The EU's common foreign policy and the Korean Peninsula

Testing theorized causal mechanisms which led to the EU's common foreign policy change towards the Korean Peninsula in 2003

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Abstract

The Common European Foreign and Security institutional framework (CFSP) has been in continuous development. The EU has been active on the Korean Peninsula by offering humanitarian and economic aid to the Democratic Republic of Korea (DPRK) as part of the CFSP. However, the EU's common foreign policy towards the Korean Peninsula changed drastically starting from 2003. The aim of this study is to test which theory explains the EU's common foreign policy change towards the Korean Peninsula with the most confidence. From an Intergovernmentalist point of view the national preferences of the strongest European powers and the EU countries with the most expertise on the Korean Peninsula have mainly influenced the policy change. An Institutionalist point of view explains that path dependency, agent-principal theory and spillover theory of European integration leads to the European Commission independently changing EU foreign policy towards the Korean Peninsula when it sees fit. A Liberalist point of view emphasized the international system of power relations which leads to the EU member states and the EU to change its common foreign policy towards the Korean Peninsula based on the international system. The method of process tracing helps to test the three theorized causal mechanisms. Testing the evidence and evaluating the mechanisms concludes that the liberalist theorized causal mechanism explains EU common foreign policy towards the Korean Peninsula with the most confidence. This thesis therefore indicates that a Liberalist theoretical point of view explains the EU common foreign policy change towards the Korean Peninsula in 2003.

Keywords: EU; Korean Peninsula; Intergovernmentalism; Institutionalism; liberalism; Process Tracing; Causal Mechanisms; Policy Change

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List of abbreviations and acronyms

CFSP	:	Common Foreign and Security Policy
EC	:	European Commission
EP	:	European Parliament
EU	:	European Union
DPRK	:	Democratic People's Republic of Korea
KEDO	:	Korean Peninsula Energy Development Program
MEP	:	Member of European Parliament
ROK	:	Republic of Korea
UK	:	United Kingdom
UN	:	United Nations
UNHRC	:	United Nations Human Rights Council
US	:	United States

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1. Introduction

1.1 Background

Recent news stories about the DPRK intensifying its development of Weapons of Mass destruction (WMD) and the thereby increasing tensions is worrisome. In addition, the Korean Peninsula is already one of the most alarming conflict zones in the world since the end of the Korean War. The Korean War may have ended, but both countries on the Peninsula are still officially in war with each other by upholding an armistice (The Korea Times, 2022; The Korea Times, 2022). It may be unknown to many, but the European Union and its member states have connections and ties to the Korean Peninsula which go beyond participating in the Korean War.

The European Union's relationship with the Korean Peninsula has different linkages to the present and the past. Current ties of the European Union with the DPRK and the ROK traces back to the Korean War, the Cold War and to the establishment of the DPRK in 1948. Starting from 1948 current EU members from Central and Eastern Europe (Poland, Romania, Czechoslovakia) formed diplomatic ties with North Korea (Pardo, 2021; Hoare, 2019). These Central and Eastern European countries positioned themselves as allies of the DPRK while the Western and Northern European countries allied with the ROK (Kim, 2021). Furthermore, the Korean War showed the rigid divide between West and East, with Central and Eastern European countries providing financial and humanitarian aid to the DPRK and Western and Northern European countries fighting alongside US-led UN forces and providing economic and material support to the ROK (Cumings, 2010). After the Korean War EU members from Central and Eastern Europe maintained trade relations and exchanged knowledge with the DPRK. The North Korean leader even had state visits to these European countries (Kim, 2021; Horak, 2010).

Starting from the end of the 50s, North Korea diversified its economic approach and signed trade agreements with some Northern and Western European countries. The DPRK's goal was to become more independent and less reliant on China and the Soviet Union (Kim, 2021). North Korea established relationships with more Northern and Western European countries which led to trade representation offices and friendship associations with some of these European countries in the 60s.

Starting from the 1970's some Western and Northern European countries even developed an independent foreign policy regarding the DPRK. In contrast, the European Union did not have close relations with the DPRK before 1994. A formal diplomatic relationship with the DPRK was established by the European Union in 2001. The established relationship between the EU and the DPRK led to the EU becoming the third biggest economic market for North Korea (Pardo, 2018). The relationship between EU member states and North Korea consisted of economic and diplomatic ties (Kim, 2021). There was a general increase in trade between the DPRK and European countries starting from the 1960s and onwards. However, very strong diplomatic ties were basically absent.

Although North Korea initially outpaced South Korea in economic performance, the end of the 70's showed a decrease in the North's economic output. North Korea was mostly depended on trade with Eastern and Central European countries. Since these countries were suffering an economic slowdown as well, the North Korean economy suffered. This led to indebtedness to these European countries (Pardo, 2021). The worsening economy of the DPRK led to Central and Eastern European countries normalizing relationships with South Korea. At the end of the Cold War, it became clear that South Korea took precedence over North Korea for European countries on a political and eventually on an economical level as well (Pardo, 2021).

The European Union's common foreign policy towards the DPRK was a policy based on unconditional engagement. This meant that the EU was aiming to help the DPRK towards future growth and development. The European Commission prepared a Country Strategy Paper for the DPRK with long-term priorities and cooperation planning. The Swedish EU presidency of 2001 led to a proposal for EU mediation on dialogues between North and South Korea.

The EU and the ROK shared the same diplomatic approach towards North Korea. This approach was called the Sunshine Policy by South Korea in 1998. However, the EU changed its common foreign policy in 2003 and therefore disengaged from North Korea after 2003. This change resulted in dissipating trade ties and the end of the promising EU-DPRK Country Strategy Paper (European Commission, 2021). There is no official EU delegation present within the DPRK. Nevertheless, communication and dialogue channels are open by using embassies of some of the member states of the EU which are still active in the DPRK on a bilateral level (Pardo, 2018).

When it comes to the relationship between South Korea and the EU a more longstanding relationship has been active with great cooperation on both sides on different subjects. The EU and South Korea have been strategic partners for 55 years already and the EU has a diplomatic delegation based in Seoul, South Korea. In addition, the EU is South Korea's third largest trading partner (European Commission, 2021).

The change of the EU's common foreign policy towards the Korean Peninsula is interesting since the EU showed potential in strengthening ties with the DPRK which could lead to gaining more influence in the region as a global actor. Historical ties to EU member states and the existence of a certain neutral or a somewhat pro-EU sentiment in the DPRK can be beneficial for future relationship building. The EU could even have become a player to assist the peace process on the Korean Peninsula and could have been included in past regional matters on the Korean Peninsula alongside other major powers in the region (Alexsandrova, 2019).

Past and recent turmoil on the Korean Peninsula and specifically issues regarding North Korea's WMD, human suffering and increase tensions on the Peninsula, has stirred up discussions on whether the European Union specifically, should seek a more active role in the affairs on the Korean Peninsula. Instead of a more active role the new common foreign policy towards the peninsula seems to have become more passive. The development of the EU's CFSP institutional framework led to a

change in the EU's common foreign policy towards the Korean Peninsula (Alexsandrova, 2019). Researching EU common foreign policy change is therefore interesting.

Inter-Korean negotiations towards peace and reconciliation, the past policy of former President Trump of the United States concerning denuclearization and stabilizing relationships with the DPRK have all been happening without a strong visible involvement of the European Union (Deshiri & Shamoradi, 2019). Yet, history shows that the EU has historical ties and had a decent policy towards the Korean Peninsula even before the policy change of 2003. Therefore, it is an interesting and a logical next step to study past and more recent developments concerning the EU common foreign policy change towards the Korean Peninsula.

1.2 Outline of this research

Analyzing what happened between the establishment of the European CFSP and the 2003 policy change towards the Korean Peninsula can be done by analyzing underlying causal mechanisms Revealing this black box reveals what has happened in between the establishment of the CFSP and how it to led to the policy change. Opening the black box reveals the actors, the activities, and the interconnections to the outcome of the 2003 policy change towards the Peninsula. Examining causal mechanisms help to understand why the EU has really changed its common foreign policy towards the Korean Peninsula in 2003.

There are three suitable theories which can be used to explain EU common foreign policy change concerning the Korean Peninsula. The theories are coming from European and International Relations studies. The main theories in this study are called the theory of Intergovernmentalism, Institutionalism and Liberalism. These theories help to reveal the black box leading to the outcome of the EU's common foreign policy change towards the Korean Peninsula. One of the theories will be the most applicable to this case. The main question for this study therefore is:

Why has the EU's common foreign and security policy changed towards the Korean Peninsula in 2003 and how is this related to the establishment and development of the EU's CFSP?

The theorized causal mechanisms which can explain the change in EU common foreign policy have been analyzed by using process tracing as a research method. This research therefore used process tracing to test the three theories with corresponding hypotheses. These hypotheses with corresponding theory can explain why the common foreign and security policy change of the EU has happened in 2003. The main purpose of this research has therefore been to further enhance EU common foreign policy research by identifying and explaining the causal mechanisms. This includes identifying the main actors which have had an influence on the EU's common foreign policy change towards the Korean Peninsula in 2003.

1.3 Societal relevance

South Korea is a close democratic and economic partner of the EU. It is therefore important for the EU to have a stable, safe, and denuclearized Korean Peninsula. This is important to further solidify political and economic cooperation with the ROK. A stable and denuclearized Peninsula enables looking for possible closer economic and political ties with not only South but also North Korea (European commission, 2021). The easing of tensions in the East Asian region and on the Korean Peninsula is important for the EU since the global economic shift to Asia is still ongoing with the rise of China. Researching European common foreign policy on the Korean peninsula furthers the knowledge of the EU and its institutions responsible for foreign policy strategies.

As of now the diplomatic branch of the European Commission is the EEAS. The EEAS. Formally launched in 2011, is headed by Joseph Borrell who is named the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Vice President of the European Commission (EEAS, 2021). The EEAS is responsible for the EU common foreign policy ranging from global strategies, security questions but also promoting democracy, European culture, and humanitarian aid (EEAS, 2021). An analysis of the EU's common foreign and security policy on the Korean Peninsula by using process tracing, helps to improve the understanding of the EU's past foreign policy strategy and the potential role the EU can play in future conflicts or issues concerning the Korean Peninsula and the neighboring region. So, a study about EU common foreign policy before the launch of the EEAS (EEAS, 2021) is interesting for EU policy makers.

Understanding the change in EU common foreign policy will not only help EU member states but also South and North Korea and other regional actors like the US, China, and Japan. It can help regional actors to assess the EU's global capabilities. An analysis of European common foreign policy can give those who want a more prominent role of the EU in the Asia-Pacific, which includes the Korean Peninsula, insights in how common foreign policies of the EU are in place and how decisions have been made or influenced.

1.4 Scientifical relevance

The European Union is further integrating as a union on different domains and one of these domains is the domain of the EU's common foreign policy. It is therefore essential to gain an in-depth understanding about integration and changes regarding the EU's foreign policy and for this study specifically, the integration of and changes in EU common foreign policy. There has been some research on the European Union's common foreign policy towards the Korean Peninsula and the EU's common foreign policy in general (Alexsandrova, 2019; Berkofsky, 2003, 2008; Pardo, 2018, 2021; Sangtu, 2008). None of the research seems to be focusing specifically on testing which IR theory fits best in explaining the EU's common foreign policy change towards the Korean Peninsula in 2003. Most research is descriptive research which entails explaining what happened in the past and it mainly leads to advice for the European Union for their future common foreign policy strategies or advice on

what the EU should have done in the past in the region of the Korean Peninsula. In contrast, this study aims to not only include a narrative of what has happened in the past regarding EU common foreign policy towards the Korean Peninsula, but also tests which IR or European studies theory fits best in explaining why EU common foreign policy has changed towards the Korean Peninsula in 2003 and which actors or entities have been the most influential for this change specifically. Hence, this study draws on three main theoretical approaches that explain EU integration and changes in EU common foreign policy, namely the theory of Intergovernmentalism, Liberalism and Institutionalism in European studies and in International Relations.

1.5 Structure of this thesis

The thesis structure is as followed. In chapter 2 the theoretical framework is outlined with an overview of existing literature on Intergovernmentalism, Liberalism and Institutionalism. These theories have been conceptualized for this research by the formulation of theorized hypotheses. Chapter 3 is the methodological section with a description of the process tracing method and how this method will be used, followed by the operationalization of the hypothesized causal mechanisms. In chapter 4, the empirical analysis consisting of a country selection, an overview based on the evidence found and a summarized timeline of events are being presented. In chapter 5, the results of the process tracing tests are presented based on the evidence found as part of chapter 4. In chapter 6, conclusions from the empirical findings are being drawn by explaining which hypothesized causal mechanism fits best and therefore confirms which IR or European studies theory most likely explains EU's common foreign policy change towards the Korean Peninsula in 2003.

2. Theoretical framework

This chapter starts with a general introduction of the history of European Integration theories as part of European studies. This introduction gives an overview of the rise of and an explanation of Intergovernmentalism and Institutionalism within European studies. It is followed by applying and interpretating these two theories as part of the EU common foreign policy change towards the Korean Peninsula. Lastly, the theory of Liberalism as part of IR studies will be explained and applied to this study. This chapter includes the creation of the theorized hypotheses which are tested as part of the empirical analysis in Chapter 5.

2.1. Historical overview of European integration theories

The second world war is one of the main influencers of the formed theories coming from the 1950s about EU integration. The main theories in this period were Neofunctionalism and Intergovernmentalism. The Neo-Functionalist scholars believed that European integration was made possible due to benefits of integration. Intergovernmentalist scholars argued that the role of state interests and preferences is the main aspect that is driving the integration process forward and not the benefits of integration (Saurugger, 2014). What is in contrast as well is that the Intergovernmentalist scholars do not see the start of EU integration as a clear starting point which can lead to more EU integration as is suggested by Neo-Functionalist scholars like Haas (1961). Critique on Neofunctionalism of not being empirically applicable enough seemed valid. Integration does not automatically foster more integration according to Intergovernmentalists. The case of the UK leaving the EU is a good example of disintegration after integration (Jensen, 2013). In summary, the theory of Intergovernmentalism becomes the most valid interpretation for European Integration studies till the 80s (Saurugger, 2014).

The theory of Intergovernmentalism argues that assessments are made based on national interests and preferences of the member states of the Union. However, not only states with their national interests seem to have been influencing European integration alone. European Union institutions, which have been formed under the Intergovernmentalism framework through the years, seem to have been influencing European integration as well (Keukeleire & MacNaughan, 2008). EU institutions like the European Bank, The European Court of Justice and the European Commission are all examples of institutional powers which can assert influence independently from a European Union member state. This shows that there are limitations to the theory of Intergovernmentalism when talking about European integration as being based on the interests and preference of member states alone. Therefore, the theory of Institutionalism explains EU integration by the influence of EU institutions and become, together with Intergovernmentalism, the main theory of EU integration (Saurugger, 2014).

2.2 Intergovernmentalism and EU common foreign policy

The authors who have made important contributions to the Intergovernmentalism framework with regards to EU common foreign policy and the related theories are being discussed in this section of the theoretical framework.

> ‘EU integration can best be understood as a series of rational choices made by national leaders. These choices responded to constraints and opportunities stemming from the economic interests of powerful domestic constituents, the relative power of each state in the international system, and the role of institutions in bolstering credibility of interstate commitments ‘(Moravcsik 1998:18)

Moravcsik argues that European integration is based on national preferences, interstate bargaining and institutional choice. The traditional realist theory of Intergovernmentalism explains that a state defines the national interest and preferences on its own and that whether to integrate or not within the EU depends on the power and preferences of the states alone (Leuffen, Rittberger, Schimmelfenning, 2022b). There are differences within the theory of Liberalism and Liberal Intergovernmentalism is the best fitting theory for this study.

Liberal Intergovernmentalism on EU integration explains that domestic political institutions of a state and the power of societal groups within a state can also influence the integration preferences of states (Leuffen, Rittberger, Schimmelfenning, 2022b). So, domestic factors like national political institutions and societal groups can help with the credibility and interest in EU integration as part of interstate commitments (Moravcsik, 1998). So, Moravcisk explains that while states are the main actors, Liberal Intergovernmentalism is not a realist theory. This is since Liberal Intergovernmentalism sees states as representing the preferences of the domestic groups and not only the relative power of states themselves (Moravcsik, 1998).

Wiener et al. (2009) criticizes Moravcsik’s Liberal Intergovernmentalism because it focusses mostly on the grand schemes of European Integration, ranging from treaty making and other grand decisions about the Union. It does not focus on daily European Union decision making. However, this study is focusing on EU common foreign policy change which makes it far from a topic of daily decision making. This makes Wiener’s critique not applicable to this study.

EU member states can be seen as the actors which drive and influence changes on European common foreign policy. The decisions on changing or improving EU common foreign policy are made based on national interest and intergovernmental bargaining between the member states. The EU as an institution may therefore not be the main influencer of common foreign policy change towards the Korean Peninsula, but the EU can be seen as crucial or key to form possible cooperation and mutual decision making between member states to form one common policy. Moravcsik’s (1998) Theory of Liberal Intergovernmentalism in relation to the EU’s common foreign policy change towards the Korean Peninsula is therefore used for this study.

2.2.1 National preferences and interstate bargaining

To reiterate, Liberal Intergovernmentalism focuses on the national interests defined by the EU states and their domestic national politics. EU common foreign policy change towards the Korean Peninsula therefore depends on how beneficial or interesting this EU policy change would be for an EU member state on a national level (Leuffen, Rittberger, Schimmelfenning, 2022b).

The endogenous (trade) theory as part of Intergovernmentalism gives a perfect example of national preferences being key within the EU. To illustrate this theory: the preferences of a state for a certain international or trade policy depends on their state interests, a state's economy, and its structure. When it comes to trade, export-oriented states would prefer trade liberalization with lower or no protectionist policies within the EU market. Free-trade agreements benefits export-oriented industries. The opposite is true for import-oriented and national focused states (Nelson, 1988).

Nielson's (2019) endogenous trade theory shows that larger domestic markets of large countries have more lobby power over pursuing their domestic policies within the EU. Small countries do not have this power due to their smaller market sizes. Small EU states therefore need to rely on bargaining within the EU and the international system (Leuffen, Rittberger, Schimmelfenning, 2022b).

The endogenous (trade) theory is applicable to EU common foreign policy change as well. National preferences and bargaining concerning the integration or change of EU common foreign policy is based on state interests and their power relations within the EU. In the case of the common foreign policy change towards the Korean Peninsula, historical and economic ties as well as other factors which are affecting or are important to EU member states can all play a role in forming their national preferences on foreign policy change by the EU.

The EU institutions like the European Commission for example, has low bargaining power concerning foreign policy change because of the lack of powers given by member states due to the lack of member states' national interests to give the EC this kind of decision power (Leuffen, Rittberger, Schimmelfenning, 2022b). So, Liberal Intergovernmentalism sees the choice and creation of EU institutions as necessary and beneficial for solving the problems of monitoring and sanctioning member states and ensuring integration of preferred domains and thus not on all EU domains. This is called the functional theory of institutions.

By having the EU, transactions costs can be reduced and problems of enforcing cooperation on international problems can be prevented when intergovernmental agreements are ignored. The EU institutions can therefore help to maximize state interests and reduce the possibility of making wrong decisions. The design and the workings of institutions determine which problems are being dealt with regarding individual states (Koremenos et al, 2001). This means that the EU institutions remain an instrument of the state governments instead of autonomous actors (Leuffen, Rittberger, Schimmelfenning, 2022b).

The delegation of sovereignty to EU institutions therefore depends on the specific issue, the possible outcomes and expected non-compliance of member states. So, the higher the benefits for

states and the higher possible non-compliance by other states, the more likely it is that governments would give a EU institution more autonomy on specific issues (Moravcsik, 1998).

Transferring competencies to EU institutions in order to have the power of changing EU common foreign policy change is therefore very unlikely to happen since it seemed to be a too difficult topic to align all member states to accept this level of autonomy for the EC. Small states may be in favor for the EC having more power in changing common foreign policy, since smaller states become stronger in collectivity with the EU as a power (Grieco, 1995). Since the common foreign policy of the European Union is based on intergovernmental decision making, the strongest states are considered the main influencers for a foreign policy change by the EU towards the Korean Peninsula. This is because the EC has no autonomy to change common foreign policy entirely.

2.2.2 Conclusion Liberal Intergovernmentalism and hypothesis

To reiterate, the basis of Liberal Intergovernmentalism applied to the EU common foreign policy change towards the Korean Peninsula in 2003, is that historical ties and national preferences of EU member states on security issues, human rights issues and economic interests with the Korean Peninsula can all play a role or influence a decision to change the common foreign policy. This is in line with the endogenous and institutional choice theory. In this specific case the European countries with the most expertise on the Korean Peninsula or the strongest military or security powers within the EU may mainly have influenced the EU common foreign policy change towards the Korean Peninsula in 2003. To conclude, the following hypothesis has been formed based on Liberal Intergovernmentalist theory.

Hypothesis 1: The EU's common foreign policy change on the Korean Peninsula is based on the national interests of the strongest states within the European Union.

2.3 Institutionalism and EU common foreign policy

Institutionalism explains the transformative potentials of supranational organizations and their integration. Haas describes integration as followed:

'a process whereby political actors in several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations, and political activities toward a new and larger center, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over pre-existing national states (Haas 1961; 366).

Haas (1961) is one of the scholars who defined Neofunctionalism as part of Institutionalism theories. Although his description still holds, the perspective of the EU eventually evolving into a European federal state because of integration does not hold to this day, and especially not when it comes to common foreign policy. In short, institutionalization processes and outcomes entail the evolution and emergence of institutional rules, actors, and the EU's authority structure (Stone Sweet et al, 2001; Stone Sweet and Sandholz, 1998).

Institutionalism differs from Liberal Intergovernmentalism. Liberal Intergovernmentalism notes not only the state but also domestic actors. Institutionalism includes transnational and supranational actors, multinational corporations, interest groups and labor associations, and issue-specific organizations. Institutionalism also sees the European Commission as an actor and not as an instrument for member states. Second, Institutionalism questions EU states forming institutions according to their national preferences (Leuffen, Rittberger, Schimmelfenning, 2022b).

The theories of cooperation and integration between states are being contested by Institutionalism (Leuffen, Rittberger, Schimmelfenning, 2022b). The functional choice theory as explained as part of Liberal Intergovernmentalism, explains that institutional-building choices are made by the effects of state preferences (Keohane, 1984). Institutional choices are thus only explained by the expected effects of creating these institutions.

However, Historical Institutionalism doubts the notion of functional theories of institutional building. First, it is unlikely that political actors who agree on institutional choices consider long-term consequences of the institutional choices which are made. Second, political actors are unable to foresee all consequences and contingencies of their own actions (Pierson, 1998). Third, institutional developments can only be corrected by political actors on a marginal scale because of unforeseen obstacles and veto players. The process of integration itself can thus create unforeseen gaps which can result in enabling institutional actors to act without national states' involvement (Pierson, 1996).

Unintended results for states due to unforeseen consequences of integration means adapting state preferences and state behavior to institutional choice consequences to avoid high disintegration costs. This reasoning does follow Haas' (1961) reasoning of being persuaded to shift expectations as stated above.

2.3.1 Institutionalism and path dependency in European integration

Institutionalization of intergovernmental treaties has not only benefited economic, legal, and political integration between European member states, but has benefited European Union institutions as well.

The European Parliament has been very successful interpreting rules noted down in treaties for its own institutional gains (Farrell & Heritier, 2003, 2004). Treaties, legislative rules, and procedures are mostly open for interpretation to offer some flexibility to the member states. Because of this flexibility member states do not precisely know how the EP or EC will interpret the treaty rules. The MEPs are chosen for a longer period of time in contrast to the Council members and the Counsel president. This gives the EP more bargaining power since more information is available to a MEP and therefore the EP's informal powers are increased (Hix, 2002).

Looking at this from an institutionalist perspective, it can be said that intergovernmental treaties are embedded in supranational contexts because of the self-reinforcing dynamics of institutionalization by the institutions of the European Union. This is called the path-dependency theory. It can therefore be said that endogenous path dependent processes, intergovernmental treaties and negotiations are not the key starting points for European integration, but in essence are already the product of European integration (Caporasso 1998, Stone Sweet & Sandholtz, 1998).

The self-reinforcing dynamics of institutionalization within the European Union may lead to the European Commission as an actor finding paths to influence or decide on EU common foreign policy on an autonomous level, and thus not in an intergovernmental context. The institutionalist scholar Gabriel Almond (1956) therefore argues that historical changes, like the past change in the EU's common foreign policy towards the Korean Peninsula, can only be examined by looking at these historical institutional paths taken and the corresponding conditions concerning the policy change of the EU.

2.3.2 Principal-agent and incomplete contracting theory

In line with the path dependency theory, state governments who act as principals delegate decision-making authority to agents. These agents fulfill collective tasks more effectively and efficiently than if a government must do it herself (Pollack, 1997). However, problems may occur when choosing agents. Selecting the right agent may be difficult since you do not know whether an agent has his or her own agenda as well. Principals can therefore make use of control mechanisms to prevent potential slippery by the agent (Leuffen, Rittberger, Schimmelfenning, 2022b).

Even with control mechanism the agent can still try to increase their own autonomy (Pierson, 1998). Incomplete contracts and confusing treaties only lead to possible slippage and more autonomy for agents. To reiterate, if power or autonomy of EU institutions on the common foreign policy of the EU is not well described in contracts, it can lead to EU agents making autonomous decisions on EU common foreign policy.

2.3.3 Spillover in institutionalism

The European Union's institutions help the member states to discover common interests and possible opportunities for a more efficient cooperation (Haas, 1961). However, this is only possible in situations wherein institutions like the European Commission have an information advantage in comparison to member states themselves.

Alec Stone Sweet and Wayne Sandholtz argue that integration processes of the EU are a result of the interplay between the expansion of international exchange (functional spillover), the political influence of groups which benefit from international exchange (political spillover), and supranational actors like the EU institutions with their capacity to pursue their own integrative agenda which is called institutional spillover (Stone Sweet 2004; Stone Sweet and Sandholtz 1997). In sum, the European Commission may be able to change common foreign policy by having institutional spillover.

2.3.3 Conclusion Institutionalism and hypothesis

To reiterate, the basis of institutionalism applied to the EU common foreign policy change towards the Korean Peninsula in 2003, is that the theory of path dependency, principal-agent and functional spillover can play a role in increasing the autonomous power of the European Commission which in turn can change or have an influence on the common foreign policy. This may happen despite decisions mainly being made on an intergovernmental level when it comes to EU common foreign policy. To conclude, the following hypothesis has been formed based on Institutionalist theory:

Hypothesis 2: The EU's common foreign policy change on the Korean Peninsula has been the result of institutionalization of the European Union.

In the following subchapter not European Integration theory but an International Relations theory is discussed. First the Third Great Debate in IR is shortly discussed. It is followed by the discussion and application of Liberalism theory to actors and allies outside of the EU which may have influenced the change in EU common foreign policy towards the Korean Peninsula in 2003.

2.4 The Third Great Debate in International Relations

The Third Great debate in international relations is between Neorealism and Neoliberalism. Kenneth Waltz puts forward the assumption of an international system which is anarchical which means that there is no superior authority which controls states. The distribution of capabilities among states is therefore determining the way these states cooperate (Waltz, 1979). In these 'self-help systems' state survival is the objective for all states. This also indicates that one state's gain is the other state's loss (Waltz, 1979). Robert Keohane as a Neoliberalist does not deny this anarchical structure of the international system by neorealist, but states that cooperation in the form of international institutions like the EU can emerge based on shared interests, and in the form of reciprocal action (Keohane, 1984). The difference between Waltz and Keohane is therefore quite clear: Neorealism views the world as a place with competitive relations and relative payoffs, whereas Neo-liberals state the option of mutual benefits for states through cooperation and absolute payoffs. Both theories seem to favor rational choice of states, but in the case of the international system today, international institutions like the EU have a role to play which as well makes Neoliberalism an interesting point of view to analyze actors or allies outside of the EU. These actors may have influenced EU common foreign policy change towards the Korean Peninsula in 2003.

2.4.1 (Neo)Liberalism and complex interdependence

Since complex interdependence in an anarchic international system means that relying on alliances for military might or confronting security issues may be necessary. Especially when rivals are up to no good. This means that in the case of EU common foreign policy change, the change itself is based on an alliance or based on other nations' power within the international systems. This means that there can be a threat when the policy change is not going to be made (Keohane & Nye, 1973). Examples of cooperation between the EU and outside actors is the transatlantic alliance with the United States and commitment to the United Nations. Since Liberalism still talks about power relations, it also means that the strongest states within the European Union are perceived as the main actors of the Union as part of the international system. The smaller states are in this case considered allies or followers of the strongest states for protection.

Similar to Institutionalism of European Integration theories, Neoliberalism by Keohane mentions similar benefits of cooperation within an anarchical system. These benefits are reducing transaction costs, providing information between allies, increasing credibility between state relationships, and creating or facilitating the principle of reciprocity between states (Keohane & Martin, 1995). Nevertheless, neoliberalism is being criticized of not minimizing or decreasing power politics by having cooperation to a certain degree. Institutions leading to cooperation between states are in essence just enforcing power politics by having institutions who reflect the power politics of the strongest powers within the system (Mearsheimer, 2017).

Keohane and Nye respond to the critique by explaining the principle of complex interdependence. The theory of complex interdependence explains that there are multiple channels for connecting states and societies. These channels can be informal government ties, but also multinational organizations like the EU, NATO, and the United Nations. States are therefore not the only units in the international system. They also argue that there is no hierarchy among specific issues. They mean that there is no clear line between foreign policy and domestic policy ((Keohane & Nye, 1973). This means that there is no clear line on foreign policy as opposed to Liberal Intergovernmentalism and Institutionalism, which means there is no clear agenda on EU common foreign policy change and that policy change is dependent on the complex interdependence of the international system and its hegemonic forces.

2.4.2 Conclusion (Neo)Liberalism and hypothesis

The basis of Neo-Liberalism can be applied to the EU common foreign policy change towards the Korean Peninsula in 2003. The theory of complex interdependence between the EU, EU member states, non-EU countries and EU allies or international organizations can thus have a strong influence on the EU changing its common foreign policy towards the Korean Peninsula due to this complex interdependence within the international system. To conclude, the following hypothesis has been formed based on Liberalism theory:

Hypothesis 3: The EU's common foreign policy change on the Korean Peninsula has been done by the influence of a strong external power or international organization active in the region of the Korean Peninsula.

3. Methodology

This chapter discusses the methodology of this research. This thesis uses process tracing as a method. The analysis mainly consists of a deductive content analysis. First, the process of process tracing as a method following Beach and Pederson is explained. Subsequently, the explanation of how process tracing is applied in this thesis is explained.

3.1 Research design: Process Tracing

Process tracing consists of three different types: theory-testing, theory-building, and explaining-outcome. Each type has a different approach to analyzing how a specific cause led to a given outcome within a case (Beach & Pederson, 2013). This research tested the hypothesized theories as described in the previous theoretical framework chapter.

Process tracing is a method which helps to make inferences based on causal mechanisms. The analysis of mechanisms is a very powerful tool, it ensures the analysis of events and sequences leading to the explanandum. Analyzing these mechanisms is precisely useful for phenomena like foreign policy change because foreign policy change can be dynamic, rare, and highly contingent. Events or sequences leading to change are difficult to quantify or make them into a statistical analysis (Hall, 2003,2006).

A statistical analysis helps to provides evidence for average effects but does not provide certain evidence that a particular cause results in a particular effect. It therefore lacks the explanatory power for certain cases (Crasnow, 2012). A case study can help to discover the causal mechanisms through which decisions or policy changes have been made. These changes cannot be understood by providing a statistical result (Crasnow, 2012). Process tracing is a very suitable method to discover the causal mechanisms which led to foreign policy change. It is different from statistical observational arguments since process tracing uses evidence in an explanatory sequence with the goal of overturning or supporting hypotheses.

Testing the evidence found as part of the process tracing method provides contributions to causal inference (Brady & Collier, 2010). Goldthorpe (2001, p. 3) has a similar statement. He states that statistical techniques do not show how the relations among variables are being produced. He states that the relations among variables can only be produced by individuals. Brady & Collier (2010) call the found evidence as part of process tracing *Causal-Process Observations (CPOS).* Such observations may seem less sophisticated for an analysis in comparison to a regression analysis, but as Crasnow (2012) mentions, *Causal-Process Observations* can help to contradict or confirm conclusions based on quantitative regression analysis.

Even though process tracing speaks of causal mechanisms there is no apparent clear consensus on the definition of causal mechanism in the literature (Schaffer, 2014). However, this research applies the definition of Beach and Pedersen (Appendix A). Beach and Pedersen (2013) offer an

understanding of mechanisms by explaining that mechanisms are being made up of several different parts. The conceptualization of mechanisms by Beach and Pederson (2013) is the most fitting for this research since past events leading to the change in the European Union's common foreign policy can be traced back to the different European Union treaties and historical events. In other words, every part leads to another part. This conceptualization of mechanisms therefore differs with other approaches like the realist approach which does not include corresponding parts but focuses on generally examining multiple different mechanisms (Westdorp, 2014; Wong et al, 2013). An abstract conceptualization of Beach and Pederson's theory-testing process tracing can be seen in appendix B.

3.2 Procedure of Theory-Testing Process Tracing

Theory-testing process tracing has different steps to undertake to use this method successfully (Beach & Pederson, 2013). The five steps of theory-testing process tracing of Beach & Pederson are followed in this thesis. It consists of 1) Developing hypothesized causal mechanisms, 2) Operationalizing the causal mechanisms, 3) Collecting evidence, 4) Assessing the inferential weight of the evidence, 5) Conclusions of theory-testing process tracing.

3.2.1 Step 1: Developing hypothesized causal mechanisms and step 2: Operationalizing the causal mechanisms

Beach & Pederson start with developing a hypothesized mechanism followed by the operationalization of the corresponding mechanisms. The theories applicable to this thesis do not have to be explained again in this method chapter, since this has been done as part of the theoretical framework. For each theorized hypothesis the causal mechanisms have been conceptualized and operationalized as can be seen below in figure 1, 2 and 3. These theorized causal mechanisms provide a clear overview of step 1 and 2 of the theory-testing process tracing method.

Figure 1: Simplified operationalization of hypothesis 1 (Intergovernmentalism)



Figure 2: Simplified operationalization of hypothesis 2 (Institutionalism)



Figure 3: Simplified operationalization of hypothesis 3 (Liberalism)



3.2.2 Step 3: Data collection

To test the operationalized hypothesized causal mechanisms, data was collected. Included data was not older than data from the year 1997 since the Treaty of Amsterdam, signed in 1997, created the position of the High Representative of the EU responsible for EU common foreign policy (CFSP) (EEAS, 2021). The European Union's common foreign policy has a long history which is tied to milestones on EU integration. An overview of the main milestones of EU common foreign policy integration can be seen in Appendix C.

The data used for this study consisted of data that was available in English. Categorization and specification of the evidence found has been done according to the categorization of Beach and Pederson (2013) as can be seen in table 1.

Table 1: Simplified categorization of the evidence used

1) Account evidence,	The content of empirical material like treaty documents, EU official documents, books, articles, and country strategy documents
2) Trace evidence,	Evidence which shows that mere existence proofs a part of the hypothesized causal mechanism
3) Pattern evidence,	Evidence such as voting on policies or resolutions on a topic related to EU foreign policy
4) Sequence evidence.	Evidence which shows the expected chronological or temporal order of EU common foreign policy change

3.2.3 Step 4: assessing the weight of the data

Theory-testing process tracing is not only collecting evidence but also assess the inferential weight of the evidence. The application and assessment of the inferential weight of the evidence has been part of the empirical analysis of this thesis in chapter 4.

This thesis used four tests to assess the inferential weight of the evidence found. The four tests which have been used consist of the 1) Straw-in-the-wind test, 2) Hoop test, 3) Smoking-gun test, and 4) Auxiliary Outcome test. The tests are based on the principles of necessary and sufficiency. This means that some tests are necessary and/or sufficient for inferring the evidence (figure 4) (Collier, 2011).

1. Straw-In-The-Wind test (not necessary and not sufficient)

These tests can increase the plausibility of the hypotheses or raise doubts about it but do not confirm any hypotheses. This tests therefore provides a neither a necessary nor a sufficient criterion for accepting or rejecting a hypothesis and can slightly weaken the rival hypotheses (Collier, 2011).

2. Hoop test (necessary but not sufficient)

These tests do not confirm a hypothesis but can eliminate a hypothesis. Passing this test has therefore more implications than the straw-in-the-wind tests. Passing this test weakens rival hypotheses but do not preclude these hypotheses in possible relevance (Collier, 2012).

3. Smoking-gun test (sufficient but not necessary)

This test can strongly confirm a hypothesis but does not reject it in case of failure (Collier, 2011).

4. Auxiliary Outcome test

If evidence is found which does not directly involve EU foreign policy to the Korean Peninsula but offers further support of why the EU has its common foreign policy towards the Korean Peninsula change in 2003. A test called “Auxiliary Outcome test” suggested by Mahoney (2009, 125-31) can be

used to provide the opportunity to use this found evidence which is not part of the main causal mechanisms. It can therefore be used to provide valuable inferential leverage for one of the hypotheses. The evidence found outside of the causal mechanisms can be tested as either a Straw-In-The-Wind, a Hoop test, or a Smoking-Gun test (Collier, 2012).

Figure 4: Process Tracing Tests for Causal Inference



Process Tracing Tests for Causal Inference

		SUFFICIENT FOR AFFIRMING CAUSAL INFERENCE	
		No	Yes
NECESSARY FOR AFFIRMING CAUSAL INFERENCE	No	**1. Straw-in-the-Wind** a. **Passing:** Affirms relevance of hypothesis, but does not confirm it. b. **Failing:** Hypothesis is not eliminated, but is slightly weakened. c. **Implications for rival hypotheses:** **Passing** *slightly* weakens them. **Failing** *slightly* strengthens them.	**3. Smoking-Gun** a. **Passing:** Confirms hypothesis. b. **Failing:** Hypothesis is not eliminated, but is somewhat weakened. c. **Implications for rival hypotheses:** **Passing** *substantially* weakens them. **Failing** *somewhat* strengthens them.
	Yes	**2. Hoop** a. **Passing:** Affirms relevance of hypothesis, but does not confirm it. b. **Failing:** Eliminates hypothesis. c. **Implications for rival hypotheses:** **Passing** *somewhat* weakens them. **Failing** *somewhat* strengthens them.	**4. Doubly Decisive** a. **Passing:** Confirms hypothesis and eliminates others. b. **Failing:** Eliminates hypothesis. c. **Implications for rival hypotheses:** **Passing** *eliminates* them. **Failing** *substantially* strengthens.

Source: Collier, D. (2011). Understanding Process Tracing. *PS: Political Science & Politics, 44*(04), 823–830. https://doi.org/10.1017/s1049096511001429

3.2.4 Step 5: Conclusion

The weight of the data or evidence found has been assessed, the degree of confidence for each part of the hypothesized causal mechanisms as previously operationalized has been completed. In this step the hypothesized causal mechanisms have either been accepted or rejected. Concluding, testing the causal mechanisms confirmed the theory which answers the research question with the most confidence.

RQ: *Why has the EU's common foreign and security policy changed towards the Korean Peninsula in 2003 and how is this related to the establishment and development of the EU's CFSP?*

4. Empirical analysis – part 1: historical observations and evidence

This chapter discusses the evidence found on the common EU foreign policy change towards the Korean Peninsula in 2003. First, a country selection has been made to select the most influential European member states relating to the Intergovernmental causal mechanism. The starting point for this selection is the starting date of the Treaty of Amsterdam. Followed by giving a historical overview of the selected countries with regards to their foreign policies on the Korean Peninsula. Subsequently, is the historical overview of the EU with regards to their past common foreign policy on the Korean Peninsula. Lastly, is the historical overview and evidence found on the regional allies and their own foreign policies to the Peninsula as well as their view on past EU common foreign policy. This chapter ends with a timeline of the key evidence found to give a clear overview of the most notable events and of the key actors on EU common foreign policy change towards the Korean Peninsula in 2003.

4.1 Background on the Treaty of Amsterdam and country selection

The Treaty of Amsterdam (1997) further developed the CFSP which was established in the Treaty of Maastricht (1992). The Treaty of Amsterdam created the function of high representative (Keukeleire & MacNaughtan, 2008) For this study it is important to understand that in the case of 1997 till 2003, the current day diplomacy body of the EC called the EEAS did not exist yet. The EU's CFSP institutional framework was therefore less developed from 1997 till 2003 as it is now in 2022. This is important to take into consideration when reading about and when analyzing EU states, non-EU states and institutional actors on EU common foreign policy change towards to the Korean Peninsula.

A country selection of the most influential EU member states regarding the Korean Peninsula has been made for this study on EU common foreign policy. Table 2 and figure 5 show that diplomatic relationship between EU member states with the DPRK and the ROK. Most EU member states established a diplomatic relationship with the DPRK before the European Union established a diplomatic relationship with the DPRK. Ireland did not establish any diplomatic ties with both countries on the Korean Peninsula before the European Union established diplomatic ties with the Peninsula. Ireland is therefore the first country to be excluded as an EU member state which national preference based on historical, political, and economic ties have an influence on the EU common foreign policy change towards the Korean Peninsula.

Another interesting fact is that France is the only EU member state which did not establish any diplomatic ties at all with the DPRK. However, France did establish diplomatic ties with the ROK before the EU did in 1963. Hence, France is still interesting to analyze as a country when looking at the national preferences of France towards the Korean Peninsula. France is one of the most powerful countries within the European Union (Lehne, 2012) because of this power position it is interesting to observe why France did not establish diplomatic ties with the DPRK and whether this has any influence on the EU common foreign policy change towards the Korean Peninsula.

Portugal (1975), Austria (1974), Finland (1973), and Sweden (1973) have the longest standing diplomatic relationship with the DPRK till 2003.The long-standing historical ties of these countries with the DPRK makes them interesting EU member states for this analysis.

Italy and the UK both formed diplomatic relationship with the DPRK one year earlier than the EU did. This is interesting since it is only a one-year difference. This seems a bit odd, and it is therefore interesting to take these two countries into the analysis as EU member states.

All the green highlighted EU member states in table 2 are excluded from this analysis since these countries formed diplomatic ties with the DPRK in the same year as the EU did and because they are not one of the three most powerful countries within the EU (Lehne, 2012). The blue highlighted countries have been chosen for this analysis because of their longstanding ties with the Korean Peninsula, because of the odd timing of establishing a diplomatic relationship with the DPRK and because they are part of the big three within the European Union.

Table 2: EU member states' diplomatic relationship with the Korean Peninsula

Country	Year of joining the EU	Year of establishing diplomatic relations with the DPRK	Year of establishing diplomatic relations with the ROK
Belgium	1957	2001	1901
France	1957	-	1949
Germany	1957	2001	1883
Italy	1957	2000	1956
Luxembourg	1957	2001	1962
The Netherlands	1957	2001	1961
Denmark	1973	1973, ended in 1976	1959
Ireland	1973	2003	1983
The UK	1973 (left in 2020)	2000	1883
Greece	1981	2001	1961
Spain	1986	2001	1950
Portugal	1986	1975, ended in 2017	1961
Austria	1995	1974	1892
Finland	1995	1973	1973
Sweden	1995	1973	1959
The EU	**-**	**2001**	**1963**

Note: years given are coming from multiple sources, namely Sangtu (2008), Andersson & Bae (2015), Ministry of foreign affairs of the Republic of Korea (n.d.), The Korea Herald (2017), Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland (2017), Wertz (2016), European Commission (2019)

***Green** = not selected for analysis*

***Blue** = selected for analysis*

Figure 5: Establishment of diplomatic relations with DPRK, by period



Source: Wertz, D. (2016). *DPRK Diplomatic Relations*. Retrieved from, https://www.ncnk.org/resources/briefing-papers/all-briefing-papers/dprk-diplomatic-relations

4.2 National preferences and foreign policy of the big three within the European Union

The big three countries are in theory equal to the smaller states within the European Union. However, zooming in on the European Union, experts would say that a country's economic, political, military, and diplomatic might determines their influence within EU bodies. This means that the EU and its institutions are reflecting power relations (Lehne, 2012). In theory there may be equality, but an unspoken understanding is that the three strongest nations with the strongest assets within the EU were France, Germany, and the UK and therefore had the most power from 1997 to 2003. It comes naturally that the strongest countries take the lead in shaping EU foreign policy because these countries have more to offer due to their might (Lehne, 2012).

4.2.1 France

France is one of the countries who sees EU foreign policy as complimentary to their national foreign policy. France is member of the UN Security Council and has veto rights, still has influence on former colony regions, is part of the G7, NATO and has military and nuclear power (Lehne, 2012). These facts therefore differentiate France form the smaller EU states. France can act independently if preferred. France also has more institutional frameworks to choose from besides the EU's CFSP. This means that France can avoid potential EU foreign policy limitations and opt for national foreign policy but can also join EU foreign policy initiatives if it benefits France or if it does not diminish France's own national foreign policy and thus national preferences.

I made clear as part of the country selection that France is the only European country who did not establish diplomatic relations with the DPRK. The reasoning is quite simple. France does not envision diplomatic ties with the DPRK until it abandons its nuclear weapons program and makes sure

that human rights are improved (Irish & Pennetier, 2018). This stance can explain why France accepted EU diplomatic relations with the DPRK because the initial aim of forming diplomatic relations by the EU was to improve human rights conditions and general development of the economy of the DPRK for the sake of its people and did not include military activities (Sangtu, 2008).

France was already offering humanitarian aid and promoting French culture without having official diplomatic ties with the DPRK (Ministère de l'Europe et Des Affaires Étrangères, 2022). So, initially French national foreign policy and the EU-DPRK foreign policy was not of a different nature. This meant that their national preferences towards the DPRK was not affected by the 2001 EU-DPRK diplomatic relationship. However, after a breakdown of regular talks between the EU and the DPRK in 2001, France as the principal initiator went further and went to the United Nations Human Rights Commission and delivered an EU resolution that urged North Korea to improve the human rights of its people. This happened during the 59th session of the United Nations Human Rights Commission which took place in 2003 from the 17 of March till the 25th of April 2003 and was the first human rights resolution of its kind against the DPRK (Sangtu, 2008, OHCHR, n.d.).

4.2.2 UK

The UK was a country within the EU which could act independently and if it provided benefits could rely on EU common foreign policy. The UK is also a member of the UN Security Council and has veto rights, still has influence on former colonies, is part of the G7, NATO and has military and nuclear power (Lehne, 2012). However, in comparison to France, which would like to lead EU foreign policy, the UK had a stronger stance on protecting sovereign foreign policy and only allowed collective foreign policy to a certain degree when it did not influence the UK's own foreign policy relations (Lehne, 2012). The UK and other member states could block and veto decisions regarding a common approach on CFSP matters (Cardwell, 2013). This helped to keep the CFSP to a minimum level. Both the UK and France together favored a critical engagement of the EU towards the DPRK (Esteban, 2019)., No clear evidence has been found of the UK acting in the same way France did by going to the United Nations to condemn the DPRK.

4.2.3 Germany

Germany is different from the UK and France since Germany has not perceived itself as a major power after World War 2 despite being an economic powerhouse within the EU. Another difference is that Germany has an aversion to military force and prefers multilateralism and international law. France acknowledges Germany's preponderance on economic matters in the Union and Germany seems to accept France's political leadership (Lehne, 2012). There is no clear evidence which leads to Germany being the most influential country to have influenced policy change on the Korean Peninsula. Germany therefore seems a less likely candidate to opt for a new common foreign policy based on their national preferences.

4.3. The national preferences and foreign policy of the EU countries with the longest standing diplomatic relationship with the DPRK

Evidence found points to Sweden and Italy as the two countries outside of the big three with expertise and having had an influence on events relating to the EU's common foreign policy towards the Korean Peninsula. There is no clear evidence found on national preferences from the other countries (Denmark, Portugal, Austria, Finland) with longstanding diplomatic relationships with the Korean Peninsula.

4.3.1 Sweden

Sweden has been one of the first countries which established diplomatic ties with not only the DPRK but also the ROK (table 2). The first official presence in the DPRK was by being part of the Neutral Nations and Supervisory Commission (Andersson & Bae, 2015). This commission consisted of Sweden, Switzerland, Poland, and Czechoslovakia and its goal was to preserve the Korean armistice. Sweden had been chosen as a member because Sweden offered medical and economic aid during the Korean war and was not actively fighting on the side of the North or the South (Andersson & Bae, 2015).

To reiterate, the North Korean economy grew and industrialized in the 70's to 80's, so Sweden took this opportunity and forged ties with the DPRK because of economic interests. Sweden's Anti-Imperialist stance during the 70's to 80's led to expanding diplomatic relations with countries where other Western democracies were less likely to be engaged with (Andersson & Bae, 2015). Sweden joined the EU in 1995 (table 2) and even considered withdrawing its presence in the DPRK in the 90s. However, the 1994 Agreed Framework between the U.S. and the DPRK led to the U.S.'s government requesting Sweden to serve as a protecting power in the DPRK (Andersson & Bae, 2015). Till 2001 Sweden was the only western power with an official embassy in the DPRK which led to Sweden not only being the protecting power of the US but eventually also for other western countries. Since Sweden had a functioning embassy, Sweden offered help during the North Korean famine crisis of the 90s and general humanitarian aid coming from Sweden to North Korea was quite high in comparison to other European countries (Table 3)

The inter-Korean summit of 2000 led to a Nobel Peace prize for the South Korean president Kim Dae-Jung. This prize let the South Korean president to meet the Swedish prime minister Persson. This meeting led to the South Korean president asking Sweden to arrange an EU-high level visit to North Korea. Sweden chaired the European council as part of the European presidency of 2001 thus the Swedish prime minister eventually visited Pyongyang together with EU officials. This led to the establishment of EU-DPRK diplomatic relationship in 2001 (Andersson & Bae, 2015). Looking at the development of Sweden-DPRK relations, it can be said that Sweden functioned as s facilitator for the EU as well as the US when it comes to the Korean Peninsula.

4.3.2 The national preferences and foreign policy of Italy

Italy together with South Korea can be seen not as facilitators in comparison to Sweden but as one of the pushers for EU-DPRK relations. While the EU was still in talks with the DPRK on diplomatic relations, Italy established diplomatic ties with the DPRK independently from the EU in 2000 (Sangtu, 2008). This went against the European Union Council conclusions of 1999 which stressed an EU coordinated approach towards the Korean Peninsula. Italy acted on national interests and wanted to secure diplomatic relations to prevent North Korea transferring missile technology to former Italian colonies in North Africa. After Italy more EU states followed (table 2) which put pressure on the European Commission to consider forging ties with the DPRK (Sangtu, 2008).

3 years later, the 1st of July 2003, was the beginning of the Italian presidency of the EU with the Italian prime minister Silvio Berlusconi. One of his primary goals for the EU was to improve the relations of the EU with the US, since the relationship suffered because of the Iraq crisis. Berlusconi was a supporter of the US during the Iraq crisis and spoke of improving EU's military capabilities to improve the EU-US relationship and to hopefully improve the EU's role in global affairs (Bower,2003; Quaglia, 2004). The formation and implementation of the new CFSP European Security Strategy paper of 2003 which led to the new common foreign policy towards the Korean Peninsula happened during the Italian presidency (European Council, 2022)

4.4 The European Commission and its foreign policy

Starting from the 90s, the EU (ECHO) has been the first and largest, but also the most constant donor for humanitarian aid to the DPRK. EU member states have followed the EU, but the EU provided the most humanitarian aid in total (Table 3). First, aid mostly consisted of food aid but starting from 1997 the European Commission combined food aid with delivering agricultural expertise for self-sustainment. The European Commission went further by implementing the EU's National Indicative Program as part of the follow-up on the Country Strategy Paper of 2000 which led to a fund of 15 million euros to offer technical assistance to projects in North Korea. However, the nuclear crisis of 2002 on the Korean Peninsula put a hold to the technical assistance of the EU (Sangtu, 2008) (European Commission, 2001).

Table 3: EU (ECHO) and EU member states' humanitarian aid to the DPRK

Table 3. EU Humanitarian Aid to North Korea (thousand euros)

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	SUM
ECHO	290	544	20,215	4,665	4,800	8,050	3,365	21,025	17,250	16,750	17,600	114,554
Germany	0	0	1,772	1,123	1,946	750	2,378	3,163	4,650	5,261	5,666	26,709
Sweden	0	0	1,496	3,367	468	3,522	2,940	2,829	0	4,270	3,356	22,248
Denmark	0	0	3,607	970	0	0	2,146	1,613	2,019	538	670	11,563
Finland	0	0	256	168	1,009	0	841	1,000	1,300	1,450	1,200	7,224
U. K.	0	0	1,814	0	0	83	1,912	0	0	1,540	0	5,349
Netherlands	0	0	953	226	229	304	0	665	700	500	0	3,577
Ireland	0	0	0	0	222	0	0	0	150	950	250	1,572
Luxemburg	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	521	0	0	521
Austria	0	0	36	0	0	0	0	0	0	350	0	386
Italy	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	150	0	0	0	150
France	0	0	0	91	0	0	0	0	0	50	0	141
Greece	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	30	0	30
SUM	290	544	30,149	10,610	8,675	12,709	13,582	30,445	26,590	31,689	28,742	194,025

Source: ECHO, HOLIS 14 Points, https://hac.cec.eu.int/listReport.

Source: Sangtu, K. (2008). Vanguard of European Politics: The Role of Member States in the EU's Foreign Policy toward North Korea. *Journal of International and Area Studies*, *15*(1), 47–59. http://www.jstor.org/stable/43111475

The EU is well known for its soft power which helps other states to develop economically. North Korea could have been the EU's new envisioned next project of EU soft power diplomacy. Opening North Korea's economy could lead to social reforms and therefore increase the EU's political influence in East Asia, which could lead to more security operations in the East Asia region (Berkofsky, 2008). However, this quiet diplomacy by the EU Commission did not work. North Korea did not take the Commissions bait and the Commissions' quiet diplomacy of offering aid with barely strings attached did not have a positive effect on Pyongyang at all (Berkofsky, 2008). The nuclear activities of North Korea continued from 2002 and onwards.

The strategy of the Commission by not getting involved in hard security questions, like the missile and nuclear crisis of the 90's and later the intensification of nuclear activities by the DPRK in 2002, undermined the EU's global credibility. Opting for quiet policy is undermining the EU's credibility of global foreign and security policies in East-Asia (Berkofsky, 2008). Even if the EC wanted to get involved in military or security questions it would have to get through the European Council which would have been very difficult since countries would probably vote against a collective military or security approach in the name of the EU to protect their own national preferences on foreign policy (Cardwell, 2013).

4.4.1 Korean Energy Development Organization (KEDO)

KEDO stands for Korean Energy Development Organization and served as an organization to help North Korea with the construction of two light-water reactors in North Korea. KEDO was founded in 1995 by the U.S., Japan, and South-Korea. KEDO came into existence because of the 1994 US-North Korea agreed framework to freeze North Korea's nuclear power plant. The EU joined the KEDO program in 1997 (Center for Nonproliferation studies, 2003). The EU provided financial aid to KEDO, and some EU member states contributed on a bilateral level as well. KEDO was mostly behind schedule because of a lack of funding and political will which eventually led to a standstill in 2003 (Berkofsky, 2008).

Despites KEDO's goals to prevent a nuclear crisis, the second North Korean nuclear crisis started in 2002 when North Korea resumed nuclear activities, and which led to North Korea withdrawing from the Non-Proliferation Treaty (Sangtu, 2008). Evaluating the financing of KEDO it becomes apparent that the EU member states of Finland, Greece, the United Kingdom, and Germany all played a more prominent role as financiers before the EU joined KEDO in 1997 (Sangtu, 2008).

The US and Japan as regional allies have not advocated for a more prominent EU role of solving the nuclear crisis on the Korean Peninsula after the establishment of KEDO and did not consider the possible EU participation of the Six-Party Talks in 2003 (Berkofsky, 2008). The Six-Party Talks aimed to end the DPRK's nuclear program through negotiations. The negotiations involved the US, China, the ROK, the DPRK, Japan and Russia and thus not the EU (Bajoria & Beina, 2013). Both the US and Japan have shown critique on the EU's economic engagement towards the DPRK which was against the policies of the US and Japan of having a hardline policy of aiming at pressing the DPRK to stop its nuclear ambitions through economic sanctions and political pressure. Eventually Brussels gave in into the fact that the nuclear issues essentially come down between Pyongyang and Washington (Berkofsky, 2008).

4.4.2 The EU's country strategy paper on the DPRK

The South Korean government of 1998 initiated The Sunshine policy to refer to the strategy of improving inter-Korean relations. The European Union agreed on this preferred approach by the ROK. This approach was appealing for the EU since offering aid and investing seems like the way to communicate with the DPRK, was in the lines of the EC's power and it is a common strategy the EU has used in the past with other countries (Alexsandrova, 2019). The EU's country strategy paper was in line with the Sunshine Policy and concerning the DPRK lists 3 principal future objectives which show that the EU is aiming for more than just humanitarian and development aid. This strategy paper explains that the EU is 1. Fostering sustainable economic and social development. 2. integrating the DPRK into the world economy. 3. combating poverty based on a close integration of the political, economic, social, and environmental dimensions of development (European Commission, 2001).

The EU joining the South's Sunshine Policy was not in line with the US's policy which meant tensions with the US. Despite objections by the US. The EU-DPRK relations booked some successes and even led to positive propaganda by the DPRK about the EU (Alexsandrova, 2019). As is clear from this study, 2003 is the turning point for the EU – Korean Peninsula relations and the EU's direct involvement in the region.

4.5. The EU's security strategy paper and the US

The EU's signing of the UN Human Rights resolutions made North Korea terminate the aid programs by the EU and only non-governmental organizations were allowed to give aid from that point on. The EU not being able to continue their aid and development efforts because of the DPRK opposing the EU's signing of the United Nations Human Rights resolution as proposed by France on behalf of the EU has not been the only reason of the failing of the EU-DPRK country strategy paper.

In another part of the world the three biggest member states of the EU were dealing with Iran. Iran built a nuclear fuel production facility which could eventually lead to the production of WMD. Since Iran is closer to the EU than the Korean Peninsula it was of a higher security concern. France, the UK, and Germany addressed Iran's nuclear policy by a joint diplomatic effort on behalf of the EU (Lyons, 2015). The European Security Strategy paper as part of the CFSP framework was established in 2003 as well which coincides time-wise with the situation in Iran. The creation of the European Security Strategy paper was a breakthrough for forming a more solid integrated common European foreign Policy. As part of the Security Strategy Paper of 2003 an explicit statement was made regarding opposing weapons of mass destruction (WMD).

"[t]he EU must act with resolve, using all instruments and policies at its disposal to prevent, deter, halt, and, where possible, eliminate proliferation programmes of concern worldwide." (European Council, 2003).

Countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction meant acting in union with the US who had the same goal. The US invaded Iraq in 2003 on the basis to destroy the possible existence of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and wanted to end dictatorial rule in Iraq (Laub, 2017).

Consistency for the EU was key with regards to their newly formed security strategy paper as part of the CFSP to be perceived as a real global player and a unitary actor. This mean that the engagement approach to the DPRK had to change as well. The newly formed strategy as part of the CFSP was not in line with the EU's work on the Korean Peninsula. Thus, the EU was no longer allowed to tolerate the activities of the DPRK which could lead to the creation of nuclear weapons while condemning the same kind of activities it in the middle east. 2003 than led to a standstill and a new course for EU-DPRK relations based on a new name called "Critical Engagement". The EU lost its role of being a global player on the Korean Peninsula since the EC could not continue its plans

made in the DPRK-country strategy paper due to the new security strategy paper of 2003 as formed by the European Council Peninsula (Alexsandrova, 2019; Berkofsky, 2008; Sangtu, 2008).

To not confront the US and to ensure a security partner for the old European Continent to uphold the balance of power in the world, the EU common foreign policy needed to be in in line with the US. 2003 is therefore the beginning of the change in policy towards the Korean Peninsula wherein the EU aligned its new common foreign policy with the US and went away from South Korea's more conciliatory policies toward the North. The Korean Peninsula eventually became the first case to show that a common foreign policy position by all EU member states was possible, but it also limits EU member states to directly approach the DPRK on a bilateral level to not contradict the EU's legitimacy as a global player in the international system (Alexsandrova, 2019; Berkofsky, 2008; Sangtu, 2008).

4.6 Timeline of events

Table 4: Simplified timeline of events

Year	*Observation(s) / event(s)*	*Actor(s)*
1997	1.Treaty of Amsterdam (CFSP) 2.EU is asked for and joins KEDO	European Council EC USA Japan ROK
1998	3.Start of ROK Sunshine policy	ROK
	4. EU follows ROK Sunshine policy. USA and Japan object this strategy 5. High level talks EU – DPRK	EU DPRK USA Japan
2000	6.Inter-Korean summit 7. Italy as the first G7 country establishes diplomatic ties with the DPRK	DPRK ROK Italy
2001	8. Swedish presidency of the EU 9.EU-DPRK establish diplomatic ties 10. EU-DPRK-country strategy paper (2001-2004)	EC DPRK Sweden
2002	11.DPRK withdrawal from Non-Proliferation Treaty	DPRK
2003	12.Italian presidency of the EU 13. UNHRC accepts EU backed French resolution on condemning DPRK's human rights situation 14. DPRK opposes European UNHRC resolution *15. The 'big three' in diplomatic talks with Iran about non-proliferation *16. US invasion of Iraq to disarm Iraq of WMD 17. EU common security strategy paper of 2003	European council European Commission UNHRC France UK Germany Italy USA

Note: This timeline is based on the information of Chapter 4 - part 1
***** These observations are not part of the hypothesized theoretical causal mechanisms

5. Empirical analysis - part 2: Process Tracing Tests for Causal Inference

This part consists of testing the observations and evidence as described in part 1 of the empirical analysis based on the necessity and sufficiency of the evidence as part of the process tracing method. Testing will be done by using the Straw-In-The-Wind test, the Hoop test, the Smoking-gun test and the Auxiliary Outcome test (see 3.2.3).

5.1 Testing hypothesis 1

Hypothesis 1: The EU's common foreign policy change on the Korean Peninsula is based on the national interests of the strongest states within the European Union.

Table 5: Process Tracing Test – France (Intergovernmentalism)

France	***Pass or fail***	***Evidence***
Straw-In-The-Wind test (not necessary & not sufficient)	Passed	1. No diplomatic ties with the DPRK 2. Core member of the United Nations Security Council 3. Part of the G8 4. One of the big three within the EU 5. Offered humanitarian aid towards the DPRK
Hoop test (necessary but not sufficient)	Passed	1. Submitted a resolution to the UNHC on behalf of the EU to condemn the DPRK's human rights situation 2. Is in favor of leading the EU politically
Smoking-gun (Sufficient but not necessary)	Failed – no clear evidence	-

Table 6: Process Tracing Test – UK (Intergovernmentalism)

United Kingdom	***Pass or fail***	***Evidence***
Straw-In-The-Wind test (not necessary & not sufficient)	Passed	1. Diplomatic ties with both the DPRK and ROK 2. Core member of the United Nations Security Council 3. Part of the G7 4. One of the big three within the EU 5. Offered humanitarian aid towards the DPRK
Hoop test (necessary but not sufficient)	Failed	1. Is not in favor of collectivity within the EU
Smoking-gun (Sufficient but not necessary)	Failed – no clear evidence	-

Table 7: Process Tracing Test – Germany (Intergovernmentalism)

Germany	***Pass or fail***	***Evidence***
Straw-In-The-Wind test (not necessary & not sufficient)	Passed	1. Diplomatic ties with both the DPRK and ROK 2. Part of the G7 4. One of the big three within the EU 5. Offered the most humanitarian aid towards the DPRK among all member states
Hoop test (necessary but not sufficient)	Passed	1. Is in favor of multilateralism and collectivity with the EU
Smoking-gun (Sufficient but not necessary)	Failed – no clear evidence	-

Table 8: Process Tracing Test – Sweden (Intergovernmentalism)

Sweden	***Pass or fail***	***Evidence***
Straw-In-The-Wind test (not necessary & not sufficient)	Passed	1. Most historical and long-lasting diplomatic ties with the Korean Peninsula 2. Offered the second to most humanitarian aid towards the DPRK among all member states
Hoop test (necessary but not sufficient)	Passed	1. Swedish European Presidency in 2001 led to the official EU-DPRK diplomatic relationship 2. Serves as a facilitator with its embassy functioning for the US and for other western countries in the DPRK 3. Has been part of the NNSC
Smoking-gun (Sufficient but not necessary)	Failed – no clear evidence	-

Table 9: Process Tracing Test – Italy (Intergovernmentalism)

Italy	***Pass or fail***	***Evidence***
Straw-In-The-Wind test (not necessary & not sufficient)	Passed	1. Diplomatic ties with both the DPRK and ROK 2. Part of the G7
Hoop test (necessary but not sufficient)	Passed	1. Showed leadership by form diplomatic ties with the DPRK before the EU did to prevent nuclear threats is evident. 2. Favored the improvement of the relationship of the EU with the US.
Smoking-gun (Sufficient but not necessary)	Failed – no clear evidence	-

5.2 Testing hypothesis 2

Hypothesis 2: The EU's common foreign policy change on the Korean Peninsula has been the result of institutionalization of the European Union.

Table 10: Process Tracing Test – European Commission (Institutionalism)

European Commission	***Pass or fail***	***Evidence***
Straw-In-The-Wind test (not necessary & not sufficient)	Passed	1. Offered more humanitarian aid than EU member states and offered the most consistent humanitarian aid
Hoop test (necessary but not sufficient)	Passed	1. Established the DPRK – country strategy paper in 2001 2. Formed diplomatic ties with the DPRK in 2001 3. Delegations visited the DPRK 4. Follows the resolutions of the UNHRC 5. Participated in KEDO
Smoking-gun (Sufficient but not necessary)	Failed – no clear evidence	-

5.3 Testing hypothesis 3

Hypothesis 3: The EU's common foreign policy change on the Korean Peninsula has been done by the influence of a strong external power or international organization active in the region of the Korean Peninsula.

Table 11: Process Tracing Test – USA (Liberalism)

USA	***Pass or fail***	***Evidence***
Straw-In-The-Wind test (not necessary & not sufficient)	Passed	1. An ally of European member states in the region of the Korean Peninsula
Hoop test (necessary but not sufficient)	Passed	1. Opposed the EU's support for the Sunshine policy by the ROK 2. One of the founding states of KEDO 3. Has a high stake in EU security 4. Did not invite the EU for the Six Party Talks
Smoking-gun (Sufficient but not necessary)	Failed – no clear evidence	-
Auxiliary Outcome test (Smoking-gun test)	Passed	1. USA invasion of Iraq in 2003 2. USA sees contradictions in EU's common foreign policy when looking at the cases of Iran and Iraq 3. EU created EU security strategy paper so contradictions between the Korean Peninsula and the Middle East is not possible anymore

Table 12: Process Tracing Test – Japan (Liberalism)

Japan	***Pass or fail***	***Evidence***
Straw-In-The-Wind test (not necessary & not sufficient)	Passed	1. An ally of European member states in the region of the Korean Peninsula
Hoop test (necessary but not sufficient)	Passed	1. Opposed the EU's support for the Sunshine policy by the ROK 2. One of the founding states of KEDO 3. Did not invite the EU for the Six Party Talks
Smoking-gun (Sufficient but not necessary)	Failed – no clear evidence	-

6. Conclusion

6.1 Summary of hypotheses

To reiterate, this thesis has investigated which one of the following three theorized hypotheses could provide an explanation on the EU's common foreign policy change towards the Korean Peninsula in 2003.

H1: The EU's common foreign policy change on the Korean Peninsula is based on the national interests of the strongest states within the European Union.

H2: The EU's common foreign policy change on the Korean Peninsula has been the result of institutionalization of the European Union.

H3: The EU's common foreign policy change on the Korean Peninsula has been done by the influence of a strong external power or international organization active in the region of the Korean Peninsula.

RQ: *Why has the EU's common foreign and security policy changed towards the Korean Peninsula in 2003 and how is this related to the establishment and development of the EU's CFSP?*

Table 13: Rejection and acceptance of hypotheses

Hypothesis 1	Rejected
Hypothesis 2	Rejected
Hypothesis 3	Accepted

6.2 Conclusion hypothesis 3 (Liberalism)

Hypothesis 3 is the most likely to answer the research question and is therefore accepted.
Although European integration theories are the main theories about European integration and thus EU common foreign policy, the evidence found in line with (Neo)Liberalist theory is that the EU as an institution has a complex interdependence between the strongest EU member states, the United Nations as an international organization and with the USA as an ally in the region of the Korean Peninsula.

When it comes to survival of the European continent the EU and EU member states seem to change their own common foreign policy due to international credibility issues and due to pressure of mainly the US stating the obvious contradictions between the EU's foreign policy on Iran in contrast to the EU's policy towards the DPRK. Even though the Iran deal has been formed by the big three of the Union it is still considered part of EU foreign policy from the perspective of outsiders whitin the international system. France, the UK, and Germany as the big three acted as a trio when it came to discussions about the WMD of Iran. There was also no EU consensus on helping the US during the Iraq invasion. This shows that European common foreign policy towards the Korean Peninsula comes

in disarray and is non-compliant with EU member states when being influenced by crisis and wars thus EU member states sidelining the EU institutional framework by favoring the international neoliberal system

The EU not being invited to the six party talks despite being one of the biggest aid donors on the Korean Peninsula showed the decreased credibility of the EU as a global power in the international system by again, the contradictions of the EU as a player within the international system. The EU's common foreign policy has the image of not only being non-coherent but also of being neutral and is not primarily engaging in military or security questions. The EU's common foreign policy normative approach serves as the opposite of US foreign policy. The US has a more militaristic and alliance-based image. Members states of the EU therefore have the flexibility to stand behind the EU to ensure their neutrality and normativity or go for a bilateral approach when it concerns militaristic or alliance-based policies. Even though the EU common foreign policy allows for flexibility for its member states, at the same time this flexibility diminishes the EU's foreign policy coherent effectiveness and power perception in its entirety and thus a policy change which aligns with the US is noteworthy.

A smoking-gun test could be performed on the Auxiliary Outcome test. The Neoliberalist hypothesis seemed to be the best fitting and most confirming hypothesis even though it is a weak confirmation. The compelling evidence of the Auxiliary Outcome test helped to confirm the contradictions between the EU's common foreign policy towards the Korean Peninsula and the general international policy of opposing the development of WMD by the USA as the hegemon in the world. This has been the most important indicator of the creation of the European Security paper of 2003, which eventually led to the EU common foreign policy change towards the Korean Peninsula in 2003.

6.3 Conclusion hypothesis 1 (Intergovernmentalism)

In this section as part of the process tracing tests for causal Inference, evidence for the influence of national preferences by EU member states has been found. The evidence found indicates that the EU common foreign policy change towards the Korean Peninsula seemed to a certain degree have been influenced by EU member states as part of the Intergovernmentalist theoretical framework. The Liberal Intergovernmentalist perspective would argue that the national interests are leading for the development and thus change for EU common foreign policy. In sum, an open approach towards the Korean Peninsula by the European Commission from the 90s till 2003 was not in line with the national interests of one or more European Countries. The UK as a country of the big three within Europe, was openly against an active EU common foreign policy. However, clear evidence of actions based on national interests to change EU foreign policy by the UK have not been found to confirm the UK's influence on the policy change. Germany is more open to EU integration and multilateralism but specific interests on the Korean Peninsula have not been found.

France is the only country of the big three with corresponding leads of having national interests which corresponds to a possible changing EU common foreign policy. France shows a strong stance against forming diplomatic ties with the DPRK till the abandonment of their nuclear activities. The fact that the UNHRC voted in favor of France's request led to the DPRK opposing the UNHCR's resolution and led to the DPRK opposing EU government aid. However, since the UNHCR and France mainly condemned the human rights situation of the DPRK and did not condemn the EU's common foreign policy it does not fit in the narrative of France influencing the policy change towards the Korean Peninsula in 2003.

Sweden has a lot of expertise when it comes to the Korean Peninsula but lacks power within the EU in terms of economic and military power in comparison to the big three to have a strong bargaining stance for or against common foreign policy change. The perceived neutrality of Sweden and mainly functioning as a facilitator for the US and other western countries and not as an initiator indicates that their national interests of changing what has been working for Sweden for all these years seemed of low interest. The EU common foreign policy change is therefore less likely to be coming from Sweden within the EU as part of the Intergovernmentalist framework on national preferences and interstate bargaining. In general, economic interests, political and colonial ties to the DPRK as part of the Korean Peninsula are low or non-existent among the EU member states selected for this study which makes intergovernmental bargaining no key issue.

Italy, except for having the presidency of the EU in 2003 and favoring the US alliance has been more on the sideline of the EU by forming bilateral ties with the DPRK based on their own national leadership against WMD but with no obvious historical milestone found in general. For none of the countries selected, a smoking-gun test could be performed which means that based on the performed tests alone hypothesis 1 cannot evidently be confirmed and is therefore rejected.

6.4 Conclusion hypothesis 2 (Institutionalism)

Even though the CFSP is part of the EU's second pillar which mainly means unanimous intergovernmental bargaining and consensus orientated decision making, there is room for the European Commission to overcome intergovernmentalism. The acceptance of the Treaty of Maastricht is proof that institutionalization creates more autonomous power on foreign policy for the EC. Path dependency on past EU treaties, EU agents influencing national policy and functional spillover which leads to the EU member states on a national level, on an international level and on the EU, level becoming intertwined are all linked to an increase in autonomy for EU institutions like the EC.

The EC has been the frontrunner for humanitarian aid and project assistance to the Korean Peninsula as has been described in their DPRK country strategy paper of 2001. The establishment of diplomatic ties and visits to the DPRK by the EU are based on the EC foreign strategy of cooperation.

The EU joining KEDO but not actively opposing the DPRK nuclear activities seems odd since it brings the EC's own common foreign policy credibility down in relation to the US. The evidence

about the EU as an institutional actor does not openly confirm a policy change coming from the EC since most evidence shows that the EC seems to be the front runner and promoter of the common foreign policy before 2003 which makes hypothesis 2 weak since the changed common foreign policy ended grand humanitarian aid and development projects. A smoking-gun test could not be performed with the evidence found which means that based on the performed tests alone hypothesis 2 cannot evidently be accepted and is therefore rejected.

6.5 General Conclusion

Based on the three hypothesized causal mechanisms, it becomes clear that the Liberal Intergovernmentalist and Neoliberalist perspective both offer compelling insights into EU common foreign policy change. This research favors the Neoliberalist explanation, but it is important to bear in mind that there is a lack of information on the DPRK coming from the official EU channels.

The country selection excluded smaller EU states based on their lack of power within the EU but also based on the lack of evidence or information found. However, this research still offers a view of the black box of the common foreign policy change towards the Korean Peninsula in 2003 in relation to the CFSP. More research will be necessary to redefine and further elaborate on the specifics of decision making within the European Union when it comes to issues concerning the EU and the Korean Peninsula. More research on the EU and the Korean Peninsula and mainly on the DPRK since even information from the data bases of the European Union is scarce. This research thus illustrates the beginning of hopefully more research on the EU's common foreign policy on the Korean Peninsula, but it also raises the question if the EU can even have an independent and successful common foreign policy at all without relying on the US within the current international system.

6.6 Reflection on theory

Having used other theoretical perspectives on EU common foreign policy change towards the Korean Peninsula would have generated different outcomes. A constructivist perspective would seek to examine issues of European identity, interest formation and the individual and social level with regards to the change in EU common foreign policy (Wendt, 1992). EU common foreign policy change could therefore not only be studied on an ontological level but also on a sociological level of constructivism theory.

Critical theory could also have been used as a theory to analyze and evaluate the EU common foreign policy change towards the Korean Peninsula. This could have been analyzed in the form of criticizing EU's imperialism or EU member states' past involvement in East Asia or criticizing the EU's CFSP institutional framework and thus EU's legitimacy of having a common foreign policy.

There is potential value of a constructivist and critical theory perspective. However, the main aim of this study was to discover and analyze the evidence on the role and influence of EU institutions, the EU member states and the EU allies active in the region of the Korean Peninsula on

EU common foreign policy change towards the Korean Peninsula in 2003. This study's aim was not to critically evaluate behavior or investigate the sociological in depth.

6.7 Reflection on method and case selection

This study refers to the Korean Peninsula more than once while mainly focusing on evidence and observations relating to the DPRK while the ROK is also a part of the Peninsula. The EU common foreign policy change mainly involves and affects the DPRK, and most security questions and threats are coming from the DPRK. The foreign policy towards the DPRK thus became the center of attention in this study. Since the DPRK is part of the Peninsula, the implantation of EU common foreign policy change has an influence on the whole Peninsula and not just only on the DPRK.

Aspects such as domestic opinion and domestic party politics by European member states and by the allies of the EU were neglected. The evidence found and presented focused mainly on the macro-level of the causal mechanisms which meant that the parts of the three hypothesized causal mechanism were based on macro findings alone and were not identified and presented in detail due to lack of data as well. Although it became apparent throughout this research that detailed meso- and micro level data was difficult to find. the macro level mechanisms which have been formed for this specific Korean Peninsula case may also be applicable to or generalizable for other causal mechanisms on EU common foreign policy change for other cases than the Korean Peninsula.

Only the countries which are part of the big three within the EU and the countries with a clear historical link or clear evidence of involvement on the Korean Peninsula have been chosen based on macro data. No specific evidence was found for the smaller EU states but according to the Neoliberalist theory the smaller countries would likely have sided with one of the big three or with the country with the most expertise on the Korean Peninsula which makes it less likely for one of these countries to be a deciding factor as part of the causal mechanisms.

While confirmed, the causal mechanism of Neoliberalism as part of the process tracing method has not been entirely complete. Extra information which has not been part of the Neoliberalist causal mechanisms as described in the methodology chapter has been found and tested in the form of an Auxiliary Outcome test to eventually confirm the Liberalist hypothesis with more confidence.

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Appendix A - Mechanisms according to Beach and Pederson (2013)

What are mechanisms?	Explanation
Not just empirical events	Mechanisms will show why and how one event will lead to another. It shows how event A leads to outcome B.
Systematic	Mechanisms exist independently of any event.
Singular	A single causal mechanism is examined including the parts that make up the mechanism.
Macro-level and micro level	Mechanisms are studied at the level that makes sense within a specific case.

Source: Beach, D. and Pedersen, R.B. (2013) *Process-Tracing Methods: Foundations and Guidelines*, Ann Arbor MI: University of Michigan Press

Appendix B - An abstract example of theory-testing mechanism in process tracing.



Source: Beach, D. and Pedersen, R.B. (2013) *Process-Tracing Methods: Foundations and Guidelines*, Ann Arbor MI: University of Michigan Press

Appendix C - timeline and key dates of the development of European foreign policy

Year	Treaty/document	Event/development
1947	Marshall plan	US assistance for Western Europe
1949	Treaty of Washington	North Atlantic Treaty
1950		Creation of NATO
1951	Treaty of Paris	Creation ECSC
1952		Signing of EDC Treaty
1954	Modified Brussels Treaty	Non-ratification of EDC treaty Creation of the WEU
1957	Treaty of Rome	Creation of the EEC
1963		Yaoundé Treaty with former African colonies
1964		Failure of the Fouchet Plans
1970	Luxembourg report	Start of EPC
1975		First Lomé Agreement with the ACP countries
1986	Single European Act	EPC gains treaty basis
1988		Start of a policy towards reformist CEECs
1989		Fall of the communist regimes in CEECs
1991		Start of Balkan wars
1992	Treaty of Maastricht	Creation of the EU and CFSP
1993		Copenhagen criteria for the CEECs
1995	European Council in Madrid	Start Euro-Mediterranean Process Set of strategies/partnerships towards main regions in the world
1997	Treaty of Amsterdam	Creation of the position of High Representative for the CFSP
1998		End of Balkan wars Franco-British Saint Malo Agreement
1999	European Councils in Cologne and Helsinki	Establishment of ESDP
2000		Cotonou Agreement with ACP countries

2003		Iraq war First ESDP operations European Security Strategy
2004	Treaty for establishing a constitution for Europe	Enlargement to 25 member states Start of European Neighborhood policy Constitution for the EU (not ratified)
2007	Lisbon/Reform Treaty	Enlargement to 27 member states Amendment of the Treaties

Source: Keukeleire, S., & MacNaughtan, J. (2008). *The Foreign Policy of the European Union* (First ed.). Palgrave Macmillan.