normative change theory of Finnemore & Sikkink was expected to come to an understanding of *how* sexual violence became framed as a threat to international security. From the answer to the *how* question it was expected to come to an understanding of *why* as well.

Ms. Gina Torry's, representative of the *NGO Working Group on Women, Peace and Security,* statement during the anniversary meeting on *Women, Peace and Security* was welcomed by Security Council Member States Panama, Qatar, France, South Africa, Italy and Iceland. Ms. Gina Torry was the first to state during an official *Women, Peace and Security* Security Council meeting that sexual violence poses a threat to international security, she had an organizational platform and she stood up for the fate of women in armed conflict. Therefore, Ms. Gina Torry was a norm entrepreneur and the *NGO Working Group on Women, Peace and Security* was her organizational platform (unfortunately, the norm entrepreneurship could not be traced down further within the *NGO Working Group on Women, Peace and Security)*. Since these states welcomed her statement, they are thought of having been persuaded by her. However, only South Africa, Panama, Italy and France were both Security Council Member States during October 2007 and June 2008; only they count as being persuaded (x). Eventually, the US put the issue of sexual violence as posing a threat to international security on the agenda of the United Nations Security Council for the 19th of June 2008 and even drafted a UNSC resolution (y).

Again, all of this happened and was of importance. Hence, *H2. Norm Emergence* can be <u>verified</u>.

However, again, it is not ruled out that *x* is the one and only explanation of *y*. This argument is strengthened by the analysis of Chapter 5 and the formulated answer to the research question. A lot of things, especially related to the DRC and ongoing events at the UN, is suggested to eventually have led the US to schedule the matter for June 19th. Moreover, although not operationalized in that way, the Wilton Park Conference in May seems to have more functioned as the critical tipping point threshold than the agenda-setting of June 19th eventually proved to have been since this was the moment the UK, France and the US decided that the US would schedule a Security Council meeting on the matter. It could have been that the US did so because of moral statute but that explanation is not very likely taking into consideration *why* sexual violence was framed as a threat to international security. It is more likely that the UK and France thought the US, being P1, would have more normative leverage, moreover since the US would be June's Security Council President. The US on the other hand, would have a flagship UNSC resolution since it might have been clear for the US that the Security Council would eventually sign the draft resolution anyway since the Security Council's legitimacy was at stake. Sending their Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice would only strengthen the suggestion that the issue dealt with concerned a highly normative matter. Therefore, it cannot be ruled out that solely *x* led to *y*. An intervening and reinforcing *x* therefore might have caused the increased attention of the international community towards the UN's presence in the DRC and the prominence given to it by the media. Moreover, it is not being accounted for by the hypothesis how come that the Security Council invited Ms. Gina Torry of the *NGO Working Group on Women, Peace and Security*, operationalized norm entrepreneur in this case, to their annual *Women, Peace and Security* Security Council meeting.

H3. Norm Cascade:

> ***If (a) Permanent Member(s) of the United Nations Security Council put(s) the normative frame that sexual violence poses a threat to international security on the agenda of the United Nations Security Council (x), the other Security Council Member States will socialize to the normative frame that sexual violence poses a threat to international security and adopt UNSCR 1820 (y).***

As stated, the US performed as the critical state that had put the frame - that sexual violence poses a threat to international security - on the agenda of the Security Council for June 19th (*x*). Indeed, the other Security Council Member States in that composition eventually socialized to the normative frame that sexual violence poses a threat to international security and eventually adopted UNSCR 1820. Permanent Security Council Member States China, Russia and Non-Permanent Security Council Member States Libya, Vietnam, Indonesia and Costa Rica all stated during the meeting June 19th that they felt that sexual violence need not to be addressed as a stand-alone Security Council agenda topic. However, they did adopt the UNSCR 1820. In their statements, these states were hesitant or even opposed the framing of sexual violence as a matter of security, most of them however did address themselves as members of the international community and as a Security Council Member States. So, the legitimation, reputation and esteem of these states can be thought of to have been the motivation of these states to adopt UNSCR 1820. Hence, also *H3. Norm Cascade* can be <u>verified.</u>

However, also in this case, *x* is not the only ruled out explanation of *y*. This is suggested since during the *Women, Peace and Security* meeting of June 19th, these states were hesitant or even opposing the framing of sexual violence as a matter of security. Because of the fact that they did adopt UNSCR 1820 anyway but at the same time opposed the framing of sexual violence; it is suggested that something else was going on. The analysis made clear that although these states opposed the idea of sexual violence becoming a stand-alone issue on the Security Council's agenda and therefore the

framing of sexual violence becoming a threat to international security, they did however emphasize the need for clearer Peacekeeping missions mandates, the impunity of perpetrators of sexual violence and the alleged sexual harassment of Congolese women by 'blue-helmets'. This suggests that these Security Council Member States might predominantly have been motivated by something else.

These hypotheses were expected to understand *that* and *how* and therefore *why* sexual violence became framed as a threat to international security. All three hypotheses were verified, however, their story and expectations seemed not to be the exclusive explanation of the narrative of sexual violence becoming a threat to international security and therefore have not come to a full understanding of *why sexual violence became framed as a threat to international security?*

6.3. Answer to the research question

Therefore, *why did sexual violence become framed as a threat to international security?*

The analysis in the previous chapter has shown a steady increase in the United Nations' and Security Council's attention towards the matter of sexual violence in armed conflict since 2007. Several actions of the UN drew the world's attention to the matter of sexual violence in armed conflict. During that years' annual United Nations Security Council anniversary meeting on *Women, Peace and Security,* the *NGO Working Group on Women, Peace and Security* was invited to the meeting and 'named and shamed' the Security Council on the fact that sexual violence in armed conflict kept on threatening women's security and therefore constituted a threat to international security. However, the tables on the matter really turned in 2008 when the situation in the DRC became both pressing for both Congolese women and the legitimacy of the United Nations Security Council's peacekeeping missions. Moreover, some of the UN Peacekeeping Mission's mandates would end that same year and the need for a stronger mandate on sexual violence and impunity for perpetrators became urgent. After the UN had started an investigation on the alleged sexual exploitation of Congolese women by 'blue helmets' of MONUC in the DRC, the Wilton Park Conference *Women Targeted or Affected by Armed Conflict: What role for Military Peacekeepers* was held. During this conference, the issue of 'blue-helmeted' perpetrators and impunity and the need for stronger mandates on sexual violence was discussed and sexual violence was framed as a threat to international security in the official conference's summary. In co ordinance with Security Council Member States the UK and France, the US set the agenda for June 19. For the first time since the establishment of the *Women, Peace and Security* agenda a *Women, Peace and Security* meeting would be held in another month than October. In the meantime, much media attention was given to the situation in the DRC, the alleged 'blue-helmeted' perpetrators and the Security Council's indifference. During the meeting of June 19th references were made to sexual violence as a threat to international security, but also the UN mission mandates, impunity of perpetrators and the alleged sexual harassment of Congolese women and girls by MONUC-peacekeepers. The states that did not frame sexual violence as a threat to international security, even hesitated whether sexual violence should have its own UNSC resolution. The argument of uniform mission mandates, impunity of perpetrators and the 'blue-helmeted' perpetrators however, might have eventually led Permanent Security Council Member States China, Russia and Non-Permanent Security Council Member States Libya, Vietnam, Indonesia and Costa Rica to sign the US-proposed draft of what at the end of the day became UNSCR 1820 anyway.

Therefore, through a coincidence of events between 2007 and June 2008, sexual violence became framed as a threat to international security. But *why*? Because the legitimacy of the United Nations Security Council's Peacekeeping missions was shaken by the events in the DRC in 2007 and 2008 and therefore was at stake. An ample attempt to adjust the mandate of MONUC was already done by the

end of 2007 through UNSCR 1794 when it had become apparent that sexual violence still was a widespread problem. However, later, in May 2008 became clear that there was yet another problem for the UN Security Council to tackle concerning the DRC: allegations of sexual harassment by MONUC-peacekeepers. The international media waited for the Security Council to step up. Moreover, the fact that the Wilton Park Conference was named *Women Targeted or Affected by Armed Conflict: What Role for Military Peacekeepers?* already revealed the felt gap between policy and real-life practices which was emphasized by Major-General Patrick Cammaert, former Commander of MONUC both during this conference as well during the official Security Council Meeting June 19th.

So *why was sexual violence framed as a threat to international security?*

The answer to the empirical puzzle therefore is: because the Security Council Member States felt the legitimacy of the (future) United Nations Security Council's Peacekeeping mission mandates, due to the prominence of the matter in the media and coincidence of the course of events in the DRC - and therefore of the Security Council itself - was shaken and at stake. The framing of sexual violence as a threat to international security therefore seems to have more or less been a normative cover up of the Security Council dealing with impunity and the lack of coherent mandates. Hence, legitimacy, reputation and esteem were at stake, but it seems to have been those of the UN (Security council) (Peacekeeping mission mandates) In the end, UNSCR 1820 is more concerned with the legitimation, reputation and esteem of the UN (Security Council) (Peacekeeping mission mandates) rather than the fate of women concerning sexual violence in armed conflict.[73] Legitimation seems to have been the dominant mechanism at the moment prominence was given to the matter by the media on the events in the DRC. The intrinsic characteristics of the norm seems to have been of less(er) importance than the Security Council's interest in its legitimacy.

6.4. Theoretical implications

The testing and subsequently verifying of the hypotheses in 6.2. has not provided the answer to the research question , as 6.3. has suggested. Although all three hypotheses were verified, understanding *that* and *how* sexual violence became framed as a threat to international security, did not answer the question *why* sexual violence became framed as a threat to international security.

For both theories the theoretical implications will be discussed.

Chapter 1 and 2 already pitched the possible problem of securitization theory being able to understand *that* and not *how* or even for that matter *why* non-traditional security frames have emerged since the end of the Cold War. This research could add to the theoretical prerequisites for securitization to happen. Since this research has shown that legitimacy, reputation and esteem were at stake, although it were the legitimacy, reputation and esteem of the UN (Security Council) (Peacekeeping mission mandates), the theoretical hypothesis can be re-formulated:

H1. Securitization:

> *If* a) *a securitizing actor claims* b) *that a referent object is threatened in its existence   by   a certain 'threat'[74] and* c) *stress the need for extraordinary measures to ensure the*

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[73] One of the informants mentioned in Chapter 3 stated that "it would not surprise me if this [reputation of the UN Security Council] would have been the reason of UNSCR 1820's adoption. It would have kept their critics silent for a while. It would moreover explain why the implantation of UNSCR 1820 happens so slowly [since the Security Council was not that interested in sexual violence as a normative issue]" (personal communication, August 9 2013).

[74] 'Threat' is place between brackets here because until securitization has occurred, the 'threat' is not been acknowledged as a threat to the referent object yet.

survival of the referent object d) *to an audience of functional actors* **e) *and these functional actors have any self-interest in that 'threat' becoming securitized*** (x)*, the 'threat' to the referent object gets securitized* (y)*.*

Hence, securitization theory can now account for the motivations of the audience of functional actors since now a dominant mechanism is incorporated. This thesis aimed at extending securitization theory, theoretical puzzle. However, whereas normative change theory of Finnemore & Sikkink was first thought of to provide a solution for the gap in securitization theory, it proved to have been a dominant mechanism for the audience of functional actors in order for the 'threat' to the referent object to get securitized. Now, securitization theory seems to be *better* able to understand   *that* security frames change.

Also Finnemore & Sikkink's theory did not provide a conclusive explanation for *why* sexual violence became framed as a threat to international security, although the hypotheses based on their theory were verified. Predominantly the causality between the dependent and independent variable proved to be difficult to trace down since the dominant mechanisms were persuasion and socialization. Hence, these mechanisms were motivated by altruism, empathy, ideational commitment; legitimacy, reputation and esteem. However, both mechanisms and motivations are hard to 'see' and need to be thoroughly operationalized in order to make sense. Otherwise, one risks verifying every hypothesis. Moreover, prominence was given to the issue of sexual violence because of the course of events in the DRC that concerned (the legitimacy) of the UN Security Council and became pressing because of pressing media prominence as well. Finnemore & Sikkink have stated themselves that these kinds of hypotheses could be tested and elaborated upon in further research. Since this research has illuminated this element, the hypotheses concerning norm emergence and norm cascade can now also be re-formulated:

H2. Norm Emergence:

> *If (a) norm entrepreneur(s) persuade(s)(a) state(s) of a normative frame **and prominence is given to the issue by international media** (x), amongst those states (a) critical state(s) put(s) that normative frame on the international community's agenda   (y).*

H3. Norm Cascade:

> *If (a) critical state(s) put(s) that normative frame on the international community's agenda **and that normative frame (also) serves the self-interest of that political community in terms of legitimacy** (x), other states become socialized to the normative frame as well (y).*

Another focus point relates to norm entrepreneurs and their need for an organizational platform. In this case study, the NGO was of more importance than the person stating the normative frame; performing the actual speech act. Hence, the individual here served the NGO and not the other way around.

6.5. Societal relevance

The explanation of *why* sexual violence became framed as a threat to international security could prove to be of relevance for potential norm entrepreneurs in order to manipulate normative change at the international community level. NGOs could, for instance, 'name and shame' and persuade their particular international community and promote their normative frame during times the legitimacy of that international community is at stake concerning or related to that normative frame and moreover, prominence is given to the issue through the media. It might also prove helpful to cover issues

concerning the legitimacy of the international community, given prominence by the media, with a particular normative frame. However, when the normative frame is used as a cover-up, it might be possible that the international community uses the cover of a normative frame but nevertheless will never internalize (stage 3) the normative frame. The lack of implementation and internalization of the normative frame that sexual violence poses a threat to international security therefore can be highly problematic for the norm entrepreneurs, as my informant has stated as well.

6.6. Research limitations

There are several limitations to this research to be discerned. The first lack concerns access to the important players, mechanisms and procedures at the UN or at the NGO level. Informants at War Child and the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs were able to explain some of the procedures and mechanisms of NGO lobby directed at the UN or about the general UN proceedings. This links to the second limitation: resources. The UN documents analyzed were all very diplomatic documents and statements performed by the (Security Council) Member States during the meetings were often prepared so did often not directly respond to prior statements. The official meeting records merely exposed statements rather than discussion. Unfortunately, other meetings in which (Security Council) Member States and NGOs would interact with each other were not recorded or transparent for the general public. These meeting records could have been very informative. Attempts to get in touch with the *NGO Working Group on Women, Peace and Security,* unfortunately also failed. Hence, for both the Security Council and the *NGO Working Group on Women, Peace and Security* applies the lack of transparency in procedures, mechanisms and statements. Therefore, this thesis provides a slight glimpse of the 'real'[75] story.

Moreover, the fact that this thesis deals with normative change - changing security frames – brings along fuzzy concepts such as persuasion and socialization which are difficult to measure. Therefore, it is difficult to determine whether the fact that the hypotheses were verified while they could not account for the research questions concerns a theoretical misfit or an operational one, or both.

6.7. Recommendations

First, further research can for example include the third stage of Finnemore & Sikkink's Norm-Life-Cycle; internalization. This would provide useful insights since the results of this thesis hinted at sexual violence framed as a threat to international security was merely a cover-up for self-interest aimed at restoring legitimacy.

Next, already hinted at by Finnemore & Sikkink, the re-formulated hypotheses on legitimation and prominence by the media mentioned in this chapter can be tested and further elaborated upon.

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[75] 'real' is put between inverted commas since it can be questioned whether one can ever know the 'truth'.

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Appendix

Comparison UNSCR 1325 and UNSCR 1820

UNSCR 1325	UNSCR 1820
'*Expressing* concern that civilians, particularly women and children, account for the vast majority of those adversely affected by armed conflict, including as refugees and internally displaced persons, and increasingly are targeted by combatants and armed elements, and *recognizing* the consequent impact this has on durable peace and reconciliation' '*Reaffirming* the important role of women in the prevention and resolution of conflicts and in peace-building, and *stressing* the importance of their equal participation and full involvement in all efforts for the maintenance and promotion of peace and security, and the need to increase their role in decision-making with regard to conflict prevention and resolution' *First UNSC Resolution linking women to the mandate of the Security Council and therefore to the maintenance of international peace and security and to address the impact of war on women and their contribution to conflict resolution and sustainable peace*	'*Stresses* that sexual violence, when used or commissioned as a tactic of war in order to deliberately target civilians or as a part of widespread or systematic attack against civilian populations, can significantly exacerbate situations of armed conflict and may impede the restoration of international peace and security, *affirms* in this regard that effective steps to prevent and respond to such acts of sexual violence can significantly contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security, and *expresses its readiness*, when considering situations on the agenda of the Council, to, where necessary, adopt appropriate steps to adress widespread or systematic sexual violence' [OP 1] *First UNSC Resolution to frame sexual violence as a security issue on itself and therefore a matter of international peace and security*
'*Emphasizes* the responsibility of all States to put an end to impunity and to prosecute those responsible for genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes including those relating to sexual violence and other violence against women and girls, and in this regard *stresses* the need to exclude these crimes, where feasible from amnesty provisions' [OP 11] *Amnesty should be avoided where feasible*	'*Notes* that rape and other forms of sexual violence can constitute a war crime, a crime against humanity, or a constitutive act with respect to genocide, *stresses the need for* the exclusion of sexual violence crimes from amnesty provisions in the context of conflict resolution processes, and *calls upon* Member States to comply with their obligations for prosecuting persons responsible for such acts, to ensure that all victims of sexual violence, particularly women and girls, have equal protection under the law and equal acces to justice, and *stresses* the importance of ending impunity for such acts as part of a comprehensive approach to seeking sustainable peace, justice, truth, and national reconciliation' [OP 4] *All sexual violence crimes are now excluded from amnesty provisions and a link with international peace is made*
'*Requests* the Secretary-General to provide to Member States training guidelines and materials on the protection, rights and the particular needs of women, as well as on the importance of involving women in all peacekeeping and peace-building measures, *invites* Member States to incorporate these elements as well as HIV/AIDS awareness training into their national training programmes for military and civilian police personnel in preparation for deployment, and *further requests* the Secretary-General to ensure that civilian personnel of peacekeeping operations receive similar training' [OP 6]	'*Demands* that all parties to armed conflict immediately take appropriate measures to protect civilians, including women and girls, from all forms of sexual violence, which could include, inter alia, enforcing appropriate military disciplinary measures and upholding the principle of command responsibility, training troops on the categorical prohibition of all forms of sexual violence against civilians, debunking myths that fuel sexual violence, vetting armed and security forces to take into account past actions of rape and other forms of sexual violence, and evacuation of women and children under imminent threat of sexual violence to safety; and *requests* the Secretary-General, where appropriate, to encourage dialogue to address this issue in the context of broader discussions of conflict resolution between

	appropriate UN officials and the parties to the conflict, taking into account, inter alia, the views expressed by women of affected local communities' [OP 3]
	'Requests the Secretary-General, in consultation with the Security Council, the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations and its Working Group on relevant States, as appropriate, to develop and implement appropriate training programs for all peacekeeping and humanitarian personnel deployed by the United Nations in the context of missions as mandated by the Council to help them better prevent, recognize and respond to sexual violence and other forms of violence against civilians' [OP 6]
	'Requests the Secretary-General to continue and strengthen efforts to implement the policy of zero tolerance of sexual exploitation and abuse in United Nations Peacekeeping operations; and urges troop and police contributing countries to take appropriate preventative action, including pre-deployment and in-theatre awareness training, and other action to ensure full accountability in cases of such conduct involving their personnel' [OP 7]
	Specific training of troops on categorical prohibition of sexual violence now specifically mentioned
Training should be given on the protection of the rights and needs of women	
'Calls upon all parties to armed conflict to respect the civilian and humanitarian character of refugee camps and settlements, and to take into account the particular needs of women and girls, including in their design and recalls its resolutions 1208 (1998) of 19 November 1998 and 1296 (2000) of 19 April 2000' [OP 12]	'Requests the Secretary-General and relevant United Nations agencies, inter alia, through consultation with women and women-led organizations as appropriate, to develop effective mechanisms for providing protection from violence, including in particular sexual violence, to women and girls in and around UN managed refugee and internally displaced persons camps as well as in all disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration processes, and in justice and security sector reform efforts assisted by the United Nations' [OP 10]
The need to maintain a civilian character and take into account special needs in their design is emphasized	*The specific need to develop mechanisms in order to protect women and girls in and around the UN managed refugee camps is emphasized*
'Reaffirms its readiness, whenever measures are adopted under Article 41 of the Charter of the United Nations, to give consideration to their potential impact on the civilian population, bearing in mind the special needs of women and girls, in order to consider appropriate humanitarian measures' [OP 14]	'Affirms its intention, when establishing and renewing state-specific sanctions regimes, to take into consideration the appropriateness of targeted and graduated measures against parties to situations of armed conflict who commit rape and other forms of sexual violence against women and girls in situations of armed conflict' [OP 5]
No reference was made to any kind of sanction for perpetrators of violence and/or discrimination against women	*Sexual violence was now relevant for the specific country sanctions regimes*
	'Also requests the Secretary-General to submit a report to the Council by 30 June 2009 on the implementation of this resolution in the context of situations which are on the agenda of the Council, utilizing information from

	available United Nations sources, including country teams, peacekeeping operations, and other United Nations personnel, which would include, inter alia, information on situations of armed conflict in which sexual violence has been widely or systematically employed against civilians; analysis of the prevalence and trends of sexual violence in situations of armed conflict; proposals for strategies to minimize the susceptibility of women and girls in such violence; benchmarks for measuring progress in preventing and addressing sexual violence; appropriate input from United Nations implementing partners in the field; information on his plans for facilitating the collection of timely, objective, accurate, and reliable information on the use of sexual violence in situations of armed conflict, including through improved coordination of UN activities on the ground and at Headquarters; and information on actions taken by parties to armed conflict to implement their responsibilities as described in this resolution, in particular immediately and completely ceasing all acts of sexual violence and in taking appropriate measures to protect women and girls from all forms of sexual violence' [OP 15] *A Global report should have been due 30 June 2009*
No strategy was developed for any improvement in the information flow towards the United Nations Security Council	
'Calls on all parties to armed conflict to take special measures to protect women and girls from gender-based violence, particularly rape and other forms of sexual abuse, and all other forms of violence in situations of armed conflict' [OP 10] 'Special measures' to protect women and girls from sexual and gender-based violence mentioned; no concrete measures mentioned*	'Urges all parties concerned, including Member States, United Nations entities and financial institutions, to support the development and strengthening of the capacities of national institutions, in particular of judicial and health systems, and of local civil society networks in order to provide sustainable assistance to victims of sexual violence in armed conflict and post-conflict situations' [OP 13] *The need for specific measures in order to improve protection and assistance is mentioned*
No mechanisms for coordination were mentioned*	'Welcoming the ongoing coordination of efforts within the United Nations system, marked by the inter-agency initiative "United Nations Actions against Sexual Violence in Conflict," to create awareness about sexual violence in armed conflicts and post-conflict situations and, ultimately, to put an end to it' *The United Nations Actions against Sexual Violence in Conflict is welcomed as the coordination of effort within the United Nations system*
	'Demands that all parties to armed conflict immediately take appropriate measures to protect civilians, including women and girls, from all forms of sexual violence, which could include, inter alia, enforcing appropriate

	military disciplinary measures and upholding the principle of command responsibility, training troops on the categorical prohibition of all forms of sexual violence against civilians, debunking myths that fuel sexual violence, vetting armed and security forces to take into account past actions of rape and other forms of sexual violence, and evacuation of women and children under imminent threat of sexual violence to safety; and *requests* the Secretary-General, where appropriate, to encourage dialogue to address this issue in the context of broader discussions of conflict resolution between appropriate UN officials and the parties to the conflict, taking into account, inter alia, the views expressed by women of affected local communities' [OP 3] *Myths fuelling sexual violence are mentioned as cause of sexual violence and the need to debunk them is mentioned*
No references were made to the root causes of rape in war	
No references were made to the Peacebuilding Commission (since it was only to be established in 2005)	'*Stresses* the important role the Peacebuilding Commission can play by including in its advice and recommendations for post-conflict peace building strategies, where appropriate, ways to address sexual violence committed during and in the aftermath of armed conflict, and in ensuring consultation and effective representation of women's civil society in its country-specific configurations, as part of its wider approach to gender issues' [OP 11] *Specifically asks the Peacebuilding Commission on how to address sexual violence*

Adapted by the author of the example provided by PeaceWomen[76]

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[76]See:

http://www.peacewomen.org/assets/file/BasicWPSDocs/overview_of_security_council_resolution_1820.pdf