

Perceptions of Cypriot Citizens after the 2017 Negotiations on the Conflict in Cyprus



MSc THESIS

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ABSTRACT

The Mediterranean island of Cyprus has been divided ever since two invasions in 1974. Although the conflict in Cyprus might be frozen, negotiations aimed at solving the conflict in Cyprus are by no means stationary. For decades, leaders of the Greek Cypriot community and the Turkish Cypriot community have attempted to find a solution, yielding no final breakthrough to this day. This thesis and its underlying research set out to find out if, how and why Cypriot citizens have (re)evaluated their views, opinions and feelings regarding the Cyprus Issue after the breakdown in the latest round of negotiations in July 2017. Their opinions are crucial since any plan to reunify the island will require an electoral majority in both communities in simultaneous referenda to be initiated. By performing in-depth interviews with Cypriot citizens on both sides of the divide about their opinions on the conflict before and after the most recent talks, an insight into and analysis of the development of their views is given.

Key Words: Cyprus, Conflict, UNFICYP, Perception, Negotiation, Intractability

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LIST OF ACRONYMS

CBM	Confidence Building Measure
DMZ	Demilitarized Zone
EEZ	Exclusive Economic Zone
EOKA	<i>Ethniki Organosis Kypriou Agoniston</i> [National Organization of Cypriot Fighters]
EU	European Union
FM	Foreign Minister
GC	Greek Cypriot
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
HDI	Human Development Index
MHS	Mutually Hurting Stalemate
MP	Member of Parliament
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
PM	Prime Minister
RoC	Republic of Cyprus
SASG	Special Adviser of the Secretary-General on Cyprus
SBA	Sovereign Base Area
TC	Turkish Cypriot
TMT	<i>Türk Mukavemet Teşkilatı</i> [Turkish Resistance Organization]
TRNC	Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus
UK	United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNDPA	United Nations Department of Political Affairs
UNFICYP	United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
UNSCR	United Nations Security Council Resolution
UNSG	United Nations Secretary-General

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Introduction

“Nicosia, 27 October 2017 – Big Game Hunting Season starts on 5th of November. UNFICYP would like to remind hunters that hunting in the buffer zone is strictly prohibited. Entering the buffer zone area in order to perform any kind of hunting activities, including, but not limited to, those contemplating the use of weapons and/or dogs, runs the risk of drawing fire from either of the opposing forces, and is therefore dangerous and irresponsible.”

(UNMissions 2017a)

Nothing describes the human capacity to adapt to threatening circumstances like a friendly yet strict reminder of an international peace operation to bear in mind the risk of drawing fire from armed forces surrounding the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ). Four decades since the invasion, the buffer zone is still actively guarded on its exterior and is patrolled by the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) inside. As such, UNFICYP is one of the longest-running UN missions still in operation. This means that for decades, despite numerous efforts of the parties involved, a real sense of urgency to solve their differences seems to be lacking.

This is noted by UN Secretary-General Guterres in his report on the most recent negotiations in July 2017: “While the parties were moving closer on substance, they remained far apart with respect to the trust and determination necessary to seek common ground through mutual accommodation, ultimately preventing them from reaching the broad outlines of a strategic understanding across the negotiating chapters that could have paved the way for the final settlement deal” (UNSC 2017, 6).

In this thesis this lack of determination is one of the core concepts in the shape of ‘comfortable’ or ‘intractable’ conflicts. In such conflicts, a sense of urgency to come to a solution is lacking and resolution is consequently staved off. The economy of the Republic of Cyprus is managing relatively well despite the 2012-2013 Cypriot banking crisis. In addition, it is not being crippled by any violent conflict itself, keeping economic incentives to rejoin at bay. Moreover, direct hostilities have completely ended two decades ago. A lack of casualties does not force leaders to seek alternative means to settle their differences.

Adamides and Constantinou (2012, 5) describe this lack of physical violence: “Unlike many other protracted conflict cases, Cyprus has not experienced any violence since 1974 with the exception of rare shootings across the buffer zone in the 1970s and 80s and the killings of two Greek Cypriot protesters in 1996.” Though the scars of the past are still in the minds of those who have witnessed it, the de facto division of the island has become politically bearable.

Even though the situation in Cyprus may have become a comfortable conflict, the everyday reality of partition points to something more violent. In the capital of Nicosia, the signs of lethal encounters are always just around the corner, as the buffer zone divides the capital city and the island itself to this day. Although the ‘Cyprus Issue’ – as it is known in the academic literature and media – is not characterized by direct physical violence anymore, the partition of the island affects at least the Turkish Cypriots negatively, as they live in an internationally unrecognized area and suffer the economic consequences. According to a joint statement by leaders of both communities, Greek Cypriots also bear the negative consequences of the sustained division (PIO 2014). Furthermore, the Cyprus Issue also reflects widely on the international arena, where NATO members Turkey and Greece each back the respective communities. The suspicion between the communities still exists, and a security dilemma persists.

Politicians from both sides occasionally point to the presence of Turkish soldiers in the north; numbers of anywhere between 30,000 to 40,000 troops are regularly cited (Goldman 2016, 26-30). Even though lower estimates by third parties are also provided (Cyprus-Mail

2017a), their presence is unquestioned. South of the buffer zone, in the Old Town of Nicosia, Greek Cypriot and Greek troops man the various posts alongside the Demilitarized Zone. Their posts are surrounded by sandbag-barriers, barbed wire and are often marked with the blue and white colors of the Greek flag.

Twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week, sentries still guard their posts. The guards observe passing traffic on their side and gaze into a buffer zone that contains buildings which are in a state of disrepair after four decades of negligence. Though shots have not been fired in over two decades, the thought that this cease-fire may be broken is apparently not entirely unrealistic. Based on the warning to hunters by UNFICYP, soldiers on either side would not hesitate to open fire if they felt their position was threatened. Still, the sheer time that has passed since the last incidents leads one to believe the current status-quo of a calm yet potentially threatening stalemate between the sides persists, unless a common solution is found.

Against the background of this stalemate, leaders of the Greek Cypriot and the Turkish Cypriot community are still negotiating the future of Cyprus. On behalf of the Greek Cypriots, the President of the Republic of Cyprus, Mr. Nikos Anastasiades represents the interests of his community. The Turkish Cypriots are represented by Mr. Mustafa Akıncı, President of the unrecognized state of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. The combination of these two leaders is of particular interest, because both of them are geared towards negotiating a solution; both supported the Annan Plan of 2004 to reunify the island (Direkli 2016, 132). Such a combination represents an opportunity for resolution in itself as there are nationalist parties in both communities that do not seek resolution to the Cyprus Issue (Direkli 2016, 134-135). Such parties might even gain power in the (near) future.

At any rate, even leaders that want a solution need to be pragmatic about the opinions, feelings and perceptions of the electorate they represent. Any potential agreement on a reunited Cyprus will require electoral approval on both sides of the buffer zone. In 2004, a comprehensive plan to reunite Cyprus into a bi-communal Federal State known as the Annan Plan – mediated by former UNSG Kofi Annan – was put to a referendum. Though a majority of the Turkish Cypriot side accepted the agreement, only 25% of Greek Cypriot voters accepted the resolution, meaning that the plan was fully discarded. The outcome of this referendum shows the importance of taking the perceptions of citizens into account. Thus, in short, regardless of whether domestic and international leaders can agree on the future of Cyprus, perceptions, feelings and opinions of the Cypriot electorate do matter and are crucial in the process leading up to reunification.

The latest joint efforts for resolution came in the shape of the June-July 2017 ‘Conference on Cyprus’ in Switzerland. Though expectations for the talks were high (Paul 2017), a solution failed to materialize and the conference was closed on July 7th, 2017 (UNSC 2017, 6). Any development in the resolution of the Cyprus Issue changes or perhaps reconfirms the perceptions citizens have of the conflict. By themselves, such changes can affect the position of leaders at during a next round of negotiations and voter behavior in possible future referenda.

Problem

The principal driving force behind this thesis and its research is the lack of knowledge concerning the (re)evaluation of opinions and perceptions of Cypriot citizens since the closure of the most recent round of negotiations in Crans-Montana, Switzerland, in July 2017. Although opinions regarding issues such as property, Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) and reunification in general are well-documented in recent quantitative research (e.g. Irwin 2017b), more recent information from *after* the collapse of the talks is still lacking. As Cypriots’ opinions, perceptions and feelings matter in light of a referendum in the future as well as the

positions of political leaders, it is imperative to peek into some of these opinions, perceptions and feelings.

The research of this thesis set out to uncover such opinions based on qualitative research, by conducting in-depth interviews. Qualitative research is an excellent method to see exactly how and why perceptions have (recently) changed. This research does not seek to address the extent and size of large-scale societal changes, but merely the ‘how’ and the ‘why’. By taking this approach, dynamics in intractable conflicts can be more intricately understood. In-depth interviews have been utilized to grasp the foundations of changes in citizens’ perceptions and the outcomes will add to the literature on the Cyprus Issue and the theme of intractability.

Societal Relevance

As with many other conflicts, the societal relevance of analyzing conflicts and its resolutions are evident. Analyzing and learning from conflict help us to understand conflicts, and contribute to its resolution. For Cyprus itself, a broadly agreed and sustainable resolution will depose of the DMZ that has divided the country for over 40 years, will reunify a country and would provide a platform to do away with mutual suspicions. It will strengthen the economy by mutual trade between the future federal parts. The Turkish Cypriot community in the North will enjoy more opportunities for international business as they will be part of an internationally recognized state. From an international perspective, reunifying Cyprus solves one of the major issues between two NATO countries, Turkey and Greece.

Although the conflict has an unmistakable international dimension, the fate of reunification will be ultimately accepted or dismissed by electoral majority among the Greek Cypriot as well as the Turkish Cypriot community. Identifying and understanding developments in perspectives, attitudes, opinions and motivations of the population is therefore fundamental to understanding the Cyprus Issue today, and is also key for understanding its future.

Scientific Relevance

This research seeks not only to add to the literature on the Cyprus conflict itself, but also in a broader sense to notions such as intractability. On a first glance, the fact that the Cyprus Issue has been around for decades suggests that it is an inherent, stagnant and permanent problem. Though the same parties have indeed been opposed for decades, it is by no means a stagnant and inherent problem. The Cyprus Issue remains dynamic; leaders bent on resolving the conflict or opposing resolution come and go, relations between Turkey, Greece, the European Union and Cyprus change, and perceptions of Cypriot citizens develop along the way.

As recently as June 2017, President Anastasiades and Turkish Cypriot leader Akıncı met in Switzerland, in the presence of international delegates to discuss a variety of issues such as power-sharing, property, security and guarantees (UNSC 2017, 1-6). This shows that the Cyprus Issue remains dynamic and continues to be internationally relevant – its perceived progress, or lack thereof, and attempts at resolution have to be monitored and evaluated. The persevering and seemingly inherent nature of it, makes it relevant for literature as a case study in intractable conflicts. Analyzing the conflict and recent dynamics uncovers motivations for citizens to keep or change their opinions and perceptions and how this impacts their voting behavior in a possible referendum.

Research Objective and Questions

The research and this thesis are intended to produce insight where knowledge lacks on the development and influence of the perceptions of Cypriot citizens after the closure of the Conference on Cyprus in June-July 2017. The main Research Question (RQ) for this thesis is

derived from this objective, namely: “How do perceptions of Cypriot citizens after the Conference on Cyprus in July 2017 influence the future of the negotiations on the conflict in Cyprus?” This main RQ will be answered through several sub-questions, which are in turn answered by the analysis of qualitative in-depth interviews performed in August 2017.

As with any question, the phrasing and interpretation of this main RQ is important. The main RQ asks for in-depth knowledge concerning the influence of the perceptions of Cypriot citizens on the future of the process. It is assumed that this influence indeed exists, on the basis of the fact that an agreement by leaders will be decided by electoral majority on both sides of the DMZ in simultaneous referenda. As such, the desires of the communities must be taken into account. The importance of this fact manifested itself in the 2004 referendum and is currently acknowledged by leaders of both communities (PIO 2014).

The word ‘*how*’ is also an important part of the main RQ. Firstly, this word points at the qualitative nature of this research. While the theoretical framework partly builds on quantitative research on the same subject (Irwin 2017b), the interviews have been conducted qualitatively to uncover dynamics and reasoning behind perceptions. Secondly, asking ‘*how*’ allows for the interviews to be constructed quite broadly – spanning several themes relevant to the recent negotiations. This is required because the perceptions and the reasoning of a diverse pool of interviewees is likely extensive.

A total of five sub-questions flow from the main RQ. Their relevance and importance are addressed on by one.

(1) “To what extent are Cypriot citizens aware of the Conference on Cyprus in June-July 2017?” General awareness is important to measure, because it shows the involvement of the interviewee, and provides a basis to explore their participation. Their knowledge of the relevant international actors will also be explored.

(2) “How do Cypriot citizens perceive the presence of international and/or domestic spoilers during the Conference on Cyprus in June-July 2017?” The question on spoilers is of interest because it can be taken as an indicator of mistrust. Gauging mistrust and its development between the parties is important, because it implies skepticism towards the other side and resistance towards reunification. Because the negotiations in Crans-Montana took place behind closed doors, it is not possible to objectively determine who – if anyone – undermined the peace process, and what ‘undermining’ would entail. After the breakdown of the negotiations, the blame game went both ways (UN 2017). If the interviewee points out an undermining party, it suggests mistrust towards that side. Asking specifically about any of the identified spoiler(s) will uncover the reasoning behind these perceptions.

(3) “In what manner does the closure of the Conference on Cyprus in June-July 2017 feed into the intractability of the conflict?” Under this sub-question, general questions concerning the development of resistance to resolution after the collapse of the talks are discussed, such as: attitude on reunification, opinion on the future of Cyprus Issue after the collapse of the talks and thoughts on the possibility of a permanent division. Such questions serve the main RQ by uncovering developments surrounding resistance to resolution.

(4) “How do Cypriot citizens evaluate the possibility of a future referendum and reunification?” By asking interviewees about the future of the Cyprus Issue after the breakdown of the negotiations in July 2017, the development of important issues to reunification can be tracked. In contrast to sub-question (3), this question will solely focus on the perspective on the future.

(5) “How do Cypriots citizens evaluate CBMs for the Cyprus conflict?” Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) are a policy to bring leaders and communities closer together by creating/rebuilding trust. Irwin (2017b) polled the popularity of several specific CBMs among the Cypriot population. By discussing such concrete steps for building trust, willingness to

negotiate and compromise can be explored. Any recent developments in the interviewees' stances surrounding this topic are also discussed.

All in all, the main RQ and its sub-questions will guide the research and the thesis. The conclusion of this thesis will answer these five sub-questions in order to come to a comprehensive answer for the main RQ.

Theoretical Framework

In any conflict, there is a range of factors and perspectives to consider in understanding and theoretically framing a particular conflict. Therefore, four major themes will be discussed in this *Theoretical Framework* in order to comprehensively cover the Cyprus Issue: (1) the rise of ethno-nationalist categories; (2) the concept of intractability; (3) de facto statehood; and (4) perceptions of Cypriot citizens. The significance of each of these themes is shortly covered.

Firstly, the relevance of the rise of *ethno-nationalist* categories is explored. Clearly, in Cyprus the parties are split over their ethnic differences. Today, the two main ethnicities – Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot – live in their respective homogenous entities. Each of these entities is de facto governed by a separate government and are split by the buffer zone, monitored by UNFICYP. Currently, the negotiations still center largely around these categories, with leaders representing the interests of their respective communities. It is important to trace the development of these categories through history in order to understand their current meaning for the communities on the island. In a literature review, the development of these categories is traced during the period after the Second World War – when these ethnic cleavages gained salience – until the last round of negotiations in July 2017.

Secondly, the notion of *intractability* is explored. This notion encompasses specific qualities of a given conflict that makes it extremely resistant to resolution. Such conflicts are protracted beyond a single generation, have experienced various failed resolution attempts and are destructive. This perspective is relevant because many attempts at reunification have been made and the conflict in Cyprus is protracted; in existence in roughly the same format for the last 40+ years. The literature used helps in understanding and framing the conflict on the island.

Thirdly, the matter of *de facto statehood* will be discussed. Unrecognized states exist throughout the world. Such ‘states’ are present on the territory of, for instance, various post-Soviet states, Somalia and of course Cyprus. Much has been written about the durability of and negotiations with this type of states. This literature is highly appropriate considering the fact that contemporary negotiations focus on disbanding the unrecognized Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus in favor of a reunified, federal state. Studying this body of literature gives us an opportunity to learn from other examples, to see what negotiations with an unrecognized entity entail and where incentives for reunification exist.

Fourthly, and lastly, the *perceptions* of Cypriot citizens will be addressed. Because Cypriot citizens on both sides of the DMZ can decide on any future deal by popular vote, they are crucial to take into account. As such, they form the core of the research. In combination with the first three themes this core comprehensively describes the Cyprus Issue in a way it informs the methods of this research.

1. The Rise of Ethno-Nationalist Categories and Recent Negotiations

Although this research focuses on contemporary issues and perceptions of the future of the Cyprus Issue, the recent history of Cyprus is crucial to take into account. As a protracted/frozen conflict, many of the geographic, political and ethnic realities that define the Cyprus Issue today, directly relate to events in the past. Of particular importance are the events leading up to the end of British colonialism in 1960, the consociational system that followed between 1960 and 1963, a period of intercommunal violence, and the Turkish invasions of 1974. The development of ethnic tensions that meanders through these events resulted in the situation as we know it today. Contemporary ethnic strife and attempts to resolve it can only be fully understood by looking at the timeline of the recent history of Cyprus.

Although the reality of the conflict in Cyprus ever since the mid-1950s is obviously centered around the ethno-nationalistic categories of Greek Cypriot (GC) and Turkish Cypriot (TC) identities (Adamides & Constantinou 2012, 3), it is not clear when these terms exactly came to prominence. Extensive cultural and political influence from both (Ancient) Greece and the Ottoman Empire is riddled throughout the history of the island, as well as influences from other powers such as the Venetians, Persians, Egyptians and the British. Thanks to its strategic location, the island of Cyprus has been invaded, conquered and colonized by whatever regional party was dominant at the time (Library of Congress 1993, 224). Still, violent clashes between the two communities first came about during and right after British colonial rule (Hatzivassiliou 2005). British rule started in 1874 – when the island was leased from the Ottoman Empire – and lasted until 1960, when independence was granted.

Loizides points to the rise of the respective association to the Turkish and Greek motherlands as the basis for nationalist projects during British rule. In the late 19th century, linkages between Greek Cypriots and the Greek mainland intensified: “They increasingly saw their destinies as linked to the ancient Hellenic past of Cyprus and their future to its revival through unification with Greece. Politicized forms of Greek nationalism resulted from resentment of British colonialism” (Loizides 2007, 174).

After the Second World War, British colonial rule became increasingly contested as Greek Cypriots actively voiced their calls for self-determination. Before the end of the 1940s, such calls were characterized by demonstrations from both sides and respective nationalist projects. (Loizides 2007, 175). Under the continuing British colonial rule, a Greek nationalist movement came to the fore that intended to forcibly rid the island of its colonial rule.

Loizides notes that nationalist projects of Turkish Cypriots had a different source: “nationalism has been driven by reaction to Greek Cypriot demands, insecurity, and fears of marginalization” (2007, 174). Loizides makes his point by quoting former Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktaş’ analogies, in which he compared the Turkish Cypriots to their “co-ethnics in Crete and the Balkan”, while voicing the concern that Turkish Cypriots might suffer the same fate as them (Loizides 2007, 174). In other words, despite the different sources of their nationalist movements, both narratives were fixed on claimed ties to their respective motherlands. For Greek Cypriots nationalists this meant union with Greece; the so-called *Enosis*. For Turkish Cypriot nationalists, this meant partition of the island; *Taksim*. Denktaş explained this connection with clear nationalist rhetoric:

I am Child of Anatolia. Everything on me is Turkish. My roots are in Central Asia. I am Turkish in my language, culture and history. My country is my motherland. Cyprus culture, Turkish Cypriots, Greek Cypriots, a common state, all these are nonsense. The Greek Cypriots are Byzantium, they are Greeks, we are Turks. They have their Greece and we have our Turkey. Why should we live under the same state?

(Loizides 2007, 172)

Through intelligence operations and investigations, the British colonial authorities set out to undermine nationalist sentiments of self-determination on the island, but they could not prevent the founding of the Greek Cypriot nationalist movement of EOKA in 1955 (Dimitrakis 2008, 378). EOKA sought unity with the Greek Motherland – *Enosis* – and formally declared its existence in 1955 under the leadership of Georgios Grivas. In April 1955, EOKA started to bomb British installations. Later that year, Grivas gave explicit orders to target British military personnel (Dimitrakis 2008, 378).

Initially, EOKA promised to not target the Turkish Cypriot community, but the Turkish Cypriot leadership proposed the partitioning of the island (Loizides 2007, 175). In response to the Greek Cypriot nationalists, an armed Turkish Cypriot movement known as TMT was founded in 1958 that sought the partition of the island: *Taksim* (Papadakis 2008, 130). EOKA now started to target Turkish Cypriots that were thought to be collaborating with the British (Loizides 2007, 175). The end of the 1950s was marked by provocative rhetoric, rioting and violent attacks on both sides.

In response to increased violence along ethno-nationalist lines, a settlement was sought: “In 1958 communal violence occurred, when the Turkish Cypriot armed organization, the TMT, manipulated attacks against the Greek Cypriots, trying to prove that partition was the only possible solution. It was in the midst of this upheaval, in February 1959, that Greece and Turkey agreed to the establishment of an independent Cyprus” (Hatzivassilliou 2005, 523).

In addition to Greece, Turkey and the UK, representatives from both Cypriot communities joined the discussions on an impending independence of Cyprus. They agreed on three important documents: The Constitution of an independent Republic of Cyprus, the Treaty of Guarantee and the Treaty of Alliance. These documents entailed a format of an independent bi-communal Cyprus that was provided as a blanket solution to independence struggle and ethnic anxieties.

The 1960 Constitution addressed *Enosis* and *Taksim* by making both unconstitutional (Adamides & Constantinou 2012, 3-4; Cyprus Constitution 1960, Art. 185). It also defined the President of the Republic as a Greek Cypriot and the Vice-President as a Turkish Cypriot. Both of these offices held veto-powers on issues such as defense, security and foreign policy (Cyprus Constitution 1960, Art. 57) in order to meet communal anxieties. Anxieties were further addressed by expanding the consociational arrangement throughout the rest of the state apparatus. A ratio of 7:3 – respectively GC:TC – was ingrained in the representation of ministerial positions, representatives in parliament, armed forces, government employees and even in the time allotment for radio and television broadcasts (Cyprus Constitution 1960, Art. 46; Art.62; Art. 123; Art. 171).

The Treaty of Guarantee set out to ensure the territorial integrity and independence of Cyprus. Art. 4 of that treaty grants the power to all three of the Guarantor Powers – UK, Turkey and Greece – to intervene if the integrity, sovereignty or independence of Cyprus is in jeopardy (Adamides & Constantinou 2012, 4). The Treaty of Guarantee is still in effect today, meaning that the United Kingdom, Turkey and Greece formally remain guarantor powers.

The Treaty of Alliance outlines provisions according to which Greece and Turkey place contingents of respectively 950 and 650 military personnel on Cyprus. It also gives the President and Vice-President the authority to jointly request an increase or reduction of the contingents. Upon the independence of Cyprus on August 16th, 1960, these three documents came into effect. Together, the three documents addressed ethnic tensions and provided guarantees for both communities, and they ought to have formed a solid basis for a stable and independent state.

However, the constitutional guarantees and the considerations underlying them quickly proved unhelpful: “Resentment within the Greek Cypriot community arose because Turkish Cypriots were given a larger share of government posts than the size of their population warranted” (Library of Congress 1993, XXII). If anything, the 1960 Constitution and its consociational arrangement rapidly put communities in a deadlock. In 1961, Turkish Cypriot MPs blocked much-needed tax legislation over issues of municipal authority (Hatzivassilou 2005, 525). In 1963, President Makarios attempted to revise the Constitution extensively, in order to overcome government deadlock, but Turkey rejected his proposal. Less than a month later intercommunal clashes began in events known as ‘Bloody Christmas’ (Hatzivasilliou

2005, 527). Both communities blamed each other of starting the clashes that could no longer be contained (Boyd 1966, 3).

In late 1963 and early 1964, hundreds were killed, and many others were wounded, kidnapped or harassed, with Turkish Cypriots as the main victims of these actions. As a consequence, many Turkish Cypriots fled into enclaves (Fisher 2001, 310).

In 1964, UNFICYP was established, tasked with “preserving international peace and security, to use its best efforts to prevent a recurrence of fighting” (UNSCR 186; UNmissions 2017b). Meanwhile, Turkish Cypriot enclaves formed a type of proto-states that were increasingly able to provide defense and manage their own affairs, with Turkish military assistance. Between 1968 and 1971, Turkish Cypriot leader Denktaş sought to formalize these enclaves within the Constitution (Fisher 2001, 314).

In 1974, the Greek military Junta attempted to violently force *Enosis* into reality by staging a coup d'état. Shortly after, Turkish Cypriot enclaves were attacked (Fisher 2001, 311). The coup on July 15, 1974, drove President Makarios into exile. Nikos Sampson was installed as leader of Cyprus (Dimitrakis 2008, 387) and the Hellenic Republic of Cyprus was proclaimed. Five days later, Turkish armed forces invaded the island, citing concerns for the protection of the Turkish Cypriot minority (Fouskas 2001, 98; Fisher 2001, 311). Turkish leadership claimed the invasion to be a legal response to the coup, invoking the provision in the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee that gave the right to intervene if the independence of Cyprus was threatened.

In the early hours of July 20, 1974, Turkey launched *Operation Atilla*. Turkish armed forces established a beachhead in the coastal town of Kyrenia (Fisher 2001, 311). In a matter of three days Turkish forces were able to form a wide corridor from Kyrenia towards the capital of Nicosia. Negotiations on this crisis started quickly, but on August 12, 1974, a deadlock in the negotiations was reached. Two days later, a second invasion was launched by Turkish troops, resulting in the occupation of 37% of the territory of Cyprus (Fouskas 2001, 99). Ever since August 1974, the Turkish-occupied territories of the Republic of Cyprus and the area where the Republic of Cyprus exercises effective sovereignty have been divided by a buffer zone known as the ‘Green Line’, monitored by international troops, UNFICYP.

During the period of intercommunal violence and the subsequent coup and invasion, approximately 210,000 people were uprooted and left their houses and other property behind, becoming Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) (Sert 2010, 238). The uprooting of large portions of both communities formed the basis for the creation of two ethnic homogenous entities. The homogenous entity for Greek Cypriots is the area where the Republic of Cyprus has effective control; south of the DMZ. North of the DMZ, an ethnically homogenous Turkish Cypriot population resides.

After the invasions, the subsequent division of the island and the creation of ethnically homogenous areas, clashes came to a halt. In 1983, the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) was declared, with TC Rauf Denktaş as its first President. Until today, the international community regards the territory to which the TRNC claims sovereignty as occupied. The exception here is Turkey, the only country that has recognized the TRNC. Turkey is also the only country that does not recognize the Republic of Cyprus (Adamides & Constantinou 2012, 4). The UNSC regarded the move by Turkish Cypriot authorities to declare an independent state as detrimental to the situation in Cyprus, and considered the declaration of independence invalid (UNSCR 541).

Despite this violent history and the seemingly irreconcilable entities, negotiations have been going on for years to achieve reconciliation between the communities in the form of a joint future. This decades-long process of negotiations between the two sides has been characterized by cycles of breakthroughs and breakdowns. A notable example of such a cycle

is the 2004 Annan plan, in which then UNSG Kofi Annan mediated ‘The Comprehensive Settlement of the Cyprus Issue’ which entailed a future ‘United Cyprus Republic’.

This nearly 200 page long ‘Annan Plan’ was – as its name suggests – a comprehensive settlement. It addressed key issues in legal detail, such as: compensation for loss of property, the relationship between Constituent States and the Federal State, transitional security arrangements and even prescribed etiquette for the flag raising ceremony were the agreement to be signed by representatives of the parties involved (Annan Plan 2004). In 2004, this deal for reunification was put up for a referendum within both Cypriot communities.

Although the Turkish Cypriots voted in favor of the plan with a majority of 65%, the Greek Cypriot community rejected it with 76% of voters opposing the settlement (Adamides & Constantinou 2012, 4). As defined by the Annan Plan itself, this meant that the entire Foundation Agreement was ‘null and void’ and had no ‘legal effect’ (Annan Plan 2004, 137). In other words, the Greek Cypriot no-vote meant that the entire plan was discarded, and sent the leaders back to the drawing board.

Tracing the evolution of the Cyprus Issue and the negotiations surrounding it, it becomes clear that the Cyprus Issue is very resistant to resolution. Even before the Annan Plan was put up for referendum this resistance was described:

Throughout mediation, at a number of points when one side accepted the UN proposals, the other side would balk, almost as if a settlement acceptable to the other had to be suspect or not good enough. When modifications were made to redress the concerns, the first party would now remove its acceptance, even though the substance had changed little. Such failures and frustrations in negotiations then become additional issues in the conflict, enabling the parties yet again to blame the other side, adding to escalation and intractability. This highly competitive, suspicious, and adversarial approach to negotiations focused on self-interests and hardened positions demonstrates the inappropriateness of traditional negotiation and mediation in emerging and escalating identity-based conflicts.
(Fisher 2001, 322)

This statement by Fisher should be noted as one of the core reasons why after decades of negotiation and mediation the problem in Cyprus still persists; both sides show tendencies to shy away when the prospect of reunification becomes real. Such behavior points to the notion of intractability; an intrinsic characteristic of the Cyprus Issue.

2. Intractable Conflict

The notion of intractability has been variously defined. In short, what is meant by intractability, is a quality of conflicts that causes extreme resistance to resolution. A development in intractability can thus be regarded events that change the resistance to conflict. This development can entail discrete events such as a rejection of a referendum, but also large-scale transitions such as the socialization of new generation.

Exploring this concept will not only aid in understanding the processes of intractability, but also helps to comprehend the current status-quo in Cyprus in general. Many authors that have written on the Cyprus Issue incorporate the notion of intractability and its protracted nature to explain its perseverance (Coleman et al. 2007; Adamides & Constantinou 2012; Hadjipavlou 2007; Bar-Tal 2017; Library of Congress 1993). The rich literature on intractability relates to the Cyprus Issue in a variety of ways. This thesis too, will draw on this

notion and relate it to the issue at hand in order to explain positions and perceptions within the conflict.

2.1 Defining and Applying Intractability

One of the most frequently used definitions of intractability is the one given by Kriesberg (2005). According to Kriesberg, the notion of intractability revolves around at least the following three elements: protraction, failed resolution attempts and destructiveness (2005, 66). These elements are explained in the following and then applied to the case of Cyprus. This allows to assess the value of Kriesberg's definition for explaining and characterizing the Cyprus Issue.

Firstly, the element of protraction is dealt with. What timeframe exactly constitutes a 'protracted conflict' is subject to discussion. Any specific absolute timeframe is likely to be arbitrary to some extent – at the very least not guaranteeing applicability throughout the spectrum of intractable conflicts. As such, a concrete timeframe – or even an approximation thereof – will always be the subject of debate.

However, Kriesberg considers large-scale social conflicts as protracted if they last longer than a 'social generation' as it "indicates that the parties in the conflict are likely to have learned and internalized reasons to continue their fight with each other" (Kriesberg 2005, 66-67). Bar-Tal explains this acclimatization over time similarly: "Intractable conflicts persist for a long time, at least a generation, which means that at least one generation did not know another reality" (2007, 1432).

Bar-Tal continues by demonstrating that the socialization of a new generation into the conflict leads to further institutionalization of the conflict. He argues that socialization of the structures that make up the conflict takes place through child-rearing and other communication channels such as mass media and history books. This has significant effects: "By adulthood, many members share the same beliefs, attitudes, values, and emotions. As a result, they have a similar experience of reality and tend to endorse or take a similar course of action" (Bar-Tal 2007, 1445). As such, antagonism towards the other party is likely to be repeated by a new generation that has never known life without the conflict.

This first crucial element of protraction therefore entails resistance to resolution as new generations continue to be raised within the parameters of conflict and become accustomed to it. Bar-Tal's and Kriesberg's insights make clear how protraction matters and reifies intractability. In short, socializing a new generation within the framework of the conflict and its corresponding antagonist positions stacks the odds against successful resolution.

Secondly, the element of failed resolution attempts is discussed. There are three readily identifiable layers to this element that relate to resistance to resolution – or intractability. (1) The first is an *implication*: repeatedly failed negotiations between parties prove by definition that the conflict is resistant to resolution. Repeated attempts at peace have proven fruitless and imply resistance – whatever the cause for such resistance may be. (2) The second layer is a *consequence* of this: repeated failures of negotiations "discourage new attempts and constitute a burden of mistrust to be overcome" (Kriesberg 2005, 73). In such cases, critical politicians and citizens point to the failure of previous attempts to resolve differences and display their lack of confidence for a resolution this time, making it harder to restart peace efforts. (3) The third layer of this element is a *suspicion*. It is argued that moves towards peace are often made in expectation that the adversary will reject it. For instance, by formulating extreme demands that are not expected to be fulfilled, the party making these demands can appear conciliatory while not actually being ready or open for resolution at all. "They are actually made to mobilize constituency support or to demonstrate to allies and observers that the other side is the obstacle to a peaceful resolution of the conflict" (Kriesberg 2005, 72).

It is imperative to keep in mind the implication, consequence and suspicions regarding protracted conflicts and their contribution to resistance to resolution, as it is clear that these levels relate to intractability; by implication, consequence and by suspicion, failed resolution attempts often amplify resistance to resolution.

The third and last element of the notion of intractability is destructiveness. Although destructiveness could be regarded just by looking at direct casualties, our understanding of conflict should be more colored. After all, in many cases around the world, casualties or physical violence between conflicting sides can be staved off for years while the case can still be qualified as a destructive conflict. Examples include India versus Pakistan (Kriesberg 2005, 73) and South Korea versus North Korea. While large-scale open conflict between the various sides may not occur for years, they still distrust each other and maintain the capability to escalate into large-scale violent clashes. Clearly, conflict is more than physical violence and casualties. In this respect, the definition of destructiveness is not embodied by casualties versus no casualties, but destructiveness versus constructiveness.

For any conflict resolution concerning intractable conflict to be effective, the prime aim should be to make conflicts more tractable and more prone to resolution. According to Burgess and Burgess (2006, 183), moving the dynamics of intractable conflict from a destructive format towards a constructive format makes them more tractable. Kriesberg also addresses this aim of transforming intractable conflict from destructive to constructive. Here, sides jointly resolve the conflict, instead of continuing unilateral attempts to impose a settlement. An example of such an outreach between conflicting sides is a Confidence Building Measure (CBM) (Kriesberg 2005, 92). A CBM is a symbolic gesture that demonstrates willingness to negotiate, and can constitute a variety of activities, e.g.: informing the other side about military exercises, the exchange of captives or cultural events. In a nutshell, joint resolution implies leaving zero-sum perceptions behind and recognizing the perspective of the antagonists as well as one's own (Burgess & Burgess 1996, 310-319).

Now that these three elements – protraction, failed resolution attempt and destructiveness – have been defined and presented, their interrelationships are also important to take into account. Kriesberg sums this up neatly: “a destructively conducted struggle tends to be prolonged and the target of many failed peacemaking efforts. Similarly, as a conflict goes on, it is likely to be waged increasingly destructively and with more unsuccessful efforts to end it” (Kriesberg 2005, 68). To complement these two statements with the last element of failed peacemaking efforts, failed peacemaking intrinsically protracts conflict and it most likely frustrates the leadership as well as the population, possibly making conflict more destructive.

The concept of intractability is applied to the case of Cyprus, one element at the time. The first element of protraction is certainly identifiable in Cyprus. Although the conflict in Cyprus has evolved over time – with a decrease in violence and negotiations becoming a reality – the essence of two ethno-nationalist categories has persisted over half a century. New generations have been socialized in a divided society within the ethno-nationalist frameworks and may consider these categories as normal. Protraction is present within the Cyprus Issue, encompassing both the definitions of Bar-Tal (2007) and Kriesberg (2005).

The second element of failed resolution attempts is also present within the Cyprus Issue, as is addressed the previously quoted statement of Fisher (2001). This observation of Fisher was made before the down-voted Annan Plan in 2004 and the numerous rounds of negotiations and meetings that followed. Failed resolution attempts are of importance as they frustrate new attempts and may point to the lack of interest or lack of perceived urgency in resolving the issue by all of the parties.

The last and third element of destructiveness is relatively opaque in the case of Cyprus. Although shots have not been fired between the sides since 1996, the Cyprus Issue has been marked by destructive characteristics rather than constructive ones. Kriesberg (2005) as well as Burgess and Burgess (2006) prescribe – among other suggestions – moving away from overt violence and learning to live and work together as a method for moving towards a more constructive tractable conflict. This prescription ideally constitutes one of the first steps towards a joint resolution.

In Cyprus, parties have moved away from violence. However, ‘working and living together’ or similar methods, only take place on a very limited scale and suspicion between the communities remains. In daily reality, most Cypriots reside and work only within ethnically homogenous entities. Indeed, only less than 1% of Turkish Cypriots is working in the south after this was made possible in 2004 (Ioannou & Sonan 2016, 3). Furthermore, both communities remain skeptical of possible first constructive steps such as various CBMs which are meant to rebuild trust (Irwin 2017b, 3-5).

Though a majority of both sides would like to see CBMs implemented, and a majority believes CBM implementation will improve chances of a successful agreement, less than 30% of both communities believes that the other side will implement many of them (Irwin 2017b, 2). All things considered, the two communities are practically separated. Furthermore – despite an obvious trust in the efficacy of CBMs themselves – skepticism regarding implementation thrives. This reflects on the leaders negotiating a settlement.

Although leaders have been at the negotiation table for years trying to build a common future for Cyprus, they have repeatedly failed. Public opinion polls show that less than 30% of Greek Cypriots will likely vote in favor of a referendum. In the north, this number is between 40 and 50% (Irwin 2017b, 6). This uncompromising statistic gives leaders an unclear mandate. As such, lack of resolution does not only iterate economic disadvantages for Turkish Cypriots in the north but also confirms antagonistic positions through frustration and mistrust that come with failure of mediation. Rather than the anticipated constructive agreements, the recent history of the Cyprus Issue is destructive instead of constructive. This shows how the last element of intractability applies to the case of Cyprus.

With these three elements and their application in hand, the second part of this section focuses on additional explanations and literature to complement and contrast the definition as presented above.

2.2 Complementing The Definition

The case of Cyprus cannot solely be understood by the definition of Kriesberg (2005) and some other authors. The theoretical understanding of intractability in Cyprus is complemented with a range of authors. For this purpose, authors who have written on the subject will be presented and evaluated with an occasional critical note.

There are other dimensions that are not considered by Kriesberg (2005) that require focus. Four elements of intractability deserve special attention here: socio-economic causes, socio-psychological foundations, military and political influence and intractability as an equilibrium. Each of these elements sheds another light on the notion of intractability in general and intractability in Cyprus in particular.

2.2.1 Socio-Economic Causes; A Comfortable Conflict

Adamides and Constantinou (2012) note an essential feature of resolution in Cyprus. In the Republic of Cyprus (RoC), many social rights are currently in place. In addition, the RoC scores a ‘very high’ on the Human Development Index (HDI) (UNDP 2016, 198) despite the consequences of the 2012-2013 Cypriot banking crisis. This means that for citizens of the RoC,

there are little socio-economic incentives to rejoin with the northern part, as reunification would not change their ability to perform in international trade or expand their rights. In other words, the socio-economic benefits for the RoC derived from a potential reunification are perceived to be rather limited (Adamides & Constantinou 2012, 2).

Instead, reunification into a format of a federal bi-zonal state, might even limit some rights that are in place within the RoC today. Indeed, a reunified federal state would likely include legal recognition for the other community in terms of special statuses and exceptions. Apart from rights, it is perceived that a reunification threatens the relatively comfortable situation that is currently in place in the south. A reunification entails an anxious blend of conflicting discourses and unpredictable shifts in policy (Adamides & Constantinou 2012, 2), which could hurt the economy.

Given the expectation of limited gains and potential risks to the comfortable situation, it is difficult to explain to the electorate why a reunification is favorable. This is especially true given the impact after failed negotiations for the average citizen:

They have failed a number of times before and life went on for Cypriots who continued to socially and economically prosper. This increasingly leads to international fatigue and loss of interest about the Cyprus Issue. It also leads to a disturbing conservative tendency among Cypriot politicians and people who pronounce the benefits of a settlement, but in reality feel easier with 'the devil they know' and consequently seem to handle better potential failure in negotiations than the 'risk' of success.

(Adamides & Constantinou 2012, 2)

Adamides & Constantinou address the international and domestic perception that not a lot seems to be at stake if peace talks fail. As stated in the quote above, the comfortability of the conflict in Cyprus has deprived the situation of attention. They further observe cynicism regarding the Cyprus Issue: “The joke at UN headquarters—where the termination of UN involvement on the island has been floated on numerous occasions—is that UNFICYP currently operates in a holiday zone [rather] than a conflict zone and that it engages more in beach-keeping than peace-keeping” (Adamides & Constantinou 2012, 2).

Regarding socio-economic comfort, it has to be noted that the statistics do not show an equal picture across the island. The economies of the RoC and the TRNC are distinctly different. The economic isolation of the unrecognized state TRNC has profound effects on its population: “The Turkish Cypriot economy is to a large extent isolated from the rest of the world and has only indirect access to the global economy via Turkey” (Ioannou & Sonan 2016, 5). Thus, for the TRNC and Turkish Cypriots, a major economic incentive for reunification for the TRNC and Turkish Cypriots is gaining direct access to the global market.

The current state of the TRNC economy is characterized by a high dependency on Turkish aid (Feridun 2014, 500) and structurally high youth unemployment (Ioannou & Sonan 2016, 5-6). In fact, Greek Cypriots have a GDP per capita that is three to four times higher than the Turkish Cypriots (Kolstø 2006, 728; Hadjipavlou 2007, 360). Reunification holds the key for Turkish Cypriots to become part of an internationally recognized state, inducing a more attractive trade position. In addition, a reunited island would fundamentally change the aid dependency of the Turkish Cypriot population.

Consequently, in terms of socio-economic causes of intractability in Cyprus, the perception of ‘comfortability of the conflict’ is likely shared by Greek Cypriots only. Here, the

status-quo of an intractable division is preferred over reunification, while Turkish Cypriots would stand to gain from a reunified country with full access to a global market.

2.2.2 Socio-Psychological Foundations

Related to socio-economic causes are the so-called 'socio-psychological foundations' that can be observed in any intractable conflict. Also in this case, there is a threshold that makes the conflict resistant to resolution. This concept of socio-psychological foundations is discussed based on the article by Daniel Bar-Tal (2007), who first wrote extensively about this topic as a framework for examining the dynamics of intractable conflicts. Bar-Tal addresses the psychological infrastructure that feeds and sustains exclusion, maintains identities, allows dealing with trauma and legitimizes immoral acts. This notion will be applied to the case of Cyprus, by utilizing the article by Yiannis Papadakis (2008) who analyzed Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot history books and their contribution to nationalism and self-victimization.

Socio-psychological foundations of intractable conflicts (Bar-Tal 2007) encompass the entirety of socio-psychological mechanisms and functions that allow members of societies in intractable conflicts to cope with their situation. Quite simply put, such mechanisms are created in order to meet psychological needs that are deprived for an extended period of time during conflict (Bar-Tal 2007, 1434). Clearly, within intractable conflicts, many negative effects exist for the people exposed to it, such as stress, fear of the opposing group, loss of life and lack of resources. Successfully constructing such mechanisms allows individuals to withstand the opposing group.

Bar-Tal describes the intriguing mechanism of *collective memory* that underlies an intractable conflict. Collective memory provides a given group with a "meaningful and coherent picture of the past". It should be noted that such beliefs are functional to the present, rather than providing an objective representation of the past (Bar-Tal 2007, 1437).

This functional construction neglects and omits particular facts and inserts doubtful or disputed events. They are, however, treated as truthful accounts and are relayed into society by for instance history books. Omission and insertion are exposed by the contradictory accounts of history, as narrated by opposing parties (Bar-Tal 2007, 1438). Within both parties, collective memory addresses at least the following items: justification of the outbreak and development of the conflict, positive image of the self, delegitimization of the opponent and self-victimization. In a nutshell, collective memory is to some extent a 'chosen trauma' (Bar-Tal 2007, 1438).

There is a range of functions the collective memory serves. Firstly, it functions as a provision of the psychological need for comprehending an unpredictable and often dangerous situation: "In view of ambiguity and unpredictability, individuals must satisfy the need for a comprehensive understanding of the conflict, which provides a coherent and predictable picture of the situation" (Bar-Tal 2007, 1441). Following Bar-Tal's logic, the need for predictability is met by a historical narrative in which a party's suffering is explained by inherent antagonism.

Secondly, such socio-psychological foundations function as motivating factors for solidarity. The unity this brings about is important to withstand the threat from the opposing party (Bar-Tal 2007, 1443) and serves to channel mistrust. Instead of unpredictability and suspicions, a collective history serves to identify opposing groups and allows to aim group behavior.

Ultimately, over the years of protracted conflict, a negative association with the out-group is legitimized and institutionalized. As Bar-Tal puts it, "This negative repertoire is thus individually stored, frozen, and continuously accessible. Because most of the members of the society in conflict are involved with it (actively or passively, directly or indirectly), this repertoire is often widely shared, especially during its intractable stage" (Bar-Tal 2007, 1444).

This repertoire is communicated by means of books, films and other mass media throughout society and also transferred to a newer generation. A new generation will be socialized within a similar antagonistic framework, which completes the cycle of institutionalization. According to a recent study by Bar-Tal et al. this ‘political socialization’ occurs at an extremely young age, where children between the ages of three and six accurately identify antagonists, display prejudices towards them and recognize relevant symbols, marches and violence (2017, 419-420).

Bar-Tal notes that while all of this enables adaptation to harsh conditions within conflict settings, it also encourages resistance towards alternative narratives that may help resolution: “Involvement in intractable conflict tends to ‘close minds’ and stimulate tunnel vision, which excludes incongruent information and alternative approaches to the conflict” (Bar-Tal 2007, 1447). This institutionalized skepticism of facts contradicting a given historical narrative causes resistance to new approaches. Such resistance to new approaches causes resistance to resolution.

Next, the socio-psychological framework as presented above is applied to the case of Cyprus based on Papadakis’ research (2008) on history teaching. Much like Bar-Tal, Papadakis notes that “in many societies, especially those divided through ethnonational conflicts, history is often used to propagate a narrative focusing on the suffering of the nation and to legitimate its political goals” (Papadakis 2008, 128). In Turkish Cypriot as well as Greek Cypriot textbooks, Papadakis observes nationalism that ties a community to its respective homeland, Turkey or Greece, on the basis of culture, religion, language and descent (2008, 131).

For instance, Greek Cypriot textbooks trace the history of Ancient Greece as the beginning of history towards the ‘glorious’ days during the Byzantine Empire, until finally being liberated from the ‘Turkish yoke’ (Papadakis 2008, 131-132).

According to the logic of ethnic nationalism, the Byzantines are treated as Greeks, the Ottomans are presented as Turks, with the primary schoolbook having a section on ‘The Conquest of Nicosia by the Turks’ beginning as follows: ‘It was obvious that one day the Turks would try to grab Cyprus. The way that the state of the Sultan expanded, little Cyprus appeared like a weak mouse in the claws of a wild lion.’ This sets the tone regarding the Turks who appear as an expansionist and bestially savage people.

(Papadakis 2008, 133)

Papadakis goes on to illustrate the details and images of torture and slaughter on the part of ‘the Turks’. In addition, Turkish Cypriots are often referred to as ‘Turks’, thereby equating them with hostile and bloodthirsty people (Papadakis 2008, 133).

Much like the Greek Cypriot history books, Turkish Cypriot schoolbooks follow ethno-nationalist rhetoric. Conversely however, these books depict Cyprus as being an integral part of Turkish history. Images of Atatürk as well as the Turkish, TRNC flags and anthems are depicted at the beginning of the book. Contrary to its Greek Cypriot counterpart, this history book describes the island of Cyprus as being historically and geographically connected to Anatolia, and explicitly dismisses Greek significance. In this Turkish Cypriot book, history starts after the Ottoman conquest of the island in 1571, implying that Cyprus was Turkish for over three quarters of its history (Papadakis 2008, 135). Analogous to the Greek Cypriot book, the Turkish Cypriot book contains images and detailed description of killings, mass graves and displacement of population during the period between 1963 and 1974. The invasion by Turkey

in 1974 is described as the 'Happy Peace Operation' by the 'Heroic Turkish Army' (Papadakis 2008, 136).

Looking at such stark contrasts between the two narratives, it becomes clear what the 'construction of collective memory' really means. Hinging on political socialization by texts with favorable omissions and additions, institutionalization of the conflict takes place by communication of the collective memory to the next generation. Still, according to Bar-Tal, it is vital to change the 'negative repertoire' that parties have of each other, to break the cycle of hostility and negative imagery (Bar-Tal 2007, 1447). Papadakis notes that recent editions of the Turkish Cypriot history books have opened the door for a more diverse understanding of history, in which identity is internally diverse and a result of political choice rather than an unchanging and homogenous characteristic (Papadakis 2008, 144).

Papadakis makes clear how important the contents of history books are for shaping a narrative about the 'other', and how this is institutionalized and maintained. Construction and institutionalization of a narrow narrative about the other party makes an intractable conflict resistant to solution. However, in the case of Cyprus, it seems that one party made steps to depart from monolithic understandings of identity and history, paving the way to gain mutual trust. This move may help to do away with mistrustful categories and ultimately make negotiations and reunification easier.

2.2.3 Military and Political Influence

Another important dimension of intractability in Cyprus is military and political influence. When examining the military and political situation in Cyprus, an observation promptly jumps into focus: the presence of foreign and domestic troops on the island and the DMZ separating them. This is an important fact as many forces on the island provide deterrence until this day. Firstly, understanding the presence of these forces helps in understanding the intractability of the conflict in Cyprus. Secondly, the political direction of the island within the region needs to be addressed. This will be discussed along the lines of *Pax Turca* versus *Pax Europæana*; the contemporary forced peace by Turkish occupation versus the aspired peace by seeking closer proximity to European liberal values.

Firstly, military influence is examined. The international dimension of the Cyprus Issue is frequently characterized by the sheer variety of military forces on the island from a range of international actors. A case study report describes these military actors present in Cyprus comprehensively:

The intractability of the Cyprus Issue nevertheless imposed on the island the presence of six separate military forces. As of the early 1990s, these forces included Turkish troops in the north, the Greek Army contingent in the south, the British in the two Sovereign Base Areas on the southern coast, and UNFICYP manning the buffer zone separating the two Cyprus communities. The indigenous Cypriot armed forces on the island consisted of the Greek Cypriot National Guard in the south and the Turkish Cypriot Security Force in the north.

Library of Congress 1993, 225

The protracted and frozen situation in Cyprus becomes abundantly clear from the fact that information regarding the presence and location of military parties from 25 years ago is still accurate today. Obviously, the international political and military dimension is very real in Cyprus and its impact on the strategic political landscape of the island cannot be underestimated. The Turkish troops in the north provide deterrence against the ethno-

demographically superior south, Greek and Greek Cypriot troops in the south counter the numerically superior military forces in the north, while UNFICYP keeps the previously warring parties apart. The location of the DMZ is attached to this thesis in *Appendix II*. It becomes clear how important these parties are by imagining a party pulling out: the strategic balance would alter radically and a power vacuum forms. In a nutshell, each of the parties involved provide deterrence to keep their counterparts at bay.

Although the above quote in itself gives a complete picture of the actors present, a brief critical note is needed. While it is true that there are six different military forces stationed on the island and all of them directly or indirectly relate to the Cyprus Issue, not all of them necessarily relate to intractability in Cyprus. The British troops stationed in the Sovereign Base Areas (SBAs) are there at the full discretion of the British government and the SBAs constitute sovereign British territory. Neither the Turkish Cypriots nor Greek Cypriots have asked for their full departure. Nor is the presence of the troops or the existence of the SBAs regarded as detrimental to the progress of resolution.

Though the colonial connection is obvious and relatively recent, the current presence of British troops must not be mistaken as a sword of Damocles deterring parties into compliant non-violent intractability. If anything, the current British government has been helpful in aiding the process by partaking in conferences and repeatedly offering to give up (unused) territory if that would help in finding a solution (Cyprus-Mail 2017b); British forces are currently not directly related to the perseverance of the conflict by radiating military influence towards any of the parties involved.

Moving on from British presence, the intractability of the Cyprus Issue by means of military influence over unrecognized states is discussed next. Kolstø (2006) notes several issues with the status-quo in conflicts that include unrecognized states such as the TRNC. He analyzes a range of unrecognized states, their status-quo and the roles of the international community and peacekeepers. He notes that stalled negotiations often freeze conflicts, rather than resolve them. In addition, the presence of international peacekeepers may aid state building processes of unrecognized states and inadvertently protract the conflict:

The party most likely to renew hostilities in these conflicts is the parent state, since it wants to regain lost territory. The unrecognized quasi-state is normally satisfied with holding on to the territory it has control over. For these reasons, the international peacekeepers deployed between the warring parties for all practical purposes function as additional border guard units for the quasi-state, behind which it may pursue its nation-building and other activities.

(Kolstø 2006, 734)

In short, while neutral, peacekeepers may inadvertently prolong conflicts in favor of the unrecognized state. According to this line of reasoning, the unrecognized state can focus on managing its governmental duties such as building its economy, instead of having to devote time and resources to deterring its 'parent state'. In the case of Cyprus, the TRNC is separated from the RoC by the buffer zone, patrolled and guarded by UNFIFCYP. Following the argument of Kolstø, this grants the TRNC the possibility to grow to the fullest extent possible under the circumstances.

All in all, the current composition of troops in Cyprus contributes to the intractability in several ways. First, the parties present on the island deter their opponents into non-violence. Such non-violence is monitored by the UNFICYP buffer zone. Secondly, with the ability to

perform state building activities behind the buffer zone and with support of foreign troops, incentives to promptly rejoin the RoC are diminished.

From *Pax Turca* to *Pax Europeana*

The second feature discussed under military and political influence is *Pax Turca* versus *Pax Europeana*. Adamides and Constantinou explore the Turkish military influence and European liberal aspiration along the lines of the so-called liberal peace theory.

Adamides and Constantinou see the invasion in 1974 and the current presence of Turkish troops as the forceful pacification of the island. To end this occupation, they note the aspired move from this *Pax Turca* to a liberal *Pax Europeana*. The RoC initiative to join the EU in 2004 can be seen as a manifestation of such aspiration (Adamides & Constantinou 2012, 15). This liberal peace “follows on an idealization of the EU and its liberal values that may not hold up to scrutiny”, as Greek Cypriots would likely attempt to restrict any Turkish settlers and Turkish residence on the island if Turkey would enter the European Union (Adamides & Constantinou 2012, 15).

They further make a point based on the observations of exceptionalism on both sides of the buffer zone: “Basic articles of the RoC Constitution have been suspended or modified under the doctrine of necessity in the south; a new ‘liberal’ constitution has come into being in the north that treats Greek Cypriots as ‘aliens’ and gives extra-legal power to the Turkish army” (Adamides & Constantinou 2012, 6). The authors argue that while both sides display liberal values associated with such a *Pax Europeana*, they note that such liberal values only apply to one side and therefore exclude the other side. Adamides and Constantinou dub this an ‘illiberal peace’, based on ethnocentrism (2012, 15).

Adamides and Constantinou argue that this type of mutual exclusion leads to solidification of the *Pax Turca* (2012, 16). Obviously, solidification of the *Pax Turca* – military occupation – reifies the division on the island and further strengthens the intractability of the situation in Cyprus.

2.2.4 Intractability as an Equilibrium

For this final part, the analytical framework by Coleman et al. (2007) will be discussed. It relates to many of the studies previously addressed by describing an intractable conflict as a reliable equilibrium of narrow narratives within conflict. Such narratives are similarly described by Bar-Tal, in which history teaching is actively created and a trauma may be ‘chosen’ (2007, 1436 - 1438).

Coleman et al. (2007) argue that the acclimatization to intractable conflict in itself is a cause for its protraction. They argue that intractability is a predictable equilibrium in which a small range of thoughts, feelings and attitudes exist, and alternative positions are easily rejected (Coleman et al. 2007, 1458). Trying to move away from this equilibrium – effective peacemaking – introduces a range of easily rejected new attitudes and positions. As such, discourse normally returns to its original perceptions, feelings and opinions. Hence, the equilibrium. In practice, such an equilibrium can also be regarded as the manifestation of a cycle of failed and renewed negotiations, in which only short-term changes can be expected (Coleman et al. 2007, 1458).

It is a state or a reliable pattern of changes (e.g., periodic oscillation) toward which a dynamical system evolves over time and to which the system returns after it has changed. A person or group may encounter a wide range of ideas and learn of alternative action scenarios, for example, but over time only those ideas and actions

that are consistent with destructive conflict are embraced as relevant and credible.
(Coleman et al. 2007, 1457)

This perspective relates to the dichotomy of self-victimization and extreme characterization of the ‘other’, as argued by Bar-Tal (2007, 1438). Turning an intractable destructive conflict into a negotiated tractable constructive conflict entails recognizing the other. This method is inconsistent with the extreme characterizations and narrow narratives as argued by Bar-Tal (2007) and Coleman et al. (2007) respectively.

This relates to the equilibrium of Coleman et al. by dismissing ideas and actions that are not consistent with the narrative of the conflict. In short, the small range of ideas and feelings regarding the conflict make both leaders and citizens resistant, as they are likely to dismiss newer ideas that may aid peacemaking.

2.3 An Assessment of the Intractability of Cyprus Issue

Obviously, exploring intractability in Cyprus is not a simple, one-dimensional issue. As outlined above, there are various economic, psychological, military and political aspects to the Cyprus Issue that make it resistant to resolution. This resistance has been embodied by the numerous failed attempts to reunite the island.

Recently, opinion polls (Irwin 2017b) show that in both communities less than 30% believe the other community would implement many CBMs – aimed at providing the first steps to regain trust between the communities. Clearly, trust between the sides is lacking. This lack of trust was recently also observed in the relations between the leaders. In his final report on the Conference on Cyprus UNSG Guterres noted: “While the parties were moving closer on substance, they remained far apart with respect to the trust and determination necessary to seek common ground through mutual accommodation (UNSC 2017, 6).” Leaders currently evidently mirror the same mistrust their communities have.

All in all, incentives for reunification in general are lacking in the south. Further, the two communities on the island are objectively suspicious of each other. Comprehensively incentivizing Cypriots to rejoin would not only mean create trust, but also entails addressing the various economic, psychological, military and political elements and dimensions of the Cyprus Issue. The combination of this makes the situation in Cyprus extremely resistant to resolution, indeed intractable.

3. De Facto Statehood

Unrecognized states are often characterized as grey backwaters on the brink of total anarchy. Such stereotypical depictions do have some ground in reality. Kolstø recalls the short-lived state of Chechnya: “The state institutions were pure fiction, communications were erratic at best, schools closed, stores empty, and production had ground to a halt. The only thriving businesses were smuggling, looting, and hostage-taking. People were killed for a trifle, or for no reason at all, and there was no one to deter the perpetrators” (Kolstø 2006, 728). Kolstø acknowledges that the specific example of Chechnya is an extreme case of the general lawlessness of an unrecognized state, but it does make us aware why foreign investors and international traders are cautious with unrecognized states.

The subject of the unrecognized statehood relevant to the issue in Cyprus as the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) – which comprises the homogenous entity where most Turkish Cypriots reside – is an unrecognized state. It is relevant as such states often suffer the consequences of non-recognition: “Foreign firms are wary of investing in a quasi-state since legal contracts might not be internationally binding there. Investors may also be afraid of offending the parent state, lest they be barred from trade with its normally larger market”

(Kolstø 2006, 729). In other words, Turkish Cypriots stand to gain relatively more from reunification as they would have direct access to the global market, in contrast to Greek Cypriots who arguably lose some economic advantages. Clearly, the status of non-recognition of the north is major element in the negotiations.

Therefore, it is important to consider the various authors that have published on the phenomenon in order to explore some of the incentives and calculations that exist for reunification involving a de facto state. For this purpose, first the topic of de facto states is introduced. Secondly, the status and implication of non-recognition of the TRNC is covered by looking at the effects of exclusion from the global market and incentives for joining it.

3.1 De Facto States and TRNC

The situation of internationally unrecognized statehood has been variously described. Some authors use the term of ‘de facto states’ (Pegg 1998) to contrast such states with de jure states – i.e. legally recognized. Such de facto states do in fact fill all other requirements of statehood; becoming a state in effect though not by law. Other academics use phrases like ‘quasi-states’, ‘para-states’, ‘pseudo-states’ or simply ‘unrecognized states’ (Kolstø 2006, 725) to describe this phenomenon. In addition to the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, some other examples include the Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic of Transnistria (Moldova), the Republic of Abkhazia (Georgia) and Republic of Somaliland (Somalia).

To be sure, the type of de facto states referred to in this thesis are states that do have internal sovereignty but lack external sovereignty. This means that they are not internationally recognized to be the sole representative of the territory they claim and, in fact control. Academics note that unrecognized states are often parts of states that are externally sovereign, but internally contested (Kolstø 2006, 725). Such states are frequently dubbed ‘parent states’ (Kanol & Köprülü 2017, 391; Pegg 1998, 16; Kolstø 2006, 725).

Parent states have a seat at the UN and other international organizations, yet internally, their sovereignty is disputed. By contrast, solely internally sovereign de facto states are often denied a seat at international organizations (Kolstø 2006, 725). An example of this contrast at work is the Federal Republic of Somalia which is represented with its entire territory, at for instance, the UN and the African Union, while the unrecognized Republic of Somaliland has effective control over a large part of the territory of its parent state.

De facto states are states much like any other states. They have a well-defined territory with a well-defined population. They declare and exercise authority over a given population and territory (Pegg, 1998, 1). Such states have structures marked by parliaments with political parties, codified laws, they produce means of identification for their citizens and, occasionally, their own printed currency. Still, they lack international recognition. Although the TRNC has been recognized by the Republic of Turkey, the rest of the international community does not recognize the TRNC and regards the territory it claims as occupied territories since 1974.

This international isolation has, of course, various effects on the TRNC. The TRNC, like many other de facto states, is unable to create a self-sustaining economy, as it is not able to trade directly with the outside world. As such, it is dependent on its ‘patron state’ Turkey for trade, economic aid, but also military aid (Kanol & Köprülü 2017, 390). This dependence has repercussions:

Since its founding, the TRNC has experienced economic isolation and a threat of annihilation from the parent state, which has created a huge need for economic and military resources. Turkey has offered these resources, and the TRNC has grown reliant on its patronage, but it has not come without a cost. The TRNC’s internal

politics have been highly susceptible to Turkey's demands.
(Kanol & Köprülü 2017, 398)

Considering the effects of the combination of economic and political isolation from the outside world and dependency on its patron state, Turkey, the TRNC has every reason to seek reunification with its parent state, the Republic of Cyprus (RoC). For many Turkish Cypriots, the Cyprus Issue is simply not a 'comfortable conflict'. Therefore, it is argued that the isolated position of the TRNC in itself is a principal driving force for the Turkish Cypriot authorities to partake in the negotiations. In the next section, TRNC's efforts to alleviate the situation in the north by either settlement or recognition are explored.

3.2 Status and Implications of Non-Recognition of TRNC

In this part, three issues are considered. Firstly, the meaning and objective of non-recognition in the case of the TRNC are explored. It will be argued that the TRNC enjoys limited recognition and is ultimately incapable of achieving full recognition. As such, resolution is the only way forward. Secondly, the implementation of EU *acquis* is considered. When the RoC joined the EU in 2004, the entirety of its territory joined, including the occupied areas in the north. Here, the EU *acquis* was suspended leading to constrained EU involvement. These two points show how the TRNC has attempted to produce some legitimacy through both the UN and the EU. Thirdly, the impact on the people is considered, based on a study by Bryant (2014) concerning the daily effect of the situation on Turkish Cypriots.

Firstly, the objective and meaning of non-recognition of the TRNC is discussed. Practically, there are more paths to take than solely focusing on resolution by reunification. Any de facto state may attempt to achieve international recognition or an alternative producing similar results. Examples are Kosovo and Taiwan. Although they are not close to gaining recognition from all UN member states, they are still able to conduct business much like any other internationally recognized state. The independence and recognition of Eritrea shows that such projects can in fact be successful (Pegg 1998, 7).

The TRNC has worked on its recognition, employing a so-called 'limited recognition' approach: "In this case, though most countries support the isolate and embargo strategy, they realize that there can be no overall settlement of the Cyprus Issue without the Turkish Cypriots" (Pegg 1998, 7). Therefore, TRNC officials do have full access to the UN, allowing them to be on equal footing with Greek Cypriots concerning the settlement of the Cyprus Issue. However, this non-diplomatic communication is strictly confined to issues related to its settlement, and any trade questions or disputes will not be discussed (Pegg 1998, 7). In a nutshell, although the international community does not recognize the TRNC, engagement with the unrecognized republic is necessary in order to reach a settlement of the Cyprus Issue. Thus, this limited recognition is confined solely to the themes of resolution, which is why attempting to gain full recognition cannot be the way forward.

Secondly, the implementation of EU *acquis* in 2004 is addressed. This currently constitutes the closest the north has to economic ties with the European Union. The relationship between the authorities in the north and the EU can only be understood by taking a short glance at history. Ever since the RoC became independent in 1960, both Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots were considered to be its citizens. This recognition extends until today: The RoC regards Turkish Cypriots in the north as its citizens living under occupation. Historically, Turkish Cypriots were never able to make physical claims to their RoC citizenship in the shape of passports or identity cards simply because the buffer zone was closed (Bryant 2014, 131-

132). However, this changed in 2004, when checkpoints crossing the DMZ were opened up, allowing people and goods to cross (Ioannou & Sonan 2016, 5).

When the RoC joined the EU in 2004, its full territory joined – including the occupied territories in the north. This meant that Turkish Cypriots in the north joined the EU with them, becoming EU citizens in the process. Still, the EU *acquis* were suspended, meaning that European law did not come into effect. This resulted in a thorny legal situation: the full territory administered by the TRNC became EU territory, its citizens became EU citizens, but EU law did not apply.

In practice, this leads to a situation where the EU provides support by its economic and infrastructural projects, but only in a limited way. This entails a strategy of engaging with the north, without undertaking any actions that may implicitly recognize the TRNC government or legitimize the 1974 invasion. In short: *engagement without recognition* (Bryant 2014, 132-135).

This engagement without recognition proves to be difficult, as the issues of occupation and recognition are riddled throughout the dialogue. Bryant describes what this awkward position between the TRNC and EU member state Cyprus looks like in practice concerning trade crossing the DMZ:

Greek Cypriots have tended to portray anything grown or made in the north as having been grown or made on stolen Greek Cypriot lands or properties. As a result, Turkish Cypriots have often had difficulty in finding partners in the south who are willing to take their goods, except in cases where it was possible to disguise their origins. Moreover, the Green Line Regulation that controls this trade recognizes only the ports in the island's south as legal ones through which goods may be exported to Europe. In other words, although the EU has attempted to encourage trade, it does so through mechanisms that ask Turkish Cypriots to acknowledge the illegitimacy of their own means of export and sale.

(Bryant 2014, 136)

In short, the legal progress proved to be of little help in practice. 2004 was a bittersweet year for the north. Citizens became EU citizens, but in the process the RoC government effectively became a gatekeeper for foreign travel and trade (Bryant 2014, 132). The 2004 Green Line Regulation stipulated rules for the crossing of goods and persons through the DMZ – precisely for the purpose of economic development of the north – and yet, the trade crossing the buffer zone never exceeded 7 million euros (Ioannou & Sonan 2016, 5).

In sum, it is clear how and why the TRNC tried to gain international proximity. However, it only enjoys limited recognition at best, and will most likely never achieve full recognition. Further, international trade with the European Union by means of the 2004 Green Line Regulation never came to full fruition. Resolution of the division then remains the only way forward. Still, a concrete plan for reunification is not in place. This means that Turkish Cypriots are caught between a rock and a hard place; dependency on Turkey while having only limited engagement with the Republic of Cyprus, the European Union and the wider international community.

Thirdly, to assess the effects of this exclusion, the daily impact of it on Turkish Cypriots is discussed. Bryant (2014) describes what this exclusion means for the average Turkish Cypriot. She framed the situation in the north with the notion of liminality. This notion was originally developed in anthropology to describe rites of passage – e.g. temporary rituals mediating the transition towards adulthood. It can best be generalized as the middle ground

between two points of transition, often marked by confusion and inversion. As Bryant shows, it finds applicability in the case of the TRNC:

The two projects of recognition and reunification both failed. Although international actors still cling to hopes for a negotiated settlement, Cypriots on both sides of the island have been skeptical for some years now. Turkey's economic and regional rise, Greece's financial catastrophe, the meltdown of south Cyprus's banks, and systemic crisis in the EU have all contributed to Turkish Cypriots' current sense that there is nowhere else for them to turn. If liminality is a transition phase, Turkish Cypriots now do not know what stage will follow that transition. This makes their liminality appear indefinite, leaving them in a state of uncertainty. Belirsizlik, the Turkish word for uncertainty, is how Turkish Cypriots invariably describe their state, their identity, and their quotidian existence. One columnist, for instance, called northern Cyprus "the country of uncertainty," remarking, "Is there any other people, society, or tribe in the world that for more than half a century has asked 'I wonder if there will be a solution?' and declared every year 'The Year of Peace'? What kind of never-ending torment is this?"
(Bryant 2014, 133)

The predicament of the Turkish Cypriots in the north extends well beyond emotional and psychological implications of liminality; the cycle of hopelessness and insecurity as displayed above correspond to the economy and the international political dimension of the north as outlined before.

As with any de facto state, the creation, the context of its rise and its current existence is the subject of criticism and legal debate. It is clear this is wreaking havoc on the economy in the north, by means of exclusion and dependency. Moves to cope with the effects have been successful in a limited fashion. Political recognition will most likely never happen, and the impact of building economic relations with the EU has been minimal. De facto statehood exacerbates the situation in the north and incentivizes leaders and the population in the north to cooperate with the negotiations, as it is in their own interest to live in a state with the benefits of international recognition.

4. Perceptions of Cypriot citizens

In addition to the international legal dimension, the perceptions, opinions and feelings of Cypriot citizens matter at least as much since any possible future agreement is destined to require electoral approval on both sides of the DMZ. In combination with the background provided by the three previous subjects on ethno-nationalist categories, intractability and de facto statehood, the subject of perceptions can be comprehensively addressed. Issues of intractability, feelings of hopelessness and cynicism about the future of the Cyprus Issue are addressed first. Secondly, as an antidote to such negative perceptions, Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) are explored. The value of CBMs are considered by assessing recent quantitative research among the Cypriot population concerning the Cyprus Issue. For this purpose, research by Irwin (2017b) is discussed. Irwin found a rise in skepticism after negative press coverage due to an earlier failure of talks (Irwin 2017b, 5-6).

4.1 Intractability – Cycle of Hope and Hopelessness

As has been argued before, conflicts remain unresolved when at least one relevant party does not feel the urgency to resolve the conflict. If that is the case, the status-quo can be perpetuated,

regardless of whether or not other parties involved feel that urgency. The key for a joint resolution therefore lies in both parties realizing that a joint future outweighs maintaining the status-quo. This means that both parties need to understand the negative effects of conserving the current status. This is precisely what happened in 2014.

On February 11, 2014, the leaders of both communities came together and put out a joint statement explicitly acknowledging this realization: “The status-quo is unacceptable and its prolongation will have negative consequences for the Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots” (PIO 2014). This acknowledgment was the basis for an intention to work together in a result-oriented manner. Therefore, to facilitate the process, both leaders committed to avoiding negative commentary and/or a blame game (PIO 2014).

In 2015, a Turkish Cypriot leader in the north, Mr. Akıncı, was elected as President of the TRNC. Alongside his counterpart, Greek Cypriot leader Mr. Anastasiades, the spirit of the 2014 statement was further cemented. As a sign of their commitment, the Greek Cypriot side shared the coordinates of a minefield in the north. The Turkish Cypriot side reciprocated by dropping time-consuming procedures at the crossings of the buffer zone. Both leaders further expressed their intent to host bi-communal cultural events and instructed their negotiators to work on Confidence Building Measures. The leaders expressed their shared will to reach a comprehensive settlement (UNDPA 2015). All in all, these joint moves paved the way for a period of frequent meetings between the leaders, in which they worked together on a variety of issues.

As we know now, during the 2017 Conference on Cyprus in Switzerland, the leaders came close to an agreement. As the UNSG noted: “the essence of a comprehensive settlement to the Cyprus Issue is practically there” (UNSC 2017, 10), with all the ‘core-enablers in place’. Yet, at the end of the day the leaders could not reach an agreement. Despite the steps taken, the two leaders remained far apart regarding ‘trust and determination’ (UNSC 2017, 6). Looking at the ultimate lack of result of the conference and the ensuing blame game, one might consider that more could have been done on building personal trust between the leaders, or that the focus should have been even more on refraining from negative commentary. However, looking at the lack of results from a historical point of view, it fits well within the known pattern, which is best described as a cycle of hope and hopelessness. Indeed, like clockwork, this recent era of optimism came after a period of pessimism.

Before the latest rise in hope – roughly coinciding with the 2014 and 2015 joint statements as presented above – cynicism and hopelessness were clearly present. Bryant & Yakinthou researched perceptions of the Cypriot population, and largely found negative responses. Imagining the future in 2012 was described as follows: “interviewees were almost uniformly pessimistic when asked how they imagined the future of the island in ten years’ time. Most said that they had nothing to imagine anymore, while even strong supporters of a federal solution to the island’s division remarked that the future was opaque to them” (2012, 59). Then in 2015, in the context of positive joint messages and a pro-reunification president being elected in the north, various academics hailed the new period of cautious optimism. Direkli points to the favorable mix of pro-reunification leaders of both communities that might prove to be capable of combating dominant conservative nationalists by holding renewed talks (2015, 132). In a later text, the same Bryant that found pessimism in 2014, then described the first glimpse of hope for the Turkish Cypriot community in over a decade (2015, 1).

What has been described in more detail above, has been a pattern throughout the years; the negotiations have been characterized by ups and down for decades. This pattern was observed during the 1980s and 1990s, marked by initial acceptances, then rejections of UN-facilitated deals, and the resulting halting and restarting of negotiations (Fisher 2001, 316). Even more (in)famous are the concrete hopes for comprehensive resolution in 2004 in the framework of the Annan Plan, followed by its eventual dismissal by a referendum. And of

course, the most recent round of talks is documented: the rising anticipation surrounding the talks in Switzerland in 2017, and the final closure of that conference without a mutually agreed comprehensive deal on the table. This pattern is consistent with the notions of ‘intractability as an equilibrium’ and the ‘narrow narratives’, as argued by Coleman et al. (2007).

To recap, the argument of Coleman et al. can be summed up as follows: “A person or group may encounter a wide range of ideas and learn of alternative action scenarios, for example, but over time only those ideas and actions that are consistent with destructive conflict are embraced as relevant and credible” (2008, 1458). This leads to what Coleman et al. (2008) dub ‘oscillation’, where the introduction of new ideas is eventually discredited and narratives return to their old equilibrium, in which large changes are not probable.

Over time, this can also be thought of as a cycle, in which hopes for a resolution rise, but resolution ultimately does not take place. The description of the last decades of the Cyprus peace process as outlined above, fits this cycle. It is precisely this cycle of hope and hopelessness that contributes to pessimism among the Cypriot population. This pessimism ultimately influences the path to a referendum and the voting-behavior.

But even in periods of pessimism, interviewees still do point to issues they think can improve the situation (Bryant & Yakinthou 2012). Apparently, despite a cycle of hope and hopelessness exacerbating intractability, hope for resolution is never entirely lost. That is why, after the failure of the 2017 talks, it is vital to understand concerns of citizens and what can be done to redress them. The next part therefore focuses on the recent polling of opinions regarding the implementation of CBMs and about the future of the Cyprus Issue.

4.2 Confidence Building Measures and Future of Cyprus Issue

As its name suggests, a Confidence Building Measures (CBM) is designed to gain trust between the various sides. The aim of such measures is to increase chances of successful negotiations. Recently, incentives for investing in creation of trust became quite apparent. As noted by UNSG Guterres, a ‘strategic understanding’ between the leaders existed at the 2017 Conference on Cyprus and the essence of the settlement was largely there. Still, the leaders simply lacked ‘trust and determination’ to conclude the negotiations successfully (UNSC 2017). Considering this fact, the idea to establish trust between the communities and their respective leaders gains traction.

Surely, it is not only the leaders that share suspicion or mistrust of each other; it is also present within the electorates of both communities. The need for monitoring perceptions, feelings and opinions of the Cypriot electorate becomes obvious when examining the study by Irwin (2017b) on CBMs. Irwin’s recent quantitative empirical data shows that a large majority on both sides would like to see CBMs implemented, and a large majority of both communities also think that implementation of CBMs would increase chances of a final settlement. However, less than 30% expects that their counterparts will implement many CBMs (2017b, 2). This means that despite a strong perception among the population of the efficacy and value of CBMs, the communities are simply suspicious of each other.

In short, leaders and their communities are distrustful of each other, which also had an impact at the 2017 Conference on Cyprus. This fact by itself is ample reason to invest in CBMs. In the face of a decades-long lack of the much anticipated mutually agreed comprehensive deal, the importance of creating trust by means of CBMs is recognized by various actors. Academics (Bryant & Yakinthou 2012, 82; Irwin 2017b) as well as leaders (PIO 2014; UNDP 2015) realize their value.

After the unfruitful Conference on Cyprus in June-July 2017 this has become especially important. It is conceivable that Cypriots became more skeptical of a solution – thereby possibly introducing a new period of pessimism. For instance, due to the lack of producing a comprehensive settlement, both communities might see their suspicions of the

other confirmed; perceiving them as the stubborn antagonist, ultimately unwilling to compromise to live together within a reunified country again. The first signs of a new rise in skepticism are already observable.

According to Irwin (2017b), after the first part of the Conference on Cyprus in February 2017, Cypriots became more skeptical of a solution. Irwin notes: “The Greek Cypriot vote for an agreement went down a little in February due to a negative press following the failed negotiations in Switzerland and then the breakdown of negotiations also indicated a slight shift to ‘no’ from ‘undecided’. Our most recent poll in March does not indicate any recovery in the ‘yes’ vote or further shift to ‘no’” (2017b, 6). This empirically illustrates the mechanism of erosion of trust after a breakdown in negotiations. Furthermore, the most recent quantitative data available does not show any recovery from skepticism.

To understand and track developments of skepticism and intractability, this thesis includes research conducted in Nicosia in August 2017. Instead of (exactly) measuring the extent of this shift, this research focuses on the how and why of this shift, in order to gain more insight in processes of intractability in Cyprus. The research is based on in-depth interviews with Cypriots from both sides of the DMZ. The rationale for the methods used for the research in August 2017, and the limitations of the methods used, are discussed in the next chapter *Methodology*.

Methodology

This chapter contains five parts that address the methods used for this research. First, the research themes of this thesis are explored – they will be inferred from the sub-questions. Second, the choice for semi-structured qualitative interviews is justified. Third, the selection of the sites and respondents and the timing of the interviews is clarified. Fourth, the decision to perform verbatim transcription and coding of the interviews is explained. The fifth and last section of this chapter is a reflection on the limitations of the methodology chosen for this research.

1. Research Themes and Interview Questions

Every sub-question carries implicit themes. These themes have been used to structure the interview, and form the overarching themes for the coding and subsequent analysis of the interview transcripts.

To recap, the main RQ and the sub-questions are as follows:

Main RQ: How do the perceptions of Cypriot citizens after the Conference on Cyprus in July 2017 influence the future of the negotiations on the conflict in Cyprus?

Sub-questions:

1. To what extent are Cypriot citizens aware of the Conference on Cyprus in June-July 2017?
2. How do Cypriot citizens perceive the presence of international and/or domestic spoilers during the Conference on Cyprus in June-July 2017?
3. In what manner does the closure of the Conference on Cyprus in June-July 2017 feed into the intractability of the conflict?
4. How do Cypriot citizens evaluate the possibility of a future referendum and reunification?
5. How do Cypriots citizens evaluate CBMs for the Cyprus conflict?

The themes deduced from these questions are, respectively: General Awareness, Spoilers, Intractability, Future Referendum/Reunification, and CBMs. To find answers along these research themes, a list of interview questions has been created to form the basis of the interview. The full list of interview questions is attached to this thesis in *Appendix I*. This list was used systemically as the basis for every interview in August 2017. Since the list offers open-ended questions, the answers often gave cause for new questions. As such, those secondary questions differed per interview. The motivation for this setup will be more comprehensively covered in the next sections.

2. Type and Amount of Interviews

The research for this thesis was structured to determine the ‘how’ and ‘why’ of the change and/or repetition of perceptions of Cypriot citizens after the collapse of talks in July 2017. This intention required in-depth interviews to uncover and discuss motivation behind perceptions. The semi-structured interviews provided the structure of set topics to discuss with interviewees, and yet had to allow for the freedom to discuss the background of a wide range of perceptions and motivation.

Literature points to the usefulness of such interviews. According to DiCicco-Bloom et al., “The individual in-depth interview allows the interviewer to delve deeply into social and personal matters” (2006, 315). This type of interview is precisely what was needed to allow for the required discussion.

Besides the *type* of interviews, a decision and motivation for the *amount* of interviews is also of importance. To some extent, any fixed number of interviews in qualitative research is arbitrary. On the basis Guest et al. (2006) and Dworkin (2012) the choice was made to guide the number of interviews would be guided by the concept of ‘*saturation*’, which would likely occur in the range between ten and fifteen interviews. ‘*Saturation*’ is described as the point in the process of data collection in which no new viewpoints are presented. It is agreed that this is a suitable and generally accepted when using semi-structured, in-depth interviews (Guest et al. 2006, 59; Dworkin 2012, 1319).

However, finding a strict ‘*magic*’ number or even a ‘*magic*’ range for an appropriate number of interviewees required for qualitative research is difficult. Dworkin’s review of an extensive list of literature suggests that anything between five and fifty participants can be adequate, depending on the context (2012, 1319). Guest et al. (2006) suggest a tighter range is possible. In a large qualitative study consisting of sixty in-depth interviews in total, Guest et al. found that 92% of the total amount of codes were already found within the first twelve interviews. 72% of the codes were even found within the first six interviews (Guest et al. 2006, 67-74). A graphical depiction of this rapid saturation is displayed in *Figure 1*.

With this saturation in mind, the range around number 12 as suggested by Guest et al., was chosen as a goal for the amount of interviews. As such, the range of ten to fifteen interviews was accepted as an appropriate objective for the research. The research proposal allowed for reflection on the ongoing saturation during the research, so as to adjust the number of interviewees required if necessary. Ultimately, a total of eleven interviews have been conducted.




Figure 1: Code Saturation in In-depth Interviews (Guest et al. 2006, 67)

3. Selection of Sites and Respondents and Timing of Interviews

A total of eleven qualitative interviews were performed between August 11, 2017, and August 24, 2017. This timeframe was chosen because it was recently after the breakdown of the negotiations in Crans-Montana, Switzerland. As such, the negotiations were expected to be fresh in the memory of interviewees, while the interviewees had had sufficient time to form an opinion on the issues.

All of the interviews were held in the Nicosia area – either north or south – with the exception of the last interview which was performed within the buffer zone. These sites were chosen because of an assumed connection between proximity to physical manifestations of the conflict (e.g.: buffer zone, checkpoints and presence of UNFICYP) and engagement with it. This assumption was later verbally confirmed by several interviewees.

Although one of the core concepts of this thesis is *intractability* – and some cynicism or lack of interest was expected to be present anywhere on the island – people that were uninterested in the conflict would naturally not respond to an invitation to talk about it extensively. Therefore, aiming attention at a more engaged area was considered a more efficient use of time.

Interviewees were found by means of contacting a Nicosia-based NGO, personal contacts, and snowball-sampling from there on. Respondents were approached regardless of their ethnicity, age or gender. The resulting turnout is displayed in Table 1. Table 1 also features the *Interviewee Designations* as they will be used in the analysis. It must be noted that any selection

carries the inherent risk of inadvertently selecting a uniform group. Reflections on the possibility of such a selection are made under section 5 of this chapter: *Limitations*.

Interviewee Designation	Ethnic Community	Sex
Respondent 1 (R1)	Greek Cypriot	Female
Respondent 2 (R2)	Turkish Cypriot	Male
Respondent 3 (R3)	Greek Cypriot	Female
Respondent 4 (R4)	Greek Cypriot	Female
Respondent 5 (R5)	Greek Cypriot	Male
Respondent 6 (R6)	Turkish Cypriot	Male
Respondent 7 (R7)	Greek Cypriot	Female
Respondent 8 (R8)	Greek Cypriot	Female
Respondent 9 (R9)	Greek Cypriot	Female
Respondent 10 (R10)	Greek Cypriot	Female
Respondent 11 (R11)	Turkish Cypriot	Male
11 interviewees total	GC:TC ratio 8:3	F:M ratio 7:4

Table 1: *Ethnicity and Sex of Interviewees*

4. Transcripts and Coding

The interviews were fully recorded with an audio device. Altogether, they produced nearly thirteen hours of recording. To avoid any ambiguity, the audio files were transcribed verbatim. Though the choice for full transcription was not substantiated in the research proposal, the decision for verbatim transcription was eventually made on the basis of the consideration by Halcomb & Davidson (2006), in conjunction with the thesis supervisor.

Halcomb & Davidson weigh (2006) the pros and cons of verbatim transcription. Besides taking up much time and resources, the authors argue that “the process of transcription is open to a range of human errors, including misinterpretation of content, class, and cultural differences and language errors” (Halcomb & Davidson 2006, 40). They show that up to 60% of passages written by even professional transcribers may contain significant errors (Halcomb & Davidson 2006, 40). However, the authors do argue that personal transcription by the researcher her/himself allows the researcher to come closer to the data (Halcomb & Davidson 2006, 40) and thus a more intricate understanding of the research. Part of the goal of the thesis is to acquire in-depth knowledge about complex dynamics. Personal verbatim transcription by the researcher supports that process.

The transcripts are marked with a time index to allow for easy verification of the quotes by interviewees and the analysis made in this thesis. After completion of transcripts, they were funneled into a coding book, using the computer program *ATLAS.ti* (Version 8). The codes were made under the main research themes as defined in the first section of this chapter. The coding book provided the foundation for the analysis.

The coding procedure produced a total of 117 codes. An index of all codes per theme is attached to this thesis in *Appendix IV*. The expected saturation – as outlined in Chapter *Methodology* – was registered during the coding of the transcripts. For example, the first two interviews produced 38 and 32 new codes respectively, while the last four interviews only produced 2, 2, 1 and 0 new codes respectively. This process of saturation is illustrated in *Appendix V*.

Using the interview guide from *Appendix I* from top to bottom, every code is addressed in the same manner for every interview. The quotes taken from those codes, provide the reference between the interviews and the analysis made in the next Chapter *Data Analysis*.

5. Limitations

5.1 Saturation and Self-Selection

The criterion for the number of interviewees is saturation. However, considering limitations in any qualitative research, one must always examine if saturation has not occurred by means of inadvertently selecting a relatively uniform group; leaving all kinds of perspectives overlooked and unconsidered. Indeed, the group of eleven interviewees shared a range of features: almost exclusively residing in the Nicosia area; the capability of speaking the English language; a willingness to be interviewed regarding what can be seen as sensitive topics; and the willingness to have that interview recorded and used for research – albeit anonymous. It is conceivable that such features might have resulted in the selection of a group in which only a narrow range of opinions and/or socially desirable answers are voiced. Assessing limitations of such selection is therefore a valid and important duty.

Analyzing the points made by the interviewees shows, however, that an inadvertent narrow selection has most likely not occurred; sifting through the opinions voiced by all interviewees, a wide range of perspectives becomes evident. There are opinions voiced that can be characterized as nationalistic opinions – including even a single self-proclaimed racist – but there were also interviewees that explicitly acknowledge construction and contents of identity and how that pits groups against each other. Likewise, there were interviewees with in-depth knowledge about the negotiations in Crans-Montana (R2, R4, R5, R11) – being able to name specific events and the individuals involved that were of importance to the negotiations – as well as interviewees that did not even know that these high-level negotiations had taken place (R1, R3, R8). Similarly, some interviewees dealt with the conflict academically (R5, R6, R11), others were involved professionally (R2, R4, R11), some respondents followed the conflict through (social) media and many others explicitly claimed they had very little detailed information to share (R1, R3, R8). All in all, on several levels of analysis, the pool of interviewees was diverse.

5.2 Group Ratios

Additionally, in Table 1, it becomes clear that Greek Cypriot-Turkish Cypriot ratios are skewed. The need for taking a look at the ethnic ratio is clear: throughout this thesis and during the interviews, these categories were referred to frequently. Indeed, they are portrayed as the two opposing groups in the Cyprus conflict and their fair representation must be assured.

Regarding overrepresentation, it should be considered that the research was performed qualitatively, not quantitatively. In other words, even if the representation of the Greek Cypriot population is relatively high in the interviewee pool, reaching 50:50 representation is not the goal. Qualitative research is not aimed at finding out *how frequently* something is said, but values instead *what* is said. Seven Greek Cypriot voices saying one thing do not disprove, delegitimize or drown out one Turkish Cypriot saying something else. What is important, is the group contribution in terms of new codes to reach saturation.

Figure 1 on code saturation shows that asking different populations the same things will likely produce much of the same codes. In the corresponding research by Guest et al. (2006), equally large interviewee pools in Ghana and Nigeria provide answers to the same questions. It appears that the second group in that diagram brings roughly only 5% of new codes to the fore. This means that in all interviews that were conducted with Nigerians, about 95% of the codes were already present in the interviews with Ghanaians (Guest et al. 2006, 67). This shows how small the difference – in terms of unique contributions to saturation – between the groups is.

Of course, Cyprus is a different case, and the saturation rate in the study by Guest et al. (2006) is not guaranteed to apply in the same or even in a similar manner. However, looking through some of the statements by both Greek Cypriots as well as Turkish Cypriots, the

difference seems to be comparable to the case of Guest et al., with respect to saturation across groups. A short analysis of the opinions voiced by members of both communities demonstrates that.

For this brief analysis, the issue of spoilers will be considered. The issue of spoilers is chosen because this shows mistrust towards a given actor. The perceived presence of spoilers forms a contentious and divisive issue that would follow ethnic lines closely – if, in fact, the ethnic groups had wildly different perspectives and would have different codes because of it. Perceptions on the existence of spoilers in the peace process were uncovered by asking the interviewee if she/he saw a party involved that *undermines* the process. When asked about spoilers, Greek Cypriots exclusively identified Turkey (R1, R3) as well as exclusively Greece and their Foreign Minister specifically (R4) as well as both the Greek Cypriot party and Turkey (R7). On the other hand, Turkish Cypriots identified spoilers as the Greek Cypriot party (R2), the Turkish Cypriot party and Turkey (R6).

It appears that even when asking about contentious issues that supposedly define seemingly inherently antagonistic parties, the interviewees in this research do not necessarily pander to their respective ethnic group. Instead, this preliminary look at some of the raw data shows that even opinions regarding a contentious issue – mistrust towards the parties involved – are diverse, and do not conform to ethnic lines. As such, adverse selection regarding ethnic groups has most likely not occurred.

Data Analysis

The foremost goal of this chapter on *Data Analysis* is to provide the basis for answering the Main RQ, which is done in the chapter *Conclusion*. The analysis of the interviews takes place by discussing various perspectives of interviewees on the same topic. In doing so, a type of conversation is established between the interviewees to provide a comprehensive foundation for an answer to the sub-questions. Each sub-question is answered per theme in this *Data Analysis*. The framework for this discussion between the interviewees is defined by the research themes. In order of appearance they are: (1) General Awareness, (2) Spoilers, (3) Intractability, (4) Future Referendum/Deal and (5) CBMs.

1. General Awareness

The first theme of the research is '*General Awareness*'. This analysis under this theme aims to find an answer to the following sub-question: "To what extent are Cypriot citizens aware of the Conference on Cyprus in June-July 2017?" The analysis of this theme consists of two parts. The first part is concerned with general feelings and general awareness on the most recent negotiations, but also delves into slightly more focused topics, such as: Urgency, Suggestions for Improvement of Negotiations and View on the Future. The second part focuses on the knowledge and perceptions of each of the international parties. Interviewees were asked about the necessity of international mediation, followed by the role and opinion of each of the international parties separately. Any development they saw in their opinion regarding the party in question was also discussed and is part of the analysis.

1.1 General Awareness, General Feelings, Urgency, Suggestions and Future

The first question was aimed at uncovering the general knowledge of interviewees on the negotiations. A number of interviewees had very little to no knowledge of the last negotiations, with many of them being unaware of the topics discussed at the negotiations (R1, R3, R8, R9). Some of them had not known negotiations had taken place until they received an invitation for the interview (R1, R3), while two others (R8, R9) knew they had occurred, but could not name the timeframe in which it had taken place.

The rest of the interviewees (R2, R4, R5, R6, R7, R10, R11) had in-depth knowledge about the events, being able to point out all relevant parties, the topics in the negotiations and their expectations beforehand. Most interviewees with in-depth knowledge regarding the negotiations were personally involved, either professionally and/or academically (R4, R4, R6, R7, R11). R10 had worked professionally on the negotiations in the past but was not involved in the most recent round.

After a first general question and discussion, the interview moved on to more precise questions. This part focuses on four distinct topics. (1) Firstly, general feelings on the negotiation are discussed. (2) Then, the perception of urgency of the last negotiation is analyzed. (3) Thirdly, suggestions for improvement of the negotiations is evaluated. (4) Lastly, the outlook on future of the negotiation process is described. At the end of each of these topics, the findings will be summarized with a brief conclusion, reflection or implication, if possible based on consensus between interviewees.

(1) The general feelings of the interviewees will be addressed first. Irrespective of knowledge of the last negotiations, all interviewees were able to provide their feelings about the process of the negotiations. R1 and R3 felt the process of negotiations was unfair; with R1 – a GC – still being open for the inclusion of Turkish Cypriots, dubbing them her 'brothers'. R4, R6 and R8

acknowledged the difficult issues in the last round. R4 and R6 defined the property issue as ‘difficult’, while R8 only noted that the process is ‘complicated’.

R4, R5 and R11 expressed disappointment with the failure of the last negotiations. R5’s disappointment came from the view that the sides were unprepared. R11 was dissatisfied because of the lack of settlement and was upset with the process for not being complemented with CBMs. R4 defined the leadership and lack of political will as basis of her disappointment:

“Where I lacked respect for the process, is in the consistency and real willingness on part of the leaders. [...] More could have been done, a lot more could have been done with this. Overall, the cultivation of a culture of peace and trust, that wasn’t done. And in the end, the last half-year or so, it became clear to me that actually, the political will wasn’t there either. And once that’s been established, I don’t really see the point in continuing the process, because you’re just basically playing with image of the people. So in that sense, it wasn’t a good process.”

(R4, 08:00-09:00)

Several interviewees talked about progress, or rather lack thereof, in the negotiations (R5, R6, R9, R10, R11). R6 expressed that he had observed no progress, and did not feel hope for successful negotiations. R9 considered a solution to be important, but was skeptical of a solution because decades of negotiations did not bring any solution. R10 and R11 stated that parties were very close to an agreement in the last round and that that in itself was already a huge progress. R5 described the progress as an important evolution, because the Government of the RoC ‘denied’ unhelpful attitudes that previous RoC governments had.

It is difficult to filter out any consensus, conclusion or implication from the opinions voiced under (1) *General Feelings*. The general question gave general answers. The question was intended to provide an introduction for the interviewee to the subject, but also to allow for room to express what interviewees find important. In that respect, a basic perspective on the views of each interviewee has been established.

(2) The second topic addressed here is the sense of *Urgency* concerning a successful agreement, as felt by the interviewees. Most interviewees agreed that a solution is urgently required, but diverged on how to accomplish it and whether it is even possible. For example, R4 said a solution is urgently required, but pointed out that the leadership was not ready. R7 also agreed on its urgency but pointed out that upcoming elections make resolution difficult.

R5 did not express whether a solution is urgently required, but stated that it would be difficult to achieve with the upcoming elections. R3 did not feel that a solution was urgent, but stated that fairness was most important:

“It’s not something that I feel like, needs to be happening now. Again, it is all about being fair to both sides. Maybe more our side [...] It’s better to delay something that is bad for us than to jump into something that will be affecting the people in Cyprus in a bad way. I think it makes sense.”

(R3, 08:00)

The topic of *Urgency* was included in the interview in order to determine whether there is any incentive and/or pressure for a solution. Although many interviewees stated that they do want a solution quickly, they were pragmatic about political realities. The history of lacking resolution, the prospect of the upcoming elections in the south and the north and lack of

readiness on part of the leadership were core reasons identified for the unlikelihood of a swift resolution.

(3) The third topic on *Suggestions for Improvement* of the negotiations was embodied by the question: “What could have been done differently?”, and the ensuing discussion on how and why. R4 stated that more could have been done to alleviate the concerns of the other community regarding the property and security issues. R5 saw a loss of faith after President Anastasiades threatened to publish the minutes of confidential meetings with The Special Adviser of the Secretary-General on Cyprus (SASG), Mr. Eide. Later, it turned out that there were no minutes. According to R5, it is this type of events that cause people to lose faith in the negotiations. R6 pointed out that the leaders of both communities went to Switzerland expecting gains. This led to a rigidity in their stances, where compromise was required. R11 stated that Turkey could have been more generous.

This topic offered no general consensus among the interviewees, but instead provided a range of ideas on what might have contributed to the collapse of the talks. What R5 and R6 describe has implications for the notion of *intractability*. The perceptions of ‘loss of faith’ and rigidity on part of the leaders imply a negative outlook regarding the future and may catalyze the process of resistance to resolution.

(4) The fourth topic *Outlook on the Future* is an important issue as it describes the interviewee’s hope for resolution. This is not only a direct element of the main RQ of the thesis, but also informs it indirectly by gauging the development of *Intractability*. The way in which the question was phrased allowed for a discussion on the development of their outlook: “Have these recent negotiations changed your view of the future the negotiations?”

R2 stated that while he was usually optimistic, the latest developments caused some pessimism, especially considering that the two leaders are pro-reunification, and were nevertheless not able to produce any settlement. R5 said he was let down, and the future of the negotiations may require a different approach. He suggested learning from Colombia and Northern Ireland and moving step by step.

Pessimism and/or cynicism regarding the future were voiced by all other interviewees. Many had their pessimistic stance reaffirmed (R7, R8, R10), while some typically optimistic interviewees had become more pessimistic about the future (R2, R5, R11). R10 equated her pessimistic stance with realism, which she had acquired working at organizations involved with the negotiations and the peace process on a daily basis.

While interviewees had diverging expectations during the negotiations, all of them have either gained skepticism/pessimism or saw their skepticism/pessimism regarding the future confirmed. Though some interviewees were explicitly still hopeful, despite their newfound skepticism, a widely-shared trend toward skepticism illustrates the impact of failure of negotiations.

Based on the analysis of the transcripts made, a table with key word summaries is constructed.

	Awareness	Feelings	Urgency	Suggestions	Future
R1	No/Little	Unfair	-	-	-
R2	In-depth	Disappointment but optimistic	Yes	-	Becomes more pessimistic
R3	No/Little	Unfair	No, fairness is most important	-	-
R4	In-depth	Difficult Issues, Disappointment,	Personally yes, but not	Alleviate concerns on	-

			observed in politics	property and security issues	
R5	In-depth	Disappointment, but progress/evolution	Difficult	Refrain from quarrel with SASG	Disappointment, different angle necessary
R6	In-depth	Difficult Issues, no progress, no hope	Yes, because of TRNC non-recognition	Openness to compromise	-
R7	In-depth	Skeptical beforehand	Yes, but upcoming elections	-	Skepticism confirmed, looking forward toward future
R8	No/Little	Difficult Issues	-	-	Unchanged skepticism
R9	No/Little	Solution important but skeptical	Yes, but skeptical	-	-
R10	In-depth	Solution was close, progress made	-	-	Cynical, pessimistic as usual
R11	In-depth	Disappointment, progress made, agreement was close	Yes	Turkish generosity	Disappointment rises

Table 2: Key word summary of awareness and opinions voiced, per interviewee

1.2 International Mediation

The second topic under *General Awareness* is the perception of the roles of each international actor individually, and the necessity of including international parties. The issues addressed under this topic follow the structure of the questions as outlined in the interview guide, namely: (1) Necessity of International Actors in Peace Process, (2) Role of United Nations, (3) Role of Turkey, (4) Role of Greece, (5) Role of The European Union. At the end of each of these issues, the findings will be again summarized with a short conclusion, reflection or implication – if possible, on consensus between interviewees.

(1) The issue of *Necessity* is discussed first. This issue was addressed by asking the following question: “To what extent do you think it is necessary that parties other than two community leaders are part of the negotiations?”

All interviewees except R7 considered it necessary to involve international actors. R7 expressed uncertainty towards the necessity, but voiced appreciation for the UN as a peacekeeper. All other interviewees provided a range of reasons explaining why it is necessary. The most-cited reason was the rights of the guarantors – Turkey, Greece and the UK (R2, R6 and R10). Another oft-cited motivation for the inclusion of international players was the support function they provide.

The need for support was characterized in several manners. R2 stated that ‘internal dynamics’ would not be sufficient for resolution. R8 appreciated the mediating function of international players, arguing that two parties fighting over sensitive issues make bilateral negotiations as such difficult. R10 listed a range of topics that can be characterized as ‘international support’:

“I certainly do think it’s important to have other parties, like international parties present on the negotiating table. Especially international organizations such as the UN or the EU, because any solution would also affect the wider sphere. The wider international sphere, let’s say. And Cyprus is also an EU

member state, so any solution would also affect its status within the EU. [...] They can also bring expertise when it comes to resolving conflicts. [...] When it comes to sometimes having heated discussion and where emotions can be, you know, brought in from the two communities. [...] I mean, their role has been facilitating between the two communities' willingness, whether or not they will find a solution."

(R10, 09:00-10:00)

The question on necessity of international mediation was part of the interview guide because of the notion that perceived failure/success, persistence and even presence of international mediation may affect perceptions of citizens. It is obvious that most interviewees find the presence of international actors necessary, either through their international legal rights as guarantors, mediating sensitive issues or any other support they may offer. The presence of international actors goes almost unanimously unquestioned. However, questions about the role of each specific actor revealed differences. The views of the interviewees on the roles of each international actor will now be analyzed. Any development of perceptions regarding the actors is also discussed.

(2) The UN is considered as an international actor in the Cyprus peace process. Many interviewees regard the UN as a neutral and necessary player in the peace process (R2, R3, R4, R9) that provides services such as protection/peacekeeping (R3, R9) and mediation (R2, R7). R5 considered the UN to be a significant player in the peace process, as it kept the process alive. R6 expressed concern on the "many failures of the UN", asking himself:

"United Nations role in Cyprus started very problematic, they came in '64. [...] they knew the island, so they were not new. After 10 years, a foreign country made a coup d'état in the island. And another foreign country invaded while the UN was here with a peacekeeping mission. And both they were part of the UN. It's very strange. How does this kind of thing happen?"

(R6, 01:00:00-01:01:00)

R10 agrees with the negative perceptions, based on her realistic/pessimistic perspective on the UN, dismissing the 'peace bringing' image of the organization, arguing that the track record of decades of rounds of negotiations have not brought a solution:

"They are not as powerful as you thought they would be. That they are actually able to bring peace. [...] When you're growing up as a child, you see the blue helmets around. So, you think that: 'okay, this is the stabilizing force, they're here to bring peace on the island.' But then it comes to reality and you think that: 'okay, there's been another round of negotiations that has failed'."

(R10, 12:00)

R7 takes those same failures and dismisses them. She regards it as a popular, yet inaccurate assessment of the UN to blame the organization for everything. Instead, she adds her perspective on diplomacy and mediation. Rather than blaming the UN, she lodges her disappointment with the Cypriot parties that are "never ready to discuss".

R4 fostered a larger amount of respect for the organization after the latest negotiations: "I think they did what they could, I think they tried really hard. And, sometimes I wish that some people who are actually in charge in Cyprus, have the vision and the faith in the Cypriot people that members of the UN do" (R4, 18:00).

All in all, most interviewees regard the UN as the necessary mediator, with no further negative or positive association. However, the few interviewees that do present differing opinions, voice positions that are nearly opposites from each other: where R6 and R10 expressed substantiated disillusionment with the UN, R7 dismissed blaming the UN as a popular yet inaccurate picture.

(3) The role of Turkey is considered next. There are a range of interviewees that voiced a negative perception of the role of this country during the peace process (R1, R5, R6, R7, R8, R9). This negative association does not fully conform to the respective ethnicities. For instance, R6, a Turkish Cypriot, criticized Minister of Foreign Affairs (FM) Çavuşoğlu of Turkey for having the wrong attitude. In particular, he spoke out against the dominance of Turkey during the negotiations. According to R6, this resulted in rigidity in the rest of those present during the conference. Another Turkish Cypriot, R11 stated that Turkey could have been more generous. Still, R2 – also a Turkish Cypriot – figured that Turkey played a positive role during the negotiation, and has done so in the past as well.

Conversely, Greek Cypriots almost unanimously condemned Turkey during the interview. They saw a range of issues with the country participating in the negotiations, almost all of which were differently substantiated. Even though R1 would like to see Turkey leave the north as soon as possible, she was realistic about them aiding the TRNC. R5 stated that Turkey is interrupting the process, and is uncertain if they actually represent the interests of the Turkish Cypriots. R7 doubts the sincerity of Turkey attending the conference because of the unpredictability of its leader, President Erdoğan, saying: “No one can read what he’s trying to do. So, I don’t think that they went there willingly, or that they went there sincerely. Because, you have a leader right now which is more like a dictator than a leader” (R7, 22:00).

R4 agreed with the nature of the current Turkish President, but nuances the dominant negative view on Turkey in the south entirely:

“I believe that Turkey wanted a reunification in this instance. And that Erdoğan in particular, just maintained a very hardline approach. I just think that that’s something we should have expected from him. [...] I don’t want to say that anybody on the Greek Cypriot team didn’t understand. But, I just think that, for some reason, having a nuanced understanding of Turkey, doesn’t really fit into our narrative where Turkey is concerned.”

(R4, 31:00)

R4 then went on to explain how the stereotype of Turkey as an ‘opaque negative entity’ rhetorically traps leaders in the south, as they cannot speak about Turkey in a more nuanced way that denies the dominant negative association that many Greek Cypriot citizens have. According to R4, this impacts any intentions for reunification from the Turkish side: “Even if they want a reunification, basically the way in which they’re spoken about by the Greek Cypriots, it can just completely override what their intentions were” (R4, 33:00).

It is clear that most interviewees on both sides of the divide regard Turkey with a negative perception. Still, most of the people that are opposing or condemning Turkey, are still realistically nuanced about its role as guarantor power and the status-quo of the occupation of the north. R4 takes this nuance a step further by considering that the negative perception of Turkey makes resolution a more difficult topic for leaders in the south to talk about.

(4) The role of Greece is analyzed next. Many of the interviewees agreed that Greece had a minor role (R2, R7, R9, R10), and/or should not be involved (R1, R3, R4). Much of the latter hinges on the reasoning that Greece and Cyprus are not the same countries; i.e. distancing

Cyprus from the Greek ‘motherland’ connection that is often made. Though this is not related to the conference in Switzerland – in which parties were present in their capacity as legal guarantor powers – some interviewees did make that connection:

“I believe that Greece is not Cyprus. Most of the Cypriots believe that Greece is Cyprus. No. I disagree. I totally disagree. 100% disagree. Cyprus is Cyprus and Greece is Greece. So, I don’t think that they have to say something about this. It is not in their business.”

(R1, 13:00)

R1, R3 and R8 were initially unaware of the attendance of Greece at the conference. When discussing Greece’s rights as guarantor powers, they held the conviction that it should not have to attend (R3, R4). R4 identified FM Kotsias of Greece in particular as a negative influence on the conference, calling him ‘disgraceful’ for his behavior towards the United Nations.

Other than the many negative attitudes towards Greece, the remaining interviewees regard Greece’s role simply as minor, or only facilitating. This is demonstrated differently by each interviewee. R5 and R7 argued that Greece agrees with whatever position Greek Cypriots have. R9 dismissed the role of the country as ‘useless’ and pointed out that Greece has enough internal problems to worry about. R4 and R7 saw this as part of a development in which Greece is no longer the ‘motherland’ of Cyprus: “Greece has been very clear from the beginning, that it doesn’t see itself as a guarantor power, and it would just prefer to take the role of a neighbor or a cultural ally” (R4, 43:00).

The only appreciative note regarding Greece came from R8, but it did not concern the conference itself. R8 stated that Greek Cypriots look up to Greece like a mother and Greece would likely protect the population if the conflict re-escalated:

“Well, with the Greek flag everywhere. And I am not sure this is true, but I heard that if something was to happen on the island, the Greeks would move in their army. Because our army is not big enough. They understand what the Cypriots have been through. What I know from Greek people, is that they empathize. They understand the history.”

(R8, 11:00)

All things considered, the role of Greece during the conference is viewed either as negative or insignificant by virtually all interviewees – perhaps even more so than Turkey. Three interviewees were unaware of its role, six others classified the role of the country as ‘minor’, ‘useless’ or ‘unnecessary’. Two others identified Foreign Minister Kotsias specifically as ‘negative’ and even ‘disgraceful’. It appears that while the negative perception is shared among all interviewees, perhaps only a part of it can be blamed on its performance. It became clear that a share of the negative perception comes from the contemporary distancing from the framing of Greece as the ‘motherland’ of Cyprus. At least three interviewees referred to this (R1, R4, R7).

(5) Lastly, the role of the European Union is considered. R5 and R7 thought during the conference the role of the EU was limited to being an observer party. R7 argued that the limited role was related to Cyprus not having prominent position on the EU agenda. R4 summarized the presence of the EU as ‘appropriate’ and ‘professional’. R2 called its presence ‘supportive’.

R10 expressed the view that the presence of the EU was a pressure tool to make the parties involved more conciliatory. She reasoned that rather than just having the recurrent

presence of the UN, the attendance of an additional international actor exerted pressure for finding a settlement during the negotiations.

R6 forewent reflection on the EU as an actor during the latest negotiations, and criticized its conduct surrounding the 2004 referendum, saying:

“There was lots people saying that the European Union intentionally, or unintentionally – probably unintentionally – blew up the Annan Plan by just accepting the Greek Cypriots before the end of negotiations, before the referendum. And if you look at the results, one side saying ‘yes’ one side saying ‘no’. It looks like that [it] kind of worked in that way, unfortunately.”

(R6, 1:06:00)

R2 expressed a similar disappointment with the role of the EU during the 2004 referendum. 2004 was the year in which Cyprus joined the EU and voted on the reunification of the country. The RoC joined the EU, regardless of whether or not it had reunified. Some critics of those events argue that the reunification of the RoC should have been a condition for EU admission. Even though R2 did not explicitly refer to that, it is likely what he meant, which is largely in line with the reasoning by R6, as displayed above.

All in all, the interviewees provided shorter and less-substantiated answers regarding the EU compared to Turkey and Greece. All interviewees found the role of the EU either limited, appropriate or professional. The criticism of R2 and R6 regarding the EU was not directed at its role during the Crans-Montana conference.

Based on the analysis of the transcripts made, again a table with key word summaries is constructed.

	Necessity	UN	Turkey	Greece	EU
R1	-	-	Turkey should leave Cyprus and leave administration to RoC; negative development	Greece should not be involved; Greece is not Cyprus	-
R2	Yes: internal dynamics not sufficient, and guarantor powers	Mediator necessary; SASG Eide successful: no development	Positive role in Switzerland; no development	Relatively minor; FM Kotsias was negative and unprepared	Could have played better role in 2004 referendum
R3	-	Neutral party, provides protection; no development	-	Unaware, but not necessary	-
R4	-	Respect and understanding for their involvement increased	Domestic political development causes hardline approach	Greece doesn't regard itself as Guarantor; Kotsias was disgraceful. Greece isn't Cyprus	Appropriate presence; Professional
R5	-	Important as they kept the process alive; no development.	Interrupts the process, does not represent the interests of TCs; no development	Agree with GC, but better prepared than them.	Limited interaction as observer

R6	Yes: Guarantor powers.	UN does good things around the globe, but many failures in Cyprus	Did not like attitude of FM, makes the process more rigid.	Greece-GC relationship very different from Turkey-TC	Blew up 2004 Annan-plan
R7	Uncertain, but UN as peacekeeper is valued	Mediator role, dismissed perception of failures; development from idealistic to realistic	Unpredictable because of Erdoğan	Agreeing with GC regardless of their position, don't use their influence	Cyprus is not a priority for EU; did not play active role this time
R8	Yes: internationals mediate sensitive topics between fighting parties	Uncertain what the role of UN is, besides Green Line	Stubbornness, not open to compromise, no development	Unaware of the role, but recognized motherland role.	-
R9	Yes: Cyprus is in EU; Supportive.	Peacekeepers	No goodwill, closed-mindedness, threatening	Useless: they have their own internal problems	-
R10	Yes: neutral facilitation; Guarantor powers; expertise	Disillusioned with the UN	-	Mostly facilitating role/advising	EU was a tool for pressuring the sides
R11	-	-	Large influence on TCs: more generous	-	-

Table 3: Key-word summary per international actor, per interviewee

1.3 Sub-Question (1)

Now that the first theme has been comprehensively analyzed, a nuanced answer to the first sub-question can be formulated. The first sub-question of this thesis is: "To what extent are Cypriot citizens aware of the Conference on Cyprus in June-July 2017?" There is no single sentence answer to this question, so a themed answer is required.

Regarding the topics of 'General Feelings' and 'General Awareness', it should first be noted that the interviewees gave very diverse responses; general questions gave general answers. However, it did give an insight into what interviewees found most important in the negotiations. What is interesting to see is that several interviewees were unaware of the conference taking place. Further, the realism displayed by virtually all interviewees regarding a swift resolution is thought-provoking. Though many of them would like to see a swift resolution, almost all respondents are convinced that it is unlikely to happen soon, because of political realities such as upcoming elections, disappointment with previously hopeful processes and the lack of readiness on part of the leadership.

Related to this is the expression of pessimism by all interviewees, regarding resolution in the future. Though most optimistic interviewees attempt to remain hopeful, they expressed a loss of hope after the collapse of the talks in Crans-Montana. Those that were already – almost principally – skeptical or pessimistic about a resolution had their stance confirmed by the failure.

Considering the topic of 'International Mediation', it has become abundantly clear that it is an essential topic, in terms of perception of the interviewees. The interviewees almost unanimously agree on the necessity of international mediation of some parties like the UN. The

importance of the topic in the interview becomes further apparent when considering that short, simple questions about each specific party, often gave elaborate answers, especially in the cases of Greece and Turkey. The answers surrounding these two parties in particular often related to matters of identity. These two parties were perceived largely either negatively or useless by respondents from both sides of the divide.

The international parties both share three characterizations. Some interviewees classify them positively, using phrases such as ‘helpful’, ‘necessary’ or ‘appropriate’. Others express disillusionment or disappointment, especially with the United Nations. The third characterization is a neutral response in which both the UN and the EU are qualified as impartial and unbiased parties.

2. Spoilers

The second theme of the research concerns ‘*spoilers*’. This theme is aimed at finding an answer to the following sub-question: “How do Cypriot citizens perceive the presence of international and/or domestic spoilers during the Conference on Cyprus in June-July 2017?”

The theme is of particular interest because (the perception of) their presence provides an indication of lacking trust between the sides. It also indicates the faith citizens have in their leaders regarding the negotiations. Since the negotiations took place behind closed doors and both sides were engaged in blaming the other for the failure of the negotiations, it is not possible to objectively determine if any single party is to blame for the collapse of the talks, or for making the process difficult. However, some interviewees did point out a distinct party and/or a specific person that undermined the peace process.

This second part of the *Data Analysis*, goes through a total of four topics related to spoilers before formulating an answer to sub-question 2. These topics are: (1) Identification, (2) Methods, (3) Goals and Reasoning, (4) Development of the spoiler.

2.1 Identification, Methods and Goals of The Spoiler

In this section, the identification of the spoilers will be addressed first. Second, the methods that spoilers employ, and the goals they seek to achieve will be discussed.

(1) The first step in the topic on spoilers is the identification of spoilers. The identification of spoilers was assessed by the following question: “Do you think there was a party involved in the negotiations that undermined the peace process?”, and “What is this party?”. These questions formed the basis for a discussion about the parties and how the interviewee felt about them.

Of the eleven interviewees, four identified spoilers in the last negotiations (R2, R3, R4, R7). These spoilers include President Anastasiades, Turkey and Foreign Minister Kotsias of Greece. Turkey was identified by two different interviewees (R3, R7). While these three parties were all criticized by interviewees other than the four mentioned, none of them viewed them as undermining the peace process during the last round of negotiations.

(2) The second part in the topic on spoilers is the methods employed by spoilers and the goals they aim to achieve with spoiling. A view on the perceptions of the interviewees on this matter was established by asking: “How does it undermine?”, and “What does it seek to achieve?”.

All four interviewees provided different methods for their spoilers. Still, all identified goals were related to political gain. R2 said President Anastasiades was changing his positions frequently and was never planning to agree to a settlement at the conference: “I think he didn’t go there to solve the Cyprus Issue. [...] They thought: ‘if we say no, very soon we will get a better deal’. They didn’t get a better deal, they waited for 30 years” (R2, 15:00-16:00).

R3 stated that Turkey demanded too much and tried to gain influence. In particular, R3 thought Turkey sought to be part of the government in the north, or at least aspired to exert considerable power over it. R7 agreed that Turkey attempted to gain politically from the negotiations, but that the methods differ from what R3 thought. R7's perceptions of Turkey's methods are similar to those perceived by R2 regarding Anastasiades. R7 too, thinks that Turkey was insincere, and was not actually planning to agree to any settlement on the conference.

R4 considered FM Kotsias of Greece to be undermining the process. She does not think it was the policy, or the line of the government he represented, he rather presented his personal feelings at the conference:

“It just seemed like one man presenting his personal views, and his personal grievances. And that’s why I attributed it to him, rather than the entire country. Also, because everything that we saw from [PM of Greece] Tsipras was different. It didn’t reflect anything that Kotsias had been saying. Okay, that’s still just one person, but you know, that’s one very significant official.”

(R4, 57:00)

When asked about the goals of Kotsias, R4 indicated: “One hopes that he was trying to achieve something, but I can’t see that – whatever he was trying to achieve – was in any way helpful for the Cypriot people. And I am not interested in what else he was trying to achieve” (R4, 58:00). R4 is the only interviewee that identified a spoiler but was unable to identify any goals. However, lack of perceived goals such as political influence/gain by Kotsias is in line with the perceived method: the expression of personal views.

Although there was only a relatively small amount of interviewees that identified any spoilers, those that did, provided three different identifications, and perceived differing methods. The goals perceived were uniform.

Based on the analysis of the transcripts made, a table with key word summaries is constructed.

	Spoiler Identification	Methods	Goals
R1	-	-	-
R2	President Anastasiades	Changing positions often, not planning to agree	Reelection, Waiting for better deal
R3	Turkey	Demanding too much	Influence
R4	Foreign Minister Kotsias of Greece	Expressing personal views instead of governmental line	Unclear
R5	-	-	-
R6	-	-	-
R7	Turkey	Insincerity in peace process	Political gain
R8	-	-	-
R9	-	-	-
R10	-	-	-
R11	-	-	-

Table 4: key word summary per spoiler, per interviewee

2.2 Development

Any expected development regarding spoilers was also considered during the interview. This topic was addressed by the following question: “Do you expect this party to change its behavior in the future?” While four interviewees provided distinct identifications of parties or people that can be regarded as spoiler, only two of them provided a reflection on a potential development of the spoiler (R3, R4).

R3 expressed concern about demographic dominance of the north and/or Turkey, and the danger of their spread across the DMZ. She noted:

“The Muslims religion and way it is to multiply. They do. And they have a lot of kids. And imagine some part of this country growing, growing, growing and they’re like slowly. But they can’t cross the borders. But if they open the borders.”

(R3, 06:00)

R4 was the other interviewee that spoke about development of the spoiler she identified, FM Kotsias. She expressed concern for the future if Kotsias was still in power by the time a new round of negotiations came around:

“Even if he was, let’s say, not as destructive at the conference itself, his behavior since then has been appalling. In terms of how he responded to the UN. So, no, I don’t really have any more faith in him. I also don’t really have much faith in the kind of future process. [...] Hopefully Kotsias won’t even be in power by that time – by the next time we have a realistic process.”

(R4, 1:00:00)

There was a very limited response on the issue of development of the identified spoiler. The questions were asked to find out whether spoilers were perceived to be inherent to the process or could instead develop. Both interviewees displayed no belief that the identified party will change its behavior in the future.

2.3 Sub-Question (2)

Now that the second theme has been comprehensively analyzed, a nuanced answer to the second sub-question can be formulated. The second sub-question of this thesis is: “How do Cypriot citizens perceive the presence of international and/or domestic spoilers during the Conference on Cyprus in June-July 2017?”

Although most interviewees criticized one or more parties to the negotiations, only four regarded them as ‘undermining the peace process’. The identification of spoilers was limited to President Anastasiades, Turkey and FM Kotsias, recognized by a total of four interviewees. The perceived methods were diverse, while the goals of these spoilers were uniform. All identified goals were consistent with political influence in one way or another. Some interviewees simply stated ‘influence’, while others define reelection as gaining influence.

3. Intractability

The third sub-question of this thesis is: “In what manner does the closure of the Conference on Cyprus in June-July 2017 feed into the intractability of the conflict?” This sub-question informs an important aspect of the Main RQ, as it focuses on the perceptions of the resistance to resolution. This theme of the *Data Analysis* will focus on two topics. Firstly, the perceptions surrounding the resistance to resolution are analyzed, followed by, secondly, development of intractability. After those two topics, an answer to sub-question (3) is formulated.

3.1 Resistance to Resolution

This first part measuring resistance to resolution consists of the analysis of three questions asked and discussed within the interview. These are the following, in order of appearance: (1) “Do

you feel that Cyprus should be reunified?”, (2) “In what case do you think it would be better to leave Cyprus permanently divided?” and (3) “How do you view the other side?”.

(1) The first question on the stance on reunification was kept broad, and produced long answers and discussions. However, three topics were noticeable; skepticism, optimism and opposition towards resolution. These topics will be addressed one by one.

Skeptical answers and arguments were thriving in nearly every interview. A total of thirteen reasons were coded as motivation for this skepticism. All these motivations can be found in *Appendix IV – Code 3.1.1*. Some examples include: upcoming elections in the south, mistrust of one’s own government, disbelief in the effect of voting, detrimental economic impact in the south, previous unfruitful attempts and the division created by ethno-nationalist categories in history books.

Some interviewees appeared to be skeptical by default (R1, R10):

“It was a funny joke every Easter or Christmas. At the Christmas table, when all the family was sitting there, and we were saying ‘cheers to the Free Cyprus one day’. We were all laughing, because we were thinking that we will never have a Free Cyprus.”

(R1, 02:00)

Then there were ordinarily optimistic interviewees who displayed newfound skepticism (R2, R4):

“Do I feel that Cyprus should be reunified? Okay. I mean, I have spent the last 12 years of my life preaching that it should be, but going through this process has taught me that actually, there is a lot that hasn’t been resolved. I believe that Cyprus should be reunified, but I can see that, you know, an unbelievable amount of work needs to be done before that point, if reunification needs to be sustainable. And there’s, you know, there’s a small part of me which is just saying: ‘maybe the more realistic and the kind of safer option is for some kind of official partition’. Which breaks my heart.”

(R4, 1:03:00-1:04:00)

R5 substantiated skepticism for a resolution by considering possible adverse economic effects for the south. He argued that if the occupied city of Famagusta came under Greek Cypriot control again – and reached the tourism levels it used to have – it would affect the economy of Greek Cypriots cities in the south:

“Now Larnaca is, Ayia Napa is, Limassol is thriving. Paphos has been on the rise as well – with investments. So, are people willing to sacrifice their economic success for what? Again, moving along in time, will people make more skeptical because of these reasons.”

(R5, 25:00)

Another type of stance on reunification was *optimism* (R7, R11). Though both optimistic interviewees were aware of the difficulties in successful reunification or expressed disappointment with the collapse of the talks, they identified themselves as optimistic. R7 lodged her optimism with the progress that had been made throughout the years, and the opportunities for the two communities meeting each other it produced:

“Imagine that before the checkpoints opened, we never had the opportunity to communicate or to pass. At first it was very difficult to pass, to take your car. But now, people have been here, and they don’t mind the Turkish Cypriots. [...] You walk with them sometimes. The political leaders also communicate, but the citizens also communicate between each other and they try to do something. So, I believe I am very optimistic.”

(R7, 10:00)

The last type of stance on reunification was *opposition* to reunification. This stance was voiced by one interviewee (R8). She voiced her concerns regarding reunification, as it would entail effectively endorsing the invasion:

“You can’t just invade another country, and after a certain amount of years expect it to be one. There’s history behind it – everything that happened. You know, it should not be unified. There still should be a border, a checkpoint. With people coming in and going out. And it should be controlled.”

(R8, 14:00)

When pressed on the issue, the only other alternative of the RoC regaining full control was dismissed by R8 as something that would realistically never happen. R8 maintained her view on opposition to resolution because of the incompatibility of the ethnicities on the island: “I know the people living right there now have nothing to do with this whole political situation, but, you can’t. It’s apples and oranges. [...] There’s a difference between politically and the human side” (R8, 15:00-16:00).

The eleven interviewees showed three different stances regarding reunification: skepticism, optimism and opposition. The most prominent of the three was skepticism. This stance was shown by people who were normally skeptical of a solution, but also by those who usually consider themselves optimistic. It is in line with the general feelings of skepticism/pessimism as analyzed under the first topic of ‘General Awareness’ of this *Data Analysis*. The connotation of intractability and additional explanation on the part of the interviewees further illustrates a development towards skepticism.

(2) Answers on the second question measuring the preference of permanent division are analyzed next. The question was formulated as follows: “In what case do you think it would be better to leave Cyprus permanently divided?”. Most interviewees that expressed an opinion on the matter, did not think it will be better to leave Cyprus divided (R5, R6, R7 R10, R11). Most gave reasons for never wanting to pursue such division.

R6, a Turkish Cypriot, did not favor the option because the TRNC will likely never get recognized. R7 expressed concern that permanent division would only reify the presence of the Turkish army in the north, and explicitly preferred “this never-ending negotiation” over permanent division (R7, 15:00). R11 regarded reunification as the only realistic option, as negotiations about reunification have always been restarted.

Two interviewees (R3, R4) imagined cases in which leaving Cyprus permanently divided was preferable. R3 stated that this would be preferable if the terms of the deal would not be fair, without delving into detail on what this entails. R4 went into more detail and outlined a future situation where it would be preferable:

“It would never be better than the motives for which we have been negotiating. [...] It’s not one of my favorite options. Although I am wondering; depending on which conditions would it be favorable to continue the status quo? Which is not

good for anybody. Because, it just leaves so much of the islands potential unlocked. [...] In the case that it looks like that there's no way that we're coming to a political settlement, and that there's nothing moving forward; no progress. Then maybe we have to start looking at partition."

(R4, 1:14:00-1:15:00)

It is clear that most interviewees preferred the option of 'endless negotiations' – or similar – over the prospect of permanent division. Although most did recognize that the process has been difficult, they would never prefer either legal or effective permanent partition. R4 reflected on such a future and thought it would only be worth to consider it if progress has completely stalled and no other options are possible. R8 was opposed to resolution – she favored permanent division on the basis of fundamental human and political differences between the sides.

(3) The third question regarding the 'view of the other' is analyzed now. This question was formulated in the interview guide as follows: "How do you view the other side?". Though the intention was to ask this same question to every interviewee, all interviewees already voiced their opinions on the other side before it could be asked, which made the question superfluous in the interview guide. The characterizations made by the interviewees regarding their ethnic counterparts will be addressed here.

Almost every interviewee took a nuanced approach in which they criticized the dominant characterization of the other as untrue, containing favorable omission and/or even harmful to the negotiations (R1, R2, R4, R5, R6, R7, R9, R10, R11). R3 and R8 were the only ones that voiced differing opinions. For example, R1 distanced herself from the demonization of the Turkish Cypriots and broke from the dominant narrative of self-victimization, by examining historical narratives surrounding the former President, Archbishop Makarios:

"For us, he is a hero, there are statues everywhere of Makarios, but he was ordering for killing. So, there are many things behind the story, of how they are showing it. In order for people to understand and see how the things are, they have to dig. A lot. [...] Because until now, I was listening only this: 'Oh the Turkish. They were raping our women. Killing our men.' How many things did we do to them? We did the same, maybe worse."

(R1, 25:00-26:00)

Many more expressed comparable perspectives on the discourse. R5 described a rather similar view as R1 about history lessons in the south, which teach only about the massacres on the part of the Turkish army, while they omit raids on Turkish Cypriot villages by Greek Cypriots. R2 criticized the 'official hateful discourse'. He remarked that Turkish Cypriots schoolbooks have recently departed from such a narrative, before expressing that the schoolbooks of his counterparts in the south are still 'very nationalist'.

R7 expressed regret that Greek Cypriots think of the others as 'monsters', and praised the NGOs that are involved in bi-communal events. R10 expressed the opinion that superstition and prejudice need to be countered. She explicitly argued against 'self-victimization' from both sides. R9 reflected on her childhood:

"I remember in kindergarten – I was four years old – and I was having a conversation with my friend there. [...] My friend was saying: 'my dad told me that when I grow up I will kill all the Turks'. [...] We had had that attitude from even four years old that Turks are the enemy. I do believe that we need to get over that, if we're going to move forward."

(R9, 21:00-22:00)

R4 talked at length about the characterization of Turkey as the dominant and authoritarian party, which makes resolution more difficult:

“In fact, probably the phrase I heard the most throughout the entire process, was: ‘well, if Erdoğan doesn’t want it, you know..’ or ‘Erdoğan is a mad-man, so..’ the Greek Cypriots still very much have the impression that – I am not saying it’s necessarily wrong – but they have this impression that the fate of Cyprus is ultimately in the hand of Turkey. And as much as we apply force, it’s ultimately in the hands of Turkey whether or not there’s peace in Cyprus.”

(R4, 32:00)

R6 identified specific segments of the population in the north that are prone to professing polarized discourse regarding Greek Cypriots:

“The ones who are born after 1980s, those kind of peoples, they tell you this kind of stuff. And then you ask them: ‘have you ever seen Greek Cypriots? Have you ever talked to them?’ The Turkish migrants they can’t go to the Southern part, they don’t have permission to go there. When you look, when you have some kind of Turkish name, they say this kind of stuff. They open the newspaper, and they see the one incident that happened, and they say: ‘you see?’ As if it’s a sample that is representative.”

(R6, 21:00)

R8 was the only interviewee expressing purely negative views of the other side. She regarded Turkey as manipulative, stubborn and untrustworthy. R3 was unique in the pool of interviewees as she stated she was blacklisted by the TRNC authorities for discussing the Christian faith in the north. She wished not to get involved with the north.

All other interviewees – apart from R8 and R3 – recognized the polarized historical discourse that exists between the parties regarding what happened during the 1960s, what occurred during the coup d’état and what precisely took place during the following invasions. They regularly made references to history books and/or narratives presented by the media. Interviewees from both sides recognized that Turkish Cypriot history books have recently become more progressive. All interviewees that spoke about the teaching of history argued that the nationalist narrative should be challenged.

Interview	Reunification	Permanent Division	View of other
R1 – GC	Skepticism	-	Both parties committed atrocities
R2 – TC	Skepticism	-	Official hateful discourse should be challenged
R3 – GC	Skepticism	If terms are not fair	Blacklisted by TRNC; keeps distance.
R4 – GC	Skepticism	Only if complete lack of progress	Dominant view of the other is harmful for negotiating a shared future.
R5 – GC	Skepticism	Never	History lessons leave out wrongdoings of own side; TC schoolbooks more progressive
R6 – TC	Skepticism	Never	Especially younger generation of TCs and Turkish migrants are prone to support polarized discourse

R7 – GC	Optimism	Never	Praising bi-communal events, regrets polarized discourse
R8 – GC	Opposition	Preferable over reunification	Turkey is manipulative, stubborn and not to be trusted
R9 – GC	Skepticism	-	No goodwill from Turkey
R10 – GC	Skepticism	Never	Counter prejudice and superstition, stop self-victimization
R11 – TC	Optimism	Never	TC schoolbooks have become recently more progressive

Table 5: key word summary on stances on reunification, permanent division and the other party, per interviewee

3.2 Development of Intractability

The second topic addressed under *Intractability* is its perceived development after the collapse of the talks in July 2017. To uncover this development, the following question was asked: “How do you think this collapse influences chances of the talks getting started again?”. The interviewees provided a range of answers and substantiations, but most of them can be characterized as the (confirmation of) loss of faith in the process.

R1 did not reflect on the collapse of the latest talks and instead expressed the view that most Cypriots have become fed up with politics because of the Cyprus Issue. R3 expressed a similar view that people lose faith in the process. In her view, the collapse in Switzerland fits a pattern of previous failures. R8 agreed that the collapses cause people to lose faith. R1 and R3 remarked that they knew only one or two people that followed the negotiations.

R4 agreed with the loss of faith after the collapse in Switzerland and added that such collapses have two effects that in themselves causes more difficulty later on in the process. She stated that it contributed to more people favoring a permanent division. Additionally, the failures could have led to the departure of skilled people that are involved professionally to resolve the Cyprus Issue:

“I remember hearing a lot people saying: ‘if it doesn’t work this time, I am going to leave the country and never come back.’ Partly you have to look at domestic issues, like unemployment levels and etcetera. [...] For these people in this field, it’s just heavily dependent on the success of the process. The fact that, as humans, there is only so many times you can be distraught. You end up betrayed and being disappointed by the results. Well, the lack of results of the talks. So, when you start to lose those people, then there’s the chances of the next round being successful are lowered.”

(R4, 1:07:00-1:08:00)

R4 nuanced her last statement because it is not clear exactly what the extent of the influence of the departure of skilled workers is and whether they actually influence the leaders’ decision to reconvene, but she still concluded that they are important to the process. Concerning the leaders, R11 recognized the loss of good report between the leaders after the collapse of the talks. However, he did not think that this marked a shift in which both leaders become permanently intransigent:

“I mean, it’s obvious that initially they have this good report between them, Anastasiades and Akıncı. That is gone. I can clearly say that. But at the end of the day, they are politicians, and I think they can act like a statesman and take some risks. I mean, after the collapse of the Crans-Montana, they were very upset and made some angry statements, they were engaged in the blame game

etcetera. But, I think the interruption until February-March will give them some time to calm down and think again.”

(R11, 47:00-48:00)

R11 deals with the conflict on an academic level on a daily basis. His experience of having studied the conflict in detail for over a decade demonstrates a pattern. This pattern neatly explains the cycle which has been described in the *Theoretical Framework* of this thesis:

“I’ve been observing the Cyprus conflict long enough to observe this flip-flop on positions, and breakthroughs. And overall, we never had a breakthrough which lead to a settlement. But there are major, let’s say, zigzags in the process. Back in 1988, Denktaş said: ‘I am not going to negotiate a federation anymore, if they want to have a deal, they have to recognize TRNC and we’ll talk about confederation’. Three years later he wrote a letter to Clerides [RoC President 1993-2003], to call him back to the negotiation table which produced the Annan Plan eventually. So, things may change. It depends on, of course, what will happen with the gas explorations, it’s a dynamic process. One thing happens, one major international development takes place and the whole setup changes, but overall, if we’re condemned by history and geography to live together, the only realistic solution is based on federation.”

(R11, 45:00-46:00)

R5 also reflected on history to make sense of the influence of the latest talks on the future of the peace process. He saw the restart of the negotiations even after the 2004 dismissal of the Annan Plan as a reason for not expecting any influence of the collapse of the 2017 talks on the future of the negotiations. R2 and R11 both thought the process will remain stationary until at least the election in the south in 2018.

Most interviewees saw the collapse of the talks in Switzerland as a reason to lose faith in the process, or to have their loss of faith confirmed. Some interviewees with in-depth knowledge of the negotiations voiced the opinion that regardless of domestic and international fluctuations, parties will come together sooner or later to discuss the prospect of a federation. This is an effect of what R11 dubs “the historical and geographical condemnation to live together”. Within this perception, the TRNC’s desire for negotiations – driven by political-economic incentives – further fuels such attempts. A notable prediction voiced by two interviewees is that the process will remain stationary until at least February 2018 – the date of the Presidential elections in the RoC.

3.3 Sub-Question (3)

Now that the third theme is comprehensively analyzed, a nuanced answer to the third sub-question can be formulated. The third sub-question of this thesis is: “In what manner does the closure of the Conference on Cyprus in June-July 2017 feed into the intractability of the conflict?” By linking the perception of the interviewees of what happened in Crans-Montana to their feelings about the future of the Cyprus Issue, this sub-question answers an important aspect of the Main RQ. Especially the topic of *Development of Intractability* is key for the main RQ.

Perhaps the best way to sum up the responses of most interviewees is: skepticism and realism. While nine out of eleven were against permanent division, most interviewees thought successful negotiations were not only extremely difficult but also unlikely. Some had their skepticism and/or lack of faith confirmed after the collapse of the talks in July 2017, while others found skepticism anew. A hopeful note came from two interviewees that were aware of

the difficulties, but did say they were hopeful for the future because a lot had been achieved already.

Related to this is the vision/mistrust of the other party. All interviewees – except two – explicitly stated parties should move away from polarized discourse. This was seen by many as harmful to the process and may reify intractability. History books on both sides of the divide are often cited for spreading ethno-nationalist categories, while interviewees from both sides stated that the Turkish Cypriot books have become more progressive recently. Most interviewees argued against the polarized narratives between the sides.

Almost all interviewees agreed that the collapse of the talks either led to or confirmed the lack of interest and loss of faith in the process. Still, there are several interviewees with in-depth knowledge of the last negotiations that believed that the process will start again sooner or later. These interviewees looked at the past to predict the future and stated that the negotiations have always restarted, no matter how desperate it looked.

4. Future Referendum

The fourth theme of the *Data Analysis* is ‘Future Referendum’. The analysis for this theme is aimed at finding an answer to the fourth sub-question: “How do Cypriot citizens evaluate the possibility of a future referendum and reunification?”. Although this theme may seem similar to the last theme on intractability, it is markedly different. While the last theme also incorporates a future dimension, it does so only in the context of intractability. Under this theme, the analysis and questions are solely aimed at finding perceptions of the future.

Two questions are employed to find a good basis for answering the fourth sub-question. The first: “Do you think a solution is possible in the future?” The second question is: “Is there something that should be part of a solution for you to agree to reunification?” By analyzing the responses to these two questions, sub-question (4) will be answered.

One question that was originally specified in the interview guide under this theme was scrapped because of its overlap with a question under the theme of *Intractability*. It concerns the following question: “Would you be in favor of reunification at this point?” The scrapping of this question is marked in the list of interview questions, in *Appendix I*.

4.1 Perception of Possibility of Solution

For this section, the answers on the following question and the ensuing discussions are analyzed: “Do you think a solution is possible in the future?”.

Six out of the eleven interviewees expressed an opinion on the matter (R1, R4, R5, R7, R8, R9). R1, R5, R7 agreed that it was possible. R1 liked to see Cyprus move back to the bi-communal society it used to be as soon as possible. R5 predicted it will take decades to reach a resolution, if it is left up to politicians. He considered the introduction of new CBMs such as the opening of new crossings of particular importance. R7 expressed a desire to see a resolution take place within the next decade.

R4 and R9 took a different stance. Though R4 stated that she would like to see a reunification happen, she was uncertain if it was possible, because she saw Cypriots getting more fed up with each other. She argued that a ‘solution’ will occur in any case, but that it may take the form of a partition instead of a reunification. R9 declared that the prospect of reunification frightened her, and considered reescalation likely. “It’s so easy, for like one little thing to escalate. And then the next thing, you know, the whole neighborhood is going to be fighting. [...] There needs to be continuous efforts to promote tolerance, acceptance” (R9, 36:00). R8 only stated that she would vote against any referendum.

All in all, three interviewees thought reunification was possible, though they gave different timelines for its realization. The two interviewees R4 and R9 displayed uncertainty towards the possibility of a solution, respectively based on lack of political/electoral will and

potential for reescalation. One interviewee was against the referendum and would vote against reunification if a referendum would come.

4.2 Threshold Yes Vote

This topic is addressed by analyzing responses to this question from the interview guide: “Is there something that should be part of a solution for you to agree to reunification?” In past themes, the interviewees had the opportunity to express their stances on reunification in various manners. This resulted in stances such as skepticism or opposition. This question, however, expands on this. Furthermore, it allows the interviewee to name all the elements necessary for their agreement to a resolution. As Cypriot citizens have the final say in any agreement, the importance of evaluating their requirements cannot be stressed enough.

Seven out of eleven interviewees provided a minimum of what a future deal should contain if they were to agree to it (R1, R2, R3, R4, R5, R8, R11). The exception here is R8, who stated that she would vote against the referendum regardless of the circumstances and contents of the deal. R1 and R3 agreed with each other that they would be in favor if Turkish influence and occupation would completely end. R1 stated she would be hesitant if the Turkish occupation remained to any extent or if Turkish leadership imposed rules.

R2 and R11 – both Turkish Cypriots – also agreed with each other to some extent. R2 stated that he would vote in favor under any circumstances, as long as the current aim of the negotiations would define the deal: a bi-communal, bi-zonal federation. R11 expected most Turkish Cypriots to look favorably at the deal. He expressed that they would likely have a low threshold to agree to a settlement. He linked this to the idea that most Turkish Cypriots do not experience the conflict in Cyprus as a ‘comfortable conflict’ and would thus be relatively conciliatory. R11 substantiated this by pointing to the successful election of pro-reunification President Akinci of the unrecognized TRNC, despite the fact that he was endorsed by only the smallest party in parliament.

The two remaining interviewees (R4, R5) offered different perspectives on the matter. R4 stated that feasibility and sustainability are most important. She argued that this entails that any parameters that allow for an internal power struggle – such as at the start of the 1960s – should be avoided. R5 had never considered the minimum threshold for voting yes on a referendum, but said that any deal allowing for religious influence on the education system would be a ‘no-no’.

Though the interviewees voiced a range of opinions, some agreements between the interviewees can be observed. R2 and R11 implicitly and explicitly state that Turkish Cypriots would be relatively conciliatory: i.e. a low threshold. R2 specified this by noting that if the current format of negotiations would be realized, he would be in favor, regardless of the circumstances. R1 and R3 both expressed a minimum requirement – for a definite yes vote – of a policy in which Turkey completely ends its occupation and does not impose any rules. R4 would consider sustainability of the reunification deal for her voting behavior on a referendum. R8 would not vote in favor of reunification under any circumstances.

	Possibility of Future Solution	Threshold Yes Vote
R1	Yes, go back to bi-communal society as soon as possible	If Turkish occupation ends completely; uncertain otherwise
R2	-	Bi-communal, bi-zonal Federation
R3	-	No influence or participation from Turkish government on future republic
R4	Uncertain, but hopes it happens	Feasibility and sustainability should be most important; internal power struggle should be avoided

R5	It is possible, but will take decades if it's left to politicians; new CBMs, such as opening crossings is vital	Has not considered it, but would not agree with religious influence on education.
R6	-	-
R7	Within the next decade would be optimal	-
R8	Will vote against any referendum	Under no circumstances
R9	Prospect frightens R9; reescalation is likely; effort for tolerance is necessary	-
R10	-	-
R11	-	Most TCs would look favorably to a deal

Table 6: key-word summary on stances on future solution and threshold yes vote, per interviewee

4.3 Sub-Question (4)

Now that the response to the two questions of this theme have been comprehensively analyzed, an answer can be formulated to the fourth sub-question “How do Cypriot citizens evaluate the possibility of a future referendum and reunification?”. A total of six interviewees provided a view on the possibility of a solution and seven interviewees displayed their minimum requirement for a yes vote on the referendum. These respondents have evaluated the possibility of a future referendum in different manners.

Out of the six interviewees that expressed a view on the possibility of a solution, three thought it was possible, two had sincere doubts about the feasibility and impact of a solution, while one interviewee stated to vote against any solution.

Similarly, the seven interviewees that expressed minimum requirements for a yes vote displayed differing opinions. Two interviewees – both Turkish Cypriots – stated that a yes vote from the Turkish Cypriots is relatively likely, regardless of the precise contents of the deal. Two other interviewees – both Greek Cypriots – stated that Turkish occupation and other political influence should come to a halt for a yes vote. Another interviewee would vote against a deal that allowed for religious influence on the education system. Yet another showed disapproval of any deal that would allow for internal power struggle. A single interviewee would not vote in favor under any circumstances.

Altogether, the Cypriots above have evaluated the possibility of a future referendum and reunification varyingly. In short: almost all would be in favor, depending on a specific set of circumstances, with the circumstances defined by the interviewees not necessarily being mutually exclusive. However, the legal provisions implied by the threshold of one interviewee for a ‘bi-communal bi-zonal federation’ could clash with the threshold of another to avoid ‘internal power struggle’. For example, much like the early 1960s, it is conceivable that either community may use its constitutional assurances to put extra pressure on issues important to them – thus allowing the risk of a deadlock.

5. CBMs

The last theme of the *Data Analysis* concerns Confidence Building Measures (CBMs). The analysis of this theme is aimed at answering the following sub-question: “How do Cypriots citizens evaluate CBMs for the Cyprus conflict?”. This theme is different from the last four themes, in the sense that it uses specific proposals of CBMs as a basis for discussion. There are a total of five CBMs per community that were selected from the text by Irwin (2017b, 3-4). These five most popular CBMs from each of the two communities were chosen as the basis of discussion. Despite their popularity in the polls, some CBMs gave cause to discussion.

In order to evaluate this last theme of the *Data Analysis*, firstly, all ten CBMs that were have been used in the interview are introduced and then briefly explained. Secondly, the responses of the interviewee regarding the top 5 of CBMs of their *own* community are analyzed.

Thirdly, the responses of the interviewee regarding the CBMs of the *other* community are evaluated. Fourthly, the responses of the interviewees regarding the efficacy of the CBMs, and the trust they had that the other community will implement them are interpreted. Lastly, sub-question (5) is answered comprehensively.

5.1 CBMs per community

The five most popular proposed Confidence Building Measures for the Greek Cypriots, according to Irwin (2017b, 3), are listed here, in order of importance, before they are briefly explained: Turn off the lights of the TRNC flag to show TC support for the negotiations; Ensure a common time zone across Cyprus; Allow owners of property in Varosha to visit their property; Return religious icons; Allow the Greek Church in Famagusta to be opened for Easter services.

The most popular CBM for Greek Cypriots would entail switching off the lights of the TRNC flag to show support for the negotiations. On the mountain range north of the capital of Nicosia, TRNC authorities constructed a large flag of the TRNC, which is outlined with lights. Because of the lights, it is visible 24 hours a day from the south. According to Irwin (2017b), turning off the lights of the TRNC flag was seen as ‘essential’ by 68% of the Greek Cypriot respondents and by just 4% of the Turkish Cypriots. 74% of Turkish Cypriots deemed it ‘unacceptable’.

The second most popular CBM for Greek Cypriots is to ensure a common time zone across the island. 57% of Greek Cypriots and 37% of Turkish Cypriots saw it as essential.

The third CBM for Greek Cypriots allows owners of property in Varosha to visit their property. Varosha is an occupied residential area on the coast, that before the invasion used to be popular with tourists. The area is currently inaccessible to anyone but armed forces in the north. Most of the properties belong to Greek Cypriot families that fled the offensive in 1974. This CBM would give the owners a chance to revisit their properties in the deserted area. 47% of Greek Cypriots and 22% of the Turkish Cypriots viewed it as essential.

The fourth CBM in terms of popularity is the return of religious icons to their rightful owners. Many icons – such as paintings and other religious artifacts – have gone missing after the invasion. Considering their religious and cultural significance, 44% of Greek Cypriots thought it was essential to return them, 19% of Turkish Cypriots agreed.

The last popular CBM for the Greek Cypriots, used in the interview is to allow the Greek Church in Famagusta to be opened for Easter services. Much like the icons, this CBM entails significant cultural and religious value, and 44% of the Greek Cypriots in the poll of Irwin (2017b) thought it was essential, while 10% of Turkish Cypriots agreed.

The five most popular CBMs for the Turkish Cypriot community are as follows. The most popular CBM in the north was the coordination and financing of the repair of cemeteries in the north and the south. 46% of Turkish Cypriots viewed it as essential, with 37% of Greek Cypriots expressing the same view.

The second CBM would allow for arranging meetings between fire brigades of the north and south to agree on joint procedures to prevent catastrophic fires. As an increasingly arid and significantly agrarian island, large fires affect both sides negatively. Joint procedures would help to fight fires effectively. 49% of Turkish Cypriots viewed it as essential, 48% of Greek Cypriots did the same.

The third CBM involves the facilitation of the purchase of car insurance to cover both sides of the island at the same rates. The situation is currently arranged in such a manner that an owner of a car registered in either the RoC or the TRNC, will need to buy insurance before crossing to make sure the car is properly covered. 47% of Turkish Cypriots viewed such as policy as essential; 29% of Greek Cypriots agreed.

The fourth CBM is the extension of the cellular coverage across the island. Much like car insurance, cellular coverage is available on one side only. When traveling to the other side, one must buy another sim card to be covered. 31% of Turkish Cypriots thought it was an essential practice, 43% of Greek Cypriots agreed.

The last important CBM used in the interview is the implementation of common time zone across the island. 37% of Turkish Cypriot viewed it as essential, and 57% of the Greek Cypriots agreed.

5.2 CBMs of one's own community

In this section, the responses and discussions regarding CBMs of the interviewees' own community will be addressed, per community. Since many CBMs inspired not more than agreement, those that led to discussion will be highlighted. Firstly, the responses of Turkish Cypriot interviewees to the top 5 CBMs for Turkish Cypriots are discussed and analyzed. Secondly, the responses of Greek Cypriot interviewees to the top 5 CBMs for Greek Cypriots will be discussed and analyzed. The CBMs will be discussed in the order of their popularity, according to the findings by Irwin (2017b, 3-4).

Firstly, the responses to the top 5 CBMs for the Turkish Cypriots are evaluated. In the case of two Turkish Cypriots, this last part of the interview was cut short due to time constraints. This means that only one Turkish Cypriot reflected on the CBMs for his community (R2).

The first two CBMs concerning the repair and maintenance of graves in the north and south, respectively the meeting between fire brigades to prevent catastrophic fires gained little response. R2 attached little meaning to both of them. The fifth CBM focused on the common time zone, and received no response.

The third CBM for the Turkish Cypriots entails the facilitation of car insurance for both sides. He stated it was important, and thought the current policy prevented some Greek Cypriots from visiting the north. He also thought that the fourth CBM – cellular coverage on both sides – was important. He stated that people feel less secure visiting the other side if they would not have regular coverage. He said that a combination of these two CBMs would help to increase personal interaction between the communities. R2 attached particular importance to this 'grass-roots' interaction because "it is stuck on the political level".

Secondly, the top 5 CBMs for the Greek Cypriots are evaluated. The CBM that gave rise to the most response was the measure that proposed switching off the lights of the outline of the TRNC flag. This CBM provoked an emotional response from almost every Greek Cypriot that was asked about it. For example, R1 stated the following:

"Erase it. All of it. We hate it. We so much hate it. That makes us so angry. This is one of the things that people in Cyprus – the parties that are against the relations – is this. Because, imagine every day waking up and seeing these things in front of you. Even at night see all these lights like opening and closing."

(R1, 39:00)

R1 then went on to use expletives. R8 and R9 also agreed that it should be fully erased. R3 called it childish. R5 thought the implementation of this CBM would be valuable, and did not think it would be an issue for most Turkish Cypriots to switch off the lights. R4 thought such a symbolic gesture would have a 'massive' effect, not only because of the willingness it implies, but also for its potential for deeper understanding Turkish Cypriots. R7 expressed agreement that it should be turned off.

The second CBM concerning a common time zone across the island, did not receive any opposition from Greek Cypriots (R3, R4, R5, R7, R8, R9). Most interviewees did not attach much political meaning to the differing time zones. R3 did not understand the point of having a different time zone in the first place. R4 “didn’t really buy into the politicization of it” (R4, 34:00). R5 expressed that there were jokes being made about it. R7 thought it was ‘confusing’ and R9 called the time difference between north and south “the most bizarre thing that ever happened” (47:00). R8 referred to the common time zone as ‘basic’.

The third CBM concerned allowing a visit of properties Varosha by its owners. This point raised relatively differing opinions. For instance, R3 and R4 were indifferent towards the proposition, while R5 thought it would be a big and important step. R7 agreed with R5 and added that the owners are still very attached to their property. R4 expressed that the topic of Varosha was extremely complicated and that it would likely produce many different reactions, and therefore would prefer not to go in depth about it.

The fourth CBM concerned the return of religious icons. Even more so than the previous measure, this fourth CBM produced diverse responses. R4 articulated unawareness of any importance of the topic. R5 thought it was highly important and noted that it was picked up by the technical committees that are working towards reunification. R7 argued there was especial importance regarding the issue because of the religiosity of many Greek Cypriots. R9 thought it would demonstrate ‘some respect’. R8 was certain the icons have all disappeared, and that the north does not “have icons to give back” (R8, 30:00).

The fifth CBM concerned allowing opening the Greek Church in Famagusta for Easter services. R4, R5, R7 and R9 agreed it was important, because of the religious nature of many Greek Cypriots. R7 stated that a similar procedure should be thought of for the mosques in the south. R9 added she would be touched if such a measure would be implemented. R8 said it would be nice gesture but expressed skepticism due to the political nature of a move like that on part of authorities in the north.

All things considered, it is difficult to make any comparisons within the communities groups. Not only because of the fact that only one interview with a Turkish Cypriot addressed the CBMs comprehensively, but also because of the fact that Greek Cypriot responses regarding CBMs were so diverse. However, all in all, every interviewee either expressed (profound) agreement with the CBMs for their community, or were indifferent towards them. The only opposition against the CBMs was the expression that the CBMs did not go far enough. Some Greek Cypriots interviewees voiced this when asked about the TRNC flag.

5.3 CBMs of the other community

In this section, the responses and discussions regarding CBMs of the other community are addressed, per community. Firstly, the responses of Turkish Cypriot interviewees to the top 5 CBMs for Greek Cypriots are discussed and analyzed. Secondly, the responses of Greek Cypriot interviewees to the top 5 CBMs for Turkish Cypriots are discussed and analyzed.

Like Turkish Cypriot responses to the CBMs of their own community, the response from Turkish Cypriot interviewees towards the Greek Cypriot top 5 was limited to a single individual (R2), due to time constraints. This individual expressed agreement with all five CBMs of the Greek Cypriot community, except the one regarding switching off the lights of the TRNC flag displayed on the mountain range north of Nicosia. He stated the following on the matter:

“It’s not possible. You can do it after a solution. How can you do it, if you don’t find a solution? I mean: we cannot do it either, Turkish Cypriots – not only because of Turkey. If there’s ten Turkish Cypriots, five will not take it [and] five are fine with it. It’s not possible. [...] As long as there is no solution in the north,

there is a self-declared state. So, it will become contradictory. You say: 'I become a state', and then ask me to take down my own flag. It is an oxymoron. So every day tell to the soldier: 'you die for your flag', and then you go on take down the flag. For me it's fine, I would have taken it. But, I know it's impossible, it's an oxymoron."

(R2, 29:00-30:00)

His estimate on the extent of the conciliatory stance of other Turkish Cypriots regarding this particular issue – “five in ten people will not have it” – was in the right direction, but is in fact even higher. Irwin’s polls show that 74% of Turkish Cypriots deem such a proposal unacceptable (2017b, 3). With such a large majority against it, pursuing this CBM becomes difficult.

The Greek Cypriot responses towards the Turkish Cypriot top 5 are evaluated and analyzed next. Two Greek Cypriots gave responses on the Turkish Cypriot top 5 (R1, R8). Both of them expressed only agreement towards the five most popular CBMs for Turkish Cypriots and both added substantiation for their importance. R1 underlined the need for meetings between fire brigades (CBM1), because a large portion of the forests in Cyprus were consumed in a wildfire the previous year. She agreed that that was something that had to be arranged regardless of the negotiations. R8 noted the effects of having a different time zone (CBM5). She spoke about the case of her colleagues working and using the airport in the north. R8 stated that while she was not personally affected by the difference, it was “really silly” and “a joke” (27:00).

After being asked about the top 5 measures for the Turkish Cypriots, R8 displayed a surprising response. While she professed to be categorically against resolution – because of the political and human difference between the sides – she now struck a conciliatory tone: “we are on the same island for crying out loud” and added: “I think they’re all very logical and useful to be honest. I mean for both sides, not only to them. It’s not something that’ll only affect them, it’s beneficial for us as well” (R8, 44:00-45:00).

All things considered, the interviewees reacted positively towards almost all proposed CBMs. However, the most popular CBM for the Greek Cypriots was discarded by the Turkish Cypriot interviewee. While the top 5 CBMs for Turkish Cypriots were mostly regarded with agreement by both of the Greek Cypriot interviewees, it should be noted that if the selection of the CBMs for Turkish Cypriots was any different, the results would likely have been different as well. Indeed, right after the top 5 CBMs, number 6 of the CBMs for Turkish Cypriots concerned commemoration of *Enosis* in school in the south: “Remove the requirement for the *Enosis* plebiscite to be commemorated in Greek Cypriot schools.” This measure was viewed as essential by 44% by Turkish Cypriots and deemed unacceptable by 47% of the Greek Cypriots (Irwin 2017b, 4). This contentious issue would have likely evoked a different response from many Greek Cypriot interviewees than agreement.

5.4 Trust and Efficacy

This last section of the *Data Analysis* focuses on the trust interviewees have that the other side will implement CBMs and the efficacy of the CBMs. The first topic on trust regarding implementation is of interest: Though over 80% of the respondents of Irwin’s polls would like to see CBMs implemented, less than 30% of the respondents from both sides believe the other side will implement many CBMs (Irwin 2017b, 2). As such, this trust regarding implementation is connected to (mis)trust of the other. This presents another tool to uncover data fundamental to the notion of intractability. The second topic on efficacy is vital to consider. Over 65% of Cypriots from both communities think it will improve the chances of reaching a final agreement if the two sides implement the CBMs (Irwin 2017b, 2). Understanding (dis)belief in the value

of CBMs will aid to comprehend CBMs in Cyprus more broadly and supports recommendations.

Two respondents (R1, R8) reflected on the trust of the other side implementing many CBMs. R1 thought CBMs were a good idea, as they have the potential to build relations between communities. She believed that both sides would implement the CBMs, as long as the north would turn off the lights of the flag, arguing: “For us it is maybe over-demanding to turn off the lights of the flag. But this has to be. This something very important. You are in Cyprus not in Turkey (R1, 42:00).” R8 expressed skepticism towards the north implementing the CBMs and suspected an alternative agenda behind it.

Six interviewees reflected on the general efficacy of CBMs (R1, R2, R3, R8, R9, R11). The stance of all interviewees can be summed up as a view in which they expressed belief in the efficacy of CBMs but made – sometimes serious – critical notes regarding implementation. The exception here is R8, who stated she does not believe in the efficacy of the CBMs.

R1 expressed belief in the efficacy, as long as the north would comply with Greek Cypriot CBMs. Likewise, R3 thought it might be effective, but was concerned with the delay it would bring to the process. R2 also believed in CBMs, but made a critical note and lodged his hope with grass-roots:

“Yeah of course, I believe in confidence building. But because of the current situation some of them are pretty hard to achieve. They couldn’t solve this roaming system for the telephone although it would be great actually. But I more believe in common destiny. More like, interrelated futures. So in that sense I more believe in economy. Opening more check-points would be better. So my priorities would be more on these kind of things.”

(R2, 23:00)

R11 also displayed lack of confidence in the efficacy of CBMs, but produced serious remarks regarding the future after implementation. He thought Greek Cypriot authorities had reservations regarding the CBMs because some of them would solve key issues that the TRNC faces. This, in turn, would make the TRNC less conciliatory:

“Both sides reconfirm their commitment to a comprehensive deal and promise not to use this as an upgrade the TRNC or whatever. Because this is the Greek Cypriot reality. They say: ‘if we do this, practically we will upgrade the TRNC, and we make Turkish Cypriots even more intransigent.’ Etcetera. Of course, I mean, it’s really difficult for them to avoid that with a deal. [...] This is politics, I mean you promise one thing, you do the other.”

(R11, 33:00-34:00)

R9 thought the CBMs would be a “huge step forward”, but was uncertain towards its efficacy because of Cypriot mentality:

“We have sometimes this attitude problem. I can say that because I am Cypriot (laughs). I love my country, I love my people, but yeah, we are a funny bunch. [...] Sometimes, we have this attitude that we deserve things and we don’t, we don’t think about working towards that, with people. There is a change in attitude, I believe, I hope. But, like I said, not everybody is cultured, not everybody is open-minded. Not everybody has experienced other cultures and so

on. So, there needs to be a variety of projects to educate the masses of Cyprus. To educate them, to culture them. There needs to be, especially for tolerance, appreciation – not just acceptance but appreciation – of differences of all countries.”

(R9, 40:00-41:00)

R8 did not think the CBMs would be effective. She suspected that if authorities would implement them, they would do so only to create the impression that they care about resolution.

5.5 Sub-Question (5)

Having comprehensively analyzed the CBMs have, it is possible to answer the final sub-question of this thesis: “How do Cypriots citizens evaluate CBMs for the Cyprus conflict?” Most interviewees expressed that they appreciate the CBMs of their community and the other community. The response of some Greek Cypriot interviewees towards the Turkish Cypriot top 5 CBMs even prompted conciliatory responses, from usually skeptical interviewees. However, despite many positive responses, there were some hesitant assessments of interviewees from both communities to take into account.

It should be noted that while CBMs are actually aimed at bringing parties together, they may in fact provoke emotional responses. While most CBMs produced (substantiated) agreement or indifference, the measure regarding the lights of the TRNC flag evoked an almost universal emotional and negative response. Albeit to a relatively lesser degree, the CBMs with a religious nature also raised an emotional response with some Greek Cypriot interviewees. Skepticism towards the intentions of the other party – if such CBMs were to be implemented – was also observed.

Moreover, the critical note made by R11 needs to be underlined. Since some CBMs address critical issues that emanate from the conflict, implementing such measures may make parties less conciliatory. In effect, implementing CBMs – which are aimed at making resolution more likely – bears the inherent risk of inadvertently prolonging the division.

In short, while most interviewees agree with the CBMs of their community and the ones of the other community, critical notes are almost ubiquitous. These critiques point to the risks involved with implementation of the CBMs and should be considered in any effort to realize them.

Conclusion

Now that all five sub-questions have been addressed, the main Research Question is comprehensively answered. To recap, the main Research Question is as follows: “How do perceptions of Cypriot citizens after the Conference on Cyprus in July 2017 influence the future of the negotiations on the conflict in Cyprus?”. The answer to this Research Question builds on all five sub-questions, which have been answered in the *Data Analysis*.

The most striking trend among the interviewees is substantiated *pessimism*. Interviewees moved towards a pessimistic outlook on the future or had their previously existing skeptical attitude confirmed. The few interviewees that were explicitly hopeful of the future, expressed the sentiment in combination with stating that the process has been difficult, and that it will not be resolved easily.

Regarding intractability, most interviewees looked favorably towards the prospect of a solution, but also voiced *realism* regarding reunification with most of them expressing a substantial degree of certainty it will not happen soon. Two notable arguments for skepticism identified in this research are the polarized discourse between the parties and lack of readiness on part of the leadership.

Furthermore, proposals to deal with the lack of trust between the sides were evaluated largely positively by the pool of interviewees, but there is significant risk involved. This risk is illustrated by the notion that some of the proposed measures in fact resolve major issues, and therefore could make parties less conciliatory. The inherent risk of such proposals is further underlined by the negative emotional responses towards some of the proposals.

This answer should be viewed in the context of a cycle of hope and hopelessness as described in the *Theoretical Framework*. This cycle is characterized by rising and then subsiding anticipation for successful negotiations – a pattern which can be observed in the last decades. This was also referred to by one interviewee with in-depth academic knowledge of the negotiations.

All things considered, this qualitative research identified a largely negative and realistic consensus. The eye-catching event of the failed peacemaking effort in 2017 contributed to rising skepticism towards the peace process by means of the confirmation of previously existing negative perceptions as well as the introduction to them.

Discussion

No research is perfect. Every research has inherent limitations presented by the choice of methods, the analysis of the data and the conclusion tied to them. Acknowledging and examining these limitations, supports the validity of the research and is thus an important duty. This *Discussion* chapter addresses such issues and discusses its implications. Firstly, the limitations of this thesis are discussed. Secondly, the contribution of this research in terms of scientific relevance will be assessed.

Limitations

To address the topic of limitations comprehensively, two angles will be explored. Firstly, the limitations outlined in the *Methodology* Chapter will be related to the results as displayed in the *Data Analysis* and reevaluated. Secondly, suggestions by interviewees regarding the extensiveness of the interview will be considered.

Methodology and Data Analysis

The last part of the *Methodology* chapter includes an elaborate reflection on the limitations of the methodology and the collection of data. The issues raised pertained to the risk of self-selection by means of the criteria for the interviewees and skewed group ratios. Both issues may have implications for the type of interviewees that were approached for the research. The research by Irwin shows that around 30% of Greek Cypriots and almost 40% of Turkish Cypriots would likely vote 'no' on a referendum (2017b, 6-7). Yet, only one interviewee (R8) explicitly and repeatedly stated she was against reunification.

These facts illustrate that the possibility of self-selection of a pool of interviewees where relatively conciliatory opinions are voiced is real. However, as outlined under part 3 of the *Methodology* Chapter, this is an inherent risk of the research design. Naturally, citizens that are were not engaged with the peace process – non-conciliatory Cypriots – would be harder to find to talk about it comprehensively. This line of reasoning was practically demonstrated when interviewees were asked about any people they knew that would be interested for the same interview: almost all of them exclusively offered contacts that were engaged and conciliatory. Only R3 thought of the non-conciliatory R8, because she was aware that R8 was particularly vocal against resolution. The rest of the interviewees offered contacts that were either engaged with the peace process or had mixed feelings regarding reunification.

It is difficult to determine if any knowledge is missing concerning the perspectives of non-conciliatory Cypriots. On one hand, the graphical representation of saturation in *Appendix V*, shows that R8's opposing perspectives did not contribute to an unexpected amount of new codes. In fact, her contribution to the codes is in line with what would have been expected if she was conciliatory. On the other hand, R8 is the only one distinctly opposed interviewee, so it cannot be concluded that two or three other particularly opposed interviewees would not have shown different perspectives.

Thus, regarding limitations, it should be noted that while this research offers in-depth insight on what conciliatory Cypriots – and Cypriots that doubt about reunification – think, it is not possible to say the same with certainty about Cypriots that are not engaged with the peace process.

Interviewee Suggestions

At the end of every interview, each interviewee was asked whether she/he found that anything was missing from the interview; another angle that was worth exploring or an issue that they felt that had been left out. While most of the interviewees did think that the interview was comprehensive, two interviewees (R4, R7) made remarks on what topics could have been

addressed. These remarks are included in the transcripts and can be found under the code 6: ‘closing remarks’.

R4 expressed the following:

“Maybe an area that you can delve into a little bit more is; ‘what are the aspects of involvement in the process that have most motivated people?’ [...] what is it about this round of talks – or anything that has been happening during that time-period – that have made people feel the most hopeful? Although, you do give, in many question do give an answer to that indirectly, by asking: ‘what do you think of the process overall?’”

(R4, 1:50:00)

It is true that many interview questions were phrased in a broad enough manner that they allowed for reflection on what has most motivated them in the process, or what has made them feel most hopeful. And indeed, some interviewee provided responses in which they stated that several features of the peace process made them feel hopeful/motivated.

Still, the advice by R4 is valuable because it allows to explicitly dig in to the positive perceptions of the interviewees. Respective responses could then further support or even contrast the findings, allowing for a deeper understanding. Thus, it should be noted that while some interviewees gave responses along the lines of the suggested topic, the conclusion for this thesis was reached without asking the interviewees *specifically* for the type of question R4 mentioned. Such questions could be considered for any future research.

R7 proposed a focus on the other three religious communities on the island (R7, 1:26:00-1:28:00). Besides the Greek Cypriot and the Turkish Cypriot community, there are three recognized religious minority communities that reside on the island: the Latins, the Maronites and the Armenians. The most numerous of which are the Maronites; accounting for roughly 6,000 inhabitants (Akçali 2007, 60). These religious communities are represented by non-voting delegates in the RoC Parliament. These members are consulted when legislation regarding their communities is drafted (Akçali 2007, 59-60), and thus do wield some influence.

Still, in most academic literature regarding the Cyprus Issue and the ongoing negotiations, these communities are unaccounted for, and – as R7 points out – they were not considered for this research. The terminology surrounding the negotiations of Cyprus – e.g. ‘bi-communal federation’ or ‘the two ethnically homogenous entities’ – reifies the impression the peace process revolves around the Greek Cypriot and the Turkish Cypriot communities. In addition, outside the implications of such jargon, the three religious minority communities in fact voted to be represented under the Greek Cypriot authorities in a 1960 referendum and will likely not pursue further representation by actual voting power in Parliament (Akçali 2007, 59-60).

However, as R7 shows, academic consideration of other communities does lead to a thought-provoking addition to the understanding of the Cyprus Issue. She stated the following:

“Did you know that actually the Maronite community was able to negotiate and they return to Kormakitis [under TRNC administration] and now they negotiate to return to Ayia Marina? [...] It’s actually a military zone, but as the Maronite community, they negotiate, and they gained access to the first village and now they actually return inside the military zone.”

(R7, 1:26:00)

The ability to negotiate peaceful return toward the occupied areas suggests alternative negotiation tactics employed by the Maronite community. The examination of such alternatives should be a valuable addition to any future research. This could inform other approaches towards the peace process between the communities.

Contribution and Generalization

The introduction of the thesis stated that this research was intended to contribute to the literature on intractability generally, but also to the Cyprus Issue specifically. In that respect, this research has described various mechanisms of intractability applicable to the case of Cyprus. Most notable is the shift towards and confirmation of skepticism regarding resolution. The cycle of hope and hopelessness as described in the *Theoretical Framework* is of particular interest as the context in which this happens, and was referred to explicitly by one interviewee with in-depth academic knowledge.

Regarding generalization, naturally, this qualitative research is not generalizable in a representative manner to the larger population. However, it does provide us with in-depth knowledge regarding the stances of Cypriot citizens regarding the peace process. In doing so, it informs topics for quantitative research, to determine the extent of newfound skepticism, reconfirmation of negative perceptions and restrained hope for future resolution. These topics become especially significant when considering the possible impact of recent events that took place after the interviews. These events are incentives for renewed research regarding the Cyprus Issue, as is discussed in the next and last Chapter on *Recommendations*.

Recommendations

The fieldwork for this thesis was conducted in August 2017. Many of the interviewees note that they themselves and their family and friends pay little attention to the negotiation process, and are thus not expected to reevaluate their stance on the issue swiftly. However, as shown by this research and the polls by Irwin (2017b), high profile events have previously influenced the perceptions of Cypriot citizens regarding the future of the negotiations. Therefore, new conspicuous events warrant renewed qualitative and quantitative research on the topic to determine the extent of the influence and its implications.

One such novel occurrence is the Presidential election in the Republic of Cyprus on January 28th, 2018, and its run-off on February 4th, 2018. President Anastasiades was reelected for a second – and final – five-year term (Reuters 2018a). In interviews with both Greek Cypriots as well as Turkish Cypriots, the prospect of the elections in the south was noted as an important feature for the future of the peace process. As Anastasiades and Akıncı form a pro-reunification mix, the election of another leader in the south would likely have altered the process dramatically. However, now the pro-reunification leadership in the south is assured for another five years, perceptions may differ.

Before the election, it could have been argued that President Anastasiades was apprehensive towards agreeing to a solution, not only because of the possible dismissal of a referendum, but also because of the risk of losing the Presidential election if he was perceived to be incompetent or undesirable because of his conduct towards an agreement. Now that the latter incentive has dissipated, it is conceivable that policy towards reunification undergoes changes. With that in mind, the views of Cypriot citizens may alter, which warrants new research that includes perceptions on this recent election.

Another recent eye-catching event is the intrusion of Turkish warships into the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) of Cyprus, to counter the exploration of natural gas (Reuters 2018b). Such intrusion is no novelty. However, the latest activities involved an unprecedented effective blockade of the exploration. Turkey argues that the explorations on part of the RoC are done in “disregard of the inalienable rights on natural resources of the Turkish Cypriot people” and that Turkey is “determined to take the necessary steps together with the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus” (Turkish MFA 2018). President Anastasiades of Cyprus called the incident a “violation of the Republic’s sovereign rights” (Cyprus-Mail 2018).

The Cyprus Issue evidently remains a dynamic topic with frequent international implications and therefore merits reassessment regularly. Considering the demonstrated impact of high profile events on the perceptions of Cypriots in the past, the importance and value of the Cyprus Issue after such events as a topic for future research cannot be overstated.

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Appendix I – Interview Questions

1. Recent negotiations (introduction and gauging opinions of the international setting)
 - Are you aware of the negotiations in Switzerland in June-July?
 - How do you feel about the process of negotiations?
 - Do you feel these negotiations were urgently required?
 - How/Why?
 - What could have been done differently?
 - How/Why?
 - Have these recent negotiations changed your view of the future the negotiations?
 - How?/Why?
 - International Mediation (As context and format of talks)
 - What parties can you identify that are negotiating on Cyprus?
 - To what extent do you think it is necessary that parties other than two community leaders are part of negotiations?
 - How/why?
 - How do you view the role of the United Nations in the negotiations?
 - Why?
 - Has this changed?
 - How do you view the role of Turkey in the negotiations?
 - Why?
 - Has this changed?
 - How do you view the role of Greece in the negotiations?
 - Why?
 - Has this changed?
 - How do you view the role of the European Union in the negotiations?
2. Spoilers (as a practical manifestation of mistrust)
 - Do you think there was a party involved in the negotiations in general that undermined the peace process?
 - What is this party?
 - Have you seen this party before in the process?
 - Does this party behave differently now compared to how it used to?
 - How does it undermine?
 - What does it seek to achieve?
 - Do you expect this party to change its behavior in the future?
 - How do you feel about this party?
 - How does the presence of such a party make you feel about the prospects of the Cyprus Issue?
 - How does it affect the negotiations?
 - What could be done to redress this party?
3. Intractability & Urgency (Gauging inherent mistrust between sides)
 - Do you feel that Cyprus should be reunified?
 - Why?
 - Do you feel that this should be done urgently?
 - Why?
 - ~~○ How do you view the failure of the peace talks in Switzerland?~~
 - How do you think this collapse influence chances of talks getting started again?
 - *Do you think there is a solution possible in the future?* [moved to four]
 - In what case do you think it would be better to leave Cyprus permanently divided?
 - How do you view the other side?
 - Why/how?
4. Possible future referendum/deal(Perceptions on solution)

- *Do you think a solution is possible in the future* [moved from three]
- ~~Would you be in favor of reunification at this point?~~
 - Why
 - Have you changed your opinion on that over the years?
 - How/why?
- Is there something that should be part of a solution for you to agree to reunification.
 - What
 - Have you changed your opinion on that over the years?
 - How/why?
- CBM/critical issues polls:
 - Anything that you identify as important?
 - Is there something you would give up in exchange for peace?

Response and background to concrete CBM's (according to Irwin 2017b)

5. TC top 5
 1. Coordinate and finance repair/maintenance of graves in north and south
 2. Arrange meetings between fire brigades from north/south to prevent catastrophic fires
 3. Facilitate the purchase of car insurance to cover both sides at the same rates
 4. Being able to use your mobile phone all over Cyprus
 5. Ensure a common time zone all over Cyprus.
6. GC top 5
 1. Turn off the lights of the Turkish Cypriot flag to show support for negotiations.
 2. Ensure a common time zone.
 3. Allow owners of Varosha to visit their property.
 4. Return Icons to their rightful owners
 5. Allow the Greek Church in Famagusta to be opened for Easter services
7. Evaluate/opinion:
 - How do you feel about CBM's in general?
 - Why?
 - How do you feel about the CBM's of the other side [north or south]?
 - Why?
 - Do you feel differently about CBM's in general than before?
 - How/why?
 - Do you think this CBM is important to regain trust?
 - How/why?
 - Do you think this CBM is effective?
 - How/why?
 - Do you feel differently about this CBM now than that you used to?
 - How/why?
 - Is there something else about CBM's that you feel should be taken into account?
8. Other/ending:
 - How do you reflect on your personal position in the peace process?
 - Is there something you feel that has not been covered in this interview that should be addressed/noted?

Appendix III – Interviewee Designation Table

Interviewee Designation	Ethnic Community	Sex
Respondent 1 (R1)	Greek Cypriot	Female
Respondent 2 (R2)	Turkish Cypriot	Male
Respondent 3 (R3)	Greek Cypriot	Female
Respondent 4 (R4)	Greek Cypriot	Female
Respondent 5 (R5)	Greek Cypriot	Male
Respondent 6 (R6)	Turkish Cypriot	Male
Respondent 7 (R7)	Greek Cypriot	Female
Respondent 8 (R8)	Greek Cypriot	Female
Respondent 9 (R9)	Greek Cypriot	Female
Respondent 10 (R10)	Greek Cypriot	Female
Respondent 11 (R11)	Turkish Cypriot	Male
11 interviewees total	GC:TC ratio 8:3	F:M ratio 7:4

Appendix IV – Code Report per Research Theme

(created with ATLAS.ti, Version 8)

Project: Interview 1-11

Report created by s4398033 on 19-1-2018

Codes Report – Grouped by: Code Groups

All (117) codes

Groupless (1 Codes)

- 6. Closing remarks

1. General Awareness (35 Codes)

- 1. General Awareness
- 1.1 General Feeling
- 1.1.1 General Feeling - Fairness
- 1.1.2 General Feeling - Inclusion
- 1.1.3 General Feeling - Personal Interest
- 1.1.4 General Feeling - Difficult issues
- 1.1.5 General Feeling - Appreciation mediation
- 1.1.6 General Feeling - Disappointment (leadership)
- 1.1.7 General Feeling - Evolution
- 1.1.8 General feeling - Progress/lack
- 1.1.9 General Feeling - Agreement was very close
- 1.2 International Mediation
- 1.2.1 Greece
- 1.2.1.1 Greece Development
- 1.2.2 Turkey
- 1.2.2.1 Turkish Development
- 1.2.3 United Nations
- 1.2.3.1 UN Development
- 1.2.4 European Union
- 1.2.4.1 EU development
- 1.2.5 United Kingdom
- 1.2.5.1 UK Development
- 1.2.6 Necessity of International mediation
- 1.2.6.1 Guarantorship
- 1.2.6.2 EU/rest of international community
- 1.3 General attitude on future after negotiations
- 1.3.1 Reasoning Attitude future
- 1.4 General urgency
- 1.4.1 General Urgency - Reasoning
- 1.5 Suggestions on improvement negotiations
- 1.6 Hope during negotiations
- 1.6.1 GC after crisis
- 1.7 Engagement per city correlation
- 1.8 Bicomunal events
- 1.8.1 Impact of events

2. Spoilers (6 Codes)

- 2. Spoilers
- 2.1 Spoilers - Identification
- 2.2 Spoilers - Methods
- 2.3 Spoilers - Goals & Reasoning

- 2.4 Spoilers - Development
- 2.5 Effect of Spoilers on prospect of solution

3. Intractability (35 Codes)

- 3. Intractability & Urgency
- 3.1 Opinion on solution
 - 3.1.1 Skepticism & Reasoning
 - 3.1.1.1 Upcoming Elections in south
 - 3.1.1.2 Lack of urgency in south
 - 3.1.1.3 Changing Demography
 - 3.1.1.4 Property Issue
 - 3.1.1.5 Stance of TRNC government
 - 3.1.1.6 Political developments in RoC
 - 3.1.1.7 Voting has little effect
 - 3.1.1.8 effect of status quo
 - 3.1.1.9 History Teaching & Education
 - 3.1.1.10 Referendum revenge
 - 3.1.1.11 Previous unfruitful attempts
 - 3.1.1.12 Mistrust towards own government
 - 3.1.1.13 Detrimental economic impact south
 - 3.1.2 Fairness & Reasoning
 - 3.1.2.1 Turkish governmental influence
 - 3.1.3 Optimism and reasoning
 - 3.1.3.1 Grassroots trust
 - 3.1.4 opposition to reunification
 - 3.1.4.1 normalization of invasion
- 3.2 Generational development
- 3.3 view of the other/mistrust
 - 3.3.1 Development of view of other
 - 3.3.2 Blame game
- 3.4 Influence of talks collapse
 - 3.4.1 Fatigue/uninterested/Cynical
 - 3.4.2 Trust
 - 3.4.3 Loss of expertise
 - 3.4.4 Favoring permanent division
- 3.5 General Necessity/Urgency of Solution
- 3.6 Threshold preference permanent division
 - 3.6.1 Effect of permanent division
- 3.7 Possibility of solution

4. Future Referendum/Reunification (8 Codes)

- 4. Future Referendum/Reunification
 - 4.1 General reunification stance
 - 4.1.1 Reasoning on stance
 - 4.1.1.1 Development Reasoning stance
 - 4.2 Benefits of agreement
 - 4.3 Threshold yes-vote
 - 4.3.1 Development threshold yes-vote
 - 4.4 Specifics of deal

5. CBMs (32 Codes)

- 5. CBMs
 - 5.1 CBM Themes own community
 - 5.1.1 mountain flag
 - 5.1.2 Cellular

- 5.1.3 Graves
- 5.1.4 fire
- 5.1.5 Car insurance
- 5.1.6 cellular
- 5.1.7 Common time zone
- 5.1.8 Varosha return
- 5.1.9 Famagusta Easter
- 5.1.10 Religious icons
- 5.2 CBM themes other community
- 5.2.1 Graves
- 5.2.2 Fire Brigades
- 5.2.3 Car insurance
- 5.2.4 Cellular coverage
- 5.2.5 Flag mountain
- 5.2.6 Common time zone
- 5.2.7 Varosha return
- 5.2.8 Religious icons
- 5.2.9 Famagusta Easter service
- 5.3 Feeling towards CBMs in general
- 5.3.1 reasoning of feelings
- 5.4 Trust implementation other side
- 5.5 efficacy of CBMs
- 5.6 CBM suggestions
- 5.6.1 Intercommunal activities
- 5.6.2 History teaching
- 5.6.3 Grassroots
- 5.7 CBM suggestion development
- 5.8 CBM Package suggestions

Appendix V – Saturation

INTERVIEW	New Codes	Cumulative Codes
R1	38	38
R2	32	70
R3	9	79
R4	19	98
R5	6	104
R6	4	108
R7	4	112
R8	2	114
R9	2	116
R10	1	117
R11	0	117

This table depicts the amount of new codes produced per Interviewee. The Column ‘*Cumulative Codes*’ shows how each interview contributes to the total of 117 codes. The slower rise at later interviews shows saturation of codes.

The two figures below depict this table graphically.

