

Re-member Social Democracy

A multilevel regression analysis of the change in ideological positions of social democratic parties in 24 OECD countries between 1945 and 2015

Over time, social democratic parties (SDPs) have altered their ideological positions. An example of such a change is the third way, in which SDPs changed their ideological positions more towards the centre of the political left-right dimension. In this paper, I investigate how and why SDPs have changed their ideological positions, using the *Dataset on Social Democratic Party Competition*, which was created for the purpose of this thesis. Noteworthy, I show that these parties have shifted their ideological positions more towards the right over time. Subsequently, I developed and tested a theoretical framework for explaining the ideological change of SDPs, integrating spatial modelling theory and class cleavage theory. Applying advanced panel regression models, I identify explanations based on vote-seeking, office-seeking, policy-seeking, and intra-party democracy preferences. Furthermore, this thesis is the first to test the intra-party democracy preference by analysing the ideological position of party members in a large-N study. Thereby, I contribute to the existing literature by a) introducing a theoretical synthesis of standard party-ideology theories and b) systematically test these theories using data on SDPs between 1945 and 2015. The analysis shows that SDPs change their ideological positions: a) in the opposite direction to the median voter, b) away from the largest party in the party system, c) in the same direction as their party members, and d) more to the right if the working class is smaller.

Key Words: Social Democracy, Ideological Positions, Spatial Modelling, Party Change, Party Members, Party Preferences

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1. Introduction

With the fall of the Soviet Union, the main opposition and alternative to the neo-liberal model disappeared (Giddens, 1998, p. 27). This gave an incentive to social democratic parties (SDPs), which accepted the dominant claim of neo-liberalism, to move to the right (Mouffe, 2005, p. 31). This change was most illustrative in the United Kingdom. After the dominance of Thatcher in the '80s there was a need for the Labour Party (Labour) to shift to the right. SDPs had to find a new way to combine social justice on the one hand and economic prosperity on the other (Green-Pedersen and van Kersbergen, 2002, p. 508). This resulted in the 'third way' (Giddens, 1998). After the start of the third way, Labour was in office from 1997 until 2010 in which the party gradually moved to the left. However, the electoral defeat in 2010 made the party move to the centre again. Nevertheless, the 2015 leadership election of Labour resulted in the victory for Corbyn who is striving for a more economic left and progressive agenda (Policy Network, 2015; Green and Prosser, 2016, pp. 1307-1308). Such changes in SDPs did not only occur in the UK but also in several other OECD countries, for instance in Scandinavian countries (Arter, 2003, pp. 88-94) and in Australia (Keman, 2009, p.11). However, the academic literature mainly focusses on the rise of new party families such as populist parties, green parties and regionalist parties and had much less attention for the existing mainstream parties (Mudde, 2007; Richardson and Rootes, 2006; Hepburn, 2013). Therefore, this thesis focusses on how and why SDPs' ideological positions¹ in OECD countries have changed since 1945.

Important social and economic transformations pose challenges for many political actors, including SDPs (Fagerholm, 2014, p. 1). Because of new movements and parties who emerged on the left and on the right, SDPs had to rethink their ideological positions. Furthermore, the rise of globalization, the decline of the working class and the rise of individualism resulted in incentives for SDPs to reconsider their ideological positions (Fagerholm, 2014, p. 2).

1.1. Scientific Relevance

According to Adams et al., the research field on the change in policy positions of political parties is underdeveloped (2004, p. 589). In research on electoral politics, it is argued that political parties strategically change their policy positions between elections in order to improve their electoral performance (Dalton and McAllister, 2015, p. 761). It is often assumed that political parties act rationally; political parties are vote-seeking actors and their strategy is to maximize the number of votes they receive. Downs was one of the first to apply a rational choice approach to the study of political parties and their electoral competition (Downs, 1957). It was argued that political parties'

¹ I define ideological positions in this thesis as the position on the left-right political dimension.

rational behaviour can make them change their policy positions; they want to maximize their electoral support in order to control the governing apparatus (Downs, 1957, p. 137).

Many explanations for the change in ideological positions are theorized and tested on a diverse set of party families and countries (e.g. Harmel and Janda, 1994; Budge, 1994). Harmel and Janda argue that parties have certain strategies and these strategies determine the way parties change their policy positions. The strategies they define are the vote-seeking, the office-seeking and the policy-seeking party strategy (1994, pp. 269-271). From this, Harmel and Janda argued that certain factors can have an influence on the ideological positions of a political party. The explanations range from a change in leadership to a change in the electoral performance of the party in question (1994, p. 266-268).

Although the explanations of these authors are very diverse, the theoretical approach they use is very similar. They mostly use rational choice assumptions for their explanations. However, most research that tested these ideas empirically, lack these clear theoretical explanations. Often explanations are introduced because of positive findings in other research, but the theoretical mechanisms that underpin these explanations are not presented. This thesis contributes to the existing literature by introducing a clear theoretical approach from which expectations for the change in ideological position of SDPs can be deduced. I apply a rational choice approach in which I incorporate elements of both culture and structuralism. That way, I discard a narrow definition of agency and allow for structure in explaining the behaviour of SDPs. So clearly this thesis focusses on the supply side of politics: on political parties. However, both the internal supply side (i.e. the behaviour of the parties) and the external supply side (i.e. the institutional context and structure) are integrated in this thesis. I apply this rational choice approach to the spatial modelling theory in which voters and parties hold certain position on the left-right dimension. Next to a more general application of the spatial modelling theory, I incorporate the study of cleavages into the debate on the change in ideological position. Although cleavages are often used to explain the electoral success of political parties (e.g. Kitschelt, 1993), the effect on the change in ideological position of political parties has received less scholarly attention.

Next to introducing a clear theoretical approach to the study of the change in ideological positions of SDPs, I add to the existing literature by applying different party preferences. The existing literature distinguishes mainly between vote-seeking parties, office-seeking parties and sometimes policy-seeking parties (e.g. Schumacher et al., 2013; Somer-Topcu, 2009; Adams, 2012, see also: Müller and Strøm, 1999). I add the intra-party democracy party preference as introduced by Harmel and Janda (1994) and deduce hypotheses that allow for testing all of these

party preferences in order to test why SDPs have changed their ideological positions between 1945 and 2015.

1.2. Research Questions

Most literature on political party's ideological position change presumes that SDPs changed their ideological positions since 1945. However, there has only been limited comparative large-N research on whether and how exactly this change has taken place and how these changes differ between countries. Without the knowledge on how the SDPs have changed over the years, the question on why these parties changed seems less relevant. Furthermore, knowledge of the patterns of change can give important insights for introducing explanations for this change. Therefore, I start by answering the question:

To what extent and how has the ideological position of social democratic parties in OECD countries changed between 1945 and 2015?

After presenting an answer to the former question, the question on why these ideological positions change becomes relevant. After all, the main aim of this thesis is to improve the understanding on how SDPs have changed their ideological positions and how different theories and preferences are able to explain these changes. Hence, I also address the following question:

To what extent can the change in the ideological position of social democratic parties in OECD countries between 1945 and 2015 be explained by rational choice and are social democratic parties vote-seeking parties, office-seeking parties, policy-seeking parties, or intra-party democracy parties?

1.3. Societal Relevance

The findings of this thesis are relevant for all sorts of societal actors. First of all, despite the general drop in electoral support for these parties², the SDP family is one of the most important party families in OECD countries (Gallagher et al., 2011, p. 241). Therefore, these parties still represent a large electoral group and still influence political outcomes, which emphasizes the importance of this thesis. After all, a change in the ideological position of SDPs influences the way electorates are represented and affects the outcome of the political processes.

Second, this thesis addresses the question of how the SDPs' ideological position represents the interest of different groups of people. Wessels argued that:

² As I show in my analysis: an average electoral decline of more than 7,8% in the period 1945 – 2015.

“Representation is a complex phenomenon. It has been addressed from a variety of angles and dimensions and through different normative lenses. The smallest common denominator in normative terms, though, is that in a democracy there should be some match between the interests of the people and what representatives promote” (1999, p. 137).

It is relevant to understand what the role of voters and members is in determining the ideological positions of SDPs. Thereby it can spur a societal debate on the democratic legitimacy of the way ideological positions come about and the match between the interest of the electorate and the ideological positions of SDPs.

Third, SDPs are faced with different challenges, such as electoral decline, declining membership and increasing competition from new parties. This thesis highlights the potential causes of some of these challenges. How the ideological position of SDPs changed in the period 1945- 2015 can inform these parties and other actors with insight on how to overcome or address these challenges.

Lastly, information on how SDPs change can provide information to a wide range of interest groups that try to influence the ideological position of SDPs. Insight on why these parties change their ideological position and which preference drives this change can provide them with more information on how to influence these positions.

1.4. Structure of the Thesis

This thesis starts with a theoretical framework. Within this framework, I first elaborate on the subject under study; the SDPs. I present a clear definition of the SDP family. Next, I present a brief history of SDPs. The second part of the theoretical framework consists of an extensive literature overview with regard to the change of ideological positions of political parties in general and of SDPs specifically. The third part of the theoretical framework elaborates on the theoretical approaches that I incorporate in this thesis: a synthesis between rational choice, culture and structuralism. After this, I introduce four different party preferences. From the theoretical approach and the party preferences, I deduce hypotheses from spatial modelling theory that apply to the change in ideological position of political parties in general. Next, I deduce hypotheses that apply to SDPs from a specification of the spatial modelling theory: class cleavage theory.

The third part of my thesis is the data and measurements chapter. Within this section, I discuss the data, which is derived from over 50 different sources, the data structure and the methods that I use in this thesis as well as the operationalization of the variables I use in the analyses. The fourth chapter of this thesis, the analyses, consists of a presentation of the analyses that I conduct to give an answer to both of the questions under study in this thesis. To answer

these two questions, I conduct a quantitative analysis on data from 1945 until 2015 from 24 countries. Firstly, I start by presenting an overview of how SDPs have changed their ideological positions between 1945 and 2015. Secondly, I analyse whether these expectations make parties change their ideological positions to the left or to the right and how strong these shifts are.

The last part of the thesis is the conclusion and discussion chapter. In this chapter, I start by summarizing the most important findings of this thesis and formulate answers to the two questions under study. Second, I present the theoretical and the methodological contributions of this thesis. Furthermore, I discuss the most important drawbacks of this research. I end off by presenting interesting recommendations for further research in the field of political party competition.

2. Theoretical Framework

The theoretical framework starts with a definition of the SDP family. Next, I present a short history of SDPs. This history emphasizes the political and social importance of the SDP family. The third part presents an overview of the existing literature on the change in ideological positions. I structure these explanations according to two theories: the spatial modelling theory and the class cleavage theory. In the fourth part of this theoretical framework I discuss the theoretical approach that I use in this thesis to explain the change in ideological positions of SDPs. In this part, a synthesis between rational choice, structuralism and culture is presented. In part five, four different models of party preferences are discussed. Part six consists of an elaboration of the two theories I discuss in the literature review. I derive hypotheses from these theories, within the theoretical approach. Furthermore, I specify which of the hypothesis fit within which of the preferences.

2.1. Social Democratic Parties

According to Mair and Mudde, party families are best identified based on their shared origin and on their shared ideology (1998, pp. 223-224). The origins of the SDP family can be traced back to 1850 when there was a demand for the establishment of democracy within the political realm in society (Przeworski and Sprague, 1988, p. 13). With the emergence of bourgeois political institutions, the question was whether to oppose these political institutions or to use them as a political instrument. The first response came from the anarchists who argued that involvement in the bourgeois institutions would destroy the socialist movement (Droz, 1996, p. 33). The other response came from socialists, who embraced the opportunities that the political institutions offered. Several socialist parties were founded between 1884 and 1892 (Przeworski and Sprague, 1988, pp. 14-15). The socialist movement became dominated by social democracy, which advocates a moderate and parliamentary kind of socialism (Giddens, 1998, p. 9). Most of the SDPs have roots that can be traced back to the end of the 19th century or the beginning of the 20th century. SDPs therefore have a shared origin in the socialist movements of that time. However, in many countries SDPs emerged much later, because these countries were not full democracies around 1900. Mair and Mudde themselves acknowledge that this origin based approach indeed is best suited for West-Europe, but not applicable to the whole world (1998, p. 215). Therefore, it is also important to look at the ideology that is shared by SDPs.

The ideology of SDPs was quite revolutionary during the emergence of the party family. SDPs aspired to completely transform the economic constellation of the bourgeois society and foster the social liberation of the working class (Tingsten, 1973, pp. 118-119). They wanted to

destroy society's class division, remove all sorts of inequalities and injustice and abolish the exploitation of the working class (Przeworski and Sprague, 1988, p. 22). However, throughout the years, this revolutionary aspect of this party family was loosened. The best way to grasp the ideology of the SDPs nowadays is reconciling socialism with liberal politics and a capitalist society (Padgett and Paterson, 1991, p. 1).

A disadvantage of this ideology approach is that it is difficult to distinguish between ideological similarity because of being in the same party family or being in the same kind of party system. Furthermore, measurements of ideologies are difficult to compare and often biased towards West-European countries (Mair and Mudde, 1998, p. 218). Most of these ideology measurements do not even measure the real ideology, but something that is better quantifiable, such as policy positions (Berman, 2006, p. 9).

However, it is not in the scope of this thesis to rewrite or criticize the definition of the SDP family, nor to test whether SDPs fit within this definition. And, although social democracy is a broad term (Giddens, 1998, p. 10), I argue that nevertheless, based on the above mentioned criteria, a clear demarcation can be made on whether a certain party belongs to this party family or not. Therefore, a SDP, in this thesis, is a political party that strives for the improvement of people's welfare by correcting the effect of the free capitalist market, which has the tendency to be disadvantageous for the working class. Furthermore, SDPs advocate equality and solidarity between different groups within society. In the method section of this thesis, I discuss how I incorporate this definition in the analyses (Chapter 3).

2.2. Brief History of Social Democratic Parties

The 19th century brought political, economic and social transformations in Europe. On the one hand, capitalism flourished. On the other hand, there was a growing dissatisfaction with increasing inequalities. This fostered a backlash against liberalism and the need to find an alternative ideology (Berman, 2006, p. 20). The most successful alternative came from the left, in the form of Marxism. In a short period, Marxism's alternative was able to become dominant within the left parties. However, although support for orthodox Marxism rose, the inequalities and other social problems did not disappear. This led to an internal crisis within Marxism. Marx's theory had a deterministic assumption that socialism would replace capitalism. There was little room to think about how to come to socialism, since it would not occur through politics, but through the internal contradictions of capitalism (Berman, 2006, pp. 21-28).

This created a clash within the socialist movement between the orthodox Marxists and the revisionists. The first group argued that participation in government harms the socialist movement. The second argued that the socialist movement enhances society through the

participation in parliament and in government. This clash persisted to divide the socialist movement until World War I (Berman, 2006, pp. 47-57). It was Lenin who inspired many socialists to choose the democratic path. Lenin rejected the determinism of Marxism and argued in favour of political action. This, together with an increase in globalization and population growth in Europe resulted in a more non-Marxian form of socialism that relied more on nationalism (Berman, 2006, pp. 67-68). Hence, World War I had offered the revisionist movement within socialism to start a movement of its own. Many socialists were convinced that orthodox Marxism had become politically irrelevant. This resulted in the emergence of, among others, social democracy and SDPs. Furthermore, SDPs got the opportunity to get into office in many countries after World War I (Berman, 2006, pp. 96-98).

Since the Second World War, the pursuit for economic prosperity and social justice became an important objective for SDPs. With regard to economic policy, the general strategy of SDPs was Keynesianism. Keynesianism is the use of fiscal policy in order to ensure full employment (Hay, 2007, p. 188). However, since the 1970s, Keynesianism produced some macro-economic failures which made this strategy unable to govern the economy effectively (Green-Pedersen and van Kersbergen, 2002, p. 508). Since this strategy proved not to be effective anymore, and since SDPs still want to be competitive in terms of votes, a new strategy had to be found (Green-Pedersen and van Kersbergen, 2002, p. 508). The need for a change of strategy is further strengthened by the fact that most SDPs have been in a (coalition) governments. This has put even more pressure on having an effective strategy of combining the promotion of social justice and the control over the economy (Green-Pedersen and van Kersbergen, 2002, p. 508). The alternative strategy that was chosen is the 'third way' (Giddens, 1998). The third way is a strategy in which on the one hand the market is given superiority on some issues, but on the other hand, an important role is ascribed to the state. According to Giddens, the third way is taking the effects of globalization seriously, adopts a positive attitude towards it, and combines a neo-liberal endorsement of free trade with a focus on social justice and equality (1998, p. 64). The first and second part make the third way different from old social democracy, the last part distinguishes it from neo-liberalism (Green-Pedersen and van Kersbergen, 2002, p. 513). Partly due to this change in ideology and partly due the importance of the SDP family in the post-war period, there is no other party family which received more academic attention.

2.3. Literature Review

In this part, I review the most important literature on the change in ideological positions of political parties. To structure this review, I start by giving an overview of the most important

literature for the change in ideological positions of political parties in general. Some stimuli are expected to have an influence on the ideological positions of all political parties regardless of the parties' background or political family. Second, I discuss the literature that focusses on the parties on the left side of the left-right political dimension, or on the SDP family specifically.

2.3.1. General Explanations

The first influence on the ideological position of political parties in general has to do with the previous electoral performance of a party (Fagerholm, 2016, p. 504). Budge theorized in his 'past election' model, that a party responds to the outcome of the previous election (1994, p. 453). A party knows in what direction on the left-right dimension it shifted its position after the previous election. Furthermore, a party can compare its vote share to its vote share after the previous election. This information gives a party insight in whether a certain shift on the left-right dimension has been successful or not. From this, a party moves further in the same direction when a party has gained votes. After all, this indicated a successful shift. If the party has lost votes, the party changes the ideological position in order to regain the previous lost votes (Budge, 1994, pp. 453-454). The empirical results found for this explanation are rather mixed. Some authors find that there is no support for this hypothesis (Adams et al., 2004, p. 602). Others find that this effect only happens under certain conditions and is therefore not a sufficient cause and some find a significant effect of the previous electoral performance on the change in ideological positions of political parties (Janda et al., 1995, p. 189) According to Somer-Topcu, the effect of the previous electoral performance is moderated by the time between the current and the past election; the more recent the previous election, the stronger the effect of an electoral defeat (2009, p. 246). Therefore, I argue that there is some, but mixed, evidence that parties respond to the past election results and that these responses are moderated by the time between the current and the previous election (Fagerholm, 2016, p. 504).

The second explanation that influences a political parties' position on the left-right dimension is a shift in public opinion. On a theoretical level, it is argued that parties are reactive to a change in public opinion, but only if the public opinion shifts away from the position of the party (Adams et al., 2004, pp. 602-603). The argument is that a disadvantageous shift to either the left or the right gives more incentives to a party to change position than an advantageous shift in public opinion. This is because a shift in the disadvantageous direction induces pressure on a political party to shift their ideological position in order to avoid losing votes and to improve the probability of getting into office. Empirical tests of this hypothesis show positive results for mainstream parties, but not for niche parties (i.e. green, nationalist and radical-right) (Adams et al., 2004, p. 593; Schumacher, 2013, p. 467, Ezrow et al., 2011, p. 285).

A third general explanation for the shift in ideological positions of political parties is derived from change within the party. When focusing on the changes within the party for explaining changes in the ideological positions of political parties, there is a clear departure from the treatment of parties as unitary actors. Instead, parties are regarded as complex organizations composed of many individuals (Meyer, 2013, p. 169). These individuals have different roles within the party, ranging from party leaders who make key national decisions to activists who carry out the main party operations (Harmel and Janda, 1994, p. 274-275). From this point of view, political parties have a changing internal structure that affects their ideological positions.

Three causes for the change in ideological positions within a party can be distinguished. The first is a change in party leadership. It is argued that a change in leadership may have an effect on the ideological positions since a new leader may be an indicator for a broader commitment to change (Harmel and Janda, 1994, p. 266). However, empirical research does not support this theoretical explanation (Fagerholm, 2016, p. 503). The second cause for change is a change in the dominant faction within a party. A faction is defined by Zariski as a grouping of members with a common identity, acting together to achieve certain goals within the party (1960, p. 33). A change in dominant faction is argued to be important for a change in the ideological position of a political party. This is because a change in the dominant faction is, even more than with regard to the party leader, an indicator that there is a change of view within the party. However, also the empirical evidence for this explanation is scarce (Fagerholm, 2016, pp. 503-504). The third often mentioned internal-party factor for changing ideological positions is a change in the intra-party structure. It is argued that the internal structure and the change in this structure affect the ability of a party to change its ideological positions (Fagerholm, 2016, p. 504). However, the empirical research on the effect of a change in the party structure is relatively new. Nevertheless, it provides limited support for this explanation (e.g. Meyer, 2013, pp. 170-176; Schumacher et al., 2013, pp. 472-474). In conclusion, the effect of these internal party changes on the ideological positions of political parties is missing convincing empirical evidence. The strongest findings result from those analyses that combine multiple of the above mentioned internal party changes. For example, Harmel et al. find that a combination of both a faction change and a leadership change triggers the political party to change its position on the left-right dimension (1995, p. 17).

The fourth explanation for the shift in the ideological position of political parties in general is the governmental status of a political party. This theoretical idea is mainly derived from Meyer, who argues that government parties have more media attention and therefore, the political parties' change is more visible to voters. The expectation is that government parties are

more likely to change their positions (2013, p. 148). This in turn leads to the expectation that opposition parties are less likely to shift their ideological positions (Fagerholm, 2016, p. 505). Schumacher et al. empirically demonstrate this finding and claim that opposition parties are less likely to shift their position than parties in government, but only if the party organization is strong (2013, p. 467). Therefore, it is argued that a government party is more likely to change its ideological position (Fagerholm, 2016, p. 505).

Fifth, global economic changes are presented as explanations for the shift in political parties' ideological positions (Fagerholm, 2016, p. 506). There is a consensus on the notion that international economic conditions affect national policy making (Garrett and Mitchell, 2001, pp. 145-146). Therefore, the global economy has a potential to influence the ideological positions of political parties on the domestic level. Some have argued that because of globalization, there is a convergence around neo-liberal ideological positions (Crough, 1997, pp. 358-359). This means that parties on the left are forced to move to the right. Adams et al. have put this hypothesis to the test and have found empirically that indeed parties adjust their ideological positions to changing global economic conditions, but this only applies to centre and right parties. Furthermore, Adams et al. find that left parties are not, or less than centre and right parties, responsive to short-term changes in the global economic conditions. These findings counter the idea of a neo-liberal convergence (2009, pp. 626-627). Therefore, it is argued that parties shift their ideological positions in response to changing global economic conditions. However, this mainly applies to centre and right parties (Fagerholm, 2016, p. 506).

Finally, an explanation that is not based upon the actual left-right placement but upon the relative placement in relation to other parties is presented by the exciting literature. This model assumes theoretically that a party wants to differentiate itself from other parties. Therefore, the party changes its positions in the same direction as the 'marker' party, an ideological similar party (Budge, 1994, p. 454). The cause of party change is in this case a shift of the ideological positions of rival parties. When this hypothesis was put to the test empirically, it turned out that indeed parties respond to ideological positions of other parties and even more to changes of parties which are in the same ideological family (Adams and Somer-Topcu, 2009, pp. 836-837). Therefore, parties are responsive to the ideological positions of other parties within and outside the party system and especially of those parties that are ideologically similar.

These explanations for the shift in ideological positions of political parties fit within the spatial modelling theory. This theory has a long history within the study of political parties' change in ideological positions. The spatial modelling theory assumes that voters have certain policy preferences and that parties offer a range of policies during the elections. Within the

ideological space in which voters and parties position themselves, voters support the party that is closest to their preferences. Based on knowledge about the positions of the voters, parties change their ideological positions in order to achieve specific goals (Congleton, 2004). Since the spatial modelling theory offers such important explanations for the change in the ideological positions of political parties, I use this theory to come to expectations myself in the end of this chapter. However, before I move on to this theoretical discussion, I first discuss the literature on the change in ideological positions of political parties that applies mainly to parties on the left or to the SDPs specifically.

2.3.2. Explanations for Social Democratic Parties

Although the literature on the change in ideological position of political parties in general provides interesting explanations for this thesis, there are other interesting explanations that apply to the political parties on the left end of the left-right dimension, or only to the SDP family.

The most important explanation that applies to the SDP family is the change in the class structure of society. SDPs traditionally are supported by the working class. Any change in this working class or the structure of classes in society affects the support for SDPs. This in turn leads to a change of the ideological positions of SDPs. This explanation is especially important for the SDP family since this party is a product of the worker-owner cleavage (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967, pp. 54-55). Cleavages are deep divisions within society that allow political parties to mobilize their electorate on. The worker-owner cleavage (or class-cleavage) is a division between on the one hand workers (labourers) and on the other hand owners (employees). It is expected that a change in this cleavage or the importance of this cleavage makes parties change their ideological positions. Furthermore, the change in class structure is important since it did not only change the preferences of the supporters of SDPs, it also affected the group of supporters itself.

Traditionally, SDPs get their support from the working class. However, this working class became a smaller proportion of society since World War II. Due to the development of the welfare state and the growth of the service sector, a new middle class emerged, which became the largest segment of the population in West-Europe (Kriesi, 1998, p. 168). The working class mainly voted for SDPs because of economic reasons. However, economic differences were less able to motivate the new middle class to vote for SDPs (Jansen, 2011a, p. 126). Furthermore, the remaining working class became less likely to vote for SDPs. This remaining working class favoured non-economic issues (i.e. environmental issues) more and more. Moreover, the traditional economic issues on which the SDPs appealed to them became less relevant (Knutson and Scarbrough, 1995, p. 519). This resulted in a steady decline of working class support for SDPs.

The decline in support of the working class forced SDPs to rethink their ideological positions. Especially after the fall of the Soviet regime, SDPs have shown an abandonment of some welfare state issues and started to accept a more market-focused economy (Clark et al., 1993, pp. 308-309). Furthermore, SDPs have responded to the rise of post-material values by including ecological values in their manifestos (Fagerholm, 2014, p. 18).

In the next part of this thesis, I introduce the theoretical framework I apply in this paper. Second, I use this theoretical framework to deduce expectations from both the general spatial modelling theory and the specific class cleavage theory. However, some hypotheses I present differ from the existing literature. This is because I argue that some explanations as presented by the existing literature are missing a coherent theoretical basis, on which I elaborate in the next part of this thesis.

2.4. Theoretical Approach

The existing literature presents interesting explanations for the change in the ideological positions of SDPs. However, problematic in the existing literature is the lack of theoretical grounding of these explanations. Often, explanations are introduced because of positive findings in previous studies, but miss a clear theoretical mechanism. This is problematic since missing a theoretical mechanism causes us to label correlations that are not actually related directly, as causal relations. To give an example of how this creates problems I present an example in which the theoretical mechanism is obviously missing. I turned out that when more firefighters were extinguishing a fire in a building, the damage to this building was higher. When testing, we would probably find a correlation between the number of firefighters and the damage and therefore label it as a causal relation. However, a logical theoretical mechanism is missing. It turned out that a bigger fire was the cause of both more firefighters sent to the fire and the damage that the fire caused, which theoretically makes sense. In conclusion, we might label correlations wrongly as causal relationships when the theoretical mechanism is missing. Therefore, it is important to present this theoretical mechanism for each hypothesis that is presented.

In order to present well underpinned scientific explanations, I argue that clarity on three levels is needed. On the first level, a certain theoretical approach is needed (on the meta level) which defines the theoretical assumptions of the theories. Within the second level, different theories, within the boundaries of the theoretical approach as defined on the first level, try to explain certain outcomes. On the third level, different models that describe what motivates actors, are needed. Only if those three levels are defined, useful hypothesis can be presented. Figure 2.1 illustrates how these three levels are structured in this thesis.

I start with the first level in this part of the chapter, in which I define the theoretical assumptions I use in this thesis. In part 2.5. of this chapter, I present different models of party strategies. Within these models, different preferences of SDPs are discussed (level 3). Part 2.6. of this chapter presents the theories of the second level. These theories fit within the theoretical approach and use the different models of preferences to deduce expectations about why SDPs change their position on the left-right dimension. Finally, I present hypotheses that can be derived from these different expectations.

The theoretical approach I use in this thesis is rational choice. I first elaborate on this approach within social scientific research. Furthermore, I discuss differences within the rational choice approach and explain the type of rational choice approach I use to present my explanations for the change in the ideological positions of SDPs. I discuss the critiques of both structuralism and culture on the rational choice approach. Finally, I present a theoretical synthesis which allows incorporating the critiques of both structuralism and culture within rational choice approach.




Figure 2.1: Theoretical structure of the thesis.

2.4.1. Rational Choice

Rational choice is a theoretical approach to come to theories to study social phenomena (Coleman, 1990, p. 2). The emphasis within the rational choice approach is on “*rational and strategic individuals who make choices within constraints to obtain their desired ends, whose decision rest on their assessment of the probable actions of others, and whose personal outcomes depend on what others do*” (Levi, 1997, p. 23). This definition of the rational choice approach is called a thin definition of rational choice. This means that the features that characterize this definition are broad. Adding more specific features to this definition would make the definition thicker. Nevertheless, the three main features of the rational choice approach can be deduced from this thin definition. A more

specific rational choice approach, in which I synthesize culture and structuralism within the rational choice approach, is presented at the end of this part of the chapter.

There are three main features of the rational choice approach. First, theories within the rational choice theoretical approach all start with a certain type of actor. Second, these actors have preferences; actors value certain 'goods' over others. Applied to SDPs, it might be that certain parties value getting into government over getting more votes. Third, actors have a range of alternative actions to choose from. These three features are broad and how these features are used within specific theories differs from theory to theory. There is discussion on which actors are relevant, what the preferences of these actors are and which alternatives they can choose from. In the next sections, I elaborate on each of these three features and address the problems and alternative interpretations these features face. I start by discussing the type of actors this thesis focusses on. Second, the preferences of the actors are discussed. Third, the alternatives that actors face are presented. In conclusion, I apply these three features to SDPs.

The first feature of the rational choice approach is that actors are important. Although rational choice theorists often explain social phenomena on the macro level, they do this by referring to individual level properties: "*Only actors are able to feel, believe and prefer and a society does not exist without these actors*" (Lichbach, 2003, pp. 32-33). The approach in which all knowledge is derived from individuals is called 'methodological individualism'. By this it is meant that all macro level outcomes are explained by behaviour of actors on the micro level; it offers the micro foundations of macro processes (Levi, 1997, p. 23). This methodological individualistic approach fits within the debate on causal mechanisms in the social science in which it is argued that simple macro-macro relationships are unsatisfactory to explain social phenomena (Hedström and Ylikoski, 2010, pp. 58-59). Although, actors are often referred to as individuals, they can be all sorts of actors on the micro level, from people to complex organizations. In this thesis, the actors on the micro level are the SDPs.

The second feature of the rational choice approach is that actors have certain preferences. However, specific rational choice theories and models differ in what these preferences are. Abell argues that preferences are dependent upon the actor's belief about the consequences of the action and the appeal of certain actions or perceived consequence (2000, p. 234). Each actor assesses its expected costs and benefits of each alternative and then act in accordance with the actor's particular preference (Levi, 1997, pp. 23-24). Although the rational choice approach is clear about this rational behaviour of political parties, what the specific preference are differs. When applied to SDPs, it might be that different parties want to achieve different goals.

However, they all act rational. So what rational behaviour is for each specific party preference differs.

The third feature of the rational choice approach is that there are certain alternatives to choose from. Rational choice theorists agree that there has to be a choice. There have to be some behaviour alternatives otherwise there is no (rational) choice to make (Simon, 1955, p. 102). There are some 'classical' rational choice theories which assume wealth-maximization in which the range of alternatives solely derives from the internal consideration of the actor (e.g. in many economic theories). However, in reality, actors face other constraints that influence their range of alternatives. One of the constraints is scarcity. This can be scarcity with regard to time, money or other resources (Levi, 1997, p. 25). Contemporary rational choice theories use a weak model of information availability in which actors do not have access to all information. Because of this information scarcity, actors are information satisfiers who do the best they can (Simon, 1982, p. 295). Within the rational choice approach, actors make rational decisions when they face situations of uncertainty (Levi, 1997, p. 23). The two other constraints are offered by the critiques of culture and structuralism. However, before I elaborate on these criticisms, I first discuss the way the behaviour of actors is understood by the 'classical' notion of rational choice. Second I discuss an alternative approach which allows for other constraints on the alternatives that an actor can choose from.

Within actor-theoretic research in social sciences, there is a longstanding debate on how actors should be understood. This debate is also known as the 'embeddedness debate'. This debate can be traced back to Hobbes who argued that individuals are *asocial* beings and are in a permanent war of each against all (Udehn, 2002, pp. 480-481). Within the framework of methodological individualism, the complexity of the embeddedness debate can be brought back to the dispute between two camps, or two ends of a spectrum (Scharpf, 1997, p. 20). On the one end, strong methodological individualist are positioned. Strong methodological individualists argue that everything that social scientists try to explain is the result of the decision of some individual units (Arrow, 1959, p. 42). In this approach, institutions are seen as an endogenous variable; institutions are a result of human behaviour (Udehn, 2002, p 500). On the other end of the spectrum, it is argued that motivations and preferences, and thereby actions of actors, are shaped by social norms and institutionalized rules; weak methodological individualists. The weak methodological individualists argue that culture and institutions are important for explaining interaction between actors (Scharpf, 1997, p. 21). Within this approach, institutions are seen as an exogenous variable; institutions are the antecedent of the behaviour of actors (Coleman, 1994, p. 171).

To exemplify this weak methodological individualistic approach, I refer to Coleman's boat or 'bathtub' (see figure 2.2) (Coleman, 1990). Coleman's boat shows that a particular factor on the macro-level has an effect on the preferences and possible alternatives of actors (arrow 2). Next, from these preferences and alternatives certain individual actions follow (arrow 3). Arrow 4 tries to explain how actions of the individual actors lead to certain macro-level outcomes. In short, it shows how the rational choice perspective explains a macro-macro relationship (arrow 1) through the other three relationships. To give an example of each of the relationships, I refer to the relation between the improvement of social conditions and revolution. The macro relationship is that improved social conditions lead to revolution. The macro to micro relationship (arrow 2) is about how improved social conditions make individuals frustrated. The third arrow in Coleman's boat refers to how frustration among individuals leads to aggression, which ultimately results in revolution on the macro level (arrow 4) (Coleman, 1990, p. 10). So the macro-macro relationship operates through the micro level and is an abstraction of the micro-level effects (Coleman, 1990, p. 12). The rational choice approach tries to present models for the arrows 2, 3 and 4 in order to understand the arrow 1 relationship. The use of Coleman's boat makes the rational choice approach more ambitious than traditional approaches, which try to establish a causal macro-level relationship; it tries to theorize the micro-foundation (Hedström and Swedberg, 1996, p. 129; also see: Kittel, 2006).




Figure 2.2: Coleman's boat.

Source: Coleman (1990)

Arrow 2 in figure 2.2 exemplifies the main difference between the strong and the weak methodological individualists. The latter allows the macro-level (or environment) to have an effect on the behaviour of individuals on the micro-level. This is because the behaviour of actors is partly determined by the structure of the system according to the weak methodological individualists. However, the strong methodological individualists argue instead that phenomena are explained by solely referring to individuals.

Although the weak and the strong version of methodological individualism seem to be mutually exclusive, most approaches in the social science combine the two (Scharpf, 1997, p. 21). Furthermore, there are certain assumptions shared by both of these methodological individualistic approaches. As argued above, both approaches fit within methodological individualism. Both approaches believe that all knowledge about society derives from the knowledge of individuals. However, if and to what extent actors are embedded in their environment is debated (Udehn, 2002, p. 486). Furthermore, both the weak and the strong methodological individualistic approaches agree that actors have certain preferences and a range of alternatives to choose from. Both of the above mentioned approaches thus fit within the thin definition of rational choice. Nevertheless, weak methodological individualism allows for a different view on the alternatives that actors face than strong methodological individualism.

I discuss the alternatives that actors are faced with further by introducing the two main criticisms on the rational choice approach; culture and structuralism. By using a weak methodological individualistic approach, I show in the next part how I incorporate these two critiques into the rational choice approach. Culture is a theoretical approach which puts emphasis on the role of identification and the idea that an actor has certain internal constraints because of this identification (Ross, 1997, p. 47). Culture mainly criticizes the way rationality is used by rational choice theories. In the classical rational choice approach, actors are acting rationally and respond to a change in the external environment. According to Alexander and Giesen, the behaviour of an actor can therefore be calculated based on the external environment (1987, p. 13-14). This is of course a paradoxical conclusion; rationalist start from within the actor (i.e. preferences lead to action), but explain behaviour by looking at the environment (Lichbach, 2003, p. 43). So it implies that actors only can follow their environment; a no-choice situation (Blaug, 1992, p. 154).

Another critique is presented by structuralism. Structuralism is a theoretical approach that argues that actors follow the rules of the structure that actors are in. Structuralists argue thereby that macro-level factors explain individual behaviour. Within the macro-level structure, actors are seen as 'rule-following satisfiers' (Thelen and Steinmo, 1992, p. 8). This structure (or environment) can be seen as concrete rules or laws, but also includes the distribution of resources, the actors' place within the social hierarchy and social networks (Sil, 2000, pp. 357-358). Rational choice theory however, argues that only through individual-level mechanisms, we can deduce explanations within the social science.

Structuralism's critique on this focus on the individual-level is two-folded. First, it is argued that multiple lower-level processes can lead to the same macro-level consequence. This means

that by using methodological individualism only sufficient processes are detected, not the necessary ones (i.e. there is more than one causal mechanism that leads to a particular macro-level outcome) (Wendt, 1999, p. 152). Second, the link between the micro and the macro-level might be context dependent. This means that only taking into account the micro-level variables does not always reveal the macro-level outcomes (Lichbach, 2003, p. 47). This can lead to finding certain micro explanations for macro outcomes that are in fact driven by macro causes according to Kincaid (1988, p. 265). So, structuralism argues: an explanation in which macro outcomes are explained by micro-foundations is problematic because action and structure are often autonomous and interactive. Therefore, focusing solely on micro theories is always presenting an incomplete picture and social explanations should contain more than individual-level elements (Lichbach, 2003, p. 47).

The critiques of culture and structuralism mainly focus on the 'classical' notion of rational choice. However, these critiques can be incorporated when the weak version of methodological individualism is applied. Therefore, I get rid of the strong version of methodological individualism and use a weak version of methodological individualism in this thesis. Many rational choice theorists recognize culture's critiques on determinism within the thin version of rationality (Lichbach, 2003, p. 44). For example, they argue that information is not always perfect or almost never perfect (Hedström and Swedberg, 1996, p. 128). By acknowledging that information is often imperfect and costly, a model becomes more realistic. Therefore, I get rid of the assumption that information is perfect and free. Furthermore, contemporary rational choice theorists agree that only looking at the individual-level does not give the complete picture. Therefore, a weak version of methodological individualism should be applied. However, the rational choice approach which allows for weak methodological individualism is still different from structuralism. It does not imply that findings are explained directly by structural factors, without the interference of individuals. The weak methodological individualistic approach does however allow structure to influence the behaviour of individual actors (Hedström and Swedberg, 1996, p. 131). I therefore allow more structure into the rational choice approach by losing the idea of strong methodological individualism and allow for weak methodological individualism. In this use of the rational choice approach, there is room to take both explanations of the culturalist approach and the structuralist approach into consideration. The advantage of such an approach is that certain macro-level factors are brought into the explanations (Hedström and Swedberg, 1996, p. 131). This can be done while holding on to the basic framework of the rational choice approach; actors that have certain preferences and have a range of alternatives to choose from.

Applied to the change in ideological positions, the actors under study are SDPs. The alternatives that these SDPs choose from are, as indicated in the discussion above, limited by the structure that the parties are embedded in. Furthermore, the effect of these alternatives is sometimes uncertain because of limited access to information. The question remains what the preferences of the SDPs are. I distinguish four different preferences: (1) attaining as many votes as possible, (2) increase the probability to get into office, (3) increase the influence on the policy-making process and (4) representing the will of the party members. Now I have discussed the alternatives that a SDP can choose from in the former section, the next section focusses on the different preferences a SDP has. I argue that different preferences lead to different expectations and therefore also apply these different preferences to the theories that I present in section 2.6. to derive hypotheses.

2.5. Political Parties' Preferences

The rational choice approach which allows for incorporating the critiques of both structuralism and culture, can be used in the field of comparative politics research and, more specifically, applied to the change in the ideological position of SDPs. This part of the thesis discusses the different party preferences that fit within the rational choice approach I apply in this thesis.

In 1957, Downs was one of the first to apply a rational choice approach to the study of competition between political parties. He argued that parties rationally change their ideological positions to maximize the electoral support they receive in order to get control over the government. Downs' model fits within the rational choice approach since it applies a methodological individualistic approach. Furthermore, Downs argued that political parties have certain preferences and have a range of action alternatives to choose from. The model of Downs relies on the classical rational choice approach in which all actors act completely rational (Downs, 1957, p. 137). Downs model of party competition is what I classify as the 'vote-seeking' party preference, since the goal for political parties is to maximize the number of votes they receive in an election: "*political parties in a democracy formulate policy strictly as a means of gaining votes*" (Downs, 1957, p. 137). Building upon Downs, three other models of preferences for SDPs emerged, using the rational choice approach (Strøm, 1990, pp. 566–568; Harmel and Janda, 1994, p. 271). I label these alternative preferences the 'office-seeking' party preference, the 'policy-seeking' party preference and the 'intra-party democracy' party preference. These party preferences try to explain how political parties respond to certain input; what their strategies are. These four types of party preferences all fit within the rational choice framework as described above; actors, SDPs, have a range of alternatives to choose from and have certain preferences. However, these four party types differ with regard to their preferences; what type of 'goods' they value.

I discuss the four types of party preferences in the next part. First, I discuss the vote-seeking party which goal is to maximize its electoral support. The second is the office-seeking party. This party tries to maximize the probability to get into office. The policy-seeking party is the third party preference I discuss. The policy-seeking party's preference is to maximize the party's influence on public policy. The last preference I present is a party type in which representing the preferences of the party members is the main goal; the intra-party democracy party.

2.5.1. The Vote-Seeking Party

The vote-seeking party finds its origin in Downs's theory on party competition (1957). According to Downs, parties are composed of 'a team of men', who seek to maximize electoral support in order to control the government; to get into office (1957, p. 137). In Downs' theory, this is the only aim that parties have. According to Downs, parties seek votes in order to attain the income, power, and prestige of being in office. Although this can also be linked to the office-seeking party, Downs' idea fits better within the vote-seeking party, because the parties adjust their positions in order to attract more votes.

The vote-seeking party is different from the policy-seeking party since the formulation and implementation of policy is only a by-product of being in government. Furthermore, vote-seeking parties do not aim to serve their own party members. This differentiates the vote-seeking party from the intra-party democracy party (Downs, 1957, p. 137).

Downs is not explicit about the justification of the vote-seeking assumption. Therefore, his model is discussed and improved by many authors. Some have argued that in particular voting systems (such as a multi-district system), it might be more 'rational' to try to maximize the probability of winning a contested seat than to focus only on maximizing the number of votes (Robertson, 1976). After all, an increase in votes in these contested seats increases the possibility to get into office. These alternative models also belong to the tradition of the vote-seeking party since the parties aim to get votes to serve the office ambitions (Strøm, 1990, pp. 566-567). Downs does recognize the complexity of competition within a multiparty system compared to a two-party system. However, he still argues that winning more seats increases the change a party has to enter a coalition (Downs, 1957, p. 159). So, if parties have a vote-seeking preference, they are expected to change their ideological position if they expect that this change has a positive effect on the amount of votes they receive during the next elections.

2.5.2. The Office-Seeking Party

The office-seeking party does not prefer to maximize the number of votes the party receives, but to maximize the control over political office (or the probability to do so). Riker was one of the

first to recognize this preference (1962). He reacted to Downs: “*Downs assumed that political parties [...] seek to maximize votes. [...] I shall attempt to show that they seek to maximize only up to the point of subjective certainty of winning*” (Riker, 1962, p. 33). Winning, according to Riker, means getting into office. The office-seeking party is therefore in pursuit of office benefits. These office benefits are the private goods that are received by governmental and sub-governmental appointments; it is about holding the portfolios within a government. The motive for office-seeking parties is not the electoral success or the policy effectiveness, but the mere pursuit of the office benefits (Strøm, 1990, p. 567). The difference between an office-seeking party and a vote-seeking party is not distinguishable within a pure two-party system. After all, if a party wins the election (by winning the majority of the votes) in a two-party system, it also gets control over the government. The most important difference between the office-seeking party and the vote-seeking party is found within multiparty systems. In most multiparty systems, governments are in need of a coalition of two or more parties (Laver and Scofield, 1998). Therefore, the relationship between parties is different from a two-party system. Parties compete during election time, but cooperate afterwards in order to get into office. This influences the behaviour of the parties and thereby their competition. For example, parties in a multiparty system are less likely to aim a negative campaign towards another party than in a two-party system (Elmelund-Præstekær, 2008, pp. 33-34). Furthermore, there is more uncertainty about where deflecting voters go to after changing ideological positions.

The office-seeking party’s ideological position is affected by influences that directly affect their (potential) participation in government. For example, it might be the case that party A changes in a direction away from party B. This makes it less likely that party B is able to form a coalition government with party A and thereby reduces party B’s chance to get into office. This provides party B with the incentive to change its ideological position towards party A, if party B is an office-seeking party (Harmel and Janda, 1994, p. 270).

2.5.3. The Policy-Seeking Party

The third party preference that I distinguish is the preference of the policy-seeking party. In such party type, the preference is the maximization of the effect on public policy. This preference was offered as a solution for the ‘policy-blind’ critique on the vote-seeking and the office-seeking preferences and is perfectly illustrated by the quote of Henry Clay, a U.S. Senator in 1838: “*I’d rather be right than president*”. The assumption is that while office-seeking parties mainly strive for office, for the policy-seeking party it matters with which parties a coalition is formed, since it aims for a particular policy. For policy-seeking parties, it is less important to maximize the number of votes they receive or the likelihood to get into office.

The policy-seeking party is different from the office-seeking party since for the former it matters what kind of coalition the party joins (Budge and Laver, pp. 486-487). It does not even require a party to join a coalition. Influencing the policy making process can also occur by supporting minority governments or ad hoc support of policies that fit within the policy-seeking party's policy goal. The policy-seeking party is different from the vote-seeking party since gaining more votes is not the key aim of the party, it aims for particular policy. Since within this preference the party seeks a particular policy, it is least likely to change the ideological position of the party. This is because a change in the ideological position would mean a move away from the desired policy.

However, shocks closely related to the party's preferred policy are important for policy-seeking parties. A change in the ideological positions can be due to the changing nature of a certain issue which is related to a party's preferred policy. For example, the reduction of the amount of nuclear weapons in Europe can be seen as a shock for environmental parties which, until that time, had nuclear non-proliferation high on the agenda. Although in this example, the shock was due to a success (from the party's standpoint), this can also result from a failure (Harmel and Janda, 1994, pp. 270-271). So, there is a possibility within the policy-seeking preference to change the ideological position of a party, however, it is difficult.

The policy-seeking party is clearly visible when we look at minority governments. The opposition party that support the minority government (either permanent or ad hoc) has given up the benefits of getting into office, but still enforce policy concessions for legislative votes (Budge and Laver, 1986, pp. 487-491). Such an arrangement between government parties and opposition parties is in line with the policy-seeking party, but does not fit within the office-seeking party.

2.5.4. The Intra-Party Democracy Party

The intra-party democracy party is less concerned with what happens outside the party and more with what happens within the party. For intra-party democracy parties, representing the wishes of the party members is the main goal. A change in the wishes (i.e. demands) of the party members influences the ideological positions of the party. Another source of change is a change in party system or in society. These changes can alter the composition of the party's membership. An example of such a change is that of the agrarian parties that faced a decline in the number of farmers as party members. Thereby, the makeup of the party members changed, whereby the parties themselves had to become less agrarian focused. The agrarian parties shifted more to the centre of the ideological space in order to keep representing the wishes of their party members (Harmel and Janda, 1994, p. 271).

Within an intra-party democracy party, it is likely that party members are all involved in the formulation process of the party policy and thereby influence the ideological position of the party. This involvement increases the legitimacy of the party and thereby creates more support among the members. Whether parties adapt their constitutions in response to public demands, as a marketing tool to improve their legitimacy or because of the party leaders' desire to remain the party leader, is debated (Gauja, 2013, p. 116; Luebbert, 1996, p. 46). Nevertheless, in recent years, more parties have opened up their policy making process in order to give their members a greater role within this process (Whiteley, 2011, p. 26). However, parties differ significantly in the way they allow their members to have an actual influence on the policy development of the parties (Gauja, 2013, p. 117). Furthermore, party members often differ in their preferences. Mulé argues that party leaders are often vote-seekers and activists are more often policy-seekers (1997, p. 503).

Although the four party preferences are different, they do not all result in different expectations with regard to the behaviour of political parties. The next section of this thesis introduces the theories I use to deduce expectations from, for the shift in the ideological position of SDPs. In the discussion of the theories, I use the four different party preferences to derive different expectations. Some preferences result in multiple expectations with regard to the cause of change in the ideological position of SDPs. Furthermore, some expectations result from more than one preference. The four different preferences are nevertheless an insightful addition to this thesis since they allow me to deduce different expectations from the same theories. In figure 2.3, the theoretical structure of this thesis is further completed with the different preferences I discussed.




Figure 2.3: Theoretical structure of the thesis.

2.6. Theories of Political Parties' Change in Ideological Positions

In this part of the chapter, I discuss two different theories to explain the change in the ideological positions of SDPs (level 2 of figure 2.3). The two theories I use in this thesis are the spatial modelling theory and the class cleavage theory. These theories are presented as two different theories in the theoretical structure (figure 2.3). However, the class cleavage theory fits within the framework of the spatial modelling theory. Nevertheless, a distinction between the spatial modelling theory and the class cleavage theory is useful since the former applies to political parties in general while the latter applies specifically to SDPs. Both the spatial modelling theory and the class cleavage theory argue that actors have certain preferences and a range of alternatives to choose from. Therefore, they both fit within the broader rational choice approach as presented in section 2.4. (Level 1 of figure 2.3). Next to discussing the two theories, I incorporate the four different preferences as discussed in the former section (level 3 of figure 2.3). Furthermore, I deduce expectations that follow from these preferences within the theories. I present falsifiable hypotheses that are derived from these expectations for the change in ideological positions of SDPs, which I test in the fourth chapter of this thesis. I discuss the operationalization of the variables of the different hypotheses in the data and measurements section.

2.6.1. Spatial Modelling Theory

Within spatial modelling theory, there are two actors: voters and political parties. Both voters and parties are assumed to be self-interested. Voters recognize their own self-interest and evaluate different parties' ideological positions on the basis of which of these positions serves their self-interest best. Voters thus vote for the party which ideological position is closest to theirs. In short, this means that voters are rational (Enelow and Hinich, 1984, p. 3).


Next to the voters, political parties are rational as well. Every political party positions itself somewhere on the left-right dimension. They are aware that changing their policies affects their position on the left-right dimension. Furthermore, parties see the connection between their ideological position and the amount of votes the parties receives (Enelow and Hinich, 1984, p. 3).

Spatial modelling theory fits within the rational choice approach since it implies certain actors: political parties. Furthermore, these parties have certain alternatives to choose from. Political parties decide either to hold on to their ideological position or to change the position either to the left or to the right. The parties change their ideological position when they expect that this change serves their self-interest. This self-interest is based on the preference of the political party, whether this is vote-seeking, office-seeking, policy-seeking or intra-party democracy. Furthermore, the spatial modelling theory fits within the weak methodological individualistic approach; I focus on SDPs as the actors, but also take the effect of the

environment that the SDPs are embedded in into account. So, SDPs are expected to take their environment, such as the distribution of voters and the behaviour of other parties, into consideration.

Spatial modelling theory starts from an artificial position in which parties and voters represent particular points across the policy space (Laver, 2005, p. 266). In first instance, voters vote for the party that is closest to their ideological position (Congleton, 2004, pp. 707-711). Based on the outcome of that election, parties have the opportunity to respond to the support of voters. Once parties have adapted their policies, voters again vote for the party closest to their own ideological position and switch parties if another party has come closer to their ideological position (Laver, 2005, p. 266). Consequently, parties respond to the outcome of the next election and this process repeat itself constantly; voters respond to a change the in ideological position of parties and parties respond to the change in support of voters. This process is illustrated by figure 2.4.

The most well-known application of the spatial theory is the median voter theory. This theory argues that a party that is closest to the median voter always wins the election (Black, 1958). The idea is that within a two party system, the median voter splits the voting pool into two groups of the same size. Therefore, the party that is able to attract the median voter is closest to more than half of the electorate. Therefore, this party wins the elections. However, this is applicable to a pure



Political parties respond to change in support of voters and change their ideological position in accordance to a particular strategy

Figure 2.4: Dynamic of party competition.

two party system which only exists theoretically³. Nevertheless, when applying the idea of the mean voter theory to a multiparty system, interesting expectations can be derived.

When applied to the vote-seeking preference, parties are expected to maximize the number of votes they receive. It is expected that a vote-seeking party holds an ideological position within the distribution of voters where it receives the most votes, without risking the competition of another party. So when a party is positioned at position Q in figure 2.5, it is likely that it responds to a change in the position of the median voter. Thereby it follows the change in peak of the voter distribution. If, for example, the peak shifts to the left, P is closer to Q's peak. Therefore, by also shifting to the left, Q prevents its competitors to benefit from the change in ideological position of the mean voter. So, by changing its ideological position in line with the change of the ideological position of the median voter, the vote-seeking party tries to achieve its goal; maximize the number of votes they receive.




Figure 2.5: Distribution of voters in multiparty system (Downs, 1957, p. 143).

Therefore, a SDP is expected to change its ideological position in response to a change in the position of the median voter. It is expected that there is a positive relationship between the ideological position of the median voter and the ideological position of the parties. If the median voter is moving more to the right, the peak of voters is moving away from the party. In order to maximize the number of votes, a SDP is expected to move to the right. A similar mechanism applies when the median voter is moving to the left. This expectation is similar to that of Adams

³ However, the United States is close to this theoretical ideal. See: Gaines (1999, p. 857).

et al.'s and Ezrow et al.'s, who find consistent support for this hypothesis for SDPs (2004, p. 601; 2011, p. 286). The hypothesis that can be deduced from this, using the vote-seeking preference, is:

The more the ideological position of the median voter is right, the more the ideological position of a social democratic party is right. (H1)

Although this mechanism is mainly derived from the vote-seeking preference, this mechanism might also apply to the office-seeking party. After all, increasing the number of votes might increase the possibility to be an important factor in government formation.

When a SDP has an office-seeking preference within a multiparty system, a party is expected to change its ideological position to increase the probability to get into office. On the one hand, an office-seeking party wants more votes, which increases their importance in the party system and thereby the probability to get into office (Green-Pederson, 2004, p. 325). However, on the other hand, moving away from potential coalition partners decreases the probability to get into office. After all, coalitions are more likely to be made by parties who are ideologically connected or close to each other (Strøm, 1990, pp. 567-568). Office-seeking parties thus have to take their environment into account in order to achieve their goal. Since the actions to increase the votes they receive are limited by the position of other parties, an office-seeking party is not expected to change its ideological position in the same way as the vote-seeking party. The office-seeking party is less likely to change its ideological position in line with the change of the ideological position of the median voters if this increases the relative distance to the largest party in the party system. So, although an office-seeking party is expected to change its ideological position in reaction to a change in the ideological position of the median voter, this effect is moderated by the position of other parties in the party system. A party is more likely to get into office when it is close to the party that is most likely to get into office; the largest party in the party system. If the SDP is the largest party itself, a shift to the second largest increases the probability to get into office. Being close to this second largest party increases the probability to create a majority. The following hypothesis can be derived from this, using the office-seeking preference:

The association between the more right position of the median voter and the more right position of a social democratic party is stronger when the distance to the largest other party decreases than when the distance to the largest other party increases. (H2)

Although this mechanism mainly applies to the office-seeking party preference, this expectation can also be derived from the policy-seeking party preferences. A party with a policy-seeking preference enhances the possibility of influencing the policy outcome when it receives more votes. This increase in vote share is only effective for influencing the policy-outcome if the party joins a coalition. However, the position of the largest other party is thereby important. After all, if the party is moving away from the largest party, the SDP limits the possibility to form a coalition, which reduces the possibility to reach its goal; implementing certain policies. Therefore, although hypothesis 2 mainly applies to the office-seeking party preference, it does also fit within the policy-seeking preference. With regard to the intra-party democracy party, it is also not expected that the party responds to a change in the ideological position of the median voter. After all, an intra-party democracy party is not expected to respond to changes external to the party.

Next to the expectations that are derived from the median voter theory, others used the spatial modelling theory in order to deduce other expectations (e.g. Kollman et al., 1992; Kollman et al., 1998; Laver, 2005). Using the four different preferences I presented in section 2.5, some other expectations for the change in the ideological positions of SDPs can be deduced. Furthermore, I discuss the different expectations and present hypotheses for each of these expectations.

To deduce useful hypothesis for the change in the ideological positions of SDPs, I focus on those factors that influence the preferences that parties have. As argued in the part on the theoretical approach, parties act rational in order to achieve their goals. They are therefore expected to change their ideological positions when these goals are affected.

An indicator that can be used by political parties is the position of the largest party. The idea of this indicator is that in an environment with limited information on the voters' positions, a party does not have the information on the best ideological position to achieve its goal. However, the information that there are more voters located close to another party is much easier to obtain; other parties are able to acquire a higher share of the votes. Therefore, for a vote-seeking party, the position of the largest party indicates where on the left-right dimension more voters are located. Since a vote-seeking party tries to maximize the number of votes it receives, the party is expected to move towards this position on the ideological position where most voters are located. So, until the vote-seeking party is the largest party, it changes its position on the left-right dimension towards the position of the largest party in order to maximize the number of votes it receives. If the vote-seeking party is already the largest party in the party

system, a shift towards the second largest party can create the opportunity to take away some of the latter's vote share whereby the vote-seeking party's vote share is maximized even more.

Applied to the office-seeking party, the largest party is indicating the position on the left-right dimension where most votes are located. By moving towards the largest party in the system, a party increases the probability to get into office. The largest party has often the initiative when it comes to formation of a coalition (Schofield, 1993, p. 11). Next to increase the probability to become the largest party itself, being close to the largest party increases the probability that the largest party wants to get into a coalition with the office-seeking party. So, moving towards the largest party increases the probability that a party gets into office. The following hypothesis can be derived from this, using the vote-seeking and the office-seeking preferences:

When the largest party in the party system is to the right of a social democratic party, the ideological position of a social democratic is more to the right than when the largest party in the party system is to the left of the social democratic party. (H3)

The policy-seeking party's goal is to influence the policy-making process. Although moving towards the largest party in the party system might increase the probability for a policy-seeking party to get into office, it matters for a policy-seeking party what kind of coalition it joins (Budge and Laver, 1986, pp. 486-487). Getting into office increases the probability of a policy-seeking party to influence the policy making process. However, if the largest party is positioned at the other side of the left-right dimension, moving towards this position makes the party move away from its own goal; implementing certain policies. Therefore, the extent to which the policy-seeking party is responsive to the position of the largest party is moderated by the ideological distance between the policy-seeking party and the largest party in the system. The hypothesis that can be derived from this, using the policy-seeking party preference, is:

The association between the relative position of the largest party and the more right position of a social democratic party is stronger when the distance to the largest party is smaller. (H4)

Although hypothesis 4 is mainly applicable to the policy-seeking party preference, it can also be derived from the office-seeking party preference. A party is more likely to get into government if its position is closer to the largest party in the party system. The drive to shift towards the largest party in the party system might be stronger when the relative distance to this party is smaller.

After all, this increases the likeliness to get into office. Therefore, hypothesis 4 is also applicable to the office-seeking party.

The position of the largest party is irrelevant for the intra-party democracy party. As argued, the intra-party democracy party is interested in satisfying the needs of the party members. The position of the largest party is not influencing the extent to which an intra-party democracy party is able to satisfy the needs of its members. Therefore, it is not expected that the position of the largest party is influencing the ideological position of an intra-party democracy party.

The main goal for intra-party democracy parties is representing the wishes of the party members. The behaviour of these parties is thus constrained by the policy preferences of the current party members. An intra-party democracy party is therefore expected to change its ideological position if the ideological position of the party members changes. Another reason for an intra-party democracy party to change its ideological position is a change in the composition of the party members. A change in membership influences the mean ideological position of these members. Since the party wants to meet the demands of the party's members, such a change makes a party change its ideological positions. According to Müller and Strøm, this behaviour is especially applicable to SDPs (1999, pp. 292-293). Müller and Strøm, argue that SDPs such as the Dutch Labour Party (*Partij van de Arbeid*) and the Danish Social Democrats (*Socialdemokraterne*) are influenced more by their party organization (i.e. members) compared to other party families. This is partly explained by the parties' dependence on the party organization and labour organizations for the provision of resources (Müller and Strøm, 1999, p. 294).

Since the intra-party democracy party wants to meet the demands of its members, the party is expected to change its ideological position in the same direction as the change in the mean party members' ideological position. By doing so, the intra-party democracy party keeps its ideological position in line with the ideological position of the party members. The hypothesis that can be derived from this, using the intra-party democracy preference, is:

The more the mean ideological position of party members is right, the more the ideological position of a social democratic party is right. (H5)

When the change in the ideological position of the mean party member is applied to the other three preferences, it is not expected to result in a change in the ideological positions of SDPs. A change in the ideological position does not affect a party's possibility to achieve more votes, to get into office or to influence the policy-making process. Therefore, this indicator is only relevant

for parties which seek to represent the wishes of their party members: intra-party democracy parties.

The spatial modelling theory as presented above applies to political parties in general. However, the actors of interest in this thesis are not all political parties, but SDPs. Therefore, I turn to a theory that is especially interesting when focusing on the SDP family; the class cleavage theory.

2.6.2. Class Cleavage Theory

The class cleavage theory is a specification of the spatial modelling theory in which parties have a certain ideological position and voters vote for the party that is closest to their own ideological position. The expectations I presented in the former section, applied to the change in ideological positions of political parties in general. The class cleavage theory is a specification of the spatial modelling theory that applies more specific to SDPs. This theory is mainly based on Lipset and Rokkan's seminal work on the emergence and persistence of political cleavages in Europe (1967). A cleavage is a deep division within society in which groups are conscious of their identity as a group and are willing to act on the basis of this collective identity (Kriesi, 1998, p. 167). It is argued that competing social groups on both sides of the cleavage furnish a base of electoral support and a set of political interests that parties try to cover. The expectation furthermore was that cleavages would persist for a long time (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967, p. 50). The strength of cleavages to shape political competition was due to the deep divide between the values of groups on both sides of the cleavage. Furthermore, social groups that represented both camps offered a strong organizational basis for political parties (Dalton, 1996, p. 321).

The most studied cleavage is the worker-owner cleavage (also the class cleavage). This cleavage was according to Lipset and Rokkan rooted in the industrial revolution and represented the conflict between on the one hand labourers and on the other hand employers (or workers against owners) (1967, pp. 46-50). The class cleavage was reflected in class voting; political parties focused their policies towards a specific class, and members of that class supported that political party. The working class supported parties on the left, which advocate expansion of the welfare state and the redistribution of wealth. The owning class supported parties that opposed governmental intervention and advocated an economy based on the free market (Jansen, 2011a, p. 20). Lipset and Rokkan saw this cleavage as an important cleavage that was able to shape all party systems, at least in West-Europe. Furthermore, they argued that the SDP family arose from this cleavage (1967, pp. 54-55).

The class cleavage can be simplified into the left-right dimension. A more left-wing position represents a position that represents the workers and a more right-wing position

represents the position of the employers (Inglehart, 1984, p. 25). SDPs strive to improve people's welfare and focus mostly on the working class. Here, the working class is, in Marxist terms, defined as non-ownership of the means of production and the creation of surplus value due to labour; primarily blue-collar workers (Kitschelt, 1993, p. 300). Since SDPs have a party program which appeals to this working class, it is likely that blue-collar workers vote for the SDPs. After all, by applying working class policies, SDPs are likely to be closest to the blue-collar workers' ideological positions. However, the extent to which SDPs appeal to blue-collar workers differs between countries and over time, depending on the preferences that these parties have. I now turn to the discussion on how the different preferences of a SDP influence the way these parties change their position on the left-right dimension.

SDPs are assumed to pursue policies that mainly benefit the working class. However, SDPs are also political parties that have certain preference. These preferences alter the extent to which they are pursuing working class policies (Przeworski and Prague, 1988, pp. 101-102). If a SDP has a vote-seeking preference, it is expected to maximize the number of votes. If the working class is large in a country, a SDP receives more electoral support from this working class by moving towards them on the left-right dimension. So, it increases its electoral appeal by moving to the left. However, if the working class is smaller, the electoral benefits of solely appealing to this group shrink. Therefore, it becomes more fruitful for a SDP to shift to the right on the left-right dimension in order to be appealing to a wider range of voters. A SDP gets more support from the working class, if the working class in a country is growing. Therefore, it is more inclined to shift its ideological position to the left in order to maximize the number of votes it receives. Applied to the intra-party democracy party, a change in the size of the working class can change the make-up of the party members. Ergo, if the size of the working class is decreasing, it is likely that relative fewer members are part of the working class. Therefore, the mean ideological position of the party members changes. This would give the intra-party democracy party an incentive to change its ideological position. This expectation is already tested directly through hypothesis *H5*. Nevertheless, this expectation does give insight in part of the theoretical expectation as derived from the intra-party democracy preference. After all, a conformation of both expectations might indicate that the decrease in the size of the working class indeed makes it more likely for a SDP to change its ideological position to the right since the decline in the size of the working class has changed the make-up of the membership of SDPs⁴. The hypothesis that is derived from the class cleavage theory, using the vote-seeking and the inter-party democracy preference, is:

⁴ Note: this indirect relationship is not formally tested by testing hypotheses 5 and 6.

The smaller the size of the working class, the more the ideological position of a social democratic party is right. (H6)

If a SDP's preference is getting into office, it is expected that this party is not merely focussing at increasing the number of votes it receives. Although attaining more votes increases the probability for a political party to get into office, the relative distance to other parties in the party system is taken into consideration. If the working class shrinks, an office-seeking party is able to attract more votes by moving to the right, just like the vote-seeking party. However, it might decrease the parties' probability to get into office. As argued above, the positioning of the largest party in the party system is crucial for a party's probability to get into office. Therefore, office-seeking parties are expected to adapt their ideological positions in response to a change in the size of the working class, however, the behaviour of the party is restricted by the position of the largest other party in the party system. Therefore, the hypothesis that can be derived from the class cleavage theory, using the office-seeking preference, is:

The association between the size of the working class and the more right position of a social democratic party is stronger when the distance to the largest other party decreases. (H7)

When the change in the size of the working class is applied to the policy-seeking party preference, it is not expected to result in a change in the ideological positions of SDPs. After all, the size of the working class does not influence the probability of a policy-seeking party to influence the policy process.

Lipset and Rokkan argued that the party system and thereby the cleavage structures were frozen after the extension of the suffrage in Europe (1967, p. 50). However, others have disagreed with this statement. Some focused on the 'defreezing' of the European party systems while others argued that the party systems have never been frozen at all (Shamir, 1984, p. 69; Lane and Ersson, 2007, p. 101; Alonso and Rovira Kaltwasser, 2015, p. 27). Certain cleavages within society bring competition on certain issues between parties. However, a change in these cleavages also changes the issues that parties compete on. When this endangers their preference, the change in cleavages provides parties with incentives to change their ideological positions.


It has been argued that cleavages have transformed and weakened as predictors of electoral choice since World War II (e.g. Lipset, 1981, p. 505; Nieuwebeerta, 1995, p. 195; Pukulski and Waters, 1996, p. 132). The decline of the class cleavage has multiple causes. First, the standards

of living of the worker class (blue-collar workers) have risen, while there was an increase in low-paid white-collar workers, which almost levelled the standards of living between these groups (Evans, 2000, p. 405). Second, new values, issues and cleavages have cross-cut or even replaced the class conflict (Manza et al., 1995, p. 144). Third, the rising level of education has increased the voters' ability to vote independently of class-related motives (Dalton, 1996, p. 332). Furthermore, due to industrialization, the number of working class labourers has declined (Jansen, 2011a, p. 123). Therefore, it is expected that the hypothesis that is derived from the social class cleavage is less able to explain the change in ideological position of SDPs throughout the years. This expectation mainly fits within the vote-seeking party preference. After all, the decline in salience of the class cleavage, reduce the need for parties to change the ideological position due to a change in this cleavage. After all, people are less likely to vote according to this cleavage. The hypothesis that is derived from this, using the intra-party democracy preference, is:

Over time, the association between the decrease in the working class size and the more right position of a social democratic party is weakened. (H8)

However, it has to be noted that there is some controversy about the deterministic relationship between the change in social classes and the changes in political competition. It was often assumed that a changing nature of social classes would change the political competition. However, it has been argued that the strategies of parties influence class voting as well. This implies that when parties would advocate 'class-relevant' policies, class based voting would increase (Evans, 2000, pp. 410-411). According to Przeworski and Sprague, by appealing to voters in general and not to the working class specifically, SDPs leave room open for voters to vote because of religion, regions or ethnicity (1988, pp. 45-46). Therefore, a decline in class voting might be the result of the 'catch-all' strategy of political parties and not its cause.

In figure 2.6 the complete theoretical structure of this thesis is presented. Table 2.1 presents a summary of the hypotheses together with the theories and preferences. An X indicates that the hypothesis is derived from that particular party preference. The preference from which the hypothesis mainly is derived is indicated by a bold X.






Figure 2.6: Theoretical structure of the thesis.

Table 2.1: Summary of hypotheses, theories and preferences.

Hypotheses	Theory	Preference			
		Vote-seeking	Office-seeking	Policy-Seeking	Intra-Party Democracy
The more the ideological position of the median voter is right, the more the ideological position of a social democratic party is right. (H1)		X	X		
The association between the more right position of the median voter and the more right position of a social democratic party is stronger when the distance to the largest other party decreases than when the distance to the largest other party increases. (H2)			X	X	
When the largest party in the party system is to the right of a social democratic party, the ideological position of a social democratic is more to the right than when the largest party in the party system is to the left of the social democratic party. (H3)	Spatial modelling theory	X	X		
The association between the relative position of the largest party and the more right position of a social democratic party is stronger when the distance to the largest party is smaller. (H4).			X	X	
The more the mean ideological position of party members is right, the more the ideological position of a social democratic party is right. (H5)					X
The smaller the size of the working class, the more the ideological position of a social democratic party is right. (H6)		X			X
The association between the size of the working class and the more right position of a social democratic party is stronger when the distance to the largest other party decreases. (H7)	Class cleavage theory		X		
Over time, the association between the decrease in the working class size and the more right position of a social democratic party is weakened. (H8)		X			

3. Data and Measurements

In this chapter, I discuss the research methods, data and the operationalisations that I use in this thesis. First of all, I discuss the research approach that I apply in this thesis. I apply a quantitative study on SDPs in 24 OECD countries from 1946 until 2015 to explain the change of SDPs in these countries, over time. Secondly, I discuss structure of the data that I use in this thesis. Thirdly, the country selection is discussed. Fourthly, the operationalisation of the dependent variables is discussed after which I present the operationalisation of the independent variables. Next, I introduce the control variables that are added to the analyses. In the final section of the Data and Measurements chapter, the different methods that I apply are discussed and justified.

3.1. Research Approach

The aim of this thesis is to discover why SDPs change their ideological positions over time. A range of research approaches are suitable for this aim. Case studies have the advantage that they provide in-depth information on one or more specific cases (Eisenhardt, 1989, pp. 546-547). They can provide new information on why SDPs change their ideological positions. On the other hand, large-N studies have the advantage that they allow for comparing a large number of cases which enables to find explanations that are applicable to a large population. Since the aim of this thesis is to compare a wide variety of countries over a large timespan, the latter research approach is more suitable. After all, to gather in-depth information on SDPs in all countries for the whole period is infeasible within one study. Practical limitations such as language barriers and time limitations are the main cause for this infeasibility. Furthermore, such in-depth studies limit the comparability between countries because of context-specific explanations. In order to overcome these problems, I apply a quantitative (large-N) approach. This allows me to compare SDPs across many countries over a long period of time. Furthermore, a quantitative study allows for formal hypotheses tests.

3.2. Data

To study the change of SDPs' ideological positions, I compiled a new dataset: the *Dataset on Social Democratic Party Competition* (DSDPC). This dataset is a rich source of information on relevant variables regarding the change in ideological positions of SDPs. The DSDPC-file is particularly distinctive with regard to the number of countries and period that is covered in the dataset. Data on a variety of variables is included on 24 democracies from 1945 until 2015.

The most important data that is used to construct the DSDPC-file is derived from the Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP), in which party programs of political parties are coded

(Comparative Manifesto Project, 2016). The CMP data is created in order to study political parties' policy positions (Comparative Manifest Project, 2015). Moreover, other important information on political parties is included in the CMP data, such as the number of votes a party received in a specific election. Therefore, the CMP data is useful for this thesis since it covers a large amount of countries and contains information on the relevant variables used in this thesis. Next to the CMP data, data from various other sources is used to compile DSDPC-file. Data on voter and party member characteristics are derived from multiple surveys conducted by the Eurobarometer (EB), the World Values Survey (WVS) and the European Values Survey (EVS) (European Commission, 2015; WVS, 2016a; EVS, 2015a). Data on the composition of governments is derived from ParlGov (ParlGov, 2016). Furthermore, data on the size of the working class is derived from the comparative dataset on cleavage voting as compiled by Giedo Jansen (2011b). In the operationalization part of this chapter, the sources of the specific variables are discussed.

3.2.1. Structure of the Data

The data within the DSDPC-file is multilevel data. The data consists of different time-points (years) which are nested in clusters (countries or SDPs). So the data is essentially pooled time-series cross-section data (pooled data). Such a structure of the data comes with certain advantages. Pooled data offers a remedy for the small-N problem which is a notorious problem in case of a time-series analysis and especially in case of a cross-section analysis. Furthermore, it allows to control for certain exogenous shock in time by controlling for the time effects or to control for country specific biases by controlling for the country effect (Plümper et al., 2005, pp. 328-329). However, pooling data also poses some additional problems. First, errors of observations might be auto correlated, which means that they are dependent from one time period to the other. Second, errors in the observations tend to be heteroscedastic; the variance of the errors is different in different countries. Third, errors are likely to be correlated between units because of exogenous shocks such as an economic crisis. And lastly, errors might be auto correlated and heteroscedastic at the same time (non-spherical) (Plümper et al., 2005, p. 329).

When talking about pooled data, two types of data structures are distinguished: Time-Series-Cross-Section (TSCS) and Panel data (Beck, 2001, p. 273). Reflecting on which of the two data structures I am dealing with is important since it implies different analyses (Beck, 2001, p. 274). Often, the proportion of the N relative to the T is used as an indication on what kind of data structure someone is dealing with. If data involves a large N and a small T, it is regarded as Panel data. If $T > N$ however, it is regarded as TSCS. Within the DSDPC-file, the T is larger than the N.

This would imply a TSCS data structure. However, in this thesis, there are no time-invariant or almost time-invariant variables. Therefore, I treat the data as panel data.

3.3. Case selection

The goal of the thesis is to include as many SDPs as possible in order to increase the possibilities to generalize the findings. However, due to theoretical or methodological reasons, some SDPs are excluded from the analysis. I limit the scope of the countries that I include to countries that are members of The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). The selection is limited to OECD countries both because data on other countries is limited and because countries outside OECD countries are, on average, less stable democracies with less stable party systems (if at all). Furthermore, in some of the OECD countries, there is a lack of comparative data⁵, or a clear SDP that participated in at least three elections is missing⁶. The demarcation of three elections is chosen because of methodological reasons. If a party participated in less than three elections, data on a former election period is missing. SDPs in the rest of the OECD countries are similar enough to compare them. Although this is often debated with regard to the eastern European countries, Camia and Caramani argue that ideological identities of party families are much stronger than the geographical identity of parties (2012, p. 75).

In those countries with more than one SDP, I selected one. In case of multiple SDPs, the (electorally) largest SDP in the party system was chosen. According to this demarcation, I was able to distinguish a single SDP in most countries. If the electoral size of two or more SDPs was similar, the party which participated in most elections was selected. This is the case in Belgium in which the Francophone Socialist Party (*Parti Socialiste*) and the Flemish Socialist Party (*Socialistische Partij* or *Socialistische Partij Anders*) both attained between ten and fifteen percent of the vote each year. In this case, the Francophone Socialist Party was chosen because this party participated in more elections. After this selection, one country remains a borderline case; Italy. Although the Italian Socialist Party (*Partito Socialista Italiano*) (PSI) was electorally more successful and also participated in more elections, I selected the Italian Democratic Socialist Party (*Partito Socialista Democratico Italiano*), due to the socialist history of the former party. If a party has become a SDP over time, it is likely that it shifted to the right. However, the goal of this thesis is to measure the ideological change of SDPs and not the change of socialist parties to SDPs. Including the PSI can therefore lead to a bias towards a more right position throughout the year because of the shift from socialist party to a SDP.

⁵ As is the case for Chile, Estonia, Israel, Korea, Mexico, the Slovak Republic and Slovenia.

⁶ As is the case for Latvia, Poland, Turkey and the United States.

Excluding all others, 24 SDPs remain across 24 countries; Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. A complete list of the SDPs that are included in the DSDPC-file can be found in appendix 3.1. Next, appendix 3.2 displays boxplots of the ideological positions of all countries over time. As can be observed, the interquartile box ranges between the -40 and 0. Furthermore, the amount of outliers is relatively low. These boxplots therefore indicate that talking about a ‘SDP family’ makes sense using the data from the DSDPC-file. This conclusion is even further supported by the distribution of the ideological positions of SDPs (appendix 3.3.), which indicates that ideological positions are close to each other and close to the normal distribution.

3.4. Operationalisation

In this section, I discuss the variables that I use in the analyses. I start to discuss the dependent variable that is used in this thesis; the ideological position of SDPs. Next, I discuss the independent variables that are applied in the analyses. In the third part of the operationalization, I introduce the control variables that are considered important in the existing literature and relevant for this thesis.

3.4.1. Dependent Variable

The extent to which a party positions itself on the left-right dimension is translated into the **rightness of party** variable. Data for this variable is derived from the CMP (Comparative Manifesto Project, 2016). Within this dataset, information on election programmes and policy positions of all significant political parties from over 50 countries from 1945 until 2014 is available. The party programmes are used since they provide the only reliable observation of a party’s position at the time of an election (Adams et al., 2004, pp. 594-595). Manifestos are of course only a proxy of the real policy positions of political parties. Nevertheless, the content of the manifestos is often heavily debated at party conventions, which emphasize that the content of these manifestos is important (Adams et al., 2004, p. 595).

The manifestos are cut into (quasi)sentences and coded according to 57 categories covering almost all policy issues (e.g. education, welfare, agriculture and environmental protection). Policy categories are coded as either left or right issues and turned into a left-right dimension (*rile*), which runs from -100 (left) to +100 (right) (Budge et al., 2001, p. 796). Budge and Meyer specify the categories that indicate either a left or a right position (2013a, p. 88)⁷.

⁷ For a complete overview of the CMP’s coding procedure see appendix 2 of Budge et al. (2001).

The CMP data is not without critiques. Most of these critiques regard the reliability of the hand coded content analyses (Mikhaylov et al., 2008, pp. 2-3). Hand coding is claimed to increase validity while computerized schemes for the estimation of the ideological position of political parties is praised for its perfect reliability. It is of course difficult to address what the real change of the ideological position of SDPs is. However, alternatives to the CMP data do not perform better with regard to the validity (Gabel and Huber, 2000, pp. 98-102; Budge and Meyer, 2013a, p. 100). This validity and the amount of information on which the measurements of the CMP data are based, I qualify the data as reliable enough for the purpose of this thesis. Furthermore, the CMP, compared to other measurements of party positions, is able to display more within party family variation and more cross-country variation (Klingemann et al., 2006, pp.75-79). This serves the goals of this thesis, since I focus solely on one party family. Besides, an alternative that include a temporal variance and are comparable and consistent across many countries, is missing (Budge and Meyer, 2013b, pp. 23-24). Expert surveys, for example, are not suitable for this purpose since they take the national context into consideration, while positions should be measured within the same policy space (McDonald et al., 2007, p. 75).

3.4.2. Independent Variables

Data on the **rightness of voters** is derived from multiple Eurobarometer surveys. This variable contains data on the mean ideological position of the voters within a country. Several of the Eurobarometer surveys contain a question that is similar to the following question: “*In political matters people talk of "the left" and "the right". How would you place your views on this scale?*” (Gesis, 2016a). The scale ranges from ‘1’ to ‘10’ in which ‘1’ represents ‘left’. The Eurobarometer surveys are limited to countries that are, or are likely to become, members of the European Union (EU). Thereby, the data that is derived from the Eurobarometer contains limitations with regard to time and geographical area. Therefore, for those countries that are excluded from (some of the) Eurobarometer surveys because of their geographical position or the timing of accession to the EU, data from either the World Values Survey or the European Values Survey was collected. According to Inglehart and Welzel, there are ‘remarkably similar cross-national patterns’ between the World Values Survey and the European Values Survey (2010, p. 556). Results from these surveys are therefore considered to be identical. Questions on the ideological position of respondents are comparable to the question asked in the Eurobarometer surveys. The resulting rightness of voters variable can run from ‘1’ to ‘10’ in which ‘10’ is right. An overview of the data collected for this variable is presented in appendix 3.4.

The variable **largest party on the right** is based upon the position of the largest other party and the ideological position of the SDP. If the largest other party has a higher score on the left-

right dimension (i.e. on the right of the SDP) it is labelled as '1'. Data for this variable is derived from the CMP dataset. The resulting variable is a dummy variable with the largest party on the left as reference category.

The **rightness of party members** is derived from the Eurobarometer, the World Value Survey and from the European Value Study. Eurobarometer are surveys commissioned by the European Commission that consist of on average 1000 face-to-face interviews (European Commission, 2016). Multiple surveys of the Eurobarometer asked respondents questions on party membership and ideological positions.

Since there is not a direct question on whether people are members of SDPs, I used a proxy to derive this information. Some Eurobarometer surveys questioned respondents whether they are member of a political party. There is often a general question on whether a respondent is a member of an organization such as: *“Do you, yourself, subscribe to any clubs or societies of any kind?”* in Eurobarometer 8 or *“Which, if any, of the following groups or associations do you belong to?”* in Eurobarometer 34.2. Hereafter, the respondent is shown multiple answers of which one is close to membership of a political party such as *‘Political clubs or societies’* in Eurobarometer 8 and *‘Political Parties or movements’* in Eurobarometer 34.2 (Gesis, 2014a, p. 100; Gesis, 2014b, p. 83). Next to question on membership of a political party, or a proxy for this membership, respondents are asked a question on what party they should vote if there would be a general election tomorrow. For example: *“If there were a general election tomorrow, which party would you support?”* in Eurobarometer 8 (Gesis, 2014a, p. 135). I combine these two variables and assume that if a respondent is an (in)active member of a political party and would vote for the SDP in her or his country, the respondent is a member of the SDP. I then determine the mean ideological position of the party members as defined by the question of left-right placement in which respondents have to indicate where they would place themselves on a scale from '1' (left) to '10' (right). These questions usually look like this: *‘In political matters people talk of “the left” and “the right”. How would you place your views on this scale?’* (Gesis, 2014c). For those surveys that correspond with the survey used for the rightness of voters variable, the same question with regard to the ideological positions of the respondents is used.

For the World Value Survey (WVS), similar questions were asked (WVS, 2016a). In some of the WVS surveys, the question with regard to the political party membership offered more answer categories: *‘Now I am going to read off a list of voluntary organizations. For each organization, could you tell me whether you are an active member, an inactive member or not a member of that type of organization?’* (WVS, 2016b). In case of such a question both inactive membership and active membership were

included as membership. The other questions were asked in a similar way and had the same scale. For the European Values Study, similar questions as in the WVS were asked (EVS, 2015a).

Although the three different sources have information on different countries and for different years, the data is comparable since questions with a similar meaning were asked to the respondent. Furthermore, as argued before, the data of the WVS and the EVS are considered identical (Inglehart and Welzel, 2010, p. 556). In case of more than one measurements of a country by different surveys in the same year, the mean value of the ideological positions was taken in order to smooth the possible biases. To exemplify this, the ideological position of the party members of the Spanish SDP in 1990 was asked in all three surveys. For the Eurobarometer, the WVS and the EVS, the mean ideological position of the party members was respectively 3.11, 2.5 and 3.66. This results in a score of 3.09 in the final dataset. See appendix 3.5 for an overview of all the collected data on the ideological position of party members and the sources of these data. For all relevant descriptives of this variable, see Table 4.1 of the next chapter.

Data on the **working class size** is derived from the *Comparative Dataset on Cleavage Voting* (Jansen, 2011b). This data incorporates a simplified version of the class schema as compiled by Erikson, Goldthorpe and Portocarero (1979). Data on these classes is derived from surveys which collected information on the occupational status of respondents. Using this occupation, the respondents are grouped within four social classes: (1) *'the manual working class'*, (2) *'the self-employed'*, (3) *'the routine non-manual class'* and (4) *'the service class'* (Jansen, 2011a, p. 64). The working class size variable that I created, is the percentage of the *'the manual working class'* in a specific year. Although data on this variable is quite inclusive with regard to time (i.e. ranging from 1958-2008), the geographical scope is more restricted since the *Comparative Dataset on Cleavage Voting* focusses on Western Europe, the US and Australia. Therefore, fourteen countries are included on this variable.

The variable **movement towards largest party** is based upon the position of the SDP and the position of the largest other party in the party system. The position of the SDP is derived from the ideological position as measured for the dependent variable. The position of the largest party in the party system is derived from ParlGov in combination with the ideological positioning of this party according to the CMP dataset (ParlGov, 2016; CMP, 2016). If the SDP is the largest party itself, the ideological position of the second largest party is used. The change in distance is labelled as *'1'* if the distance between the ideological position of the SDP, as used as dependent variables, and the ideological position of the largest other party decreased during the last year.

The resulting variable is a dummy variable with a movement away from the largest party as the reference category.

The relative **distance to the largest party** in the party system is the difference between the ideological position of the SDP and the ideological position of the largest other party in the party system. Data on the ideological position of the largest other party is derived from the Comparative Manifesto Data. In case of a change in the largest other party, the ideological position of the largest party in the beginning of the specific year is used. This is chosen because the ideological position of the current largest other party is expected to be important for the behaviour of a SDP. The difference between the ideological position of the SDP and that of the largest other party is expressed in the distance between these two parties on the CMP's left-right scale. The resulting variable is a scale variable. Theoretically this variable can run from '0' to '200'.

The **year** variable is added in order to determine the effect of time. This is a scale variable that represents the year of the observations within a specific country. For each year in each country only one observation is included in the dataset. The year variable is transformed⁸ to normalize the constant in the models and to prevent multicollinearity between the year variable and the interaction variables that use the year variable. The resulting variable runs from '0' (1945) to '70' (2015).

3.4.3. Control Variables

Next to the abovementioned variables, I include some control variables to the analyses. The first control variable I add to the analyses is the **electoral performance** variable. As discussed in the literature review, the electoral performance of a party is seen as an important explanation for the change in ideological position of political parties (e.g. Janda et al., 1995, p. 189; Somer-Topcu, 2009, p. 246). However, the empirical studies show that the effect of the electoral performance on change in ideological position of a political party is dependent on the direction of the change in ideological position during the former election period. So, if a party loses votes after an election and it changed its ideological position to the right, it is likely to change the ideological position to the left and vice versa (Budge, 1994, p. 453). Since the dependent variable for this explanation (i.e. the direction of the change relative to the direction of the previous change in the ideological position) is different than the dependent variable in this thesis (the change in ideological position), I do not deduce an hypothesis for this explanation. Nevertheless, since the electoral performance is seen as an important explanatory variable in the literature, I include this variable as a control variable. This variable represents the increase (or decrease) in the percentage of votes that a party has received between the last election and the election before the last

⁸ $Y = Y_1 - 1945$

election. For this variable, a positive number represents an increase in the percentage of votes gained by the party. Data for the electoral gains are derived from the CMP (Comparative Manifesto Project, 2016). The difference between the electoral performance (i.e. percentage of votes) at election T is subtracted from the electoral performance at election T₁. The difference between the two elections applies to all years up to and including the next election year. The resulting variable, theoretically, can run from -100 to 100 (increase or decrease of 100 percent of the votes).

The second control variable I add to the analyses is the **governmental status** variable. From the literature review it turns out that parties that have been in government during the former election period, are more likely to change their ideological position compared to opposition parties (Meyer, 2013, p. 148; Fagerholm, 2016, p. 505). However, no particular expectation with regard to the direction of this change is expected. Therefore, I add this variable as a control variable to the analyses. Data for this variable are derived from ParlGov (ParlGov, 2016). The governmental status variable is a dummy variable. If a party participated in government between the former election and the upcoming election, a party is coded as '1'. In case of a new cabinet formation, which parties are included as governmental parties depends on the timing of the election. If the election is in the same year as the cabinet formation, the composition of the former cabinet is used for determining whether a party is in government or not. If, however, the election was in the year prior to the formation of the new cabinet, the composition of the new cabinet determined whether a party is in government or not. The reason for this is in such a way, the party that was in government until the elections is seen as a governmental party.

The last control variable I add is the **economic situation** variable. This variable is included since it is often mentioned as a factor that influences the ideological position of political parties. Empirical studies show that this effect is mainly applicable to parties on the right (Fagerholm, 2016, p. 506; Adams et al., 2009, p. 626). Nevertheless, Adams et al. show that left parties are at least to some extent reactive to the economic situation (2009, pp. 626-627). Therefore, the annual growth of the GDP per capita is included as a control variable. Information on this variable is derived from the World Bank (2016).

Although there are some other control variables that are important for the study of the change in ideological positions of SDPs, such as electoral system (Sommer-Topcu, 2009; Ezrow, 2011) and the presence of another (strong) parties (e.g. radical left or radical right parties) (Rooduijn et al., 2014; Mequid, 2005; Bale et al., 2010). Most of these other control variables only differ between countries or too little over time to include in the models. After all, the main

models in this thesis apply fixed effect analyses. Since these (almost) time-invariant variables are (near) perfectly collinear with the countries, applying a fixed effect method takes away the effect of these variables (Kohler and Kreuter, 2005, p. 245).

3.4.4. Missing data

Due to the nature of some of the variables, there are a lot of missing values in the original data. For example, data on a party's ideological position is only available for election year which leaves this variable for some countries with data gaps of five years. Furthermore, many variables are derived from this ideological position variable whereby the same problems would arise. Other variables such as the ideological position of party members are derived from several surveys that are not available for each year. To overcome these missing data problems, I apply two different methods to 'fill in' these missing observations.

The first approach to fill in missing values is interpolation. Using interpolation data is generated for each year in between the first and the last observed value. For the variables rightness of party, rightness of voters, rightness of party members and size of the working class, linear interpolation is used⁹. For some other variables, it made theoretically more sense to extent the value of the latest observation instead of interpolation such as the vote share (which was used for information on the largest party) and the distance to the largest party. With regard to the former, parties are not expected to have an idea on what their vote share is going to be after the next election. Although election polls can provide them with an indication, these often change just before an election. Furthermore, in the year just after an election, it is not expected that an interpolation of the vote share is in line with the specific election polls of that year. Since data on election polls is not available for all countries and certainly not since for all years, the vote share after the last election is used for each year until the next election.

With regard to the distance to the largest party variable, the ideological position of the largest party was also kept the same between two elections. I choose not to use interpolation since I assume that SDPs are not expected to have a clear picture on where competing parties are heading towards (in terms of ideological position) between elections. The only information SDPs have complete access to is the competitors' ideological position during the last election. Furthermore, as described in the theoretical framework, the ideological position of the largest other party is used as an indicator for the position of voters (i.e. if another party is the largest, most voters are located around that party). A change in the ideological position of the largest other party does not change the position of these voters. Therefore, the value of the latest observation of the ideological position of the largest other party is used for this variable.

⁹ $y = y_1 + (x - x_1) \frac{y_2 - y_1}{x_2 - x_1}$

This solution to the problem of missing data is only applied to values between observed values and not outside these values (i.e. I did not use extrapolation). Nevertheless, this increases the N*T to a number which is useful for analyses. In fact, not applying any kind of transformation to deal with the missing data problem leaves me with only 18 observations (N*T). Nevertheless, there are some problems involved with the interpolation I apply in this thesis. It is not expected that a linear line is perfectly representing the missing data. However, information on how the missing data point relates to the previous and the next observation is missing. For example, with regard to the ideological position of the SDPs, it might be that the bulk of this change happens just before an election and not gradually between two elections. Nevertheless, competition between parties can be seen as a ‘*continuous process that runs all the time, between elections as well as in the run-up to these*’ (Laver, 2005, p. 266). Therefore, a linear relation is likely to be a good estimator of this change.

The second method I apply to fill in missing data is using the mean values over a time-period of five years. This alternative method is necessary because it is likely that observations for Y for a political party in year T are dependent on the value of Y of that party in year T₋₁. Dalton and McAllister show that these values are indeed highly correlated (2015, p. 768)¹⁰. The problem of serial correlation occurs when the errors of these observations are correlated with each other as well. This is problematic since serial correlation can produce standard errors that are smaller than the real standard errors, which may result in a rejection of the null hypothesis, while this is not necessary (Type I error). To identify whether the problem of serial correlation really occurs in the data from the *Dataset on Social Democratic Party Competition*, I apply a Wooldridge test for autocorrelation. The results of this test are presented in table 3.1 It turns out that the null-hypothesis, which assumes there is no serial correlation in the errors, is rejected $\alpha < 0.05$.

Table 3.1: Test for autocorrelation.

F	50.523
Prob>F	0.000

Source: Dataset on Social Democratic Party Competition.

To overcome this problem, I use five year means for the dependent and independent variables. To increase the number of observations included in the analyses that apply this approach to fill in missing data, the means are taken from the interpolated data as discussed

¹⁰ Note: Their analysis is based on public perceptions of ideological positions (Dalton & McAllister, 2015, pp. 765-767).

above. From now on, I use the interpolation method to fill in missing values as default and mention specifically when I refer to the five year mean approach.

Despite all these procedures to deal with missing data, some variables still have missing data. I shortly discuss the most important of these variables. The rightness of party variables has missing values for many countries (1) that were not democracies in 1945 (such as post-communist countries), (2) of which the selected SDP was not present in 1945 or (3) the selected SDP did not exist any more in 2015. Both the rightness of voters and the rightness of party members variables have missing values because they are both derived from surveys. The surveys they are derived from are not available before 1973 and not for all countries until 2015. The last variable with a large number of missing values is the working class size variable. Due to the limited scope of the *Comparative Dataset on Cleavage Voting* from which this variable is derived (Jansen, 2011b) and the lack of accessible comparable data from other sources on this variable, the number of countries included for this variable drop from 24 to 14. Furthermore, data for the period between 1945 and 1958 and 2008 and 2015 is also missing for this variable. Therefore, models that include this variable consist of the least N*T. In the next chapter I present a descriptives table in which the number valid N*T for each variable is presented.

3.5. Modelling Approach

In order to test the hypotheses as derived in the theoretical framework, I use statistical tests to estimate the effects of the different variables as operationalized in the former part on the dependent variable; the change in the ideological positions of SDPs. As discussed earlier, the data that is included in the DSDPC-dataset is panel data. This means that the yearly observations (level 1) are nested within the different SDPs (level 2) which are again, nested in countries (level 3). However, since including a third level would make the analyses even more complex and because there are not sufficient SDPs within each country to analyse the effect of different SDPs within different countries, I only include one SDP per country (see section 3.3.). The result is that, for the analyses, level 2 and 3 are the same. The structure of the data is therefore as illustrated in figure 3.1.




Figure 3.1: Multilevel structure of the Dataset on Social Democratic Party Competition.

Because of the multilevel structure, a simple OLS regression is not appropriate for analysing the data. Using a simple OLS regression technique for analysing the data, would pose several problems. OLS regression assumes that errors are uncorrelated, or independent, across observations (Allison, 1999, pp. 122-123). This assumption is problematic and often violated in case of multilevel data. The observations of the dependent variable are related within the countries. After all, the ideological position of a SDP within a country in a certain year is likely to be (partly) dependent upon the ideological position of the same SDP in the previous year. This effect is illustrated by the table in appendix 3.6. By only including the countries to explain the variance in the ideological position of SDPs, 23.18% of the variance is explained. The mean ideological position of the SDP in 16 out of 23 countries is significantly ($p < 0.05$) different from the United Kingdom mean. So, I assume that the intra-class correlation is not 0. Therefore, applying a simple OLS regression is likely to bias the coefficients and to bias the standard errors downwardly. The latter results in a t-value that is too high (and thereby a p-value that is too low), which can lead into rejecting the null hypothesis too early (Type I error) (Bell and Jones, 2015, p. 136).

The solution for these problems is using a quantitative method that is able to cope with these multilevel structured data. If the data is not of a multilevel structure, a simple model looks like formula 1. In this formula, the observed value within a year, Y_t , is equal to the fixed mean score of the entire group (i.e. country) (β_0) and a random component (error) that is different for every observation (i.e. year) (ε_t).

$$Y_t = \beta_0 + \varepsilon_t \quad (1)$$

However, because of the multilevel structure of the data, the mean of the group, β_0 in formulae 1, is not fixed, but random. This is because the mean is dependent on the cluster (i.e. country) in which the observed value is nested. Therefore, the observations in each year (level 1) are represented by formula 2.1. In this formula, the observed value within a year within a specific country, Y_{it} , is equal to the mean score of that specific group (i.e. country) (β_{0i}) and a random component that is different for every observation (i.e. year), but is also different for every group (i.e. country) (ε_{it}).

$$Y_{it} = \beta_{0i} + \varepsilon_{it} \quad (2.1)$$

The random component β_{0i} , is represented by formula 2.2. The mean score for each country is dependent on both the total mean of the means of all groups (γ_{00}) and the deviation of each group's mean from the total mean (μ_{0i}).

$$\beta_{0i} = \gamma_{00} + \mu_{0i} \quad (2.2)$$

If formula 2.1 and 2.2 are combined, formula 3 is the result (the mixed effects equation).

$$Y_{it} = \gamma_{00} + \mu_{0i} + \varepsilon_{it} \quad (3)$$

I assume the slope for the variable to be the same for each group (i.e. country). Therefore, I apply a model with a random intercept, but a fixed slope. This means that I expect that the mean of the variables is different for each country, but that the effect of the variables is the same across countries. This implies that γ_{00} is fixed and that there is only random variance within countries (σ^2_{ε}) and between countries ($\sigma^2_{\mu_i}$).

To test the effect of the independent variables on the dependent variable, I apply a model in which I add country dummies to the OLS regression model; a fixed effects model, also the covariance model (Stimson, 1985, p. 921). The most important drawbacks of the fixed effects model are that it is (1) an inefficient model and (2) it cannot use the between-variance for the estimation of a particular effect. Furthermore, as an effect of 2, (3) it cannot estimate the effects of variables that are time-invariant and therefore only vary between countries (Plümper et al., 2005, p. 330). However, these drawbacks do not limit the possibility to test the hypotheses as derived in the theoretical framework. With regard to the second drawback, I do not have hypotheses that expect different effects between countries, whereby this is not problematic. The third drawback is not limiting the analyses in this thesis. The DSDPC-file consists of variables that vary both within and between countries and not only between countries. Therefore, I am mainly interested in the within-variance. By inclusion of country variables, only the between-variance is eliminated. With regard to the first drawback, the benefits of the simple estimation of the fixed effects model outweigh the inefficiency of the model. The inclusion of country dummies takes away the underlying historical context of a country that has an effect on the dependent variable that is not captured by any of the variables included in the model (Garrett and Mitchell, 2001, p. 163). Furthermore, a fixed effects model is based on fewer assumptions in comparison to a more complex multilevel analysis technique such as a random effects model.

Nevertheless, I apply a random effects model to test the robustness of the findings. After all, a fixed effects model eliminates higher level variance and makes any correlations between this variance and the covariates irrelevant (Bell and Jones, 2015, p. 138). Especially for those variables which vary little within countries but do vary between countries, this is problematic. Applying a fixed effects model loses a large amount of information; it is not able to fully account for causal heterogeneity (Steenbergen and Jones, 2002, p. 220).

I have applied a Hausman test to test whether a random effects model or a fixed effects model is most suitable to analyse this data. The Hausman test evaluates whether the errors of the individuals are correlated with the variables. A rejection of this hypothesis implies that I should use a fixed effects model. However, as table 3.2 indicates, the probability of obtaining this chi-square statistic ($\text{prob} > \text{chi}^2$) is >0.05 which means that I cannot reject the null hypothesis. So, there is not a systematic difference in coefficients and therefore a random effects model is more efficient; a random effects model is not biased.

Table 3.2: Fixed or random effects? – Hausman test.

	Fixed Effect	Random Effect	Difference (FE-RE)	Standard Error
Rightness of voters	-7.809	-7.441	-0.368	1.001
Largest on the right	-13.761	-13.699	-0.063	0.409
Rightness of party members	1.678	1.697	-0.019	0.148
Working class size	-0.182	-0.181	-0.001	0.041
Towards largest party	1.316	1.400	-0.084	0.071
Distance to largest party	-0.322	-0.313	-0.084	0.006
Prob>chi2	0.510			

Source: Dataset on Social Democratic Party Competition.

However, according to Clark and Linzer, the Hausman test is “neither a necessary nor sufficient metric for deciding between fixed and random effect” (2015, p. 400). Furthermore, the fact that I cannot reject the null hypothesis in the Hausman test does not imply that a fixed effects model cannot be used¹¹. It only indicates that both random and fixed effects are

¹¹ If the null hypothesis was rejected in the Hausman test, a random effects model would be inconsistent.

consistent. Therefore, the random effects model is used as a robustness check. I consider these robustness checks necessary since working with pooled data and especially panel data has the potential to pose a plethora of problems (Stimson, 1985, p. 945). Hence, finding effects using different estimators enhances the reliability of the findings.

Next to these robustness checks, I introduce another method to make the interpretation of the moderation effects more straightforward: marginal effects. Marginal effects graphs present the change of the effect of x on y given different values for the z -variable. Marginal effects is often used to make sense of a moderation effect when using logistic regression (Mood, 2010, p. 75). However, it also makes the effect of the moderation effects easier to analyse. Therefore, I apply this method in combination with the regression models for the interpretation of the moderation effects.

Another robustness check is necessary because of the possibility of serial correlations. As discussed above, the Wooldridge test for autocorrelation shows that autocorrelation is indeed a problem in the *Dataset on Social Democratic Party Competition*. Next to applying a different method for filling in the missing observations, I also add a lagged dependent variable to overcome this problem. By adding a lagged dependent variable to the model, I add the value of Y in T_{-1} as a predictor for the value of Y in T . However, as discussed in the next chapter, the inclusion of a lagged dependent variable poses important problems. It turns out that the explanatory power of the lagged dependent variable is so strong that it suppresses the effect of other variables. The problem of suppressed independent variables by including a lagged dependent variable occurs often. If so, some scholars decide to neglect this lagged dependent variable (Achen, 2001, p. 2). Nevertheless, it indicates a problem with autocorrelation and therefore the model including the lagged dependent variable seems more appropriate (even when all the other independent variables are suppressed) (Achen, 2001, p. 2-4). Although this is not entirely the case with the data from the *Dataset on Social Democratic Party Competition*, completely neglecting these problems would leave the conclusions of this thesis open to a ‘charge of wishful thinking’ (Achen, 2001, p. 3). In order to overcome (parts) of these problems, I also test the expectations in models that apply the five year mean approach to fill in missing values (as discussed above), in order to remove at least a part of the problems that occur due to serial correlation.

3.6. Model Building

In this part of the thesis, I discuss the different models that I analyse in this thesis. I start with bivariate models in which the individual effect of the independent variables on the change in ideological position is estimated. These bivariate models are conducted both with and without

clustered robust errors to control for the fact that observations are clustered within countries. Next to the bivariate models, I test multivariate models. These multivariate models start simple and become more complex as more variables enter the model. The build-up of these models is based on theoretical arguments and methodological reasons that I discuss below. Thereby, I expand the models with different independent variables to test the hypotheses as presented at the end of the second chapter of this thesis.

3.6.1. Bivariate Models

In this thesis, seven independent variables are used. For each of these independent variables, a bivariate model is estimated. The first model includes the rightness of voters, the second the distance to largest party, the third whether a party moves towards the largest party and the fourth whether the largest party is on the right. Furthermore, the fifth model includes the rightness of the party members, the sixth the size of the working class and the seventh the year variable. Next to a bivariate OLS regression of these independent variables on the change in ideological position of SDPs, the models are also estimated with clustered robust errors. I choose not to use another type of robust regression such as with iteratively reweighted least squares since I do not expect that any of the cases are extremely deviant or that deviant cases distort the coefficients or the standards errors. Therefore, the bivariate models estimated both with and without the clustered robust errors, are:

$$Y = \beta_0 + \beta_1 * \text{rightness of voters} + \mu + \varepsilon \text{ (Model b1)}$$

$$Y = \beta_0 + \beta_1 * \text{distance to largest party} + \mu + \varepsilon \text{ (Model b2)}$$

$$Y = \beta_0 + \beta_1 * \text{towards largest party} + \mu + \varepsilon \text{ (Model b3)}$$

$$Y = \beta_0 + \beta_1 * \text{largest party on the right} + \mu + \varepsilon \text{ (Model b4)}$$

$$Y = \beta_0 + \beta_1 * \text{rightness of party members} + \mu + \varepsilon \text{ (Model b5)}$$

$$Y = \beta_0 + \beta_1 * \text{working class size} + \mu + \varepsilon \text{ (Model b6)}$$

$$Y = \beta_0 + \beta_1 * \text{year} + \mu + \varepsilon \text{ (Model b7)}$$

3.6.2. Multivariate models

As indicated in section 3.6. of this thesis, the multilevel structure of the data from the *Dataset on Social Democratic Party Competition* requires to control for clusters (i.e. countries) in which observations are nested. Since I am not interested in time-invariant variables, adding country dummies to the models is sufficient. Therefore, in the following multivariate models, country dummies are included in the analyses.

The first multivariate model includes the variable of *H1* and *H3*. These hypotheses use the variables rightness of voters and largest party on the right. These are the only two hypotheses that not imply an interaction and of which the observations are not severely limited. The first multivariate model is:

$$Y = \beta_0 + \beta_1 * \textit{rightness of voters} + \beta_2 * \textit{largest party on the right} + \mu + \varepsilon \textit{ (Model m1)}$$

In the second multivariate model, I include the information on the rightness of the party members. Although including this variable limits the number of cases to a certain extent, all countries are still included. Including this variable allows me to test *H5*. The second multivariate model includes therefore the rightness of voters, largest on the right and the rightness of party members variable.

$$Y = \beta_0 + \beta_1 * \textit{rightness of voters} + \beta_2 * \textit{largest party on the right} + \beta_3 * \textit{rightness of party members} + \mu + \varepsilon \textit{ (Model m2)}$$

The third multivariate model excludes the rightness of the party member and adds the size of the working class to the equation. However, it should be noted that the data on the working class size is severely limited in scope, especially with regard to the number of countries that is included which drops between model m2 and m3 from 24 to 14.

$$Y = \beta_0 + \beta_1 * \textit{rightness of voters} + \beta_2 * \textit{largest party on the right} + \beta_3 * \textit{working class size} + \mu + \varepsilon \textit{ (Model m3)}$$

In the fourth model of the analysis, all variables that do not assume an interaction are included. This allows to test *H1*, *H3*, *H5* and *H6* together in a model to test their relative strength.

$$Y = \beta_0 + \beta_1 * \textit{rightness of voters} + \beta_2 * \textit{largest party on the right} + \beta_3 * \textit{rightness of party members} + \beta_4 * \textit{working class size} + \mu + \varepsilon \textit{ (Model m4)}$$

Next to the above mentioned hypotheses, I have deduced several hypotheses that assume an interaction. Before I turn to the models that test these interactions, I present a model in which all the main effects are included to make the interpretation of the interaction variables more straightforward.

$$\begin{aligned}
Y = & \beta_0 + \beta_1 * \textit{rightness of voters} + \beta_2 * \textit{largest party on the right} + \beta_3 \\
& * \textit{rightness of party members} + \beta_4 * \textit{working class size} + \beta_5 \\
& * \textit{towards largest party} + \beta_6 * \textit{distance to largest party} + \beta_7 * \textit{year} + \mu \\
& + \varepsilon \textit{ (Model m5)}
\end{aligned}$$

The first interaction I include in a model is the interaction between the rightness of voters and whether a party moves towards the largest other party in the party system. Model m5 includes these two variables together with the interaction of these variables.

$$\begin{aligned}
Y = & \beta_0 + \beta_1 * \textit{rightness of voters} + \beta_2 * \textit{towards largest party} + \beta_3 * \textit{rightness of voters} \\
& * \textit{towards largest party} + \mu + \varepsilon \textit{ (Model m6)}
\end{aligned}$$

The second model I include to test an interaction hypothesis is model m7. This model includes the variables for testing *H4* in which interaction between the position of the largest party and the relative distance to the largest party is expected. Therefore, model m7 includes variables: largest party on the right, distance to largest party, and the interaction of these variables.

$$\begin{aligned}
Y = & \beta_0 + \beta_1 * \textit{largest party on the right} + \beta_2 * \textit{distance to largest party} + \beta_3 \\
& * \textit{largest party on the right} * \textit{distance to the largest party} + \mu \\
& + \varepsilon \textit{ (Model m7)}
\end{aligned}$$

The last two interactions both involve the working class size. The first of these interactions is relevant for hypothesis *H7* and involves the size of the working class and whether a party moves towards the largest party in the party system. Therefore, model m8 is created.

$$\begin{aligned}
Y = & \beta_0 + \beta_1 * \textit{working class size} + \beta_2 * \textit{towards largest party} + \beta_3 * \textit{working class size} \\
& * \textit{towards largest party} + \mu + \varepsilon \textit{ (Model m8)}
\end{aligned}$$

The second interaction that involves the size of the working class assumes an interaction between the working class size and time. Therefore, the size of the working class variable, the year variable and the interaction between these variables is included in model m9.

$$\begin{aligned}
Y = & \beta_0 + \beta_1 * \textit{working class size} + \beta_2 * \textit{year} + \beta_3 * \textit{working class size} * \textit{year} + \mu \\
& + \varepsilon \textit{ (Model m9)}
\end{aligned}$$

The tenth multivariate model that I run, combines all the hypotheses that I deduced in the theoretical chapter. By estimating the result of all variables within one model, the strength of each

variable can be compared to the other variables. Furthermore, the control variables as discussed in the method chapter are included in the model.

$$\begin{aligned}
 Y = & \beta_0 + \beta_1 * \textit{rightness of voters} + \beta_2 * \textit{largest party on the right} + \beta_3 \\
 & * \textit{rightness of party members} + \beta_4 * \textit{working class size} + \beta_5 \\
 & * \textit{towards largest party} + \beta_6 * \textit{distance to largest party} + \beta_7 * \textit{year} + \beta_8 \\
 & * \textit{rightness of voters} * \textit{towards largest party} + \beta_9 \\
 & * \textit{largest party on the right} * \textit{distance to largest party} + \beta_{10} \\
 & * \textit{working class size} * \textit{towards largest party} + \beta_{11} * \textit{working class size} \\
 & * \textit{year} + \beta_{12} * \textit{electoral performance} + \beta_{13} * \textit{governmental status} + \beta_{14} \\
 & * \textit{economic situation} + \mu + \varepsilon \textit{ (Model m10)}
 \end{aligned}$$

Since the variables that included the working class size limited the model with regard to the number of countries included (from 24 to 14) and thereby the number of cases. Therefore, the last multivariate model I run, excludes the variables that include the working class size.

$$\begin{aligned}
 Y = & \beta_0 + \beta_1 * \textit{rightness of voters} + \beta_2 * \textit{largest party on the right} + \beta_3 \\
 & * \textit{rightness of party members} + \beta_4 * \textit{towards largest party} + \beta_5 \\
 & * \textit{distance to largest party} + \beta_6 * \textit{year} + \beta_7 * \textit{rightness of voters} \\
 & * \textit{towards largest party} + \beta_8 * \textit{largest party on the right} \\
 & * \textit{distance to largest party} + \beta_9 * \textit{electoral performance} + \beta_{10} \\
 & * \textit{governmental status} + \beta_{11} * \textit{economic situation} + \mu + \varepsilon \textit{ (Model m11)}
 \end{aligned}$$

In the next chapter, I test these models to give an answer the research question of this thesis.

4. Analyses

In this chapter, I test the hypotheses that are presented in the theoretical framework of this thesis. However, before I discuss the analyses of the hypothesis, I first describe how SDPs have changed over the years. I present some illustrative information on how the SDPs have changed their ideological positions in OECD countries between 1945 and 2015. Second, I present the models that are specified in the former part of this thesis. Finally, the most important findings of the analyses are summarized and some additional robustness checks are discussed. In table 4.1, the descriptives of the variables used in this thesis are presented for both the interpolated as well as the period data.

Table 4.1: Descriptives of variables.

	Valid N*T	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Standard Deviation
Interpolated					
Rightness of party	1,328	-63.380	78.947	-19.473	13.788
Rightness of voters	717	4.130	7.030	5.397	0.393
Largest party on the right	1,328	0.000	1.000	0.929	
Rightness of party members	584	2.000	7.780	3.823	0.793
Working class size	490	15.500	58.800	36.092	8.955
Movement towards largest party	1,303	0.000	1.000	0.480	
Distance to largest party	1,328	0.033	121.874	29.250	19.098
Year	1,387	0.000	70.000	37.852	19.304
Electoral performance	1,280	-32.910	22.731	-0.203	-5.801
Governmental status	1,384	0.000	1.000	0.524	
Economic situation	1,097	-11.403	12.507	2.154	2.704
5 year periods					
Rightness of party	280	-58.465	32.719	-19.513	12.486
Rightness of voters	157	4.263	6.350	5.412	0.374
Largest party on the right	280	0.000	1.000	0.939	
Rightness of party members	131	2.118	6.304	3.820	0.749
Working class size	110	17.013	57.150	36.004	9.042
Movement towards largest party	277	0.000	1.000	0.458	
Distance to largest party	280	0.255	69.837	28.887	16.460
Time period	285	1.000	14.000	7.937	3.932
Electoral performance	269	-25.101	18.346	-0.120	4.230
Governmental status	284	0.000	1.000	0.512	
Economic situation	277	-6.782	9.411	2.117	1.862

Source: Dataset on Social Democratic Party Competition.

4.1. Change in the Ideological Positions of Social Democratic Parties

Previous studies on SDPs and their change in ideological position often assume a change of the parties' ideological positions. However, the empirical comparative research on this change is rather limited (at least in a large-N setting). Before turning to the question what can explain such a change in ideological positions, I first map how these positions have changed between 1945 and 2015. The reasons for starting with this description is two-folded. First, comparative knowledge of the patterns of the change in ideological positions of SDPs can produce important insights of how these parties changed (or did not change) over time. Second, without addressing this descriptive question, questioning why SDPs changed, seems less relevant. Therefore, it is important to first know *how* SDPs changed, before turning to the question *why* they changed their ideological positions.

4.1.1. Ideological Position

The most important expectation about the aggregated change of the SDPs' ideological position can be derived from the idea of the 'third way' (Giddens, 1998). The third way made SDPs change their ideology and according to many, made them shift to the right (de Beus and Koelble, 2001, p. 183; Bradford, 2002, p. 150). The expectation is therefore, that the ideological position of SDPs has changed towards the right over the years. Figure 4.1 displays the change of the ideological positions of SDPs from 1945 and 2015. What can be observed from this figure is that there is a gradual trend towards the right, which is in line with the third way argument and therefore not unexpected.

Table 4.2 represents figure 4.1 in a bivariate analysis between the rightness of SDPs and time. From this table, it can be argued that the trend towards the right that is presented in figure 4.1 is significant ($p < 0.000$). Therefore, I argue that there is a change of the ideological position of SDPs towards the right; SDPs have, on average, become 0.162 more right, on a 200-point scale, every year. Although this does not sound as much change, in the whole period between 1945 and 2015, this accounts for a change towards the right of more than 11 points on the 200-point left-right dimension. When only those countries with data on the entire period between 1945 and 2015 are assessed, a similar result is obtained (appendix 4.1).




Figure 4.1: SDPs’ ideological positions over time.

Source: Dataset on Social Democratic Party Competition.

Table 4.2: Bivariate analysis of the ideological positions of SDPs from 1945 until 2015.

Independent variable	Regression Coefficient (Std. Error)
Year	0.162*** (0.0196)
Constant	-25.434*** (0.8097)
Adjusted R ²	0.048
N*T	1,328

*=p<.05; **=p<.01; ***= p<.001 (two-tailed)

Source: Dataset on Social Democratic Party Competition.

The trend over time as presented above is based on an aggregated analysis of all OECD countries. However, time is not expected to be a deterministic explanation for the change in the ideological position of SDPs, nor is it expected to have the same effect in all countries. Therefore, in figure 4.2 the change in the ideological position of SDPs in each country is presented together with a trend line. From this, it is illustrated that, although on an aggregated-level SDPs have changed their ideological positions to the right, the trends for individual

countries are more diverse. The bivariate regression between time and the ideological position for each country can be found in appendix 4.2. It turns out that in only 16 out of the 24 countries the ideological position of the SDP has moved towards the right. The coefficients for the individual countries range from 1.090 (to the right) per year in Italy to -1.208 (to the left) per year in the Czech Republic. As illustrated in figure 4.2, the changes of the ideological position of SDPs are diverse. In Finland, the ideological position of the SDP is most unstable. Other countries, like Norway have a more stable development of the ideological position of the SDP. Furthermore, some countries have peaks in the ideological position in certain periods. Without having the intention to cover all deviation from the trend line in each country, I discuss some interesting findings.

In Greece, a sudden rightward direction can be observed in 2012 of the Panhellenic Socialist Movement (*Panellinio Sosialistiko Kinima*) (PASOK). Although Greek politics was complex in 2012¹², part of the explanation might be the sudden upswing of the (radical-)left party Coalition of the Radical Left (*Synaspismós Rizospastikís Aristerás*) (SYRIZA) in 2012. In the first 2012 election, SYRIZA quadrupled its vote share (Stavrakakis and Katsambekis, 2014, p. 125). This shock on the Greek political left might have had an influence on the ideological position of PASOK. In the second 2012 election party manifesto, PASOK clearly shifted to the right. However, this did not prevent the SDP to lose much of its vote share, whereby a (electoral unsuccessful) shift to the left in the subsequent 2015 election was applied.

The rightward peak of the Swedish Social Democratic Party (*Sveriges socialdemokratiska arbetareparti*) (SAP) in 1994 has a different explanation. At the start of the 1990s, Sweden faced a fiscal crisis. Under influence of the Chicago School, more neoliberal policies were adopted by the SAP which traditionally was everyone's favourite example of hegemonic social democracy (Green-Pedersen, 2002, p. 284; Pontusson, 1992, p. 305). This third way direction of the SAP can account for the rightward shift.

Although these observations are only backed by anecdotal evidence in specific periods, they emphasize that the position of other large parties and the economic situation in a country may influence the ideological position of SDPs. In the second part of this chapter, I turn to find the explanatory variables for this shift of the ideological position of SDPs for the entire period between 1945 and 2015.

¹² With a total volatility of 45.5 (Poguntke, 2015, p. 236).



Figure 4.2: SDP's ideological positions per country over time.
Source: Dataset on Social Democratic Party Competition.

4.1.2. Electoral Performance

When additional variables are examined, other changes in the SDP family are observable. Figure 4.3 indicates the electoral success of the SDP family. The figure represents a significant downward trend in electoral performance of SDPs. As represented in appendix 4.3, the significant coefficient of year on the vote share is -0.112 . Over the whole period of 70 years, this represents a decline in vote share of over 7.8% in the aggregated mean vote share of all SDPs. Excluding those countries that have missing values somewhere between 1945 and 2015, a similar result can be observed (appendix 4.4). Furthermore, the result of the bivariate analysis as presented in appendix 4.4 turns out to be similar.




Figure 4.3: SDPs' vote shares over time.

Source: Dataset on Social Democratic Party Competition.

As observable, there are large differences in the vote share received by different SDPs in different years (a range in electoral performance of 2.4% - 51.3%). Therefore, it might be more interesting to focus on the country specific change in the vote share received by SDPs. Figure 4.4 represents the electoral performance of SDPs in each country (see appendix 4.5 for the bivariate regression of each country). 18 out of 24 countries have experienced a decline in their vote share. The strongest decline in vote share can be found in Japan with an average yearly decline of more than 0.5%. However, there are also some countries that experienced an increase in the vote share that they received, of which the French SDP is the outstanding example with an average increase of over 0.25% a year.

Although far from complete, table 4.3 provide some indication of the relation between the vote share and the ideological position of SDPs. There are more parties with a decline in vote share than parties with an increase in vote share. Furthermore, most parties shifted their ideological positions to the right (62%). If both groups are examined, it can be observed that those SDPs that experienced a decline in vote share are more likely to shift to the right (71%) than to the left (29%).




Figure 4.4: Social democratic party’s vote shares per country over time.

Source: Dataset on Social Democratic Party Competition.

Furthermore, this pattern is not observable in the group of SDPs with an increase in vote share, and if, it is in the opposite direction (43% vs. 57%). Therefore, I argue that SDPs with a decline in vote share are more likely to shift their ideological position to the right. This finding is in line with the vote-seeking preference. However, these findings are obviously not controlled for explanations that fit within the other preferences.

Table 4.3: Ideological change and vote share change of SDPs over time.

	Shift to the Left (-)	Shift to the Right (+)
Increase in vote share (+)	HUN, ICE, POR, SPA (57%)	CAN, FRA, IRE (43%)
Decrease in vote share (-)	BEL, CHR, FIN, JAP, SWI (29%)	AUS, AUT, DEN, GER GRE, ITA, LUX, NET, NZE, NOR, SWE, UK (71%)
	(38%)	(62%)

Source: Dataset on Social Democratic Party Competition.

4.1.3. Governmental Status

Where the electoral performance of SDPs is an important indicator for measuring its success in terms of vote-seeking, the governmental status (i.e. whether the party is in government or not) is important for the office-seeking preference. In figure 4.5, the percentage of the total SDPs in government are plotted. As indicated by the trend line, there is only a very marginal decrease in the percentage of SDPs in government over time. The bivariate analysis as presented in appendix 4.6 shows that the effect is not significant. However, appendix 4.7, the scatterplot that only includes those SDPs with data on the entire period between 1945 and 2015, indicates a very small increase in SDPs in government. Furthermore, this increase turns out to be significant. Nonetheless, the effect is small with an increase of 4.2% of SDPs in government in the period between 1945 and 2015, which represents only one extra SDP in government¹³.

The aim of this thesis is not to provide a comprehensive explanation for this relative steady percentage of SDPs in government. Nevertheless, using the former two descriptive variables, two explanations can be deduced. First, the shift to the right of SDPs make them more likely to participate in government, since they are closer to other parties in the party system. So, SDPs are expected to participate more in government. However, when turning to the electoral performance, SDPs are expected to participate less in government. After all, a smaller share of the votes makes a party less likely to have a pivotal position in government formation and therefore less likely to participate in government. These explanations are supported by the data. In a bivariate regression, both the rightness of the SDP and the vote share correlate positively with the governmental status (appendix 4.8).

Despite the horizontal trend line, some clear patterns throughout the years are observable. Just after the Second World War, SDPs were represented in many governments, with more than 90% of all SDPs in government¹⁴. In the period 1955-1980, the percentage of SDPs in power drops and almost never exceeds the overall mean of 52.3%. This period represented the lowest participation of SDPs in government with the ultimate low of 33.3% in 1962, 1969, 1971 and 1972. From 1980 to 2000, SDPs were more successful with regard to governmental participation. They were able to improve the governmental participation rate to almost 70% again in 1996. However, from the start of the new millennium, this trend seems to reverse again. However, the future will prove whether SDPs head towards a new nadir as in the 60s and 70s or reverse the negative trend.

¹³ Note: in this analysis only Australia, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom are included.

¹⁴ It has to be noted that only thirteen countries are included in the data in the year 1946. Nevertheless, twelve out thirteen countries were in government.




Figure 4.5: SDPs in government over time.

Source: Dataset on Social Democratic Party Competition.

These descriptive figures provide important information about *how* the SDP family has transformed. The most important conclusion is that SDPs have (significantly) changed over time. Thereby, it becomes relevant to assess why these changes have occurred. Therefore, in the next part of the analysis I try to explain *why* SDPs have changed over time.

4.2. Bivariate Analyses

In this part of the thesis, the bivariate models as presented in chapter 3 are analysed and discussed. The result of both the simple OLS bivariate analyses and the bivariate analyses using standard clustered errors are presented in table 4.4 (results without standard clustered errors between brackets).

With regard the first model of the table, a significant negative relation between the rightness of voters and the rightness of a party is observed. In plain words this means that if the mean ideological position of the voters is more to the left, the ideological position of the SDP party is more to the right.

Table 4.4: OLS regression estimates of the effect of independent variables on the change in the rightness of SDPs.

Model	b1	b2	b3	b4	b5	b6	b7
Rightness of voters	-7.068*** (4.855) [1.616]						
Largest party on the right (ref: largest party on the left)		-13.630*** (3.371) [1.328]					
Rightness of party members			1.101 (1.120) [0.727]				
Working class size				-0.544**[*] (0.205) [0.086]			
Movement towards largest party (ref: away from largest party)					2.438**[*] (0.798) [0.650]		
Distance to largest party						-0.196**[*] (0.070) [0.018]	
Year							0.150** (0.061) [0.018]
Constant	21.952	-5.9840	-20.452	3.798	-19.771	-13.079	-24.386
Number of countries	24	24	24	14	24	24	24
Time range	1973-2015	1945-2015	1977-2013	1958-2008	1945-2015	1945-2015	1945-2015
R-squared	0.032	0.079	0.003	0.001	0.009	0.072	0.049
rho	0.341	0.252	0.455	0.291	0.294	0.266	0.245
N*I	679	1,328	578	485	1,303	1,328	1,328

*Standard errors in parentheses; standard errors, extra significance and within R-squared without standard clustered errors in brackets; #p < 0.1; *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001 (two-tailed).*

Source: Dataset on Social Democratic Party Competition.

If this finding is compared to hypothesis 1 (*The more the ideological position of the median voter is right, the more the ideological position of a social democratic party is right*) this finding is striking. A positive effect was expected, but a significant negative effect is observed. With regard to the strength of the effect, a one-point shift to the right of voters on a ten-point scale represents a 7.068 point shift (on a 200-point scale) to the left for the ideological position of SDPs. However, a one-point shift on the rightness of voters is not achieved easily. A standard deviation (0.405) shift in the rightness of voters represents a 2.863 shift in the ideological position of a SDP, which is not a lot on a 200-point scale. Nevertheless, because of the unexpected significant direction, the result is a strong first indication for a rejection of hypothesis 1.

In the second model, a negative relationship between the position of the largest other party and the rightness of a SDP is reported. The amount of variance of the rightness of the SDP that is explained by this variable is 7.9%, which is the highest among all the bivariate analyses. Since the position of the largest party is a dummy variable, this value means that when the largest other party is on the right, a party is expected to be 13.630 more left (on a 200-point scale). This finding is contrary to the expectation from hypothesis 3 (*When the largest party in the party system is to the right of a social democratic party, the ideological position of a social democratic is more to the right than when the largest party in the party system is to the left of the social democratic party*). When the strength of the relationship is assessed, a change of 13.630 is quite a large change. However, the probability that a party is to the left of the SDP is small (0.071). This is not an unexpected probability since, on average, a SDP is to the left of the left-right dimension and its largest competitor is likely to be on the other side (i.e. to the right) of this dimension to represent the entire left-right dimension. The direction of the bivariate analysis therefore indicates that there is no support for hypothesis 3.

With regard to the third model, a positive relationship is observed. Although this effect is in the expected direction, this value is not significant. Therefore, it does not allow me to corroborate H5 (*The more the mean ideological position of party members is right, the more the ideological position of a social democratic party is right*) for now.

When the effect of the size of the working class is assessed in a bivariate analysis (model b4), a negative relationship between the size of the working class and the rightness of a SDP is observed. Furthermore, this relation is significant. An increase of the working class with one percent, indicates a change of a SDP of 0,544 to the left on a 200-point scale, which is therefore not a strong effect. Furthermore, the explained variance of the rightness of party variable by the working class size is only 0.1% which is very low and also the least for all bivariate variables.

Therefore, this model offers some indication for hypothesis 6 (*The smaller the size of the working class, the more the ideological position of a social democratic party is right*).

With regard to the variables in model b5, b6 and b7, no specific hypothesis using these variables were presented in the theoretical framework. These variables are used for certain interaction that are assumed in hypothesis 2, 4, 7 and 8. However, the analyses show that these three variables are significant (both with and without standard clustered errors). Nevertheless, I do not discuss these correlation in detail, since, as argued in the theoretical framework, correlation does not mean causation.

As argued before, only analysing bivariate relations is insightful, but does not allow to test the relative strength of certain explanations, while controlling for others. Furthermore, these bivariate regressions do not include the extensive robustness check which I apply for the multivariate analysis. In short, drawing conclusions based upon these bivariate analyses is not possible and not desirable given the complexity of the theories that are tested in this thesis and given the multilevel structure of the data within the *Dataset on Social Democratic Party Competition*. Therefore, I turn to multivariate analyses.

4.3. Multivariate Analyses

In this part of the analysis, I discuss the multivariate models as presented in the data and measurements chapter. The eleven multivariate models are tested using different estimators and methods in order to check the robustness of the data and to control for potential biases in the data. The eleven models are tested over seven different tables (table 4.5; appendix 4.9 – appendix 4.14). In appendix 4.9, an OLS regression is used to test the models. Table 4.5 is a fixed effects model in which the between-country variance is controlled for. Both the country clusters and the year clusters are held constant in appendix 4.10 in which a fixed effects including dummies for the year variables model is applied. The table in appendix 4.11 presents all of the models using random effects, which allows me to test whether the differences between SDPs, have an effect on the rightness of these parties. Appendix 4.12 presents a fixed effects model including a lagged dependent variable to control for some of the autocorrelation as discussed in the former chapter. In appendix 4.13, a different method for dealing with missing values is applied, in which period means are used as observations. This analysis applies a fixed effects model (just as table 4.5), but uses the data with period means. The last table, appendix 4.14, also uses this period data, but includes a lagged dependent variable to the models as presented in appendix 4.13. I start with discussing the results from table 4.5 and test their robustness using the results from appendix 4.9, 4.10 and 4.11. Furthermore, I discuss the findings of the additional tests and robustness checks as

presented in appendix 4.12, 4.13 and 4.14 at the end of this chapter. A discussion on the assumptions of linear regression is presented in appendix 4.15.

4.3.1. Analyses

Now I discuss the effects of the multivariate analyses. Using these effects, I draw conclusions on the hypotheses as presented in theoretical framework of this thesis. In this part of the analysis I focus primarily on table 4.5 in which analyses using fixed effects are presented. This table is the main analyses table from which I draw the most important conclusion with regard to the hypotheses. However, when the other tables indicate different results, I do also discuss the implications of the different findings. I start by discussing the hypothesis that do not assume a moderation effect (i.e. hypotheses 1, 3, 5 and 6).

The first hypothesis that I discuss is hypothesis 1: *The more the ideological position of the median voter is right, the more the ideological position of a social democratic party is right.* To test this hypothesis, the rightness of voters variable is relevant. The expectation for this variable is a positive relationship between the rightness of a SDP and the rightness of voters. When I examine the effects in table 4.5, no support for the hypothesis can be observed. None of the coefficients of the rightness of voters variable show a positive relationship. Therefore, these models provide no evidence for the hypothesis that the rightness of a SDP is positively related to the rightness of voters.

However, a striking pattern is visible in table 4.5. Contradictory to the expectation that there is a positive relation between the rightness of voters and the rightness of a SDP, it turns out that there is a negative relationship. Furthermore, except for effects in model 5 and model 10 of table 4.5, this negative relationship is significant ($p < 0.1$, two-tailed). From this, I argue that controlling for other factors, SDPs shift their ideological position to the left when the voters shift more to the right. Therefore, I refute hypothesis 1.

With regard to the robustness of these results, it can be argued that the findings are consistent across the tables, however, using different estimations, model 5 does not show a significant relationship between the rightness of voters and the rightness of a SDP. Nevertheless, the effect is consistent enough to argue that there is a negative correlation between the rightness of voters and the rightness of a SDP.

When assessing the strength of this relationship, I argue the effect is relatively weak. Although, the coefficient indicates that a one point more right position of voters results an increase in the ideological position of a SDP of on about seven points on a 200-point scale, the standard deviation for the rightness of voters is less than 0.4 and even more stable within countries. So a one point change in the rightness of voters is unlikely.

Table 4.5. OLS regression estimates of the effect of independent variables on the change in the rightness of SDPs (FE).

Model	m1	m2	m3	m4	m5	m6	m7	m8	m9	m10	m11
Rightness of voters	-7.604*** (1.645)	-8.228*** (1.894)	-10.998*** (2.596)	-12.572*** (2.992)	-4.537 (2.911)	-9.013*** (1.938)				-3.225 (3.271)	-5.233* (2.339)
Largest party on the right (ref: largest party on the left)	-12.789*** (1.744)	-7.096** (2.051)	-19.465*** (2.645)	-15.803*** (2.960)	-13.224*** (2.615)		4.862** (1.415)			-6.710# (3.708)	4.173 (2.790)
Rightness of party members		1.737* (0.741)		2.431* (0.976)	1.782* (0.862)					1.336 (0.844)	1.300# (0.672)
Working class size			-0.272* (0.118)	-0.201# (0.099)	0.007 (0.124)			-0.528*** (0.102)	-0.094 (0.287)	-1.195* (0.485)	
Towards largest party (ref: away from largest party)					1.928# (1.086)	-15.093 (11.478)		13.856** (4.439)		17.178 (15.350)	3.971 (11.185)
Distance to largest party					0.294*** (0.042)		0.832*** (0.053)			0.240 (0.264)	0.658** (0.245)
Year					0.303** (0.101)				0.432# (0.222)	-0.660# (0.356)	-0.036 (0.058)
Rightness of voters * towards largest party						3.355 (2.116)				-1.779 (2.720)	-0.634 (2.072)
Largest party on the right * distance to largest party							-1.097*** (0.056)			-0.546* (0.268)	-0.916*** (0.247)
Working class size * towards largest party								-0.272* (0.120)		-0.175 (0.108)	
Working class size * year									0.002 (0.006)	0.026** (0.009)	
Electoral performance										0.143 (0.097)	-0.036 (0.069)
Governmental status										3.924** (1.172)	3.923*** (0.861)
Economic situation										0.572* (0.293)	0.223 (0.164)
Constant	36.457	27.649	72.150	65.417	8.509	30.601	-17.351	0.433	-33.808	39.944	7.925
Number of countries	24	24	14	14	14	24	24	14	14	14	24
Time range	1973-2015	1977-2013	1973-2008	1977-2008	1977-2008	1973-2015	1945-2015	1958-2008	1977-2008	1977-2008	1977-2013
R-squared (within)	0.100	0.061	0.198	0.183	0.380	0.054	0.327	0.135	0.200	0.459	0.254
Rho	0.345	0.431	0.409	0.510	0.593	0.359	0.328	0.460	0.356	0.645	0.522
N* Γ	679	532	356	279	279	676	1,328	484	485	278	529

Standard errors in parentheses; # $p < 0.1$; * $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$ (two-tailed).

Source: Dataset on Social Democratic Party Competition.

This remarkable finding produces important insights for the study of the ideological position of SDPs since they counter general expectations for the change in the ideological position of political parties. This finding gives initial reasons to question the vote-seeking preference for the SDP family. This indicates that with regard to this expectation, the SDP family responds differently to the position of voters than other party families. In the conclusion of this thesis, I elaborate further on this interesting finding.

Hypothesis 3 predicted that *when the largest party in the party system is to the right of a social democratic party, the ideological position of a social democratic is more to the right than when the largest party in the party system is to the left of the social democratic party*. From this hypothesis, a positive relationship between the largest party on the right variable and the rightness of a SDP is expected. Table 4.5 indicates that there is a negative relationship between the largest party on the right variable and the rightness of a SDP. Furthermore, this relationship is significant ($p < 0.1$, two-tailed) throughout the models. The only exception is observable in model 7 (table 4.5). This model indicates a significant positive relationship. However, an interaction variable is included in this model which is negative. Since the largest party on the right variable is a dummy variable, the interaction variable that indicates a significant relationship only influences the predicted value when the largest party is on the right. Therefore, even in this model, a more left position of a SDP is expected when the largest party is on the right of the SDP¹⁵. Therefore, the multivariate analyses do not provide evidence to corroborate hypothesis 3.

Similar to the findings for the hypothesis 1, the findings for hypothesis 3 go against the expected direction for this hypothesis. Table 4.5 indicates that when the largest party is on the right of the SDP, SDPs change their ideological position to the left. This implies that when the largest party is on the left of the SDP, SDPs shift their ideological position to the right. This result seems to be robust across all of the different estimations procedures. Furthermore, the effect of the result is consistent across the different models. This indicates strong support for a negative relationship between the largest party on the right variable and the rightness of a SDP.

With regard to the strength of this effect, I argue that this effect is relatively strong. The coefficient shows that if the largest other party is on the right of the SDP, the SDP is on average twelve points more left on a 200-point scale. Although SPDs are more likely to be on the left of the largest party (probability of 0.929), in sixteen out of 24 countries, for at least one observation, the largest other party was on the left of the SDP.

These findings are remarkable since this means that SDPs shift away from the largest party, which undermine the expectations that arose from the vote-seeking and office-seeking

¹⁵ This is the case if the distance to the largest party is at least 4.44, which is for about 92.8% of the cases.

preferences. This provides an indication that the SDP family responds differently to the position of the largest party compared to parties of other party families and thereby that the SDPs have different motives for changing their ideological position. In the conclusion of this thesis, I reflect further on this finding.

The third hypothesis that I discuss is hypothesis 5: *the more the mean ideological position of party members is right, the more the ideological position of a social democratic party is right*. For this hypothesis a positive relationship between the rightness of party members and the rightness of a SDP is expected. The results from table 4.5 show that the relationship is a positive one. Furthermore, the effects turn out to be significant ($p < 0.1$, two-tailed) in most of the models. However, this is not the case for model 10 in which all the variables are included in the analysis¹⁶. Nevertheless, the effect for this expectation is consistent throughout the different estimation procedures. Therefore, the analyses provide a strong indication that there is a positive relationship between the rightness of party members and the rightness of a SDP (Hypothesis 5).

I qualify the strength of this effect as relatively weak. The coefficients indicate that a one point more mean right position of party members results in, on average, a 1.5 more right position of a SDP on a 200-point scale. Furthermore, the standard deviation for the rightness of party members is just under 0.8, which makes the effect on the ideological position of SDPs weak. However, the effect still significant and in the expected direction.

This finding is not surprising because it is in line with the expectation as presented in the theoretical framework of this thesis. However, not surprising does not mean that the finding is not interesting. The expectation that the ideological position of party members has a positive relationship with the ideological position of a SDP is derived from the intra-party democracy preference as specified in the theoretical framework. Finding support for this hypothesis therefore supports the idea that SDPs have an intra-party democracy preference.

According to Müller and Strøm, changing the ideological position in response to the change in the mean ideological position of the party members differentiates SDPs from other political parties (1999, pp. 292-293). This in turn implies that SDPs shift their ideological position for different reasons than other parties. Furthermore, the finding that SDPs respond to the position of party members counters the idea of Katz and Mair (1995). They argue that with the rise of the catch-all and the cartel party, the party is no longer only accountable to the party members, but to a wider range of supporters (1995, p. 20). Even when controlling for effect over time (m5 of table 4.5) or for the effect of different years (appendix 4.10), the positive effect between the ideological position of party members and the ideological position of SDPs remains

¹⁶ In this model, the p-value just exceeded the 0.1 demarcation ($p = 0.103$).

significant. Therefore, the thesis of Katz and Mair does not seem to hold for SDPs. Further implications that this finding offers for the theory are discussed in the conclusion of this thesis.

The last hypothesis that does not include a moderation effect is hypothesis 6: *The smaller the size of the working class, the more the ideological position of a social democratic party is right*. From this hypothesis, a negative relationship between the working class size and the rightness of a SDP is expected. From table 4.5 it is observable that the significant results ($p < 0.1$, two-tailed) indicate that there is indeed a negative relation between the size of the working class and the rightness of a SDP. With regard to the robustness of this result, it turns out that most estimation procedures do find the same results. However, when controlled for the effect of time (by including year dummies), it turns out that the results are not significant anymore. This indicates that the effect is strongly related to certain years. Nevertheless, using these findings, I argue that there is at least some evidence to support the hypothesis which indicates that there is a negative relationship between the size of the working class and the rightness of a SDP (hypothesis 6).

However, the strength of this relationship is relatively weak. A standard deviation change in the size of the working class results in a change in the ideological position of SDPs of about 2.5 point on a 200-point scale, which is not a large change. Nevertheless, the effect is significant and in the expected direction.

This finding is interesting since this expectation is derived from the class cleavage theory which offered specific expectations for the change in ideological position of SDPs and not for political parties in general. What these findings contribute to the theory of the ideological change of SDPs is elaborated further in the conclusion and discussion chapter of this thesis.

Now, I turn to a discussion of the hypotheses that include a moderation effect. Next to findings from table 4.5, I use marginal effects to exemplify the effects (see the data and measurements chapter). This makes the interpretation of the effect more straightforward. The first hypothesis that I discuss is hypothesis 2: *The association between the more right position of the median voter and the more right position of a social democratic party is stronger when the distance to the largest other party decreases than when the distance to the largest other party increases*. This hypothesis expects that the relationship between rightness of voters and the rightness of a SDP is stronger when the distance to the largest party is smaller compared to when this distance is larger. Therefore, it expects the effect of the moderation term to be negative. Table 4.5 indicates that the moderation term is not significant. Furthermore, the other estimation procedures neither indicate that the results are significant.

In figure 4.6, the marginal effects for this moderation effect is illustrated. As can be observed, the effect of a movement away from the largest party strengthens the negative effect

between the rightness of voters and the rightness of a SDP. However, as argued above and as can be observed from the 95 interval lines, this effect is not significant. Therefore, I do not find any support for hypothesis 2.




Figure 4.6: Marginal effect of the rightness of voters on the rightness of a SDP for both categories of the movement towards largest party variable (95% CI).

Source: Dataset on Social Democratic Party Competition.

Hypothesis 4 also includes a moderation effect. The hypothesis' expectation is that *the association between the relative position of the largest party and the more right position of a social democratic party is stronger when the distance to the largest party is smaller*. Therefore, it expects that the relationship between whether the largest party is on the right of the SDP and the rightness of a SDP is moderated by the ideological distance to the largest party. From model 10 in table 4.5, the interaction term is significant ($p < 0.1$, two-tailed). Therefore, I argue that the moderation effect of the distance to the largest party is significant. To make sense of the direction of the results, I turn to the marginal effects graph of this effect (figure 4.7). From this graph, it can be observed that the negative relation between the largest party on the right and the rightness of voters is stronger when the

largest party is further away ($=60$) compared to when this party is closer by ($=0$)¹⁷. Therefore, it can be argued that the relation between whether the largest party is on the right and the rightness of a SDP is stronger when the distance to the largest party is larger.




Figure 4.7: Marginal effect of whether a party is on the right of the SDP on the rightness of a SDP for four different distances to the largest party (95% CI).

Source: Dataset on Social Democratic Party Competition.

With regard to the robustness of this result, it turns out that the effect of the moderation is significant throughout all of the estimation procedures. Therefore, there is a strong indication to reject hypothesis 4. Even beyond the rejection of the hypothesis, the founded direction is significant and in the opposite direction throughout the different ways to estimate the effect. Since this expectation was derived from the policy-seeking preference, a significant result in the opposite direction indicates that the expectation as derived from the policy-seeking preference does not hold for SDPs. I assess the strength of this effect as relatively strong. The effect of being on the left of the largest other party compared to being on the right of the largest other party on the ideological position of a SDP is almost ten points weaker when the distance to the

¹⁷ Note: 0 is never a value that gives a valid finding since the largest other party is neither on the left nor on the right for that case. However, this is not a problem because this value does not actually exist in the data.

larger party is one standard deviation smaller than the mean of the distance to the larger party. This finding strong finding is remarkable since a reversed effect was expected.

The last two hypotheses that involve and moderation effect are hypothesis 7 and 8. Hypothesis 7 expects that *the association between the size of the working class and the more right position of a social democratic party is stronger when the distance to the largest other party decreases*. The hypothesis therefore expects that the relation between the working class size and the rightness of a SDP is moderated by whether the distance to the largest party has increased or decreased after the last election. Table 4.5 displays a positive effect of the interaction term. Although this relationship is significant in model 8, it is not in model 10 ($p=0.111$). However, if the robustness of this effect is assessed, it turns out that other models do indicate a significant negative relationship.




Figure 4.8: Marginal effect of the working class size on the rightness of a SDP for both categories of the movement towards largest party variable (95% CI).

Source: Dataset on Social Democratic Party Competition.

To evaluate whether the effect is in line with hypothesis 7, I turn to the marginal effects graph in figure 4.8. From this graph, it becomes clear that parties are more to the left when the working class is larger and vice versa. However, this effect is stronger when the distance to the largest party decreases. This is in line with the expected effect from hypothesis 7. Therefore, I argue that there is some indication that whether a party moves towards or away from the largest

party moderates the effect between the working class and the rightness of SDPs (Hypothesis 7). With regard to the strength of this effect, is qualify this as a relatively strong effect. The effect an increase of one standard deviation from the mean of the size of the working class on the ideological position of a SPD is more than sixteen points stronger when the distance to the largest party decreases compared to when the distance to the largest party increased.

Next to an interaction of whether a party moves towards the largest party on the relation between the size of the working class and the rightness of a SDP, hypothesis 8 expects a moderation effect of time on this effect. The last hypothesis that I discuss is therefore: *Over time, the association between the decrease in the working class size and the more right position of a social democratic party is weakened.* This hypothesis expects that the relationship between the size of the working class and the rightness of a SDP is moderated over time (the year variable). Table 4.5 indicates a significant interaction effect in model 10. However, the effect is not significant in model 9. If the robustness of the result is assessed, it turns out that the effect also not significant for most of the other estimation procedures.




Figure 4.9: Marginal effect of the working class size on the rightness of a SDP for three time periods (95% CI).

Source: Dataset on Social Democratic Party Competition.

To make sense of the direction of the interaction coefficient, I turn to figure 4.9 in which the marginal effects graph for this interaction is presented. From this graph, it can be observed that the negative relationship between the size of the working class and the rightness of a SDP is weakened (and becomes even positive) over time. Therefore, this graph illustrates the expected effect of the interaction term. However, as noted before, the effect is not consistently significant throughout the estimation procedures.

Although I did not formulate specific hypotheses for the variables on the electoral performance, governmental status and economic situation, I shortly discuss the findings for these variables since they are important explanations for the change in ideological positions according to the literature. Nevertheless, I did not expect a specific direction for these variables.

The analyses show that the electoral performance does not seem to be an explanation for the change in the ideological position of SDPs. Although this variable is significant in one of the models in Appendix 4.10 and 4.12 ($p < 0.1$, two-tailed), this result is not robust across the other estimation procedures. Furthermore, theoretically, the expectation was that the electoral performance is an important indicator for the change in ideological position relative to the previous change. Since this was not the dependent variable for this thesis, finding no indication for a particular direction is not surprising.

The governmental status indicates a significant positive relationship ($p < 0.1$, two-tailed). It turns out that SDPs that were in previous government, on average, are four points more right compared to parties that were in opposition. This finding is robust across most of the estimation procedures. However, the causal relationship between the governmental status and the rightness of a SDP is not straightforward. After all, it might be that parties that were in government indeed become more right compared to parties in government. However, theoretically, the reversed relation is also likely. A SDP which has a more right position might be more likely to get into government since it is closer to the potential coalition partners. This possible causal relation is supported by the analyses which include a lagged dependent variable. In these analyses, the governmental status is not significant anymore.

The analyses for the economic situation variable do not show consistent significant results. This finding is in line with the literature on the change in ideological position of SDPs, which indicates that parties on the left are less responsive to economic changes compared to centre parties and parties on the right of the left-right spectrum.

4.3.2. Robustness Checks and Additional Tests

The results as presented in the former section offer interesting insights. However, as indicated in the data and measurements chapter, there are some problems with the data of the *Dataset on Social*

Democratic Party Competition. In order to deal with some of these problems, I did some additional tests. In this section, I shortly discuss the most important findings and the implications of these tests. For a more elaborate discussion of these tests see appendix 4.21. The first of these tests includes a lagged dependent variable to deal with serial correlation (appendix 4.12.). The results indicate that the lagged dependent variable is an important explanatory variable. Furthermore, this variable severely suppresses the results as presented in table 4.5. In order to deal with this suppression, I applied a different method to deal with the missing values (see chapter 3 for an elaboration). The results of the tests using this different method for filling in missing values are presented in appendix 4.13 and appendix 4.14 (respectively without and with the lagged dependent variable). The results from these analyses show that the problems with autocorrelation are largely the result of the linear interpolation methods of filling in missing values. After all, the problems with autocorrelation almost disappear in the new analyses (see appendix 4.20 for the Wooldridge test).

With regard to hypotheses testing, the table in appendix 4.14 indicates that the findings with regard to the rightness of the voters and whether the largest party is on the right are still fairly significant. The hypotheses with regard to the rightness of the party members and the size of the working class lack significance in the models of appendix 4.14. However, it has to be noted that in those models that include these variables, the N^*T is relatively low. So, a lack of significance in those models might be due to the low N^*T .

5. Conclusion and Discussion

The SDP family is one of the most influential party families in modern democracies. Nevertheless, the academic literature mainly focusses on new and more newsworthy party families (e.g. populism and regionalism). The rise and change of these new party families has received extensive academic attention. However, much less is known about how the SDP family has changed recently, with the rise of new party families and major social changes. The aim of this thesis was to investigate whether, how and why SDPs have changed their ideological position between 1945 and 2015. For the purpose of this thesis, I compiled the *Dataset on Social Democratic Party Competition*, for which I collected data on SDPs between 1945 and 2015. In this conclusion, I first summarize the most important findings and conclusions with regard to the hypotheses that I have formulated in the theoretical framework. Subsequently, I reflect on the central research question of the thesis. Hereafter, I discuss some scientific implications of this thesis, both theoretical and methodological. In the final part of this conclusion, I discuss some limitations of this thesis and provide directions for further research on the ideological change of political parties in general and SDPs in specific.

5.1. Summary: Research Questions and Findings

Two research questions are assessed in this thesis. Before trying to explain why SDPs have changed their ideological positions over time, it is important to evaluate whether and how this change has taken place. To answer this important question of how SDPs have changed over the years, I addressed the question:

To what extent and how has the ideological position of social democratic parties in OECD countries changed between 1945 and 2015?

I addressed this question by analysing the extent to which the ideological position of SDPs has changed over time. A general insight resulting from this analysis is that SDPs have changed their ideological positions to the right between 1945 and 2015. The average shift to the right over this period is eleven points on a 200-point scale. Therefore, this shift is substantial. However, this change is not the same for SDPs within all OECD countries in the analysis. For instance, while in Sweden the shift to the right over this period was over 30 points, the SDP in Switzerland shifted almost 25 points to the left on this 200-point left-right scale. Moreover, the results from this analysis show that the change in ideological position is not gradual, but show considerable differences between elections.

The insight that SDPs have indeed changed their ideological positions indicates that it is furthermore relevant to discuss the question why this change has taken place. Furthermore, since the change is not consistent throughout time, it is relevant to see why parties sometimes move to the left and sometimes move to the right. Theoretically, I proposed that SDPs are responsive to different factors, namely the position of the median voter in the party system, the position of the largest other party in the party system, the position of the mean party member, and the size of the working class. Furthermore, for some of these effects, a moderation of the ideological distance to the largest other party, a change in this ideological distance, or time was expected. For these expectations, I used a rational choice framework in which I incorporated critique of both structuralism and culture. Furthermore, different party preferences resulted in different expectations of why SDPs have changed their ideological positions. Using the spatial modelling theory and a specific application of this theory – the class cleavage theory – the above mentioned expectations are deduced by applying different (and sometimes overlapping) party preferences.

First, I discuss the different expectations that are derived from the spatial modelling theory after which I present the findings that are derived from the class cleavage theory. In order to test the hypotheses that I deduced in the theoretical framework, I applied a variety of estimation methods. The findings suggest that SDPs change their ideological position in the opposite direction to the median voter. This is contrary to the expectation (*H1*) that is derived from the spatial modelling theory, which was mainly derived from the vote-seeking preference. The expectation that this effect is moderated by the distance to the largest other party in the party system (*H2*), which was derived mainly using the office-seeking preference, was also not supported by the data. Since these findings are conflicting with the expectations, they provide a first indication that vote-seeking and office-seeking preferences do not apply to SDPs.

My analyses furthermore indicate that SDPs respond, in the opposite way as expected, to the position of the largest other party in the party system (*H3*). Where spatially modelling theory, applying mainly a vote-seeking and office-seeking preference, expects a shift towards the largest party in the party system, a reverse effect is found. This remarkable finding provides me with additional indication that SDPs do not act out of a vote-seeking preference nor out of an office-seeking preference. The expectation, as derived from the policy-seeking preference, that the above mentioned effect is moderated by the change in distance to the largest party (*H4*) is neither supported by the data. Again, the effect turns out to be in the opposite direction to what was expected. Therefore, this indicates that the policy-seeking preference does not apply to SDPs in OECD countries.

When the intra-party democracy party preference is applied to the spatial modelling theory, it turns out that SDPs are responsive to the position of the party members' mean ideological position as expected (*H5*). This finding suggests that while applying the vote-seeking, office-seeking and policy-seeking party preference to the spatial modelling theory produce none or even contrary findings, the intra-party democracy preference results in an expectation that is confirmed by the analyses.

The class cleavage theory proposes expectations with regard to the size of the working class. The first expectation that is derived from the class cleavage theory is mainly applying the vote-seeking preference and expects that a decrease of the size of the working class results in a more right position of SDPs (*H6*). My findings regarding this expectation show that there is some indication to assume this expectation to be correct. This finding thereby indicates that there is some indication for the vote-seeking preference. However, as indicated in the theoretical framework, the expectation that SDPs are responsive to the size of the working class also applies to the intra-party democracy preference. After all, due to a decline in working class, the make-up (and thereby the mean ideological position) of the party members is likely to change which results in a change in the ideological position of SDPs. Therefore, this finding also further reinforces the idea that SDPs act out of an intra-party democracy preference.

Two hypotheses were deduced from the class cleavage theory which expected a moderation effect on the effect of the size of the working class on the rightness of SDPs. The first of these expected a strengthening of this effect when the relative distance to the largest other party in the party system decreases (*H7*). The findings indicate that, as expected, a decrease in the distance to the largest other party strengthens the effect of the size of the working class on the rightness of the SDPs. However, the robustness of this effect turns out to be weak. Since this expectation was deduced using the office-seeking party preference, it offers some indication that the office-seeking preference produces correct expectations on why SDPs change their ideological position.

The other moderation effect is the effect of time. The class cleavage theory, applying a vote-seeking preference, expected that over time the effect between the size of the working class and the rightness of a SDP weakens. It turns out that there is insufficient indication for this hypothesis to be confirmed. Therefore, this result does not provide support for the vote-seeking preference. Based on the findings for the specific hypotheses within both the spatial modelling theory and the class cleavage theory, applied to the different party preference, I provide an answer to the central research question I addressed in this thesis. The central question of this thesis is as follows:

To what extent can the change in the ideological position of social democratic parties in OECD countries between 1945 and 2015 be explained by rational choice and are social democratic parties vote-seeking parties, office-seeking parties, policy-seeking parties, or intra-party democracy parties?

It turns out that the different explanations as derived using the rational choice approach are able to explain a large part of why SDPs change their ideological positions. The preferences of SDPs are a mix of the vote-seeking, the office-seeking, the policy-seeking and the intra-party democracy party preference. However, the party preference that explains the change in ideological position of SDPs best and most consistently is the intra-party democracy preference.

5.2. Theoretical Contributions

The current literature on the change of the ideological positions of SDPs lacks a clear theoretical framework. Expectations are drawn from findings in other studies and the theoretical basis of these expectations can often be questioned. Furthermore, the focus is often on the change in ideological position of political parties in general and less on SDPs specifically. Moreover, when it comes to party preferences, most studies mainly derive explanations from the votes-seeking and office-seeking preference and some studies devote attention to the policy-seeking preference as a distinct preference (e.g. Adams and Merrill, 2009; Dalton and McAllister, 2015). However, almost no study embraces the intra-party democracy preference. This study is the first to include the ideological position of party members as an explanation for the change in the ideological position of SDPs. The main contributions of this thesis are that it offers a systematic theoretical approach, deduces expectation for both political parties in general and SDPs specifically and apply a vote-seeking, office-seeking, policy-seeking and an intra-party democracy preference to these theories. I show in this thesis that the rational choice approach, in which I integrate critique of both structuralism and culture, results in testable explanations that are able to explain the change in ideological positions of SDPs. Both the general spatial modelling theory and the more specific class cleavage theory, to which I applied different party preferences, offer different expectations for the change in ideological position of SDPs. Furthermore, the findings suggest that, although all four party preferences offer explanations for the change in ideological position, the intra-party democracy preference offers the most consistent results.

First of all, the conclusion that SDPs do not respond to the position of the mean voters as I expected is remarkable. After all, of all the hypotheses that were formulated in the theoretical framework of this thesis, this was the expectation that was most consistently supported by the existing literature on political parties (e.g. Adams et al., 2004, p. 601) and for SDPS specifically

(Ezrow et al., 2011, p. 286). Although Adams et al., already find that parties on the left (such as SDPs) are less responsive to the ideological position of the mean voter compared to right and centre parties (2009, pp. 626-627), my results show that SDPs are moving even in the opposite direction. This finding offers the theoretical insight that the behaviour of SDPs might differ from other political parties, and even other political parties on the left.

Second, my results show that SDPs do not respond to the position of the largest party as expected. If SDPs are office-seeking parties, I expect that they would be responsive to the position of the largest party and that this position affected their responsiveness to other incentives for change. After all, this would improve the possibility for SDPs to form a coalition (Schofield, 1993, p. 11). However, the results show that the support for this expectation is weak or even in the opposite direction.

With the theoretical discussion and synthesis that I present in the theoretical framework, I add to the existing literature by improving the debate on how to understand political behaviour of political parties and actors in general. Thereby I embed my thesis into the debate which is often called the 'lifeblood of academia' (Weyland, 2002, p. 79). I show this theoretical approach results in vastly different explanations and predictions based on the preferences of a SDP. Furthermore, my analyses show that the expectations that I derive by using this approach are able to explain a fair amount of the total change in ideological position of SDPs. This provides important theoretical insights for the study of the ideological positions of SDPs. It shows that a concise theoretical approach as presented in the theoretical framework is able to explain a fair share of the behaviour of SDPs.

5.3. Methodological Contributions

Next to the theoretical contributions that this thesis provides, it also offers some methodological contributions. Often panel data is plagued by incompleteness. This is particularly true when a dataset is the result of a combination of different other datasets. For example, in this thesis, I combined data on party manifestos, voter preferences, party member preferences and the size of the working class. However, none of data sources I derived these data from have observations for every year in every country between 1945 and 2015. To overcome this problem, I started by using linear interpolation to 'fill in' the missing values. An important benefit of such an approach is that it increases the degrees of freedom, which offers possibility for including more variables and applying more complex estimation techniques for analysing data from *Dataset on Social Democratic Party Competition*. However, the analyses show that this approach to fill in the missing values poses some important drawbacks.

First, autocorrelation turns out to be problematic. Not surprisingly, it turns out that, using interpolation, the observation of the dependent variable in year T is largely dependent on the observation of the dependent variable in year T_{-1} . This is problematic since, due to autocorrelation, coefficients are potentially biased. After all, the analyses do not include all the potential predictors for explaining the value of the dependent variable in t .

Second, including a lagged dependent variable to eliminate the autocorrelation, results in largely suppressed results. It turns out that when using interpolation to fill in missing values, the explanatory power of the lagged dependent variable is very strong. The increase in explanatory power of the model including this variable (R-squared) raises from about 0.2 to 0.9 (see table 4.5 and the table in appendix 4.12). Furthermore, the effect of the other predictors becomes less significant and, if they remain significant, their coefficient drops substantially.

The alternative to this approach is aggregating both the dependent and the independent variables into five year averages. An obvious and important drawback of such a procedure to deal with missing values is that it reduces the number of observations by about 80 percent. This decrease in observations greatly affects the empirical results. Nevertheless, the analyses show that autocorrelation is less of a problem. Furthermore, although the lagged dependent variable remains important, it does no longer suppress the entire model.

This insight offers important knowledge for research using datasets that are plagued by incomplete datasets, such as the combination of the Comparative Manifesto Project database with other datasets, as was the case in this thesis. Using interpolation to fill in missing data poses important problems with autocorrelation. This problem can be solved by aggregating variables into a few year averages (five in this thesis). Although this severely limits the number of observations, the suppression of including a lagged dependent variable into a model with an interpolation procedure is so substantial that the improvement of the model outweighs these limitations.

5.4. Limitations and Suggestions for Further Research

In this thesis, I have addressed the question why and to what extent SDPs in OECD countries changed their position to the left or to the right in the period between 1945 and 2015. However, this does not answer the question why and under what circumstances SDPs decide to either change their position (significantly) or not. Therefore, further research on the development of SDPs should analyse when and why these parties decide to (substantially) change their ideological positions and when and why not. Such research should also include the electoral performance of SDPs as an important indicator for change (Budge, 1994, p. 461; Adams et al., 2004, p. 608). Although, I did already include the electoral performance in this thesis, the expected direction of

the change due to the electoral performance is dependent on the change in the previous period. Since this was not the dependent variable of this thesis, I was not able to test this expectation.

This thesis shows that SDPs behaviour is best explained by applying an intra-party democracy preference. However, this party preference is least applied to the study of the change in ideological positions of political parties. Therefore, further research should, next to the vote, office and policy seeking preferences, take the intra-party democracy preference into account to derive expectation for the behaviour of SDPs.

Some expectations that are discussed in the theoretical framework are expected to be more important for SDPs than for other party families. Therefore, the generalization of the outcomes of this thesis is limited to SDPs and does not extend to other party families. However, although I expected a different behaviour of SDPs to the behaviour of other parties, it was not in the scope of this research to test whether this is actually true. So, further research should identify which theories and which preferences are able to explain the change of the ideological positions of other party families to substantiate these claims.

Apparently, SDPs have mainly responded to the demands of their party members. However, the larger changes in society are not likely to be represented in those party members' preferences. After all, the question can be raised to what extent SDP members are a good representation of their voters. Historically, SDPs represented the working class. However, as indicated by the analysis, the effect of the size of the working class has become less important over time. Therefore, it can be argued that SDPs have moved away from representing the working class and have become more catch-all parties. This might be an explanation for the (electoral) difficulties that SDPs in OECD countries face nowadays (e.g. an average decline in vote share between 1945 and 2015 of 7.8%). However, to corroborate this effect, more research is needed on how the role and the composition of party members within SDPs have changed over time.

6. References

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7. Appendixes

Appendix 3.1: SDPs included.

Country	Social democratic party
Australia	Australian Labor Party (ALP)
Austria	Social Democratic Party of Austria (SPÖ)
Belgium	Socialist Party (PS)
Canada	New Democratic Party (NDP)
Czech Republic	Czech Social Democratic Party (ČSSD)
Denmark	Social Democrats (SD)
Finland	Social Democratic Party of Finland (SDP)
France	Socialist Party ^c (PS)
Germany	Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD)
Greece	Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK)
Hungary	Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP)
Iceland	Social Democratic Alliance ^b (SDA)
Ireland	Labour Party (Labour)
Italy	Italian Democratic Socialist Party (PSDI)
Japan	Social Democratic Party ^d (SDP)
Luxembourg	Luxembourg Socialist Workers' Party (LSAP)
Netherlands	Labour Party (PvdA)
New Zealand	New Zealand Labour Party (Labour)
Norway	Labour Party ^a (A/Ap)
Portugal	Socialist Party (PS)
Spain	Spanish Socialist Workers' Party (PSOE)
Sweden	Swedish Social Democratic Party (SAP)
Switzerland	Social Democratic Party of Switzerland (SP)
United Kingdom	Labour Party (Labour)


^aNorwegian Labour Party until 2011.

^bSocial Democratic Party until 2000.

^cFrench Section of the Workers' International until 1969.


^dJapan Socialist Party until 1993, Social democratic party of Japan from 1993 till 1996.

Appendix 3.2: Distribution of the ideological positions of SDPs.



Source: Dataset on Social Democratic Party Competition.

Appendix 3.3: Distribution of the ideological positions of SDPs.



Source: Dataset on Social Democratic Party Competition.

Country	1973	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989
Australia							5.75 ^a								
Austria															
Belgium	5.67	5.89	5.90	6.18	5.84	7.03	5.83 ^b	5.75 ^c	5.40	5.67 ^f	5.71	5.73	5.53	5.60	5.94 ^h
Canada															
Czech Republic															
Denmark	5.41	5.48	5.33	5.55	5.59	5.44	5.68 ^b	5.66 ^c	5.81	5.61 ^f	5.59	5.68	5.81	5.87	5.87 ^h
Finland							5.85 ^a								
France	5.05	4.76	4.8	5.09	4.95	5.76	4.79 ^b	5.03 ^c	5.05	5.19 ^f	5.40	5.13	5.01	5.00	4.86 ^h
Germany	5.63	5.94	6.03	5.96	5.79	5.82	5.92 ^b	5.40 ^c	5.55	5.34 ^f	5.31	5.49	5.32	5.46	5.23 ^h
Great Britain	5.37	5.82	5.85	5.91	5.83	5.68	5.59 ^b	5.95 ^c	5.72	5.86 ^f	5.93	5.65	5.81	5.94	5.59 ^h
Greece						5.15	5.22 ^b	4.88 ^c	5.19	5.26 ^f	5.18	5.55	5.54	5.51	5.38 ^h
Hungary															
Iceland										5.67 ^g					
Ireland	6.30	6.13	6.30	6.20	6.23	5.91	6.30 ^b	6.19 ^c	5.70	6.3 ^f	6.13	6.13	6.15	6.16	6.37 ^h
Italy	4.69	4.13	4.24	4.33	4.30	4.32	4.51 ^b	4.63 ^c	4.63	4.58 ^f	4.65	4.70	4.66	4.83	4.63 ^h
Japan							6.07 ^a								

Appendix 3.4: Overview of the ideological position of the mean voter.

Luxembourg	5.43	5.48	5.93	5.72	5.63	5.61	5.55 ^b	5.69 ^c	5.96	5.67 ^f	5.81	5.95	5.76	5.76	5.61 ^h
Netherlands	5.80	5.80	5.72	5.92	5.94	5.92	5.69	5.59	5.22	5.41	5.98	5.25	5.22	5.06	5.28
New Zealand							5.34 ^m								
Austria		5.59 ⁱ					5.21 ⁿ	5.90 ^l	4.78	5.24 ^q	5.04 ^s	4.74 ^u	5.24	4.79	
Poland		5.43 ^k	5.55	5.33	5.36	5.03	5.38 ⁿ	5.15 ^o	5.37	5.24 ^q	5.48 ^s	5.40	5.35	5.80	5.29
Spain											5.00	4.76	5.54	4.59	4.55 ^h
Czech Republic							5.38 ^a								
Sweden		5.57 ^k	5.62	5.73	5.53	5.44	5.64 ⁿ	5.50 ^o	5.71	5.67 ^q	5.68 ^s	5.65 ^u	5.57	5.69	5.43

Sources:

- 1973: European Communities Study 1973 (Gesis, 2014d).
1976: Eurobarometer 5 (May-Jun 1976) (Gesis, 2014e).
1977: Eurobarometer 7 (Apr-May 1977) (Gesis, 2014f).
1978: Eurobarometer 9 (May-Jun 1978) (Gesis, 2014g).
1979: Eurobarometer 11 (Apr 1979) (Gesis, 2014h).
1980: Eurobarometer 14 (Oct-Nov 1980) (Gesis, 2014i).
1981: ^aWVS wave 1 (1981-1984); ^bEurobarometer 16 (Oct-Nov 1981) (WVS, 2016g; Gesis, 2014j).
1982: ^cEurobarometer 18 (Oct, 1982); ^d1st EVS wave; ^eWVS wave 1 (1981-1984) (Gesis, 2014k; EVS, 2015b; WVS, 2016g).
1983: Eurobarometer 20 (Oct 1983) (Gesis, 2014l).
1984: ^fEurobarometer 22 (Oct 1984); ^g1st EVS wave (Gesis, 2014m; EVS, 2015b).
1985: Eurobarometer 24 (Oct 1985) (Gesis, 2014n).
1986: Eurobarometer 26 (Nov 1986) (Gesis, 2014o).
1987: Eurobarometer 28 (Nov 1987) (Gesis, 2014p).
1988: Eurobarometer 29 (Mar-Apr 1988) (Gesis, 2014q).
1989:^hEurobarometer 31 (Mar-Apr 1989); ⁱWVS wave 2 (1990-1994) (Gesis, 2014r; WVS, 2016c).

Finland						5.87 ⁿ	5.64 ^o	5.73	5.73 ^q	5.70 ^s	5.80 ^u	5.44	5.60
France	5.03 ^k	4.84	4.96	5.01	4.83	4.88 ⁿ	4.55 ^o	4.78	4.76 ^q	4.78 ^s	4.78 ^u	4.75	4.97
Germany	5.43 ^k	5.36	5.43	5.4	5.19	5.33 ⁿ	5.42 ^o	5.19	5.24 ^q	5.51 ^s	5.36 ^u	5.20	5.41
Great Britain	5.31 ^k	5.65	5.46	5.45	5.21	5.27 ⁿ	5.17 ^o	5.01	5.28 ^q	5.20 ^s	5.18 ^u	5.13	5.09
Greece	5.66 ^k	5.83	5.77	5.65	5.76	5.69 ⁿ	5.32 ^o	5.50	5.71 ^q	5.67 ^s	5.73 ^u	5.74	5.69
Hungary													
Iceland	5.68 ^j									5.78 ^t			
Ireland	5.68 ^k	5.77	5.69	5.53	5.64	5.59 ⁿ	5.70 ^o	5.62	5.54 ^q	5.45 ^s	5.67 ^u	5.65	5.80
Italy	4.76 ^k	4.70	4.66	4.69	4.88	5.28 ⁿ	4.94 ^o	5.09	5.13 ^q	5.48 ^s	5.43 ^u	5.12	5.07
Japan	5.93 ^l					5.98 ^m					5.70 ^v		
Luxembourg	5.62 ^k	5.19	5.23	5.27	5.30	5.17 ⁿ	5.18 ^o	5.30	4.86 ^q	4.92 ^s	4.87 ^u	5.12	5.09
Netherlands	5.36 ^k	5.42	5.39	5.33	5.11	5.18 ⁿ	5.07 ^o	5.04	5.21 ^q	5.33 ^s	5.22 ^u	5.03	5.04
New Zealand									5.79 ^f				
Norway	5.66 ^j		5.31	5.34	5.37		5.57 ^p						5.75
Portugal	5.36 ^k	5.39	5.58	5.45	5.23	5.11 ⁿ	5.29 ^o	5.25	5.11 ^q	5.27 ^s	5.26 ^u	5.22	5.31
Spain	4.43 ^k	4.32	4.66	4.77	4.89	4.65 ⁿ	4.82 ^o	4.67	4.71 ^q	4.80 ^s	4.84 ^u	4.60	4.70
Sweden						5.26 ⁿ	5.20 ^o	5.40	5.44 ^q	5.43 ^s	5.29 ^u	5.28	5.07
Switzerland						5.31 ^p							

Overview of the ideological position of the mean voter (3.4 continued).

Sources:

1990: ⁱ2nd EVS wave; ^kEurobarometer 33 (Spring 1990); ^lWVS wave 2 (1990-1994) (EVS, 2015c; Gesis, 2014s; WVS, 2016c).

1991: Eurobarometer 35.1 (Apr 1991) (Gesis, 2014t).

1992: Eurobarometer 38.0 (Sep-Oct 1992) (Gesis, 2014u).

1993: Eurobarometer 40 (Oct-Nov 1993) (Gesis, 2014v).

1994: Eurobarometer 42 (Nov-Dec 1994) (Gesis, 2014w).

1995: ^mWVS wave 3 (1995-1998); ⁿEurobarometer 44.0 (Oct-Nov 1995) (WVS, 2016d; Gesis, 2014x).

1996: ^oEurobarometer 46.0 (Oct-Nov 1996); ^pWVS wave 3 (1995-1998) (Gesis, 2014y; WVS, 2016d).

1997: Eurobarometer 48.0 (Oct-Nov 1997) (Gesis, 2014z).

1998: ^sEurobarometer 50.0 (Oct-Nov 1998); ^rWVS wave 3 (1995-1998) (Gesis, 2014aa; WVS, 2016d).

1999: ^sEurobarometer 52.0 (Oct-Nov 1999); ^t3th EVS wave (Gesis, 2014ab; EVS, 2015d).

2000: ^wEurobarometer 53 (Apr-May 2000); ^vWVS wave 4 (1999-2004) (Gesis, 2014ac; WVS, 2016e).

2001: ^wEurobarometer 56.0 (Aug-Sept 2001) (Gesis, 2014ad).

2002: Eurobarometer 58.0 (Sep-Oct) (Gesis, 2014ae).

Country	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
Australia			5.57 ^{aa}							5.33 ^{am}			
Austria	5.21	5.17 ^y	5.02 ^{ab}	5.22	5.07 ^{ac}	5.39 ^{ac}	5.00 ^{ag}	5.01 ^{ai}	5.13 ^{ak}	5.18 ^{an}	5.14	5.01	4.79
Belgium	5.01	4.97 ^y	5.10 ^{ab}	5.19	5.01 ^{ac}	5.23 ^{ac}	5.18 ^{ag}	5.13 ^{ai}	5.06 ^{ak}	5.26 ^{an}	5.18	5.37	5.36
Canada			5.45 ^{aa}										
Czech Republic		5.34 ^y	5.77 ^{ab}	6.00	5.96 ^{ac}	5.42 ^{ac}	5.50 ^{ag}	5.53 ^{ai}	5.39 ^{ak}	5.16 ^{an}	5.14	5.35	5.29
Denmark	5.60	5.53 ^y	5.71 ^{ab}	5.42	5.48 ^{ac}	5.44 ^{ac}	5.48 ^{ag}	5.41 ^{ai}	5.09 ^{ak}	5.43 ^{an}	5.44	5.48	5.37

Finland	5.58	5.66 ^y	5.60 ^{ab}	5.66	5.64 ^{ac}	5.79 ^{ac}	5.93 ^{ag}	5.80 ^{ai}	5.76 ^{ak}	5.68 ^{an}	5.56	5.68	5.67
France	4.92	4.85 ^y	4.91 ^{ab}	5.06	5.11 ^{ac}	4.95 ^{ac}	5.01 ^{ag}	4.89 ^{ai}	4.95 ^{ak}	4.96 ^{an}	5.00	5.12	5.07
Germany	5.39	5.22 ^y	5.02 ^{ab}	5.15	4.86 ^{ac}	5.03 ^{ac}	5.10 ^{ag}	5.05 ^{ai}	5.11 ^{ak}	4.96 ^{an}	5.12	5.03	5.03
Great Britain	5.05	5.16 ^y	5.10 ^{ab}	5.25	5.06 ^{ac}	5.22 ^{ac}	5.32 ^{ag}	5.20 ^{ai}	5.09 ^{ak}	5.04 ^{an}	5.07	5.08	5.27
Greece	5.41	5.42 ^y	5.48 ^{ab}	5.65	5.84 ^{ac}	5.65 ^{ac}	5.55 ^{ag}	5.36 ^{ai}	5.37 ^{ak}	5.21 ^{an}	5.38	5.26	5.06
Hungary		5.18 ^y	5.33 ^{ab}	5.18	5.34 ^{ac}	6.09 ^{ac}	5.98 ^{ag}	6.34 ^{ai}	5.74 ^{ak}	5.59 ^{an}	5.80	5.97	5.78
Iceland							5.39 ^{ah}	5.24 ^{ai}				5.45	
Ireland	5.52	5.43 ^y	5.71 ^{ab}	5.87	5.99 ^{ac}	5.93 ^{ac}	5.51 ^{ag}	5.52 ^{ai}	5.63 ^{ak}	5.36 ^{an}	5.12	5.10	5.36
Italy	5.04	4.88 ^y	5.08 ^{ab}	4.85	5.23 ^{ac}	5.12 ^{ac}	5.56 ^{ag}	5.68 ^{ai}	5.35 ^{ak}	5.13 ^{an}	4.91	5.17	4.95
Japan			5.50 ^{aa}					5.61 ^{aj}					
Luxembourg	5.25	5.18 ^y	5.27 ^{ab}	5.50	4.43 ^{ac}	5.52 ^{ac}	5.34 ^{ag}	5.31 ^{ai}	5.09 ^{ak}	4.97 ^{an}	5.04	5.02	5.26
Netherlands	5.28	5.03 ^y	5.08 ^{ab}	5.01	5.04 ^{ac}	5.22 ^{ac}	5.23 ^{ag}	5.19 ^{ai}	5.10 ^{ak}	4.90 ^{an}	5.11	4.97	4.94
New Zealand		5.71 ^z							5.68 ^{al}				
Norway	5.59				5.60 ^{ad}	5.59 ^{af}							
Portugal	5.25	5.02 ^y	5.18 ^{ab}	4.94	5.09 ^{ac}	4.89 ^{ac}	5.19 ^{ag}	4.97 ^{ai}	5.20 ^{ak}	4.80 ^{an}	4.72	4.88	4.78
Spain	4.70	4.58 ^y	4.39 ^{ab}	4.75	4.48 ^{ac}	4.25 ^{ac}	4.52 ^{ag}	4.81 ^{ai}	4.87 ^{ak}	4.63 ^{an}	4.42	4.24	4.19
Sweden	5.29	5.27 ^y	5.41 ^{ab}	5.29	5.32 ^{ac}	5.35 ^{ac}	5.44 ^{ag}	5.31 ^{ai}	5.29 ^{ak}	5.26 ^{an}	5.24	4.85	5.08
Switzerland					5.24 ^{ad}	5.20 ^{af}							

Overview of the ideological position of the mean voter (3.4 continued).

Sources:

2003: Eurobarometer 59.0 (Jan-Feb 2003) (Gesis, 2014af).

2004: ^yEurobarometer 62.0 (Oct-Nov 2004); ^zWVS wave 5 (2004-2009) (Gesis, 2014ag; WVS, 2016f).

2005:^{aa}WVS wave 5 (2004-2009); ^{ab}Eurobarometer 63.4 (May-Jun 2005) (WVS, 2016f; Gesis, 2014ah).

2006: Eurobarometer 65.3 (May-Jun 2006) (Gesis, 2014ai).

2007:^{ac}Eurobarometer 67,3 (May-Jun 2007); ^{ad}WVS wave 5 (2004-2009) (Gesis, 2014aj; WVS, 2016f).

2008:^{ac}Eurobarometer 69.2 (Mar-May 2008); ^{af}4th EVS Wave (Gesis, 2014ak; EVS, 2015e).

2009:^{ag}Eurobarometer 71.2 (May-Jun 2009); ^{ah}4th EVS Wave (Gesis, 2014al; EVS, 2015e).

2010:^{ai}Eurobarometer 73.4 (May 2010); ^{aj}WVS wave 6 (2009-2014) (Gesis, 2014am; WVS, 2016g).

2011:^{ak}Eurobarometer 75.2 (2011); ^{al}WVS wave 6 (2009-2014) (Gesis, 2014an; WVS, 2016g).

2012:^{am}WVS wave 6 (2009-2014); ^{an}Eurobarometer 77.2 (2012) (WVS, 2016g; Gesis, 2014ao).

2013:^{ao}Eurobarometer 79.5 (2013) (Gesis, 2015a).

2014: Eurobarometer 81.4 (2014) (Gesis, 2015b).

2015: Eurobarometer 83.4 (2015) (Gesis, 2016b).

Country	1977	1981	1982	1983	1984	1987	1989	1990	1991	1995	1996	1997	1998
Australia										3.48			
Austria								4.90 ^a					4.03 ^f
Belgium		3.00						5.00 ^a					
Canada			4.33					3.85 ^a					
Czech Republic									2.71	3.67			
Denmark	4.63	5.48		4.57		4.44		4.49 ^b					4.49 ^f
Finland								3.67 ^a			3.88		4.45 ^f
France	2.56			2.92		2.09		3.04 ^b					3.22 ^f
Germany	3.70	3.85		3.73		3.95		3.83 ^b					4.24 ^f
Great Britain	4.54	4.00		3.21		2.81		3.88 ^b				4.32	3.80 ^f
Greece				3.30		4.35		4.15 ^c					4.00 ^f
Hungary									2.50				
Iceland					4.14			4.45 ^a					
Ireland	4.57	3.20		5.50		2.00		3.50 ^b					3.00 ^f
Italy	5.33			3.50		4.67		3.50 ^b					
Japan								3.50 ^d					
Luxembourg	3.50			2.83		3.00		3.57 ^c					4.75 ^f
Netherlands	2.60			2.78		2.78		3.40 ^b					2.82 ^f

Appendix 3.5: Overview of the ideological position of the mean party member.

New Zealand				4.40 ^g
Norway			4.73	
Portugal	4.00	4.20 ^c		3.29 ^f
Spain	3.25	3.09 ^e	4.00	2.67 ^f
Sweden		3.44 ^a	2.85	3.36 ^f
Switzerland		3.65	3.05	

Sources:

1977: Eurobarometer 8 (Oct-Nov 1977) (Gesis, 2014ap).

1981, 1982 and 1984: 1st EVS wave (EVS, 2015b).

1983: Eurobarometer 19 (Mar-Apr 1983) (Gesis, 2014aq).

1987: Eurobarometer 28 (Nov 1987) (Gesis, 2014ar).

1989: WVS wave 2 (1990-1994) (WVS, 2016c).

1990: ^a 2nd EVS wave (EVS, 2015c); ^b Combination of Eurobarometer 34.0 (Oct-Nov 1990) and 2nd EVS wave (Gesis, 2014as; EVS, 2015c) ; ^c Eurobarometer 34.0 (Oct-Nov 1990) (Gesis, 2014as); ^d WVS wave 2 (1990-1994) (WVS, 2016c); ^e Combination of Eurobarometer 34.0 (Oct-Nov 1990), 2nd EVS wave and WVS wave 2 (1990-1994) (Gesis, 2014as; EVS, 2015c; WVS, 2016c).

1991: 2nd EVS wave (EVS, 2015c).

1995, 1996 and 1997: WVS wave 3 (1995-1998) (WVS, 2016d).

1998: ^f Eurobarometer 49 (Apr-May 1998); ^g WVS wave 3 (1995-1998) (Gesis, 2014at; WVS, 2016d).

Overview of the ideological position of the mean party member (3.5 continued).

Country	1999	2000	2001	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
Australia					3.97							4.35	
Austria	4.34							3.95					
Belgium	2.22								2.38 ^j				
Canada		2.91 ^h			4.11								
Czech Republic	4.85							4.10					
Denmark	4.50							4.30					
Finland		4.33 ⁱ			4.67				3.07 ^j				
France	2.71							2.00					
Germany	4.53					3.37		4.57					4.33
Great Britain	4.17								3.67 ^j				
Greece	4.69							4.35					
Hungary	2.60							2.33	2.14 ^k				
Iceland	5.50								3.50 ^j				
Ireland	3.50							4.50					
Italy	3.00												
Japan					4.50					3.00			
Luxembourg	3.73							2.92					
New Zealand				5.09								5.14	
Norway							4.53	4.28					
Portugal	5.50							5.50					
Spain	2.27	3.94 ^h					4.27	2.42				3.50	
Sweden	3.81					3.41		3.07				3.73	
Switzerland							3.25	3.13					

Sources:

1999: 3th EVS wave (EVS, 2015d).

2000: ^h WVS wave 4 (1999-2004) ; ⁱ 3th EVS wave (WVS, 2016e; EVS, 2015d).

2001: WVS wave 4 (1999-2004) (WVS, 2016e).

2004, 2005, 2006 and 2007: WVS wave 5 (2004-2009) (WVS, 2016f).

2008: 4th EVS Wave (EVS, 2015e).

2009: ⁱ 4th EVS Wave; ^k WVS wave 5 (2004-2009) (EVS, 2015e ;WVS, 2016f).


2010, 2011, 2012 and 2013: WVS wave 6 (2009-2014) (WVS, 2016g).

Appendix 3.6: Explanatory power of clusters.

Country	Regression coefficient.	Std. Error
Sweden	-4.511*	2.044
Norway	-11.984***	2.060
Denmark	2.980	2.043
Finland	3.769	2.043
Iceland	6.746**	2.036
Belgium	0.393	2.528
Netherlands	-1.569	2.044
Luxembourg	-10.363***	2.028
France	-7.829***	2.044
Italy	7.686**	2.372
Spain	2.864	2.478
Greece	1.296	2.336
Portugal	10.404***	2.433
Germany	4.986*	2.060
Austria	4.286*	2.104
Switzerland	-5.728**	2.060
Ireland	-1.987	2.068
Canada	-10.230***	2.215
Australia	8.407***	2.036
New Zealand	-3.831	2.052
Japan	-10.650***	2.178
Czech Republic	8.895**	3.167
Hungary	14.777***	2.791
Constant	-18.884***	
Adjusted R ²	0.232	
N	1,372	

*=p<.05; **=p<.01; ***= p<.001 (two-tailed).

Appendix 4.1: SDPs' ideological positions over time for those parties with data on whole period 1945 – 2015¹⁸.



Bivariate analysis of rightness of SDP from 1945 until 2015.

Independent variable	Regression Coefficient (Std. Error)
Year	0.156*** (0.022)
Constant	-25.291 (0.859)
Adjusted R ²	0.046
N*T	1,028

*=p<.05; **=p<.01; ***= p<.001 (two-tailed).

Source: *Dataset on Social Democratic Party Competition.*

¹⁸ Australia, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom.

Appendix 4.2: Bivariate regression of time on SDPs' ideological position per country.

Country	Regression coefficient (std. Error)	Adjusted R ²
Australia	0.311*** (0.081)	0.1704
Austria	0.149* (0.073)	0.0518
Belgium	-0.630*** (0.081)	0.6501
Canada	0.209** (0.067)	0.1518
Czech Republic	-1.208*** (0.129)	0.8233
Denmark	0.052 (0.065)	-0.0056
Finland	-0.276 (0.146)	0.0376
France	0.190** (0.069)	0.0905
Germany	0.101 (0.056)	0.0338
Greece	0.740*** (0.106)	0.5376
Hungary	-0.674*** (0.148)	0.4500
Iceland	-0.081 (0.066)	0.0080
Ireland	0.222*** (0.050)	0.2282
Italy	1.090*** (0.076)	0.8409
Japan	-0.301*** (0.078)	0.2094
Luxembourg	0.195*** (0.050)	0.1709
Netherlands	0.396*** (0.070)	0.3172
New Zealand	0.312*** (0.056)	0.3083
Norway	0.096** (0.033)	0.1017
Portugal	-0.258 (0.237)	0.0052
Spain	-0.329** (0.083)	0.2880
Sweden	0.493*** (0.086)	0.3261
Switzerland	-0.355*** (0.066)	0.3039
United Kingdom	0.464*** (0.054)	0.5067

*=p<.05; **=p<.01; ***= p<.001 (two-tailed).

Source: *Dataset on Social Democratic Party Competition.*


Appendix 4.3: Bivariate analyses of electoral performance over time.

	Regression Coefficient (Std. Error)	Adjusted R ²
All countries	-0.112** (0.032)	0.028
Constant	33.962	

*=p<.05; **=p<.01; ***= p<.001 (two-tailed).

Source: Dataset on Social Democratic Party Competition.

Appendix 4.4: SDPs' vote share over time for those parties with data on whole period 1945 – 2015¹⁹.



Bivariate analysis of vote share of SDP from 1945 until 2015.

Independent variable	Regression Coefficient (Std. Error)
Year	-0.129*** (0.033)
Constant	33.862 (1.295)
Adjusted R ²	0.044
N*T	305

*=p<.05; **=p<.01; ***= p<.001 (two-tailed).

Source: *Dataset on Social Democratic Party Competition.*

¹⁹ Australia, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom.

Appendix 4.5: Bivariate regression of time on SDPs' vote share per country.

Country	Regression coefficient (std. Error)	Adjusted R ²
Australia	-0.115*** (0.034)	0.437
Austria	-0.185* (0.067)	0.268
Belgium	-0.051 (0.047)	0.019
Canada	0.053 (0.080)	-0.037
Czech Republic	-0.497 (0.294)	0.271
Denmark	-0.198*** (0.043)	0.456
Finland	-0.047 (0.027)	0.102
France	0.266** (0.083)	0.366
Germany	-0.052 (0.078)	-0.034
Greece	-0.201 (0.307)	-0.046
Hungary	0.055 (0.724)	-0.199
Iceland	0.129 (0.065)	0.135
Ireland	0.034 (0.046)	-0.026
Italy	-0.058* (0.021)	0.448
Japan	-0.509*** (0.049)	0.865
Luxembourg	-0.184** (0.046)	0.499
Netherlands	-0.096 (0.046)	0.142
New Zealand	-0.230*** (0.045)	0.527
Norway	-0.253*** (0.050)	0.601
Portugal	0.215 (0.184)	0.027
Spain	0.012 (0.185)	-0.111
Sweden	-0.190*** (0.035)	0.591
Switzerland	-0.115*** (0.022)	0.624
United Kingdom	-0.250*** (0.051)	0.578

*=p<.05; **=p<.01; ***= p<.001 (two-tailed).

Source: Dataset on Social Democratic Party Competition.

Appendix 4.6: Bivariate analyses of SDPs' governmental status over time.


Bivariate analysis of vote share of SDP from 1945 until 2015.

Independent variable	Regression Coefficient (Std. Error)
Year	0.002 (0.017)
Constant	52.311 (0.712)
Adjusted R ²	-0.001
N*T	1,387

*=p<.05; **=p<.01; ***= p<.001 (two-tailed).

Source: Dataset on Social Democratic Party Competition.

Appendix 4.7: Governmental status of SDPs over time for those parties with data on whole period 1945 - 2015²⁰.



Bivariate analysis of percentage of SDPs in government from 1945 until 2015.

Independent variable	Regression Coefficient (Std. Error)
Year	0.061** (0.020)
Constant	54.769 (0.832)
Adjusted R ²	0.007
N*T	1,068

*=p<.05; **=p<.01; ***= p<.001 (two-tailed).

Source: *Dataset on Social Democratic Party Competition*.

Appendix 4.8: Bivariate regressions on governmental status of SDPs.

²⁰ Australia, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom.

Independent variable	Regression Coefficient (Std. Error)	Adjusted R ²
Rightness of party	0.004*** (0.001)	0.012
Vote share	0.005* (0.002)	0.013

*=p<.05; **=p<.01; ***= p<.001 (two-tailed).

Source: Dataset on Social Democratic Party Competition.

Appendix 4.9: OLS regression estimates of the effect of independent variables on the change in the rightness of SDPs.

Model	m1	m2	m3	m4	m5	m6	m7	m8	m9	m10	m11
Rightness of voters	-7.410*** (1.553)	-8.337*** (1.777)	-10.330*** (2.349)	-11.903*** (2.714)	-3.791 (2.560)	-8.894*** (1.862)				0.549 (2.947)	-5.055* (2.201)
Largest party on the right (ref: largest party on the left)	-12.947*** (1.727)	-7.607*** (2.016)	-19.624*** (2.609)	-15.871*** (2.903)	-13.407*** (2.610)		4.796** (1.413)			-13.570** (4.628)	3.777 (2.766)
Rightness of party members		1.734*** (0.716)		2.466** (0.955)	1.829* (0.856)					2.840** (0.883)	1.382* (0.655)
Working class size			-0.252* (0.106)	-0.205# (0.110)	0.020 (0.110)			-0.446*** (0.099)	-0.029 (0.283)	-0.694 (0.562)	
Towards largest party (ref: away from largest party)					2.208* (1.109)	-14.088 (11.450)		14.243** (4.467)		22.360 (20.715)	-4.873 (11.140)
Distance to largest party					-0.273*** (0.042)		0.830*** (0.053)			0.184 (0.347)	0.649** (0.244)
Year					0.337** (0.097)				0.468* (0.220)	0.839* (0.419)	-0.028 (0.056)
Rightness of voters * towards largest party						3.180 (2.111)				-1.865 (3.647)	-0.784 (2.063)
Largest party on the right * distance to largest party							-1.095*** (0.056)			-0.326 (0.349)	-0.899*** (0.246)
Working class size * towards largest party								-0.285* (0.121)		-0.254# (0.143)	
Working class size * year									0.001 (0.006)	-0.010 (0.011)	
Electoral performance										0.121 (0.129)	-0.033 (0.069)
Governmental status										2.566# (1.447)	3.905*** (0.855)
Economic situation										0.753# (0.388)	0.236 (0.163)
Constant	35.804	29.366	68.093	62.729	2.377	30.2546	-16.668	-1.724	-36.121	-62.843	7.074
Number of countries	24	24	14	14	14	24	24	14	14	14	24
Time range	1973-2015	1977-2013	1973-2008	1977-2008	1977-2008	1973-2015	1945-2015	1958-2008	1977-2008	1977-2008	1977-2013
R-squared (within)	0.107	0.110	0.141	0.155	0.264	0.054	0.263	0.010	0.154	0.380	0.254
Rho	0.337	0.415	0.390	0.540	0.371	0.341	0.263	0.327	0.333	0.493	0.518
N*Γ	679	532	356	279	279	676	1.328	484	485	279	529

Standard errors in parentheses; # $p < 0.1$; * $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$ (two-tailed).

Source: Dataset on Social Democratic Party Competition.

Appendix 4.10: OLS regression estimates of the effect of independent variables on the change in the rightness of SDPs including country dummies and year dummies (FE).

Model	m1	m2	m3	m4	m5	m6	m7	m8	m10	m11
Rightness of voters	-3.972*	-4.516*	-4.561	-5.186	-2.793	-3.664			-1.386	-3.539
	(1.954)	(2.225)	(2.899)	(3.352)	(2.954)	(2.251)			(3.286)	(2.298)
Largest party on the right (ref: largest party on the left)	-12.277***	-6.006**	-18.287***	-13.256***	-11.628***		5.130***		-5.730	4.759#
	(1.746)	(2.007)	(2.636)	(2.998)	(2.637)		(1.378)		(3.771)	(2.735)
Rightness of party members		1.932**		2.703**	1.842**				1.613#	1.408*
		(0.709)		(0.973)	(0.860)				(0.832)	(0.652)
Working class size			-0.115	-0.032	0.076			0.093	0.117	
			(0.141)	(0.141)	(0.124)			(0.132)	(0.136)	
Towards largest party (ref: away from largest party)					1.733	-5.238		12.732**	19.421	1.685
					(1.089)	(11.574)		(4.265)	(15.652)	(11.123)
Distance to largest party					-0.318***		0.866***		0.158	0.640**
					(0.042)		(0.052)		(0.275)	(0.242)
Rightness of voters * towards largest party						1.571			-2.513	-0.104
						(2.135)			(2.788)	(2.060)
Largest party on the right * distance to largest party							-1.107***		-0.460	-0.874***
							(0.055)		(0.279)	(0.245)
Working class size * towards largest party								-0.242*	-0.122	
								(0.116)	(0.108)	
Electoral gains									0.202*	-0.023
									(0.095)	(0.067)
Governmental status									4.439***	3.370***
									(1.186)	(0.852)
Economic situation									-0.395	0.022
									(0.413)	(0.217)
Constant	8.339	-4.509	24.447	5.536	5.896	-3.3708	-24.526	-18.145	-17.850	-12.776
Number of countries included	24	24	14	14	14	24	24	14	14	24
Time range	1973-2015	1977-2013	1973-2008	1977-2008	1977-2008	1973-2015	1945-2015	1958-2008	1977-2008	1977-2013
R-squared (within)	0.216	0.225	0.336	0.345	0.503	0.180	0.438	0.336	0.562	0.375
Rho	0.376	0.496	0.410	0.528	0.635	0.399	0.336	0.375	0.660	0.559
N*Γ	679	532	356	279	279	676	1.328	484	278	529

Standard errors in parentheses; # $p < 0.1$; * $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$ (two-tailed).

Source: Dataset on Social Democratic Party Competition.

Appendix 4.11: OLS regression estimates of the effect of independent variables on the change in the rightness of SDPs (RE).

Model	m1	m2	m3	m4	m5	m6	m7	m8	m9	m10	m11
Rightness of voters	-7.410*** (1.553)	-8.337*** (1.777)	-10.330*** (2.349)	-11.903*** (2.714)	-3.791 (2.561)	-8.894*** (1.862)				0.549 (2.947)	-5.055** (2.201)
Largest party on the right (ref: largest party on the left)	-12.947*** (1.727)	-1.607*** (2.016)	-19.624*** (2.609)	-15.871*** (2.903)	-13.407*** (2.610)		4.796** (1.413)			-13.570** (4.628)	3.777 (2.766)
Rightness of party members		1.734* (0.716)		2.466* (0.955)	1.829* (0.856)					2.840** (0.883)	1.382* (0.655)
Working class size			-0.253* (0.106)	-0.205# (0.110)	0.0202 (0.110)			-0.446*** (0.099)	-0.029 (0.283)	0.694 (0.562)	
Towards largest party (ref: away from largest party)					2.208* (1.109)	-14.088 (11.450)		14.243** (4.467)		22.360 (20.715)	4.873 (11.140)
Distance to largest party					-0.273*** (0.0421)		0.830*** (0.053)			0.184 (0.347)	0.649** (0.244)
Year					0.337** (0.097)				0.468* (0.220)	0.839 (0.419)	-0.028 (0.056)
Rightness of voters * towards largest party						3.180 (2.111)				-1.865 (3.647)	-0.784 (2.063)
Largest party on the right * distance to largest party							-1.095*** (0.056)			-0.326 (0.349)	-0.899*** (0.246)
Working class size * towards largest party								-0.285* (0.121)		-0.254# (0.143)	
Working class size * year									0.001 (0.006)	-0.010 (0.011)	
Electoral performance										0.121 (0.129)	-0.033 (0.069)
Governmental status										2.566# (1.447)	3.905*** (0.855)
Economic situation										0.753# (0.388)	0.236 (0.163)
Constant	35.804	29.366	68.093	62.729	2.377	30.255	-16.668	-1.724	-36.121	-62.843	7.074
Number of countries	24	24	14	14	14	24	24	14	14	14	24
Time range	1973-2015	1977-2013	1973-2008	1977-2008	1977-2008	1973-2015	1945-2015	1958-2008	1977-2008	1977-2008	1977-2013
R-squared (within)	0.100	0.061	0.198	0.183	0.379	0.054	0.327	0.134	0.200	0.380	0.254
Rho	0.337	0.415	0.390	0.540	0.371	0.341	0.329	0.327	0.333	0.493	0.518
N*I	679	532	356	279	279	676	1,328	484	485	278	529

Standard errors in parentheses; # $p < 0.1$; * $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$ (two-tailed).

Source: Dataset on Social Democratic Party Competition.

Appendix 4.12: OLS regression of the effect of independent variables on the change in the rightness of SDPs (lagged) (FE).

Model	m1	m2	m3	m4	m5	m6	m7	m8	m9	m10	m11
Rightness of voters	-1.548# (0.816)	-1.159 (0.896)	-3.296* (1.355)	-0.960 (1.508)	-0.403 (1.202)	-1.565# (0.801)				-0.277 (1.386)	-1.595# (0.950)
Largest party on the right (ref: largest party on the left)	-5.880*** (0.858)	-3.291** (0.958)	-7.039*** (1.390)	-5.554*** (1.481)	-3.841** (1.106)		0.159 (0.794)			0.393 (1.582)	2.033# (1.130)
Rightness of party members		0.314 (0.346)		0.600 (0.479)	-0.022 (0.358)					-0.200 (0.360)	-0.036 (0.273)
Working class size			0.052 (0.060)	0.026 (0.665)	-0.006 (0.051)			-0.014 (0.040)	-0.136 (0.140)	-0.344# (0.207)	
Towards largest party (ref: away from largest party)					5.405*** (0.457)	-6.426 (4.685)		7.353*** (1.714)		7.339 (6.498)	1.597 (4.529)
Distance to largest party					-0.076*** (0.018)		0.234*** (0.036)			0.296** (0.112)	0.362*** (0.099)
Year					-0.028 (0.042)				-0.089 (0.109)	-0.292# (0.151)	-0.031 (0.024)
Rightness of voters * towards largest party						2.232* (0.863)				-0.367 (1.151)	0.510 (0.839)
Largest party on the right * distance to largest party							-0.332*** (0.038)			-0.387** (0.113)	-0.433*** (0.100)
Working class size * towards largest party								-0.036 (0.046)		-0.010 (0.046)	
Working class size * year									0.003 (0.003)	0.007# (0.004)	
Electoral performance										0.017 (0.041)	0.048# (0.281)
Governmental status										0.315 (0.507)	0.637 (0.355)
Economic situation										-0.162 (0.126)	-0.072 (0.067)
Lagged rightness of party	0.839*** (0.018)	0.859*** (0.020)	0.844*** (0.027)	0.871*** (0.030)	0.884*** (0.025)	0.896*** (0.016)	0.760*** (0.014)	0.916*** (0.018)	0.886*** (0.023)	0.880*** (0.026)	0.862*** (0.017)
Constant	11.170	5.796	20.074	5.392	5.276	3.982	-2.296	-3.674	-2.402	14.703	5.444
Number of countries	24	24	14	14	14	24	24	14	14	14	24
Time range	1973-2015	1977-2013	1973-2008	1977-2008	1977-2008	1973-2015	1945-2015	1958-2008	1977-2008	1977-2008	1977-2013
R-squared (within)	0.851	0.864	0.849	0.871	0.924	0.891	0.829	0.905	0.860	0.904	0.878
Rho	0.066	0.083	0.110	0.117	0.180	0.050	0.107	0.061	0.048	0.216	0.187
N*I	678	532	355	279	279	676	1,304	484	484	278	529

Standard errors in parentheses; # $p < 0.1$; * $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$ (two-tailed).

Source: Dataset on Social Democratic Party Competition

Appendix 4.13: OLS regression of the effect of independent variables on the change in the rightness of SDPs (period) (FE).

Model	m1	m2	m3	m4	m5	m6	m7	m8	m9	m10	m11
Rightness of voters	-7.723*	-8.918#	-8.184	-13.705#	-5.057	-9.709*				-6.342	-6.946
	(3.670)	(4.689)	(5.802)	(7.522)	(8.551)	(4.237)				(10.538)	(7.206)
Largest party on the right (ref: largest party on the left)	-9.206**	-6.683#	-20.503**	-17.152*	-12.803#		10.348**			-4.963	6.084
	(3.317)	(3.844)	(5.697)	(7.129)	(7.036)		(3.760)			(12.656)	(7.387)
Rightness of party members		2.853		3.151	2.852					3.059	2.496
		(1.807)		(2.357)	(2.238)					(2.310)	(1.769)
Working class size			-0.413#	-0.279	-0.135			-0.578**	0.026	-0.444	
			(0.232)	(0.110)	(0.286)			(0.207)	(0.601)	(1.218)	
Towards largest party (ref: away from largest party)					3.598	-17.237		9.701**		-2.238	-1.154
					(2.358)	(24.911)		(9.254)		(43.063)	(29.284)
Distance to largest party					-0.221*		0.817***			0.581	0.642
					(0.107)		(0.147)			(1.521)	(0.588)
Time periods					0.958				2.327*	-0.533	0.088
					(1.074)				(2.118)	(4.135)	(0.704)
Rightness of voters * towards largest party						3.781				3.560	0.718
						(4.576)				(7.665)	(5.431)
Largest party on the right * distance to largest party							-1.076***			-0.774	-0.810
							(0.154)			(1.528)	(0.582)
Working class size * towards largest party								-0.149		-0.375	
								(0.253)		(0.287)	
Working class size * year									-0.005	0.053	
									(0.053)	(0.098)	
Electoral performance										0.080	-0.149
										(0.363)	(0.225)
Governmental status										3.571	4.278*
										(2.952)	(1.992)
Economic situation										0.669	0.565
										(1.117)	(0.605)
Constant	33.379	26.372	62.726	72.200	13.318	34.055	-22.814	2.157	-36.715	15.302	3.608
Number of countries	24	24	14	14	14	24	24	14	14	14	24
Time range	1973-2015	1977-2013	1973-2008	1977-2008	1977-2008	1973-2015	1945-2015	1958-2008	1977-2008	1977-2008	1977-2013
R-squared (within)	0.085	0.073	0.241	0.221	0.352	0.064	0.247	0.167	0.232	0.446	0.222
Rho	0.390	0.409	0.457	0.522	0.534	0.385	0.345	0.470	0.372	0.538	0.450
N*T	155	123	83	66	66	155	280	109	109	66	123

*Standard errors in parentheses; #p < 0.1; *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001 (two-tailed).*

Source: Dataset on Social Democratic Party Competition

Appendix 4.14: OLS regression of the effect of independent variables on the change in the rightness of SDPs (period) (lagged) (FE).

Model	m1	m2	m3	m4	m5	m6	m7	m8	m9	m10	m11
Rightness of voters	-8.006*	-4.746	-15.636*	-12.234	-5.788	-10.909*				-7.404	-3.447
	(3.757)	(4.396)	(6.716)	(7.674)	(8.478)	(4.320)				(10.569)	(6.457)
Largest party on the right (ref: largest party on the left)	-10.179**	-6.424#	-21.231***	-15.700*	-11.072		8.255*			-1.453	4.439
	(3.116)	(3.520)	(5.555)	(7.285)	(7.072)		(3.682)			(13.065)	(6.587)
Rightness of party members		1.964		2.749	1.962					2.198	1.680
		(1.667)		(2.393)	(2.305)					(2.446)	(1.584)
Working class size			-0.215	-0.191	-0.064			-0.217	0.016	-0.651	
			(0.246)	(0.286)	(0.288)			(0.211)	(0.612)	(1.232)	
Towards largest party (ref: away from largest party)					5.178#	-18.532		15.291#		-6.050	14.153
					(0.457)	(23.295)		(8.674)		(43.147)	(26.266)
Distance to largest party					-0.211#		0.940***			0.933	0.558
					(0.106)		(0.211)			(1.557)	(0.524)
Year					0.352				1.821	-1.922	-0.283
					(1.148)				(2.212)	(4.332)	(0.632)
Rightness of voters * towards largest party						4.581				4.275	-1.732
						(4.276)				(7.683)	(4.863)
Largest party on the right * distance to largest party							-1.152***			-1.139	-0.710
							(0.214)			(1.564)	(0.518)
Working class size * towards largest party								-0.201		-0.344	
								(0.235)		(0.288)	
Working class size * year									0.008	0.072	
									(0.055)	(0.100)	
Electoral performance										0.180	0.153
										(0.374)	(0.210)
Governmental status										2.560	2.705
										(3.099)	(1.803)
Economic situation										0.399	0.078
										(1.144)	(0.548)
Lagged rightness of party	0.311***	0.401***	0.083	0.138***	0.223	0.394***	0.470***	0.425***	0.156	0.199	0.471***
	(0.082)	(0.091)	(0.113)	(0.141)	(0.160)	(0.085)	(0.051)	(0.105)	(0.105)	(0.188)	(0.096)
Constant	40.997	13.802	97.316	63.639	25.005	45.692	-13.083	-5.142	-33.401	39.218	1.808
Number of countries	24	24	14	14	14	24	24	14	14	14	24
Time range	1973-2015	1977-2013	1973-2008	1977-2008	1977-2008	1973-2015	1945-2015	1958-2008	1977-2008	1977-2008	1977-2013
R-squared (within)	0.200	0.231	0.293	0.237	0.379	0.233	0.397	0.306	0.278	0.462	0.390
Rho	0.266	0.235	0.469	0.458	0.438	0.229	0.196	0.260	0.320	0.461	0.229
N*I	154	123	82	66	66	154	256	107	107	66	123

Standard errors in parentheses; # $p < 0.1$; * $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$ (two-tailed).

Source: Dataset on Social Democratic Party Competition.

Appendix 4.15: Discussion on assumptions

The first assumption that I test looks at additivity and linearity. The additivity and linearity assumption entails that the dependent variable is linear related to all of the independent variables and that the combination of the independent effects is best described by adding their effects together (Field, 2013, pp. 167-168). To test this assumption, I plot the standardized residuals against each of the predictor variables for model 5 of table 4.5, since this model is based on the main method (fixed effects) and includes all independent variables without including interaction variables. When analysing the graphs in appendix 4.16, I conclude that although there is some deviation from linearity, it does not indicate a strong departure from linearity. Therefore, this assumption is met.

The second assumption that is tested is the assumption of normality. This does not mean that the data has to be normally distributed, but entails normality of the residuals. This is important to make sure that p-values of t- and F-tests are valid (Field, 2013, p. 168). To test for this assumption, I use a standardized normal probability plot (a P-P plot). Furthermore, I plot the quantiles of the residuals against the quantiles of a normal distribution (Q-Q plot). The results of these plots are presented in appendix 4.17 for both the data using interpolation and using time periods. With regard to the normality of the data using interpolation, no problems can be observed since there deviation from normality is minimal. With regard to the data using time periods, the deviation from normality is somewhat larger. However, I do not classify this deviation as problematic, since it is still close to normality. Therefore, the normality assumption is met.

Thirdly, the homoscedasticity assumption is tested. Linear models assume variance to be equal across different values of the independent variables. Heteroscedasticity entails that this variance is not equally distributed along the different values of the independent variable and is therefore a problem (Field, 2013, p. 174). To test whether there is a problem of heteroscedasticity, I plot the residuals versus the predicted (or fitted) values (see appendix 4.18). From the graph in appendix 4.18 we see that the data points are closer to each other in the beginning of the graph and spread out a bit. This might be an indication for heteroscedasticity. Furthermore, the formal test; Wooldridge's test for autocorrelation, indicates that I should reject the null hypothesis that the residuals are homogenous ($p > 0.05$) (see table 3.1). Therefore, the homoscedasticity assumption is problematic. After all, violating this assumption produces biased standard errors, which results in incorrect conclusions about the significance of regression


coefficients. However, given the structure of the data, this result is not unexpected. In the robustness checks part of this chapter, I devote more focus to this problem.

The fourth assumption is independence of errors. However, I already discussed this assumption in the data and measurements chapter. To overcome the problems that a violation of this assumption involves, I added a lagged dependent variable in the analyses in appendix 4.12 and appendix 4.14. Furthermore, the use of a different method to deal with missing values (time periods instead of interpolation) does already solve some of the problems that are involved with this assumption. In conclusion, this assumption is problematic for this research. However, I conduct additional tests and use different methods for dealing with missing data to (partly) overcome these problems.


Fifth, although it is officially not an assumption, it is important to test whether the different independent variables are multicollinear. Tests for this assumption are presented in appendix 4.19. Although there is no clear demarcation for when a VIF value is considered too high, I use Field's demarcation of 10 (2013, p. 325). As can be observed from the table in appendix 4.19, the only variable that exceeds this value is the year variable in appendix 4.10. This is not a remarkable finding, since year dummies are included in the models of appendix 4.10. Therefore, the year variable and the interaction variables including the year variable are excluded from the models in appendix 4.10. With regard to the other tests of the models, no extreme VIF values can be observed. Therefore, I assume that by removing the year variable from appendix 4.10, multicollinearity is not problematic.

Appendix 4.16: Linearity checks.


Rightness of voters



Rightness of party members




Working class size




Source: Dataset on Social Democratic Party Competition.

Appendix 4.17: Test for normality of residuals.


P-P plot of interpolation data




Q-Q plot of interpolation data



PP and QQ plot of time periods data




Q-Q plot of for time periods data



Source: Dataset on Social Democratic Party Competition.

Appendix 4.18: Tests for homoscedasticity of the interpolated data.



Wooldridge test for homoscedasticity

Chi2	50.523
Prop > chi2	0.000

Source: Dataset on Social Democratic Party Competition.

Appendix 4.19: Multicollinearity tests.

Independent variable	Appendix 4.9	Table 4.5	Appendix 4.10	Appendix 4.11	Appendix 4.12	Appendix 4.13	Appendix 4.14
	VIF	VIF	VIF	VIF	VIF	VIF	VIF
Rightness of voters	1.48 (0.67)	5.23 (0.19)	5.96 (0.17)	5.23 (0.19)	5.27 (0.19)	9.07 (0.11)	9.09 (0.11)
Largest party on the right	1.15 (0.87)	1.58 (0.63)	1.77 (0.56)	1.58 (0.63)	1.68 (0.60)	1.87 (0.54)	1.90 (0.53)
Rightness of party members	1.13 (0.89)	1.93 (0.52)	2.11 (0.47)	1.93 (0.52)	1.97 (0.51)	2.38 (0.42)	2.61 (0.38)
Working class size	1.34 (0.75)	5.79 (0.17)	6.57 (0.15)	5.79 (0.17)	5.79 (0.17)	6.66 (0.15)	6.78 (0.15)
Movement towards largest party	1.17 (0.86)	1.23 (0.81)	1.38 (0.72)	1.23 (0.81)	1.29 (0.78)	1.24 (0.81)	1.50 (0.67)
Distance to largest party	1.41 (0.81)	2.23 (0.45)	2.38 (0.42)	2.23 (0.45)	2.49 (0.40)	2.36 (0.42)	2.37 (0.42)
Year / Time period	1.33 (0.75)	2.58 (0.39)	24.08 (0.04)	2.58 (0.39)	2.73 (0.37)	3.19 (0.31)	3.90 (0.26)
Electoral performance	1.06 (0.94)	1.14 (0.88)	1.24 (0.81)	1.14 (0.88)	1.16 (0.86)	1.26 (0.79)	1.38 (0.73)
Governmental status	1.13 (0.88)	1.38 (0.73)	1.56 (0.64)	1.38 (0.73)	1.42 (0.70)	1.58 (0.63)	1.75 (0.57)
Economic situation	1.04 (0.96)	1.12 (0.89)	2.29 (0.44)	1.12 (0.89)	1.15 (0.87)	1.33 (0.75)	1.39 (0.72)
Lagged dependent variable					2.66 (0.38)		3.90 (0.26)
Mean VIF	1.22	2.98	4.55	2.98	3.20	3.57	3.81

Tolerance in parentheses.

Source: Dataset on Social Democratic Party Competition.

Appendix 4.20: Formal test for homoscedasticity of the five year mean data.

Wooldridge test for homoscedasticity

Chi2	6.796
Prop > chi2	0.024

Source: Dataset on Social Democratic Party Competition.

Appendix 4.21: Discussion on robustness tests.

As discussed in the data and measurements chapter, the data that I use in this thesis involves some problems that might bias the results. The most important of these problems is the problem of serial correlation (or autocorrelation). Serial correlation occurs when consecutive observations (in time) are correlated. So, when observation T is dependent on observation T_{-1} (see the data and measurements chapter for an extensive discussion on this problem). A way to deal with this problem is adding a lagged dependent variable to the model (Beck and Katz, 1995, p. 2). By doing so, the effect of each of the independent variables to explain the rightness of SDPs is controlled for the rightness of the SDP in the period. The table in appendix 4.12 presents the same models as table 4.5, using the same estimation technique (fixed effects). However, in this table, a lagged dependent variable is added.

Before discussing the change in results, two other changes draw the attention. The first is the significant effect of the lagged dependent variable ($p < 0.05$, two-tailed). Furthermore, the strength of this effect is very consistent throughout all the models. On average there is a positive significant effect of 0.850 between the rightness of a party in former year on the rightness of a party in the next year. From this I conclude that the effect the former observation is a good predictor for the rightness of a SDP. The second remarkable change is the increase of the R^2 . In table 4.5 the R^2 only just exceeded 0.6 in the most complete model. If the R^2 of the table in appendix 4.12 is assessed, the R^2 never drops below 0.8 and sometimes even exceeds the 0.9 threshold. From this, I argue that the influence of the lagged dependent variable is large. Furthermore, including this new variable takes away explanatory power from the other variables as I discuss below.

With regard to the change in the results, some interesting changes occur when the effect of the independent variables are assessed. With regard to the rightness of voters, two changes are observable. First, the significance of the results drops or disappears as a result of the inclusion of the new variable. Second, and maybe even more remarkable, the strength of this effect drops considerably. Between table 4.5 and the table in appendix 4.12., the average predicted negative effect of an increase in the rightness of voters on the rightness of a SDP drops from around 9 to less than 2. The effect of the largest party on the right variable also drops considerably (from about 12 to 5). However, this effect remains significant throughout the relevant models in the table in Appendix 4.12. The effect of the rightness of the party members and the size of the working class become totally insignificant when the lagged dependent variable is included. All in all, these results indicate that the lagged dependent variable has a strong effect on the entire model (both an increase in R^2 and a suppression of the other variables). This offers an indication

that problems with serial correlation are indeed problematic for the data in the *Dataset on Social Democratic Party Competition*.

The results from the analyses that include the period means method are presented in the tables in appendix 4.13 and 4.14. The analyses as presented in appendix 4.14 apply the same analyses as those in table 4.5. From this table, it turns out that by using a different method for dealing with missing observations, the effect of the independent variables drop a bit. Furthermore, the significance of all the effects drops and sometimes disappears. However, this is probably because the $N \cdot T$ is up to almost five times smaller in the second model. Therefore, I am less interested in the significance of the results. More interesting is the effect of the different data on the serial correlation. It was expected that (at least a part of) the serial correlation was due to the way I dealt with missing variables. Interpolation almost per definition results in observations that are dependent on the former observations. By moving away from this interpolation method, the expectation is that serial correlation becomes less of a problem. The Wooldridge test still indicates that serial correlation offers a problem using the new data (appendix 4.20). However, if this result is compared to the Wooldridge test of the interpolation data (appendix 4.18), the problems is much less problematic in the new dataset. Therefore, it is interesting to see what the effect of the lagged dependent variable is, using the new data.

The analyses in appendix 4.14 apply a fixed effects estimation using the new period means data. Compared to appendix 4.13, it turns out that the increase in R^2 is much smaller compared to the increase in R^2 when the lagged dependent variable is added to the interpolation data. Furthermore, the effects of the independent variables are not suppressed any more due to the inclusion of the lagged dependent variable. Thereby, it turns out that while the problem with serial correlation is still formally a problem, it does not influence the founded results to a large extent. This is even better exemplified by the fact that the effect of the lagged dependent variable is less significant in all the models and becomes even insignificant in some of the models.