


Voting for the PVV in the Netherlands based on educational level and region: an explanatory and comparative perspective



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Preface

The rise of radical right parties has been of special interest to media as well as to academics, especially in times of increasing polarization of society (Mudde, 2012). In the Netherlands the PVV is known as one of the major radical right parties as it portrays many characteristics of radical right parties: nationalistic, against involvement from the European Union and anti-migration (Vossen, 2011). In this research different explanations are explored for differences in electoral support for a radical right party in the Netherlands i.e. the PVV. The discrepancies between voters are based on individual and geographical differences. In this thesis the different motives for voting the PVV are studied as well as connecting them to individual and geographical aspects of the electoral support of the PVV. This thesis was completed based on national data gathered on the occasion of the elections for the House of Representatives in the Netherlands in 2017.

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Table of contents

Preface.....	2
Table of contents	3
Abstract.....	5
1. Introduction	7
1.1 Societal context: the political climate in the Netherlands anno 2017.....	9
1.2 The radical right.....	10
1.3 The PVV.....	11
1.4 Societal relevance.....	12
1.5 Scientific relevance	14
1.6 Objectives and research question(s).....	17
1.7 Thesis outline.....	18
2. Theory	19
2.1 Individual characteristics.....	19
2.2 Geographical differences.....	25
3. Methods.....	31
3.1 Design.....	31
3.2 Data	31
3.3. Operationalization of variables	32
3.3.1. Dependent variable.....	32
3.3.2 Variables on individual level	32
3.3.3 Variables on the national level.....	34
3.3.4 Control variables	35
3.4 Analysis.....	36
4. Results.....	39
4.1 Descriptive results: bivariate relationships	39
4.1.1 Educational level and voting for the radical right	39
4.1.2 Region and voting for the radical right.....	39
4.1.3 Migrant threat.....	40
4.1.4 National pride.....	41
4.1.5 Populism	42
4.1.6 Political trust	43
4.1.7 Political external efficacy	44
4.1.8 Euroscepticism	45
4.2 Testing hypotheses: multivariate relationships	46
4.2.1 Model design.....	46

4.2.2 Results concerning educational level.....	47
4.2.3. Results concerning regional differences	54
4.2.4. Results concerning control variables	60
5. Conclusions and discussion.....	61
5.1 Conclusions concerning educational level.....	61
5.2 Conclusions concerning geographical differences	64
5.3 Discussion.....	67
6. References	70
7. Appendix	85
7.1 Appendix A: conceptual model.....	85
7.2 Appendix B: results of factor analysis for the purpose of the method section.....	86
7.2.1 Migrant threat.....	86
7.2.2 Populism	86
7.2.3 Euroscepticism	86
7.2.4 Political distrust.....	87
7.2.5. External political efficacy	87
7.2.6 National pride.....	87
7.3 Appendix C: multicollinearity	88
7.4 Appendix D: additional analysis fur the purpose of hypothesis 8.....	89
7.5 Appendix E: overview hypotheses.....	90

Abstract

Due to their increasing popularity, radical right parties are a force to be reckoned with in contemporary politics in the whole of Europe, but also in the Netherlands (Mudde, 2012). Radical right parties are characterized by certain traits such as: nativism, authoritarianism and populism (Mudde, 2007). In the Netherlands, the PVV (Party for Freedom) fits these criteria (Vossen, 2011). The PVV was founded in 2004 by Geert Wilders, who is a former member of the VVD (Liberal Party). The PVV is widely known in the Netherlands for its anti-migration positions, Eurosceptic attitudes and claiming to represent the needs of the 'ordinary people' (Lucardie & Voerman, 2012). From 2006 on their electoral support amongst voters has increased. Research into the electoral support for the PVV has identified that PVV voters are more often lower educated and that the PVV is more popular in certain parts of regions of the Netherlands (Billiet & de Witte, 2008; de Voogd, 2017). Moreover, research has shown that certain ideological motives are connected to the popularity of radical right parties such as: anti-migrant attitudes, national pride, populist attitudes, political distrust, (external) political efficacy and Eurosceptic attitudes (Ivarsflaten, 2007; Lucassen & Lubbers, 2011; Van Hauwaert & Van Kessel, 2017; Zmerli & Newton, 2007; Magni, 2017; Rydgren, 2008). In this research, these motives are used to explain as to why people from different educational level and different regions have voted for the PVV.

The research question of this thesis entails: how can the relationship between educational level and voting for the PVV in the Netherlands be explained with different motives for voting for the PVV? Are there regional differences in voting for the PVV? Are there regional differences in motives for voting for the PVV? To explore these questions, national data were used collected after the most recent elections for the House of Representatives in 2017. These data were chosen because they contain representative information about voting behaviour, educational levels, geographical location and political attitudes (Nederlands Kiezersonderzoek, n.d.).

The results of this research show that all the above-mentioned motives, except for national pride, play a role in explaining the relationship between voting for the PVV and educational levels. In other words: people with a lower level of education tend to experience more: migrant threat, populist attitudes, political distrust and Eurosceptic attitudes and less external political efficacy and therefore are more likely to vote for the PVV. In additional analyses, it appears that when combining all the motives, the foremost important motives are: migrant threat, populist attitudes and Eurosceptic attitudes. Furthermore, the results concerning regional differences and voting for the PVV were less apparent. Solely migrant threat and national pride showed significant differences as motives for voting for the PVV. People from the Western- and the Eastern regions are more likely to vote for the PVV when they experienced these political motives. The other motives (populist attitudes, political distrust, external political efficacy and Eurosceptic attitudes) were not significantly different across different regions in voting for the PVV.

Concluding from this thesis the following can be stated: the different political motives that were studied in this research are of importance to explain differences amongst the electoral support for the PVV concerning educational level and regional differences. In follow-up research, smaller geographical levels should be considered, more political parties could be taken into consideration and a longitudinal study would provide more insight in trends in contemporary politics.

1. Introduction

Since the third-wave of the rise of radical right parties more than three decades ago, critics have warned for the risks of radical right parties to contemporary European societies and democracies (Von Beyme, 1988; Mudde, 2012). There has been a growing sense of urgency to look at the dangers that populist parties pose to democracies, not only by academics but also by the various media-outlets (Mudde, 2012). Feelings of urgency are fuelled by the rising support for radical right parties and movements in various European countries (Backes & Moreau, 2012). The consequences of the emergence of radical right parties are both societal and political, which stresses the importance of this topic in scientific research (Muis & Immerzeel, 2017). It is often stated that radical right parties jeopardize diverse aspects of the constitutional foundations of liberal democracies by advertising against them (Mudde, 2007; Abts & Rummens 2007). Abts et al. (2007) state that when comparing democracy and populism, this leads to high discontinuities as democracy is based on an open diverse society whilst populism is focused on a closed uniform society.

Because of the rising electoral support for radical right parties in Europe, it is stated that radical right parties are an important factor in contemporary European politics (Mudde, 2012). Moreover, there are concerns about a rightist populist turn in European politics. Given that the presence of radical right parties and their increasing popularity, other political parties have shifted in the direction of the radical right part of the political spectrum because of the salience of certain topics on the political agenda (Mudde, 2012). Established political parties are increasingly adopting the radical right rhetoric which contributes to the normalisation of these political values (Van Houtum & Bueno Lacy, 2017). Because of the normalisation of populist positions, they are no longer disregarded and, moreover, determine the social debate (Mudde, 2019).

In this research the topic of the electorate of radical right parties in the Netherlands will be studied, specifically the PVV (Party for Freedom). This political party has been on the rise since 2006 and is denoted as a populist party on the far right of the political spectre because of the various positions the party has concerning topics such as migration and involvement with the European Union (Vossen, 2011). This party will solely be considered in the current research. This has multiple reasons, the first reason is driven by the aim to gain insights on the electorate of the PVV with data that are recent, high quality in terms of validity and reliability of measurements and representative of the Dutch population. The data (that will be further discussed in the method section) were collected in 2017 when the most recent elections for the House of Representatives in the Netherlands was held. In these elections, there was another party which could qualify as a radical right party: Forum voor Democratie (Forum for Democracy). However, because of the small number of votes this party received during the election of 2017, respectively 1,78 percent, and widely divergent political positions (in comparison to the PVV), it was decided that solely looking at the PVV would be more suiting to this research (Kiesraad, 2017). In later years Forum voor Democratie gained more

prominence and even became the largest party in the provincial and senate elections of 2019 (Von Piekartz, 2019). But as the number of votes in 2017 was yet small, it was decided that solely looking at the PVV would be more suiting for this research.

The second cause for solely taking the PVV into account in this research is that this party qualifies as a radical right-wing party as it shows all the characteristic elements in contradiction to other political parties (Vossen, 2011). As mentioned before, established political parties tend to adopt positions from radical right parties to keep voters on board (Van Houtum et al., 2017). However, because they only adapt certain positions but are not characterized as a radical right party, they do not qualify as a radical right party and will not be considered in this research (Vossen, 2017).

The aim of the current thesis is to look for explanations for the relationship between voting for the radical right in the Netherlands and educational level on an individual level: educational level turns out to have a great affect people's likelihood to vote for political parties at the extreme right end of the political spectrum (e.g., Betz, 1993; Lubbers, Gijsberts & Scheepers, 2002; Norris, 2005; Billiet & de Witte, 2008; Ivarsflaten & Stubager, 2013). More specifically, the focus is on political views or motives that vary across educational levels that may mediate the relationship between educational level and voting for the radical right. These mediators will be tested to research the extend these mediators can explain educational differences in voting for the PVV. This thesis, however, also explores regional variations in the importance of the motives. The different political motives for voting for the radical right that will be discussed are derived from different branches of theories and entail: migrant threat, national pride, populist attitudes, political trust, political efficacy, Euroscepticism. These motives are chosen because, according to previous research, they are connected to voting for radical right parties and therefore would be relevant to look at in order to test them simultaneously (Rydgren, 2005; Ivarsflaten, 2007; Werts, Scheepers & Lubbers, 2012).

Testing the extent to which populist attitudes mediate the relationship between educational level and voting for the radical right in combination with a set of other political motives is a first novelty of this study. In many scientific studies populist attitudes is perceived as part of political trust, however, Geurkink, Zaslove, Sluiter and Jacobs (2019) have demonstrated that populism separately needs to be taking into account when looking at radical right voting. Looking at the differential importance of these political motives per region is a second novelty of the current study. The four regions that are examined in the Netherlands are: North, East, South and West. The Northern regions consists out of the following provinces: Groningen, Drenthe and Friesland. The Eastern region consists out of: Gelderland, Overijssel and Flevoland. The Southern region consists out of: Noord-Brabant and Limburg. And the Western regions consists out of: Noord-Holland, Zuid-Holland, Utrecht and Zeeland (Ministry of Internal Affairs, 2020). This divide is made based on NUTS-1 (Nomenclature des Unités Territoriales Statistiques) region grouping method from Eurostat, the European Bureau for Statistics (Ministry of Internal Affairs, 2020). These four regions will be considered as they are the solely geographical unit that is available in these recent data to look at

geographical differences. The societal and scientific relevance of this research will be further discussed in paragraph 1.4 and 1.5.

This chapter aims to introduce the subject of radical right voting within the societal context of the elections in 2017 and a description of the PVV. Furthermore, the societal relevance and scientific relevance will be described as well as presenting the objectives and research questions of this research.

1.1 Societal context: the political climate in the Netherlands anno 2017

This study addresses the political climate in the Netherlands in 2017 because this is the most recent year when there was an election for the House of Representatives and therefore this outcome is perceived to reflect the current political situation in Dutch society. There have been other elections for alternate political organs (such as the Provincial Council) in the mean time, however, the attendance for these elections are much lower (56,16 percent in 2019) in comparison to the elections for the House of Representatives (81,57 percent in 2017) and are therefore less representative (Kiesraad, 2019).

In order to explore voting for the radical right in the Netherlands in 2017, the political situation anno 2017 will be assessed as a background of the societal framework. The government that was seated from 2012 to 2017, prior to the elections of 2017, was formed by two parties: VVD (People Party for Freedom and Democracy) and PvdA (Labour Party). This government was named after the prime-minister Rutte II, who was (and still is) the leader of the VVD. During this term in office, the government had to guide the Netherlands through the aftermath of the economic crisis, which was characterized by persistent negative economic growth. Simultaneously, there was a crisis in the European Union, with Greece having large sums of government debt and being unable to reduce it (Voerman et al., 2014). Despite these troubling factors, the parliament was the first one to complete their term of office since 1998 and at the same time close the budget gap the Netherlands had had at the start of their term in 2012 (de Volkskrant, 2017).

Towards the end of the term of office of the government of Rutte II and in vicinity of the elections of 2017, there was a rising trend of societal discomfort in the Netherlands (Dekker, Den Ridder, & Van Houwelingen, 2017). The number of Dutch citizens who expressed the sentiment that the country was going in the wrong direction was rising, especially amongst lower educated people. In 2017, 64 percent of the citizens expressed this sentiment, in comparison to 53 percent in 2016 (Dekker et al., 2017). The concerns amongst citizens regarding the direction of the country were mostly concerning on the issue of migration fuelled by a lack of trust in politics. These developments took place despite the relative growth in economical welfare and optimistic attitudes about one's own economic situation, which was not seen in previous years (Dekker et al., 2017). These sentiments are societal developments that formed the backdrop for the elections of 2017 for the House of Representatives.

The election for the House of Representatives (in the Netherlands) in 2017 was an extraordinary one in various ways. Traditionally established parties, such as VVD (right-wing Liberal Party) and especially the PvdA (Labour party) received a lot less votes than they usually (in earlier elections) received. An exception to this is the (traditionally) large political party CDA (Christen Democrats), that continued to attract a similar number of voters and even became a bigger, although not much (Kiesraad, 2017). These three parties, which are traditionally established (VVD, PvdA and CDA), together had approximately 40 percent of the voters, whilst in former years this was much more. For example, the elections for the House of Representatives in 2003, which was the last election when the three parties had majority, the VVD, PvdA and CDA secured 114 (of 150 in total) seats (Van der Meer, Van der Kolk, & Rekker, 2017). Although the VVD lost voters in the elections, they remained the biggest political party (Kiesraad, 2017).

Simultaneous to the loss of electoral support for these traditionally large parties, many (relative) small parties gained votes and therefore seats in the House of Representatives. This led to the House of the Representatives showing a highly fragmented picture with thirteen political parties taking seats (Van der Meer et al., 2017). The biggest party of the election was still the VVD with approximately 22 percent of the votes, followed by the PVV in second place with approximately 13 percent of votes. In third place was CDA which had approximately 12 percent of the votes (Kiesraad, 2017). The big win was no surprise, since the PVV was one of the biggest parties of this election due to their rising popularity (Van der Meer et al., 2017).

1.2 The radical right

According to Mudde (2007), populist parties at the right end of the political spectrum consist out of three main ideological characteristics: nativism, authoritarianism and populism. These three factors will be discussed by means of portraying the characteristics that are part of the attractive power of the radical right for the electorate. Nativism entails that a state should be inhabited by its \neg native citizens. Donselaar (1997) describes the populist radical right ideology as one that focusses on their \neg own group and has fear and aversion of the \neg unknown. The unknown is often characterised by groups of different ethnical background in society. The idea of nativism is largely applied to anti-migration standpoints that radical right parties often represent, to \neg protect the national identity of one's country from external influences of people who are not \neg native (Mudde, 1999). Furthermore, the appealing power of nativism in voting for the radical right is that nativism can create a sense of belonging to a group which is one of human's basic needs. In the case of radical right politics, that group is the nation (Eatwell, 2003; Turner, Brown & Tajfel, 1979).

The second characteristic of the radical right entails authoritarianism, a term first introduced by Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson and Stanford (1950) after the Second World War to get a grasp at fascist tendencies displayed on a large scale during the war. Authoritarianism can be divided

into two aspects. The first one entails negative perceptions of 'out-groups' (groups other than the one a person identifies with). Out-groups can form a threat to a person because of alternating behaviour or culture they have. By means of protecting one's own group, out-groups are marked as inferior (Altemeyer, 1998). Radical right parties often have statements about defending the national community against mass immigration, which will appeal to authoritarian people (Tillman, 2016). The second aspect of authoritarianism refers to traditional ideas of society. These traditional ideas entail that society should be strictly ordered and those who deviate should be punished severely with an emphasis on obedience to the authority (Mudde, 2007; Tierolf, Drost & van Kapel, 2017).

The last aspect of radical right parties according to Mudde (2007) is populism, which entails a strict line of demarcation between the elite and the 'common' people. Mudde (2007) describes radical right populist views as being ideational in their nature, which entails that populism appeals to 'the people' in conflict with 'the elite'. This is often expressed in radical right parties that propose more direct influence of the people (Werts et al., 2012). Furthermore, populism is stated to act as a 'thin-centred ideology' which mainly focusses only on certain political issues, whereas other political parties have to be more 'all-round'. Populist parties therefore 'borrow' political views from other political streams, such as socialism or liberalism (Freeden, 1998; Mudde, Kaltwasser and Rovira, 2017). Other examples of 'thin-centred ideologies' are feminism or ecologism (Freeden, 1998).

When applying this ideology to modern day political parties, we see that radical right parties can differ quite a bit in their party programs, depending on what country the political party is located in. Nevertheless, the overarching characteristics of radical right parties now-a-days globally entail these aspects: negative attitudes towards migrants and multicultural society, anti-political establishment as expressed in populism, nativism, authoritarianism and a high presence of national pride (Rydgren, 2005; Ivarsflaten, 2007; Werts et al., 2012).

1.3 The PVV

During the last decade, the radical right's popularity has re-emerged in several Western European countries (Ivarsflaten, 2007). This is also the case in the Netherlands, with the rising of parties such as the PVV. The PVV is known as a radical right political party (Vossen, 2011). In a report by Moors, Balogh, van Donselaar and de Graaf (2009), commissioned by the Ministry of Interior and Kingdom Relations, it is written that the PVV can be seen as a radical right party because of the nature of their political standing points. They are described as to focus more on their own in-group, have an aversion against the unknown and to lean towards authoritarianism (Moors et al., 2009). In this research, the PVV therefore will be addressed as a radical right party.

The PVV was founded by Geert Wilders, who is a former member of parliament for the liberal party in the Netherlands, the VVD (Lucardie, 2009). In his days as a member of the VVD, Geert Wilders was a follower of Frits Bolkenstein. Bolkenstein's ideology can be characterized as a mixture

of economic liberalism in combination with concerns about migration. Geert Wilders leaned more towards the radical right in his political statements after the elections in 2002. He began criticizing the Islam more, as a threat to the Netherlands and Europe (Lucardie & Voerman, 2012). Wilders separated himself from the VVD in 2004 when he disagreed with his party on allowing Turkey to enter the EU. In 2006, Geert Wilders founded the PVV (Otjes & Louwse, 2013). The PVV is strongly built around its leader, Geert Wilders. He is the only member of the political party and dominates the political strategy (Vossen, 2011).

When the PVV first entered the elections in 2006, they got approximately six percent of the votes. Their popularity increased in later years, when they got 15,5 percent of votes during elections in 2010 and then decreased in 2012 with 10,1 percent of votes. In 2017 it increased again to 13,06 percent of the votes (Kiesraad, 2020). During these years, the PVV changed their party program in different ways, so they could appeal to more people. They, for example, proposed to lower the age of retirement in the Netherlands, which is a more left-wing political issue (Otjes & Louwse, 2013).

To get a better grasp of what kind of party the PVV is and what they stand for, their party program can be described. The party program, anno 2017, contained the following notions. The first point entails that the PVV is very nationalistic. The interests of the 'ordinary Dutch people' is the most important. This is also substantiated by the anti-Islamic attitudes the PVV portrays. Their first point on their party program is to de-Islamise the Netherlands by closing the borders and by shutting down Islamic schools and mosques. Second, they are against involvement in the EU and therefore want to leave the EU to gain more independence as a country. Furthermore, they believe that legal punishments should be stricter and that there should be more money invested to strengthen the police force. The last important point is that they want more involvement from 'ordinary people' by using binding referenda (Vossen, 2011; Party for the Freedom, 2017).

There are two important differences aspects of the PVV that differ with other radical right parties in the EU. The first one is that the PVV is progressive on ethical issues, such as abortion or euthanasia. The PVV also supports gay and female emancipation (Vossen, 2011). The second difference is that the PVV does not have connections with most other radical right parties within the EU, which most radical parties do have (Vossen, 2011).

1.4 Societal relevance

Since the rise of populist parties in Europe, anno 1980, there has been a lot of societal attention for these parties. Political commentators warned for the dangers of radical right parties to societies and democracies (Mudde, 2012). The radical right parties focused on aspects of society to which they are politically opposed, such as: migrants, criminals, drugs and paedophilia (Tierolf et al., 2017; Lubbers et al., 2002).

After the Second World War, radical right standing points were often dismissed and rejected in the political landscape. This changed in 1971 when the *Nederlandse Volksunie* (NVU) was founded. They characterized themselves as an ethnic nationalistic party (Voerman & Lucardie, 1992). The success of NVU was limited, as they received 0,4 percent of the votes in the elections 1977, which was not enough to grant them a seat in parliament (Voerman & Lucardie, 1992). The later emerged radical right party in the Netherlands had more political success: the *Centre Party* which was founded in 1979; and the *Centre Democrats* which was a successor of the Centre Party and was founded in 1984. These parties had respectively 1 to 3 seats in parliament (Voerman & Lucardie, 1992). The predecessor of the PVV was the party of Pim Fortuyn (*Lijst Pim Fortuyn* LPF) who had tremendous political success by winning 17 percent of the votes in the elections of 2002 (Kiesraad, 2003). LPF focused on political topics such as: migration, globalisation, national identity and European unification. The party focused on the number of migrants in the Netherlands and their alleged lack of integration (Buff, 2003).

Lucassen and Lucassen (2015) describe that the Netherlands' leading position in being a lenient and multiculturalist country took a turn around the year 2000. The rising popularity of Pim Fortuyn and his assassination just before the elections of 2002, the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Centre in New York (also known as 9/11), and the murder of Theo van Gogh after his publication of an anti-Islam movie all led to strong unfavourable sentiments towards migrants and Muslims in Dutch society (Lucassen & Lucassen, 2015). This societal discontent formed the breeding ground for politicians such as Geert Wilders to put anti-immigration politics on the agenda (Lucassen & Lucassen, 2015).

This rise in voting for radical right parties is often seen as a political development, but it also carries societal consequences and can illustrate certain trends in society (Lubbers et al., 2002). According to de Voogd (2017), voting and its geographical dispersed pattern, shows what sentiments are currently important and how these sentiments change over time and place. This makes this research to have an important topic from a societal viewing point because the people who vote for radical right parties, such as the PVV, often have a great dissatisfaction with the way the government has been run for the last years. The PVV mobilises these dissatisfactions and therefore represents these voters in society (Van der Meer et al., 2017). Especially amongst people who are lower educated, such dissatisfaction plays a role (Billiet & de Witte, 2008). By doing more research into the motives for voting for the PVV in relation to educational level of its electorate and region, more can be known about current political sentiments in society.

This topic is societally relevant to look at because of the increasing number of citizens who are unhappy about the multicultural aspect of Dutch society. This points at a risk of polarization in Dutch society: the contradictions between *us* and *them* are increasingly (mutually) reinforced by means of prejudice (Bellaart, Broekhuizen, & Van Dongen, 2017). This distress concerning the multiculturalist society that is felt by citizens concerns different topics. For example, 60 percent of the *native* Dutch

population report a loss of control related to (migrating) newcomers. The arrival of migrants causes changes in their living environment. This leads to a feeling of loss of their own culture and identity. This sentiment was especially felt amongst people who vote for the PVV, as 90 percent of them reported this (Smeekes & Mulders, 2016).

An additional reason why this topic is societally relevant entails that voting for the radical right is often connected to xenophobia, which is characterized by Yakushko (2009) as a fear for foreigners, also seen as the unknown. The relationship between xenophobic attitudes and discrimination can be seen as a conditional one. Watts (1996) describes that xenophobia can lead to discrimination, but only when people feeling threatened by the groups they have prejudices on. To his opinion, prejudice that starts political xenophobia can lead to more governance that is aimed at disadvantaging immigrants. This is consistent with findings from Moors et al. (2009), who found that 75 percent of the Muslim people in the Netherlands feel they are perceived more negatively since the PVV gained popularity. They mostly state that they feel this way because of (sometimes) provocative statements on the discourse about the Islam done by Geert Wilders and voters supporting these ideas (Moors et al., 2009). Therefore, looking into motives to vote for the PVV can indicate changing sentiments in society concerning xenophobic tendencies nowadays.

In this research there will be a specific focus on differences regarding educational level and regions concerning voting for the radical right. According to previous research, which will be discussed in the theory chapter, there are differences to be expected concerning people from different educational levels and people who live in different regions (de Voogd, 2017; Billiet & de Witte, 2008; Stephans & Long, 1970; Emler & Frazer, 1999; Van der Werfhorst & de Graaf, 2004). By looking at these differences, more information about the electoral support for the radical right can be provided in the Netherlands. The different motives that are looked at, can indicate why these differences are present. For example, does Euro-scepticism play a significant role in voting for the radical right in certain regions of the Netherlands? The societal relevance of this research entails displaying political sentiments in various regions of the population of the Netherlands.

1.5 Scientific relevance

Mudde (2012) describes the impact of radical right parties on Western societies by looking at four aspects: people, parties, policies and politics. The first aspect, people, is mostly influenced in their issue positions and priorities by radical right parties (Westin, 2003). This is in line with the *verrechtsing* thesis, which states that radical right parties influence European citizens by changing their political positions (Mudde, 2012). Topics such as immigration and crime are put on the political agenda by radical right parties and therefore the eminence of these topics rises amongst citizens (Minkenberg, 2001). For example, various critics have stated that when a radical right party becomes

successful in a country, there is a rise in Euroscepticism amongst the citizens, which is one of the main pillars of the political discourse of many radical right parties (Krouwel & Abts, 2007).

The next aspect of society that is influenced by radical right parties are other political parties (Mudde, 2012). This is also part of the *‘verrechtsing’* thesis, as other political parties also tend to put more emphasis on topics that the radical right introduced, in order to be able to compete with these parties (Mudde, 2007). These topics often entail migration issues, but also the involvement of the EU. This argument does not entail that all political parties become radical right parties, but that they use populist themes in their own political discourse. This trend is seen through the whole of Eastern Europe, even in countries where there is not a populist party present (Albertazzi & McDonnel, 2007).

Furthermore, the presence of radical right parties also influences policies as European politics have made a shift towards more *‘populist radical right’* policies since 1980 (Mudde, 2012). This is especially the case concerning policies for migration and integration. After 9/11, much emphasis was put on securitisation via policies. When radical right parties are seated in the government, this is a direct effect of their presence, but often this is an indirect effect and can be attributed to the changing political discourses of the mainstream parties due to the salience of radical right topics (Mudde, 2012; Akkerman & de Lange, 2012; Schain, 2009).

In contrast to the previous aspects, radical right parties did not influence the polities in European countries (Mudde, 2012). This is no wonder as the radical right parties are not against democratic systems, but they are sceptic of certain parts of the democratic system, for example protecting minority rights and the politics of compromising (Mudde 2007). Minkenberg (2001) describes that radical right parties do not endanger the aspect of representation of the people by democracy, but they do question which citizens should be represented. Therefore, radical right parties are often described as *‘movements of exclusion’* (Rydgren, 2005).

As stated before, the radical right has received a lot of academic attention (Mudde, 2012). It is often questioned how radical right parties gain popularity, therefore there is much research on which predicting factors for voting for the radical right can be identified (Kitschelt, 2007). Previous research has rather consistently found a strong relationship between educational level and voting for a radical right party (Betz, 1993; Lubbers et al, 2002; Norris, 2005; Billiet & de Witte, 2008; Ivarsflaten & Stubager, 2013): time and again it turns out that the lower educated are overrepresented in the electoral support of radical right parties (Arzheimer & Carter, 2006). Why this relation is present is often debated. Some authors state that lower educated people have not been exposed to educational institutions where political values different from populist attitudes prevail (Hyman & Wright, 1979; Pascarella & Terenzini, 1999). Other authors state that lower educated people often have less access to the job market which reduces their materialistic position and causes frustration. This frustration is then mobilized by the radical right by addressing it, leading to more votes for these parties (Ivarsflaten & Stubager, 2011).

There are also various other factors that are associated with the relationship between educational level and voting for the radical right, such as negative attitudes about migrant groups and such. In this research, there will be focus on interlinkages that can explain why a relative large number of voters for the PVV have a low(er) educational level. Therefore, this research will identify mediators, i.e., political views, for the relationship between educational level and voting for the PVV, thereby identifying political views that induce of drive voting for the PVV rather than any other political party.

Another important aspect of voting radical right is the relationship with geographical factors. Research suggests that regional differences in culture have a relation with differentiating political attitudes in the United States of America (Lieske, 1993). This is often connected to the degree of racial tolerance that cities or regions have towards newcomers and voting for anti-migrant parties (Brown, Knopp and Morill, 2005). This is a contextual effect, which indicates that it is not the sum of individual characteristics of the population, but culture that has an effect on the ideological and political stances of the population (Clark & Harvey, 2010; Sharp, 2007). Another important geographical factor is the economic opportunity structure of a region (van der Waal, de Koster & Achterberg, 2013). When the economic opportunities in a region are scarce, people tend to be less welcoming and tolerant to newcomers with whom they would have to compete (Dancygier, 2010). This influences the popularity of anti-migrant political parties, such as radical right parties (Van der Waal et al., 2013).

Therefore, educational level and regional differences in relation to voting for the radical right will be the crucial topic of this thesis. The aim is to look for explanations for these relationships by looking at various factors derived from previously developed theories, such as on migrant threat, to explain the relationship between educational level and voting for the radical right (in particular the PVV) and how these could be of different importance in different regions of the Netherlands.

In this research, there are two scientific novelties which makes it scientifically relevant. The first novelty in this line of research is including populist attitudes as a separate aspect or mediator for the relationship between educational level and voting for the radical right, in contrast with populism as being considered to be just another dimension of well-known concepts such as political trust (Geurkink et al., 2019). This novelty can be described as the populist attitudes approach, and contains three aspects: people-centrism and anti-elitism, the people and the elite being irreconcilable and a focus on the general will of the people (Van Hauwaert & Van Kessel, 2017; Geurkink et al., 2019). In the current research, both approaches will be taken into account. In this way, the importance of different concepts in relation to radical right voting can be further studied.

The second novelty in this research is the consideration of regional differences in the Netherlands concerning voting for the PVV, especially because they are statistically tested. In response to the different election results per region, it will be explored why these differences are present and whether people in different regions have different motives to vote for the PVV. The PVV

is more popular in some parts and cities in the Netherlands, such as Rotterdam, West Brabant and certain parts of Limburg and Drenthe (De Voogd, 2017; Kiesraad, 2017). Furthermore, it seems to be the case that the PVV gains a lot of popularity and votes in parts of the Netherlands that are characterized as dependent on industry and the logistics business or where economic opportunities are scarce (de Voogd, 2017; Van der Waal et al., 2013). These differences raise questions on why certain parts of the Netherlands vote more for the PVV. This is, next to the inclusion of the populist attitudes approach, another scientific (relative) novelty that will be explored in this research.

This research is useful for politicians and policy makers because it gives more insight in the characteristics and political views of the electoral support for the PVV. For example, which are important motives to vote for the PVV and whether certain motives prevail over other in different regions. This is important because it is often proposed in scientific literature that populist and radical right parties are popular because they mobilize certain frustrations amongst the population (Ivarsflaten & Stubager, 2011). These frustrations entail topics such as immigration and involvement of the EU (Lucassen & Lubbers, 2011). By gaining more insight in which political motives are important for different groups in the population, policy makers and politicians can take the needs of voters and citizens more into consideration.

1.6 Objectives and research question(s)

The research question of the thesis entails: how can the relationship between educational level and voting for the PVV in the Netherlands be explained with different motives for voting for the PVV? Are there regional differences in voting for the PVV? And are there regional differences in motives for voting for the PVV?

The research question can be specified in different sub-questions:

1. What exactly is the relationship between level of education and voting for the PVV?
2. Can this relationship between level of education and voting for the PVV be explained by the following mediating variables: migrant threat, populist attitudes, Euroscepticism, political distrust, external political efficacy and national pride?
3. Are there regional differences in voting for the PVV?
4. Are the mediating variables (migrant threat, populist attitudes, Euroscepticism, political distrust, external political efficacy and national pride) of different importance for explaining the relationship between region and voting for the PVV in the four different regions of the Netherlands?

The conceptual model of the study is illustrated in appendix A.

1.7 Thesis outline

This thesis consists of 5 chapters. The next chapter (chapter 2) will contain a literature review of relevant theories and previous research. On the basis of these theories, the hypotheses of the current research will be explicated. In chapter 3 the methods will be discussed, including the analysis. In chapter 4 the hypotheses will be tested by using multiple logistic regression analysis. Following the analysis, the results will be discussed returning to the research questions in chapter 5 as well as the discussion.

2. Theory

The aim of this study is to look at previously elaborated explanations on mediators to vote for the radical right and to test to what extent these mediators, i.e., political views may explain the relationship between educational level and voting for the PVV. Therefore, this study first focuses on the relationship between educational level and voting for radical right political parties. Next, political views are considered to be mediators, i.e., political motives to vote for the PVV in paragraph 2.1. Furthermore, it will be explored whether these different political motives vary across different regions of the Netherlands, considering regions with geographical differences as moderators in paragraph 2.2.

2.1 Individual characteristics

Research concerning the radical right and the PVV is often focussed on the motives that people have when voting for such parties. A major theme in this research is the relationship between the level of education and voting for the radical right (Billiet & de Witte, 2008). In various research, there is evidence that a lower educational level enhances the likelihood to vote for radical right parties during elections (Billiet & de Witte, 2008; Stephans & Long, 1970; Emler & Frazer, 1999; Van der Werfhorst & de Graaf, 2004). Therefore, lower educated voters are overrepresented in the electorate of radical right parties (Arzheimer & Carter, 2006). Why there is such a strong association between educational level and voting for the radical right is debated. Some suggest that a lower level of education is associated with certain political values, such as low tolerance towards others which enhance the chances of voting for anti-migration parties. They argue that certain political values and social norms are institutionalized by particularly educational institutions. People who did not attend these institutions would be expected to have alternative political values (Hyman & Wright, 1979; Pascarella & Terenzini, 1999).

However, others emphasize that a lower level of education is connected to material positions in society. People with a lower level of education have limited access to the labour market which prohibits them to collect certain material means. This leads to frustration amongst citizens that in turn is mobilized by radical right parties (Ivarsflaten & Stubager, 2011). As reported by the CBS (2019b), the unemployment rate in the Netherlands is highest amongst those who have a lower level of education. Inglehart (1971) identifies a vulnerable material position caused by educational level as one of the many factors that influences political values. Furthermore, Inglehart (1971) states that educational level is one of the factors that contribute to the inequalities between groups in societies which (partly) determine political attitudes and beliefs. Recent research affirmed that educational level is an important factor to determine political attitudes (Van der Waal, Achterberg & Houtman, 2008; Barone, Lucchini & Sarti, 2007). The expectation that a lower level of education will increase the likelihood to vote for the radical right is included in the first hypothesis:

H1: people with a low(er) level of education will be more likely to vote for the PVV.

A common distinction in the scientific literature about the radical right is made between the supply- and demand- side of support for the radical right (Van der Brug, Fennema & Tillie, 2005; Mudde, 2010). The supply side refers to characteristics of the radical right parties themselves, whereas the demand side refers to characteristics of the voters (Rydgren, 2007). In this research, the connection between the demand- and supply- side of radical right support will be studied, taking educational level in account. The different motives that voters might have for voting for the radical right will be related to the likelihood they have voted for the PVV. To illustrate this, questions such as: 'do voters who support political view A, also are more likely to have voted for the PVV?' will be answered.

The first political motive that will be looked at concerning radical right voting is migrant threat. Previous research has established that negative attitudes towards migrants is often found to be the most important predictor for voting for the radical right (Lubbers et al., 2002; Ivarsflaten, 2007). Negative stigmatization of migrants being a threat to the nation is often prevalent in the discourse of radical right parties (Rydgren, 2008). Especially migrants from a low socio-economic position are targeted by radical right parties, as they are proposed to endorse values that are not compatible with those of the nation which would prohibit integration. Additionally, they are seen as an unwanted competition on the job market (Green, Sarassin, Baur and Fasel, 2015).

In researching negative attitudes towards migrants on a psychological individual level, often is found that perceptions of threat underly these hostile attitudes towards migrants (Ceobanu & Escandell, 2010; Green et al., 2015). Perceptions of threat by migrants are often felt on economical, political and cultural level (Biggs & Knauss, 2011). This assumption is based on the group threat hypothesis as developed by Blumer (1958) and Blalock (1967) which entails that experienced or perceived threats induces people's (negative) prejudice towards migrant groups (Sniderman, Hagendoorn & Prior, 2004).

Furthermore, research has shown that specifically people with a lower level of education experience these feelings of threat from migrants (Scheepers, Gijsberts & Coenders, 2002). Research has shown that migrants are more likely to be perceived as an economic threat by people who are in the same social positions in society, which more often are the lower educated (Lubbers et al., 2002; Scheepers et al., 2002). Feelings of threat lead people to gravitate towards radical right parties who in public discourse oppose to migration and claim to represent the interest of people in the lower social classes. (Lubbers et al., 2002). This leads to the second hypothesis:

H2: the relation between educational level and voting for the PVV can be (partly) explained by experienced migrant threat.

Or:

people with a lower level of education experience more migrant threat and are therefore more likely to vote for the PVV.

Another important aspect of perceiving threat from migrants, is the threat they pose to national identity due to external influences from other cultures (Vieten & Poynting, 2016). Why people feel threatened in their national identity by external influences is explained by van Houtum and van Naerssen (2002) in their concept of 'bordering, ordering and othering' which describes that people tend to create borders to protect themselves by identifying 'others' and creating a shared identity through culture with those who live in the same territory. This creating of others can be explained by the so called 'in-and out-group effect' as described by Tajfel (1970). The in-group is the group with which individuals identify themselves, in this case to a nation, and an out-group is not. The forming of categories can be done based on multiple selection criteria, such as: gender, culture, country, sexuality etcetera. People tend to prefer their own in-group and also attribute positive characteristics upon them whilst the out-group is perceived more negatively (Brons, 2015).

Lucassen and Lubbers (2011) state that when people have stronger feelings of national identity, they tend to be more negative towards migrants and more likely to be exclusionary towards migrants. The radical right mobilizes this threat by using a twofold narrative in their political discourse (Lubbers & Coenders, 2017). First, they use a nationalistic narrative emphasizing the significance of national identity for the stability of the country. Secondly, they state that outsiders (migrants in this case) form a threat to the national identity. Radical right parties often emphasize nativist narratives which imply that the population should mainly exist of 'native' inhabitants (Mudde, 2007). Simultaneously, feelings of national pride are more common amongst the lower-educated (Green et al., 2015). Because of these narratives, the feelings that a national identity is being threatened by 'outsiders' can mobilize voters to vote for parties that promote hostility against migrants and therefore reduces this perceived threat (Lucassen & Lubbers, 2011). This leads to the third hypothesis:

H3: the relation between educational level and voting for the PVV can be (partly) explained by national identity.

Or:

People with a lower level of education have more feelings of national identity and therefore are more likely to vote for the PVV.

In previous scientific research, it is often mentioned that radical right parties have a populist character in Europe, although populism is differently interpreted around the world (Bale, 2012; Akkerman, Mudde & Zaslove, 2013). For example, populism in Latin America tends to be left-wing and inclusive whilst in Europe this is the opposite (Mudde, Rovira and Kaltwasser, 2013).

Populist attitudes are described as a set of (political) views about the world, democracy and political representation (Hawkins, 2009). Populist attitudes are proposed to exist out of four components: (1) the existence of two homogeneous groups: the people and the elite, (2) the nature of the relation between the two groups is opposed, (3) the people are perceived to be better than the elite and (4) representing the people is the ultimate source of political rightfulness (Spruyt, Keppens & van Droogenbroeck, 2016). There is an overarching idea within populism that citizens are better than the people who rule over them as the people are the backbone of society (Pasquino, 2008; Akkerman et al., 2013). Research has shown that people with prominent populist attitudes are more inclined to vote for populist political parties. However, this effect does differ for populist parties on the left-, and right-wing of the political spectrum. For leftish populist parties, socio-economic attitudes are an important predictor, next to populist attitudes. Whilst for right populist parties, other predictors such as: anti-migration attitudes and authoritarianism are of importance (Van Hauwaert & Van Kessel, 2017).

In previous research (Rico, Guinjoan & Anduiza, 2017), it was found that populist attitudes are often driven by emotions, especially fear and anger. Populist attitudes can unite a range of grievances that people feel about society and the power of the elite. These grievances are often felt more amongst people in weak social-economic positions in society as they are more vulnerable, i.e., the lower educated (Kriesie, 2014; Spruyt et al., 2016). Certain groups in society are expected to be more vulnerable due to: increased economical rivalry, enlarged cultural competition and amplified political opposition as an effect of a globalizing world (Kriesie et al., 2006). These changes leave people who cannot compete behind, often the lower educated, and cause feelings of not being represented in politics (Kriesie, 2014; Spruyt et al., 2016). Therefore, populist attitudes are described to be more appealing to people who are in weak socio-economic positions in society, i.e., the lower educated (Betz, 1990). This leads to the fourth hypothesis:

H4: the relation between educational level and voting for the PVV can be (partly) explained by populist attitudes.

OR:

People with a lower level of education tend to have more populist attitudes and are therefore more likely to vote for the PVV.

Another important aspect that is often related to voting for the radical right is the lack of trust in politicians, which must not be mistaken to be the same as populism. Geurkink et al., (2019) showed political trust and populism are empirically different concepts which refer to different latent characteristics in individuals. Therefore, both concepts will be measured and analysed in this research. Trust in politics is perceived as a broad concept. People do not have to trust every politician to have trust in the political system. Therefore, political trust is perceived as assuming that politics and

politicians are (at least) not damaging to society, but necessary to preserve the law and democracy in a country (Zmerli & Newton, 2007; Misztal, 1996). Political trust is seen as an outcome of the evaluations of the political system done by citizens (Grönlund & Setälä, 2007). Fuchs & Klingemann (1995) state that evaluations of political trust are often short-term and variable. It is claimed that political trust in modern society is a result of the evaluation of implemented policies and the perception of honesty of politicians (Newton & Norris, 2000).

The amount of political trust influences political behaviour as well as voting (Zmerli & Newton, 2007; Misztal, 1996). This is particularly applicable to the electorate of radical right and left political parties, as their voters often have negative attitudes about the political system. Furthermore, people who vote for parties which form the contemporary government often trust the political system more, whilst people who vote for parties who do not rule become more pessimistic and distrustful (Söderlund & Kestilla- Kekkonen, 2009).

There are differences in the amount of political trust that people from different educational levels have (Anderson, Blais, Bowler, Donovan, & Listhaug, 2007). There are multiple explanations for these differences. The first one entails cognitive mechanisms that are at the base of political trust. People with a higher level of education are often more intelligent which allows them to have more trust as the result of a rational process (Gambetta, 1988; Schoon & Scheng, 2011). The second explanation is based on the social sorting mechanism of education. The privileged position of people with a higher education will make it easier for them to trust the political system as they are less vulnerable to the vicissitude of the government (Newton, 1997; Hooghe, 2007). Therefore, people who have a low educational level more often do not trust politics to represent their interests (Anderson et al., 2007). Therefore, it can be expected that people who are lower educated also have a lower political trust and are therefore more inclined to vote for radical right parties, who generally do not rule the country. This leads to the fifth hypothesis:

H5: the relation between educational level and voting for the PVV can be (partly) explained by trust in politics.

Or:

People with a lower level of education have less political trust and are therefore more likely to vote for the PVV.

In line with political distrust is the concept of external political efficacy. This entails the extent in which people feel they can influence politics and political actors (Craig, Niemi & Silver, 1990). This is a different concept than political trust because it refers to the degree of influence a person feels he/she has on politics rather than the trust they have in politics and politicians in general (Geurkink et al., 2019). The amount of experienced political efficacy varies across the political electorate and is frequently associated with the electorate of populist parties. This is the case because of the emphasis

that radical right parties put on elite politiciansølack of attending to needs of the so called “common peopleø(Geurkink et al., 2019). People who have a lower amount of political external efficacy are therefore more easily mobilized by populist messages of radical right parties that are often anti-establishment and offer an alternative to the established parties (Magni, 2017).

Furthermore, experiencing external political efficacy is related to educational level. People with a higher level of education often experience more political efficacy. This is the case because education provides more means to understand politics and at the same time provides more feelings of self-assurance to give meaningful input to the process of politics (Lambert, Curtis, Brown, & Kay, 1986). This leads to the sixth hypothesis:

H6: the relation between educational level and voting for the PVV can be (partly) explained by perception of external political efficacy.

Or:

People with a lower level of education have lower external political efficacy and therefore are more likely to vote for the PVV.

The last concept that is interlinked with voting for the radical right is Euroscepticism. Having Eurosceptic attitudes entails having a sceptic or negative attitude towards the EU and its policies (Ivarsflaten, 2005). Opinions about involvement of the EU vary across the political spectrum. A majority of radical right parties are against involvement of the EU in member states. This is based on the assumption that Europe opens the doors for integration and the merge of different cultures, which in the ideology of radical right parties is not the political aim to strive for (Rydgren, 2008). The radical right parties are also opposed to giving more power to the EU, because it undermines the national power of a state (Mudde, 2007). Therefore, it is found that people who are highly Eurosceptic also tend to vote more for radical right parties (Rydgren, 2008).

Furthermore, educational level is also related to Euroscepticism. People with a lower educational level tend to have more Eurosceptic attitudes. This can be clarified because of attitudes on collective identity being threatened by the mingling of cultures (Hakhverdian, Van Elsas, Van der Brug, & Kuhn, 2013): the lower educated are more often threatened by this and therefore oppose involvement in the EU (Lubbers et al., 2002). A second explanation can be found in utilitarian considerations based on economic motivations. Thus, people often feel they “loseømore than they “gainøwhen their country becomes or is a member of the EU (Hakhverdian et al., 2013). This leads to the seventh hypothesis:

H7: the relation between educational level and voting for the PVV can be (partly) explained by Euroscepticism.

Or:

People with a lower level of education also have more Eurosceptic attitudes and therefore are more likely to vote for the PVV.

2.2 Geographical differences

A novelty that will be addressed in this study is to look at the question whether political motives to vote for the radical right prevail over others in different regions in the Netherlands. Previous research will be explored to develop hypotheses on the moderation of geographical differences regarding these political motives.

Differences in electoral support between countries and regions may reflect variances in voter compositions. However, voter composition is insufficient in explaining spatial variation in electoral support (van Gent, Jansen & Smits, 2013). Spatial variations in electoral support may reflect voter experiences with socio-spatial processes (Agnew, 1996). There are two mechanisms described in which electoral support is influenced by geographical (local) environment (Johnston & Pattie, 2006). The first mechanism is direct and proposes characteristics of one's environment. There are different factors that can vary such as economic circumstances, crime rates and the presence of migrants (Pattie, Dorling & Johnston, 1995). These factors are of importance to what voters perceive as pressing matters (Van Gent et al., 2013). The second mechanism is based on the role of social networks in forming one's political ideas by means of communicating with your environment (Nieuwbeerta & Flap, 2000). As social networks are tied to space, this also contributes to political choices (Johnston & Pattie, 2006).

There are differences in voting behaviour and electoral support in different regions of countries (Lieske, 1993; Kiesraad, 2017). These differences are explained by populations having their own historical and social or political sentiments which influence political attitudes (De Voogd, 2017). Ochsner & Roesel (2020) show that extremism can be passed on through different generations by handing over certain (political) norms and values. This indicates that differences between regions and voting behaviour can be passed on and therefore maintained. Furthermore, research has shown that regional culture affects the ideological and political stances of a population (Clark & Harvey, 2010; Sharp, 2007).

Considering the geographical distribution of votes for the PVV in the Netherlands, there are regional differences to be found (Kiesraad, 2017; de Voogd, 2017). When looking at the map of the elections of 2017, there are certain regions (or part of them) of the Netherlands that show more electoral support for the PVV, such as the Southern province Limburg and the eastern parts of the Groningen and Drenthe in the Northern region of the Netherlands (de Voogd, 2017). The support for the PVV in various regions of the Netherlands can be (partly) explained geographical factors (van der Waal et al., 2013). For example, an important geographical factor for voting behaviour is the amount of economic opportunities in a region. When there are less economic opportunities for the population,

people tend to be less welcoming to migrants with whom they would have to compete (Dancygier, 2010). In a rapport written by the CBS (2018) there was concluded that Groningen (in the Northern region of the Netherlands) had the highest number of unemployed citizens in 2018. Whilst in Utrecht and Zeeland (which are in the western part of the Netherlands) there were much more job opportunities. The amount of job opportunities affects the popularity of anti-migrant political parties, such as radical right parties (Van der Waal et al., 2013). Because of the differences in popularity for the PVV the next hypothesis is proposed:

H8: people who live in the Southern (Noord-Brabant and Limburg) and the Northern (Groningen, Drenthe and Friesland) region of the Netherlands are more likely to vote for the PVV.

The existing body of research on space and voting for the radical right shows that the presence of minorities in the region is an important factor (Van Gent et al., 2013). There are two opposite trends in the scientific debate concerning ethnic propinquity and voting for the radical right. The first trend concerns the contact hypothesis originally proposed by Allport (1954). This hypothesis entails that contact between different groups reduces prejudice towards members from the other group. It is emphasized that people who live in places where they meet a lot of migrants, these encounters will decrease negative attitudes about migrants and therefore chances to vote for anti-migrant parties such as the radical right (Green et al., 2015).

The second scientific trend in this research field entails the ethnic threat theory, which proposes that when living in proximity of a large number of migrants, this will increase experiences of ethnic threat (Biggs & Knaus, 2011). There is research to support this hypothesis that found that when people live in places where there are a lot of minorities, they tend to gravitate more towards the radical right (Mudde, 2007). An explanation for this entails that increasing visibility of these minority groups enhances feelings of threat (Savelkoel, Laméris & Tolsma, 2017). When people experience more ethnic threat, they have more negative attitudes towards migrants groups and tend to vote more for parties that oppose these groups, such as the radical right (Savelkoul, Laméris & Tolsma, 2017).

Throughout the Netherlands there are differences in the concentration of ethnic minorities. Especially in and around the four major cityø (Amsterdam, Rotterdam, Den Haag and Utrecht), where there are high concentrations of people with a migration background (Statistics Netherlands, 2016). These four cities are in the Western region of the Netherlands. Because of different concentrations of ethnic minorities over the regions of the Netherlands, it can be expected that in several regions people experience different levels of ethnic threat and therefore the relationship between the region and voting for the radical right will differ (Statistics Netherlands, 2018). This leads to the ninth hypothesis:

H9: the relation between experienced migrant threat and voting for the PVV will differ in the four different regions of the Netherlands

Or:

People who live in different regions of the Netherlands will experience different levels of migrant threat and therefore will be more/less likely to vote for the PVV.

Furthermore, there are studies that have shown the relation between national identity and civic attitudes concerning migration (e.g., Maddens, Billiet & Beerten, 2000). The entrance of more (external) individuals enhances feelings of $\text{us}\text{\o}$ versus $\text{them}\text{\o}$ in populations, as described by Tajfel (1970). People who fall under the $\text{them}\text{\o}$ category are perceived more negatively in contrast to people who are believed to belong to the $\text{us}\text{\o}$ group (Brons, 2015). Previous research has established that people with strong national pride feel also feel more threatened when living in close proximity of a high percentage of migrants in comparison to a low proximity (Lucassen & Lubbers, 2011). The ethnic threat theory also is applicable to the case of national pride. As research has shown that living in close proximity to migrants enhances feelings of threat among citizens. These threats are proposed to interfere with national identity (Vieten & Poynting, 2016). As the presence of migrants differs per region, so would the relationship between feelings of national pride and voting for the radical right (Statistics Netherlands, 2018). Therefore, the next hypothesis has been assembled:

H10: the relation between national pride and voting for the PVV will differ in the four different regions of the Netherlands.

Or:

People who live in different regions of the Netherlands will experience different levels of national pride and therefore will be more/less likely to vote for the PVV.

De Voogd (2017) describes multiple differences in voting in various regions of the Netherlands over time, for example the in- or decrease of populist voting. De Voogd describes a $\text{phantom border}\text{\o}$ in the Netherlands. This $\text{phantom border}\text{\o}$ is made up by rivers separating the Northern from the Southern regions of the Netherlands. South of this border, people tend to vote more for parties with a populist character, such as the PVV. Given that secularization took place (relative) late and quick in the Southern region, voting was longer influenced by religious beliefs in comparison to the Northern region. When religion became less important for voters' preference, there was a larger electoral market for other parties to gain electoral popularity. This holds especially for parties such as the PVV, SP and 50 Plus, that have leaders that originate from the South and have a lot of electoral support from this region (de Voogd, 2017).

Populism used to be more apparent in some larger cities (for example: Rotterdam, Almere and Venlo) whilst less so in others (for example: Amsterdam, Utrecht and Nijmegen). Over the last years, the PVV is gaining popularity in peripheral municipalities, smaller cities and the countryside (Van Gent et al. 2013; De Voogd, 2017). This may be caused by the composition of voters, as cities have

higher percentages of migrants, who will not likely vote for anti-migration parties such as the PVV (Van Gent et al., 2013). Populist parties seem to get the most votes in the Northern and Southern parts of the Netherlands, in contrary to the other regions (De Voogd, 2017). This leads to the expectation that the level of populist attitudes differs over different regions of the Netherlands and therefore also as a motive for voting for the radical right. This leads to the eleventh hypothesis:

H11: the relation between populist attitudes and voting for the PVV will differ in the four different regions of the Netherlands.

Or:

People who live in different regions of the Netherlands will have different levels of populist attitudes and therefore will be more/less likely to vote for the PVV.

Another political attitude that varies over geographical areas is political trust. In research, there is often found that political trust varies across time, people and place (Rahn, Kwang Suk Yoon, Garet, Lipson, Lofflin, 2009). For example, political trust in the House of Representatives is the highest in the province of Utrecht (Statistics Netherlands, 2019a). An important reason for this is that political trust, and trust in general, grows when people gain more education (Anderson et al., 2007). Utrecht has the highest relative share of higher educated in the Netherlands and can therefore be expected to have citizens with high political trust (Statistics Netherlands, 2019c). Whilst the amount of political trust is lower in provinces that are more in the Northern or Southern regions such as: Groningen, Drenthe and Limburg (Statistics Netherlands, 2019a). Simultaneously, these are provinces with a (relative) large amount of electoral support for the PVV (Kiesraad, 2019). Reasons for this lack of political trust can be found in educational level as these are provinces with relative low shares of high educated people. For example, the number of adults who have an university master degree or doctorate reaches 9,6 percent in Groningen, 6,3 percent in Drenthe and 7,5 percent in Limburg; whilst in Utrecht this is 18,4 percent (Statistics Netherlands, 2019c). This leads to the expectation that political trust varies over different regions and therefore also the importance of political trust as a motive for voting for the radical right. this leads to the twelfth hypothesis:

H12: the relation between political distrust and voting for the PVV will differ in the four different regions of the Netherlands.

Or:

People who live in different regions of the Netherlands will have different levels of political trust and therefore will be more/less likely to vote for the PVV.

Furthermore, research also shows that also political efficacy is linked to geographical place. Political efficacy is associated with place because of the representativeness and involvement of a place

in politics (Clarke & Acock, 1989). Research has shown that external political efficacy increases political participation (Merolla, Sellers & Fowler, 2013). The perception of external political efficacy is connected to the perception of descriptive representation which entails that a group is represented by an individual in politics (Merolla et al., 2013). As mentioned before, de Voogd (2017) states that politicians who originate from (for example) the Southern region of the Netherlands can (often) count on electoral support from that region which increases the descriptive representation and the perception of external political efficacy (Merolla et al., 2013).

Some regions may feel more represented in politics and therefore can be expected to experience more external political efficacy (Ter Berg & Schothorst, 2017). To illustrate this, the example of Groningen can be considered. This is a province in the upper part of the Netherlands, where gas was gained from 1963 and on. This drilling was increasingly causing problems for the residents of various places in Groningen because of the seismic events it caused. This gave a lot of damage to property in the province, causing many citizens to have nuisance (Van Thienen-Visser & Breunese, 2015). Since 2012, the residents have urgently asked the government to order a stop to the gas drilling. The government came to an agreement with the gas companies in 2019. Because of the lingering nature of this conflict the inhabitants may have lost faith in their ability to affect the politics because of the lack of assistance they felt (Van den Berg, 2017).

Furthermore, the amount of political efficacy is related to voting for radical right parties, such as the PVV. People who feel they are not represented and attended to by the government, are more likely to vote for anti-establishment parties (Magni, 2017; Geurkink et al., 2019). Because of these differences in historical background and political climate in different regions, the relationship between political efficacy and voting for the radical right might differ. This leads to the thirteenth hypothesis:

H13: the relation between external political efficacy and voting for the PVV will differ in the four different regions of the Netherlands.

Or:

People who live in different regions of the Netherlands will have different levels of external political efficacy and therefore will be more/less likely to vote for the PVV.

Last but not least, Euroscepticism varies across different people and places in the Netherlands, similar to other countries (Schmeets, 2008). The EU has often been characterized as having a neo-liberal character because of the economic policies it has and implements in their member states. For example, the EU is known for stimulating market forces and privatizing of certain sectors (Hooghe & Marks, 1999; Lubbers & Jaspers, 2010). One of the objectives of the EU is to decrease economic differences between and within member states (Puga, 2002; Raspe & van Oort, 2007). As certain regions within countries are less economic prosperous, the EU has different funds to stimulate economic growth (Raspe & van Oort, 2007). A country or region receives funds when they meet

certain criteria, such as: the GDP (Gross Domestic Product) per capita is below 75 percent of the EU average GDP (Europa Nu, 2019). In the Netherlands part of the provinces of Groningen, Drenthe, Friesland, Flevoland, Gelderland and Zuid- Holland receive economic support from the EU. These provinces are part of the Northern, Eastern and Western region. Due to the amount of support a region receives from the EU, attitudes about the EU are expected to vary. Therefore, Euroscepticism could play a different role in voting for the radical right in different parts of the Netherlands. This leads to the last and fourteenth hypothesis:

H14: the relation between Euroscepticism and voting for the PVV will differ in the four different regions of the Netherlands.

Or:

People who live in different regions of the Netherlands will have different perceptions about the EU and therefore will be less/more likely to vote for the PVV.

3. Methods

In the current chapter the research methods will be discussed. First the research design will be considered, followed by the data, the operationalization of the variables and finally the analysis that will be used to answer the research questions and test the hypotheses.

3.1 Design

In the current research people voting PVV are compared with people who did not vote PVV. PVV-versus non-PVV voters will be specifically compared on the basis of educational level, perceived migrant threat, national pride, populist attitudes, political distrust, (external) political efficacy and Euroscepticism. Furthermore, motives for voting for the PVV are explored, as well as which motives are the strongest in different regions of the Netherlands. The design of the current research was cross-sectional.

3.2 Data

The data that is used in this thesis is derived from the *Nederlands Kiezersonderzoek 2017* (NKO). This is a large-scale survey that is conducted every time there are elections for the House of Representatives in the Netherlands. The NKO survey was first initiated in 1971 by all the chair holders of political sciences of Dutch universities to understand political attitudes and opinions amongst citizens. The most recent edition, that will be used in this research, dates from the elections for the House of Representatives in 2017. This version of the NKO data will be used in this research since its most recent and therefore most representative for current (political) trends in Dutch society. (Nederlands Kiezersonderzoek, n.d.). The NKO data consisted out of three components: a main questionnaire, a complement dataset from the CBS and a supplementary questionnaire with additional variables. These additional questionnaires ensure that next to information about the participants (age, gender etc.), there also is knowledge about their attitudes on various subjects. The data was collected using various survey methods, such as *computer-assisted personal interviewing* and *computer-assisted web interviewing*. These methods entailed, respectively, participants completing a questionnaire online with or without the presence of an interviewer. The participants were all randomly selected from a sample of Dutch voters provided by the CBS (Nederlands Kiezersonderzoek, n.d.). There was ensured that the sample was representative for the Dutch population (Nederlands Kiezersonderzoek, n.d.).

Not all participants completed all three of the surveys; data was available on all the variables of interest for 1809 participants. This group was included in the analysis. The participants were from different regions of the Netherlands: East, West, North and South. For reasons of privacy of participants, no information on their exact municipality or neighbourhood was publicly available.

3.3. Operationalization of variables

3.3.1. Dependent variable

The dependent variable was defined as voting for the PVV in the last elections (2017) of the House of Representatives in the Netherlands versus not voting for the PVV. The data was dichotomous in nature, respondents could score a 0 or a 1. Respondents scored a 0 if they voted for another party than the PVV in 2017 and a 1 if they voted for the PVV. If participants had missing values on one of the variables included in the research, they were deleted from the data. In total, 145 participants (approximately 8 percent) of the 1809 participants voted for the PVV. The number of participants that voted for the PVV is an under representation when comparing it to the election outcomes from 2017, which states that 13 percent voted for the PVV.

3.3.2 Variables on individual level

Educational level

The independent variable of the current research is the highest completed educational level. In the data there are eight categories for educational level varying from completing primary school to completing a master's degree. To make the data more straightforward, the different levels were divided into three categories: low, middle and high educational levels. These educational levels were based on a categorization by the CBS (2017). The low educational level category consists of 'elementary/ primary school' and 'secondary lower vocational (VMBO-B, VMBO-K, VGLO, LAVO and LTS). The middle educational level consists of: 'secondary higher vocational (VMBO-T, MAVO, MULO, HBS), 'tertiary vocational (MBO, MTS)' and higher secondary vocational (HAVO, VWO, HBS, Gymnasium and Athenaeum). The last and highest educational level consist out of: 'Tertiary higher vocational (HBO, HTS, HEAO etc.)' 'University Bachelor and University Master. 11,3 percent of the respondents are in the lowest category, 45,3 percent is in the middle-educated category and 43,4 percent of the participants is in the highest category.

Migrant treat

Migrant threat is measured by the following items: 'Immigrants are generally good for the Dutch economy', 'The Dutch culture is threatened by immigrants' and 'Immigrants increase crime rates in the Netherlands'. Participants could answer these questions with 5 response possibilities: (1) fully agree, (2) agree (3) neither agree or disagree, (4) disagree and (5) fully disagree. The second two items were negatively formulated and reversed due to practicalities. Whether these three items were representative for the concept of migrant threat was assessed with an explorative principal factor analysis. This showed that all the items were represented in the same dimension: migrant threat. To use this scale in the analysis, there was a variable created that consists out of the mean score of the 3

items (after item 2 and 3 were reversed). Furthermore, a reliability analysis was conducted that showed a Cronbach's alpha of .781, indicating a good reliability of the scale. The higher someone scores on this variable, the more migrant threat someone experiences. The results of the factor analysis are illustrated in the appendix A (chapter 7.2.1).

Populism

The degree to which people support populist notions is measured by several items in the data. An explorative factor analysis was performed to assess whether these items refer to the same latent characteristic. There are 9 items that were included in the factor analysis: "What people call compromise in politics is really just selling out on one's principles", "Most politicians do not care about the people", "Most politicians are trustworthy", "Politicians are the main problem in the Netherlands", "Most politicians care only about the interests of the rich and powerful", "Politicians in the House of Representatives should be guided by the will of the people", "Political differences between the elite and ordinary people are bigger than the differences that between citizens among themselves", "I would rather be represented by an ordinary citizen than by a career politician", and "Politicians talk too much and do too little". Participants could answer to these questions with 5 answers: (1) strongly disagree, (2) somewhat disagree (3) neither agree or disagree, (4) somewhat agree and (5) strongly agree. The item "most politicians are trustworthy" was reversed due to practicalities. The factor analysis showed that all the items were represented in the same dimension: populist attitudes. A high score on this variable means that a person shows more populist attitudes. Due to a low factor loading, the item: "Politicians in the House of Representatives should be guided by the will of the people" was deleted from the scale due to a low contribution to the reliability. The variable which measures migrant threat is the mean of the remaining 8 items. Furthermore, a reliability analysis was conducted that showed a Cronbach's alpha of .877, indicating high reliability of the scale. The results of the factor analysis are illustrated in the appendix A (chapter 7.2.2).

Euroscepticism

To investigate Euroscepticism of the participants two items were used. The first one entails: "The following question is about your trust in a number of institutions. Would you indicate for each of the following institutions whether you trust them (1) very much; (2) fairly much; (3) not so much; or (4) not at all?: European Union." The second item entails: "Do you think the membership of the Netherlands to the EU is in general?" The answer options were recoded into are (1) A good thing, (2) Neither bad or good or (3) A bad thing. Whether these items were representative for the concept of Euroscepticism was assessed with an explorative factor analysis. This showed that all the items were represented in the same dimension: Euroscepticism. A variable was made of the average score on these items. A high score on this variable means shows more Eurosceptic attitudes. A reliability analysis of these scale showed a Chronbach's alpha of .594, which indicates (borderline) acceptable reliability. The results of the factor analysis are shown in appendix A (chapter 7.2.3).

Political distrust

To assess political trust there were 3 items used which were part of the following question: "The following question is about your trust in a number of institutions. Would you indicate for each of the following institutions whether you trust them (1) not at all; (2) not so much (3) fairly much; or (4) very much? The three institutes which were chosen were: The National parliament, the civil servants and the political parties. An explorative factor analysis was conducted to assess whether these items direct to the same latent concept, namely political trust. This was indeed the case. Furthermore, a variable was created; a high score on this variable means the participant shows more political distrust. A reliability analysis was conducted, which estimated the reliability at Chronbach's alpha .763, which is sufficient. The results of the factor analysis are shown in appendix A (chapter 7.2.4).

External political efficacy

External political efficacy was assessed using several items in the data: "MPs do not care about the opinion of people like me", "Political parties are only interested in my vote and not in my opinion" and "People like me have absolutely no influence on governmental policy". Participants could answer this question with two options (1) true or (2) not true. Factor analysis showed that these three items all directed to the same concept: external political efficacy. To make a metric variable, which is necessary for logistic analysis, sum scores were calculated for each respondent. The higher someone scores on this variable, the higher their external political efficacy is. Reliability analysis showed this scale has a Cronbach's alpha of .806, which is high. The results of the factor analysis are shown in Appendix A (chapter 7.2.5).

National pride

National pride was explored using the following variables: "I feel connected to the Netherlands and the Dutch people", "I am proud to be Dutch" and "There is no better country than the Netherlands". The answer categories, after recoding into the opposite direction, entail: (1) fully disagree, (2) disagree, (3) neither agree nor disagree, (4) agree or (5) fully agree. Factor analysis showed all items directed to the same concept: national pride. Next, a score was calculated for national pride consisting of a mean of the three items. The scale was medium reliable with a Cronbach's alpha of .686. The results of the factor analysis are shown in Appendix A (chapter 7.2.6).

3.3.3 Variables on the national level

Region

The respondents were divided over four regions in the Netherlands: North, East, South and West. These regions were created following the NUTS-1 (Nomenclature des Unités Territoriales Statistiques) region grouping method from Eurostat, the European Bureau for Statistics (Ministry of Internal Affairs, 2020). The Northern regions consisted out of the following provinces: Groningen,

Drenthe and Friesland. The Eastern region consisted out of: Gelderland, Overijssel and Flevoland. The Southern region consisted out of: Noord-Brabant and Limburg. And the Western regions consisted out of: Noord-Holland, Zuid-Holland, Utrecht and Zeeland (Ministry of Internal Affairs, 2020). Dummies were created to look at the effect of region in the analysis. This entailed making a separate variable of all the regions, which indicates whether a participants lives in that region or not by scoring 0 or 1. The respondents are divided over the four regions: North (11%), East (22,2%), West (43,8%) and South (22,1%). In figure 3.1 below the different regions are presented on a map of the Netherlands.



Figure 3.1: four regions in the Netherlands. Source: https://www.regioatlas.nl/kaarten#_nuts1regioslandsdelen.

3.3.4 Control variables

In the analysis different factors will be incorporated that do not have a direct link with the hypothesis. These factors are included because they are expected to have an effect on the dependent variable. To determine whether the hypothesis are true or false, these factors need to be considered to make sure there are no spurious relations between the dependent and independent variables.

Age

Age was considered in the analysis because of the relation between voting behaviour and age. People from different age categories have different political interests and therefore different political preferences (Van der Meer et al., 2017). Age was measured as a numeric number and it varies between 18 and 100 years old.

Gender

Gender will also be considered in this research. Research has found that men are more likely to vote for radical right parties than women (Spierings & Zaslove, 2015). Gender was categorized in the data with two categories: 'male' and 'female'. Male is the reference category. 49,1 % of the respondents is male and 51,1% is female.

Country of origin

As expressed earlier, anti-immigrant attitudes are an important determinant for voting for the radical right (Lubbers et al., 2002; Ivarsflaten, 2007). These attitudes vary based on one's migrant status, people who are a migrant themselves would not likely have anti-migrant attitudes (André, Kraaykamp, Meuleman & Wittenberg, 2018). Therefore, country of birth is accounted for in the analysis. Specifically, respondents are divided in three categories: 'Dutch origin', 'Western origin' and 'Non-Western origin'. These variables were also dummy codified in preparation of the analysis. 85,9% of the respondents is from Dutch origin, 8,5 percent is from Western origin and 5,6% is from non-Western origin.

Income

According to Van der Meer et al (2017) income has an effect, although a minor, on political behaviour since it influences political concerns and interests. Therefore, income will be included in the analysis. Income is specifically categorized in 20 percent groups: '0-20%', '21-40%', '41-60%', '61-80%', '81-100%'.

Religion

Religion is also a factor that is accounted for because of its possible impact on voting for the radical right parties. For example, research conducted by Billiet (1995) shows a (ambivalent) relationship between going to church (Catholic) and voting for the radical right. Religion was categorized into: Roman-Catholic (18,9%), Dutch Reformed (4,5%), Calvinist (3,2%), Protestant Church of the Netherlands (6,7%), Islam (1,7%), other (4,7%) or none (60,4%). These variables were dummy codified in preparation for the analysis.

3.4 Analysis

The data was analysed using logistic regression analysis. This analysis is conducted because of the nature of the dependent variable, which consist out of two scores: 0 and 1. In preparation of this

analysis, various variables were dummy-codified. An overview of the descriptive statistics is illustrated in table 3.1 below.

Table 3.1: descriptive statistics of all the variables.

	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Standard deviation
<i>Dependent variable</i>				
Voting for the PVV in 2017	0	1	.077	.268
<i>Independent variable</i>				
Educational level				
-Low	0	1	.114	.318
-Middle	0	1	.426	.495
-High	0	1	.405	.491
<i>Mediating variables</i>				
Migrant threat	1	5	3.201	.873
National pride	1	5	3.784	.677
Populism	1	5	2.734	.697
Political trust	1	4	2.389	.555
Political external efficacy	1	2	1.519	.429
Euroscepticism	1	4	2,084	.641
<i>Interaction variables</i>				
Region of the Netherlands				
-North	0	1	.113	.409
-East	0	1	.217	.413
-South	0	1	.236	.425
-West	0	1	.426	.495
<i>Control variables</i>				
Age	18	100	54.95	17.128
Gender (male=ref)	0	1	.493	.501
Country of origin				
- Dutch origin	0	1	.867	.339
- Western origin	0	1	.082	.274
- Non-Western origin	0	1	.077	.274
Income class				
- 0-20%	0	1	.036	.186
- 21-40%	0	1	.057	.233
- 41-60%	0	1	.070	.256
- 61-80%	0	1	.108	.310
- 81-100%	0	1	.118	.323
Religion				
- No religion	0	1	.611	.487
- Roman-Catholic	0	1	.187	.390
- Dutch Reformed	0	1	.043	.203
- Calvinist	0	1	.032	.175

- Protestant Church of the Netherlands	0	1	.068	.252
- Islam	0	1	.009	.094
- Other religion	0	1	.040	.197

N=1809

4.Results

4.1 Descriptive results: bivariate relationships

In the current section the descriptive results are illustrated concerning the relation between education level, region and voting for the radical right (PVV) in the Netherlands. Furthermore, the different mediating variables will be assessed by using means per educational level and region. These results will be used to illustrate the bivariate relationships between these variables as preparation to the testing results; these will clarify whether the differences are of significant importance. The percentages that are shown in the figures below are based on the survey data which included approximately 8 percent of PVV voters.

4.1.1 Educational level and voting for the radical right

As shown in the figure below (figure 4.1), there is a clear trend in the relation between voting for the PVV and educational level. Amongst the lower educated participants, 16,7 percent voted for the PVV in comparison to 9,8 percent of the middle-educated participants and 2,7 percent of the higher educated participants.




Figure 4.1: percentages of people voting for the PVV in relation tot educational level.

4.1.2 Region and voting for the radical right

Figure 4.2 displays percentages of participants voting versus not-voting PVV per region in the Netherlands. The Northern region has the biggest share of PVV voters, 10,4 percent. The second greatest percentage of PVV voters can be found in the South with 9,2 percent, followed by the East

region of the Netherlands with 7,8 percent. The West region of the Netherland includes the smallest share of PVV voters, 6,4 percent.




Figure 4.2: percentages of people voting for the PVV in relation to the region.

4.1.3 Migrant threat

In figure 4.3 the descriptive results concerning experienced migrant threat per educational level are presented. The lowest educated group experiences the most migrant threat (3,52), followed by the middle educated (3,35) and high educated (2,93).




Figure 4.3: Mean scores on experienced migrant threat by educational level.

In figure 4.4, the mean scores concerning migrant threat per region are displayed. In the South participants report the highest level of perceived migrant threat, 3,32. Followed by the East and the West (both have a mean score of 3,19). The Northern region of the Netherlands has the lowest score on experienced migrant threat, 3,10.




Figure 4.4: Mean scores on experienced migrant threat by region.

4.1.4 National pride

In table 4.5, the descriptive results concerning national pride per educational level are displayed. People from the low education strata report to experience the highest level of national pride (3,98), followed by the middle-educated people (3,80) and the high educated people (3,70).




Figure 4.5: Mean scores on national pride by educational level.

In table 4.6, the results concerning national pride and region are indicated. The differences are small, but present. The region that has the highest (mean) score on national pride is the South (3,83), followed by the West (3,78) and the East (3,77). In the North there is the lowest score on national pride (3,72).




Figure 4.6: Mean scores on national pride by region.

4.1.5 Populism

The differences in populist attitudes per educational level are portrayed in figure 4.7 below. The low educated group reported higher scores on populist attitudes in comparison to the middle- and high educated groups. The mean score on populist attitudes for the low educated group was 3,17, in comparison to 2,88 in the middle-educated group and 2,49 in the high educated group.




Figure 4.7: Mean scores on populist attitudes by educational level.

In figure 4.8, the mean scores on populist attitude are portrayed per region. People from the Southern region score the highest on populist attitude (2,83), in comparison to the North (2,74) and the East and West (2,73).




Figure 4.8: Mean scores on populist by region.

4.1.6 Political trust

In figure 4,9 the descriptive results concerning educational level and political trust are displayed. People from the lowest education group score the lowest on perceived political trust (2,12) in comparison to the middle educated (2,33) and the high educated (2,54).




Figure 4.9: Mean scores on political trust by educational level.

The results concerning political trust and region are displayed in figure 4.10 below. The Northern and Southern region of the Netherlands have the lowest average score on perceived political trust (2.38) in comparison to the mean scores of the East and the West (2,40).




Figure 4.10: Mean scores on political trust by region.

4.1.7 Political external efficacy

Concerning political external efficacy (figure 4.11) the same trend is portrait as concerning political trust: the higher educational levels have a higher score. People who are in the highest education group have a average score of 1,65, followed by people who are in the middle educated group who have 1,46 mean score. The lowest score on political external efficacy can be found in the lowest education group, namely 1,33.




Figure 4.11: Mean scores on political external efficacy by educational level.

In table 4,12 the descriptive results concerning political external efficacy and region are portrait. The differences amongst political efficacy in different regions are present though small. The region that scores the highest on political efficacy is the East (1,53), followed by the West (1,52). Both the North as the South score the lowest with a mean of 1,50.




Figure 4.12: Mean scores on political external efficacy by region.

4.1.8 Euroscepticism

The differences found concerning Euroscepticism and educational level are displayed in figure 4.13. People from the low educated group score the highest (2,24) on Euroscepticism, followed by the middle-educated group (1,94) and the high educated group (1,68).




Figure 4.13: Mean scores on political external efficacy by educational level.

In figure 4.14 the differences concerning Euroscepticism and region are portrayed. In the East and West region of the Netherlands Euroscepticism attitudes score the highest (1,90). The Northern regions is next with a 1,87 mean score and the South has the lowest score, 1,86.




Figure 4.14: Mean scores on Euroscepticism by region.

4.2 Testing hypotheses: multivariate relationships

Following the descriptive results, the current section describes the results of analysis that tested the hypotheses. Hypotheses were tested using multiple logistic regression analyses. To interpret the findings that result from this analysis, we look at the Expected (B) value. This value indicates the likelihood to have voted for the PVV versus the likelihood to have voted for any other party during the elections of 2017, according to the odds ratio.

In the current research there are 15 models included, referring to the number of hypothesis plus one extra to look at the results when all the mediators are included (model 8). Before reporting these models, first the multicollinearity between the different variables was examined.

Multicollinearity indicates the coherence between the different variables via (Pearson) correlation (Mansfield & Helms, 1981). The correlations do not indicate that multicollinearity is taken place as none of the correlation is higher than 0,7. The correlation matrix of all the variables are included in appendix C.

4.2.1 Model design

Educational level

Models 1 to 7 are related to the first seven hypotheses that concern educational level and mediation factors. In tables 4.1 and 4.2 the results concerning educational level are presented. In model 1 the relationship between level of education and voting for the PVV is in focus. In models 2 to 7 the relation between level of education and voting for the PVV is explained by the various mediating variables, in order of the hypotheses: migrant threat, national pride, populist attitudes, political trust, political (external) efficacy and Euroscepticism. Comparing the odds of the level of education in these models with model 1 provides insights in the extent to which each of the mediating factors explains

(some of) the original relationship between educational level and voting for the PVV. The extent that parameters of model 1 are reduced are considered to be due to the specific mediating factor (Davis, 1985). In model 8 all the mediating variables are included in the model to look at the composite effect, as well as indicating which effects of the mediating variables remain with the other factors included.

Region

Models 9 to 15 are in relation to the second seven hypotheses that concern region and voting for the PVV. In the tables 4.3 and 4.4 the results concerning regions are portrait. In model 9 the relation between region and voting for the PVV is portrait. Models 10 to 15 display the various interaction variables containing interaction between regions and mediating variables, i.e. migrant threat, national pride, populist attitudes, political trust, political (external) efficacy and Euroscepticism.

4.2.2 Results concerning educational level

Model 1 shows that there are differences concerning voting behaviour in relation to education. The likelihood of a person from the low education category to vote for the PVV is 4,5 times bigger in comparison to the highest education group. When comparing the middle-educated group and the highest educated group, the odds are 2,5 times bigger that someone who belongs to the middle educated group voted for the PVV in 2017. Hypothesis 1 entailed that people who fall in the low education category have a bigger likelihood to have voted for the PVV and this hypothesis is therefore supported.

Model 2 shows that the relation between educational level and voting for the PVV can partly be explained or mediated by experienced migrant threat. People who perceive migrant threat are 4,8 times more likely to have voted for the PVV in comparison to people who do not experience migrant threat. Experiencing migrant threat can partly explain the relation between educational level and voting for the PVV as the odds of persons from both low and middle education group decrease when taking migrant threat into account. Hypotheses 2 entailed that migrant threat can partly explain the relation between educational level and voting for the PVV and is therefore accepted to be correct.

Model 3 shows that national pride did not have an effect on voting for the PVV as it is a non-significant predictor. Hypothesis 3 entailed that the relationship between educational level and voting for the PVV could be (partly) explained by national pride and can be dismissed according to these results.

Model 4 shows that populist attitudes have an effect on voting for the PVV. People who have more populist attitudes have a 4,7 greater likelihood to have voted for the PVV in comparison to people who do not have populist attitudes. Having populist attitudes can partly explain the relation between educational level and voting for the PVV as the odds for people from both the lowest and middle educated group decrease when taking populist attitudes into account. Hypothesis 4 entailed

that the relation between educational level and voting for the PVV can partly be explained or mediated by populist attitudes, and therefore can be accepted.

Model 5 shows that having more political trust has a negative effect on the likelihood to have voted for the PVV. People who have more political trust are 80 percent less likely to have voted for the PVV. Having more political trust can also partly explain the relation between educational level and voting for the PVV as the differences between the separate educational groups decrease. Hypothesis 5 entailed that the relation between educational level and voting for the PVV can partly be explained or mediated by political trust and can be accepted due to the results.

Model 6 shows that having more political external efficacy leads to a lower likelihood to have voted for the PVV. People who experience more political external efficacy have a 78 percent lower likelihood to have voted for the PVV. Political external efficacy can partly explain the relation between educational level and voting for the PVV as the differences between the several education groups odds of voting for the PVV decrease. Hypothesis 6 entailed that political external efficacy can partly explain the relation between educational level and voting for the PVV and can therefore be accepted.

Model 7 shows that Euroscepticism also has a positive effect on the likelihood to have voted for the PVV. People who are more Eurosceptic have a 23 percent larger likelihood to have voted for the PVV in comparison to people who are not Eurosceptic. Euroscepticism can partly explain the relation between educational level and voting for the PVV as the odds of the different educational groups decrease when taking Euroscepticism into account. Hypothesis 7 entailed that the relation between educational level and voting for the PVV can partly be explained by Euroscepticism and can be accepted.

Model 8 portrays the various mediating factors all in one model to show which factors are still of predictive value when combining all the mediating factors simultaneously. The model shows that migrant threat, populist attitudes and Euroscepticism are still significant on having voted for the PVV. The effects of political trust and political efficacy are no longer significant. National pride is also not significant, but neither was in the previous analysis. Hence, political trust, political efficacy and national pride turn out to be spurious mediators. People who experience more migrant threat are 3,1 times more likely to have voted for the PVV. People who have more populist attitudes are 2,2 times more likely to have voted for the PVV. Furthermore, people who are more EU-sceptic have an 80 percent higher likelihood to have voted for the PVV. When all the mediating effects are taken into account, the effects of the different educational levels remain although the effects of education are substantially smaller. People from the lowest education strata are still 2 times more likely to have voted for the PVV in comparison to the highest educated strata. In comparison, this factor was 4,5 when none of the mediating factors was included. People from the middle-educated strata have a 80 percent bigger likelihood to have voted for the PVV in comparison to the highest educated strata. When none of the mediating effects was included, this likelihood entailed 2,5. This decreasing effect

of education on likelihood to have voted for the PVV shows that the mediating factors partly explain this relation.

Table 4.1: results logistic regression analysis concerning educational level

	Model 1			Model 2			Model 3			Model 4		
	B	SE	Exp(B)	B	SE	Exp(B)	B	SE	Exp(B)	B	SE	Exp(B)
Intercept	-2,639**	,247	,071	-8,316**	,682	,000	-2,853**	,576	,058	-7,707**	,456	,001
<i>Independent variable</i>												
Educational level												
- Low	1,514**	,200	4,546	1,126**	,300	3,084	1,586**	,277	4,886	,904**	,227	2,470
- Middle	,924**	,154	2,518	,789**	,233	2,202	1,057**	,218	2,878	,524**	,182	1,688
- High (reference category)												
<i>Mediating variables</i>												
Migrant threat				1,566**	,136	4,789						
National pride							,076	,134	1,079			
Populist attitudes										1,562**	,113	4,771
<i>Control variables</i>												
Age	,000	,004	1,000	-,002	,006	,998	-,003	,006	,997	-,006	,005	,994
Gender (reference category=male)	-,488**	,133	,614	-,284	,195	,753	-,454*	,180	,635	-,461*	,150	,631
Country of origin												
- Dutch origin (reference category)												
- Western origin	-,243	,258	,785	-,486	,410	,615	-,515	,381	,598	-,397	,285	,672
- Non-Western origin	,169	,323	1,185	,845	,577	2,141	-,045	,545	,956	-,149	,362	,862
Income class												
- 0-20% (reference category)												
- 21-40%	,292	,217	1,340	,373	,345	1,453	,173	,314	1,189	,364	,234	1,439
- 41-60%	-,140	,225	,869	,075	,358	1,078	-,107	,329	,899	-,013	,242	,987
- 61-80%	-,419~	,235	,657	-,954*	,421	,385	-,897*	,405	,408	,016	,250	,631
- 81-100%	-,658*	,258	,518	-,833~	,425	,998	-,946	,404	,388	,018	,283	,672
Religion												
- Non-religious (reference category)												
- Roman- Catholic	-,092	,173	,912	-,192	,246	,825	-,205	,233	,815	-,094	,187	,910
- Dutch-Reformed	,021	,302	1,021	-,272	,438	,762	-,146	,421	,864	,147	,322	1,159
- Calvinist	-,966	,522	,381	-,948	,657	,388	-,763	,613	,466	-,659	,535	,517

- Protestant Church of the Netherlands	-,187*	,591	,154	-,168*	,742	,186	-1,827*	,727	,161	-,159*	,600	,203
- Islam	-19,107	5477,432	,000	-19,052	7777,020	,000	-18,604	9258,447	,000	-18,953	5516,950	,000
- Other religion	-,558	,406	,572	,010	,530	1,010	-,202	,490	,817	-,380	,426	,684

N=1809; ~p <0,10; *p <0,05; **p<0,01

Table 4.2: results logistic regression analysis concerning educational level

	Model 5			Model 6			Model 7			Model 8		
	B	SE	Exp(B)	B	SE	Exp(B)	B	SE	Exp(B)	B	SE	Exp(B)
Intercept	,996~	,545	2,708	,148	,407	1,160	-5,009**	,367	,007	-10,026**	1,479	,000
<i>Independent variable</i>												
Educational level												
- Low	1,122**	,292	3,070	1,206**	,219	3,342	1,071**	,221	2,917	,701*	,329	2,016
- Middle	,867**	,225	2,380	,758**	,175	2,134	,717**	,174	2,049	,602*	,256	1,826
- High (reference category)												
<i>Mediating variables</i>												
Migrant threat										1,117**	,153	3,056
National pride										-,018	,149	,982
Populist attitudes										,797**	,208	2,220
Political trust	-1,504**	,176	,222							,017	,243	1,017
Political efficacy				-1,851**	,205	,157				-,169	,334	,845
Euroscpticism							1,230**	,102	3,422	,605*	,194	1,832
<i>Control variables</i>												
Age	-,006	,006	,994	-,004	,004	,996	-,006	,005	,994	-,006	,007	,994
Gender (reference category=male)	-,503*	,187	,604	-,514	,114	,598	-,449	,146	,638	-,347	,212	,707
Country of origin												
- Dutch origin (reference category)												
- Western origin	-,640	,390	,527	-3,76	,286	,686	-,238	,277	,788	-,623	,451	,536
- Non-Western origin	-,287	,569	,750	,130	,362	1,139	,092*	,366	1,096	,472	,600	1,603
Income class												
- 0-20% (reference category)												
- 21-40%	,313	,331	1,367	,316	,225	1,372	,547*	,236	1,728	,516	,363	1,676
- 41-60%	,069	,341	1,072	-,104	,232	,901	,239	,238	1,270	,248	,373	1,281
- 61-80%	-,724~	,415	,485	-,301	,242	,740	-,114	,252	,892	-,515	,438	,597
- 81-100%	-,469	,416	,626	-,350	,267	,705	-,151	,273	,860	-,195	,452	,823
Religion												
- Non-religious (reference category)												
- Roman- Catholic	-,114	,239	,892	,013	,178	1,013	,010	,183	1,010	-,132	,265	,876

- Dutch-Reformed	-.071	,427	,932	,070	,311	1,073	,085	,314	,426	-,177	,458	,540
- Calvinist	-.702	,624	,495	-.728	,530	,483	-,854	,537	,176	-,616	,660	,279
- Protestant Church of the Netherlands	-1.669*	,730	,188	-1,665*	,595	,189	-1,739	,599	,176	-1,276	,745	,000
- Islam	-18,363	9123,156	,000	-19,217	5611,150	,000	-19,092	5535,932	,000	-19,088	8457,155	1,161
- Other religion	,138	,508	1,148	-,421	,416	,657	-,759	,450	,468	,149	,557	1,676

N=1809; ~p <0,10; *p <0,05; **p<0,01.

4.2.3. Results concerning regional differences

Model 9 shows the differences between the four regions of the Netherlands in voting for the PVV. The results show that there are differences between the regions in the electoral support for the PVV, however these differences were not found to be significant. Furthermore, when conducting additional analysis it was found that when comparing the regions versus the West instead of the South (which has the lowest percentage of PVV voters), the differences are found to be significant. The results of this analysis can be found in appendix D in table 7.4.1. The results in this appendix show that the Northern and Southern regions are significantly different from the Western region. People who live in the North region are 51 percent more likely to have voted for the PVV in comparison to people who live in the West. Furthermore, people who live in the South have a 44 percent greater likelihood to have voted for the PVV in comparison to the people who live in the West. Hypothesis 8 entailed that people who live in the Northern and Southern regions of the Netherlands were more likely to have voted for the PVV. This hypothesis can be accepted due to the found results.

Model 10 shows the interaction between the regions and the first mediating factor: migrant threat. This model shows that in the East and the West regions, the relation between migrant threat and voting for the PVV differs. The overall effect of migrant threat on the likelihood to have voted for the PVV remains 3,18. People who live in the East and experience migrant threat are 110,8 percent higher more likely to have voted for the PVV in comparison to people who live in the South. Furthermore, people who live in the West and experience migrant threat have a 101,2 percent higher likelihood to have voted for the PVV in comparison to the South. Hypothesis 9 entailed that the relation between migrant threat and voting for the PVV would differ amongst the four regions of the Netherlands. This hypothesis can be partly accepted as it only differs in the East and West from the South region.

Model 11 shows that interaction between the various regions and the effect of national pride on voting for the PVV. The overall effect of national pride remains non-significant, as in model 3. However, there are significant differences found on the relation between national pride and voting for the PVV in the different regions. In the East people who experience national pride have a 105 percent greater likelihood to have voted for the PVV in comparison to the South. Furthermore, in the West people who experience national pride have a 176 percent higher likelihood to have voted for the PVV in comparison to the South. Hypothesis 10 entailed that the relation between national pride and voting for the PVV is different in the four regions of the Netherlands and therefore can be partly accepted.

Model 12 shows the interaction between populist attitudes in the four regions of the Netherlands concerning voting for the PVV. This model shows that there are no significant differences in the importance of this predictor for voting for the PVV in the different regions. In contrast to the effect found in the whole country that entails that when people display more populist attitudes the likelihoods to have voted for the PVV become 4,84 times bigger. Hypothesis 11 entailed that the

relation between populist attitudes and voting for the PVV would differ between the four regions. This hypothesis can be rejected as a consequence of the found results.

Model 13 shows the results concerning the relation between political trust, the four regions and voting for the PVV. The effect political trust shows an overall negative relation to the likelihood to have voted for the PVV: people who experience more political trust have a 79 percent lower likelihood to have voted for the PVV. This effect does not significantly vary over the four regions. Hypothesis 12 entailed that the relation between national pride and voting for the PVV would vary in the four regions of the Netherlands and can be rejected as there are no differences.

Model 14 shows the relation between political external efficacy and voting for the PVV for the four regions of the Netherlands. This model shows that there are no significant differences in the importance of this predictor for voting for the PVV in the different regions. This contrasts with the overall effect of political efficacy which entails that when people experience more political efficacy their likelihoods to have voted for the PVV decrease with 88 percent. Hypothesis 13 entailed that the relation between political external efficacy and voting for the PVV would differ over the four regions. This hypothesis can be rejected because of the found results.

Model 15 shows the results concerning Euroscepticism and voting for the PVV in the four regions. This model shows that there are no significant differences in the importance of this predictor for voting for the PVV in the different regions. The overall effect of Euroscepticism as a predictor for voting for the PVV does exist, as it enhances the likelihood to have voted for the PVV with a factor of 3,4. Hypothesis 14 entailed that the relation between Euroscepticism and voting for the PVV would differ between the various regions of the Netherlands and can hereby be rejected.

Table 4.3: results logistic regression analysis concerning educational level

	Model 9			Model 10			Model 11			Model 12		
	B	SE	Exp(B)	B	SE	Exp(B)	B	SE	Exp(B)	B	SE	Exp(B)
Intercept	-2,304**	,255	,100	-6,401**	,988	,002	-,312	,951	,732	-6,806	,736	,001
<i>Independent variable</i>												
Region												
- North	,214	,224	1,238	-2,046	1,770	,129	-1,881	1,526	,152	-,322	1,258	,724
- East	-,043	,190	,958	-2,926*	1,592	,054	-2,775~	1,457	,062	-,570	1,063	,566
- South (reference category)												
- West	-,121	,166	,463	-3,038*	1,321	,048	-4,069*	1,283	,017	-,330	,905	,719
<i>Mediating variables</i>												
Migrant threat				1,157**	,229	3,182						
National pride							-,470	,250	,625			
Populist attitudes										1,576**	,198	4,836
<i>Conditional effects</i>												
Migrant threat x North				,684	,452	1,983						
Migrant threat x East				,746~	,392	2,108						
Migrant threat x South (reference category)												
Migrant threat x West				,699*	,323	2,012						
National pride x North							,576	,407	1,779			
National pride x East							,719~	,382	2,052			
National pride x South (reference category)												
National pride x West							,999*	,333	2,716			
Populist attitudes x North										,179	,366	1,196
Populist attitudes x East										,170	,308	1,185
Populist attitudes x South (reference category)												
Populist attitudes x West										,056	,259	1,058
<i>Control variables</i>												
Age	,004	,004	1,004	,002	,006	1,002	,002	,005	1,002	-,004	,004	,996
Gender (reference category=male)	-,431*	,131	,650	-,207	,194	,813	-,355*	,178	,701	-,404*	,149	,667
Country of origin												
- Dutch origin (reference category)												
- Western origin	-,295	,256	,744	-,522	,409	,594	-,565	,381	,568	-,434	,284	,648
- Non-Western origin	,118	,321	1,126	,948	,611	2,579	-,112	,544	,894	-,184	,363	,832
Income class												

-	0-20% (reference category)												
-	21-40%	,689*	,210	1,992	,644	,333	1,903	,569	,304	1,776	,516	,232	1,675
-	41-60%	,094	,221	1,099	,193	,363	1,213	,105	,329	1,111	,047	,243	,1048
-	61-80%	-,370	,233	,691	-,959*	,418	,383	-,912*	,402	,402	,058	,249	1,060
-	81-100%	-,727*	,257	,483	-,825~	,427	,438	-1,028*	,401	,358	,008	,283	1,008
Religion													
-	Non-religious (reference category)												
-	Roman- Catholic	,087	,176	1,091	-,098	,255	,906	-,066	,239	,936	-,035	,192	,966
-	Dutch-Reformed	,189	,301	1,208	-,313	,450	,732	-,058	,423	,944	,169	,326	1,184
-	Calvinist	-,849	,522	,428	-1,046	,656	,351	-,713	,612	,490	-,652	,536	,521
-	Protestant Church of the Netherlands	-1,821*	,589	,162	-1,729*	,746	,177	-1,837*	,727	,159	-1,647*	,601	,193
-	Islam	-18,932	5568,240	,000	-19,187	7686,551	,000	-18,740	9266,089	,000	-18,903	5531,732	,000
-	Other religion	-,537	,403	,585	-,009	,538	,991	-,287	,486	,750	-,422	,427	,656

N=1809; ~p <0,10; *p <0,05; **p<0,01.

Table 4.4: results logistic regression analysis concerning educational level

	Model 13			Model 14			Model 15		
	B	SE	Exp(B)	B	SE	Exp(B)	B	SE	Exp(B)
Intercept	1,599*	,773	4,946	,913~	,541	2,491	-4,500**	,515	,011
<i>Independent variable</i>									
Region									
- North	1,301	1,251	3,674	,006	,855	1,006	-,297	,820	,743
- East	1,356	1,050	3,882	,196	,743	1,217	-,974	,743	,378
- South (reference category)									
- West	-,919	,869	,399	-,504	,625	,604	-,301	,597	,740
<i>Mediating variables</i>									
Political trust	-1,569**	,329	,208						
Political efficacy				-2,021**	,364	,132			
Eurocepticism							1,223**	,180	3,396
<i>Conditional effects</i>									
Political trust x North	-,539	,615	,583						
Political trust x East	-,698	,516	,498						
Political trust x South (reference category)									
Political trust x West	,311	,415	1,365						
Political efficacy x North				,031	,666	1,031			
Political efficacy x East				-,315	,586	,730			
Political efficacy x South (reference category)									
Political efficacy x West				,157	,483	1,170			
Eurocepticism x North							,207	,327	1,230
Eurocepticism x East							,301	,288	1,351
Eurocepticism x South (reference category)									
Eurocepticism x West							,007	,236	1,007
<i>Control variables</i>									
Age	-,003	,006	,997	-,002	,004	,998	-,004	,004	,996
Gender (reference category=male)	-,444*	,187	,641	-,434*	,142	,648	-,391*	,146	,676
Country of origin									
- Dutch origin (reference category)									
- Western origin	-,724~	,187	,641	-,418	,285	,658	-,274	,276	,761
- Non-Western origin	-,468	,390	,485	,116	,361	1,123	,068	,370	1,070
Income class									
- 0-20% (reference category)									
- 21-40%	,604~	,322	1,829	,554*	,220	1,740	,787*	,230	2,196

-	41-60%	,228	,339	1,256	,039	,230	1,039	,373	,238	1,453
-	61-80%	-,648	,411	,523	-,280	,241	,756	-,058	,250	,944
-	81-100%	-,415	,414	,661	-,415	,266	,661	-,163	,272	,849
Religion										
-	Non-religious (reference category)									
-	Roman- Catholic	-,055	,247	,946	,036	,182	1,037	,062	,188	1,064
-	Dutch-Reformed	-,074	,435	,928	,158	,312	1,171	,184	,318	1,202
-	Calvinist	-,558	,621	,573	-,637	,532	,529	-,703	,536	,495
-	Protestant Church of the Netherlands	-1,619*	,730	,198	-1,677*	,594	,187	-1,781*	,601	,168
-	Islam	-18,446	9016,479	,000	-19,198	5654,874	,000	-19,078	5555,517	,000
-	Other religion	,129	,500	1,137	-,458	,414	,633	-,770	,449	,463

N=1809; ~p <0,10; *p <0,05; **p<0,01.

4.2.4. Results concerning control variables

Furthermore, there are results found concerning the various control variables which were included in the analysis. There was found that age did not have a determining effect on voting for the PVV. Concerning gender there were differences found: men have a greater likelihood to have voted for the PVV in comparison to women. When looking at the different countries of origin, there are no differences found between the three categories: Dutch origin, Western origin and non-Western origin. Except for in model 7 which was concerning Euroscepticism, there was a slight effect found concerning the odds of people who are from non-Western origin. They have a 9 percent bigger likelihood to have voted for the PVV when taking Euroscepticism into account. There are also results found concerning the various income categories which show significant and non-significant effects but the overall effect that is found entails that when people are in a higher income class they have a lower likelihood to have voted for the PVV. The last control variable concerns different religious beliefs. The only significant differences that was found in the models concerns the difference between non-religious people and people who are affiliated to the Protestant Church of the Netherlands. People who have this religion, have a smaller likelihood to have voted for the PVV in comparison to people who do not belong to a denomination.

5. Conclusions and discussion

This thesis explored different motives (migrant threat, populism, Euroscepticism, political distrust, political efficacy and national pride) for voting for the PVV based on different educational levels and geographical regions. Due to rising popularity of radical right parties in Europe and the Netherlands, there is an increasing feeling of urgency to study the electoral support for these parties as they form an important factor in contemporary European politics which cannot be ignored (Mudde, 2012; Van Beyme, 1988; Mudde, 2012; Backes & Moreau, 2012). The consequences of the rising popularity of radical right parties are both societal and political, as it is often stated that radical right parties mobilize frustrations that are felt in society (Lubbers et al., 2002; De Voogd, 2017). By studying different motives for voting on the PVV and how these differ between people from different educational levels and regions, more information is gathered about contemporary sentiments that live in society and how these contribute to explain voting behaviour.

In this chapter, the results of the current research will be described and evaluated. The results will be reviewed by relating them to existing theories that were discussed in the first two chapters of this thesis. This thesis aimed to look at the differences in the electoral support of PVV by comparing different voting motives and connecting these to educational and geographical differences. The research question of this thesis entailed: *how can the relationship between educational level and voting for the PVV in the Netherlands be explained with different motives for voting for the PVV? Are there regional differences in voting for the PVV? And are there regional differences in motives for voting for the PVV?* Furthermore, the sub-questions of this research entailed: *(1) What exactly is the relationship between level of education and voting for the PVV? (2) Can this relationship between level of education and voting for the PVV be explained by the following mediating variables: migrant threat, populist attitudes, Euroscepticism, political distrust, external political efficacy and national pride? (3) Are there regional differences in voting for the PVV? (4) Are the mediating variables (migrant threat, populist attitudes, Euroscepticism, political distrust, external political efficacy and national pride) of different importance for explaining the relationship between region and voting for the PVV in the four different regions of the Netherlands?*

The conclusions will be discussed and will be divided into two subsections: conclusions concerning educational levels and conclusions concerning geographical differences, in order to answer the different research questions. Furthermore, the strengths and weaknesses of this research will be discussed and suggestions for follow-up research will be described. Appendix E contains an overview of the hypotheses and whether they were proven true or rejected.

5.1 Conclusions concerning educational level

Various expectations were formulated in advance regarding educational differences in the electoral support of the PVV amongst participants in the survey-data. First, people with a lower level of education were expected to have a higher chance to vote for the PVV in comparison to people with a higher level of education. This was found to be true: people with a lower level of education are more likely to vote for the PVV in comparison to people who from the middle educated and high educated levels. This finding answers the first sub-question of this research: *what exactly is the relationship between level of education and voting for the PVV?* Different theoretical explanations are given for this association, such as the deviance from certain political values transmitted by institutions of higher education (Hyman & Wright, 1979; Pascarella et al., 1999). Educational level also is associated with a certain material position and economic welfare in society. People with a lower level of education have limited access to the labour market which decreases their chances of economic welfare, which in turn increases frustration mobilized by radical right parties (Ivarsflaten & Stubager, 2011; Van der Waal et al., 2008). These theoretical assumptions are in accordance with the results found: people with lower levels of education are more likely to vote for the PVV.

Research question 2 entailed: *Can this relationship between level of education and voting for the PVV be explained by the following mediating variables: migrant threat, populist attitudes, Euroscepticism, political distrust, external political efficacy and national pride?* In order to answer this question, the findings concerning the different motives will first be discussed, starting with migrant threat. It was found that people with a lower level of education tend to experience more migrant threat and are therefore more likely to vote for the PVV. This is in accordance with previous research done on this topic, which indicates that (negative) attitudes and threatening perceptions of migrants are an important predictor of voting for radical right parties (Rydgren, 2008). Radical right parties often portray migrants as a threat to the native population of a country on cultural, social and economic level. People who experience this threat are more likely to vote for a political party that promises to put their needs above migrants (Sniderman et al., 2004; Green et al., 2015; Ceobanu & Escandel, 2010).

The results that were found concerning national identity were in contrast to the expectations derived from previous research done by Lucassen and Lubbers (2011) who state that people with more feelings of national identity are more likely to vote for the radical right (Lubbers et al., 2017). However, national identity was not found to predict voting for the PVV for different levels of education. This outcome contrasted with earlier mentioned theories that emphasize that people who experience more national pride are more likely to vote for radical right parties (Lubbers et al., 2016; Lucassen & Lubbers, 2011). An explanation for the absence of this effect can be found in the low reliability of the scale used to measure national pride (Cronbach's alpha: .686). A theoretical explanation for the absence of the effect comes from Lubbers et al. (2017) who describe that the role of nationalistic attitudes in voting for the radical right is complex and the relationship is heavily debated. It could be the case that radical right voters have strong exclusionary attitudes regarding

who is welcome to join the nation, but do not identify that much with the nation itself but rather express more loyalty to the interests of the local community (Bruter & Harrison, 2011; Meuleman & Lubbers, 2013).

The relevance of populist attitudes in radical right voting as proposed by findings from Van Hauwaert and Van Kessel (2017) is supported by the current findings. Populist attitudes can be identified as one of the reasons why low educated people are more likely to vote for the PVV. These findings are in accordance with the theoretical expectations. Populist attitudes are more often displayed amongst the lower educated as they have a more vulnerable position in society due to increased economic and cultural competition in society from migrants (Kriesie et al., 2006; Betz, 1990; Rico et al., 2017). Due to the populist characteristics of the PVV, this appeals more to those who have more populist grievances (Spruyt et al., 2016).

Furthermore, this research has shown that political distrust is identified as one of the motives for people with a lower level of education to be more likely to vote for the PVV. Political trust is seen as one of the important outcomes of evaluations of the political system by citizens, one that has consequences for voting behaviour (Grönlund et al., 2017, Zmerli et al., 2017). The lower educated express more often that they do not trust the political system. This can be explained by a social sorting mechanism: higher educated people are less vulnerable to changes in the government due to a more privileged position in society (Newton, 1997; Hooghe, 2007). Radical right parties, such as the PVV, often get more votes from people who do not have a lot of trust in the political system because of the anti-establishment character of these parties (Söderlund et al., 2009; Magni, 2017).

External political efficacy also made a difference in explaining the relationship between educational level and voting for the PVV. In other words: people with a lower level of education are more likely to vote for the PVV due to a lack of (external) political efficacy. Attitudes about external political efficacy are more strongly present among higher educated people as education provides a better understanding of politics at the same time as confidence to give meaningful input in the political process (Lambert et al., 1986). People who feel they do not have the ability to influence politics are more likely to vote for the PVV as this party emphasizes to attend to the needs of exactly these voters (Magni, 2017).

Concerning Euroscepticism, it was found that people with a lower education are more likely to be Eurosceptic and therefore vote for the PVV. The PVV expresses anti-Europe political positions and therefore appeals more to people who share these sentiments. Their narrative is based on the EU opening the gates for migrants to come into the Netherlands and form an economic and cultural threat to the native population (Rydgren, 2008; Mudde, 2007). This narrative is more commonly supported among the lower educated and therefore it is found as a motive for voting for the PVV (Hakhverdian et al., 2013).

Combining the described findings as reported above, the second research question can be answered: *Can this relationship between level of education and voting for the PVV be explained by the*

following mediating variables: migrant threat, populist attitudes, Euroscepticism, political distrust, external political efficacy and national pride? All motives, except for national pride, can be identified as an explanation as to why people with a lower level of education are more likely to vote for the PVV. People with a lower level of education tend to experience more migrant threat, support populist attitudes, favour Euroscepticism, harbour political distrust and show less political efficacy, and are therefore more likely to vote for the PVV. When looking at all the motives combined, migrant threat, populist attitudes and Euroscepticism seem to have the strongest contribution on explaining differences between educational level and voting for the PVV.

5.2 Conclusions concerning geographical differences

Various expectations were formulated in advance regarding geographical differences in electoral support of the PVV. First, it was expected that support for the PVV would vary among voters from the four different regions of the Netherlands. This was found to be true: the likelihood of voting for the PVV in the Northern and Southern regions are significantly different from those in the Western region. People from the South and the Northern regions in the Netherlands have a higher chance of voting for the PVV. These findings confirmatively answer the third research question: *Are there regional differences in voting for the PVV?* In figure 5.2.1 below there is an geographic overview of PVV votes amongst the different regions of the Netherlands.




Figure 5.2.1: percentage of PVV voters in the Netherlands. Source: Josse de Voogd

The final research question entails: *Are the mediating variables (migrant threat, populist attitudes, Euroscepticism, political distrust, external political efficacy and national pride) of different importance for explaining the relationship between region and voting for the PVV in the four different regions of the Netherlands?* In order to answer this last question, the findings concerning the different motives and their relations to the regions will be discussed, starting with experienced migrant threat.

Concerning migrant threat, it can be concluded that it is of different importance for voting for the PVV in the different regions of the Netherlands. For people who live in the Eastern and Western regions of the Netherlands, the chances of voting for the PVV are higher when they experience migrant threat in comparison to the Southern region. This finding can be explained by the higher presence of migrants (with a non-Western background) especially in the Western regions (and to a lesser extent in the Eastern regions) of the Netherlands in comparison to the Southern and Northern regions (Statistics Netherlands, 2016). The division of migrants with a non-Western background is portrayed in the map below:




Figure 5.2.2: non-western migrants per municipality in the Netherlands. Source: <https://www.cbs.nl/nl-nl/dossier/dossier-asiel-migratie-en-integratie/hoeveel-mensen-met-een-migratieachtergrond-wonen-in-nederland->

The results concerning migrant threat can theoretically be explained in two ways. First, people who live in the East and especially the West of the Netherlands live in closer proximity to migrants and therefore are more inclined to vote for the PVV because of perceived migrant threat as expressed in 'ethnic threat theory' (Biggs & Knaus, 2011; Savelkoul et al., 2017). Second, people who live in the Eastern and Western regions of the Netherlands live in more proximity of migrants and therefore experience less negative attitudes about migrants, according to the classic contact hypothesis proposed by Allport (1954), and therefore the salience of the relationship between voting for the radical right and experienced migrant threat is more strongly present. This implies that most people who live in the East and West of the Netherlands have less negative attitudes about migrants, but when they do have such attitudes, they have a strong effect on their voting behaviour i.e. voting for the PVV. This theoretical explanation is supported by the descriptive results that show that people in the Southern region perceive more migrant threat versus people who live in the Eastern and Western region.

The second finding concerning regional differences on voting behaviour is related to national pride. People who live in the Western and Eastern regions of the Netherlands are more likely to vote for the PVV when they experience higher levels of national pride in comparison to the Southern region. An explanation for these results can (again) be found in the presence of ethnic minorities in the region. According to Tajfel (1970), increasing arrivals of migrants in the neighbourhood strengthens sentiments of national identity by enhancing feelings of 'us' versus 'them' (Brons, 2015). Therefore, a possible explanation for these findings could be that people who live in the Western and Eastern regions of the Netherlands experience more national pride as a motive for the PVV. However, it also could be the case that people who live in the Eastern and Western regions do not experience so much national pride, but when they do, it has a substantial effect on their voting behaviour i.e. voting for the PVV. This theoretical explanation is (again) supported by descriptive results found in this thesis which show that people who live in the South experience more national pride in comparison to people in the East and West.

The remaining political motives (populist attitudes, political distrust, external political efficacy and Euroscepticism) were not proven to be of different importance in the four different regions of the Netherlands for voting for the PVV. The absence of these effects could be explained by different reasons. First and foremost, the geographical scale used in this thesis to look at geographical aspects in voting for the PVV was quite big, namely region. This geographical scale was (necessarily) chosen due to availability of data. It could be the case that differences are more prevalent on a more local level, for example: on the level of provinces, municipalities or even neighbourhoods, instead of on the region level. Research done by Veul, Flache and Venema (2016) showed that differences in voting for the PVV are present across municipalities. They identified various factors concerning municipalities, such as socio-economic positions, percentage non-western migrants living in a municipality and turnout percentages of elections, that could explain the different amounts of electoral support for the

PVV. De Voogd (2017) shows how several patterns in electoral geographic phenomena, like the orthodox protestant so-called 'Bible Belt' are crossing borders of regions. Hence, the large regions can consist out of quite different electoral typologies. Furthermore, an alternative explanation for the findings could be that geographical aspects simply do not play a big role in voting for the PVV in the Netherlands. In research on the radical right, different individual factors are identified to be more important for voting for the radical right (Lubbers et al., 2002). Perhaps, characteristics of the people themselves are more important than the place they live in for voting behaviour.

Combining the described findings as reported above, this provides an answer to the fourth research question of this research: *Are the mediating variables (migrant threat, populist attitudes, Euroscepticism, political distrust, external political efficacy and national pride) of different importance for explaining the relationship between region and voting for the PVV in the four different regions of the Netherlands?* Experienced migrant threat as well as national pride were found to be of different importance for voting for the PVV in the different regions. Both motives seem to be of more importance for voting for the PVV in the Western and Eastern regions of the Netherlands in comparison to the Southern regions. The remaining motives (populist attitudes, Euroscepticism, political distrust and external political distrust) were not found to be of different importance for voting for the PVV. Whilst this study did not confirm that all motives are of importance in different regions, it did partially substantiate that some do. In conclusion, it can be said that the results concerning geographical differences on voting motives are modest, however, they do incite further research which will be elaborated in the discussion.

5.3 Discussion

The research design of this thesis had several strengths as well as weaknesses, which both will be addressed in this paragraph, that also elaborates on suggestions for further research on this topic. One of the major strengths of this thesis is the research material. These data have been collected on a national level and on a large scale, aimed to be representative for the Dutch population. Therefore, conclusions that are drawn from this research are likely to be generalizable. Furthermore, both individual- as geographical factors are included in the data. Therefore, this thesis provides a more complete picture and allows for multiple factors to be taken into account in explaining differences in support for the PVV. Taking both individual- as well as geographical factors into account is a novelty and a strength of this research. Another strength of this thesis is that populist attitudes are considered, separately from political distrust and other political motives to vote for the PVV. Research done by Geurkink et al., (2019) showed that populist attitudes and political trust do not refer to the same latent characteristic. These populist attitudes are considered and tested as mediators in the relationship between educational level and voting for the PVV, next to a number of other previously considered

mediators. The findings from this research confirm that both have separate effects on voting for the radical right as an explanation for educational differences.

A limitation of this study is the geographical scale included in the data. The scope of the study was limited to regional level due to the geographical scale that was available in the data. Therefore, lower geographical levels, i.e. municipalities and provinces, could not be considered when assessing the geographical aspects of voting behaviour. Further research could explore these different levels in order to establish the role of geographical differences in voting behaviour: more information on the geographical aspects of voting behaviour would help to establish a greater degree of accuracy on this matter. A second limitation of this study is that it did not take multiple years into account. In follow-up research, multiple years and elections could be considered to create a longitudinal research to establish causality more elaborately. By doing so, the long-term effects of individual and geographical determinants on political behaviour could be assessed and political trends can be identified when comparing important determinants over multiple years. Furthermore, this can also be done in other parts of the world (other countries of the EU or in the VS) to compare whether these mechanisms of voting for the radical right work in a similar way in other societies.

Thirdly, this study has not chosen to evaluate political parties other than the PVV. Further research could assess a broader scope on political parties in looking for different determinants on individual and geographical levels. As mentioned before, de Voogd (2017) portrays that political behaviour and its geographical pattern shows what political sentiments are of importance in contemporary society. By not only looking at an extreme such as the radical right, more can be known about the majority of voters and their political opinions. Moreover, as mentioned before, an increasing amount of political parties are portraying more extreme political positions (according to the *verrechtsing* thesis of Mudde (2012)) in order to be able to compete with radical right parties. It would be relevant to research the Dutch electoral landscape in a more broader scope to consider a shift that is taken place in such a way that the PVV is no longer the only political party that used extreme right political views.

Concluding this thesis, we now know more about motives on voting for the radical right in the Netherlands, i.e. the PVV and how these differ between people from different levels of education and regions. As discussed earlier, the societal relevance of this research entails assessing sentiments in contemporary society that are related to radical right voting amongst different levels of education. Sentiments such as dissatisfaction about migration and multicultural society are often expressed as well as an increasing number of xenophobic attitudes (Bellaart et al., 2017; Smeekes & Mulders, 2016). This study contributes to our understanding of the way in which these attitudes contribute to voting for a radical right party such as the PVV and amongst which groups these sentiments are more strongly expressed. This also contributes to the scientific relevance of this research as this relationship is further explored in addition to adding populist attitudes as a separate motive for voting for the PVV: this study has shown that the experience of migrant threat, populist attitudes, (external) political

efficacy, political distrust and Euroscepticism contribute to the popularity of the PVV amongst lower educated people. A second aspect of the scientific relevance was the novelty that was addressed by analysing differences in motives for voting for the PVV in different regions. The results of this study indicate that there are differences found concerning experienced migrant threat and national pride in the regions. However, concerning the remainder of the motives, no differences were found. Therefore, this study partly strengthens the idea that geographical aspects play a role in voting behaviour concerning radical right parties. However, further research needs to be conducted in order to assess the geographical effects on multiple levels.

6. References

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
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7. Appendix

7.1 Appendix A: conceptual model



7.2 Appendix B: results of factor analysis for the purpose of the method section

7.2.1 Migrant threat

Table 8.1: Explorative factor analysis with oblique rotation on the items of migrant threat.

Item	Factor loadings
1. Immigrants are generally good for the Dutch economy.	.574
2. The Dutch culture is threatened by immigrants.	.842
3. Immigrants increase crime rates in the Netherlands.	.806
Chronbach's alfa	.781

7.2.2 Populism

Table 8.2: Explorative factor analysis with oblique rotation on the items of populism.

Item	Factor loadings
1. What people call compromise in politics is really just selling out on one's principles.	.693
2. Most politicians do not care about the people.	.792
3. Most politicians are trustworthy.	.567
4. Politicians are the main problem in the Netherlands.	.720
5. Most politicians care only about the interests of the rich and powerful.	.779
6. Political differences between the elite and ordinary people are bigger than the differences that between citizens among themselves.	.521
7. I would rather be represented by an ordinary citizen than by a career politician.	.683
8. Politicians talk too much and do too little.	.735
Chronbach's alfa	.877

7.2.3 Euroscepticism

Table 8.3: explorative factor analysis with oblique rotation on the items of Euroscepticism.

Item	Factor loadings
1. Would you indicate for each of the following institutions whether you trust them very much; fairly much; not so much; or not at all?: European Union.	.652
2. Do you think the membership of the Netherlands to the EU is in general? Answer options:ø	.652

Chronbach's alfa .594

7.2.4 Political distrust

Table 7.4: explorative factor analysis with oblique rotation on the items of political distrust.

Item	Factor loadings
1. Would you indicate for each of the following institutions whether you trust them very much; fairly much; not so much; or not at all?: The national parliament	.861
2. Would you indicate for each of the following institutions whether you trust them very much; fairly much; not so much; or not at all?: civil servants	.601
3. Would you indicate for each of the following institutions whether you trust them very much; fairly much; not so much; or not at all?: political parties	.704
Chronbach's alfa	.763

7.2.5. External political efficacy

Table 7.5: explorative factor analysis with oblique rotation on the items of political efficacy.

Item	Factor loadings
1. MPs do not care about the opinion of people like me.	.787
2. Political parties are only interested in my vote and not in my opinion	.808
3. People like me have absolutely no influence on governmental policy	.694
Chronbach's alfa	.806

7.2.6 National pride

Table 7.6: explorative factor analysis with oblique rotation on the items of national trust.

Item	Factor loadings
1. I feel connected to the Netherlands and the Dutch people.	.561
2. I am proud to be Dutch.	.964
3. There is no better country than the Netherlands.	.490
Chronbach's alfa	.686

7.3 Appendix C: multicollinearity

Table 7.3.1: The correlations between the different variables for the purpose of multicollinearity

	Voting for the PVV	Low educated	Middle educated	High educated	Region: North	Region: West	Region: South	Region: East	Migrant threat	Populism	Euroscepticism	Political trust	National pride	External efficacy
Voting for the PVV	1	,119	,066	-,154	,035	-,044	,030	,001	,317	,319	,308	-,245	,022	-,208
Low educated	,119	1	-,305	-,295	-,006	-,042	,044	,014	,129	,228	,186	-,173	,106	-,170
Middle educated	,066	-,305	1	-,699	,017	-,028	,001	,026	,142	,126	,078	-,086	,026	-,094
High educated	-,154	-,295	-,699	1	-,019	,040	-,020	-,020	-,253	-,292	-,229	,222	-,091	,226
Region: North	,035	-,006	,017	-,019	1	-,308	-,197	-,186	-,042	,011	-,030	-,007	-,026	-,007
Region: West	-,044	-,042	-,028	,040	-,308	1	-,480	-,454	-,022	-,037	-,007	,015	,001	,000
Region: South	,030	,044	,001	-,020	-,197	-,480	1	-,291	,074	,063	,019	-,019	,037	,000
Region: East	,001	,014	,026	-,020	-,186	-,454	-,291	1	-,010	-,026	,011	,011	-,012	,004
Migrant threat	,317	,129	,142	-,253	-,042	-,022	,074	-,010	1	,392	,416	-,327	,197	-,333
Populism	,319	,228	,126	-,292	,011	-,037	,063	-,026	,392	1	,559	-,618	,001	-,615
Euroscepticism	,308	,186	,078	-,229	-,030	-,007	,019	,011	,416	,559	1	-,583	-,004	-,444
Political trust	-,245	-,173	-,086	,222	-,007	,015	-,019	,011	-,327	-,618	-,583	1	,050	,489
National pride	,022	,106	,026	-,091	-,026	,001	,037	-,012	,197	,001	-,004	,050	1	-,048
External efficacy	-,208	-,170	-,094	,226	-,007	,000	,000	,004	-,333	-,615	-,444	,489	-,048	1

N=1809; bold printed correlations are significant (p<0,05).

7.4 Appendix D: additional analysis for the purpose of hypothesis 8

Table 7.4.1: results logistic analysis concerning model 9 and hypothesis

	Model 9b B	SE	Exp(B)
Intercept	-2,508**	,248	,081
<i>Independent variable</i>			
Region			
- North	,413*	,211	1,512
- East	,161	,177	1,174
- South	,365*	,168	1,441
- West (reference category)			
<i>Control variables</i>			
Age	,004	,004	1,004
Gender (reference category=male)	-,422*	,132	,655
Country of origin			
- Dutch origin (reference category)			
- Western origin	-,308	,256	,735
- Non-Western origin	,153	,321	1,165
Income class			
- 0-20% (reference category)			
- 21-40%	,674*	,210	1,962
- 41-60%	,078	,221	1,081
- 61-80%	-,386	,233	,680
- 81-100%	-,722*	,256	,486
Religion			
- Non-religious (reference category)			
- Roman- Catholic	,021	,178	1,021
- Dutch-Reformed	,205	,301	1,227
- Calvinist	-,830	,522	,436
- Protestant Church of the Netherlands	-1,809*	,589	,164
- Islam	-18,954	5560,164	,000
- Other religion	-,511	,402	,600

N=1809; ~p <0,10; *p <0,05; **p<0,01.

7.5 Appendix E: overview hypotheses

Table 7.5.1: overview of hypothesises and whether they were proven to be true

Hypothesis	True or False
H1: <i>people with a low(er) level of education will be more likely to vote for the PVV.</i>	True
H2: <i>the relation between educational level and voting for the PVV can be (partly) explained by experienced migrant threat.</i>	True
H3: <i>the relation between educational level and voting for the PVV can be (partly) explained by national identity.</i>	False
H4: <i>the relation between educational level and voting for the PVV can be (partly) explained by populist attitudes.</i>	True
H5: <i>the relation between educational level and voting for the PVV can be (partly) explained by trust in politics.</i>	True
H6: <i>the relation between educational level and voting for the PVV can be (partly) explained by perception of external political efficacy.</i>	True
H7: <i>the relation between educational level and voting for the PVV can be (partly) explained by Euroscepticism.</i>	True
H8: <i>: people who live in the Southern (Noord-Brabant and Limburg) and the Northern (Groningen, Drenthe and Overijssel) region of the Netherlands are more likely to vote for the PVV.</i>	True
H9: <i>the relation between experienced migrant threat and voting for the PVV will differ in the four different regions of the Netherlands</i>	Partly true
H10: <i>the relation between national pride and voting for the PVV will differ in the four different regions of the Netherlands.</i>	Partly true
H11: <i>the relation between populist attitudes and voting for the PVV will differ in the four different regions of the Netherlands.</i>	False
H12: <i>the relation between political distrust and voting for the PVV will differ in the four different regions of the Netherlands.</i>	False

H13: *the relation between external political efficacy and voting for the PVV will differ in the four different regions of the Netherlands.*

False

H14: *the relation between Euroscepticism and voting for the PVV will differ in the four different regions of the Netherlands.*

False